



J. STALIN
WORKS

13





WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao



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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ



О Г И З

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

Москва • 1949

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME

13

JULY 1930 - JANUARY 1934

NOT FOR
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DISTRIBUTION



FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

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PREFACE

The thirteenth volume of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings and speeches of the period from July 1930 to January 1934.

During this period the Bolshevik Party, carrying out the policy of a sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, achieved epoch-making successes in the socialist transformation of the country. The Soviet Union became a mighty industrial power, a country of collective, large-scale, mechanised agriculture.

In the "Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," J. V. Stalin exposes the double-dealing of the leaders of the Right opportunists. Describing the successes in the work of socialist construction, he points out that the U.S.S.R. has entered the period of socialism. Criticising the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory of the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language within the framework of a single state at a time when socialism is victorious in one country, J. V. Stalin substantiates the programmatic thesis that the national languages will merge into one common language only after the victory of socialism on a world scale.

In his speeches "The Tasks of Business Executives" and "New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction," J. V. Stalin shows the historical necessity of rapid rates of socialist industrialisation, shows the decisive importance of technique in the period of reconstruction of all branches of the national economy and advances the slogan: "Bolsheviks must master technique." J. V. Stalin discloses the new conditions of development of socialist industry and outlines new methods of management in the work of economic construction.

In the report "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan" at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin shows that the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years is of the utmost international significance. The results of the five-year plan, achieved at a time when the entire capitalist system was shaken by a world economic crisis, proved the indisputable superiority of the Soviet socialist system over the out-of-date capitalist system of economy.

Speaking of the principal forces that ensured the victory of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin notes first and foremost the activity and selflessness, the enthusiasm and initiative, of the vast masses of workers and collective farmers who, in conjunction with the engineering and technical personnel, displayed enormous energy in the promotion of socialist emulation and shock-brigade work.

In defining the main tasks of the Party connected with the results of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin indicates the special importance of safeguarding public,

socialist property against grafters and pilferers and the necessity of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat in every way.

The problems of consolidating the collective-farm system and the tasks of Party work in the countryside are the theme of the speech "Work in the Countryside" and of the "Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders." Revealing the new tactics of the camouflaged class enemies in the countryside, J. V. Stalin appeals to the Party organisations for greater vigilance. Summarising the results of collective-farm development, J. V. Stalin advances the slogan: Make the collective farms Bolshevik and the collective farmers prosperous.

The following works by J. V. Stalin: "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism"—(letter to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia*) and "Reply to Olekhnovich and Aristov," deal with very important problems of the history of Bolshevism. Denouncing the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of the Party, J. V. Stalin calls for the study of the history of the Party to be put on scientific, Bolshevik lines, emphasising that Leninism was born, grew up and became strong in relentless struggle against opportunism of every brand. J. V. Stalin characterises Trotskyism as the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

In his letter to Demyan Bedny, J. V. Stalin points out that some of Demyan Bedny's skits in verse are permeated with unpatriotic tendencies and are an obvious retreat from Leninism. J. V. Stalin stresses the fact that the Russian working class has given mankind

splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism. This fills the hearts of the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles. J. V. Stalin calls upon Soviet writers to be equal to the lofty tasks of bards of the advanced proletariat.

In the "Talk with the German Author Emil Ludwig," J. V. Stalin by his theoretical treatment throws light on the question of the role of the individual and of the masses of the people in history. In his replies to Ludwig's questions, J. V. Stalin declares that the task to which he has devoted his life is the elevation of the working class, the strengthening of the socialist state. Everything that strengthens the socialist state helps to strengthen the entire international working class.

In a number of talks with public figures from abroad J. V. Stalin characterises the foreign policy of the Soviet state as a consistent policy of peace and substantiates the possibility of peaceful co-existence and of establishing business connections between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries.

In the "Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," J. V. Stalin sums up the great victories of socialism in the U.S.S.R., notes the radical changes that have taken place in the country since the Sixteenth Congress, the successes achieved in all the branches of the socialist national economy and culture, successes that testify to the complete triumph of the general line of the Party. J. V. Stalin stresses that the Party owes its successes to being guided in its work by the invincible teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin. J. V. Stalin outlines the pro-

gramme of the further work of the Party in industry, agriculture and other branches of the national economy, and in culture and science. J. V. Stalin puts forward the task of raising organisational leadership to the level of political leadership, of intensifying the ideological work of the Party and the struggle against the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people.

J. V. Stalin analyses the course of the world economic crisis, which is based on the general crisis of capitalism; he shows that in the conditions of the general crisis of the capitalist system capitalism is experiencing a depression of a special kind, one which does not lead to a new upward trend and industrial boom. J. V. Stalin describes the growing tension in the political situation within the capitalist countries and in the relations between these countries, and the imperialists' preparation for a new world war.

Exposing the plans of the instigators of war and scientifically forecasting the further development of events, J. V. Stalin points out that war against the Soviet Union will be the most dangerous war for the imperialists, that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution, that the war will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, and to the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries. J. V. Stalin defines the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. as a policy of preserving peace. He warns that it is necessary to strengthen the defence capacity of the Soviet country in order to be ready to defend it from attack by imperialist states.

The following items in the thirteenth volume are published for the first time: J. V. Stalin's letters to Comrade Shatunovsky, Comrade Ch., Demyan Bedny, Comrade Etchin, and Comrade I. N. Bazhanov; J. V. Stalin's replies to Ralph V. Barnes's questions and the reply to Mr. Barnes's letter; the talk with Colonel Robins.

*Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*

JULY 1930 ~ JANUARY 1934



**REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION
ON THE POLITICAL REPORT
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)¹**

July 22, 1930

Comrades, after the discussion on the Central Committee's report and after all that has happened at this congress in connection with the statements made by the former leaders of the Right opposition, little is left for me to say in my concluding remarks.

I stated in my report that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few congresses in the history of our Party at which there is no opposition of any crystallised kind, able to lay down its line and to counterpose it to that of the Party. That, as you see, is in fact precisely what has happened. Not only has there been no definitely crystallised opposition at our congress, the Sixteenth Congress of the Party, but there has not been even a small group, or even individual comrades, who have thought fit to come forward on the platform here and declare that the Party line is wrong.

The line followed by our Party is clearly the only correct one, moreover its correctness, it turns out, is so evident and indisputable that even the former

leaders of the Right opposition considered it necessary unhesitatingly to stress in their pronouncements the correctness of the Party's entire policy.

After all that, there is of course no need to dwell at length on the correctness of the propositions expounded in the report. There is no such need because, in view of its evident correctness, the Party's line stands in no need of further defence at this congress. And if, nevertheless, I have not waived my right to reply to the discussion, it is because I do not think it will be superfluous to answer briefly some notes handed up by comrades to the congress Presidium, and then to say a few words with regard to the utterances of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

A great many of the notes concern questions of secondary importance: why was no mention made of horse-breeding in the reports, and could not this be touched upon in the reply to the discussion? (*Laughter.*) Why did the reports not mention house-building, and could not something be said about it in the reply to the discussion? Why did the reports say nothing about the electrification of agriculture, and could not something be said about it in the reply to the discussion? And so on in the same strain.

My answer to all these comrades must be that I could not in my report touch on all the problems of our national economy. And I not only could not but had no right to, since I have no right to invade the sphere of the reports which Comrades Kuibyshev and Yakovlev are to make to you on concrete problems of industry and agriculture. Indeed, if all questions were to be dealt with in the Central Committee's report, what

should the reporters on industry, agriculture, etc., say in their reports? (*Voices*: Quite right!)

In particular, as regards the note on the electrification of agriculture, I must say that its author is wrong on several points. He asserts that we are already "confronted squarely with" the electrification of agriculture, that the People's Commissariat of Agriculture is blocking progress in this matter, that Lenin thought differently on the subject, etc. All that is untrue, comrades. It cannot be said that we are "confronted squarely with" the problem of electrifying agriculture. If we were in fact confronted squarely with the electrification of agriculture we should already have ten to fifteen districts in which agricultural production was electrified. But you know very well that we have nothing of the kind as yet. All one can say at the present time about the electrification of agriculture in our country is that it is in the experimental stage. That is how Lenin regarded this matter, encouraging such experiments. Some comrades believe the tractor is already out of date, that the time has come to advance from tractors to the electrification of agriculture. That of course is a fantastic notion. Such comrades should be taken down a peg or two. And that is precisely what the People's Commissariat of Agriculture is doing with them. Hence the note-writer's dissatisfaction with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture cannot be considered justified.

The second batch of notes concerns the national question. One of them—the most interesting, in my opinion—compares the treatment of the problem of national languages in my report at the Sixteenth Con-

gress with the treatment of it in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the East in 1925² and finds a certain lack of clarity which needs elucidating. The note says: "You objected at that time to the theory (*Kautsky's*) of the dying away of national languages and the formation of a single, common language in the period of socialism (*in one country*), while now, in your report at the Sixteenth Congress, you state that Communists believe in the merging of national cultures and national languages into one common culture with one common language (*in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale*). Is there not a lack of clarity here?"

I think that there is neither lack of clarity nor the slightest contradiction here. In my speech in 1925 I objected to Kautsky's national-chauvinist theory on the basis of which a victory of the proletarian revolution in the middle of the past century in the united Austro-German state was bound to lead to the merging of the nations into one common *German* nation, with one common *German* language, and to the *Germanisation* of the Czechs. I objected to this theory as being anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, and in refutation of it quoted facts from life in our country after the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. I still oppose this theory, as can be seen from my report at this Sixteenth Congress. I oppose it because the theory of the merging of all the nations of, say, the U.S.S.R. into one common *Great-Russian* nation with one common *Great-Russian* language is a national-chauvinist, anti-Leninist theory, which contradicts the basic thesis of Leninism that national differences cannot disappear in the near future,

that they are bound to remain for a long time even after the victory of the proletarian revolution *on a world scale*.

As for the more remote prospects for national cultures and national languages, I have always adhered and continue to adhere to the Leninist view that in the period of the victory of socialism *on a world scale*, when socialism has been consolidated and become the way of life, the national languages are inevitably bound to merge into one common language, which, of course, will be neither Great-Russian nor German, but something new. I made a definite statement on this also in my report at the Sixteenth Congress.

Where, then, is the lack of clarity here and what is it exactly that needs elucidating?

Evidently, the authors of the note were not quite clear on at least two things:

First and foremost, they were not clear on the fact that in the U.S.S.R. we have already entered the period of socialism; moreover, despite the fact that we have entered this period, the nations are not only not dying away, but, on the contrary, are developing and flourishing. Have we, in actual fact, already entered the period of socialism? Our period is usually called the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. It was called a transition period in 1918, when Lenin, in his celebrated article, “‘Left-Wing’ Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality,”³ first described this period with its five forms of economy. It is called a transition period today, in 1930, when some of these forms, having become obsolete, are already on the way to disappearance, while one of them, namely, the new form

of economy in the sphere of industry and agriculture, is growing and developing with unprecedented speed. Can it be said that these two transition periods are identical, are not radically different from each other? Obviously not.

What did we have in the sphere of the national economy in 1918? A ruined industry and cigarette lighters; neither collective farms nor state farms on a mass scale; the growth of a "new" bourgeoisie in the towns and of the kulaks in the countryside.

What have we today? Socialist industry, restored and undergoing reconstruction, an extensive system of state farms and collective farms, accounting for more than 40 per cent of the total sown area of the U.S.S.R. in the spring-sown sector alone, a moribund "new" bourgeoisie in the town and a moribund kulak class in the countryside.

The former was a transition period and so is the latter. Nevertheless, they are as far apart as heaven and earth. And nevertheless, no one can deny that we are on the verge of eliminating the last important capitalist class, the kulak class. Clearly, we have already emerged from the transition period in the old sense and have entered the period of direct and sweeping socialist construction along the whole front. Clearly, we have already entered the period of socialism, for the socialist sector now controls all the economic levers of the entire national economy, although we are still far from having completely built a socialist society and from having abolished class distinctions. Nevertheless, the national languages are not only not dying away or merging into one common tongue, but, on the contrary,

the national cultures and national languages are developing and flourishing. Is it not clear that the theory of the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language within the framework of a *single* state in the period of sweeping socialist construction, in the period of socialism in *one* country, is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory?

Secondly, the authors of the note were not clear on the fact that the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language is not an *intra-state* question, not a question of the victory of socialism in *one* country, but an *international* question, a question of the victory of socialism on an *international* scale. They failed to understand that the victory of socialism in *one country* must not be confused with the victory of socialism on an *international* scale. Lenin had good reason for saying that national differences will remain for a long time even after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat on an international scale.

Besides, we must take into consideration still another circumstance, which affects a number of the nations of the U.S.S.R. There is a Ukraine which forms part of the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Ukraine which forms part of other states. There is a Byelorussia which forms part of the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Byelorussia which forms part of other states. Do you think that the question of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages can be settled without taking these specific conditions into account?

Then take the nations of the U.S.S.R. situated along its southern border, from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and Buryat-Mongolia. They are all in the same posi-

tion as the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Naturally, here too we have to take into consideration the specific conditions of development of these nations.

Is it not obvious that all these and similar questions that are bound up with the problem of national cultures and national languages cannot be settled within the framework of a single state, within the framework of the U.S.S.R.?

That, comrades, is how matters stand with respect to the national question in general and the above-mentioned note on the national question in particular.

Allow me to pass now to the utterances of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

What does the congress demand of the former leaders of the Right opposition? Repentance perhaps, or self-chastisement? Of course not! Our Party, the congress of our Party, will never go to the length of requiring Party members to do anything that might humiliate them. The congress demands three things of the former leaders of the Right opposition:

firstly, that they realise that there is a gulf between the line of the Party and the line they were advocating, and that the line they upheld leads objectively not to the victory of socialism, but to the victory of capitalism (*voices*: "Quite right!");

secondly, that they brand that line as an anti-Leninist line and dissociate themselves from it frankly and honestly (*voices*: "Quite right!");

thirdly, that they fall into step with us and, together with us, wage a determined struggle against all Right deviators. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Stormy applause*.)

That is what the congress demands of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

Is there anything in these demands humiliating for them as people wanting to remain Bolsheviks?

Obviously, there is nothing here that is or could be humiliating. Every Bolshevik, every revolutionary, every self-respecting Party member will realise that he can only stand higher and gain in the eyes of the Party if he frankly and honestly admits facts that are clear and indisputable.

That is why I think Tomsky's talk about people wanting to send him to the Gobi Desert to eat locusts and wild honey is on a par with the flat jokes of a provincial variety theatre and has nothing in common with the question of a revolutionary's self-respect. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

It may be asked: why is the congress once again making these demands of the former leaders of the Right opposition?

Is it not a fact that these demands were presented to them once before, in November 1929, at the plenum of the Central Committee⁴? Is it not a fact that they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, accepted those demands at that time, renounced their own line, admitting its erroneous character, recognised the correctness of the Party line and promised to fight, together with the Party, against the Right deviation? Yes, all that was so. What is the point then? The point is that they did not keep their promise, they did not fulfil and are not fulfilling the pledges that they gave seven months ago. (*Voices: "Quite right!"*) Uglanov was quite right when he said in his speech that they had

not fulfilled the pledges given to the November plenum of the Central Committee.

That is the source of the distrust which they are now encountering at the present congress.

That is why the congress is once more presenting its demands to them.

Rykov, Tomsy and Uglanov complained here that the congress was treating them with distrust. But whose fault is that? It is their own fault. One who does not fulfil his pledges cannot expect to be trusted.

Did they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, have any opportunities, any occasions to fulfil their promises and turn over a new leaf? Of course they did. And what advantage did they take of these opportunities and occasions during the seven months? None.

Recently Rykov attended the conference in the Urals.⁵ Consequently, he had an excellent chance to correct his mistakes. And what happened? Instead of frankly and resolutely shedding his vacillations he began to play tricks and manoeuvre. Naturally, the Urals Conference could not but rebuff him.

Now compare Rykov's speech at the Urals Conference with his speech at the Sixteenth Congress. A gulf lies between them. There he played tricks and manoeuvred, fighting the conference. Here he tries frankly and publicly to admit his mistakes, tries to break with the Right opposition and promises to support the Party in the struggle against deviations. Whence such a change and how is it to be explained? It is to be explained, obviously, by the precarious situation that has arisen in the Party for the former leaders of the Right oppo-

sition. No wonder then that the congress has gained this definite impression: You'll get nothing out of these people unless you put the screw on them. (*General laughter. Prolonged applause.*)

Did Uglanov have an opportunity of fulfilling the promise he made to the November plenum of the Central Committee? Yes, he did. I have in mind the non-Party meeting at the Moscow Electric Works which he recently addressed. And what happened? Instead of speaking there as befits a Bolshevik he began to find fault with the Party line. For that he was, of course, suitably rebuffed by the Party unit of the works.

Now compare that speech with his statement printed in today's *Pravda*. A gulf lies between them. How is this change to be explained? Again by the precarious situation that has arisen around the former leaders of the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress has drawn a definite lesson from this: You'll get nothing out of these people unless you put the screw on them. (*General laughter. Applause.*)

Or Tomsy, for instance. Recently he was in Tiflis, at the Transcaucasian Conference.⁶ Consequently, he had a chance to make amends for his sins. And what happened? In his speech there he dealt with state farms, collective farms, co-operatives, the cultural revolution and all that sort of thing, but he did not utter a word about the chief thing, that is, his opportunist work in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. And that is called fulfilling pledges given to the Party! He wanted to outwit the Party, not realising that millions of eyes are watching every one of us and that in this matter you cannot outwit anybody.

Now compare his Tiflis speech with the one he delivered at this congress, where he directly and openly admitted his opportunist mistakes in leadership of the A.U.C.C.T.U. A gulf lies between them. How is this difference to be explained? Again, by the precarious situation that has arisen around the former leaders of the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress tried to exert due pressure on these comrades to get them to carry out their obligations. (*Applause. General laughter throughout the hall.*)

That is the source of the distrust which the congress still entertains for these comrades.

How is this more than strange conduct of the former leaders of the Right opposition to be explained?

How is the fact to be explained that during the past period they did not make a single attempt to fulfil their pledges voluntarily, without pressure from outside?

It is to be explained by at least two circumstances:

Firstly, by the fact that, being still not fully convinced that the Party line was right, they continued to carry on a certain factional activity surreptitiously, lying low for the time being and waiting for a suitable occasion to come out openly once more against the Party. When they gathered at their factional meetings and discussed Party questions they would usually calculate in this way: let us wait until the spring; maybe the Party will come a cropper with the sowing, then we will strike, and strike hard. The spring, however, gave them no advantage, as the sowing proceeded successfully. Then they calculated afresh: let us wait until the autumn; maybe the Party will come a cropper with the grain

procurements, then we will strike at the Central Committee. But the autumn, too, disappointed them, giving them nothing for their pains. And as spring and autumn recur every year, the former leaders of the Right opposition continued to bide their time, repeatedly pinning their hopes now on the spring and now on the autumn. (*General laughter throughout the hall.*)

Naturally, as they kept biding their time from season to season in expectation of a favourable moment for striking at the Party, they were unable to fulfil their pledges.

Lastly, the *second reason*. It consists in the circumstance that the former leaders of the Right opposition do not understand our Bolshevik rates of development, do not believe in those rates and, in general, will not accept anything that goes beyond the bounds of gradual development, beyond the bounds of allowing matters to take their own course. Moreover, our Bolshevik speeds, our new methods of development bound up with the period of reconstruction, the sharpening of the class struggle and the consequences of this sharpening fill them with alarm, confusion, fear and terror. Hence it is natural that they should shrink from everything connected with the most incisive slogans of our Party.

They are afflicted with the same disease as that of Chekhov's well-known character Belikov, teacher of Greek, "the man wrapped in padding." Do you remember Chekhov's story, "The Man Wrapped in Padding"? That character, you may recall, always went about in galoshes and a padded coat, carrying an umbrella, in hot and in cold weather. "Excuse me, but why do

you wear galoshes and a padded coat in July, in such hot weather?" Belikov used to be asked. "You never can tell," Belikov would reply, "Something untoward might happen; a sudden frost might set in, what then?" (*General laughter. Applause.*) Everything new, everything that was outside the daily routine of his drab philistine life, he feared like the plague. If a new restaurant was opened, Belikov promptly took alarm: "It may, of course, be a grand idea to have a restaurant, but take care, something untoward might happen!" If a dramatic circle was formed or a reading room opened, Belikov again fell into a panic: "A dramatic circle, a new reading room—what could they be for? Take care—something untoward might happen!" (*General laughter.*)

The same thing must be said about the former leaders of the Right opposition. Do you remember the case of the transfer of the technical colleges to the economic People's Commissariats? We wanted to transfer only two technical colleges to the Supreme Council of National Economy. A small matter, it would seem. Yet we encountered desperate resistance on the part of the Right deviators. "Hand over two technical colleges to the S.C.N.E.? Why? Would it not be better to wait a bit? Take care, something untoward might happen as a result of this scheme!" Yet today all our technical colleges have been transferred to economic People's Commissariats. And we are getting along all right.

Or take, for example, the emergency measures against the kulaks. Do you remember the hysterics of the Right opposition leaders on that occasion? "Emergency measures against the kulaks? Why? Would it not be better to adopt a liberal policy towards the kulaks?

Take care, something untoward might happen as a result of this scheme!" Yet today we are carrying out the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, a policy in comparison with which the emergency measures against the kulaks are a mere trifle. And we are getting along all right.

Or, for example, the question of the collective farms and state farms. "State farms and collective farms? What are they for? Why hurry? Mind you, something might happen as a result of these state and collective farms."

And so on and so forth.

It is this dread of the new, this inability to approach new problems in a new way, this apprehension that "something untoward might happen," these traits of the man wrapped in padding that prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from merging properly with the Party.

These traits of the man wrapped in padding assume particularly ridiculous forms with them when difficulties arise, when the tiniest cloud appears on the horizon. As soon as any difficulty or hitch occurs anywhere in our country they become alarmed, fearing that something untoward might happen. Should a cockroach make a rustling sound somewhere, they start back terror-stricken even before it has had time to crawl out of its hole, and they begin to howl about a catastrophe, about the downfall of the Soviet regime. (*Loud laughter.*)

We try to calm them, to convince them that as yet nothing dangerous has occurred, that after all it is only a cockroach, which no one need be afraid of. But

it is of no avail. They keep on howling: "What do you mean, a cockroach? That's not a cockroach, it's a thousand wild beasts! It's not a cockroach, but the abyss, the downfall of the Soviet regime.". . . And—there is a regular commotion. Bukharin writes theses on the subject and sends them to the Central Committee, asserting that its policy has brought the country to ruin and that the Soviet regime will certainly perish, if not at once then in a month's time at most. Rykov associates himself with Bukharin's theses, with the reservation, however, that he has a most serious point of disagreement with Bukharin, namely, that the Soviet regime will perish, in his opinion, not in a month's time, but after a month and two days. (*General laughter.*) Tomsky associates himself with Bukharin and Rykov, but protests against their inability to do without theses, to do without a document which they will have to answer for later on: "How many times have I told you, 'do as you please, but don't leave any documents behind, don't leave any traces!'" (*Roars of laughter throughout the hall. Prolonged applause.*)

True, later on, when a year has passed and every fool can see that the cockroach peril was not worth a rap, the Right deviators begin to come to and, gaining courage, are not averse even to boasting a little, declaring that they are not afraid of any cockroaches, and that, anyway, that particular cockroach was such a frail and puny specimen. (*Laughter. Applause.*) But that is after a year has passed. In the meantime—be good enough to put up with these procrastinators. . . .

These, comrades, are the circumstances which prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from

coming closer to the core of the Party leadership and completely merging with it.

How can the situation be remedied here?

There is only one way to do so: by breaking once and for all with their past, equipping themselves anew and merging completely with the Central Committee of our Party in its struggle for Bolshevik rates of development, in its struggle against the Right deviation.

There is no other way.

If the former leaders of the Right opposition are able to do this, well and good. If not, they will have nobody but themselves to blame. (*Prolonged applause from the entire hall. An ovation. All rise and sing the "Internationale."*)

Pravda, No. 181,
July 3, 1930

LETTER TO COMRADE SHATUNOVSKY

Comrade Shatunovsky,

I do not remember your first letter (about Liebknecht). Your second (on criticism) I have read. Criticism, of course, is necessary and obligatory, but on one condition: that it is not barren. Unfortunately, your criticism cannot be considered other than barren. Let me take it up point by point:

1) It is not true that before the revolution land was bought *only* by kulaks. In point of fact both the kulaks and the *middle peasants* used to buy land. If the peasant households that bought land are divided according to social groups, a larger number of them will be found to belong to middle peasants than to kulaks; but if the quantity of land bought is taken as the criterion the kulaks will preponderate. In my speech,⁷ of course, I had the middle peasants in mind.

2) The phrase about the blockheads' retreat to Leninist positions is another way of expressing the idea that they are renouncing their errors. That, I believe, is clear and understandable. Your "critical" remark on this score is really amusing.

3) You are likewise wrong about the conversion of rye into pig food. The point I am making is not that rye can also be fed to pigs, but that there is a *crisis of*

over-production of rye,⁸ which makes it unprofitable to enlarge the area under rye and compels the capitalists (for the sake of maintaining prices) to spoil rye by a special chemical treatment that makes it fit only for pig food (and unfit for human consumption). How could you overlook this “trifle”?

4) You are still more wrong in assuming that the *decay* of capitalism precludes its *growth*. Read Lenin's *Imperialism*⁹ and you will realise that the *decay* of capitalism in certain industries and countries does not preclude but presupposes the *growth* of capitalism in other industries and countries. How could you fail to notice this “trifle” in Lenin? Criticise, if you please, but do so from Lenin's point of view, and from that point of view alone, if you want your criticism to be productive.

5) You are likewise wrong when you describe our country as one of the “colonial type.” Colonial countries are in the main *pre-capitalist* countries. Ours, however, is a *post-capitalist* country. The former have not reached the stage of developed capitalism. The latter has outgrown developed capitalism. They are two fundamentally different types. How can one forget this “trifle,” comrade critic?

6) You are surprised that in Stalin's view the new economic cadres should be technically more experienced than the old.¹⁰ It may be asked, why is this? Is it not true that in our country our old economic cadres were trained during the restoration period, the period when the old and technically backward factories were working to capacity, and consequently they did not afford much technical experience? Is it not true that in the period of reconstruction, when new, modern technical equip-

ment is being introduced, the old economic cadres have to be retrained in the new methods, not infrequently giving way to new, more qualified technical cadres? Will you really deny that the old economic cadres, who were trained in working the old factories to capacity or restarting them, frequently prove to be quite unable to cope not only with the new machinery but also with our new tempos?

7) I shall not touch upon the other points raised in your letter, which are smaller and more trivial, although just as fallacious.

8) You speak of your "devotion" to me. Perhaps it was just a chance phrase. Perhaps. . . . But if the phrase was not accidental I would advise you to discard the "principle" of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not confuse it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of weak-minded intellectuals.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

August 1930

Published for the first time

LETTERS TO COMRADE CH.

Comrade Ch.,

Your note is full of misunderstandings. My report at the Fifteenth Party Conference speaks of the “unity between the interests of industrialisation (i.e., of the proletariat) and the interests of the main mass of the labouring sections of the population.” It says there that our method of industrialisation, i.e., the socialist method of industrialisation, “leads not to the impoverishment of the vast masses, but to an improvement of their living standards, not to an aggravation of the internal contradictions, but to the latter being evened out and overcome.”¹¹ Hence it is a matter here of the bond between the working class and the main mass of the working people, particularly the main mass of the peasantry. Hence it is a matter of the contradictions *within the bond*, which will be evened out and overcome satisfactorily as industrialisation increases, that is, as the strength and influence of the country’s proletariat grows.

That is the matter dealt with in my report.

But you, having forgotten all this, argue about the contradictions between the proletariat and the kulaks, that is contradictions that lie outside the scope of the

bond and will grow and become more acute until we eliminate the kulaks as a class.

It follows that you have confused two different things. You have confused the contradictions between the proletariat and the main mass of the working people with the contradictions between the proletariat and the kulaks.

Is that clear? I think it is.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

November 1930

Comrade Ch.,

1. In your first letter you *played* with the word “contradictions” and *lumped together* contradictions outside the bond (that is contradictions between the proletarian dictatorship and the capitalist elements of the country) and those within the bond (that is contradictions between the proletariat and the main mass of the peasantry). You could have avoided this, for a Marxist impermissible, game if you had taken the trouble to understand the basic causes of the disputes between the Party and the Trotskyists. The Trotskyists told us:

a) You *will not cope* with the contradictions between the middle peasants and the working class; they are bound to fall out and the bond will be abolished unless a victorious world revolution renders timely assistance;

b) You *will not overcome* the capitalist elements, you will not completely build socialism by your own efforts and a Thermidor will be inevitable unless a victorious world revolution renders timely assistance.

On both these questions the Trotskyists, as we know, were defeated. But you had no desire to reflect on our disputes with the Trotskyists. In my reply I was therefore compelled to expose your playing with the word “contradictions” and said that it was impermissible to lump together two series of dissimilar contradictions.

And what was your reply to this?

2. Instead of honestly acknowledging your mistake, you “diplomatically” evaded the question and passed on from playing with the word “contradictions” to playing with the words “inner contradictions,” lumping together contradictions within the bond and contradictions within the country, contradictions between the proletarian dictatorship and capitalism. That is, you are “imperceptibly” repeating your former mistake, with a mere change in its form. I shall not conceal the fact that lumping together two dissimilar contradictions and “diplomatically” slurring over this question is a very characteristic feature of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist way of thinking. I did not think that you were infected with this disease. Now I have to think about this as well.

As I cannot tell what further play you will indulge in and am terribly overburdened with current affairs so that I have no time left for play, I must bid you farewell, Comrade Ch.

J. Stalin

December 7, 1930

Published for the first time

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY

(Excerpts from a Letter)

Your letter of December 8 received. You evidently want my answer. Well, here it is.

First of all, about some of your small and trifling phrases and insinuations. If these ugly “trifles” were an accidental element, one could ignore them. But they are so numerous and “pour forth” in such a lively spate that they set the tone of your entire letter. And as everyone knows, it is the tone that makes the music.

In your estimation the decision of the C.C. is a “noose,” a sign that “the hour of my (that is, your) doom has struck.” Why, on what grounds? What shall one call a Communist who, instead of reflecting on the essence of a C.C. decision and rectifying his mistakes, treats it as a “noose”? . . .

Dozens of times the C.C. praised you when praise was due. And dozens of times the C.C. shielded you (not without stretching things somewhat!) from the attacks of particular groups or members of our Party. Dozens of poets and writers have been rebuked by the C.C. when they made mistakes. All this you considered normal and understandable. But when the C.C. found itself compelled to criticise your mistakes you suddenly started to fume and shout about a “noose.” On what grounds? Has the C.C. perhaps no right to criticise your

mistakes? Is the C.C. decision perhaps not binding on you? Is your poetry perhaps above all criticism? Do you not find that you have caught a certain unpleasant disease called "conceit"? A little more modesty, Comrade Demyan. . . .

What is the essence of your mistakes? The fact that your criticism of shortcomings in the manner and conditions of life in the U.S.S.R.—an essential, imperative subject of criticism—which at first you carried out with considerable accuracy and skill, carried you away so that it began to turn in your works into *slander* of the U.S.S.R., of its past and present. Such are your "Get Down from the Oven" and "Without Mercy." Such is your "Pererva," which I read today at Comrade Molotov's suggestion.

You say that Comrade Molotov praised your skit "Get Down from the Oven." It is very possible. I praised it perhaps no less than Comrade Molotov did, for it (as well as other skits) contains a number of splendid passages that hit the nail on the head. But there is a fly in the ointment which spoils the whole picture and turns it into a veritable "Pererva." That's the point, and that's what sets the tone in these skits.

Judge for yourself.

The whole world now admits that the centre of the revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the U.S.S.R. as the centre of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognise it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the

Russian working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognised leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries. The leaders of the revolutionary workers in all countries are eagerly studying the highly instructive history of Russia's working class, its past and the past of Russia, knowing that besides reactionary Russia there existed also revolutionary Russia, the Russia of the Radishchevs and Chernyshevskys, the Zhelyabovs and Ulyanovs, the Khalturins and Alekseyevs. All this fills (cannot but fill!) the hearts of the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles.

And you? Instead of grasping the meaning of this process, one of the greatest in the history of the revolution, and of being equal to the lofty tasks of a bard of the advanced proletariat—you retired to a quiet spot in the country and, after getting into a muddle between most tedious quotations from the works of Karamzin and no less tedious maxims from the *Domostroi*,* began to shout from the house-tops that in the past Russia was an abomination of desolation, that present-day Russia is one solid “Pererva,” that “laziness” and a desire “to lie on the oven-couch” are well-nigh national traits of the Russians in general and hence also of the Russian workers, who after achieving the October Revolution did not, of course, cease to be Russians. And

* *Domostroi*, a memorial of Russian literature of the 16th century—a code of social, religious, and particularly family conduct. It has come to be a synonym for a conservative and uncultured mode of life.—Tr.

this you call Bolshevik criticism! No, highly esteemed Comrade Demyan, this is not Bolshevik criticism but *slander* of our people, a *discrediting* of the U.S.S.R., a *discrediting* of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., a *discrediting* of the Russian proletariat.

And after that you want the C.C. to keep silent! What do you take our C.C. for?

And you want me to keep silent on the ground that you, it appears, cherish a "biographical tenderness" for me! How naïve you are and how little you know the Bolsheviks. . . .

Perhaps, being a "literate person," you will not refuse to listen to the following words of Lenin's:

"Is the sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Of course not! We love our language and our country, we are working most of all to raise *her* labouring masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of the politically conscious life of democrats and Socialists. It pains us more than anything else to see and feel the outrage, oppression and humiliation inflicted on our splendid country by the tsarist hangmen, the nobility and the capitalists. We are proud of the fact that these outrages have roused resistance in our midst, the midst of the Great Russians; that from *this* midst came Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies; that the Great-Russian working class in 1905 created a mighty, revolutionary party of the masses; that at the same time the Great-Russian muzhik was becoming a democrat, began to overthrow the priest and the landlord. We remember that half a century ago the Great-Russian democrat Chernyshevsky, who devoted his life to the cause of the revolution, said: 'A miserable nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves.' The avowed and unavowed Great-Russian slaves (slaves of the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love of

country, love saddened owing to the absence of a revolutionary spirit among the masses of the Great-Russian people. That spirit was absent at that time. There is little of it now; but it already exists. We are filled with a sense of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, *too*, has created a revolutionary class, it *too* has proved that it is capable of giving mankind splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism, and not only great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility towards priests, tsars, landlords and capitalists" (see Lenin, *The National Pride of the Great Russians*).¹²

That is how Lenin, the greatest internationalist in the world, could speak of the national pride of the Great Russians.

And he spoke *thus* because he knew that

"The interests (not in the servile sense) of the national pride of the Great Russians *coincide* with the *socialist* interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians" (*ibid.*).¹³

There you have it, Lenin's clear and bold "programme."

This "programme" is fully comprehensible and natural to revolutionaries intimately linked with their working class, their people.

It is not comprehensible and not natural to political degenerates of the Lelevich type, who are not and cannot be linked with their working class, their people.

Can this revolutionary "programme" of Lenin be reconciled with that unhealthy tendency displayed in your latest skits?

Unfortunately, it cannot, and that is because they have nothing in common.

That is the point at issue and that is what you refuse to understand.

Therefore, you must *at all costs* turn back to the old, Leninist road.

That is the crux of the matter, and not the inane lamentations of a frightened intellectual who goes around in a blue funk talking about how they want to “isolate” Demyan, that Demyan “won’t be printed any more,” and so on.

J. Stalin

December 12, 1930

Published for the first time

ANTI-SEMITISM

Reply to an Inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States

In answer to your inquiry:

National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.

Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.

In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.

J. Stalin

January 12, 1931

First published
in the newspaper *Pravda*, No. 329,
November 30, 1936

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES

*Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference
of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry¹⁴
February 4, 1931*

Comrades, the deliberations of your conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions—I am somewhat familiar with them—you approve the control figures of industry for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in the habit of fulfilling promises made by them. But what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. And that is a very big task. More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only pledge yourselves to fulfil our five-year plan in four years—that matter has already been settled, and no more resolutions on it are needed—*it means that you promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive branches of industry.*

It is good that the conference gives a promise to fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience." We know that promises are not always kept. In the beginning of 1930, too, a promise was given to fulfil the plan for the year. At that time it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31 to

32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the full. Actually, the increase in industrial output during 1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask: Will not the same thing occur again this year? The managers and leading personnel of our industries now promise to increase industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee is there that this promise will be kept?

What is needed in order to fulfil the control figures, to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure the fulfilment of the five-year plan not in four, but, as regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are needed for this.

Firstly, real or, as we term it, "objective" possibilities.

Secondly, the willingness and ability to direct our enterprises in such a way as to realise these possibilities.

Did we have the "objective" possibilities last year for completely fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable facts testify to this. These facts show that in March and April of last year industry achieved an increase of 31 per cent in output compared with the previous year. Why then, it will be asked, did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? What was lacking? *The ability to make use of the existing possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the factories, mills and mines properly was lacking.*

We had the first condition: the "objective" possibilities for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because we lacked

the ability to manage the factories, the plan was not fulfilled. Instead of a 31-32 per cent increase we had one of only 25 per cent.

Of course, a 25 per cent *increase* is a big thing. Not a single capitalist country *increased* its production in 1930, or *is increasing* production now. In all capitalist countries without exception a sharp *decline* in production is taking place. Under such circumstances a 25 per cent *increase* is a big step forward. But we could have achieved more. We had all the necessary "objective" conditions for this.

And so, what guarantee is there that what happened last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be fulfilled, that we shall use the existing possibilities in the way that they should be used, that your promise will not to some extent remain a promise on paper?

In the history of states and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when there was every possibility for success and victory, but these possibilities were wasted because the leaders failed to notice them, did not know how to take advantage of them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil the control figures for 1931?

Yes, we have such possibilities.

What are these possibilities? What is needed in order that these possibilities should really exist?

First of all, adequate *natural resources* in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for

example, which provide a combination of resources not to be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain—what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a year or two we shall have our own rubber as well. As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. We have even more than necessary.

What else is needed?

A *government* desirous and capable of utilising these immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. Have we such a government? We have. True, our work in utilising natural resources does not always proceed without friction among our leading personnel. For instance, last year the Soviet Government had to conduct a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating a second coal and metallurgical base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles and shall soon have this base.

What else is needed?

That this government should enjoy the *support* of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will find no other government in the world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet government. There is no need for me to refer to the growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock-brigade work, the campaign and struggle for counter-plans. All these facts, which vividly demonstrate the support that the vast masses give the Soviet Government, are well known.

What else is needed in order to fulfil and overfulfil the control figures for 1931?

A *system* that is free from the incurable diseases of capitalism and has great advantages over capitalism. Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses—such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; that is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism.

Notice the way in which the capitalists are trying to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages as much as possible. They are reducing the prices of raw materials as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and industrial commodities for mass consumption to any important extent. This means that they want to escape from the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, at the expense of the workers and peasants, at the expense of the working people. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions are accumulating which lead to a new, even more severe crisis.

Our superiority lies in the fact that we have no crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, for we are conducting a planned economy. But that is not all. We are a land of the most concentrated

industry. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that this industry was based upon scattered and small peasant farming. That was so in the past; it is no longer so now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we shall become the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. This year, the state farms and collective farms—and these are forms of large-scale farming—have already supplied half of all our marketable grain. And that means that our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.

What else is needed in order to advance with giant strides?

A *party* sufficiently solid and united to direct the efforts of all the best members of the working class to *one point*, and sufficiently experienced to be unafraid of difficulties and to pursue systematically a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a party? Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is, for it is yielding important successes. This is now admitted not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known “honourable” gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in Britain, Poincaré in France, fume and rave against our Party. Why do they fume and rave? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is yielding success after success.

There, comrades, you have all those objective possibilities which assist us in realising the control figures for 1931, which help us to fulfil the five-year plan in

four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus we have the first condition for fulfilment of the plan—the “objective” possibilities.

Have we the second condition, the ability to use these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills and mines properly managed? Is everything in order in this respect?

Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, as Bolsheviks, we must say this plainly and frankly.

What does management of production mean? There are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik approach to the question of the management of our factories. There are many people among us who think that management is synonymous with signing papers and orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how Madame Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: “Don't bother your head with science, don't go into matters, let others do that, it is not your business—your business is to sign papers.” It must be admitted to our shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a few who carry out management by signing papers. But as for going into matters, mastering technique, becoming master of the business—why, that is out of the question.

How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter civil war, who have solved the tremendous task of building a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry on to the path of socialism—how is it that in the matter of the management of production we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to manage production. And so, many economic executives are taking this line of least resistance. We, too, in the centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers—the experts—carry on production, and you, Communists, do not interfere with the technique of the business; but, while not interfering, study technique, study the art of management tirelessly, in order later on, together with the experts who are loyal to us, to become true managers of production, true masters of the business." Such was the slogan. But what actually happened? The second part of this formula was cast aside, for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first part of the formula was vulgarised: non-interference was interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once warned us that all was not well in this field. The Shakhty affair¹⁵ was the first grave warning. The Shakhty affair showed that the Party organisations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our economic executives were disgracefully backward in technical knowledge; that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, especially as they are constantly being besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad.

The second warning was the "Industrial Party" trial.¹⁶

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy furiously resists the socialist offensive. This alone, however, is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth of wrecking activities.

How is it that wrecking activities assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. Had we handled the business of managing production differently, had we started much earlier to learn the technique of the business, to master technique, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of production, the wreckers would not have succeeded in doing so much damage.

We must ourselves become experts, masters of the business; we must turn to technical science—such was the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first warning nor even the second brought about the necessary change. It is time, high time that we turned towards technique. It is time to discard the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-interference in technique, and ourselves become specialists, experts, complete masters of our economic affairs.

It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man management? We do not have it and we shall not get it until we have mastered technique. Until there are among us Bolsheviks a sufficient number of people thoroughly familiar with technique, economy and finance, we shall not have real one-man management. You can write as many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as you please, but, unless you master the technique, economy and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, to become masters of the business ourselves. This is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that one-man management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today, but tomorrow we shall. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire for it.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial

backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was profitable and could be done with impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: "You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia."¹⁷ Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: "You are abundant," so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: "You are poor and impotent," so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty—therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.

That is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

But we have yet other, more serious and more important, obligations. They are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. That is well said. But it imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish working-class state power, we were the first to begin building socialism. By the fact that we were engaged on a cause which, if successful, will transform the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, may say: There you have my advanced detachment, my shock brigade, my working-class state power, my fatherland; they are engaged on their cause, our cause, and they are working well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not justify the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want to utterly disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international. As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to management of production during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output compared with the pre-war level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished still more if we had tried during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to make proper use of these possibilities. And that depends on us. **Only** on us! It is time we learned to make use of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten line of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new line, one corresponding to the present period—the line of *interfering in everything*. If you are a factory manager—interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction, technique decides everything. And an economic executive who does not want to study technique, who does not want to master technique, is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult prob-

lems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have transferred the middle peasants on to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we shall develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we shall do it if we really want to.

Pravda, No. 35,
February 5, 1931

LETTER TO COMRADE ETCHIN

Comrade Etchin,

I was unable (for lack of time!) to read your pamphlet but I can reply briefly to your four questions.

1) "*Inner-Party contradictions*." Ever since Engels's day the proposition that the development of proletarian parties takes place through the overcoming of internal Party contradictions has been axiomatic. These contradictions find expression in overt or covert disagreements. Ossovsky has nothing to do with the matter here, since he wrongly considered our Party, for instance, to be a bloc of two antagonistic classes, as the representative of these classes, whereas our Party (like the other sections of the Comintern) is in actual fact the representative of one class, namely, the working class. And, after all, we are concerned with the Communist Parties, each of which is the representative of one (the proletarian) class.

2) *Leninism*. There can be no doubt that Leninism is the most Left (without quotation marks) trend in the world labour movement. The labour movement contains all kinds of trends, from the feudal-monarchist (such as "the League of the Russian People") and the openly capitalist trend (such as the Cadets) to the covertly-bourgeois trend (Social-Democrats, particularly the "Left" Social-Democrats, Anarchists, Anarcho-Syndicalists) and the

ultra-Left “communist” trend. The most Left of these, and the only consistently revolutionary trend, is Leninism.

3) *The roots of the “Left” and Right deviations.* Their roots are common in the sense that they both reflect the pressure of classes alien to us. Their forms and means of struggle against the Party differ in accordance with the differences in the social strata which they, i.e., the deviations, represent.

4) *The struggle on two fronts.* There is nothing to explain here. I fail to understand why Comrade Kantor disagrees with you.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

February 27, 1931

Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO THE STAFFS OF AZNEFT AND GROZNEFT

I congratulate the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the State Association of the Azerbaijanian Oil Industry and of the State Association of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry on the fulfilment of the five-year plan in two and a half years. Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Long live the workers of the U.S.S.R., who have broken the chains of capitalism and become the masters of their country!

Long live Soviet Power! Long live the Party of the Bolsheviks!

J. Stalin

March 31, 1931

Pravda, No. 90,
April 1, 1931

TO ELEKTROZAVOD

Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of Elektrozavod, who have fulfilled the five-year plan in two and a half years. Forward to further victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 92,
April 3, 1931

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK

I congratulate the Magnitogorsk workers and executive staff on their first important victory.¹⁸

Forward, comrades, to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 136,
May 19, 1931

**TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
OF THE ALL-UNION CENTRE
OF MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS.
TO ALL MACHINE AND TRACTOR
STATIONS**

Fraternal greetings to the working men and working women, to the technicians and specialists and the entire executive staff of the machine and tractor stations on the occasion of the pre-schedule fulfilment of the plan for sowing 18,000,000 hectares.

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Last year about 2,000,000 hectares of collective-farm fields were sown by machine and tractor stations. This year—more than 18,000,000 hectares. Last year the machine and tractor stations served 2,347 collective farms. This year—46,514 collective farms. From the wooden plough to the tractor—such is the path travelled by the peasant farms of our country. Let everyone know that the working class of the Soviet Union is firmly and confidently promoting the technical re-equipment of its ally, the labouring peasantry!

Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations will not rest content with the results achieved, but will, by way of a counter-plan, *increase* the 18,000,000 hectares of sown area assigned in the plan (and already fulfilled) to 20,000,000 hectares.

Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations will not stop at this, but will confidently tackle their next tasks: to prepare about 5,000,000 hectares of *fallow land*, successfully carry out the *harvesting* campaign, do about 15,000,000 hectares of *autumn ploughing*, raise the *winter-crop* area to 8,000,000 hectares, organise a *further thousand* machine and tractor stations and thus establish the basis for serving the overwhelming majority of collective farms next year.

Let everybody know that the Soviet Union is being transformed from a country of small-peasant economy and backward agricultural technique into a country of large-scale, collective economy with the most modern agricultural technique!

Forward, comrades, to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 145,
May 28, 1931

**TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE GRAIN TRUST BOARD.
TO ALL STATE GRAIN FARMS**

Fraternal greetings to the leading force of the new Soviet agriculture, to the socialist standard-bearer of the new technique and the new methods of organising agriculture, to the *system of state grain farms*, its working men and working women, its technicians and specialists, its leaders and instructors!

Do not rest content with having fulfilled the sowing plan. You can and must *overfulfil* this plan, for you have every possibility required for doing so.

Bring into line your *lagging detachments* in Siberia and especially in the Far East, render the utmost *assistance to the collective farms*, get the preparations for the *harvest* under way—the chief immediate task of the state grain farms—and achieve *new successes*.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 147,
May 30, 1931

NEW CONDITIONS — NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

*Speech Delivered
at a Conference of Business Executives¹⁹
June 23, 1931*

Comrades, the materials presented to this conference show that as regards the fulfilment of the plan our industry presents a rather motley picture. There are branches of industry that have increased their output during the past five months 40 to 50 per cent compared with last year. Other branches have increased their output not more than 20 to 30 per cent. Lastly, there are certain branches that show a very small increase, some 6 to 10 per cent and sometimes even less. Among the latter we must include coal mining and the iron and steel industry. The picture, as you see, is a motley one.

How is this diversity to be explained? Why are certain branches of industry lagging behind? Why is it that certain branches of industry show an increase of only 20 to 25 per cent, while coal mining and the iron and steel industry show an even smaller increase and are trailing behind other branches?

The reason is that lately the conditions of development of industry have radically changed; new conditions demanding new methods of management have arisen; but some of our economic executives, instead of changing their methods of work, are continuing in the old way. The

point, therefore, is that the new conditions of development of industry require new methods of work; but some of our economic executives do not understand this and do not see that they must now adopt new methods of management.

That is the reason why certain branches of our industry are lagging behind.

What are these new conditions of development of our industry? How did they arise?

There are at least six such new conditions.

Let us examine them.

I

MANPOWER

First of all, there is the question of the supply of *manpower* for our factories. Formerly, the workers usually came of their own accord to the factories and mills—to some extent, therefore, things proceeded automatically in this sphere. And this happened because there was unemployment, there was differentiation in the countryside, there was poverty and fear of starvation, which drove people from the country to the town. You remember the formula: “The flight of the peasant from the country to the town”? What compelled the peasant to flee from the country to the town? The fear of starvation, unemployment, the fact that the village was like a stepmother to him, and he was ready to flee from his village to the devil himself, if only he could find some sort of work.

Such, or nearly such, was the state of affairs in the recent past.

Can it be said that the same conditions prevail now? No, it cannot. On the contrary, conditions have now radically changed. And because conditions have changed we no longer have an automatic influx of manpower.

What, in point of fact, has changed during this period? Firstly, we have done away with unemployment—consequently, we have abolished the force that exercised pressure upon the “labour market.” Secondly, we have radically undermined differentiation in the countryside—consequently, we have overcome the mass poverty there, which drove the peasant from the country to the town. Lastly, we have supplied the countryside with tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines, we have smashed the kulak, we have organised collective farms and have given the peasants the opportunity to live and work like human beings. Now the countryside cannot any longer be termed a stepmother to the peasant. And precisely because it can no longer be termed a stepmother, the peasant has begun to settle down in the countryside; we no longer have “the flight of the peasant from the country to the town,” nor an automatic influx of manpower.

As you see, we now have an entirely new situation and new conditions in regard to the supply of manpower for our factories.

What follows from that?

It follows, firstly, that we must no longer count on an automatic influx of manpower. This means that we must pass from the “policy” of letting things proceed automatically to the policy of *organised* recruiting of

workers for industry. But there is only one way of achieving this—that of contracts of economic organisations with collective farms and collective farmers. As you know, certain economic organisations and collective farms have already adopted this method; and experience has shown that this practice yields important advantages both for the collective farms and for the industrial enterprises.

It follows, secondly, that we must pass immediately to *mechanisation* of the heavier processes of labour and develop this to the utmost (timber industry, building industry, coal mining, loading and unloading, transport, iron and steel industry, etc.). This, of course, does not mean that we must abandon manual labour. On the contrary, manual labour will continue to play a very important part in production for a long time to come. But it does mean that mechanisation of labour processes is for us the *new* and *decisive* force, without which neither our tempo nor the new scale of production can be maintained.

There are still quite a number of our economic executives who “do not believe” either in mechanisation or in contracts with collective farms. These are the very executives who fail to understand the new situation, who do not want to work in the new way and sigh for the “good old times” when manpower “came of its own accord” to the enterprises. Needless to say, such economic executives are as remote from the new tasks in economic construction, which are imposed by the new conditions, as the sky from the earth. Apparently they think that the difficulties in regard to manpower are accidental and that the shortage of manpower will disappear automatically, so to speak. That is a delusion, comrades.

The difficulties in regard to manpower cannot disappear of themselves. They can disappear only as the result of our own efforts.

Hence the task is *to recruit manpower in an organised way, by means of contracts with the collective farms, and to mechanise labour.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the first new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the second condition.

