


1 ROCKETSHIP EDUCATION:
2 AN EXPLORATORY PUBLIC POLICY CASE STUDY

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8 by
9 Vladimir Gresham Ivanović 

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1 ROCKETSHIP EDUCATION:
2 AN EXPLORATORY PUBLIC POLICY CASE STUDY

3 Abstract

4 This dissertation is an exploratory case study of the finances of the Rocketship
5 charter school chain. Rocketship is a popular, not-for-profit charter
6 management organization and is one of the oldest in the United States. This
7 study seeks to determine if Rocketship yields profits for investors, despite it
8 being a non-profit entity, and if it does, how and where does it do so. In order to
9 characterize fairly and completely Rocketship's profitability, this study analyzes
10 publicly available documents in order to track money flowing in and out of
11 Rocketship. Using data from initial and renewal charter petitions, annual
12 budget documents, filings with the California Department of Education and
13 with the federal government, bond prospectuses, tax credit programs, state and
14 federal grants, plus data from publicly available datasets, this study derives an
15 estimate of Rocketship's profitability. It found that [Results TBD]. [Conclusion
16 TBD]. These results, it is hoped, will serve to inform local, state, and federal
17 legislatures when they establish public policy for charter schools.

18 *Keywords:* Rocketship Education, charter management organization,
19 privatization, charter finances, education public policy

Acknowledgments

1
2 My debts are many.

3 It goes without saying that I am solely responsible for any errors or omissions in
4 this dissertation.

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Abbreviations

1	
2	ARUSD Alum Rock Unified School District
3	BAN Bond anticipation note
4	CAFR Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
5	CDE California Department of Education
6	CMO Charter school management organization
7	COE County Office of Education
8	COVID-19 Corona Virus Disease 2019
9	CPRA California Public Records Act
10	CSBA California School Boards Association
11	DOE U.S. Department of Education
12	EC Education Code of California law
13	EMO Education management organization
14	FOIA (federal) Freedom of Information Act
15	GO bond General obligation bond
16	LASD Los Altos School District
17	LCAP Local Control and Accountability Plan
18	LCFF Local Control Funding Formula
19	LEA Local education agency
20	SACS Standardized Account Code Structure
21	SARC School Accountability Report Card
22	SARS-CoV-2 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus #2
23	SCCBOE Santa Clara County Board of Education
24	SCCOE Santa Clara County Office of Education
25	SCC Santa Clara County
26	SEDA Stanford Educational Data Archive
27	TPS Traditional Public School
28	TRAN Tax revenue anticipation note

Introduction

If, in Harold Lasswell's words, politics is about who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1936), then education is surely one of the most consequential — and fascinating — of public policy issues. At stake is the future well-being of 56.4 million students on whose behalf federal, state, and local governments spend upwards of three quarters of a trillion dollars annually.¹ The number of stakeholders is huge: every parent and every child is a stakeholder, as are teachers, administrators, legislators, employees of fifty state departments of education, the federal Department of Education, the President of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court, and state and local courts. Stakeholders exist throughout the United States, in states, counties, cities, towns, villages, and in almost 100 thousand schools in thousands of school districts. The COVID-19 pandemic of the last 2+ years has revealed just how important public education is to stakeholders.

Education is the arena in which parents, legislators, unions, political parties, billionaires, technologists, scholars and educators clash, all vying for influence and reward. Education is where religion, politics, free market neoliberalism, and social justice — all of them beliefs — intersect. One topic in particular has, in the last fifty years, generated a disproportionate share of discord: the privatization of public education, i.e. school choice.²

Formerly sleepy school board elections have attracted national interest, and with that interest, a flood of money. The 2020 Los Angeles school board election cost over \$14M for just four seats and generated articles in the national press. Likewise, a

¹The 50 states and the federal government spent \$734.9B in 2017–18. Using an inflation rate of 2%, the estimate for 2021–22 would be just shy of \$800B. Author's estimate using data from "Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education: FY 18", NCES, 2020

²"School choice" is an Orwellian name designed to mislead, to dress up an otherwise unpalatable reality: privatization takes something that used to be available to all and restricts it exclusively to those who can afford to pay.

1 November 2016 statewide proposition in Massachusetts that sought to expand
2 charter schools was covered extensively by national newspapers with one advocacy
3 group spending more than \$15M (not including a \$425,000 fine for violating
4 campaign law). Betsy DeVos, U.S. Secretary of Education under the twice impeached
5 President Donald Trump, drew fierce criticism from the start of her tenure, criticism
6 which was endlessly reported on. What caused these uproars? Why was so much
7 money spent on these and other elections? The answer is charter schools.

8 Schools and Charter Schools

9 Schools in the United States take three basic forms: the traditional public school
10 (TPS), charter schools, and private schools. Only two states, Nebraska and North
11 Dakota, have resisted some form of school choice; all have private schools and an
12 extensive public school system. By definition, school choice encompasses charter,
13 private, magnet, and homeschooling, i.e. every kind of school traditional except
14 public schools. But, because school vouchers in particular are becoming more
15 common, school choice now increasingly refers to school vouchers in addition to
16 charter schools (Enlow, 2022). In this dissertation, I will use school choice to refer to
17 charter schools.

18 Schools, under this definition of school choice, take a number of forms: they can,
19 like TPSs be in-person, but unlike TPSs, they can also be online (virtual), or even a
20 blend of the two. How school choice is financed varies as well. School vouchers,
21 education savings accounts, and tax-credit education savings accounts, tax-credit
22 scholarships, individual tax-credits & deductions, have all been used, often
23 augmented by tax dollars. The phrase “school choice” is also associated with 529
24 savings accounts, student income loans, social impact bonds, and
25 philanthrocapitalism.

1 Regardless of how school choice is financed, school choice complicates what used
2 to be a system of mostly public schools plus a few private schools that had been in
3 place for over 150 years. This new kind of financing has raised some fundamental
4 questions: Who benefits from this new financing? Do the children for whom
5 education is the difference between poverty and flourishing benefit? Is education is
6 being turned into a low-risk, profitable investment for hedge funds, private equity
7 firms, investment banks, and the 1%?

8 The various forms of school choice have waxed and waned, but charter schools
9 were present at the creation of the privatization movement in education and have
10 continued to enroll more and more students, diverting more and more dollars out of
11 the public school system (Lafer, 2018, p. 18; Lafer et al., 2021, p. 9). School choice has
12 spawned an entire industry devoted to marketing school choice: academic
13 departments and institutions, educational associations, think tanks, astroturf³
14 advocacy groups, and political action committees, all of which are examples of the
15 marketing of the privatization of public education.

16 According to the National Center of Education Statistics in the U.S. Department
17 of Education, there were 7,547 elementary and secondary charter schools in the
18 United States enrolling 3,431,230 students in 2019–20 school year (de Brey et al.,
19 2022, Table 216.90, p.144). This represents 7.7% of the total number of elementary and
20 secondary schools and 6.8% of the total number of students in the United States. The
21 state with the greatest charter school presence was California which had 1,321 schools
22 (12.7% of the total) and 674,652 students (11.0%). Within California, in the 2019–20
23 school year, charter schools in Santa Clara County enrolled 31,584 students (13.6% out
24 of 231,865) (California Department of Education, n.d.).

³Wordnik definition: “The disguising of an orchestrated campaign as a “grass-roots” event – i.e., a spontaneous upwelling of public opinion.”

1 These are notable patterns, and the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the
2 growth of charter schools, in contrast to recent years of slowing growth. This recent
3 growth appears to be almost completely due to the expansion of virtual charter
4 schools (Strauss, 2021). Despite continued growth, charter schools remain
5 controversial and have generated heated debate. Reports and studies from charter
6 school opponents have been answered by reports and studies from charter school
7 advocates. Both sides claim their methodology to be superior and consider the other
8 side's fatally flawed.⁴

9 What the research indicates is that *some* charter schools, under *some*
10 circumstances, for *some* students, seem to do *somewhat* better than traditional public
11 schools. (Garcia, 2018, p.119) Charter schools are, on average, not surprisingly, just
12 average. If charter schools are on average not better than public schools, why are they
13 so fervently touted as the answer to the perceived ills of American public education?
14 Why are eye-popping sums (10× the usual amount) spent supporting public school
15 board candidates who favor charter schools? Why are charter schools still growing in
16 both enrollment and in number? Is the profit motive is the overriding goal of charter
17 schools, or are they instead driven by a genuine desire to radically improve the
18 educational outcomes of children who could most benefit from a quality education?
19 My goal in this dissertation is to offer some answers to questions like these by looking
20 closely at the finances of a single charter school chain, Rocketship Education.

21 I will use the term *charter school chains* to refer both to for-profit and to non-profit
22 organizations that manage more than one charter school since both take financial
23 control away from the school and centralize outside of schools. Charter school chains
24 are essentially franchise operations like McDonald's or Hertz, but in education

⁴Jeffery Henig in *Spin Cycle: How Research is Used in Policy Debates: The Case of Charter Schools* (J. Henig, 2009) offers a fascinating look at the war of words that resulted from just one report and one newspaper article.

1 instead of hamburgers or rental cars. For-profit charter school chains have
2 traditionally been called *educational management organizations* (EMOs) and non-profit
3 charter school chains *charter management organizations*, but since there is little
4 difference between the two, I will use *charter school chains* when the distinction is
5 unimportant.

6 The remainder of this chapter provides some context for why I conducted this
7 study. The chapter A Review of the Literature discusses the voluminous literature on
8 charter schools. The following chapter, *Research Design and Methodology*, details what
9 data will be collected, how it will be collected, and how it will be analyzed. The
10 chapter *Findings and Results* provides the results of analyzing that data in context of
11 this study's research questions. The last chapter, *Discussion* considers the public
12 policy implications of my study and its conclusions, and makes some suggestions for
13 how current public policy should be changed to achieve some of the seven goals that
14 the California Legislature set out in *The Charter School Act of 1992*.

15 What is the Purpose of this Study?

16 The goal of this case study is to analyze as carefully and fully as possible the finances
17 of Rocketship Education and associated entities. Is Rocketship profitable? and if it is,
18 how does it generate those profits?a I chose Rocketship Education⁵ to study because
19 its popularity has led to core aspects of its model being adopted by other charter
20 school chains such as the Caliber Public Schools or the Navigator Schools, both in
21 California. It is an exemplar of a popular charter school and has had an outsized
22 influence on public education in Santa Clara County.

⁵Rocketship Public Schools is the new name of Rocketship Education, but since it has been known as Rocketship Education for much longer than it has been as Rocketship Public Schools, I've chosen to retain the former name.

1 Charter schools, Rocketship included, offer themselves as better alternatives to
2 traditional public schools. Rocketship claims that its pedagogical model of blended
3 learning

- 4 • is more efficient than that of traditional public schools,
- 5 • offers personalized learning⁶ through computer-mediated instruction, and
- 6 • offers a human connection (at least part of the time) that is similar to
7 traditional public schools.

8 These are claims that can be tested in other studies by comparing individual
9 Rocketship schools to independent charter schools and to TPSs in the same district.
10 The Rocketship chain can be compared to other charter school management
11 organizations, to portfolios of charter schools, as well to traditional public school
12 districts, but such studies need to be done with care to avoid methodological errors
13 that would reduce the validity of their conclusions.

14 Many studies have looked at the outcomes of charter schools and charter chains,
15 including one specifically on Rocketship's effect on Milwaukee's public schools if
16 proposed legislation were to have been passed. But Rocketship's finances, *in toto* have
17 not been studied in detail.

18 *Research Question*

19 These themes lead to the following research question: Has Rocketship structured
20 itself and its finances, to earn a return to investors, and if so, how?

21 More broadly, there are additional reasons for studying charter school finances.
22 Are we (the states, the federal government) misallocating the money we spend on

⁶Note that personalized learning is not the same differentiated instruction. All students follow the same path with personalized learning, albeit at different rates, instead of following different paths at different rates, as with properly implemented differentiated instruction.

1 charter schools? Could we be spending our tax dollars more wisely? What did
2 taxpayers get for these expenditures?

3 This case study is believed to be unique in that it examines in depth the finances
4 of a single charter school chain. There have been studies of the finances of
5 aggregations of charter school chains (e.g., all known charter school chains in the
6 United States,⁷ or a selected group of charter school chains). Other studies have
7 looked at the effects of charter schools on segregation or academic achievement, or
8 the financial impact of charter schools on their surrounding public school district.
9 But academic studies of the finances of just a single charter school chain seem to be
10 missing.⁸ It is hoped that the lessons learned from this case study will be used by
11 policy makers to strengthen charter school law in California and elsewhere in order
12 to increase desired outcomes and to minimize unintended consequences.

13 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

14 According to Grant and Osanloo (2014), creating and understanding the theoretical
15 framework for one's dissertation is "one of the most important aspects in the
16 research process." (p.12) They liken the theoretical framework of a dissertation to the
17 blueprints that define a house. That framework both defines the organization and the
18 structure of a dissertation, as well as what counts as elements and their
19 relationships. A theoretical framework articulates "the researcher's understanding of
20 how the research problem will best be explored, the specific direction the research
21 will have to take, and the relationship between the different variables in the study."
22 (Grant & Osanloo, 2014, pp. 16–17)

⁷See Miron et al. (2021) for a list of currently known charter school chains.

⁸I distinguish between academic studies and criminal investigations. Clearly, the grand jury indictment of 11 persons associated with A3 Education was a study of a single charter school chain, but it was a criminal investigation, not an academic study.

1 Further, a “conceptual framework offers a logical structure of connected concepts
2 that help provide a picture or visual display of how ideas in a study relate to one
3 another within the theoretical framework” (Grant & Osanloo, 2014, pp. 16–17). This
4 dissertation uses a case study approach as its theoretical framework within a public
5 policy framework, its conceptual framework.

6 *A Case Study Approach as a Practical Framework*

7 Broadly, social science research falls into one of two categories. The research may
8 make many observations with a narrow focus, or may instead adopt a broader focus,
9 but with a correspondingly smaller number of observations. Gerring calls these
10 “large C” or “small C” studies, respectively (Gerring, 2017, p. xvii). Of course, the
11 boundary between large C and small C studies is not sharply defined.

12 Gerring calls small C studies *case studies*. In this dissertation I look at one entity,
13 Rocketship Education, and at only one aspect of Rocketship, its finances. But I look at
14 its finances broadly, examining as many different kinds of financial transactions as
15 are publicly available for the subset of Rocketship schools that are in Santa Clara
16 County. I discuss the elements of what makes a case study a good case study in
17 chapter *Discussion*.

18 McCombes (2019) says that case studies are a “detailed study of a specific subject,
19 such as a person, group, place, event, organization, or phenomenon”. They are ‘good
20 for describing, comparing, evaluating and understanding different aspects of a
21 research problem” and are “an appropriate research design when it allows you to
22 explore the key characteristics, meanings, and implications of the case.” Two papers
23 go into detail about using the case study approach: Crowe et al. (2011) and Rashid
24 et al. (2019). Yin (2018) provides a detailed methodology for doing case study research
25 well.

1 A case study framework for public policy research is ideal because the theory and
2 practice of case studies is well-known and has been used both for public policy
3 research and in public policy analysis for years. A case study framework formalizes
4 an in-depth examination of a single topic, in this case, Rocketship's finances.

5 *Public Policy as a Theoretical Framework*

6 A public policy framework provides a rich set of tools and techniques with which to
7 analyze Rocketship's finances. Three factors support using a public policy framework
8 to guide understanding and evaluating Rocketship's finances. First, charter school
9 finance is constrained primarily by public policies set by state legislatures, the
10 creators of charter schools. These laws regulate taxes, grants, borrowing capacity,
11 and reporting requirements of charter schools and charter school chains (Aguinaldo
12 et al., 2020), and by definition, whatever falls within the purview of legislators is
13 public policy. Second, Brighthouse et al. (2018), in *Educational goods*, provide a succinct
14 definition of what public policy analysis is which matches the purpose of
15 undertaking this case study. They use a values, evidence, and decision-making
16 framework "to make judgments about how well specific policies are likely to realize
17 valued outcomes" (Brighthouse et al., 2018, p.1). Last, these three concerns — values,
18 evidence, decision-making — are considered the key concerns by academics and
19 researchers in the public policy field (Bueno de Mesquita, 2016; Clemons & McBeth,
20 2021; Fowler, 2013; Gupta, 2011). Using a public policy framework is appropriate when
21 examining charter school finances.

