


ROCKETSHIP EDUCATION:
AN EXPLORATORY PUBLIC POLICY CASE STUDY

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by
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Abstract

This dissertation is an exploratory case study of the finances of the Rocketship charter school chain, especially those related to real estate. Rocketship is a not-for-profit charter management organization, one of the first in Santa Clara County, California. This study seeks to determine if the financial transactions related to Rocketship charter schools yield profits for investors, despite Rocketship itself being a non-profit entity, and if they do, how and where do they do so. In order to characterize fairly and completely the profits of Rocketship Education itself and Rocketship-related entities, this study uses publicly available documents to track money flowing in and out of Rocketship and related entities, for example, the various Launchpad Development companies. Using data from initial and renewal charter petitions, annual budget documents, filings with county, state and federal government agencies, bond prospectuses, tax credit programs, state and federal grants, plus data from publicly available datasets, this study derives an estimate of Rocketship's profitability. It found that [Results TBD]. [Conclusion TBD]. These results, it is hoped, will serve to inform local, state, and federal legislatures when they establish public policy for charter schools, not only in California, but throughout the United States.

Keywords: Rocketship Education, charter management organization, privatization, charter finances, education public policy, profit, real estate, bonds, venture funds, philanthrocapitalism

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Abbreviations

ARUSD	Alum Rock Unified School District
BAN	Bond Anticipation Note
CAFR	Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
CDE	California Department Of Education
CMO	Charter School Management Organization
COE	County Office of Education
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease 2019
CPRA	California Public Records Act
CSBA	California School Boards Association
DOE	U.S. Department of Education
EC or Ed Code	Education Code of California
ECLS-K	Early Childhood Longitudinal Study – Kindergarten class of 1998 or 2011
EMO	Education Management Organization
FOIA	(federal) Freedom of Information Act
GO bond	General Obligation Bond
LASD	Los Altos School District
LCAP	Local Control and Accountability Plan
LCFF	Local Control Funding Formula
LEA	Local Education Agency
SACS	Standardized Account Code Structure
SARC	School Accountability Report Card
SARS-CoV-2	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus #2
SCCBOE	Santa Clara County Board of Education
SCCOE	Santa Clara County Office of Education
SCC	Santa Clara County
SEDA	Stanford Educational Data Archive
TPS	Traditional Public School
TRAN	Tax Revenue Anticipation Note

Glossary

ADA Average Daily Attendance, the method that the state of California uses to determine how many students are in a particular school. An alternative is to use the number of students enrolled, some of whom may attend sporadically but still need to be educated when they do attend.

arm's length transaction A transaction, usually financial, where all parties are independent and self-interested.

basic aid See “community funded”, the preferred term.

blended learning A method of teaching where both in-person instruction and virtual instruction are used.

charter school A quasi-private school that is publicly funded but privately run.

chartering authority A governmental entity that grants charter schools the authority to operate and which provides oversight. In California, a chartering authority could be a public school district, a county office of education, or the California Department of Education.

charter management organization (CMO) “A non-profit organization that operates or manages a network of charter schools (either through a contract or as the charter holder) linked by centralized support, operations, and oversight ((CA Dept of Education), 2021)”. A type of charter school chain.

charter school chain One or more individual charter schools owned by or operated by a parent organization, i.e. a charter management organization or a education management organization.

community funded In California, if the local property tax revenue of a public school district exceeds the state minimum educational guarantee under Prop. 98, that district is called “community funded” (formerly “basic aid”).

cream skimming When charter schools select the best students to admit.

cross-collateralization A term from bond financing which indicates that an asset has been used as collateral in two different obligations.

double bottom line grantors Grantors (philanthropies) which measure social impact in addition to fiscal performance.

education management organization (EMO) “A for-profit entity that operates or manages a network of charter schools (either through a contract or as the charter holder) linked by centralized support, operations, and oversight.” ((CA Dept of Education), 2021)

general obligation bonds (GO) General obligation bonds are tax-exempt bonds backed by an LEA's property revenues. State law limits bond debt to 2.5% of total assessed valuation for unified school district and 1.25% for elementary and high school districts.

parcel tax A property tax that is not based on the value of the property.

philanthrocapitalism Using a market capitalism approach in non-profits.

portfolio school district A collection of diverse charter schools managed as together.

property tax A tax based on the assessed value of a property.

Proposition 13 Passed by California voters in 2000 as a constitutional amendment, Prop. 13 devastated funding to local governments, including school districts by limiting the property tax to 1% of assess value and requiring a two-thirds majority to increase non-property taxes.

Proposition 39 Passed by California voters in 2000 as a constitutional amendment and state statute, Prop. 39 mandates that public school districts *must* provide reasonably equivalent facilities to charter schools if requested.

Proposition 98 Passed by California voters 1988 as a constitutional amendment and state statute, Prop. 98 mandated a minimum percentage of the state budget to be spent on K-14 education. The exact formula is complicated...

public school Public schools are funded by taxpayers and are governed by a publicly elected Board of Trustees. Unlike charter schools, public schools accept any and all students who wish to enroll, at any time of year, regardless of race, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, religion, citizenship, ability, disability, or language proficiency.

related party transaction A transaction, usually financial, where all parties are not independent or are self-interested, i.e. when the transaction is not an “arm's length transaction”. A synonym for “self-dealing”.

revenue bonds Tax-exempt bonds guaranteed by a schools revenue instead of by an LEA's property tax revenue.

school choice The umbrella term used by “education reformers” to put positive spin on the privatization of public education. Charter schools, school vouchers, and educational savings accounts are the most common forms of school choice.

socio-economic status A euphemism for wealth.

student pushout When charter schools push their lowest performing students out.

tax-exempt conduit bonds Bonds issued to make loans to entities other than state or local governments are known as “conduit bonds” or “conduit issues” and state or local governments that issue these bonds are known as “conduit issuers.” Conduit issuers (usually) ensure that the revenues of the charter school are sufficient to pay off the conduit bond with interest.

theory of action A logical chain of reasoning that explains what needs to happen to go from a particular (current) social state to another (future) social state.

trailer bills Legislative bills which implement and fund elements of California's enacted budget.

typical or neuro-typical children Children without special needs.

unduplicated pupils The State of California augments school district revenue on a per pupil basis for every pupil that qualifies for free or reduced price lunch, or is an English language learner, or is a foster youth, but only on an unduplicated basis. Notably, children with special needs are not considered *unduplicated pupils*. Neither are homeless children.

Introduction

If, in Harold Lasswell's words, politics is about who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1936), then education is surely one of the most consequential — and fascinating — of public policy issues. At stake is the future well-being of 56.4 million students on whose behalf federal, state, and local governments spend upwards of three quarters of a trillion dollars annually.¹ The number of stakeholders is huge: every parent and every child is a stakeholder, as are teachers, administrators, legislators, employees of fifty state departments of education, the federal Department of Education, the President of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court, and state and local courts. Stakeholders exist throughout the United States, in states, counties, cities, towns, villages, and in almost 100 thousand schools in thousands of school districts. The COVID-19 pandemic of the last 2+ years has revealed just how important public education is.

Education is the arena in which parents, legislators, unions, political parties, billionaires, technologists, scholars and educators clash, all vying for influence and reward. Education is where religion, politics, free market neoliberalism, and social justice intersect. One topic in particular has, in the last fifty years, generated a disproportionate share of discord: the privatization of public education, i.e. school choice.²

Formerly sleepy school board elections have attracted national interest, and with that interest, a flood of money. The 2020 Los Angeles school board election cost over \$14M for just four seats and generated articles in the national press. Likewise, a November 2016

¹The 50 states and the federal government spent \$734.9B in 2017–18. Using an inflation rate of 2%, spending for 2021–22 would be just shy of \$800B. (Author's estimate using data from "Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education: FY 18", NCES, 2020)

²"School choice" is an Orwellian name designed to mislead, to dress up an otherwise unpalatable reality: privatization takes something that used to be available to all and restricts it exclusively to those who can afford to pay.

1 statewide proposition in Massachusetts which sought to expand charter schools was
2 covered extensively by national newspapers with one advocacy group spending more
3 than \$15M (not including a \$425,000 fine for violating campaign law).³ Betsy DeVos, U.S.
4 Secretary of Education under the former President Donald Trump, drew fierce criticism
5 from the start of her tenure with her unwavering support of charter schools, criticism
6 which was endlessly reported on. In short, charter schools became nationally visible.

7 Schools and Charter Schools

8 Most schools in the United States are either traditional public school (TPS), charter
9 schools, or private schools, with one catchall category: alternative schools. Only two
10 states, Nebraska and North Dakota, have resisted all forms of school choice; all states
11 have private schools and an extensive public school system. By definition, school choice
12 encompasses charter, private, magnet, and homeschooling, i.e. every kind of school
13 traditional except public schools. But, because school vouchers in particular are
14 becoming more common, school choice now increasingly refers to school vouchers in
15 addition to charter schools (Enlow, 2022).

16 Schools, under this definition of school choice, take a number of forms: they can, like
17 TPSs be in-person, but unlike TPSs, they can also be completely online (virtual), or even a
18 blend of virtual and in-person. How school choice is financed varies as well. School
19 vouchers, various types of tax-credits, savings accounts, and tax deductions, have all
20 been used, often augmented by tax dollars. The phrase “school choice” is also associated
21 with 529 savings accounts, student income loans, social impact bonds, and
22 philanthrocapitalism⁴.

³Details of the financing of the Great Schools Massachusetts 2016 ballot committee are spelled out in Cunningham (2021).

⁴The use of a market-based approach in philanthropy

1 Regardless of how school choice is financed, school choice complicates what used to
2 be a system of mostly public schools plus a few private schools that had been in place for
3 over 150 years. This new kind of financing has raised some fundamental questions: Who
4 benefits from this new financing? Do the children for whom education is the difference
5 between being poor and flourishing benefit? Is education is being turned into a low-risk,
6 profitable investment for hedge funds, private equity firms, investment banks, and the
7 one percent?

8 The various forms of school choice have waxed and waned, but charter schools were
9 present at the creation of the privatization movement in education and have continued
10 to enroll more and more students, diverting more and more dollars out of the public
11 school system (Lafer, 2017a; Lafer, 2018; Lafer et al., 2021). School choice has spawned an
12 entire industry devoted to marketing school choice: academic departments and
13 institutions, educational associations, think tanks, astroturf⁵ advocacy groups, and
14 political action committees, all of which are examples of the marketing of the
15 privatization of public education.

16 According to the National Center of Education Statistics in the U.S. Department of
17 Education, there were 7,547 elementary and secondary charter schools in the United
18 States enrolling 3,431,230 students in 2019–20 school year (de Brey et al., 2022, Table
19 216.90, p.144). This represents 7.7% of the total number of elementary and secondary
20 schools and 6.8% of the total number of students in the United States. The state with the
21 greatest charter school presence was California which had 1,321 schools (12.7% of the
22 total) and 674,652 students (11.0%). Within California, in the 2019–20 school year, charter
23 schools in Santa Clara County enrolled 31,584 students (13.6% out of 231,865) (California
24 Department of Education, n.d.).

⁵Wordnik definition: “The disguising of an orchestrated campaign as a “grass-roots” event – i.e., a spontaneous upwelling of public opinion.”

1 These are notable patterns, and the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the growth
2 of charter schools, in contrast to the small decline of recent years. However, this recent
3 growth appears to be almost completely due to the expansion of virtual charter schools
4 (Strauss, 2021). Despite continued growth, charter schools remain controversial and have
5 generated heated debate. Reports and studies from charter school opponents have been
6 answered by reports and studies from charter school advocates. Both sides claim their
7 methodology to be superior and consider the other side's fatally flawed.⁶

8 What the research indicates – again and again – is that *some* charter schools, under
9 *some* circumstances, for *some* students, seem to do *somewhat* better than traditional
10 public schools. Garcia notes that charter schools start out doing somewhat worse than
11 public schools, but improve over time, with “no discernible difference” (Garcia, 2018,
12 p. 119) after about five years of operation.

13 On the other hand, the Lubienskis showed after careful and thorough statistical
14 analysis in (Lubienski & Lubienski, 2014) that public schools out perform charter schools.
15 The Lubienskis used restricted-access 2003 NAEP data from just shy of 300,000 students
16 in 4th and 8th in 6041 schools throughout the United States, plus data from the Early
17 Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten (ECLS-K 98) class of 1998-99. ⁷ So, based on
18 the Lubienski's analyses, there is no evidence that, on the whole, charter schools are
19 superior to traditional public schools in academic performance. Rather, at best, they
20 perform, on average, similarly.

21 If charter schools are on average no better than public schools, why are they so

⁶Jeffery Henig in his book *Spin Cycle: How Research is Used in Policy Debates: The Case of Charter Schools* (J. Henig, 2009), offers a detailed examination of the war of words that resulted from just one report and one newspaper article.

⁷The Lubienskis were exceedingly thorough in their statistical analysis and devote over 80 pages in Lubienski and Lubienski (2014) to the details of their two-level hierarchical linear mode (three level for the ECLS-K 98 data). Their data is available from the National Center for Educational Statistics to qualified researchers, so their analysis can be replicated.

1 fervently touted as the answer to the perceived ills of American public education? Why
2 are eye-popping sums (10× the usual amounts) spent supporting public school board
3 candidates who favor charter schools? Why are charter schools still growing in both
4 enrollment and in number? Is the profit motive is the overriding goal of charter schools,
5 or are they instead driven by a genuine desire to improve the educational outcomes of the
6 very children who could most benefit from a quality education? My goal in this
7 dissertation is to offer some answers to questions like these by examining in detail the
8 finances and financial structure of a single charter school chain, Rocketship Education,
9 and entities associated with it.

10 I will use the term *charter school chain* to refer both to for-profit and non-profit
11 organizations that manage more than one charter school since both take both financial
12 and operational control away from schools and centralize it outside of schools, much like
13 public schools are part of a public school district. Charter school chains are essentially
14 franchise operations like McDonald's or Hertz, but in education instead of hamburgers
15 or rental cars. For-profit charter school chains have traditionally been called *educational*
16 *management organizations (EMOs)* and non-profit charter school chains *charter management*
17 *organizations*, but since there is little difference between the two, I will use *charter school*
18 *chains* when the distinction is unimportant.

19 The remainder of this chapter provides some context for why I conducted this study.
20 The chapter *A Review of the Literature* discusses the extensive literature on charter schools.
21 The following chapter, *Research Design and Methodology*, details what data will be collected,
22 how it will be collected, and how it will be analyzed. The chapter *Findings and Results*
23 provides the results of analyzing that data in context of this study's research questions.
24 The last chapter, *Discussion* considers the limitations and public policy implications of my
25 study and its conclusions. Finally, it makes some suggestions for how current public
26 policy should be changed to achieve some of the seven goals that the California

1 Legislature set out in *The Charter School Act of 1992*.

2 What is the Purpose of this Study?

3 The goal of this case study is to analyze as carefully and fully as possible the finances of
4 Rocketship Education and of associated entities, concentrating on its real estate dealings.
5 Why real estate? The non-real estate finances of charter schools — at least in California
6 — are similar to public schools. Both use the same state mandated accounting structure
7 because both have very similar needs. Although a charter school may pay more for this or
8 less for that, fundamentally the revenues and expenses of charter schools are similar to
9 that of TPSs. But when facilities, i.e. real estate, enters the picture, much greater sums
10 are at stake. A single transaction might be in the range of tens of millions of dollars.

11 This study concentrates on Rocketship Education⁸ because its popularity has led to
12 core aspects of its model being adopted by other charter school chains such as the Caliber
13 Public Schools or the Navigator Schools, both in California. It is an exemplar of a popular
14 charter school and has had an outsized influence on public education in Santa Clara
15 County.

16 This study seeks to determine if Rocketship Education is profitable and if it is, how
17 are its profits generated. Are the entities related to Rocketship Education the generators
18 of profit, or is Rocketship Education itself the primary source of profit? Furthermore, if
19 the model that Rocketship Education uses does generate profits, can that model be used
20 by other charter school operators within and outside of California? Many studies have
21 examined the educational outcomes of charter schools and of charter chains, including

⁸A note on names: Rocketship Public Schools is name that Rocketship Education is doing business as starting in June 2020, but since it has been known as Rocketship Education for much longer than it has been as Rocketship Public Schools, this study uses (mostly) the former name. Also, this study uses just Rocketship to refer to Rocketship Education and related entities, such as the various Launchpad Development LLCs that are associated with individual schools.

1 one specifically on Rocketship's effect on Milwaukee's public schools had proposed
2 legislation passed, but Rocketship's finances, as a whole, have not been studied in detail.

3 It should be noted that this study will not examine the educational outcomes of
4 Rocketship. All charter schools offer themselves as better alternatives to traditional
5 public schools. Rocketship, for example, claims that its pedagogical model of blended
6 learning

- 7 • is more efficient than that of traditional public schools,
- 8 • offers personalized learning⁹ through computer-mediated instruction, and
- 9 • yet still offers a human connection (at least part of the time) that is similar to
10 traditional public schools.

11 These claims can and should be tested in other studies by comparing individual
12 Rocketship schools to independent charter schools and to TPSs in the same district. The
13 Rocketship chain may be compared to other charter school management organizations,
14 to portfolios of charter schools, as well as to traditional public school districts, but such
15 studies need to be done with care to avoid methodological errors that would reduce the
16 validity of their conclusions.

17 *Research Question*

18 These questions and themes lead to the following research question: Has Rocketship
19 structured itself and related entities to earn a return to investors, and if so, how? In order
20 to answer this research question definitively, this study must be as complete as possible,
21 and that entails understanding the finances of public schools in California, those of
22 charter schools in California, and finally, those of Rocketship Education and related
23 entities.