II WAGES

I have just spoken about the organised recruiting of workers for our factories. But recruiting workers is not all that has to be done. In order to ensure manpower for our enterprises we must see to it that the workers are stably connected with their factories and make the composition of the labour force in the factories more or less constant. It scarcely needs proof that without a constant labour force who have more or less mastered the technique of production and have become accustomed to the new machinery it will be impossible to make any headway, impossible to fulfil the production plans. Unless this is achieved, we shall have to keep on training new workers and to spend half the time on training them instead of making use of this time for production. But what is actually happening now? Can it be said that the composition of the labour force at our factories is more or less constant? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. On the contrary, we still have a so-called *fluidity* of manpower at our factories. More than that, in a number of

factories the fluidity of manpower, far from disappearing, is increasing and becoming more marked. At any rate, you will find few factories where the personnel does not change at least to the extent of 30 to 40 per cent of the total in the course of half a year, or even in one quarter.

Formerly, during the period of restoration of our industry, when its technical equipment was not very complex and the scale of production not very large, it was more or less possible to "tolerate" this so-called fluidity of manpower. Now it is another matter. Now the situation is radically different. Now, in the period of intensive reconstruction, when the scale of production has become gigantic and technical equipment has become extremely complex, the fluidity of manpower has become a scourge of production and is disorganising our factories. To "tolerate" the fluidity of manpower now would mean disintegrating our industry, destroying the possibility of fulfilling production plans and ruining any chance of improving the quality of the output.

What is the cause of the fluidity of manpower?

The cause is the wrong structure of wages, the wrong wage scales, the "Leftist" practice of wage equalisation. In a number of factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. The consequence of wage equalisation is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "visitor" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to "earn a little money" and then go off to "try his luck" in some other place. The consequence of wage equalisation is

that the skilled worker is obliged to go from factory to factory until he finds one where his skill is properly appreciated.

Hence, the “general” drift from factory to factory; hence, the fluidity of manpower.

In order to put an end to this evil we must abolish wage equalisation and discard the old wage scales. In order to put an end to this evil we must draw up wage scales that will take into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. We cannot tolerate a situation where a rolling-mill worker in the iron and steel industry earns no more than a sweeper. We cannot tolerate a situation where a locomotive driver earns only as much as a copying clerk. Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and unskilled labour would exist even under socialism, even after classes had been abolished; that only under communism would this difference disappear and that, consequently, even under socialism “wages” must be paid according to work performed and not according to needs. But the equalitarians among our economic executives and trade-union officials do not agree with this and believe that under our Soviet system this difference has already disappeared. Who is right, Marx and Lenin or the equalitarians? It must be assumed that it is Marx and Lenin who are right. But it follows from this that whoever draws up wage scales on the “principle” of wage equalisation, without taking into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, breaks with Marxism, breaks with Leninism.

In every branch of industry, in every factory, in every shop, there is a leading group of more or less skilled

workers who first and foremost must be retained if we really want to ensure a constant labour force in the factories. These leading groups of workers are the principal link in production. By retaining them in the factory, in the shop, we can retain the whole labour force and radically prevent the fluidity of manpower. But how can we retain them in the factories? We can retain them only by promoting them to higher positions, by raising the level of their wages, by introducing a system of wages that will give the worker his due according to qualification.

And what does promoting them to higher positions and raising their wage level mean, what can it lead to as far as unskilled workers are concerned? It means, apart from everything else, opening up prospects for the unskilled worker and giving him an incentive to rise higher, to rise to the category of a skilled worker. You know yourselves that we now need hundreds of thousands and even millions of skilled workers. But in order to build up cadres of skilled workers, we must provide an incentive for the unskilled workers, provide for them a prospect of advancement, of rising to a higher position. And the more boldly we adopt this course the better, for this is the principal means of putting an end to the fluidity of manpower. To economise in this matter would be criminal, it would be going against the interests of our socialist industry.

But that is not all.

In order to retain the workers in the factories we must still further improve the supply of goods and the housing conditions of the workers. It cannot be denied that a good deal has been done during the last few years in

the sphere of housing construction and supplies for the workers. But what has been done is altogether inadequate compared with the rapidly growing requirements of the workers. It will not do to plead that there were fewer houses before than there are now and that therefore we can be content with the results achieved. Nor will it do to plead that workers' supplies were far worse before than they are now and therefore we can be satisfied with the present situation. Only those who are rotten to the core can content themselves with references to the past. We must proceed, not from the past, but from the growing requirements of the workers at the present time. We must realise that the conditions of life of the workers have radically changed in our country. The worker to-day is not what he was previously. The worker today, our Soviet worker, wants to have all his material and cultural needs satisfied: in respect of food, housing conditions, cultural and all sorts of other requirements. He has a right to this, and it is our duty to secure these conditions for him. True, our worker does not suffer from unemployment; he is free from the yoke of capitalism; he is no longer a slave, but the master of his job. But this is not enough. He demands that all his material and cultural requirements be met, and it is our duty to fulfil this demand of his. Do not forget that we ourselves are now making certain demands on the worker—we demand from him labour discipline, intense effort, emulation, shock-brigade work. Do not forget that the vast majority of workers have accepted these demands of the Soviet Government with great enthusiasm and are fulfilling them heroically. Do not be surprised, therefore, if, while fulfilling the demands of the Soviet

Government, the workers in their turn demand that the Soviet Government should fulfil its obligations in regard to further improving their material and cultural condition.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to the fluidity of manpower, to do away with wage equalisation, to organise wages properly and to improve the living conditions of the workers.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the second new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the third condition.

III

THE ORGANISATION OF WORK

I have said that it is necessary to put an end to the fluidity of manpower, to retain the workers in the factories. But retaining the workers in the factories is not all; the matter does not end there. It is not enough to put an end to the fluidity of manpower. We must provide the workers with such working conditions as will enable them to work efficiently, to increase productivity and to improve the quality of the products. Consequently, we must so organise work in the factories as to bring about an increase in labour productivity from month to month, from quarter to quarter.

Can it be said that the present organisation of work in our factories meets the modern requirements of production? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. At all events, we still have a number of factories where work is organised abominably, where instead of order and co-ordination of work there is disorder and mud-

dle, where instead of responsibility for the work there is absolute irresponsibility, *lack of personal responsibility*.

What is meant by lack of personal responsibility? It is the absence of any responsibility for work that is entrusted to one, the absence of responsibility for machinery and tools. Naturally, when there is no personal responsibility there can be no question of any important increase in the productivity of labour, of any improvement in the quality of production, of the exercise of care in handling machinery and tools. You know what lack of personal responsibility led to on the railways. It is leading to the same result in industry. We have abolished the system under which there was lack of personal responsibility on the railways and have thus improved their work. We must do the same in industry in order to raise its work to a higher level.

Formerly, we could “manage” somehow or other with the bad organisation of work that goes naturally with lack of personal responsibility, with no worker being responsible for a particular concrete job. Now it is another matter. Now the situation is completely different. With the present vast scale of production and the existence of giant enterprises, lack of personal responsibility has become a scourge of industry that is jeopardising all our achievements in the factories in the sphere of production and organisation.

What enabled lack of personal responsibility to become the rule in a number of our factories? It entered the factories as the illegitimate companion of the uninterrupted working-week. It would be wrong to assert that the uninterrupted working week necessarily leads to

lack of personal responsibility in production. If work is properly organised, if each person is made responsible for a definite job, if definite groups of workers are assigned to machines, if the shifts are properly organised so that they are equal in quality and skill—given such conditions, the uninterrupted working-week leads to a tremendous increase in labour productivity, to an improvement in quality of work and to eliminating lack of personal responsibility. Such is the case on the railways, for example, where the uninterrupted working-week is now in force, but where there is no longer lack of personal responsibility. Can it be said that the position in regard to the uninterrupted working-week is equally satisfactory in industrial enterprises? Unfortunately, this can not be said. The fact of the matter is that a number of our factories adopted the uninterrupted working-week too hastily, without preparing suitable conditions for it, without properly organising shifts more or less equal in quality and skill, without making each worker responsible for a particular concrete job. The result is that the uninterrupted working-week, left to itself, has given rise to lack of personal responsibility. The result is that in a number of factories we have the uninterrupted working-week on paper, in words, and lack of personal responsibility not on paper, but in actual operation. The result is that there is no sense of responsibility for the job, machinery is handled carelessly, large numbers of machine tools break down, and there is no incentive for increasing the productivity of labour. It is not for nothing that the workers say: “We could raise the productivity of labour and improve matters; but who is going to appreciate it when nobody is responsible for anything?”

It follows from this that some of our comrades were a little hasty in introducing the uninterrupted working-week, and in their hurry distorted it and transformed it into a system of lack of personal responsibility.

There are two ways of putting an end to this situation and of doing away with lack of personal responsibility. Either change the method of carrying out the uninterrupted working week so that it does not result in lack of personal responsibility, as was done on the railways. Or, where the conditions do not favour this, abandon the nominal uninterrupted working week, temporarily adopt the interrupted, six-day week, as was recently done in the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and prepare the conditions so as to return, should the need arise, to a real, not nominal, uninterrupted working-week; to return eventually to the uninterrupted working-week, but not to lack of personal responsibility.

There is no other way.

There can be no doubt that our economic executives understand all this very well. But they keep silent. Why? Because, evidently, they fear the truth. But since when have Bolsheviks begun to fear the truth? Is it not true that in a number of factories the uninterrupted working-week has resulted in lack of personal responsibility and has thus been distorted to an extreme degree? The question is: Who wants such an uninterrupted working-week? Who dares assert that the preservation of this nominal and distorted uninterrupted working-week is more important than the proper organisation of work, than increased productivity of labour, than a genuine uninterrupted working-week, than the interests of our socialist industry? Is it not clear that the sooner we bury

the nominal uninterrupted working-week the sooner shall we achieve a proper organisation of work?

Some comrades think that we can do away with the lack of personal responsibility by means of incantations and high sounding speeches. At any rate, I know a number of economic executives who in their fight against lack of personal responsibility confine themselves to speaking at meetings now and again, hurling curses at the lack of personal responsibility, apparently believing that after such speeches lack of personal responsibility is bound to disappear automatically, so to speak. They are grievously mistaken if they think that lack of personal responsibility can be done away with by speeches and incantations. No, comrades, lack of personal responsibility will never disappear of itself. We alone can and must put an end to it; for it is you and I who are at the helm and it is you and I who are answerable for everything, including lack of personal responsibility. I think that it would be far better if our economic executives, instead of making speeches and incantations, spent a month or two at some mine or factory, studied all details and "trifles" relating to the organisation of work, actually put an end there to lack of personal responsibility and then applied the experience gained at this enterprise to other enterprises. That would be far better. That would be really fighting against lack of personal responsibility, fighting for the proper, Bolshevik organisation of work, for the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to lack of personal responsibility, to improve the organisation of work and to secure the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the third new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fourth condition.

IV

A WORKING-CLASS INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

The situation has also changed in regard to the administrative staff of industry in general, and in regard to the engineering and technical personnel in particular.

Formerly, the situation was that the main source of supply for all our industry was the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. The Ukraine supplied metal to all our industrial regions: both to the South and to Moscow and Leningrad. It also supplied coal to the principal enterprises in the U.S.S.R. I leave out the Urals because the relative importance of the entire Urals was very small compared with the Donets Basin. Accordingly, we had three main centres for training an administrative staff for industry: the South, the Moscow district and the Leningrad district. Naturally, under those conditions we could somehow manage with the very small engineering and technical forces that were all that our country could have at its disposal at that time.

That was the position in the recent past.

But the situation is now quite different. Now it is obvious, I think, that with the present rate of development and gigantic scale of production we are already unable to make do with the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical base alone. As you know, the supply of Ukrainian

coal and metal is already in adequate, in spite of the increase in their output. As you know, we have been obliged, as a result of this, to create a new coal and metallurgical base in the East—the Urals-Kuznetsk Basin. As you know, our work to create this base has been not without success. But that is not enough. We must, further, create a metallurgical industry in Siberia itself to satisfy its own growing requirements. And we are already creating it. Besides this, we must create a new base for non-ferrous metals in Kazakhstan and Turkestan. Finally, we must develop extensive railway construction. That is dictated by the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a whole—by the interests of the border republics as well as of the centre.

But it follows from this that we can no longer make do with the very small engineering, technical and administrative forces of industry with which we managed formerly. It follows that the old centres for training engineering and technical forces are no longer adequate, that we must create a whole network of new centres—in the Urals, in Siberia and in Central Asia. We must now ensure the supply of three times, five times the number of engineering, technical and administrative forces for industry if we really intend to carry out the programme of the socialist industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.

But we do not need just *any kind* of administrative, engineering and technical forces. We need *such* administrative, engineering and technical forces as are capable of understanding the policy of the working class of our country, capable of assimilating that policy and ready to carry it out conscientiously. And what does this mean? It means that our country has entered a phase of

development in which the *working class must create its own industrial and technical intelligentsia*, one that is capable of upholding the interests of the working class in production as the interests of the ruling class.

No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia. There are no grounds for believing that the working class of the U.S.S.R. can manage without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

The Soviet Government has taken this circumstance into account and has opened wide the doors of all the higher educational institutions in every branch of national economy to members of the working class and labouring peasantry. You know that tens of thousands of working-class and peasant youths are now studying in higher educational institutions. Whereas formerly, under capitalism, the higher educational institutions were the monopoly of the scions of the rich—today, under the Soviet system, the working-class and peasant youth predominate there. There is no doubt that our educational institutions will soon be turning out thousands of new technicians and engineers, new leaders for our industries.

But that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that the industrial and technical intelligentsia of the working class will be recruited not only from those who have had higher education, but also from practical workers in our factories, from the skilled workers, from the working-class cultural forces in the mills, factories and mines. The initiators of emulation, the leaders of shock brigades, those who in practice inspire labour enthusiasm, the organisers of operations in the various sectors of our work of construction—such is the new stratum of the working class that, together with the

comrades who have had higher education, must form the core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core of the administrative staff of our industry. The task is to see that these "rank-and-file" comrades who show initiative are not pushed aside, to promote them boldly to responsible positions, to give them the opportunity to display their organising abilities and the opportunity to supplement their knowledge, to create suitable conditions for their work, not stinting money for this purpose.

Among these comrades there are not a few non-Party people. But that should not prevent us from boldly promoting them to leading positions. On the contrary, it is particularly these non-Party comrades who must receive our special attention, who must be promoted to responsible positions so that they may see for themselves that the Party appreciates capable and gifted workers.

Some comrades think that only Party members may be placed in leading positions in the mills and factories. That is the reason why they not infrequently push aside non-Party comrades who possess ability and initiative and put Party members at the top instead, although they may be less capable and show no initiative. Needless to say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such a "policy," if one may call it such. It scarcely needs proof that such a "policy" can only discredit the Party and repel non-Party workers from it. Our policy does not by any means lie in converting the Party into an exclusive caste. Our policy is to ensure that there is an atmosphere of "mutual confidence," of "mutual control" (*Lenin*), among Party and non-Party workers. One of the reasons why our Party is strong among the working class is that it pursues this policy.

Hence, the task is to see *to it that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the fourth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fifth condition.

V

SIGNS OF A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THE OLD INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

The question of our attitude towards the old, bourgeois industrial and technical intelligentsia is also presented in a new light.

About two years ago the situation was that the more highly skilled section of the old technical intelligentsia was infected with the disease of wrecking. More than that, at that time wrecking was a sort of fashionable activity. Some engaged in wrecking, others shielded the wreckers, others again washed their hands of what was going on and remained neutral, while still others vacillated between the Soviet regime and the wreckers. Of course, the majority of the old technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally. But we are not speaking here of the majority, but of the most highly skilled section of the technical intelligentsia.

What gave rise to the wrecking movement? What fostered it? The intensification of the class struggle in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government's policy of offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country, the resistance of these elements to the policy of the Soviet

Government, the complexity of the international situation and the difficulties of collective-farm and state-farm development. While the activities of the militant section of the wreckers were augmented by the interventionist intrigues of the imperialists in the capitalist countries and by the grain difficulties within our country, the vacillations of the other section of the old technical intelligentsia towards the active wreckers were encouraged by utterances that were in fashion among the Trotskyite-Menshevik windbags to the effect that “nothing will come of the collective farms and state farms anyway,” that “the Soviet power is degenerating anyway and is bound to collapse very soon,” that “the Bolsheviks by their policy are themselves facilitating intervention,” etc., etc. Besides, if even certain old Bolsheviks among the Right deviators could not resist the “epidemic” and swung away from the Party at that time, it is not surprising that a certain section of the old technical intelligentsia who had never had any inkling of Bolshevism should, with the help of God, also vacillate.

Naturally, under such circumstances, the Soviet Government could pursue only one policy towards the old technical intelligentsia—the policy of *smashing* the active wreckers, *differentiating* the neutrals and *enlisting* those who were loyal.

That was a year or two ago.

Can we say that the situation is exactly the same now? No, we cannot. On the contrary, an entirely new situation has arisen. To begin with, there is the fact that we have routed and are successfully overcoming the capitalist elements in town and country. Of course, this cannot evoke joy among the old intelligentsia. Very prob-

ably they still express sympathy for their defeated friends. But sympathisers, still less those who are neutral or vacillating, are not in the habit of voluntarily agreeing to share the fate of their more active friends when the latter have suffered severe and irreparable defeat.

Further, we have overcome the grain difficulties, and not only have we overcome them but we are now exporting a larger quantity of grain than has ever been exported since the existence of the Soviet power. Consequently, this "argument" of the vacillators also falls to the ground.

Furthermore, even the blind can now see that as regards the front of collective-farm and state-farm development we have gained a definite victory and achieved tremendous successes.

Consequently, the chief weapon in the "arsenal" of the old intelligentsia has gone by the board. As for the bourgeois intelligentsia's hopes of intervention, it must be admitted that, for the time being at least, they have proved to be a house built on sand; Indeed, for six years intervention has been promised, but not a single attempt at intervention has been made. The time has come to recognise that our sapient bourgeois intelligentsia has simply been led by the nose. That is apart from the fact that the conduct of the active wreckers at the famous trial in Moscow was bound to discredit, and actually did discredit, the idea of wrecking.

Naturally, these new circumstances could not but influence our old technical intelligentsia. The new situation was bound to give rise, and did actually give rise, to new sentiments among the old technical intelligentsia. This, in fact, explains why there are definite signs of a

change of attitude in favour of the Soviet regime on the part of a certain section of this intelligentsia that formerly sympathised with the wreckers. The fact that not only this stratum of the old intelligentsia, but even definite wreckers of yesterday, a considerable number of them, are beginning in many factories and mills to work hand in hand with the working class—this fact shows without a doubt that a change of attitude among the old technical intelligentsia has already begun. This, of course, does not mean that there are no longer any wreckers in the country. No, it does not mean that. Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we have classes and as long as capitalist encirclement exists. But it does mean that, since a large section of the old technical intelligentsia who formerly sympathised, in one way or another, with the wreckers have now made a turn to the side of the Soviet regime, the active wreckers have become few in number, are isolated and will have to go deeply under ground for the time being.

But it follows from this that we must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia accordingly. Whereas during the height of the wrecking activities our attitude towards the old technical intelligentsia was mainly expressed by the policy of routing them, now, when these intellectuals are turning to the side of the Soviet regime, our attitude towards them must be expressed mainly by the policy of enlisting them and showing solicitude for them. It would be wrong and undialectical to continue our former policy under the new, changed conditions. It would be stupid and unwise to regard practically every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal and wrecker. We

have always regarded and still regard “expert-baiting” as a harmful and disgraceful phenomenon.

Hence, the task is *to change our attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old school, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to enlist their co-operation more boldly.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the fifth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the last condition.

VI

BUSINESS ACCOUNTING

The picture would be incomplete if I did not deal with one more new condition. I refer to the sources of capital accumulation for industry, for the national economy; I refer to the need for increasing the rate of accumulation.

What is the new and special feature of the development of our industry from the point of view of accumulation? It is that the old sources of accumulation are already beginning to be inadequate for the further expansion of industry; that it is necessary, therefore, to seek new sources of accumulation and to reinforce the old sources if we really want to maintain and develop the Bolshevik tempo of industrialisation.

We know from the history of the capitalist countries that not a single young state that desired to raise its industry to a higher level was able to dispense with external aid in the form of long-term credits or loans. For this reason the capitalists in the Western countries point-blank refused credits or loans to our country, in

the belief that the lack of credits and loans would certainly prevent the industrialisation of our country. But the capitalists were mistaken. They failed to take into account the fact that our country, unlike the capitalist countries, possesses certain special sources of accumulation sufficient to restore and further develop our industry. And indeed, not only have we restored our industry, not only have we restored our agriculture and transport, but we have already managed to set going the tremendous work of reconstructing heavy industry, agriculture and transport. Of course, this work has cost us many thousand million rubles. Where did we get these thousands of millions from? From light industry, from agriculture and from budget accumulations. This is how we managed until recently.

But the situation is entirely different now. Whereas previously the old sources of capital accumulation were sufficient for the reconstruction of industry and transport, now they are obviously becoming inadequate. Now it is not a question of reconstructing our old industries. It is a question of creating new, technically well-equipped industries in the Urals, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan. It is a question of creating new, large scale farming in the grain, livestock and raw material regions of the U.S.S.R. It is a question of creating a new network of railways connecting the East and West of the U.S.S.R. Naturally, the old sources of accumulation cannot suffice for this gigantic task.

But that is not all. To it must be added the fact that owing to inefficient management the principles of business accounting are grossly violated in a large number of our factories and business organisations. It is a

fact that a number of enterprises and business organisations have long ceased to keep proper accounts, to calculate, to draw up sound balance-sheets of income and expenditure. It is a fact that in a number of enterprises and business organisations such concepts as “regime of economy,” “cutting down unproductive expenditure,” “rationalisation of production” have long gone out of fashion. Evidently they assume that the State Bank “will advance the necessary money anyway.” It is a fact that production costs in a number of enterprises have recently begun to increase. They were given the assignment of reducing costs by 10 per cent and more, but instead they are increasing them. Yet what does a reduction in the cost of production mean? You know that reducing the cost of production by one per cent means an accumulation in industry of 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 rubles. Obviously, to raise the cost of production under such circumstances means to deprive industry and the entire national economy of hundreds of millions of rubles.

From all this it follows that it is no longer possible to rely solely on light industry, on budget accumulations and on revenue from agriculture. Light industry is a bountiful source of accumulation, and there is every prospect of its continuing to expand; but it is not an unlimited source. Agriculture is a no less bountiful source of accumulation, but now, during the period of its reconstruction, agriculture itself requires financial aid from the state. As for budget accumulations, you know yourselves that they cannot and must not be unlimited. What, then, remains? There remains heavy industry. Consequently, we must see to it that heavy industry—and above all its machine-building section—also pro-

vide accumulations. Consequently, while reinforcing and expanding the old sources of accumulation, we must see to it that heavy industry—and above all machine-building—also provide accumulations.

That is the way out.

And what is needed for this? We must put an end to inefficiency, mobilise the internal resources of industry, introduce and reinforce business accounting in all our enterprises, systematically reduce production costs and increase internal accumulations in every branch of industry without exception.

That is the way out.

Hence, the task is *to introduce and reinforce business accounting, to increase accumulation within industry.*

VII

NEW METHODS OF WORK, NEW METHODS OF MANAGEMENT

Such, comrades, are the new conditions of development of our industry.

The significance of these new conditions is that they are creating a new situation for industry, one which demands new methods of work and new methods of management.

Hence:

a) It follows, therefore, that we can no longer count, as of old, on an automatic influx of manpower. In order to secure manpower for our industries it must be recruited in an organised manner, and labour must be mechanised. To believe that we can do without mechanisation, in view of our tempo of work and scale of produc-

tion, is like believing that the sea can be emptied with a spoon.

b) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer tolerate the fluidity of manpower in industry. In order to do away with this evil, we must organise wages in a new way and see to it that the composition of the labour force in the factories is more or less constant.

c) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer tolerate lack of personal responsibility in industry. In order to do away with this evil, work must be organised in a new way, and the forces must be so distributed that every group of workers is responsible for its work, for the machinery, and for the quality of the work.

d) It follows, further, that we can no longer manage, as of old, with the very small force of old engineers and technicians that we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present rate and scale of production, we must ensure that the working class has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

e) It follows, further, that we can no longer, as of old, lump together all the experts, engineers and technicians of the old school. In order to take into account the changed situation we must change our policy and display the utmost solicitude for those experts, engineers and technicians of the old school who are definitely turning to the side of the working class.

f) It follows, lastly, that we can no longer, as of old, manage with the old sources of accumulation. In order to ensure the further expansion of industry and agriculture we must tap new sources of accumulation; we must put an end to inefficiency, introduce business

accounting, reduce production costs and increase accumulation within industry.

Such are the new conditions of development of industry, which demand new methods of work and new methods of management in economic construction.

What is needed in order to ensure management along new lines?

First of all, our economic executives must understand the new situation; they must study concretely the new conditions of development of industry and reform their methods of work to meet the requirements of the new situation.

Further, our economic executives must direct their enterprises not "in general," not "in the abstract," but concretely, specifically; they must approach every question not from the standpoint of general phrases, but in a strictly business-like manner; they must not confine themselves to formal written instructions or general phrases and slogans, but study the technique of the business and enter into details, into "trifles," for it is out of "trifles" that great things are now being built.

Further, our present unwieldy combines, which sometimes consist of as many as 100 to 200 enterprises, must each be immediately split up into several combines. Obviously, the chairman of a combine who has to deal with a hundred or more factories cannot really know those factories, their potentialities and their work. Obviously, if he does not know those factories he is not in a position to direct them. Hence, to enable the chairman of a combine to study the factories thoroughly, and direct them, he must be relieved of some of the factories; the combine must be split up into several smaller ones, and

the combine headquarters must be brought into closer contact with the factories.

Further, our combines must substitute one-man management for board management. The position at present is that there are from 10 to 15 persons on the board of a combine, drawing up documents and carrying on discussions. We cannot go on managing in this way, comrades. We must put a stop to paper "management" and switch to genuine, business like, Bolshevik work. Let one chairman and several vice-chairmen remain at the head of a combine. That will be quite enough for its management. The other members of the board should be sent to the factories and mills. That will be far more useful, both for the work and for themselves.

Further, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of combines must pay more frequent visits to the factories, stay and work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more closely with the personnel in the factories and not only teach the local people, but also learn from them. To think that you can now direct by sitting in an office, far away from the factories, is a delusion. In order to direct the factories you must come into more frequent contact with the staffs in those factories, maintain live contact with them.

Finally, a word or two about our production plan for 1931. There are certain near-Party philistines who assert that our production programme is unrealistic, that it cannot be fulfilled. They are somewhat like Shchedrin's "sapient gudgeons" who are always ready to spread "a vacuum of ineptitude" around themselves. Is our production programme realistic or not? Most certainly, it is. It is realistic if only because all the condi-

tions necessary for its fulfilment are available. It is realistic if only because its fulfilment now depends solely on ourselves, on our ability and willingness to take advantage of the vast opportunities at our disposal. How else can we explain the fact that a whole number of enterprises and industries have already *overfulfilled* their plans? That means that other enterprises and industries, too, can fulfil and overfulfil their plans.

It would be foolish to think that the production plan is a mere enumeration of figures and assignments. Actually, the production plan is the living and practical activity of millions of people. The reality of our production plan lies in the millions of working people who are creating a new life. The reality of our programme lies in living people, you and I, our will to work, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to fulfil the plan. Have we that determination? Yes, we have. Well then, our production programme can and must be fulfilled. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Pravda, No. 183,
July 5, 1931

**TO THE WORKERS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL
PERSONNEL OF AMO²⁰**

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) marks with great satisfaction the victory won by the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the AMO Automobile Works. Where the Russian capitalists could only build automobile workshops with a backward technique, a low productivity of labour and barbarous methods of exploitation, there has arisen a powerful giant plant capable of producing 25,000 motor lorries and employing all the achievements of modern technology. Your victory is the victory of all the working people in our country. The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses its firm conviction that this first great victory of yours will be followed by others: by mastery of the works' new technical equipment, steady fulfilment of the production programme, lowering of production costs and high quality of output.

Ardent Bolshevik greetings to all the builders of the AMO Works, the first giant automobile works in the U.S.S.R.

Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. Stalin

**TO THE WORKERS
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
OF THE KHARKOV TRACTOR WORKS
PROJECT**

The working people of our country, the millions of collective farmers and the Party have followed the course of construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works with the greatest attention. The Kharkov Tractor Works is a steel bastion of the collectivisation of agriculture in the Ukraine; its builders are the vanguard leading the millions of Ukrainian peasants along the road to socialism. The construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works, which joins our family of tractor works, will go down in the history of our country's socialist industry as a model of genuine Bolshevik tempos. The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses its conviction that the workers and the engineering and technical personnel will overcome the difficulties of the young enterprise, will utilise the experience of the Stalingrad Works and succeed in fulfilling the militant programme for 1932.

Ardent Bolshevik greetings to the builders of the second giant tractor works in the U.S.S.R.!

Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 271,
October 1, 1931

TO THE NEWSPAPER *TEKHNIKA*²¹

I greet the appearance of the first Bolshevik technical newspaper.

The newspaper *Tekhnika* must become a powerful instrument of the broad masses of workers, business executives and engineering and technical personnel for mastering technique. It must help the Party to forge further hundreds of thousands of technicians and engineers from people of the working class—fighters for Bolshevik tempos.

I wish the newspaper every success.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 280,
October 10, 1931

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

*Letter to the Editorial Board of the Magazine
"Proletarskaya Revolutsia"*

Dear Comrades,

I emphatically protest against the publication in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*²² (No. 6, 1930) of Slutsky's anti-Party and semi-Trotskyist article, "The Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period of Its Pre-War Crisis," as an article for discussion.

Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of *Centrism* in German Social-Democracy and in pre-war Social-Democracy in general; that is, he underestimated the danger of camouflaged opportunism, the danger of conciliation towards opportunism. In other words, according to Slutsky, Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not wage an irreconcilable struggle against opportunism, for, in essence, underestimation of Centrism is tantamount to refraining from a thorough-going struggle against opportunism. It follows, therefore, that in the period before the war Lenin was not yet a real Bolshevik; that it was only in the period of the imperialist war, or even at the close of the war, that Lenin became a real Bolshevik.

Such is the tale Slutsky tells in his article. And you, instead of branding this new-found "historian" as a slanderer and falsifier, enter into discussion with him,

provide him with a forum. I cannot refrain from protesting against the publication of Slutsky's article in your magazine as an article for discussion, for the question of Lenin's *Bolshevism*, the question whether Lenin *did* or *did not wage* an irreconcilable struggle, based on principle, against Centrism as a certain form of opportunism, the question whether Lenin *was* or *was not* a real Bolshevik, cannot be made into a subject of discussion.

In your statement entitled "From the Editorial Board," sent to the Central Committee on October 20, you admit that the editorial board made a mistake in publishing Slutsky's article as a discussion article. That is all to the good, of course, despite the fact that the statement of the editorial board is very belated. But in your statement you commit a fresh mistake by declaring that "the editorial board consider it to be politically extremely urgent and necessary that the entire complex of problems pertaining to the relations between the Bolsheviks and the pre-war Second International be further analysed in the pages of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*." That means that you intend once again to draw people into a discussion on questions which are axioms of Bolshevism. It means that you are again thinking of converting the subject of Lenin's Bolshevism from an axiom into a problem requiring "further analysis." Why? On what grounds?

Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up and became strong in relentless struggle against opportunism of every brand, including Centrism in the West (Kautsky) and Centrism in our country (Trotsky, etc.). This cannot be denied even by the downright enemies of Bolshevism, It is an axiom. But you are dragging us

back by trying to turn an axiom into a problem requiring "further analysis." Why? On what grounds? Perhaps through ignorance of the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of a rotten liberalism, so that the Slutskys and other disciples of Trotsky may not be able to say that they are being gagged? A rather strange sort of liberalism, this, exercised at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism. . . .

What, exactly, is there in Slutsky's article that the editorial board regard as worthy of discussion?

1) Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not pursue a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists in German Social-Democracy, with the opportunists in the Second International of the pre-war period. You want to open a discussion on this Trotskyist thesis of Slutsky's. But what is there to discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is simply slandering Lenin, slandering the Bolsheviks? Slander must be branded as such and not made the subject of discussion.

Every Bolshevik, if he really is a Bolshevik, knows that long before the war, approximately since 1903-04, when the Bolshevik group in Russia took shape and when the Lefts in German Social-Democracy first raised their voice, Lenin pursued a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists both here, in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and over there, in the Second International, particularly in the German Social-Democratic Party.

Every Bolshevik knows that it was for that very reason that even at that time (1903-05) in the ranks of the opportunists of the Second International the Bolshe-

viks won for themselves honourable fame as being “splitters” and “disrupters.” But what could Lenin do, what could the Bolsheviks do, if the Left Social-Democrats in the Second International, and above all in the German Social-Democratic Party, were a weak and powerless group, a group without organisational shape, ideologically ill-equipped and afraid even to pronounce the word “rupture,” “split”? It cannot be demanded that Lenin, the Bolsheviks, should have, from inside Russia, done the work of the Lefts for them and brought about a split in the parties of the West.

That is apart from the fact that organisational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the Left Social-Democrats not only in the period prior to the war. As is well known, the Lefts retained this negative feature in the post-war period as well. Everyone knows the appraisal of the German Left Social-Democrats given by Lenin in his famous article, “On Junius’s Pamphlet,”* published in October 1916—that is, more than two years after the beginning of the war—in which Lenin, criticising a number of very serious political mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany, speaks of “*the weakness of a l l German Lefts, who are entangled on all sides in the vile net of Kautskyist hypocrisy, pedantry, ‘friendship’ for the opportunists*”; in which he says that “*Junius has not yet freed himself completely from the ‘environment’ of the German, even Left Social-Democrats, who are afraid of a split, are afraid to voice revolutionary slogans to the full.*”²³

* Junius was the pen name of Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the Lefts in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

Of all the groups in the Second International, the Russian Bolsheviks were at that time the only one which, by its organisational experience and ideological equipment, was capable of undertaking anything serious in the sense of a direct rupture, of a split with its own opportunists in its own Russian Social-Democratic Party. Now, if the Slutskys attempted, not even to prove, but simply to assume that Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks did not exert all their efforts to organise a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) and to oust the Centrists (Trotsky and other adherents of the August bloc), then one could argue about Lenin's Bolshevism, about the Bolsheviks' Bolshevism. But the whole point is that the Slutskys dare not even hint at such a wild assumption. They dare not, for they are aware that the universally known facts concerning the resolute policy of rupture with the opportunists of all brands pursued by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904-12) cry out against such an assumption. They dare not, for they know that they would be pilloried the very next day.

But the question arises: Could the Russian Bolsheviks bring about a split with their opportunists and Centrist conciliators long before the imperialist war (1904-12) without at the same time pursuing a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists and Centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks regarded their policy towards the opportunists and Centrists as a model for the policy of the Lefts in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks did all they could to push the Left Social-Democrats in the West, particularly the Lefts in the German Social-Democratic Party, towards a rupture,

towards a split with their own opportunists and Centrists? It was not the fault of Lenin and of the Russian Bolsheviks that the Left Social-Democrats in the West proved to be too immature to follow in the footsteps of the Russian Bolsheviks.

2) Slutsky reproaches Lenin and the Bolsheviks for not supporting the German Left Social-Democrat resolutely and wholeheartedly, for supporting them only with important reservations, for allowing factional considerations to hinder them from giving all-out support to the Lefts. You want to discuss this fraudulent and utterly false reproach. But what is there indeed to discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is manoeuvring and trying, by means of a false reproach against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, to cover up the real gaps in the position of the Lefts in Germany? Is it not obvious that the Bolsheviks could not support the Lefts in Germany, who time and again wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, *without* important reservations, *without* seriously criticising their mistakes, and that to act otherwise would have been a *betrayal* of the working class and its revolution? Fraudulent manoeuvres must be branded as such and not made a subject of discussion.

Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social-Democrats in Germany only with certain important reservations, criticising their semi-Menshevik mistakes. But for this they ought to be applauded, not reproached.

Are there people who doubt this?

Let us turn to the most generally known facts of history.

a) In 1903, serious differences arose between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question

of Party membership. By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organisational barrier against the influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic character of the Russian revolution. The Russian Mensheviks advocated the opposite position, which threw the doors of the Party wide open to non-proletarian elements. In view of the importance of the questions of the Russian revolution for the world revolutionary movement, the West-European Social-Democrats decided to intervene. The Left Social-Democrats in Germany, Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, then the leaders of the Lefts, also intervened. And what happened? Both declared for the Mensheviks and against the Bolsheviks. They accused the Bolsheviks of having ultra-centralist and Blanquist tendencies. Subsequently, these vulgar and philistine epithets were seized upon by the Mensheviks and spread far and wide.

b) In 1905, differences developed between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question of the character of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks asserted that the objective must be a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry for the purpose of passing immediately from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, with the support of the rural poor secured. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; instead of the policy of an alli-

ance between the working class and the peasantry they preferred the' policy of an agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie, and they declared that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was a reactionary Blanquist scheme that ran counter to the development of the bourgeois revolution. What was the attitude of the German Left Social-Democrats, of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, to this controversy? They invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution (a distorted representation of the Marxist scheme of revolution), which was permeated through and through with the Menshevik repudiation of the policy of alliance between the working class and peasantry, and they counterposed this scheme to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was seized upon by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and turned into a weapon of struggle against Leninism.

c) In the period before the war, one of the most urgent questions that came to the fore in the parties of the Second International was the national and colonial question, the question of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the liberation of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the paths to be followed in the struggle against imperialism, the question of the paths to the overthrow of imperialism. In the interests of developing the proletarian revolution and encircling imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed the policy of supporting the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies on the basis of the self-

determination of nations, and developed the scheme of a united front between the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries and the revolutionary-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed countries. The opportunists of all countries, the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists of all countries hastened to take up arms against the Bolsheviks on this account. The Bolsheviks were baited like mad dogs. What position did the Left Social-Democrats in the West adopt at that time? They developed a semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist sense (including secession and formation of independent states), rejected the thesis that the liberation movement in the colonies and oppressed countries is of great revolutionary importance, rejected the thesis that a united front between the proletarian revolution and the movement for national liberation is possible, and counterposed all this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch, which is nothing but an underestimation of the national and colonial question, to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is well known that this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch was subsequently seized upon by Trotsky, who used it as a weapon in the struggle against Leninism.

Such are the universally known mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany.

I need not speak of the other mistakes of the German Lefts, mistakes which were severely criticised in various articles by Lenin.

Nor need I speak of the mistakes they committed in appraising the policy of the Bolsheviks in the period of the October Revolution.

What do these mistakes of the German Lefts taken from the history of the pre-war period indicate, if not that the Left Social-Democrats, despite their Leftism, had not yet rid themselves of Menshevik lumber?

Of course, the record of the Lefts in Germany does not consist only of serious mistakes. They also have great and important revolutionary deeds to their credit. I have in mind a number of their services and revolutionary actions in relation to questions of internal policy and, in particular, of the electoral struggle, questions of the struggle inside and outside parliament, the general strike, war, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc. That is why the Bolsheviks reckoned with them as Lefts, supported them and urged them forward. But it does not and cannot obliterate the fact that at the same time the Left Social-Democrats in Germany did commit a number of very serious political and theoretical mistakes; that they had not yet rid themselves of the Menshevik burden and therefore were in need of severe criticism by the Bolsheviks.

Now judge for yourselves whether Lenin and the Bolsheviks could have supported the Left Social-Democrats in the West *without serious reservations, without severely criticising* their mistakes, and whether it would not have been a betrayal of the interests of the working class, a betrayal of the interests of the revolution, a betrayal of communism, to act otherwise?

Is it not obvious that in reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks for something for which he should have applauded them if he were a Bolshevik, Slutsky fully exposes himself as a semi-Menshevik, as a camouflaged Trotskyist?

Slutsky assumes that in their appraisal of the Lefts in the West, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were guided by their own factional considerations and that, consequently, the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the international revolution to the interests of their faction. It scarcely needs proof that there can be nothing more base and disgusting than such an assumption. There can be nothing more base, for even the basest of Mensheviks are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution is not a private cause of the Russians; that, on the contrary, it is the cause of the working class of the whole world, the cause of the world proletarian revolution. There can be nothing more disgusting, for even the professional slanderers in the Second International are beginning to understand that the consistent and thoroughly revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries.

Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks did put in the forefront the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution, such questions as those of the Party, of the attitude of Marxists towards the bourgeois-democratic revolution, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of the hegemony of the proletariat, of the struggle inside and outside parliament, of the general strike, of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of imperialism, of the self-determination of nations, of the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies, of the policy of support for this movement, etc. They advanced these questions as the touchstone by which they tested the revolutionary stamina

of the Left Social-Democrats in the West. Had they, the right to do so? Yes, they had. They not only had the right, but it was their duty to do so. It was their duty to do so because all these questions were also fundamental questions of the world revolution, to whose aims the Bolsheviks subordinated their policy and their tactics. It was their duty to do so because only through such questions could they really test the revolutionary character of the various groups in the Second International. The question arises: Where is there here any "factionalism" of the Russian Bolsheviks and what have "factional" considerations to do with this?

As far back as 1902 Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* that "*history has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks that confront the proletariat of any country,*" that "*the fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat.*"²⁴ Thirty years have elapsed since that pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, appeared. No one will dare deny that the events during this period have brilliantly confirmed Lenin's words. But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution was (and remains) the nodal point of the world revolution, that the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution were at the same time (and are now) the fundamental questions of the world revolution?

Is it not obvious that only through these fundamental questions was it possible to make a real test of the rev-

olutionary character of the Left Social-Democrats in the West?

Is it not obvious that people who regard these questions as “factional” questions fully expose themselves as base and degenerate elements?

3) Slutsky asserts that so far there has not been found a sufficient number of official documents testifying to Lenin’s (the Bolsheviks’) determined and relentless struggle against Centrism. He employs this bureaucratic thesis as an irrefutable argument in favour of the proposition that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of Centrism in the Second International. And you are ready to discuss this nonsense, this rascally chicanery. But what is there indeed to discuss? Is it not obvious anyway that by his talk about documents Slutsky is trying to cover up the wretchedness and falsity of his so-called conception?

Slutsky considers the Party documents now available to be inadequate. Why? On what grounds? Are not the universally known documents relating to the Second International, as well as those relating to the inner-Party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, sufficient to demonstrate with full clarity the revolutionary relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the opportunists and Centrists? Is Slutsky at all familiar with these documents? What more documents does he need?

Let us assume that, in addition to the documents already known, a mass of other documents were found, containing, say, resolutions of the Bolsheviks once again urging the necessity of wiping out Centrism. Would that mean that the mere existence of written documents is

sufficient to demonstrate the real revolutionary character and the real relentlessness of the Bolsheviks' attitude towards Centrism? Who, except hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on written documents alone? Who, except archive rats, does not understand that a party and its leaders must be tested primarily by their *deeds* and not merely by their declarations? History knows not a few Socialists who readily signed all sorts of revolutionary resolutions, just for the sake of satisfying importunate critics. But that does not mean that they *carried out* these resolutions. Furthermore, history knows not a few Socialists who, foaming at the mouth, called upon the workers' parties of *other* countries to perform the most revolutionary actions imaginable. But that does not mean that they did not in their own party, or in their own country, *shrink* from fighting *their own* opportunists, *their own* bourgeoisie. Is not this why Lenin taught us to test revolutionary parties, trends and leaders, not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their *deeds*?

Is it not obvious that if Slutsky really wanted to test the relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks towards Centrism, he should have taken as the *basis* of his article, not individual documents and two or three personal letters, but a test of the Bolsheviks by their *deeds*, their *history*, their *actions*? Did we not have opportunists and Centrists in the Russian Social-Democratic Party? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a determined and relentless struggle against all these trends? Were not these trends both ideologically and organisationally connected with the opportunists and Centrists in the West? Did not the Bolsheviks smash the opportunists and Cen-

trists as no other Left group did anywhere else in the world? How can anyone say after all this that Lenin and the Bolsheviks underestimated the danger of Centrism? Why did Slutsky ignore these facts, which are of decisive importance in characterising the Bolsheviks? Why did he not resort to the most reliable method of testing Lenin and the Bolsheviks: by their deeds, by their actions? Why did he prefer the less reliable method of rummaging among casually selected papers?

Because recourse to the more reliable method of testing the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have instantaneously upset Slutsky's whole conception.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have shown that the Bolsheviks are the *only* revolutionary organisation in the world which has completely smashed the opportunists and Centrists and driven them out of the Party.

Because recourse to the real deeds and the real history of the Bolsheviks would have shown that Slutsky's teachers, the Trotskyists, were the *principal* and *basic* group which fostered Centrism in Russia, and for this purpose created a special organisation, the August bloc, as a hotbed of Centrism.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have exposed Slutsky once and for all as a falsifier of the history of our Party, who is trying to cover up the Centrism of pre-war Trotskyism by slanderously accusing Lenin and the Bolsheviks of having underestimated the danger of Centrism.

That, comrade editors, is how matters stand with Slutsky and his article.

As you see, the editorial board made a mistake in permitting a discussion with a falsifier of the history of our Party.

What could have impelled the editorial board to take this wrong road?

I think that they were impelled to take that road by rotten liberalism, which has spread to some extent among a section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a faction of communism—one which makes mistakes, it is true, which does many foolish things, is sometimes even anti-Soviet, but which, nevertheless, is a faction of communism. Hence a certain liberalism in the attitude towards the Trotskyists and Trotskyist-minded people. It scarcely needs proof that such a view of Trotskyism is deeply mistaken and harmful. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of communism. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is fighting against communism, against the Soviet regime, against the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an ideological weapon against Bolshevism in the shape of the thesis that building socialism in our country is impossible, that the degeneration of the Bolsheviks is inevitable, etc.? Trotskyism gave it that weapon. It is no accident that in their efforts to prove the inevitability of the struggle against the Soviet regime all the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. have been referring to the well-known Trotskyist thesis that building socialism in our country is impossible, that the degener-

ation of the Soviet regime is inevitable, that a return to capitalism is probable.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R. a tactical weapon in the shape of attempts at open actions against the Soviet regime? The Trotskyists, who tried to organise anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskyists raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and let loose the wrecking activities of the bourgeois experts.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an organisational weapon in the form of attempts at setting up underground anti-Soviet organisations? The Trotskyists, who organised their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the underground anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyists helped the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. to assume an organised form.

Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is why liberalism in the attitude towards Trotskyism, even though the latter is shattered and camouflaged, is blockheadedness bordering on crime, on treason to the working class.

That is why the attempts of certain "writers" and "historians" to smuggle disguised Trotskyist rubbish into our literature must meet with a determined rebuff from Bolsheviks.

That is why we cannot permit a literary discussion with the Trotskyist smugglers.

It seems to me that "historians" and "writers" of the Trotskyist smuggler category are for the present trying to carry out their smuggling work along two lines.

Firstly, they are trying to prove that in the period before the war Lenin underestimated the danger of Centristism, thereby leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that, in consequence, Lenin was not yet a real revolutionary at that time; that he became one only after the war, after he had “re-equipped” himself with Trotsky’s assistance. Slutsky may be regarded as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

We have seen above that Slutsky and Co. are not worth making much fuss about.

Secondly, they are trying to prove that in the period prior to the war Lenin did not realise the necessity of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, thereby leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that, in consequence, Lenin at that time was not yet a real Bolshevik; that he realised the necessity of this growing over only after the war, after he had “re-equipped” himself with Trotsky’s assistance. Volosevich, author of *A Course in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, may be regarded as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

True, as far back as 1905 Lenin wrote that “*from the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution,*” that “*we stand for uninterrupted revolution,*” that “*we shall not stop halfway.*”²⁵ True, a very large number of facts and documents of a similar nature could be found in the works of Lenin. But what do the Voloseviches care about the facts of Lenin’s life and work? The Voloseviches write in order, by decking themselves out in Bolshevik colours, to smuggle in their anti-

Leninist contraband, to utter lies about the Bolsheviks and to falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party.

As you see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the Slutskys.

Such are the "highways and byways" of the Trotskyist smugglers.

You yourselves should realise that it is not the business of the editorial board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* to facilitate the smuggling activities of such "historians" by providing them with a forum for discussion.

The task of the editorial board is, in my opinion, to raise the questions concerning the history of Bolshevism to the proper level, to put the study of the history of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik lines, and to concentrate attention against the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party, systematically tearing off their masks.

That is all the more necessary since even some of our historians—I am speaking of historians without quotation marks, of *Bolshevik* historians of our Party—are not free from mistakes which bring grist to the mill of the Slutskys and Voloseviches. In this respect, even Comrade Yaroslavsky is not, unfortunately, an exception; his books on the history of the C.P.S.U.(B.), despite all their merits, contain a number of errors in matters of principle and history.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

The magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*,
No. 6 (113), 1931

AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD

Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the construction project on the occasion of the successful completion of the building work for the factory.

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

We wish you further success in your work of assembling, setting in working order and inaugurating this giant plant. We do not doubt that you will be able to surmount all difficulties and will fulfil with honour your duty to the country.

J. Stalin, V. Molotov

Pravda, No. 305,
November 4, 1931

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG

December 13, 1931

Ludwig: I am extremely obliged to you for having found it possible to receive me. For over twenty years I have been studying the lives and deeds of outstanding historical personages. I believe I am a good judge of people, but on the other hand I know nothing about social-economic conditions.

Stalin: You are being modest.

Ludwig: No, that is really so, and for that very reason I shall put questions that may seem strange to you. Today, here in the Kremlin, I saw some relics of Peter the Great and the first question I should like to ask you is this: Do you think a parallel can be drawn between yourself and Peter the Great? Do you consider yourself a continuer of the work of Peter the Great?

Stalin: In no way whatever. Historical parallels are always risky. There is no sense in this one.

Ludwig: But after all, Peter the Great did a great deal to develop his country, to bring western culture to Russia.

Stalin: Yes, of course, Peter the Great did much to elevate the landlord class and develop the nascent merchant class. He did very much indeed to create and

consolidate the national state of the landlords and merchants. It must be said also that the elevation of the landlord class, the assistance to the nascent merchant class and the consolidation of the national state of these classes took place at the cost of the peasant serfs, who were bled white.

As for myself, I am just a pupil of Lenin's, and the aim of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his.

The task to which I have devoted my life is the elevation of a different class—the working class. That task is not the consolidation of some “national” state, but of a socialist state, and that means an international state; and everything that strengthens that state helps to strengthen the entire international working class. If every step I take in my endeavour to elevate the working class and strengthen the socialist state of this class were not directed towards strengthening and improving the position of the working class, I should consider my life purposeless.

So you see your parallel does not fit.

As regards Lenin and Peter the Great, the latter was but a drop in the sea, whereas Lenin was a whole ocean.

Ludwig: Marxism denies that the individual plays an outstanding role in history. Do you not see a contradiction between the materialist conception of history and the fact that, after all, you admit the outstanding role played by historical personages?

Stalin: No, there is no contradiction here. Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. In Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy*²⁶ and in other works of his you

will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. Thus it is precisely Marx's view that people must not be counterposed to conditions. It is people who make history, but they do so only to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions that they have found ready-made, and only to the extent that they understand how to change those conditions. That, at least, is how we Russian Bolsheviks understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx for a good many years.

Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I was at the university, many German professors who considered themselves adherents of the materialist conception of history taught us that Marxism denies the role of heroes, the role of heroic personalities in history.

Stalin: They were vulgarisers of Marxism. Marxism has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it admits that they play a considerable role, but with the reservations I have just made.

Ludwig: Sixteen chairs are placed around the table at which we are seated. Abroad people know, on the one hand, that the U.S.S.R. is a country in which everything

must be decided collectively, but they know, on the other hand, that everything is decided by individual persons. Who really does decide?

Stalin: No, individual persons cannot decide. Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people who may express wrong opinions. From the experience of three revolutions we know that out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 90 are one-sided.