22 The discipline of public policy sanctions a wide variety of tools and techniques
23 when analyzing issues. Public policy has been studied for years (there are public
24 policy departments in many universities) and it is a mature area of academic
25 research. As in most academic fields, there are fierce debates about the merits and

1 robustness of a particular approach compared to alternatives, but at a high level,
2 what to do is generally agreed upon. Most identify the following five steps (or
3 variants thereof) that are used when creating public policy:

- 4 1. Define the issues and set the agenda.
- 5 2. Formulate one or more policies that address the issues identified.
- 6 3. Evaluate those policies using tools and techniques like cost-benefit analysis,
7 value analysis, political feasibility, game theory, and economic analysis.
- 8 4. Implement those policies by passing legislation, changing practices, or by
9 using the courts.
- 10 5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the policy changes.

11 Two keys to identifying alternatives during policy formation and later when
12 evaluating consequences are choosing or creating a model, and forecasting. Models
13 identify what is going to be studied and their relationships, and forecasting is a
14 prediction of the future whose consequences are (hopefully) identified in a model.
15 Page (2018) lists 26 major models that have been used in science, business, and
16 medicine.

17 This dissertation relies on two excellent guides to public policy: Fowler (2013),
18 which offers a broad and complete treatment of public policy specifically in the field
19 of education, and Clemons and McBeth (2021) which offers a number of well-tried
20 tools and techniques useful in analyzing public policy. An additional comprehensive
21 treatment of public policy can be found in Gupta (2011).

22 This introduction makes the case that public education is important to many
23 stakeholders, but that there is also discord around larger issues like values, ideology,
24 and implementation. Charter schools have been offered as way of disrupting
25 American public education from its hide-bound, archaic, and sclerotic present,

1 driving it, despite opposition, into a dynamic future where education is tailored to
2 each child's real needs. Establishing whether financial gain plays a key or even a
3 primary role in American educational reform by carefully examining Rocketship's
4 finances is both timely and important: Rocketship is growing and has served as a
5 model for other charter school chains.

6 The next chapter reviews what other researchers and scholars have said about the
7 origins of charter schools, their history, and their ostensible goals before
8 characterizing first the finances of all public schools in California and then the
9 unique aspects of charter school finance. Finally, it reviews the history of Rocketship
10 Education.

A Review of the Literature

American public education has – allegedly – been a failure, and hence, in desperate need of reform ever since the idea of free public education took hold in the early 1800s.⁹ Since then, a succession of educators and reports have documented the abysmal[sic] state of American education. Prior to the Civil War, Horace Mann introduced widely copied reforms (Pulliam & Van Patten, 2007, p. 147) into a system which was not free, not open to all, and not compulsory. Those schools had hardly changed since the founding of the Boston Latin School on April 23, 1635. In the early 1900s, John Dewey, an educational leader of the Progressive Era (1896–1916) preached reform, but it really was not until the publication of *Nation at Risk* in 1983 that the modern zeal for education reform took form. Pulliam and Van Patten (2007) list 29 major education reform reports from 1982 to 2005 (p.252). That American public education needed reform was repeated constantly, mainly by conservatives, despite underwhelming evidence of its veracity and substantial evidence to the contrary. Through repetition, the need for reform has become accepted wisdom. The answer to this need was to take the government’s “monopoly in education” (Milton Friedman’s characterization) out of the hands of faceless bureaucrats and subject it to the rigors of free markets which would, it was asserted with scant evidence, increase efficiency, choice, and quality. Thus vouchers and charter schools were legitimized.

No amount of research, it seems, can dispel the *idée fixe* that American education was in dire straits, and further, piecemeal changes were simply not enough to make substantive changes. No matter what J. R. Henig (1994) or Berliner and Biddle (1997) or Nichols and Berliner (2007) or Glass (2008) or Berliner and Glass (2014) wrote, the idea that American education needed fundamental, pervasive reform persisted;

⁹Wikipedia has an excellent summary article on *Education in the United States* available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_the_United_States.

1 education reform was an evidence-free endeavor.

2 To be clear, it is not the case that every American school is a model for the rest of
3 the world: systematic and persistent, pervasive inequities and injustices abound and
4 have been powerfully written about in Kozol (1992) and again in Kozol (2005),
5 Valenzuela (1999), Heitzeg (2009), and Roithmayr (2014). But it is also clear that those
6 schools have been systematically underfunded for decades; their dismal performance
7 is more likely the result of the poverty of their neighborhoods and their lack of
8 funding than it is the other way around. For example, the California School Boards
9 Association’s (CSBA) Education Legal Alliance Adequacy Committee found that there
10 exists a “substantial gap in funding between what K-12 education [in California]
11 receives and what K-12 education needs even to meet the standards prescribed by the
12 state (Bray, 2015, iii). B. D. Baker et al. (2018) in their aptly titled report *The Real Shame*
13 *of the Nation*, develop a *National Education Cost Model* (B. D. Baker et al., 2018, p. 5)
14 which accounted for regional cost differences as well different funding levels to show
15 that inadequate funding is present throughout the United States. Garcia (2018) says
16 in *School Choice* that the “existence and importance of the issues that reformers
17 believe plague public education are based as much on tradition and reputation as
18 they are on tangible research evidence” (Garcia, 2018, p. 54). Finally, and tellingly,
19 grossly inadequate funding is a characteristic of communities that are racially
20 segregated and which are not white (Darling-Hammond, 2012; Rothstein, 2017).

21 J. R. Henig (1994)’s book, *Rethinking school choice*, which came out a mere three
22 years after the passage of the nation’s first state charter school law in Minnesota¹⁰
23 and two years after the second in California¹¹ lays out a key argument against charter
24 schools. Henig says, “[T]he real danger in the market-based choice proposals is not

¹⁰Laws of Minnesota 1991, chapter 265, article 9, section 3

¹¹Education Code, Title 2, Division 4 Part 26.8, §47600 *et. seq*

1 that they might allow some students to attend privately run schools at public
2 expense, but that *they will erode the public forums in which decisions with societal*
3 *consequences can democratically be resolved.*" (emphasis added) (J. R. Henig, 1994, *xiii*).
4 Translated this means that the decisions about public education's form and content
5 are not going to be made by parents and teachers, but by people who do not have a
6 stake in the outcome. It's a matter of badly misaligned incentives.

7 But even before that, in 1982, Earl Craig, Jr. attached a minority report to
8 *Rebuilding Education to Make It Work* which advocated for vouchers. He says in a
9 paragraph that is as accurate today as it was in 1982:

10 In conclusion, this report is part of a national movement toward
11 privatization of public services and responsibilities. I believe this
12 movement will have the eventual result of a complete retreat by this
13 society from a societal responsibility for the powerless who are difficult
14 or expensive to educate, house, protect, etc. I believe the committee and
15 board majority when they say that they are committed to equal access
16 and equity. They say, trust that we will do the right thing. I do trust
17 them, I do not trust the societal momentum of which vouchers is a part.
18 It is a very destructive wave that has caught up many good people. It
19 scares me to death. (Citizens League, Education Alternatives
20 Committee, 1982, p. 48)

21 The belief that that American schools were in crisis is simply not supported by the
22 evidence. But the idea that American schools are in crisis has been relentlessly
23 promoted, and sheer repetition has turned fiction turned into fact; charter schools
24 then became an idea whose time had come. Charter schools didn't actually take off
25 until "education reformers across party lines realized that charter school laws could
26 be crafted in ways that made it possible to open nonunion public schools, or even
27 allow public schools to be managed by for-profit companies" (Goldstein, 2015, p. 172).

1 This literature review will first examine charter schools, their origins and the
2 early research, before reviewing the types of charters which exist. Then it looks at the
3 various models of charter schools like virtual charter schools, charters which use
4 blended learning, and charter management organizations before taking a closer look
5 charter schools in Santa Clara County and in Rocketship in particular. It ends with a
6 consideration of the finances of charter schools.

7 A History of Charter Schools

8 Charter schools (privately run, but publicly financed schools) had an ugly racist origin
9 in the post-*Brown v Board of Education* era as a method of evading the U.S. Supreme
10 Court's mandate to educate both black and white Americans equally and not
11 separately. Fifty years later, charter schools turned segregation academies into the
12 preferred vehicle for privatizing public schools for profit while maintaining
13 segregation.

14 *The Origins of Charter Schools in Segregation*

15 The first charter schools were not founded for educational or economic reasons.
16 Charter schools had their origin in the aftermath of "Brown v. Board of Education".
17 "[Brown] was the genesis of school choice as a public policy mechanism." (Garcia,
18 2018, p. 8) In the Deep South, academies sprung up as part of the massive resistance
19 to the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous 1954 ruling which answered the question

20 Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
21 even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be
22 equal, deprive children of the minority group of equal educational
23 opportunities? (Warren, 1954, p. 9)

24 with "We believe that it does." (p.9)

1 In order to circumvent *Brown*, white parents in eleven states formed thousands of
2 private schools, and until the early 1970's, these segregation academies received
3 public funds (Rooks, 2017, p. 81). These origins of charter schools have been amply
4 documented, in Frankenberg et al. (2010), Frankenberg et al. (2011), and especially in
5 Suitts (2019) and Suitts (2020). Alexander (2011) in *The new Jim Crow* (Alexander, 2011,
6 p. 223) quotes Rosenberg (1991, p. 52) "The statistics from the Southern states are truly
7 amazing. For ten years, 1954–1964, virtually *nothing happened*." [emphasis in
8 Alexander (2011)] She goes on to say,

9 Not a single black child attended an integrated public grade school in
10 South Carolina, Alabama, or Mississippi as of the 1962–1963 school year.
11 Across the South as a whole, a mere 1 percent of black school children
12 were attending school with whites in 1964—a full decade after *Brown* was
13 decided.

14 In the years after *Brown*, some localities went further than merely forming
15 segregation academies. Prince Edward County in Virginia closed all of its schools for
16 five years rather than integrate. Others closed pools, parks, zoos, and recreational
17 facilities instead of integrating. This deliberate evasion of racial equality continued
18 until a 1968 Supreme Court ruling put a stop to the practice of closing public facilities
19 to avoid integrating them (Brennan, 1968).

20 The irony is that while charter schools started life as 100% white, they now serve
21 intensely segregated students of color. Frankenberg et al. (2019) noted that
22 Nearly three out of four students in the typical black student's charter
23 school are also black. This indicates extremely high levels of isolation,
24 particularly given the fact that black students comprise less than
25 one-third of charter students. Latino isolation is also high, but not as
26 severe as for blacks or whites across all charter schools. (p. 47)

27 Unfortunately, these segregation academies still exist, but instead of excluding
28 children of color the way segregation academies did, they disproportionately target

1 and enroll children of color. While these schools are no longer referred to as
2 segregation academies, they make up a sizable subset of charter schools and often
3 include the word “Academy” in their name. In Santa Clara County, for example, 11 out
4 of 21 charter schools authorized by the county currently include “Academy” in their
5 name (SCCOE, 2021).

6 Nikole Hannah-Jones, in her keynote speech at the Network for Public
7 Education’s Fourth Annual Conference, said that it has never been the case that a
8 majority of African-Americans have attended majority white schools (“Keynote at the
9 Network for Public Education’s 4th Annual Conference,” 2017). She then added
10 ruefully, that this was quite a feat considering that African-Americans make up
11 roughly one seventh of the population of the United States. Orfield and Frankenberg
12 (2014) note that the percent of African-Americans in majority white schools rose from
13 0% in 1954 to a peak of 43.5% in 1988 before steadily declining to 23.2% in 2011. (Table
14 3: Percent of Black Students in Majority White Schools, 1954–2011 Orfield &
15 Frankenberg, 2014, p. 10). Hannah-Jones also commented that American public
16 education doesn’t even live up to the Separate but Equal doctrine espoused in *Plessy v*
17 *Ferguson* and overturned by *Brown v Board of Education*: Schools are still segregated and
18 are still unequal.

19 Charter Schools, Free Markets and Privatization

20 Just a year after *Brown*, Friedman (1955) published his article “The Role of Government
21 in Education” in *Economics and the Public Interest* (Friedman, 1955) that reframed
22 charter schools as an economic problem in education instead as a way of evading
23 court-ordered integration. That paper ensured that charter schools would no longer
24 be morally tainted by their association with virulent racism, but rather would take on
25 the honorable task of breaking up what was called a monopoly. Charters, operating

1 in a free market¹², would allow parents to choose the best alternative from an array of
2 competing choices. Tellingly left unspecified was exactly how the free market would
3 ensure that the array of competing choices actually offered valuable educational
4 alternatives rather than merely alternatives in different locations.

5 In 1981, Ronald Reagan ran and became President of the United States based on a
6 platform of less government is better government. This platform included
7 eliminating the U.S. Department of Education (“The Republican Party platform of
8 1980,” 1980). True, eliminating the Department of Education is not the same as
9 shutting down an entire school district the way white parents did in 1964, but the
10 thought is there. Haney-López (2014) expertly dissects how it’s possible to voice racist
11 thoughts without actually using racial words, a practice perfected by President
12 Ronald Reagan (Haney-López, 2014).

13 Now, only liberty and freedom matter, in education, as in other fields. It’s school
14 choice or bust; school choice is proffered not only as *the* panacea for all that ails
15 America’s schools, but is even touted as the morally right thing to do. With trace of
16 irony, the twice impeached President Donald Trump framed school choice as the
17 “civil rights issue of our time” in a garbled statement at the signing of an executive
18 order on Safe Policing for Safe Communities:

19 School choice is the civil rights statement of the year, the decade and
20 probably beyond. Because all children have to have access to quality
21 education. A child’s zip code in America should never determine their
22 future.

23 (as quoted in Lennox, 2020)

¹²No one really wants a free market because a market completely free of regulation would have un-enforceable contracts, rampant monopolies, and constant and ruinous market failures. What people really want when they use the phrase “free market” is a heavily regulated market which allows them to profit, unfettered, while restraining or excluding others.

1 Education reformers have latched on to the notion that schools need to be
2 privatized and freed from bureaucratic control for reasons of efficiency, increased
3 flexibility, and accountability (Garcia, 2018). This claim is made despite educational
4 management organizations (EMOs) themselves being high overhead, opaque
5 bureaucracies with scant accountability.

6 B. Baker and Miron (2015) identified four major policy concerns with the
7 privatization of public education:

- 8 1. A substantial share of public expenditure intended for the delivery of direct
9 educational services to children is being extracted inadvertently or
10 intentionally for personal or business financial gain, creating substantial
11 inefficiencies;
- 12 2. Public assets are being unnecessarily transferred to private hands, at public
13 expense, risking the future provision of “public” education;
- 14 3. Charter school operators are growing highly endogenous, self-serving private
15 entities built on funds derived from lucrative management fees and rent
16 extraction which further compromise the future provision of “public”
17 education; and
- 18 4. Current disclosure requirements make it unlikely that any related legal
19 violations, ethical concerns, or merely bad policies and practices are not
20 realized until clever investigative reporting, whistleblowers or litigation
21 brings them to light.

22 (p.3)

23 In California at least, these policy concerns have not been addressed in the six
24 years since B. Baker and Miron (2015) wrote about them¹³.

¹³Changes in policy to address some of these concerns have been strenuously opposed by charter school advocates. For example, the California Charter Schools Association opposed an accountability bill, AB1316 *School accountability: financial and performance audits: charter schools: contracts. (2021–2022)*, which merely sought to make charter school finances more transparent.

1 Charter schools are now just one of the many forms of *privatization*, when public
2 functions are performed by private parties for profit. Privatization is a manifestation
3 of the corporate takeover of the world. More than fifty years ago, Domhoff (2014)
4 published the first of eight editions of *Who rules America?* in which he argues that
5 corporations and the corporate elite really run the United States, and by extension,
6 the world. Kahn and Minnich (2005) make much the same point in their book *The fox*
7 *in the henhouse: How privatization threatens democracy* (Kahn & Minnich, 2005). They list
8 “[s]chools, prisons, welfare, Social Security, water and sewer systems, buses, trains,
9 subways, highways, waterways, sanitation systems” (p. 30) as examples of formerly
10 government run functions that are in whole or part privatized. They could have also
11 listed postal mail, space travel, and now every facet of education, as being wholly or
12 partly privatized. Cohen and Mikaelian (2021) lay out in detail how privatization has
13 infiltrated American life and the consequences of this takeover of public goods by
14 private firms run for profit (Cohen & Mikaelian, 2021). Black in *Schoolhouse Burning*
15 (Black, 2020) focuses on the less tangible but arguably more important consequences
16 of privatization of public schools, the loss of democratic control.