⁹Note that personalized learning is not the same differentiated instruction. All students follow the same path with personalized learning, albeit at different rates, instead of following different paths at different rates, as with properly implemented differentiated instruction.

1 More broadly, there are additional reasons for studying charter school finances. Are
2 we (the states, the federal government) misallocating the money we spend on charter
3 schools? Could we be spending our tax dollars more wisely? What did taxpayers get for
4 these expenditures? These questions, however interesting and appealing they may be, are
5 beyond the scope of this study and remain for future researchers to explore.

6 This case study is unique in that it examines in depth the finances of a single charter
7 school chain. There have been studies of the finances of aggregations of charter school
8 chains (e.g., all known charter school chains in the United States,¹⁰ or a selected group of
9 charter school chains). Other studies have explored the effects of charter schools on
10 segregation or academic achievement, or the financial impact of charter schools on their
11 surrounding public school district. But academic studies of the finances of just a single
12 charter school chain seem to be missing.¹¹ It is hoped that the lessons learned from this
13 case study will be used by policy makers to strengthen charter school law in California
14 and elsewhere in order to increase desired outcomes and to minimize cost and
15 unintended consequences.

16 As tempting and as important as it might be, this dissertation will not examine the
17 academic outcomes of Rocketship or of other charter schools. This dissertation will
18 restrict itself to the finances of those schools. Much excellent work has already been done
19 evaluating charter school outcomes. Section 2 discusses four surveys of charter school
20 research and one overview book.

21 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

¹⁰See Miron et al. (2021) for a list of currently known charter school chains.

¹¹I distinguish between academic studies and criminal investigations. Clearly, the grand jury indictment of 11 persons associated with A3 Education was a study of a single charter school chain, but it was a criminal investigation, not an academic study.

1 According to Grant and Osanloo (2014), creating and understanding the theoretical
2 framework for one's dissertation is "one of the most important aspects in the research
3 process." (p.12) They liken the theoretical framework of a dissertation to the blueprints
4 that define a house. That framework both defines the organization and the structure of a
5 dissertation, as well as what counts as elements and their relationships. A theoretical
6 framework articulates "the researcher's understanding of how the research problem will
7 best be explored, the specific direction the research will have to take, and the relationship
8 between the different variables in the study." (Grant & Osanloo, 2014, pp. 16–17)

9 Further, a "conceptual framework offers a logical structure of connected concepts
10 that help provide a picture or visual display of how ideas in a study relate to one another
11 within the theoretical framework" (Grant & Osanloo, 2014, pp. 16–17). This dissertation
12 uses a case study approach as its theoretical framework within a public policy
13 framework, its conceptual framework.

14 *Public Policy as a Theoretical Framework*

15 A public policy framework provides a rich set of tools and techniques with which to
16 analyze Rocketship's finances. Three factors support using a public policy framework to
17 guide understanding and evaluating Rocketship's finances. First, charter school finance
18 is constrained primarily by public policies set by state legislatures, the creators of charter
19 schools. These laws regulate taxes, grants, borrowing capacity, and reporting
20 requirements of charter schools and charter school chains (Aguinaldo et al., 2020), and
21 by definition, whatever falls within the purview of legislators is public policy. Second,
22 Brighthouse et al. (2018), in *Educational Goods*, provide a succinct definition of what public
23 policy analysis is which matches the purpose of undertaking this case study. They use a
24 values, evidence, and decision-making framework "to make judgments about how well
25 specific policies are likely to realize valued outcomes" (Brighthouse et al., 2018, p.1). Last,

1 these three concerns — values, evidence, decision-making — are considered the key
2 concerns by academics and researchers in the public policy field (Bueno de Mesquita,
3 2016; Clemons & McBeth, 2021; Fowler, 2013; Gupta, 2011). Using a public policy
4 framework is appropriate when examining charter school finances.

5 The discipline of public policy sanctions a wide variety of tools and techniques when
6 analyzing issues. (These tools and techniques will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3 or
7 in Chapter ch:results if and when they are used.) Public policy has been studied for years
8 (there are public policy departments in many universities) and it is a mature area of
9 academic research. As in most academic fields, there are fierce debates about the merits
10 and robustness of a particular approach compared to alternatives, but at a high level,
11 what to do is generally agreed upon. Most identify the following five steps (or variants
12 thereof) that are used when creating public policy:

- 13 1. Define the issues and set the agenda.
- 14 2. Formulate one or more policies that address the issues identified.
- 15 3. Evaluate those policies using tools and techniques like cost-benefit analysis, value
16 analysis, political feasibility, game theory, and economic analysis.
- 17 4. Implement those policies by passing legislation, changing practices, or by using
18 the courts.
- 19 5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the policy changes.

20 Two keys to identifying alternatives during policy formation and later when
21 evaluating consequences are choosing or creating a model, and forecasting. Models
22 identify what is going to be studied and their relationships, and forecasting is a
23 prediction of the future whose consequences are (hopefully) identified in a model. Page
24 (2018) lists 26 major models that have been used in science, business, and medicine.

25 The methodology of this dissertation draws on two excellent guides to public policy,
26 Clemons and McBeth (2021) and Gupta (2011). The first presents concepts, tools, and

1 techniques used in analyzing public policy; the second a case study approach to public
2 policy analysis. Fowler (2013) treats public policy in the field of education, but with an
3 emphasis on power, politics, policy actors and the messy process of creating and
4 implementing public policy. Clemons and McBeth concentrate on explicating different
5 theoretical approaches to public policy, whereas Gupta is the most practically oriented.

6 Since much of the evidence that will be presented will include financial data, the tools
7 and techniques which manipulate and display data play an important role. First and
8 foremost is statistical analysis. But, as Epple et al. (2016) show in Chapter 2, being clear
9 on what exactly is being analyzed and what are the inherent limitations of that data is
10 fundamental. It makes no sense to analyze brilliantly the wrong data or to stretch the
11 data beyond its limit.

12 *A Case Study Approach as a Conceptual Framework*

13 Broadly, social science research falls into one of two categories. The research may
14 make many observations with a narrow focus, or may instead adopt a broader focus, but
15 with a correspondingly smaller number of observations. Gerring calls these “large C” or
16 “small C” studies, respectively (Gerring, 2017, p. xvii). Of course, the boundary between
17 large C and small C studies is not sharply defined.

18 Gerring calls small C studies *case studies*. In this dissertation I study only one entity,
19 Rocketship Education, and only one aspect of that entity, namely Rocketship’s finances.
20 But I consider the topic of Rocketship’s finances look at its finances broadly, examining
21 as many different kinds of financial transactions as are publicly available for the subset of
22 Rocketship schools that are in Santa Clara County. I discuss the elements of what makes
23 a case study a good case study in Chapter 5, *Discussion*.

24 McCombes (2019) says that case studies are a “detailed study of a specific subject,
25 such as a person, group, place, event, organization, or phenomenon”. They are ‘good for

1 describing, comparing, evaluating and understanding different aspects of a research
2 problem” and are “an appropriate research design when it allows you to explore the key
3 characteristics, meanings, and implications of the case.” Two papers go into detail about
4 using the case study approach: Crowe et al. (2011) and Rashid et al. (2019). Yin (2018)
5 provides a detailed methodology for doing case study research well.

6 A case study framework for public policy research is ideal because the theory and
7 practice of case studies is well-known and has been used both for public policy research
8 and in public policy analysis for years. A case study framework formalizes an in-depth
9 examination of a single topic, in this case, the finances of Rocketship Education and
10 related entities.

11 This introduction has made the case that public education is important to many
12 stakeholders, but that there is also discord around larger issues like values, ideology, and
13 implementation. Charter schools have been offered as way of disrupting American public
14 education from its hide-bound, archaic, and sclerotic present, driving it, despite
15 opposition, into a dynamic future where education is tailored to each child’s real needs.
16 Establishing whether financial gain plays a key or even a primary role in American
17 educational reform by carefully examining Rocketship’s finances is both timely and
18 important: Rocketship Education is growing, and with it, Launchpad Development. They
19 have served as a model for other charter school chains in the United States.

A Review of the Literature

This chapter reviews what other researchers and scholars have said about the origins of charter schools, their history, and their ostensible goals before characterizing first the finances of all public schools in California and then the unique aspects of charter school finance. Finally, it reviews the history of Rocketship Education.

American public education has – allegedly – been a failure, at least “[a]ccording to highly publicized NAEP results in the mid 1980s” (Gove & Meier, 2000). Berliner and Glass (2014) in *50 Myths & Lies That Threaten America’s Public Schools* refute those myths which have been advanced to show that American’s schools are in a crisis, and hence, in desperate need of reform. It turns out, this urge for reform has a long history: America’s schools have judged as needing reform ever since the idea of free public education took hold in the early 1800s.¹² Since then, a succession of educators and reports have documented the abysmal [sic] state of American education.

The Birth of American Public Education

Prior to the Civil War, Horace Mann introduced widely copied reforms (Pulliam & Van Patten, 2007) into the existing system of education which was then not free, not open to all, and not compulsory. Those schools had hardly changed since the founding of the Boston Latin School on April 23, 1635. In the early 1900s, John Dewey, an educational leader of the Progressive Era (1896–1916) preached reform, but it was not until the publication of *Nation at Risk* in 1983 that the modern zeal for education reform took form. *Nation at Risk* was the most influential of roughly 30 major education reform reports listed by Pulliam and Van Patten (2007) starting in 1982 and continuing up until 2005.

¹²Wikipedia has an excellent summary article on *Education in the United States* available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_the_United_States.

1 That American public education needed reform was repeated constantly, mainly by
2 conservatives, despite underwhelming evidence of its veracity and substantial evidence
3 to the contrary. Through constant repetition, the need for reform has become accepted
4 wisdom. The answer to this need was to take the government's "monopoly in education"
5 (Milton Friedman's characterization) out of the hands of faceless bureaucrats and subject
6 it to the rigors of free markets which would, it was asserted with scant evidence and with
7 the complete absence of a theory of action, increase efficiency, choice, and quality. Thus
8 vouchers and charter schools were legitimized.

9 No amount of research, it seems, can dispel the *idée fixe* that American education is in
10 dire straits, and further, piecemeal changes were simply not enough to make substantive
11 changes. No matter what J. R. Henig (1994) or Berliner and Biddle (1997) or Nichols et al.
12 (2007) or Glass (2008) or Berliner and Glass (2014) wrote, the idea that American
13 education needed fundamental, pervasive reform persisted; education reform was an
14 evidence-free endeavor.

15 Garcia writes in *School Choice*

16 The four primary arguments put forth in support of school choice are the
17 elimination of government bureaucracies, the interjection of competition
18 into education through market forces, the promotion of parental choice as
19 the most granular form of local control, and school choice as the "new" civil
20 rights issue of our time.¹³ (Garcia, 2018, p. 55)

21 .
22 What is noteworthy is that none of the four arguments are about student achievement or
23 attainment. A poorly staffed, badly run, charter school located in a dangerous
24 neighborhood is as capable of satisfying the four requirements as is a high quality

¹³Lest Garcia be tarred as anti-school choice, thereby justifying ignoring his research, Garcia is merely following Anatol Rapoport's Rules for Constructive Criticism, the first of which is to restate the argument of the person you are criticizing better than they themselves have done. See Daniel Dennett's succinct summary of "Rapoport's Rules" on Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogerian_argument%23Rapoport's_rules.

1 charter school. Whatever school choice is about, it's not about students and how well
2 they are doing.

3 To be clear, it is not the case that every American school is a model for the rest of the
4 world: systematic, persistent, pervasive inequities and injustices abound and have been
5 powerfully written about in Kozol (1992) and again in Kozol (2005), Valenzuela (1999),
6 Heitzeg (2009), and Roithmayr (2014). The Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) concluded
7 that ten years after *Brown v. Board of Education*, American schools were still segregated and
8 were still unequal. Surprisingly and contrary to the expectations of many, the report laid
9 most of the blame for unequal educational outcomes on systematic, persistent, pervasive
10 inequalities and injustices outside of schools. The report said,

11 Taking all these results together, one implication stands out above all: That
12 schools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is
13 independent of his background and general social context; and that this very
14 lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on
15 children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried
16 along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the
17 end of school. For equality of educational opportunity through the schools
18 must imply a strong effect of schools that is independent of the child's
19 immediate social environment, and that strong independent effect is not
20 present in American schools. (Coleman, 1966, p. 325)

21 The report concluded that family background, the socioeconomic background of a
22 school, and a student's sense that they were in control of their lives were more important
23 than race-based disparities in explaining the black-white achievement gap (Pearce, 2016).

24 Downey (2020), using two ECLS-K studies, 1998 and 2011, supports this conclusion
25 but in a slightly different way. He finds that academic inequality is reduced when
26 children are in school, and increases when children are not in school, i.e. during the
27 summer, which runs counter to the notion that schools exacerbate the achievement gap.

28 None of this should be a surprise because it is also clear that those schools have been

1 systematically underfunded for decades; their dismal performance is more likely the
2 result of the poverty of their neighborhoods and their lack of funding than it is the other
3 way around. For example, the California School Boards Association's (CSBA) Education
4 Legal Alliance Adequacy Committee found that there exists a "substantial gap in funding
5 between what K-12 education [in California] receives and what K-12 education needs even
6 to meet the standards prescribed by the state (Bray, 2015, *iii*). B. D. Baker et al. (2018) in
7 their aptly titled report *The Real Shame of the Nation*, develop a *National Education Cost Model*
8 (B. D. Baker et al., 2018) which accounts for regional cost differences as well different
9 funding levels to show that inadequate funding is present throughout the United States.
10 Garcia (2018) says in *School Choice* that the "existence and importance of the issues that
11 reformers believe plague public education are based as much on tradition and reputation
12 as they are on tangible research evidence" (Garcia, 2018, p. 54). Finally, and tellingly,
13 grossly inadequate funding is a characteristic of communities that are racially
14 segregated and which are not white (Darling-Hammond, 2012; Rothstein, 2017).

15 J. R. Henig (1994)'s book, *Rethinking School Choice*, which came out a mere three years
16 after the passage of the nation's first state charter school law in Minnesota¹⁴ and two
17 years after the second in California¹⁵ lays out a key argument against charter schools.
18 Henig says, "[T]he real danger in the market-based choice proposals is not that they
19 might allow some students to attend privately run schools at public expense, but that *they*
20 *will erode the public forums in which decisions with societal consequences can democratically be*
21 *resolved.*" (emphasis added) (J. R. Henig, 1994, *xiii*). Translated, this means that the
22 decisions about public education's form and content are not going to be made by parents
23 and teachers, but by people who do not have a stake in the outcome. It is now a matter of
24 badly misaligned incentives.

¹⁴Laws of Minnesota 1991, chapter 265, article 9, section 3

¹⁵Education Code, Title 2, Division 4 Part 26.8, §47600 *et. seq*

1 But even before that, in 1982, Earl Craig, Jr. attached a minority report to *Rebuilding*
2 *Education to Make It Work* which advocated for vouchers. He says in a paragraph that is as
3 accurate today, forty years later, as it was in 1982:

4 In conclusion, this report is part of a national movement toward
5 privatization of public services and responsibilities. I believe this movement
6 will have the eventual result of a complete retreat by this society from a
7 societal responsibility for the powerless who are difficult or expensive to
8 educate, house, protect, etc. I believe the committee and board majority
9 when they say that they are committed to equal access and equity. They say,
10 trust that we will do the right thing. I do trust them, I do not trust the
11 societal momentum of which vouchers is a part. It is a very destructive wave
12 that has caught up many good people. It scares me to death. (Citizens
13 League, Education Alternatives Committee, 1982, p. 48)

14 The belief that that American schools were in crisis due to poor academic outcomes,
15 sclerotic teachers resistant to change, ineffective and bureaucratic administrators more
16 concerned with job safety than educating children is simply not supported by the
17 evidence. But the idea that American schools are in crisis has been relentlessly promoted,
18 and sheer repetition has turned fiction turned into fact, and this “manufactured crisis”,
19 to use David Berliner and Bruce Biddle’s turn of phrase (Berliner & Biddle, 1997), has been
20 used to justify school choice in the form of vouchers and charter schools. But charter
21 schools didn’t actually take off until “education reformers across party lines realized that
22 charter school laws could be crafted in ways that made it possible to open nonunion
23 public schools, or even allow public schools to be managed by for-profit companies”
24 (Goldstein, 2015, p. 172).

25 This literature review will first examine charter schools, their origins and the early
26 research, before reviewing the types of charters which exist. It then examines the various
27 models of charter schools such as virtual charter schools, charters which use blended
28 learning, and charter management organizations before taking a closer look charter

1 schools in Santa Clara County and in Rocketship in particular. It ends with a
2 consideration of the finances and financing of charter schools.

3 A History of Charter Schools

4 Charter schools (privately run, but publicly financed schools) have an ugly racist
5 origin in the post-*Brown v Board of Education* era as a method of evading the U.S. Supreme
6 Court's mandate to educate both black and white Americans equally and not separately.
7 Fifty years later, charter schools turned segregation academies into the preferred vehicle
8 for privatizing public schools for profit while maintaining segregation.

