

HGame2024 Week1 Writeup

Web

2048*16

很好的2048，使我的大脑旋转

要求玩到32768，显然不可能是手动去玩（我手动最高记录才玩到2048）。估计flag就藏在前端，查看javascript，里面有许多混淆代码。手搓还原了一小部分获胜后的核心代码，看起来好像是个换表base64。找到表和密文后，解码得到flag。

表如下

```
56  [469]=function(x){var n=h,e=x?"game-won":n(443),t=x?e0(n(439),"V+g5LpoEej/fy0nPnivz9SSwHlhGaDOMU8CuXb72dB1xYMrZFRAl=QcTq6JkWk4t3"):n(453
57  /var x=h,;ntry{var e=function("return (function() "tx(492)+"");";n=e()}catch{n=window}n[x(486)](r0,-1633+-1033*-6+-115*31})(),;
58  [461]=function(){var x=h;this[x(438)][x(437)].remove("game-won"),this[x(438)][x(437)][x(465)][x(443))];
59
60  [x,n]{for(var e=h,t=0,r,a,o=0,c="";;a&&(r=t%4?r*(64)+a:a,t++%4)?c+=String.fromCharCode(255&r>>(-2*t&6)):0)a=n[e(481)](a);
```

密文如下

```
"I7R8ITMCnzbCn5eFIC=6ylifiXfzN=I5NMnz0XIC==yzycysi70ci7y7ik"
```


解码代码如下

```
def base64_decode(encoded_str):
    # Base64字符映射表
    base64_chars =
    "V+g5LpoEej/fy0nPnivz9SSwHlhGaDOMU8CuXb72dB1xYMrZFRAl=QcTq6JkWk4t3"
    # 将每个Base64字符转换为其6位二进制形式
    char_to_bin = {char: bin(index)[2:]:.zfill(6) for index, char in
    enumerate(base64_chars)}
    # 移除Base64编码中的填充字符
    encoded_str = encoded_str.rstrip('=')
    # 解码过程
    binary_str = ''.join([char_to_bin[char] for char in encoded_str])
    # 将二进制字符串分成每8位一组，转换为字节
    bytes_list = [int(binary_str[i:i+8], 2) for i in range(0, len(binary_str),
    8)]
    # 将字节序列转换为字节对象
    decoded_bytes = bytes(bytes_list)
    return decoded_bytes
# 测试解码
encoded_str = "I7R8ITMCnzbCn5eFIC=6ylifiXfzN=I5NMnz0XIC==yzycysi70ci7y7ik"
decoded_bytes = base64_decode(encoded_str)
# 尝试将解码后的字节序列解码为字符串（假设是UTF-8编码）
try:
    decoded_str = decoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
    print("解码后的字符串:", decoded_str)
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    print("解码后的数据可能不是有效的UTF-8格式")
```

解码后的字符串： flag{b99b820f-934d-44d4-93df-41361df7df2d}

Bypass it

题目描述是个很好的提示



显然是因为前端检测而无法注册登录，用浏览器中的功能禁用javascript然后再注册即可

javascript.enabled false

启用javascript登录，找到flag

hgame{726bd746e16bf79734f1265c360696300bbdb7bc}

Select Courses

要求选到所有的课程，但是所有课程都是已满的状态

A screenshot of a web-based course selection system. It shows four separate course lists: 1. 创业管理 - 2.0 学分, 状态: 未选. 2. 大学生职业发展与就业指导4 - 0.5 学分, 状态: 未选. 3. 体育-羽毛球 - 1.0 学分, 状态: 未选. 4. 计算机网络原理 - 4.0 学分, 状态: 未选. Each course has a table with columns: 课程名称, 课程性质, 上课时间, 教学地点, 已选/容量, 操作. The '操作' column contains a blue '选课' button. In all cases, the '已选' column shows '已满'.

使用burpsuite抓包，看到选课实际上是对post传参id。

A screenshot of the Burp Suite Professional proxy tool. It shows a captured POST request to the URL '/api/courses'. The request parameters include 'id=1'. The request headers show standard browser information like User-Agent and Accept. The response status is 200 OK.