17 Privatizers make money by turning goods or services that used to be publicly
18 available into private goods and services that must be paid for before they can be
19 used. The canonical example of privatization is the enclosure of the commons in
20 Britain in the 16th and 17th centuries whereby land which had previously been owned
21 collectively by a village was now owned by an individual who charged villagers for the
22 use of that land (Simon Fairlie, 2009). But modern privatizers have many more ways
23 of turning a profit. They can:

- 24 • Obtain tax benefits
- 25 • Invest in other firms with public monies
- 26 • Invest in financial instruments with public monies

- 1 • Obtain a monopoly
- 2 • Engage in fraud, corruption, or outright theft
- 3 • Engage in self-dealing
- 4 • Obtain grants or loans on favorable terms
- 5 • Sell what doesn't belong to them
- 6 • Avoid paying for externalities
- 7 • Pay below market rates for goods or services
- 8 • Skew public-private partnerships to create unearned profits
- 9 • Engage in pay-for-success contracts
- 10 • Offer social impact bonds

11 Charter school operators have even more options. They can inflate enrollment,
12 charge excessive management fees, mis-characterize expenses, omit or inaccurately
13 report financial data, fail to open a school or close one soon after receiving a grant,
14 and sell their facilities to investors and lease them back, both at inflated prices. Many
15 charter schools have a long history of duplicitous or fraudulent actions (In the Public
16 Interest, 2018; Burris & Bryant, 2020; B. Baker & Miron, 2015).

17 School choice has been relentlessly marketed and promoted by billionaires who
18 do not send their children to public schools.¹⁴ The Walton family, Eli Broad, Bill
19 Gates, the Koch brothers, the Zuckerbergs, and Laurene Jobs, are all on the list of the
20 500 richest people in the world. Their collective wealth exceeds half a trillion dollars,
21 and they are busily engaged using that wealth to fix the very problems that their
22 accumulation of wealth caused. Giridharadas (2018) whose book, *Winners Take All: The*
23 *Elite Charade of Changing the World*, says that it's a
24 "Trying-to-Solve-the-Problem-with-the-Tools-That-Caused-It" issue (Giridharadas,
25 2018, p. 142).

¹⁴Ravitch (2010) lumps these billionaires together, calling them the "Billionaires Boys Club", an epithet first used in *The Death and Life of the Great American School System*.

1 The effects of billionaire spending on education cannot be over emphasized. Bill
2 Gates made \$2B in grants aimed at creating smaller schools (Gates, 2009, p. 11),
3 despite a lack of evidence that they were educationally valuable. The grants were
4 eventually discontinued when the initiatives didn't produce the intended results.
5 Gates was also instrumental in funding and promoting the Common Core State
6 Standards and associated assessments whose premise was that if we only had high
7 enough academic standards, student outcomes would improve, again without
8 evidence that the reforms were educationally valuable.

9 Types of Charter Schools

10 Charter schools can be broadly classified along three axes. The authorizer/oversight
11 axis has to do with what entity approved their charter and who will exercise
12 oversight. The profit/non-profit axis classifies schools by their intent to generate a
13 profit, or not. Lastly, the in-person/blended/virtual axis characterizes pedagogical
14 approach. Are their classes in-person, virtual, or a blend of the two?

15 **Charter School Authorizers and Oversight** Charter schools in California are
16 potentially subject to a three step process to gain authorization to operate. The first
17 step is to submit a petition to the school district in which the charter wishes to reside.
18 This petition must contain a number of required elements, all of which are specified
19 in Education Code §47605(c)(5)(A–O), the so-called “15 Required Elements (A–O
20 elements)” (Aguinaldo et al., 2021, p. 89). Besides some technical details, the petition
21 must contain a description of the charter’s annual goals which must align with state
22 priorities, for all pupils and for various subgroups; how these outcomes are to be
23 measured; how the charter is to achieve a racial and ethnic balance similar to its
24 district, its governance structure, and its finances. All of these elements are captured

1 in “Charter Petition Evaluation Matrix” by FCMAT, a document intended to provide a
2 legally sound checklist for authorizers.

3 If a petition contains all the required elements, then the public school district
4 may approve the petition, possibly with additional stipulations. If the public school
5 district denies the charter school’s petition, the charter school may appeal that denial
6 to that County’s Board of Education (CBOE), and if the CBOE denies the charter
7 school’s appeal, under certain circumstances, the charter school may appeal to the
8 State Board of Education (SBE). A denial by the SBE terminates the process, and the
9 charter school is not permitted to open.

10 Public school districts (LEAs, local education agencies, in the parlance of the
11 California Department of Education (CDE)) may authorize one several kinds of
12 charter schools. A district may sponsor a charter school directly, in which case the
13 LEA exercises oversight. These dependent charter schools are authorized by the local
14 public school board and are subject to the board’s jurisdiction. It also is possible for
15 all the schools in a district to convert to charter schools, and then the public school
16 board becomes the charter school board. The table *Attributes of Private, Charter, and*
17 *Public Schools in California* below is a summary of the attributes of the types of schools
18 in California.

19 **Profit-Making Status** Until the 2019–20 school year, charter schools in California
20 could be run directly or indirectly by a profit-making organization. California now
21 prohibits profit-making organizations, either a single school or a charter
22 management organization, from submitting an initial charter school petition or a
23 renewal.

24 Even though profit-making charters are banned, there are many ways of getting
25 around this restriction. Charter operators can contract with outside firms to provide

Table 1*Attributes of Private, Charter, and Public Schools in California*

	Private	Charter	Public
Funding	parent tuition	tax dollars	tax dollars
Governance	self-appointed	self-appointed	elected board
Duration	unlimited	time-limited	unlimited
Ed. Code	no	no	yes
Taxation Powers	none	none	limited
Facilities Bonds	no	no	yes
Facilities Grants	no	yes	no
Enrollment	limited	limited	unlimited
Unionized	rarely	rarely	often
Curriculum	completely flexible	very flexible	flexible
Standardized Testing	no	yes	yes
Accountable	no	authorizer	state & parents
Teacher Certification	no requirement	yes	yes
Teacher Pension	perhaps	perhaps	yes

1 all or just some services, and those firms may be profit-making firms. Charter
2 operators are able to lease, buy, or sell their facilities, and those transactions might
3 generate a profit. Charter operators can sell their facilities and lease them back from
4 the buyer. This kind of financial transaction converts an illiquid asset (buildings) into
5 a liquid asset, cash, and also generates a revenue stream from the rental income, all
6 of which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. Charter operators may also charge
7 schools a management fee or an expansion fee. Charter operators are not restricted
8 in the salaries they pay administrators.

9 However, charter school board members in California have recently become
10 subject to the conflict-of-interest laws specified in Government Code §§1090–1099
11 and §§87100–87314 (Becerra & Medeiros, 2018). Generally, government officials are
12 prohibited from benefiting financially from their positions as public servants, but it
13 remains to be seen if these conflict-of-interest laws will prevent profiteering by

1 school board members, administrators, or relatives of either.¹⁵

2 **Type of Instruction** Charter schools, unlike almost all public schools, vary in their
3 instructional format. In-person instruction is similar to that in traditional public
4 schools. On the other hand, virtual charter schools have no face-to-face instruction;
5 everything is mediated by some sort of technology, typically, computers running
6 specialized software, paid for by taxpayers. Blended instruction is a mixture of
7 in-person and virtual instruction.

8 Virtual charter schools have been studied extensively by Alex Molnar, Gary Miron
9 and others and at the National Education Policy Center, University of Colorado,
10 Boulder since 2013. (*Virtual Schools in the U.S.* 2013, 2013; *Virtual Schools in the U.S.* 2014,
11 2014; *Virtual Schools in the U.S.* 2015, 2015; Miron & Gulosino, 2016; *Virtual Schools in the*
12 *U.S.* 2017, 2017; *Full-Time Virtual and Blended Schools: Enrollment, Student Characteristics,*
13 *and Performance*, 2018; *Virtual Schools in the U.S.* 2019, 2019; *Virtual Schools in the U.S.*
14 2021, 2021) Their annual reports are depressingly consistent: virtual school not run by
15 a public school district significantly underperform public schools. Their conclusions
16 are echoed by Woodworth et al. (2015) and Garcia (2018). Yet, despite being clearly
17 academically inferior to public schools, the number of students attending virtual
18 schools has risen year after year. Their pre-pandemic growth seems to be slowing,
19 but their performance, compared to TSPs, has not measurably improved.¹⁶ (*Virtual*
20 *Schools in the U.S.* 2019, 2019, p. 11).

¹⁵The law is necessarily complex. Two useful guides are Chaney et al. (2010) and Kevin Ennis et al. (2016) (which run to nearly 300 pages). A more general guide to local government ethics is “Understanding the Basics of Public Service Ethics” from California’s Institute for Local Government.

¹⁶Although *Charter Schools in Perspective: A Guide to Research* is otherwise an excellent summary of the research on charter schools, they incorrectly state (p.117) that there is little research of online or virtual charter schools. The authors must not be aware of the NEPC series on virtual charter schools. However, according to *Virtual Schools in the U.S.* 2019 (2019, p. 117), there is only one study on blended charter schools.

1 Pre-pandemic, charter schools in California were legally deemed
2 classroom-based (e.g. not virtual) if students spent no more than 20% of their time in
3 front of a computer.¹⁷ Blended charter schools, on the other hand, offer some sort of
4 face-to-face interaction with a teacher along with online activity without face-to-face
5 interaction. But they too offer only marginally better educational outcomes than fully
6 virtual charter schools (*Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2019*, 2019, p. 52). Rocketship schools
7 use a blended instructional model.

8 *Charter Schools in the United States*

9 Charter schools are one of several different kinds of school choice that are or have
10 been available in the United States. Vouchers, private schools, home schooling,
11 educational savings accounts, freedom-of-choice plans, magnet schools, and open
12 enrollment are all forms of school choice. Home schooling accounts for less than 5%
13 of all the students in United States. Private schools enroll about 12% of the total.
14 Magnet school account for a few percent. Roughly, the various form of school choice,
15 including charter schools, account for just under a quarter of all American students.

16 The characteristic that home schooling and private schools share is that they are
17 agnostic about public schools. Not so for charter schools, voucher, and
18 freedom-of-choice plans. Charter schools, voucher programs, parent trigger
19 programs, and freedom-of-choice plans explicitly want to supplant or replace public
20 schools (Garcia, 2018).

21 The first charter schools, other than segregation academies, were founded in
22 Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1991, followed by California starting in 1993. Conceptually,

¹⁷The California Education Code §47612.5(e)(1) doesn't mention computers, but bases its definition of classroom-based on students being physically at the schoolsite with a certificated teacher in charge. Under that definition, a roomful of students behind computers with a teacher in attendance would qualify as classroom-based and not virtual. California's Education Code does not recognize the blended category.

1 charter schools were based on an amalgam of ideas from Milton Friedman, Albert
2 Shanker, and Ray Budde. Milton Friedman came at it from an ideological point of
3 view couched in economic terms. Albert Shanker, in 1988, in a speech at the National
4 Press Club, proposed that *teachers* in conjunction with *parents* be allowed to form a
5 school *within* a school district. Shanker made no mention of competition, or free
6 markets, or even of charter schools. Shanker's speech emphasized curriculum and
7 learning, not governance or finance. Ray Budde first thought of charter schools in the
8 early 1970s, but his proposal generated no interest and it was not until 1988 that he
9 published his ideas (Budde, 1988).

10 *Charter Schools in California*

11 Charter schools, in California as elsewhere in the United States, enter into a contract
12 (the charter) with a chartering authority that specifies what they are to do and how,
13 and in return, are exempt from the entirety of California's Education Code (with the
14 exception of five technical provisions). The California Legislature, when it enacted
15 the *The Charter School Act of 1992*¹⁸ (Ed. Code §47600), spelled out its intent in passing
16 that legislation. The Act has been amended many times in its nearly 30 years of
17 existence, but its intent has remained the same. Charter schools should:

- 18 a) Improve pupil learning.
- 19 b) Increase learning opportunities for all pupils, with special emphasis on
20 expanded learning experiences for pupils who are identified as academically
21 low achieving.
- 22 c) Encourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods.

¹⁸Current California law can be accessed at <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/home.xhtml>. California Regulations are at <https://ccr.oal.ca.gov>. California's Education Code (Ed.Code) is at <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=EDC&tocTitle=+Education+Code+-+EDC>

- 1 d) Create new professional opportunities for teachers, including the
- 2 opportunity to be responsible for the learning program at the school site.
- 3 e) Provide parents and pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational
- 4 opportunities that are available within the public school system.
- 5 f) Hold the schools established under this part accountable for meeting
- 6 measurable pupil outcomes, and provide the schools with a method to change
- 7 from rule-based to performance-based accountability systems.
- 8 g) Provide vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate
- 9 continual improvements in all public schools.¹⁹

10 It is important to keep these seven goals in mind because charter schools have
11 contractually agreed to meet these goals in return for funding, independently of
12 whatever other goals they explicitly specified in their charter. Note, in particular, that
13 nothing has been said about profitability, and in fact, California enacted a
14 prohibition against for-profit charter schools (Ed. Code §47604 et seq.) in 2018.

15 Surveys of Charter School Research

16 It's been about 30 years since the first charter school law was passed. In the last
17 decade, researchers have published several surveys of the research on charter
18 schools. The first two decades (1990–2010) were somewhat experimental and
19 different enough that the research that came out of that period is less relevant than
20 more recent research. The first survey of the last decade, “Beyond ideological warfare:
21 the maturation of research on charter schools,” is by Smith et al. It is a systematic
22 review of charter school research as it existed in 2011. Smith et al. (2011) are
23 interested, not so much in the conclusions of the studies they looked at, but how the

¹⁹This goal was added in 1998.

1 research was performed, how was it structured, what facets of charter schools were
2 looked at, and what was the subject of the research in order to “separate empirical
3 evidence from politicized conjecture” (p. 460). They reviewed a total of 323
4 peer-reviewed articles and research center reports and found that student and school
5 outcomes were the most commonly studied topics. They noted many studies were
6 unable to generalize their findings because variations in policy between states and
7 localities. Smith et al. also noted that there was a lack of longitudinal studies which is
8 not surprising due to policy variations. Furthermore, they found that “acceptance
9 into a peer reviewed journal does not always ensure that qualitative research adheres
10 to the standards of providing substantiation that findings are credible and
11 trustworthy or that quantitative research provides evidence of the studies’ validity,
12 reliability and generalizability.” (p.466) Finally, the authors noted that many studies
13 could not draw causal connections. They conclude that more research is needed.

14 Four years later, Berends (2015) chose as his focus the various theories that
15 researchers used when looking at the social organization of charter schools. In
16 “Sociology and School Choice,” Berends (2015), found, like Smith et al., that most
17 studies concentrated on student achievement and neglected educational attainment
18 such as high school graduation, college admission, and the granting of a degree. He
19 notes that “the effects of charter schools on student achievement are mixed (some
20 positive, some negative and some neutral)” (p. 170) Berends thinks the context in
21 which charter schools operate is important in order to understand the magnitude of
22 any effects and to understand what we can expect from school reform. He identifies
23 longer school days, a focus on achievement, behavioral policies, teacher coaching and
24 feedback, and data-based decision-making as characteristics most often associated
25 with effective charter schools. Lastly he looks at innovation and distinguishes
26 between curriculum and class-room based changes, and organizational changes and

1 finds that charter schools mostly innovate on the structural side rather than the
2 academic side. He concludes that more research is needed.

3 Next, Epple et al. (2016), in *Charter schools*, did much the same as Berends, but
4 concentrated on the technical aspects of study design (Epple et al., 2016). They
5 observed that which the research question being answered by a particular study was
6 often much narrower or significantly different than the research question authors set
7 out to answer or thought they were answering. The heart of their review is an
8 analysis of “the methodological challenges in evaluating charter effectiveness” (p.141),
9 and the strength and weaknesses of the various approaches that have been used.
10 They find that researchers used one of five statistical methods: lottery-based design,
11 fixed-effect approaches, matching procedures, ordinary least squares (OLS)
12 regression, and instrumental variable approaches (p. 165), and they evaluate each
13 approach. Epple et al. also discuss the much scrutinized virtual control record
14 method of matching charter school students to public school students that came out
15 of Stanford’s Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) which was
16 criticized on purely statistical grounds in Andrea Gabor (2015). Epple et al. concluded
17 that more research is needed.

18 In 2015 and then updated in 2018, Public Agenda released a guide to charter
19 school research for non-academics, a review of current charter school research that
20 was written in a way that is accessible to the public. The chapter on finance focused
21 on four questions related to how charter schools are funded, comparisons between
22 per pupil funding between charter and traditional schools, financial effects on
23 traditional public schools, and differential spending patterns between traditional
24 public and charter schools (Public Agenda, 2018, pp. 78–89).

25 The finance chapter must have been a difficult chapter to write because the 48
26 states with school choice programs have 48 different methods of funding public

1 schools and charter schools. In addition, each state has likely gone through several
2 iterations of models of charter school funding, and this lack of commonality prevents
3 researchers from conducting valid longitudinal studies.