9 *The Origins of Charter Schools in Segregation*

10 The first charter schools were not founded for educational or economic reasons.
11 Charter schools had their origin in the aftermath of "*Brown v. Board of Education*". "[*Brown*]
12 was the genesis of school choice as a public policy mechanism." (Garcia, 2018, p. 8) In the
13 Deep South, academies sprung up as part of the massive resistance to the U.S. Supreme
14 Court's unanimous 1954 ruling which answered the question,

15 Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
16 even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal,
17 deprive children of the minority group of equal educational
18 opportunities? (Warren, 1954, p. 9)

19 with "We believe that it does." (p.9)

20 In order to circumvent *Brown*, white parents in eleven states formed thousands of
21 private schools, and until the early 1970's, these segregation academies received public
22 funds (Rooks, 2017). These origins of charter schools have been amply documented, in
23 Frankenberg et al. (2010), Frankenberg et al. (2011), and especially in Suitts (2019) and
24 Suitts (2020). Alexander in *The New Jim Crow* quotes Rosenberg (1991, p. 52) "The statistics

1 from the Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954–1964, virtually *nothing*
2 *happened*.” [emphasis in (Alexander, 2011, p. 223)] She goes on to say,

3 Not a single black child attended an integrated public grade school in South
4 Carolina, Alabama, or Mississippi as of the 1962–1963 school year. Across the
5 South as a whole, a mere 1 percent of black school children were attending
6 school with whites in 1964—a full decade after *Brown* was decided.

7 In the years after *Brown*, some localities went further than merely forming
8 segregation academies. Prince Edward County in Virginia closed all of its schools for five
9 years rather than integrate. Other jurisdictions closed pools, parks, zoos, and
10 recreational facilities instead of integrating. This deliberate evasion of racial equality
11 continued until a 1968 Supreme Court ruling put a stop to the practice of closing public
12 facilities to avoid integrating them (Brennan, 1968).

13 The irony is that while charter schools started life as 100% white, they now serve
14 intensely segregated students of color. Frankenberg et al. (2019) noted that,

15 Nearly three out of four students in the typical black student’s charter school
16 are also black. This indicates extremely high levels of isolation, particularly
17 given the fact that black students comprise less than one-third of charter
18 students. Latino isolation is also high, but not as severe as for blacks or
19 whites across all charter schools. (p. 47)

20 Unfortunately, these segregation academies still exist, but instead of excluding
21 children of color the way segregation academies did, they disproportionately target and
22 enroll children of color. While these schools are no longer referred to as segregation
23 academies, they make up a sizable subset of charter schools and often include the word
24 “Academy” in their name. In Santa Clara County, for example, 11 out of 21 charter schools
25 authorized by the county currently include “Academy” in their name (SCCOE, 2021).

26 Nikole Hannah-Jones, in her keynote speech at the Network for Public Education’s
27 Fourth Annual Conference, said that it has never been the case that a majority of

1 African-Americans have attended majority white schools (“Keynote at the Network for
2 Public Education’s 4th Annual Conference,” 2017). She then added ruefully, that this was
3 quite a feat considering that African-Americans make up roughly one seventh of the
4 population of the United States. Orfield and Frankenberg note that the percent of
5 African-Americans in majority white schools rose from 0% in 1954 to a peak of 43.5% in
6 1988 before steadily declining to 23.2% in 2011. (Table 3: Percent of Black Students in
7 Majority White Schools, 1954–2011, Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014, p. 10). Hannah-Jones
8 also commented that American public education doesn’t even live up to the Separate but
9 Equal doctrine espoused in *Plessy v Ferguson* and overturned by *Brown v Board of Education*.
10 More recently, Heilig et al. made the same point using 2015–16 Common Core of Data.
11 They say, “Nationally, we find that higher percentages of charter students of every race
12 attend intensely segregated schools.” (Heilig et al., 2019, p. 205). This segregation has an
13 effect on the achievement of the students thus segregated: it makes the “achievement
14 gap” worse.

15 Racial segregation is strongly associated with racial achievement gaps, and
16 the racial difference in the proportion of students’ schoolmates who are poor
17 is the key dimension of segregation driving this association. (Reardon,
18 2016, p. 47)

19 Charter Schools, Free Markets and Privatization

20 Just a year after *Brown*, Friedman (1955) published his article “The Role of Government
21 in Education” in *Economics and the Public Interest* (Friedman, 1955) that reframed charter
22 schools as an economic problem in education instead as a way of evading court-ordered
23 integration. That paper ensured that charter schools would no longer be morally tainted
24 by their association with virulent racism, but rather would take on the honorable task of

1 breaking up what was called a monopoly. Charters, operating in a free market¹⁶, would
2 allow parents to choose the best alternative from an array of competing choices. Tellingly
3 left unspecified was exactly how the free market would ensure that the array of competing
4 choices actually offered valuable educational alternatives rather than mere alternatives.

5 In 1981, Ronald Reagan ran and became President of the United States based on a
6 platform of less government is better government. This platform included eliminating
7 the U.S. Department of Education (“The Republican Party Platform of 1980,” 1980). True,
8 eliminating the Department of Education is not the same as shutting down an entire
9 school district the way white parents did in 1964, but the thought is there. Haney-López
10 (2014) expertly dissects how it’s possible to voice racist thoughts without actually using
11 racial words, a practice perfected by President Ronald Reagan (Haney-López, 2014).

12 Now, only liberty and freedom matter, in education, as in other fields. It’s school
13 choice or bust; school choice is proffered not only as *the* panacea for all that ails America’s
14 schools, but it is even touted as the morally right thing to do. Without a trace of irony, the
15 former President Donald Trump framed school choice as the “civil rights issue of our
16 time” in a garbled statement at the signing of an executive order on Safe Policing for Safe
17 Communities:

18 School choice is the civil rights statement of the year, the decade and
19 probably beyond. Because all children have to have access to quality
20 education. A child’s zip code in America should never determine their future.

21 (as quoted in Lennox, 2020)

22 Education reformers have latched on to the notion that schools need to be privatized
23 and freed from bureaucratic control for reasons of efficiency, increased flexibility, and
24 accountability (Garcia, 2018). This claim is made despite educational management

¹⁶No one really wants a free market because a market completely free of regulation would have unenforceable contracts, rampant monopolies, and constant and ruinous market failures. What people really want when they use the phrase “free market” is a heavily regulated market which allows them to profit, unfettered, while restraining or excluding others.

1 organizations (EMOs) themselves being high overhead, opaque bureaucracies with scant
2 accountability.

3 B. Baker and Miron identified four major policy concerns with the privatization of
4 public education:

- 5 1. A substantial share of public expenditure intended for the delivery of
6 direct educational services to children is being extracted inadvertently or
7 intentionally for personal or business financial gain, creating substantial
8 inefficiencies;
- 9 2. Public assets are being unnecessarily transferred to private hands, at
10 public expense, risking the future provision of “public” education;
- 11 3. Charter school operators are growing highly endogenous, self-serving
12 private entities built on funds derived from lucrative management fees
13 and rent extraction which further compromise the future provision of
14 “public” education; and
- 15 4. Current disclosure requirements make it unlikely that any related legal
16 violations, ethical concerns, or merely bad policies and practices are not
17 realized until clever investigative reporting, whistleblowers or litigation
18 brings them to light.

19 (B. Baker & Miron, 2015, p. 3)

20 In California at least, these policy concerns have not been addressed in the six years
21 since B. Baker and Miron wrote about them¹⁷.

22 Charter schools are now just one of the many forms of *privatization*, when public
23 functions are performed by private parties for profit. Privatization is a manifestation of
24 the corporate takeover of the world, first documented more than fifty years ago by
25 Domhoff and elaborated on in seven subsequent editions. Domhoff argues that
26 corporations and the corporate elite really run the United States, and by extension, the

¹⁷Changes in policy to address some of these concerns have been strenuously opposed by charter school advocates. For example, the California Charter Schools Association opposed an accountability bill, AB1316 *School accountability: financial and performance audits: charter schools: contracts*. (2021–2022), which merely sought to make charter school finances more transparent.

1 world. Kahn and Minnich (2005) make much the same point in their book *The Fox in the*
2 *Henhouse: How Privatization Threatens Democracy* (Kahn & Minnich, 2005). They list
3 “[s]chools, prisons, welfare, Social Security, water and sewer systems, buses, trains,
4 subways, highways, waterways, sanitation systems” (p. 30) as examples of formerly
5 government run functions that are in whole or part privatized. They could have also
6 listed postal mail, space travel, and now every facet of education, as being wholly or
7 partly privatized. Cohen and Mikaelian (2021) lay out in detail how privatization has
8 infiltrated American life and the consequences of this takeover of public goods by private
9 firms run for profit (Cohen & Mikaelian, 2021). *Black in Schoolhouse Burning* (Black, 2020)
10 focuses on the less tangible but arguably more important consequences of privatization
11 of public schools, the loss of democratic control.

12 Privatizers make money by turning goods or services that used to be publicly
13 available into private goods and services that must be paid for before they can be used.
14 The canonical example of privatization is the enclosure of the commons in Britain in the
15 16th and 17th centuries whereby land that previously had been owned collectively by a
16 village was now owned by an individual who charged villagers for the privilege of using
17 that land (Simon Fairlie, 2009). But modern privatizers have many more ways of turning
18 a profit. They can:

- 19 • Obtain tax benefits
- 20 • Invest in other firms with public monies
- 21 • Invest in financial instruments with public monies
- 22 • Obtain a monopoly
- 23 • Engage in fraud, corruption, or outright theft
- 24 • Engage in self-dealing
- 25 • Obtain grants or loans on favorable terms
- 26 • Sell what doesn't belong to them

- Avoid paying for externalities
- Pay below market rates for goods or services
- Skew public-private partnerships to create unearned profits
- Engage in pay-for-success contracts
- Offer social impact bonds

Charter school operators have even more options. They can inflate enrollment, charge excessive management fees, mis-characterize expenses, omit or inaccurately report financial data, fail to open a school or close one soon after receiving a grant, or sell their facilities to investors and lease them back, all at potentially inflated prices. Many charter schools have a long history of duplicitous or fraudulent actions (In the Public Interest, 2018; Burris & Bryant, 2020; B. Baker & Miron, 2015).

School choice has been relentlessly marketed and promoted by billionaires who do not send their children to public schools.¹⁸ The Walton family, Eli Broad, Bill Gates, the Koch brothers, the Zuckerbergs, and Laurene Jobs, are all on the list of the 500 richest people in the world. Their collective wealth exceeds half a trillion dollars, and they are busily engaged using that wealth to fix the very problems that their accumulation of wealth caused. Giridharadas (2018) whose book, *Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World*, says that it's a "Trying-to-Solve-the-Problem-with-the-Tools-That-Caused-It" issue (Giridharadas, 2018, p. 142).

The effects of billionaire spending on education cannot be over emphasized. Bill Gates made \$2B in grants aimed at creating smaller schools (Gates, 2009, p. 11), despite a lack of evidence that they were educationally valuable. These grants were eventually discontinued when the initiative didn't produce the intended results. Gates was also instrumental in funding and promoting the Common Core State Standards and

¹⁸Ravitch (2010) lumps these billionaires together, calling them the "Billionaires Boys Club", an epithet first used in *The Death and Life of the Great American School System*.

1 associated assessments whose premise was that if we only had high enough academic
2 standards, student outcomes would improve, again without evidence that the reforms
3 were educationally valuable and without evidence of a mechanism of improvement.

4 Types of Charter Schools

5 Charter schools can be broadly classified along three axes. The authorizer/oversight
6 axis has to do with what entity approved their charter and who will exercise oversight.
7 The profit/non-profit axis classifies schools by their intent to generate a profit, or not.
8 Lastly, the in-person/blended/virtual axis characterizes pedagogical approach. Are their
9 classes in-person, virtual, or a blend of the two?

10 *Charter School Authorizers and Oversight*

11 Charter schools in California are potentially subject to a three step process to gain
12 authorization to operate. The first step is to submit a petition to the school district in
13 which the charter wishes to operate. This petition must contain a number of required
14 elements, all of which are specified in Education Code §47605(c)(5)(A–O), the commonly
15 called “15 Required Elements (A–O elements)” (Aguinaldo et al., 2021, p. 89). Besides some
16 technical details, the petition must contain a description of the charter’s annual goals
17 which must align with state priorities, for all pupils and for various subgroups; how these
18 outcomes are to be measured; how the charter is to achieve a racial and ethnic balance
19 similar to its district, its governance structure, and its finances. All of these elements are
20 captured in “*Charter Petition Evaluation Matrix*” by FCMAT, a document intended to
21 provide a legally sound checklist for authorizers (FCMAT, 2022).

22 If a petition contains all the required elements, then the public school district may
23 approve the petition, possibly with additional stipulations. If the public school district

denies the charter school's petition, it must state why. The charter school may appeal that denial to that County's Board of Education (CBOE), and if the CBOE denies the charter school's appeal, under certain circumstances, the charter school may appeal to the State Board of Education (SBE). A denial by the SBE terminates the process, and the charter school is not permitted to open.

Public school districts (LEAs, local education agencies, in the parlance of the California Department of Education (CDE)) may authorize one several kinds of charter schools. Table 1, *Attributes of Private, Charter, and Public Schools in California*, is a summary of the attributes of the types of schools in California. A public school district may sponsor a charter school directly, in which case the district exercises oversight. These dependent charter schools are authorized by the local public school board and are subject to the board's jurisdiction. It also is possible for all the schools in a district to convert to charter schools, and then the public school board becomes the charter school board. Lastly, charter schools may be authorized by a public school district or a county office of education with a governing board that is distinct and independent from the authorizer's governing board.

Profit-Making Status

Until the 2019–20 school year, charter schools in California could be run directly or indirectly by a profit-making organization. California now prohibits profit-making organizations, either a single school or a charter management organization, from submitting an initial charter school petition or a renewal.

Even though profit-making charters are banned, there are many ways of getting around this restriction. Charter operators can contract with outside firms to provide all or just some services, and those firms may be profit-making firms. Charter operators are able to lease, buy, or sell their facilities, and those transactions might generate a profit.

Table 1*Attributes of Private, Charter, and Public Schools in California*

Attribute	Private	Charter	Public
Funding	parent tuition	tax dollars	tax dollars
Governance	self-appointed	self-appointed	elected board
Duration	unlimited	time-limited	unlimited
Ed. Code	no	no	yes
Taxation Powers	none	none	limited
Facilities Bonds	no	no	yes
Facilities Grants	no	yes	no
Enrollment	limited	limited	not capped
Unionized	rarely	rarely	often
Curriculum	completely flexible	very flexible	flexible
Standardized Testing	no	yes	yes
Accountable	no	authorizer	elected board
Teacher Certification	no requirement	yes	yes
Teacher Pension	perhaps	perhaps	yes

1 Charter operators can sell their facilities and lease them back from the buyer. This kind
2 of financial transaction converts an illiquid asset (buildings) into a liquid asset (cash) and
3 also generates a revenue stream from the rental income, all of which is ultimately paid
4 for by taxpayers. Charter operators may also charge schools a management fee or an
5 expansion fee. Charter operators are not restricted in the salaries they pay
6 administrators.

7 However, charter school board members in California have recently become subject
8 to the conflict-of-interest laws specified in Government Code §§1090–1099 and
9 §§87100–87314 (Becerra & Medeiros, 2018). Generally, government officials are
10 prohibited from benefiting financially from their positions as public servants, but it
11 remains to be seen if these conflict-of-interest laws will prevent profiteering by school
12 board members, administrators, or relatives of either.¹⁹

¹⁹The law is necessarily complex. Two useful guides (total: 300 pages) are Chaney et al. (2010) and Kevin Ennis et al. (2016). A more general guide to local government ethics is “Understanding the Basics of Public Service Ethics” from California’s Institute for Local Government (Institute for Local Government, 2016).

Types of Instruction

Charter schools, unlike almost all public schools, vary in their instructional format. In-person instruction is similar to that in traditional public schools, with one exception: the so-called “no excuses” charter schools (J. Horn, 2016; Torres & Golann, 2018; Golann, 2021). These schools emphasize a highly scripted, rigid code of conduct that relies on fear, intimidation, and Skinnerian behavior modification as foundational elements of their pedagogy. Unlike schools which offer in-person instruction, virtual charter schools have no face-to-face instruction; everything is mediated by some sort of technology, typically, computers running specialized software, paid for by taxpayers. In between in-person instruction and virtual instruction is blended learning. It is simply a mixture of in-person and virtual instruction (M. B. Horn & Staker, 2015).

Since 2013, virtual charter schools have been studied extensively by Alex Molnar, Gary Miron and others and at the National Education Policy Center, University of Colorado, Boulder (*Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2013*, 2013; *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2014*, 2014; *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2015*, 2015; Miron & Gulosino, 2016; *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2017*, 2017; *Full-Time Virtual and Blended Schools: Enrollment, Student Characteristics, and Performance*, 2018; *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2019*, 2019; *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2021*, 2021). Their annual reports are depressingly consistent: virtual schools not run by a public school district significantly underperform public schools. Their conclusions are echoed by Woodworth et al. (2015) and Garcia (2018). Yet, despite being clearly academically inferior to public schools, the number of students attending virtual schools has risen year after year. Their pre-pandemic growth seems to be slowing, but their performance, compared to TSPs, has not measurably improved.²⁰ (*Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2019*, 2019, p. 11).

²⁰Although *Charter Schools in Perspective: A Guide to Research* is otherwise an excellent summary of the research on charter schools, they incorrectly state (p.117) that there is little research of online or virtual charter schools. The authors must not be aware of the NEPC series on virtual charter schools. However, according to *Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2019* (2019, p. 117), there is only one study on blended charter schools.

1 Pre-pandemic, charter schools in California were legally deemed classroom-based
2 (e.g. not virtual) if students spent no more than 20% of their time in front of a
3 computer.²¹ Blended charter schools, on the other hand, offer some sort of face-to-face
4 interaction with a teacher along with online activity without face-to-face interaction.
5 But they too offer only marginally better educational outcomes than fully virtual charter
6 schools (*Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2019*, 2019). Rocketship schools use a blended
7 instructional model

8 Charter Schools in the United States

9 Charter schools are one of several different kinds of school choice that are or have
10 been available in the United States. Vouchers, private schools, home schooling,
11 educational savings accounts, freedom-of-choice plans, magnet schools, and open
12 enrollment are all forms of school choice. Home schooling accounts for less than 5% of all
13 the students in United States. Private schools enroll about 12% of the total. Magnet
14 school account for a few percent. Roughly, the various form of school choice, including
15 charter schools, account for just under a quarter of all American students.