使用Intruder，卡系统自动退选的bug，不停地进行选课直到所有的课都选中为止。

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite Professional interface. A modal window titled "Payload Positions" is open, showing an "Intruder attack 4" configuration. The "Results" tab is selected, displaying a table of requests. The table has columns: Request, Payload, Status, Error, Timeout, Length, and Comment. There are 11 rows, each with a status of 200 and a length of 291. The payload column contains the value "1" for all rows. The "Comment" column shows the expression `(*id:\$1)` for row 11. The "Start attack" button is visible in the top right of the modal. Below the modal, the main Burp Suite interface shows a list of targets and a search bar. The browser window below shows a login page with a blue header "自主选课". The URL is 47.100.137.175:30461. The page content includes a message: "帮阿菇选到以下所有课程，阿菇会给你奖励！" (Help A-Girl select all the following courses, A-Girl will give you a reward!). It lists several courses with their status as "已选" (Selected). A small modal window is overlaid on the page, containing the text "47.100.137.175:30461" and "谢谢啦！这是给你的礼物: hgame[w0W_!_1E4Rn_Tu5e_5cripT_ ^_^]" (Thank you! This is your gift: hgame[w0W_!_1E4Rn_Tu5e_5cripT_ ^_^]).

ezHTTP

一眼就是经典的各种http文件头的套娃题

要求从vidar.club访问，referer头

GET http://47.102.130.35:30483

No Environment

Save Send </>

Params	Authorization	Headers (7)	Body	Pre-request Script	Tests	Settings	Cookies
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Postman-Token				<small>(i) <calculated when request is sent></small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Host				<small>(i) <calculated when request is sent></small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> User-Agent				<small>(i) PostmanRuntime/7.36.1</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accept				<small>(i) */*</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accept-Encoding				<small>(i) gzip, deflate, br</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Connection				<small>(i) keep-alive</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Referer		vidar.club					
Key		Value		Description			

Body Cookies Headers (6) Test Results

200 OK 67 ms 766 B Save as example ...

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize

请从vidar.club访问这个页面

Postbot Runner Start Proxy Cookies Trash ?

制定了浏览器，UA头

GET http://47.102.130.35:30483

No Environment

Save Send </>

Params	Authorization	Headers (8)	Body	Pre-request Script	Tests	Settings	Cookies
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Host				<small>(i) <calculated when request is sent></small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> User-Agent				<small>(i) PostmanRuntime/7.36.1</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accept				<small>(i) */*</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accept-Encoding				<small>(i) gzip, deflate, br</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Connection				<small>(i) keep-alive</small>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Referer		vidar.club					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> User-Agent		Mozilla/5.0 (Vidar; VidarOS x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/121.0.0.0					
Key		Value		Description			

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results

200 OK 63 ms 819 B Save as example ...

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize

请通过Mozilla/5.0 (Vidar; VidarOS x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.0.0
Safari/537.36 Edg/121.0.0.0访问此页面

Postbot Runner Start Proxy Cookies Trash ?

要求从本地访问，但是响应头里面要求不能使用XFF头

GET http://47.102.130.35:30483

Headers (8)

Key	Value
Host	<calculated when request is sent>
User-Agent	PostmanRuntime/7.36.1
Accept	/*
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate, br
Connection	keep-alive
Referer	vidar.club
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Vidar; ViderOS x86_64) Apple...
Key	Description

Body Cookies Headers (6) Test Results

200 OK 53 ms 721 B Save as example

那么我们就使用X-Real-IP头，值为本地IP 127.0.0.1

GET http://47.102.130.35:30483

Headers (9)

Key	Value
User-Agent	PostmanRuntime/7.36.1
Accept	/*
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate, br
Connection	keep-alive
Referer	vidar.club
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Vidar; ViderOS x86_64) Apple...
X-Real-IP	127.0.0.1
Key	Description

Body Cookies Headers (6) Test Results

200 OK 63 ms 866 B Save as example

Ok, the flag has been given to you ^-^

在响应头的Authorization中发现了一个JWT，base64解码，得到flag

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface with a 'From Base64' recipe selected. The input field contains a long string of characters, and the output field shows a JSON object with a single key-value pair: "flag": "HTTP_1mP0rT4nt".