4 Their answer to their first question is to point to compilations of state funding.
5 Their answer to the second question is yes, and in some cases, by 40% to nearly 60%
6 less. Their take on whether it matters is hedged because studies differ in their
7 conclusions for a variety of reasons. Not mentioned is B. D. Baker (2018) which
8 emphatically says that money does matter, perhaps because it was published after
9 *Charter Schools in Perspective: A Guide to Research* was. They answer their third question
10 with an unambiguous yes. More recent research, Lafer (2018), B. D. Baker (2019), and
11 Miron et al. (2021) validates their conclusion. Finally, they conclude that charter
12 schools do spend their revenues differently, in part because spend more on
13 administration than public schools do and sometimes more on facilities. The authors
14 conclude that more research is needed.

15 The last of the four academic surveys, Zimmer et al. (2019), considered who was
16 served, racial segregation effects, both academic and non-academic outcomes,
17 management structure, and financial effects of charter schools. Since Zimmer is a
18 co-author of both this survey and of the previously cited Epple et al. (2016), the kinds
19 of study designs analyzed are similar. Zimmer et al. intend to synthesize “the best
20 research to inform the debate [about the value of charter schools]” (p. 2). They go
21 beyond the 2016 study and survey studies on racial segregation, cream skinning²⁰,
22 and student pushout²¹. They conclude that charter schools lead to greater segregation
23 for African Americans, but not necessarily for whites or Hispanics. They find that
24 charter schools do engage in sometimes subtle forms of cream skinning and

²⁰selecting the best students from TPSs

²¹pushing out their lowest performing students

1 student pushout. After summarizing three different kinds of research (fixed effects,
2 lottery-based, and match and other regression), they turn their attention to research
3 on non-cognitive outcomes. Their penultimate chapter looks at research on indirect
4 effects. They conclude in their last chapter that more research is needed.

5 Although Garcia (2018) is not explicitly a survey of the existing literature, Garcia
6 (2018), in Chapter 3 (pp. 91–146), contains much material on the research evidence
7 which guides (or should guide) school choice policies. His goal is to present general
8 trends that “reflect the weight of the evidence” (p. 93). The weight of the evidence,
9 Garcia finds the research points to the conclusions that “school choice policies are
10 more likely to separate, rather than integrate, students from different racial/ethnic
11 and socioeconomic backgrounds” (pp. 159–60), “how countries and states structure
12 school choice policies can have a profound impact on how school choice functions at
13 a practical level” (p. 160), “low-income students face obstacles to participating in
14 school choice plans” (p. 161), lastly, “one should expect student achievement gains
15 under school choice plans to be modest at best and inconsistent across subjects and
16 years” (p. 161), and “a major reason for the inability of school choice to have an impact
17 on the academic core of schools—teaching and learning—is that school choice came
18 of age at the same time as high-stakes accountability policies that encourage
19 standardization” (p. 162)

20 Garcia makes a point that hasn’t been made before: Since both public schools and
21 charter schools are measured the same way (standardized tests), “the incentives to
22 implement innovative pedagogical strategies are curtailed because the methods by
23 which students are able to demonstrate their learning are uniform across all schools
24 and restricted to the format of the tests.” (p. 163) He does not conclude that more
25 research is needed, but instead predicts that school choice in its many forms will
26 continue to expand.

2 Charter schools have been much studied, and the last decade has produced a number
3 of reports examining charter school finances based on carefully collected evidence.
4 For example, in 2014, Lafer (2014), now at In the Public Interest, published an analysis
5 of a proposed law in Milwaukee, WI (Lafer, 2014) that was specifically tailored to
6 benefit a to-be-opened Rocketship school. Lafer went on to author two other studies
7 on charter schools, public policy, and finance: *Spending blind: the failure of policy*
8 *planning in california charter school funding* and *Breaking point: The cost of charter schools for*
9 *public school districts*. Carol Burris, Executive Director of the Network for Public
10 Education, and several co-authors have produced three reports on charter schools:
11 Burris and Pflieger (2020), Burris and Bryant (2020), and Burris and Cimarusti (2021).
12 The National Education Policy Center is a research center based at the University of
13 Colorado, Boulder, with over 150 scholars and academics from institutions across the
14 U.S. whose goal is “to produce and disseminate high-quality, peer-reviewed research
15 to inform education policy discussions” (“National Education Policy Center,” n.d.).
16 The NEPC has produced hundreds of reviews of research, policy and legislative
17 briefs, some of which are annual surveys of charter schools. The series on profiles of
18 EMOs have been produced annually for fifteen years; the series on virtual charter
19 schools, for ten years.

20 Bruce Baker’s contributions to the NEPC are especially noteworthy. He is an
21 author or co-author of 28 reviews of reports, studies, or articles on school finance, in
22 addition to six policy, legislative, or research briefs. Baker co-wrote with Gary Miron
23 *The business of charter schooling: Understanding the policies that charter operators use for*
24 *financial benefit*. B. Baker and Miron (2015) which introduces many of the tools and
25 techniques for evaluating how charter schools operate for profit. It will serve as a key

1 resource for this dissertation.

2 Lafer (2017)'s report, *Spending blind: the failure of policy planning in california charter*
3 *school funding* is particularly scathing. He says, "Any time there is a low bar of entry for
4 firms seeking to access government funds, one can expect to find corruption, and the
5 charter industry is no exception." (p.18) But even absent corruption, there is ample
6 opportunity to make lots of money. Lafer documents \$2.5B of Californian taxpayer
7 money spent over fifteen years on charter school facilities, in many cases where there
8 is no documented educational need and where the charter school is of lower quality
9 than nearby public schools. Lafer says, "It's as if legislators turned on a faucet of
10 money and then just walked away." (p.12) It is saddening that in the four years since
11 Lafer's report came out, nothing has fundamentally changed.

12 Rocketship

13 Rocketship is well-known in the charter school world. It even has been the subject of
14 a "biography", *On the rocketship* (Whitmire, 2014).²². Rocketship's leaders and
15 supporters routinely describe it as "high performing", "deserving of huge credit",
16 "dynamic", and "nationally lauded". Rocketship schools, it is claimed, outperform
17 some of the best public schools in the country. Rocketship "believe[s] that every
18 student deserves the right to dream, to discover, and to develop their own unique
19 talent". Rocketship, charter school advocates, and privatizers excel at choosing
20 names and tag lines that are impossible to argue against.

21 Rocketship is one of the largest non-profit blended charter school management
22 organization in the United States. They operate 21 schools in three states and
23 Washington, D.C.; thirteen in California, three in both Nashville, TN and

²²Just two other charter schools share this distinction: Geoffrey Canada's Harlem Children's Zone (Tough, 2009) and the KIPP schools (Mathews, 2009; Horn, 2016)

1 Washington, D.C., and two in Milwaukee, WI. In Santa Clara County, CA, they have
2 eight TK-5 elementary schools authorized by the county that served 4,254 students in
3 the 2019–20 school year plus 1240 students in two district authorized schools, for a
4 total of 5494 students.

5 *Founders and Supporters*

6 Rocketship was founded by John Danner, Don Shalvey, Jennifer Andaluz, and Eric
7 Resnick in 2007. Danner had significant teaching experience (Nashville, TN public
8 schools) prior to Rocketship, as did Shalvey (Aspire Public Schools) and Andaluz
9 (Downtown College Prep). Resnick, the fourth member of the founding group was a
10 hedge fund manager who had a “a deep understanding of financial management and
11 real estate transactions” (Danner, 2006, p. 13). The inclusion of Resnick, an expert in
12 real estate transactions, at the very beginning of Rocketship, is interesting because
13 one of the preferred ways for charter school investors and founders to generate
14 profits is via real estate deals. John Danner eventually left Rocketship in 2013 to found
15 Zeal, an online math tutoring tool, and was replaced by Preston Smith who became
16 CEO.

17 Not mentioned in the first charter petition, nor in the Articles of Incorporation of
18 Rocketship Education, the owners of the first Rocketship school, were Preston Smith,
19 Matt Hammer, and Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix. Smith became the first principal
20 of the Rocketship’s first school, Mateo Sheedy, and was subsequently listed as a
21 Rocketship co-founder in the charter petition for Rocketship’s second school.
22 Hammer brought Danner and Smith together, and has relentlessly promoted charter
23 schools through his advocacy non-profit, Innovate Public Schools.²³ Hastings
24 proselytized Rocketship to the larger charter school community and when he

²³<https://innovateschools.org/>

1 promised Rocketship \$250K for each of the first eight Rocketship schools they opened
2 his donation caught the attention of philanthropic venture funds (Whitmire, 2014,
3 p. 50).

4 *Rocketship History*

5 The first Rocketship school, Mateo Sheedy, opened in Santa Clara County in 2007.
6 Rocketship's initial petition to the San José Unified School District was denied, so
7 they appealed to the Santa Clara County Board of Education, which granted their
8 petition. Over the years, Rocketship opened ten schools in Santa Clara County. Of
9 those ten, only two were authorized by a public school district. The remainder were
10 either countywide charters or charter schools whose petitions were denied by the
11 local public school district, but subsequently approved by the Santa Clara County
12 Board of Education. Table 2 *Rocketship Schools in Santa Clara County, California* lists the
13 eleven Rocketship schools that were approved and the ten that opened. Note that
14 only two were approved by the school district in which there were expected to locate.
15 This lopsided result suggests that current charter school laws are tilted in favor of
16 charter schools.

17 *Rocketship Finances*

18 Charter schools have a number of unique financial needs. They need startup funds,
19 operating funds, and often funds to expand, funds that public schools do without.
20 Rocketship is no exception. The *operation* of charter schools are funded by federal,
21 state, and local governments, but funding *expansion* may or may not be funded with
22 tax dollars, depending on the laws of a particular state. The difference between
23 what's funded at taxpayer expense and what's not must somehow be funded with

Table 2*Rocketship Schools in Santa Clara County, California*

School	Type	Opened	Renewed	Notes
Mateo Sheedy	District appeal	2007	2009, 2015	Denied by SJUSD, approved by SCCOE
Sí Si Puede	District appeal	2009	2011, 2017	Denied by ARUSD, approved by SCCOE
Los Sueños	Countywide	2010	2015	SCCOE countywide
Discovery Prep	Countywide	2011	2016	SCCOE countywide charter
Mosaic	District	2011	2016	Approved by ARUSD
Brilliant Minds	Countywide	2012	2017	SCCOE countywide charter
Alma Academy	Countywide	2012	2017	SCCOE countywide charter
Spark Academy	District	2013	2018	Approved by FMSD
Alum Rock	District appeal	—		Denied by ARUSD, approved by SCCOE, but withdrawn 2015
Fuerza	Countywide	2014	2018	SCCOE countywide charter
Rising Stars	District appeal	2016	2021	Denied by FMSD, approved by SCCOE

1 outside money. Startup money is needed for facilities, desks and chairs, teacher and
2 administrator salaries, legal fees, curriculum materials, etc., all of this before even
3 one student registers. Startup facilities cost vary widely. If the charter school chooses
4 to use public school district facilities under Proposition 39²⁴, their need for funds will
5 be less. Regulations drawn up by the State Board of Education further define the
6 phrase “sufficient to accommodate the charter school’s students” (California Code of
7 Regulations, Title 5, §11969.), then startup facilities cost might be small; if they choose
8 not to avail themselves of Proposition 39, then startup facilities costs might involve
9 the purchase of land and the construction of school buildings, or might just involve
10 lease payments. But since state funding is tied to attendance, some startup funding

²⁴ Proposition 39, passed by California voters in November 2000, contains a provision that requires public school districts to provide charter schools facilities “sufficient to accommodate the charter school’s students” (Secretary of State, California, 2000, pp. 38—41) (Smaller Classes, Safer Schools and Financial Accountability Act, 2000)

1 is necessary. Thus the federal government provides grants, administered by the
2 states, for this purpose.

3 Rocketship has indicated from the beginning its intent to expand. In 2009,
4 Rocketship announced plans to open six new schools (Cook, 2009). It submitted a
5 petition to Santa Clara County to open countywide charters and within three years
6 had actually opened four. Like many other CMOs and EMOs, Rocketship must
7 expand in order to increase revenue enough to be worth the while of investors. A
8 single school's profit is not enough to satisfy investors, but by using economies of
9 scale, a "portfolio" of charter schools might suffice. A portfolio of charter schools is a
10 collection of schools – almost always charter schools – managed as a whole.

11 The idea of a portfolio of schools comes from finance where a carefully chosen
12 portfolio of investments can have lower collective risk for a given level of return than
13 a mere collection of individual investments. (See "Markowitz model," 2021, for an
14 overview of the mathematics of modern portfolio theory). Hill et al. claim to have
15 invented the term *portfolio school district* (Hill et al., 2009, p. 1) and with it a strategy to
16 implement such a district. Just a year later, J. R. Henig et al. define portfolio strategy
17 for schools as

18 ...a loosely coupled conglomeration of ideas held together by the
19 metaphor of a well-managed stock portfolio and its proponents'
20 *unshakable belief* that the first step for successful reform must be to
21 dismantle the bureaucratic and political institutions that have built up
22 around the status quo. [emphasis added] (J. R. Henig et al., 2010)

23 Hill et al. acknowledge, in dry, understated language, that overcoming the
24 objections and criticisms of educators and scholars to their unshakable belief will be
25 difficult: "It is hard to imagine that a portfolio strategy could be introduced into a
26 major city without significant conflict." Portfolio strategy is most often associated

1 with Paul Hill and The Center for Reinventing Public Education, which is now located
2 at the Mary Lou Fulton Teachers College at Arizona State University.

3 *Rocketship Expansion Funding*

4 California, startup charter school funding has waxed and waned, in part because
5 federal funding has varied. Currently, the U.S. Department of Education provides
6 startup funds to states under the Charter Schools Program State Educational Agency
7 (SEA) grant program²⁵. The federal charter school funding programs are listed in
8 National Charter School Resource Center (2020). *The federal charter schools program:*
9 *2020 annual report* notes that

10 At the core of the Charter Schools Program are the Grants to State
11 Entities (SE Grants). The State Entity program offers competitive grants
12 to states, which then make subgrants within their states to *open new*
13 *charter schools and replicate or expand existing charter schools*. [emphasis
14 added]

15 (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2020)

16 Funds like the New School Venture Fund²⁶ and the Charter School Growth Fund I
17 & II²⁷ exist to fund the development and expansion of charter schools and charter
18 management organizations. In 2007, when Rocketship Mateo Sheedy was started,
19 Rocketship used lines of credit and loans to fund its beginning (Danner, 2006, p. 260).
20 Now, charter schools have many more options for funding startup or operations.

21 Charters have at least three other sources of facilities funding: bonds, tax credits
22 and foundation or individual contributions. Betsy DeVos, who served as Secretary of
23 Education for Donald Trump, has donated \$12.6M to Rocketship. Reed Hasting, a

²⁵<https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/funding.html>

²⁶<https://www.newschools.org/>

²⁷<https://chartergrowthfund.org/>

1 founder and now CEO Netflix has donated more than \$2M. In addition, charter
2 schools can avail themselves of the New Market Tax Credit if they meet certain
3 investment criteria, and if they do, they can get back 39% of their investment in tax
4 credits in seven years. If their investment returns, say, 20%, then combined, they are
5 looking at nearly a 60% return on their investment. A sixty percent return is fantastic.
6 Charter schools and charter school operators can also issue revenue bonds. Revenue
7 bonds are guaranteed by a revenue stream instead of by property tax revenues the
8 way general obligation bonds are. Note that both are tax-exempt. As of 2015, charter
9 schools issued over \$11B in revenue bonds according to Clark-Herrera et al. (2019).

10 *Rocketship Expansion Difficulties*

11 In 2014, the Santa Clara County Office of Education and Rocketship were sued by four
12 Santa Clara County public school districts: Alum Rock, Mount Pleasant,
13 Franklin-McKinley and Evergreen. At issue was the SCCOE's bulk authorization of
14 twenty countywide Rocketship charter schools. Sixteen months, 17,500 pages of
15 evidence, and an estimated \$435,000 later, Rocketship, the public school districts,
16 and Santa Clara County settled (Noguchi, 2015). As part of the settlement, Rocketship
17 agreed to withdraw 13 of the 20 countywide charters thus far authorized. Since one
18 of the remaining countywide charter had already been withdrawn, that left six
19 potential charters still authorized but as of yet, unopened. So far, it appears that
20 Rocketship has attempted to expand in locations beyond Santa Clara County: San
21 Pablo²⁸ and Concord in California, Nashville in Tennessee, Milwaukee in Wisconsin,
22 Washington, D.C. and Fort Worth in Texas.

²⁸unsuccessfully

1 Charter School Accountability

2 In California, all K–12 schools, including privately managed charter schools like
3 Rocketship, must submit annual budgets, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports
4 (CAFR), and since 2014, Local Control and Accountability Plans (LCAP). LCAPs are
5 three year plans updated in years two and three and which in detail how a school will
6 use its funds to address state priorities, and to improve educational outcomes for
7 foster youth, English learners, and low-income students, along with the metrics
8 which will be used to show progress (Aguinaldo et al., 2021, pp. 66–84). These
9 characteristics make LCAPs particularly interesting from both a financial point of
10 view and from an educational point of view.