16 The characteristic that home schooling and private schools share is that they are
17 agnostic about public schools. Not so for charter schools, voucher, and
18 freedom-of-choice plans. Charter schools, voucher programs, parent trigger programs,
19 and freedom-of-choice plans explicitly want to supplant or replace public schools
20 (Garcia, 2018).

21 The first charter schools, other than segregation academies, were founded in
22 Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1991, followed by California starting in 1993. Conceptually,

²¹The California Education Code §47612.5(e)(1) doesn't mention computers, but bases its definition of classroom-based on students being physically at the schoolsite with a certificated teacher in charge. Under that definition, a roomful of students behind computers with a teacher in attendance would qualify as classroom-based and not virtual. California's Education Code does not recognize the blended category.

1 charter schools were based on an amalgam of ideas from Milton Friedman, Albert
2 Shanker, and Ray Budde. Milton Friedman came at it from an ideological point of view
3 couched in economic terms. Albert Shanker, in 1988, in a speech at the National Press
4 Club, proposed that *teachers* in conjunction with *parents* be allowed to form a school *within*
5 a school district. Shanker made no mention of competition, or free markets, or even of
6 charter schools. Shanker's speech emphasized curriculum and learning, not governance
7 or finance. Ray Budde first thought of charter schools in the early 1970s, but his proposal
8 generated no interest and it was not until 1988 that he published his ideas (Budde, 1988).

9 *Charter Schools in California*

10 Charter schools, in California as elsewhere in the United States, enter into a contract
11 (the charter) with a chartering authority that specifies what they are to do and how, and in
12 return, are exempt from the entirety of California's Education Code (with the exception
13 of five technical provisions). The California Legislature, when it enacted the *The Charter*
14 *School Act of 1992*²² (Ed. Code §47600), spelled out its intent in passing that legislation. The
15 Act has been amended a number of times in its nearly 30 years of existence, but its intent
16 has remained the same. It specifies that charter schools should

- 17 a) Improve pupil learning.
- 18 b) Increase learning opportunities for all pupils, with special emphasis on expanded
19 learning experiences for pupils who are identified as academically low achieving.
- 20 c) Encourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods.
- 21 d) Create new professional opportunities for teachers, including the opportunity to
22 be responsible for the learning program at the school site.

²²Current California law can be accessed at
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/home.xhtml>. California Regulations are at
<https://ccr.oal.ca.gov>. California's Education Code (Ed.Code) is at
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=EDC&tocTitle=+Education+Code+-+EDC>

- 1 e) Provide parents and pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational
- 2 opportunities that are available within the public school system.
- 3 f) Hold the schools established under this part accountable for meeting measurable
- 4 pupil outcomes, and provide the schools with a method to change from
- 5 rule-based to performance-based accountability systems.
- 6 g) Provide vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate
- 7 continual improvements in all public schools.²³

8 It is important to keep these goals in mind because charter schools have contractually
9 agreed to meet these goals in return for funding, independently of whatever other goals
10 they explicitly specified in their initial petition. Note, in particular, that the Legislature
11 said nothing about profitability, and in fact, California enacted in 2018 a prohibition
12 against for-profit charter schools (Ed. Code §47604 et seq.).

13 Surveys of Charter School Research

14 It's been about 30 years since the first charter school law was passed. In the last
15 decade, researchers have published several surveys of the research on charter schools.
16 The first two decades (1990–2010) were somewhat experimental and different enough
17 that the research that came out of that period is less relevant than more recent research.
18 The first survey of the last decade, is “Beyond Ideological Warfare: The Maturation of
19 Research on Charter Schools.” In it, Smith et al. (2011) reviewed systematically charter
20 school research as it existed in 2011. The authors were interested, not so much in the
21 conclusions of the studies they looked at, but how the research was performed, how it
22 was structured, what facets of charter schools were examined, and what was the subject
23 of the research in order to “separate empirical evidence from politicized conjecture” (p.

²³This goal was added in 1998.

1 460). They reviewed a total of 323 peer-reviewed articles and research center reports and
2 found that student and school outcomes were the most commonly studied topics. They
3 noted many studies were unable to generalize their findings because variations in policy
4 between states and localities. Smith et al. also noted that there was a lack of longitudinal
5 studies which is not surprising due to policy variations. Furthermore, they found that
6 “acceptance into a peer reviewed journal does not always ensure that qualitative research
7 adheres to the standards of providing substantiation that findings are credible and
8 trustworthy or that quantitative research provides evidence of the studies’ validity,
9 reliability and generalizability.” (p.466) Finally, the authors noted that many studies could
10 not draw causal connections. They concluded that more research is needed.

11 Four years later, Berends (2015) chose as his focus the various theories that
12 researchers used when looking at the social organization of charter schools. In
13 “Sociology and School Choice,” Berends (2015), found, like Smith et al., that most studies
14 concentrated on student achievement and neglected educational attainment such as
15 high school graduation, college admission, and the granting of a degree. He notes that
16 “the effects of charter schools on student achievement are mixed (some positive, some
17 negative and some neutral)” (p. 170) Berends thinks the context in which charter schools
18 operate is important in order to understand the magnitude of any effects and to
19 understand what we can expect from school reform. He identifies longer school days, a
20 focus on achievement, behavioral policies, teacher coaching and feedback, and
21 data-based decision-making as characteristics most often associated with effective
22 charter schools. Lastly he looks at innovation and distinguishes between curriculum and
23 class-room based changes, and organizational changes, and he found hat charter schools
24 mostly innovate on the structural side rather than the academic side. He concluded that
25 more research is needed.

26 Next, Epple et al. (2016), in *Charter Schools*, did much the same as Berends, but

1 concentrated on the technical aspects of study design (Epple et al., 2016). The authors
2 observed that which the research question being answered by a particular study was
3 often much narrower or significantly different than the research question authors set out
4 to answer or thought they were answering. The heart of their review is an analysis of “the
5 methodological challenges in evaluating charter effectiveness” (p.141), and the strength
6 and weaknesses of the various approaches that have been used. They find that
7 researchers used one of five statistical methods: lottery-based design, fixed-effect
8 approaches, matching procedures, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and
9 instrumental variable approaches (p. 165), and they evaluate each approach. Epple et al.
10 also discuss the much scrutinized virtual control record method of matching charter
11 school students to public school students that came out of Stanford’s Center for Research
12 on Education Outcomes (CREDO) which was criticized on purely statistical grounds in
13 Andrea Gabor (2015). Epple et al. concluded that more research is needed.

14 In 2015 and then updated in 2018, Public Agenda released a guide to charter school
15 research for non-academics, a review of current charter school research that was written
16 in a way that is accessible to the public. The chapter on finance focused on four questions:
17 how charter schools are funded, how charter schools and traditional schools compare in
18 per pupil funding, what financial effects do charter schools impose on traditional public
19 schools, and what are, if any, differential spending patterns between traditional public
20 and charter schools (Public Agenda, 2018, pp. 78–89).

21 The finance chapter revealed that the 48 states with school choice programs had 48
22 different methods of funding public schools and charter schools. This variation in
23 funding models made comparisons difficult. In addition, each state has likely gone
24 through several iterations of models of charter school funding, and this lack of
25 commonality prevents researchers from conducting valid longitudinal studies. The
26 authors answered their first question on funding by referring to a compilation of state

1 funding amounts.

2 Their answer to the second question was yes, different levels of funding do exist, and
3 in a few cases, by as much as 40% to nearly 60% less. Their take on whether it matters was
4 hedged because studies differ in their conclusions for a variety of reasons. Likely not
5 published in time to be reviewed by Public Agenda, was B. D. Baker (2018) which
6 emphatically says that money does matter. They answer their third question with an
7 unambiguous yes, charter schools do affect the finances of public schools. More recent
8 research, Lafer (2018), B. D. Baker (2019), and Miron et al. (2021) validates their
9 conclusion. Finally, they conclude that charter schools do spend their revenues
10 differently, in part because charters spend more on administration than public schools
11 do and sometimes more on facilities.

12 The last of the four academic surveys, Zimmer et al. (2019), considers who was served,
13 racial segregation effects, both academic and non-academic outcomes, management
14 structure, and financial effects of charter schools. Since Zimmer is a co-author of both
15 this survey and of the previously cited Epple et al. (2016), the kinds of study designs
16 analyzed are similar. Zimmer et al. intend to synthesize “the best research to inform the
17 debate [about the value of charter schools]” (p. 2). They go beyond the 2016 study and
18 survey studies on racial segregation, cream skimming, and student pushout. Zimmer
19 et al. conclude that charter schools lead to greater segregation for African Americans, but
20 not necessarily for whites or Hispanics. They find that charter schools do engage in
21 sometimes subtle forms of cream skimming and student pushout. (Independently, and
22 two years later, Mommandi and Welner document thirteen major ways that charter
23 schools effectively choose who they enroll (Mommandi & Welner, 2021).) After
24 summarizing three different kinds of research (fixed effects, lottery-based, and match
25 and other regression), they turn their attention to research on non-cognitive outcomes.
26 Their penultimate chapter looks at research on indirect effects.

1 Although Garcia (2018) is not explicitly a survey of the existing literature, Garcia
2 (2018), in Chapter 3, contains much material on the research evidence which guides (or
3 should guide) school choice policies. His goal is to present general trends that “reflect the
4 weight of the evidence” (p. 93). The weight of the evidence, Garcia finds the research
5 points to the conclusions that “school choice policies are more likely to separate, rather
6 than integrate, students from different racial/ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds”
7 (pp. 159–60), “how countries and states structure school choice policies can have a
8 profound impact on how school choice functions at a practical level” (p. 160),
9 “low-income students face obstacles to participating in school choice plans” (p. 161),
10 lastly, “one should expect student achievement gains under school choice plans to be
11 modest at best and inconsistent across subjects and years” (p. 161), and “a major reason
12 for the inability of school choice to have an impact on the academic core of
13 schools—teaching and learning—is that school choice came of age at the same time as
14 high-stakes accountability policies that encourage standardization” (p. 162)

15 Garcia makes a point that hasn’t been made before: Since both public schools and
16 charter schools are measured the same way (standardized tests), “the incentives to
17 implement innovative pedagogical strategies are curtailed because the methods by which
18 students are able to demonstrate their learning are uniform across all schools and
19 restricted to the format of the tests.” (p. 163) He predicts that school choice in its many
20 forms will continue to expand.

21 *Research on Charter School Finances*

22 Charter schools have been much studied, and the last decade has produced a number
23 of reports examining charter school finances based on carefully collected evidence. For
24 example, in 2014, Lafer (2014), now at In the Public Interest, published an analysis of a
25 proposed law in Milwaukee, WI (Lafer, 2014) that was specifically tailored to benefit a

1 to-be-opened Rocketship school. Lafer went on to author two other studies on charter
2 schools, public policy, and finance: *Spending Blind: The Failure of Policy Planning in California*
3 *Charter School Funding* (Lafer, 2017b) and *Breaking Point: The Cost of Charter Schools for Public*
4 *School Districts* (Lafer, 2018). Carol Burris, Executive Director of the Network for Public
5 Education, and several co-authors have produced three reports on money and charter
6 schools: Burris and Pflieger (2020), Burris and Bryant (2020), and Burris and Cimarusti
7 (2021). The National Education Policy Center, a research center based at the University of
8 Colorado, Boulder, with over 150 scholars and academics from institutions across the
9 U.S. whose goal is “to produce and disseminate high-quality, peer-reviewed research to
10 inform education policy discussions” (“National Education Policy Center,” n.d.), has
11 produced hundreds of reviews of research, policy and legislative briefs, some of which
12 are annual surveys of charter schools. The series on profiles of EMOs have been produced
13 annually for fifteen years; the series on virtual charter schools, for ten years.

14 Bruce Baker’s contributions to the NEPC are especially noteworthy. He is an author
15 or co-author of 28 reviews of reports, studies, or articles on school finance, in addition to
16 six policy, legislative, or research briefs. Baker co-wrote with Gary Miron *The Business of*
17 *Charter Schooling: Understanding the Policies That Charter Operators Use for Financial Benefit*.
18 (B. Baker & Miron, 2015) which introduces many of the tools and techniques for
19 evaluating how charter schools operate for profit. It will serve as a key resource for this
20 dissertation.

21 Lafer (2017b)’s report, *Spending Blind: The Failure of Policy Planning in California Charter*
22 *School Funding* is particularly scathing. He says, “Any time there is a low bar of entry for
23 firms seeking to access government funds, one can expect to find corruption, and the
24 charter industry is no exception.” (p.18) But even absent corruption, there is ample
25 opportunity to make lots of money. Lafer documents \$2.5B of Californian taxpayer
26 money spent over fifteen years on charter school facilities, in many cases where there is

1 no documented educational need and where the charter school is of lower quality that
2 nearby public schools. Lafer says, “It’s as if legislators turned on a faucet of money and
3 then just walked away.” (p.12) It is saddening that in the four years since Lafer’s report
4 came out, nothing has fundamentally changed.

5 Rocketship

6 Rocketship is well-known in the charter school world. It even has been the subject of
7 a “biography”, *On the Rocketship* (Whitmire, 2014).²⁴ Rocketship’s leaders and supporters
8 routinely describe it as “high performing”, “deserving of huge credit”, “dynamic”, and
9 “nationally lauded”. Rocketship schools, it is claimed, outperform some of the best public
10 schools in the country. Rocketship “believe[s] that every student deserves the right to
11 dream, to discover, and to develop their own unique talent”.²⁵

12 Rocketship is one of the largest non-profit charter school chains in the United States.
13 They operate 21 schools in the United States; thirteen in California, three in each in
14 Nashville, TN and Washington, D.C., and two in Milwaukee, WI. In Santa Clara County,
15 CA, they have eight TK-5 elementary schools authorized by the county that served 4,254
16 students in the 2019–20 school year plus 1,240 students in two district authorized
17 schools, for a total of 5,494 students.

18 *Founders and Supporters*

19 Rocketship was founded by John Danner in February 2006. Danner, Don Shalvey,
20 Jennifer Andaluz, and Eric Resnick are listed as the initial members of Rocketship

²⁴Just two other charter schools share this distinction: Geoffrey Canada’s Harlem Children’s Zone (Tough, 2009) and the KIPP schools (Mathews, 2009; J. Horn, 2016)

²⁵Rocketship, like many charter school advocates and privatizers, excel at choosing memorable, compelling names and tag lines that are impossible to argue against but which nonetheless misrepresent — deliberately so — their goals.

1 Education's board of directors. Danner had significant teaching experience (Nashville,
2 TN public schools) prior to Rocketship, as did Shalvey (Aspire Public Schools) and
3 Andaluz (Downtown College Prep). Resnick, the fourth member of the founding group
4 was a hedge fund manager who had a "a deep understanding of financial management
5 and real estate transactions" (Danner, 2006, p. 13). The inclusion of Resnick, an expert in
6 real estate transactions, at the very beginning of Rocketship, is interesting because one of
7 the preferred ways for charter school investors and founders to generate profits is via real
8 estate deals. John Danner eventually left Rocketship in 2013 to found Zeal, an online math
9 tutoring tool, and was replaced by Preston Smith who became CEO. Smith became the
10 first principal of the Rocketship's first school, Mateo Sheedy, and was subsequently listed
11 as a Rocketship co-founder in the charter petition for Rocketship's second school.

12 Matt Hammer, Executive Director of PACT (People Acting in Community Together),
13 brought Danner and Smith together, and has relentlessly promoted charter schools
14 through his advocacy non-profit, Innovate Public Schools.²⁶ Hastings proselytized
15 Rocketship to the larger charter school community and when he promised Rocketship
16 \$250K for each of the first eight Rocketship schools they opened, his donation caught the
17 attention of philanthropic venture funds (Whitmire, 2014, p. 50).

18 *Rocketship History*

19 The first Rocketship school, Mateo Sheedy, opened in Santa Clara County in 2007.
20 Rocketship's initial petition to the San José Unified School District was denied, so they
21 appealed to the Santa Clara County Board of Education, which granted their petition.
22 Over the years, Rocketship opened ten schools in Santa Clara County. Of those ten, only
23 two were authorized by a public school district. The remainder were either countywide
24 charters or charter schools whose petitions were denied by the local public school

²⁶<https://innovateschools.org/>

1 district, but subsequently approved by the Santa Clara County Board of Education.
2 Table 2, *Rocketship Schools in Santa Clara County, California*, lists the eleven Rocketship
3 schools that were approved and the ten that opened. Note that only two were approved by
4 the school district in which there were expected to locate. This lopsided result suggests
5 that current charter school laws are tilted in favor of charter schools.

Table 2
Rocketship Schools in Santa Clara County, California

School	Type	Opened	Renewed	Notes
Mateo Sheedy	District appeal	2007	2009, 2015	Denied by SJUSD, approved by SCCOE
Sí Si Puede	District appeal	2009	2011, 2017	Denied by ARUSD, approved by SCCOE
Los Sueños	Countywide	2010	2015	SCCOE countywide
Discovery Prep	Countywide	2011	2016	SCCOE countywide charter
Mosaic	District	2011	2016	Approved by ARUSD
Brilliant Minds	Countywide	2012	2017	SCCOE countywide charter
Alma Academy	Countywide	2012	2017	SCCOE countywide charter
Spark Academy	District	2013	2018	Approved by FMSD
Alum Rock	District appeal	—		Denied by ARUSD, approved by SCCOE, but withdrawn 2015
Fuerza	Countywide	2014	2018	SCCOE countywide charter
Rising Stars	District appeal	2016	2021	Denied by FMSD, approved by SCCOE

6 Rocketship Finances

7 Charter schools have a number of unique financial needs. They need startup funds,
8 operating funds, and often funds to expand, funds that public schools do without.
9 Rocketship is no exception. The *operation* of charter schools are funded by federal, state,
10 and local governments, but funding *expansion* may or may not be funded with tax dollars,
11 depending on the laws of a particular state. The difference between what's funded at

1 taxpayer expense and what's not must somehow be funded with outside money. Startup
2 money is needed for facilities, desks and chairs, teacher and administrator salaries, legal
3 fees, curriculum materials, etc., all of this before even one student registers. Startup
4 facilities cost vary widely. If the charter school chooses to use public school district
5 facilities under Proposition 39²⁷, their need for funds will be lower than if they choose to
6 lease or build their own facilities. Startup facilities costs might involve the purchase of
7 land and the construction of school buildings, or might just involve lease payments. But
8 since state funding is tied to attendance, some startup funding is necessary. Thus the
9 federal government provides grants, administered by the states, for this purpose.

