



J. STALIN
WORKS

7





WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao



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RUSSIAN EDITION
PUBLISHED BY DECISION
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
(BOLSHEVIKS)

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ



О Г И З

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

Москва • 1947

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME

7



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CONTENTS

FROM MARX

TO MAO

<i>Preface</i>	XIII
WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN, REMEMBER AND CARRY OUT ILYICH'S BEHESTS! . .	1
TO THE TEACHERS' CONGRESS	3
THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE <i>KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH</i>	4
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.), <i>January 17, 1925</i>	6
SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.), <i>January 19, 1925</i>	11
TO <i>RABOCHAYA GAZETA</i>	15
A LETTER TO COMRADE D—OV	16
“DYMOVKA.” <i>Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), January 26, 1925.</i>	19
CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY. <i>Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), January 27, 1925.</i>	25
THE PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVISATION. <i>Interview with Herzog, Member of the C.P.G.</i> .	34

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME—RT	42
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY	48
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG	50
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES	51
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. <i>Speech Delivered in the Czechoslovak Commission of the E.C.C.I., March 27, 1925</i>	58
CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLA- VIA. <i>Speech Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I., March 30, 1925</i>	69
THE ACTIVE OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. <i>Speech Delivered at a Meet- ing of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), April 6, 1925.</i>	77
TO THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLE- TARIAN STUDENTS. <i>A Message</i>	85
THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.); <i>Report Deliv- ered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), May 9, 1925</i>	90
I. The International Situation	91
II. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Parties in the Capitalist Countries.	102
III. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Elements in the Colonial and Dependent Countries	107
IV. The Fate of Socialism in the Soviet Union . . .	110
V. The Party's Policy in the Countryside	123
VI. The Metal Industry.	130

THE POLITICAL TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST. <i>Speech Delivered at a Meet- ing of Students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May 18, 1925</i>	135
I. The Tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Relation to the Soviet Republics of the East.	136
II. The Tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Relation to the Colonial and Dependent Countries of the East	146
TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i>	155
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. <i>Speech Delivered at the Sverd- lov University, June 9, 1925</i>	158
TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY. <i>On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade Union Courses</i>	215
THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN. <i>Concerning the Article by Semich</i>	219
THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST. <i>Interview Given to Mr. Fuse, Japanese Correspondent of Nichi-Nichi</i>	231
A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY	237
INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CON- FERENCE OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENTS, <i>October 14, 1925</i>	240
THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE. <i>Answers to Questions Submitted by the Editorial Board of Komsomolskaya Pravda</i>	247
SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL OF M. V. FRUNZE, <i>Novem- ber 3, 1925</i>	256

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT	258
A LETTER TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE TWENTY-SECOND LENINGRAD GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE	263
THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), <i>December 18-31, 1925</i>	265
Political Report of the Central Committee, <i>December 18</i>	267
I. The International Situation	267
1. The Stabilisation of Capitalism	269
2. Imperialism, the Colonies and Semi-Colonies	275
3. Victors and Vanquished	277
4. The Contradictions between the Victor Countries	284
5. The Capitalist World and the Soviet Union	288
6. The External Position of the U.S.S.R.	295
7. The Party's Tasks	302
II. The Internal Situation in the Soviet Union	304
1. The National Economy as a Whole	305
2. Industry and Agriculture	321
3. Questions Concerning Trade	325
4. Classes, Their Activity, Their Correlation	327
5. Lenin's Three Slogans on the Peasant Question	332
6. Two Dangers and Two Deviations In Regard to the Peasant Question	342
7. The Party's Tasks	347
III. The Party	351
Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee, <i>December 23</i>	362
1. Sokolnikov and the Dawesation of Our Country	363
2. Kamenev and Our Concessions to the Peasantry	365
3. Whose Miscalculations?	369

4. How Sokolnikov Protects the Poor Peasants	370
5. Ideological Struggle or Slander?	372
6. Concerning NEP	373
7. Concerning State Capitalism	375
8. Zinoviev and the Peasantry	381
9. Concerning the History of the Disagreements	389
10. The Opposition's Platform	397
11. Their "Desire for Peace"	399
12. The Party Will Achieve Unity	401
<i>Notes</i>	404
<i>Biographical Chronicle (1925)</i>	419

PREFACE

The Seventh Volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the year 1925.

In this period the working class and peasantry, led by the Bolshevik Party, were completing the restoration of the national economy. The Land of Soviets was passing into the period of socialist industrialisation, which was the key-note of the Fourteenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party. In this period the question of the character and prospects of our country's development, of the fate of socialism in the Soviet Union, was already confronting the Party as a practical question.

In the works: "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)," "Questions and Answers," "October, Lenin, and the Prospects of Our Development," "The Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)," and others, J. V. Stalin gives an all-round substantiation of the Bolshevik Party's general line for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, and exposes the defeatist line of the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, whose aim was to restore capitalism.

The questions of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of educating the

masses of the working people and the youth, and of drawing them into active participation in building a socialist society are dealt with in the following works: "Dymovka," "Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and the Peasantry," "The Active of the Young Communist League in the Countryside," "The Tasks of the Young Communist League," "The First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students," "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," and in the interview with delegates at the Conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments on October 14, 1925, etc.

This volume also contains the following articles and speeches on the situation and tasks of the Communist Parties abroad under the conditions of the partial stabilisation of capitalism: "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties," "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," "The National Question in Yugoslavia," "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevisation," and "A Letter to Comrade Me—rt."

The following are published for the first time: "Speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on January 19, 1925," "Interview with Delegates at the Conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments on October 14, 1925," letter to the members of the editorial board of Komsomolskaya Pravda, and letters to Comrades D—ov, Me—rt and Yermakovsky.

*Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*

1925



WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN REMEMBER AND CARRY OUT ILYICH'S BEHESTS!

A year ago, departing from us, the great leader and teacher of the working people, our Lenin, bequeathed to us his behests, indicated the road along which we must go to the final victory of communism. Carry out these behests of Ilyich, working women and peasant women! Bring up your children in the spirit of these behests!

Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the behest to strengthen with all our might the alliance of the workers and peasants. Then strengthen this alliance, working women and peasant women!

Comrade Lenin taught the toiling people to support the working class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, home and foreign. Remember this behest, working women and peasant women! Support the rule of the working class which is building a new life!

Comrade Lenin taught us to hold high the banner of the Communist Party, the leader of all the oppressed. Then rally round this Party, working women and peasant women—it is your Party!

On the anniversary of Ilyich's death, the Party issues the watchword—more scope for the working women and peasant women who, with the Party, are building a new life!

J. Stalin

Written January 5, 1925
Published in the magazine
Rabotnitsa, No. 1,
January 1925

TO THE TEACHERS' CONGRESS¹

The phalanx of school-teachers is one of the most essential units of the great army of working people in our country who are building a new life on the basis of socialism.

The path along which the working class is marching to socialism can lead to victory only if the vast masses of the toiling peasantry follow this path and march in step with the working class, only if the working class exercises unrelaxing leadership of the toiling masses.

The village school-teacher must realise that if there is no such leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship, and if there is no such dictatorship, our country cannot be free and independent.

To become one of the links that connect the peasant masses with the working class—such is the chief task of the village school-teacher if he really wants to serve the cause of his people, to serve the cause of its freedom and independence.

J. Stalin

January 6, 1925

Uchitelskaya Gazeta, No. 2
January 10, 1925

THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE *KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH*²

In his interview with the members of the editorial board, Comrade *Stalin*, dealing with the tasks of the magazine, said:

The chief task the magazine should set itself is to encourage the proletarian non-Party students to take an active part in the work of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party. The magazine will accomplish this only when it becomes a real Soviet students' magazine. There are still, of course, a number of defects in the work of higher educational institutions, organs of the People's Commissariat of Education, etc. The students, who know these defects better than anybody else, should systematically expose and criticise them, point them out, so that by common effort we may improve our work. It is therefore necessary, on a wide scale, to encourage the best of the non-Party proletarian students to write for the magazine. The students must feel that it is their own magazine, a means of facilitating their work and development.

Referring to the tasks of some of the departments of the magazine, Comrade *Stalin* pointed out:

The political departments of the magazine should deal only with the major questions of the work of

the Party and the Soviet Government. There is no need to duplicate other magazines. Every organ of the press in our Union ought to have its own definite place in the general work. The departments: "Student Life," "Literature," and "Science and Technology," should be considerably enlarged. Those are the departments in which the students themselves can take an active part and show what they can do. It is also necessary to get the students, as well as lecturers and professors, to elaborate various problems in the department: "Reform of Higher Education."

If the magazine acts in keeping with the slogan "closer to the students," it will be better able to perform its function and really become the Soviet students' own organ.

The magazine *Krasnaya Molodyozh*,
No. 1 (5), January 1925

**SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)³**

January 17, 1925

Comrades, on the instructions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee I have to give you certain necessary information on matters concerning the discussion and on the resolutions connected with the discussion. Unfortunately, we shall have to discuss Trotsky's action in his absence because, as we have been informed today, he will be unable to attend the plenum owing to illness.

You know, comrades, that the discussion started with Trotsky's action, the publication of his *Lessons of October*.

The discussion was started by Trotsky. The discussion was forced on the Party.

The Party replied to Trotsky's action by making two main charges. Firstly, that Trotsky is trying to revise Leninism; secondly, that Trotsky is trying to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership.

Trotsky has not said anything in his own defence about these charges made by the Party.

It is hard to say why he has not said anything in his own defence. The usual explanation is that he has fallen ill and has not been able to say anything in his own defence. But that is not the Party's fault, of

course. It is not the Party's fault if Trotsky begins to get a high temperature after every attack he makes upon the Party.

Now the Central Committee has received a statement by Trotsky (statement to the Central Committee dated January 15) to the effect that he has refrained from making any pronouncement, that he has not said anything in his own defence, because he did not want to intensify the controversy and to aggravate the issue. Of course, one may or may not think that this explanation is convincing. I, personally, do not think that it is. Firstly, how long has Trotsky been aware that his attacks upon the Party aggravate relations? When, precisely, did he become aware of this truth? This is not the first attack that Trotsky has made upon the Party, and it is not the first time that he is surprised, or regrets, that his attack aggravated relations. Secondly, if he really wants to prevent relations within the Party from deteriorating, why did he publish his *Lessons of October*, which was directed against the leading core of the Party, and was intended to worsen, to aggravate relations? That is why I think that Trotsky's explanation is quite unconvincing.

A few words about Trotsky's statement to the Central Committee of January 15, which I have just mentioned, and which has been distributed to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The first thing that must be observed and taken note of is Trotsky's statement that he is willing to take any post to which the Party appoints him, that he is willing to submit to any kind of control as far as future actions on his part are concerned, and that he thinks it absolutely necessary in the interests of our work that

he should be removed from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council as speedily as possible.

All this must, of course, be taken note of.

As regards the substance of the matter, two points should be noted: concerning “permanent revolution” and change of the Party leadership. Trotsky says that if at any time after October he happened on particular occasions to revert to the formula “permanent revolution,” it was only as something appertaining to the History of the Party Department, appertaining to the past, and not with a view to elucidating present political tasks. This question is important, for it concerns the fundamentals of Leninist ideology. In my opinion, this statement of Trotsky’s cannot be taken either as an explanation or as a justification. There is not even a hint in it that he admits his mistakes. It is an evasion of the question. What is the meaning of the statement that the theory of “permanent revolution” is something that appertains to the History of the Party Department? How is this to be understood? The History of the Party Department is not only the repository, but also the interpreter of Party documents. There are documents there that were valid at one time and later lost their validity. There are also documents there that were, and still are, of great importance for the Party’s guidance. And there are also documents there of a purely negative character, of a negative significance, to which the Party cannot become reconciled. In which category of documents does Trotsky include his theory of “permanent revolution”? In the good or in the bad category? Trotsky said nothing about that in his statement. He wriggled out of

the question. He avoided it. Consequently, the charge of revising Leninism still holds good.

Trotsky says further that on the questions settled by the Thirteenth Congress he has never, either in the Central Committee, or in the Council of Labour and Defence, and certainly not to the country at large, made any proposals which directly or indirectly raised the questions already settled. That is not true. What did Trotsky say before the Thirteenth Congress? That the cadres were no good, and that a radical change in the Party leadership was needed. What does he say now, in his *Lessons of October*? That the main core of the Party is no good and must be changed. Such is the conclusion to be drawn from *The Lessons of October*. *The Lessons of October* was published in substantiation of this conclusion. That was the purpose of *The Lessons of October*. Consequently, the charge of attempting to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership still holds good.

In view of this, Trotsky's statement as a whole is not an explanation in the true sense of the term, but a collection of diplomatic evasions and a renewal of old controversies already settled by the Party.

That is not the kind of document the Party demanded from Trotsky.

Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands from its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, but an honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky, evidently, lacks the courage frankly to admit his mistakes. He does not understand that the Party's sense of power and dignity has grown, that the Party feels that it is the master and demands that we should bow our heads

to it when circumstances demand. That is what Trotsky does not understand.

How did our Party organisations react to Trotsky's action? You know that a number of local Party organisations have passed resolutions on this subject. They have been published in *Pravda*. They can be divided into three categories. One category demands Trotsky's expulsion from the Party. Another category demands Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his expulsion from the Political Bureau. The third category, which also includes the last draft resolution sent to the Central Committee today by the comrades from Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, demands Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his conditional retention in the Political Bureau.

Such are the three main groups of resolutions on Trotsky's action.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission have to choose between these resolutions.

That is all I had to tell you about matters concerning the discussion.

J. Stalin, *Trotskyism*,
Moscow, 1925

**SPEECH DELIVERED
AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)**

January 19, 1925

I have taken the floor in order strongly to support Comrade Frunze's proposal. I think that we must decide here on three things.

Firstly, we must accept Comrade Frunze's proposal concerning additional assignments—5,000,000 rubles; a total of 405,000,000 rubles.

Secondly, we must pass a resolution endorsing Comrade Frunze's appointment to the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

Thirdly, we must instruct the Party to render the new Revolutionary Military Council every assistance in the way of providing personnel.

I must say that lately, owing to some increase in the requirements of our economic bodies and to the fact that economic and cultural requirements are growing beyond our present means, a certain liquidationist mood concerning the army has arisen among us. Some of our comrades say that little by little, keeping the brakes on, we ought to reduce our army to the level of a militia. What they have in mind is not the militia system, but a peace army, the conversion of the army into a simple militia that cannot be prepared for military complications.

I must declare most emphatically that we must resolutely do away with this liquidationist mood.

Why? Because a radical change in the international situation has begun lately. New pre-conditions are maturing, which foreshadow new complications for us, and we must be ready to meet them. The danger of intervention is again becoming real.

What are those facts?

Firstly, the growth of the colonial movement, and of the liberation movement in general, in the East. India, China, Egypt, the Sudan are important bases for imperialism. There, the colonial movement is growing and will continue to grow. That is bound to turn the ruling strata of the Great Powers against us, against the Soviets, for they know that the seeds that are falling on this fertile soil in the East will mature and germinate. They will certainly germinate.

Second fact: complications are maturing in North Africa, in the region of Morocco and Tunisia. That is causing a new regrouping of forces, new preparations for new military complications between the imperialists. The fact that Spain has suffered defeat in Morocco⁴; that France is stretching out her hands to grab Morocco; that Britain will not tolerate the strengthening of France's position in Morocco; that Italy is trying to take advantage of the new situation to lay her hands on Tunisia and that the other states will not permit her to do so; the fact that Britain and France are vying with each other in their strenuous endeavours to secure influence in the Balkans, in the new states that were formed as a result of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary—all this is reminiscent of the well-known facts in the history of

the last war, reminiscent of the facts that preceded the last war. The Albanian events are not accidental⁵; they are a manifestation of the struggle between the Great Powers, each trying to establish its influence on that small area. All this shows that the preparation and regrouping of forces is taking place all over Europe in view of the nascent complications in the Far East and of the new prospects that are opening in North Africa. All this forms the pre-conditions for a new war. And a new war is bound to affect our country.

Third fact: the growth of a revolutionary mood among the workers in Britain. This is a fact of first-rate importance. Britain holds a commanding position in Europe. The incipient split between the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, and the fissures which have begun to develop within the British Labour Party, go to show that something revolutionary, something new is developing in Britain. This is alarming the ruling strata in Britain. And this is bound to turn them against Soviet Russia, for the key-note of the revival of the movement in Britain is friendship with Russia.

Fourth fact: in view of the pre-conditions of which I have spoken, in view of the fact that the pre-conditions for war are maturing and that war may become inevitable, not tomorrow or the day after, of course, but in a few years' time, and in view of the fact that war is bound to intensify the internal, revolutionary crisis both in the East and in the West—in view of this we are bound to be faced with the question of being prepared for all contingencies. I think that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the West are strong, that they are growing and will continue to grow, and here or there may

succeed in kicking out the bourgeoisie. That is so. But it will be very difficult for them to hold out. That is clearly shown by the examples of the border countries, Estonia and Latvia, for instance. The question of our army, of its might and preparedness, will certainly face us as a burning question in the event of complications arising in the countries around us.

That does not mean that in such a situation we must necessarily undertake active operations against somebody or other. That is not so. If anybody shows signs of harbouring such a notion—he is wrong. Our banner is still the banner of *peace*. But if war breaks out we shall not be able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to take action, but we shall be the last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive weight in the scales, the *weight* that can turn the scales.

Hence the conclusion: we must be prepared for all contingencies; we must prepare our army, supply it with footwear and clothing, train it, improve its technical equipment, improve chemical defence and aviation, and in general, raise our Red Army to the proper level. The international situation makes this imperative for us.

That is why I think that we must resolutely and irrevocably meet the demands of the war department.

Published for the first time

TO *RABOCHAYA GAZETA*⁶

Remember, love and study Ilyich, our teacher, our leader.

Fight and defeat our enemies, home and foreign—in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Build the new society, the new way of life, the new culture—in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Never refuse to do the little things, for from little things are built the big things—that is one of Ilyich's important behests.

J. Stalin

Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 17,
January 21, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE D—OV

Comrade D—ov,

I am late with my reply, but I had no time to reply earlier.

1) I think that you read the article⁷ carelessly, otherwise you would certainly have found in it the passage from Ilyich's article about "the victory of socialism in one country."

2) If you read the article carefully you will probably understand that the point at issue is not *complete* victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the "joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries."

It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, "cannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe." That is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If Trotsky's theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into

socialist Russia, and that we have “all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society” (see the article “On Co-operation”⁸), would be wrong.

3) Evidently, you failed to note that the published article is part of a “Preface.” Had you noted this, I think you would have understood that the “Preface” must be taken as a whole.

4) The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP*—do you think that during those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist economy? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it does not (see my “Preface”), for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the danger of military intervention. Nevertheless, it is obvious to everyone that it is the victory and not the

* I am fully justified in making the second assumption because the strength of our Republic is growing and will continue to grow, and the support we are receiving from our Western Comrades is increasing and will continue to increase.

defeat of socialism. And there can scarcely be any reason to doubt that at the same time this victory creates the pre-conditions for the victory of the revolution in other countries.

I see that some comrades have not yet abandoned the old Social-Democratic theory that the proletarian revolution cannot be brought about in countries where capitalism is less developed than, say, in Britain or America.

5) I advise you to read again some of Ilyich's articles in the symposium *Against the Stream*,⁹ his pamphlets *The Proletarian Revolution*¹⁰ and "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*,¹¹ and also his article "On Co-operation."

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

January 25, 1925

Published for the first time

“DYMOVKA”

*Speech Delivered
at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)¹²
January 26, 1925*

First of all the question of Sosnovsky, although it is not the central question. He is accused of stating somewhere in the press that the entire Soviet apparatus, even the system, is rotten. I have not read such statements, and nobody has indicated where Sosnovsky wrote this. Had he said anywhere that the Soviet system was rotten, he would have been a counter-revolutionary.

Here is his book. It says: “Not knowing the Ukrainian countryside sufficiently, I do not undertake to judge how far Dymovka is typical of all the Ukrainian villages. Let those who have more expert knowledge about the Soviet Ukraine decide this. Nevertheless, I take the liberty to assert that Dymovka is by no means an exception. From the local press, from conversations with responsible workers, from meetings with peasants and from certain documents that came into my hands, I gathered that elements of a ‘Dymovka’ situation are to be found in other villages too.”

This is put very mildly, and it does not say anything about decay of the Soviet system or of the Soviet apparatus as a whole. Therefore, the accusations against

Sosnovsky made by the commission, or by individual comrades, are incorrect. Whether they are made by the Gubernia Committee, the Okrug Committee, the commission, or by individuals makes no difference; the charges are unsupported, there are no documents.

On the contrary, I should like to point out that in this matter Sosnovsky has something to his credit. Nobody has said anything about that. It is to the credit of *Pravda*, to the credit of Sosnovsky, to the credit of Demyan Bedny, that they had the courage to drag into the light of day a piece of real life and to reveal it to the whole country. That is a service which it is absolutely necessary to point out. That is what must be said, and not that they overdid things.

It is said that Sosnovsky overdid things. But in cases where there is a general tendency towards officialdom, -while there are evils under the surface which are spoiling all our work, it is necessary to overdo things. It is certainly necessary. It is inevitable. Nothing but good can come of it. Of course, somebody will be offended, but our work gains by it. We shall not be able to set things right without some offence to individuals.

The main thing in this matter, in my opinion, is not that a village correspondent was murdered, or even that we have a Dymovka—all this is very deplorable, but it is not the main thing. The main thing is that here and there in the countryside, in the volosts, in the districts, in the okrugs, our local responsible workers look only towards Moscow and refuse to turn towards the peasantry, failing to understand that it is not enough to be on good terms with Moscow, that it is also necessary to be on good terms with the peasantry. That is the principal mis-

take, the principal danger in our work in the countryside.

Many responsible workers say that it has become the fashion at the centre to make new statements about the countryside, that this is diplomacy for the outside world, that we are not moved by an earnest and determined desire to improve our policy in the countryside. That is what I regard as the most dangerous thing. If our comrades in the localities refuse to believe that we have earnestly set to work to teach our responsible workers a new approach to the countryside, to the peasantry, if they fail to see this, or do not believe it, a very grave danger arises. What we must do now is to dispel this mood among the local responsible workers, to turn the line abruptly in the other direction, so that they look on our policy in regard to the countryside as something important, something absolutely essential.

We have three allies: the international proletariat, which is tardy in making a revolution; the colonies, which are very slow in getting into their stride; and the peasantry. I shall not now speak of the fourth ally, i.e., the conflicts in the camp of our enemies. It is hard to say when the international revolution will get into its stride; when it does, it will be the decisive factor. It is also hard to say when the colonies will get into their stride; that is a very serious and difficult question and nothing definite can be said about it. As for the peasantry, we are working with it today; it is our third ally, and an ally who is giving us direct assistance at this very moment; it gives us the men for the army, grain, and so forth. With this ally, i.e., the peasantry, we are working jointly, together we are building socialism, well

or ill, but we are building it, and we must appreciate the value of this ally at the present time, particularly at the present time.

That is why we are now putting the question of the peasantry into the forefront of our work.

It must be said that the present course of our policy is a new one; it marks a new line in our policy in regard to the countryside in the matter of building socialism. The comrades do not wish to understand this. If they fail to understand this fundamental thing, we shall make no progress whatever in our work, and there will be no building of socialism in our country. The gravest cause of danger, to my mind, is that our comrades forget about this main thing and are carried away by what may be called their departmental view that Moscow must be shown the "right side of the cloth" and that apparently all is well, that they must conceal evils, that they must not permit criticism because, they think, it discredits the local authorities, the local responsible workers. We must put a stop to that, and we must tell the comrades that they must not be afraid of dragging bits of life into the light of day, however unpleasant they may be. We must make our comrades turn round, so that they do not look only towards Moscow, but learn to look towards the peasantry, whom it is their function to serve; so that they shall not conceal evils, but, on the contrary, help us to expose our mistakes, to rectify them and to conduct our work along the line now laid down by the Party.