11 Rocketship and Privatization

12 Some contend that the central purpose of charter schools is to disguise a
13 money-making operation (Saltman, 2018). Whitmire, who now sits on the board of
14 Rocketship Education and who in 2014 published *On the rocketship*, makes note of the
15 role that private venture funds played in Rocketship financing (Whitmire, 2014,
16 pp. 25, 65), and it is instructive to remember that private, for-profit venture funds
17 exist to make money. True, they often are “double bottom line” grantors (Clark et al.,
18 2004). As Ball (cited in Tewksbury (2016, p. 75)) makes clear

19 ... particularly with the added case of Rocketship, a blended learning
20 chain of charter schools, is that the NSVF [New Schools Venture Fund] is
21 using its clout to further blur the lines between for-profit and nonprofit
22 educational projects and organizations, thus smoothing the groves
23 [grooves?] for marketizing educational policy and practices. Ball (2012)
24 makes the connections and rationalities clear: “Symbolically,
25 philanthropy provides an ‘acceptable’ alternative to the state in terms of
26 its moral legitimacy. It has also provided a kind of rehabilitation for the

1 form of capital that were subject of ‘ill repute’ in the public imagination.
2 Strategically, philanthropy has provided a “Trojan horse” for the
3 modernizing move that opened the ‘policy door’ to new actors and new
4 ideas and sensibilities.” (Ball, 2012, p. 32)

5 Privatizers use investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms as their
6 vehicle for investing (Stowell, 2018). These investment vehicles are called *alternative*
7 *investments*, in contrast to *traditional investments* like stocks and bonds. Investment
8 banks provide the financial expertise that hedge funds and private equity firms need.

9 *Privatization*

10 Charter CMOs and EMOs appear to be following the lead of prison and health care
11 privatizers. They lobby legislators intensively. They position themselves as being
12 more efficient than the “wasteful” public sector, and they claim to be able to do
13 better than public schools, prisons or hospitals at a lower cost. Since charter schools
14 have positioned themselves as being in competition with TPSs, they need to do at
15 least as well as TPSs, or failing that, appear to do so. This calls for creative marketing,
16 and so to that end, pro-charter advocacy organizations, some university-affiliated
17 institutions and some think tanks have been harnessed to churn out pro-charter puff
18 pieces that are regularly debunked.²⁹ Evidently even creative marketing is not
19 enough to prod the free market to supply the educational choice that charter school
20 advocates feel is necessary, so pro-choice advocacy organizations also lobby state
21 representatives and fund pro-charter board candidates.

²⁹The National Educational Policy Center (<https://nepc.colorado.edu>) in the School of Education at the University of Colorado (Boulder) currently has over 150 NEPC Fellows who aim “to produce and disseminate high-quality, peer-reviewed research to inform education policy discussion” on a wide variety of topics. They often review pro-charter school publications which have been presented as academic research even though those publications have not been peer-reviewed and often have serious methodological problems which weaken or negate their conclusions.

1 Charter school marketing is extensive. Organizations like The 74 Million, a
2 reference to the 74 million children in America, or Innovate Public Schools, an
3 advocacy organization, produce reports, news items, briefs and what claims to be
4 research that is slanted toward charter schools and away from public schools,
5 teachers, unions, school boards, and anything and anyone who doesn't buy into the
6 notion that American education is in desperate need of reform. One technique that is
7 used is to fund media outlets to write allegedly unbiased and non-partisan articles
8 and blog postings that promote "successes" while dismissing any harm that charter
9 schools might cause.

10 These influence techniques are reminiscent of how OxyContin was marketed by
11 the Sackler family, which is not surprising since Jonathan Sackler, now deceased,
12 founded or funded charter advocacy groups like 50CAN, ConnCAN, Families for
13 Excellent Schools, the Northeast Charter School Network, Education Reform Now,
14 Partnership for Educational Justice, and The 74 Million. Dubb (2017) describes the
15 similarities in marketing strategies used to sell oxycontin and those used to promote
16 charter schools, where the focus of all communications was to highlight benefits
17 while ignoring or erasing harms. While this is the standard playbook of corporate
18 marketing, we now have public education dollars being spent on such tactics. When a
19 national exposé published by National Public Radio (NPR) documented serious
20 concerns about Rocketship's practices, The 74 Million immediately published an *ad*
21 *hominem* attack accusing the NPR reporting to have been a "hit piece" on the charter
22 network instead of responding with reasonable and reasoned arguments.

23 Unlike many other forms of privatization, charter schools have competition.
24 When a local government turns over the task of supplying water to a town, for
25 example, there is not another, public water company serving the same customers to
26 serve as a comparison. Privatization is often an all-or-nothing proposition. Charter

1 schools, on the other hand, can be and are often compared to the public schools in the
2 same school district. The presence of very visible competition has an interesting
3 consequence: charter schools view public schools as an existential threat, precisely
4 the opposite of the cooperative, synergistic relationship that state legislators
5 envisioned. In fact, the sharing of innovations appears so infrequently that it might
6 as well be completely absent.

7 Given that charter schools in California get the same per pupil funding as do
8 public schools, there are a limited number of ways that charter schools can generate
9 “excess” funds. They can lower operating costs. They can tap into state or federal
10 facilities grants. They can collect and sell student data. They can contract out to a
11 for-profit management company. They buy technology from business partners. In all
12 these cases, the net result is always the same: money flows out of the public school
13 system into private hands.

14 Charter schools employ fewer and less experienced teachers than public schools
15 do. A teacher with 10 or 20 years of experience can easily command a salary that is
16 twice that of a newly minted teacher. Rocketship has a student-to-teacher ration
17 that’s as high as 36:1 (SCCOE, 2021, pp. 23–30). The combination of fewer and less
18 expensive teachers can reduce the cost of teacher salaries to one-third of what public
19 schools pay for teachers. This reduction is significant because teacher salaries
20 typically account for from one-third to three-quarters of the total expense of running
21 a school. Charter schools that employ a blended pedagogy can further reduce the cost
22 of salaries, with virtual schools dispensing entirely with teachers, effectively
23 reducing the single largest component of running a school to zero.

1 Philanthrocapitalism

2 Philanthrocapitalism is the term used to describe the approach to philanthropy that
3 prioritizes operating non-profits as businesses, i.e. making money while “doing
4 good”. The epigraph to Giridharadas’s book *Winners Take All* is a quote taken from Leo
5 Tolstoy’s *Writings on Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence* which captures the absurdity of
6 making money while “doing good”:

7 I sit on a man’s back choking him and making him carry me, and yet
8 assure myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten is
9 load by all means possible ... except by getting off his back.

10 For philanthrocapitalists, the techniques and vehicles used to extract a profit
11 from public education are impressive. Saltman (2018) lists the following in *The swindle*
12 *of innovative educational finance* (pp.xii–xiii):

- 13 • social impact bonds,
- 14 • higher education lending and student income loans,
- 15 • charter school real estate, tax credit, and municipal schemes, and
- 16 • philanthrocapitalist educational technology schemes.

17 Marachi and Carpenter (2020), Burris and Cimarusti (2021), Scott (2009), B. Baker
18 and Miron (2015) all make the same point: education has been captured by big
19 business, profits are hidden, and the profits are substantial.

Research Design and Methodology

This dissertation is an *exploratory, case study* using a *public policy* lens to examine the *finances* of Rocketship Education. Exploratory means that the precise data that will be collected and the precise methods used to analyze those data are not fully known in advance and will depend on this study's findings as the inquiry evolves. Case studies are in-depth examinations of a single topic that are limited in space or time. Public policy is the set of rules, laws, regulations, and mores that affect the actions of an element of society. It is "the decisions, measures, programmes, strategies and courses of action adopted by the government or the legislative body" (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 3). Public policy mandates and constrains Rocketship Education's actions and how it structures its finances to meet its goals. Finance, as it pertains to Rocketship Education, encompasses all transactions of monetary value which involve the legal entity called Rocketship Education, its principals and executives, and other entities with which it has significant relationships. Not only are the finances of Rocketship itself included in this definition, but also those of its founders who, perhaps went on to found companies that sold software to Rocketship, and also any entities focused on real property from whom Rocketship might have bought, leased, or sold real property. Included as well are financing transactions like bonds, tax credits, loans, and grants.

The next section, *Process Overview*, describes at a very high level the four steps of inquiry this dissertation will follow. Since understanding how schools are financed is essential to understanding Rocketship's finances, the next section, *An Overview of California School Financing*, will give an overview of school financing in California by describing the normal, common financial disclosures and reports made by all districts and schools, including charter schools. It is important to remember that budgets reflect the future, and audits reflect the past. Budgets are estimates,

1 guesses, projections, whereas audits are a definitive, fixed record of the past.

2 In order to make what's being analyzed more concrete, Appendix A, *School*
3 *Financing in California* contains some example tables drawn from the Los Altos School
4 District (LASD) for the 2019–20 school year. These are standard financial reports
5 taken from the school's SACS data, but presented in a way that is both visually
6 appealing and informative.³⁰ The high level view is given in Figure 5, *LASD 2019–20 All*
7 *Funds Summary*. That view is further broken down in five more tables. The last table is
8 a projection of LASD's of financial numbers for the current year (2018–19), the year
9 whose budget is being presented (2019–20), and five years into the future. The first
10 half of the table contains the assumptions used to generate the amounts in the
11 second half.

12 Once the overall financing landscape has been described, the study can start to
13 analyze actual data from Rocketship. There are three such groups of data: petitions,
14 financial reports, and other data. Each will be covered in the third section, *Charter*
15 *School Financing* of this chapter.

16 Once all the data have been gathered, the analyses can begin. The first such
17 analysis is of profits that do not accrue to Rocketship itself, but rather to associated
18 entities. They are covered in section *Indirect Profits*.

19 The fifth section, *Are There Gaps or Anomalies in the Data?*, discusses how potential
20 gaps or anomalies in the financial data might be discovered. This is where
21 triangulation can be used to cross-check the validity of that data. Does everything
22 add up? Are there important, missing documents? How much do these gaps or
23 anomalies matter? Are the oddities long-standing or fleeting? Examples of

³⁰LASD's annual reports have consistently won the Meritorious Budget Award for Excellence from the Association of School Business Officials International for the quality and comprehensiveness of its financial statements for each of the last 15 years.

1 triangulation might be comparing Rocketship's LCAPs to their budget, or comparing
2 IRS Form 990 data to their audited financial statement of salary expenses.

3 Lastly, the sixth section, *What About the Flow of Money Through Rocketship?*,
4 describes how this dissertation will study the flow of money in and out of Rocketship.
5 Until now, this study has treated Rocketship's finances statically, i.e. at points in time.
6 Just as important are the dynamic flows of money. Where do they come from, and
7 where do they go?

8 Process Overview

9 Explaining the finances of Rocketship Education is the heart of this dissertation.
10 Where do Rocketship's revenues come from? Where are they spending that revenue?
11 Are there investors who make money off of Rocketship? And, critically, if Rocketship
12 takes in more money than it spends on education, where does that money go?

13 To respond to these questions, the basic process steps for this dissertation will
14 include the following:

- 15 1. Gather financial data for the Rocketship schools being studied. The initial set
16 of data being analyzed is discussed in the section *Charter School Financing* later
17 in this chapter.
- 18 2. Identify any gaps or anomalies in the data. This is where triangulation is
19 useful and is discussed further in the section *Triangulation*.
- 20 3. Analyze the flow of money in and out of Rocketship. Section *What About the*
21 *Flow of Money Through Rocketship?* tries to determine where Rocketship funds
22 come from, where is that money being spent, and what public policies (or lack
23 thereof) account for Rocketship's actions.
- 24 4. Identify to the extent possible how people or entities that are not part of
25 Rocketship may nonetheless profit from Rocketship.

1 Analyzing the finances of Rocketship Education means, for example, determining
2 if general obligation or revenue bonds are purchased by entities that are related to
3 Rocketship, i.e. they are not arm's length transactions. All bonds are risky to some
4 extent, some more than others, and purchasers of those bonds are compensated for
5 taking on that risk by being paid interest on the amount borrowed. An immediate
6 question comes to mind: Is the interest rate appropriate for the risk being taken on?
7 Answering that question entails comparing Rocketship Education to other, similar
8 borrowers. If the interest rate is higher than expected, then Rocketship Education is
9 effectively giving away some of its revenue. Another question one might ask is, "How
10 is Rocketship Education spending its bond proceeds?" Are those expenses in line with
11 what other charter school chains or public school districts are spending their bond
12 proceeds on?

13 An Overview of California School Financing

14 Primary and secondary schools (grades K–12) and charter schools in California
15 are financed with a combination of federal, state, and local monies as seen in
16 Figure 1, *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*. Since federal funds account for
17 only 8.01% of total funding for California's elementary school children (Legislative
18 Analyst's Office, 2021), the federal contribution will not be considered further. Note
19 that federal facilities grants to charter schools are not part of this 8.01%.

20 In June of every year, the California Legislature passes a budget for the next fiscal
21 year (July 1 – June 30) and the Governor signs it into law. This is called the enacted
22 budget. This version of the budget describes the *intent* of the Governor and the
23 Legislature, but does not fund anything. The real work is done in what are called
24 *trailer bills* that are passed piecemeal in the months following the adoption of the
25 budget. During the course of the fiscal year, revisions are made to this enacted

Figure 1
California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source

K-12 Funding by Source

(Dollars in Millions)

	2017-18 Final	2018-19 Revised	2019-20 Enacted	Change From 2018-19	
				Amount	Percent
Proposition 98					
General Fund ^a	\$47,194	\$48,327	\$49,322	\$994	2.1%
Local property tax	19,644	20,645	21,921	1,276	6.2%
Subtotals	\$66,839	\$68,973	\$71,243	\$2,270	3.3%
Other State					
Other General Fund	\$6,879	\$9,749 ^b	\$10,503 ^b	\$754 ^c	7.7%
Lottery	\$1,382	\$1,305	\$1,304	-\$1	-0.1%
Special funds	\$75	\$79	\$228	\$149	189.0%
Subtotals	\$8,336	\$11,133	\$12,036	\$903 ^c	8.1%
Other Local ^d	\$12,023	\$12,712	\$11,814	-\$898	-7.1%
Federal	\$7,435	\$8,190	\$8,284	\$94	1.1%
Total	\$94,633	\$101,008	\$103,377	\$2,369	2.3%
Students ^e	5,960,120	5,944,769	5,933,407	-11,362	-0.2%
Proposition 98 funding per student	\$11,214	\$11,602	\$12,007	\$405	3.5%
Total funding per student	\$15,878	\$16,991	\$17,423	\$432	2.5%
^a Consists of funding for K-12 education, preschool, and other agencies serving K-12 students.					
^b Includes \$3.9 billion in additional retirement payments authorized in the 2019-20 budget package (\$2.8 billion attributed to 2018-19 and \$1 billion attributed to 2019-20).					
^c These year-to-year comparisons are notably affected by how the administration attributed the additional retirement payments authorized in the 2019-20 budget package across fiscal years.					
^d Includes revenue from local fees, property taxes collected in excess of the Local Control Funding Formula allotments, parcel taxes, and reimbursements.					
^e Reflects average daily attendance.					

Note: Legislative Analyst's Office (2021). Public record.

1 budget either because of circumstance or because of changed priorities, and at the
2 end of the fiscal year, this is now called the revised budget. After the budget year has
3 passed, technical adjustments are still made: Exactly how much money was spent, or
4 what was misclassified and improperly allocated will change the revised budget
5 numbers. This then becomes the final budget. The upshot of this is that there are
6 actually three versions of California's education budget: the one for next year
7 (enacted), the one for the current year (revised) and the one for the prior year (final).
8 Normally, the enacted budget is the one that is meant when people speak of the
9 budget.

10 Figure 1, *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*, shows what money California
11 has to fund its primary and secondary educational system, i.e. grades K–12. This
12 money is then allocated to local educational agencies (LEAs), through a formula
13 known as the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF). LEAs include individual charter
14 schools, county offices of education, and local public school districts. The total
15 amount of money for K–12 funding is allocated using a formula that was enacted by
16 voters in 1988 (LAO, 2017): Proposition 98. Prop. 98 was originally meant to be a
17 minimum guaranteed funding level, but has evolved into a ceiling. The Legislative
18 Analyst's Office (LAO), which serves as an independent, non-partisan research arm of
19 the California Legislature in much the same way that the Congressional Research
20 Service serves the U.S. Congress, calls Prop. 98 “A Tale of Complexity” and says that “A
21 Plethora Tests and Rules Govern the Minimum Guarantee”, and that “State Has Made
22 Myriad Adjustments to the Proposition 98 Calculations”. Undoubtedly LCFF is
23 complex, but LCFF is more transparent, has fewer rules, is more equitable, and is
24 more responsive than the Revenue Limit System which came before it. The Revenue
25 Limit System was also complex, but in a completely difference way; it had many
26 separately funded programs, called categorical programs, each with their own set of

1 requirements, rules, durations, and funding levels. Each passing year saw more
2 programs being added to the set of categorical programs until the collection of
3 categorical programs became so unwieldy it threatened to soak up all of a district's
4 financial resources.