10 Rocketship has indicated from the beginning its intent to expand. In 2009,
11 Rocketship announced plans to open six new schools (Cook, 2009). It submitted a
12 petition to Santa Clara County to open countywide charters and within three years had
13 actually opened four. Like many other CMOs and EMOs, Rocketship must expand in
14 order to increase revenue enough to be worth the while of investors. A single school's
15 profit is not enough to satisfy investors, but by using economies of scale, a "portfolio" of
16 charter schools might suffice. A portfolio of charter schools is a collection of schools –
17 almost always charter schools – managed as a whole.

18 The idea of a portfolio of schools comes from finance where a carefully chosen
19 portfolio of investments can have lower collective risk for a given level of return than a
20 mere collection of individual investments. (See "Markowitz Model," 2021, for an overview
21 of the mathematics of modern portfolio theory). Hill et al. claim to have invented the
22 term *portfolio school district* (Hill et al., 2009, p. 1) and with it a strategy to implement such
23 a district. Just a year later, J. R. Henig et al. define portfolio strategy for schools as

²⁷ Proposition 39, passed by California voters in November 2000, contains a provision that requires public school districts to provide charter schools facilities "sufficient to accommodate the charter school's students" (Secretary of State, California, 2000, pp. 38—41) (Smaller Classes, Safer Schools and Financial Accountability Act, 2000). Regulations governing Prop. 39 facilities are in California Code of Regulations, Title 5, §11969.

1 ...a loosely coupled conglomeration of ideas held together by the metaphor of
2 a well-managed stock portfolio and its proponents' *unshakable belief* that the
3 first step for successful reform must be to dismantle the bureaucratic and
4 political institutions that have built up around the status quo. [emphasis
5 added] (J. R. Henig et al., 2010)

6 Hill et al. acknowledge, in dry, understated language, that overcoming the objections
7 and criticisms of educators and scholars to their unshakable belief will be difficult: "It is
8 hard to imagine that a portfolio strategy could be introduced into a major city without
9 significant conflict." (p.2) Portfolio strategy is most often associated with Paul Hill and
10 The Center for Reinventing Public Education, which is now located at the Mary Lou
11 Fulton Teachers College at Arizona State University.

12 *Rocketship Expansion Funding*

13 California, startup charter school funding has waxed and waned, in part because
14 federal funding has varied. Currently, the U.S. Department of Education provides
15 startup funds to states under the Charter Schools Program State Educational Agency
16 (SEA) grant program²⁸. The federal charter school funding programs are listed in
17 National Charter School Resource Center (2020). *The Federal Charter Schools Program: 2020*
18 *Annual Report* notes that

19 At the core of the Charter Schools Program are the Grants to State Entities
20 (SE Grants). The State Entity program offers competitive grants to states,
21 which then make subgrants within their states to *open new charter schools and*
22 *replicate or expand existing charter schools*. [emphasis added]

23 (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2020)

²⁸<https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/funding.html>

1 Funds like the NewSchools Venture Fund²⁹ and the Charter School Growth Fund I &
2 II³⁰ exist to fund the development and expansion of charter schools and charter
3 management organizations. In 2007, when Rocketship Mateo Sheedy was started,
4 Rocketship used lines of credit and loans to fund its beginning (Danner, 2006, p. 260).
5 Now, charter schools have many more options for funding startup or operations.

6 Charters have at least three other sources of facilities funding: bonds, tax credits and
7 foundation or individual contributions. Betsy DeVos, who served as Secretary of
8 Education for Donald Trump, has donated \$12.6M to Rocketship. Reed Hasting, a
9 founder and now CEO Netflix has donated more than \$2M. In addition, charter schools
10 can avail themselves of the New Market Tax Credit if they meet certain investment
11 criteria, and if they do, they can get back 39% of their investment in tax credits in seven
12 years. If their investment returns, say, 20%, then combined, they are looking at nearly a
13 60% return on their investment. A sixty percent return is fantastic. Charter schools and
14 charter school operators can also issue revenue bonds. Revenue bonds are guaranteed by
15 a revenue stream instead of by property tax revenues the way general obligation bonds
16 are. Note that both are tax-exempt. As of 2015, charter schools issued over \$11B in
17 revenue bonds according to Clark-Herrera et al. (2019).

18 *Rocketship Expansion Difficulties*

19 In 2014, the Santa Clara County Office of Education and Rocketship were sued by four
20 Santa Clara County public school districts: Alum Rock, Mount Pleasant,
21 Franklin-McKinley and Evergreen. At issue was the SCCOE's bulk authorization of
22 twenty countywide Rocketship charter schools. Sixteen months, 17,500 pages of
23 evidence, and an estimated \$435,000 later, Rocketship, the public school districts, and

²⁹<https://www.newschools.org/>

³⁰<https://chartergrowthfund.org/>

1 Santa Clara County settled (Noguchi, 2015). As part of the settlement, Rocketship agreed
2 to withdraw 13 of the 20 countywide charters thus far authorized. Since one of the
3 remaining countywide charter had already been withdrawn, that left six potential
4 charters still authorized but as of yet, unopened. So far, it appears that Rocketship has
5 instead attempted to expand in locations beyond Santa Clara County: San Pablo³¹ and
6 Concord in California, Nashville in Tennessee, Milwaukee in Wisconsin, Washington,
7 D.C. and Fort Worth in Texas.

8 *Charter School Accountability*

9 In California, all K–12 schools, including privately managed charter schools like
10 Rocketship, must submit annual budgets, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports
11 (CAFR), and since 2014, Local Control and Accountability Plans (LCAP). LCAPs are three
12 year plans updated in years two and three and which in detail how a school will use its
13 funds to address state priorities, and to improve educational outcomes for foster youth,
14 English learners, and low-income students, along with the metrics which will be used to
15 show progress (Aguinaldo et al., 2021, pp. 66–84). These characteristics make LCAPs
16 particularly interesting from both a financial point of view and from an educational
17 point of view.

18 *Rocketship and Privatization*

19 Some contend that the central purpose of charter schools is to disguise a
20 money-making operation (Saltman, 2018). Whitmire, who now sits on the board of
21 Rocketship Education and who in 2014 published *On the Rocketship*, makes note of the role
22 that private venture funds played in Rocketship financing (Whitmire, 2014), and it is

³¹unsuccessfully

1 instructive to remember that private, for-profit venture funds exist to make money.
2 True, they often are “double bottom line” grantors (Clark et al., 2004). As Ball (cited in
3 Tewksbury (2016, p. 75)) makes clear

4 ... particularly with the added case of Rocketship, a blended learning chain of
5 charter schools, is that the NSVF [NewSchools Venture Fund] is using its
6 clout to further blur the lines between for-profit and non-profit educational
7 projects and organizations, thus smoothing the groves [grooves?] for
8 marketizing educational policy and practices. Ball (2012) makes the
9 connections and rationalities clear: “Symbolically, philanthropy provides an
10 ‘acceptable’ alternative to the state in terms of its moral legitimacy. It has
11 also provided a kind of rehabilitation for the forms of capital that were
12 subject of ‘ill repute’ in the public imagination. Strategically, philanthropy
13 has provided a “Trojan horse” for the modernizing move that opened the
14 ‘policy door’ to new actor and new ideas and sensibilities.” (Ball, 2012,
15 p. 32)

16 Privatizers use investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms as vehicles
17 for investing (Stowell, 2018). These investment vehicles are called *alternative investments*,
18 in contrast to *traditional investments* like stocks and bonds. Investment banks provide the
19 financial expertise that hedge funds and private equity firms need.

20 *Privatization*

21 Charter CMOs and EMOs appear to be following the lead of prison and health care
22 privatizers. They lobby legislators intensively. They position themselves as being more
23 efficient than the “wasteful” public sector, and they claim to to be able to do better than
24 public schools, prisons or hospitals at a lower cost. Since charter schools have positioned
25 themselves as being in competition with TPSs, they need to do at least as well as TPSs, or
26 failing that, appear to do so. This calls for creative marketing, and so, to that end,
27 pro-charter advocacy organizations, some university-affiliated institutions, and some

1 think tanks have been harnessed to churn out pro-charter puff pieces that are regularly
2 debunked.³² Evidently even creative marketing is not enough to prod the free market to
3 supply the educational choice that charter school advocates feel is necessary, so
4 pro-choice advocacy organizations also lobby state representatives and fund pro-charter
5 board candidates.

6 Charter school marketing is extensive. Organizations like The 74 Million, a reference
7 to the 74 million children in America, or Innovate Public Schools, an advocacy
8 organization, produce reports, news items, briefs and what claims to be research that is
9 slanted toward charter schools and away from public schools, teachers, unions, school
10 boards, and anything and anyone who doesn't buy into the notion that American
11 education is in desperate need of reform. One technique that is used is to fund media
12 outlets to write allegedly unbiased and non-partisan articles and blog postings that
13 promote "successes" while dismissing any harm that charter schools might cause.

14 These influence techniques are reminiscent of how OxyContin was marketed by the
15 Sackler family, which is not surprising since Jonathan Sackler, now deceased, founded or
16 funded charter advocacy groups like 50CAN, ConnCAN, Families for Excellent Schools,
17 the Northeast Charter School Network, Education Reform Now, Partnership for
18 Educational Justice, and The 74 Million. Dubb (2017) describes the similarities in
19 marketing strategies used to sell oxycontin and those used to promote charter schools,
20 where the focus of all communications was to highlight benefits while ignoring or
21 erasing harms. While this is the standard playbook of corporate marketing, we now have
22 public education dollars being spent on such tactics. When a national exposé published

³²The National Educational Policy Center (<https://nepc.colorado.edu>) in the School of Education at the University of Colorado (Boulder) currently has over 150 NEPC Fellows who aim "to produce and disseminate high-quality, peer-reviewed research to inform education policy discussion" on a wide variety of topics. They often review pro-charter school publications which have been presented as academic research even though those publications have not been peer-reviewed and often have serious methodological problems which weaken or negate their conclusions.

1 by National Public Radio (NPR) documented serious concerns about Rocketship's
2 practices, The 74 Million immediately published an *ad hominem* attack on NPR, accusing
3 the report to have been a "hit piece" on the charter network. The response of The 74
4 Million addressed some of the issues raised by NPR while leaving unanswered some of
5 the most serious concerns.

6 Unlike many other forms of privatization, charter schools have competition. When a
7 local government turns over the task of supplying water to a town, for example, there is
8 not another public water company serving the same customers to serve as a comparison.
9 Privatization is often an all-or-nothing proposition. Charter schools, on the other hand,
10 can be and are often compared to the public schools in the same school district. The
11 presence of very visible competition has an interesting consequence: charter schools
12 view public schools as an existential threat, precisely the opposite of the cooperative,
13 synergistic relationship that state legislators envisioned. In fact, the absence of reports
14 on the successful sharing of innovations appear so infrequently that sharing might as
15 well be completely absent.

16 Given that charter schools in California get the same per pupil funding as do public
17 schools, there are a limited number of ways that charter schools can generate "excess"
18 funds. They can lower operating costs by hiring unqualified teachers and paying them
19 less. They can tap into state or federal facilities grants. They can collect and sell student
20 data. They can contract out to a for-profit management company. They can buy
21 technology from business partners. In all these cases, the net result is always the same:
22 money flows out of the public school system into private hands.

23 Charter schools employ fewer and less experienced teachers than public schools do. A
24 teacher with 10 or 20 years of experience can easily command a salary that is twice that of
25 a newly minted teacher. Rocketship schools have a student-to-teacher ratio that's
26 officially as high as 36:1 (SCCOE, 2021), and if aides are counted as teachers, it is an

1 estimate which understates the number of students per teacher. The combination of
2 fewer and less expensive teachers can reduce the cost of teacher salaries to one-third of
3 what public schools pay for teachers. This reduction is significant because teacher
4 salaries typically account for from one-third to three-quarters of the total expense of
5 running a school. Charter schools that employ a blended pedagogy can further reduce
6 the cost of salaries, with virtual schools dispensing entirely with teachers, effectively
7 reducing the single largest component of running a school to zero.

8 Philanthrocapitalism

9 Philanthrocapitalism is the term used to describe the approach to philanthropy that
10 prioritizes operating non-profits as businesses, i.e. making money while “doing good”.
11 The epigraph to Giridharadas’s book *Winners Take All* is a quote taken from Leo Tolstoy’s
12 *Writings on Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence* which captures the absurdity of making
13 money while “doing good”:

14 I sit on a man’s back choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure
15 myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all
16 means possible ... except by getting off his back.

17 For philanthrocapitalists, the techniques and vehicles used to extract a profit from
18 public education are impressive. Saltman (2018) lists the following in *The Swindle of*
19 *Innovative Educational Finance* (pp.xii–xiii):

- 20 • social impact bonds,
- 21 • higher education lending and student income loans,
- 22 • charter school real estate, tax credit, and municipal schemes, and
- 23 • philanthrocapitalist educational technology schemes.

1 Marachi and Carpenter (2020), Burris and Cimarusti (2021), Scott (2009), B. Baker and
2 Miron (2015) all make the same point: education has been captured by big business,
3 where profits are hidden, and where the profits are substantial.

Research Design and Methodology

This dissertation is an *exploratory, case study* using a *public policy* lens to examine the finances of Rocketship Education. Exploratory means that the precise data that will be collected and the precise methods used to analyze those data are not fully known in advance and will depend on this study's findings as the inquiry evolves. Case studies are in-depth examinations of a single topic that are limited in space or time. Public policy is the set of rules, laws, regulations, and mores that affect the actions of an element of society. It is "the decisions, measures, programmes, strategies and courses of action adopted by the government or the legislative body" (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 3). Public policy mandates, constrains, and abets Rocketship Education's actions and how it structures its finances to meet its goals. Finance, as it pertains to Rocketship Education, encompasses all transactions of monetary value which involve the legal entity called Rocketship Education, its principals and executives, and other entities with which it has significant relationships. Not only are the finances of Rocketship itself included in this definition, but also those of its founders who, perhaps went on to found companies that sold software to Rocketship, and also any entities focused on real property from whom Rocketship might have bought, leased, or sold real property. Included as well are financial transactions like bonds, tax credits, loans, and grants.

This chapter contains six sections. The first section, *Process Overview*, describes at a very high level the four steps of inquiry this dissertation will follow. Since understanding how schools are financed is essential to understanding Rocketship's finances, the next section, *An Overview of California School Financing*, will give an overview of school financing in California by describing the normal, common financial disclosures and reports made by all districts and schools, including charter schools. It is important to remember that budgets reflect the future, and audits reflect the past. Budgets are estimates, guesses,

1 projections, whereas audits are a definitive, fixed record of the past.

2 In order to make what's being analyzed more concrete, Appendix A, *School Financing*
3 *in California* contains some example tables drawn from the Los Altos School District
4 (LASD) for the 2019–20 school year. These are standard financial reports taken from
5 LASD's SACS data, but presented in a way that is both visually appealing and
6 informative.³³ The high level view is given in Figure 5, *LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary*.
7 That view is further broken down in five more tables. The final, sixth table is a projection
8 of LASD's of finances for the current year (2018–19), the year whose budget is being
9 presented (2019–20), and five years into the future. The first half of the table contains the
10 assumptions used to generate the amounts in the second half.

11 Once the overall financing landscape of all schools in California has been described,
12 data will be gathered that pertains to Rocketship. There are three such groups of data:
13 petitions, financial reports, and a catchall group: other data. Each will be covered in the
14 third section, *Charter School Financing* of this chapter. All of this data is publicly available,
15 or can be made publicly available through CPRA (California Public Records Act) requests,
16 by accessing websites of the California Department of Education, the California School
17 Finance Authority, the Santa Clara County Office of Education, public school districts in
18 Santa Clara County, or Rocketship itself. Additional data might be obtained from federal
19 sources such as the SEC's (Security Exchange Commission) EDGAR (Electronic Data
20 Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System) or the IRS (Internal Revenue Service). In a few
21 cases, data might be obtained from organizations like LittleSis³⁴, OpenSecrets³⁵, or the

³³LASD's annual budgets have consistently won the Meritorious Budget Award for Excellence from the Association of School Business Officials International for the quality and comprehensiveness of its financial statements for each of the last 15 years. Both LASD's annual budget and its CAFR exceed 100 pages. That information and data, although available elsewhere, is truly informative and serves as a record, a history if you will, of LASD's past, its actions, and the data which guided those actions.

³⁴<https://littlesis.org/>

³⁵<https://www.opensecrets.org/>

1 Sunlight Foundation³⁶.

2 Once all the data have been gathered, the analyses can begin. The first such analysis is
3 of profits that do not accrue to Rocketship itself, but rather to associated entities. They
4 are covered in section *Indirect Profits*.