One thing or the other (I have already spoken about this a number of times): either we, jointly with the non-Party peasants, jointly with our local Soviet and

Party workers, criticise ourselves in order to improve our work, or the discontent of the peasants will accumulate and burst out in revolts. Bear in mind that under the new conditions, under NEP, another Tambov, or another Kronstadt,¹³ is by no means precluded. The Transcaucasian, the Georgian revolt¹⁴ was a grave warning. Such revolts are possible in future if we do not learn to expose and eliminate our evils, if we go on making it appear outwardly that all is well.

That is why I think that what we must speak of here is not the shortcomings or exaggerations of individual writers who expose the defects in our work, but their merits in doing so.

Here I must pass on to the question of our writers, our correspondents. I think that we have arrived at the period when the worker correspondents and village correspondents can become one of the principal instruments for correcting our constructive work in the countryside, for exposing our defects and, consequently, for correcting and improving the work of the Soviets. Perhaps we do not all realise this, but it is clear to me that it is precisely from this end that the improvement of our work must begin. These people, the bulk of whom are impressionable, who are fired by the love of truth, who desire to expose and correct our shortcomings at all costs, people who are not afraid of bullets—it is these people who, in my opinion, should become one of the principal instruments for exposing our defects and correcting our Party and Soviet constructive work in the localities.

That is why we must heed the voice of these comrades and not disparage our press workers. By means of them,

as by means of a sort of barometer which directly marks defects in our constructive work, there is very much that we could expose and correct.

As regards the Central Control Commission, I think that, on the whole, the resolution that it adopted is correct. Something, perhaps, should be amended, revised.

The Dymovka affair should be dealt with in the press in such a way as to enable our comrades to understand what gave rise to it. The point does not lie in the fact that a village correspondent was murdered; still less does it lie in not offending the secretary of the Okrug Committee or Gubernia Committee. The point is to start improving our constructive socialist work in the countryside. That is the main thing. That is the point at issue.

J. Stalin, *The Peasant Question*,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1925

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

*Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference
of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)¹⁵
January 27, 1925*

Comrades, I should like to say a few words about the principles underlying the policy which the Party has now adopted towards the peasantry. That the question of the peasantry is particularly important at the present time there can be no doubt. Many comrades have gone to extremes and even say that a new era has begun—the peasant era. Others have begun to interpret the slogan “face to the countryside” as meaning that we must turn our backs on the towns. Some have even gone to the length of talking about a political NEP. That is nonsense, of course. All that means going to extremes, of course. If, however, we put those extremes aside, one thing remains, namely, that at the present time, particularly just now, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance.

Why? What is the reason?

There are two reasons for it. I am speaking of fundamental reasons.

The first reason why the peasant question has assumed exceptional importance for us at the present moment is that, of the allies of the Soviet power, of all the proletariat’s principal allies—of whom there are four,

in my opinion—the peasantry is the only ally that can be of direct assistance to our revolution *at this very moment*. It is a question of direct assistance just now, at the present moment. All the other allies, while they will be of great importance in the future and while they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution, nevertheless, unfortunately, cannot render our regime, our state, direct assistance now.

What are these allies?

The first ally, our principal ally, is the proletariat in the developed countries. The advanced proletariat, the proletariat in the West, is an immense force, and it is the most faithful and most important ally of our revolution and our regime. But, unfortunately, the situation, the state of the revolutionary movement in the developed capitalist countries, is such that the proletariat in the West is unable to render us direct and decisive assistance at the present moment. We have its indirect, moral support, and this is so important that its value cannot even be measured, it is inestimable. Nevertheless, it does not constitute that direct and immediate assistance that we need now.

The second ally is the colonies, the oppressed peoples in the under-developed countries, which are oppressed by the more developed countries. Comrades, they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution. But they are very slow in getting into their stride. They are coming directly to our help, but it is evident that they will not arrive quickly. For that very reason they are unable to render us direct and immediate assistance in our work of socialist construction, of strengthening the Soviet regime, of building our socialist economy.

We have a third ally, intangible, impersonal, but for all that an extremely important one, namely, the conflicts and contradictions between the capitalist countries; they cannot be personified, but they certainly render our regime and our revolution very great support. That may seem strange, comrades, but it is a fact. Had the two chief coalitions of capitalist countries not been engaged in mortal combat during the imperialist war in 1917, had they not been clutching at each other's throats, had they not been busy with their own affairs and unable to spare time to wage a struggle against the Soviet power, it is doubtful whether the Soviet power would have survived. The struggle, conflicts and wars between our enemies, I repeat, constitute an extremely important ally for us. But what is the situation with regard to this ally? The situation is that world capital after the war, after passing through several crises, has begun to recover. That must be admitted. The chief victor countries—Britain and America—have now acquired such strength that they have the material possibility not only of putting capital's affairs in more or less tolerable order at home, but also of infusing new blood into France, Germany and other capitalist countries. That is one aspect of the matter. And as a result of that aspect of the matter, the contradictions between the capitalist countries are, for the time being, not developing with the same intensity as was the case immediately after the war. That is a gain for capital, and a loss for us. But this process has also another aspect, a reverse side. The reverse side is that, notwithstanding the relative stability which capital has been able to create for the time being, the contradictions at the other end of the

inter-relations, the contradictions between the exploiting advanced countries and the exploited backward countries, the colonies and dependent countries, are becoming sharper and deeper and are threatening to disrupt capital's "work" from a new and "unexpected" end. The crisis in Egypt and in the Sudan—you have probably read about it in the newspapers—also a number of key points of contradiction in China, which may set the present "allies" at loggerheads and wreck the strength of capital, a new series of key points of contradiction in North Africa, where Spain is losing Morocco, towards which France is stretching out her hands, but which she will be unable to take because Britain will not permit France to gain control over Gibraltar—all these are facts which are in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war period and which are bound to imperil the "constructive work" of international capital.

Such are the gains and losses in the total balance-sheet of the development of contradictions. But as, for the time being, capital's gains in this sphere are bigger than its losses and as there are no grounds for expecting that armed conflicts between the capitalists will break out in the immediate future, it is evident that the situation as regards our third ally is still not what we would like it to be.

There remains the fourth ally—the peasantry. It is by our side, we are living together, together we are building the new life; well or ill, we are building together. As you yourselves are aware, this ally is not a very staunch one; the peasantry is not as reliable an ally as the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries. But, for all that, it is an ally, and of all our existing

allies it is the only one that can render us, and is rendering us, direct assistance at this very moment, receiving our assistance in exchange.

That is why, particularly at the present moment, when the course of development of revolutionary and all other crises has slowed down somewhat, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance.

Such is the first reason for the exceptional importance of the peasant question.

The second reason for our making the question of the peasantry the corner-stone of our policy at the present moment is that our industry, which is the basis of socialism and the basis of our regime, rests on the home market, the peasant market. I do not know what the situation will be when our industry develops to the full, when we are able to cope with the home market, and when we are faced with the question of winning foreign markets. We shall be faced with that question in the future, you can have no doubt about that. It is doubtful whether we shall be able in the future to count on capturing foreign markets in the West from capital, which is more experienced than we are. But as regards markets in the East, our relations with which cannot be considered bad—and they will improve still further—here we shall find more favourable conditions. There can be no doubt that textile goods, means of defence, machinery, and so forth, will be the principal commodities with which we shall supply the East in competition with the capitalists. But that concerns the future of our industry. As for the present, when we have not yet fully utilised even a third of our peasant market, at the present moment, the chief question that faces us is that of the home market, and

above all the peasant market. The fact that the peasant market is at the present moment the chief basis of our industry is precisely the reason why we, as the government, and we, as the proletariat, are interested in improving to the utmost the condition of peasant economy, in improving the material conditions of the peasantry, in raising the purchasing power of the peasantry, in improving the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, in establishing that bond which Lenin spoke about, but which we have not yet established properly.

That is the second reason why we, as the Party, must put the question of the peasantry in the forefront at the present moment, why we must devote special attention and special care to the peasantry.

Such are the premises of our Party's policy in regard to the peasantry.

The whole trouble, comrades, is that many of our comrades do not understand, or do not want to understand, how extremely important this question is.

It is often said: our leaders in Moscow have made it the fashion to talk about the peasantry; probably, they don't mean it seriously, it is diplomacy. Moscow needs these speeches to be made for the outside world, but we can continue the old policy. That is what some say. Others say that the talk about the peasantry is just talk. If the Moscow people did not stick in their offices, but were to visit the countryside, they would see what the peasants are, and how the taxes are collected. That is the sort of talk one hears. I think, comrades, that of all the dangers that face us, this failure of our local responsible workers to understand the tasks before us is the most serious danger.

One thing or the other:

Either our local comrades will realise how very serious the question of the peasantry is, in which case they will really set about drawing the peasantry into our constructive work, improving peasant economy and strengthening the bond; or the comrades will fail to realise it, in which case things may end in the collapse of the Soviet power.

Let not the comrades think that I am trying to frighten somebody. No, comrades, there would be no sense in trying to frighten anybody. The question is too serious, and it must be dealt with in a way that befits serious people.

On arriving in Moscow, comrades often try to show the "right side of the cloth," saying that all is well in the countryside where they are. This official optimism is sometimes sickening, for it is obvious that all is not well, nor can it be. Obviously, there are defects, which must be exposed without fear of criticism, and then eliminated. The issue is as follows: either we, the entire Party, allow the non-Party peasants and workers to criticise us, or we shall be criticised by means of revolts. The revolt in Georgia was criticism. The revolt in Tambov was also criticism. The revolt in Kronstadt—was not that criticism? One thing or the other: either we abandon this official optimism and official approach to the matter, do not fear criticism and allow ourselves to be criticised by the non-Party workers and peasants, who, after all, are the ones to feel the effects of our mistakes, or we do not do this, and discontent will accumulate and grow, and we shall have criticism in the form of revolts.

The greatest danger now is that many of our comrades fail to understand this specific feature of the present situation.

Has this question—the question of the peasantry—any connection with the question of Trotskyism, which you have discussed here? Undoubtedly it has.

What is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism is disbelief in the forces of our revolution, disbelief in the alliance between the workers and peasants, disbelief in the bond. What is our principal task at the present time? In the words of Ilyich, it is to convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia. Can this task be carried out if the bond is not established? No, it cannot. Can the bond, the alliance between the workers and peasants, be established if the theory which involves disbelief in that alliance, i.e., the theory of Trotskyism, is not smashed? No, it cannot. The conclusion is obvious: whoever wants to emerge from NEP as the victor must bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.

Before the revolution in October, Ilyich would often say that of all our ideological opponents the most dangerous were the Mensheviks, for they were trying to instil disbelief in the victory of the October Revolution. Therefore, he said, the victory of October could not be achieved unless Menshevism was smashed. I think that there is some analogy between Menshevism at that time, in the period of October, and Trotskyism at the present time, in the period of NEP. I think that of all the ideological trends in communism today, after the victory of October, under the present conditions of NEP, Trotskyism must be regarded as the most dangerous,

for it tries to instil disbelief in the forces of our revolution, disbelief in the alliance of the workers and peasants, disbelief in the work of converting NEP Russia into socialist Russia. Therefore, unless Trotskyism is smashed, it will be impossible to achieve victory under the conditions of NEP, it will be impossible to achieve the conversion of present-day Russia into socialist Russia.

Such is the connection between the Party's policy towards the peasantry and Trotskyism.

Pravda, No. 24,
January 30, 1925

THE PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVISATION

Interview with Herzog, Member of the G.C.P.

First Question (Herzog). Do you think that political and economic conditions in the democratic-capitalist republic of Germany are such that the working class will have to wage a struggle for power in the more or less immediate future?

Answer (Stalin). It would be difficult to give a strictly definite answer to this question if it were a matter of dates and not of trends. That the present situation, as regards both international and internal conditions, differs substantially from that in 1923 needs no proof. That, however, does not preclude the possibility of the situation changing abruptly in favour of a revolution in the immediate future as a result of possible important changes in the external situation. The instability of the international situation is a guarantee that this assumption may become very probable.

Second question. Considering the present economic situation and the present relation of forces, shall we need a longer preparatory period in which to win over the majority of the proletariat (the task which Lenin set the Communist Parties of all countries as an extremely important condition for the conquest of political power)?

Answer. As regards the economic situation, I am able to judge the matter only in the light of the general data that I have at my disposal. I think that the Dawes Plan¹⁶ has already produced some results, which have led to a relative stabilisation of the situation. The influx of American capital into German industry, the stabilisation of the currency, the improvement that has taken place in a number of highly important branches of German industry—which by no means signifies a radical recovery of Germany's economy—and lastly, some improvement in the material conditions of the working class—all this was bound to strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie in Germany to some extent. That is, so to speak, the “positive” side of the Dawes Plan.

But the Dawes Plan also has “negative” sides, which are bound inevitably to make themselves felt at some definite period and to demolish the “positive” results of this plan. Undoubtedly, the Dawes Plan imposes a double yoke upon the German proletariat, the yoke of home and the yoke of foreign capital. The contradiction between the expansion of German industry and the shrinking of the foreign markets for this industry, the discrepancy between the hypertrophied demands of the Entente and the maximum ability of German national economy to meet these demands—all this inevitably worsens the conditions of the proletariat, the small peasants, office employees and the intelligentsia, and is bound to lead to an upheaval, to a direct struggle for the conquest of power by the proletariat.

That circumstance must not, however, be regarded as the only favourable condition for a German revolution. In order that this revolution may be victorious, it is

also necessary that the Communist Party should represent the majority of the working class, that it should become the decisive force in the working class. Social-Democracy must be exposed and routed, it must be reduced to an insignificant minority in the working class. Without that, it is useless even to think of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If the workers are to achieve victory, they must be inspired by a single will, they must be led by a single party, which enjoys the indubitable confidence of the majority of the working class. If there are two competing parties of equal strength within the working class, a lasting victory is impossible even under favourable external circumstances. Lenin was the first to lay special emphasis on this in the period before the October Revolution as a most essential condition for the victory of the proletariat.

It could be considered that the situation most favourable for a revolution would be one in which an internal crisis in Germany and the decisive growth of the Communist Party's forces coincided with grave complications in the camp of Germany's external enemies.

I think that the absence of this latter circumstance in the revolutionary period of 1923 was by no means the least important unfavourable factor.

Third question. You said that the C.P.G. must have the majority of the workers behind it. Too little attention has been paid to this aim hitherto. What, in your opinion, must be done to convert the C.P.G. into such an energetic party, with a progressively increasing recruiting power?

Answer. Some comrades think that strengthening the Party and Bolshevizing it mean expelling all dissent-

ers from it. That is wrong, of course. Social-Democracy can be exposed and reduced to an insignificant minority in the working class only in the course of the day-to-day struggle for the concrete needs of the working class. The Social-Democrats must be pilloried not on the basis of planetary questions, but on the basis of the day-to-day struggle of the working class for improving its material and political conditions; in this, questions concerning wages, hours, housing conditions, insurance, taxation, unemployment, high cost of living, and so forth, must play a most important if not the decisive role. To hit the Social-Democrats day after day on the basis of these questions, exposing their treachery—such is the task.

But that task would not be fully carried out if those everyday practical questions were not linked up with the fundamental questions of Germany's international and internal situation, and if, in all its work, the Party failed to deal with all those everyday questions from the standpoint of revolution and the conquest of power by the proletariat.

But such a policy can be conducted only by a party which is headed by cadres of leaders sufficiently experienced to be able to take advantage of every single blunder of Social-Democracy in order to strengthen the Party, and possessing sufficient theoretical training not to lose sight of the prospects of revolutionary development because of partial successes.

It is this, chiefly, that explains why the question of the leading cadres of the Communist Parties in general, including those of the Communist Party of Germany, is one of the vital questions of Bolshevism.

To achieve Bolshevisation it is necessary to bring about at least certain fundamental conditions, without which no Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties will be possible.

1) The Party must regard itself not as an appendage of the parliamentary electoral machinery, as the Social-Democratic Party in fact does, and not as a gratuitous supplement to the trade unions, as certain Anarcho-Syndicalist elements sometimes claim it should be, but as the *highest* form of class association of the proletariat, the function of which is to *lead* all the other forms of proletarian organisations, from the trade unions to the Party's group in parliament.

2) The Party, and especially its leading elements, must thoroughly master the revolutionary theory of Marxism, which is inseparably connected with revolutionary practice.

3) The Party must draw up slogans and directives not on the basis of stock formulas and historical analogies, but as the result of a careful analysis of the concrete internal and international conditions of the revolutionary movement, and it must, without fail, take into account the experience of revolutions in all countries.

4) The Party must test the correctness of these slogans and directives in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses.

5) The entire work of the Party, particularly if Social-Democratic traditions have not yet been eradicated in it, must be reorganised on new, revolutionary lines, so that every step, every action, taken by the Party should naturally serve to revolutionise the masses, to

train and educate the broad masses of the working class in the revolutionary spirit.

6) In its work the Party must be able to combine the strictest adherence to principle (not to be confused with sectarianism!) with the maximum of ties and contacts with the masses (not to be confused with khvostism!); without this, the Party will be unable not only to teach the masses but also to learn from them, it will be unable not only to lead the masses and raise them to its own level but also to heed their voice and anticipate their urgent needs.

7) In its work the Party must be able to combine an uncompromising revolutionary spirit (not to be confused with revolutionary adventurism!) with the maximum of flexibility and manoeuvring ability (not to be confused with opportunism!); without this, the Party will be unable to master all the forms of struggle and organisation, will be unable to link the daily interests of the proletariat with the fundamental interests of the proletarian revolution, and to combine in its work the legal with the illegal struggle.

8) The Party must not cover up its mistakes, it must not fear criticism; it must improve and educate its cadres by learning from its own mistakes.

9) The Party must be able to recruit for its main leading group the best elements of the advanced fighters who are sufficiently devoted to the cause to be genuine spokesmen of the aspirations of the revolutionary proletariat, and who are sufficiently experienced to become real leaders of the proletarian revolution, capable of applying the tactics and strategy of Leninism.

10) The Party must systematically improve the social composition of its organisations and rid itself of corrupting opportunist elements with a view to achieving the utmost solidarity.

11) The Party must achieve iron proletarian discipline based on ideological solidarity, clarity concerning the aims of the movement, unity of practical action and an understanding of the Party's tasks by the mass of the Party membership.

12) The Party must systematically verify the execution of its decisions and directives; without this, these decisions and directives are in danger of becoming empty promises, which can only rob the Party of the confidence of the broad proletarian masses.

In the absence of these and similar conditions, Bolshevism is just an empty sound.

Fourth question. You said that, in addition to the negative sides of the Dawes Plan, the second condition for the conquest of power by the C.P.G. is a situation in which the Social-Democratic Party stands fully exposed before the masses, and when it is no longer an important force in the working class. In view of actual circumstances, we are a long way from that. That is obviously the effect of the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party's present methods of work. How can these be removed? What is your opinion of the results of the December 1924 elections, in which the Social-Democratic Party—an utterly corrupt and rotten party—far from losing votes, actually gained about two million votes?

Answer. That is not due to shortcomings in the work of the Communist Party of Germany. It is primarily due to the fact that the American loans and the influx

of American capital, plus the stabilisation of the currency, which have somewhat improved the situation, have created the illusion that the internal and external contradictions connected with Germany's situation can be completely eliminated. It was on this illusion that German Social-Democracy rode into the present Reichstag as if on a white horse. Wels is now preening himself on his election victory; evidently he does not realise that he is claiming another's victory as his own. It was not the victory of German Social-Democracy, but of the Morgan group. Wels has been and remains merely one of Morgan's agents.

Pravda, No. 27,
February 3, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME—RT

Dear Comrade Me—rt,

I have received your letter of February 20. First of all, accept my greetings. And now to the matter in hand.

1) You (and not only you) are making too much of my interview with Herzog.* I could not, and will not, kick him out, not only because he is a member of the Party, but also because he came to me with a letter from Comrade Geschke, who begged me to give him an interview. I am sending you a copy of that letter. I have already sent the German original to the Central Committee of the C.P.G. On the basis of the mere fact that, on Comrade Geschke's written request, I gave Herzog an interview, to draw the conclusion that the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) is turning, or intends to turn, towards Brandler, means making a mountain not even out of a molehill, but out of nothing, and being altogether wide of the mark. If the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) were to learn that you, or other members of the Central Committee of the C.P.G., suspect the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) of having sympathies towards Brandler-Thalheimer,¹⁷ and of turning from the Lefts to the Rights, they would split their sides with laughter.

* See this volume, pp. 34-41.—*Ed.*

2) You are quite right in saying that the Communist Party of Germany has achieved enormous successes. There is no doubt that Brandler and Thalheimer belong to the category of the old type of leaders who have outlived their time and are being pushed into the background by leaders of a new type. Here in Russia, too, the process of the dying-out of a number of old guiding functionaries from the world of letters and old “leaders” has taken place. That process was more rapid in periods of revolutionary crises and slower in periods when we were accumulating forces, but it went on all the time. The Lunacharskys, Pokrovskys, Rozhkovs, Goldenbergs, Bogdanovs, Krassins, etc.—such are the first specimens that come to my mind of former Bolshevik leaders who later dropped into secondary roles. It is a necessary process of renewal of the leading cadres of a live and developing party. Incidentally, the difference between the Brandlers and Thalheimers and the comrades I have mentioned is that, in addition to everything else, the Brandlers and Thalheimers are burdened with the old Social-Democratic baggage, whereas the above-mentioned Russian comrades were free from such a burden. This difference, as you see, speaks not in favour of but against Brandler and Thalheimer. The fact that the C.P.G. has succeeded in pushing the Brandlers and Thalheimers aside, in pushing them off the stage, is in itself evidence that the C.P.G. is growing, advancing and prospering. That is apart from the undoubted successes of the C.P.G. which you quite rightly mention in your letter. To think now that there are people in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) who are planning to turn back the wheel of the German Communist Party’s development means having a very bad

opinion of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). Be more careful, Comrade Me—rt. . . .

3) You speak about the line of the C.P.G. It is beyond doubt that its line—I mean its political line—is correct. That indeed explains the close, friendly (and not merely comradely) relations between the R.C.P.(B.) and the C.P.G. that you yourself refer to in your letter. But does that mean that we must slur over individual mistakes in the political work of the C.P.G. or of the R.C.P.(B.)? Of course not. Can it be asserted that the Central Committee of the C.P.G., or the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), are free from individual mistakes? Can it be asserted that criticism of *part* of the activities of the Central Committee of the C.P.G. (inadequate exploitation of the Barmat case,¹⁸ the well-known voting of the Communist group in the Prussian parliament in the election of the Speaker of that parliament, the question of taxation in connection with the Dawes Plan, etc.) is incompatible with complete solidarity with the *general* line of the Central Committee of the C.P.G.? Obviously not. What will become of our Parties if, when meeting one another, in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, say, we shut our eyes to individual mistakes committed by our Parties, content ourselves with parading our “complete harmony” and “well-being,” and become yesmen to one another? I think that such parties could never become revolutionary. They would not be revolutionary parties, but mummies. It seems to me that some German comrades are occasionally inclined to demand that we should become complete yesmen to the Central Committee of the C.P.G. and are ready on their part to become complete yesmen to the Central Commit-

tee of the R.C.P.(B.). I am emphatically opposed to this mutual yesmanship. Judging by your letter, you are also opposed to it. All the better for the C.P.G.