Reverse

ezASM

题目是一串汇编语言

```

section .data
    c db 74, 69, 67, 79, 71, 89, 99, 113, 111, 125, 107, 81, 125, 107, 79, 82,
18, 80, 86, 22, 76, 86, 125, 22, 125, 112, 71, 84, 17, 80, 81, 17, 95, 34
    flag db 33 dup(0)
    format db "plz input your flag: ", 0
    success db "Congratulations!", 0
    failure db "Sry, plz try again", 0

section .text
    global _start

_start:
    ; Print prompt
    mov eax, 4
    mov ebx, 1
    mov ecx, format
    mov edx, 20
    int 0x80

    ; Read user input
    mov eax, 3
    mov ebx, 0
    mov ecx, flag
    mov edx, 33
    int 0x80

    ; Check flag
    xor esi, esi
check_flag:
    mov al, byte [flag + esi]

```

```

xor al, 0x22
cmp al, byte [c + esi]
jne failure_check

inc esi
cmp esi, 33
jne check_flag

; Print success message
mov eax, 4
mov ebx, 1
mov ecx, success
mov edx, 14
int 0x80

; Exit
mov eax, 1
xor ebx, ebx
int 0x80

failure_check:
; Print failure message
mov eax, 4
mov ebx, 1
mov ecx, failure
mov edx, 18
int 0x80

; Exit
mov eax, 1
xor ebx, ebx
int 0x80

```

根据其中的逻辑只要将c中的元素都与0x22异或再转ascii即可得到flag

exp:

```

c = [74, 69, 67, 79, 71, 89, 99, 113, 111, 125, 107, 81, 125, 107, 79, 82, 18,
80, 86, 22, 76, 86, 125, 22, 125, 112, 71, 84, 17, 80, 81, 17, 95, 34]
flag=''
for i in c:
    flag+=chr(i^0x22)
print(flag)

```

ezPYC

(修改前)

先用下面的指令pyinstxtractor将exe反编译为pyc文件

```
python3 pyinstxtractor.py ezPYC.exe
```

然后再用pycdc将pyc转py时出现了错误，于是用pycdas将其转为字节码

```
#先切到pycdc文件夹内  
.pycdas ezPYC.pyc > ezPYC.txt
```

通过阅读字节码人为排除错误，再根据其中的逻辑（一个简单的异或）编写exp：

```
flag = [  
    87,  
    75,  
    71,  
    69,  
    83,  
    121,  
    83,  
    125,  
    117,  
    106,  
    108,  
    106,  
    94,  
    80,  
    48,  
    114,  
    100,  
    112,  
    112,  
    55,  
    94,  
    51,  
    112,  
    91,  
    48,  
    108,  
    119,  
    97,  
    115,  
    49,  
    112,  
    112,  
    48,  
    108,  
    100,  
    37,  
    124,  
    2]  
c=[1,2,3,4]  
s=''  
for i in range(0, 36, 1):  
    s+=chr(flag[i] ^ c[i % 4])
```

```
print(s)
```

得到flag：

```
VIDAR{Python_R3vers3_1s_1nter3st1ng!}
```

(修改后)

—(早知道晚点做了。。。)—

先用下面的指令pyinstxtractor将exe反编译为pyc文件

```
python3 pyinstxtractor.py ezPYC.exe
```

然后用pycdc如下将其反编译为py文件

```
#先切到pycdc文件夹内  
.pycdc ezPYC.pyc > ezPYC.py
```

下面是反编译出的源码

```
flag = [  
    87,  
    75,  
    71,  
    69,  
    83,  
    121,  
    83,  
    125,  
    117,  
    106,  
    108,  
    106,  
    94,  
    80,  
    48,  
    114,  
    100,  
    112,  
    112,  
    55,  
    94,  
    51,  
    112,  
    91,  
    48,  
    108,  
    119,  
    97,  
    115,  
    49,  
    112,  
    112,  
    48,  
    108,
```

```
100,
37,
124,
2]
c = [
1,
2,
3,
4]
input = input('plz input flag:')
for i in range(0, 36, 1):
if ord(input[i]) ^ c[i % 4] != flag[i]:
print('Sry, try again...')
exit()
continue
print('Wow! You know a little of python reverse')
return None
```