5 As seen in Figure 1, *California 2019–20 K–12 Funding by Source*, Proposition 98
6 funding accounts for nearly 70% of California's K–12 funding, the remainder coming
7 from local property taxes and fees, and from various state sources. This money gets
8 distributed to county offices of education which then distribute it to public school
9 districts. Districts then distribute funds to charter schools.

10 Some districts are funded outside of the LCFF system. These are called “basic aid”
11 districts, or now the preferred term, “community funded” districts. Districts whose
12 annual property tax revenue is greater than their annual LCFF entitlement are
13 community funded since they get only “basic aid”, i.e. the constitutionally required
14 minimum funding (the greater of \$120 per pupil or \$2,400 in total) from the state.
15 For non-community funded districts, the state contribution is the difference between
16 a district's LCFF entitlement and its share of district property taxes. In other words,
17 the state ensures that each district gets at least its LCFF entitlement, an amount
18 which is determined by Prop. 98.³¹

19 *Budgets & Interim Reports*

20 Budgets, in California, are the first of four important financial documents that
21 schools produce during a fiscal year. For any given fiscal year, which runs from July 1
22 to June 30, the first financial document produced is the annual budget, a forward
23 looking financial statement, which is approved before the end of the prior fiscal

³¹A detailed description of K-12 funding in California, for both public school districts and charter schools, can be found in Aguinaldo et al. (2021). It is an annual publication.

1 year.³² Next are two (unaudited) interim reports, one in December, and another in
2 March, which track how well the school or district is adhering to the approved annual
3 budget, and finally, after a certified public accountant has audited the school or
4 district, a comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR). State law requires that an
5 independent auditor certify this retrospective account of the school or district's
6 financial activity as being an accurate representation of the school's finances for the
7 previous fiscal year.

8 *Local Control Accountability Plans (LCAPs)*

9 An important, recurring, non-financial report of schools is the Local Control
10 Accountability Plan (LCAP). Although the LCAP is a three year plan, it is updated
11 annually. The focus of an LCAP is on the programs that the school (public or charter)
12 is going to implement, finance, and monitor that will allow it meet the goals that the
13 state has set. These are goals that the California Department of Education sets
14 periodically, primarily to ensure that students with the greatest needs are in fact
15 served and are in addition to the seven goals that the Legislature set for charter
16 schools in general. Furthermore, the school's community must be offered the
17 opportunity to provide input to a school's LCAP and this is why a separate meeting
18 specifically and only on the LCAP is a requirement.

19 Typically LCAP goals remain the same, but their financing may change if the
20 metrics used to measure progress toward achieving those goals isn't showing
21 progress. In unusual circumstances, how the goals are to be achieved might change.
22 LCAPs are the State of California's way of ensuring that all public schools, including
23 charter schools, meet the same set of priorities or goals. LCAPs contain

³²Since a school's budget needs to be approved before the state budget is finalized, it is guaranteed that a school's budget will need to be modified after it has been approved.

1 specifications for how a school or district will meet all eight of the state's goals and
2 how achievement will be measured. Apparently, some LCAPs have been on the order
3 of 500 pages long, although the norm is much less.

4 For each activity or group of activities, schools indicate what goal is being met, if
5 the goal includes increased services for disadvantaged student, how well the school
6 or district has met that goal, and the money that has been allocated to achieving and
7 reporting those goals. (The reality of what the Department of Education wants is an
8 order of magnitude more complicated than this description, but it is accurate as far
9 as it goes.)

10 Unlike budgets and CAFRs, LCAPs don't have to "add up", nor do they have to offer
11 a complete financial picture, but they do have to be consistent with other data.
12 Expenditures have to be budgeted, and the amounts in a school's budget must agree
13 with what's in the LCAP. The charter or public school's board must approve an LCAP at
14 the same time as it approves its annual budget.

15 *Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports*

16 A major source of financial data are the annual, independently audited,
17 comprehensive financial statements of Rocketship Education. Comprehensive
18 Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) are sent to the California Department of Education
19 (CDE) and to a charter's County Office of Education (COE) annually. They cover the
20 previous fiscal year and are similar to annual budgets because they report the same
21 information, perhaps in a different format. CAFRs are retrospective whereas budgets
22 are prospective. The major difference is that CAFRs are independently audited and
23 budgets are not.

24 Similarly to bond underwriters, financial auditors are liable for "omitting,
25 misstating, or obscuring [items which] could reasonably be expected to influence

1 decisions that the primary users make on the basis of those financial statements”
2 (Cayamanda, 2020), and this requirement tends to increase the diligence of the
3 auditors. However, potential liability doesn't always result in truly comprehensive
4 financial statements; sometimes the lure of accounting fees overwhelms any
5 misgivings, as was the case with Enron and Arthur Andersen in 2001, and apparently
6 with Donald Trump in 2022. Errors and sloppiness may exist, but in general, fraud is
7 thankfully rare, in part because fraud on the part of auditors would likely result in the
8 loss of the auditor's license, effectively ending their business.

9 In order to make what's being analyzed more concrete, I present in Appendix A
10 on page 91 some examples drawn from the Los Altos School District (LASD) for the
11 2019–20 school year. These LASD documents make good models because they have
12 consistently won the Meritorious Budget Award for Excellence from the Association
13 of School Business Officials International for the quality and comprehensiveness of
14 its financial statements for each of the last 15 years.

15 Charter School Financing

16 In California, charter schools are financed the same way as public schools are,
17 from the same pot of money, using the same set of rules, except for one significant
18 difference: how they finance facilities. Charter schools have no taxing authority
19 unlike public schools, so they cannot pass bond measures or parcel taxes. This lack of
20 a taxing authority means that charter schools may either occupy existing public
21 school facilities (potentially displacing existing public school students) or seek grants
22 and donations. The federal government provides significant amounts of facilities
23 grant money and relies on the states to administer the program.

24 The topic of charter school finances is broader than that of public schools because, in
25 addition to all of the financial dealings of traditional public schools, almost all of

1 which also apply to charter schools, charter schools have large and immediate needs
2 for facilities that TPSs don't have. This brings into the picture bonds, loans, grants,
3 leases, construction, and the purchase and sale of real estate. TPSs do issue several
4 kinds of bonds, levy parcel taxes, and buy real estate on which they build schools.
5 Public schools usually have done this years ago, but charter schools have an
6 immediately and reoccurring need for facilities. They face these needs once when
7 they start up, and whenever they outgrow their facilities because of increased
8 enrollment. The charter schools' need for facilities charter schools is more pressing,
9 more immediate, and more common than the corresponding needs of TPSs whose
10 enrollment doesn't fluctuate as much.³³

11 Once a charter has been granted the right to operate, it must file annually with
12 the California Department of Education, just like public school district, certain forms
13 that detail its revenues and expenses. State law also mandates an annual audit by an
14 independent accounting firm which charter schools must file with their County
15 Office of Education. All together, these forms should provide a complete picture of a
16 charter school's finances, and crucially, everything should be in agreement. Charters
17 must approve and publish at a public meeting their annual budget, and they, just like
18 TPSs, cannot spend – at least in theory – unbudgeted money unless the governing
19 board approves at a public meeting any changes.

20 *Charter Financial Documents*

³³Usually a TSP sees a change in enrollment because of significant demographic changes like immigration or emigration, birth rate increases or declines. Charter schools can see enrollment changes absent any demographic change, with the total number of students residing in a district staying the same. In a few instances, increased enrollment in charter schools comes from public school students switching from the public school system to charter schools. This is what is happening to Oakland, CA and it produces simultaneous but opposite changes in enrollment.

1 There are numerous publicly available sources of the same charter school
 2 financial data. These are, in roughly chronological order, petitions/renewals,
 3 budgets, LCAPs, interim financial statements, and finally, audited Comprehensive
 4 Annual Reports (CAFRs). Table 3, *Charter School Financial Documents*, summarizes the
 5 financial reports which are available about charter school finances. The first two
 6 documents are specific to charter schools and have no public school equivalent.

Table 3
Charter School Financial Documents

Name	Description	Frequency	When
Initial Petition	Comprehensive description	Once	Before opening
Renewal Petitions	Similar to initial petition	Every 5 years	Years 5, 10, 15, ...
Budget	Complete financial plan	Annually	Before June 15 th
LCAP	How to meet state priorities	Tri-annually	With budget
Interim Reports	Current spending	Twice yearly	December, March
CAFR	Audited financials	Annually	In the following year

7 Viewed chronologically, the first financial statement from a charter school is
 8 contained in their initial petition. Although petitions are not submitted under
 9 penalty of perjury, any material change to a petition would likely be cause for a
 10 re-evaluation of the petition, something that is undesirable. Petitions are presented
 11 at the start of a charter school's life and whenever a charter needs to be renewed.
 12 They are discussed next.

13 Petitions & Renewals

14 Chronologically the first category of financial data that's publicly available is what's
 15 in a charter school's initial petition. Renewal petitions occur at five year intervals
 16 and are very similar to the initial petition. One of the required elements of any
 17 petition is a financial projection. Although no one expects a charter school (or any
 18 school for that matter) to prepare and adhere to a budget that exactly matches what's

1 been projected, budgets are expected to be similar to actual expenditures, for some
2 meaning of “similar”.

3 Before a charter school is allowed to begin operation, every charter school in
4 California is required to present to a chartering authority a petition which must
5 contain certain required elements. The absence of one of these elements is grounds
6 for denying the charter’s petition to operate. For example, what is the intent of the
7 charter school? How is the charter school going to measure its success or failure?
8 What population is it targeting? And, what are its financial projections?

9 These petitions run anywhere from a hundred or so pages to over a thousand.
10 They contain a wealth of data on curriculum, demographics, pedagogy, discipline,
11 teacher recruitment, and, of course, on the charter school’s finances. Only a few
12 financial statements are needed to get a good overall picture of a school’s or district’s
13 finances. These are the enacted annual budget and interim reports, the audited
14 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR), parts of the Local Control
15 Accountability Plan (LCAP), and for charter schools, the financial portions of their
16 petitions.

17 Fortunately, these documents are all publicly available and could, if needed, be the
18 subject of a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request. The CPRA is the California
19 equivalent of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Many of the documents
20 mentioned in this dissertation should be available from the California Departments
21 of Education and Finance, or from the Santa Clara County Office of Education.³⁴

22 Since Rocketship schools are all operated by a single entity, Rocketship
23 Education, Inc., their financial statements and those of their affiliates are rolled up
24 into a single document, the Consolidated Financial Statements and Supplementary

³⁴Since these documents are publicly available, by law, no copyright is applicable or can be claimed.

25 Information. Every school is included as are separate Launchpad Development LLC's
26 which own the facilities that are leased to individual schools.

1 The primary questions that these financial data analyses are seeking to answer
2 involves a clear mapping of the financial flows tied to Rocketship's ten schools in
3 Santa Clara County. That mass of data needs to be organized and interpreted, and
4 using an interpretive framework will make the analysis easier. Some examples of
5 potential frameworks are:

- 6 • The six year forecast spreadsheet that LASD uses, an example of which is
7 reproduced in Figure 11 *LASD 2019–20 Multi-Year Projection* on page 98. Most of
8 the elements of a forecast are combinations of SACS³⁵ codes. The main
9 drawback of using this framework is that each school would have to have its
10 elements extracted from their SACS submissions. "The main benefit is that
11 these elements have been used for years and so are known to be useful in
12 budgeting.
- 13 • A spreadsheet of the 9 high-level SACS object codes. This option is has the
14 advantage that these sums can be calculated automatically using reports
15 available on Annual Financial Data web page³⁶ maintained by the California
16 Department of Education. These reports go back to FY2003–4. The main
17 disadvantage is that any gaps or anomalies may not show up in the aggregate
18 numbers.
- 19 • A third way of approaching the problem of making sense of large amounts of
20 data is to use a model. Some possible models are

³⁵The Standardized Account Code Structure (SACS) is the chart of accounts (cost centers) used by the California Department of Education. These are defined in "California School Accounting Manual: Definitions, Instructions, and Procedures." The function (activity) codes are on pp.149–151 (\$325–3 *et seq.*)

³⁶<https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/fd/fd>

- 21 – Bruce Baker’s *National Education Cost Model* (B. D. Baker et al., 2018, p. 5)
- 1 – the Operating Resource Flow model from B. Baker and Miron (2015, p. 16)
- 2 and Figure 4
- 3 – the resource cost model (RCM) or the education cost function (ECF) as
- 4 developed by B. D. Baker (2018, pp. 188–197)
- 5 – ratio analysis or index analysis as in B. D. Baker and Richards (2004,
- 6 pp. 70–86)

7 Of the four models mentioned, only the last is likely to be useful in this study’s
8 analysis because that method can identify quickly what’s different in a particular
9 budget or petition. Ratio and index analysis compares the relationship between
10 financial data elements. In addition to B. D. Baker and Richards (2004) cited above,
11 National Forum on Education Statistics (2007, pp. 35–44) lists a dozen or so ratios
12 and indexes that have proven useful when analyzing school finance.

13 *Other Data*

14 Vast amounts of data are available from the federal, state and local governments,
15 easily over half a million datasets. Unfortunately this data has been collected in
16 different formats, over different time periods, using different inclusion criteria,
17 more or less carefully. Picking a subset of educational data to use and then cleaning it
18 is a huge endeavor well beyond the scope of this dissertation. That being said, a very
19 small subset of available datasets will be consulted, based on the immediate need at
20 hand. The most likely datasets to be used are ones are:

- 21 • California Department of Education and the State Board of Education
- 22 • The County of Santa Clara and the Santa Clara County Office of Education
- 23 • The California Open Data Portal

- 1 • National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) at the Institute for Education
- 2 Sciences (IES)
- 3 • American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau)
- 4 • Stanford Educational Data Archive (SEDA)
- 5 • School Finance Indicators Database
- 6 • EdSource, Ed-Data, and other aggregators of educational data specific to
- 7 California

8 State and Federal Filings

9 Some officers of Rocketship may be required to submit annually to the California
10 Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) Form 700, Statement of Economic
11 Interests. This particular requirement of charter school officers is not settled law, but
12 if Form 700 is filed, it will list the submitter's assets and income. The intent is to
13 prevent related-party transactions by enumerating an officer's economic interests so
14 that the school can avoid doing business with entities that might benefit an officer.

15 The federal Internal Revenue Service grants income tax exemptions to
16 organizations that meets the requirements of §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
17 Code.³⁷ These organizations must file annually Form 990 that provides some minimal
18 financial data. (Tax returns of for-profit organizations are not public documents and
19 their contents do not have to be disclosed; however, in order to sell stock to the public,
20 i.e. on a stock exchange, firms are required to publish various financial documents,
21 which like bond prospectuses, are required to be informative and complete.)

³⁷ 26 USC 501, i.e. Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter F Part I § 501(c)(3)

1 Bond prospectuses

2 Bond prospectuses are also a source of financial information. When bonds are
3 issued, they are described in detail in a prospectus. These documents, in addition to
4 specifying the terms (e.g. interest rate, repayment schedule, collateral) of the bond,
5 contain information relevant to assessing the risk associated with purchasing that
6 bond.

7 Bond prospectuses can be mined for data that might not appear in petitions and
8 financial statements because bond underwriters are “potential liability for any
9 material misrepresentations or omissions contained in a registration statement or
10 prospectus” (Block et al., 2008). This liability, of course, is not unlimited. If bond
11 underwriters exercise due diligence or the misrepresentation is not material, they
12 are probably not liable. Crucially, the definitions of *material misrepresentation* and *due*
13 *diligence* depended on both statute and case law, so a bond underwriter can only make
14 a reasoned guess at their exposure to liability. The result is that bond underwriters
15 are likely to be more diligent than is absolutely necessary.

16 Unlike many studies, there is not a paucity of data on Rocketship, rather there is a
17 surfeit. The data collected so far is voluminous. The current number of pages of
18 initial and renewal petitions runs to 7371 pages. Three bond prospectuses total over
19 1000 pages. And there are many financial data documents yet to obtain. For example,
20 of the six categories of financial data listed in Table 3, only half have been collected.