4) I am emphatically opposed to the policy of kicking out all dissenting comrades. I am opposed to such a policy not because I am sorry for the dissenters, but because such a policy gives rise in the Party to a regime of intimidation, a regime of bullying, which kills the spirit of self-criticism and initiative. It is not good when leaders of the Party are feared but not respected. Party leaders can be real leaders only if they are not merely feared but respected in the Party, when their authority is recognised. It is difficult to produce such leaders, it is a long and arduous process, but it is absolutely essential, otherwise the Party cannot be called a real Bolshevik Party, and the discipline of the Party cannot be conscious discipline. I think that the German comrades are acting contrary to this self-evident truth. To disavow Trotsky and his supporters, we Russian Bolsheviks carried out an intense campaign based on an explanation of principles in support of the foundations of Bolshevism as against the foundations of Trotskyism, although, considering the strength and prestige of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), we could have dispensed with such a campaign. Was that campaign needed? Certainly it was, for by means of it we educated hundreds of thousands of new Party members (and also people who are not Party members) in the spirit of Bolshevism. It is very sad that our German comrades do not feel it necessary that repressive measures against the opposition should be preceded or supplemented by a wide campaign based on an explanation of principles, and are thus hindering the

education of the Party members and Party cadres in the spirit of Bolshevism. To expel Brandler and Thalheimer is an easy matter, but the task of overcoming Brandlerism is a difficult and serious one. In this matter, repressive measures alone can only cause harm; here the soil must be deeply ploughed, minds must be greatly enlightened. The R.C.P.(B.) always developed through contradictions, i.e., in the struggle against non-communist trends, and only in that struggle did it gain strength and forge real cadres. The same path of development through contradictions, through a real, serious and lengthy struggle against non-communist trends, especially against Social-Democratic traditions, Brandlerism, etc., lies before the C.P.G. But repressive measures alone are not enough in such a struggle. That is why I think that the inner-Party policy of the Central Committee of the C.P.G. must be made more flexible. I have no doubt that the C.P.G. will be able to rectify the defects in this sphere.

5) You are quite right about work in the trade unions. The role of the trade unions in Germany is different from that of the trade unions in Russia. In Russia, the trade unions arose after the Party and, in essence, they were the Party's auxiliary organs. That is not the case in Germany, or in Europe generally. There, the Party arose from the trade unions; the latter successfully competed with the Party in influencing the masses, and often acted as a heavy fetter on the Party. If the broad masses in Germany, or in Europe generally, were asked which organisation they regarded as nearer to them, the Party or the trade unions, they would undoubtedly answer that the trade unions were nearer to them than the Party. Whether good or bad, it is a fact that the non-Party

workers in Europe regard the trade unions as their principal strongholds, which help them in their struggle against the capitalists (wages, hours, insurance, etc.), whereas they regard the Party as something auxiliary, secondary, although necessary. That explains the fact that the broad masses of the workers regard the direct struggle waged against the present trade unions from outside by the “ultra-Lefts” as a struggle against their principal strongholds, which took them decades to build, and which the “Communists” now want to destroy. Failure to take this specific feature into account means wrecking the entire communist movement in the West. But from this two conclusions follow:

firstly, that in the West the vast working-class masses cannot be won over unless the trade unions are won over,

and, secondly, that the trade unions cannot be won over unless we work inside them and strengthen our influence there.

That is why special attention must be paid to the work of our comrades in the trade unions.

That is all for the time being. Don't scold me for being straightforward and blunt.

J. Stalin

28.II.25

Published for the first time

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

There has not been in the history of mankind a single great movement of the oppressed in which women toilers have not participated. Women toilers, the most oppressed of all the oppressed, have never kept away from the high road of the emancipation movement, and never could have done so. As is known, the movement for the emancipation of the slaves brought to the front hundreds of thousands of great women martyrs and heroines. In the ranks of the fighters for the emancipation of the serfs there were tens of thousands of women toilers. It is not surprising that the revolutionary working-class movement, the mightiest of all the emancipation movements of the oppressed masses, has rallied millions of women toilers to its banner.

International Women's Day is a token of the invincibility of the working-class movement for emancipation and a harbinger of its great future.

Women toilers—working women and peasant women—are a vast reserve of the working class. This reserve constitutes a good half of the population. The side that it takes—for or against the working class—will determine the fate of the proletarian movement, the victory or defeat of the proletarian revolution, the victory or defeat

of the proletarian power. Consequently, the first task of the proletariat, and of its advanced detachment—the Communist Party, is to wage a resolute struggle to free women, working women and peasant women, from the influence of the bourgeoisie, to enlighten them politically and to organise them under the banner of the proletariat.

International Women's Day is a means of winning the reserve of women toilers to the side of the proletariat.

But the women toilers are not only a reserve. If the working class pursues a correct policy, they can and must become a real working-class army, operating against the bourgeoisie. To forge from this reserve of women toilers an army of working women and peasant women, operating side by side with the great army of the proletariat—such is the second and decisive task of the working class.

International Women's Day must become a means of transforming the working women and peasant women from a reserve of the working class into an active army of the emancipation movement of the proletariat.

Long live International Women's Day!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 56,
March 8, 1925

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party joins you in mourning the loss of the leader of the Kuomintang¹⁹ and organiser of the national-liberation struggle of the workers and peasants of China for the freedom and independence of the Chinese people, for the unity and independence of the Chinese state.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has no doubt that Sun Yat-sen's great cause will not die with Sun Yat-sen, that Sun Yat-sen's cause will live in the hearts of the Chinese workers and peasants to the terror of the enemies of the Chinese people.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party is confident that the Kuomintang will hold high the banner of Sun Yat-sen in the great struggle for liberation from imperialism, that the Kuomintang will succeed with honour in carrying this banner to complete victory over imperialism and its agents in China.

Sun Yat-sen is dead—long live the cause of Sun Yat-sen! May Sun Yat-sen's behests live on and gain in power!

Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Russian Communist Party

J. Stalin

March 13, 1925

Pravda, No. 60,
March 14, 1925

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

Of a number of phenomena of decisive significance in the international situation, the following basic facts should be noted:

1. Undoubtedly, capital has succeeded in extricating itself from the quagmire of the post-war crisis. The stabilisation of the currency in a number of capitalist countries, the growth of world trade and the expansion of production in individual countries, the export and investment of capital, especially Anglo-American capital, in Europe and Asia—all this testifies to the successes capital has achieved in its “constructive work.” As is known, that “work” is being conducted under the aegis of the Anglo-American bloc. Of the results of this “work,” the so-called “Dawesation” of Germany, i.e., the transition from the method of military intervention to the method of financial intervention, to the method of financial enslavement of Germany, must be regarded as one of the most important.

2. It is also beyond doubt that in Germany, in the centre of Europe, the period of revolutionary upsurge has come to an end. The period of the upsurge of revolution, when the movement seethes, rises and boils over, whereas the Party’s slogans lag behind the movement, when the masses break the bounds of legality, storm

the old order and establish their own, new law—that period has now gone by in Germany. The working-class movement in Germany has passed from the period of assault to the period of accumulating forces, to the period of forming and training a proletarian army under the banner of communism. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance is bound to be of great importance. All the more definitely, therefore, must this be said, in order to be able quickly to find our bearings in the new situation and to start the work of preparing the revolution on new lines.

Such are the facts of *positive* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they testify to the strength and successes of capital at the present time.

But alongside these facts there are a number of facts of *negative* significance for capitalism.

1. Undoubtedly, side by side with the strengthening of capitalism, there is a growth of the contradictions between the capitalist groups, a growth of the forces which weaken and disintegrate capitalism. The struggle between Britain and America for oil, for Canada, for markets, etc.; the struggle between the Anglo-American bloc and Japan for Eastern markets; the struggle between Britain and France for influence in Europe; and, lastly, the struggle between enslaved Germany and the dominant Entente—all these are commonly-known facts which indicate that the successes that capital has achieved are transient, that the process of capitalism's "recovery" contains within itself the germs of its inherent weakness and disintegration.

2. The growth and consolidation of the national-liberation movement in India, China, Egypt, Indonesia,

North Africa, etc., which are undermining capitalism's rear. Since, for its "recovery," imperialism must enlarge its sphere of influence in the colonies and dependent countries, whereas the struggle of these countries against imperialism is undoubtedly becoming intensified, it is obvious that the successes of imperialism in this sphere cannot be durable.

3. The fight for trade-union unity in Europe and the crisis in the Amsterdam Federation.²⁰ The fight of the British trade unions for trade-union unity, the support of this fight by the Soviet trade unions, the transformation of the fight for trade-union unity into a fight against the counter-revolutionary leaders of the Amsterdam Federation (Oudégeest, Sassenbach, Jouhaux, and others), who pursue a policy of splitting the trade unions—are all facts which indicate that the Amsterdam Federation is in a state of profound crisis. And what does the crisis in the Amsterdam Federation mean? It means the instability of bourgeois rule, for the Amsterdam trade-union bureaucracy is a part and a prop of this rule.

4. The economic growth of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the stories of the bourgeois hack writers about the Soviets being incapable of organising industry have been completely refuted. There is no doubt that during the past two years, after intervention and the blockade ceased, the industry of the Soviet Union has revived and gained strength. There is no doubt that the material and cultural conditions of the workers have substantially improved during this short period. There is no doubt that this improvement will continue. All these circumstances are now of decisive importance for revolutionising the

workers in the capitalist countries. I think that the workers of the West have never displayed such interest in Russia as they are doing now. Why? Because rumours are reaching them about the *new way of life* of the Soviet workers in the workers' state called the Soviet Union, and they would like to test the truth of these rumours. The fact that scores and hundreds of workers holding diverse views come from Europe to Russia and peer into every nook and cranny undoubtedly indicates that interest in Russia will grow month by month among the workers of the West. There is no doubt that this pilgrimage to Russia will grow. And when the Western workers become convinced that every step in the development of industry in Russia also means a step in the improvement of the conditions of the workers, and not the deterioration of these conditions, as usually happens in the capitalist countries, they will realise that it is high time for them, the Western workers, to set up workers' states in their own countries. That is why the very existence of the Soviet state is a deadly menace to imperialism. That is why no successes that imperialism achieves can be durable as long as the Soviet state exists and develops.

Such are the facts of *negative* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they testify to the strength and probable successes of the revolutionary movement in the near future.

The conflict between these opposite trends, positive and negative, constitutes the basis and content of the present international situation.

Amidst this conflict of opposites, so-called pacifism arose and wilted before it could bloom, failing to mark either an "era," an "epoch" or a "period." It failed to

justify either the hopes of the compromisers or the apprehensions of the counter-revolutionaries.

In this conflict the “renowned” names of Poincaré and Hughes, of MacDonald and Herriot, perished.

Which of these trends will gain the upper hand, the positive or the negative?

There can be no doubt that *in time* the trends that are unfavourable for capitalism and favourable for the revolution must triumph, for imperialism is incapable of resolving the contradictions that are corroding it, for it is capable only of alleviating them for a time with the result that they break out again later on and manifest themselves with fresh destructive force. It is also beyond doubt, however, that at the *present* time the positive trends, that are favourable for capitalism, are gaining the upper hand.

That is the specific feature of the present international situation.

As a result we have a sort of lull in Europe and America, “disturbed” by the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and “marred” by the existence, development and growing strength of the Soviet Union.

For the bourgeoisie it means a *respite*, increased exports of capital, increased wealth, increased oppression and exploitation in the colonies, increased pressure on the Soviet Union, the concentration of all the counter-revolutionary forces around Anglo-American capital.

For the proletariat in the capitalist countries it means the opening of a period of accumulating forces, the opening of a period of forming and training the proletarian armies under the banner of communism in the

conditions of a system of repression alternating with a system of "liberties."

For the colonies it means an intensification of the struggle against national oppression and exploitation, an intensification of the struggle for liberation from imperialism.

For the Soviet Union it means the exertion of all efforts to develop industry further, to strengthen the country's defensive capacity, to concentrate the revolutionary forces of all countries against imperialism.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

1. To utilise to the utmost all contradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie with the object of disintegrating and weakening its forces and of strengthening the positions of the proletariat.

2. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing the working class in the advanced countries closer to the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries with the object of rendering all possible support to this movement against the common enemy, against imperialism.

3. To promote the fight for trade-union unity and to carry it to a successful conclusion, bearing in mind that this is the surest means of winning over the vast working-class masses; for it is impossible to win over the vast proletarian masses unless the trade unions are won over; and it is impossible to win over the trade unions unless work is conducted in them and unless the confidence of the masses of the workers is won in the trade unions month by month and year by year. Failing this, it is out of the question even to think of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing the working class closer to the small peasantry, who are crushed by the bureaucratic machine of the bourgeois state and by the extortionate prices of the all-powerful trusts, bearing in mind that the struggle to win over the small peasantry is the immediate task of a party that is advancing towards the dictatorship of the proletariat.

5. To support the Soviet regime and to frustrate the interventionist machinations of imperialism against the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the bulwark of the revolutionary movement in all countries, and that to preserve and strengthen the Soviet Union means to accelerate the victory of the working class over the world bourgeoisie.

Pravda, No. 66,
March 22, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*Speech Delivered in the Czechoslovak
Commission of the E.C.C.I.²¹
January 17, 1925*

Comrades, leaving aside certain minor points and personal factors which some comrades have dragged into the subject, the disagreements in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia can be reduced to the following nine questions:

1) Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

2) What is the chief cause of the crisis?

3) What is the character of the crisis, i.e., from where does danger threaten, from the Left or from the Right?

4) Which danger is the more serious, the Left or the Right?

5) Why is the danger from the Right the more real danger?

6) How should the struggle against the Right danger be waged so that it results in real Bolshevisation and in a real solution of the crisis?

7) What is the immediate task in connection with Bolshevisation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

8) The rights of the Comintern in relation to the national sections.

9) Comrade Kreibich and the threat of a split.

Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia? Yes, there is. Both sides admit it. On this point there is no disagreement between them. Comrade Šmeral went even further and said that the crisis is deeper than some comrades usually represent it.

What is the chief cause of the crisis? Comrade Šmeral was quite right when he said that the chief cause of the crisis lay in the difficulties entailed by the transition from a period of revolutionary upsurge to a period of lull. A transition period, which calls for a new orientation, usually gives rise to some kind of a crisis in the Party. That is the situation in Czechoslovakia, too, at the present time.

What is the character of the crisis, and from where does danger threaten, from the Left or from the Right? Here, too, Comrade Šmeral was right when he said that danger threatens from both sides, from the Left and from the Right. There is the danger of over-estimating the importance of partial demands to the detriment of fundamental demands, of over-estimating parliamentary activity and work in the trade unions. That is the danger from the Right, for it leads to adapting oneself to the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, there is the danger of under-estimating the importance of partial demands, of parliamentary activity, of work in the trade unions, and so forth. That is the danger from the Left, for it leads to becoming divorced from the masses and to sectarianism. Comrade Šmeral's desire to take a middle position in this conflict between the two opposite deviations is quite

legitimate. The only trouble is that he has failed to keep to that position and has followed in the wake of the Rights.

Which is the more serious danger, the Left or the Right? I think that Comrade Šmeral has not cleared up this question for himself. He directs his criticism mainly against the Lefts, in the belief that they are the chief danger. The facts, however, show that the chief danger comes from the Right and not from the Left. Comrade Šmeral has not realised this, and herein lies his first mistake.

Why is the danger from the Right the more serious danger at the present time? For three reasons.

Firstly. The transition itself from upsurge to lull, by its very nature, increases the chances of danger from the Right. Whereas an upsurge gives rise to revolutionary illusions and causes the Left danger to become the principal one, a lull, on the contrary, gives rise to Social-Democratic, reformist illusions and causes the Right danger to become the principal one. In 1920, when the working-class movement was on the upgrade, Lenin wrote his pamphlet "*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*". Why did Lenin write this particular pamphlet? Because at that time the Left danger was the more serious danger. I think that if Lenin were alive he would now write another pamphlet entitled *Right-Wing Communism, an Old-Age Disorder*, because, at the present time, in the period of lull, when illusions about compromise are bound to grow, the Right danger is the most serious danger.

Secondly. As Comrade Šmeral reported, no less than 70 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of

Czechoslovakia are former Social-Democrats. It scarcely needs proof that Social-Democratic relapses are not only possible but inevitable in such a party. Needless to say, this circumstance is bound to increase the danger from the Right.

Thirdly. The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation. The workers there are for the time being fairly well off: there is no unemployment, and they are obviously intoxicated with the idea of possessing a national state. All this is bound to give rise to illusions about national peace between the classes in Czechoslovakia. Needless to say, this circumstance, in its turn, gives rise to and increases the danger from the Right. And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Rights and Lefts took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank Comrade Šmeral spoke of the danger of such a division. That is true, of course. But it is also true that such a division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.

Such are the principal reasons why the danger from the Right in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is a particularly serious danger.

How should the struggle against the Right danger in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia be waged? This question brings us to the very core of the disagreements. One would think that the struggle against this danger

should be waged in the most determined and ruthless manner. But with the Czech Communists the opposite has happened. Is Comrade Šmeral combating the danger from the Right? Yes, he is. But he is combating it in such a way that, in the final result, the Rights, instead of being eliminated, are being cultivated, supported, protected from the blows of the Lefts. That is somewhat strange, but it is a fact, comrades. That is Comrade Šmeral's second and principal mistake.

Judge for yourselves.

1. It is a fact that Comrade Kreibich wrote an article in favour of Trotskyism. It is a fact that this document is known in Party circles and is passing from hand to hand. This document should have been dragged into the light of day and its author should have been given a good drubbing, an ideological drubbing, in full view of the workers, in order to give the Party the opportunity to realise the danger of Trotskyism and to train the cadres in the spirit of Bolshevism; for what is Trotskyism if not the Right wing of communism, if not the danger from the Right? What did Comrade Šmeral do in this case? Instead of raising the question of Comrade Kreibich's Trotskyism before the whole Party, he slurred over it, suppressed it, took it behind the scenes and "settled" it there in a hole-and-corner way, as if it were an ordinary "misunderstanding." The gainers by this were Trotskyism and Comrade Kreibich. The Party was the loser. Instead of the Rights being combated, they were protected.

2. It is known that some of the leaders of three trade unions—those of the transport workers, woodworkers and building workers—issued a document demanding the

complete independence of the unions from the Party. It is known that this document is evidence of the existence of a number of Right elements in the trade unions of Czechoslovakia. This document should have been analysed in full view of the Party, and the Party should have been warned of the danger of the trade unions becoming divorced from it. What did Comrade Šmeral do in this case? He hushed up this question too; he withdrew the document from circulation and thereby hid it from the eyes of the Party membership. The Rights escaped unscathed and the "Party's prestige" was saved. And that is called combating the Rights!

3. It is known that there are Right-wing elements in the communist group in parliament. It is known that every now and again these elements throw off the leadership of the Party and try to set themselves up in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party. It is urgently necessary to combat these elements, particularly at the present time, in the present lull. How did Comrade Šmeral combat this danger? Instead of exposing the Right-wing elements in the communist parliamentary group he took them under his protection and saved them by means of an elastic resolution on recognising the Party leadership, a resolution adopted as the result of an internal struggle conducted behind the scenes, in the fourth year of the Party's existence. Again the Rights gained and the Party was the loser.

4. Lastly, the Bubnik case. I must say, comrades, that the lull is not a period of the absence of all action. The lull is a period of forming and training the proletarian armies, a period of preparing them

for revolution. But the proletarian armies can be trained only in the course of action. The rise in the cost of living that has recently begun in Czechoslovakia is one of the favourable conditions for such action. As is known, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took advantage of this situation and recently organised a number of demonstrations in connection with the rise in the cost of living. As is known, the Right-wing Communist Bubnik, now expelled from the Party, also took advantage of the situation and tried to disrupt those actions by the workers, thereby striking a blow at the Party in the rear. What did Comrade Šmeral do to safeguard the Party from the blow struck in its rear by the Rights? Instead of utilising the Bubnik "case" and by means of it ruthlessly exposing the entire Right-wing group in full view of the Party, Comrade Šmeral reduced the question of principle concerning the Rights to the individual case of Bubnik, although all the world knows that Bubnik does not stand alone, that he has supporters in the trade unions, in the communist group in parliament, and in the press. At the price of a small sacrifice (the expulsion of Bubnik) he saved the Right-wing group from defeat, to the detriment of the fundamental interests of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. And Comrade Šmeral calls that the tactics of combating the Rights!

Comrade Šmeral calls those tactics "fine," "delicate." Those tactics may indeed be fine, but they have nothing in common with the Bolshevik tactics of uncompromising struggle against the Rights; there cannot be the slightest doubt about that. Comrade Šmeral forgets the

Russian saying: "The finest thread is most likely to break." He forgot that fineness is no guarantee against failure. And that is what happened, as is known; for those "fine" tactics towards the Rights broke and failed at the very first test, when, encouraged by those tactics, the Bubnik group almost succeeded in disrupting the recent action by the Czech proletariat. The strengthening of the Rights and Bubnik's treachery—such are the results of Comrade Šmeral's "fine" tactics. That is why I think that Comrade Šmeral's "fine" tactics are tactics that save the Rights, tactics that intensify the crisis, tactics threatening to doom the Party.

Why did the old Social-Democracy perish as a revolutionary Party? Among other things, because Kautsky and Co. did indeed employ the "fine" tactics of shielding and saving the Rights, the "delicate" tactics of "unity and peace" with Ed. Bernstein and Co. What was the result? The result was that at the crucial moment, just before the war, the Right-wing Social-Democrats betrayed the workers, the "orthodox" became the prisoners of the Rights, and Social-Democracy as a whole proved to be a "living corpse." I think that, in time, this may happen to the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia if you do not quickly and resolutely substitute for Comrade Šmeral's "fine" tactics the Bolshevik tactics of ruthless struggle against the Right-wing groups in the communist movement. In saying this I am not putting Comrade Šmeral on a par with the Social-Democrats. Not at all. He is undoubtedly a Communist, and, perhaps, even a splendid Communist. What I want to say is that if he does not renounce his "fine" tactics he will inevitably slide into Social-Democracy.

What is the immediate task of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

The immediate task is, while combating “ultra-Left” deviations, resolutely to combat the danger from the Right with the aim of altogether isolating and completely eliminating the Rights. To unite all the genuine revolutionary elements in the Party for the purpose of completely eliminating the Right groups—such is the Party’s task, such is the way out of the crisis. Unless this is done it is useless even to think of Bolshevising the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

That, of course, does not mean that all the Rights must necessarily be expelled. Expulsion is not the decisive weapon in the struggle against the Rights. The main thing is to give the Right groups a drubbing, ideologically and morally, in the course of a struggle based on principle and to draw the mass of the Party membership into this struggle. That is one of the chief and most important means of educating the Party in the spirit of Bolshevism. Expulsion must come, if it is really necessary, as a natural result of the ideological rout of the enemy. In this respect, the Lefts in Czechoslovakia committed a grave mistake in hastening to expel Bubnik. Instead of utilising the Bubnik “case” to the utmost and linking it with the principles underlying the stand taken by the Rights on the question of mass action, revealing their true countenance, the Lefts hastened with the expulsion, and cut off the road to further attack against the Rights on this ground.