In our leading body, the Central Committee of our Party, which directs all our Soviet and Party organisations, there are about 70 members. Among these 70 members of the Central Committee are our best industrial leaders, our best co-operative leaders, our best managers of supplies, our best military men, our best propagandists and agitators, our best experts on state farms, on collective farms, on individual peasant farms, our best experts on the nations constituting the Soviet Union and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated the wisdom of our Party. Each has an opportunity of correcting anyone's individual opinion or proposal. Each has an opportunity of contributing his experience. If this were not the case, if decisions were taken by individual persons, there would be very serious mistakes in our work. But since each has an opportunity of correcting the mistakes of individual persons, and since we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at decisions that are more or less correct.

Ludwig: You have had decades of experience of illegal work. You have had to transport illegally arms, literature, and so forth. Do you not think that the enemies of the Soviet regime might learn from your experience and fight the Soviet regime with the same methods?

Stalin: That, of course, is quite possible.

Ludwig: Is that not the reason for the severity and ruthlessness of your government in fighting its enemies?

Stalin: No, that is not the chief reason. One could quote certain examples from history. When the Bolsheviks came to power they at first treated their enemies mildly. The Mensheviks continued to exist legally and publish their newspaper. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also continued to exist legally and had their newspaper. Even the Cadets continued to publish their newspaper. When General Krasnov organised his counter-revolutionary campaign against Leningrad and fell into our hands, we could at least have kept him prisoner, according to the rules of war. Indeed, we ought to have shot him. But we released him on his "word of honour." And what happened? It soon became clear that such mildness only helped to undermine the strength of the Soviet Government. We made a mistake in displaying such mildness towards enemies of the working class. To have persisted in that mistake would have been a crime against the working class and a betrayal of its interests. That soon became quite apparent. Very soon it became evident that the milder our attitude towards our enemies, the greater their resistance. Before long the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries—Gotz and others—and the Right Mensheviks were organising in Leningrad a counter-revolutionary action of the military cadets, as a result

of which many of our revolutionary sailors perished. This very Krasnov, whom we had released on his "word of honour," organised the whiteguard Cossacks. He joined forces with Mamontov and for two years waged an armed struggle against the Soviet Government. Very soon it turned out that behind the whiteguard generals stood the agents of the western capitalist states—France, Britain, America—and also Japan. We became convinced that we had made a mistake in displaying mildness. We learnt from experience that the only way to deal with such enemies is to apply the most ruthless policy of suppression to them.

Ludwig: It seems to me that a considerable part of the population of the Soviet Union stands in fear and trepidation of the Soviet power, and that the stability of the latter rests to a certain extent on that sense of fear. I should like to know what state of mind is produced in you personally by the realisation that it is necessary to inspire fear in the interests of strengthening the regime. After all, when you associate with your comrades, your friends, you adopt quite different methods than those of inspiring fear. Yet the population is being inspired with fear.

Stalin: You are mistaken. Incidentally, your mistake is that of many people. Do you really believe that we could have retained power and have had the backing of the vast masses for 14 years by methods of intimidation and terrorisation? No, that is impossible. The tsarist government excelled all others in knowing how to intimidate. It had long and vast experience in that sphere. The European bourgeoisie, particularly the French, gave tsarism every assistance in this matter and taught

it to terrorise the people. Yet, in spite of that experience and in spite of the help of the European bourgeoisie, the policy of intimidation led to the downfall of tsarism.

Ludwig: But the Romanovs held on for 300 years.

Stalin: Yes, but how many revolts and uprisings there were during those 300 years! There was the uprising of Stepan Razin, the uprising of Yemelyan Pugachov, the uprising of the Decembrists, the revolution of 1905, the revolution of February 1917, and the October Revolution. That is apart from the fact that the present-day conditions of political and cultural life in the country are radically different from those of the old regime, when the ignorance, lack of culture, submissiveness and political downtroddenness of the masses enabled the “rulers” of that time to remain in power for a more or less prolonged period.

As regards the people, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., they are not at all so tame, so submissive and intimidated as you imagine. There are many people in Europe whose ideas about the people of the U.S.S.R. are old-fashioned: they think that the people living in Russia are, firstly, submissive and, secondly, lazy. That is an antiquated and radically wrong notion. It arose in Europe in those days when the Russian landlords began to flock to Paris, where they squandered the loot they had amassed and spent their days in idleness. These were indeed spineless and worthless people. That gave rise to conclusions about “Russian laziness.” But this cannot in the least apply to the Russian workers and peasants, who earned and still earn their living by their own labour. It is indeed strange to consider

the Russian peasants and workers submissive and lazy when in a brief period of time they made three revolutions, smashed tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and are now triumphantly building socialism.

Just now you asked me whether everything in our country was decided by one person. Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person. With us personages of the greatest authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses of the workers. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptionally great prestige. And what happened? As soon as he began to stumble politically the workers forgot him. They forsook him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. His prestige too was great, although, of course, it was nothing like Plekhanov's. What happened? As soon as he drifted away from the workers they forgot him.

Ludwig: Entirely forgot him?

Stalin: They remember him sometimes—but with bitterness.

Ludwig: All of them with bitterness?

Stalin: As far as our workers are concerned, they remember Trotsky with bitterness, with exasperation, with hatred.

There is, of course, a certain small section of the population that really does stand in fear of the Soviet power, and fights against it. I have in mind the remnants of the moribund classes, which are being eliminated, and primarily that insignificant part of the peasantry, the kulaks. But here it is a matter not merely of a policy of intimidating these groups, a policy that really does

exist. Everybody knows that in this case we Bolsheviks do not confine ourselves to intimidation but go further, aiming at the elimination of this bourgeois stratum.

But if you take the labouring population of the U.S.S.R., the workers and the labouring peasants, who represent not less than 90 per cent of the population, you will find that they are in favour of Soviet power and that the vast majority of them actively support the Soviet regime. They support the Soviet system because that system serves the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants.

That, and not a policy of so-called intimidation, is the basis of the Soviet Government's stability.

Ludwig: I am very grateful to you for that answer. I beg you to forgive me if I ask you a question that may appear to you a strange one. Your biography contains instances of what may be called acts of "highway robbery." Were you ever interested in the personality of Stepan Razin? What is your attitude towards him as an "ideological highwayman"?

Stalin: We Bolsheviks have always taken an interest in such historical personalities as Bolotnikov, Razin, Pugachov, and so on. We regard the deeds of these individuals as a reflection of the spontaneous indignation of the oppressed classes, of the spontaneous rebellion of the peasantry against feudal oppression. The study of the history of these first attempts at such revolt on the part of the peasantry has always been of interest to us. But, of course, no analogy can be drawn here between them and the Bolsheviks. Sporadic peasant uprisings, even when not of the "highway robber" and unorganised type, as in the case of Stepan Razin, cannot

lead to anything of importance. Peasant uprisings can be successful only if they are combined with uprisings of the workers and if they are led by the workers. Only a combined uprising headed by the working class can achieve its aim.

Moreover, it must never be forgotten that Razin and Pugachov were tsarists: they came out against the landlords, but were in favour of a "good tsar." That indeed was their slogan.

As you see, it is impossible to draw an analogy here with the Bolsheviks.

Ludwig: Allow me to put a few questions to you concerning your biography. When I went to see Masaryk he told me he was conscious of being a Socialist when only six years old. What made you a Socialist and when was that?

Stalin: I cannot assert that I was already drawn to socialism at the age of six. Not even at the age of ten or twelve. I joined the revolutionary movement when fifteen years old, when I became connected with underground groups of Russian Marxists then living in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for underground Marxist literature.

Ludwig: What impelled you to become an oppositionist? Was it, perhaps, bad treatment by your parents?

Stalin: No. My parents were uneducated, but they did not treat me badly by any means. But it was a different matter at the Orthodox theological seminary which I was then attending. In protest against the outrageous regime and the jesuitical methods prevalent at the seminary, I was ready to become, and actually

did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as a really revolutionary teaching.

Ludwig: But do you not admit that the Jesuits have good points?

Stalin: Yes, they are systematic and persevering in working to achieve sordid ends. But their principal method is spying, prying, worming their way into people's souls and outraging their feelings. What good can there be in that? For instance, the spying in the hostel. At nine o'clock the bell rings for morning tea, we go to the dining-room, and when we return to our rooms we find that meantime a search has been made and all our chests have been ransacked. . . . What good point can there be in that?

Ludwig: I notice that in the Soviet Union everything American is held in very high esteem, I might even speak of a worship of everything American, that is, of the Land of the Dollar, the most out-and-out capitalist country. This sentiment exists also in your working class, and applies not only to tractors and automobiles, but also to Americans in general. How do you explain that?

Stalin: You exaggerate. We have no especially high esteem for everything American. But we do respect the efficiency that the Americans display in everything—in industry, in technology, in literature and in life. We never forget that the U.S.A. is a capitalist country. But among the Americans there are many people who are mentally and physically healthy, who are healthy in their whole approach to work, to the job on hand. That efficiency, that simplicity, strikes a responsive chord in our hearts. Despite the fact that America is a highly

developed capitalist country, the habits prevailing in its industry, the practices existing in productive processes, have an element of democracy about them, which cannot be said of the old European capitalist countries, where the haughty spirit of the feudal aristocracy is still alive.

Ludwig: You do not even suspect how right you are.

Stalin: Maybe I do; who can tell?

In spite of the fact that feudalism as a social order was demolished long ago in Europe, considerable relics survive in manner of life and customs. There are still technicians, specialists, scientists and writers who have sprung from the feudal environment and who carry aristocratic habits into industry, technology, science and literature. Feudal traditions have not been entirely demolished.

That cannot be said of America, which is a country of "free colonists," without landlords and without aristocrats. Hence the sound and comparatively simple habits in American productive life. Our business executives of working-class origin who have visited America at once noted this trait. They relate, not without a certain agreeable surprise, that on a production job in America it is difficult to distinguish an engineer from a worker by outward appearance. That pleases them, of course. But matters are quite different in Europe.

But if we are going to speak of our liking for a particular nation, or rather, for the majority of its citizens, then of course we must not fail to mention our liking for the Germans. Our liking for the Americans cannot be compared to that!

Ludwig: Why precisely the German nation?

Stalin: If only for the reason that it gave the world such men as Marx and Engels. It suffices to state the fact as such.

Ludwig: It has recently been noticed that certain German politicians are seriously afraid that the traditional policy of friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Germany will be pushed into the background. These fears have arisen in connection with the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Should the recognition of Poland's present frontiers by the U.S.S.R. become a fact as a result of these negotiations it would spell bitter disappointment for the entire German people, who have hitherto believed that the U.S.S.R. is fighting the Versailles system and has no intention of recognising it.

Stalin: I know that a certain dissatisfaction and alarm may be noticed among some German statesmen on the grounds that the Soviet Union, in its negotiations or in some treaty with Poland, may take some step that would imply on the part of the Soviet Union a sanction, a guarantee, for Poland's possessions and frontiers.

In my opinion such fears are mistaken. We have always declared our readiness to conclude a non-aggression pact with any state. We have already concluded such pacts with a number of countries. We have openly declared our readiness to sign such a pact with Poland, too. When we declare that we are ready to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland, this is not mere rhetoric. It means that we really want to sign such a pact. We are politicians of a special brand, if you like. There are politicians who make a promise or statement one day, and on the next either forget all about it or deny

what they stated, and do so without even blushing. We cannot act in that way. Whatever we do abroad inevitably becomes known inside our country, becomes known to all the workers and peasants. If we said one thing and did another, we should forfeit our prestige among the masses of the people. As soon as the Poles declared that they were ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact with us, we naturally agreed and opened negotiations.

What, from the Germans' point of view, is the most dangerous thing that could happen? A change for the worse in our relations with them? But there is no basis whatever for that. We, exactly like the Poles, must declare in the pact that we will not use force or resort to aggression in order to change the frontiers of Poland or the U.S.S.R., or violate their independence. Just as we make such a promise to the Poles, so they make the same promise to us. Without such a clause, namely, that we do not intend to go to war for the purpose of violating the independence or integrity of the frontiers of our respective states, no pact can be concluded. Without that a pact is out of the question. That is the most that we can do.

Is this recognition of the Versailles system?²⁷ No. Or is it, perhaps, a guaranteeing of frontiers? No. We never have been guarantors of Poland and never shall become such, just as Poland has not been and will not be a guarantor of our frontiers. Our friendly relations with Germany will continue as hitherto. That is my firm conviction.

Therefore, the fears you speak of are wholly without foundation. They have arisen on the basis of rumours spread by some Poles and Frenchmen. They will disap-

pear when we publish the pact, if Poland signs it. Everyone will then see that it contains nothing against Germany.

Ludwig: I am very thankful to you for that statement. Allow me to ask you the following question: You speak of “wage equalisation,” giving the term a distinctly ironical shade of meaning in relation to general equalisation. But, surely, general equalisation is a socialist ideal.

Stalin: The kind of socialism under which everybody would get the same pay, an equal quantity of meat and an equal quantity of bread, would wear the same clothes and receive the same goods in the same quantities—such a socialism is unknown to Marxism.

All that Marxism says is that until classes have been finally abolished and until labour has been transformed from a means of subsistence into the prime want of man, into voluntary labour for society, people will be paid for their labour according to the work performed. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” Such is the Marxist formula of socialism, i.e., the formula of the first stage of communism, the first stage of communist society.

Only at the higher stage of communism, only in its higher phase, will each one, working according to his ability, be recompensed for his work according to his needs. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”

It is quite clear that people’s needs vary and will continue to vary under socialism. Socialism has never denied that people differ in their tastes, and in the quantity and quality of their needs. Read how Marx

criticised Stirner²⁸ for his leaning towards equalitarianism; read Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme of 1875²⁹; read the subsequent works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and you will see how sharply they attack equalitarianism. Equalitarianism owes its origin to the individual peasant type of mentality, the psychology of share and share alike, the psychology of primitive peasant "communism." Equalitarianism has nothing in common with Marxist socialism. Only people who are unacquainted with Marxism can have the primitive notion that the Russian Bolsheviks want to pool all wealth and then share it out equally. That is the notion of people who have nothing in common with Marxism. That is how such people as the primitive "Communists" of the time of Cromwell and the French Revolution pictured communism to themselves. But Marxism and the Russian Bolsheviks have nothing in common with such equalitarian "Communists."

Ludwig: You are smoking a cigarette. Where is your legendary pipe, Mr. Stalin? You once said that words and legends pass, but deeds remain. Now believe me, there are millions of people abroad who do not know about some of your words and deeds, but who do know about your legendary pipe.

Stalin: I left my pipe at home.

Ludwig: I shall now ask you a question that may astonish you greatly.

Stalin: We Russian Bolsheviks have long ceased to be astonished at anything.

Ludwig: Yes, and we in Germany too.

Stalin: Yes, you in Germany will soon stop being astonished.

Ludwig:: My question is the following: You have often incurred risks and dangers. You have been persecuted. You have taken part in battles. A number of your close friends have perished. You have survived. How do you explain that? And do you believe in fate?

Stalin: No, I do not. Bolsheviks, Marxists, do not believe in "fate." The very concept of fate, of "Schick-sal," is a prejudice, an absurdity, a relic of mythology, like the mythology of the ancient Greeks, for whom a goddess of fate controlled the destinies of men.

Ludwig:: That is to say that the fact that you did not perish is an accident?

Stalin: There are internal and external causes, the combined effect of which was that I did not perish. But entirely independent of that, somebody else could have been in my place, for somebody *had* to occupy it. "Fate" is something not governed by natural law, something mystical. I do not believe in mysticism. Of course, there were reasons why danger left me unscathed. But there could have been a number of other fortuitous circumstances, of other causes, which could have led to a directly opposite result. So-called fate has nothing to do with it.

Ludwig: Lenin passed many years in exile abroad. You had occasion to be abroad for only a very short time. Do you consider that this has handicapped you? Who do you believe were of greater benefit to the revolution—those revolutionaries who lived in exile abroad and thus had the opportunity of making a thorough study of Europe, but on the other hand were cut off from direct contact with the people; or those revolutionaries who carried on their work here, knew the moods of the people, but on the other hand knew little of Europe?

Stalin: Lenin must be excluded from this comparison. Very few of those who remained in Russia were as intimately connected with the actual state of affairs there and with the labour movement within the country as Lenin was, although he was a long time abroad. Whenever I went to see him abroad—in 1906, 1907, 1912 and 1913³⁰—I saw piles of letters he had received from practical Party workers in Russia, and he was always better informed than those who stayed in Russia. He always considered his stay abroad to be a burden to him.

There are many more comrades in our Party and its leadership who remained in Russia, who did not go abroad, than there are former exiles, and they, of course, were able to be of greater benefit to the revolution than those who were in exile abroad. Actually few former exiles are left in our Party. They may add up to about one or two hundred out of the two million members of the Party. Of the seventy members of the Central Committee scarcely more than three or four lived in exile abroad.

As far as knowledge of Europe, a study of Europe, is concerned, those who wished to make such a study had, of course, more opportunities of doing so while living there. In that respect those of us who did not live long abroad lost something. But living abroad is not at all a decisive factor in making a study of European economics, technique, the cadres of the labour movement and literature of every description, whether belles lettres or scientific. Other things being equal, it is of course easier to study Europe on the spot. But the disadvantage of those who have not lived in Europe is not of much importance. On the contrary, I know many comrades who were abroad twenty years, lived

somewhere in Charlottenburg or in the Latin Quarter, spent years in cafés drinking beer, and who yet did not manage to acquire a knowledge of Europe and failed to understand it.

Ludwig: Do you not think that among the Germans as a nation love of order is more highly developed than love of freedom?

Stalin: There was a time when people in Germany did indeed show great respect for the law. In 1907, when I happened to spend two or three months in Berlin, we Russian Bolsheviki often used to laugh at some of our German friends on account of their respect for the law. There was, for example, a story in circulation about an occasion when the Berlin Social-Democratic Executive fixed a definite day and hour for a demonstration that was to be attended by the members of all the suburban organisations. A group of about 200 from one of the suburbs arrived in the city punctually at the hour appointed, but failed to appear at the demonstration, the reason being that they had waited two hours on the station platform because the ticket collector at the exit had failed to make his appearance and there had been nobody to give their tickets to. It used to be said in jest that it took a Russian comrade to show the Germans a simple way out of their fix: to leave the platform without giving up their tickets. . . .

But is there anything like that in Germany now? Is there respect for the law in Germany today? What about the National Socialists, who one would think ought to be the first to stand guard over bourgeois legality? Do they not break the law, wreck workers' clubs and assassinate workers with impunity?

I make no mention of the workers, who, it seems to me, long ago lost all respect for bourgeois legality.

Yes, the Germans have changed quite a bit lately.

Ludwig: Under what conditions is it possible to unite the working class finally and completely under the leadership of one party? Why is such a uniting of the working class possible only after the proletarian revolution, as the Communists maintain?

Stalin: Such a uniting of the working class around the Communist Party is most easily accomplished as the result of a victorious proletarian revolution. But it will undoubtedly be achieved in the main even before the revolution.

Ludwig: Does ambition stimulate or hinder a great historical figure in his activities?

Stalin: The part played by ambition differs under different conditions. Ambition may be a stimulus or a hindrance to the activities of a great historical figure. It all depends on circumstances. More often than not it is a hindrance.

Ludwig: Is the October Revolution in any sense the continuation and culmination of the Great French Revolution?

Stalin: The October Revolution is neither the continuation nor the culmination of the Great French Revolution. The purpose of the French Revolution was to abolish feudalism in order to establish capitalism. The purpose of the October Revolution, however, is to abolish capitalism in order to establish socialism.

**TO THE CHIEF
OF THE AUTOMOBILE WORKS PROJECT
AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MOLOTOV
AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD**

Greetings to the working men and working women, and to the administrative, political and technical chiefs of the works on the occasion of the completion of the building and inauguration of the Giant Automobile Works!

Hearty congratulations to the men and women shock brigaders of the Automobile Works Project, who bore the brunt of the construction work!

Our thanks to the foreign workers, technicians and engineers who rendered assistance to the working class of the Soviet Union in building, assembling and inaugurating the works!

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Let us hope that the Automobile Works will succeed in swiftly and completely overcoming the difficulties of mastering and developing the process of production, the difficulties of fulfilling the production programme.

Let us hope that the Automobile Works will soon be able to supply the country with thousands and scores of thousands of cars and lorries, which are as essential to our national economy as air and water.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

**TO THE CHIEF
OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS
PROJECT AND THE DIRECTOR
OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS,
SARATOV**

Greetings to the working men and working women and the entire executive personnel of the works!

Hearty congratulations to the active of the works and, first and foremost, to the men and women shock brigaders, on the successful completion of the building and inauguration of the works!

Comrades, the country needs harvester combines as much as it needs tractors and automobiles. I have no doubt that you will succeed in completely fulfilling the production programme of the works.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

January 4, 1932

Pravda, No. 5,
January 5, 1932

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV

With Reference to the Letter "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" Addressed to the Editorial Board of the Magazine "Proletarskaya Revolutsia"

To Comrade Olekhnovich

I received your letter. I am late in replying owing to pressure of work.

I cannot possibly agree with you, Comrade Olekhnovich, and the reason is as follows.

1. It is not true that "Trotskyism was *never* a faction of communism." Since the Trotskyists broke organisationally—even if temporarily—with Menshevism, put aside—even if temporarily—their anti-Bolshevik views, were admitted to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern and submitted to the decisions of these bodies, Trotskyism was undoubtedly a part, a faction, of communism.

Trotskyism was a faction of communism both in the *broad* sense of the word, i.e., as a *part* of the world communist movement while retaining its individuality as a group, and in the *narrow* sense of the word, i.e., as a more or less organised *faction* within the C.P.S.U.(B.), fighting for influence in the Party. It would be ridiculous to deny the generally known facts about the Trotskyists as a faction of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that are record-

ed in resolutions of C.P.S.U.(B.) congresses and conferences.

The C.P.S.U.(B.) does not tolerate factions and cannot agree to legalise them? Yes, that is so; it does not tolerate them and cannot agree to legalise them. But this does not mean that the Trotskyists did not really constitute a faction. Precisely because the Trotskyists actually did have a faction of their own, which they fought to have legalised, precisely for this reason—among others—they were later on thrown out of the Party.

You are trying to score a point in reply by an attempt to draw a distinction between *Trotskyism* and the *Trotskyists*, on the supposition that what applies to Trotskyism cannot apply to the Trotskyists. In other words, you mean to say that Trotskyism was never a faction of communism, but that Trotsky and the Trotskyists were a faction of communism. That is scholasticism and self-deception, Comrade Olekhnovich! There can be no Trotskyism without exponents of it, i.e., without Trotskyists, just as there can be no Trotskyists without Trotskyism—maybe veiled and put aside, but nevertheless Trotskyism—otherwise they would cease to be Trotskyists.

What was the characteristic feature of the Trotskyists when they were a faction of communism? It was that they “permanently” wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, these vacillations reaching a climax at each turn made by the Party and the Comintern and finding vent in a factional struggle against the Party. What does this mean? It means that the Trotskyists were not *real* Bolsheviks, although they were in the

Party and submitted to its decisions, that they could not be called *real* Mensheviks either, although they frequently wavered to the side of Menshevism. It was this wavering that formed the basis of the inner-Party struggle between the Leninists and the Trotskyists during the period when the latter were in our Party (1917-27). And the basis of this wavering of the Trotskyists lay in the fact that although they put aside their anti-Bolshevik views and thus entered the Party, they nevertheless *did not renounce* these views. As a result these views made themselves felt with particular strength at each turn made by the Party and the Comintern.

You evidently do not agree with this interpretation of the question of Trotskyism. But in that event you are bound to arrive at one of two *incorrect* conclusions. *Either* you must conclude that when they entered the Party Trotsky and the Trotskyists made a clean sweep of their views and turned into *real* Bolsheviks, which is incorrect, for on that assumption it becomes impossible to understand and explain the continuous inner-Party struggle of the Trotskyists against the Party which fills the entire period of their stay in the Party. *Or* you must conclude that Trotskyism (the Trotskyists) “was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism,” which again is incorrect, as Lenin and Lenin's Party would have committed a mistake *in principle* had they admitted *Mensheviks* into the Communist Party even for one minute.

2. It is not true that Trotskyism “was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism, one variety of bourgeois agency in the working-class movement,” just as it is incorrect on your part to attempt to *draw distinction* between “the attitude of the Party to Trotskyism as the

theory and practice of a bourgeois agency in the working-class movement” and the “attitude of the Party at a definite historical period to Trotsky and the Trotskyists.”

In the first place, as I stated above, you are making a mistake, a scholastic mistake, by artificially separating Trotskyism from the Trotskyists and, conversely, the Trotskyists from Trotskyism. The history of our Party tells us that such a separation, in so far as some section or other of the Party did make it, was always and *entirely* to the advantage of Trotskyism, making it easier for the latter to cover up its traces when launching attacks against the Party. I may tell you confidentially that you are performing a very great service to Trotsky and the Trotskyist smugglers by introducing into our general political practice the method of artificially separating the question of Trotskyism from the question of the Trotskyists.

In the second place, having made this mistake you are compelled to make *another* that follows from the first, namely the assumption that “at a definite historical period” the Party regarded Trotsky and the Trotskyists as *real* Bolsheviks. But this assumption is quite wrong and altogether incompatible with the historical facts of the *inner-Party* struggle between the Trotskyists and the Leninists. How are we to explain in that case the unceasing struggle between the Party and the Trotskyists throughout the period in which they were in the Party? Are you not supposing that it was a squabble and not a fight based on principle?

So you see that your “correction” to my “letter to the editorial board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*” leads to an absurdity

As a matter of fact Trotskyism was a faction of Menshevism until the Trotskyists entered our Party; it became temporarily a faction of communism after the Trotskyists entered our Party, and it became once more a faction of Menshevism after the Trotskyists were driven out of our Party. "The dog returned to his vomit."

Hence:

a) it cannot be asserted that "at a definite historical period" the Party considered Trotsky and the Trotskyists *real* Bolsheviks, for such a supposition would flatly contradict the facts of the history of our Party during the period 1917-27;

b) it cannot be considered that Trotskyism (the Trotskyists) "was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism," for such a supposition would lead to the conclusion that in 1917-27 our Party was a *bloc* between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and not a *monolithic* Bolshevik party, which is quite wrong and at variance with the fundamentals of Bolshevism;

c) the question of Trotskyism cannot be artificially separated from the question of the Trotskyists without one running the risk of becoming involuntarily an instrument of Trotskyist machinations.

What conclusion then remains? This one thing: to agree that "at a definite historical period" Trotskyism was a faction of communism, a faction which wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

J. Stalin

January 15, 1932

To Comrade Aristov

You are under a misapprehension, Comrade Aristov.

There is no contradiction between the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists"³¹ (1924) and the "Letter to the Editorial Board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*" (1931). These two documents concern *different* aspects of the question, and this has seemed to you to be a "contradiction." But there is no "contradiction" here.

The article "The October Revolution" states that in 1905 it was not Rosa Luxemburg, but Parvus and Trotsky who *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution *against* Lenin. This fully corresponds to historical fact. It was Parvus who in 1905 came to Russia and edited a special newspaper in which he *actively* came out in favour of "permanent" revolution *against* Lenin's "conception," it was Parvus and then, after and together with him, Trotsky—it was this pair that at the time bombarded Lenin's plan of revolution, counterposing to it the theory of "permanent" revolution. As for Rosa Luxemburg, she kept behind the scenes in those days, abstained from active struggle against Lenin in this matter, evidently preferring not to become involved as yet in the struggle.

In the polemic against Radek contained in the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," I focussed attention on Parvus because when Radek spoke about the year 1905 and "permanent" revolution, he *purposely* kept silent about Parvus. He kept silent about Parvus because after

1905 Parvus had become an odious figure. He became a millionaire and turned into a direct agent of the German imperialists. Radek was averse to having the theory of “permanent” revolution linked up with the obnoxious name of Parvus; he wanted to dodge the facts of history. But I stepped in and frustrated Radek’s manoeuvre by establishing the historical truth and giving Parvus his due.

That is how the matter stands with regard to the article “The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists.”

As for the “Letter to the Editorial Board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*,” that treats of *another* aspect of the question, namely, the fact that the theory of “permanent” revolution was *invented* by Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus. This, too, corresponds to historical fact. It was not Trotsky but Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus who *invented* the theory of “permanent” revolution. It was not Rosa Luxemburg but Parvus and Trotsky who in 1905 *advanced* the theory of “permanent” revolution and actively fought for it *against* Lenin.

Subsequently Rosa Luxemburg, too, began to fight actively against the Leninist plan of revolution. But that was *after* 1905.

J. Stalin

January 25, 1932

Bolshevik, No. 16
August 30, 1932

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK

Telegraphic news has been received of the completion of the inauguration period and full operation of the first giant blast furnace in the U.S.S.R., producing daily over a thousand tons of foundry pig iron, equivalent to a daily output of about twelve hundred tons of pig iron for conversion into steel.

I congratulate the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works on their successful fulfilment of the first part of the works' programme.

I congratulate them on mastering the technique of this unique gigantic blast furnace, the first in Europe.

Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, who under the adverse conditions of winter fought and overcame the difficulties of inaugurating the blast furnace and putting it into full operation and who are readily taking upon themselves the brunt of the work of building the plant!

I have no doubt that the Magnitogorsk workers will likewise successfully fulfil the main part of the 1932 programme, will build three more blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces and rolling machinery, and will thus fulfil with honour their duty to their country.

J. Stalin

**REPLY TO THE LETTER
OF Mr. RICHARDSON,³² REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE *ASSOCIATED PRESS*
NEWS AGENCY**

To Mr. Richardson

This is not the first time that false rumours that I am ill are circulating in the bourgeois press. Obviously, there are people to whose interest it is that I should fall ill seriously and for a long time, if not worse. Perhaps it is not very tactful of me, but unfortunately I have no data capable of gratifying these gentlemen. Sad though it may be, nothing will avail against facts, viz., that I am in perfect health. As for Mr. Zondeck, he can attend to the health of other comrades, which is why he has been invited to come to the U.S.S.R.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 93,
April 3, 1932

THE IMPORTANCE AND TASKS OF THE COMPLAINTS BUREAUS

The work of the Complaints Bureaus³³ is of tremendous importance in the struggle to remove shortcomings in our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union and Kom-somol apparatuses, in improving our administrative apparatus.

Lenin said that without an apparatus we should have perished long ago, and that without a systematic, stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we should certainly perish. This means that resolute and systematic struggle against conservatism, bureaucracy and red tape in our apparatus is an essential task of the Party, the working class and all the working people of our country.

The tremendous importance of the Complaints Bureaus consists in their being a serious means of carrying out Lenin's behest concerning the struggle to improve the apparatus.

It is indisputable that the Complaints Bureaus have considerable achievements to their credit in this field. The task is to consolidate the results attained and to achieve decisive successes in this matter. There can be

no doubt that if the Complaints Bureaus rally around them all the more active sections of the workers and collective farmers, drawing them into the work of administering the state and attentively heeding the voice of the working people both within and without the Party, these decisive successes will be won.

Let us hope that the five-day review of the work of the Complaints Bureaus will serve as a stimulus for further expansion of their work along the line indicated by our teacher Lenin.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 97,
April 7, 1932

REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS OF RALPH V. BARNES

May 3, 1932

1st Question: Certain circles in America are intensely discussing at the present time the possibility of sending to Moscow an unofficial American trade representative, accompanied by a staff of specialists, for promoting the establishment of closer trade connections between the United States and the U.S.S.R. What would be the attitude of the Soviet Government to such a proposal?

Stalin: In general, the U.S.S.R. gladly receives trade representatives and specialists of countries which maintain normal relations with it. As regards the U.S.A., I believe the Soviet Government would look favourably upon such an undertaking.

2nd Question: If certain of the obstacles existing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean to an expansion of Soviet-American trade were removed, what would be the approximate volume of orders that the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to place in the United States?

Stalin: It is difficult to name a figure in advance without the risk of making a mistake. In any event the growing requirements of the U.S.S.R. and the vast possibilities of the industry of the U.S.A. fully warrant

the belief that the volume of orders would increase several times over.

3rd Question: Certain responsible circles in the U.S.A. are under the quite definite impression that obvious similarity has been revealed in the reaction of the Soviet and the American Governments to events in the Far East during the last seven months, and that in general as a consequence of this the divergence in policy between the Soviets and America has become less than hitherto.

What is your opinion in this regard?

Stalin: It is impossible to say anything definite, since unfortunately it is very difficult to grasp the essentials of the Far Eastern policy of the U.S.A. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has adhered, and will continue to adhere, to a firm policy of maintaining peace both with Japan and with Manchuria and China as a whole.

4th Question: There is a great difference between your country and mine, but there is also obvious similarity. Each occupies a vast territory in which there are no such obstacles to trade as tariff barriers. Stupid traditions, of course, interfere less with economic activity in the U.S.S.R. and the United States than in other first-rate powers. The process of industrialisation in the U.S.S.R. is more like the same process in the United States than that in other West-European Powers. In my preceding question I already indicated that in some cases policy in Moscow and Washington is not so much at variance as might have been expected. Lastly, there is undoubtedly a deep friendly feeling between the American and Soviet peoples despite all the obvious difference between them. In view of these facts, would it not be

possible to inspire the conviction in the minds of both peoples that no armed clash between the two countries should ever under any circumstances be allowed to occur?

Stalin: There can be nothing easier than to convince the peoples of both countries of the harm and criminal character of mutual extermination. But, unfortunately, questions of war and peace are not always decided by the peoples. I have no doubt that the masses of the people of the U.S.A. did not want war with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in 1918-19. This, however, did not prevent the U.S.A. Government from attacking the U.S.S.R. in 1918 (in conjunction with Japan, Britain and France) and from continuing its military intervention against the U.S.S.R. right up to 1919. As for the U.S.S.R., proof is hardly required to show that what its peoples as well as its government want is that "no armed clash between the two countries should ever under any circumstances" be able to occur.

5th Question: Contradictory reports have been spread in America concerning the real nature of the Second Five-Year Plan. Is it true that between January 1, 1933, and the end of 1937 the daily needs of the Soviet population will be satisfied to a greater extent than hitherto? In other words, will light industry really develop to a greater extent than before?

Stalin: Yes, light industry will develop to a much greater extent than before.

KUZNETSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, KUZNETSK

Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders, the technical personnel and the entire executive staff of the Kuznetsk Works, who have achieved a high output of pig iron at Blast Furnace No. 1 and who have displayed Bolshevik tempo in mastering the most modern technology.

I am confident that the personnel of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works Project will improve on the successes they have achieved, operate Blast Furnace No. 2 with no less success, complete the building of the open-hearth furnaces and the rolling mill within the next few months and will also complete and put into operation this third and fourth blast furnaces.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 97,
May 24, 1932

**GREETING TO THE SEVENTH
ALL-UNION CONFERENCE
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST
YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE³⁴**

Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League fighters, to the delegates, young men and women, of the League's Seventh All-Union Conference!

I wish you success in the communist education and organisation of the vast masses of the working-class and peasant youth!

Hold high the banner of Leninist internationalism, work for peace and friendship among the peoples, strengthen the defence of our country against capitalist invasion, shatter the old world of slavery and exploitation, build and consolidate the new world of emancipated labour and communism, learn in all your work to combine powerful revolutionary enthusiasm with the sustained efficiency of Bolshevik builders, be worthy sons and daughters of our mother, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live the Y.C.L. generation!

J. Stalin

July 8, 1932

Pravda, No. 188,
July 9, 1932

CONGRATULATIONS TO MAXIM GORKY³⁵

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart and firmly clasp your hand. I wish you many years of life and labour, to the joy of all the working people and the terror of the enemies of the working class.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 266,
September 25, 1932

TO THE BUILDERS OF THE DNEIPER HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER STATION

Unfortunately I shall be unable to comply with your request to attend the inauguration of the Dnieper Power Station as my work makes it impossible for me to leave Moscow.

Hearty greetings and congratulations to the workers and the executive personnel of the Dnieper Power Station on the successful completion of this great historic work of construction.

I firmly shake the hands of the Dnieper Power Station shock brigaders, the glorious heroes of socialist construction.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 281,
October 10, 1932

GREETINGS TO LENINGRAD

Greetings to Bolshevik Leningrad, the cradle of Soviet power, on the fifteenth anniversary of the birth of the power of the Soviets!

Long live the Leningrad workers, the first to raise the banner of the October uprising against capitalism, who smashed the power of the capitalists and established the power of the workers and peasants—the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Forward to new victories, comrades of Leningrad!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 309,
November 7, 1932

LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER *PRAVDA*

My sincere thanks to the organisations, institutions, comrades and friends who have expressed their condolences on the occasion of the passing away of my beloved friend and comrade, Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva-Stalina.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 318,
November 18, 1932

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH

A book in English entitled *Russia—Market or Menace?*, written by Mr. Campbell, a well-known figure in the agricultural world, who had visited the U.S.S.R., recently made its appearance in America. In this book Mr. Campbell, among other things, gives an account of what he calls an “interview” with Stalin that took place in Moscow in January 1929. This “interview” is remarkable for the fact that its every sentence is either pure fiction or a sensational piece of trickery with the aim of gaining publicity for the book and its author.

It will not be amiss, in my opinion, to say a few words in order to expose these fictitious statements.

Mr. Campbell is obviously drawing on his imagination when he says that his talk with Stalin, which began at 1 p.m., “lasted until well after dark, in fact, until dawn.” Actually, the talk did not last more than two hours. Mr. Campbell’s imagination is truly American.

Mr. Campbell is stretching the truth when he asserts that Stalin “took my hand in both of his and said: ‘we can be friends.’” As a matter of fact, nothing of the kind happened or could have happened.

Mr. Campbell cannot but know that Stalin has no need of "friends" of the Campbell type.

Mr. Campbell again stretches the truth when he says that on sending him a record of the talk, I added the postscript: "Keep this record, it may be a very historical document some day." As a matter of fact the record was sent to Mr. Campbell by the translator Yarotsky without any postscript at all. Mr. Campbell's desire to make capital out of Stalin obviously betrays him.

Mr. Campbell still further stretches the truth when he puts such words into the mouth of Stalin as that "under Trotsky there had been an attempt to spread communism throughout the world; that this was the primary cause of the break between himself [i.e., Stalin] and Trotsky; that Trotsky believed in universal communism, while he [Stalin] worked to confine his efforts to his own country." Only people who have deserted to the camp of the Kautskys and the Welses can believe such stuff and nonsense, in which the facts are turned upside-down. As a matter of fact, the talk with Campbell had no bearing on the Trotsky question and Trotsky's name was not mentioned at all in the course of it.

And so on in the same strain. . . .

Mr. Campbell mentioned in his book the record of his talk with Stalin but he did not find it necessary to publish it in his book. Why? Was it not because publication of the record would have upset Mr. Campbell's plan to utilise the sensational fables about the "interview" with Stalin in order to gain publicity for Campbell's book among the American philistines?

I think the best punishment for the lying Mr., Campbell would be to publish the record of the talk between Mr. Campbell and Stalin. This would be the surest means of exposing his lies and establishing the facts.

J. Stalin

November 23, 1932

RECORD OF THE TALK WITH MR. CAMPBELL

January 28, 1929

After an exchange of preliminary phrases Mr. Campbell explained his desire to pay a visit to Comrade Stalin. He pointed out that although he was in the U.S.S.R. in a private capacity, he had, before leaving the United States, seen Coolidge and also Hoover, the newly elected President, and received their full approval of his trip to Russia. His stay here showed him the amazing activity of the nation that has remained an enigma to the whole world. He particularly liked the projects for the development of agriculture. He knew of the existence of many wrong notions about Russia, but had himself been in the Kremlin, for instance, and had seen the work being done to preserve memorials of art and in general to raise the level of cultural life. He was particularly struck by the solicitude for working men and working women. It seemed to him an interesting coincidence that before his departure from the United States he was invited by the President, and saw Coolidge's son and wife while yesterday he was the guest of Mikhail Kalinin,

President of the U.S.S.R., who impressed him tremendously.

Comrade Stalin: With regard to our plans of agricultural and industrial development, as well as our concern for the development of cultural life, we are still at the very beginning of our work. In the building up of industry we have done very little as yet. Still less has been done in carrying out the plans for agricultural reconstruction. We must not forget that our country was exceedingly backward and that this backwardness is still a great handicap.

The difference between the former and the new leading figures in Russia consists, among other things, in the fact that the old ones considered the country's backwardness one of its good points, regarding it as a "national characteristic," a matter for "national pride," whereas the new people, the Soviet people, combat it as an evil that must be rooted out. Herein lies the guarantee of our success.

We know that we are not free from mistakes. But we do not fear criticism, are not afraid to face the difficulties and admit our mistakes. We shall accept correct criticism and welcome it. We watch developments in the U.S.A., for that country ranks high in science and technology. We would like scientific and technical people in America to be our teachers in the sphere of technique, and we their pupils.

Every period in the development of a nation is marked by a passion of its own. In Russia we now witness a passion for construction. This is her preponderating feature today. This explains the construction fever that we are experiencing at present. It is reminiscent of the pe-

riod that the U.S.A. went through after the Civil War.³⁶ This affords a basis and an opportunity for technical, industrial and commercial co-operation with the U.S.A. I do not know what still needs to be done to secure contact with American industry. Could you not explain what now prevents such a rapprochement from being realised, if it is established that such contact would be advantageous to both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.?

Mr. Campbell: I am certain that there is a striking similarity between the U.S.A. and Russia in point of size, resources and independence. Mr. Stalin's reference to the Civil War period is correct. After the Civil War extraordinary expansion was witnessed. The people in the U.S.A. are interested in Russia. I am sure that Russia is too big a country not to be a big factor in world relations. The people at the head of the Russian Government have grand opportunities to accomplish great things. All that is needed for this is clarity of judgment and the ability to be fair at all times.

I see the advantage of proper business contact and I am maintaining close connection with the government, although I am a private citizen. I am carrying on this conversation as a private person. Once I have been asked what hinders contact between the U.S.A. and Russia I want to answer with the utmost frankness and courage, with due respect for Mr. Stalin and without giving offence. He is very objective-minded and this allows me to converse with him as man to man for the benefit of both countries and absolutely confidentially. If we could have official recognition everybody would be anxious to get here to do business on a credit or other basis, as is being done everywhere. A reason why American firms

hesitate to do business and grant long-term credits is the fact that our Washington Government does not recognise your Government.

The main reason for this, however, is not simply failure in the matter of recognition. The main reason, we assume (and this may be taken as certain), is that representatives of your Government in our country are trying all the time to sow discontent and spread the ideas of Soviet power.

We have in our country what is called the "Monroe Doctrine," which signifies that we do not want to interfere in the affairs of any other country in the world, that we confine ourselves strictly to our own affairs. For that reason we do not want any country whatever—Britain, France, Germany, Russia or any other—to interfere in our private affairs.

Russia is so vast a country that she can by herself fulfil everything that her whole people decide to do. Russia has resources of her own of every kind, and although it will take more time the Russians in the long run will be able to develop their resources independently.

It gives us pleasure to feel that in many respects we are an ideal for the Russian people, and I believe we can be very useful to that people, particularly in economising time. Since we have solved many economic problems and our methods are copied by many countries besides Russia, such enterprises as the building of state farms imply a strengthening of trade connections, and in the final analysis trade connections will be followed by diplomatic recognition on some equitable basis. The only way for nations, as for individuals, is to speak

out frankly without discourtesy, and then the time will soon come for some kind of agreement. The better our upbringing the greater our conviction that more can be achieved by reason than by any other means. Great nations can differ in opinion without straining relations and great men can come to an arrangement on major problems. They usually wind up their negotiations with a definite agreement in which they meet each other halfway, no matter how far apart their initial positions were.

Comrade Stalin: I realise that diplomatic recognition involves difficulties for the U.S.A. at the present moment. Soviet Government representatives have been subjected to abuse by the American press so much and so often that an abrupt change is difficult. Personally I do not consider diplomatic recognition decisive at the moment. What is important is a development of trade connections on the basis of mutual advantage. Trade relations need to be normalised and if this matter is put on some legal footing it would be a first and very important step towards diplomatic recognition. The question of diplomatic recognition will find its own solution when both sides realise that diplomatic relations are advantageous. The chief basis is trade relations and their normalisation, which will lead to the establishment of definite legal norms.

The natural resources of our country are, of course, rich and varied. They are richer and more varied than is officially known, and our research expeditions are constantly finding new resources in our extensive country. But this is only one aspect of our potentialities. The other aspect is the fact that our peasants and workers

are now rid of their former burden, the landlords and capitalists. Formerly the landlords and capitalists used to squander unproductively what today remains within the country and increases its internal purchasing power. The increase in demand is such that our industry, in spite of its rapid expansion, cannot catch up with it. The demand is prodigious, both for personal and productive consumption. This is the second aspect of our unlimited potentialities.

Both the one and the other give rise to an important basis for commercial and industrial contact with the U.S.A. as well as other developed countries.

The question as to which state is to apply its forces to these resources and potentialities of our country is the object of a complicated struggle among them. Unfortunately the U.S.A. still stands quite aloof from this struggle.

On all sides the Germans are shouting that the position of the Soviet Government is unstable and that therefore one ought not to grant any considerable credits to Soviet economic organisations. At the same time they try to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R. by granting it credits.

As you know, one group of British businessmen is also carrying on a fierce anti-Soviet campaign. At the same time this very group and also the McKenna group are endeavouring to organise credits for the U.S.S.R. The press has already reported that in February a delegation of British industrialists and bankers will come to the U.S.S.R. They intend to submit to the Soviet Government an extensive plan for trade relations and a loan.

How are we to explain this duplicity of the German and British businessmen? It is to be explained by their desire to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R., frightening the U.S.A. away and pushing it aside.

At the same time, it is clear to me that the U.S.A. has better grounds for extensive business connections with the U.S.S.R. than any other country. And this is not only because the U.S.A. is rich both in technical equipment and capital, but also because in no other country are our business people given such a cordial and hospitable welcome as in the U.S.A.

As regards propaganda, I must state most emphatically that no representative of the Soviet Government has the right to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of the country in which he happens to be. In this respect the most strict and definite instructions have been given to all our personnel employed in Soviet institutions in the U.S.A. I am certain that Bron and the members of his staff do not have the slightest connection with propaganda in any form whatsoever. Should any of our employees violate these strict directives as regards non-interference he would immediately be recalled and punished. Naturally we cannot answer for the actions of persons not known and not subordinate to us. But we can assume responsibility as regards interference by persons employed in our institutions abroad, and we can give the maximum guarantees on that score.

Mr. Campbell: May I tell that to Mr. Hoover?

Comrade Stalin: Of course.

Mr. Campbell: We do not know who those people are that sow discontent. But there are such people. The

police find them and their literature. I know Bron and am convinced that he is an honest, straightforward gentleman, who does business honestly. But there is somebody.

Comrade Stalin: It is possible that propaganda in favour of Soviets is being carried on in the U.S.A. by members of the American Communist Party. But that party is legal in the U.S.A., it legally participates in Presidential elections and nominates its candidates for President, and it is quite clear that we cannot be interfering in your internal affairs in this case either.

Mr. Campbell: I have no further questions. But yes, I have. When I return to the United States businessmen will ask me whether it is safe to do business with the U.S.S.R. Engineering concerns in particular will be interested in the possibility of granting long-term credits. Can I answer in the affirmative? Can I obtain information on the measures now being taken by the Soviet Government to guarantee credit transactions; is there any special tax or other specific source of revenue set aside for this purpose?

Comrade Stalin: I would prefer not to sing the praises of my country. But now that the question has been put I must reply as follows: There has not been a single instance of the Soviet Government or a Soviet economic institution failing to make payment correctly and on time on credits, whether short-term or long-term. Inquiries could be made in Germany on how we meet payments to the Germans on their credit of three hundred millions. Where do we get the means to effect payment? Mr. Campbell knows that money does not drop from the sky. Our

agriculture, industry, trade, timber, oil, gold, platinum, etc.—such is the source of our payments. Therein lies the guarantee of our payments. I do not want Mr. Campbell to take my word for it. He can check my statements in Germany, for example. He will find that not once was payment postponed, although at times we actually had to pay such unheard-of interest rates as 15-20%.

As far as special guarantees are concerned, I believe there is no need to speak of this seriously in the case of the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Campbell: Of course not.

Comrade Stalin: Perhaps it would not be amiss to tell you, strictly confidentially, about the loan, not credit but loan, offered by a group of British bankers—that of Balfour and Kingsley.

Mr. Campbell: May I tell Hoover about this?

Comrade Stalin: Of course, but don't give it to the press. This group of bankers are making the following proposal:

They calculate that our debts to Britain amount approximately to £400,000,000.

It is proposed that they be consolidated at 25%. That means £100,000,000 instead of £400,000,000.

Simultaneously a loan of £100,000,000 is proposed.

Thus our indebtedness will amount to £200,000,000 to be paid in instalments over a period of several decades. In return we are to give preference to the British engineering industry. This does not mean that we shall have to place our orders in Britain alone, but the British must be given preference.

Mr. Campbell, in expressing his thanks for the interview, says that Comrade Stalin has impressed him as a fair, well-informed and straightforward man. He is very glad to have had the opportunity of speaking with Comrade Stalin and considers the interview historic.

Comrade Stalin thanks Mr. Campbell for the talk.

Bolshevik, No. 22,
November 30, 1932

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OGPU

Greetings to the officials and troops of the OGPU, who are honestly and courageously fulfilling their duty to the working class and the peasantry of the Soviet Union!

I wish them success in the difficult task of eradicating the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Long live the OGPU, the bared sword of the working class!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 350,
December 20, 1932

**JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C.,
C.P.S.U.(B.)³⁷**

January 7-12, 1933

Pravda, Nos. 10 and 17,
January 10 and 17, 1933

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Report Delivered on January 7, 1933

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Comrades, when the five-year plan was published, people hardly anticipated that it could be of tremendous international significance. On the contrary, many thought that the five-year plan was a private affair of the Soviet Union—an important and serious affair, but nevertheless a private, national affair of the Soviet Union.

History has shown, however, that the international significance of the five-year plan is immeasurable. History has shown that the five-year plan is not the private affair of the Soviet Union, but the concern of the whole international proletariat.

Long before the five-year plan appeared on the scene, in the period when we were finishing our struggle against the interventionists and were going over to the work of economic construction—even in that period Lenin said that our economic construction was of profound international significance; that every step forward taken by the Soviet Government along the path of economic construction was finding a powerful response among the most varied strata in capitalist countries and dividing

people into two camps—the camp of the supporters of the proletarian revolution and the camp of its opponents.

Lenin said at that time:

“At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. This we have achieved. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale surely and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be fast—but steady progress upward and forward” (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11³⁸).

This was said at the time when we were bringing to a close the war against the interventionists, when we were passing from the military struggle against capitalism to the struggle on the economic front, to the period of economic development.

Many years have elapsed since then, and every step taken by the Soviet Government in the sphere of economic development, every year, every quarter, has brilliantly confirmed Comrade Lenin's words.

But the most brilliant confirmation of the correctness of Lenin's words has been provided by our five-year plan of construction, by the emergence of this plan, its development and its fulfilment. Indeed, it seems that no step taken along the path of economic development in our country has met with such a response among the most varied strata in the capitalist countries of Europe, America and Asia as the question of the five-year plan, its development and its fulfilment.

At first the bourgeoisie and its press greeted the five-year plan with ridicule. "Fantasy," "delirium," "utopia"—that is how they dubbed our five-year plan at that time.

Later on, when it began to be evident that the fulfilment of the five-year plan was producing real results, they began to sound the alarm, asserting that the five-year plan was threatening the existence of the capitalist countries, that its fulfilment would lead to the flooding of European markets with goods, to intensified dumping and the increase of unemployment.

Still later, when this trick used against the Soviet regime also failed to produce the expected results, a series of voyages to the U.S.S.R. was undertaken by representatives of all sorts of firms, organs of the press, societies of various kinds, etc., for the purpose of seeing with their own eyes what was actually going on in the U.S.S.R. I am not referring here to the workers' delegations, which, from the very first appearance of the five-year plan, have expressed their admiration of the undertakings and successes of the Soviet regime and manifested their readiness to support the working class of the U.S.S.R.

From that time a cleavage began in so-called public opinion, in the bourgeois press, in all kinds of bourgeois societies, etc. Some maintained that the five-year plan had utterly failed and that the Bolsheviks were on the verge of collapse. Others, on the contrary, declared that although the Bolsheviks were bad people, their five-year plan was nevertheless going well and in all probability they would achieve their object.