21 The challenge for this inquiry will be to organize the data so that gaps and
22 anomalies can be identified, interesting and valid comparisons can be made with
23 public schools and other charter schools, and the flows of money in and out of
24 Rocketship can be identified. One approach would be to create a common framework
25 and recast all the financial data from each school into that common framework. But,

1 until the data have actually been collected and analyses started, choosing one
2 particular framework within which to work is likely to lead to work which will need to
3 be redone using a different framework.

4 Indirect Profits

5 It is not necessarily the case that all profit be derived from Rocketship itself.
6 Other people or entities could profit indirectly from Rocketship's activities. For
7 example, contracts which are not at arm's length are automatically suspect.

8 Leases are another area where profits can be made. Some charter schools receive
9 a per-pupil rent subsidy which reduces their effective net rent (gross rent –
10 government subsidy). But, if the operator of a charter school is also the owner of the
11 facilities, then a profit is to be made. It is the difference between the (market) rent
12 charged and the net rent. Furthermore, if the rent (paid by the charter to a third
13 party) is actually a mortgage payment by the third party to a bank, then the sale of of
14 the property can result in a significant profit. The mortgage (effectively) was paid for
15 by the government, but the proceeds of the sale accrue to the third party, the owner of
16 the facilities.

17 Tax credits are another source of profit. The New Markets Tax Credit is a 39% tax
18 credit, usable over seven years, available to those who make an investment in
19 specified economically depressed neighborhoods. A 39% tax credit is roughly twice
20 the current corporate tax rate which means that this credit wipes out the taxes on
21 gains equal to twice the initial investment (which also has a return).

22 The NewSchools Venture Funds, the Charter School Fund, and the Charter School
23 Growth Fund are just a few examples of venture funds that specialize in charter
24 schools. Since it is unlikely that investors will invest in a fund that does not return a

1 profit, establishing exactly how these funds turn a profit is going to be a key goal of
2 this study's explorations.³⁸

3 Are There Gaps or Anomalies in the Data?

4 All of the sources mentioned above should be in basic agreement, i.e. the LCFF
5 funding received by a Rocketship charter school should match what the state thinks
6 it's sending to the school, what the school reports to the state it received and spent,
7 what independent auditors report the school received and spent, and what it actually
8 spent. Further, bond prospectuses and Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings
9 should be in agreement with themselves and with budgets. If these figures are not in
10 agreement, something is amiss and should be investigated.

11 In some fashion or another, all profit must originate from Rocketship's revenue.
12 In the case of the sale-leaseback of facilities, for example, the rent over and above
13 market rates constitutes profit to the property owners, and this is an operational
14 expense ultimately paid for by tax payers. If facilities are bought with public dollars
15 (i.e. federal grants) and subsequently sold, the net proceeds are profit that might
16 accrue to an organization other than Rocketship. If technology is being used and the
17 contracts are not at arm's length, then someone or some organization is making
18 more than the usual profit. If student data is being sold by a for-profit entity that
19 operates non-profit charter schools, that's revenue that rightfully belongs to the
20 students or to the non-profit schools.

21 Determining whether there are gaps or anomalies in a charter school's financial
22 data is time-consuming but not very complex. Reviewing the data is not difficult –

³⁸It is interesting that none of the web sites of these funds mentions that fund's return. The absence of any indication of a return on investment is either an innocent mistake or (more likely) an attempt at obfuscation.

1 usually there are no advanced algorithms to apply; basic arithmetic may be used to
2 check if all the numbers add up.

3 When looking at financial statements, one should look for:

- 4 • Unusually large (or small) entries
- 5 • Unusual changes year-to-year
- 6 • Unusual ratios
- 7 • Totals which do not add up or which exceed their component parts
- 8 • Entries that are not supported by detail elsewhere
- 9 • Complex third-party transactions which do not seem to add value
- 10 • Unusually large management compensation or management fees.

11 There are several financial analysis models which might be applied to Rocketship.

12 These are:

- 13 • The Beneish M-Score which combines eight variables to get an indication that
14 an entity is manipulating its earnings or assets.
- 15 • The Altman Z-Score Plus which is used to measure how financially stable an
16 entity is.
- 17 • The F-Score which tries to identify likely material accounting misstatements.

18 The issue is that these scores are designed for a typical business with daily sales,
19 order backlogs, accounts receivable, assets, common stock, etc. It remains to be seen
20 if they can be adapted to the business of charter school chains.

21 In the search of gaps or anomalies, one might ask questions such as:

- 22 • Are the data accessible, or even present? Charter schools are notorious for
23 simply not filing required documents or filing horrendously late, or submitting
24 incomplete filings. Petitions are not usually a problem because without a
25 petition, or with a materially incomplete petition, the petition will not be
26 granted. However, once a school is operational, late or missing filings will not

1 bring everything to a halt. Although Rocketship was fined for failing an
2 attendance audit, it was allowed to continue to operate.

- 3 • Have the data been fudged? There are forensic techniques (e.g. Benford's Law)
4 that can point to suspect data (Zhu et al., 2021). There is also triangulation
5 which involves comparing one source of data with another to see if they match.
6 For example, charter petitions make forecasts of revenue and expenses. How
7 accurate were those forecasts? Were the reasons given for anomalies plausible?
8 foreseeable? reasonable? One mistake is not usually a sign that something is
9 being covered up, but several large mistakes usually are.
- 10 • California requires that LEAs meet the numbers they previously forecast or
11 explain why they didn't meet those numbers, and certify they can meet their
12 financial obligations the current year, and for the next two years. If an LEA
13 cannot certify that they did and that they can, they might receive a visit from
14 the California Department of Education's Financial Crisis & Management
15 Assistance Team (FCMAT), and in the extreme case be subject to a state
16 takeover or to involuntary closure.

17 After the documents and data have been collected and cleaned³⁹, this study will
18 look at comparing Rocketship's financials to traditional public schools and districts,
19 and to other charter schools and charter school chains.

20 *Triangulation*

21 Another technique for determining if there are gaps or anomalies is to use
22 triangulation. Triangulation is the use of multiple sources of data. While
23 triangulation in the social science research often refers to the mixed methods use of

³⁹Raw data needs to be prepared so that entries are uniform across all elements of a dataset: Missing data might have to be synthesized, units made uniform, outliers removed, etc.

1 quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the common definition refers to the
2 analysis of multiple forms of corroborating evidence in the form of financial and
3 media documentation. For example, Bhandari (2022) notes that one of the forms of
4 triangulation is “[u]sing data from different times, spaces and people” and also that
5 “[t]riangulation in research means using multiple datasets, methods, theories and/or
6 investigators to address a research question. It’s a research strategy that can help you
7 enhance the validity and credibility of your findings.”⁴⁰

8 Are There More Serious Problems?

9 Unfortunately, charter schools and charter school chains have a long history of
10 various kinds of fraud. Lafer (2017), In the Public Interest (2018), Burris et al. (2020),
11 and Burris and Bryant (2020), are just a few of the reports that detail fraud and waste
12 in charter schools. Although Rocketship has engaged in a number of questionable
13 activities, it has not been charged anything illegal.⁴¹ But with billions of dollars
14 allocated to charter schools for facilities in the last 15 years in California alone (Lafer,
15 2017, p. 4), coupled with lax or no oversight, the temptation to misappropriate funds
16 must be strong. It is also instructive to note that Californian charter schools have
17 fought tooth and nail to prevent any laws that would increase transparency or hold
18 charter operators to the same conflict-of-interest standards that public schools and
19 other government entities are held to. While the charter sector has for the most part
20 been successful in warding off demands for accountability, the Attorney General of

⁴⁰Triangulation does not imply exactly three concepts or ideas; often, as is in this dissertation, more than three concepts, ideas, data are combined in the analysis.

⁴¹Rocketship schools in Santa Clara have had ties with a virtual charter school serving special education students hundred of miles away. They have collected pandemic-relief funds intended for businesses and not available to public schools. Rocketship has been the subject of several Letters of Concern from the California Department of Education, and it has had petitions to open schools denied for substantive reasons. Many of these issues have been collected and can be viewed at <https://www.scoop.it/topic/charter-choice-closer-look> (Marachi, 2016–2022).

1 California issued an official ruling in 2018 stating that the Brown Act, the CPRA, and
2 Government Code §1090 apply to charter schools as well as to other LEAs (Becerra &
3 Medeiros, 2018).

4 However, it's not necessary to misappropriate funds to make money off of charter
5 school facilities. As the report *Fraud and waste in California's charter schools* from In the
6 Public Interest details,

7 While charter schools constructed with general obligation bonds cannot
8 be sold or used for anything other than the authorized school, schools
9 constructed with tax-exempt conduit bonds become the private property
10 of the charter operator. Even if the charter is revoked, neither the state
11 nor a local school district can take control of this property. Additionally,
12 schools constructed with private funding subsidized by New Market Tax
13 Credits or acquired with private funds but whose mortgage payments
14 are reimbursed through the Charter Facilities Grant Program (known as
15 "SB740") are typically owned without restriction.

16 (In the Public Interest, 2018, p. 6)

17 Rocketship has issued just shy of \$90M of tax-exempt bonds to "finance and/or
18 refinance the acquisition, construction, expansion, remodeling, renovation,
19 improvement, furnishing and equipping of the land and facilities" (California School
20 Finance Authority, 2015b, 2015a, 2017b, 2017a). These conduit bonds are exactly the
21 kind referenced in In the Public Interest (2018). The properties owned or leased are
22 partially paid for out of public funds but are privately owned.

23 *Analyzing Rocketship's Bond Financing*

24 Bond financing can be both complicated (a hard problem, but solution methods
25 exist) and complex (many unknowns and interrelated factors). Illustrating this are
26 two examples of the analysis from just a single prospectus, that of Rocketship's \$43M
27 bond offering. That offering is described in the 536 pages which comprise

1 “\$42,160,000 Charter School Revenue Bonds (Rocketship Education - Obligated
2 Group).” The \$43M offering is complicated because there are many moving parts
3 which are described in the offering in the well-known language of bond finance.
4 Terms, rates, contingencies, amounts, dates, and required performance are all
5 specified in a fashion that has withstood legal onslaught many times over. But the
6 offering is also complex because it must also convince others that its predictions are
7 reasonable. The most important of those predictions is that the issuer can pay the
8 interest and repay the principal when they due.


9 Figure 2 on the following page *Flow of Funds: Overview* gives the overall picture and
10 shows how rents from schools (blue) are “intercepted” by the California Controller
11 (red) and paid directly to landlords, or paid into the Gross Revenue Fund (red) from
12 which the Master Trustee pays lessors (orange) and bond holders and expense
13 accounts (orange). What is not shown is the \$750 per ADA (in 2017, rising to \$1,211 in
14 2020–21) that Rocketship will apply to lease payments. Since money is fungible, the
15 State of California is giving Rocketship between \$2.4 and \$3.7M depending on the
16 year, money they would otherwise not have. This is effectively profit.

17 The next figure, Figure 3 on page 71 *Flow of Funds: Cross-Collateralization* adds an
18 important detail: how Rocketship uses its assets as collateral more than once.⁴² In
19 this case, if the payments of “School Tenants” are insufficient, the Master Trustee may
20 require additional monthly payments from the “Obligated Group Representatives
21 and Member” to supplement those from “School Tenants”.

22 These two examples show the kind of analysis that is needed to characterize a
23 bond offering.

⁴²*Cross-collateralization* means using an asset as collateral for two or more obligations, here lease and bond payments.

Figure 2
Flow of Funds: Overview



53


Note: California School Finance Authority (2017a, p. 53). In the public domain.

1 What About the Flow of Money Through Rocketship?

2 Since a goal of this dissertation is to map the flow of money into and out of
3 Rocketship, I will use diagrams similar to the one used by B. Baker and Miron (2015),
4 which is reproduced here as Figure 4. In this example, money flows from left to right,
5 and there are no loops. Colors are used merely to distinguish the various blocks.


Figure 3
Flow of Funds: Cross-Collateralization

TABLE 2
FLOW OF FUNDS – CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION MECHANISM



Note: California School Finance Authority (2017a, p. 55). In the public domain.

Figure 4
Operating Resource Flows



Note: B. Baker and Miron (2015, p. 16). Used with permission.

Findings and Results

1
2 This chapter discusses my findings and results. Recall my research question: Has
3 Rocketship structured itself and its finances, to earn a return to investors, and if so,
4 how?

1

Discussion

2 Judging Case Studies

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School Financing in California

Public school districts and charter schools receive funding from the state and the federal governments which most often goes into the district's or school's General Fund. A small portion of funding is restricted to particular programs, and sometimes that money goes into a specialized and restricted fund, but the norm is for the General Fund to account for the majority of transactions.

The first table to look at is the aggregate of all funds as shown in Figure 5 on the following page, *LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary*. It is a very high-level summary of a school's or a district's budget. It's a snapshot of what the district's revenues are expected to be, roughly where that revenue is expected to come from, what the district's expenses are expected to be, and whether revenue and expenses are expected to be in balance. It is the rough equivalent of a business income statement.⁴³

Because Figure 5 on the next page, *LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary*, is a snapshot, detecting unusual changes year-to-year is not possible. Changes are detectable using Figure 6 on page 95 which compares fiscal two years. However, with just a budget summary, one can nonetheless note some interesting ratios, for example, the percentage of expenses spent on salaries and benefits. For LASD in 2021–20, this is 80.18% which is in line with what is typical of elementary school districts in California. One can calculate the state-wide average for all districts for 2019–20 using the Data Table at www.ed-data.org/state/CA, and that comes out to 83.71%. So, LASD spends a little less on salaries and benefits than the average elementary school district in California does.

⁴³Schools group their finances by funds. Most of their revenue goes into the general fund, and most of their expenses come out of the general fund. Some transactions must by law be accounted for in different funds. The three largest are the General Fund, the Special Revenue Fund, and the Capital Projects Fund, and together they account for virtually all of the financial activity of LASD. Other schools may have a different set of funds, but all contain a General Fund that is the primary fund for their day-to-day financial activities.

Figure 5
LASD 2019–20 All Funds Summary

	General Fund	Special Revenue Funds	Capital Project Funds	Total All Governmental Funds
REVENUES				
LCFF/Revenue Limit Sources	43,551,141	300,174	-	43,851,315
Federal Revenue	1,155,694	-	-	1,155,694
Other State Revenue	3,417,200	-	-	3,417,200
Other Local Revenue	16,387,903	22,500	1,243,180	17,653,583
TOTAL REVENUES	64,511,938	322,674	1,243,180	66,077,792
EXPENDITURES				
Certificated Salaries	25,965,289	-	-	25,965,289
Classified Salaries	10,606,613	-	-	10,606,613
Employee Benefits	16,904,698	-	-	16,904,698
Books & Supplies	1,526,084	-	-	1,526,084
Services & Other Operating Expenditures	8,453,291	300,000	1,428,474	10,181,765
Capital Outlay	162,342	-	43,000	205,342
Other Outgo	341,064	-	-	341,064
TOTAL EXPENDITURES	63,959,381	300,000	1,471,474	65,730,855
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues Over Expenditures	552,558	22,674	(228,294)	346,938
OTHER FINANCING SOURCES/USES				
Interfund Transfers In	-	-	-	-
Interfund Transfers Out	-	-	-	-
TOTAL OTHER FINANCING SOURCES/USES	-	-	-	-
NET INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN FUND BALANCE	552,558	22,674	(228,294)	346,938
BEGINNING FUND BALANCES	107,727	3,603,040	1,745,439	5,456,206
ENDING FUND BALANCES	660,284	3,625,714	1,517,145	5,803,144

\$1 dollar difference in General Fund Ending Fund Balance due to rounding error.

Note: Kenyon (2019, p. 38). In the public domain.

1 Calculating this ratio brings up a general issue: What is an appropriate
2 comparison group? In this particular case, the Ed-Data web site does not have
3 county-level financial data, so the only comparison which can easily be made is at the
4 state level. But should the state-level comparison group be all districts, or just
5 elementary school districts? Should “basic aid” districts, also called
6 “community-funded” districts, districts whose property tax revenues exceed their
7 LCFF entitlement, be included or not? Again, the Data Table tab on
8 www.ed-data.or/state/CA does not filter by type of district (although the Graph
9 tab does), so, in this case, using just the Ed-Data data, our choices are forced since we

1 cannot use state-level data.

2 The other common financial business report is the balance sheet, which identifies
3 assets and liabilities. In the educational world, this is the statement of net position.
4 Figure 6 on page 95 shows LASD's assets and liabilities at the end of the 2019–20
5 school year. Note that unlike a balance sheet, a statement of net position for schools
6 (and other governmental entities) does not balance; assets are not exactly equal to
7 liabilities.⁴⁴

8 As an example of a number which stands out and is therefore worth investigating,
9 is the large increase in Capital Assets, year over year, an increase of \$132M (line 3 of 6
10 on page 95, *LASD YE 2020 Summary of Net Position*). In “Comprehensive Annual
11 Financial Report FY 2020,” six notes appear immediately after Figure 6, and these
12 provide an explanation for the increase: LASD purchased a property whose cost was
13 \$134.9M net of \$2.7M in depreciation. This purchase shows up again in line 1 of
14 Figure 9 on page 97 and explains the enormous 9052% increase in the value of LASD's
15 largest asset in FY2019, land.