As regards the rights of the Comintern and its intervention in the affairs of the national parties, I emphatically disagree with those comrades who spoke in favour

of curtailing those rights. They want the Comintern to be transformed into an organisation situated beyond the stars, gazing dispassionately at what is going on in the individual parties and patiently recording events. No, comrades, the Comintern cannot become an organisation beyond the stars. The Comintern is a militant organisation of the proletariat, it is linked with the working-class movement by all the roots of its existence and cannot refrain from intervening in the affairs of individual parties, supporting the revolutionary elements and combating their opponents. Of course, the parties possess internal autonomy, the party congresses must be unfettered, and the Central Committees must be elected by the congresses. But to deduce from this that the Comintern must be denied the right of leadership, and hence of intervention, means working on behalf of the enemies of communism.

Lastly, about Comrade Kreibich. I think that the purpose of his entire speech was to frighten somebody or other with the threat of a split. Don't touch the Rights in Brünn, he said. If you do there will be trouble. Don't fight them; if you do there will be a split. Well, we shall see. But let not Comrade Kreibich try to frighten us, he will not succeed. He surely knows that we are seasoned people, and threats of a split cannot frighten our kind. And if he thinks of passing from threats to action, I assure him that he, and he alone, will suffer.

To sum up. There is a crisis in the Party. There can be no doubt about its causes. The chief danger comes from the Right. The task is to wage a determined and uncompromising struggle against this danger. The way out of the crisis is to unite all the revolutionary elements

in the Party for the purpose of completely eliminating the Rights.

Advantage must be taken of the lull to strengthen the Party, to Bolshevise it and make it “always ready” for all possible “complications”; for “ye know neither the day nor the hour” wherein “the bridegroom cometh” to open the road for a new revolutionary upsurge.

Pravda, No. 72,
March 29, 1925

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

*Speech Delivered
in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I.,
March 30, 1925*

Comrades, I think that Semich has not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question. The Bolsheviks never separated the national question from the general question of revolution, either before October or after October. The main essence of the Bolshevik approach to the national question is that the Bolsheviks always examined the national question in inseparable connection with the revolutionary perspective.

Semich quoted Lenin, saying that Lenin was in favour of embodying the solution of the national question in the constitution. By this he, Semich, evidently wanted to say that Lenin regarded the national question as a constitutional one, that is, not as a question of revolution but as a question of reform. That is quite wrong. Lenin never had, nor could he have had, constitutional illusions. It is enough to consult his works to be convinced of that. If Lenin spoke of a constitution, he had in mind not the constitutional, but the revolutionary way of settling the national question, that is to say, he regarded a constitution as something that would result from the victory of the revolution. We in the U.S.S.R. also have a Constitution, and it reflects

a definite solution of the national question. This Constitution, however, came into being not as the result of a deal with the bourgeoisie, but as the result of a victorious revolution.

Semich further referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question written in 1912,²² and tried to find in it at least indirect corroboration of his point of view. But this reference was fruitless, because he did not and could not find even a remote hint, let alone a quotation, that would in the least justify his "constitutional" approach to the national question. In confirmation of this, I might remind Semich of the passage in Stalin's pamphlet where a contrast is drawn between the Austrian (constitutional) method of settling the national question and the Russian Marxists' (revolutionary) method.

Here it is:

"The Austrians hope to achieve the 'freedom of nationalities' by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the 'freedom of nationalities' with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia."

Clear, one would think.

And this is not Stalin's personal view, but the general view of the Russian Marxists, who examined, and continue to examine, the national question in inseparable connection with the general question of revolution.

It can be said without stretching a point that in the

history of Russian Marxism there were two stages in the presentation of the national question: the first, or pre-October stage; and the second, or October stage. In the first stage, the national question was regarded as part of the general question of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is to say, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In the second stage, when the national question assumed wider scope and became a question of the colonies, when it became transformed from an intra-state question into a world question, it came to be regarded as part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In both stages, as you see, the approach was strictly revolutionary.

I think that Semich has not yet fully grasped all this. Hence his attempts to reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, i.e., to regard it as a question of reform.

That mistake leads him to another, namely, his refusal to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. Not an agrarian but a peasant question, for these are two different things. It is quite true that the national question must not be identified with the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, the national question includes such questions as national culture, national statehood, etc. But it is also beyond doubt that, after all, the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant

army, nor can there be. That is what is meant when it is said that, *in essence*, the national question is a peasant question. I think that Semich's reluctance to accept this formula is due to an under-estimation of the inherent strength of the national movement and a failure to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the national movement. This lack of understanding and this under-estimation constitute a grave danger, for, in practice, they imply an under-estimation of the potential might latent, for instance, in the movement of the Croats for national emancipation. This under-estimation is fraught with serious complications for the entire Yugoslav Communist Party.

That is Semich's second mistake.

Undoubtedly, Semich's attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia in isolation from the international situation and the probable prospects in Europe must also be regarded as a mistake. Proceeding from the fact that there is no serious popular movement for independence among the Croats and the Slovenes at the present moment, Semich arrives at the conclusion that the question of the right of nations to secede is an academic question, at any rate, not an urgent one. That is wrong, of course. Even if we admit that this question is not urgent at the present moment, it might definitely become very urgent *if war begins*, or when war begins, *if a revolution breaks out in Europe*, or when it breaks out. That war will inevitably begin, and that *they*, over there, are bound to come to blows there can be no doubt, bearing in mind the nature and development of imperialism.

In 1912, when we Russian Marxists were outlining the first draft of the national programme, no serious movement for independence yet existed in any of the border regions of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, we deemed it necessary to include in our programme the point on the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of every nationality to secede and exist as an independent state. Why? Because we based ourselves not only on what existed then, but also on what was developing and impending in the general system of international relations; that is, we took into account not only the present, but also the future. We knew that if any nationality were to demand secession, the Russian Marxists would fight to ensure the right to secede for every such nationality. In the course of his speech Semich repeatedly referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question. But here is what Stalin's pamphlet says about self-determination and independence:

"The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war. . . . It is quite possible that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases."

That was written as far back as 1912. You know that subsequently this view was fully confirmed both during the war and afterwards, and especially after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

All the more reason, therefore, why we must reckon with such possibilities in Europe in general, and in Yugoslavia in particular, especially now, when the national revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries has become more profound, and after the victory of the revolution in Russia. It must also be borne in mind that Yugoslavia is not a fully independent country, that she is tied up with certain imperialist groups, and that, consequently, she cannot escape the great play of forces that is going on outside Yugoslavia. If you are drawing up a national programme for the Yugoslav Party—and that is precisely what we are dealing with now—you must remember that this programme must proceed not only from what exists at present, but also from what is developing and what will inevitably occur by virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the question of the right of nations to self-determination must be regarded as an immediate and vital question.

Now about the national programme. The starting point of the national programme must be the thesis of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, the thesis that the national question cannot be solved at all satisfactorily unless the bourgeoisie is overthrown and the revolution is victorious. Of course, there may be exceptions; there was such an exception, for instance, before the war, when Norway separated from Sweden—of which Lenin treats in detail in one of his articles.²³ But that was before the war, and under an exceptional combination of favourable circumstances. Since the war, and especially since the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia, such cases are hardly possible. At any rate, the chances

of their being possible are now so slight that they can be put as nil. But if that is so, it is obvious that we cannot construct our programme from elements whose significance is nil. That is why the thesis of a revolution must be the starting point of the national programme.

Further, it is imperatively necessary to include in the national programme a special point on the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede. I have already said why such a point cannot be omitted under present internal and international conditions.

Finally, the programme must also include a special point providing for national territorial autonomy for those nationalities in Yugoslavia which may not deem it necessary to secede from that country. Those who think that such a contingency must be excluded are incorrect. That is wrong. Under certain circumstances, as a result of the victory of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, it may well be that some nationalities will not wish to secede, just as happened here in Russia. It is clear that to meet such a contingency it is necessary to have in the programme a point on autonomy, envisaging the transformation of the state of Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based on the Soviet system.

Thus, the right to secede must be provided for those nationalities that may wish to secede, and the right to autonomy must be provided for those nationalities that may prefer to remain within the framework of the Yugoslav state.

To avoid misunderstanding, I must say that the *right* to secede must not be understood as an *obligation*, as a

duty to secede. A nation may take advantage of this right and secede, but it may also forgo the right, and if it does not wish to exercise it, that is its business and we cannot but reckon with the fact. Some comrades turn this right to secede into an obligation and demand from the Croats, for instance, that they secede *whatever happens*. That position is wrong and must be rejected. We must not confuse a right with an obligation.

The magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 7,
April 15, 1925

THE ACTIVE OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

*Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Organising
Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)
April 6, 1925*

Comrades, the first task is to ensure that the Youth League possesses its basic proletarian core, as the core which leads the entire League. The reporter did not say anything on this question. That is not surprising, since we are discussing the work of the Young Communist League in the countryside and not its proletarian core. But this does not prevent the task of acquiring a proletarian core from remaining the League's principal task. I think that the efforts that are being made in the League in this direction are more or less successful. It may be said without exaggeration that the recruiting of young workers for the Young Communist League is proceeding successfully, and the time is not far distant when the League will embrace no less than nine-tenths of the entire working-class youth.

The second task is properly to distribute the responsible workers of the proletarian core in the key points and principal districts of the Union in order to ensure that this core exercises real leadership of the peasant section of the youth. I take as my starting point the fact that the peasant section of the youth is numerically larger than its proletarian section, and also the fact that the proletarian forces among the youth are not numerous enough to be distributed evenly among

all the uyezds and volosts of the Soviet Union. It is therefore necessary to place these forces at points from which it will be most easy to ensure leadership of the peasant youth. I do not think that the Young Communist League is carrying out this task as successfully as the first. Nevertheless, there are grounds for supposing that the League is devoting all its energy to the accomplishment of this task and that the results of these efforts will be seen in the very near future.

The third task is to ensure that the Young Communist League has a numerous active of peasant youth in the countryside, to educate this active politically, to make it the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside, and to transform it into a cement that will bind the proletariat with the toiling masses of the peasantry. That is a difficult and extremely complicated task, and it is quite impossible to carry it out in a short space of time. The proletarian core of the Young Communist League will have to exert tremendous efforts, and to strain every nerve in order to cope with it. But it must be carried out at all costs, for if it is not, it will be impossible either to strengthen the Young Communist League or to maintain the bond between the workers and peasants.

But how can we ensure that the Young Communist League has a peasant active, how can we educate this active, and how can we ensure that this active will become the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside?

It is said that the secretaries of Y.C.L. village units alone number not less than 27,000. It is said that in addition to secretaries of units there are active Young Communist League workers in the co-

operatives, in the Soviets, in the Peasant Committees, cultural institutions, and so forth. It is said that, all together, these should constitute a Young Communist League rural active amounting to no less than 100,000. Whether all this is true, it is difficult to say, but if it is, then I must say that, skilfully utilised, this active can be a tremendous force, capable of performing miracles. This is all the more important because at the present time the Party's active in the countryside is much smaller.

And so the problem is: *how is this numerous active to be educated, how can it be made an instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside not only in name, but in fact?*

It is not my intention to give an exhaustive answer here. It is quite impossible to do so in a short speech. But it is quite possible even in a short speech to indicate some of the chief conditions that are necessary for a correct approach to this problem. What are these conditions? There are at least eight of them.

Firstly. The youth active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets and handbooks explaining the decrees the Soviet Government has issued for the benefit of the peasant poor. This active must know these decrees inside out, must be able to explain them to the peasant poor, and must be able on the basis of these decrees to protect the interests of the peasant poor from the domination of the kulaks. I think that ignorance of these decrees and their systematic violation by the "powers that be" in the countryside is one of the chief evils of the existing state of things there. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be the guardian of revolutionary law. It must stand up staunchly for the poor in the countryside. This task is

undoubtedly simple and prosaic. Undoubtedly, it is far easier to talk about the world revolution than to carry out this simple and everyday task connected with the Soviet decrees. There is no doubt, however, that unless it is carried out, no bond is possible.

Secondly. The youth active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the elementary principles of agricultural science. This active must study agriculture, must become familiar with measures for improving it, and must be able to give the peasants the necessary advice on this subject. Often the peasants do not take Young Communist League members seriously and ridicule them. That happens because the peasants regard them as having nothing to do with farming, regard them as ignoramuses and idlers. Hence, the task is to bring the Young Communist Leaguers closer to farming, to link them with it. The Young Communist League activist will be able to win the respect and confidence of the peasants only if he becomes directly linked with agriculture, if he learns to give useful advice on how to advance peasant economy, how to improve and strengthen it. That is not an easy matter, of course; it may even be dull work. But that does not prevent it from being an essential means of winning the confidence of the peasantry.

Thirdly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the agricultural tax, on the local budget and on the financial state of the country. The tax and the local budget are now in the forefront in the countryside. In connection with them innumerable abuses are being committed. How should the taxes be apportioned so that the poor peasant is not wronged or the kulak relieved

from the burden of taxation? How should the sums assigned in the local budgets be spent, and for what needs? How can it be ensured that abuses in this connection are exposed and eradicated? All these are questions that the Young Communist League activist cannot ignore. The task is to intervene in all these matters and come to the aid of the labouring peasants. That, too, is by no means easy or attractive. But if it is not done there cannot be any Soviet constructive work in the countryside.

Fourthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular handbooks on questions concerning Soviet constructive work, on revitalising the Soviets and enlisting the peasants in the work of village, volost, district, uyezd, etc., administration. The Young Communist League activist must know inside out the regulations governing the rights and duties of the local Soviets; the rights and duties of the peasants in relation to the Soviets, the electoral system, the procedure of conducting elections, etc. The task is to explain to the peasants the policy of the Party and the Soviet Government in the countryside and to see to it that this policy is honestly and conscientiously carried out. If that is not done it is useless to think of winning confidence among the peasants, of enlarging the peasant active, or of implanting proletarian democracy in the countryside.

Fifthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on agricultural, credit and consumer co-operatives, on agricultural artels, and on collective farming generally. The Young Communist League activist must be able to enlist the peasants in the work of implanting a co-operative communal life in the countryside. This is an extremely

difficult and complicated task, but it is absolutely necessary to carry it out in order to draw the rural population into the work of socialist construction. Agricultural and credit co-operatives are now a matter of first-rate importance for the peasants. The task is to make co-operation something near and dear to the peasantry. In this connection attention should be paid to the fact that the lack of livestock and farm implements among the poor sections of the peasantry creates in the countryside a special situation favourable to the formation of artels and collective farms, provided the state credit institutions render definite assistance. The task is to make it possible for the poor sections of the peasantry to obtain preferential credits for this purpose. The Young Communist League activist cannot ignore such vital questions.

Sixthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with the necessary instructions and information concerning cultural development in the countryside—on the organisation of village reading-rooms, the abolition of illiteracy, etc. The task is to make the Young Communist League activist the natural assistant of the Soviets, and of the rural cultural forces generally, in the work of implanting Soviet culture.

Seventhly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must receive precise instructions concerning the rights and duties of Young Communist Leaguers, concerning the relations between the Young Communist League and the Party, between the Soviets and the Young Communist League. Every Young Communist League activist must regard himself as an assistant of the Party and the Soviet Government in the countryside. High-handed methods in the countryside, disorder during Soviet elec-

tions, attempts to usurp the functions of the Party, co-operative and Soviet organisations, and rowdy escapades during so-called anti-religious propaganda—all this must be abandoned and stopped forthwith as something that tarnishes the banner of the Young Communist League and disgraces the name of Young Communist Leaguer. The task is to wage a ruthless struggle against such scandals and to establish proper relations between the Young Communist League and the Soviet and Party bodies.

Eighthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the alliance between the workers and peasants, on the meaning and significance of this alliance, on the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the principles of communism, and lastly, on the history of the October Revolution and on how the peasants lived before, under the tsar and the landlords, how they are living now, and how they will live if the bond is strengthened and socialism is implanted. The Y.C.L. activist must in no way pander to the peasants' prejudices. There is a difference between reckoning with these prejudices and pandering to them. He must be able to speak to the peasants in the language of the Communists. He must be able to convince the peasants by means of concrete facts that there is no salvation for them outside of socialism.

Such are the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to educate politically the Young Communist League active in the countryside and to make it the instrument of proletarian policy there.

The task of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League is to facilitate and supervise the fulfilment of these conditions.

There is talk about the danger of the colossal growth of the Young Communist League in the countryside. There is talk about an influx of peasant youth into the Young Communist League. Undoubtedly, there is some danger in that. But it is also beyond doubt that the Young Communist League will have no reason to fear that danger if it succeeds in carrying out with honour the tasks mentioned above. A Young Communist League active of 100,000 in the countryside is a force for whom no influx of peasant youth can be dangerous. The whole point is to make energetic efforts to educate this active politically. The whole point is skilfully to direct the efforts of this active towards strengthening the alliance between the workers and peasants. The whole point is to utilise this active for the purpose of drawing the peasantry into the new Soviet constructive work.

Hence: a) to ensure that the Young Communist League has a proletarian core which is the chief leading force; b) to distribute the active forces of this core among the principal districts of the Soviet Union with a view to ensuring this leadership; c) to educate the youth active in the countryside in such a way as to ensure the implementation of proletarian policy there—such are the immediate tasks of the Young Communist League in general and of its Central Committee in particular.

Having these tasks before it, and carrying them out in the course of its daily work, the Young Communist League need not fear the dangers that confront it in the countryside.

TO THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN STUDENTS²⁴

A Message

Comrades, your representatives have asked me to give my views on the tasks of the Party and of Party work among the proletarian students.

Permit me to say a few words to you on this subject.

The specific feature of the present situation is that the proletariat of our country has succeeded in creating the conditions necessary for building socialism. It is not true that socialism cannot be built in one country, a country that has vanquished and driven out the capitalists and landlords. A country which has established the dictatorship of the proletariat, which possesses tremendous resources and enjoys the backing of the proletarians of all countries—such a country can and must build socialism. Lenin was right when he said that our country possesses all that is necessary “for building a complete socialist society.” The specific feature of the present situation is that we have succeeded in making considerable progress in building socialism, that we have transformed socialism from an icon into a prosaic object of everyday practical work.

What part should the proletarian students play in this work of construction?

Their part is undoubtedly important, perhaps of prime importance. The higher educational institutions,

communist universities, workers' faculties and technical schools are institutions for training the commanding personnel for economic and cultural development. Doctors and economists, co-operators and teachers, miners and statisticians, technicians and chemists, agriculturists and railway engineers, veterinary surgeons and forestry experts, electrical and mechanical engineers, are all future commanders of the work of building the new society, of building socialist economy and socialist culture. The new society cannot be built without new commanders, just as a new army cannot be built without new commanders. The advantage that the new commanders possess is that their function is to build not for the purpose of exploiting the working people in the interests of a handful of rich men, but for the purpose of emancipating the working people, in opposition to the handful of exploiters. The whole point is that the students at the higher educational institutions—workers and peasants, Party and non-Party—should become conscious of this honourable role, and begin to fulfil it not by constraint but by conviction.

Hence: to make the proletarian students conscious builders of socialist economy and socialist culture—such is the Party's first task.

But the new society cannot be built only by the commanders, without the direct support of the masses of the working people. The knowledge obtained by the new commanders is not in itself sufficient for the building of socialism. These commanders must also have the confidence and support of the masses. The distinguishing feature of the old commanders who built under capitalism was that they were divorced from the workers and peas-

ants, they felt superior to the toiling masses, they attached no value either to the confidence or to the support of these masses and, as a consequence, enjoyed neither the one nor the other. This method is absolutely unsuitable for our country. The new commanders of the work of building the new economy and the new culture are called new precisely because they must abruptly and irrevocably break with the old methods of commanding. Not divorce from the masses, but the closest connection with them; not feeling superior to the masses, but going in front of them and leading them; not alienation from the masses, but merging with them and winning their confidence and support—such are the new methods of management that must be employed by the new commanders. Without these methods no kind of socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence: to make the proletarian students regard themselves as an inseparable part of the masses of the working people, to make the students feel and act in a genuinely public spirit—such is the Party's second task.

Lastly, about the Communist students in particular. It is said that the Communist students are making little progress in scientific knowledge. It is said that they lag very much behind the non-Party students in this respect. It is said that the Communist students prefer to engage in "high politics" and that they waste two-thirds of their time in endless debates on "world problems." Is all this true? I think it is. But if it is true, at least two conclusions must be drawn. Firstly, that the Communist students stand in danger of becoming poor directors of the work of building socialism, for it is impossible to direct the work of building a socialist society without a

mastery of scientific knowledge. Secondly, the work of training the new commanders stands in danger of becoming the monopoly of the old professors, who need to be replaced by new people, for a new professorial staff and new scientific workers cannot be obtained from people who are unwilling or unable to master science. Needless to say, all this cannot but directly jeopardise the entire work of building socialism. Can we resign ourselves to such a state of affairs? Obviously not. Hence the Communist students, and Soviet students generally, must set themselves clearly and definitely the immediate task of mastering science, and of creating a new professorial staff consisting of new Soviet people to take the place of the old. I do not mean to say that students should not engage in politics. Not in the least. I merely wish to say that the Communist students must learn to combine political work with the work of mastering science. It is said that it is difficult to combine the two. That is true, of course. But since when have Communists been daunted by difficulties? The difficulties in the path of our work of construction are there precisely to be combated and overcome.

Moreover, still another circumstance must be taken into consideration. I think that our country, with its revolutionary habits and traditions, its struggle against conservatism and stagnation of thought, provides the most favourable environment for the flourishing of science. There can be scarcely any doubt that philistine narrow-mindedness and routine, which are characteristic of the old professors of the capitalist school, are fetters on science. There can be scarcely any doubt that only new people who are free from these defects are capable

of full and free creative activity in science. In this respect, our country has a great future before it as the citadel and nursery of free and unfettered science. I think that we are already beginning to take this road. But it would be deplorable and disgraceful if the Communist students kept away from the high road of development of science. That is why the slogan about mastering science is acquiring special importance.

Hence: to make the proletarian students, and above all the Communist students, realise the necessity of mastering science and that they do master it—such is the Party 's third task.

Accept my greetings,

J. Stalin

15.IV.25

Pravda, No. 87,
April 16, 1925

THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

*Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active
of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)
May 9, 1925*

Comrades, I do not think there is any point in examining here in detail the resolutions adopted at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.²⁵ That would take up a great deal of time, and besides, there is no need to do so. I think it will be enough to note the main lines that stand out in these resolutions. That will enable us to emphasise the main conclusions of the resolutions that were adopted. And this, in its turn, will facilitate a further study of these resolutions.

If we turn to the resolutions we shall find that the diverse questions touched upon in them can be reduced to six main groups of questions. The first group consists of questions concerning the international situation. The second group consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. The third group consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the communist elements in the colonial and dependent countries. The fourth group consists of questions concerning the fate of socialism in our country in connection with the present international situation. The fifth group consists of questions con-

cerning our Party policy in the countryside and the tasks of Party leadership under the new conditions. And, lastly, the sixth group consists of questions concerning the vital nerve of all our industry, namely, the metal industry.

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

What is new and specific in the international situation, which, in the main, determines the character of the present period?

The new feature that has revealed itself lately, and which has laid its impress upon the international situation, is that the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb, that a certain lull has set in, which we call the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, *while* at the same time the economic development and political might of the Soviet Union are increasing.

What is the ebb of the revolution, the lull? Is it the beginning of the end of the world revolution, the beginning of the liquidation of the world proletarian revolution? Lenin said that the victory of the proletariat in our country ushered in a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, an epoch replete with conflicts and wars, advances and retreats, victories and defeats, an epoch leading to the victory of the proletariat in the major capitalist countries. Does the fact that the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb mean that Lenin's thesis concerning a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, no longer holds good? Does it mean that the proletarian revolution in the West has been cancelled?

No, it does not.

The epoch of world revolution is a new stage of the revolution, a whole strategic period, which will last for a number of years, perhaps even a number of decades. During this period there can and must be ebbs and flows of the revolution.