It will not be superfluous, perhaps, to quote the opinions of various bourgeois press organs.

Take, for example, an American newspaper, *The New York Times*.³⁹ At the end of November 1932 this newspaper wrote:

“A five-year industrial plan which sets out to defy the sense of proportion, which drives towards an objective ‘regardless of cost,’ as Moscow has often proudly boasted, is really not a plan. It is a gamble.”

So it seems that the five-year plan is not even a plan, but a sheer gamble.

And here is the opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, *The Daily Telegraph*,⁴⁰ expressed at the end of November 1932:

“As a practical test of ‘planned economics’ the scheme has quite clearly failed.”

The opinion of *The New York Times* in November 1932:

“The collectivisation campaign is of course a ghastly failure. It has brought Russia to the verge of famine.”

The opinion of a bourgeois newspaper in Poland, *Gazeta Polska*,⁴¹ in the summer of 1932:

“The situation seems to show that in its policy of collectivising the countryside the government of the Soviets has reached an impasse.”

The opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, *The Financial Times*,⁴² in November 1932:

“Stalin and his party, as the outcome of their policy, find themselves faced with the breakdown of the five-year plan system and frustration of the aims it was expected to achieve.”

The opinion of the Italian magazine *Politica*⁴³:

"It would be absurd to think that nothing has been created in four years' work by a nation consisting of a hundred and sixty million, in four years of super-human economic and political effort on the part of a regime of such strength as the Bolshevik regime represents. On the contrary, a great deal has been done. . . . Nevertheless, the catastrophe is evident—it is a fact obvious to all. Friends and enemies, Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, oppositionists on the Right and on the Left are convinced of this."

Finally, the opinion of the American bourgeois magazine *Current History*⁴⁴:

"A survey of the existing posture of affairs in Russia, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the five-year programme has failed both in terms of its announced statistical objectives and more fundamentally in terms of certain of its underlying social principles."

Such are the opinions of one section of the bourgeois press.

It is hardly worth while to criticise those who gave utterance to these opinions. I think it is not worth while. It is not worth while because these "die-hards" belong to the species of mediaeval fossils to whom facts mean nothing, and who will persist in their opinion no matter how our five-year plan is fulfilled.

Let us turn to the opinions of other press organs belonging to the same bourgeois camp.

Here is the opinion of a well-known bourgeois newspaper in France, *Le Temps*,⁴⁵ expressed in January 1932:

"The U.S.S.R. has won the first round, having industrialised herself without the aid of foreign capital."

The opinion of *Le Temps* again, expressed in the summer of 1932:

“Communism is completing the process of reconstruction with enormous speed, whereas the capitalist system permits only of progress at a slow pace. . . . In France, where the land is infinitely divided up among individual property owners, it is impossible to mechanise agriculture; the Soviets, however, by industrialising agriculture, have solved the problem. . . . In the contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the victors.”

The opinion of a British bourgeois magazine, *The Round Table*⁴⁶:

“The development achieved under the five-year plan is astounding. The tractor plants of Kharkov and Stalingrad, the AMO automobile factory in Moscow, the automobile plant in Nizhni-Novgorod, the Dnieprostroi hydro-electric project, the mammoth steel plants at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the network of machine shops and chemical plants in the Urals—which bid fair to become Russia’s Ruhr—these and other industrial achievements all over the country show that, whatever the shortcomings and difficulties, Russian industry, like a well-watered plant, keeps on gaining colour, size and strength. . . . She has laid the foundations for future development . . . and has strengthened prodigiously her fighting capacity.”

The opinion of the British bourgeois newspaper, *The Financial Times*:

“The progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, and the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, glowing as they are, are not unwarranted. It must be remembered that Russia, of course, produced machines and tools, but only of the simplest kind. True, the importation of machines and tools is actually increasing in absolute figures; but the proportion of imported machines to those of native production is steadily diminishing. Russia is producing today all the machinery essential to her metallurgical and electrical industries; has succeeded in creating her own automobile industry; has established her own tool-making industry from small precision instruments to the heaviest presses; and in the matter of agricultural machinery is independent of foreign imports. At the same

time, the Soviet Government is taking measures to prevent the retardation of production in the output of such basic industries as iron and coal endangering the fulfilment of the plan in four years. The one thing certain is that the enormous plants now being established guarantee a very considerable increase in the output of the heavy industries."

The opinion of an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, *Die Neue Freie Presse*,⁴⁷ expressed in the beginning of 1932:

"We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand it. *The five-year plan is a new huge quantity* which must be taken into account in every economic calculation."

The opinion of a British capitalist, Gibson Jarvie, the president of the United Dominion Trust, expressed in October 1932:

"Now I want it clearly understood that I am neither Communist nor Bolshevik, I am definitely a capitalist and an individualist. . . . Russia is forging ahead while all too many of our factories and shipyards lie idle and approximately 3,000,000 of our people despairingly seek work. Jokes have been made about the five-year plan, and its failure has been predicted. You can take it as beyond question, that under the five-year plan much more has been accomplished than was ever really anticipated. . . . In all these industrial towns which I visited, a new city is growing up, a city on a definite plan with wide streets in the process of being beautified by trees and grass plots, houses of the most modern type, schools, hospitals, workers' clubs and the inevitable crèche or nursery, where the children of working mothers are cared for. . . . Don't underrate the Russians or their plans and don't make the mistake of believing that the Soviet Government must crash. . . . Russia today is a country with a soul and an ideal. Russia is a country of amazing activity. I believe that the Russian objective is sound. . . . And perhaps most im-

portant of all, all these youngsters and these workers in Russia have one thing which is too sadly lacking in the capitalist countries today, and that is—hope!”

The opinion of the American bourgeois magazine, *The Nation*,⁴⁸ expressed in November 1932:

“The four years of the five-year plan have witnessed truly *remarkable developments*. Russia is working with war-time intensity on the positive task of building the physical and social moulds of a new life. *The face of the country is being changed literally beyond recognition . . .* This is true of Moscow, with hundreds of streets and squares paved, with new suburbs, new buildings, and a cordon of new factories on its outskirts, and it is true of smaller and less important cities. New towns have sprung out of the steppe, the wilderness, and the desert—not just a few towns, but at least 50 of them with populations of from 50,000 to 250,000—all in the last four years, each constructed round an enterprise for the development of some natural resource. Hundreds of new district power stations and a handful of ‘giants’ like Dnieprostroi are gradually putting reality into Lenin’s formula: ‘Electricity plus Soviets equals Socialism. . . .’ The Soviet Union now engages in the large-scale manufacture of an endless variety of articles which Russia never before produced—tractors, combines, high-grade steels, synthetic rubber, ball bearings, high-power diesel motors, 50,000-kilowatt turbines, telephone-exchange equipment, electrical mining machinery, aeroplanes, automobiles, lorries, bicycles, and several hundred types of new machines. . . . For the first time Russia is mining aluminium, magnesium, apatite, iodine, potash, and many other valuable minerals. *The guiding landmark on the Soviet countryside is no longer the dome of a church but the grain elevator and the silo.* Collectives are building piggeries, barns, and houses. Electricity is penetrating the village, and radio and newspaper have conquered it. Workers are learning to operate the world’s most modern machines; peasant boys make and use agricultural machinery bigger and more complicated than ever America has seen. *Russia is*

becoming 'machine minded,' Russia is passing quickly from the age of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors."

The opinion of a British "Left"-reformist magazine, *Forward*,⁴⁹ expressed in September 1932:

"Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of building work that is going on. New factories, new picture-houses, new schools, new clubs, new big blocks of tenements, everywhere new buildings, many completed, others with scaffolding. It is difficult to convey to the mind of the British reader exactly what has been done, and what is being done. It has to be seen to be believed. Our own wartime efforts are flea-bites to what has been done in Russia. Americans admit that even in the greatest rush days in the West there could have been nothing like the feverish building activity that is going on in Russia today. One sees so many changes in the Russian scene after two years that one gives up trying to imagine what Russia will be like in another 10 years. . . . So dismiss from your heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press that lies so persistently, so contemptibly about Russia, and all the half truths and misconceptions that are circulated by the dilettante intelligentsia that look at Russia patronisingly through middle-class spectacles without having the slightest understanding of what is going on. . . . Russia is building up a new society on what are, generally speaking, fundamentally sound lines. To do this it is taking risks, it is working enthusiastically with an energy that has never been seen in the world before, it has tremendous difficulties inseparable from this attempt to build up socialism in a vast, undeveloped country isolated from the rest of the world. But the impression I have, after seeing it again after two years, is that of a nation making solid progress, planning, creating, constructing in a way that is striking challenge to the hostile capitalist world."

Such are the discordant voices and the cleavage in the camp of bourgeois circles, of whom some stand for the annihilation of the U.S.S.R. with its allegedly bank-

rupt five-year plan, while others, apparently, stand for commercial co-operation with the U.S.S.R., obviously calculating that they can obtain some advantage for themselves out of the success of the five-year plan.

The question of the attitude of the working class in capitalist countries towards the five-year plan, towards the successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., is in a category by itself. It may be sufficient to quote here the opinion of just one of the numerous workers' delegations that come to the U.S.S.R. every year, for example, that of a Belgian workers' delegation. The opinion of this delegation is typical of that of all workers' delegations without exception, whether they be British or French, German or American, or delegations of other countries. Here it is:

“We are struck with admiration at the tremendous amount of construction that we have witnessed during our travels. In Moscow, as well as in Makeyevka, Gorlovka, Kharkov, and Leningrad, we could see for ourselves with what enthusiasm the work is carried on there. All the machines are the most up-to-date models. The factories are clean, well ventilated and well lit. We saw how medical assistance and hygienic conditions are provided for the workers in the U.S.S.R. The workers' houses are built near the factories. Schools and crèches are organised in the workers' towns, and the children are surrounded with every care. We could see the difference between the old and the newly constructed factories, between the old and the new houses. All that we have seen has given us a clear idea of the tremendous strength of the working people who are building a new society under the leadership of the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. we have observed a great cultural revival, while in other countries there is decadence in all spheres, and unemployment reigns. We were able to see the frightful difficulties the working people of the Soviet Union encounter on their

path. We can therefore appreciate all the more the pride with which they point to their victories. We are convinced that they will overcome all obstacles.”

There you have the international significance of the five-year plan. It was enough for us to carry on construction work for a matter of two or three years, it was enough for us to show the first successes of the five-year plan, for the whole world to be split into two camps—the camp of those who never tire of snarling at us, and the camp of those who are amazed at the successes of the five-year plan, apart from the fact that we have all over the world our own camp, which is growing stronger—the camp of the working class in the capitalist countries, which rejoices at the successes of the working class in the U.S.S.R. and is prepared to support it, to the alarm of the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

What does this mean?

It means that there can be no doubt about the international significance of the five-year plan, about the international significance of its successes and achievements.

It means that the capitalist countries are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, and that precisely because they are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie would like to find in a failure of the five-year plan a fresh argument against revolution; whereas the proletariat, on the other hand, is striving to find, and indeed does find, in the successes of the five-year plan a fresh argument in favour of revolution and against the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

The successes of the five-year plan are mobilising the revolutionary forces of the working class of all

countries against capitalism—such is the indisputable fact.

There can be no doubt that the international revolutionary significance of the five-year plan is really immeasurable.

All the more attention, therefore, must we devote to the question of the five-year plan, of the content of the five-year plan, of the fundamental tasks of the five-year plan.

All the more carefully, therefore, must we analyse the results of the five-year plan, the results of the carrying out and fulfilment of the five-year plan.

II

THE FUNDAMENTAL TASK OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE WAY TO ITS FULFILMENT

We pass to the question of the essence of the five-year plan.

What is the five-year plan?

What was the fundamental task of the five-year plan?

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, and in part medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, modern technology.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was, in converting the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country, to

completely oust the capitalist elements, to widen the front of socialist forms of economy, and to create the economic basis for the abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R., for the building of a socialist society.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to create in our country an industry that would be capable of re-equipping and reorganising, not only industry as a whole, but also transport and agriculture—on the basis of socialism.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer small and scattered agriculture on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, so as to ensure the economic basis of socialism in the countryside and thus to eliminate the possibility of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

Finally, the task of the five-year plan was to create all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for increasing to the utmost the defence capacity of the country, enabling it to organise determined resistance to any attempt at military intervention from abroad, to any attempt at military attack from abroad.

What dictated this fundamental task of the five-year plan; what were the grounds for it?

The necessity of putting an end to the technical and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union, which doomed it to an unenviable existence; the necessity of creating in the country the prerequisites that would enable it not only to overtake but in time to outstrip, technically and economically, the advanced capitalist countries.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not maintain itself for long on the basis of a back-

ward industry; that only a modern large-scale industry, one not merely not inferior to but capable in time of surpassing the industries of the capitalist countries, can serve as a real and reliable foundation for the Soviet regime.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not for long rest upon two opposite foundations: on large-scale socialist industry, which *destroys* the capitalist elements, and on small, individual peasant farming, which *engenders* capitalist elements.

Consideration of the fact that until agriculture was placed on the basis of large-scale production, until the small peasant farms were united into large collective farms, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. was the most real of all possible dangers.

Lenin said:

“The result of the revolution has been that the *p o l i t i c a l* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries.

“But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *e c o n o m i c a l l y a s w e l l*. . . . Perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us” (see Vol. XXI, p. 191⁵⁰).

Lenin said:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the

economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. . . . Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve final victory" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47⁵¹).

These propositions formed the basis of those considerations of the Party that led to the drawing up of the five-year plan and to determining its fundamental task.

That is how matters stand with regard to the fundamental task of the five-year plan.

But the execution of such a gigantic plan cannot be started haphazardly, just anyhow. In order to carry out such a plan it is necessary first of all to find its main link; for only after finding and grasping this main link could a pull be exerted on all the other links of the plan.

What was the main link in the five-year plan?

The main link in the five-year plan was heavy industry, with machine building as its core. For only heavy industry is capable of reconstructing both industry as a whole, transport and agriculture, and of putting them on their feet. It was necessary to begin the fulfilment of the five-year plan with heavy industry. Consequently, the restoration of heavy industry had to be made the basis of the fulfilment of the five-year plan.

We have Lenin's directives on this subject also:

"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore

it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country. . . . Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide them, then we are doomed as a civilised state—let alone as a socialist state” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 349⁵²).

But the restoration and development of heavy industry, particularly in such a backward and poor country as ours was at the beginning of the five-year plan period, is an extremely difficult task; for, as is well known, heavy industry calls for enormous financial expenditure and the existence of a certain minimum of experienced technical forces, without which, generally speaking, the restoration of heavy industry is impossible. Did the Party know this, and did it take this into account? Yes, it did. Not only did the Party know this, but it announced it for all to hear. The Party knew how heavy industry had been built in Britain, Germany and America. It knew that in those countries heavy industry had been built either with the aid of big loans, or by plundering other countries, or by both methods simultaneously. The Party knew that those paths were closed to our country. What, then, did it count on? It counted on our country's own resources. It counted on the fact that, with a Soviet government at the helm, and the land, industry, transport, the banks and trade nationalised, we could pursue a regime of the strictest economy in order to accumulate sufficient resources for the restoration and development of heavy industry. The Party declared frankly that this would call for serious sacrifices, and that it was our duty openly and consciously to make these sacrifices if we wanted to achieve our goal. The Party counted on carrying through this task with the aid of

the internal resources of our country—without enslaving credits and loans from abroad.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

“We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations.

“We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. We must remove from it all traces of extravagance, of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from its bureaucratic and capitalist apparatus.

“Will not this be a reign of peasant narrow-mindedness?

“No. If we see to it that the working class retains the leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to finish the construction of Volkhovstroï, etc.

“In this, and this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have done this will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, from the horse of economy adapted to a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroï, etc.” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 417⁵³).

To change from the muzhik horse of poverty to the horse of large-scale machine industry—such was the aim of the Party in drawing up the five-year plan and striving for its fulfilment.

To establish a regime of the strictest economy and to accumulate the resources necessary for financing the industrialisation of our country—such was the path that had to be taken in order to succeed in creating heavy industry and in carrying out the five-year plan.

A bold task? A difficult path? But our Party is called a Leninist party precisely because it has no right to fear difficulties.

More than that. The Party's confidence in the feasibility of the five-year plan and its faith in the forces of the working class were so strong that the Party found it possible to undertake the fulfilment of this difficult task not in five years, as was provided for in the five-year plan, but in four years, or, strictly speaking, in four years and three months, if the special quarter be added.

That is what gave rise to the famous slogan, "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years."

And what happened?

Subsequent facts have shown that the Party was right.

The facts have shown that without this boldness and confidence in the forces of the working class, the Party could not have achieved the victory of which we are now so justly proud.

III

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRY

Let us pass now to the results of the fulfilment of the five-year plan.

What are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of *industry*?

Have we achieved victories in this sphere?

Yes, we have. And not only that, but we have accomplished more than we ourselves expected, more than

the ardent minds in our Party could have expected. That is not denied now even by our enemies, and certainly our friends cannot deny it.

We did not have an iron and steel industry, the basis for the industrialisation of the country. Now we have one.

We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.

We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a real and big industry for the production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we have one.

We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have one.

In output of electric power we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

In output of oil products and coal we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

We had only one coal and metallurgical base—in the Ukraine—and it was with difficulty that we made do with that. We have not only succeeded in improving this base, but have created a new coal and metallurgical base—in the East—which is the pride of our country.

We had only one centre of the textile industry—in the North of our country. As a result of our efforts we shall have in the very near future two new centres

of the textile industry—in Central Asia and Western Siberia.

And we have not only created these new great industries, but have created them on a scale and in dimensions that eclipse the scale and dimensions of European industry.

And as a result of all this the capitalist elements have been completely and irrevocably ousted from industry, and socialist industry has become the sole form of industry in the U.S.S.R.

And as a result of all this our country has been converted from an agrarian into an industrial country; for the proportion of industrial output, as compared with agricultural output, has risen from 48 per cent of the total in the beginning of the five-year plan period (1928) to 70 per cent at the end of the fourth year of the five-year plan period (1932).

And as a result of all this we have succeeded by the end of the fourth year of the five-year plan period in fulfilling the total programme of industrial output, which was drawn up for five years, to the extent of 93.7 per cent, thereby raising the volume of industrial output to more than *three times* the pre-war output, and to more than *double* the level of 1928. As for the programme of output for heavy industry, we have fulfilled the five-year plan by 108 per cent.

It is true that we are 6 per cent short of fulfilling the total programme of the five-year plan. But that is due to the fact that in view of the refusal of neighbouring countries to sign pacts of non-aggression with us, and of the complications that arose in the Far East,⁵⁴ we were obliged, for the purpose of strengthening our

defence, hastily to switch a number of factories to the production of modern defensive means. And owing to the necessity of going through a certain period of preparation, this switch resulted in these factories suspending production for four months, which could not but affect the fulfilment of the total programme of output for 1932, as fixed in the five-year plan. As a result of this operation we have completely filled the gaps with regard to the defence capacity of the country. But this was bound to affect adversely the fulfilment of the programme of output provided for in the five-year plan. It is beyond any doubt that, but for this incidental circumstance, we would almost certainly not only have fulfilled, but even overfulfilled the total production figures of the five-year plan.

Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern means of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from abroad.

Such, in general terms, are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about the "failure" of the five-year plan in the sphere of industry.

And what is the position in regard to growth of industrial output in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe crisis?

Here are the generally known official figures.

Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 334 per cent of the *pre-war* output, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. *dropped* during this same period to 84 per cent of the pre-war level, in Britain to 75 per cent, in Germany to 62 per cent.

Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 219 per cent of the *1928 output*, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. *dropped* during this same period to 56 per cent, in Britain to 80 per cent, in Germany to 55 per cent, in Poland to 54 per cent.

What do these figures show if not that the capitalist system of industry has failed to stand the test in competition with the Soviet system, that the Soviet system of industry has all the advantages over the capitalist system.

We are told: This is all very well; many new factories have been built, and the foundations for industrialisation have been laid; but it would have been far better to have renounced the policy of industrialisation, the policy of expanding the production of means of production, or at least to have relegated it to the background, so as to produce more cotton fabrics, shoes, clothing and other goods for mass consumption.

It is true that the output of goods for mass consumption was less than the amount required, and this creates certain difficulties. But, then, we must realise and take into account where such a policy of relegating the task of industrialisation to the background would have led us. Of course, out of the 1,500 million rubles in foreign currency that we spent during this period on equipment

for our heavy industries, we could have set aside a half for importing cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. Then we would now have more cotton fabrics, shoes and clothing. But we would not have a tractor industry or an automobile industry; we would not have any thing like a big iron and steel industry; we would not have metal for the manufacture of machinery—and we would remain unarmed while encircled by capitalist countries armed with modern technique.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of supplying agriculture with tractors and agricultural machinery—consequently, we would be without bread.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of achieving victory over the capitalist elements in our country—consequently, we would have raised immeasurably the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

We would not have all the modern means of defence without which it is impossible for a country to be politically independent, without which a country becomes a target for military attacks of foreign enemies. Our position would be more or less analogous to the present position of China, which has no heavy industry and no war industry of its own and which is being molested by anyone who cares to do so.

In short, in that case we would have military intervention; not pacts of non-aggression, but war, dangerous and fatal war, a sanguinary and unequal war; for in such a war we would be almost unarmed in the face of an enemy having all the modern means of attack at his disposal.

This is how it works out, comrades.

It is obvious that no self-respecting government and no self-respecting party could adopt such a fatal point of view.

And it is precisely because the Party rejected this anti-revolutionary line—it is precisely for that reason that it achieved a decisive victory in the fulfilment of the five-year plan in the sphere of industry.

In carrying out the five-year plan and organising victory in the sphere of industrial development the Party pursued the policy of accelerating the development of industry to the utmost. The Party, as it were, spurred the country on and hastened its progress.

Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

Yes, it was absolutely right.

It was necessary to urge forward a country which was a hundred years behindhand and which was faced with mortal danger because of its backwardness. Only in this way was it possible to enable the country quickly to re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique and to emerge on to the high road at last.

Furthermore, we could not know just when the imperialists would attack the U.S.S.R. and interrupt our work of construction; but that they might attack us at any moment, taking advantage of the technical and economic weakness of our country—of that there could be no doubt. That is why the Party was obliged to spur the country on, so as not to lose time, so as to make the utmost use of the respite and to create in the U.S.S.R. the basis of industrialisation which is the foundation of its might. The Party could not afford to wait and manoeuvre; it had to pursue the policy of accelerating development to the utmost.

Finally, the Party had to put an end, in the shortest possible space of time, to the weakness of the country in the sphere of defence. The conditions prevailing at the time, the growth of armaments in the capitalist countries, the collapse of the idea of disarmament, the hatred of the international bourgeoisie for the U.S.S.R.—all this impelled the Party to accelerate the work of strengthening the defence capacity of the country, the basis of its independence.

But did the Party have a real possibility of implementing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost? Yes, it did. It had this possibility, not only because it succeeded in good time in rousing the country to make rapid progress, but above all because in the work of extensive new construction it could rely on the old or renovated factories and plants which the workers and engineering and technical personnel had already mastered, and which, therefore, enabled us to achieve the utmost acceleration of development.

That was the basis for the rapid advance of new construction, for the enthusiasm displayed in the extensive construction work, for the rise of heroes and shock brigaders on construction jobs, for the tempestuous rates of development in our country in the period of the First Five-Year Plan.

Can it be said that exactly the same policy of accelerating development to the utmost must be pursued in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan?

No, it cannot.

Firstly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have, in the main, *already achieved* its principal object—to place industry, transport, and

agriculture on a new, modern, technical basis. Is there really any need, after this, to spur the country on and urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer necessary.

Secondly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have *already succeeded* in raising the defence capacity of the country to the proper level. Is there really any need, after this, to spur the country on and urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer necessary.

Finally, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have been able to build scores and hundreds of big new factories and works, provided with new, complex technical equipment. This means that in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the bulk of industrial output will be provided not by the old factories, whose equipment has already been mastered, as was the case during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, but by the new factories, whose equipment has not yet been mastered, but has still to be mastered. But the mastering of the new enterprises and new equipment presents much greater difficulties than the utilisation of old, or renovated factories and plants whose equipment has already been mastered. It requires more time, needed for raising the skill of the workers and engineering and technical personnel and for acquiring the new habits in order to make full use of the new equipment. Is it not clear after all this that, even if we desired to, we could not in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, particularly during the first two or three years, pursue a policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

That is why I think that in the second five-year plan period we shall have to adopt less speedy rates of

increase in industrial output. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan the average annual increase in industrial output was 22 per cent. I think that in the Second Five-Year Plan we will have to adopt a 13-14 per cent average annual increase in industrial output as a minimum. For capitalist countries such a rate of increase in industrial output is an unattainable ideal. And not only such a rate of increase in industrial output—even a 5 per cent average annual increase in industrial output is now an unattainable ideal for them. But, then, they are capitalist countries. The Soviet country, with the Soviet system of economy, is altogether different. Under our economic system we are fully able to obtain, and we must obtain, a 13-14 per cent annual increase of production as a *minimum*.

In the period of the First Five-Year Plan we succeeded in organising enthusiasm and zeal for *new construction*, and achieved decisive successes. That is very good. But now that is not enough. Now we must supplement that with enthusiasm and zeal for *mastering* the new factories and the new technical equipment, with a substantial rise in the productivity of labour, with a substantial reduction of production costs.

This is the chief thing at present.

For only on this basis shall we be able, say, in the latter half of the Second Five-Year Plan period, to make a fresh powerful spurt both in the work of construction and in increasing industrial output.

Finally, a few words about the rates of development and percentages of annual increase of output. Our executives in industry pay little attention to this question. And yet it is a very interesting one. What is the

nature of the percentage increases of output, what lies hidden behind each per cent of increase? Let us take, for example, the year 1925, the period of restoration. The annual increase in output was then 66 per cent. Gross industrial output amounted to 7,700 million rubles. The increase of 66 per cent at that time represented, in absolute figures, a little over 3,000 million rubles. Hence, each per cent of increase was then equal to 45,000,000 rubles. Now let us take the year 1928. In that year the increase was 26 per cent, i.e., about a third of that in 1925 as far as percentages are concerned. Gross industrial output in 1928 amounted to 15,500 million rubles. The total increase for the year amounted, in absolute figures, to 3,280 million rubles. Hence, each per cent of increase was then equal to 126,000,000 rubles, i.e., it was almost three times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase. Finally, let us take 1931. In that year the increase was 22 per cent, i.e., a third of that in 1925. Gross industrial output in 1931 amounted to 30,800 million rubles. The total increase, in absolute figures, amounted to a little over 5,600 million rubles. Hence, every per cent of increase represented more than 250,000,000 rubles, i.e., six times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase, and twice as much as in 1928, when we had an increase of a little over 26 per cent.

What does all this show? It shows that in studying the rate of increase of output we must not confine our examination to the total percentage of increase—we must also take into account what lies behind each per cent of increase and what is the total amount of the annual increase of output. For 1933, for example, we are provid-

ing for a 16 per cent increase, i.e., a quarter of that of 1925. But this does not mean that the actual increase of output in 1933 will also be a quarter of that of 1925. In 1925 the increase of output in absolute figures was a little over 3,000 million rubles and each per cent was equal to 45,000,000 rubles. There is no reason to doubt that a 16 per cent increase of output in 1933 will amount, in absolute figures, to not less than 5,000 million rubles, i.e., almost twice as much as in 1925, and each per cent of increase will be equal to at least 320,000,000-340,000,000 rubles, i.e., will represent at least seven times as much as each per cent of increase represented in 1925.

That is how it works out, comrades, if we examine the question of the rates and percentages of increase in concrete terms.

That is how matters stand with regard to the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

IV

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURE

Let us pass to the question of the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

The five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was a five-year plan of collectivisation. What did the Party proceed from in carrying out collectivisation?

The Party proceeded from the fact that in order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and build a socialist society it was necessary, in addition to industrialisation, to pass from small, individual peasant farming to large-scale collective agriculture equipped

with tractors and modern agricultural machinery, as the only firm basis for the Soviet regime in the countryside.

The Party proceeded from the fact that without collectivisation it would be impossible to lead our country on to the high road of building the economic foundations of socialism, impossible to free the vast masses of the labouring peasantry from poverty and ignorance.

Lenin said:

“Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 540⁵⁵).

Lenin said:

“If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin” (see Vol. XX, p. 417⁵⁶).

Lenin said:

“Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 537⁵⁷).

Lenin said:

“We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms. Otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself” (see Vol. XX, p. 418⁵⁸).

Proceeding from this, Lenin arrived at the following fundamental conclusion:

“Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds

state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 579⁵⁹).

It was from these propositions of Lenin's that the Party proceeded in carrying out the programme of collectivising agriculture, the programme of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture.

In this connection, the task of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was to unite the scattered and small, individual peasant farms, which lacked the possibility of using tractors and modern agricultural machinery, into large collective farms, equipped with all the modern implements of highly developed agriculture, and to cover unoccupied land with model state farms.

The task of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was to convert the U.S.S.R. from a small-peasant and backward country into one of large-scale agriculture organised on the basis of collective labour and providing the maximum output for the market.

What has the Party achieved in carrying out the programme of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture? Has it fulfilled this programme, or has it failed?

The Party has succeeded in the course of some three years in organising more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms devoted to grain growing and livestock raising, and at the same time it has succeeded during four years in expanding the crop area by 21,000,000 hectares.

The Party has succeeded in getting more than 60 per cent of the peasant farms to unite into collective farms,

embracing more than 70 per cent of all the land cultivated by peasants; this means that we have *fulfilled* the five-year plan *three times over*.

The Party has succeeded in making possible its procurement of 1,200 to 1,400 million poods of marketable grain annually, instead of the 500,000,000-600,000,000 poods that were procured in the period when individual peasant farming predominated.

The Party has succeeded in routing the kulaks as a class, although they have not yet been dealt the final blow; the labouring peasants have been emancipated from kulak bondage and exploitation, and the Soviet regime has been given a firm economic basis in the countryside, the basis of collective farming.

The Party has succeeded in converting the U.S.S.R. from a country of small-peasant farming into a country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world.

Such in general are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about the "collapse" of collectivisation, about the "failure" of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture.

And what is the position of agriculture in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe agricultural crisis?

Here are the generally known official data.

In the principal grain-producing countries the crop area has been reduced by 8-10 per cent. The area under cotton in the United States has been reduced by 15 per cent; the area under sugar-beet in Germany and Czechoslovakia has been reduced by 22-30 per cent; the area

under flax in Lithuania and Latvia has been reduced by 25-30 per cent.

According to the figures of the United States Department of Agriculture, the value of the gross output of agriculture in the U.S.A. *dropped* from \$11,000 million in 1929 to \$5,000 million in 1932. The value of the gross output of grain in that country *dropped* from \$1,288 million in 1929 to \$391,000,000 in 1932. The value of the cotton crop in that country *dropped* from \$1,389 million in 1929 to \$397,000,000 in 1932.

Do not all these facts testify to the superiority of the Soviet system of agriculture over the capitalist system? Do not these facts go to show that collective farms are a more efficient form of farming than individual and capitalist farms?

It is said that collective farms and state farms do not always yield a profit, that they eat up an enormous amount of funds, that there is no sense in maintaining such enterprises, that it would be more expedient to dissolve them, leaving only those that do yield a profit. But only people who understand nothing about national economy, about economics, can say such things. A few years ago more than half of our textile mills did not yield a profit. Some of our comrades suggested at the time that we should close down these mills. What would have happened had we followed their advice? We would have committed an enormous crime against the country, against the working class; for by doing that we would have ruined our rising industry. What did we do at that time? We persevered for a little more than a year, and finally succeeded in making the whole

of our textile industry yield a profit. And what about our automobile plant at Gorky? It does not yield a profit as yet either. Would you, perhaps, have us close it down? Or our iron and steel industry, which does not yield a profit as yet either? Shall we close that down, too, comrades? If one looks in that light on profitableness, then we ought to develop to the utmost only a few industries, those which are the most profitable, as, for example, confectionery, flour milling, perfumery, knitted goods, toy-making, etc. Of course, I am not opposed to developing these industries. On the contrary, they must be developed, for they, too, are needed for the population. But, in the first place, they cannot be developed without equipment and fuel, which are provided by heavy industry. In the second place, it is impossible to make them the basis of industrialisation. That is the point, comrades.

We cannot look on profitableness from the huckster's point of view, from the point of view of the immediate present. We must approach it from the point of view of the national economy as a whole, over a period of several years. Only such a point of view can be called a truly Leninist, a truly Marxist one. And this point of view is imperative not only in regard to industry, but also, and to an even greater extent, in regard to the collective farms and state farms. Just think: in a matter of three years we have created more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms, i.e., we have created entirely new large enterprises which have the same importance for agriculture as large mills and factories for industry. Name another country which has managed in the course of three years to create, not

205,000 new large enterprises, but even 25,000. You will not be able to do so; for there is no such country, and there has never been one. But we have created 205,000 new enterprises in agriculture. It appears, however, that there are people who demand that these enterprises should immediately become profitable, and if they do not become so immediately, they should be destroyed and dissolved. Is it not clear that these very strange people are envious of the laurels of Herostratus?

In saying that the collective farms and state farms do not yield a profit, I by no means want to suggest that none of them yield a profit. Nothing of the kind! Everyone knows that even now we have a number of collective farms and state farms that are highly profitable. We have thousands of collective farms and scores of state farms which are fully profitable even now. These collective farms and state farms are the pride of our Party, the pride of the Soviet regime. Of course, not all collective farms and state farms are alike. Some collective farms and state farms are old, some are new, and some are very young. These last are still weak economic organisms, which have not yet fully taken shape. They are passing through approximately the same period of organisational development that our factories and plants passed through in 1920-21. Naturally, the majority of these cannot yield a profit yet. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that they will begin to yield a profit in the course of the next two or three years, just as our factories and mills began to do so after 1921. To refuse them assistance and support on the grounds that at the present moment not all of them yield a profit would be committing a grave

crime against the working class and the peasantry. Only enemies of the people and counter-revolutionaries can raise a question of the collective farms and state farms being unnecessary.

In fulfilling the five-year plan for agriculture, the Party carried through collectivisation at an accelerated tempo. Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation? Yes, it was absolutely right, even though certain excesses were committed in the process. In pursuing the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, and in destroying the kulak nests, the Party could not stop halfway. It had to carry this work to completion.

That is the first point.

Secondly, having tractors and agricultural machinery at its disposal, on the one hand, and taking advantage of the absence of private property in land (the nationalisation of the land!), on the other, the Party had every opportunity of accelerating the collectivisation of agriculture. And, indeed, it has achieved tremendous successes in this sphere; for it has fulfilled the programme of the five-year plan of collectivisation three times over.

Does that mean that we must pursue the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan as well? No, it does not mean that. The point is that, in the main, we have *already completed* the collectivisation of the principal regions of the U.S.S.R. Hence, we have done more in this sphere than could have been expected. And we have not only, in the main, completed collectivisation. We have succeeded in getting the overwhelming major-

ity of the peasantry to regard collective farming as the most acceptable form of farming. This is a tremendous victory, comrades. Is it worth while, after this, being in a hurry to accelerate the tempo of collectivisation? Clearly, it is not.

Now it is no longer a question of accelerating the tempo of collectivisation. Still less is it a question as to whether the collective farms should exist or not—that question has already been answered in the affirmative. The collective farms have come to stay, and the road back to the old, individual farming is closed for ever. The task now is to strengthen the collective farms *organisationally*, to expel sabotaging elements from them, to recruit real, tried, Bolshevik cadres for the collective farms, and to make them really Bolshevik collective farms.

That is now the chief thing.

That is how matters stand with regard to the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

V

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS IMPROVING THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

I have spoken of our successes in industry and agriculture, of the progress of industry and agriculture in the U.S.S.R. What are the results of these successes from the standpoint of improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants? What are the main results of our successes in the sphere of industry and

agriculture as regards radical improvement of the material conditions of the working people?

Firstly, the fact that *unemployment has been abolished* and that among the workers uncertainty about the future has been done away with.

Secondly, the fact that almost all the poor peasants have been drawn into collective-farm development; that, on this basis, the differentiation of the peasantry into kulaks and poor peasants has been stopped; and that, *as a result, impoverishment and pauperism in the countryside have been done away with.*

These are tremendous achievements, comrades, achievements of which not a single bourgeois state, even the most "democratic," can dream.

In our country, in the U.S.S.R., the workers have long forgotten unemployment. Some three years ago we had about 1,500,000 unemployed. It is already two years now since unemployment was completely abolished. And in these two years the workers have already forgotten about unemployment, about its burden and its horrors. Look at the capitalist countries: what horrors result there from unemployment! There are now no less than 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 unemployed in those countries. Who are these people? Usually it is said of them that they are "down and out."

Every day they try to get work, seek work, are prepared to accept almost any conditions of work, but they are not given work, because they are "superfluous." And this is taking place at a time when vast quantities of goods and produce are being wasted to satisfy the caprices of the favourites of fortune, the scions of the capitalists and landlords.

The unemployed are refused food because they have no money with which to pay for it; they are refused shelter because they have no money with which to pay rent. How and where do they live? They live on the miserable crumbs from the rich man's table; by raking refuse bins, where they find decayed scraps of food; they live in the slums of big cities, and more often in hovels outside the towns, hastily put up by the unemployed out of packing cases and the bark of trees. But this is not all. It is not only the unemployed who suffer as a result of unemployment. The employed workers, too, suffer as a result of it. They suffer because the presence of a large number of unemployed makes their position in industry insecure, makes them uncertain about their future. Today they are employed, but they are not sure that when they wake up tomorrow they will not find themselves discharged.

One of the principal achievements of the five-year plan in four years is that we have abolished unemployment and have saved the workers of the U.S.S.R. from its horrors.

The same thing must be said of the peasants. They, too, have forgotten about the differentiation of the peasants into kulaks and poor peasants, about the exploitation of the poor peasants by the kulaks, about the ruin which every year caused hundreds of thousands and millions of poor peasants to become destitute. Three or four years ago the poor peasants constituted not less than 30 per cent of the total peasant population in our country. They numbered about 20,000,000. And still earlier, in the period before the October Revolution, the poor peasants constituted not less than 60 per

cent of the peasant population. Who were the poor peasants? They were people who usually lacked either seed, or horses, or implements, or all of these, for carrying on their husbandry. The poor peasants were people who lived in a state of semi-starvation and, as a rule, were in bondage to the kulaks—and in the old days, both to the kulaks and to the landlords. Not at all long ago more than 2,000,000 poor peasants used to go south—to the North Caucasus and the Ukraine—every year to hire themselves out to the kulaks—and still earlier, to the kulaks and landlords. Still larger numbers used to come every year to the factory gates and swell the ranks of the unemployed. And it was not only the poor peasants who found themselves in this unenviable position. A good half of the middle peasants lived in the same state of poverty and privation as the poor peasants. All that is already forgotten by the peasants.

What has the five-year plan in four years given the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants? It has undermined and smashed the kulaks as a class, liberating the poor peasants and a good half of the middle peasants from kulak bondage. It has brought them into the collective farms and placed them in a secure position. It has thus eliminated the possibility of the differentiation of the peasantry into exploiters—kulaks—and exploited—poor peasants, and abolished destitution in the countryside. It has raised the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants to a position of security in the collective farms, and has there by put a stop to the process of ruination and impoverishment of the peasantry. Now it no longer

happens in our country that millions of peasants leave their homes every year to seek work in distant areas. In order to attract a peasant to go to work outside his own collective farm it is now necessary to sign a contract with the collective farm and, in addition, to pay the collective farmer his railway fare. Now it no longer happens in our country that hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants are ruined and hang around the gates of factories and mills. That is what used to happen; but that was long ago. Now the peasant is in a position of security, a member of a collective farm which has at its disposal tractors, agricultural machinery, seed funds, reserve funds, etc., etc.

That is what the five-year plan has given to the poor peasants and to the lower strata of the middle peasants.

That is the essence of the principal achievements of the five-year plan in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants.

As a result of these principal achievements in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants, we have brought about during the period of the First Five-Year Plan:

a) a *doubling* of the number of workers and other employees in large-scale industry compared with 1928, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 57 per cent;

b) an increase in the national income—hence, an increase in the incomes of the workers and peasants—to 45,100 million rubles in 1932, which represents an increase of 85 per cent over 1928;

c) an increase in the average annual wages of workers and other employees in large-scale industry by

67 per cent compared with 1928, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 18 per cent;

d) an increase in the social insurance fund by 292 per cent compared with 1928 (4,120 million rubles in 1932, as against 1,050 million rubles in 1928), which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 111 per cent;

e) an increase in public catering facilities, now covering more than 70 per cent of the workers employed in the decisive industries, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 500 per cent.

Of course, we have not yet reached the point where we can fully satisfy the material requirements of the workers and peasants, and it is hardly likely that we shall reach it within the next few years. But we have unquestionably attained a position where the material conditions of the workers and peasants are improving from year to year. The only ones who can have any doubts on this score are the sworn enemies of the Soviet regime, or, perhaps, certain representatives of the bourgeois press, including some of the Moscow correspondents of that press, who hardly know any more about the economy of nations and the condition of the working people than, say, the Emperor of Abyssinia knows about higher mathematics.

And what is the position in regard to the material conditions of the workers and peasants in capitalist countries?

Here are the official figures.

The number of unemployed in the capitalist countries has increased catastrophically. In the United

States, according to official figures, the number of employed workers in the manufacturing industries alone dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932; and according to the figures of the American Federation of Labour, the number of unemployed in the United States, in all industries, at the end of 1932, was 11,000,000. In Britain, according to official figures, the number of unemployed increased from 1,290,000 in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932. In Germany, according to official figures, the number of unemployed increased from 1,376,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932. This is the picture that is observed in all the capitalist countries. Moreover, official statistics as a rule minimise the number of unemployed, the total number of whom in the capitalist countries ranges from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000.

The wages of the workers are being systematically reduced. According to official figures, average monthly wages in the United States have been reduced by 35 per cent compared with 1928. In Britain wages have been reduced by 15 per cent in the same period, and in Germany by as much as 50 per cent. According to the estimates of the American Federation of Labour, the American workers lost more than \$35,000 million as a result of wage cuts in 1930-31.

The workers' insurance funds in Britain and Germany, small as they were, have been considerably diminished. In the United States and in France unemployment insurance does not exist, or hardly exists at all, and, as a consequence, the number of homeless workers and waifs is growing enormously, particularly in the United States.

The position is no better as regards the condition of the masses of the peasantry in the capitalist countries, where the agricultural crisis is utterly undermining peasant farming and is forcing millions of ruined peasants and farmers to go begging.

Such are the results of the five-year plan in four years in regard to improving the material conditions of the working people of the U.S.S.R.

VI

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS TRADE TURNOVER BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Let us pass now to the question of the results of the five-year plan in four years in regard to the growth of trade turnover between town and country.

The tremendous growth of the output of industry and agriculture, the growth of the marketable surplus both in industry and in agriculture, and, finally, the growth of the requirements of the workers and peasants—all this could not but lead, and indeed has led, to a revival and expansion of trade turnover between town and country.

The bond based on production is the fundamental form of the bond between town and country. But the bond based on production is not enough by itself. It must be supplemented by the bond based on trade in order that the ties between town and country may be durable and unseverable. This can be achieved only by developing Soviet trade. It would be wrong to think that Soviet trade can be developed only along one channel, for example, the co-operative societies. In order

to develop Soviet trade all channels must be used: the network of co-operatives, the state trading network, and collective-farm trade.

Some comrades think that the development of Soviet trade, and particularly the development of collective-farm trade, is a reversion to the first stage of NEP. That is absolutely wrong.

There is a fundamental difference between Soviet trade, including collective-farm trade, and the trade carried on in the first stage of NEP.

In the first stage of NEP we permitted a revival of capitalism, permitted private trade, permitted the "activities" of private traders, capitalists, speculators.

That was more or less free trade, restricted only by the regulating role of the state. At that time the private capitalist sector had a fairly large place in the trade turnover of the country. That is apart from the fact that we did not then have the developed industry that we have now, nor did we have collective farms and state farms working according to plan and placing at the disposal of the state huge reserves of agricultural produce and urban manufactures.

Can it be said that this is the position now? Of course not.

In the first place, Soviet trade cannot be put on a par with trade in the first stage of NEP, even though the latter was regulated by the state. While trade in the first stage of NEP permitted a revival of capitalism and the functioning of the private capitalist sector in trade turnover, Soviet trade proceeds from the negation, the absence, of both the one and the other. What is Soviet trade? Soviet trade is trade without capital-

ists, big or small; it is trade without speculators, big or small. It is a special type of trade, which has never existed in history before, and which is practised only by us, the Bolsheviki, under the conditions of Soviet development.

Secondly, we now have a fairly widely developed state industry and a whole system of collective farms and state farms, which provide the state with huge reserves of agricultural and manufactured goods for the development of Soviet trade. This did not exist, and could not have existed, under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thirdly, we have succeeded in the recent period in completely expelling private traders, merchants and middlemen of all kinds from the sphere of trade. Of course, this does not mean that private traders and profiteers may not, in accordance with the law of atavism, reappear in the sphere of trade and take advantage of the most favourable field for them in this respect, namely, collective-farm trade. Moreover, collective farmers themselves are sometimes not averse to engaging in speculation, which does not do them honour, of course. But to combat these unhealthy activities we have the recently issued Soviet law on measures for the prevention of speculation and the punishment of speculators.⁶⁰ You know, of course, that this law does not err on the side of leniency. You will understand, of course, that such a law did not exist, and could not have existed, under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thus you see that anyone who in spite of these facts talks of a reversion to the trade of the first stage of

NEP, shows that he understands nothing, absolutely nothing, about our Soviet economy.

We are told that it is impossible to develop trade, even if it is Soviet trade, without a sound money system and a sound currency; that we must first of all achieve the recovery of our money system and our Soviet currency, which, it is alleged, is worthless. That is what the economists in capitalist countries tell us. I think that those worthy economists understand no more about political economy than, say, the Archbishop of Canterbury understands about anti-religious propaganda. How can it be asserted that our Soviet currency is worthless? Is it not a fact that with this currency we built Magnitostroi, Dnieprostroi, Kuznetskstroï, the Stalin-grad and Kharkov tractor works, the Gorky and Moscow automobile works, hundreds of thousands of collective farms, and thousands of state farms? Do those gentlemen think that all these enterprises have been built out of straw or clay, and not out of real materials, having a definite value? What is it that ensures the stability of Soviet currency—if we have in mind, of course, the organised market, which is of decisive importance in our trade turnover, and not the unorganised market, which is only of subordinate importance? Of course, it is not the gold reserve alone. The stability of Soviet currency is ensured, first of all, by the vast quantity of goods held by the state and put into commodity circulation at stable prices. What economist can deny that such a guarantee, which exists only in the U.S.S.R., is a more real guarantee of the stability of the currency than any gold reserve? Will the economists in capitalist countries ever understand that they are hopelessly

muddled in their theory of a gold reserve as the "sole" guarantee of the stability of the currency?

That is the position in regard to the questions concerning the growth of Soviet trade.

What have we achieved as a result of carrying out the five-year plan as regards the expansion of Soviet trade?

As a result of the five-year plan we have:

a) an increase in the output of light industry to 187 per cent of the output in 1928;

b) an increase in retail co-operative and state trade turnover, which, calculated in prices of 1932, now amounts to 39,600 million rubles, i.e., an increase in the volume of goods in retail trade to 175 per cent of the 1928 figure;

c) an increase of the state and co-operative network by 158,000 shops and stores over the 1929 figure;

d) the continually increasing development of collective farm trade and purchases of agricultural produce by various state and co-operative organisations.

Such are the facts.

An altogether different picture is presented by the condition of internal trade in the *capitalist* countries, where the crisis has resulted in a catastrophic drop in trade, in the mass closing down of enterprises and the ruin of small and medium shopkeepers, in the bankruptcy of large trading firms, and the overstocking of trading enterprises while the purchasing power of the masses of the working people continues to decline.

Such are the results of the five-year plan in four years as regards the development of trade turnover.

VII
THE RESULTS
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS
IN THE SPHERE OF THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE REMNANTS OF THE HOSTILE CLASSES

As a result of the fulfilment of the five-year plan in regard to industry, agriculture and trade, we have established the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy and have expelled the capitalist elements from them.

What should this have led to in relation to the capitalist elements; and what has it actually led to?

It has led to this: the last remnants of the moribund classes—the private manufacturers and their servitors, the private traders and their henchmen, the former nobles and priests the kulaks and kulak agents, the former Whiteguard officers and police officials, policemen and gendarmes, all sorts of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinist type, and all other anti-Soviet elements—have been thrown out of their groove.

Thrown out of their groove, and scattered over the whole face of the U.S.S.R., these “have-beens” have wormed their way into our plants and factories, into our government offices and trading organisations, into our railway and water transport enterprises, and, principally, into the collective farms and state farms. They have crept into these places and taken cover there, donning the mask of “workers” and “peasants,” and some of them have even managed to worm their way into the Party.

What did they carry with them into these places? Of course, they carried with them a feeling of hatred

towards the Soviet regime, a feeling of burning enmity towards the new forms of economy, life and culture.

These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal attack against the Soviet regime. They and their classes made such attacks several times, but they were routed and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. And they are doing as much mischief as they can, acting on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machinery. They organise sabotage. They organise wrecking activities in the collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their passion for wrecking as to inject plague and anthrax germs into the cattle on the collective farms and state farms, help to spread meningitis among horses, etc.

But that is not the main thing. The main thing in the “work” of these “have-beens” is that they organise mass theft and plundering of state property, co-operative property and collective-farm property. Theft and plundering in the factories and plants, theft and plundering of railway freight, theft and plundering in warehouses and trading enterprises—particularly theft and plundering in the state farms and collective farms—such is the main form of the “work” of these “have-beens.” Their class instinct, as it were, tells them that the basis of Soviet economy is public property, and that it is precisely this basis that must be shaken in order to injure the Soviet regime—and they try indeed to shake the foundations of public ownership, by organising mass theft and plundering.

In order to organise plundering they play on the private property habits and survivals among the collective farmers, the individual farmers of yesterday who are now members of collective farms. You, as Marxists, should know that in its development man's consciousness lags behind his actual position. The position of the members of collective farms is that they are no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but their consciousness is as yet still the old one—that of private property owners. And so, the “have-beens” from the ranks of the exploiting classes play on the private-property habits of the collective farmers in order to organise the plundering of public wealth and thus shake the foundation of the Soviet system, viz., public property.

Many of our comrades look complacently upon such phenomena and fail to understand the meaning and significance of this mass theft and plundering. They remain blind to these facts and take the view that “there is nothing particular in it.” But these comrades are profoundly mistaken. The basis of our system is public property, just as private property is the basis of capitalism. If the capitalists proclaimed private property sacred and inviolable when they were consolidating the capitalist system, all the more reason why we Communists should proclaim public property sacred and inviolable in order to consolidate the new socialist forms of economy in all spheres of production and trade. To permit theft and plundering of public property—no matter whether it is state property or co-operative or collective-farm property—and to ignore such counter-revolutionary outrages means to aid and abet

the undermining of the Soviet system, which rests on public property as its basis. It was on these grounds that our Soviet Government passed the recent law for the protection of public property.⁶¹ This enactment is the basis of revolutionary law at the present time. And it is the prime duty of every Communist, of every worker, and of every collective farmer strictly to carry out this law.

It is said that revolutionary law at the present time does not differ in any way from revolutionary law in the first period of NEP, that revolutionary law at the present time is a reversion to revolutionary law of the first period of NEP. That is absolutely wrong. The sharp edge of revolutionary law in the first period of NEP was directed mainly against the excesses of war communism, against "illegal" confiscation and imposts. It guaranteed the security of the property of the private owner, of the individual peasant and of the capitalist, provided they strictly observed the Soviet laws. The position in regard to revolutionary law at the present time is entirely different. The sharp edge of revolutionary law at the present time is directed, not against the excesses of war communism, which have long ceased to exist, but against thieves and wreckers in public economy, against rowdies and pilferers of public property. The main concern of revolutionary law at the present time is, consequently, the protection of public property, and not something else.