16 In addition, the “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report FY 2020” contains a
17 section, on pp. 19–45, called *Notes to the Basic Financial Statements*. These notes are an
18 integral part of the certified, audited annual statement, just as they are in audited
19 financial reports in the business world; they cannot be omitted, and must be accurate
20 and complete. Note 7B of Kenyon (2021a, p. 7), General Obligation (GO) Bond
21 Anticipation Notes (BANs), explains how LASD uses a common technique to convert
22 general obligation bonds into cash: issue BANs, backed by general obligation bonds,
23 and payable when those GO bonds are issued.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Business accountants achieve this seemingly low probability equality by adding a fudge factor, *owner's equity*, so that *assets = liabilities + equity* always, exactly.

⁴⁵One reason this makes sense is that interest rate on BANs is less than the interest rate of GO bonds, so LASD makes money by issuing BANs to pay off GO bonds. In a different situation, school districts is-

1 It's important to remember is that although changes in finances can be
2 complicated, they should also be adequately explained in a transparent and complete
3 CAFR. When the documents are incomplete or opaque is when serious concerns
4 should be raised.

5 Within a CAFR are five summaries of financial tables that go one level deeper
6 than the All Funds Summary. These are

- 7 • Summary of Net Position (Figure 6 on the following page)
- 8 • Change in Net Position (Figure 7 on page 96)
- 9 • Net Costs of Services (Figure 8 on page 96)
- 10 • Capital Assets (Figure 9 on page 97)
- 11 • Long-term Liabilities (Figure 10 on page 97)

12 LASD rolls up its detailed financial data into a single multi-year summary, as
13 shown in Figure 11 on page 98. In addition to purely financial data, the multi-year
14 summary includes the key assumptions that were behind the numbers. In fact, the
15 first section of Figure 11 is only assumptions, and it is those assumptions which drive
16 the numbers in Sections 2–4. The value of this summary is that it captures in one
17 table the key data needed to make budgetary decisions and thus might serve as a
18 template for what data is important.

sue tax revenue anticipation notes (TRANs) because property taxes are paid by taxpayers semi-annually and salaries are paid monthly, so districts often and predictably do not have the cash on hand to pay their employees. The solution is to issue TRANs backed by anticipated revenue, and are paid off when the school or district receives the funds.

Figure 6*LASD YE 2020 Summary of Net Position*

Table 1: Summary of Net Position				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Assets				
Current and Other Assets	\$ 20,044,318	\$ 65,493,755	\$ 45,449,437	227%
Capital Assets	89,045,541	221,076,448	132,030,907	148%
Total Assets	\$ 109,089,859	\$ 286,570,203	\$ 177,480,344	163%
<i>Deferred Outflows of Resources</i>	\$ 22,094,579	\$ 19,321,134	\$ (2,773,445)	13%
Liabilities				
Other Liabilities	\$ 2,665,639	\$ 22,680,079	\$ 20,014,440	751%
Long Term Liabilities	141,558,936	269,006,215	127,447,279	90%
Total Liabilities	\$ 144,224,575	\$ 291,686,294	\$ 147,461,719	102%
<i>Deferred Inflows of Resources</i>	\$ 5,549,865	\$ 9,680,588	\$ 4,130,723	74%
Net Position				
Net Investment in Capital Assets	\$ 37,623,977	\$ 64,225,229	\$ 26,601,252	71%
Restricted	7,726,718	6,825,216	(901,502)	12%
Unrestricted	(63,940,697)	(66,525,990)	(2,585,293)	4%
Total Net Position	\$ (18,590,002)	\$ 4,524,455	\$ 23,114,457	124%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 6). Public record.

Figure 7*LASD YE 2020 Change of Net Position*

Table 2: Change in Net Position				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Revenues				
Program Revenues:				
Charges for Services	\$ -	\$ 446,710	\$ 446,710	100%
Operating Grants and Contributions	10,052,323	7,968,769	(2,083,554)	-21%
Capital Grants and Contributions	-	23,000,000	23,000,000	100%
General Revenues:				
Property Taxes	63,216,247	65,285,688	2,069,441	3%
Grants and Entitlements - Unrestricted	3,933,401	2,511,734	(1,421,667)	-36%
Other	7,347,728	7,498,513	150,785	2%
Total Revenues	84,549,699	106,711,414	22,161,715	26%
Program Expenses				
Instruction	52,349,163	54,025,994	1,676,831	3%
Support Services:				
Instruction-related services	7,219,873	7,282,281	62,408	1%
Pupil services	4,381,022	4,334,692	(46,330)	-1%
General administration	4,658,051	4,519,337	(138,714)	-3%
Plant services	8,526,753	8,569,628	42,875	1%
Payments to other agencies	-	7,036	7,036	100%
Interest and Fiscal Charges	2,893,333	4,857,989	1,964,656	68%
Total Expenses	80,028,195	83,596,957	3,568,762	4%
Change in Net Position	4,521,504	23,114,457	18,592,953	411%
Beginning Net Position	(23,111,506)	(18,590,002)	4,521,504	20%
Ending Net Position	\$ (18,590,002)	\$ 4,524,455	\$ 23,114,457	124%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 7). Public record.

Figure 8*LASD YE 2020 Net Cost of Services*

Table 3: Net Cost of Services				
	Net Cost of Services for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2019	Net Cost of Services for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2020	Change	Percentage Change
Instruction	\$ 43,345,309	\$ 24,008,344	\$ (19,336,965)	-45%
Support Services:				
Instruction-related services	6,608,564	6,681,271	72,707	1%
Pupil services	4,033,498	4,019,853	(13,645)	0%
General administration	4,568,746	4,444,973	(123,773)	-3%
Plant services	8,526,422	8,162,012	(364,410)	-4%
Payments to other agencies	-	7,036	7,036	100%
Interest and Fiscal Charges	2,893,333	4,857,989	1,964,656	68%
Total Expenses	\$ 69,975,872	\$ 52,181,478	\$ (17,794,394)	-25%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 9). Public record.

Figure 9
LASD YE 2020 Capital Assets

Table 5: Capital Assets				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Increase (Decrease)	Percentage Change
Land	\$ 1,488,885	\$ 136,262,476	\$ 134,773,591	9052%
Site improvements	1,225,056	1,225,056	-	0%
Buildings and improvements	129,573,748	130,339,280	765,532	1%
Equipment	4,636,939	3,871,407	(765,532)	-17%
Total	136,924,628	271,698,219	134,773,591	98%
<i>Less: Accumulated Depreciation</i>	<i>47,879,087</i>	<i>50,621,771</i>	<i>2,742,684</i>	<i>6%</i>
Net Capital Assets	\$ 89,045,541	\$ 221,076,448	\$ 132,030,907	148%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 10). Public record.

Figure 10
LASD YE 2020 Long-term Liabilities

Table 6: Long-term Liabilities				
	June 30, 2019	June 30, 2020	Increase (Decrease)	Percentage Change
Long-term Debt:				
General obligation bonds:				
Current interest bonds	\$ 40,665,000	\$ 95,850,000	\$ 55,185,000	136%
Unamortized bond premium	4,596,243	9,376,755	4,780,512	104%
Bond anticipation notes	10,000,000	79,000,000	69,000,000	690%
Lease-leaseback obligations	2,405,645	2,185,036	(220,609)	-9%
Subtotal long-term debt	57,666,888	186,411,791	128,744,903	223%
Other Long-term liabilities:				
Net pension liabilities	64,535,048	65,113,381	578,333	1%
Net OPEB obligation	18,914,928	16,922,035	(1,992,893)	-11%
Compensated absences	442,072	559,008	116,936	26%
Subtotal other long-term liabilities	83,892,048	82,594,424	(1,297,624)	-2%
Total Long-term Liabilities	\$ 141,558,936	\$ 269,006,215	\$ 127,447,279	90%

Note: Kenyon (2021a, p. 11). Public record.

Figure 11
LASD 2019–20 Multi-Year Projection

	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26
% Change in Prop Tax Collections	7.06%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
Enrollment	3,574	3,669	3,725	3,761	3,792	3,813
In-district students @ charter school	1043	1061	1061	1061	1061	1061
Total Enrollment, LASD + BCS	4,617	4,730	4,786	4,822	4,853	4,874
Transfer of Prop Tax to BCS	9,187,469	9,926,004	10,210,982	10,494,976	10,785,723	10,450,068
Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA)	0.00%	4.05%	2.98%	3.05%	3.00%	3.00%
Foundation Funding	2,400,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000
Parcel Tax	820	820	820	820	820	597
Class Size, K-3	19	22	22	22	22	22
Class Size, 4-6	25	25	25	25	25	25
Class Size, 7-8	25	26	26	26	26	26
Teachers, FTE	226	220	222	223	225	226
Raises (across-the-board)	2.00%	2.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Cost of Step/Column Movement	355,034	355,276	357,641	358,823	361,188	362,370
Step/Col (converted to % salary inc.)	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Health Benefit rate increases	5.0%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
Health Benefits (converted to % salary inc.)	0.9%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.6%	1.7%
STRS rate increases	-1.0%	0.8%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total Comp (as % of salary)	3.2%	5.4%	3.7%	2.6%	2.8%	2.9%
LCFF Sources	47,831,288	48,960,469	50,930,778	52,994,478	55,150,308	58,023,166
Federal Sources	2,966,976	1,128,389	1,162,015	1,197,456	1,233,380	1,270,382
Other State Sources	7,460,221	3,799,074	3,848,990	3,863,445	3,874,123	3,881,107
Other Local Sources	14,942,614	15,253,502	15,910,684	15,977,729	16,049,330	13,308,736
Total Revenues	73,201,099	69,141,434	71,852,467	74,033,108	76,307,141	76,483,390
Certificated Salaries	28,473,085	26,804,421	27,081,223	27,286,386	27,563,386	27,771,946
Classified Salaries	12,146,432	11,964,000	12,072,253	12,178,439	12,284,470	12,390,750
Employee Benefits	16,708,058	17,877,672	19,185,547	19,853,541	20,542,397	21,163,633
Retiree Benefits	934,490	960,791	1,001,625	1,044,194	1,088,572	1,134,836
Books & Supplies	3,926,089	1,508,677	1,542,077	1,573,747	1,607,611	1,640,136
Contract Services	9,782,495	8,879,712	8,999,752	9,143,511	9,308,868	9,477,329
Capital Outlay	251,893	235,312	240,835	246,658	253,080	259,653
Other	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262	8,262
Total Expenses	72,230,804	68,238,847	70,131,574	71,334,737	72,656,646	73,846,545
Net Change	970,295	902,587	1,720,892	2,698,370	3,650,495	2,636,845
Adjusted Beginning Balance	4,469,801	5,440,096	6,342,683	8,063,576	10,761,946	14,412,441
Ending Balance	5,440,096	6,342,683	8,063,576	10,761,946	14,412,441	17,049,286
Encumbrances	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
General Fund Reserves	5,435,096	6,337,683	8,058,576	10,756,946	14,407,441	17,044,286
Reserves, Special Reserve Funds	3,590,562	3,630,562	3,690,466	3,760,585	3,839,557	3,920,188
Total Reserves	9,025,657	9,968,245	11,749,042	14,517,531	18,246,998	20,964,474
% of Expense	12.50%	14.61%	16.75%	20.35%	25.11%	28.39%

Note: Kenyon (2021b, p. 137) Public record.

Glossary

- arm's length transaction** A transaction, usually financial, where all parties are independent and are self-interested.
- blended learning** A method of teaching where both in-person instruction and virtual instruction are used.
- charter school** A quasi-private school that is publicly funded but privately run.
- chartering authority** A governmental entity that grants charter schools the authority to operate and which provides oversight. In California, a chartering authority could be a public school district, a county office of education, or the California Department of Education.
- charter management organization (CMO)** "A non-profit organization that operates or manages a network of charter schools (either through a contract or as the charter holder) linked by centralized support, operations, and oversight." ((CA Dept of Education), 2021)
- cross-collateralization** A term from bond financing which indicates that an asset has been used as collateral in two different obligations.
- education management organization (EMO)** "A for-profit entity that operates or manages a network of charter schools (either through a contract or as the charter holder) linked by centralized support, operations, and oversight." ((CA Dept of Education), 2021)
- general obligation bonds** General obligation bonds are tax-exempt bonds backed by an LEA's property revenues. State law limits bond debt to 2.5% of total assessed valuation for unified school district and 1.25% for elementary and high school districts.
- public school** Public schools are funded by taxes and are governed by a publicly elected Board of Trustees. Public schools accept any and all students who wish to enroll, at any time of year, regardless of race, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, religion, or citizenship.
- revenue bonds** Tax-exempt bonds guaranteed by a schools revenue instead of by an LEA's property tax revenue.

1 **typical or neuro-typical children** Children without special needs.

2 **unduplicated pupils** The State of California augments school district revenue on

3 a per pupil basis for every pupil that qualifies for free or reduced price lunch,

4 or is an English language learner, or is a foster youth, but only an

5 unduplicated basis. Notably, children with special needs are not considered

6 *unduplicated pupils*. Neither are homeless children.

Colophon

This dissertation was created almost entirely⁴⁶ with free, open source programs. The fonts, the text editor, the markup language, the reference manager, the operating system, and many utilities are all FOSS (free, open source software).

The body and headings were set in 12pt Alegreya. The Alegreya family of serif & sans serif typefaces was designed by Juan Pablo del Peral of Huerta Tipográfica in 2011 and immediately won praise and awards. It is a classic Renaissance typeface, a kind that was first developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in northern Italy. It comes in Regular, Medium, Bold and Black weights, all of which are available in Roman and Italic styles. There is a full set of Greek and Cyrillic letters as well as Latin small caps. All have a full set of ligatures, and Old Style, and Lining numerals. Notably, all the numeral share the same width so they line up regardless of which style is being used. (Multiplication using Roman numerals, anyone?) If any criticism can be leveled against the Alegreya superfamily, it is that they don't come in display sizes and don't contain swash characters. Otherwise it is nearly perfect.

The programs \TeX & \LaTeX and the document class `memoir` were used to format this dissertation. \LaTeX was created by Leslie Lamport as a user-friendly version of one of the first digital typesetting systems, \TeX . \TeX is one of the masterpieces of computer programming whose author, Donald Knuth, won the Turing Award in 1974. It is a testament to Knuth's brilliance as both a mathematician and a programmer that \TeX is still in use more than four decades later and arguably has no peers when it comes to typesetting complex mathematics and scientific material. It is, however, awkward to use and hard to learn. Fortunately, Leslie Lamport wrapped \TeX in a macro system, \LaTeX , which was orders of magnitude easier to use than \TeX itself.

\LaTeX is extraordinarily flexible because there are thousands of packages which implement specialized tasks. Currently, CTAN (the Comprehensive TeX Archive Network) has just shy of 6000 packages which can be downloaded. One of those packages implements the class `memoir` that was used here. It was written by Peter Wilson, and released in 2001. (I'm listed as a contributor to `memoir`, but in truth I really just corrected some minor typos.)

⁴⁶Two closed source, proprietary programs were used to manipulate PDF files. They could have been replaced with FOSS programs, but the results would not have been as high quality.

1



2 Wilson's muse is Robert Bringhurst, author of *The Elements of Typographic Style*, the
3 definitive book on typography and book design. The package `memoir` would undoubtedly
4 meet with Bringhurst's approval. The class `memoir` provides in one package nearly everything
5 a person needs to produce "beautiful books" (Knuth's words). Although creating a
6 bibliography, glossary, and an index are possible in `memoir`, specialized packages are
7 normally used instead of the built-in ones supplied by `memoir`.

8



9 Zotero is a program to manage and maintain a bibliographic database and to provide
10 citations on demand. It, along with the editor Emacs ("an operating system disguised as an
11 editor") and the package `refTeX`, cooperate with `memoir` to provide a complete system for
12 writing scholarly papers, theses, reports, and dissertations.

13



14 All of these program run on Linux, a version of Unix. The particular distribution being
15 used here is called Arch Linux. It is notable that Linux, Emacs, and \TeX are all programs that
16 are decades old, have never been replaced or superseded, are constantly being improved, and
17 are actively used. They share a common set of characteristics: their fundamental architecture
18 is sound, extensibility is a core feature, and they and thousands of specialized packages are
19 freely available. I predict that iPhones will barely be a faint memory before Unix, Emacs, and
20 \TeX fade from view.