Our revolution passed through two stages, two strategic periods, in the course of its development, and after October it entered a third stage, a third strategic period. The first stage (1900-17) lasted over fifteen years. The aim then was to overthrow tsarism, to achieve the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution. During that period we had a number of ebbs and flows of the revolution. The tide of revolution flowed in 1905. That tide ended with the temporary defeat of the revolution. After that we had an ebb, which lasted a number of years (1907-12). Then the tide flowed anew, beginning with the Lena events (1912), and later it ebbed again, during the war. In 1917 (February) the tide began to flow once again and it culminated in the victory of the people over tsarism, the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. With each ebb the Liquidators asserted that the revolution was done for. After ebbing and flowing several times, however, the revolution swept on to victory in February 1917.

The second stage of the revolution began in February 1917. The aim then was to extricate the country from the imperialist war, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the victory of the proletarian dictatorship. That stage, or strategic period, lasted only eight months, but these were eight months of profound revolutionary crisis, during which war and economic ruin spurred on the revolution and quickened its pace to the utmost. Pre-

cisely for that reason, those eight months of revolutionary crisis can and should be counted as being equal to at least eight years of ordinary constitutional development. That strategic period, like the preceding one, was not marked by a steady rise of the revolution in a straight ascending line, as the philistines of revolution usually picture it, but by alternating ebbs and flows. During that period we had an immense rise in the tide of the revolutionary movement in the days of the July demonstration. Then the revolutionary tide ebbed after the July defeat of the Bolsheviks. The tide flowed again immediately after the Kornilov revolt and it carried us to the victory of the October Revolution. The Liquidators of that time talked of the complete liquidation of the revolution after the July defeat. After passing through a number of trials and ebbs, however, the revolution, as is known, culminated in the victory of the proletarian dictatorship.

After the October victory we entered the third strategic period, the third stage of the revolution, in which the aim is to overcome the bourgeoisie on a world scale. How long this period will last it is difficult to say. At all events, there is no doubt that it will be a long one, and there is no doubt also that it will contain ebbs and flows. The world revolutionary movement at the present time has entered a period of ebb of the revolution, but, for a number of reasons, of which I shall speak later, the tide must turn again, and it may end in the victory of the proletariat. On the other hand, it may not end in victory, but be replaced by a new ebb, which in its turn is bound to be followed by another rise in the tide of the revolution. The present-day Liquidators say that the lull

that has now set in marks the end of the world revolution. But they are mistaken, just as they were mistaken before, in the periods of the first and second stages of our revolution, when they regarded every ebb of the revolutionary movement as the utter defeat of the revolution.

Such are the fluctuations within each stage of the revolution, within each strategic period.

What do those fluctuations show? Do they show that Lenin's thesis about the new epoch of world revolution has lost, or may lose, its significance? Of course not! They merely show that, usually, revolution develops not in a straight ascending line, not in a continuously growing upsurge, but in zigzags, in advances and retreats, in flows and ebbs, which in the course of development steel the forces of the revolution and prepare for its final victory.

Such is the historical significance of the present ebb of the revolution, the historical significance of the lull we are now experiencing.

But the ebb is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that simultaneously with the ebb of the revolution in Europe we have the impetuous growth of the economic development of the Soviet Union and its increasing political might. In other words, we have not only the stabilisation of capitalism; we also have the stabilisation of the Soviet system. Thus, we have two stabilisations: the temporary stabilisation of capitalism and the stabilisation of the Soviet system. A certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilisations has been reached—such is the characteristic feature of the present international situation.

But what is stabilisation? Is it not stagnation? And if it means stagnation, can that term be applied to the Soviet system? No. Stabilisation is not stagnation. Stabilisation is the consolidation of a given position and further development. World capitalism has not only consolidated itself in its present position; it is going on and developing further, expanding its sphere of influence and increasing its wealth. It is wrong to say that capitalism cannot develop, that the theory of the decay of capitalism advanced by Lenin in his *Imperialism*²⁶ precludes the development of capitalism. Lenin fully proved in his pamphlet *Imperialism* that the growth of capitalism does not cancel, but presupposes and prepares the progressive decay of capitalism.

Thus, we have two stabilisations. At one pole capitalism is becoming stabilised, consolidating the position it has achieved and developing further. At the other pole the Soviet system is becoming stabilised, consolidating the positions it has won and advancing further along the road to victory.

Who will win? That is the essence of the question.

Why are there two stabilisations, one parallel with the other? Why are there two poles? Because there is no longer a single, all-embracing capitalism in the world. Because the world has split into two camps—the capitalist camp, headed by Anglo-American capital, and the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union. Because the international situation will to an increasing degree be determined by the relation of forces between these two camps.

Thus, the characteristic feature of the present situation is not only that capitalism and the Soviet system

have become stabilised, but also that the forces of these two camps have reached a certain temporary equilibrium, with a slight advantage for capital, and hence, a slight disadvantage for the revolutionary movement; for, compared with a revolutionary upsurge, the lull that has now set in is undoubtedly a disadvantage for socialism, although a temporary one.

What is the difference between these two stabilisations? Where does the one and where does the other lead to?

Stabilisation under capitalism, while temporarily strengthening capital, at the same time inevitably leads to the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism: a) between the imperialist groups of the various countries; b) between the workers and the capitalists in each country; c) between imperialism and the peoples of all colonial countries.

Stabilisation under the Soviet system, however, while strengthening socialism, at the same time inevitably leads to an alleviation of contradictions and to an improvement in the relations: a) between the proletariat and the peasantry in our country; b) between the proletariat and the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries; c) between the proletarian dictatorship and the workers of all countries.

The fact of the matter is that capitalism cannot develop without intensifying the exploitation of the working class, without a semi-starvation existence for the majority of the working people, without intensifying the oppression of the colonial and dependent countries, without conflicts and clashes between the different imperialist groups of the world bourgeoisie. On the other

hand, the Soviet system and the proletarian dictatorship can develop only if there is a continuous rise in the material and cultural level of the working class, if there is a continuous improvement in the conditions of all the working people in the Land of Soviets, if the workers of all countries draw closer and closer together and unite, if the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries rally around the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

The path of development of capitalism is the path of impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence for the vast majority of the working people, while a small upper stratum of these working people is bribed and pampered.

The path of development of the proletarian dictatorship, on the contrary, is the path of continuous improvement in the welfare of the vast majority of the working people.

Precisely for this reason the development of capitalism is bound to create conditions which aggravate the contradictions of capitalism. Precisely for this reason capitalism cannot resolve these contradictions.

Of course, if there were no law of the uneven development of capitalism, leading to conflicts and wars between the capitalist countries on account of colonies; if capitalism could develop without exporting capital to backward countries, countries where raw materials and labour are cheap; if the surplus capital accumulated in the "metropolises" were used not for export of capital, but for seriously developing agriculture and for improving the material conditions of the peasantry; and lastly, if this surplus were used for the purpose of raising the standard

of living of the entire mass of the working class, there would be no intensification of the exploitation of the working class, no impoverishment of the peasantry under capitalism, no intensification of oppression in colonial and dependent countries, and no conflicts and wars between capitalists.

But then, capitalism would not be capitalism.

The whole point is that capitalism cannot develop without aggravating all these contradictions, and without thereby developing the conditions which, in the final analysis, facilitate the downfall of capitalism.

The whole point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the contrary, cannot develop further without creating the conditions which raise the revolutionary movement in all countries to a higher stage and prepare for the final victory of the proletariat.

Such is the difference between the two stabilisations.

That is why the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be either lasting or firm.

Let us now examine the question of the stabilisation of capitalism concretely.

In what way has the stabilisation of capitalism found concrete expression?

Firstly, in the fact that America, Britain and France have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal on the methods of robbing Germany and on the scale on which she is to be robbed. In other words, they have struck a deal on what they call the Dawesation of Germany. Can that deal be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. Because, firstly, it was arrived at without reckoning with the host, i.e., the German people; secondly, because this deal means imposing a double yoke upon the German

people, the yoke of the national bourgeoisie and the yoke of the foreign bourgeoisie. To think that a cultured nation like the German nation and a cultured proletariat like the German proletariat will consent to bear this double yoke without making repeated serious attempts at a revolutionary upheaval means believing in miracles. Even such an essentially reactionary fact as the election of Hindenburg as President,²⁷ leaves no doubt that the Entente's temporary deal directed against Germany is unstable, ridiculously unstable.

Secondly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expression in the fact that British, American and Japanese capital have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about the division of spheres of influence in China, that vast market for international capital, about the methods for plundering that country. Can that deal be regarded as being at all durable? Again, no! Firstly, because the partners to it are fighting, and will fight to the death, over the division of the spoils; secondly, because that deal was struck behind the back of the Chinese people, who have no wish to submit to the laws of the alien robbers, and will not do so. Does not the growth of the revolutionary movement in China show that the machinations of the foreign imperialists are doomed to failure?

Thirdly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expression in the fact that the imperialist groups of the advanced countries have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about mutual non-intervention in the plunder and oppression of "their" respective colonies. Can that deal, or that attempt at a deal, be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. Firstly, because each

imperialist group is striving, and will go on striving, to snatch a piece of the others' colonies; secondly, because the pressure the imperialist groups exercise in the colonies and the policy of oppression they pursue there only serve to steel and revolutionise those colonies and thereby intensify the revolutionary crisis. The imperialists are trying to "pacify" India, to curb Egypt, to tame Morocco, to tie Indo-China and Indonesia hand and foot, and are resorting to all sorts of cunning devices and machinations. They may succeed in achieving some "results" in this respect, but there can scarcely be any doubt that these machinations will not, and cannot, suffice for long.

Fourthly, the stabilisation of capitalism may find expression in an attempt on the part of the imperialist groups of the advanced countries to strike a deal concerning the formation of a united front against the Soviet Union. Let us assume that the deal comes off. Let us assume that they succeed in establishing something in the nature of a united front by resorting to all sorts of trickery, including the scoundrelly forgeries in connection with the explosion in Sofia,²⁸ etc. Are there any grounds for assuming that a deal directed against our country, or stabilisation in this sphere, can be at all durable, at all successful? I think that there are no such grounds. Why? Because, firstly, the threat of a capitalist united front and united attack would act like a gigantic hoop that would bind the whole country around the Soviet Government more tightly than ever before and transform it into an even more impregnable fortress than it was, for instance, during the invasion of the "fourteen states." Recall the threat of an invasion

by fourteen states uttered by the notorious Churchill. You know that the mere utterance of that threat was enough to unite the entire country around the Soviet Government against the imperialist vultures. Because, secondly, a crusade against the Land of Soviets would certainly set in motion a number of revolutionary key points in our enemies' rear, which would disintegrate and demoralise the ranks of imperialism. There can scarcely be any doubt that a host of such key points have developed of late, and they bode imperialism no good. Because, thirdly, our country no longer stands alone; it has allies in the shape of the workers in the West and the oppressed peoples in the East. There can scarcely be any doubt that war against the Soviet Union will mean for imperialism that it will have to wage war against its own workers and colonies. Needless to say, if our country is attacked we shall not sit with folded arms; we shall take all measures to unleash the revolutionary lion in all countries of the world. The leaders of the capitalist countries cannot but know that we have some experience in this matter.

Such are the facts and considerations which show that the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be durable, that this stabilisation signifies the creation of conditions that lead to the defeat of capitalism, while the stabilisation of the Soviet system, on the contrary, signifies the continuous accumulation of conditions that strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, raise the revolutionary movement in all countries and lead to the victory of socialism.

This fundamental antithesis between the two stabilisations, capitalist and Soviet, is an expression of the antithesis between the two systems of economy and

government, between the capitalist system and the socialist system.

Whoever fails to understand this antithesis will never understand the basic character of the present international situation.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present time.

II

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

I pass to the second group of questions.

The new and specific feature of the present position of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries is that the period of the flow of the revolutionary tide has given way to a period of its ebb, a period of lull. The task is to take advantage of the period of lull that we are passing through to strengthen the Communist Parties, to Bolshevise them, to transform them into genuine mass parties relying on the trade unions, to rally the labouring elements among the non-proletarian classes, above all among the peasantry, around the proletariat, and lastly, to educate the proletarians in the spirit of revolution and proletarian dictatorship.

I shall not enumerate all the immediate tasks that confront the Communist Parties in the West. If you read the resolutions on this subject, especially the resolution on Bolshevisation passed by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern,²⁹ it will not be difficult for you to understand what these tasks are concretely.

I should like to deal with the main task, with that task confronting the Communist Parties in the West, the elucidation of which will facilitate the fulfilment of all the other immediate tasks.

What is that task?

That task is to link the Communist Parties in the West with the trade unions. That task is to develop and bring to a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all Communists without fail join the trade unions, to work systematically in them for combining the workers in a united front against capital, and in this way to create the conditions that will enable the Communist Parties to have the backing of the trade unions.

If this task is not carried out it will be impossible to transform the Communist Parties into genuine mass parties or to create the conditions necessary for the victory of the proletariat.

The trade unions and parties in the West are not what the trade unions and the Party are here in Russia. The relations between the trade unions and the parties in the West are quite different from those that have been established here in Russia. In our country the trade unions arose after the Party, and around the Party of the working class. Trade unions had not yet arisen in our country when the Party and its organisations were already leading not only the political but also the economic struggle of the working class, down to small and very small strikes. That, mainly, explains the exceptional prestige of our Party among the workers prior to the February Revolution, in contrast to the rudimentary trade unions which then existed here and there. Real trade unions appeared in our country only after February

1917. Before October we already had definitely formed trade-union organisations, which enjoyed tremendous prestige among the workers. Already at that time Lenin said that without trade-union support it would be impossible either to achieve or to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most powerful development of the trade unions in our country was reached after the capture of power, particularly under the conditions of NEP. There is no doubt that our powerful trade unions now constitute one of the chief supports of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most characteristic feature of the history of the development of our trade unions is that they arose, developed and became strong after the Party, around the Party, and in friendship with the Party.

The trade unions in Western Europe developed under entirely different circumstances. Firstly, they arose and became strong long before working-class parties appeared. Secondly, there it was not the trade unions that developed around the working-class parties; on the contrary, the working-class parties themselves emerged from the trade unions. Thirdly, since the economic sphere of the struggle, the one that is closest to the working class, had already been captured, so to speak, by the trade unions, the parties were obliged to engage mainly in the parliamentary political struggle, and that could not but affect the character of their activities and the importance attached to them by the working class. And precisely because the parties there arose after the trade unions, precisely because the trade unions came into being long before the parties, and in fact became the proletariat's principal fortresses in its struggle against capital—precisely for that

reason, the parties, as independent forces that did not have the backing of the trade unions, were pushed into the background.

From this it follows, however, that if the Communist Parties want to become a real mass force, capable of pushing the revolution forward, they must link up with the trade unions and get their backing.

Failure to take this specific feature of the situation in the West into account means leading the cause of the communist movement to certain doom.

Over there, in the West, there are still individual "Communists" who refuse to understand this specific feature and continue to make play with the anti-proletarian and anti revolutionary slogan: "Leave the trade unions!" It must be said that nobody can do more harm to the communist movement in the West than these and similar "Communists." Regarding the trade unions as an enemy camp, these people contemplate "attacking" them from without. They fail to understand that if they pursue such a policy the workers will indeed regard them as enemies. They fail to understand that the trade unions, whether good or bad, are regarded by the rank-and-file worker as his fortresses, which help him to protect his wages, hours, and so forth. They fail to understand that such a policy, far from facilitating, hinders Communists from penetrating among the vast working-class masses.

The average rank-and-file worker may say to such "Communists": "You are attacking my fortress. You want to wreck the organisations that took me decades to build, and are trying to prove to me that communism is better than trade-unionism. I don't know, perhaps your

theoretical arguments about communism are right. How can I, an ordinary working man, grasp the meaning of your theories? But one thing I do know: I have my trade-union fortresses; they have led me into the struggle, they have protected me, well or ill, from the attacks of the capitalists, and whoever thinks of destroying these fortresses wants to destroy my own cause, the workers' cause. Stop attacking my fortresses, join the trade unions, work in them for five years or so, help to improve and strengthen them. In the meantime I shall see what sort of fellows you are, and if you turn out to be real good fellows, I, of course, will not refuse to support you," and so forth.

That is the attitude, or approximately the attitude, of the average rank-and-file workers in the West today towards the anti-trade-unionists.

Whoever fails to understand this specific feature of the mentality of the average worker in Europe will understand nothing about the position of our Communist Parties at the present time.

Wherein lies the strength of Social-Democracy in the West?

In the fact that it has the backing of the trade unions.

Wherein lies the weakness of our Communist Parties in the West?

In the fact that they have not yet linked up with the trade unions, and certain elements in these Communist Parties do not wish to link up with them.

Hence, the main task of the Communist Parties in the West at the present time is to develop and bring to a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all Communists without exception join

the trade unions, to work in them systematically and patiently for uniting the working class against capital, and in this way to enable the Communist Parties to have the backing of the trade unions.

Such is the meaning of the decisions of the enlarged plenum of the Comintern concerning the immediate tasks of the Communist Parties in the West at the present time.

III

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES

I pass to the third group of questions.

The new features in this sphere are the following:

a) owing to the increase in the export of capital from the advanced to the backward countries, an increase encouraged by the stabilisation of capitalism, capitalism in the colonial countries is developing and will continue to develop at a rapid rate, breaking down the old social and political conditions and implanting new ones;

b) the proletariat in these countries is growing and will continue to grow at a rapid rate;

c) the revolutionary working-class movement and the revolutionary crisis in the colonies are growing and will continue to grow;

d) in this connection, there is a growth, which will continue, of certain strata of the national bourgeoisie, the richest and most powerful strata, which, fearing revolution in their countries more than they fear imperialism, will prefer a deal with imperialism to the liberation of

their countries from imperialism and will thereby betray their own native lands (India, Egypt, etc.);

e) in view of all this, those countries can be liberated from imperialism only if a struggle is waged against the compromising national bourgeoisie;

f) but from this it follows that the question of the alliance between the workers and peasants and of the hegemony of the proletariat in the industrially developed and developing colonies is bound to become an urgent one, as it did before the first revolution in Russia in 1905.

Until now the situation has been that the East was usually spoken of as a homogeneous whole. It is now obvious to everybody that there is no longer a single, homogeneous East, that there are now capitalistically developed and developing colonies and backward and lagging colonies, and they cannot all be measured with the same yardstick.

Until now the national-liberation movement has been regarded as an unbroken front of all the national forces in the colonial and dependent countries, from the most reactionary bourgeois to the most revolutionary proletarians. Now, after the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary and an anti-revolutionary wing, the picture of the national movement is assuming a somewhat different aspect. Parallel with the revolutionary elements of the national movement, compromising and reactionary elements which prefer a deal with imperialism to the liberation of their countries are emerging from the bourgeoisie.

Hence the task of the communist elements in the colonial countries is to link up with the revolutionary ele-

ments of the bourgeoisie, and above all with the peasantry, against the bloc of imperialism and the compromising elements of "their own" bourgeoisie, in order, under the leadership of the proletariat, to wage a genuinely revolutionary struggle for liberation from imperialism.

Only one conclusion follows: a number of colonial countries are now approaching their 1905.

The task is to unite the advanced elements of the workers in the colonial countries in a single Communist Party that will be capable of leading the growing revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary movement in the colonial countries as far back as 1922:

"The present 'victors' in the first imperialist massacre are unable to vanquish even a small, insignificantly small, country like Ireland, they are not even able to unravel the tangle they have got themselves into in financial and currency questions. And India and China are seething. They have a population of over seven hundred million. With the surrounding Asiatic countries quite like them they account for more than half the population of the world. In these countries, 1905 is approaching, irresistibly and with ever increasing speed, but with this essential and enormous difference: in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still (at the outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, without immediately drawing other countries into the revolution, whereas the revolutions that are growing in India and China are already being drawn, and have been drawn, into the revolutionary struggle, into the revolutionary movement into the international revolution" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 293).*

* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the third edition of the *Works*.—*Tr.*

The colonial countries are on the threshold of their 1905—such is the conclusion.

Such is also the meaning of the resolutions on the colonial question adopted by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern.

IV

THE FATE OF SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

I pass to the fourth group of questions.

So far I have spoken about the resolutions of our Party conference on questions directly concerning the Comintern. We shall now pass to questions which directly concern both the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.), and thus serve as a link between the external and internal problems.

How will the temporary stabilisation of capitalism affect the fate of socialism in our country? Does that stabilisation mark the end, or the beginning of the end, of the building of socialism in our country?

Is it at all possible to build socialism by our own efforts in our technically and economically backward country if capitalism continues to exist in the other countries for a more or less prolonged period?

Is it possible to create a complete guarantee against the dangers of intervention, and hence, against the restoration of the old order of things in our country, while we are encircled by capitalism, and, at the present moment, by stabilised capitalism at that?

All these are questions which inevitably confront us as a result of the new situation in the sphere of interna-

tional relations, and which we cannot ignore. They demand a precise and definite answer.

Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism.

Let us examine these two groups of contradictions separately.

That certain contradictions exist between the proletariat and the peasantry cannot, of course, be denied. It is sufficient to recall everything that has taken place, and is still taking place, in our country in connection with the price policy for agricultural produce, in connection with the price limits, in connection with the campaign to reduce the prices of manufactured goods, and so forth, to understand how very real these contradictions are. We have two main classes before us: the proletarian class and the class of private-property-owners, i.e., the peasantry. Hence, contradictions between them are inevitable. The whole question is whether we shall be able by our own efforts to overcome the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. When the question is asked: can we build socialism by our own efforts? what is meant is: can the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry in our country be overcome or not?

Leninism answers that question in the affirmative: yes, we can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class.

What is the basis, the grounds, for such an answer?

The grounds are that, besides contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, there are also common interests between them on fundamental problems of development, interests which outweigh, or, at all events, can outweigh those contradictions, and are the basis, the foundation, of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

What are those common interests?

The point is that there are two paths along which agriculture can develop: the capitalist path and the socialist path. The capitalist path means development by impoverishing the majority of the peasantry for the sake of enriching the upper strata of the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The socialist path, on the contrary, means development by a continuous improvement in the well-being of the majority of the peasantry. It is in the interest of both the proletariat and the peasantry, particularly of the latter, that development should proceed along the second path, the socialist path, for that is the peasantry's only salvation from impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence. Needless to say, the proletarian dictatorship, which holds in its hands the main threads of economic life, will take all measures to secure the victory of the second path, the socialist path. It goes without saying, on the other hand, that the peasantry is vitally interested in development proceeding along this second path.

Hence the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry which outweighs the contradictions between them.

That is why Leninism says that we can and must build a complete socialist society together with the peasantry on the basis of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

That is why Leninism says, basing itself on the common interests of the proletarians and the peasants, that we can and must by our own efforts overcome the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry.

That is how Leninism regards the matter.

But, evidently, not all comrades agree with Leninism. The following, for example, is what Trotsky says about the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry:

“The contradictions in the position of a workers’ government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved *only** on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution” (see preface to Trotsky’s book *The Year 1905*).

In other words, it is not within our power, we are not in a position, by our own efforts to overcome, to eliminate the internal contradictions in our country, the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, because, it appears, only as a result of a world revolution, and only on the basis of a world revolution, can we eliminate those contradictions and, at last, build socialism.

Needless to say, this proposition has nothing in common with Leninism.

The same Trotsky goes on to say:

* My italics.—*J. St.*

“Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant” (see Trotsky’s *Our Revolution*, p. 278).

In other words, we cannot even dream of maintaining power for any length of time unless the Western proletariat takes power and renders us state support.

Further:

“It would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe” (see Trotsky’s *Works*, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90).