That is why it is one of the fundamental tasks of the Party to fight to protect public property, to fight with all the measures and all the means placed at our command by our Soviet laws.

A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat—that is what we need now in order to scatter to the winds the last remnants of the dying classes and to frustrate their thieving designs.

Some comrades have interpreted the thesis about the abolition of classes, the creation of a classless society, and the withering away of the state as a justification of laziness and complacency, a justification of the counter-revolutionary theory of the extinction of the class struggle and the weakening of the state power. Needless to say, such people can not have anything in common with our Party. They are either degenerates or double-dealers, and must be driven out of the Party. The abolition of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, but by its intensification. The state will wither away, not as a result of weakening the state power, but as a result of strengthening it to the utmost, which is necessary for finally crushing the remnants of the dying classes and for organising defence against the capitalist encirclement that is far from having been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done away with.

As a result of fulfilling the five-year plan we have succeeded in finally ejecting the last remnants of the hostile classes from their positions in production; we have routed the kulaks and have prepared the ground for their elimination. Such are the results of the five-year plan in the sphere of the struggle against the last detachments of the bourgeoisie. But that is not enough. The task is to eject these “have-beens” from our own enterprises and institutions and make them harmless for good and all.

It cannot be said that these "have-beens" can alter anything in the present position of the U.S.S.R. by their wrecking and thieving machinations. They are too weak and impotent to withstand the measures adopted by the Soviet Government. But if our comrades do not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and do not actually put an end to the smug, philistine attitude towards cases of theft and plundering of public property, these "have-beens" may do considerable mischief.

We must bear in mind that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes. It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to another, sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of the population and mobilising them against the Soviet regime. There is no mischief and slander which these "have-beens" will not resort to against the Soviet regime and around which they will not try to rally the backward elements. This may provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the defeated groups of the old counter-revolutionary parties: the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the bourgeois nationalists of the central and border regions, it may also provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the fragments of counter-revolutionary elements among the Trotskyites and Right deviators. Of course, there is nothing terrible in this. But we must bear all this in mind if we want to have done with these elements quickly and without particular sacrifice.

That is why revolutionary vigilance is the quality that Bolsheviki especially need at the present time.

VIII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Such are the main results of the implementation of the five-year plan as regards industry and agriculture, as regards improving the conditions of life of the working people and developing trade turnover, as regards consolidating the Soviet regime and developing the class struggle against the remnants and survivals of the dying classes.

Such are the successes and gains of the Soviet regime during the past four years.

It would be a mistake to think that since these successes have been attained everything is as it should be. Of course, not everything with us is yet as it should be. There are plenty of shortcomings and mistakes in our work. Inefficiency and confusion are still to be met with in our practical work. Unfortunately, I cannot now stop to deal with shortcomings and mistakes, as the limits of the report I was instructed to make do not give me sufficient scope for this. But that is not the point just now. The point is that, notwithstanding shortcomings and mistakes, the existence of which none of us denies, we have achieved such important successes as to evoke admiration among the working class all over the world, we have achieved a victory that is truly of world-wide historic significance.

What could and actually did play the chief part in bringing it about that, despite mistakes and shortcomings, the Party has nevertheless achieved decisive successes in carrying out the five-year plan in four years?

What are the main forces that have ensured us this historic victory in spite of everything?

They are, first and foremost, the activity and devotion, the enthusiasm and initiative of the vast masses of the workers and collective farmers, who, together with the engineering and technical forces, displayed colossal energy in developing socialist emulation and shock-brigade work. There can be no doubt that without this we could not have achieved our goal, we could not have advanced a single step.

Secondly, the firm leadership of the Party and of the Government, who urged the masses forward and overcame all difficulties in the way to the goal.

And, lastly, the special merits and advantages of the Soviet system of economy, which has within it the colossal potentialities necessary for overcoming difficulties.

Such are the three main forces that determined the historic victory of the U.S.S.R.

General conclusions:

1. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the assertion of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic leaders that the five-year plan was a fantasy, delirium, an unrealisable dream. The results of the five-year plan show that the five-year plan has already been fulfilled.

2. The results of the five-year plan have shattered the well-known bourgeois "article of faith" that the working class is incapable of building something new, that it is capable only of destroying the old. The results of the five-year plan have shown that the working class is just as well able to build the new as to destroy the old.

3. The results of the five-year plan have shattered the thesis of the Social-Democrats that it is impossible to build socialism in one country taken separately. The results of the five-year plan have shown that it is quite possible to build a socialist society in one country; for the economic foundations of such a society have already been laid in the U.S.S.R.

4. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the assertion of bourgeois economists that the capitalist system of economy is the best of all systems, that every other system of economy is unstable and incapable of standing the test of the difficulties of economic development. The results of the five-year plan have shown that the capitalist system of economy is bankrupt and unstable; that it has outlived its day and must give way to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of economy; that the only system of economy that has no fear of crises and is able to overcome the difficulties which capitalism cannot solve, is the Soviet system of economy.

5. Finally, the results of the five-year plan have shown that the Communist Party is invincible, *if* it knows its goal, and *if* it is not afraid of difficulties.

(Stormy and prolonged applause, increasing to an ovation. All rise to greet Comrade Stalin.)

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech Delivered on January 11, 1933

Comrades, I think that the previous speakers have correctly described the state of Party work in the countryside, its defects and its merits—particularly its defects. Nevertheless, it seems to me that they have failed to mention the most important thing about the defects of our work in the countryside; they have not disclosed the roots of these defects. And yet this aspect is of the greatest interest to us. Permit me, therefore, to express my opinion on the defects of our work in the countryside, to express it with all the straightforwardness characteristic of the Bolsheviks.

What was the main defect in our work in the countryside during the past year, 1932?

The main defect was that our grain procurements in 1932 were accompanied by greater difficulties than in the previous year, in 1931.

This was by no means due to the bad state of the harvest; for in 1932 our harvest was not worse, but better than in the preceding year. No one can deny that the total amount of grain harvested in 1932 was larger than in 1931, when the drought in five of the principal areas of the north-eastern part of the U.S.S.R. considerably reduced the country's grain output. Of course, in 1932, too, we suffered certain losses of crops, as a consequence

of unfavourable climatic conditions in the Kuban and Terek regions, and also in certain districts of the Ukraine. But there cannot be any doubt that these losses do not amount to half those we suffered in 1931 as a result of the drought in the north-eastern areas of the U.S.S.R. Hence, in 1932 we had more grain in the country than in 1931. And yet, despite this circumstance, our grain procurements were accompanied by greater difficulties in 1932 than in the previous year.

What was the matter? What are the reasons for this defect in our work? How is this disparity to be explained?

1) It is to be explained, in the first place, by the fact that our comrades in the localities, our Party workers in the countryside, failed to take into account the new situation created in the countryside by the authorisation of collective-farm trade in grain. And precisely because they failed to take the new situation into consideration, precisely for that reason, they were unable to reorganise their work along new lines to fit in with the new situation. So long as there was no collective-farm trade in grain, so long as there were not two prices for grain—the state price and the market price—the situation in the countryside took one form. When collective-farm trade in grain was authorised, the situation was bound to change sharply, because the authorisation of collective-farm trade implies the legalisation of a market price for grain higher than the established state price. There is no need to prove that this circumstance was bound to give rise among the peasants to a certain reluctance to deliver their grain to the state. The peasant calculated as follows: “Collective-farm

trade in grain has been authorised; market prices have been legalised; in the market I can obtain more for a given quantity of grain than if I deliver it to the state—hence, if I am not a fool, I must hold on to my grain, deliver less to the state, leave more grain for collective-farm trade, and in this way get more for the same quantity of grain sold.”

It is the simplest and most natural logic!

But the unfortunate thing is that our Party workers in the countryside, at all events many of them, failed to understand this simple and natural thing. In order to prevent disruption of the Soviet Government's assignments, the Communists in this new situation should have done everything to increase and speed up grain procurements from the very first days of the harvest, as early as July 1932. That was what the situation demanded. But what did they actually do? Instead of speeding up grain procurements, they began to speed up the formation of all sorts of funds in the collective farms, thus encouraging the grain producers in their reluctance to fulfil their obligations to the state. Failing to understand the new situation, they began to fear, not that the reluctance of the peasants to deliver grain might impede grain procurements, but that it would not occur to the peasants to withhold some of the grain in order, later on, to place it on the market by way of collective farm trade, and that perchance they would go ahead and deliver all their grain to the elevators.

In other words, our Communists in the countryside, the majority of them at all events, grasped only the *positive* aspect of collective-farm trade; they under-

stood and assimilated its *positive* aspect, but absolutely failed to understand and assimilate the *negative* aspects of collective-farm trade—they failed to understand that the negative aspects of collective farm trade could cause great harm to the state if they, i.e., the Communists, did not begin to speed up the grain procurement campaign to the utmost from the very first days of the harvest.

And this mistake was committed not only by Party workers in the collective farms. It was committed also by directors of state farms, who criminally held up grain that ought to have been delivered to the state and began to sell it on the side at a higher price.

Did the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee take into consideration the new situation that had arisen as a result of collective-farm trade in grain when they issued their decision on the development of collective-farm trade?⁶² Yes, they did take it into consideration. In that decision it is plainly stated that collective-farm trade in grain may begin only after the plan for grain procurements has been wholly and entirely fulfilled, and after the seed has been stored. It is plainly stated in the decision that only after grain procurements have been completed and the seed stored—approximately by January 15, 1933—that only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trade in grain begin. By this decision the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee said, as it were, to our officials in the countryside: Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain-procurement

campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and speed it up; for the first commandment is—fulfil the plan for grain procurements; the second commandment is—get the seed stored; and only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trade in grain be begun and developed.

Perhaps the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars made a mistake in not emphasising this aspect of the matter strongly enough and in not warning our officials in the countryside loudly enough about the dangers latent in collective-farm trade. But there can be no doubt whatever that they did warn against these dangers, and uttered the warning sufficiently clearly. It must be admitted that the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars somewhat overestimated the Leninist training and insight of our officials in the localities, not only officials in the districts, but also in a number of regions.

Perhaps collective-farm trade in grain should not have been authorised? Perhaps it was a mistake, particularly if we bear in mind that collective-farm trade has not only positive aspects, but also certain negative aspects?

No, it was not a mistake. No revolutionary measure can be guaranteed against having certain negative aspects if it is incorrectly carried out. The same must be said of collective farm trade in grain. Collective-farm trade is necessary and advantageous both to the countryside and to the town, both to the working class and to the peasantry. And precisely because it is advantageous it had to be introduced.

What considerations were the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee guided by when they introduced collective-farm trade in grain?

First of all, by the consideration that this would widen the basis of trade turnover between town and country, and thus improve the supply of agricultural produce to the workers and of urban manufactures to the peasants. There can be no doubt that state and co-operative trade alone are not sufficient. These channels of trade turnover had to be supplemented by a new channel—collective-farm trade. And we have supplemented them by introducing collective-farm trade.

Further, they were guided by the consideration that collective-farm trade in grain would give the collective farmers an additional source of income and strengthen their economic position.

Finally, they were guided by the consideration that the introduction of collective-farm trade would give the peasants a fresh stimulus for improving the work of the collective farms as regards both sowing and harvesting.

As you know, all these considerations of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee have been fully confirmed by the recent facts about the life of the collective farms. The accelerated process of consolidation of the collective farms, the cessation of withdrawals from the collective farms, the growing eagerness of individual peasants to join the collective farms, the tendency of the collective farmers to show greater discrimination in accepting new members—all this and much of a like character shows beyond a doubt that collective-farm trade not only has not weakened, but,

on the contrary, has strengthened and consolidated the position of the collective farms.

Hence, the defects in our work in the countryside are not to be explained by collective-farm trade, but by the fact that it is not always properly conducted, by inability to take the new situation into account, by inability to reorganise our ranks to cope with the new situation created by the authorisation of collective-farm trade in grain.

2) The second reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is that our comrades in the localities—and not only those comrades—have failed to understand the change that has taken place in the conditions of our work in the countryside as a result of the predominant position acquired by the collective farms in the principal grain-growing areas. We all rejoice at the fact that the collective form of farming has become the predominant form in our grain areas. But not all of us realise that this circumstance does not diminish but increases our cares and responsibilities in regard to the development of agriculture. Many think that once we have achieved, say, 70 or 80 per cent collectivisation in a given district, or in a given region, we have got all we need, and can now let things take their natural course, let them proceed automatically, on the assumption that collectivisation will do its work itself and will itself raise agriculture to a higher level. But this is a profound delusion, comrades. As a matter of fact, the transition to collective farming as the predominant form of farming does not diminish but increases our cares in regard to agriculture, does not diminish but increases the leading role of the Communists in raising

agriculture to a higher level. Letting things take their own course is now more dangerous than ever for the development of agriculture. Letting things take their own course may now ruin everything.

As long as the individual peasant predominated in the countryside the Party could confine its intervention in the development of agriculture to certain acts of assistance, advice or warning. At that time the individual peasant had to take care of his farm himself; for he had no one upon whom to throw the responsibility for his farm, which was merely his own personal farm, and he had no one to rely upon except himself. At that time the individual peasant himself had to take care of the sowing and harvesting, and all the processes of agricultural labour in general, if he did not want to be left without bread and fall a victim to starvation. With the transition to collective farming the situation has changed materially. The collective farm is not the enterprise of any one individual. In fact, the collective farmers now say: "The collective farm is mine and not mine; it belongs to me, but it also belongs to Ivan, Philip, Mikhail and the other members of the collective farm; the collective farm is common property." Now, he, the collective farmer—the individual peasant of yesterday, who is the collectivist of today—can shift the responsibility to and rely upon other members of the collective farm, knowing that the collective farm will not leave him without bread. That is why the collective farmer now has fewer cares than when he was on his individual farm; for the cares and responsibility for the enterprise are now shared by all the collective farmers.

What, then, follows from this? It follows from this that the prime responsibility for conducting the farm has now been transferred from the individual peasants to the leadership of the collective farm, to the leading group of the collective farm. Now it is not to themselves that the peasants put the demand for care for the farm and its rational management, but to the leadership of the collective farm; or, more correctly, not so much to themselves as to the leadership of the collective farm. And what does this mean? It means that the Party can no longer confine itself to individual acts of intervention in the process of agricultural development. It must now take over the direction of the collective farms, assume responsibility for the work, and help the collective farmers to develop their farms on the basis of science and technology.

But that is not all. A collective farm is a large enterprise. And a large enterprise cannot be managed without a plan. A large agricultural enterprise embracing hundreds and sometimes thousands of households can be run only on the basis of planned management. Without that it is bound to go to rack and ruin. There you have yet another new condition arising from the collective-farm system and radically different from the conditions under which individual small farms are run. Can we leave the conduct of such an enterprise to the so-called natural course of things, to allow it to proceed automatically? Clearly, we cannot. To conduct such an enterprise, the collective farm must have a certain minimum number of people with at least some education, people who are capable of planning the business and running it in an organised manner. Naturally, without system-

atic intervention on the part of the Soviet Government in the work of collective-farm development, without its systematic aid, such an enterprise cannot be put into proper shape.

And what follows from this? It follows from this that the collective-farm system does not diminish but increases the cares and responsibility of the Party and of the Government in regard to the development of agriculture. It follows from this that if the Party desires to direct the collective-farm movement, it must enter into all the details of collective-farm life and collective-farm management. It follows from this that the Party must not diminish but multiply its contacts with the collective farms; that it must know all that is going on in the collective farms, in order to render them timely aid and to avert the dangers that threaten them.

But what do we see in actual practice? In actual practice we see that quite a number of district and regional Party organisations are divorced from the life of the collective farms and from their requirements. People sit in offices, where they complacently indulge in pen-pushing, and fail to see that the development of the collective farms is going on independently of bureaucratic offices. In some cases this divorce from the collective-farms has gone so far that certain members of territorial Party organisations have learned of what was going on in the collective farms in their regions, not from the respective district organisations, but from members of the Central Committee in Moscow. That is sad but true, comrades. The transition from individual farming to collective farming should have led to stronger Communist leadership in the country-

side. In fact, however, it has led in a number of cases to Communists resting on their laurels, to their boasting of high percentages of collectivisation, while leaving things to proceed automatically, letting them take their natural course. The problem of planned leadership of collective farms should have led to an intensification of Communist leadership in the collective farms. In fact, however, what has happened in a number of cases is that the Communists have been quite out of it, and the collective farms have been run by former White officers, former Petlyura-ists, and enemies of the workers and peasants generally.

That is the position in regard to the second reason for the defects in our work in the countryside.

3) The third reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is that many of our comrades overestimated the collective farms as a new form of economy, overestimated them and converted them into an icon. They decided that since we have collective farms, which represent a socialist form of economy, we have everything; that this is sufficient to ensure the proper management of these farms, the proper planning of collective farming, and the conversion of the collective farms into exemplary socialist enterprises. They failed to understand that in their organisational structure the collective farms are still weak and need considerable assistance from the Party both in the way of providing them with tried Bolshevik cadres, and in the way of guidance in their day-to-day affairs. But that is not all, and not even the main thing. The main defect is that many of our comrades overestimated the strength and possibilities of the collective farms as a new form of organi-

sation of agriculture. They failed to understand that, in spite of being a socialist form of economy, the collective farms by themselves are yet far from being guaranteed against all sorts of dangers and against the penetration of all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements into their leadership; that they are not guaranteed against the possibility that under certain circumstances anti-Soviet elements may use the collective farms for their own ends.

The collective farm is a socialist form of *economic* organisation, just as the Soviets are a socialist form of *political* organisation. Both collective farms and Soviets are a tremendous achievement of our revolution, a tremendous achievement of the working class. But collective farms and Soviets are only a *form* of organisation—a socialist form, it is true, but only a *form* of organisation for all that. Everything depends upon the *content* that is put into this form.

We know of cases when Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for a certain time supported the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in July 1917, for example, when the Soviets were led by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and when the Soviets shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in Germany at the end of 1918, when the Soviets were led by the Social-Democrats, and when they shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. Hence, it is not only a matter of Soviets as a form of organisation, even though that form is a great revolutionary achievement in itself. It is primarily a matter of the content of the work of the Soviets; it

is a matter of the character of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of *who* leads the Soviets—revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. That, indeed, explains the fact that counter-revolutionaries are not always opposed to Soviets. It is well known, for example, that during the Kronstadt mutiny⁶³ Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, came out in favour of Soviets, but without Communists. “Soviets without Communists”—that was the slogan Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, advanced at that time. The counter-revolutionaries understood that it is not merely a matter of the Soviets as such, but, primarily, a matter of who is to lead them.

The same must be said of the collective farms. Collective farms, as a socialist form of economic organisation, may perform miracles of economic construction if they are headed by real revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, Communists. On the other hand, collective farms may for a certain period become a shield for all sorts of counter-revolutionary acts if these collective farms are run by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, Petlyura officers and other Whiteguards, former Denikinists and Kolchakites. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the collective farms, as a form of organisation, not only are not guaranteed against the penetration of anti-Soviet elements, but, at first, even provide certain facilities which enable counter-revolutionaries to take advantage of them temporarily. As long as the peasants were engaged in individual farming they were scattered and separated from one another, and therefore the counter-revolutionary tendencies of anti-Soviet elements among the peasantry could not be very effective. The

situation is altogether different once the peasants have adopted collective farming. In the collective farms the peasants have a ready-made form of mass organisation. Therefore, the penetration of anti-Soviet elements into the collective farms and their anti-Soviet activities may be much more effective. We must assume that the anti-Soviet elements take all this into account. We know that a section of the counter-revolutionaries, for example, in the North Caucasus, themselves strive to create something in the nature of collective farms, using them as a legal cover for their underground organisations. We know also that the anti-Soviet elements in a number of districts, where they have not yet been exposed and crushed, readily join the collective farms, and even praise them to the skies, in order to create within them nests of counter-revolutionary activity. We know also that a section of the anti-Soviet elements are themselves now coming out in favour of collective farms, but on condition that there are no Communists in the collective farms. "Collective farms without Communists"—that is the slogan that is now being put forward among anti-Soviet elements. Hence, it is not only a matter of the collective farms themselves as a socialist form of organisation; it is primarily a matter of the content that is put into this form; it is primarily a matter of *who* stands at the head of the collective farms and *who* leads them.

From the point of view of Leninism, collective farms, like the Soviets, taken as a form of organisation, are a weapon, and only a weapon. Under certain conditions this weapon can be turned against the revolution. It can be turned against counter-revolution. It can serve

the working class and peasantry. Under certain conditions it can serve the enemies of the working class and peasantry. It all depends upon who wields this weapon and against whom it is directed.

The enemies of the workers and peasants, guided by their class instinct, are beginning to understand this.

Unfortunately, some of our Communists still fail to understand it.

And it is precisely because some of our Communists have not understood this simple thing that we now have a situation where a number of collective farms are managed by well-camouflaged anti-Soviet elements, who organise wrecking and sabotage in them.

4) The fourth reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is the inability of a number of our comrades in the localities to reorganise the front of the struggle against the kulaks; their failure to understand that the face of the class enemy has changed of late, that the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside have changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly if we are to achieve success. The enemy understands the changed situation, understands the strength and the might of the new system in the countryside; and because he understands this, he has reorganised his ranks, has changed his tactics—has passed from frontal attacks against the collective farms to activities conducted on the sly. But we have failed to understand this; we have overlooked the new situation and continue to seek the class enemy where he is no longer to be found; we continue to apply the old tactics of a simplified struggle against the kulaks at a time when these tactics have long since become obsolete.

People look for the class enemy outside the collective farms; they look for persons with ferocious visages, with enormous teeth and thick necks, and with sawn-off shotguns in their hands. They look for kulaks like those depicted on our posters. But such kulaks have long ceased to exist on the surface. The present-day kulaks and kulak agents, the present-day anti-Soviet elements in the countryside are in the main "quiet," "smooth-spoken," almost "saintly" people. There is no need to look for them far from the collective farms; they are inside the collective farms, occupying posts as storekeepers, managers, accountants, secretaries, etc. They will never say, "Down with the collective farms!" They are "in favour" of collective farms. But inside the collective farms they carry on sabotage and wrecking work that certainly does the collective farms no good. They will never say, "Down with grain procurements!" They are "in favour" of grain procurements. They "only" resort to demagoguery and demand that the collective farm should reserve a fund for the needs of livestock-raising three times as large as that actually required; that the collective farm should set aside an insurance fund three times as large as that actually required; that the collective farm should provide from six to ten pounds of bread per working member per day for public catering, etc. Of course, after such "funds" have been formed and such grants for public catering made, after such rascally demagoguery, the economic strength of the collective farms is bound to be undermined, and there is little left for grain procurements.

In order to see through such a cunning enemy and not to succumb to demagoguery, one must possess revolu-

tionary vigilance; one must possess the ability to tear the mask from the face of the enemy and reveal to the collective farmers his real counter-revolutionary features. But have we many Communists in the countryside who possess these qualities? Not infrequently Communists not only fail to expose these class enemies, but, on the contrary, they themselves yield to their rascally demagoguery and follow in their wake.

Failing to notice the class enemy in his new mask, and being unable to expose his rascally machinations, certain of our comrades not infrequently soothe themselves with the idea that the kulaks no longer exist; that the anti-Soviet elements in the countryside have already been destroyed as a result of the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class; and that in view of this we can now reconcile ourselves to the existence of "neutral" collective farms, which are neither Bolshevik nor anti-Soviet but which are bound to come over to the side of the Soviet Government spontaneously, as it were. But that is a profound delusion, comrades. The kulaks have been defeated, but they are far from having been crushed yet. More than that, they will not be crushed very soon if the Communists go round gaping in smug contentment, in the belief that the kulaks will themselves walk into their graves, in the process of their spontaneous development, so to speak. As for "neutral" collective farms, there is not, and there cannot be, any such thing. "Neutral" collective farms are a fantasy conjured up by people who have eyes but do not see. Where there is such an acute class struggle as is now going on in our Soviet country there is no room for "neutral" collective farms; under such circum-

stances, collective farms can be *either* Bolshevik *or* anti-Soviet. And if certain collective farms are not being led by us, that means that they are being led by anti-Soviet elements. There can be no doubt about that.

5) Finally, there is one other reason for the defects in our work in the countryside. This consists in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the work of collective-farm development, in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the matter of grain procurements. In speaking of the difficulties of grain procurement, Communists usually throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants are not to blame at all. If we are to speak of responsibility and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly upon the Communists, and we Communists alone are to blame for all this.

There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative government as our Soviet Government. There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that is required by the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism requires; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable mistakes with regard to grain procurements, say—then we, and we alone, are to blame.

We are to blame for not having perceived the negative aspects of collective-farm trade in grain, and for having committed a number of gross mistakes.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our Party organisations have become divorced from the collective farms, have been resting on their laurels and allowing things to take their own course.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our comrades still overestimate the collective farms as a form of mass organisation, and fail to understand that it is not so much a matter of the form as of taking the leadership of the collective farms into our own hands and expelling the anti-Soviet elements from the leadership of the collective farms.

We are to blame for not having perceived the new situation and for not having appreciated the new tactics of the class enemy, who is carrying on his activities on the sly.

One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it?

I know of whole groups of collective farms which are developing and flourishing, which punctually carry out the assignments of the state and are becoming economically stronger day by day. On the other hand, I know also of collective farms, situated in the neighbourhood of the first-mentioned, which, in spite of having the same harvest yields and objective conditions as these, are nevertheless wilting and in a state of decay. What is the reason for this? The reason is that the first group of collective farms are led by real Communists, while the second group are led by drifters—with Party membership cards in their pockets, it is true, but drifters all the same.

One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it?

The result of underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists is that, not infrequently, the reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is not sought where it should be sought, and because of this the defects remain unremoved.

The reason for the difficulties of grain procurement must be sought not among the peasants, but among ourselves, in our own ranks. For *we* are at the helm; *we* have the resources of the state at our disposal; it is *our* mission to lead the collective farms; and *we* must bear the whole responsibility for the work in the countryside.

These are the main reasons for the defects of our work in the countryside.

It may be thought that I have drawn too gloomy a picture; that all our work in the countryside consists exclusively of defects. That, of course, is not true. As a matter of fact, alongside these defects, our work in the countryside shows a number of important and decisive achievements. But, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I did not set out to describe our achievements; I set out to speak only about the defects of our work in the countryside.

Can these defects be remedied? Yes, unquestionably, they can. Shall we remedy them in the near future? Yes, unquestionably, we shall. There cannot be the slightest doubt about that.

I think that the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the state farms represent one of the decisive means by which these defects can be removed in the shortest time. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

TO *RABOTNITSA*⁶⁴

Ardent greetings to *Rabotnitsa* on the tenth anniversary of its existence. I wish it every success in training the masses of proletarian women in the spirit of the struggle for the complete triumph of socialism, in the spirit of carrying out the great behests of our teacher Lenin.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 25,
January 26, 1933

LETTER TO COMRADE I. N. BAZHANOV

Dear Comrade I. N. Bazhanov,

I have received your letter ceding me your second Order as a reward for my work.

I thank you very much for your warm words and comradesly present. I know what you are depriving yourself of in my favour and appreciate your sentiments.

Nevertheless, I cannot accept your second Order. I cannot and must not accept it, not only because it can belong only to you, as you alone have earned it, but also because I have been amply rewarded as it is by the attention and respect of the comrades and, consequently, have no right to rob you.

Orders were instituted not for those who are well known as it is, but mainly for heroic people who are little known and who need to be made known to all.

Besides, I must tell you that I already have two Orders. That is more than one needs, I assure you.

I apologise for the delay in replying.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

P.S. I am returning the Order to where it belongs.

J. Stalin

February 16, 1933

Published for the first time

**SPEECH DELIVERED
AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONGRESS
OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK BRIGADERS⁶⁵**

February 19, 1933

Comrade collective farmers, men and women! I did not intend to speak at your congress. I did not intend to because the previous speakers have said all that had to be said—and have said it well and to the point. Is it worth while to speak after that? But as you insist, and the power is in your hands (*prolonged applause*), I must submit.

I shall say a few words on various questions.

I

**THE COLLECTIVE-FARM PATH
IS THE ONLY RIGHT PATH**

First question. Is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right path, is the path of collective farming the right one?

That is not an idle question. You shock brigaders of the collective farms evidently have no doubt that the collective farms are on the right path. Possibly, for that reason, the question will seem superfluous to you. But not all peasants think as you do. There are still not a few among the peasants, even among the collec-

tive farmers, who have doubts as to whether the collective-farm path is the right one. And there is nothing surprising about it.

Indeed, for hundreds of years people have lived in the old way, have followed the old path, have bent their backs to the kulaks and landlords, to the usurers and speculators. It cannot be said that that old, capitalist path was approved by the peasants. But that old path was a beaten path, the customary path, and no one had actually proved that it was possible to live in a different way, in a better way. The more so as in all bourgeois countries people are still living in the old way. . . . And suddenly the Bolsheviks break in on this old stagnant life, break in like a storm and say: It is time to abandon the old path, it is time to begin living in a new way, in the collective-farm way; it is time to begin living not as everyone lives in bourgeois countries, but in a new way, co-operatively. But what is this new life—who can tell? May it not turn out to be worse than the old life? At all events, the new path is not the customary path, it is not a beaten path, not yet a fully explored path. Would it not be better to keep to the old path? Would it not be better to wait a little before embarking on the new, collective-farm path? Is it worth while to take the risk?

These are the doubts that are now troubling one section of the labouring peasantry.

Ought we not to dispel these doubts? Ought we not to bring these doubts out into the light of day and show what they are worth? Clearly, we ought to.

Hence, the question I have just put cannot be described as an idle one.

And so, is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right one?

Some comrades think that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started in our country three years ago. This is only partly true. Of course, the development of collective farms on a mass scale started in our country three years ago. The transition, as we know, was marked by the routing of the kulaks and by a movement among the vast masses of the poor and middle peasantry to join the collective farms. All that is true. But in order to start this mass transition to the collective farms, certain preliminary conditions had to be available, without which, generally speaking, the mass collective-farm movement would have been inconceivable.

First of all, we had to have the Soviet power, which has helped and continues to help the peasantry to take the collective-farm path:

Secondly, it was necessary to drive out the landlords and the capitalists, to take the factories and the land away from them and declare these the property of the people.

Thirdly, it was necessary to curb the kulaks and to take machines and tractors away from them.

Fourthly, it was necessary to declare that the machines and tractors could be used only by the poor and middle peasants united in collective farms.

Finally, it was necessary to industrialise the country, to set up a new tractor industry, to build new factories for the manufacture of agricultural machinery, in order to supply tractors and machines in abundance to the collective-farm peasantry.

Without these preliminary conditions there could have been no question of the mass transition to the collective-farm path that started three years ago.

Hence, in order to adopt the collective-farm path it was necessary first of all to accomplish the October Revolution, to overthrow the capitalists and landlords, to take the land and factories away from them and to set up a new industry.

It was with the October Revolution that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started. This transition developed with fresh force only three years ago because it was not until then that the economic results of the October Revolution made themselves fully felt, it was not until then that success was achieved in pushing forward the industrialisation of the country.

The history of nations knows not a few revolutions. But those revolutions differ from the October Revolution in that all of them were one-sided revolutions. One form of exploitation of the working people was replaced by another form of exploitation, but exploitation itself remained. One set of exploiters and oppressors was replaced by another set of exploiters and oppressors, but exploiters and oppressors, as such, remained. Only the October Revolution set itself the aim of abolishing *all* exploitation and of eliminating *all* exploiters and oppressors.

The revolution of the slaves eliminated the slave-owners and abolished the form of exploitation of the toilers as slaves. But in their place it set up the serf owners and the form of exploitation of the toilers as serfs. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the slave system the "law" permitted the

slave-owner to kill his slaves. Under serfdom the "law" permitted the serf owner "only" to sell his serfs.

The revolution of the peasant-serfs eliminated the serf owners and abolished the serf form of exploitation. But in their place it set up the capitalists and landlords, the capitalist and landlord form of exploitation of the toilers. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the serf system the "law" permitted the sale of serfs. Under the capitalist system the "law" permits "only" of the toilers being doomed to unemployment and destitution, to ruin and death from starvation.

It was only our Soviet revolution, only our October Revolution that dealt with the question, not of substituting one set of exploiters for another, not of substituting one form of exploitation for another, but of eradicating all exploitation, of eradicating all exploiters, all the rich and oppressors, old and new. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why the October Revolution was a preliminary condition and a necessary prerequisite for the peasants' transition to the new, collective-farm path.

Did the peasants act rightly in supporting the October Revolution? Yes, they did. They acted rightly, because the October Revolution helped them to shake off the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, the usurers and kulaks, the merchants and speculators.

But that is only one side of the question. It is all very well to drive out the oppressors, to drive out the landlords and capitalists, to curb the kulaks and speculators. But that is not enough. In order to become entirely free from the old fetters it is not enough merely to rout the exploiters; it is necessary also to build a

new life—to build a life that will enable the labouring peasants to improve their material conditions and culture and make continuous progress from day to day and year to year. In order to achieve this, a new system must be set up in the countryside, the collective-farm system. That is the other side of the question.

What is the difference between the old system and the new, collective-farm system?

Under the old system the peasants worked singly, following the ancient methods of their forefathers and using antiquated implements of labour; they worked for the landlords and capitalists, the kulaks and speculators; they worked and lived half-starved while they enriched others. Under the new, collective-farm system the peasants work in common, cooperatively, with the help of modern implements—tractors and agricultural machinery; they work for themselves and their collective farms; they live without capitalists and landlords, without kulaks and speculators; they work with the object of raising their standard of welfare and culture from day to day. Over there, under the old system, the government is a bourgeois government, and it supports the rich against the labouring peasantry. Here, under the new, collective-farm system, the government is a workers' and peasants' government, and it supports the workers and peasants against all the rich of whatever kind. The old system leads to capitalism. The new system leads to socialism.

There you have the two paths, the capitalist path and the socialist path: the path forward—to socialism, and the path backward—to capitalism.

There are people who think that some sort of third path could be followed. This unknown third path is most

eagerly clutched at by some wavering comrades who are not yet convinced that the collective-farm path is the right one. They want us to return to the old system, to return to individual farming, but without capitalists and landlords. Moreover, they “only” want us to permit the existence of the kulaks and other small capitalists as a legitimate phenomenon of our economic system. Actually, this is not a third path, but the second path—the path to capitalism. For what does it mean to return to individual farming and to restore the kulaks? It means restoring kulak bondage, restoring the exploitation of the peasantry by the kulaks and giving the kulaks power. But is it possible to restore the kulaks and at the same time to preserve the Soviet power? No, it is not possible. The restoration of the kulaks is bound to lead to the creation of a kulak power and to the liquidation of the Soviet power—hence, it is bound to lead to the formation of a bourgeois government. And the formation of a bourgeois government is bound to lead in its turn to the restoration of the landlords and capitalists, to the restoration of capitalism. The so-called third path is actually the second path, the path leading back to capitalism. Ask the peasants whether they want to restore kulak bondage, to return to capitalism, to destroy the Soviet power and restore power to the landlords and capitalists. Just ask them, and you will find out which path the majority of the labouring peasants regard as the only right path.

Hence, there are only two paths: *either* forward and uphill—to the new, collective-farm system; *or* backward and down hill—to the old kulak-capitalist system.

There is no third path.

The labouring peasants did right to reject the capitalist path and take the path of collective-farm development.

It is said that the collective-farm path is the right path, but a difficult one. That is only partly true. Of course, there are difficulties on this path. A good life cannot be obtained without effort. But the point is that the main difficulties are over, and those difficulties which now confront you are not worth talking about seriously. At all events, compared with the difficulties which the workers experienced 10-15 years ago, your present difficulties, comrade collective farmers, seem mere child's play. Your speakers here have praised the workers of Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, and the Donbas. They said that these workers have achievements to their credit and that you, collective farmers, have far fewer achievements. It seems to me that even a certain comradely envy was apparent in the remarks of your speakers, as if to say: How good it would be if we collective-farm peasants had the same achievements as you workers of Leningrad, Moscow, the Donbas, and Kharkov. . . .

That is all very well. But do you know what these achievements cost the workers of Leningrad and Moscow; what privations they had to endure in order finally to attain these achievements? I could relate to you some facts from the life of the workers in 1918, when for whole weeks not a piece of bread, let alone meat or other food, was distributed to the workers. The best times were considered to be the days on which we were able to distribute to the workers in Leningrad and Moscow one-eighth

of a pound of black bread each, and even that was half bran. And that lasted not merely a month or six months, but for two whole years. But the workers bore it and did not lose heart; for they knew that better times would come and that they would achieve decisive successes. Well—you see that the workers were not mistaken. Just compare your difficulties and privations with the difficulties and privations which the workers have endured, and you will see that they are not even worth talking about seriously.

What is needed to push forward the collective-farm movement and extend collective-farm development to the utmost?

What is needed, in the first place, is that the collective farms should have land fully secured to them and suitable for cultivation. Do you have that? Yes, you do. It is well known that the best lands have been transferred to the collective farms and have been durably secured to them. Hence, the collective farmers can cultivate and improve their land as they please without any fear that it will be taken from them and given to somebody else.

What is needed, secondly, is that the collective farmers should have at their disposal tractors and machines. Do you have them? Yes, you do. Everyone knows that our tractor works and agricultural machinery works produce primarily and mainly for the collective farms, supplying them with all modern implements.

What is needed, finally, is that the government should support the collective-farm peasants to the utmost both with men and money, and that it should prevent the last remnants of the hostile classes from disrupt-

ing the collective farms. Have you such a government? Yes, you have. It is called the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government. Name another country where the government supports, not the capitalists and landlords, not the kulaks and other rich, but the labouring peasants. There is not, nor has there ever been, another country like this in the world. Only here, in the Land of Soviets, does a government exist which stands solidly for the workers and collective-farm peasants, for all the working people of town and country, against all the rich and the exploiters. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Hence, you have all that is needed to extend collective-farm development and to free yourself entirely from the old fetters.

Of you only one thing is demanded—and that is to work conscientiously; to distribute collective-farm incomes according to the amount of work done; to take care of collective farm property, to take care of the tractors and machines; to see to it that the horses are well looked after; to fulfil the assignments of your workers' and peasants' state; to consolidate the collective farms and to expel from the collective farms the kulaks and kulak agents who have wormed their way into them.

You will surely agree with me that to overcome these difficulties, i.e., to work conscientiously and to take good care of collective-farm property, is not so very difficult. The more so that you are now working, not for the rich and not for exploiters, but for yourselves, for your own collective farms.

As you see, the collective-farm path, the path of socialism, is the only right path for the labouring peasants.

II

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK—TO MAKE ALL THE COLLECTIVE FARMERS PROSPEROUS

Second question. What have we achieved on the new path, on our collective-farm path, and what do we expect to achieve within the next two or three years?

Socialism is a good thing. A happy, socialist life is unquestionably a good thing. But all that is a matter of the future. The main question now is not what we shall achieve in the future. The main question is: What have we already achieved at present? The peasantry has taken the collective-farm path. That is very good. But what has it achieved on this path? What tangible results have we achieved by following the collective-farm path?

One of our achievements is that we have helped the vast masses of the poor peasants to join the collective farms. One of our achievements is that by joining the collective farms, where they have at their disposal the best land and the finest instruments of production, the vast masses of the poor peasants have risen to the level of middle peasants. One of our achievements is that the vast masses of the poor peasants, who formerly lived in semi-starvation, have now, in the collective farms, become middle peasants, have attained material security. One of our achievements is that we have put a stop to the differentiation of the peasants into poor peasants and kulaks; that we have routed the kulaks and have helped the poor peasants to become masters of their own labour in the collective farms, to become middle peasants.

What was the situation before the expansion of collective-farm development about four years ago? The

kulaks were growing rich and were on the upgrade. The poor peasants were becoming poorer, were sinking into ruin and falling into bondage to the kulaks. The middle peasants were trying to climb up to the kulaks, but they were continually tumbling down and swelling the ranks of the poor peasants, to the amusement of the kulaks. It is not difficult to see that the only ones to profit by this scramble were the kulaks, and perhaps, here and there, some of the well-to-do peasants. Out of every hundred households in the countryside you could count four to five kulak households, eight or ten well-to-do peasant households, forty-five to fifty middle-peasant households, and some thirty-five poor-peasant households. Hence, at the lowest estimate, thirty-five per cent of all the peasant households were poor-peasant households, compelled to bear the yoke of kulak bondage. That is apart from the economically weaker strata of the middle peasants, comprising more than half of the middle peasantry, whose condition differed little from that of the poor peasants and who were directly dependent upon the kulaks.

By the expansion of collective-farm development we have succeeded in abolishing this scramble and injustice; we have smashed the yoke of kulak bondage, brought this vast mass of poor peasants into the collective farms, given them a secure existence there, and raised them to the level of middle peasants, able to make use of the collective-farm land, the privileges granted to collective farms, tractors and agricultural machinery.

And what does that mean? It means that not less than 20,000,000 of the peasant population, not less

than 20,000,000 poor peasants have been rescued from destitution and ruin, have been rescued from kulak bondage, and have attained material security thanks to the collective farms.

This is a great achievement, comrades. It is an achievement such as has never been known in the world before, such as no other state in the world has yet made.

There you have the practical, tangible results of collective-farm development, the results of the fact that the peasants have taken the collective-farm path.

But this is only our *first* step, our *first* achievement on the path of collective-farm development.

It would be wrong to think that we must stop at this first step, at this first achievement. No, comrades, we cannot stop at this achievement. In order to advance further and definitively consolidate the collective farms we must take a *second* step, we must secure a *new* achievement. What is this second step? It is to raise the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to a still higher level. It is *to make all the collective farmers prosperous*. Yes, comrades, prosperous. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Thanks to the collective farms we have succeeded in raising the poor peasants to the level of the middle peasants. That is very good. But it is not enough. We must now succeed in taking another step forward, and help all the collective farmers—both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants—to rise to the level of prosperous peasants. This can be achieved, and we must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

We now have all that is needed to achieve this aim. At present our machines and tractors are badly utilised. Our land is not well cultivated. We need only make better use of the machines and tractors, we need only improve the cultivation of the land, to increase the quantity of our produce two-fold and three-fold. And this will be quite sufficient to convert all our collective farmers into prosperous tillers of collective-farm fields.

What was the position previously as regards the prosperous peasants? In order to become prosperous a peasant had to wrong his neighbours; he had to exploit them; to sell to them dear and buy from them cheap; to hire some labourers and thoroughly exploit them; to accumulate some capital and then, having strengthened his position, to creep into the ranks of the kulaks. This, indeed, explains why formerly, under individual farming, the prosperous peasants aroused suspicion and hatred among the poor and middle peasants. Now the position is different. And the conditions are now different, too. For collective farmers to become prosperous it is not at all necessary now that they wrong or exploit their neighbours. And besides, it is not easy to exploit anybody now; for private ownership of land and the renting of land no longer exist in our country, the machines and tractors belong to the state, and people who own capital are not in fashion in the collective farms. There was such a fashion in the past, but it is gone for ever. Only one thing is now needed for the collective farmers to become prosperous, namely, to work in the collective farms conscientiously, to make proper use of the tractors and machines, to make proper use of the draught cattle,

to cultivate the land properly and to take care of the collective-farm property.

Sometimes it is said: If we are living under socialism, why do we have to toil? We toiled before and we are toiling now; is it not time we left off toiling? Such talk is fundamentally wrong, comrades. It is the philosophy of loafers and not of honest working people. Socialism does not in the least repudiate work. On the contrary, socialism is based on work. Socialism and work are inseparable from each other.

Lenin, our great teacher, said: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." What does this mean? Against whom are Lenin's words directed? Against the exploiters, against those who do not work themselves, but compel others to work for them, and get rich at the expense of others. And against whom else? Against those who loaf and want to live at the expense of others. Socialism demands, not loafing, but that all should work conscientiously; that they should work, not for others, not for the rich and the exploiters, but for themselves, for the community. And if we work conscientiously, work for ourselves, for our collective farms, then we shall succeed in a matter of two or three years in raising all the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to the level of prosperous peasants, to the level of people enjoying an abundance of produce and leading a fully cultured life.

That is our immediate task. We can achieve it, and we must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

III

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS

And now permit me to make a few miscellaneous remarks.

First of all about our *Party members* in the countryside. There are Party members among you, but still more of you are non-Party people. It is very good that more non-Party people than Party members are present at this congress, because it is precisely the non-Party people that we must enlist for our work first of all. There are Communists who approach the non-Party collective farmers in a Bolshevik manner. But there are also those who plume themselves on being Party members and keep non-Party people at a distance. That is bad and harmful. The strength of the Bolsheviks, the strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they are able to rally millions of active non-Party people around our Party. We Bolsheviks would never have achieved the successes we have now achieved had we not been able to win for the Party the confidence of millions of non-Party workers and peasants. And what is needed for this? What is needed is for the Party members not to isolate themselves from the non-Party people, for the Party members not to withdraw into their Party shell, not to plume themselves on being Party members, but to heed the voice of the non-Party people, not only to teach the non-Party people, but also to learn from them.

It must not be forgotten that Party members do not drop from the skies. We must remember that all Party members were at some time non-Party people. Today a man does not belong to the Party; tomorrow he will

become a Party member. What is there to get conceited about? Among us old Bolsheviks there are not a few who have been working in the Party for 20 or 30 years. But there was a time when we, too, were non-Party people. What would have happened to us 20 or 30 years ago if the Party members at that time had domineered over us and had not let us come close to the Party? Perhaps we would then have been kept away from the Party for a number of years. Yet we old Bolsheviks are not people of the least account in the world, comrades. (*Laughter, prolonged applause.*)

That is why our Party members, the present young Party members who sometimes turn up their noses at non-Party people, should remember all this, should remember that it is not conceit but modesty that is the adornment of the Bolshevik.

Now a few words about the *women*, the *women collective farmers*. The question of women in the collective farms is a big question, comrades. I know that many of you underestimate the women and even laugh at them. But that is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake. The point is not only that women constitute half the population. Primarily, the point is that the collective-farm movement has advanced a number of remarkable and capable women to leading positions. Look at this congress, at the delegates, and you will realise that women have long ago ceased to be backward and have come into the front ranks. The women in the collective farms are a great force. To keep this force down would be criminal. It is our duty to bring the women in the collective farms forward and to make use of this force.

Of course, not so long ago, the Soviet Government had a slight misunderstanding with the women collective farmers. That was over the cow. But now this business about the cow has been settled, and the misunderstanding has been removed. (*Prolonged applause.*) We have achieved a position where the majority of the collective-farm households already have a cow each. Another year or two will pass and there will not be a single collective farmer without his own cow. We Bolsheviks will see to it that every one of our collective farmers has a cow. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As for the women collective farmers themselves, they must remember the power and significance of the collective farms for women; they must remember that only in the collective farm do they have the opportunity of being on an equal footing with men. Without collective farms—inequality; in collective farms—equal rights. Let our comrades, the women collective farmers, remember this and let them cherish the collective-farm system as the apple of their eye. (*Prolonged applause.*)

A few words about the members of the *Young Communist League, young men and women*, in the collective farms. The youth are our future, our hope, comrades. The youth have to take our place, the place of the old people. They have to carry our banner to final victory. Among the peasants there are not a few old people, borne down by the burden of the past, burdened with the habits and the recollections of the old life. Naturally, they are not always able to keep pace with the Party, to keep pace with the Soviet system. Our youth are different. They are free from the burden of the past, and it is easi-

est for them to assimilate Lenin's behests. And precisely because it is easiest for the youth to assimilate Lenin's behests it is their mission to give a helping hand to the laggards and waverers. True, they lack knowledge. But knowledge is a thing that can be acquired. They may not have it today, but they will have it tomorrow. Hence, the task is to study and study again the principles of Leninism. Comrade members of the Young Communist League! Learn the principles of Bolshevism and lead the waverers forward! Talk less and work more, and your success will be assured. (*Applause.*)

A few words about the *individual peasants*. Little has been said here about the individual peasants. But that does not mean that they no longer exist. No, it does not mean that. Individual peasants do exist, and we must not leave them out of our calculations; for they are our collective farmers of tomorrow. I know that one section of the individual peasants has become utterly corrupt and has taken to speculating. That, no doubt, explains why the collective farmers accept individual peasants into the collective farms with great circumspection, and sometimes do not accept them at all. This, of course, is quite right, and there cannot be any objection to it. But there is another, larger section of individual peasants, who have not taken to speculating and who earn their bread by honest labour. These individual peasants, perhaps, would not be averse to joining the collective farms. But they are hindered in this, on the one hand, by their hesitation as to whether the collective-farm path is the right path; and, on the other hand, by the bitter feelings now existing amongst the collective farmers against the individual peasants.

Of course, we must understand the feelings of the collective farmers and appreciate their situation. During the past years they have suffered not a few insults and jeers at the hands of the individual peasants. But insults and jeers must not be allowed to have decisive importance here. He is a bad leader who cannot forget an offence, and who puts his own feelings above the interests of the collective-farm cause. If you want to be leaders, you must be able to forget the insults to which you were subjected by certain individual peasants. Two years ago I received a letter from a peasant woman, a widow, living in the Volga region. She complained that the collective farm refused to accept her as a member, and she asked for my support. I made inquiries at the collective farm. I received a reply from the collective farm stating that they could not accept her because she had insulted a collective-farm meeting. Now, what was it all about? It seems that at a meeting of peasants at which the collective farmers called upon the individual peasants to join the collective farm, this very widow, in reply to this appeal, had lifted up her skirt and said—Here, take your collective farm! (*Laughter.*) Undoubtedly she had behaved badly and had insulted the meeting. But should her application to join the collective farm be rejected if, a year later, she sincerely repented and admitted her error? I think that her application should not be rejected. That is what I wrote to the collective farm. The widow was accepted into the collective farm. And what happened? It turns out that she is now working in the collective farm, not in the last, but in the front ranks. (*Applause.*)

There you have another example, showing that leaders, if they want to be true leaders, must be able

to forget an offence if the interests of the cause demand it.

The same thing must be said about individual peasants generally. I am not opposed to the exercise of circumspection in accepting people into the collective farms. But I am against barring the path to the collective farms to all individual peasants without discrimination. That is not our policy, not the Bolshevik policy. The collective farmers must not forget that not long ago they themselves were individual peasants.

Finally, a few words about *the letter written by the collective farmers of Bezenchuk*.⁶⁶ This letter has been published, and you must have read it. It is unquestionably a good letter. It shows that among our collective farmers there are not a few experienced and intelligent organisers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, who are the pride of our country. But this letter contains one incorrect passage with which we cannot possibly agree. The point is that the Bezenchuk comrades describe their work in the collective farm as modest and all but insignificant work, whereas they describe the efforts of orators and leaders, who sometimes make speeches of inordinate length, as great and creative work. Can we agree with that? No, comrades, we cannot possibly agree with it. The Bezenchuk comrades have made a mistake here. Perhaps they made the mistake out of modesty. But the mistake does not cease to be a mistake for all that. The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of

the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railways, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life. Apparently, our Bezenchuk comrades have forgotten this. It is not good when people overrate their strength and begin to be conceited about the services they have rendered. That leads to boasting, and boasting is not a good thing. But it is still worse when people begin to underrate their strength and fail to see that their “modest” and “insignificant” work is really great and creative work that decides the fate of history.

I would like the Bezenchuk comrades to approve this slight amendment of mine to their letter.

With that, let us conclude, comrades.

(Loud and prolonged applause, increasing to an ovation. All rise and greet Comrade Stalin. Loud cheers. Shouts: “Long live Comrade Stalin, hurrah!” “Long live the advanced collective farmer!” “Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin!”)

Pravda, No. 53,
February 23, 1933

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY

To the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R.

Greetings to the men, commanders and political personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army!

Created under the leadership of Lenin, the Red Army covered itself with undying glory in the great battles of the Civil War, in which it drove out the interventionists from the U.S.S.R. and upheld the cause of socialism in our country.

The Red Army is today a bulwark of peace and the peaceful labour of the workers and peasants, the vigilant guardian of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The workers of our country, who have victoriously completed the five-year plan in four years, are equipping the Red Army with new instruments of defence. Your job, comrades, is to learn to handle those instruments to perfection and to do your duty to your country, should our enemies try to attack it.

Hold high the banner of Lenin, the banner of struggle for communism!