根据源码编写exp:

```
flag = [
87,
75,
71,
69,
83,
121,
83,
125,
117,
106,
108,
106,
94,
80,
48,
114,
100,
112,
112,
55,
94,
51,
112,
91,
48,
108,
119,
97,
115,
49,
112,
112,
48,
108,
100,
37,
```

```

124,
2]
c=[1,2,3,4]
s=''
for i in range(0, 36, 1):
    s+=chr(flag[i] ^ c[i % 4])
print(s)


```

得到flag：

VIDAR{Python_R3vers3_1s_1nter3st1ng!}

ezUPX

先用exeinfope查壳



被加壳了，用upx脱壳

```


C:\Users\jyzho\Desktop\h4ck3r_t0015\upx>upx -d ezUPX.exe
          Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
          Copyright (C) 1996 - 2020
UPX 3.96w      Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Jan 23rd 2020

      File size        Ratio       Format       Name
-----  -----  -----
  10752 <-    8192    76.19%  win64/pe  ezUPX.exe

Unpacked 1 file.

```

扔进upx生成伪代码，又是一个异或



查看byte_1400022A0

```

.rdata:0000001400022A0 byte_1400022A0 db 64h, 7Bh, 76h, 73h, 60h, 49h, 65h, 5Dh, 45h, 13h, 68h
.rdata:0000001400022A0 ; DATA XREF: main+561o
.rdata:0000001400022A8 db 2, 47h, 6Dh, 59h, 5Ch, 2, 45h, 6Dh, 6, 6Dh, 5Eh, 3
.rdata:0000001400022B7 db 2 dup(46h), 5Eh, 1, 6Dh, 2, 54h, 6Dh, 67h, 62h, 6Ah
.rdata:0000001400022C2 db 13h, 4Fh, 32h, 0Bh dup(0)

```

exp:

```

c =
[0x64, 0x7B, 0x76, 0x73, 0x60, 0x49, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x45, 0x13, 0x6B, 0x2, 0x47, 0x6D, 0x59, 0x5C,
0x2, 0x45, 0x6D, 0x6, 0x6D, 0x5E, 0x3, 0x46, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x1, 0x6D, 0x2, 0x54, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x62,
0x6A, 0x13, 0x4F, 0x32, 0xB, 0x0]
s=''
for i in c:
    s+=chr(i^0x32)
print(s)

```

VIDAR{Wow! Y0u_kn0w_4_l1tt13_of_UPX!}92

ezIDA

直接丢进IDA，即可看到flag

IDA - ezIDA.exe C:\Users\jyzho\Desktop\ezIDA.exe

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function

Functions Hex View-1 IDA View-A Structures Enums Imports Exports

Function name

```

sub_14000100
sub_140001010
sub_140001020
sub_140001080
main
__scrt_common_main_seh(void)
__scrt_common_main_seh(void)
__scrt_acquire_startup_lock
__scrt_initialize_crt
__scrt_initialize_crt_tables
__scrt_initialize_crt_tables_in_current_image
__scrt_release_startup_lock
__scrt_uninitialize_crt
oneexit
atexit
sub_14000161C
UserMathErrorFunction
char_traits::raw_length(void)
fopen_s_systream_file_mode
sub_140001724
sub_14000172C
__scrt_fastfail
JUserMathErrorFunction
__scrt_is_managed_app
__scrt_set_unhandled_exception_filter

```

Line 26 of 69

Graph overview

Output

The decompilation hotkey is F5.
Please check the Edit/Plugins menu for more information.
Using FLIRT signature: Microsoft VisualC v14 64bit runtime
Using FLIRT signature: Microsoft VisualC 64bit universal runtime
Using FLIRT signature: SEH for vc64 7-14
Propagating type information...
Function argument information has been propagated
The initial autoanalysis has been finished.