In other words, it appears that not only are we unable to build socialism, but we cannot even hold out albeit for a brief period “in the face of a conservative Europe,” although the whole world knows that we have not only held out, but have repulsed a number of furious attacks upon our country by a conservative Europe.

And lastly:

“Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia,” says Trotsky, “will become possible *only after the victory** of the proletariat in the major European countries” (ibid., p. 93).

Clear, one would think.

I have quoted these passages, comrades, in order to contrast them with passages from the works of Lenin, and thus to enable you to grasp the quintessence of the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society in the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capitalist states.

* My italics.—*J. St.*

Let us now turn to passages from the works of Lenin.

Here is what Lenin wrote as far back as 1915, during the imperialist war:

“Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible, first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity, coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.” . . . Because “the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states” (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

In other words, the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capitalists, can, it appears, not only by its own efforts eliminate the internal contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, but can and must, in addition, build socialism, organise its own socialist economy and establish an armed force in order to go to the aid of the proletarians in the surrounding countries in their struggle to overthrow capital.

Such is the fundamental thesis of Leninism on the victory of socialism in one country.

Lenin said the same thing, although in a slightly different way, in 1920, at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in connection with the question of the electrification of our country:

“Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve *final** victory” (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the technical difficulties connected with the building of socialism in our country, but he did not by any means draw from this the absurd conclusion that “real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries”; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that we could by our own efforts surmount those difficulties and achieve “final victory,” i.e., build complete socialism.

And here is what Lenin said a year later, in 1921:

“Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory *on a world scale** is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)” (“Outline and Synopsis of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*,” 1921—see Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the political difficulties connected with the building of socialism in our country, but he did not by any means draw

* My italics.—*J. St.*

from this the false conclusion that “without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power”; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that, given a correct policy towards the peasantry, we would be quite able to ensure “victory on a world scale,” meaning that we could build complete socialism.

But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry? A correct policy towards the peasantry is something that depends wholly and entirely upon us, and upon us alone, as the Party which directs the building of socialism in our country.

Lenin said the same thing, but still more definitely, in 1922, in his notes on co-operation:

“As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under the NEP? *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?** This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is *necessary and sufficient** for this building” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

In other words, under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess, it appears, all that is needed to build

* My italics.—*J. St.*

a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts.

Clear, one would think.

As regards the objection that the relative economic backwardness of our country precludes the possibility of building socialism, Lenin attacked and refuted it as something incompatible with socialism:

“Infinitely hackneyed is the argument,” says Lenin, “that they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain ‘learned’ gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 399).

Had it been otherwise, there was no point in taking power in October and carrying out the October Revolution. For if the possibility and necessity of building a complete socialist society is precluded for some reason or other, the October Revolution becomes meaningless. Anyone who denies the possibility of building socialism in one country must necessarily deny that the October Revolution was justified; and vice versa, anyone who has no faith in the October Revolution cannot admit the possibility of the victory of socialism in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. The connection between lack of faith in October and denial of the socialist potentialities in our country is complete and direct.

“I know,” says Lenin, “that there are, of course, sages who think they are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, who assert that power should not have been seized until the revolution had broken out in all countries. They do not suspect that

by speaking in this way they are deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the toiling classes bring about a revolution on an international scale means that everybody should stand stock-still in expectation. That is nonsense" (see Vol. XXIII, p 9).

That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the first order, with the internal contradictions, with the question of the possibility of building socialism in the conditions of capitalist encirclement.

Let us now pass to the contradictions of the second order, to the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the country of socialism, and all the other countries, as the countries of capitalism.

What are these contradictions?

They are that, as long as capitalist encirclement exists, there is bound to be the danger of intervention by the capitalist countries, and as long as such a danger exists, there is bound to be the danger of restoration, the danger of the capitalist order being re-established in our country.

Can those contradictions be fully overcome by one country? No, they cannot; for the efforts of one country, even if that country is the land of the proletarian dictatorship, are insufficient for the purpose of fully guaranteeing it against the danger of intervention. Therefore, a full guarantee against intervention, and hence the final victory of socialism, are possible only on an international scale, only as a result of the joint efforts of the proletarians of a number of countries, or—still better—only as a result of the victory of the proletarians in a number of countries.

What is the final victory of socialism?

The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism.

“As long as our Soviet Republic,” says Lenin, “remains an isolated borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope . . . for the disappearance of all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain, dangers will remain too, and we cannot escape them” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 29).

And further:

“We are living not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

That is why Lenin says that:

“Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).

That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the second order.

Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one

country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist.

An example of such confusion is provided by a letter I received from a comrade in January this year on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. He writes in perplexity:

“You say that the Leninist theory . . . is that *socialism can triumph in one country*. I regret to say that I have not found in the relevant passages of Lenin’s works any references to the victory of socialism in one country.”

The trouble, of course, is not that this comrade, whom I regard as one of the best of our young student comrades, “has not found in the relevant passages of Lenin’s works any references to the victory of socialism in one country.” He will read and, some day, will at last find such references. The trouble is that he confused the internal contradictions with the external contradictions and got entirely muddled up in this confusion. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform you of the answer I sent to this comrade’s letter. Here it is:

“The point at issue is not *complete* victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the ‘joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries.’

“It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat

of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, 'cannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.' That is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If Trotsky's theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia, and that we have '*all* that is necessary for building a *complete* socialist society'* (see the article "On Co-operation"), would be wrong. . . .

"The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP—do you think that during those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist economy? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

"But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it does not . . . for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the danger of military intervention" (January 1925).

That is how the matter stands with the question of the fate of socialism in our country from the standpoint of the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

V

**THE PARTY'S POLICY
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE**

I pass to the fifth group of questions.

Before passing to the resolutions of the Fourteenth Conference dealing with the Party's policy in the countryside, I should like to say a few words about the hullabaloo raised by the bourgeois press in connection with the criticism which our Party has made of our own shortcomings in the countryside. The bourgeois press leaps and dances and assures all and sundry that the open criticism of our own shortcomings is a sign of the weakness of the Soviet power, a sign of its disintegration and decay. Needless to say, all this hullabaloo is thoroughly false and mendacious.

Self-criticism is a sign of our Party's strength and not of its weakness. Only a strong party, which has its roots in life and is marching to victory, can afford the ruthless criticism of its own shortcomings that it has permitted, and always will permit, in front of the whole people. A party which hides the truth from the people, which fears the light and fears criticism, is not a party, but a clique of impostors, whose doom is sealed. Messieurs the bourgeois measure us with their own yardstick. They fear the light and assiduously hide the truth from the people, covering up their shortcomings with ostentatious proclamation of well-being. And so they think that we Communists, too, must hide the truth from the people. They fear the light, for it would be enough for them to permit anything like serious self-criticism, anything like free criticism of their own

shortcomings, to cause the downfall of the bourgeois system. And so they think that if we Communists permit self-criticism, it is a sign that we are surrounded and that the ground is slipping from under our feet. Those honourable gentlemen, the bourgeois and Social-Democrats, measure us with their own yardsticks. Only parties which are departing into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear the light and fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor the other, we do not fear them because we are a party that is in the ascendant, that is marching to victory. That is why the self-criticism that has been going on for several months already is a sign of our Party's immense strength, and not of its weakness, it is a means of consolidating and not of disintegrating the Party.

Let us now pass to the question of the Party's policy in the countryside.

What new facts are to be noted in the countryside in connection with the new internal and international situation?

I think that four chief facts are to be noted:

1) the change in the international situation and the slowing down of the tempo of the revolution, which compel us to choose the least painful, although slower, methods of drawing the peasantry into socialist construction, of building socialism together with the peasantry;

2) the economic progress in the countryside and the process of differentiation among the peasantry, which call for the elimination of the survivals of war communism in the countryside;

3) the political activity of the peasantry, which requires that the old methods of leadership and administration in the countryside be changed;

4) the elections to the Soviets, which revealed the indubitable fact that in a number of districts in our country *the middle peasants were found to be on the side of the kulaks against the poor peasants.*

In view of these new facts, what is the Party's main task in the countryside?

Proceeding from the fact that differentiation is going on in the countryside, some comrades draw the conclusion that the Party's main task is to foment class struggle there. That is wrong. That is idle talk. That is not our main task now. That is a rehash of the old Menshevik songs taken from the old Menshevik encyclopedia.

To foment class struggle in the countryside is not by any means the main task at present. *The main task at present is to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat, to win them over to our side again.* The main task at present is to link up with the main masses of the peasantry, to raise their material and cultural level, and to move forward together with those main masses along the road to socialism. The main task is to build socialism together with the peasantry, without fail together with the peasantry, and without fail under the leadership of the working class; for the leadership of the working class is the basic guarantee that our work of construction will proceed along the path to socialism.

That is now the Party's main task.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to recall Ilyich's words on this subject, the words he uttered at the time NEP was introduced, and which remain valid to this day:

“The whole point now is to advance as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 272).

And further:

“Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file toiling peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us. If we do that we shall in time get such an acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now” (ibid., pp. 231-32).

In view of this, two main tasks confront us in the countryside.

1) Firstly, we must see to it that peasant economy is included in the general system of Soviet economic development. Formerly things proceeded in such a way that we had two parallel processes: the town went its own way and the country went its way. The capitalist strove to include peasant economy in the system of capitalist development, but that inclusion took place through the impoverishment of the peasant masses and the enrichment of the upper stratum of the peasantry. As is known, that path was fraught with revolution. After the victory of the proletariat the inclusion of peasant economy in the general system of Soviet economic development must be brought about by creating conditions that can promote the progress of our national economy on the basis of a gradual but steady improvement of the welfare of the majority of the peasants, that is, along a road which is the very opposite to the one along which the capitalists led the peasantry and proposed that they should go prior to the revolution.

But how is peasant economy to be included in the system of economic construction? Through the co-operatives. Through the credit co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives, consumers' co-operatives and producers' co-operatives.

Such are the roads and paths by which peasant economy must be slowly but thoroughly drawn into the general system of socialist construction.

2) The second task consists in gradually but steadily pursuing the line of eliminating the old methods of administration and leadership in the countryside, the line of revitalising the Soviets, the line of transforming the Soviets into genuinely elected bodies, the line of implanting the principles of Soviet democracy in the countryside. Ilyich said that the proletarian dictatorship is the highest type of democracy for the majority of the working people. Ilyich said that this highest type of democracy can be introduced only after the proletariat has taken power and after we have obtained the opportunity of consolidating this power. Well, this phase of consolidating the Soviet power and of implanting Soviet democracy has already begun. We must proceed along this path cautiously and unhurriedly, and in the course of our work we must create around the Party a numerous active consisting of non-Party peasants.

While the first task, the task of including peasant economy in the general system of economic construction, makes it possible for us to put the peasantry in joint harness with the proletariat on the road of building socialism, the second task, the task of implanting Soviet democracy and revitalising the Soviets in the countryside, should make it possible for us to reconstruct our

state apparatus, to link it with the masses of the people, to make it sound and honest, simple and inexpensive, in order to create the conditions that will facilitate the gradual transition from a society with a dictatorship of the proletariat to communist society.

Such are the main lines of the resolutions adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of our Party on the question of our Party's policy in the countryside.

Hence, the methods of Party leadership in the countryside must change accordingly.

We have people in the Party who assert that since we have NEP, and since capitalism is beginning to be temporarily stabilised, our task is to pursue a policy of the utmost pressure both in the Party and in the state apparatus, pressure so strong as to make everything creak. I must say that such a policy would be wrong and fatal. What we need now is not the utmost pressure, but the utmost flexibility in both policy and organisation, the utmost flexibility in both political and organisational leadership. Unless we have that we shall be unable to remain at the helm under the present complicated conditions. We need the utmost flexibility in order to keep the Party at the helm and to ensure that the Party exercises complete leadership.

Further. The Communists in the countryside must refrain from improper forms of administration. We must not rely merely on giving orders to the peasants. We must learn to explain to the peasants patiently the questions they do not understand, we must learn to convince the peasants, sparing neither time nor effort for this purpose. Of course, it is much easier and simpler to issue an order and leave it at that, as some of our Volost Executive

Committee Chairmen often do. But not all that is simple and easy is good. Not long ago, it appears, when the representative of a Gubernia Committee asked the secretary of a volost Party unit why there were no newspapers in his volost, the answer was given: "What do we want newspapers for? It's quieter and better without them. If the peasants begin reading newspapers they will start asking all sorts of questions and we shall have no end of trouble with them." And this secretary calls himself a Communist! It scarcely needs proof that he is not a Communist, but a calamity. The point is that nowadays it is utterly impossible to lead without "trouble," let alone without newspapers. This simple truth must be understood and assimilated if we want the Party and the Soviet power to retain the leadership in the countryside.

Further. To lead, nowadays, one must be a good manager, one must be familiar with and understand economic affairs. Merely talking about "world politics," about Chamberlain and MacDonald, will not carry one very far now. We have entered the period of economic construction. Hence, the one who can lead is one who understands economic affairs, who is able to give the peasant useful advice about economic development, who can give the peasant assistance in economic construction. To study economic affairs, to be directly linked with economic affairs, to go into all the details of economic construction—such is now the task of the Communists in the countryside. Unless they do that, it is no use even dreaming of leadership.

It is now impossible to lead in the old way, because the peasants are displaying more political activity, and it is necessary that this activity should assume a Soviet

form, that it should flow through the Soviets and not past them. A leader is one who revitalises the Soviets and creates a peasant active around the Party in the countryside.

It is impossible to lead in the old way nowadays, because the economic activity of the rural population has increased, and it is necessary that this activity should assume the form of co-operation, that it should flow through the co-operatives and not past them. A leader is one who implants a co-operative communal life in the countryside.

Such, in general, are the concrete tasks of Party leadership in the countryside.

VI

THE METAL INDUSTRY

I pass to the last group of questions dealt with at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

What is new and specific in our economic leadership?

It is that our economic plans have begun to lag behind the actual development of our economy, they turn out to be inadequate and quite often fail to keep pace with the actual growth of our economy.

A striking expression of this fact is our state budget. You know that in the course of half a year we were obliged to revise our state budget three times owing to rapid increases in the revenue side of our budget not foreseen in our estimates. In other words, our estimates and our budget plans failed to keep pace with the increase in state revenues, as a result of which the state treasury found itself with a surplus. That means that the sap of eco-

conomic life in our country is surging upward with irresistible force, upsetting all the scientific plans of our financial experts. That means that we are experiencing an upsurge of economic and labour activity, at least as powerful as that which America, for example, experienced after the Civil War.

The growth of our metal industry can be taken as the most striking expression of this new phenomenon in our economic life. Last year the output of the metal industry amounted to 191,000,000 pre-war rubles. In November last year the annual output plan for 1924-25 was fixed at 273,000,000 pre-war rubles. In January this year, in view of the discrepancy between that figure and the actual growth of the metal industry, the plan was revised and the figure brought up to 317,000,000. In April this year, even this enlarged plan proved to be unsound and, as a consequence, the figure had to be raised again, this time to 350,000,000. Now we are told that this plan has also proved to be inadequate, for it will have to be enlarged once again and the figure raised to 360-370 millions.

In other words, the output of the metal industry this year has almost doubled compared with that of last year. That is apart from the colossal growth of our light industry, of the growth of our transport system, fuel industry, and so forth.

What does all this show? It shows that as regards the organisation of industry, which is the chief basis of socialism, we have already entered the broad high road of development. As regards the metal industry, the main-spring of all industry, the period of stagnation has passed, and our metal industry now has every opportunity

of going ahead and nourishing. Comrade Dzerzhinsky is right in saying that our country can and must become a land of metal.

The enormous importance of this fact both for the internal development of our country and for the international revolution scarcely needs proof.

There is no doubt that, from the standpoint of our internal development, the development of our metal industry and the significance of its growth are colossal, for this development means the growth of our entire industry and of our economy as a whole, for the metal industry is the chief basis of industry as a whole, for neither light industry, nor transport, nor the fuel industry, nor electrification, nor agriculture can be put on their feet unless the metal industry is powerfully developed. The growth of the metal industry is the basis of the growth of industry as a whole, and of our national economy as a whole.

Here is what Lenin says about "heavy industry," meaning by that mainly the metal industry:

"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. And to put it in good condition will require many years of work."

And further:

"Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

As for the international significance of the development of our metal industry, we may say that it is immeas-

urable. For what is the surging growth of the metal industry under the proletarian dictatorship if not direct proof that the proletariat is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, that it is capable of building by its own efforts a new industry, and a new society free from the exploitation of man by man? To prove this in actual fact and not from books means advancing the cause of the international revolution surely and finally. The pilgrimages of West-European workers to our country are not accidental. They are of enormous agitational and practical significance for the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world. The fact that workers come here and probe every corner at our factories and works shows that they do not believe books, but want to convince themselves by their own experience that the proletariat is capable of building a new industry, of creating a new society. And when they convince themselves of this, you may be sure that the cause of the international revolution will make enormous strides forward.

“At the present time,” says Lenin, “we are exercising our main influence on the *international* revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale *surely and finally*. That is why questions of economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be fast—but steady progress upward and forward”* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Such is the international significance of the growth of our industry in general, and of our metal industry in particular.

At the present time we have an industrial proletariat of about 4,000,000. A small number, of course, but it is something to go on with in building socialism and in building up the defence of our country to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat. But we cannot and must not stop there. We need 15-20 million industrial proletarians, we need the electrification of the principal regions of our country, the organisation of agriculture on co-operative lines, and a highly developed metal industry. And then we need fear no danger. And then we shall triumph on an international scale.

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Conference lies precisely in the fact that it clearly mapped the road to that great goal.

And that road is the right road, for it is Lenin's road, and it will lead us to final victory.

Such, in general, are the results of the work of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

Pravda, Nos. 106 and 107,
May 12 and 13, 1925

THE POLITICAL TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST

*Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Students
of the Communist University
of the Toilers of the East
May 18, 1925*

Comrades, permit me, first of all, to greet you on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the existence of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Needless to say, I wish your University every success on the difficult road of training communist cadres for the East.

And now let us pass to the matter in hand.

Analysing the composition of the student body of the University of the Toilers of the East, one cannot help noting a certain duality in it. This University unites representatives of not less than fifty nations and national groups of the East. All the students at this University are sons of the East. But that definition does not give any clear or complete picture. The fact is that there are two main groups among the students at the University, representing two sets of totally different conditions of development. The first group consists of people who have come here from the *Soviet* East, from countries where the rule of the bourgeoisie no longer exists, where imperialist oppression has been overthrown, and where the workers are in power. The second group of students consists of people who have come here from *colonial and dependent countries*, from countries where capitalism still reigns, where imperialist oppression is

still in full force, and where independence has still to be won by driving out the imperialists.

Thus, we have two Easts, living different lives, and developing under different conditions.

Needless to say, this duality in the composition of the student body cannot but leave its impress upon the work of the University of the Toilers of the East. That explains the fact that this University stands with one foot on Soviet soil and the other on the soil of the colonies and dependent countries.

Hence the two lines of the University's activity: one line having the aim of creating cadres capable of serving the needs of the Soviet republics of the East, and the other line having the aim of creating cadres capable of serving the revolutionary requirements of the toiling masses in the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

Hence, also, the two kinds of tasks that face the University of the Toilers of the East.

Let us examine these tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East separately.

I

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET REPUBLICS OF THE EAST

What are the characteristic features of the life and development of these countries, of these republics, which distinguish them from the colonial and dependent countries?

Firstly, these republics are free from imperialist oppression.

Secondly, they are developing and becoming consolidated as nations not under the aegis of the bourgeois order, but under the aegis of Soviet power. That is a fact unprecedented in history, but it is a fact for all that.

Thirdly, inasmuch as they are industrially underdeveloped, they can in their development rely wholly and entirely on the support of the industrial proletariat of the Soviet Union.

Fourthly, being free from colonial oppression, enjoying the protection of the proletarian dictatorship, and being members of the Soviet Union, these republics can and must be drawn into the work of building socialism in our country.

The main task is to make it easier to draw the workers and peasants of these republics into the work of building socialism in our country, to create and develop the prerequisites, applicable in the specific conditions of life in these republics, that can promote and hasten this process.

Hence, the immediate tasks that face the leading cadres in the Soviet East are:

1) To create industrial centres in the Soviet republics of the East to serve as bases for rallying the peasants around the working class. You know that this work has already begun, and it will advance together with the economic growth of the Soviet Union. The fact that these republics possess all kinds of raw materials is a guarantee that in time this work will be completed.

2) To raise the level of agriculture, above all irrigation. You know that this work has also been pushed

forward, at any rate in Transcaucasia and in Turkestan.

3) To start and further promote the organisation of co-operatives for the broad masses of the peasants and handicraftsmen as the surest way of drawing the Soviet republics in the East into the general system of Soviet economic construction.

4) To bring the Soviets closer to the masses, to make them national in composition, and in this way implant national-Soviet statehood, close to and comprehensible to the toiling masses.

5) To develop national culture, to set up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational-technical training, to be conducted in the native languages for the purpose of training Soviet, Party, technical and business cadres from the local people.

It is precisely the fulfilment of these tasks that will facilitate the work of building socialism in the Soviet republics of the East.

There is talk about model republics in the Soviet East. But what is a model republic? A model republic is one which carries out all these tasks honestly and conscientiously, thereby attracting the workers and peasants of the neighbouring colonial and dependent countries to the liberation movement.

I have spoken above about bringing the Soviets closer to the toiling masses of the different nationalities—about making the Soviets national in character. But what does that mean, and how does it manifest itself in practice? I think that the national delimitation recently completed in Turkestan³⁰ can serve as a model of the way

the Soviets should be brought closer to the masses. The bourgeois press regards this delimitation as "Bolshevik cunning." It is obvious, however, that this was a manifestation not of "cunning," but of the deep-rooted aspiration of the masses of the people of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to have their own organs of power, close to and comprehensible to them. In the pre-revolutionary epoch, both these countries were torn to pieces and distributed among various khanates and states, thus providing a convenient field for the exploiting machinations of "the powers that be." The time has now come when it has become possible for these scattered pieces to be *reunited* in independent states, so that the toiling masses of Uzbekistan and of Turkmenistan may be brought closer to the organs of power and linked solidly with them. The delimitation of Turkestan is, above all, the *reunion* of the scattered parts of these countries in independent states. That these states later expressed the wish to join the Soviet Union as equal members of it merely shows that the Bolsheviks have found the key to the deep-rooted aspirations of the masses of the people of the East, and that the Soviet Union is a voluntary union of the toiling masses of different nationalities, the only one in the world. To reunite Poland, the bourgeoisie needed a whole series of wars. To reunite Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, however, the Communists needed only a few months of explanatory propaganda.

That is the way to bring the organs of government, in this case the Soviets, closer to the broad masses of the toilers of different nationalities.

That is the proof that the Bolshevik national policy is the only correct policy.

I spoke, further, about raising the level of national culture in the Soviet republics of the East. But what is national culture? How is it to be reconciled with proletarian culture? Did not Lenin say, already before the war, that there are two cultures—bourgeois and socialist; that the slogan of national culture is a reactionary slogan of the bourgeoisie, who try to poison the minds of the working people with the venom of nationalism?³¹ How is the building of national culture, the development of schools and courses in the native languages, and the training of cadres from the local people, to be reconciled with the building of socialism, with the building of proletarian culture? Is there not an irreconcilable contradiction here? Of course not! We are building proletarian culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and modes of expression among the different peoples who are drawn into the building of socialism, depending upon differences in language, manner of life, and so forth. Proletarian in content, national in form—such is the universal culture towards which socialism is proceeding. Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture, it gives it content. On the other hand, national culture does not abolish proletarian culture, it gives it form. The slogan of national culture was a bourgeois slogan as long as the bourgeoisie was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded under the aegis of the bourgeois order. The slogan of national culture became a proletarian slogan when the proletariat came to power, and when the consolidation of nations began to proceed under the aegis of Soviet power. Whoever fails to understand the fundamental difference

between these two situations will never understand either Leninism or the essence of the national question.

Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather than for such a theory. Until now what has happened has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished but rather increased the number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest sections of humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, it awakens to new life a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them new life and a new development. Today, India is spoken of as a single whole. But there can scarcely be any doubt that, in the event of a revolutionary upheaval in India, scores of hitherto unknown nationalities, having their own separate languages and separate cultures, will appear on the scene. And as regards implanting proletarian culture among the various nationalities, there can scarcely be any doubt that this will proceed in forms corresponding to the languages and manner of life of these nationalities.

Not long ago I received a letter from some Buryat comrades asking me to explain serious and difficult questions concerning the relations between universal culture and national culture. Here it is:

"We earnestly request you to explain the following, for us, very serious and difficult questions. The ultimate aim of the Communist Party is to achieve a single universal culture. How is one to conceive the transition to a single universal culture through the national cultures which are developing within the limits of our individual autonomous republics? How is the assimilation of the specific features of the individual national cultures (language, etc.) to take place?."

I think that what has just been said might serve as an answer to the anxious question put by these Buryat comrades.

The Buryat comrades raise the question of the assimilation of the individual nationalities in the course of building a universal proletarian culture. Undoubtedly, some nationalities may, and perhaps certainly will, undergo a process of assimilation. Such processes have taken place before. The point is, however, that the process of assimilation of some nationalities does not exclude, but presupposes the opposite process of the strengthening and further development of quite a number of existing and developing nations; for the partial process of assimilation of individual nationalities is the result of the general process of development of nations. It is precisely for this reason that the possible assimilation of some individual nationalities does not weaken, but confirms the entirely correct thesis that proletarian universal culture does not exclude, but presupposes and fosters the national culture of the peoples, just as the national culture of the peoples does not annul, but supplements and enriches universal proletarian culture.

Such, in general, are the immediate tasks that face the leading cadres of the Soviet republics of the East.

Such are the character and content of these tasks.

Advantage must be taken of the period that has begun of intense economic construction and of new concessions to the peasantry to promote the fulfilment of these tasks, and thereby to make it easier to draw the Soviet republics in the East, which are mainly peasant countries, into the work of building socialism in the Soviet Union.

It is said that the Party's new policy towards the peasantry, in making a number of new concessions (land on short lease, permission to employ hired labour), contains certain elements of retreat. Is that true? Yes, it is. But those are elements of retreat that we permit *alongside* the retention of an overwhelming superiority of forces on the side of the Party and the Soviet power. Stable currency, developing industry, developing transport, a credit system which is growing stronger, and by means of which it is possible, through preferential credits, to ruin or to raise to a higher level any stratum of the population without causing the slightest upheaval—all these are reserves at the command of the proletarian dictatorship by means of which certain elements of retreat on one sector of the front can only facilitate the preparation of an offensive along the whole front. Precisely for this reason, the few new concessions that the Party has made to the peasantry should, at the present time, make it easier rather than more difficult to draw the peasantry into the work of building socialism.

What can this circumstance mean for the Soviet republics in the East? It can only mean that it places in the hands of the leading cadres in these republics a new weapon enabling these countries to be more easily and

quickly linked with the general system of Soviet economic development.

Such is the connection between the Party's policy in the countryside and the immediate national tasks confronting the leading cadres in the Soviet East.

In this connection, the task of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the Soviet republics of the East is to train cadres for these republics along lines that will ensure the fulfilment of the immediate tasks I have enumerated above.

The University of the Peoples of the East must not isolate itself from life. It is not, nor can it be, an institution standing above life. It must be connected with actual life through every fibre of its being. Consequently, it cannot ignore the immediate tasks confronting the Soviet republics in the East. That is why the task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to take the immediate tasks that face these republics into account in training the appropriate cadres for them.

In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind the existence of two deviations in the practice of the leading cadres in the Soviet East, deviations which must be combated within the precincts of this University if it is to train real cadres and real revolutionaries for the Soviet East.

The first deviation lies in simplification, a simplification of the tasks of which I have spoken above, an attempt mechanically to transplant models of economic construction which are quite comprehensible and applicable in the centre of the Soviet Union, but which are totally unsuited to the conditions of development in the so-called border regions. The comrades who are guilty

of this deviation fail to understand two things. They fail to understand that conditions in the centre and in the "border regions" are not alike and are far from being identical. Furthermore, they fail to understand that the Soviet republics themselves in the East are not alike, that some of them, Georgia and Armenia, for example, are at a higher stage of national formation, whereas others, Chechnya and Kabarda, for example, are at a lower stage of national formation, and others again, Kirghizia, for example, occupy a middle position between these two extremes. These comrades fail to understand that if the work is not adapted to local conditions, if all the various specific features of each country are not carefully taken into account, nothing of importance can be built. The result of this deviation is that they become divorced from the masses and degenerate into Left phrasemongers. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against this simplification.

The second deviation, on the other hand, lies in the exaggeration of local specific features, forgetfulness of the common and main thing that links the Soviet republics of the East with the industrial areas of the Soviet Union, the hushing up of socialist tasks, adaptation to the tasks of a narrow and restricted nationalism. The comrades who are guilty of this deviation care little about the internal development of their countries and prefer to leave that development to the natural course of things. For them, the main thing is not internal development, but "external" policy, the expansion of the frontiers of their republics, litigation with surrounding republics, the desire to snatch an extra

piece of territory from their neighbours and thus to get into the good graces of the bourgeois nationalists in their respective countries. The result of this deviation is that they become divorced from socialism and degenerate into ordinary bourgeois nationalists. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against this concealed nationalism.

Such are the tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the Soviet republics of the East.

II

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST IN RELATION TO THE COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF THE EAST

Let us pass to the second question, the question of the tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in relation to the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

What are the characteristic features of the life and development of these countries, which distinguish them from the Soviet republics of the East?

Firstly, these countries are living and developing under the oppression of imperialism.

Secondly, the existence of a double oppression, internal oppression (by the native bourgeoisie) and external oppression (by the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie), is intensifying and deepening the revolutionary crisis in these countries.

Thirdly, in some of these countries, India for example, capitalism is growing at a rapid rate, giving rise to and moulding a more or less numerous class of local proletarians.

Fourthly, with the growth of the revolutionary movement, the national bourgeoisie in such countries is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the petty bourgeoisie) and a compromising part (the big bourgeoisie), of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering into a bloc with imperialism.

Fifthly, parallel with the imperialist bloc, another bloc is taking shape in such countries, a bloc between the workers and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, an anti-imperialist bloc, the aim of which is complete liberation from imperialism.

Sixthly, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in such countries, and of freeing the masses of the people from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie, is becoming more and more urgent.

Seventhly, this circumstance makes it much easier to link the national-liberation movement in such countries with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

From this at least three conclusions follow:

1) The liberation of the colonial and dependent countries from imperialism cannot be achieved without a victorious revolution: you will not get independence gratis.

2) The revolution cannot be advanced and the complete independence of the capitalistically developed colonies and dependent countries cannot be won unless the compromising national bourgeoisie is isolated,

unless the petty-bourgeois revolutionary masses are freed from the influence of that bourgeoisie, unless the policy of the hegemony of the proletariat is put into effect, unless the advanced elements of the working class are organised in an independent Communist Party.

3) Lasting victory cannot be achieved in the colonial and dependent countries without a real link between the liberation movement in those countries and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

The main task of the Communists in the colonial and dependent countries is to base their revolutionary activities upon these conclusions.

What are the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries in view of these circumstances?

The distinctive feature of the colonies and dependent countries at the present time is that there no longer exists a single and all-embracing colonial East. Formerly the colonial East was pictured as a homogeneous whole. Today, that picture no longer corresponds to the truth. We have now at least three categories of colonial and dependent countries. Firstly, countries like Morocco, which have little or no proletariat, and are industrially quite undeveloped. Secondly, countries like China and Egypt, which are under-developed industrially, and have a relatively small proletariat. Thirdly, countries like India, which are capitalistically more or less developed and have a more or less numerous national proletariat.

Clearly, all these countries cannot possibly be put on a par with one another.

In countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie has, as yet, no grounds for splitting up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, the task of the communist elements is to take all measures to create a united national front against imperialism. In such countries, the communist elements can be grouped in a single party only in the course of the struggle against imperialism, particularly after a victorious revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

In countries like Egypt and China, where the national bourgeoisie has already split up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but where the compromising section of the bourgeoisie is not yet able to join up with imperialism, the Communists can no longer set themselves the aim of forming a united national front against imperialism. In such countries the Communists must pass from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. In such countries that bloc can assume the form of a single party, a workers' and peasants' party, provided, however, that this distinctive party *actually* represents a bloc of two forces—the Communist Party and the party of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. The tasks of this bloc are to expose the half-heartedness and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determined struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is necessary and expedient, provided it does not bind the Communist Party hand and foot, provided it does not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to conduct agitation and propaganda work, provided it does not hinder the rallying of the proletarians around

the Communist Party, and provided it facilitates the actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party. Such a dual party is unnecessary and inexpedient if it does not conform to all these conditions, for it can only lead to the communist elements becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, to the Communist Party losing the proletarian army.

The situation is somewhat different in countries like India. The fundamental and new feature of the conditions of life of colonies like India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but primarily that the compromising section of this bourgeoisie has already managed, in the main, to strike a deal with imperialism. Fearing revolution more than it fears imperialism, and concerned more about its money-bags than about the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie, the richest and most influential section, is going over entirely to the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, it is forming a bloc with imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country. The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless this bloc is smashed. But in order to smash this bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat systematically prepared. In other words, in colonies like India it is a matter of preparing the proletariat for the role of leader of the liberation movement, step by step dislodging the bourgeoisie and its mouthpieces from this honourable post. The task is to create a revolu-

tionary anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc. This bloc can assume, although it need not always necessarily do so, the form of a single workers' and peasants' party, formally bound by a single platform. In such countries, the independence of the Communist Party must be the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, for the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and brought about only by the Communist Party. But the Communist Party can and must enter into an open bloc with the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie in order, after isolating the compromising national bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism.

Hence, the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the capitalistically developed colonies and dependent countries are:

- 1) To win the best elements of the working class to the side of communism and to create independent Communist Parties.

- 2) To form a national-revolutionary bloc of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia against the bloc of the compromising national bourgeoisie and imperialism.

- 3) To ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in that bloc.

- 4) To fight to free the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie.

- 5) To ensure that the liberation movement is linked with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries.

Such are the three groups of immediate tasks

confronting the leading cadres in the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

These tasks assume a particularly important character and particularly great significance when examined in the light of the present international situation. The characteristic feature of the present international situation is that the revolutionary movement has entered a period of temporary lull. But what is a lull, what does it mean at the present time? It can only mean an intensification of the pressure on the workers of the West, on the colonies of the East, and primarily on the Soviet Union as the standard-bearer of the revolutionary movement in all countries. There can scarcely be any doubt that preparation for this pressure on the Soviet Union has already begun in the ranks of the imperialists. The campaign of slander launched in connection with the insurrection in Estonia,³² the infamous incitement against the Soviet Union in connection with the explosion in Sofia, and the general crusade that the bourgeois press is conducting against our country, all mark the preparatory stage of an offensive. It is the artillery preparation of public opinion intended to accustom the general public to attacks against the Soviet Union and to create the moral prerequisites for intervention. What will be the outcome of this campaign of lies and slander, whether the imperialists will risk undertaking a serious offensive, remains to be seen; but there can scarcely be any doubt that those attacks bode no good for the colonies. Therefore, the question of preparing a counter-blow by the united forces of the revolution to the blow likely to be delivered by imperialism is an inevitable question of the day.

That is why the unswerving fulfilment of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries acquires particular importance at the present time.

What is the mission of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the colonial and dependent countries in view of all these circumstances? Its mission is to take into account all the specific features of the revolutionary development of these countries and to train the cadres coming from them in a way that will ensure the fulfilment of the various immediate tasks I have enumerated.

In the University of the Peoples of the East there are about ten different groups of students who have come here from colonial and dependent countries. We all know that these comrades are thirsting for light and knowledge. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to make them into real revolutionaries, armed with the theory of Leninism, equipped with practical experience of Leninism, and capable of carrying out the immediate tasks of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries with all their heart and soul.

In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind two deviations in the practice of the leading cadres in the colonial East, two deviations which must be combated if real revolutionary cadres are to be trained.

The first deviation lies in an under-estimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement and in an over-estimation of the idea of a united, all-embracing national front in the colonies and dependent countries, irrespective of the state and degree of

development of those countries. That is a deviation to the Right, and it is fraught with the danger of the revolutionary movement being debased and of the voices of the communist elements becoming drowned in the general chorus of the bourgeois nationalists. It is the direct duty of the University of the Peoples of the East to wage a determined struggle against that deviation.

The second deviation lies in an over-estimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement and in an under-estimation of the role of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. It seems to me that the Communists in Java, who not long ago mistakenly put forward the slogan of Soviet power for their country, are suffering from this deviation. That is a deviation to the Left, and it is fraught with the danger of the Communist Party becoming divorced from the masses and converted into a sect. A determined struggle against that deviation is an essential condition for the training of real revolutionary cadres for the colonies and dependent countries of the East.

Such, in general, are the political tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the peoples of the Soviet East and of the colonial East.

Let us hope that the University of the Peoples of the East will succeed in carrying out these tasks with honour.

Pravda, No. 115,
May 22, 1925

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*³³

Comrades, in view of the great importance of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, I should like to share with you my first impressions of some of the articles in that newspaper.

1) We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky's articles "A New Stage in the New Economic Policy" evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to the slogan "enrich yourselves." That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a leading article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan. We are giving NEP full scope and permitting private accumulation *in order* to facilitate the implementation of *our* slogan of socialist accumulation within the framework of our national economy. Perhaps some of our comrades regard this as a debatable question. If so, it should be stated that the slogan "enrich yourselves" is a debatable one, and that articles in favour

of such a slogan are printed for discussion. On the other hand it is obvious that *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is not an organ for discussion, but primarily a positive organ, which presents its readers with the slogans and propositions generally accepted by the Party.

In short, whichever way you look at the question, from the formal standpoint, or from the standpoint of the substance of the matter, in this respect Stetsky's article must be regarded as unsatisfactory. You must be more careful in future.

2) The point in Stetsky's articles about non-capitalist development in the countryside is also not quite acceptable. Formerly it was possible to speak of a non-capitalist path of development. Now, however, when an actual struggle between the elements of socialist development and the elements of capitalist development has begun and is expanding to the full, it would be more correct to speak of the socialist path of development. Otherwise, the impression may be created that besides the two paths of development, capitalist and socialist, there is a third path, which is wrong, and at any rate unconvincing.

3) It seems to me that the passage in Slepko's article "Lenin's Legacy," about the Communists and Young Communist Leaguers having to *compete* with the non-Party peasant active in organisational and political work, is also wrong. Up to now we have raised the question of forming such an active around the Party and of training that active, and that was regarded as correct. Now Slepko is raising a new question about the Communists and Young Communist Leaguers having to compete with a non-Party active which has still

to be formed. That is wrong, and it is out of accord with the whole of our campaign under the slogan of revitalising the Soviets. We must not compete with this active, but form and train it.

4) It would be good to arrange for systematic publication of supplements to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in the shape of popular pamphlets by outstanding exponents of Marxist theory, on communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the October Revolution, and also on various branches of economy and administration that are directly related to the practical work of the active of the Young Communist League in town and country. Such supplements, in the shape of small pamphlets, could later form a sort of little library for the activists of the Young Communist League, which could not fail to be of great importance for training the active of the Young Communist League.

5) It would be good to simplify the style of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, to make the contributors write in a simple way, in short sentences, and, as far as possible, without employing foreign terms, as Ilyich knew how to write. At least, it should be possible to publish, also in the shape of a supplement to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a small glossary of foreign words, or at any rate to give in the text of the articles explanations of foreign words if the latter really cannot be avoided.

J. Stalin
V. Molotov
A. Andreyev

Moscow, June 2, 1925

Published for the first time

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

*Speech Delivered at the Sverdlov University
June 9, 1925*

Comrades, I shall answer the questions you have submitted in writing. I shall deal with them in the order in which they are given in your note. As you know, there are ten questions.

Let us begin with the first question.

I

What measures and what conditions would help to strengthen the bond between the working class and the peasantry under the proletarian dictatorship if the Soviet Union is not supported by a social revolution of the Western proletariat during the next ten to fifteen years?

I think that this question embraces all your other written questions. Therefore, my answer will be of a general, and hence far from exhaustive, character. Otherwise, there will be nothing left to say in answer to the other questions.

I think that the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference give an exhaustive answer to this question. These decisions say that the chief guarantee that the bond will be strengthened is a correct policy towards the peasantry.

But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry?

It can consist only of a series of measures—economic, administrative-political and cultural-educational—that will ensure the strengthening of the bond.

Let us start with the economic sphere.

First of all, the survivals of war communism in the countryside must be eliminated. Further, a correct policy must be pursued in relation to the prices of manufactured goods and agricultural produce, a policy that will ensure the rapid growth of industry and agriculture and the elimination of the “scissors.” Furthermore, the total amount of the agricultural tax must be reduced and the tax must be gradually transferred from the state budget to the local budgets. The vast masses of the peasantry must be organised in co-operatives, primarily in agricultural and credit co-operatives, as a means of drawing peasant economy into the general system of socialist construction. The countryside must be supplied with the maximum amount of tractors as a means of bringing about a technical revolution in agriculture and as the way towards creating cultural and technical centres in the countryside. Finally, the plan for electrification must be carried out as a means of bringing the countryside closer to the towns and of abolishing the antithesis between them.

Such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to ensure the bond between town and country in the economic sphere.

I should like to draw your attention to the question of transferring the agricultural tax from the state budget to the local budgets. It may seem strange to you, but it is nevertheless a fact, that the agricultural tax is

assuming, and will steadily more and more assume, the character of a local tax. You know, for example, that formerly, a year or two ago, the agricultural tax was the chief, or almost the chief, item of revenue in our state budget. But now? Now it is a small item in the state budget. Today, the state budget amounts to 2,500 million rubles, but the revenue from the agricultural tax will amount, may amount, this year to 250-260 million rubles at most, that is, 100 million rubles less than last year. As you see, it is not very much. And the more the state budget grows, the smaller will be the proportion represented by this tax. Secondly, 100 million out of the 260 million obtained from the agricultural tax will go to the local budgets. That is more than a third of the total revenue from this tax. What is the explanation of this? The fact that of all the existing taxes, the agricultural tax is most closely connected with local conditions and can be most easily utilised for local needs. There can scarcely be any doubt that the local budgets in general will grow, but it is also beyond doubt that they will grow primarily on account of the agricultural tax, which should be adapted to the utmost to local conditions. That is all the more probable for the reason that the bulk of our state revenues is already coming, and in future will in general increasingly come, from other sources, from our state enterprises, indirect taxes and so forth.

That is why the transfer of the agricultural tax from the state budget to the local budgets may in time become likely and quite expedient from the standpoint of strengthening the bond.

Let us pass to the measures for ensuring the bond in the administrative and political sphere.

Implanting Soviet democracy in town and country and revitalising the Soviets with a view to simplifying, cheapening, and morally improving the state apparatus, with a view to expelling elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois corruption from this apparatus, with a view to completely linking the state apparatus with the vast masses—such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to strengthen the bond in the sphere of administrative and political development.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. The dictatorship is a means, a way of achieving socialism. But what is socialism? Socialism is the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to a stateless society. To effect this transition, however, preparations must be made for altering the state apparatus in such a way as to ensure in fact that the society with the dictatorship is transformed into communist society. That purpose is served by the slogan of revitalising the Soviets, the slogan of implanting Soviet democracy in town and country, the slogan of drawing the best elements of the working class and the peasantry into the direct work of governing the country. It will be impossible to reform the state apparatus, to alter it thoroughly, to expel elements of bureaucracy and corruption from it and to make it near and dear to the broad masses unless the masses themselves render the state apparatus constant and active assistance. But on the other hand, active and continuous assistance of the masses is impossible unless the best elements of the workers and peasants are drawn into the organs of government, unless direct and close connection is established between

the state apparatus and the “rank and file” of the toiling masses.

What distinguishes the Soviet state apparatus from the apparatus of the bourgeois state?

Above all, the fact that the bourgeois state apparatus stands *above* the masses and, as a consequence, it is separated from the population by an impassable barrier and by its very spirit is alien to the masses of the people. The Soviet state apparatus, however, *merges* with the masses, for it cannot and must not stand above the masses if it wants to remain a Soviet state apparatus, for it cannot be alien to these masses if it really wants to embrace the millions of working people. That is one of the fundamental differences between the Soviet state apparatus and the apparatus of the bourgeois state.

Lenin once said in his pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party could undoubtedly govern the country in the interests of the poor and against the rich, for they were in no way inferior to the 130,000 landlords who governed the country in the interests of the rich and against the poor. On these grounds, some Communists think that the state apparatus can consist merely of several hundred thousand Party members, and that this is quite enough for the purpose of governing a vast country. From this standpoint they are sometimes not averse to identifying the Party with the state. That is wrong, comrades. It is a distortion of Lenin’s idea. When speaking of the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin did not in the least mean that this figure indicated, or could indicate, the total personnel and general scope of the Soviet state apparatus. On the contrary, in addition

to the members of the Party, he included in the state apparatus the million electors who cast their votes for the Bolsheviks at that time, before October, stating that we had the means by which at one stroke to *enlarge tenfold* our state apparatus, that is to say, to increase its personnel to at least 10,000,000 by drawing the working people into the daily work of governing the state.

“These 240,000,” said Lenin, “are already backed by not less than a million votes of the adult population, for this is precisely the proportion between the number of Party members and the number of votes cast for it established by the experience of Europe and the experience of Russia, as shown, for example, by the August elections to the Petrograd Duma. Thus, we already have a ‘state apparatus’ of *one million* people who will be devoted to the socialist state for the sake of their ideals and not for the sake of receiving a fat sum on the 20th of every month.

“Not only that. We have a ‘magic means’ by which at once, at one stroke to *enlarge tenfold* our state apparatus, a means which no capitalist state ever possessed nor could possess. This magic means is that of drawing the working people, drawing the poor, into the daily work of governing the state” (see Vol. XXI, pp. 264-65).

How does this “drawing the working people, drawing the poor, into the daily work of governing the state” take place?

It takes place through organisations based on mass initiative, all kinds of commissions and committees, conferences and delegate meetings, that spring up around the Soviets, economic bodies, factory committees, cultural institutions, Party organisations, youth league organisations, all kinds of co-operative associations, and so on and so forth. Our comrades sometimes fail to see that around the low units of our

Party, Soviet, cultural, trade-union, educational, Y.C.L. and army organisations, around the departments for work among women and all other kinds of organisations, there are whole teeming ant-hills—organisations, commissions and conferences which have sprung up of their own accord and embrace millions of non-Party workers and peasants—ant-hills which, by their daily, inconspicuous, painstaking, quiet work, provide the basis and the life of the Soviets, the source of strength of the Soviet state. If our Soviet and Party organs did not have the help of these organisations embracing millions, the existence and development of Soviet power, the guidance and administration of a great country would be absolutely inconceivable. The Soviet state apparatus does not consist solely of Soviets. The Soviet state apparatus, in the profound meaning of the term, consists of the Soviets plus all the diverse non-Party and Party organisations, which embrace millions, which unite the Soviets with the “rank and file,” which *merge* the state apparatus with the vast masses and, step by step, destroy everything that serves as a barrier between the state apparatus and the people.