Long live the heroic Red Army, its leaders, its Revolutionary Military Council!

J. Stalin

REPLY TO A LETTER FROM Mr. BARNES

March 20, 1933

Dear Mr. Barnes,

Your fears as to the safety of American citizens in the U.S.S.R. are quite groundless.

The U.S.S.R. is one of the few countries in the world where a display of national hatred or an unfriendly attitude towards foreigners as such is punishable by law. There has never been, nor could there be, a case of any one becoming an object of persecution in the U.S.S.R. on account of his national origin. That is particularly true with regard to foreign specialists in the U.S.S.R., including American specialists, whose work in my opinion deserves our thanks.

As for the few British employees of Metro-Vickers,⁶⁷ legal action was taken against them not as Britishers but as persons who, our investigating authorities assert, have violated laws of the U.S.S.R. Was not legal action taken similarly against Russians? I do not know what bearing this case can have on American citizens.

Ready to be of service to you,

J. Stalin

TO COMRADE S. M. BUDYONNY

Ardent Bolshevik greetings on his fiftieth birthday to Comrade Budyonny—comrade-in-arms in the Civil War, organiser and commander of the glorious Red Cavalry, Red Army leader of the, highest talent from the ranks of the revolutionary peasantry!

I firmly clasp your hand, dear Semyon Mikhailovich.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 115,
April 26, 1933

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS

May 13, 1933

(Brief Record)

Stalin: What can I do for you?

Robins: I consider it a great honour to have an opportunity of paying you a visit.

Stalin: There is nothing particular in that. You are exaggerating.

Robins (smiles): What is most interesting to me is that throughout Russia I have found the names Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, linked together.

Stalin: That, too, is an exaggeration. How can I be compared to Lenin?

Robins (smiles): Would it also be an exaggeration to say that all this time the oldest government in the world has been the government of Soviet Russia—the Council of People's Commissars?

Stalin: That, to be sure, is not exaggerated.

Robins: The interesting and important point is that this government has not taken a reactionary direction in its work and that it is the government set up by Lenin that has proved strong. It resists all hostile lines.

Stalin: That is true.

Robins: At the May Day demonstration Russia's development during the past fifteen years impressed itself

upon me with particular clarity and sharpness, for I witnessed the May Day demonstration in 1918, and now in 1933.

Stalin: We have managed to do a few things in recent years. But fifteen years is a long period of time.

Robins: Still, in the life of a country it is a short period for such great progress as Soviet Russia has achieved during this time.

Stalin: We might have done more, but we did not manage to.

Robins: It is interesting to compare the underlying motives, the basic lines followed in the two demonstrations. The 1918 demonstration was addressed to the outside world, to the proletariat of the whole world, to the international proletariat, and was a call to revolution. Now the motive was different. Now men, women and the youth went to the demonstration to proclaim: This is the country we are building, this is the land we shall defend with all our strength!

Stalin: At that time the demonstration was agitational, but now it is a summing up.

Robins: You probably know that during these fifteen years I have interested myself in establishing rational relations between our two countries, and have endeavoured to dispel the existing hostile attitude of the ruling circles in America.

Stalin: I knew of this in 1918 from what Lenin had said, and afterwards on the basis of facts. Yes, I know it.

Robins: I have come here in the capacity of a purely private citizen and speak only for myself. The chief aim of my visit is to ascertain the prospects of establishing relations, to ascertain the actual facts concerning

the ability to work and the creative, inventive capacity of the Russian workers. Anti-Soviet propaganda has it that the Russian worker is lazy, does not know how to work, and ruins the machines he handles; that such a country has no future. I want to counteract this propaganda not merely with words, but armed with the facts.

The second question of interest to me in this connection is the situation in agriculture. It is being asserted that industrialisation has played havoc with agriculture, that the peasants have stopped sowing, have stopped gathering in the grain. Every year it is asserted that this year Russia is sure to die of famine. I should like to learn the facts about agriculture in order to refute these assertions. I expect to see the areas where new kinds of crops have been sown this year for the first time. What interests me in particular is the development of the principal grain crops of the Soviet Union.

The third question that interests me is public education, the development of children and the youth, their upbringing; how far public education has developed in the fields of art and literature, as regards what is called creative genius, inventive capacity. In America two types of creativeness are recognised—one is the creativeness of the study and the other is broad, life-inspired creativeness, manifestations of the creative spirit in life. I am interested in knowing how children and young people are developing. I hope to see in real life how they study, how they are brought up and how they develop.

On the first and third questions I have already obtained some valuable information and count on getting additional data. On the second question, concerning the development of agriculture, I expect to be able to

discover the real facts during my trip to Magnitogorsk and from there to Rostov, Kharkov and back. I expect to have a look at collective farms and see how the archaic strip system of cultivation is being eliminated and large-scale agriculture developed.

Stalin: Do you want my opinion?

Robins: Yes, I would like to have it.

Stalin: The notion that the Soviet worker is by nature incapable of coping with machines and breaks them is quite wrong.

On this score I must say that no such thing is happening here as occurred in Western Europe and America, where workers deliberately smashed machines because these deprived them of their crust of bread. Our workers have no such attitude to machinery, because in our country machines are being introduced on a mass scale in conditions where there is no unemployment, because the machines do not deprive the workers of their livelihood, as with you, but make their work easier.

As far as inability to work, the lack of culture of our workers is concerned, it is true that we have few trained workers and they do not cope with machinery as well as workers in Europe or America do. But with us this is a temporary phenomenon. If, for example, one were to investigate where throughout history the workers learned to master new technical equipment quickest—in Europe, America, or Russia during the last five years—I think it will be found that the workers learned quicker in Russia, in spite of the low level of culture. The mastery of the production of wheeled tractors in the West took several years, although, of course, technology was well developed there. Mastery of this matter in our coun-

try was quicker. For example, in Stalingrad and Khar'kov the production of tractors was mastered in some 12-14 months. At the present time, the Stalingrad Tractor Works is not only working to estimated capacity, not only turns out 144 tractors per day, but sometimes even 160, that is, it works above its planned capacity. I am taking this as an example. Our tractor industry is new, it did not exist before. The same thing is true of our aircraft industry—a new, delicate business, also swiftly mastered. The automobile industry is in a similar position from the view-point of rapidity of mastery. The same applies to machine-tool building.

In my opinion, this rapid mastery of the production of machines is to be explained not by the special ability of the Russian workers but by the fact that in our country the production of, say, aircraft and engines for them, of tractors, automobiles and machine tools is considered not the private affair of individuals, but an affair of the state. In the West the workers produce to get wages, and are not concerned about anything else. With us production is regarded as a public matter, a state matter, it is regarded as a matter of honour. That is why new technique is mastered so quickly in our country.

In general, I consider it impossible to assume that the workers of any particular nation are incapable of mastering new technique. If we look at the matter from the racial point of view, then in the United States, for instance, the Negroes are considered "bottom category men," yet they master technique no worse than the whites. The question of the mastery of technique by the workers of a particular nation is not a biological question, not a question of heredity, but a question of time:

today they have not mastered it, tomorrow they will learn and master it. Everyone, including the Bushman, can master technique, provided he is helped.

Robins: The ambition, the desire to master, is also required.

Stalin: Of course. The Russian workers have more than enough desire and ambition. They consider the mastery of new technique a matter of honour.

Robins: I have already sensed this in your factories where I have seen that socialist emulation has resulted in the creation of a new kind of ardour, a new sort of ambition that money could never buy, because the workers expect to get for their work something better and greater than money can procure.

Stalin: That is true. It is a matter of honour.

Robins: I shall take with me to America diagrams showing the development of the workers' inventiveness and their creative proposals, which improve production and effect considerable savings in production. I have seen the portraits of quite a few such worker-inventors who have done very much for the Soviet Union in the way of improving production and achieving economies.

Stalin: Our country has produced a comparatively large number of such workers. They are very capable people.

Robins: I have been in all your big Moscow factories—the AMO Automobile Works, the Ball Bearing Works, the Freser Works and others—and everywhere I came across organisations for promoting workers' inventiveness. The toolroom in a number of these factories impressed me particularly. As these toolrooms provide their factories with highly valuable tools the workers there

exert all their faculties to the utmost, give full play to their creative initiative and achieve striking results.

Stalin: In spite of that, we have many shortcomings as well. We have few skilled workers, while a great many are required. Our technical personnel is also small. Each year their number grows, and still there are fewer of them than we need. The Americans have been of great help to us. That must be admitted. They have helped more effectively than others and more boldly than others. Our thanks to them for that.

Robins: I have witnessed an internationalism in your enterprises which produced a very strong impression on me. Your factory managements are ready to adopt the technical achievements of any country—France, America, Britain or Germany—without any prejudice against these countries. And it seems to me that it is just this internationalism that will make it possible to combine in one machine all the advantages possessed by the machines of other countries and thus create more perfect machines.

Stalin: That will happen.

On the second question, about industrialisation allegedly ruining agriculture, that notion is also wrong. Far from ruining agriculture in our country, industrialisation is saving it, and saving our peasants. A few years ago we had a greatly disunited, small and very small, peasant economy. With the increasing division of the land, the peasant allotments shrank so much that there was no room to keep a hen. Add to this the primitive farming equipment, such as wooden ploughs and emaciated horses, which were incapable of turning up not only virgin soil, but even the ordinary, rather hard, soil, and you will have a picture of the deterioration

of agriculture. Three or four years ago there were about 7,000,000 wooden ploughs in the U.S.S.R. The only choice left for the peasants was this: either to lie down and die or to adopt a new form of land tenure and cultivate the land with machines. This indeed explains why the Soviet Government's call to the peasants issued about that time—to unite their tiny plots of land into large tracts and accept from the government tractors, harvesters and threshers for working these tracts, for gathering and threshing the harvest—found a very lively response among the peasants. They naturally seized on the proposal of the Soviet Government, began to unite their plots of land into large fields, accepted the tractors and other machines and thus emerged on the broad highway of making agriculture large scale, the new road of the radical improvement of agriculture.

It follows that industrialisation, as a result of which the peasants receive tractors and other machines, has saved the peasants, has saved agriculture.

The process of uniting small peasant farms by whole villages into large farms we call collectivisation, and the united large farms themselves—collective farms. The absence in our country of private property in land, the nationalisation of the land, makes collectivisation much easier. The land is transferred to the collective farms for their use in perpetuity and, owing to the absence of private property in land, no land can be bought or sold here. All this considerably facilitates the formation and development of collective farms.

I do not mean to say that all this, i.e., collectivisation and the rest, is proceeding smoothly with us. There are difficulties, of course, and they are not small ones.

Collectivisation, like every great new undertaking, has not only friends, but also enemies. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the peasants are in favour of collectivisation, and the number of its opponents is becoming smaller and smaller.

Robins: Every advance involves certain outlays, and this we take into account and include in our calculations.

Stalin: In spite of these difficulties, however, one thing is clear—and I have not the slightest doubt on this score: nineteen-twentieths of the peasantry have recognised, and most of the peasants accept the fact with great joy, that the collectivisation of agriculture has become an irreversible fact. So then this has already been achieved. The predominant form of agriculture in our country now is the collective farm. Take the grain sowing or harvesting figures, the figures for grain production, and you will see that at the present time the individual peasants provide something like 10-15 per cent of the total gross output of grain. The rest comes from the collective farms.

Robins: I am interested in the question whether it is true that last year's crop was gathered in unsatisfactorily, that at the present time the sowing campaign is proceeding satisfactorily, while last year the harvesting proceeded unsatisfactorily.

Stalin: Last year the harvesting was less satisfactory than the year before.

Robins: I have read your statements, and I believe they warrant the conclusion that this year the harvesting will be more successful.

Stalin: It will most probably proceed much better.

Robins: I think you appreciate no less than I do the tremendous achievement embodied in your successful

industrialisation of agriculture, a thing which no other country has been able to do. In all capitalist countries agriculture is undergoing a deep crisis and is in need of industrialisation. The capitalist countries manage somehow or other to cope with industrial production, but not one of them can cope with agriculture. The great achievement of the Soviet Union is that it has set about the solution of this problem and is successfully coping with it.

Stalin: Yes, that is a fact.

Such are our achievements and shortcomings in the sphere of agriculture.

Now the third question—about the education of children and of the youth as a whole. Ours is a fine youth, full of the joy of life. Our state differs from all others in that it does not stint the means for providing proper care of children and for giving the youth a good upbringing.

Robins: In America it is believed that in your country the child is restricted in its development within definite, rigid bounds and that these bounds leave no freedom for the development of the creative spirit and freedom of the mind. Do you not think that freedom for the development of the creative spirit, freedom to express what is in one, is of extremely great importance?

Stalin: First, concerning restrictions—this is not true. The second is true. Undoubtedly a child cannot develop its faculties under a regime of isolation and strict regimentation, without the necessary freedom and encouragement of initiative. As regards the youth, all roads are open to it in our country and it can freely perfect itself.

In our country children are not beaten and are very seldom punished. They are given the opportunity of choosing what they like, of pursuing a path of their own

choice. I believe that nowhere is there such care for the child, for its upbringing and development, as among us in the Soviet Union.

Robins: Can one consider that, as a result of the new generation being emancipated from the burden of want, being emancipated from the terror of economic conditions, this emancipation is bound to lead to a new flourishing of creative energy, to the blossoming of a new art, to a new advance of culture and art, which was formerly hampered by all these shackles?

Stalin: That is undoubtedly true.

Robins: I am not a Communist and do not understand very much about communism, but I should like America to participate in, to have the opportunity of associating itself with, the development that is taking place here in Soviet Russia, and I should like Americans to get this opportunity by means of recognition, by granting credits, by means of establishing normal relations between the two countries, for example, in the Far East, so as to safeguard the great and daring undertaking which is in process in your country, so that it may be brought to a successful conclusion.

Stalin (with a smile): I thank you for your good wishes.

Robins: One of my closest friends is Senator Borah, who has been the staunchest friend of the Soviet Union and has been fighting for its recognition among the leaders of the American Government.

Stalin: That is so; he is doing much to promote the establishment of normal relations between our two countries. But so far, unfortunately, he has not met with success.

Robins: I am convinced that the true facts are now having a much greater effect than at any time during the past fifteen years in favour of establishing normal relations between our two countries.

Stalin: Quite true. But there is one circumstance that hinders it. Britain, I believe, hinders it (*smiles*).

Robins: That is undoubtedly so. Still, the situation forces us to act above all in our own interests, and the conflict between our own interests and the course towards which other countries are driving us is impelling America, at the present time more than at any other, to establish such reciprocal relations. We are interested in the development of American exports. The only big market with great possibilities that have not been adequately utilised hitherto by anybody is the Russian market. American businessmen, if they wanted to, could grant long-term credits. They are interested in tranquillity in the Far East, and nothing could promote this more than the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet Union. In this respect, Mr. Litvinov's Geneva declaration on the definition of an aggressor country follows entirely the line of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which has played an important role in the matter of peace. Stabilisation of reciprocal economic relations throughout the world is in the interest of America, and we fully realise that normal reciprocal economic relations cannot be attained while the Soviet Union is outside the general economic system.

Stalin: All that is true.

Robins: I was and I remain an incorrigible optimist. I believed in the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution as long as fifteen years ago. They were then depicted as

agents of German imperialism; Lenin, in particular, was considered a German agent. But I considered and still consider Lenin a very great man, one of the greatest leaders in all world history.

I hope that the information I have received at first hand may help towards carrying out the plan of rapprochement and co-operation between our two countries about which I have spoken.

Stalin (smiling): I hope it will!

Robins (smiles): If you had expressed yourself in the American manner you would have said: "More power to your elbow." He is not sure of having much strength left in his elbow.

Stalin: May be.

Robins: I think there is nothing greater and more magnificent than to participate in the making of a new world, to participate in what we are now engaged in. Participation in the creation and building of a new world is something of paramount significance not only now, but thousands of years hence.

Stalin: All the same this matter presents great difficulties (*smiles*).

Robins (smiles): I am very grateful to you for the attention you have given me.

Stalin: And I thank you for having remembered the Soviet Union after an absence of fifteen years and for paying it another visit. (*Both smile. Robins bows.*)

**GREETINGS
ON THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG
COMMUNIST LEAGUE**

Friendly greetings on its fifteenth anniversary to the Leninist workers' and peasants' Young Communist League, the organiser of our glorious revolutionary youth!

I wish it success in training our youth in the spirit of Leninism, in training our youth in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against the enemies of the working class, and of the utmost strengthening of international fraternal ties between the working people of all languages and races in the world.

The young men and women shock brigaders of the Y.C.L. have covered themselves with glory during the period of the building of new factories and mills, mines, railways, state farms and collective farms. Let us hope that the young men and women shock brigaders of the Y.C.L. will display still greater valour and initiative in mastering new technique in all branches of the national economy, in enhancing the defence capacity of our country, in strengthening our army, our navy, our air force.

During the fifteen years of its existence the Leninist Y.C.L. has boldly carried onwards the great banner

of Lenin, rallying around it millions of young workers and peasants, millions of young working women and peasant women. Let us hope that the Leninist Y.C.L. will continue to hold high the banner of Lenin and will carry it with honour to the victorious finish of our great struggle, to the complete victory of socialism.

Long live the Leninist Young Communist League!

Long live the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League!

J. Stalin

October 28, 1933

Pravda, No. 299,
October 29, 1933

TALK WITH Mr. DURANTY,
CORRESPONDENT OF *THE NEW YORK TIMES*

December 25, 1933

Duranty: Would you agree to send a message to the American people through *The New York Times*?

Stalin: No. Kalinin has already sent one,⁶⁸ and I cannot interfere in what is his prerogative.

If it is a question of relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., I am, of course, satisfied with their renewal, as being an act of tremendous significance: politically, because it increases the chances of preserving peace; economically, because it removes extraneous elements and makes it possible for our two countries to discuss questions of interest to them on a business basis; lastly, it opens up the way to mutual co-operation.

Duranty: What in your opinion will be the possible volume of Soviet-American trade?

Stalin: What Litvinov said at the London economic conference⁶⁹ still holds good. We are the biggest market in the world and are ready to order and pay for a large quantity of goods. But we need favourable credit terms and, moreover, must be sure that we shall be able to pay. We cannot import without exports, because we do not

want to place orders without being sure of our ability to pay on time.

Everybody is surprised that we are paying and are able to pay. I know that just now it is not the fashion to pay back credits. But we do. Other governments have stopped payment, but the U.S.S.R. has not and will not do so. Many believed we were unable to pay, that we lacked the wherewithal to pay, but we have shown them that we can pay and they have had to acknowledge this.

Duranty: What about gold-mining in the U.S.S.R.?

Stalin: We have many auriferous districts and they are being rapidly developed. Our output is already double that of tsarist times and now amounts to over a hundred million rubles a year. We have improved our prospecting methods, particularly during the last two years, and have discovered large deposits. But our industries are still young—not only the gold industry but also industries concerned with pig iron, steel, copper and all metallurgy—and for the time being our young industries are not in a position to give proper assistance to the gold industry. Our rates of development are rapid but the volume of output is not yet large. We could quadruple gold production within a short period if we had more dredges and other machinery.

Duranty: What is the total Soviet indebtedness on foreign credits?

Stalin: A little over 450,000,000 rubles. During the last few years we have paid back large sums—two years ago we owed 1,400 millions on credit accounts. We have paid back all this and we shall be paying back, in the period to the end of 1934 or the beginning of 1935, at the due dates.

Duranty: Granted there is no longer any doubt about Soviet willingness to pay, but how about Soviet ability to pay?

Stalin: With us there is no difference between the first and the second, because we assume no obligations that we cannot discharge. Look at our economic relations with Germany. Germany declared a moratorium on a considerable portion of her foreign debts and we could have taken advantage of the German precedent and acted in the same way towards her. But we are not doing so. And, incidentally, we are now not so dependent on German industry as before. We ourselves can manufacture the equipment we need.

Duranty: What do you think of America? I heard you had a lengthy talk with Bullitt. What is your opinion of him? Do you consider, as you did three years ago, that our crisis, as you told me at the time, is not the last crisis of capitalism?

Stalin: Bullitt made a good impression on me and my comrades. I had never met him before but had heard much about him from Lenin, who also liked him. What I like about him is that he does not talk like the ordinary diplomat—he is a straightforward man and says what he thinks. In general he produced a very good impression here.

Roosevelt, by all accounts, is a determined and courageous politician. There is a philosophical system, solipsism, which holds that the external world does not exist and the only thing that does exist is one's own *self*. It long seemed that the American Government subscribed to this system and did not believe in the existence of the U.S.S.R. But Roosevelt evidently is not a

supporter of this strange theory. He is a realist and knows that reality is as he sees it.

As for the economic crisis, it really is not the last. The crisis, of course, disrupted all business but lately, it seems, business is beginning to recover. It is possible that the lowest point of the economic decline has already been passed. I do not think that the 1929 boom level will be attained, but a transition from crisis to depression and to a certain revival of business in the near future—true, with certain fluctuations upwards and downwards—is not only not precluded but maybe even probable.

Duranty: And what about Japan?

Stalin: We should like to maintain good relations with Japan, but unfortunately this does not depend on us alone. If a sensible policy gains the upper hand in Japan, our two countries can live in friendship. But we are afraid that the bellicose elements may push a sensible policy into the background. That is where the real danger lies and we are compelled to prepare against it. No nation can have any respect for its government if the latter sees the danger of an attack and does not take measures of self-defence. In my opinion Japan would be acting unwisely should she attack the U.S.S.R. Her economic condition is not particularly good, she has weak spots such as Korea, Manchuria and China, and besides she can hardly count on obtaining support from other countries in this adventure. Unfortunately, good military specialists are not always good economists and they can not always distinguish between the force of arms and the force of economic laws.

Duranty: And what about Britain?

Stalin: I think a trade agreement will be signed with Britain and economic relations will develop, inasmuch as the Conservative Party is bound to realise that it stands to gain nothing by putting obstacles in the way of trade with the U.S.S.R. But I doubt whether under present conditions the two countries will be able to derive such great advantages from trade as one might suppose.

Duranty: What do you think of the reform of the League of Nations as proposed by the Italians?

Stalin: We have received no proposals on that score from Italy, although our representative did discuss the matter with the Italians.

Duranty: Is your attitude towards the League of Nations always exclusively negative?

Stalin: No, not always and not under all circumstances. You perhaps do not fully understand our point of view. In spite of Germany's and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations—or possibly just because of it—the League may become a certain factor in retarding the outbreak of hostilities or in preventing them altogether. If that is so, if the League can prove to be something of an obstacle that would make war at least somewhat more difficult and peace to some extent easier, then we shall not be against the League. Yes, if such is the course of historical events, the possibility is not excluded that we shall support the League of Nations despite its colossal shortcomings.

Duranty: What is now the U.S.S.R.'s most important problem of internal policy?

Stalin: The development of trade between town and country and the improvement of all forms of transport,

particularly railways. Solving these problems is not easy, but is easier than the problems that we have already solved, and I am confident that we shall solve them. The problem of industry is solved. The problem of agriculture, that of the peasants and the collective farms—the most difficult of all—may also be considered already solved. Now we have to solve the problem of trade and transport.

Pravda, No. 4,
January 4, 1934

**REPORT
TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS
ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)⁷⁰**

January 26, 1934

I

**THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM
AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION
OF THE SOVIET UNION**

Comrades, more than three years have passed since the Sixteenth Congress. That is not a very long period. But it has been fuller in content than any other period. I do not think that any period in the last decade has been so rich in events as this one.

In the *economic* sphere these years have been years of continuing world economic crisis. The crisis has affected not only industry, but also agriculture as a whole. The crisis has raged not only in the sphere of production and trade; it has also extended to the sphere of credit and money circulation, and has completely upset the established credit and currency relations among countries. While formerly people here and there still disputed whether there was a world economic crisis or not, now they no longer do so, for the existence of the crisis and its devastating effects are only too obvious. Now the con-

troversy centres around another question: Is there a way out of the crisis or not; and if there is, then what is to be done?

In the *political* sphere these years have been years of further tension both in the relations between the capitalist countries and in the relations within them. Japan's war against China and the occupation of Manchuria, which have strained relations in the Far East; the victory of fascism in Germany and the triumph of the idea of revenge, which have strained relations in Europe; the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations, which has given a new impetus to the growth of armaments and to the preparations for an imperialist war; the defeat of fascism in Spain,⁷¹ which is one more indication that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and that fascism is far from being long-lived—such are the most important events of the period under review. It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is breathing its last and that the trend towards disarmament is openly and definitely giving way to a trend towards armament and rearmament.

Amid the surging waves of economic perturbations and military-political catastrophes, the U.S.S.R. stands out like a rock, continuing its work of socialist construction and its fight to preserve peace. Whereas in the capitalist countries the economic crisis is still raging, in the U.S.S.R. the advance continues both in industry and in agriculture. Whereas in the capitalist countries feverish preparations are in progress for a new war for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the U.S.S.R. is continuing its systematic and persistent struggle against the menace of war and for peace; and it

cannot be said that the efforts of the U.S.S.R. in this direction have had no success.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present moment.

Let us pass to an examination of the principal data on the economic and political situation in the capitalist countries.

1. THE COURSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The present economic crisis in the capitalist countries differs from all analogous crises, among other things, in that it is the longest and most protracted crisis. Formerly crises would come to an end in a year or two; the present crisis, however, is now in its fifth year, devastating the economy of the capitalist countries year after year and draining it of the fat accumulated in previous years. It is not surprising that this is the most severe of all the crises that have taken place.

How is this unprecedentedly protracted character of the present industrial crisis to be explained?

It is to be explained, first of all, by the fact that the industrial crisis has affected every capitalist country without exception, which has made it difficult for some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others.

Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis has become interwoven with the agrarian crisis which has affected all the agrarian and semi-agrarian countries without exception, which could not but make the industrial crisis more complicated and more profound.

Thirdly, it is to be explained by the fact that the agrarian crisis has grown more acute in this period, and has affected all branches of agriculture, including live-stock farming; that it has brought about a retrogression of agriculture, a reversion from machines to hand labour, a substitution of horses for tractors, a sharp reduction in the use of artificial fertilisers, and in some cases a complete abandonment of them—all of which has caused the industrial crisis to become still more protracted.

Fourthly, it is to be explained by the fact that the monopolist cartels which dominate industry strive to maintain high commodity prices, a circumstance which makes the crisis particularly painful and hinders the absorption of commodity stocks.

Lastly—and this is the chief thing—it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis broke out in the conditions of the *general* crisis of capitalism, when capitalism no longer has, nor can have, either in the major countries or in the colonial and dependent countries, the strength and stability it had before the war and the October Revolution; when industry in the capitalist countries has acquired, as a heritage from the imperialist war, chronic under-capacity operation of plants and armies of millions of unemployed, of which it is no longer able to rid itself.

Such are the circumstances that have given rise to the extremely protracted character of the present industrial crisis.

It is these circumstances also that explain the fact that the crisis has not been confined to the sphere of production and trade, but has also affected the credit system, foreign exchange, the debt settlements, etc., and has

broken down the traditionally established relations both between countries and between social groups in the various countries.

An important part was played by the fall in commodity prices. In spite of the resistance of the monopolist cartels, the fall in prices increased with elemental force, affecting primarily and mainly the commodities of the unorganised commodity owners—peasants, artisans, small capitalists—and only gradually and to a smaller degree those of the organised commodity owners—the capitalists united in cartels. The fall in prices made the position of debtors (manufacturers, artisans, peasants, etc.) intolerable, while, on the other hand, it placed creditors in an unprecedentedly privileged position. Such a situation was bound to lead, and actually did lead to the mass bankruptcy of firms and of individual capitalists. As a result, tens of thousands of joint-stock companies have failed in the United States, Germany, Britain and France during the past three years. The bankruptcy of joint-stock companies was followed by a depreciation of currency, which slightly alleviated the position of debtors. The depreciation of currency was followed by the non-payment of debts, both foreign and internal, legalised by the state. The collapse of such banks as the Darmstadt and Dresden banks in Germany and the Kreditanstalt in Austria, and of concerns like Kreuger's in Sweden, the Insull corporation in the United States, etc. is well known to all.

Naturally, these phenomena, which shook the foundations of the credit system, were bound to be followed, and actually were followed, by the cessation of payments on credits and foreign loans, the cessation of payments

on inter-Allied debts the cessation of export of capital, a further decline in foreign trade, a further decline in the export of commodities, an intensification of the struggle for foreign markets, trade war between countries, and—dumping. Yes, comrades, dumping. I am not referring to the alleged Soviet dumping, about which only very recently certain honourable members of honourable parliaments in Europe and America were shouting themselves hoarse. I am referring to the real dumping that is now being practised by almost all “civilised” states, and about which these gallant and honourable members of parliaments maintain a prudent silence.

Naturally, also, these destructive phenomena accompanying the industrial crisis, which took place outside the sphere of production, could not but in their turn influence the course of the industrial crisis, aggravating it and complicating the situation still further.

Such is the general picture of the course of the industrial crisis.

Here are a few figures, taken from official data, that illustrate the course of the industrial crisis during the period under review.

***Volume of Industrial Output
(Per cent of 1929)***

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R.	100	129.7	161.9	184.7	201.6
U.S.A.	100	80.7	68.1	53.8	64.9
Britain	100	92.4	83.8	83.8	86.1
Germany	100	88.3	71.7	59.8	66.8
France	100	100.7	89.2	69.1	77.4

As you see, this table speaks for itself.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined from year to year, compared with 1929, and began to recover somewhat only in 1933—although still far from reaching the level of 1929—industry in the U.S.S.R. grew from year to year, experiencing an uninterrupted rise.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries at the end of 1933 shows on the average a *reduction* of 25 per cent and more in volume of output compared with 1929, industrial output in the U.S.S.R. has more than doubled during this period, i.e., it has *increased* more than 100 per cent. (*Applause.*)

Judging by this table, it may seem that of these four capitalist countries Britain is in the most favourable position. But that is not quite true. If we compare industry in these countries with its pre-war level we get a somewhat different picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

Volume of Industrial Output
(Per cent of pre-war level)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R.	100	194.3	252.1	314.7	359.0	391.9
U.S.A.	100	170.2	137.3	115.9	91.4	110.2
Britain	100	99.1	91.5	83.0	82.5	85.2
Germany	100	113.0	99.8	81.0	67.6	75.4
France	100	139.0	140.0	124.0	96.1	107.6

As you see, industry in Britain and Germany has not yet reached the pre-war level, while the United States

and France have exceeded it by several per cent, and the U.S.S.R. has raised, increased its industrial output during this period by more than 290 per cent over the pre-war level. (*Applause.*)

But there is still another conclusion to be drawn from these tables.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined steadily after 1930, and particularly after 1931, and reached its lowest point in 1932, in 1933 it began to recover and pick up somewhat. If we take the monthly returns for 1932 and 1933 we find still further confirmation of this conclusion; for they show that, despite fluctuations of output in the course of 1933, industry in these countries revealed no tendency to fall to the lowest point reached in the summer of 1932.

What does this mean?

It means that, apparently, industry in the principal capitalist countries had already reached the lowest point of decline and did not return to it in the course of 1933.

Some people are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon exclusively to the influence of artificial factors, such as the war-inflation boom. There can be no doubt that the war-inflation boom plays no small part in it. This is particularly true in regard to Japan, where this artificial factor is the principal and decisive force stimulating a certain revival in some industries, mainly war industries. But it would be a gross mistake to explain everything by the war-inflation boom. Such an explanation would be incorrect, if only for the reason that the changes in industry which I have described are observed, not in separate and chance areas, but in all, or nearly all, the industrial countries, including the countries with a

stable currency. Apparently, in addition to the war-inflation boom, the internal economic forces of capitalism are also operating here.

Capitalism has succeeded in somewhat alleviating the position of industry *at the expense of the workers*, by heightening their exploitation through increased intensity of labour; *at the expense of the farmers*, by pursuing a policy of paying the lowest prices for the products of their labour, for foodstuffs and, partly, raw materials; and *at the expense of the peasants in the colonies and economically weak countries*, by still further forcing down prices for the products of their labour, principally for raw materials, and also for foodstuffs.

Does this mean that we are witnessing a transition from a crisis to an ordinary depression, to be followed by a new upswing and flourishing of industry? No, it does not. At any rate, at the present time there is no evidence, direct or indirect, to indicate the approach of an upswing of industry in the capitalist countries. More than that, judging by all things, there can be no such evidence, at least in the near future. There can be no such evidence, because all the unfavourable conditions which prevent industry in the capitalist countries from making any considerable advance continue to operate. I have in mind the continuing *general* crisis of capitalism, in the circumstances of which the *economic* crisis is proceeding; the chronic under-capacity operation of the enterprises; chronic mass unemployment; the interweaving of the industrial crisis with an agricultural crisis; the absence of tendencies towards a more or less serious renewal of fixed capital, which usually heralds the approach of a boom, etc., etc.

Evidently, what we are witnessing is a transition from the lowest point of decline of industry, from the lowest point of the industrial crisis, to a depression—not an ordinary depression, but a depression of a special kind, which does not lead to a new upswing and flourishing of industry, but which, on the other hand, does not force industry back to the lowest point of decline.

2. THE GROWING TENSION IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

A result of the protracted economic crisis has been an unprecedented increase in the tension of the political situation in the capitalist countries, both within those countries and in their mutual relations.

The intensified struggle for foreign markets, the abolition of the last vestiges of free trade, the prohibitive tariffs, the trade war, the foreign currency war, dumping, and many other analogous measures which demonstrate extreme *nationalism* in economic policy have strained to the utmost the relations among the various countries, have created the basis for military conflicts, and have put war on the order of the day as a means for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence in favour of the stronger states.

Japan's war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and her advance in North China, have made the situation still more tense. The intensified struggle for the Pacific and the growth of naval armaments in Japan, the United States, Britain and France are results of this increased tension.

Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the spectre of revanchism have further added to the tension and have given a fresh impetus to the growth of armaments in Europe.

It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is now dragging out a miserable existence, and that idle talk of disarmament is giving way to "business-like" talk about armament and rearmament.

Once again, as in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, the parties of war and revanchism are coming to the foreground.

Quite clearly things are heading for a new war.

The internal situation of the capitalist countries, in view of the operation of these same factors, is becoming still more tense. Four years of industrial crisis have exhausted the working class and reduced it to despair. Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the poorer strata of the peasantry, not only in the principal capitalist countries, but also—and particularly—in the dependent and colonial countries. It is a fact that, notwithstanding all kinds of statistical trickery designed to minimise unemployment, the number of unemployed, according to the official figures of bourgeois institutions, reaches 3,000,000 in Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany and 10,000,000 in the United States, not to mention the other European countries. Add to this the more than ten million partially unemployed; add the vast masses of ruined peasants—and you will get an approximate picture of the poverty and despair of the labouring masses. The masses of the people have not yet reached the stage when they are ready to storm capitalism; but the idea of storming it is maturing in the minds of the masses—

of that there can hardly be any doubt. This is eloquently testified to by such facts as, say, the Spanish revolution which overthrew the fascist regime, and the expansion of the Soviet districts in China, which the united counter-revolution of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie is unable to stop.

This, indeed, explains why the ruling classes in the capitalist countries are so zealously destroying or nullifying the last vestiges of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy which might be used by the working class in its struggle against the oppressors, why they are driving the Communist Parties underground and resorting to openly terrorist methods of maintaining their dictatorship.

Chauvinism and preparation of war as the main elements of foreign policy; repression of the working class and terrorism in the sphere of home policy as a necessary means for strengthening the rear of future war fronts—that is what is now particularly engaging the minds of contemporary imperialist politicians.

It is not surprising that fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among war-mongering bourgeois politicians. I am referring not only to fascism in general, but, primarily, to fascism of the German type, which is wrongly called national-socialism—wrongly because the most searching examination will fail to reveal even an atom of socialism in it.

In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness of the working class and a result of the betrayals of the working class by Social-Democracy, which paved the way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a sign of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, a sign that the bourgeois-

sie is no longer able to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terrorist methods of rule—as a sign that it is no longer able to find a way out of the present situation on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, and, as a consequence, is compelled to resort to a policy of war.

Such is the situation.

As you see, things are heading towards a new imperialist war as a way out of the present situation.

Of course, there are no grounds for assuming that war can provide a real way out. On the contrary, it is bound to confuse the situation still more. More than that, it is sure to unleash revolution and jeopardise the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, in spite of the experience of the first imperialist war, the bourgeois politicians clutch at war as a drowning man clutches at a straw, that shows that they have got into a hopeless muddle, have landed in an impasse, and are ready to rush headlong into the abyss.

It is worth while, therefore, briefly to examine the plans for the organisation of war which are now being hatched in the circles of bourgeois politicians.

Some think that war should be organised against one of the great powers. They think of inflicting a crushing defeat upon that power and of improving their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organise such a war. What may be the result of that?

As is well known, during the first imperialist war it was also intended to destroy one of the great powers, viz., Germany, and to profit at its expense. But what was

the upshot of this? They did not destroy Germany; but they sowed in Germany such a hatred of the victors, and created such a rich soil for revenge, that even to this day they have not been able to clear up the revolting mess they made, and will not, perhaps, be able to do so for some time. On the other hand, the result they obtained was the smashing of capitalism in Russia, the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and—of course—the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that a second imperialist war will produce “better” results for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Others think that war should be organised against a country that is weak in the military sense, but represents an extensive market—for example, against China, which, it is claimed, cannot even be described as a state in the strict sense of the word, but is merely “unorganised territory” which needs to be seized by strong states. They evidently want to divide it up completely and improve their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organise such a war. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Italy and Germany were regarded in the same light as China is today, i.e., they were considered “unorganised territories” and not states, and they were subjugated. But what was the result of that? As is well known, it resulted in wars for independence waged by Germany and Italy, and the union of these countries into independent states. It resulted in increased hatred for the oppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, the effects of which have not been removed to this day and will not, perhaps, be removed for some time.

The question arises: What guarantee is there that the same thing will not result from a war of the imperialists against China?

Still others think that war should be organised by a “superior race,” say, the German “race,” against an “inferior race,” primarily against the Slavs; that only such a war can provide a way out of the situation, for it is the mission of the “superior race” to render the “inferior race” fruitful and to rule over it. Let us assume that this queer theory, which is as far removed from science as the sky from the earth, let us assume that this queer theory is put into practice. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that ancient Rome looked upon the ancestors of the present-day Germans and French in the same way as the representatives of the “superior race” now look upon the Slav races. It is well known that ancient Rome treated them as an “inferior race,” as “barbarians,” destined to live in eternal subordination to the “superior race,” to “great Rome”, and, between ourselves be it said, ancient Rome had some grounds for this, which cannot be said of the representatives of the “superior race” of today. (*Thunderous applause.*) But what was the upshot of this? The upshot was that the non-Romans, i.e., all the “barbarians,” united against the common enemy and brought Rome down with a crash. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the claims of the representatives of the “superior race” of today will not lead to the same lamentable results? What guarantee is there that the fascist literary politicians in Berlin will be more fortunate than the old and experienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Finally, there are others who think that war should be organised against the U.S.S.R. Their plan is to defeat the U.S.S.R., divide up its territory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the circles of the political leaders of certain states in Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from words to deeds. What may be the result of that?

There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would be the most dangerous war, not only because the peoples of the U.S.S.R. would fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution; it would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie for the added reason that it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also in the enemy's rear. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the U.S.S.R. in Europe and Asia will endeavour to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who have launched a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments near and dear to them, which today rule happily "by the grace of God," are missing on the morrow after such a war. (*Thunderous applause.*)

There has already been one such war against the U.S.S.R., if you remember, 15 years ago. As is well known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed that war in a poetic formula—"the campaign of fourteen states." You remember, of course, that that war rallied all the working people of our country into one united camp

of self-sacrificing warriors, who with their lives defended their workers' and peasants' motherland against the foreign foe. You know how it ended. It ended in the ejection of the invaders from our country and the formation of revolutionary Councils of Action⁷² in Europe. It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries.

Such are the war plans of the perplexed bourgeois politicians.

As you see, they are not distinguished either for their brains or for their valour. (*Applause.*)

But while the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, the working class in the capitalist countries, brought to despair by four years of crisis and unemployment, is beginning to take the path of revolution. This means that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue to mature. And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled in its war schemes, the more frequently it resorts to terrorist methods of fighting against the working class and the labouring peasantry, the more rapidly will the revolutionary crisis develop.

Some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie is bound to get into a hopeless position, that its end is therefore a foregone conclusion, that the victory of the revolution is thus assured, and that all they have to do is to wait for the fall of the bourgeoisie and to draw up victorious resolutions. That is a profound mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a

strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win victory. Moments occur when the situation is revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat with sufficient strength and prestige to lead the masses and to take power. It would be unwise to believe that such "cases" cannot occur.

It is worth while in this connection to recall Lenin's prophetic words on revolutionary crisis, uttered at the Second Congress of the Communist International⁷³:

"We have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, the bourgeois economists depict this crisis as mere 'unrest,' as the English so elegantly express it. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes try to prove that the crisis is absolutely hopeless. That is a mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. The bourgeoisie behaves like an arrogant plunderer who has lost his head; it commits folly after folly, making the situation more acute and hastening its own doom. All this is true. But it cannot be 'proved' that there is absolutely no chance of its gulling some minority of the exploited with some kind of minor concessions, or of suppressing some movement or uprising of some section or another of the oppressed and exploited. To try to 'prove' beforehand that a situation is 'absolutely' hopeless would be sheer pedantry, or juggling with concepts and catchwords. In this and similar questions the only real 'proof' is practice. The bourgeois system all over the world is experiencing a most profound revolutionary crisis. The revolutionary parties must now 'prove' by their practical actions that they are sufficiently intelligent and organised, are sufficiently in contact with the exploited masses, are sufficiently determined and skilful, to utilise this crisis for a successful and victorious revolution" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, pp. 340-41⁷⁴).

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST STATES

It is easy to understand how difficult it has been for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its peace policy in this atmosphere poisoned with the miasma of war schemes.

In the midst of this eve-of-war frenzy which has affected a number of countries, the U.S.S.R. during these years has stood firmly and unshakably by its position of peace: fighting against the menace of war; fighting to preserve peace; meeting half-way those countries which in one way or another stand for the preservation of peace; exposing and tearing the masks from those who are preparing for and provoking war.

What did the U.S.S.R. rely on in this difficult and complicated struggle for peace?

a) On its growing economic and political might.

b) On the moral support of the vast masses of the working class of all countries, who are vitally interested in the preservation of peace.

c) On the prudence of those countries which for one motive or another are not interested in disturbing the peace, and which want to develop trade relations with such a punctual client as the U.S.S.R.

d) Finally—on our glorious army, which stands ready to defend our country against assaults from without.

It was on this basis that we began our campaign for the conclusion with neighbouring states of pacts of non-aggression and of pacts defining aggression. You know that this campaign has been successful. As you know, pacts of non-aggression have been concluded not only with the majority of our neighbours in the West and in the South, including Finland and Poland, but also with

such countries as France and Italy; and pacts defining aggression have been concluded with those same neighbouring states, including the Little Entente.⁷⁵

On the same basis the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey has been consolidated; relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy have improved and have indisputably become satisfactory; relations with France, Poland and other Baltic states have improved; relations have been restored with the U.S.A., China, etc.

Of the many facts reflecting the successes of the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. two facts of indisputably material significance should be noted and singled out.

1) I have in mind, firstly, the change for the better that has taken place recently in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and between the U.S.S.R. and France. In the past, as you know, our relations with Poland were not at all good. Representatives of our state were assassinated in Poland. Poland regarded itself as the barrier of the Western states against the U.S.S.R. All the various imperialists counted on Poland as their advanced detachment in the event of a military attack on the U.S.S.R. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and France were no better. We need only recall the facts relating to the trial of the Ramzin group of wreckers in Moscow to bring to mind a picture of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and France. But now those undesirable relations are gradually beginning to disappear. They are giving way to other relations, which can only be called relations of rapprochement.

The point is not merely that we have concluded pacts of non-aggression with these countries, although the pacts

in themselves are of very great importance. The point is, primarily, that the atmosphere of mutual distrust is beginning to be dissipated. This does not mean, of course, that the incipient process of rapprochement can be regarded as sufficiently stable and as guaranteeing ultimate success. Surprises and zigzags in policy, for example in Poland, where anti-Soviet sentiments are still strong, can as yet by no means be regarded as out of the question. But the change for the better in our relations, irrespective of its results in the future, is a fact worthy of being noted and emphasised as a factor in the advancement of the cause of peace.

What is the cause of this change? What stimulates it?

Primarily, the growth of the strength and might of the U.S.S.R.

In our times it is not the custom to take any account of the weak—only the strong are taken into account. Furthermore, there have been some changes in the policy of Germany which reflect the growth of revanchist and imperialist sentiments in Germany.

In this connection some German politicians say that the U.S.S.R. has now taken an orientation towards France and Poland; that from an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of it, and that this change is to be explained by the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best rela-

tions with that country. Nor is it a question of any alleged change in our attitude towards the Versailles Treaty. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Brest Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into the abyss of a new war on account of that treaty. The same must be said of the alleged new orientation taken by the U.S.S.R. We never had any orientation towards Germany, nor have we any orientation towards Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is towards the U.S.S.R., and towards the U.S.S.R. alone. (*Stormy applause.*) And if the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand rapprochement with one country or another which is not interested in disturbing peace, we adopt this course without hesitation.

No, that is not the point. The point is that Germany's policy has changed. The point is that even before the present German politicians came to power, and particularly after they came to power, a contest began in Germany between two political lines: between the old policy, which was reflected in the treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, and the "new" policy, which, in the main, recalls the policy of the former German Kaiser, who at one time occupied the Ukraine and marched against Leningrad, after converting the Baltic countries into a place d'armes for this march; and this "new" policy is obviously gaining the upper hand over the old policy. The fact that the advocates of the "new" policy are gaining supremacy in all things, while the supporters of the old policy are in disfavour, cannot be regarded as an accident. Nor can the well-known statement made by Hugenberg

in London, and the equally well-known declarations of Rosenberg, who directs the foreign policy of the ruling party in Germany, be regarded as accidents. That is the point, comrades.

2) I have in mind, secondly, the restoration of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. There cannot be any doubt that this act is of very great significance for the whole system of international relations. The point is not only that it improves the chances of preserving peace, improves the relations between the two countries, strengthens trade connections between them and creates a basis for mutual collaboration. The point is that it forms a landmark between the old position, when in various countries the U.S.A. was regarded as the bulwark for all sorts of anti-Soviet trends, and the new position, when that bulwark has been voluntarily removed, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Such are the two main facts which reflect the successes of the Soviet policy of peace.

It would be wrong, however, to think that everything went smoothly in the period under review. No, not everything went smoothly, by a long way.

Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear upon us by Britain, the embargo on our exports, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and to use this as a probe—to test our power of resistance. True, nothing came of this attempt, and later the embargo was lifted; but the unpleasant after effect of these sallies still makes itself felt in everything connected with the relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R., including the negotiations for a commercial treaty. And these sallies

against the U.S.S.R. must not be regarded as accidental. It is well known that a certain section of the British Conservatives cannot live without such sallies. And precisely because they are not accidental we must reckon that in the future, too, sallies will be made against the U.S.S.R., all sorts of menaces will be created, attempts will be undertaken to damage the U.S.S.R., etc.

Nor must we lose sight of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, which stand in need of considerable improvement. Japan's refusal to conclude a pact of non-aggression, of which Japan stands in no less need than the U.S.S.R., once again emphasises the fact that all is not well in the sphere of our relations. The same must be said of the rupture of negotiations concerning the Chinese-Eastern Railway, due to no fault of the U.S.S.R.; and also of the outrageous actions of the Japanese agents on the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the illegal arrests of Soviet employees on the Chinese-Eastern Railway, etc. That is apart from the fact that one section of the military in Japan, with the obvious approval of another section of the military, is openly advocating in the press the necessity for a war against the U.S.S.R. and the seizure of the Maritime Region; while the Japanese Government, instead of calling these instigators of war to order, pretends that the matter is no concern of its. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but create an atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty. Of course, we shall persistently continue to pursue a policy of peace and strive for an improvement in our relations with Japan, because we want to improve these relations. But it does not depend entirely upon

us. That is why we must at the same time take all measures to guard our country against surprises, and be prepared to defend it against attack. (*Stormy applause.*)

As you see, alongside the successes in our peace policy there are also a number of unfavourable features.

Such is the external situation of the U.S.S.R.

Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening trade relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody—let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and uphold the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow. (*Stormy applause.*) Those who want peace and seek business relations with us will always have our support. But those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing repulse to teach them in future not to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is our foreign policy. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The task is to continue to implement this policy with unflagging perseverance and consistency.

II

THE CONTINUING PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

I pass to the question of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

From the point of view of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. the period under review presents a pic-

ture of ever increasing progress, both in the sphere of the national economy and in the sphere of culture.

This progress has not been merely a simple quantitative accumulation of strength. This progress is remarkable in that it has introduced fundamental changes into the structure of the U.S.S.R., and has radically changed the face of the country.

During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically transformed and has cast off the aspect of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become an industrial country. From a country of small individual agriculture it has become a country of collective, large-scale mechanised agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become—or rather it is becoming—a literate and cultured country covered by a vast network of higher, secondary and elementary schools functioning in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

New industries have been created: the production of machine tools, automobiles, tractors, chemicals, motors, aircraft, harvester combines, powerful turbines and generators, high-grade steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, nitrates, artificial fibre, etc., etc. (*Prolonged applause.*)

During this period thousands of new, fully up-to-date industrial plants have been built and put into operation. Giants like the Dnieprostroi, Magnitostroi, Kuznetskstroi, Chelyabstroi, Bobriki, Uralmashstroi and Krammashstroi have been built. Thousands of old plants have been reconstructed and provided with modern technical equipment. New plants have been built, and industrial

centres created, in the national republics and in the border regions of the U.S.S.R.: in Byelorussia, in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Buryat-Mongolia, in Tataria, in Bashkiria, in the Urals, in Eastern and Western Siberia, in the Far East, etc.

More than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state farms have been organised, with new district centres and industrial centres serving them.

New large towns, with large populations, have sprung up in what were almost uninhabited places. The old towns and industrial centres have grown enormously.

The foundations have been laid for the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, which unites the coking coal of Kuznetsk with the iron ore of the Urals. Thus, we may consider that the dream of a new metallurgical base in the East has become a reality.

The foundations for a powerful new oil base have been laid in areas of the western and southern slopes of the Urals range—in the Urals region, Bashkiria and Kazakhstan.

It is obvious that the huge capital investments of the state in all branches of the national economy, amounting in the period under review to over 60,000 million rubles, have not been spent in vain, and are already beginning to bear fruit.

As a result of these achievements the national income of the U.S.S.R. has increased from 29,000 million rubles in 1929 to 50,000 million in 1933; whereas during the same period there has been an enormous decline in the national income of all the capitalist countries without exception.

Naturally, all these achievements and all this progress were bound to lead—and actually have led—to the further consolidation of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

How was it possible for these colossal changes to take place in a matter of three or four years on the territory of a vast state with a backward technique and a backward culture? Was it not a miracle? It would have been a miracle if this development had taken place on the basis of capitalism and individual small farming. But it cannot be described as a miracle if we bear in mind that this development took place on the basis of expanding socialist construction.

Naturally, this enormous progress could take place only on the basis of the successful building of socialism; on the basis of the socially organised work of scores of millions of peoples; on the basis of the advantages which the socialist system of economy has over the capitalist and individual peasant system.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the colossal progress in the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R. during the period under review has at the same time meant the elimination of the capitalist elements and the relegation of individual peasant economy to the background. It is a fact that the socialist system of economy in the sphere of industry now constitutes 99 per cent of the total; and in agriculture, according to the area sown to grain crops, it constitutes 84.5 per cent of the total, whereas individual peasant economy accounts for only 15.5 per cent.

It follows, then, that capitalist economy in the U.S.S.R. has already been eliminated and that the indi-

vidual peasant sector in the countryside has been relegated to a secondary position.

