

# COM-440, Introduction to Quantum Cryptography, Fall 2025

## Exercise # 8

This exercise sheet is designed to help you review the concepts discussed in the lecture and explore some additional interesting results that were not covered in the lecture. Exercises marked with \* will have solutions provided after the exercise session, while those marked with ♦ will be the main focus during the exercise session. You are encouraged to discuss with other students, and ask for help if you get stuck for too long.

### 1. Thinking adversarially

Let's imagine that we are Eve and we observe someone trying to implement a QKD protocol. Because QKD is hard they might try to cut corners in their implementations. In this problem we present three “candidate” protocols for key distribution. It is your job to try to break them! For each protocol, choose the step in which there is a mistake which allows you to break security.

#### Protocol 1:

- (a) Alice generates bit strings  $x, \theta$ .
- (b) Alice prepares the bits  $x$  encoded in the basis  $\theta$ , and sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
- (c) Alice announces the basis string  $\theta$ .
- (d) Bob measures in the bases corresponding to  $\theta$  and obtains  $x$ .

#### Protocol 2:

- (a) Alice generates bit strings  $x, \theta$ .
- (b) Alice generates 2-qubit states  $|x_i\rangle|\theta_i\rangle$  with the first qubit in the standard basis and the second in the Hadamard basis.
- (c) Alice send the 2-qubit states to Bob.
- (d) Bob announces receipt of the states.
- (e) Bob generates a string  $\hat{\theta}$  and measures the second qubit in either the standard or Hadamard basis depending on  $\hat{\theta}$ , getting an output string  $\chi$ .
- (f) Alice and Bob announce  $\theta$  and  $\chi$  over an authenticated channel.
- (g) If  $\chi_i = \theta_i$  then Bob measures the corresponding first qubit in the standard basis, obtaining a bit  $\hat{x}_i$ .
- (h) Alice and Bob discard all data where  $\chi \neq \theta_i$ , and now share the string  $\hat{x}$ .

#### Protocol 3:

- (a) Alice creates a string of EPR pairs and sends one half of each to Bob.

- (b) Bob generates a string  $\theta$  and measures his half of each pair according to the value of  $\theta$ .
- (c) Alice generates a string  $\hat{\theta}$  and similarly measures her half of the EPR pairs.
- (d) Bob announces over an authenticated channel that he received and measured his qubits
- (e) Alice and Bob compare  $\theta$  and  $\hat{\theta}$  over an authenticated channel
- (f) Alice and Bob use the measurement results obtained for each  $\theta_i = \hat{\theta}_i$  as their key.

## 2. Generating key using an anonymous message board

Imagine that Alice and Bob have discovered an anonymous message board in the hallway. It allows both Alice and Bob to post messages in such a way that no one can ever find out who the message came from. In particular, any eavesdropper Eve cannot learn whether the message came from Alice or from Bob. The message board simply creates a list of messages posted to it, without indicating a sender. Alice and Bob come up with three candidate protocols.

- Protocol I

- Alice and Bob write a random bit on the board.
- If the bit of Alice is the same as the bit of Bob then they erase and start from step 1.
- If the bit of Alice is different than Bob's bit then the next bit of their key is Alice's bit.
- Alice or Bob erase the bits and repeat from step 1 until they have  $n$  bits of key.

- Protocol II

- Alice starts by writing two bits on the board.
- If the second bit is 0 they take the first bit as a key bit and they repeat step 1.
- If the second bit is 1 they take the XOR of the two bits as a key bit and start from step 1 but now Bob writes instead of Alice.
- Alice or Bob execute this alternating protocol until they have  $n$  bits of key.

- Protocol III

- Alice and Bob each write  $k < n$  random strings of  $n$  bits on the board in a *random* order.
- If Alice sees one of her strings followed by a Bob string she XOR's the two strings.
- If Bob sees one of his strings preceded by an Alice string he XOR's the two strings.
- Alice and Bob toss all strings that were never XOR'ed.

- Alice and Bob XOR all remaining strings together thus obtaining  $n$  bits of key.

At the end of the day, we want that Alice and Bob both share an  $n$ -bit key (correctness), but Eve is ignorant about the key (security).

- Which of the above protocols is perfectly correct? (There is only one one!)
- Which of the protocols is secure?
- Can you come up with a different protocol that generates key?