5 The fifth section, *Are There Gaps or Anomalies in the Data?*, discusses how potential gaps
6 or anomalies in the financial data might be discovered. This is where triangulation can be
7 used to cross-check the validity of that data. Does everything add up? Are there
8 important, missing documents? How much do these gaps or anomalies matter? Are the
9 oddities long-standing or fleeting? Examples of triangulation might be comparing
10 Rocketship's LCAPs to their budget, or comparing IRS Form 990 data to their audited
11 financial statement of salary expenses.

12 Lastly, the sixth section, *What About the Flow of Money Through Rocketship?*, describes
13 how this dissertation will study the flow of money in and out of Rocketship. Until now,
14 this study has treated Rocketship's finances statically, i.e. at points in time. Just as
15 important are the dynamic flows of money. Where do they come from, and where do
16 they go?

17 Process Overview

18 Explaining the real estate-related finances of Rocketship Education is the heart of
19 this dissertation. Where do Rocketship's revenues come from? Where are they spending
20 that revenue? Are there investors who make money off of Rocketship? And, critically, if
21 Rocketship takes in more money than it spends on education, where does that money go?

22 To respond to these questions, the basic process steps for this dissertation will
23 include the following:

³⁶<https://sunlightfoundation.com/>

- 1 1. Gather financial data for the Rocketship schools being studied. The initial set of
2 data being analyzed is discussed in the section *Charter School Financing* later in this
3 chapter.
- 4 2. Identify any gaps or anomalies in the data. This is where triangulation is useful
5 and is discussed further in the section *Triangulation*.
- 6 3. Analyze the flow of money in and out of Rocketship. That is covered in the section
7 *What About the Flow of Money Through Rocketship?* which tries to determine where
8 Rocketship funds come from, where is that money being spent, and what public
9 policies (or lack thereof) account for Rocketship's actions.
- 10 4. Identify to the extent possible how people or entities that are not part of
11 Rocketship may nonetheless profit from Rocketship.

12 Analyzing the finances of Rocketship Education means, for example, determining
13 what are the terms of a bond issue. Are these bonds general obligation or revenue bonds,
14 obligations of Rocketship Education and funded their revenues, or are they conduit
15 bonds issued by a government agency and obligations of that government agency that
16 are intended by not guaranteed to be funded by Rocketship's revenues? Have the bonds
17 been purchased by entities that are related to Rocketship, i.e. they are not arm's length
18 transactions?

19 All bonds are risky to some extent, some more than others, and purchasers of those
20 bonds are compensated for taking on that risk by being paid interest on the amount
21 borrowed. An immediate question comes to mind: Is the interest rate appropriate for the
22 risk being taken on? Answering that question entails comparing Rocketship Education to
23 other, similar borrowers. If the interest rate is higher than expected, then Rocketship
24 Education is effectively giving away some of its revenue. Another question one might ask
25 is, "How is Rocketship Education spending its bond proceeds?" Are those expenses in line

1 with what other charter school chains or public school districts are spending their bond
2 proceeds on?

3 An Overview of California School Financing

4 Primary and secondary schools (grades K–12) and charter schools in California are
5 financed with a combination of federal, state, and local monies as seen in Figure 1,
6 *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*. Since federal funds account for only 8% of total
7 funding for California’s elementary school children (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2021),
8 the federal contribution will not be considered further. Note that federal facilities grants
9 to charter schools are not part of this 8%.

10 In June of every year, the California Legislature passes a budget for the next fiscal
11 year (July 1 – June 30) and the Governor signs it into law. This is called the enacted
12 budget. This version of the budget describes the *intent* of the Governor and the
13 Legislature, but does not necessarily provide any actual money. The real work is done in
14 what are called *trailer bills* that are passed piecemeal in the months following the
15 adoption of the budget. During the course of the fiscal year, revisions are made to this
16 enacted budget either because of circumstance or because of changed priorities, and at
17 the end of the fiscal year, this is now called the revised budget. After the budget year has
18 passed, technical adjustments are still made: Exactly how much money was spent, or
19 what was misclassified and improperly allocated will change the revised budget
20 numbers. This then becomes the final budget. The upshot of this is that there are actually
21 three versions of California’s education budget: the one for next year (enacted), the one
22 for the current year (revised) and the one for the prior year (final). Normally, the enacted
23 budget is the one that is meant when people speak of the budget.

24 Figure 1 on the following page, *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*, shows what

Figure 1
California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source

K-12 Funding by Source

(Dollars in Millions)

	2017-18 Final	2018-19 Revised	2019-20 Enacted	Change From 2018-19	
				Amount	Percent
Proposition 98					
General Fund ^a	\$47,194	\$48,327	\$49,322	\$994	2.1%
Local property tax	19,644	20,645	21,921	1,276	6.2%
Subtotals	\$66,839	\$68,973	\$71,243	\$2,270	3.3%
Other State					
Other General Fund	\$6,879	\$9,749 ^b	\$10,503 ^b	\$754 ^c	7.7%
Lottery	\$1,382	\$1,305	\$1,304	-\$1	-0.1%
Special funds	\$75	\$79	\$228	\$149	189.0%
Subtotals	\$8,336	\$11,133	\$12,036	\$903 ^c	8.1%
Other Local ^d	\$12,023	\$12,712	\$11,814	-\$898	-7.1%
Federal	\$7,435	\$8,190	\$8,284	\$94	1.1%
Total	\$94,633	\$101,008	\$103,377	\$2,369	2.3%
Students ^e	5,960,120	5,944,769	5,933,407	-11,362	-0.2%
Proposition 98 funding per student	\$11,214	\$11,602	\$12,007	\$405	3.5%
Total funding per student	\$15,878	\$16,991	\$17,423	\$432	2.5%
^a Consists of funding for K-12 education, preschool, and other agencies serving K-12 students.					
^b Includes \$3.9 billion in additional retirement payments authorized in the 2019-20 budget package (\$2.8 billion attributed to 2018-19 and \$1 billion attributed to 2019-20).					
^c These year-to-year comparisons are notably affected by how the administration attributed the additional retirement payments authorized in the 2019-20 budget package across fiscal years.					
^d Includes revenue from local fees, property taxes collected in excess of the Local Control Funding Formula allotments, parcel taxes, and reimbursements.					
^e Reflects average daily attendance.					

Note: Legislative Analyst's Office (2021). Public record.

1 money California has to fund its primary and secondary educational system, i.e. grades
2 K–12. This money is then allocated to local educational agencies (LEAs), through a
3 formula known as the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF).³⁷ LEAs include individual
4 charter schools, county offices of education, and local public school districts. The total
5 amount of money for K–12 funding is allocated using a formula that was enacted by
6 voters in 1988 (LAO, 2017): Proposition 98. Prop. 98 was originally meant to be a
7 minimum guaranteed funding level, but has evolved into a ceiling. The Legislative
8 Analyst’s Office (LAO), which serves as an independent, non-partisan research arm of the
9 California Legislature in much the same way that the Congressional Research Service
10 serves the U.S. Congress, calls Prop. 98 “A Tale of Complexity” (p.5) and says that “A
11 Plethora Tests and Rules Govern the Minimum Guarantee” (p.5), and that “State Has
12 Made Myriad Adjustments to the Proposition 98 Calculations” (p.5). Undoubtedly LCFF is
13 complex, but LCFF is more transparent, has fewer rules, is more equitable, and is more
14 responsive to the needs of public school districts that have a high proportion of
15 under-served students than the Revenue Limit System that came before it. The Revenue
16 Limit System was also complex, but in a completely difference way; it had many
17 separately funded programs, called categorical programs, each with their own set of
18 requirements, rules, durations, and funding levels. Each passing year saw more
19 programs being added to the set of categorical programs until the collection of
20 categorical programs became so unwieldy it threatened to soak up all of a district’s
21 financial resources.

22 As seen in Figure 1, *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*, Proposition 98 funding
23 accounts for nearly 70% of California’s K–12 funding, the remainder coming from local
24 property taxes and fees, and from various other state sources. This money is distributed

³⁷The LCFF actually funds community colleges as well as public primary and secondary educational institutions, so it ought to be referred to (but isn’t) as the K-14 LCFF.

1 to county offices of education which then distribute it to public school districts. Districts
2 then distribute funds to charter schools.

3 Some districts are funded outside of the LCFF system. These used to be called “basic
4 aid” districts, but since the term is confusing, they are now called “community funded”
5 districts. Districts whose annual property tax revenue is greater than their annual LCFF
6 entitlement are community funded since they get only “basic aid”, i.e. the
7 constitutionally required minimum funding (the greater of \$120 per pupil or \$2,400 per
8 district) from the state. For districts which are not community funded, the state
9 contribution is the difference between a district’s LCFF entitlement and its share of
10 district property taxes. In other words, the state ensures that each district gets at least its
11 LCFF entitlement, the total amount which is determined by Prop. 98.³⁸

12 *Budgets & Interim Reports*

13 Budgets, in California, are the first of four important financial documents that
14 schools produce during a fiscal year. For any given fiscal year, which runs from July 1 to
15 June 30, the first financial document produced by a public school district or a charter
16 school is the annual budget, a forward looking financial statement.

17 Budgets are approved before the end of the prior fiscal year.³⁹ Next are two
18 (unaudited) interim reports, one in December, and another in March, which track how
19 well the school or district is adhering to the approved annual budget, and finally, after a
20 certified public accountant has audited the school or district, a comprehensive annual
21 financial report (CAFR). State law requires that an independent auditor certify this

³⁸An invaluable and comprehensive description of K-12 funding in California, for both public school districts and charter schools, can be found in Aguinaldo et al. (2021). It is (was?) an annual publication.

³⁹Since a school’s budget must be approved before the state budget is finalized, it is guaranteed that a school’s budget will need to be modified after it has been approved.

1 retrospective account of the school or district's financial activity as being an accurate
2 representation of the school's finances for the previous fiscal year.

3 *Local Control Accountability Plans (LCAPs)*

4 An important, recurring, non-financial report of schools is the Local Control
5 Accountability Plan (LCAP). Although the LCAP is a three year plan, it is updated
6 annually. The focus of an LCAP is on the programs that the school (public or charter) is
7 going to implement, finance, and monitor that will allow it meet the goals that the state
8 has set. These are goals that the California Department of Education sets periodically,
9 primarily to ensure that students with the greatest needs are in fact served and are in
10 addition to the seven goals that the Legislature set for charter schools in general.
11 Furthermore, the school's community must be offered the opportunity to provide input
12 to a school's LCAP and this is why a separate meeting specifically and only to approve the
13 LCAP is a requirement.

14 Typically LCAP goals remain the same over their three year lifespan, but their
15 financing may change if the metrics used to measure progress toward achieving those
16 goals aren't showing progress. In unusual circumstances, how the goals are to be
17 achieved might change. LCAPs are California's way of ensuring that all public schools,
18 including charter schools, meet the same set of priorities or goals. Apparently, some
19 LCAPs have been on the order of 500 pages long, although the norm is much less.

20 For each activity or group of activities, schools indicate what goal is being met, if the
21 goal includes increased services for disadvantaged student, how well the school or
22 district has met that goal, and how much money has been allocated to achieving and
23 reporting those goals. (The reality of what the Department of Education wants is an order
24 of magnitude more complicated than this description, but it is accurate as far as it goes.)

25 Unlike budgets and CAFRs, LCAPs don't have to "add up", nor do they have to offer a

1 complete financial picture, but they do have to be consistent with other financial data.
2 Expenditures have to be budgeted, and the amounts in a school's budget must agree with
3 what's in the LCAP. The charter or public school's board must approve an LCAP at the
4 same time as it approves its annual budget.

5 *Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports*

6 A major source of financial data are the annual, independently audited,
7 comprehensive financial statements of Rocketship Education. Comprehensive Annual
8 Financial Reports (CAFRs) are sent to the California Department of Education (CDE) and
9 to a charter's County Office of Education (COE) annually. They cover the previous fiscal
10 year and are similar to annual budgets because they report the same information,
11 perhaps in a different format. CAFRs are retrospective whereas budgets are prospective.
12 The major difference is that CAFRs are independently audited and budgets are not.

13 Similarly to bond underwriters, financial auditors are liable for "omitting,
14 misstating, or obscuring [items which] could reasonably be expected to influence
15 decisions that the primary users make on the basis of those financial statements"
16 (Cayamanda, 2020), and this requirement tends to increase the diligence of the auditors.
17 However, potential liability doesn't always result in truly comprehensive financial
18 statements; sometimes the lure of accounting fees overwhelms any misgivings, as was
19 the case with Enron and Arthur Andersen in 2001, and apparently with Donald Trump in
20 2022. Errors and sloppiness may exist, but in general, fraud is thankfully rare, in part
21 because fraud on the part of auditors would likely result in the loss of the auditor's
22 license, effectively ending their business.

23 Charter School Financing

1 In California, charter schools are financed the same way as public schools are, from
2 the same pot of money, using the same set of rules, except for one significant difference:
3 how they finance facilities. Unlike public schools, charter schools have no taxing
4 authority, so they cannot pass bond measures or parcel taxes. This lack of a taxing
5 authority means that charter schools must either occupy existing public school facilities
6 (potentially displacing existing public school students) or seek grants and donations. The
7 federal government provides significant amounts of facilities grant money and delegates
8 to the states the administration of the program and the disbursement of the actual
9 grants.

10 An in-depth analysis of charter school finances requires a broader lens than one used
11 for public schools because, in addition to all of the financial dealings of traditional public
12 schools, almost all of which also apply to charter schools, charter schools have large and
13 immediate needs for facilities that TPSs don't have. This brings into the picture bonds,
14 loans, grants, leases, construction, and the purchase and sale of real estate. TPSs do issue
15 several kinds of bonds, levy parcel taxes, and buy real estate on which they build schools,
16 but they do so infrequently. Usually public schools have done this years ago, but charter
17 schools have an immediately and reoccurring need for facilities. They face these needs
18 once when they start up, and whenever they outgrow their facilities because of increased
19 enrollment. These needs of charter schools for facilities and the financing associated
20 with obtaining those facilities is more pressing, more immediate, and more common
21 than the corresponding needs of TPSs whose enrollment doesn't fluctuate as much.⁴⁰

22 Once a charter has been granted the right to operate, it must file annually with the

⁴⁰Usually a TSP sees a change in enrollment because of significant demographic changes like immigration or emigration, birth rate increases or declines. Charter schools can see enrollment changes absent any demographic change, with the total number of students residing in a district staying the same. In some instances, increased enrollment in charter schools comes from public school students switching from the public school system to charter schools. This is what is happening to Oakland, CA and it produces simultaneous but opposite changes in enrollment.

1 California Department of Education, just like public school districts, certain forms that
 2 detail its revenues and expenses. State law also mandates an annual audit by an
 3 independent accounting firm which charter schools must file with their County Office of
 4 Education. All together, these forms should provide a complete picture of a charter
 5 school's finances, and crucially, everything should be in agreement. Charters must
 6 approve and publish at a public meeting their annual budget, and they, just like TPSs,
 7 cannot spend unbudgeted money unless the governing board approves at a public
 8 meeting any changes.

9 *Charter Financial Documents*

10 There are numerous publicly available sources of the same charter school financial
 11 data. These are, in roughly chronological order, petitions/renewals, budgets, LCAPs,
 12 interim financial statements, and finally, audited Comprehensive Annual Reports
 13 (CAFRs). Table 3, *Charter School Financial Documents*, summarizes the financial reports
 14 which are available about charter school finances. The first two documents are specific to
 15 charter schools and have no public school equivalent.

Table 3
Charter School Financial Documents

Name	Description	Frequency	When
Initial Petition	Comprehensive description	Once	Before opening
Renewal Petitions	Similar to initial petition	Every 5 years	Years 5, 10, 15, ...
Budget	Complete financial plan	Annually	Before June 15 th
LCAP	How to meet state priorities	Tri-annually	With budget
Interim Reports	Current spending	Twice yearly	December, March
CAFR	Audited financials	Annually	In the following year

16 Viewed chronologically, the first financial statement from a charter school is
 17 contained in their initial petition. Although petitions are not submitted under penalty of
 18 perjury, any material change to a petition would likely be cause for a re-evaluation of the

1 petition, something that is undesirable from the charter's point of view. Petitions are
2 presented at the start of a charter school's life and periodically thereafter, whenever their
3 charter needs to be renewed. Petitions and renewals are discussed next.

4 Petitions & Renewals

5 Chronologically the first category of financial data that's publicly available is what's in
6 a charter school's initial petition. Renewal petitions occur at five year intervals and are
7 very similar to the initial petition. One of the required elements of any petition is a
8 financial projection. Although no one expects a charter school (or any school for that
9 matter) to prepare and adhere to a budget that exactly matches what's been projected,
10 budgets are expected to be similar to actual expenditures, for some definition of
11 "similar".

12 Before a charter school is allowed to begin operation, every charter school in
13 California is required to present to a chartering authority a petition which must contain
14 certain required elements. The absence of one of these elements is grounds for denying
15 the charter's petition to operate. For example, what is the intent of the charter school?
16 How is the charter school going to measure its success or failure? What population is it
17 targeting? And, what are its financial projections?

18 These petitions run anywhere from a hundred or so pages to over a thousand. They
19 contain a wealth of data on curriculum, demographics, pedagogy, discipline, teacher
20 recruitment, and, of course, on the charter school's finances. Only a few financial
21 statements are needed to get a good overall picture of a school's or district's finances.
22 These are the enacted annual budget and interim reports, the audited Comprehensive
23 Annual Financial Report (CAFR), parts of the Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP),
24 and for charter schools, the financial portions of their petitions.