At the time when the New Economic Policy was being introduced, Lenin said that there were elements of five forms of social and economic structure in our country: 1) patriarchal economy (largely natural economy); 2) small-commodity production (the majority of the peasants who sell grain); 3) private capitalism; 4) state capitalism; 5) socialism.⁷⁶ Lenin considered that, of all these forms, the socialist form must in the end gain the upper hand. We can now say that the first, the third and the fourth forms of social and economic structure no longer exist; the second form has been forced into a secondary position, while the fifth form—the socialist form of social and economic structure—now holds undivided sway and is the sole commanding force in the whole national economy. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

Such is the result.

In this result is contained the basis of the stability of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R., the basis of the firmness of its front and rear positions in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement.

Let us pass to an examination of the concrete material relating to various questions of the economic and political situation in the Soviet Union.

1. THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY

Of all branches of our national economy, the one that has grown most rapidly is industry. During the period under review, i.e., beginning with 1930, our industry has more than doubled, namely, it has increased by

101.6 per cent; and compared with the pre-war level it has grown almost four-fold, namely, by 291.9 per cent.

This means that our industrialisation has been going ahead at full speed.

As a result of the rapid growth of industrialisation the output of industry has advanced to first place in the gross output of the whole national economy.

Here is the corresponding table:

***Relative Importance of Industry in the Gross Output
of the National Economy
(Per cent of total, in prices of 1926-27)***

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
1. Industry (without small industry) . .	42.1	54.5	61.6	66.7	70.7	70.4
2. Agriculture	57.9	45.5	38.4	33.3	29.3	29.6
<i>Total . . .</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This means that our country has definitely and finally become an industrial country.

Of decisive significance for the industrialisation of the country is the growth of the output of instruments and means of production in the total development of industry. The figures for the period under review show that this item has become predominant in the gross output of industry.

Here is the corresponding table:

***Relative Importance of the Output of the Two Main
Branches of Large-Scale Industry
(In prices of 1926-27)***

	Gross output (in thousand million rubles)				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total large-scale industry .	21.0	27.5	33.9	38.5	41.9
Of which:					
Group "A": instruments and means of production . . .	10.2	14.5	18.8	22.0	24.3
Group "B": consumer goods	10.8	13.0	15.1	16.5	17.6
Relative importance	(per cent of total)				
Group "A": instruments and means of production . . .	48.5	52.6	55.4	57.0	58.0
Group "B": consumer goods	51.5	47.4	44.6	43.0	42.0
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As you see, this table requires no explanation.

In our country, which is still young as regards technical development, industry has a special task to fulfil. It must reconstruct on a new technical basis not only itself, not only all branches of industry, including light industry, the food industry, and the timber industry; it must also reconstruct all forms of transport and all branches of agriculture. It can fulfil this task, however, only if the machine-building industry—which is the main lever for the reconstruction of the national economy—occupies a predominant place in it. The figures for the period under review show that our machine-building industry

has advanced to the leading place in the total volume of industrial output.

Here is the corresponding table:

Relative Importance of Various Branches of Industry
(Per cent of total gross output)

	U.S.S.R.			
	1913	1929	1932	1933
Coal	2.9	2.1	1.7	2.0
Coke	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.6
Oil (extraction). . . .	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.4
Oil (refining)	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.6
Iron and steel	No data	4.5	3.7	4.0
Non-ferrous metals . .	" "	1.5	1.3	1.2
Machine building . . .	11.0	14.8	25.0	26.1
Basic chemicals . . .	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9
Cotton textiles	18.3	15.2	7.6	7.3
Woolen textiles. . . .	3.1	3.1	1.9	1.8

This means that our industry is developing on a sound foundation, and that the key to reconstruction—the machine building industry—is entirely in our hands. All that is required is that we use it skilfully and rationally.

The development of industry according to social sectors during the period under review present an interesting picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

***Gross Output of Large-Scale Industry
According to Social Sectors
(In prices of 1926-27)***

	(In million rubles)				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
<i>Total output</i>	21,025	27,477	33,903	38,464	41,968
Of which:					
I. Socialised industry. .	20,891	27,402	No data	38,436	41,940
Of which:					
a) State industry. . . .	19,143	24,989	" "	35,587	38,932
b) Co-operative industry	1,748	2,413	" "	2,849	3,008
II. Private industry . . .	134	75	" "	28	28
	(Per cent of total)				
<i>Total output</i>	100	100	100	100	100
Of which:					
I. Socialised industry. .	99.4	99.7	No data	99.93	99.93
Of which:					
a) State industry. . . .	91.1	90.9	" "	92.52	92.76
b) Co-operative industry	8.3	8.8	" "	7.41	7.17
II. Private industry . . .	0.6	0.3	" "	0.07	0.07

From this table it is evident that the capitalist elements in industry have already come to an end and that the socialist system of economy is now the sole system, holding a position of monopoly, in our industry. (*Applause.*)

However, of all the achievements of industry in the period under review the most important is the fact that it has succeeded in this period in training and moulding thousands of new men and women, of new leaders of industry, whole strata of new engineers and technicians, hundreds of thousands of young skilled workers who have

mastered the new technique and who have advanced our socialist industry. There can be no doubt that without these men and women industry could not have achieved the successes it has achieved, and of which it has a right to be proud. The figures show that in the period under review about 800,000 more or less skilled workers have graduated into industry from factory training schools, and over 180,000 engineers and technicians from higher technical educational institutions, other higher educational institutions and technical schools. If it is true that the problem of cadres is a most important problem of our development, then it must be admitted that our industry is beginning really to cope with this problem.

Such are the principal achievements of our industry.

It would be wrong, however, to think that industry has only successes to record. No, it also has its defects. The chief of these are:

- a) The continuing lag of the *iron and steel industry*;
- b) The lack of order in the *non-ferrous metals industry*;
- c) The underestimation of the great importance of developing the mining of *local coal* for the general fuel supply of the country (Moscow Region, the Caucasus, the Urals, Karaganda, Central Asia, Siberia, the Far East, the Northern Territory, etc.);

- d) The absence of proper attention to the question of organising a new *oil centre* in areas of the Urals, Bashkiria, and the Emba;

- e) The absence of serious concern for expanding the production of *goods for mass consumption* both in the light and food industries and in the timber industry;

- f) The absence of proper attention to the question of developing *local industry*;

g) An absolutely impermissible attitude towards the question of improving the *quality of output*;

h) The continuing lag as regards increasing the *productivity of labour*, reducing the *cost of production*, and adopting *business accounting*;

i) The fact that bad organisation of work and wages, lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation have not yet been eliminated;

j) The fact that *red-tape and bureaucratic* methods of management in the economic People's Commissariats and their bodies, including the People's Commissariats of the light and food industries, are still far from having been eliminated.

The absolute necessity for the speedy elimination of these defects scarcely needs any further explanation. As you know, the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals industries failed to fulfil their plan throughout the first five-year plan period; nor have they fulfilled the plan for the first year of the second five year plan period. If they continue to lag behind they may become a brake on industry and the cause of failures in its work. As to the creation of new centres of the coal and oil industries, it is not difficult to understand that unless this urgent task is fulfilled both industry and transport may run aground. The question of goods for mass consumption and of developing local industry, as well as the questions of improving the quality of output, of increasing the productivity of labour, of reducing production costs, and of adopting business accounting also need no further explanation. As for the bad organisation of work and wages, and red-tape and bureaucratic methods of management, the case of the Donbas and of the enterprises of the light

and food industries has shown that this dangerous disease is to be found in all branches of industry and hinders their development. If it is not eliminated, industry will be in a bad way.

Our immediate tasks are:

1) To maintain the present leading role of machine building in the system of industry.

2) To eliminate the lag of the iron and steel industry.

3) To put the non-ferrous metals industries in order.

4) To develop to the utmost the mining of local coal in all the areas already known; to develop new coal-fields (for example, in the Bureya district in the Far East), and to convert the Kuzbas into a second Donbas. (*Prolonged applause.*)

5) Seriously to set about organising a centre of the oil industry in the areas of the western and southern slopes of the Urals range.

6) To expand the production of goods for mass consumption by all the economic People's Commissariats.

7) To develop local Soviet industry; to give it the opportunity of displaying initiative in the production of goods for mass consumption and to give it all possible assistance in the way of raw materials and funds.

8) To improve the quality of the goods produced; to stop turning out incomplete sets of goods, and to punish all those comrades, irrespective of their post, who violate or evade Soviet laws concerning the quality and completeness of sets of goods.

9) To secure a systematic increase in the productivity of labour, a reduction in production costs, and the adoption of business accounting.

10) To put an end to lack of personal responsibility in work and to wage equalisation.

11) To eliminate red-tape and bureaucratic methods of management in all the departments of the economic Commissariats, and to check systematically the fulfilment of the decisions and instructions of the directing centres by the subordinate bodies.

2. THE PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURE

Development in the sphere of agriculture has proceeded somewhat differently. In the period under review progress in the main branches of agriculture proceeded many times more slowly than in industry, but nevertheless more rapidly than in the period when individual farming predominated. In live stock farming, however, there was even a reverse process—a decline in the number of livestock, and it was only in 1933, and then only in pig breeding, that signs of progress were observed.

Evidently, the enormous difficulties of uniting the scattered small peasant farms into collective farms, the difficult task of creating a large number of big grain and live-stock farms, starting almost from nothing, and, in general, the period of *reorganisation*, when individual agriculture was being remodelled and transferred to the new, collective-farm basis, which required much time and considerable outlay—all these factors inevitably predetermined both the slow rate of progress of agriculture, and the relatively long period of decline in the number of livestock.

In point of fact, in agriculture the period under review was not so much one of rapid progress and power-

ful upswing as one during which the conditions were created for such a progress and upswing in the near future.

If we take the figures for the increase in the area under all crops, and separately the figures for industrial crops, we get the following picture of the development of agriculture during the period under review.

Area under All Crops in the U.S.S.R.

	(In million hectares)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total crop area . . .	105.0	118.0	127.2	136.3	134.4	129.7
Of which:						
a) Grain crops . .	94.4	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5
b) Industrial crops .	4.5	8.8	10.5	14.0	14.9	12.0
c) Vegetables and melons	3.8	7.6	8.0	9.1	9.2	8.6
d) Fodder crops . .	2.1	5.0	6.5	8.8	10.6	7.3

Area under Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R.

	(In million hectares)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Cotton	0.69	1.06	1.58	2.14	2.17	2.05
Flax (long fibre) . .	1.02	1.63	1.75	2.39	2.51	2.40
Sugar-beet.	0.65	0.77	1.04	1.39	1.54	1.21
Oil seeds	2.00	5.20	5.22	7.55	7.98	5.79

These tables reflect the two main lines in agriculture:

1) The line of the greatest possible expansion of crop areas in the period when the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, when collective farms were being formed

in tens of thousands and were driving the kulaks from the land, seizing the vacated land and taking charge of it.

2) The line of refraining from wholesale expansion of crop areas; the line of passing from wholesale expansion of crop areas to improved cultivation of the land, to the introduction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, to an increase of the harvest yield and, if shown to be necessary in practice, to a temporary reduction of crop areas.

As you know, the second line—the only correct line in agriculture—was proclaimed in 1932, when the period of reorganisation in agriculture was drawing to a close and the question of increasing the harvest yield became one of the fundamental questions of the progress of agriculture.

But the data on the growth of the crop areas cannot be regarded as a fully adequate indication of the development of agriculture. It sometimes happens that while the crop area increases, output does not increase, or even declines, because cultivation of the soil has deteriorated, and the yield per hectare has fallen. In view of this, data on crop areas must be supplemented by data on gross output.

Here is the corresponding table:

***Gross Output of Grain and Industrial
Crops in the U.S.S.R.***

	(In million centners)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Grain crops	801.0	717.4	835.4	694.8	698.7	898.0
Raw cotton	7.4	8.6	11.1	12.9	12.7	13.2
Flax fibre	3.3	3.6	4.4	5.5	5.0	5.6
Sugar-beet.	109.0	62.5	140.2	120.5	65.6	90.0
Oil seeds	21.5	35.8	36.2	51.0	45.5	46.0

It can be seen from this table that the years in which the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, viz., 1931 and 1932, were the years of the greatest decrease in the output of grain crops.

It follows, further, from this table that in the flax and cotton areas, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at a slower pace, flax and cotton hardly suffered, and progressed more or less evenly and steadily, while maintaining a high level of development.

Thirdly, it follows from this table that whereas there was only a slight fluctuation in the output of oil seeds, and a high level of development was maintained as compared with the pre-war level, in the sugar-beet districts, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at the most rapid rate, sugar beet farming, which was the last to enter the period of reorganisation, suffered its greatest decline in the last year of reorganisation, viz., in 1932, when output dropped below the pre-war level.

Lastly, it follows from this table that 1933, the first year after the completion of the reorganisation period, marks a turning-point in the development of grain and industrial crops.

This means that from now on grain crops, in the first place, and then industrial crops, will firmly and surely achieve a mighty advance.

The branch of agriculture that suffered most in the reorganisation period was livestock farming.

Here is the corresponding table:

Livestock in the U.S.S.R.

	(Million head)					
	1916	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
a) Horses	35.1	34.0	30.2	26.2	19.6	16.6
b) Large cattle . . .	58.9	68.1	52.5	47.9	40.7	38.6
c) Sheep and goats . .	115.2	147.2	108.8	77.7	52.1	50.6
d) Pigs	20.3	20.9	13.6	14.4	11.6	12.2

It can be seen from this table that in the period under review there was not an improvement, but a continual decline in the quantity of livestock in the country as compared with the pre-war level. It is obvious that this table reflects, on the one hand, the fact that livestock farming was most of all dominated by big kulak elements, and, on the other hand, the intense kulak agitation for the slaughter of livestock, which found favourable soil in the years of reorganisation.

Furthermore, it follows from this table that the decline in the number of livestock began in the very first year of reorganisation (1930) and continued right up to 1933. The decline was greatest in the first three years; while in 1933, the first year after the termination of the period of reorganisation, when the grain crops began to make progress, the decline in the number of livestock reached a minimum.

Lastly, it follows from this table that the reverse process has already commenced in pig breeding, and that in 1933 signs of direct progress were already seen.

This means that the year 1934 can and must mark a turning point towards progress in all branches of livestock farming.

How did the collectivisation of peasant farms develop in the period under review?

Here is the corresponding table:

Collectivisation

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Number of collective farms (thousands)	57.0	85.9	211.1	211.05	224.5
Number of households in collective farms (millions)	1.0	6.0	13.0	14.9	15.2
Per cent of peasant farms collectivised	3.9	23.6	52.7	61.5	65.0

And what was the development as regards the areas under grain crops according to sectors?

Here is the corresponding table:

Area under Grain Crops According to Sectors

Sectors	(In million hectares)					Per cent of total area in 1913
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	
1. State farms . . .	1.5	2.9	8.1	9.3	10.8	10.6
2. Collective farms	3.4	29.7	61.0	69.1	75.0	73.9
3. Individual peasant farms . . .	91.1	69.2	35.3	21.3	15.7	15.5
Total grain crop area in the U.S.S.R.	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5	100.0

What do these tables show?

They show that the period of reorganisation in agriculture, during which the number of collective farms and

the number of their members increased at a tempestuous pace, is now ended, that it was already ended in 1932.

Hence, the further process of collectivisation is a process of the gradual absorption and re-education of the remaining individual peasant farms and farmers by the collective farms.

This means that the collective farms have triumphed completely and irrevocably. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

They show also that the state farms and collective farms together control 84.5 per cent of the total area under grain in the U.S.S.R.

This means that the collective farms and state farms together have become a force which determines the fate of the whole of agriculture and of all its branches.

The tables further show that the 65 per cent of peasant farms united in collective farms control 73.9 per cent of the total area under grain crops, whereas all the individual peasant farms that remain, representing 35 per cent of the entire peasant population, control only 15.5 per cent of the total area under grain crops.

If we add to this fact that in 1933 the various deliveries to the state made by the collective farms amounted to more than 1,000 million poods of grain, while the individual peasants, who fulfilled their plan 100 per cent, delivered only about 130,000,000 poods; whereas in 1929-30 the individual peasants delivered to the state about 780,000,000 poods, and the collective farms not more than 120,000,000 poods—then it becomes absolutely clear that during the period under review the collective farms and the individual peasants have complete-

ly exchanged roles: the collective farms during this period have become the predominant force in agriculture, whereas the individual peasants have become a secondary force and are compelled to subordinate and adapt themselves to the collective-farm system.

It must be admitted that the labouring peasantry, our Soviet peasantry, has completely and irrevocably taken its stand under the Red banner of socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Let the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and bourgeois Trotskyite gossips chatter about the peasantry being counter-revolutionary by nature, about its mission to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R., about its inability to serve as the ally of the working class in building socialism, and about the impossibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. The facts show that these gentlemen slander the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet peasantry. The facts show that our Soviet peasantry has quit the shores of capitalism for good and is going forward, in alliance with the working class, to socialism. The facts show that we have already laid the foundations of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R., and it only remains for us to erect the superstructures—a task which undoubtedly is much easier than that of laying the foundations of a socialist society.

The increase in crop area and in output is not the only thing, however, that reflects the strength of the collective farms and state farms. Their strength is reflected also in the increase in the number of tractors at their disposal, in their increasing use of machinery. There is no doubt that in this respect our collective farms and state farms have gone a long way forward.

Here is the corresponding table:

***Number of Tractors Employed in Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.
(Allowance made for depreciation)***

	Number of tractors in thousands					Capacity in thousands of horse-power				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total number of tractors	34.9	72.1	125.3	148.5	204.1	391.4	1,003.5	1,850.0	2,225.0	3,100.0
Of which:										
a) In machine and tractor stations . . .	2.4	31.1	63.3	74.8	122.3	23.9	372.5	848.0	1,077.0	1,872.0
b) In state farms of all systems . .	9.7	27.7	51.5	64.0	81.8	123.4	483.1	892.0	1,043.0	1,318.0

Thus, we have 204,000 tractors with a total of 3,100,000 H.P. working for the collective farms and state farms. This force, as you see, is not a small one; it is a force capable of pulling up all the roots of capitalism in the countryside; it is a force twice as great as the number of tractors that Lenin once mentioned as a remote prospect.⁷⁷

As regards the number of agricultural machines in the machine and tractor stations and in the state farms under the People's Commissariat of State Farms, figures are given in the following tables:

In Machine and Tractor Stations

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	7 (units)	0.1	2.2	11.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands)	0.1	4.9	6.2	17.6
Complex and semi-complex threshers (thousands)	2.9	27.8	37.0	50.0
Electric threshing installations	168	268	551	1,283
MTS repair shops	104	770	1,220	1,933
Motor lorries (thousands)	0.2	1.0	6.0	13.5
Passenger motor-cars (units)	17	191	245	2,800

*In State Farms Controlled
by the People's Commissariat of State Farms*

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	1.7	6.3	11.9	13.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands)	0.3	0.7	1.2	2.5
Complex and semi-complex threshers (thousands)	1.4	4.2	7.1	8.0
Electric installations	42	112	164	222
Repair shops:				
a) For capital repairs	72	133	208	302
b) For medium repairs	75	160	215	476
c) For running repairs	205	310	578	1,166
Motor lorries (thousands)	2.1	3.7	6.2	10.9
Passenger motor-cars (units)	118	385	625	1,890

I do not think that these figures require any explanation.

Of no little importance for the progress of agriculture was also the formation of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and the sending of skilled personnel into agriculture. Everybody admits now that the personnel of the Political Departments played a tremendous role in improving the work of the collective farms and state farms. You know that during the period under review the Central Committee of the Party sent more than 23,000 Communists to the countryside to reinforce the cadres in agriculture. More than 3,000 of them were sent to work in the land organs, more than 2,000 to state farms, more than 13,000 to the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations, and over 5,000 to the Political Departments of the state farms.

The same must be said about the provision of new engineering, technical and agronomic forces for the collective farms and state farms. As you know, more than 111,000 workers of this category were sent into agriculture during the period under review.

During the period under review, over 1,900,000 tractor drivers, harvester-combine drivers and operators, and automobile drivers were trained and sent to work in the system under the People's Commissariat of Agriculture alone.

During the same period more than 1,600,000 chairmen and members of management boards of collective farms, brigade leaders for field work, brigade leaders for livestock raising, and book-keepers were trained or received additional training.

This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. But still, it is something.

As you see, the state has done everything possible to facilitate the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and of the People's Commissariat of State Farms in guiding collective-farm and state-farm development.

Can it be said that these possibilities have been properly used?

Unfortunately, it cannot.

To begin with, these People's Commissariats are more infected than others with the disease of red tape. Decisions are made, but not a thought is given to checking their fulfilment, to calling to order those who disobey the instructions and orders of the leading bodies, and to promoting honest and conscientious workers.

One would think that the existence of a huge number of tractors and machines would impose upon the land organs the obligation to keep these valuable machines in good order, to see to their timely repair, to employ them more or less efficiently. What is being done by them in this respect? Unfortunately, very little. The maintenance of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. Repairs are also unsatisfactory, because even to this day there is a refusal to understand that the basis of repairs is running and medium repairs, and not capital repairs. As for the utilisation of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory position in this respect is so clear and well known that it needs no proof.

One of the immediate tasks in agriculture is to introduce proper rotation of crops and to secure the extension of clean fallow and the improvement of seeds in all

branches of agriculture. What is being done in this respect? Unfortunately, very little as yet. The state of affairs in regard to grain and cotton seed is so muddled that it will take a long time to put straight.

One of the effective means of increasing the yield of industrial crops is to supply them with fertilisers. What is being done in this respect? Very little as yet. Fertilisers are available, but the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture fail to get them; and when they do get them they do not see to it that they are delivered on time to the places where they are required and that they are utilised properly.

In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate the great revolutionising role of our state farms. But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date, we find an enormous discrepancy to the disadvantage of the state farms. The principal reason for the discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge farms. The state farms themselves are too specialised, they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do not include sectors for livestock raising. Evidently, it will be necessary to split up the state farms and do away with their excessive specialisation. One might think that it was the People's Commissariat of State Farms that raised this question opportunely and succeeded in solving it. But that is not so. The question was raised and settled on the initiative of people who were not connected in any way with the People's Commissariat of State Farms.

Finally, there is the question of livestock farming. I have already reported on the serious situation with regard to livestock. One might think that our land organs would display feverish activity in an effort to put an end to the crisis of livestock farming, that they would sound the alarm, mobilise their personnel and tackle the problem of livestock farming. Unfortunately, nothing of the kind has happened, or is happening. Not only have they failed to sound the alarm about the serious livestock situation, but, on the contrary, they try to gloss over the question, and sometimes in their reports even try to conceal from the public opinion of the country the actual situation of livestock farming, which is absolutely impermissible for Bolsheviks. To hope, after this, that the land organs will be able to put livestock farming on to the right road and raise it to the proper level would be building on sand. The whole Party, all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take this matter in hand, bearing in mind that the livestock problem today is of the same prime importance as the grain problem—now successfully solved—was yesterday. There is no need to prove that our Soviet people, who have overcome many a serious obstacle in the path to the goal, will be able to overcome this obstacle as well. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is a brief and far from complete enumeration of the defects which must be removed, and of the tasks which must be fulfilled in the immediate future.

But the matter does not end with these tasks. There are other tasks in agriculture, concerning which a few words must be said.

First of all, we must bear in mind that the old division of our regions into industrial regions and agrarian regions has now become obsolete. We no longer have any exclusively agrarian regions that would supply grain, meat and vegetables to the industrial regions; just as we no longer have any exclusively industrial regions that would expect to obtain all necessary produce from outside, from other regions. Development is leading to the point where all our regions will be more or less industrial, and they will become increasingly so as this development proceeds. This means that the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and other formerly agrarian areas can no longer supply the industrial centres with as much produce as they supplied in the past, because they have to feed their own towns and their own workers, the number of which will be increasing. But from this it follows that every region must develop its own agricultural base, so as to have its own supply of vegetables, potatoes, butter and milk, and, to some extent, grain and meat, if it does not want to get into difficulties. You know that this is quite practicable and is already being done.

The task is to pursue this line to the end at all costs.

Further, we should note the fact that the familiar division of our regions into consuming regions and producing regions is also beginning to lose its hard and fast character. This year such "consuming" regions as the Moscow and Gorky regions delivered nearly 80,000,000 poods of grain to the state. This, of course, is no small item. In the so-called consuming zone there are about 5,000,000 hectares of virgin soil, covered with scrub. It is well known that the climate in this zone is not bad; precipitation is

ample, and droughts unknown. If this land were cleared of scrub and a number of organisational measures were undertaken, it would be possible to obtain a vast area for grain crops, which with the usually high yield in these localities could supply no less market grain than is now supplied by the Lower or Middle Volga. This would be a great help for the industrial centres in the north.

Evidently, the task is to develop large tracts under grain crops in the areas of the consuming zone.

Finally, there is the question of combating drought in the Trans-Volga area. Afforestation and the planting of forest shelter belts in the eastern districts of the Trans-Volga area is of tremendous importance. As you know, this work is already taking place, although it cannot be said that it is being carried on with sufficient intensity. As regards the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area—the most important thing in combating drought—we must not allow this matter to be indefinitely postponed. It is true that this work has been held up some what by certain external circumstances which cause considerable forces and funds to be diverted to other purposes. But now there is no longer any reason why it should be further postponed. We cannot do without a large and absolutely stable grain base on the Volga, one which will be independent of the vagaries of the weather and will provide annually about 200,000,000 of marketable grain. This is absolutely necessary, in view of the growth of the towns on the Volga, on the one hand, and of the possibility of all sorts of complications in the sphere of international relations, on the other.

The task is to set to work seriously to organise the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area. (*Applause.*)

3. THE RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

We have thus depicted the situation of our industry and agriculture, their development during the period under review and their state at the present moment.

To sum up, we have:

a) A mighty advance in production both in industry and in the main branches of agriculture.

b) The final victory, on the basis of this advance, of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist system both in industry and in agriculture; the socialist system has become the sole system in the whole of the national economy, and the capitalist elements have been ousted from all spheres of the national economy.

c) The final abandonment of small-commodity individual farming by the overwhelming majority of the peasants; their uniting in collective farms on the basis of collective labour and collective ownership of the means of production; the complete victory of collective farming over small-commodity individual farming.

d) An ever-increasing process of expansion of the collective farms through the absorption of individual peasant farms, which are thus diminishing in number month by month and are, in fact, being converted into an auxiliary force for the collective farms and state farms.

Naturally, this historic victory over the exploiters could not but lead to a radical improvement in the material standard of the working people and in their conditions of life generally.

The elimination of the parasitic classes has led to the disappearance of the exploitation of man by man.

The labour of the worker and the peasant is freed from exploitation. The incomes which the exploiters used to squeeze out of the labour of the people now remain in the hands of the working people and are used partly for the expansion of production and the enlistment of new detachments of working people in production, and partly for directly increasing the incomes of the workers and peasants.

Unemployment, that scourge of the working class, has disappeared. In the bourgeois countries millions of unemployed suffer want and privation owing to lack of work, whereas in our country there are no longer any workers who have no work and no earnings.

With the disappearance of kulak bondage, poverty in the countryside has disappeared. Every peasant, whether a collective farmer or an individual farmer, now has the opportunity of living a human existence, provided only that he wants to work conscientiously and not to be a loafer, a tramp, or a despoiler of collective-farm property.

The abolition of exploitation, the abolition of unemployment in the towns, and the abolition of poverty in the countryside are historic achievements in the material condition of the working people that are beyond even the dreams of the workers and peasants even in the most "democratic" of the bourgeois countries.

The very appearance of our large towns and industrial centres has changed. An inevitable feature of the big towns in bourgeois countries is the slums, the so-called working-class districts on the outskirts of the towns—a heap of dark, damp and dilapidated dwellings, mostly of the basement type, where usually the poor live in

filth and curse their fate. The revolution in the U.S.S.R. has meant the disappearance of such slums. They have been replaced by blocks of bright and well-built workers' houses; in many cases the working-class districts of our towns present a better appearance than the centre of the town.

The appearance of the countryside has changed even more. The old type of village, with the church in the most prominent place, with the best houses—those of the police officer, the priest, and the kulaks—in the foreground, and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the background, is beginning to disappear. Its place is being taken by the new type of village, with its public farm buildings, with its clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries and crèches; with its tractors, harvester combines, threshing machines and automobiles. The former important personages of the village, the kulak-exploiter, the blood-sucking usurer, the merchant-speculator, the “little father” police officer, have disappeared. Now, the prominent personages are the leading people of the collective farms and state farms, of the schools and clubs, the senior tractor and combine drivers, the brigade leaders in field work and livestock raising, and the best men and women shock brigaders on the collective-farm fields.

The antithesis between town and country is disappearing. The peasants are ceasing to regard the town as the centre of their exploitation. The economic and cultural bond between town and country is becoming stronger. The country now receives assistance from the town and from urban industry in the shape of tractors, agricultural machinery, automobiles, workers, and funds. And the countryside itself now has its own industry, in

the shape of the machine and tractor stations, repair shops, all sorts of industrial undertakings of the collective farms, small electric power stations, etc. The cultural gulf between town and country is being bridged.

Such are the principal achievements of the working people in the sphere of improving their material conditions, their everyday life, and their cultural standard.

On the basis of these achievements we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) An increase in the national income from 35,000 million rubles in 1930 to 50,000 million rubles in 1933. In view of the fact that the income of the capitalist elements, including concessionaires, at the present time constitutes less than one half of one per cent of the total national income, almost the whole of the national income is distributed among the workers and other employees, the labouring peasants, the co-operatives, and the state.

b) An increase in the population of the Soviet Union from 160,500,000 at the end of 1930 to 168,000,000 at the end of 1933.

c) An increase in the number of workers and other employees from 14,530,000 in 1930 to 21,883,000 in 1933. The number of manual workers increased during this period from 9,489,000 to 13,797,000; the number of workers employed in large-scale industry, including transport, increased from 5,079,000 to 6,882,000; the number of agricultural workers increased from 1,426,000 to 2,519,000, and the number of workers and other employees engaged in trade increased from 814,000 to 1,497,000.

d) An increase in the total of the wages paid to workers and other employees from 13,597 million rubles in 1930 to 34,280 million rubles in 1933.

e) An increase in the average annual wages of industrial workers from 991 rubles in 1930 to 1,519 rubles in 1933.

f) An increase in the social insurance fund for workers and other employees from 1,810 million rubles in 1930 to 4,610 million rubles in 1933.

g) The adoption of a seven-hour working day in all surface industries.

h) State aid to the peasants by the organisation of 2,860 machine and tractor stations, involving an investment of 2,000 million rubles.

i) State aid to the peasants in the form of credits to the collective farms amounting to 1,600 million rubles.

j) State aid to the peasants in the form of seed and food loans amounting in the period under review to 262 million poods of grain.

k) State aid to the economically weaker peasants in the shape of relief from taxation and insurance payments amounting to 370 million rubles.

As regards the cultural development of the country, we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education throughout the U.S.S.R., and an increase in literacy among the population from 67 per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 1933.

b) An increase in the number of pupils and students at schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929 to 26,419,000 in 1933, including an increase from 11,697,000 to 19,163,000 in the number receiving *elementary* education, from 2,453,000 to 6,674,000 in the number receiv-

ing *secondary* education, and from 207,000 to 491,000 in the number receiving *higher* education.

c) An increase in the number of children receiving pre-school education from 838,000 in 1929 to 5,917,000 in 1933.

d) An increase in the number of higher educational institutions, general and special, from 91 in 1914 to 600 in 1933.

e) An increase in the number of scientific research institutes from 400 in 1929 to 840 in 1933.

f) An increase in the number of clubs and similar institutions from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933.

g) An increase in the number of cinemas, cinema installations in clubs, and mobile cinemas, from 9,800 in 1929 to 29,200 in 1933.

h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933.

Perhaps it will not be amiss to point out that the proportion of workers among the students in our higher educational institutions is 51.4 per cent of the total, and that of labouring peasants 16.5 per cent; whereas in Germany, for instance, the proportion of workers among the students in higher educational institutions in 1932-33 was only 3.2 per cent of the total, and that of small peasants only 2.4 per cent.

We must note as a gratifying fact and as an indication of the progress of culture in the countryside, the increased activity of the women collective farmers in social and organisational work. We know, for example, that about 6,000 women collective farmers are chairmen of collective farms, more than 60,000 are members of management boards of collective farms, 28,000

are brigade leaders, 100,000 are team organisers, 9,000 are managers of collective-farm marketable livestock sectors, and 7,000 are tractor drivers.

Needless to say, these figures are incomplete; but even these figures quite clearly show the great progress of culture in the countryside. This fact, comrades, is of tremendous significance. It is of tremendous significance because women form half the population of our country; they constitute a huge army of workers; and they are called upon to bring up our children, our future generation, that is to say, our future. That is why we must not permit this huge army of working people to remain in darkness and ignorance! That is why we must welcome the growing social activity of the working women and their promotion to leading posts as an indubitable sign of the growth of our culture. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Finally, I must point out one more fact, but of a negative character. I have in mind the intolerable fact that our pedagogical and medical faculties are still being neglected. This is a great defect bordering on violation of the interests of the state. This defect must be remedied without fail, and the sooner the better.

4. THE PROGRESS OF TRADE TURNOVER AND TRANSPORT

Thus we have:

- a) An increase in the output of industry, including goods for mass consumption.
- b) An increase in the output of agriculture.

c) A growth in the requirements and the demand for produce and manufactured goods on the part of the masses of the working people of town and country.

What more is needed to co-ordinate these conditions and to ensure that the entire mass of consumers receives the necessary goods and produce?

Some comrades think that these conditions alone are sufficient for the economic life of the country to go full steam ahead. That is a profound delusion. We can imagine a situation in which all these conditions exist; yet if the goods do not reach the consumers, economic life—far from going full steam ahead—will, on the contrary, be dislocated and disorganised to its foundations. It is high time we realised that in the last analysis goods are produced not for the sake of producing them, but for consumption. Cases have occurred where we have had quite a quantity of goods and produce, but they have not only not reached the consumers, they have continued for years to wander in the bureaucratic backwaters of our so-called commodity-distribution network, at a distance from the consumers. Naturally, under these circumstances industry and agriculture lost all stimulus to increase production; the commodity-distribution network became overstocked, while the workers and peasants had to go without these goods and produce. The result was a dislocation of the economic life of the country, despite the existence of the goods and produce. If the economic life of the country is to go full steam ahead, and industry and agriculture are to have a stimulus for further in creasing their output, one more condition is necessary, namely, well-developed *trade turnover* between town and country, between the various

districts and regions of the country, between the various branches of the national economy. The country must be covered with a vast network of wholesale distribution bases, shops and stores. There must be a ceaseless flow of goods through these bases, shops and stores from the producer to the consumer. The state trading system, the co-operative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms, and the individual peasants must be drawn into this work.

This is what we call fully developed *Soviet trade*, trade *without* capitalists, trade *without* speculators.

As you see, the expansion of Soviet trade is a very urgent problem, which must be solved or further progress will be rendered impossible.

And yet, in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly obvious, in the period under review the Party has had to overcome a number of obstacles to the expansion of Soviet trade which could briefly be described as the result of an aberration of the brain among a section of Communists on questions of the necessity and importance of Soviet trade.

To begin with, there is still among a section of Communists a supercilious, disdainful attitude towards trade in general, and towards Soviet trade in particular. These Communists, so-called, look upon Soviet trade as a matter of secondary importance, not worth bothering about, and those engaged in trade as being quite hopeless. Evidently, these people do not realise that their supercilious attitude towards Soviet trade is not an expression of Bolshevik views, but rather of the views of impoverished aristocrats who are full of ambition but lack ammunition. (*Applause.*) These people do not real-

ise that Soviet trade is our own, Bolshevik work, and that those employed in trade, including those behind the counter—if only they work conscientiously—are doing our revolutionary, Bolshevik work. (*Applause.*) It goes without saying that the Party had to give those Communists, so-called, a slight dressing down and throw their aristocratic prejudices on the rubbish heap. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, we had to overcome prejudices of another kind. I have in mind the Leftist chatter current among a section of our functionaries to the effect that Soviet trade is a superseded stage; that it is necessary to organise the direct exchange of products; that money will soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens; that it is unnecessary to develop trade, since the direct exchange of products is knocking at the door. It must be observed that this Leftist petty-bourgeois chatter, which plays into the hands of the capitalist elements who are striving to sabotage the expansion of Soviet trade, is current not only among a section of our “Red professors,” but also among certain of our trading personnel. Of course, it is ridiculous and funny to hear these people, who are incapable of organising the very simple business of Soviet trade, chatter about their readiness to organise the more complicated and difficult business of a direct exchange of products. But Don Quixotes are called Don Quixotes precisely because they lack the most elementary sense of reality. These people, who are as far removed from Marxism as the sky from the earth, evidently do not realise that we shall use money for a long time to come, right up to the time when the first stage of communism, i.e., the socialist

stage of development, has been completed. They do not realise that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy which the Soviet Government has taken over and adapted to the interests of socialism for the purpose of expanding Soviet trade to the utmost, and so preparing the conditions necessary for the direct exchange of products. They do not realise that the direct exchange of products can replace, and be the result of, only a perfectly organised system of Soviet trade, of which we have not a trace as yet, and shall not have for some time. Naturally, in trying to organise developed Soviet trade, our Party found it necessary to give a dressing down to these "Left" freaks as well, and to scatter their petty-bourgeois chatter to the winds.

Further, we had to overcome among the people in charge of trade the unhealthy habit of distributing goods mechanically; we had to put a stop to their indifference to the demand for a greater range of goods and to the requirements of the consumers; we had to put an end to the mechanical consignment of goods, to lack of personal responsibility in trade. For this purpose, regional and inter-district wholesale distribution bases and tens of thousands of new shops and booths were opened.

Further, we had to put an end to the monopoly position of the co-operatives in the market. In this connection we instructed all the People's Commissariats to start trade in the goods manufactured by the industries under their control; and the People's Commissariat of Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive open trade in agricultural produce. This has led, on the one hand, to an improvement in co-operative trade through

emulation, and, on the other hand, to a drop in market prices and to sounder conditions in the market.

A wide network of dining-rooms was established which provide food at reduced prices ("public catering"). Workers' Supply Departments were set up in the factories, and all those who had no connection with the factory were taken off the supply list; in the factories under the control of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry alone, no less than 500,000 such persons had to be removed from the list.

We have organised a single centralised bank for short term credit—the State Bank, with its 2,200 district branches capable of financing trade operations.

As a result of these measures we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) An increase in the number of shops and trading booths from 184,662 in 1930 to 277,974 in 1933.

b) A newly created network of regional wholesale distribution bases, numbering 1,011, and inter-district wholesale distribution bases, numbering 864.

c) A newly created network of Workers' Supply Departments, numbering 1,600.

d) An increase in the network of shops for non-rationed sale of bread, which now exist in 330 towns.

e) An increase in the number of public dining-rooms, which at the present time cater for 19,800,000 consumers.

f) An increase in state and co-operative trade turnover, including public dining-rooms, from 18,900 million rubles in 1930 to 49,000 million rubles in 1933.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that all this expansion of Soviet trade is sufficient to satisfy

the requirements of our economy. On the contrary, it is now becoming clearer than ever that the present state of trade turnover cannot satisfy our requirements. Hence, the task is to develop Soviet trade still further, to draw local industry into this work, to increase collective-farm and peasant trade, and to achieve new and decisive successes in the sphere of increasing Soviet trade.

It must be pointed out, however, that we cannot restrict ourselves merely to the expansion of Soviet trade. While the development of our economy depends upon the development of the trade turnover, upon the development of Soviet trade, the development of Soviet trade, in its turn, depends upon the development of our transport, both rail and water transport, and motor transport. It may happen that goods are available, that all the possibilities exist for expanding trade turnover, but transport cannot keep up with the development of trade turnover and refuses to carry the freight. As you know, this happens rather often. Hence, transport is the weak spot which may be a stumbling-block, and indeed is perhaps already beginning to be a stumbling-block to the whole of our economy and, above all, to our trade turnover.

It is true that railway transport has increased its freight turnover from 133,900 million ton-kilometres in 1930 to 172,000 million ton-kilometres in 1933. But that is too little, far too little for us, for our economy.

Water transport has increased its freight turnover from 45,600 million ton-kilometres in 1930 to 59,900 million ton-kilometres in 1933. But that is too little, far too little for our economy.

I say nothing of motor transport, in which the number of automobiles (lorries and passenger cars) has increased from 8,800 in 1913 to 117,800 at the end of 1933. That is so little for our national economy that one is ashamed even to mention it.

There can be no doubt that all these forms of transport could work much better if the transport system did not suffer from the well-known disease called red-tape methods of management. Hence, besides the need to help transport by providing personnel and means, our task is to root out the red-tape attitude in the administration departments of the transport system and to make them more efficient.

Comrades, we have succeeded in solving correctly the main problems of industry, which is now standing firmly on its feet. We have also succeeded in solving correctly the main problems of agriculture, and we can say quite definitely that agriculture also is now standing firmly on its feet. But we are in danger of losing all these achievements if our trade turnover begins to be defective and if transport becomes a fetter on our feet. Hence, the task of expanding trade turnover and of decisively improving transport is an immediate and urgent problem which must be solved or we cannot go forward.

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party.

The present congress is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism, under the flag of

the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist groups.

The anti-Leninist group of Trotskyites has been smashed and scattered. Its organisers are now to be found in the backyards of the bourgeois parties abroad.

The anti-Leninist group of the Right deviators has been smashed and scattered. Its organisers have long ago renounced their views and are now trying in every way to expiate the sins they committed against the Party.

The groups of nationalist deviators have been smashed and scattered. Their organisers have either completely merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else they have recanted.

The majority of the adherents to these anti-revolutionary groups had to admit that the line of the Party was correct and they have capitulated to the Party.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress⁷⁸ it was still necessary to prove that the Party line was correct and to wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; and at the Sixteenth Party Congress we had to deal the final blow to the last adherents of these groups. At this congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to fight. Everyone sees that the line of the Party has triumphed. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The policy of industrialising the country has triumphed. Its results are obvious to everyone. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The policy of eliminating the kulaks and of complete collectivisation has triumphed. Its results are also obvious to every one. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The experience of our country has shown that it is fully possible for socialism to achieve victory in one country taken separately. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

It is evident that all these successes, and primarily the victory of the five-year plan, have utterly demoralised and smashed all the various anti-Leninist groups.

It must be admitted that the Party today is united as it has never been before. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and that the offensive of socialism is to be discontinued as superfluous?

No, it does not.

Does it mean that all is well in our Party, that there will be no more deviations in the Party, and that, therefore, we may now rest on our laurels?

No, it does not.

We have smashed the enemies of the Party, the opportunists of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all kinds. But remnants of their ideology still live in the minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently they find expression. The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. And the ground for such moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for

the reason that there still exist in town and country certain intermediary strata of the population who constitute a medium which breeds such moods.

The Seventeenth Conference of our Party⁷⁹ declared that one of the fundamental political tasks in fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan is "to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people." That is an absolutely correct idea. But can we say that we have already overcome all the survivals of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. We cannot say that, not only because in development the minds of people lag behind their economic position, but also because the capitalist encirclement still exists, which endeavours to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism in the economic life and in the minds of the people of the U.S.S.R., and against which we Bolsheviks must always keep our powder dry.

Naturally, these survivals cannot but be a favourable ground for a revival of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups in the minds of individual members of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical level of the majority of our Party members, the inadequate ideological work of the Party bodies, and the fact that our Party functionaries are overburdened with purely practical work, which deprives them of the opportunity of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and you will understand the origin of the confusion on a number of questions of Leninism that exists in the minds of individual Party members, a confusion which not infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to re-

vive the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups.

That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any need for the policy of the socialist offensive.

It would be possible to take a number of questions of Leninism and demonstrate by means of them how tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups continue to exist in the minds of certain Party members.

Take, for example, the question of building a *classless socialist society*. The Seventeenth Party Conference declared that we are advancing towards the formation of a classless socialist society. Naturally, a classless society cannot come of its own accord, as it were. It has to be achieved and built by the efforts of all the working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by intensifying the class struggle, by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants of the capitalist classes, and in battles with enemies, both internal and external.

The point is clear, one would think.

And yet, who does not know that the enunciation of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given rise to not a little confusion in the minds of a section of Party members and to unhealthy sentiments among them? The thesis that we are advancing towards a classless society—put forward as a slogan—was interpreted by them to mean a spontaneous process. And they began to reason in this way: If it is a classless society, then we can relax the class struggle, we can relax the dictatorship of the proletariat, and get rid of the state

altogether, since it is fated to wither away soon in any case. And they fell into a state of foolish rapture, in the expectation that soon there would be no classes, and therefore no class struggle, and therefore no cares and worries, and therefore it is possible to lay down one's arms and go to bed—to sleep in expectation of the advent of a classless society. (General laughter.)

There can be no doubt that this confusion of mind and these sentiments are exactly like the well-known views of the Right deviators, who believed that the old must automatically grow into the new, and that one fine day we shall wake up and find ourselves in a socialist society.

As you see, remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups are capable of revival, and are far from having lost their vitality.

Naturally, if this confusion of views and these non-Bolshevik sentiments obtained a hold over the majority of our Party, the Party would find itself demobilised and disarmed.

Let us take, further, the question of the agricultural *artel* and the agricultural *commune*. Everybody admits now that under present conditions the *artel* is the only correct form of the collective-farm movement. And that is quite understandable: a) the *artel* correctly combines the personal, everyday interests of the collective farmers with their public interests; b) the *artel* successfully adapts personal, everyday interests to public interests, and thereby helps to educate the individual peasants of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism.

Unlike the *artel*, where only the means of production are socialised, the communes, until recently, socialised

not only the means of production, but also everyday life of every member of the commune; that is to say, the members of a commune, unlike the members of an artel, did not individually own poultry, small livestock, a cow, grain, or household land. This means that in the commune the personal, everyday interests of the members have not so much been taken into account and combined with the public interests as they have been eclipsed by the latter in the interests of petty-bourgeois equalisation. It is clear that this is the weakest side of the commune. This indeed explains why communes are not widespread, why there are but a few score of them in existence. For the same reason the communes, in order to maintain their existence and save themselves from going to pieces, have been compelled to abandon the system of socialising everyday life; they are beginning to work on the basis of the workday unit, and have begun to distribute grain among their members, to permit their members to own poultry, small livestock, a cow, etc. But from this it follows that, in fact, the commune has gone over to the position of the artel. And there is nothing bad in that, because it is necessary in the interests of the sound development of the mass collective-farm movement.

This does not mean, of course, that the commune is not needed at all, and that it no longer represents a higher form of the collective-farm movement. No, the commune is needed, and it is, of course, a higher form of the collective-farm movement. This applies, however, not to the present commune, which arose on the basis of undeveloped technique and of a shortage of produce, and which is itself going over to the position of the

artel; it applies to the commune of the future, which will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of an abundance of produce. The present agricultural commune arose on the basis of an underdeveloped technique and a shortage of produce. This indeed explains why it practised equalisation and took little account of the personal, everyday interests of its members, as a result of which it is now being compelled to go over to the position of the artel, in which the personal and public interests of the collective farmers are rationally combined. The future communes will arise out of developed and prosperous artels. The future agricultural commune will arise when the fields and farms of the artel have an abundance of grain, cattle, poultry, vegetables, and all other produce; when the artels have mechanised laundries, modern kitchens and dining-rooms, mechanised bakeries, etc.; when the collective farmer sees that it is more to his advantage to get meat and milk from the collective farm's meat and dairy department than to keep his own cow and small livestock; when the woman collective farmer sees that it is more to her advantage to take her meals in the dining-room, to get her bread from the public bakery, and to have her linen washed in the public laundry, than to do all these things herself. The future commune will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed artel, on the basis of an abundance of products. When will that be? Not soon, of course. But it will take place. It would be criminal artificially to accelerate the process of transition from the artel to the future commune. That would confuse the whole issue, and would facilitate the work of our enemies. The transition from

the artel to the future commune must proceed gradually, to the extent that all the collective farmers become convinced that such a transition is necessary.

That is how matters stand with regard to the question of the artel and the commune.

One would think that this was clear and almost elementary.

And yet there is a fair amount of confusion on this question among a section of Party members. There are those who think that by declaring the artel to be the fundamental form of the collective-farm movement the Party has drifted away from socialism, has retreated from the commune, from the higher form of the collective-farm movement, to a lower form. Why, one may ask? Because, it is suggested, there is no equality in the artel, since differences in the requirements and in the personal, everyday life of the members of the artel are preserved; whereas in the commune there is equality, because the requirements and the personal, everyday life of its members have been made equal. But, firstly, we no longer have any communes in which there is levelling, equalisation of requirements and personal, everyday life. Practice has shown that the communes would certainly have been doomed had they not abandoned equalisation and had they not in fact gone over to the position of artels. Consequently, there is no point in referring to what no longer exists. Secondly, every Leninist knows, if he is a real Leninist, that equalisation in the sphere of requirements and personal, everyday life is a reactionary petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of some primitive sect of ascetics, but not of a socialist society organised on Marxist lines; for we

cannot expect all people to have the same requirements and tastes, and all people to mould their personal, everyday life on the same model. And, finally, are not differences in requirements and in personal, everyday life still preserved among the workers? Does that mean that workers are more remote from socialism than members of agricultural communes?

These people evidently think that socialism calls for equalisation, for levelling the requirements and personal, everyday life of the members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism means, not equalisation of personal requirements and everyday life, but the abolition of classes, i.e., a) the equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production after they have been converted into the property of the whole of society; c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive in return for this according to the work performed (*socialist* society); d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive in return for this according to their needs (*communist* society). Moreover, Marxism proceeds from the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical and equal in regard to quality or quantity, whether in the period of socialism or in the period of communism.

There you have the Marxist conception of equality.

Marxism has never recognised, and does not recognise, any other equality.

To draw from this the conclusion that socialism calls for equalisation, for the levelling of the requirements of the members of society, for the levelling of their tastes and of their personal, everyday life—that according to the Marxist plan all should wear the same clothes and eat the same dishes in the same quantity—is to utter vulgarities and to slander Marxism.

It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalisation. Already in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels scourged primitive utopian socialism and termed it reactionary because it preached “universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.”⁸⁰ In his *Anti-Dühring* Engels devoted a whole chapter to a withering criticism of the “radical equalitarian socialism” put forward by Dühring in opposition to Marxist socialism.

“. . . The real content of the proletarian demand for equality,” said Engels, “is the demand for the *abolition of classes*. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity.”⁸¹

Lenin said the same thing:

“Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote that to conceive equality as meaning anything *beyond* the abolition of classes is a very stupid and absurd prejudice. Bourgeois professors have tried to make use of the concept of equality to accuse us of wanting to make all men equal to one another. They have tried to accuse the Socialists of this absurdity, which they themselves invented. But in their ignorance they did not know that the Socialists—and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels—said: Equality is an empty phrase unless

equality is understood to mean the abolition of classes. We want to abolish classes, and in this respect we stand for equality. But the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals" (Lenin's speech "On Deceiving the People with Slogans About Liberty and Equality," *Works*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 293-94⁸²).

Clear, one would think.

Bourgeois writers are fond of depicting Marxist socialism in the shape of the old tsarist barracks, where everything is subordinated to the "principle" of equalisation. But Marxists cannot be held responsible for the ignorance and stupidity of bourgeois writers.

There can be no doubt that this confusion in the minds of some Party members concerning Marxist socialism, and their infatuation with the equalitarian tendencies of agricultural communes, are exactly like the petty-bourgeois views of our Leftist blockheads, who at one time idealised the agricultural communes to such an extent that they even tried to set up communes in mills and factories, where skilled and unskilled workers, each working at his trade, had to pool their wages in a common fund, which was then shared out equally. You know what harm these infantile equalitarian exercises of the "Left" blockheads caused our industry.

As you see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups display rather considerable tenacity.

It is obvious that if these Leftist views were to triumph in the Party, the Party would cease to be Marxist, and the collective-farm movement would be utterly disorganised.

Or take, for example, the slogan "*Make all the collective farmers prosperous.*" This slogan applies not only to collective farmers; it applies still more to the workers, for we want to make all the workers prosperous—people leading a prosperous and fully cultured life.

One would think that the point was clear. There was no point in overthrowing capitalism in October 1917 and building socialism all these years if we are not going to secure a life of plenty for our people. Socialism does not mean poverty and privation, but the abolition of poverty and privation; it means the organisation of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society.