IDC

AU: idle Down Disk: 220GB

Pwn

EzSignIn

签个到

```
(root@DESKTOP-LQMRD0K)-[/home/starr]
# nc 47.102.130.35 30476
hgame{I_HATE_PWN}
```

Crypto

ezMath

题目

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import random,string
from secret import flag,y,x
def pad(x):
    return x+b'\x00'*(16-len(x)%16)
def encrypt(KEY):
    cipher= AES.new(KEY,AES.MODE_ECB)
    encrypted=cipher.encrypt(flag)
    return encrypted
D = 114514
assert x**2 - D * y**2 == 1
flag=pad(flag)
key=pad(long_to_bytes(y))[:16]
enc=encrypt(key)
print(f'enc={enc}')

```

```
#enc=b"\xce\xf1\x94\x84\xe9m\x88\x04\xcb\x9ad\x9e\x08b\xbf\x8b\xd3\r\xe2\x81\x17
g\x9c\xd7\x10\x19\x1a\xa6\xc3\x9d\xde\xe7\xe0h\xed/\x00\x95tz)1\\\'t8:\xb1,u\xfe\
xdec\xf2h\xab`\xe5'\x93\xf8\xde\xb2\x9a\x9a"
```

断言函数后面是个pell方程，用在线网站<http://www.numbertheory.org/php/pell.html>解一下

The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL www.numbertheory.org/php/pell.php. The page content includes the following text:

```
no solution of  $u^2 - 114514v^2 = 2$  or -2
no primitive solution of  $u^2 - 114514v^2 = 4$  or -4
no solution of  $u^2 - 114514v^2 = 3$  or -3
the least solution of  $u^2 - 114514v^2 = 1$  is
(u,v)=(305838916481589435086675882217709431950420307140756009821362546111334285928768064662409120517323199,903781513866036992219855578521616291641233164136594854545935358689571770257604962
no solution of  $u^2 - 114514v^2 = -1$ 
```

Below this, there's a link "Return to main page" and a note "Query took 0.0057330131530762 seconds".

AES解密即可

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import random,string
def decrypt(KEY, encrypted):
    cipher = AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_ECB)
    decrypted = cipher.decrypt(encrypted)
    return decrypted

def pad(x):
    return x+b'\x00'*(16-len(x)%16)

# 使用相同的KEY和encrypted进行解密
enc=b"\xce\xf1\x94\x84\xe9m\x88\x04\xcb\x9ad\x9e\x08b\xbf\x8b\xd3\r\xe2\x81\x17
g\x9c\xd7\x10\x19\x1a\xa6\xc3\x9d\xde\xe7\xe0h\xed/\x00\x95tz)1\\\'t8:\xb1,u\xfe\
dec\xf2h\xab`\xe5'\x93\xf8\xde\xb2\x9a\x9a"
y=903781513866036992219855578521616291641233164136594854545935358689571770257604
9626533527779108680
KEY=pad(bytes_to_long(y))[:16]
flag = decrypt(KEY, enc)
print(flag)
```

```
b'hgame{G0od!_Yo3_k1ow_C0ntinued_Fra3ti0ns!!!!!!}\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
```

ezRSA

题目

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from secret import flag
m=bytes_to_long(flag)
p=getPrime(1024)
q=getPrime(1024)
n=p*q
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
e=0x10001
c=pow(m,e,n)
leak1=pow(p,q,n)
leak2=pow(q,p,n)