25 Fortunately, these documents are all publicly available and could, if needed, be the

1 subject of a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request. The CPRA is the California
2 equivalent of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Many of the documents
3 mentioned in this dissertation should be available from the California Departments of
4 Education and Finance, or from the Santa Clara County Office of Education.⁴¹

5 Since Rocketship schools are all operated by a single entity, (currently) Rocketship
6 Education, DBA Rocketship Public Schools, a 501(c)(3) non-profit, their financial
7 statements and those of their affiliates are rolled up into a single document, the
8 Consolidated Financial Statements and Supplementary Information. Every school is
9 included in this single document, as are separate Launchpad Development LLC's that
10 own facilities leased to individual schools.

11 The primary questions that these financial data analyses are seeking to answer
12 involves a clear mapping of the financial flows tied to Rocketship's ten schools in Santa
13 Clara County. That mass of data needs to be organized and interpreted, and using an
14 interpretive framework will make the analysis easier. Some examples of potential
15 frameworks are:

- 16 • The six year forecast spreadsheet that LASD uses, an example of which is
17 reproduced in Figure 11 *LASD 2019–20 Multi-Year Projection* on page 104. Most of the
18 elements of a forecast are combinations of SACS⁴² codes. The main drawback of
19 using this framework is that each school would have to have its elements extracted
20 from their SACS submissions. “The main benefit is that these elements have been
21 used for years and so are known to be useful in budgeting.
- 22 • A spreadsheet of the 9 high-level SACS object codes. This option is has the

⁴¹Since these documents are publicly available and may be freely copied, so no copyright is applicable, nor can one be claimed.

⁴²The Standardized Account Code Structure (SACS) is the chart of accounts (cost centers) used by the California Department of Education. These are defined in “California School Accounting Manual: Definitions, Instructions, and Procedures.” The function (activity) codes are on pp.149–151 (§325–3 *et seq.*)

1 advantage that these sums can be calculated automatically using reports available
2 on California's Annual Financial Data web page⁴³ This data is maintained by the
3 California Department of Education and go back to FY2003–4. The main
4 disadvantage is that any gaps or anomalies may not show up in the aggregate
5 numbers.

- 6 • A third way of approaching the problem of making sense of large amounts of data
7 is to use a model. Some possible models are

- 8 – Bruce Baker's *National Education Cost Model* (B. D. Baker et al., 2018, p. 5)
- 9 – the Operating Resource Flow model from B. Baker and Miron (2015, p. 16) and
10 Figure 4
- 11 – the resource cost model (RCM) or the education cost function (ECF) as developed
12 by B. D. Baker (2018, pp. 188–197)
- 13 – ratio analysis or index analysis as in B. D. Baker and Richards (2004, pp. 70–86)

14 Of the four models mentioned, only the last is likely to be useful in this study's
15 analysis because that method can identify quickly what's different in a particular budget
16 or petition. Ratio and index analysis compares the relationship between financial data
17 elements. In addition to B. D. Baker and Richards (2004) cited above, the National Forum
18 on Education Statistics (2007, pp. 35–44) lists a dozen or so ratios and indexes that have
19 proven useful when analyzing school finance.

20 *Other Data*

21 Vast amounts of data are available from the federal, state and local governments,
22 easily over half a million datasets each containing anywhere from a hundred elements to
23 a hundred thousand elements. Unfortunately these data have been collected in different

⁴³<https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/fd/fd>

1 formats, over different time periods, using different inclusion criteria, more or less
2 carefully. Picking a subset of educational data to use and then cleaning it is a huge
3 endeavor well beyond the scope of this dissertation. That being said, a very small subset
4 of available datasets will be consulted, based on the immediate need at hand. The most
5 likely datasets to be consulted are those maintained by:

- 6 • California Department of Education and the State Board of Education
- 7 • The County of Santa Clara and the Santa Clara County Office of Education
- 8 • The California Open Data Portal
- 9 • National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) at the Institute for Education
10 Sciences (IES)
- 11 • Stanford Educational Data Archive (SEDA)
- 12 • School Finance Indicators Database
- 13 • EdSource, Ed-Data, and other aggregators of educational data specific to California

14 State and Federal Filings

15 Two filings are of particular interest: FPPC Form 700, Statement of Economic
16 Interests, and IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax. Both
17 forms force the disclosure of personal financial information (Form 700) or personal
18 financial information and business financial information (Form 990).

19 Some officers of Rocketship may be required to submit annually to the California Fair
20 Political Practices Commission (FPPC) Form 700, Statement of Economic Interests. This
21 particular requirement of charter school officers is not settled law, but if Form 700 is
22 filed, it will list the submitter's assets and income. The intent is to prevent related-party
23 transactions by enumerating an officer's economic interests so that the school can avoid
24 doing business with entities that might benefit an officer. Rocketship's initial petition for
25 Mateo Sheedy states that Form 700, Statement of Economic Interest, shall be filed by all

1 board members, candidates for board membership, corporate officers, principals and
2 assistant principals, among others.

3 The federal Internal Revenue Service grants income tax exemptions to organizations
4 that meets the requirements of §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.⁴⁴ These
5 organizations must file Form 990 annually that provides some minimal financial data.
6 (Tax returns of for-profit organizations are not public documents and their contents do
7 not have to be disclosed; however, in order to sell stock to the public, i.e. to be listed on a
8 stock exchange, firms are required to publish various financial documents, which like
9 bond prospectuses, are required to be informative and complete.)

10 Bond prospectuses

11 Bond prospectuses are also a source of financial information. When bonds are
12 issued, they are described in detail in a prospectus. These documents, in addition to
13 specifying the terms (e.g. interest rate, repayment schedule, collateral) of the bond,
14 contain information relevant to assessing the risk associated with purchasing that bond.

15 Bond prospectuses can be mined for data that might not appear in petitions and
16 financial statements because bond underwriters are “potential liability for any material
17 misrepresentations or omissions contained in a registration statement or prospectus”
18 (Block et al., 2008). This liability, of course, is not unlimited. If bond underwriters
19 exercise due diligence or the misrepresentation is not material, the underwriters are
20 probably not liable. Crucially, the definitions of *material misrepresentation* and *due diligence*
21 depended on both statute and case law, so a bond underwriter can only make a reasoned
22 guess at their exposure to liability. The result is that bond underwriters are likely to be
23 more diligent than is absolutely necessary.

⁴⁴26 USC 501, i.e. Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter F Part I § 501(c)(3)

1 Unlike many studies, there is not a paucity of data on Rocketship, rather there is a
2 surfeit. The data collected so far is voluminous. The current number of pages of initial
3 and renewal petitions runs to 7371 pages. Three bond prospectuses total over 1000 pages.
4 And there are many financial data documents yet to obtain. For example, of the six
5 categories of financial data listed in Table 3, only half have been collected.

6 The challenge for this inquiry will be to organize the data so that gaps and anomalies
7 can be identified, interesting and valid comparisons can be made with public schools and
8 other charter schools, and the flows of money in and out of Rocketship can be identified.
9 One approach would be to create a common framework and recast all the financial data
10 from each school into that common framework. But, until the data have actually been
11 collected and analyses started, choosing one particular framework within which to work
12 is likely to lead to work which will need to be redone using a different framework.

13 Indirect Profits

14 It is not necessarily the case that all profit be derived from Rocketship itself. Other
15 people or entities could profit indirectly from Rocketship's activities. For example,
16 contracts which are not at arm's length are automatically suspect.

17 Leases are another area where profits can be made. Some charter schools receive a
18 per-pupil rent subsidy which reduces their effective net rent (gross rent – government
19 subsidy). But, if the operator of a charter school is also the owner of the facilities, then a
20 profit is to be made. It is the difference between the (market) rent charged and the net
21 rent. Furthermore, if the rent (paid by the charter to a third party) is actually a mortgage
22 payment by the third party to a bank, then the sale of the property can result in a
23 significant profit. The mortgage (effectively) was paid for by the government, but the
24 proceeds of the sale accrue to the third party, the owner of the facilities.

1 Tax credits are another potential source of profit. The New Markets Tax Credit is a
2 39% tax credit, usable over seven years, available to those who make an investment in
3 specified economically depressed neighborhoods. A 39% tax credit is roughly twice the
4 current corporate tax rate which means that this credit wipes out the taxes on gains
5 equal to twice the initial investment (which also has a return).

6 The NewSchools Venture Funds, the Charter School Fund, and the Charter School
7 Growth Fund are just a few examples of venture funds that specialize in charter schools.
8 Since it is unlikely that investors will invest in a fund that does not return a profit,
9 establishing exactly how these funds turn a profit is going to be a key goal of this study's
10 explorations.⁴⁵

11 Are There Gaps or Anomalies in the Data?

12 All of the sources mentioned above should be in basic agreement, i.e. the LCFF
13 funding received by a Rocketship charter school should match what the state thinks it's
14 sending to the school, what the school reports to the state it received and spent, what
15 independent auditors report the school received and spent, and what it actually spent.
16 Further, bond prospectuses and Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings should be
17 in agreement with themselves and with budgets. If these figures are not in agreement,
18 something is amiss and should be investigated.

19 In some fashion or another, all profit must originate from Rocketship's revenue. In
20 the case of the sale-leaseback of facilities, for example, the rent over and above market
21 rates constitutes profit to the property owners, and this is an operational expense
22 ultimately paid for by tax payers. If facilities are bought with public dollars (i.e. federal

⁴⁵It is interesting that none of the web sites of these funds mentions that fund's return on investment (ROI). The absence of any indication of a return on investment is either an innocent mistake or much more likely, an attempt at obfuscation.

1 grants) and subsequently sold, the net proceeds are profit that might accrue to an
2 organization other than Rocketship. If technology is being used and the contracts are not
3 at arm's length, then someone or some organization is making more than the usual
4 profit. If student data is being sold by a for-profit entity that operates non-profit charter
5 schools, that's revenue that rightfully belongs to the students or to the non-profit schools.

6 Determining whether there are gaps or anomalies in a charter school's financial data
7 is time-consuming but not very complex. When examining financial statements, one
8 should be alert to unusual year-to-year changes, ratios (e.g. salaries to total expenses)
9 that are markedly different from the norm, entries that are missing components, or
10 entries that are not supported by detail elsewhere. Complex third-party transactions that
11 don't seem to add value are also indicators that further investigation is needed.

12 In the search of gaps or anomalies, one might ask questions such as:

- 13 • Are the data available and accessible? Charter schools are notorious for simply not
14 filing required documents or filing them horrendously late, or submitting
15 documents that are incomplete. Petitions are not usually a problem because
16 without a petition, or with a materially incomplete petition, the petition will not be
17 granted. However, once a school is operational, late or missing filings will not bring
18 everything to a halt. Although Rocketship was fined for failing an attendance audit,
19 it was allowed to continue to operate.
- 20 • Have the data been misrepresented? There are forensic techniques (e.g. Benford's
21 Law) that can point to suspect data (Zhu et al., 2021). There is also triangulation
22 which involves comparing one source of data with another to see if they match. For
23 example, charter petitions make forecasts of revenue and expenses. How accurate
24 were those forecasts? Were the reasons given for anomalies plausible? foreseeable?
25 reasonable? Following Hanlon's Razor⁴⁶, a single anomaly is not usually a sign that

⁴⁶"Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." Naturally, Hanlon's Razor

1 something is being covered up, but several persistent anomalies usually are.

2 • California requires that LEAs meet the numbers they previously forecast or explain

3 why they didn't meet those numbers. Were those goals met, and if not, were the

4 reasons proffered legitimate? When preparing a budget, LEAs must also certify

5 they can meet their financial obligations for the current year, and for the next two

6 years. If an LEA cannot certify that they can, they might receive a visit from the

7 California Department of Education's Financial Crisis & Management Assistance

8 Team (FCMAT), and in the extreme case be subject to a state takeover or to

9 involuntary closure.

10 *Triangulation*

11 Another technique for determining if there are gaps or anomalies is to use

12 triangulation. Triangulation is the use of multiple sources of data. While triangulation

13 in social science research often refers to the mixed methods use of quantitative and

14 qualitative methodologies, the common definition refers to the analysis of multiple

15 forms of corroborating evidence in the form of financial and media documentation. For

16 example, Bhandari (2022) notes that one of the forms of triangulation is “[u]sing data

17 from different times, spaces and people” and also that “[t]riangulation in research means

18 using multiple datasets, methods, theories and/or investigators to address a research

19 question. It's a research strategy that can help you enhance the validity and credibility of

20 your findings.”⁴⁷

21 *Are There More Serious Financial Issues?*

follows Stigler's Law of Eponymy: “No scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer.” Stigler's Law adheres to Stigler's Law.

⁴⁷Triangulation does not imply exactly three concepts or ideas; often, as is in this dissertation, more than three concepts, ideas, data are combined in the analysis.

1 Unfortunately, charter schools and charter school chains have a long history of
2 various kinds of fraud. Lafer (2017b), In the Public Interest (2018), Burris et al. (2020),
3 and Burris and Bryant (2020), are just a few of the reports that detail fraud and waste in
4 charter schools. Although Rocketship has engaged in a number of questionable activities,
5 it has not been charged anything illegal.⁴⁸ But with billions of dollars allocated to charter
6 schools for facilities in the last 15 years in California alone (Lafer, 2017b, p. 4), coupled
7 with lax or no oversight, the temptation to misappropriate funds must be strong. It is
8 also instructive to note that Californian charter schools have fought tooth and nail to
9 prevent any laws that would increase transparency or hold charter operators to the same
10 conflict-of-interest standards that public schools and other government entities are held
11 to. While the charter sector has for the most part been successful in warding off
12 demands for accountability, the Attorney General of California issued an official ruling in
13 2018 stating that the Brown Act, the CPRA, and Government Code §1090 apply to charter
14 schools as well as to other LEAs (Becerra & Medeiros, 2018).

15 However, it's not necessary to misappropriate funds to make money off of charter
16 school facilities. As the report *Fraud and Waste in California's Charter Schools* from In the
17 Public Interest details,

18 While charter schools constructed with general obligation bonds cannot be
19 sold or used for anything other than the authorized school, schools
20 constructed with tax-exempt conduit bonds become the private property of
21 the charter operator. Even if the charter is revoked, neither the state nor a
22 local school district can take control of this property. Additionally, schools
23 constructed with private funding subsidized by New Market Tax Credits or
24 acquired with private funds but whose mortgage payments are reimbursed

⁴⁸ Rocketship schools in Santa Clara have had ties with a virtual charter school serving special education students hundred of miles away. They have collected pandemic-relief funds intended for businesses and not available to public schools. Rocketship has been the subject of several Letters of Concern from the California Department of Education, and it has had petitions to open schools denied for substantive reasons. Many of these issues have been collected and can be viewed at <https://www.scoop.it/topic/charter-choice-closer-look> (Marachi, 2016–2022).

1 through the Charter Facilities Grant Program (known as “SB740”) are
2 typically owned without restriction.

3 (In the Public Interest, 2018, p. 6)

4 Rocketship has issued just shy of \$90M of tax-exempt bonds to “finance and/or
5 refinance the acquisition, construction, expansion, remodeling, renovation,
6 improvement, furnishing and equipping of the land and facilities” (California School
7 Finance Authority, 2015b, 2015a, 2017b, 2017a). These conduit bonds are exactly the kind
8 referenced in In the Public Interest (2018). The properties owned or leased are partially
9 paid for out of public funds but are privately owned.


10 *Analyzing Rocketship’s Bond Financing*

11 Bond financing can be both complicated (a hard problem, but solution methods exist)
12 and complex (many unknowns and interrelated factors). Illustrating this are two
13 examples of the analysis from just a single prospectus, that of Rocketship’s \$42M bond
14 offering. That offering is described in the 536 pages which comprise “\$42,160,000 Charter
15 School Revenue Bonds (Rocketship Education - Obligated Group).” The \$42M offering is
16 complicated because there are many moving parts which are described in the offering in
17 the well-known language of bond finance. Terms, rates, contingencies, amounts, dates,
18 and required performance are all specified in a fashion that has withstood legal
19 onslaught many times over. But the offering is also complex because it must also
20 convince others that its predictions are reasonable. The most important of those
21 predictions is that the issuer can pay the interest and repay the principal when they due.

22 Figure 2 on the following page *Flow of Funds: Overview* gives the overall picture and
23 shows how rents from schools (blue) are “intercepted” by the California Controller (red)
24 and paid directly to landlords, or paid into the Gross Revenue Fund (red) from which the
25 Master Trustee pays lessors (orange) and bond holders and expense accounts (orange).

1 What is not shown is the \$750 per ADA (in 2017, rising to \$1,211 in 2020–21) that
 2 Rocketship will apply to lease payments. Since money is fungible, the State of California
 3 is giving Rocketship between \$2.4 and \$3.7M depending on the year, money they would
 4 otherwise not have. This is effectively profit.

Figure 2
Flow of Funds: Overview



53


Note: California School Finance Authority (2017a, p. 53). In the public domain.

5 The next figure, Figure 3 on the next page *Flow of Funds: Cross-Collateralization* adds an
 6 important detail: how Rocketship uses its assets as collateral more than once.⁴⁹ In this
 7 case, if the payments of “School Tenants” are insufficient, the Master Trustee may require

⁴⁹Cross-collateralization means using an asset as collateral for two or more obligations, here lease and bond payments.

1 additional monthly payments from the “Obligated Group Representatives and Member”
 2 to supplement those from “School Tenants”.

Figure 3
Flow of Funds: Cross-Collateralization




Note: California School Finance Authority (2017a, p. 55). In the public domain.

3 These two examples show the kind of analysis that is needed to characterize a bond
 4 offering.

5 What About the Flow of Money Through Rocketship?

6 Since a goal of this dissertation is to map the flow of money into and out of
 7 Rocketship, I will use diagrams similar to the one used by B. Baker and Miron (2015),

Figure 4
Operating Resource Flows



Note: B. Baker and Miron (2015, p. 16). Used with permission.

