

Russia's War Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions

Updated December 20, 2023

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a new [war](#) against Ukraine, a country Russia first invaded in 2014 and has partially occupied for almost a decade. The [United States](#), member states of [NATO](#) and the [European Union](#) (EU), and [other allies](#) have [called](#) Russia's war against Ukraine "unprovoked and unjustified." In March 2022, the U.N. General Assembly [voted](#) 141-5 to demand Russia "immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw" from Ukraine (47 countries, including China and India, registered abstentions or did not vote). After Russia purported to annex additional Ukrainian territories in fall 2022, the General Assembly [declared](#) by a vote of 143-5 that Russia's actions had "no validity under international law."

The [United States](#), in coordination with the [EU](#) and others, has provided substantial assistance to Ukraine, imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Russia and enablers of its war in Ukraine, and sought to promote [accountability](#) for Russian [war crimes](#). For more, see CRS In Focus IF12277, *Russia's War on Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Role of Congress*.

U.S. Assistance to Ukraine

Congress enacted four supplemental appropriations laws in FY2022 and FY2023 providing assistance to Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine, as well as related funding. Of a total \$113 billion in emergency appropriations made available by these laws, Congress appropriated about \$89 billion for assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war. Another \$23 billion was appropriated to support U.S. military operations in Europe and other U.S. agency responses to the war, including for sanctions enforcement and refugee and entrant assistance (about \$1 billion was appropriated for global assistance purposes).

Combining funding from supplemental and regular appropriations, since February 2022, the Biden Administration has committed more than \$70 billion in assistance to Ukraine, including [\\$44.2 billion](#) in [security assistance](#), [\\$22.9 billion](#) in direct [budget support](#), and \$2.8 billion in [humanitarian assistance](#) (including for neighboring countries to support the needs of Ukrainian refugees). Other funds have supported [governance](#) (including anti-corruption), [energy](#), and [agriculture](#) assistance, as well as [civilian security](#) and [demining](#) assistance.

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On October 20, 2023, the Administration [submitted](#) to Congress a new request for \$106 billion in FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine, Israel, border security, and other purposes. The request continues to be under consideration in Congress.

For more, see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*; CRS Insight IN12107, *Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary*; CRS Report R47275, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief*; and CRS In Focus IF12305, *U.S. Direct Financial Support for Ukraine*.

U.S. Sanctions

Prior to 2022, the United States had imposed [sanctions](#) on Russia in response to Moscow's 2014 invasion of Ukraine and other malign activities. Beginning in December 2021, the United States and others [warned](#) Russia's leadership that a new attack on Ukraine would lead to severe new sanctions (in addition to increased security [assistance](#) to Ukraine and an enhanced [NATO](#) presence in Central and Eastern Europe).

[Sanctions](#) designations and related actions the Biden Administration and Congress have taken since February 2022 include the following actions targeting Russian government assets, trade, economic sectors, and specific individuals and entities:

- [Restrictions](#) on transactions with Russia's central bank, limiting its ability to draw on dollar-denominated foreign reserves
- [Export controls](#) targeting Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors; [energy production](#); and "a wide range of commercial and industrial operations"
- A ban on the import to the United States of Russian [oil](#) and other energy products (P.L. 117-109) and suspension of normal trade relations with Russia and its ally Belarus (P.L. 117-110)
- A prohibition on maritime transport services for Russian oil exports above a [price cap](#) of \$60 per barrel, in coordination with the EU and others

The Biden Administration also has prohibited the following with respect to Russia:

- New U.S. [investment](#)
 - U.S. import of [gold](#), [diamonds](#), seafood, and alcoholic beverages
 - Export of U.S. [luxury goods](#) and dollar-denominated banknotes
 - The provision of certain [corporate](#), [maritime transport](#), [quantum computing](#), [architecture](#), and engineering services
 - Secondary-market [transactions](#) by U.S. financial institutions in Russian sovereign debt
 - Entrance into and use of U.S. [airspace](#)
 - Entrance into U.S. [ports](#)
 - U.S. [trade or investment](#) in Russia-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine
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The Administration has designated for sanctions more than 3,500 individuals and entities (including by restricting transactions and access to U.S.-based property). Designees include members of the Russian government, as well as individuals and entities in the defense and technology, financial services, energy, metals and mining, transportation, and other sectors of the Russian economy, in addition to facilitators of sanctions evasion. Those subject to U.S. sanctions include the following:

- Russian President Vladimir [Putin](#), Prime Minister Mikhail [Mishustin](#), other Cabinet members and senior [administration](#) officials, and [regional governors](#)
- Russia's legislature (the [State Duma](#) and [Federation Council](#)) and its members
- Russia's largest [banks](#)
- Hundreds of defense and technology firms and sanctions evasion facilitators
- The parent company for [Nord Stream 2](#), a Russian gas pipeline project to Europe
- Dozens of Russia's [Kremlin-connected business elites](#) (many of whom are referred to as *oligarchs*)
- Proxy occupation [officials](#)

The Administration also has [banned](#) entry into the United States for [thousands](#) of Russian [officials](#) and military [personnel](#).

For more, see CRS In Focus IF12062, *Russia's War on Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions*; and CRS In Focus IF12092, *The Economic Impact of Russia Sanctions*.

Coordinated International Sanctions

The [EU](#), the [United Kingdom \(UK\)](#), other countries in Europe (including Norway and Switzerland), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, among others, also have imposed sanctions on Russia. Many of these [sanctions](#) are identical or similar to U.S. sanctions. The EU, with U.S. support, [directed](#) the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and other specialized financial messaging services to cease serving 10 leading Russian financial institutions. The EU also has [banned](#) most Russian oil imports. Two days before Russia's attack, the German government [suspended](#) certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Hundreds of U.S. and international [companies](#) also have exited the Russian market.

For more, see CRS Insight IN11897, *Russia's War Against Ukraine: European Union Responses and U.S.-EU Relations*.

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