And yet, this clear and essentially elementary slogan has caused a good deal of perplexity, confusion and muddle among a section of our Party members. Is not this slogan, they ask, a reversion to the old slogan "Enrich yourselves," that was rejected by the Party? If everyone becomes prosperous, they go on to say, and the poor cease to exist, upon whom then are we Bolsheviks to rely in our work? How shall we work without the poor?

This may sound funny, but the existence of such naïve and anti-Leninist views among a section of Party members is an undoubted fact, which we must take into account.

Evidently, these people do not understand that a wide gulf lies between the slogan "Enrich yourselves" and the slogan "*Make all the collective farmers prosperous.*" In the first place, only *individual* persons or groups can enrich themselves; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life applies not to individual persons or groups, but to *all* collective farmers. Secondly, *individual*

persons or groups enrich themselves for the purpose of subordinating other people to themselves and *exploiting* them; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life for *all* the collective farmers—with the means of production in the collective farms socialised—*precludes* all possibility of the exploitation of some persons by others. Thirdly, the slogan “Enrich yourselves” was issued in the period when the New Economic Policy was in its initial stage, when capitalism was being partly restored, when the kulak was a power, when individual peasant farming predominated in the country and collective farming was in a rudimentary state; whereas the slogan “Make all the collective farmers prosperous” was issued in the last stage of NEP, when the capitalist elements in industry had been abolished, the kulaks in the countryside crushed, individual peasant farming forced into the background and the collective farms had become the predominant form of agriculture. This is apart from the fact that the slogan “Make all the collective farmers prosperous” was issued not in isolation, but inseparably bound up with the slogan “Make the collective farms Bolshevik.”

Is it not clear that in point of fact the slogan “Enrich yourselves” was a call to *restore* capitalism, whereas the slogan “Make all the collective farmers prosperous” is a call to *deal the final blow* to the last remnants of capitalism by increasing the economic power of the collective farms and by transforming all collective farmers into prosperous working people? (*Voices*: “Quite right!”)

Is it not clear that there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between these two slogans? (*Voices*: “Quite right!”)

As for the argument that Bolshevik work and socialism are inconceivable without the existence of the poor, it is so stupid that it is embarrassing even to talk about it. Leninists rely upon the poor when there exist both capitalist elements and the poor who are exploited by the capitalists. But when the capitalist elements have been crushed and the poor have been emancipated from exploitation, the task of Leninists is not to perpetuate and preserve poverty and the poor—the conditions for whose existence have already been eliminated—but to abolish poverty and to raise the poor to a life of prosperity. It would be absurd to think that socialism can be built on the basis of poverty and privation, on the basis of reducing personal requirements and lowering the standard of living to the level of the poor, who themselves, moreover, refuse to remain poor any longer and are pushing their way upward to a prosperous life. Who wants this sort of socialism, so-called? It would not be socialism, but a caricature of socialism. Socialism can be built only on the basis of a vigorous growth of the productive forces of society; on the basis of an abundance of produce and goods; on the basis of the prosperity of the working people, on the basis of a vigorous growth of culture. For socialism, Marxist socialism, means not the reduction of individual requirements, but their development to the utmost, to full bloom; not the restriction of these requirements or a refusal to satisfy them, but the full and all-round satisfaction of all the requirements of culturally developed working people.

There can be no doubt that this confusion in the views of certain members of the Party concerning the poor and prosperity is a reflection of the views of our

Leftist blockheads, who idealise the poor as the eternal bulwark of Bolshevism under all conditions, and who regard the collective farms as an arena of fierce class struggle.

As you see, here too, on this question, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups have not yet lost their tenacious hold on life.

It is obvious that had such blockheaded views triumphed in our Party, the collective farms would not have achieved the successes they have gained during the past two years, and would have disintegrated in a very short time.

Or take, for example, the *national question*. Here, too, in the sphere of the national question, just as in the sphere of other questions, there is in the views of a section of the Party a confusion which creates a certain danger. I have spoken of the tenacity of the survivals of capitalism. It should be observed that the survivals of capitalism in people's minds are much more tenacious in the sphere of the national question than in any other sphere. They are more tenacious because they are able to disguise themselves well in national costume. Many think that Skrypnik's fall from grace was an individual case, an exception to the rule. This is not true. The fall from grace of Skrypnik and his group in the Ukraine is not an exception. Similar aberrations are observed among certain comrades in other national republics as well.

What is the deviation towards nationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism or the deviation towards local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the

working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of "one's own," "national" bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. It is a *departure* from Leninist internationalism. If you want to keep both deviations under fire, then aim primarily against this source, against those who depart from internationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards local nationalism or the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism. (*Stormy applause.*)

There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the chief danger: the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be foolish to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable for all times and for all conditions as regards the chief and the lesser danger. Such recipes do not exist. The chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the state. (*Prolonged applause.*)

In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the chief danger; but when the fight against it ceased and it was allowed to grow to such an extent that it linked up with the interventionists, this deviation became the chief danger. The question as to which is the chief danger in the sphere of the national question is determined not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxist analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by

a study of the mistakes that have been committed in this sphere.

The same should be said of *the Right and "Left" deviations* in the sphere of general policy. Here, too, as in other spheres, there is no little confusion in the views of certain members of our Party. Sometimes, while fighting against the Right deviation, they turn away from the "Left" deviation and relax the fight against it, on the assumption that it is not dangerous, or hardly dangerous. This is a grave and dangerous error. It is a concession to the "Left" deviation which is impermissible for a member of the Party. It is all the more impermissible for the reason that of late the "Lefts" have completely slid over to the position of the Rights, so that there is no longer any essential difference between them.

We have always said that the "Lefts" are in fact Rights who mask their Rightness by Left phrases. Now the "Lefts" themselves confirm the correctness of our statement. Take last year's issues of the Trotskyist *Bulletin*. What do Messieurs the Trotskyists demand, what do they write about, in what does their "Left" programme find expression? They demand: *the dissolution of the state farms*, on the grounds that they do not pay; *the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms*, on the grounds that they are fictitious; *the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks*; *reversion to the policy of concessions*, and *the leasing to concessionaires of a number of our industrial enterprises*, on the grounds that they do not pay.

There you have the programme of these contemptible cowards and capitulators—their counter-revolutionary programme of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!

What difference is there between this programme and that of the extreme Rights? Clearly, there is none. It follows that the "Lefts" have openly associated themselves with the counter-revolutionary programme of the Rights in order to enter into a bloc with them and to wage a joint struggle against the Party.

How can it be said after this that the "Lefts" are not dangerous, or hardly dangerous? Is it not clear that those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of the sworn enemies of Leninism?

As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations from the line of the Party—regardless of whether we are dealing with deviations on general policy or with deviations on the national question—the survivals of capitalism in people's minds, including the minds of certain members of our Party, are quite tenacious.

There you have some of the serious and urgent problems of our ideological and political work on which there is lack of clarity, confusion, and even direct departure from Leninism in certain strata of the Party. Nor are these the only questions which could serve to demonstrate the confusion in the views of certain members of the Party.

After this, can it be said that all is well in the Party? Clearly, it cannot.

Our tasks in the sphere of ideological and political work are:

- 1) To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper height.
- 2) To intensify ideological work in all the organisations of the Party.
- 3) To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.

4) To train the Party organisations and the non-Party active which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.

5) Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticise the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.

6) Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.

2. QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP

I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national economy and of culture, and also in the sphere of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have spoken of the historic significance of our victory. But this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere and in all things, and that all questions have already been settled. Such successes and such victories do not occur in real life. We still have plenty of unsolved problems and defects of all sorts. Ahead of us is a host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly mean that the greater part of the urgent and immediate problems has already been successfully solved, and in this sense the very great victory of our Party is beyond doubt.

But here the question arises: How was this victory brought about, how was it actually achieved, as the result of what fight, as the result of what efforts?

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and have it voted for unanimously, for victory to come of

itself, automatically, as it were. That, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come automatically, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself—it is usually won by effort. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organised; on the organisation of the struggle for carrying out the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on checking upon the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Other wise the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced. More than that, after the correct political line has been laid down, organisational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a systematic and fierce struggle against all sorts of difficulties in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming these difficulties; by mobilising the Party and the working class for the task of overcoming the difficulties; by organising the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and where do they lie?

They are difficulties of our organisational work,

difficulties of our organisational leadership. They lie in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organisations, in the apparatus of our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union, Young Communist League and all other organisations.

We must realise that the strength and prestige of our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organisations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything. There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organisations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members and candidate members. In the Young Communist League we have more than 4,000,000 members and candidate members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 members. The trade unions have a membership of over 17,000,000. It is to these organisations that we are in-

debted for our successes. And if, in spite of the existence of such organisations and of such possibilities, which facilitate the achievement of successes, we still have quite a number of shortcomings in our work and not a few failures, then it is only we ourselves, our organisational work, our bad organisational leadership, that are to blame for this.

Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about “leadership in general” instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organisations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation; the absence of a systematic check on the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism—these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties now lie.

It would be naïve to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long been past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and Government decisions in words, and pigeon-holing them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organisational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organisational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organisational work ensured the practical realisation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was necessary to *organise* the struggle to

eliminate them; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilise the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organisations of unreliable, unstable and degenerate elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organise:

1) Full development of self-criticism and exposure of shortcomings in our work.

2) The mobilisation of the Party, Soviet, economic, trade union, and Young Communist League organisations for the struggle against difficulties.

3) The mobilisation of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the Government.

4) Full development of emulation and shock-brigade work among the working people.

5) A wide network of Political Departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages.

6) The subdivision of the People's Commissariats, chief boards, and trusts, and the bringing of economic leadership closer to the enterprises.

7) The abolition of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalisation.

8) The elimination of the "functional system," the extension of individual responsibility, and a policy aiming at the abolition of collegium management.

9) Stronger checking on the fulfilment of decisions, and a policy aiming at the reorganisation of the

power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (*Laughter.*)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter.*)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General laughter.*)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (*General laughter.*) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executive who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executive consists of people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become big-wigs, who consider that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet Government will not venture to touch them, because of their past services. These overconceited big-wigs think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") They must be demoted to lower positions and this must be announced in the press. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") This is essential in order to bring those conceited big-wig bureaucrats down a peg or two, and to put them in their proper place. This is essential in order to strengthen Party and Soviet discipline in the whole of our work. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

And now about the second type of executive. I have in mind the windbags, I would say honest windbags (*laughter*), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet

power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (*Laughter.*)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter.*)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General laughter.*)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (*General laughter.*) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organise a rally of shock brigaders? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the Government at the conference of shock brigaders? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? (*General laughter.*) Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin—what more do you want of us?" (*General laughter.*)

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they are capable of drowning every live undertaking in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

I have already briefly reported how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the Soviet and economic organisations, and how it strengthened the checking on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the congress agenda.

I should like to say a few words, however, about further work in connection with increased checking on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organisation of checking on the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by

bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to no purpose? These things can be promptly found out only by a well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. A well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if checking on fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment is checked systematically and not spasmodically; secondly, that the work of checking on fulfilment in all sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organisations is entrusted not to second rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organisations concerned.

The proper organisation of checking on fulfilment is most important of all for the central leading bodies. The organisational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-devised system for checking on fulfilment. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of *inspecting* the work of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organisations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when

our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to *inspect* it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganised. What we need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre—what we need now is *control* over the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organisation that would not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which could concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking on fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organisation can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., working on assignments of the Council of People's Commissars, and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local bodies. And in order that this organisation may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only such an organisation could strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a

split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, on the other hand, we are urgently in need of an organisation that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organisation can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), working on assignments of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local organisations. Naturally, such a responsible organisation must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings against any responsible executive who has committed an offence, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt that such an organisation will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.

That is how matters stand with regard to questions of organisational leadership.

Our tasks in the sphere of organisational work are:

- 1) To continue to adapt organisational work to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

- 2) To raise organisational leadership to the level of political leadership.

- 3) To secure that organisational leadership fully ensures the implementation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

* * *

I am coming to the end of my report, comrades.

What conclusions must be drawn from it?

Everybody now admits that our successes are great and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time our country has been transferred on to the lines of industrialisation and collectivisation. The First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. This arouses a feeling of pride among our workers and increases their self-confidence.

That is very good, of course. But successes sometimes have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck the whole work. There is, for example, the danger that some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. There have been such cases among us, as you know. There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having become intoxicated with success, will get swelled heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, such as: "It's a walkover," "We can knock anybody into a cocked hat," etc. This is not precluded by any means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and demobilise its ranks. If such sentiments gain the upper hand in our Party we may be faced with the danger of all our successes being wrecked.

Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. That is true. But the matter does not and cannot end there, comrades. Before us is the Second Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, and successfully too. You know that plans are carried out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that

there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will report to you on the Second Five-Year Plan. From their reports you will see what great difficulties we shall have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilise it, but keep it in a state of mobilisation for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Hence, the first conclusion: *We must not become infatuated with the successes achieved, and must not become conceited.*

We have achieved successes because we have had the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we have been able to organise the masses for putting this line into effect. Needless to say, without these conditions we should not have achieved the successes that we have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct line and to be able to put it into effect.

Look at the countries which surround us. Can you find many ruling parties there that have a correct line and are putting it into effect? Actually, there are now no such parties in the world; for they are all living without prospects, they are floundering in the chaos of the crisis, and see no way of getting out of the swamp. Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its course, and it is going forward successfully. To what does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it is a Marxist party, a Leninist party. It owes it to the fact that it is guided in its work by the teaching of

Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There can be no doubt that as long as we remain true to this teaching, as long as we have this compass, we shall achieve successes in our work.

It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. (*Stormy applause.*) Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; moreover, it has achieved victory in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. (*Stormy applause.*) It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved complete victory is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries, crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, that is no accident. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Hence, the second conclusion: *We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin.* (Applause.)

The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong not only because it has a Leninist party that has been tried and tested in battle; further, it is strong not only because it enjoys the support of the vast masses of the labouring peasants; it is strong also because it is supported and assisted by the world proletariat. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. There can be no doubt that if our working class had not had the support of the working class in the capitalist countries it would not have been able to retain power, it would not have secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, consequently, it would not have achieved the successes that it has achieved. International ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the capitalist countries, the fraternal alliance between the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries—this is one of the corner-stones of the strength and might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers in the West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very good. It means that the world proletariat is prepared to continue rendering all the support it can to the working class of the U.S.S.R. But it imposes serious duties upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final

victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.

Hence, the third conclusion: *We must be true to the end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all countries. (Applause.)*

Such are the conclusions.

Long live the great and invincible banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin! *(Stormy and prolonged applause from the whole hall. The congress gives Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "Internationale" is sung, after which the ovation is resumed with renewed vigour. Shouts of "Hurrah for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C. of the Party!")*

Pravda, No. 27
January 28, 1934

**TO COMRADE SHAPOSHNIKOV,
CHIEF AND COMMISSAR OF THE FRUNZE
MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE WORKERS'
AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY.
TO COMRADE SHCHADENKO,
ASSISTANT FOR POLITICAL WORK**

I congratulate the students, teaching staff and executives of the Red Banner Military Academy on its fifteenth anniversary and on the award of the Order of *Lenin*.

I wish the Academy complete success in the training, so essential for the defence of our Motherland, of educated Bolshevik commanders, masters of the art of war.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 18,
January 18, 1934

INSTEAD OF A REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

January 31, 1934

Comrades, the discussion at this congress has revealed the complete unity of the views of our Party leaders on, one can say, all questions of Party policy. As you know, no objections whatever have been raised against the report. Hence, it has been revealed that there is extraordinary ideological, political and organizational solidarity in the ranks of our Party. (*Applause.*) The question arises: Is there any need, after this, for a reply to the discussion? I do not think there is. Permit me therefore to refrain from making any concluding remarks. (*A stormy ovation. All the delegates rise to their feet. Thunderous shouts of "Hurrah!" A chorus of shouts: "Long live Stalin!" The delegates, all standing, sing the "Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Hurrah!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C.!"*)

Pravda, No. 31,
February 1, 1934

NOTES

- ¹ The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and organisational reports of the Party's Central Committee; the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central Control Commission and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and reports on the fulfilment of the five-year plan in industry, on the collective-farm movement and the promotion of agriculture, and on the tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction period. The congress unanimously approved the political line and activities of the Central Committee of the Party and instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates of socialist construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year plan in four years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front and the elimination of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The congress noted the momentous importance of the crucial change in the development of agriculture, thanks to which the collective-farm peasantry had become a real and stable support of the Soviet regime. The congress instructed the Party's Central Committee to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace and to strengthen the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The congress issued directives: that heavy industry should be developed to the utmost and a new, powerful coal and metallurgical base created in the eastern part of the country; that the work of all the mass organisations should be reconstructed and the role of the trade

unions in socialist construction increased; that all workers and the masses of the working people should be drawn into the socialist emulation movement. The congress completely exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the kulaks within the Party, and declared that the views of the Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The congress instructed the Party organisations to intensify the fight against deviations on the national question—against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism and conciliation towards them—and to firmly carry out the Leninist national policy, which ensures the broad development of the cultures—national in form and socialist in content—of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Sixteenth Congress is known in the history of the Party as the congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on June 27 (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 242-385), and replied to the discussion on the report on July 2. (For the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 481-84. For the resolutions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. 1

² J. V. Stalin, *The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East* (see *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. 4

³ V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 291-319. p. 5

⁴ The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place on November 10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: control figures for the national economy for 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm development, etc. After reviewing the question of the group of Right deviators, the plenum declared that propaganda of the views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it

was incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), decided to expel Bukharin, as the ring-leader of the Right-wing capitulators, from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and issued a warning to Rykov, Tomsy and other members of the Right opposition. (For the resolutions adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. 9

- ⁵ The Tenth Party Conference of the Urals Region took place in Sverdlovsk, June 3-13, 1930. It fully approved the political and organisational line of the C.C. of the Party. After exposing the Right-opportunist manoeuvres of Rykov and emphasising the counter-revolutionary, treacherous role of the Right deviation in the communist movement, the conference in its decisions called upon the Urals Party organisation to wage a relentless fight against all attempts of the Right capitulators to oppose the line of the Party and its Leninist Central Committee. p. 10
- ⁶ This refers to the Sixth Congress of the Communist Organisations of Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), which took place in Tiflis, June 5-12, 1930. The congress fully approved the political and organisational line and the practical work of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 11
- ⁷ J. V. Stalin, *Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R. Speech delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions*, December 27, 1929 (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 147-178). p. 18
- ⁸ J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 248-49). p. 19
- ⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. 19

- ¹⁰ J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* (see *Works*, Vol. 12, p. 310). p. 19
- ¹¹ See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, p. 300. p. 21
- ¹² See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 85. p. 28
- ¹³ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 87. p. 28
- ¹⁴ The First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry took place in Moscow, January 30 to February 4, 1931. It was attended by 728 delegates, including representatives of industrial combines, factory directors and chiefs of construction works, engineers, foremen and foremost shock brigaders, and leaders of Party and trade-union organisations. The conference heard the report of G. K. Orjonikidze, Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, entitled "Control Figures for 1931 and the Tasks of Economic Organisations." On February 3, V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, addressed the conference on "The Fundamental Premises and Fulfilment of the Economic Plan." J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Tasks of Business Executives" on February 4 at the final sitting of the conference. Taking J. V. Stalin's directives as their guide, the conference mapped out practical measures for the fulfilment of the national-economic plan for the third and decisive year of the first five-year plan period. The conference laid stress on the following as the chief tasks of business executives: mastery of technique, improvement of the quality of leadership in industry, consistent application of the principle of one-man management, introduction of business accounting and struggle for increased labour productivity, lowering of production costs and improvement of the quality of output. The conference sent greetings to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 31
- ¹⁵ This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and other Donbas areas. This organisation was discovered in

the beginning of 1928. The Shakhty case was examined at a special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow from May 18 to July 5, 1928. (For the Shakhty affair, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 38, 57-68, also *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 454.) p. 38

- ¹⁶ The trial of the counter-revolutionary organisation of wreckers and spies known as the "Industrial Party" took place in Moscow, November 25 to December 7, 1930. The case was heard at a special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. It was established at the trial that the "Industrial Party," which united the counter-revolutionary elements of the top stratum of the old, bourgeois technical intelligentsia, was an espionage and military agency of international capital in the Soviet Union. It was linked with White emigres—former big capitalists of tsarist Russia—and acted under the direct instructions of the French general staff, preparing for military intervention by the imperialists and armed overthrow of the Soviet-Government. The foreign imperialists supplied the wreckers with directives and funds for carrying on espionage and sabotage in various branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. p. 38
- ¹⁷ From N. A. Nekrasov's poem, "Who Lives Well in Russia?" (See N. A. Nekrasov, *Selected Works*, Russ. ed., 1947, p. 323.) p. 41
- ¹⁸ On May 14, 1931, the builders of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works informed J. V. Stalin by telegram that the Magnitnaya Mountain mine had been put into operation. p. 49
- ¹⁹ A Conference of Business Executives was held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), June 22-23, 1931. It was attended by representatives of the economic organisations united under the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. and by representatives of the People's Commissariat of Supply of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin attended the conference on June 22 and 23, and on the latter date delivered his speech, "New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Con-

struction." V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, A. A. Andreyev, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, N. M. Shvernik, M. I. Kalinin, G. K. Orjonikidze and V. V. Kuibyshev took part in the work of the conference. p. 53

- 20 J. V. Stalin wrote these greetings on the occasion of the inauguration, on October 1, 1931, of the Moscow AMO Automobile Works, one of the country's giant industrial plants. At a general conference of the workers, engineering and technical personnel, and office employees, held on the day that the works was put into operation, the works was named after Comrade Stalin at the request of the workers, and is now called the Stalin Automobile Works. p. 83
- 21 *Tekhnika (Technique)*—a newspaper published every three days from October 1931 to 1937. Until January 1932, it was the organ of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. and subsequently the organ of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin's greetings were published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Tekhnika* on October 10, 1931. p. 85
- 22 *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia (Proletarian Revolution)*—a historical magazine published from 1921 to 1928 by the History of the Party Department (a commission on the history of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), subsequently the Department of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) for studying the history of the October Revolution and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and from October 1928 to 1931 by the Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). After a year's interval, the magazine was published from 1933 to 1941 by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 86
- 23 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 305, 304. p. 89
- 24 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, p. 345. p. 97
- 25 V. I. Lenin, *The Attitude of Social-Democracy towards the Peasant Movement* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, p. 213). p. 103

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- ²⁶ Karl Marx, *Misère de la Philosophie. Réponse à la Philosophie de la Misère de M. Proudhon*. Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 6, Abt. 1. p. 107
- ²⁷ The Versailles system was a system of political and economic relations between the capitalist countries established by Britain, the U.S.A. and France after the defeat of Germany and her allies in the world imperialist war of 1914-18. The basis of the system was the Versailles Peace Treaty and a number of other treaties connected with it, which, in particular, established the new frontiers of the European states. p. 119
- ²⁸ K. Marx und F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten, Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten. Teil I* (see Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, B. 5, S. 1-432). p. 121
- ²⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1955, pp. 30-60. p. 121
- ³⁰ This refers to meetings of J. V. Stalin and V. I. Lenin: in Stockholm, at the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906); in London, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1907); and during J. V. Stalin's trips abroad to Cracow and Vienna (1912 and 1913). p. 123
- ³¹ See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 374-420. p. 133
- ³² In a letter dated March 25, 1932, addressed to J. V. Stalin, Mr. Richardson, representative of the *Associated Press* news agency, asked about the truth of the rumours in the foreign press that the Berlin physician, Zondeck, had been invited to Moscow to treat J. V. Stalin. p. 136
- ³³ The Complaints Bureau was set up in April 1919 under the People's Commissariat of State Control, which in 1920 was changed to the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. The tasks and scope of the work of the Central Bureau of Complaints and Applications were defined by a regulation dated May 4, 1919, and those of the local departments

of the Central Bureau by a regulation dated May 24, 1919, published over the signature of J. V. Stalin, People's Commissar of State Control. From the day they were formed the Central and local bureaus did much work in investigating and checking complaints and statements of working people, enlisting in this work an extensive active of workers and peasants. From February 1934 the Bureau of Complaints and Applications was included in the system of the Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, and from September 1940 it has formed a department of the People's Commissariat (subsequently—Ministry) of State Control of the U.S.S.R.

J. V. Stalin's article, "The Importance and Tasks of the Complaints Bureaus" was written in connection with the all-Union five-day review and checking of the work of the bureaus carried out on April 9-14, 1932, by a decision of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R. p. 137

- 34 The Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League took place in Moscow, July 1-8, 1932. It discussed the following questions: the fourth, culminating year of the five-year plan period and the tasks of the Leninist Young Communist League (socialist emulation, shock-brigade work, etc.); the growth of the Y.C.L. and Young Pioneers' organisation and the state of political education work in the Y.C.L. and among the Young Pioneers. J. V. Stalin's greetings were read out on July 8 at the final sitting of the conference. p. 143
- 35 "Congratulations to Maxim Gorky" were written in connection with the celebration, on September 25, 1932, of the fortieth anniversary of the literary and revolutionary activity of the great proletarian writer, Alexei Maximovich Gorky. p. 144
- 36 This refers to the Civil War between the Northern and the Southern states of America in 1861-65. p. 152
- 37 The Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place on January 7-12, 1933, discussed the following questions: the

results of the First Five-Year Plan and the national-economic plan for 1933—the first year of the second five-year plan period (reports of Comrades Stalin, Molotov, and Kuibyshev); the aims and tasks of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms; inner-Party questions. At the sitting of the plenum on January 7, J. V. Stalin made a report on “The Results of the First Five-Year Plan” and at the sitting on January 11 he delivered a speech on “Work in the Countryside.” In its decisions the plenum emphasised the significance of the results of the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years as the most outstanding event in current history. The plenum pointed out that the slogan of new construction in the second five-year plan period must be supplemented by the slogan of mastering the new undertakings in industry and of organisationally strengthening the new undertakings in agriculture. The plenum instructed all economic, Party and trade-union organisations to concentrate chief attention on the complete fulfilment of the assignments for raising labour productivity and lowering production costs. In order to consolidate politically the machine and tractor stations and state farms, enhance their political role and influence in the countryside and improve the work of the Party organisations in the collective farms and state farms, the plenum adopted a decision to organise Political Departments at the machine and tractor stations and state farms. The plenum approved the decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. to conduct a purge of the Party during 1933 and to discontinue admission to the Party until the end of the purge. (For the resolutions of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 717-42.)

p. 161

³⁸ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 413. p. 164

³⁹ *The New York Times*—a bourgeois daily newspaper, influential press organ of the American capitalist monopolies; associated with the so-called Democratic Party; published in New York since 1851. p. 166

- ⁴⁰ *The Daily Telegraph*—a British reactionary daily newspaper close to the Conservative Party leadership, published in London since 1855. In 1937 it merged with the *Morning Post* and since then has been issued in London and Manchester under the name of *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*. p. 166
- ⁴¹ *Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette)*—a Polish bourgeois newspaper, mouthpiece of the fascist Pilsudski clique. It was issued in Warsaw from 1929 to 1939. p. 166
- ⁴² *The Financial Times*—a British bourgeois daily newspaper, organ of the industrial and financial circles of the City, published in London since 1888. p. 166
- ⁴³ *Politica*—an Italian social and political magazine that reflected the views of the Italian big bourgeoisie. It began publication in Rome in 1918. p. 167
- ⁴⁴ *Current History*—a magazine propagating the views of American bourgeois historians and ideologists of the U.S. State Department's aggressive foreign policy. It has been published in New York since 1914. p. 167
- ⁴⁵ *Le Temps (The Times)*—a French bourgeois daily newspaper, which since 1931 was the property of the *Comité des Forges* (the heavy industry association). It was published in Paris from 1861 to 1942. p. 167
- ⁴⁶ *The Round Table*—a British bourgeois magazine dealing with questions of the colonial policy of the British Empire and international relations. Published in London since 1910, it expressed the views of conservative circles of the British bourgeoisie. p. 168
- ⁴⁷ *Die Neue Freie Presse (New Free Press)*—an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, which reflected the views of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and of banking circles; was published in Vienna from 1864 to 1939. p. 169

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- ⁴⁸ *The Nation*—an American social-political and literary magazine of a liberal trend, reflecting petty-bourgeois opinion. It has been published in New York since 1865. p. 170
- ⁴⁹ *Forward*—a trade-unionist weekly of the “Left”-reformist brand; it started publication in Glasgow (Scotland) in 1906 p. 171
- ⁵⁰ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, p. 338. p. 176
- ⁵¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 483-84. p. 177
- ⁵² See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 388-89. p. 178
- ⁵³ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 459. p. 179
- ⁵⁴ At the end of 1931, imperialist Japan, which was striving to set up its rule in China and the Far East, invaded Manchuria without declaration of war. The occupation of this territory was accompanied by a concentration of Japanese troops at the frontier of the U.S.S.R. and the mobilisation of white-guard spies and bandits intended for use in a war against the Soviet Union. The Japanese imperialists were preparing positions suitable for attack on the U.S.S.R., aiming at the seizure of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. p. 182
- ⁵⁵ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 127. p. 192
- ⁵⁶ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. 192
- ⁵⁷ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 123. p. 192
- ⁵⁸ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 466. p. 192
- ⁵⁹ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 173-74. p. 193

- ⁶⁰ This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. dated August 22, 1932, on "The Struggle against Speculation." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 233, August 23, 1932. p. 208
- ⁶¹ This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on "Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Co-operatives and the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property," adopted on August 7, 1932. This decision, written by J. V. Stalin, states: "The Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. hold that public property (state, collective-farm and co-operative property) is the basis of the Soviet system; it is sacred and inviolable, and persons committing offences against public property must be considered enemies of the people. In view of this it is a prime duty of the organs of Soviet power to wage a determined struggle against those who steal public property." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 218, August 8, 1932. p. 214
- ⁶² The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), dated May 6, 1932, on "The Plan for Grain Procurements from the 1932 Harvest and for Development of Collective-Farm Trade in Grain" was published in *Pravda*, No. 125, May 7, 1932. p. 223
- ⁶³ This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny at Kronstadt in March 1921. The mutiny was headed by whiteguards, who were connected with Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and representatives of foreign states. p. 232
- ⁶⁴ *Rabotnitsa (Working Woman)*—a magazine published by the Pravda Publishing House; it has been issued since January 1923. p. 240
- ⁶⁵ The First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigades took place in Moscow on February 15-19, 1933, attend-

ed by 1,513 delegates. J. V. Stalin took part in the work of the congress, which elected him to its honorary presidium and addressed greetings to him in the name of the millions of collective-farm peasants. The congress discussed the question of strengthening the collective farms and the tasks of the spring sowing. On February 19, when the closing session was held, the congress was addressed by J. V. Stalin. Other speakers at the congress were V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, M. I. Kalinin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny. In its appeal to all peasant collective farmers of the U.S.S.R. the congress called for the collective farms to be made Bolshevik and for the development of all-Union socialist emulation of the state and collective farms for a bumper harvest and exemplary preparation and carrying out of the spring sowing. p. 242

- ⁶⁶ This refers to a letter sent by the collective farmers of the area served by the Bezenchuk Machine and Tractor Station of the Middle-Volga territory (now Kuibyshev Region) to J. V. Stalin, published in *Pravda*, No. 28, January 29, 1933. p. 262

- ⁶⁷ *Metro-Vickers*—a British electrical-engineering firm which had contracted with the U.S.S.R. to render technical aid to enterprises of the Soviet electrical industry. In March 1933, criminal proceedings were instituted against six Britishers, employees of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers, on the charge of engaging in wrecking at large Soviet electric power stations. The investigation and the trial, which took place on April 12-19, 1933, established that the arrested Metro-Vickers employees had carried on espionage in the U.S.S.R. and, with the assistance of a gang of criminal elements, had organised damage to equipment, accidents and acts of sabotage at large U.S.S.R. electric power-stations for the purpose of undermining the strength of Soviet industry and of weakening the Soviet state. p. 265

- ⁶⁸ This refers to M. I. Kalinin's radio address to the American people, on November 20, 1933, in connection with the establishment, on November 16, 1933, of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. p. 282

⁶⁹ A world economic conference was held in London from June 12 to July 27, 1933. Its initiators—Britain and other capitalist countries—tried to represent it as a sovereign remedy for putting an end to the economic crisis and for the “rehabilitation” of capitalism. The conference was intended to discuss the problems of stabilising currencies, organising production and trade, abolishing customs barriers and establishing economic peace among all the capitalist countries. Expressing the U.S.S.R.’s unalterable desire to further the cause of peace and strengthen commercial ties, the Soviet delegation at the conference submitted a proposal for the conclusion of an economic non-aggression pact and likewise declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to place orders abroad to the value of \$1,000,000,000 on the basis of receiving long-term credits and the creation of normal conditions for Soviet exports. The Soviet delegation’s proposals were not supported by the conference. The conference revealed the complete inability of the capitalist world to find a way out of the economic crisis and the further intensification of the contradictions between the capitalist countries, primarily between Britain and the U.S.A. and between Germany and her creditors. After fruitless discussions the conference ended in failure, without settling a single one of the questions it had raised. p. 282

⁷⁰ The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 10, 1934. It discussed the report of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and reports on the Second Five-Year Plan and on organisational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). On J. V. Stalin’s report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) the congress adopted a decision in which it wholly approved the political line and practical work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and instructed all Party organisations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks enunciated in J. V. Stalin’s report. The congress noted the decisive successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and declared that the general

line of the Party had triumphed. The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has gone down in the history of the Party as the Congress of Victors. On the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev, the congress adopted a resolution on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)"—a plan for the building of socialist society, thereby endorsing the grand programme for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, and for a still more rapid rise of the living and cultural standards of the workers and peasants. The congress emphasised that the basic political task during the second five-year plan period was the final elimination of capitalist elements and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people. On the report of L. M. Kaganovich, the congress adopted decisions on organisational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). The congress pointed out that the principal tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan sharply raised the question of improving the quality of work in all spheres, and first and foremost the quality of organisational and practical leadership. The congress adopted new Party Rules. It replaced the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by a Party Control Commission under the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (On the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 496-503. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 744-87.) p. 288

- ⁷¹ In 1931 the proletariat and peasantry of Spain overthrew the military-fascist dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which had been set up in 1923, and abolished the monarchy. On April 14, 1931, a republic was proclaimed in Spain. Owing, however, to the political weakness and organisational disunity of the proletariat and the treachery of the leadership of the Socialist party and Anarchists, the bourgeoisie and landlords were able to seize power, and a coalition government of representatives of the bourgeois parties and the Socialists was

formed. In spite of the attempts of the coalition government to hold back the further development of the revolution, the revolutionary mass battles of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the bourgeoisie continued. With the general strike and the armed struggle of the Asturian miners in October 1934 the revolutionary movement of this period reached its peak. p. 289

72 *Councils of Action*: Revolutionary organisations of workers in Britain, France and other capitalist countries that took part in military intervention against the Soviet Republic in 1918-20. The Councils of Action arose under the slogan of "Hands off Soviet Russia!" Under the leadership of the Councils of Action, the workers organised strikes and demonstrations, and refused to load war equipment, with the aim of bringing about the collapse of the intervention. The Councils of Action were most widespread in Britain, in 1920. p. 304

73 The Second Congress of the Communist International took place on July 19-August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd the subsequent sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by more than 200 delegates representing working-class organisations from 37 countries. V. I. Lenin directed all the preparatory work for convening the congress. At the congress Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the chief tasks of the Communist International, as well as other reports and speeches. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin were elected by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to sit on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Second Congress laid the foundations of the programme, organisational principles strategy and tactics of the Communist International. p. 305

74 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 202-03. p. 305

75 The Little Entente: a political alliance of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia lasting from 1920 to 1938. It was under French influence and almost until the end of its existence it had the character of an anti-Soviet bloc. The bourgeois-landlord ruling circles of the countries that composed

the Little Entente regarded it as a means of strengthening their hold on the territories they had received under the Versailles Peace Treaty and as a weapon of struggle against revolution in Central Europe. The danger of aggression by German fascism and the growing international prestige of the U.S.S.R. changed the attitude of the countries of the Little Entente to the Soviet Union. In 1933 the countries of the Little Entente along with other countries, joined with the U.S.S.R. in signing a convention defining aggression, the draft submitted by the Soviet Union being taken as the basis of this convention. p. 307

⁷⁶ V. I. Lenin, *The Tax in Kind* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 309-10). p. 316

⁷⁷ V. I. Lenin, Report Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on Work in the Countryside, March 23, 1919 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 190). p. 332

⁷⁸ The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to develop to the full the collectivisation of agriculture and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. In its decisions on the opposition the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 14, 1927, to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and

decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and the whole "Democratic Centralism" group. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.)
p. 354

- ⁷⁹ The Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, January 30-February 4, 1932. The conference was directed by J. V. Stalin. It discussed G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the results of industrial development in 1931 and the tasks for 1932, and the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev on the directives for drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1933-37. The conference noted that the decisions of the Party congresses on the building and completion of the foundations of a socialist economy and on securing economic independence for the U.S.S.R. had been carried out with immense success. The conference approved the plan for the development of socialist industry in 1932, which ensured the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. In its directives for the drawing up of the Second Five-Year Plan, the conference defined the chief political and economic tasks of that plan, pointing out that its main and decisive economic task was the completion of the reconstruction of the entire national economy on the basis of the most up-to-date technique. (For the resolutions of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 679-99.)
p. 356

- ⁸⁰ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1955, p. 61.
p. 363

- ⁸¹ See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow 1954, p. 149.
p. 363

- ⁸² See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 329.
p. 364

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(July 1930—January 1934)

1 9 3 0

- July 2* J. V. Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) replies to the discussion on the Political Report of the C.C. of the Party.
- July 6* J. V. Stalin is present at the Dynamo Stadium for the sports festival held in honour of the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 10* The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for the final editing of the resolution on the report on the collective-farm movement and the progress of agriculture.
- July 12* The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the Party.
- July 13* The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Political Bureau, the Organising Bureau and the Secretariat of the C.C. and appoints him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
- August 14* On the motion of J. V. Stalin, the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. adopt a decision on "Universal Compulsory Elementary Education."

- August* J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Comrade Shatunovsky's letter.
- November 6* J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet on the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 7* J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the thirteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November, December 7* J. V. Stalin answers Comrade Ch.'s letters.
- December 9* J. V. Stalin talks with members of the bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) unit at the Institute of Red Professors of Philosophy and Natural Science on the situation at the philosophical front and the tasks of the struggle on two fronts in philosophy, and on the need for elaborating the theoretical heritage of Lenin.
- December 12* J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Demyan Bedny's letter.
- December 17-21* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- December 24* J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., is appointed a member of the Council of Labour and Defence.

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- January 4* J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Fifth Convocation.

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- January 5-6* J. V. Stalin participates in the work of a conference held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) with railway transport personnel.
- January 8* J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of the Leningrad Soviet by the workers of the city's large enterprises.
- January 12* J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the U.S.A. about the attitude in the U.S.S.R. to anti-Semitism.
- January 16* J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Ninth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Y.C.L. The congress elects him to its honorary presidium.
- January 21* J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
- January 23* J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of the Moscow Soviet at meetings of the workers of the capital's large enterprises.
- February 4* J. V. Stalin delivers his speech on "The Tasks of Business Executives" at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry.
- February 24* J. V. Stalin, at the Second Moscow Regional Congress of Soviets, is elected a delegate to the Fifteenth All-Russian and the Sixth All-Union Congresses of Soviets.
- February 26-March 5* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
- February 27* J. V. Stalin writes his answer to Comrade Etchin's letter.

- March 5* J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Fifteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, is elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
- March 8-17* J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Sixth All-Union Congress of Soviets.
- March 17* J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Sixth All-Union Congress of Soviets, is elected a member of the Union Soviet of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
- March 31* J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the State Association of the Azerbaijanian Oil Industry and that of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry in connection with their fulfilment of the five-year oil production plan in two and a half years. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 90, April 1, 1931.
- April 3* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of Elektrozavod (Moscow) in connection with the factory's fulfilment of its five-year plan in two and a half years are published in *Pravda*, No. 92.
- May 1* J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.
- May 7, 14, 23 and 29 and June 4* J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the commission for the drawing up of the draft decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on improving and expanding Moscow's municipal economy.
- May 11 and 13* J. V. Stalin takes part in a conference of personnel of the coal industry, held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

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- May 19* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers and the executive staff of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works Project on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the commencement of the exploitation of the powerful Magnitogorsk mine are published in *Pravda*, No. 136.
- May 28* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers, specialists and executive staff of the machine and tractor stations on the occasion of the pre-schedule fulfilment of their sowing plan are published in *Pravda*, No. 145.
- May 30* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers, specialists and executives of the state grain farms on the occasion of the fulfilment of the sowing plan are published in *Pravda*, No. 147.
- June 11-15* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- June 22-23* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a conference of business executives held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- June 23* J. V. Stalin delivers his speech, *New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction* at the conference of business executives held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 23* J. V. Stalin, at a meeting of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) attended by co-operative officials, delivers a speech on questions of improving the work of the consumers' co-operatives and of supplies for the working people in big industrial centres.
- October 1* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the staff of the AMO Works (Moscow) on the occasion of the completion of the building of the first gigantic automobile works in the U.S.S.R. and to the staff of

the Kharkov Tractor Works on the occasion of the pre-schedule completion of its construction are published in *Pravda*, No. 271.

- October 10* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the newspaper *Tekhnika* on the occasion of its first appearance are published in *Pravda*, No. 280 and in *Tekhnika*, No. 1.
- October 11* J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov pay a visit to A. M. Gorky, who reads them one of his works, a fairy-tale called "The Girl and Death."
- October 25* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov, G. K. Orjonikidze and L. M. Kaganovich meet in the Kremlin shock brigaders of the Stalin Automobile Works (the former AMO), who arrived on the first lorries and buses manufactured by the plant.
- October 28-31* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- End of October* J. V. Stalin's letter to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* on "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, Nos. 19-20 and in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, No. 6 (113).
- November 3* J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov send a message of greetings to the builders of the automobile works in Nizhni-Novgorod on the occasion of the successful completion of the construction work. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 305, November 4, 1931.
- November 6* J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

- November 7* J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the fourteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 25* J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is appointed a member of the commission for preparing the draft resolution of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), "Directives for Drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)."
- December 6* J. V. Stalin receives a group of Moscow writers and talks with them on problems of literature.
- December 13* J. V. Stalin has a talk with the German writer Emil Ludwig.
- December 22* J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.

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- January 2* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the staff of the Molotov Automobile Works (Nizhni-Novgorod) in connection with the inauguration of the works are published in *Pravda*, No. 2.
- January 4* J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and the executive staff of the Saratov Harvester Combine Works on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the inauguration of the works. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 5, January 5, 1932.
- January 15* J. V. Stalin writes a reply to Olekhnovich with reference to the letter "Some Questions Concern-

ing the History of Bolshevism" sent to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*. The reply was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1932.

*Before
January 21*

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) for preparing the draft resolution "Directives for Drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)." The resolution was adopted at the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and endorsed by the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on February 4, 1932.

January 21

J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.

January 25

J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Aristov with reference to the letter "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" sent to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*. The reply was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1932.

January 29

J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union Party Conference.

January 30

J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Moscow Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union Party Conference.

*January 30-
February 4*

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

February 4

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

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- February 10-April 1* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on questions of the production of goods for mass consumption.
- March 29* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works Project on the occasion of the inauguration and mastering the technique of the giant blast furnace, the first of its kind in the U.S.S.R. and Europe. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 89, March 30, 1932.
- April 7* J. V. Stalin's article, "The Importance and Tasks of the Complaints Bureaus," is published in *Pravda*, No. 97.
- April 20* J. V. Stalin attends the opening in the Bolshoi Theatre of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions. The congress elects J. V. Stalin to its honorary presidium.
- April 23* J. V. Stalin is made a member of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area.
- April 2* The decision, adopted on J. V. Stalin's initiative, of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the reconstruction of literary and art organisations and the creation of a single Union of Soviet Writers is published in *Pravda*, No. 114.
- May 1* J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.
- May 2* J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin participants in the May Day parade.

- May 3* J. V. Stalin replies to questions of Ralph V. Barnes.
- May 8* J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is made a member of the commission on checking fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies relating to the production of goods for mass consumption.
- May 23* The decision of the Council of People's Commissars, U.S.S.R. and the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 22, 1932, on "The Fight against Drought and the Irrigation of the Trans-Volga Area," signed by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, is published in *Pravda*, No. 141.
- May 24* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the men and women shock brigaders, the technical personnel and the executive staff of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works for having achieved high records of pig iron output and Bolshevik tempos in mastering the most up-to-date technique are published in *Pravda*, No. 142.
- J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the Red Square, Moscow.
- July 8* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Y.C.L. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 188, July 9, 1932.
- August 8* The law on "Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Co-operatives and the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property," written by J. V. Stalin and adopted on August 7 by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., is published in *Pravda*, No. 218.
- September 4* J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of working youth in the Red Square, Moscow, held in honour of the eighteenth International Youth Day.

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- September 25* J. V. Stalin's greetings to A. M. Gorky on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Gorky's literary and revolutionary activity are published in *Pravda*, No. 266.
- J. V. Stalin attends the ceremonial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre devoted to the fortieth anniversary of A. M. Gorky's literary and revolutionary activity.
- September 28-October 2* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- October 7* J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov have a talk in A. M. Gorky's apartment with a group of scientists organising a U.S.S.R. Institute of Experimental Medicine.
- October 10* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers and managers of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station on the occasion of the successful completion of the construction and pre-schedule inauguration of the station are published in *Pravda*, No. 281.
- October 14* The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the Arctic expedition on the ice-breaker *Sibiryakov*, which crossed the Arctic Ocean in a single journey, are published in *Pravda*, No. 285.
- October 26* J. V. Stalin talks with a group of writers at A. M. Gorky's apartment. It was during this talk that J. V. Stalin called writers "engineers of human souls."
- November 6* J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

- November 7* J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the fifteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- J. V. Stalin's greetings to Leningrad on the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power are published in *Pravda*, No. 309.
- Night of November 8* Death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina, J. V. Stalin's wife and close comrade.
- November 11* J. V. Stalin accompanies the bier of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina to the Novodevichye cemetery.
- November 18* In a letter published in *Pravda*, No. 318, J. V. Stalin thanks the organisations, institutions, friends and comrades who expressed their condolences on the occasion of the death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina.
- November 23* J. V. Stalin writes his article "Mr. Campbell Stretches the Truth." The article was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 22, November 30, 1932.
- December 20* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the officials and troops of the OGPU on the occasion of its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 350.

1933

- January 7-12* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- January 7* J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "Results of the First Five-Year Plan" at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

- January 11* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "Work in the Countryside" at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- On the proposal of J. V. Stalin, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a decision to organise Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and to send 17,000 Party workers to the countryside.
- January 21* J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
- January 23* J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third Session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.
- January 26* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the magazine *Rabotnitsa* on the occasion of its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 25.
- February 2* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the All-Union Conference of the Leninist Young Communist League on the practical tasks of the Y.C.L. in connection with the spring sowing.
- February 15-59* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders.
- February 16* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade I. N. Bazhanov.
- February 19* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders
- February 23* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Red Army on the occasion of its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 53.

J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Red Army.

March 14

J. V. Stalin attends at the Bolshoi Theatre the meeting of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx.

March 20

J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the letter of Mr. Barnes.

March 30

The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the expedition sent to rescue the ice-breaker *Malygin* are published in *Pravda*, No. 88.

April 17

J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, and A. I. Mikoyan wire congratulations to the participants in the expedition of the ice-breaker *Krassin* on the occasion of the successful completion of its Arctic cruise and its pre-schedule fulfilment of the government's assignment to render aid to the Arctic workers and population of the island of Novaya Zemlya. The telegram is published in *Pravda*, No. 106.

April 26

J. V. Stalin's greetings to Comrade S. M. Budyonny on his fiftieth birthday are published in *Pravda*, No. 115.

May 1

J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.

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- May 2* J. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the Party and the Government, receives in the Kremlin participants in the May Day parade.
- May 13* J. V. Stalin has a talk with Colonel Robins.
- May 25* J. V. Stalin attends the final concert of the First All-Union Musicians' Contest held in the Large Hall of the Moscow Conservatoire.
- May 26* J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin the young prize-winners of the First All-Union Musicians' Contest.
- June 12* J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the Red Square in Moscow.
- June 22* J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Klara Zetkin in the Red Square in Moscow.
- June 29* J. V. Stalin, together with V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and G. K. Orjonikidze, visits the art exhibition "Fifteen Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."
- July 14* J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on organisational questions of heavy industry.
- July 18* J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov arrive in Leningrad and on the same day, together with S. M. Kirov, leave on the S.S. *Anokhin* for a journey through the White Sea-Baltic Canal.
- July 18-25* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov make a journey on the White Sea-Baltic Canal, acquaint themselves with its hydraulic installations and visit the port of Soroka, the Murmansk Port and Polar Bay.

- July 21* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov in the area of Soroka Port meet a squadron of warships belonging to the Northern Fleet which had crossed from the Baltic to the White Sea via the canal.
- J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of Red Navy men on the tasks of the Northern Fleet. After the meeting J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov visit the destroyer *Uritsky* and a submarine.
- July 22* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov arrive at Murmansk and inspect its port and Polar Bay.
- July 25* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov on their return to Leningrad inspect the port. The same day J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov leave for Moscow.
- August 6* J. V. Stalin has a talk with aeronautical designers about new hydroplanes.
- August 8* J. V. Stalin talks with a group of leading personnel of the Stalin Automobile Works and gives them instructions to master the production of passenger cars.
- August 10* J. V. Stalin receives in the Kremlin a group of officials of the Moscow Soviet and talks with them about the improvement of road construction in Moscow, Moscow's river embankments and the organisation of work at construction sites.
- August 20-23* J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov take a trip on the S.S. *Klara Zetkin* from Gorky to Stalingrad.
- August 23-24* J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny visit the Budyonny Stud Farm in the Salsk steppes (Rostov Region).

- October 3* J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the crew of the stratostat *U.S.S.R.* on fulfilling the government's assignment regarding the conquest and study of the stratosphere. The congratulations are published in *Pravda*, No. 273.
- J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich greet the participants in the Moscow—Kara Kum—Moscow automobile race. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 273.
- October 17* J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the Soviet salvage engineering experts on their success in raising the ice-breaker *Sadko* from the bottom of the sea in the Arctic zone. The congratulations are published in *Pravda*, No. 287.
- October 29* Stalin's greetings to the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League on its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 299.
- November 6* J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the sixteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 7* J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the sixteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 9* J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Sen-Katayama, leader of the Communist Party of Japan, in the Red Square, Moscow.
- November 20* J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, M. I. Kalinin, and L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation of collec-

- November 29* tive-farm shock brigaders from the Odessa Region and talk with them on questions of collective-farm work.
- December 23* J. V. Stalin talks with a group of architects who have produced designs for the Palace of Soviets.
- J. V. Stalin and L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation of collective-farm shock brigaders from the Dniepropetrovsk Region and talk with them on questions of collective-farm development and the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside.
- J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre held in honour of the fifteenth anniversary of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TSAGI).
- December 25* J. V. Stalin has a talk with the *New York Times* correspondent, Mr. Duranty.
- December 28* J. V. Stalin is present at the opening of the Fourth Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.
- Before
December 29* J. V. Stalin examines and edits the theses of the reports of Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)" to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The theses are published in *Pravda*, No. 359, December 30, 1933.

1934

- January 18* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the students, teachers and executives of the Red Banner Frunze Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red

Army in connection with the Academy's fifteenth anniversary and the award to it of the Order of Lenin are published in *Pravda*, No. 18.

- January 21* J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
- January 23* J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Lenin-grad Joint Fifth Regional and Second City Party Conference.
- January 24* J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Moscow Joint Fourth Regional and Third City Party Conference.
- January 26-February 10* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- January 26* J. V. Stalin delivers the report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at the Seventeenth Party Congress.
- January 31* J. V. Stalin speaks at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.): "Instead of a Reply to the Discussion."
- J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