print(f'leak1={leak1}')
print(f'leak2={leak2}')
print(f'c={c}')
```

```
....  
leak1=14912717007361127196818257675129033155901844180572531042609541283758922767  
07575407439298658536503998391028384315072007447249396594632001580124696769799876  
96419050900842798225665861812331113632892438742724202916416060266581590169063867  
688299288985734104127632232175657352697898383441323477450658179727728908669  
leak2=11612299271467091538130991696749043648902000117288064416717991546702179489  
29279772720805966417855691191342590375223883351980431522061502591034855745588164  
24740204736215551933482583941959994625356581201054534529395781744338631021423703  
171146456663432955843598548122593308782245220792018716508538497402576709461  
c=105294818675325200342580567738640740170270195780418662454006478402302516616529  
9970971591962081093343719166118000329592327365567572958558899592524235622728816  
06550191807612081223658034499114098099153234799125270528863301491347997061005684  
55435235913241775670619489225522752354866155149139321254365439916426070286897626  
93617305246716492783116813070355512606971626645594961850567586340389705821314842  
09646563188681228128984313225813180977379777704935878918221257060625250979083099  
42631320200941536462967935229756321919124639198989883492822849729199327619526033  
79733234575351624039162440021940592552768579639977713099971  
....
```

利用费马小定理 $a^{(p-1)} \bmod p = 1$ (可推出 $a^p \bmod p = a \bmod p$)

题中给出了

$$p^q \bmod n = \text{leak1} \quad (1)$$

$$q^p \bmod n = \text{leak2} \quad (2)$$

对 (1) 式分析,

$$p^q = \text{leak1} + k \cdot n$$

两边模 q,

$$p^q \bmod q = \text{leak1} \bmod q$$

根据费马小定理得,

$$p \bmod q = \text{leak1} \bmod q$$

同理,

$$q \bmod p = \text{leak2} \bmod p$$

exp:


```
import gmpy2
from Crypto.Util.number import *
c =
10529481867532520034258056773864074017027019578041866245400647840230251661652999
70971591962081093343719166118000329592327365567572958855889959252423562272881606
55019180761208122365803449911409809915323479912527052886330149134799706100568455
43523591324177567061948922552275235486615514913932125436543991642607028689762693
61730524671649278311681307035551260697162664559496185056758634038970582131484209
64656318868122812898431322581318097737977770493587891822125706062525097908309942
63132020094153646296793522975632191912463919898988349282284972919932761952603379
733234575351624039162440021940592552768579639977713099971
E =0x10001
leak1=14912717007361127196818257675129033155901844180572531042609541283758922767
07575407439298658536503998391028384315072007447249396594632001580124696769799876
9641905090084279822566586181233113632892438742724202916416060266581590169063867
688299288985734104127632232175657352697898383441323477450658179727728908669
leak2=11612299271467091538130991696749043648902000117288064416717991546702179489
29279772720805966417855691191342590375223883351980431522061502591034855745588164
24740204736215551933482583941959994625356581201054534529395781744338631021423703
171146456663432955843598548122593308782245220792018716508538497402576709461
phi=(leak1-1)*(leak2-1)
n=leak1*leak2
d = gmpy2.invert(E,phi)
m = pow(c,d,n)
m=long_to_bytes(m)
print(m)
```

```
b'hgame{F3rmat_l1tt1e_th0rem_is_th3_bas1s}'
```

Misc


SignIn

题目



换一种视角吧

提示换一种视角，用GIMP（PS太贵了用不起）旋转一下，看到flag



hgame{WOW_GREAT_YOU_SEE_IT_WONDERFUL}

来自星尘的问候

来自星尘的问候

MISC

用户名	已解出次数	排名
Woshiluo	176 次	45
Jooooook	176 次	
pjx1314	176 次	
M4rt3n	221 次	
mumuzi	221 次	
k1sme4	221 次	

一个即将发售的游戏的主角薇^3带来了一条消息。这段消息隐藏在加密的图片里
但即使解开了图片的六位弱加密，看到的也是一张迷惑的图片。
也许游戏的官网上有这种文字的记录?
补充：flag格式为'hgame\{[a-z0-9_]+\'

下载题目附件

「态势播报」

2024/02/03 18:51:45 Fib0n@ccf

根据题目描述，推测下载得到的图片存在隐写，密码为六位弱口令，直接stegseek爆破

```
[root@DESKTOP-LQMRDOK] ~
# stegseek -sf secret.jpg -wl /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
StegSeek 0.6 - https://github.com/RickdeJager/StegSeek