- 1 which is reproduced here as Figure 4. In this example, money flows from left to right,
- 2 and there are no loops. Colors are used merely to distinguish the various blocks.

Findings and Results

1

2 This chapter discusses my findings and results. Recall my research question: Has

3 Rocketship structured itself and its finances, to earn a return to investors, and if so, how?

Discussion

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Appendices

School Financing in California

This appendix presents an example of public school financing in California.⁵⁰ Understanding the normal, usual, default financing of schools in California is necessary in order to be able to identify where Rocketship's might differ. The description which follows is necessarily high-level; the budget document for 2022–23 that LASD submits to SCCOE and hence to the state runs to 118 pages of unadorned tables derived from accounting spreadsheets.

First, the highest possible level look at a LASD budget is presented. This is the *All Funds Summary*. Next are five tables that delve one level down from the *All Funds Summary*. Each of those tables can be further decomposed until individual SACS accounting (object) codes are reached. SACS code reflect exactly one kind of expenditure or revenue. For example, money received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is recorded under SACS object code 8281 and no where else. How that money is spent is recorded under object code 8285. The lowest level of accounting is money received or money paid. All money received goes into at least one fund and is recorded under at least one object code. Payments are handled correspondingly. The intent of this process is to record unambiguously and completely every monetary transaction.

Public school districts and charter schools receive funding from the state and the federal governments which most often goes into a district's or school's General Fund. A portion of funding is restricted to particular programs, and sometimes that money goes into a specialized and restricted fund, but the norm is for the General Fund to account for the majority of transactions.

The first table to look at is the aggregate of all funds as shown in Figure 5, *LASD*

⁵⁰For a more detailed look at what a complete budget document looks like, see "LASD 2022–23 Budget Document" of Item H.4 of the June 13, 2022 LASD Board Meeting (<https://simbli.eboardsolutions.com/Meetings/Attachment.aspx?S=360303058&ID=279356&MID=12479>). Note that most public school budget documents are not as comprehensive or as well put together as LASD's.)

1 2019–20 *All Funds Summary*. It is a very high-level summary of a school's or a district's
2 budget. It's a snapshot of what the district's revenues are expected to be, roughly where
3 that revenue is expected to come from, what the district's expenses are expected to be,
4 and whether revenue and expenses are expected to be in balance. It is the rough
5 equivalent of a business income statement.⁵¹

6 Because Figure 5, *LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary*, is a snapshot, detecting unusual
7 changes year-to-year is not possible. Changes are detectable using Figure 6 on page 101
8 which compares fiscal two years. However, with just a budget summary, one can
9 nonetheless note some interesting ratios, for example, the percentage of expenses spent
10 on salaries and benefits. For LASD in 2021–20, this is 80.18% which is in line with what is
11 typical of elementary school districts in California. One can calculate the state-wide
12 average for all districts for 2019–20 using the Data Table at
13 www.ed-data.org/state/CA, and that comes out to 83.71%. So, LASD spends a little
14 less on salaries and benefits than the average elementary school district in California
15 does.

16 Calculating this ratio brings up a general issue: What is an appropriate comparison
17 group? In this particular case, the Ed-Data web site does not have county-level financial
18 data, so the only comparison which can easily be made is at the state level. But should the
19 state-level comparison group be all districts, or just elementary school districts? Should
20 “basic aid” districts, also called “community-funded” districts, districts whose property
21 tax revenues exceed their LCFF entitlement, be included or not? Again, the Data Table
22 tab on www.ed-data.org/state/CA does not filter by type of district (although the Graph

⁵¹Schools group their finances by funds. Most of their revenue goes into the general fund, and most of their expenses come out of the general fund. Some transactions must by law be accounted for in different funds. The three largest funds are the General Fund, the Special Revenue Fund, and the Capital Projects Fund, and together they account for virtually all of the financial activity of LASD. Other schools may have a different set of funds, but all contain a General Fund that is the primary fund for their day-to-day financial activities.

Figure 5
LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary

	General Fund	Special Revenue Funds	Capital Project Funds	Total All Governmental Funds
REVENUES				
LCFF/Revenue Limit Sources	43,551,141	300,174	-	43,851,315
Federal Revenue	1,155,694	-	-	1,155,694
Other State Revenue	3,417,200	-	-	3,417,200
Other Local Revenue	16,387,903	22,500	1,243,180	17,653,583
TOTAL REVENUES	64,511,938	322,674	1,243,180	66,077,792
EXPENDITURES				
Certificated Salaries	25,965,289	-	-	25,965,289
Classified Salaries	10,606,613	-	-	10,606,613
Employee Benefits	16,904,698	-	-	16,904,698
Books & Supplies	1,526,084	-	-	1,526,084
Services & Other Operating Expenditures	8,453,291	300,000	1,428,474	10,181,765
Capital Outlay	162,342	-	43,000	205,342
Other Outgo	341,064	-	-	341,064
TOTAL EXPENDITURES	63,959,381	300,000	1,471,474	65,730,855
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues Over Expenditures	552,558	22,674	(228,294)	346,938
OTHER FINANCING SOURCES/USES				
Interfund Transfers In	-	-	-	-
Interfund Transfers Out	-	-	-	-
TOTAL OTHER FINANCING SOURCES/USES	-	-	-	-
NET INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN FUND BALANCE	552,558	22,674	(228,294)	346,938
BEGINNING FUND BALANCES	107,727	3,603,040	1,745,439	5,456,206
ENDING FUND BALANCES	660,284	3,625,714	1,517,145	5,803,144

\$1 dollar difference in General Fund Ending Fund Balance due to rounding error.

Note: Kenyon (2019, p. 38). In the public domain.

1 tab does), so, in this case, using just the Ed-Data data, our choices are forced since we
2 cannot use state-level data.

3 The other common financial business report is the balance sheet, which identifies
4 assets and liabilities. In the educational world, this is the statement of net position.
5 Figure 6 on page 101 shows LASD's assets and liabilities at the end of the 2019–20 school
6 year. Note that unlike a balance sheet, a statement of net position for schools (and other
7 governmental entities) does not balance; assets are not exactly equal to liabilities.⁵²

⁵²Business accountants achieve this seemingly low probability equality by adding a fudge factor, *owner's*

1 As an example of a number which stands out and is therefore worth investigating, is
2 the large increase in Capital Assets, year over year, an increase of \$132M (line 3 of 6 on the
3 facing page, *LASD YE 2020 Summary of Net Position*). In “Comprehensive Annual Financial
4 Report FY 2020,” six notes appear immediately after Figure 6, and these provide an
5 explanation for the increase: LASD purchased a property whose cost was \$134.9M net of
6 \$2.7M in depreciation. This purchase shows up again in line 1 of Figure 9 on page 103 and
7 explains the enormous 9052% increase in the value of LASD’s largest asset in FY2019,
8 land.

9 In addition, the “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report FY 2020” contains a
10 section, on pp. 19–45, called *Notes to the Basic Financial Statements*. These notes are an
11 integral part of the certified, audited annual statement, just as they are in audited
12 financial reports in the business world; they cannot be omitted, and must be accurate
13 and complete. Note 7B of Kenyon (2021a, p. 7), General Obligation (GO) Bond
14 Anticipation Notes (BANs), explains how LASD uses a common technique to convert
15 general obligation bonds into cash: issue BANs, backed by general obligation bonds, and
16 payable when those GO bonds are issued.⁵³

17 It’s important to remember is that although changes in finances can be complicated,
18 they should also be adequately explained in a transparent and complete CAFR. When the
19 documents are incomplete or opaque is when serious concerns should be raised.

20 Within a CAFR are five summaries of financial tables that go one level deeper than
21 the All Funds Summary. These are

- 22 • Summary of Net Position (Figure 6 on the facing page)

equity, so that $assets = liabilities + equity$ always, exactly.

⁵³One reason this makes sense is that interest rate on BANs is less than the interest rate of GO bonds, so LASD makes money by issuing BANs to pay off GO bonds. In a different situation, school districts issue tax revenue anticipation notes (TRANs) because property taxes are paid by taxpayers semi-annually and salaries are paid monthly, so districts often and predictably do not have the cash on hand to pay their employees. The solution is to issue TRANs backed by anticipated revenue, and are paid off when the school or district receives the funds.

Figure 6
LASD YE 2020 Summary of Net Position

Table 1: Summary of Net Position				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Assets				
Current and Other Assets	\$ 20,044,318	\$ 65,493,755	\$ 45,449,437	227%
Capital Assets	89,045,541	221,076,448	132,030,907	148%
Total Assets	\$ 109,089,859	\$ 286,570,203	\$ 177,480,344	163%
Deferred Outflows of Resources	\$ 22,094,579	\$ 19,321,134	\$ (2,773,445)	13%
Liabilities				
Other Liabilities	\$ 2,665,639	\$ 22,680,079	\$ 20,014,440	751%
Long Term Liabilities	141,558,936	269,006,215	127,447,279	90%
Total Liabilities	\$ 144,224,575	\$ 291,686,294	\$ 147,461,719	102%
Deferred Inflows of Resources	\$ 5,549,865	\$ 9,680,588	\$ 4,130,723	74%
Net Position				
Net Investment in Capital Assets	\$ 37,623,977	\$ 64,225,229	\$ 26,601,252	71%
Restricted	7,726,718	6,825,216	(901,502)	12%
Unrestricted	(63,940,697)	(66,525,990)	(2,585,293)	4%
Total Net Position	\$ (18,590,002)	\$ 4,524,455	\$ 23,114,457	124%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 6). Public record.

- 1 • Change in Net Position (Figure 7 on the next page)
- 2 • Net Costs of Services (Figure 8 on the following page)
- 3 • Capital Assets (Figure 9 on page 103)
- 4 • Long-term Liabilities (Figure 10 on page 103)

5 LASD rolls up its detailed financial data into a single multi-year summary, as shown
6 in Figure 11 on page 104. In addition to purely financial data, the multi-year summary
7 includes the key assumptions that were behind the numbers. In fact, the first section of
8 Figure 11 is only assumptions, and it is those assumptions which drive the numbers in
9 Sections 2–4. The value of this summary is that it captures in one table the key data

Figure 7*LASD YE 2020 Change of Net Position*

Table 2: Change in Net Position				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Revenues				
Program Revenues:				
Charges for Services	\$ -	\$ 446,710	\$ 446,710	100%
Operating Grants and Contributions	10,052,323	7,968,769	(2,083,554)	-21%
Capital Grants and Contributions	-	23,000,000	23,000,000	100%
General Revenues:				
Property Taxes	63,216,247	65,285,688	2,069,441	3%
Grants and Entitlements - Unrestricted	3,933,401	2,511,734	(1,421,667)	-36%
Other	7,347,728	7,498,513	150,785	2%
Total Revenues	84,549,699	106,711,414	22,161,715	26%
Program Expenses				
Instruction	52,349,163	54,025,994	1,676,831	3%
Support Services:				
Instruction-related services	7,219,873	7,282,281	62,408	1%
Pupil services	4,381,022	4,334,692	(46,330)	-1%
General administration	4,658,051	4,519,337	(138,714)	-3%
Plant services	8,526,753	8,569,628	42,875	1%
Payments to other agencies	-	7,036	7,036	100%
Interest and Fiscal Charges	2,893,333	4,857,989	1,964,656	68%
Total Expenses	80,028,195	83,596,957	3,568,762	4%
Change in Net Position	4,521,504	23,114,457	18,592,953	411%
Beginning Net Position	(23,111,506)	(18,590,002)	4,521,504	20%
Ending Net Position	\$ (18,590,002)	\$ 4,524,455	\$ 23,114,457	124%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 7). Public record.

Figure 8*LASD YE 2020 Net Cost of Services*

Table 3: Net Cost of Services				
	Net Cost of Services for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2019	Net Cost of Services for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Instruction	\$ 43,345,309	\$ 24,008,344	\$ (19,336,965)	-45%
Support Services:				
Instruction-related services	6,608,564	6,681,271	72,707	1%
Pupil services	4,033,498	4,019,853	(13,645)	0%
General administration	4,568,746	4,444,973	(123,773)	-3%
Plant services	8,526,422	8,162,012	(364,410)	-4%
Payments to other agencies	-	7,036	7,036	100%
Interest and Fiscal Charges	2,893,333	4,857,989	1,964,656	68%
Total Expenses	\$ 69,975,872	\$ 52,181,478	\$ (17,794,394)	-25%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 9). Public record.

Figure 9
LASD YE 2020 Capital Assets

Table 5: Capital Assets					
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Increase (Decrease)	Percentage Change	
Land	\$ 1,488,885	\$ 136,262,476	\$ 134,773,591	9052%	
Site improvements	1,225,056	1,225,056	-	0%	
Buildings and improvements	129,573,748	130,339,280	765,532	1%	
Equipment	4,636,939	3,871,407	(765,532)	-17%	
Total	136,924,628	271,698,219	134,773,591	98%	
<i>Less: Accumulated Depreciation</i>	<i>47,879,087</i>	<i>50,621,771</i>	<i>2,742,684</i>	<i>6%</i>	
Net Capital Assets	\$ 89,045,541	\$ 221,076,448	\$ 132,030,907	148%	

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 10). Public record.

Figure 10
LASD YE 2020 Long-term Liabilities

Table 6: Long-term Liabilities					
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Increase (Decrease)	Percentage Change	
Long-term Debt:					
General obligation bonds:					
Current interest bonds	\$ 40,665,000	\$ 95,850,000	\$ 55,185,000	136%	
Unamortized bond premium	4,596,243	9,376,755	4,780,512	104%	
Bond anticipation notes	10,000,000	79,000,000	69,000,000	690%	
Lease-leaseback obligations	2,405,645	2,185,036	(220,609)	-9%	
Subtotal long-term debt	57,666,888	186,411,791	128,744,903	223%	
Other Long-term Liabilities:					
Net pension liabilities	64,535,048	65,113,381	578,333	1%	
Net OPEB obligation	18,914,928	16,922,035	(1,992,893)	-11%	
Compensated absences	442,072	559,008	116,936	26%	
Subtotal other long-term liabilities	83,892,048	82,594,424	(1,297,624)	-2%	
Total Long-term Liabilities	\$ 141,558,936	\$ 269,006,215	\$ 127,447,279	90%	

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 11). Public record.

Figure 11
LASD 2019–20 Multi-Year Projection

	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26
% Change in Prop Tax Collections	7.06%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
Enrollment	3,574	3,669	3,725	3,761	3,792	3,813
In-district students @ charter school	1043	1061	1061	1061	1061	1061
Total Enrollment, LASD + BCS	4,617	4,730	4,786	4,822	4,853	4,874
Transfer of Prop Tax to BCS	9,187,469	9,926,004	10,210,982	10,494,976	10,785,723	10,450,068
Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA)	0.00%	4.05%	2.98%	3.05%	3.00%	3.00%
Foundation Funding	2,400,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000
Parcel Tax	820	820	820	820	820	597
Class Size, K-3	19	22	22	22	22	22
Class Size, 4-6	25	25	25	25	25	25
Class Size, 7-8	25	26	26	26	26	26
Teachers, FTE	226	220	222	223	225	226
Raises (across-the-board)	2.00%	2.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Cost of Step/Column Movement	355,034	355,276	357,641	358,823	361,188	362,370
Step/Col (converted to % salary inc.)	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Health Benefit rate increases	5.0%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
Health Benefits (converted to % salary inc.)	0.9%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.6%	1.7%
STRS rate increases	-1.0%	0.8%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total Comp (as % of salary)	3.2%	5.4%	3.7%	2.6%	2.8%	2.9%
LCCF Sources	47,831,288	48,960,469	50,930,778	52,994,478	55,150,308	58,023,166
Federal Sources	2,966,976	1,128,389	1,162,015	1,197,456	1,233,380	1,270,382
Other State Sources	7,460,221	3,799,074	3,848,990	3,863,445	3,874,123	3,881,107
Other Local Sources	14,942,614	15,253,502	15,910,684	15,977,729	16,049,330	13,308,736
Total Revenues	73,201,099	69,141,434	71,852,467	74,033,108	76,307,141	76,483,390
Certificated Salaries	28,473,085	26,804,421	27,081,223	27,286,386	27,563,386	27,771,946
Classified Salaries	12,146,432	11,964,000	12,072,253	12,178,439	12,284,470	12,390,750
Employee Benefits	16,708,058	17,877,672	19,185,547	19,853,541	20,542,397	21,163,633
Retiree Benefits	934,490	960,791	1,001,625	1,044,194	1,088,572	1,134,836
Books & Supplies	3,926,089	1,508,677	1,542,077	1,573,747	1,607,611	1,640,136
Contract Services	9,782,495	8,879,712	8,999,752	9,143,511	9,308,868	9,477,329
Capital Outlay	251,893	235,312	240,835	246,658	253,080	259,653
Other	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262
Total Expenses	72,230,804	68,238,847	70,131,574	71,334,737	72,656,646	73,846,545
Net Change	970,295	902,587	1,720,892	2,698,370	3,650,495	2,636,845
Adjusted Beginning Balance	4,469,801	5,440,096	6,342,683	8,063,576	10,761,946	14,412,441
Ending Balance	5,440,096	6,342,683	8,063,576	10,761,946	14,412,441	17,049,286
Encumbrances	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
General Fund Reserves	5,435,096	6,337,683	8,058,576	10,756,946	14,407,441	17,044,286
Reserves, Special Reserve Funds	3,590,562	3,630,562	3,690,466	3,760,585	3,839,557	3,920,188
Total Reserves	9,025,657	9,968,245	11,749,042	14,517,531	18,246,998	20,964,474
% of Expense	12.50%	14.61%	16.75%	20.35%	25.11%	28.39%

Note: Kenyon (2021b, p. 137) Public record.

- 1 needed to make budgetary decisions and thus might serve as a template for what data is
- 2 important.