[i] Found passphrase: "123456"

[i] Original filename: "secret.zip".
[i] Extracting to "secret.jpg.out".
```

提取出一张图片，上面有一些奇奇怪怪的字符。



。根据题目描述看了半天不知道是什么游戏的官网。问了一个二次元朋友才知道，这整道题指的就是一个叫《来自星尘》的游戏。。。然后就在游戏相关的地方找到了玩家破解出的对照表。

A	𠂇 𠂅	J	𠂇 𠂅	S	𠂇	
B	𠂆 𠂈	K	𠂆 𠂈	T	𠂆	
C	𠂉 𠂊	L	𠂉 𠂊	U	𠂉	𠂋
D	𠂇 𠂄	M	𠂇 𠂄	V	𠂇	𠂄
E	𠂇 !	N	𠂇	W	𠂇	𠂊
F	𠂉 𠂊	O	𠂉 𠂊	X	𠂉	𠂄
G	𠂆 𠂊	P	𠂆 𠂊	Y	𠂆	𠂊
H	𠂇 𠂉	Q	𠂇 𠂉	Z	𠂇	𠂄
I	𠂇 𠂄	R	𠂇 𠂄			

C00E103R2P2



巡天


对照+猜测得到flag

hgame{welc0me!}

simple_attack

给了一个压缩包和其中的一个文件，一眼明文攻击。然而一开始我用的是Winrar进行压缩，由于压缩加密方法的不同导致明文攻击失败。后来换成使用Bandizip就成功了。

在ARCHPR运行了一会儿以后点停止，保存后即可看到之前被加密的文档



查看photo.txt，一眼base64


用cyberchef转换并保存为png

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface with a Base64 decoding operation. The input is a long Base64 string. The output is a file named "download.png". The "BAKE!" button is highlighted.

hgame{s1mple_attack_for_zip}

希儿希儿希尔

打开发现图片长这样，肯定是要修复宽和高




脚本跑一下，算出宽和高

```
import binascii
import struct
crcbp = open("secret.png", "rb").read()          #填入图片名
crc32frombp = int(crcbp[29:33].hex(), 16)        #读取图片中的CRC校验值
print(crc32frombp)

for i in range(4000):                            #宽度1-4000进行枚举
    for j in range(4000):                          #高度1-4000进行枚举
        data = crcbp[12:16] + \
            struct.pack('>i', i)+struct.pack('>i', j)+crcbp[24:29]
        crc32 = binascii.crc32(data) & 0xffffffff
        # print(crc32)
        if(crc32 == crc32frombp):
            print(i, j)
            print('hex:', hex(i), hex(j))
            exit(0)
```


```
303792205
1394 1999
hex: 0x572 0x7cf
```

用010Editor修改一下



binwalk一下，分离出一个secret.txt


```
(root@DESKTOP-LQNR00K:~]# binwalk -e secret.png --run-as-root
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
-----      -----      -----
0            0x0              PNG image, 1394 x 1999, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced
54           0x36             Zlib compressed data, default compression
395          0x18B            Zlib compressed data, default compression
805947       0xC4C3B          MySQL MISAM compressed data file Version 7
3919082      0x3BCCEA         Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 28, uncompressed size: 28, name: secret.txt
3919206      0x3BCD66         End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
```



文件(F) 编辑(E) 格式(O) 查看(V) 帮助(H)

CVOCRJGMKLDJGBQIUIVXHEYLPNWR

根据题目得知，这是一串希尔加密过的文字，接下来还得寻找密钥。对之前修复的图片分析，发现存在 LSB隐写。



解密得到flag

AmanCTF - 希尔(Hill Cipher)加密/解密
在线希尔(Hill Cipher)加密/解密

CVOCRJGMKLDJGBQIUIVXHEYLPNWR

模式1 (A=0) 8 7 3 8 加密 解密

DISAPPEARIN THESEAOFBUTTERFLY

签到

签个到



凌武科技



19:48



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HGAME2024



hgame{
welc0me_t0_HGAME_2024}

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