That is how we must strive to “enlarge tenfold” our state apparatus, making it near and dear to the vast masses of the working people, expelling the survivals of bureaucracy from it, merging it with the masses and thereby preparing the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to communist society.

Such is the meaning and significance of the slogan of revitalising the Soviets and implanting Soviet democracy.

Such are the principal measures for strengthening the bond that must be taken in the administrative and political sphere of the Party’s work.

As regards the measures for ensuring the bond in the cultural and educational sphere of work, little need be said about them, for they are obvious and commonly known, and therefore need no explanation. I should only like to indicate the main line of work in this sphere for the immediate future. This main line lies in preparing the conditions necessary for introducing universal, compulsory, primary education throughout the country, throughout the Soviet Union. That is a very important reform, comrades. Its achievement will be a great victory not only on the cultural front, but also on the political and economic fronts. That reform must serve as the basis of an immense advance of the country. But it will cost hundreds of millions of rubles. Suffice it to say that to carry it out a whole army of men and women school-teachers, almost half a million, will be needed. But we must, in spite of everything, carry out this reform in the very near future if we really intend to raise the country to a higher cultural level. And we shall do it, comrades. There can be no doubt about that.

Such is the answer to your first question.

Let us now pass to the second question.

II

What dangers are there of our Party degenerating as a result of the stabilisation of capitalism, if this stabilisation lasts a long time?

Are we faced by such dangers at all?

Such dangers, as possible and even real dangers, undoubtedly exist. They face us quite apart from

stabilisation. Stabilisation merely makes them more palpable. Of those dangers, taking the most important of them, I think there are three:

a) the danger of losing the socialist perspective in our work of building up our country, and the danger of liquidationism connected with it;

b) the danger of losing the international revolutionary perspective, and the danger of nationalism connected with it;

c) the danger of a decline of Party leadership and the possibility connected with it of the Party's conversion into an appendage of the state apparatus.

Let us begin with the first danger.

The characteristic feature of this danger is lack of confidence in the internal forces of our revolution; lack of confidence in the alliance between the workers and peasants; lack of confidence in the leading role of the working class within that alliance; lack of confidence in the conversion of "NEP Russia" into "socialist Russia"; lack of confidence in the victory of socialist construction in our country.

That is the path of liquidationism and degeneration, for it leads to the liquidation of the principles and aims of the October Revolution, to the degeneration of the proletarian state into a bourgeois-democratic state.

The source of this "frame of mind," the soil on which it has arisen in the Party, is the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the conditions of the New Economic Policy and of the desperate struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our national economy. The capitalist elements are fighting not only in the economic sphere; they are trying to carry the fight

into the sphere of proletarian ideology, trying to infect the least stable detachments of the Party with lack of confidence in the possibility of building socialism, with scepticism concerning the socialist prospects of our work of construction, and it cannot be said that their efforts have been entirely fruitless.

Some of these infected “Communists” say: “How can a backward country like ours build a complete socialist society? The state of the productive forces of our country makes it impossible for us to set ourselves such utopian aims. God grant that we hold on somehow. How can we dream of building socialism? Let us build in one way or another, and we shall see what happens. . . .”

Others say: “We have already fulfilled our revolutionary mission by making the October Revolution. Now everything depends on the international revolution, for we cannot build socialism unless the Western proletariat first gains victory. Strictly speaking, a revolutionary has nothing more to do in Russia.” . . . As you know, in 1923, on the eve of the German revolution, some of our young students were ready to throw down their books and go to Germany. They said: “A revolutionary has nothing to do in Russia. We must throw down our books and go to Germany to make a revolution.”

As you see, both these groups of “Communists,” the first and the second, adopt the standpoint of denying the socialist potentialities of our work of construction, they adopt a liquidationist standpoint. The difference between them is that the first group cover up their liquidationism with the “scientific” “theory of productive forces” (no wonder Milyukov praised them in *Posledniye Novosti*³⁴ the other day, calling them “serious Marxists”),

whereas the second group cover it up with Left and “terribly revolutionary” phrases about world revolution.

Indeed, let us assume that a revolutionary has nothing to do in Russia; let us assume that it is inconceivable, impossible, to build socialism in our country until socialism is victorious in other countries; let us assume that the victory of socialism in the advanced countries is delayed for another ten or twenty years—can we suppose that under those circumstances the capitalist elements in our economy, acting in the conditions of capitalist encirclement of our country, will agree to cease their mortal struggle against the socialist elements in this economy and wait with folded arms for the victory of the world revolution? It is enough to put this question to realise how utterly absurd that supposition is. But if that supposition is excluded, what is there left for our “serious Marxists” and “terrible revolutionaries” to do? Obviously, only one thing is left for them: to loaf around, surrender to the elemental forces and gradually degenerate into ordinary bourgeois democrats.

One thing or the other: *either* we regard our country as the base of the proletarian revolution, either we have, as Lenin said, all that is needed to build a complete socialist society—in which case we can and must build such a society in expectation of complete victory over the capitalist elements in our national economy; *or* we do not regard our country as the base of the revolution, we have not got what is needed to build socialism, and we cannot build a socialist society—in which case, if the victory of socialism in other countries is delayed, we must resign ourselves to the prospect that the capitalist

elements in our national economy will gain the upper hand, that the Soviet regime will decay, and the Party will degenerate.

One thing or the other.

That is why lack of confidence in the socialist potentialities of our work of construction leads to liquidationism and to degeneration.

That is why the struggle against the liquidationist danger is an immediate task of our Party, particularly at the present time, particularly during the temporary stabilisation of capitalism.

Let us pass to the second danger.

The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of confidence in the international proletarian revolution; lack of confidence in its victory; a sceptical attitude towards the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries; failure to understand that without the support of the revolutionary movement in other countries our country would not be able to hold out against world imperialism; failure to understand that the victory of socialism in one country alone cannot be final because it has no guarantee against intervention until the revolution is victorious in at least a number of countries; failure to understand the elementary demand of internationalism, by virtue of which the victory of socialism in one country is not an end in itself, but a means of developing and supporting the revolution in other countries.

That is the path of nationalism and degeneration, the path of the complete liquidation of the proletariat's international policy, for people afflicted with this disease regard our country not as a part of the whole that

is called the world revolutionary movement, but as the beginning and the end of that movement, believing that the interests of all other countries should be sacrificed to the interests of our country.

Support the liberation movement in China? But why? Wouldn't that be dangerous? Wouldn't it bring us into conflict with other countries? Wouldn't it be better if we established "spheres of influence" in China in conjunction with other "advanced" powers and snatched something from China for our own benefit? That would be both useful and safe. . . . Support the liberation movement in Germany? Is it worth the risk? Wouldn't it be better to agree with the Entente about the Versailles Treaty and bargain for something for ourselves by way of compensation? . . . Maintain friendship with Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan? Is the game worth the candle? Wouldn't it be better to restore the "sphere of influence" with one or other of the Great Powers? And so on and so forth.

Such is the new type of nationalist "frame of mind," which is trying to liquidate the foreign policy of the October Revolution and is cultivating the elements of degeneration.

Whereas the first danger, the danger of liquidationism, springs from the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the sphere of internal policy, in the sphere of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our national economy, the second danger, the danger of nationalism, must be regarded as springing from the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the sphere of foreign policy, in the sphere of the struggle that the capitalist states are waging against the state

of the proletarian dictatorship. There can scarcely be any doubt that the pressure of the capitalist states on our state is enormous, that the people who are handling our foreign policy do not always succeed in resisting this pressure, that the danger of complications often gives rise to the temptation to take the path of least resistance, the path of nationalism.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the first country to be victorious can retain the role of standard-bearer of the world revolutionary movement only on the basis of consistent internationalism, only on the basis of the foreign policy of the October Revolution, and that the path of least resistance and of nationalism in foreign policy is the path of the isolation and decay of the first country to be victorious.

That is why losing the international revolutionary perspective leads to the danger of nationalism and degeneration.

That is why the struggle against the danger of nationalism in foreign policy is an immediate task of the Party.

Finally, about the third danger.

The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of confidence in the Party's internal forces; lack of confidence in the Party's leadership; the efforts of the state apparatus to weaken the Party's leadership, to free itself from it; failure to understand that without the Party's leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship.

This danger arises on three sides.

Firstly. The classes that have to be led have changed. The workers and peasants today are no longer what they

were in the period of war communism. Formerly, the working class was declassed and scattered, and the peasants were in dread of the return of the landlords in the event of defeat in the civil war, while in that period the Party was the only concentrated force, which directed affairs in military fashion. The situation is different now. There is no war now. Consequently, there is no war danger to rally the toiling masses around the Party. The proletariat has recovered and has risen to a higher level, both culturally and materially. The peasantry has also developed and risen to a higher level. The political activity of both classes is growing and will continue to grow. It is now no longer possible to lead in the military fashion. Firstly, there must be the utmost flexibility in leadership. Secondly, there must be extreme sensitiveness to the requirements and needs of the workers and peasants. Thirdly, there must be the ability to draw into the Party the best of the workers and peasants who have come to the fore as a result of the development of the political activity of these classes. But these conditions and qualities are not created at one stroke, as we know. Hence the discrepancy between what is demanded of the Party and the possibilities at the disposal of the Party at the present time. Hence, also, the danger of a weakening of the Party's leadership, the danger of the Party losing the leadership.

Secondly. During the recent period, during the period of economic development, the apparatuses of the state and public organisations have considerably grown and gained in strength. The trusts and syndicates, the trading and credit institutions, the administrative-political and cultural-educational organisations, and,

finally, the co-operatives of all kinds, have grown and expanded considerably, having absorbed hundreds of thousands of new people, mainly non-Party people. But these apparatuses are not only growing in personnel; their power and influence are growing too. And the more their importance grows the more palpable becomes their pressure on the Party, the more persistently do they strive to weaken the Party's leadership, and the stronger becomes their resistance to the Party. The forces in those apparatuses must be regrouped and the leading people in them must be distributed in such a way as to ensure the Party's leadership in the new situation. But that cannot be achieved at one stroke, as we know. Hence the danger of the state apparatus becoming divorced from the Party.

Thirdly. The work itself has become more complicated and differentiated. I am speaking of the present work of construction. Entire branches and sub-branches of work have arisen and developed in both town and country. Accordingly, leadership has become more concrete. Formerly, it was customary to speak of leadership "in general." Today, leadership "in general" is mere talk, for there is no leadership in it whatever. Today we must have concrete, specific leadership. The past period developed a know-all type of Party worker who was ready to answer all questions of theory and practice. Today, this old, know-all type of Party worker must give way to a new type, who strives to become an expert in a given branch of work. To give real leadership, one must know the work, one must study the work conscientiously, patiently and perseveringly. One cannot give leadership in the countryside without a knowledge of

agriculture, without a knowledge of the co-operatives, without being familiar with the price policy, without having studied the laws that directly concern the countryside. One cannot give leadership in a town without a knowledge of industry, without studying the life of the workers, without paying heed to the requirements and needs of the workers, without a knowledge of co-operative, trade-union and club affairs. But can all this be acquired at one stroke? Unfortunately, it cannot. To raise Party leadership to the requisite level, it is first of all necessary to raise the qualifications of the Party workers. Today the quality of the Party worker must be the first consideration. But it is not so easy to improve the quality of the Party worker at one stroke. The old habit of hastily issuing orders, which, unfortunately, served as a substitute for knowledge, still persists in Party organisations. That explains why it is that so-called Party leadership sometimes degenerates into the ridiculous piling up of totally useless orders, into empty verbal "leadership," which affects nobody and nothing. Herein lies one of the gravest dangers of the weakening and decline of the Party's leadership.

Such, in general, are the reasons why the danger of the Party losing the leadership leads to the decay and degeneration of the Party.

That is why a determined struggle against that danger is an immediate task of our Party.

Such is the answer to your second question.

Let us pass to the third question.

III

How can a struggle be waged against the kulaks without fomenting class struggle?

I think that the question is confused and, therefore, presented incorrectly. What class struggle is meant? If it means class struggle in the countryside in general, then the proletariat is waging such a struggle not only against the kulaks. What about the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole—is that not class struggle, even though it assumes a rather unusual form? Is it not true that at the present time the proletariat and the peasantry constitute the two main classes of our society, that between these classes there are contradictions, soluble and in the long run surmountable it is true, but contradictions for all that, which give rise to a struggle between these two classes?

I think that the class struggle in our country, if we have in mind the relations between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry, has three main fronts:

a) the front of the struggle between the proletariat as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the peasantry in the matter of establishing maximum prices for manufactures and agricultural produce, in the matter of normalising taxation, and so forth;

b) the front of the struggle between the proletariat as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the kulaks in the matter of liquidating profiteering prices of agricultural produce, in the matter of shifting the main burden of taxation on to the kulaks, and so forth;

c) the front of the struggle between the rural poor, above all the agricultural labourers, and the kulaks.

You see that these fronts cannot be equal either in importance or in the character of the struggle that is being waged on them. Hence, our attitude towards the forms of the class struggle that is being waged on these fronts must be differentiated, it cannot be the same for all.

Let us examine this more closely.

The first front. The proletariat (in the shape of the state), taking into consideration the weakness of our industry and the impossibility of obtaining loans for it, took a series of fundamental measures capable of protecting it from the competition of foreign industry and of accelerating its development for the benefit of our entire national economy, including agriculture. Those measures are: the monopoly of foreign trade, the agricultural tax, state forms of procurement of agricultural produce, the introduction of the planning principle in the development of the national economy as a whole. All these are based on the nationalisation of the principal branches of industry, transport and credit. You know that those measures have led to what they were intended to lead to: that is to say, they have checked both the precipitous fall in the price of manufactured goods and also the precipitous rise in the price of agricultural produce. On the other hand, it is obvious that the peasantry as a whole, as buyers of manufactured goods and sellers of agricultural produce, prefer to buy those goods at the lowest possible price and to sell their produce at the highest possible price. Equally, the peasantry would like to have the agricultural tax

abolished altogether, or at least to have it reduced to a minimum.

Here, then, is the ground for the struggle between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Can the state abandon the fundamental measures enumerated above? No, it cannot, for the abandonment of those measures would lead at the present time to the ruin of our industry, to the utter defeat of the proletariat as a class, to the conversion of our country into an agrarian colony of the industrially developed capitalist countries, to the failure of our entire revolution.

Would it be in the interests of the peasantry as a whole to abolish those fundamental measures taken by our state? No, it would not, for their abolition at the present time would mean the triumph of the capitalist path of development, and this path is that of development through the impoverishment of the majority of the peasants for the sake of the enrichment of a handful of rich people, a handful of capitalists. Who would dare to assert that the peasantry is interested in its own impoverishment, that it is interested in the conversion of our country into a colony, that it is not vitally interested in the triumph of the socialist path of development of our national economy?

Here, then, is the ground for the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Does that mean that our industrial bodies, relying on their monopoly, can screw up the prices of manufactured goods to the detriment of the interests of the bulk of the peasantry, and to the detriment of industry itself? No, it does not. Such a policy, above all, would

injure industry, for it would make it impossible to transform it from the feeble, hothouse plant that it was only yesterday into the strong and mighty industry that it must become tomorrow. Hence our campaign to reduce the prices of manufactured goods and to raise productivity of labour. You know that this campaign is meeting with fairly wide success.

Furthermore, does it mean that our procurement bodies, relying on their monopoly, can force down the prices of agricultural produce and make them ruinous for the peasantry, to the detriment of our entire national economy? No, it does not. Such a policy, above all, would ruin industry, for, firstly, it would make it difficult to supply the workers with agricultural produce; and, secondly, it would utterly dislocate and disorganise the home market for our industry. Hence our campaign against the so-called "scissors." You know that this campaign has already produced favourable results.

Finally, does it mean that our local or central bodies, relying on the agricultural tax law and exercising their right to collect taxes, can regard that law as something unquestionable and go to such lengths in actual practice as to demolish the barns and remove the roofs from the houses of impoverished taxpayers, as happened in some districts of the Tambov Gubernia? No, it does not. Such a policy would completely destroy the peasants' confidence in the proletariat, in the state. Hence the Party's latest measures to reduce the agricultural tax, to give that tax a more or less local character, to normalise our taxation affairs in general, to put a stop to the scandalous practices in the collec-

tion of taxes that have occurred in some places. You know that those measures have already produced the desired results.

Thus, we have, firstly, the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry on fundamental questions, their common interest in the triumph of the socialist path of development of our national economy. Hence the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. We have, secondly, the contradictions between the interests of the working class and those of the peasantry on current questions. Hence the struggle within this alliance, a struggle whose importance is outweighed by that of the community of interests, and which should disappear in the future, when the workers and the peasants cease to be classes—when they become working people of a classless society. We have, thirdly, the ways and means of solving these contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the framework of maintaining and strengthening the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the interest of both allies. We not only have those ways and means at our disposal, but we are already employing them successfully in the complicated conditions of NEP and the temporary stabilisation of capitalism.

Does it follow from this that we must foment class struggle on this front? No, it does not. On the contrary! What follows from this is merely that we must do everything to moderate the struggle on this front, to regulate it by means of agreements and mutual concessions, and under no circumstances permit it to assume acute forms, to reach the point of clashes. And we are doing this, for we have every possibility of doing it; for here the

community of interests is stronger and deeper than the contradiction between them.

As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle is totally unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle on this front.

The second front. The forces operating here are the proletariat (in the shape of the Soviet state) and the kulaks. The forms of the class struggle here are as peculiar as they are under the conditions of the struggle on the first front.

Wishing to give the agricultural tax very definitely the character of an income tax, the state is shifting the main burden of this tax on to the kulaks. In retaliation, the kulaks are trying, "by hook or by crook," to evade paying, and are exercising all their power and all their influence in the countryside to shift the burden of this tax on to the middle and poor peasants.

Combating the high cost of living, and endeavouring to maintain the stability of wages, the state is trying to take measures of an economic character for the purpose of establishing fair maximum prices for agricultural produce which fully meet the interests of peasant economy. In retaliation, the kulaks buy up the produce of the poor and middle peasants, accumulate large stocks, hoard them in their barns, and withhold them from the market in order artificially to screw up the price of produce to a profiteering level; only then do they release those stocks on the market with the object of making fabulous speculative profits. You are no doubt aware that this year, in some gubernias of our country, the kulaks have succeeded in forcing up the price of grain to the utmost limit.

Hence the class struggle on this front, and its peculiar and more or less hidden forms.

It might seem that the slogan of fomenting class struggle is quite suitable for the conditions of the struggle on this front. But that is not true, for here, too, it is not in our interest to foment class struggle; for here we are quite able to avoid, and must avoid, fomenting class struggle and the complications resulting from it.

We can and must revitalise the Soviets, win over the middle peasants and organise the poor peasants in the Soviets in order to secure relief of taxation for the bulk of the peasants and actually to shift the main burden of taxation on to the kulaks. You know that measures in that direction are being taken and are already producing favourable results.

We can and must hold at the disposal of the state sufficiently large food stocks to be able to bring pressure to bear on the food market, to intervene, when necessary, to maintain prices at a level acceptable to the masses of the working people, and in this way to frustrate the profiteering machinations of the kulaks. You know that this year we have used several tens of millions of poods of grain for this purpose. You no doubt know that we have achieved quite favourable results in this field, for we have not only succeeded in keeping the price of grain at a low level in districts like Leningrad, Moscow, the Donets Basin, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other places, but have also forced the kulaks to surrender in a number of districts, compelling them to put on to the market old stocks of grain at moderate prices.

Of course, things here do not depend upon us alone. It is quite possible that in some cases the kulaks

themselves will begin to foment class struggle, will try to bring the struggle to boiling point, will try to give it the form of bandit or insurrectionary outbreaks. If that happens, however, the slogan of fomenting class struggle will not be our slogan, but that of the kulaks, and, therefore, a counter-revolutionary one. Moreover, there is no doubt that the kulaks themselves will then get a taste of all the disadvantages of this slogan against the Soviet state.

As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle on this front is not our slogan.

The third front. The forces operating here are two: the rural poor, primarily the agricultural labourers, on the one hand, and the kulaks, on the other. Formally, the state stands aside. As you see, this front is not as wide as the preceding fronts. On the other hand, on this front the class struggle is quite evident and open, whereas it is hidden and more or less masked on the first two fronts.

Here it is a matter of the direct exploitation of wage-workers, or semi-wage-workers, by kulak employers. That is why the Party cannot here conduct a policy of allaying, or moderating the struggle. *Here our task is to organise the struggle waged by the rural poor and to lead this struggle against the kulaks.*

But does that mean that we thereby undertake to foment class struggle? No, it does not. Fomenting a struggle means something more than organising and leading the struggle. It also means artificially stirring up and deliberately fanning the class struggle. Is there any necessity for these artificial measures now, when we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, and when

the Party and trade-union organisations are operating quite freely in our country? Of course, not.

Therefore, the slogan of fomenting class struggle is also unsuitable for this third front.

That is how the matter stands with the third question.

As you see, the question of the class struggle in the countryside is not as simple as it might appear to be at first sight.

Let us pass to the fourth question.

IV

A workers' and peasants' government—is it a fact or an agitational slogan?

It seems to me that the formulation of the question is rather absurd.

What is the meaning of the formulation: a workers' and peasants' government—is it a fact or an agitational slogan? It suggests that the Party can issue slogans that are not in accordance with the truth, but merely serve the purpose of some cunning manoeuvre, here, for some reason, called "agitation." It suggests that the Party can issue slogans that do not have, and cannot have, scientific substantiation. Is that correct? Of course, not. Such a party would deserve to vanish like a soap-bubble after a brief existence. Our Party would not then be the Party of the proletariat pursuing a scientific policy; it would be mere froth on the surface of political events.

Our Government, by its nature, by its programme and tactics, is a workers', proletarian, communist

government. There should be no misconception or doubt on this score. Our Government cannot simultaneously have two programmes: a proletarian one and some other kind. Its programme and practical activities are proletarian, communist, and in this sense our Government is undoubtedly proletarian, communist.

Does that mean that our Government is not at the same time a workers' and peasants' government? No, it does not. By its programme and activities, our Government is proletarian, but at the same time it is a workers' and peasants' government.

Why?

Because, under our conditions, the fundamental interests of the bulk of the peasant masses wholly and entirely coincide with the interests of the proletariat.

Because, in view of that, the interests of the peasantry are fully expressed in the programme of the proletariat, in the programme of the Soviet Government.

Because the Soviet Government rests on the alliance of the workers and peasants, which is based on the common fundamental interests of these classes.

Because, finally, in the organs of government, in the Soviets, there are not only workers, but also peasants, who are fighting the common enemy and building the new life jointly with the workers, under the leadership of the workers.

That is why the slogan "a workers' and peasants' government" is not an empty "agitational" slogan, but the revolutionary slogan of the socialist proletariat, scientifically substantiated in the programme of communism.

That is how the matter stands with the fourth question.

Let us pass to the fifth question.

V

Some comrades interpret our policy towards the peasantry as an extension of democracy for the peasantry and as a change in the character of the governmental power in our country. Is this interpretation correct?

Are we actually extending democracy in the countryside?

Yes, we are.

Is that a concession to the peasantry?

Certainly, it is.

Is it a big concession, and does it keep within the bounds of the Constitution of our country?

I think the concession is not very big, and it does not alter our Constitution one iota.

In that case, what are we changing, and what is the nature of this concession?

We are changing the way in which work in the countryside is carried out, for the old way is totally unsatisfactory under the new conditions of development. We are changing the established state of affairs in the countryside, which is impeding the bond and disorganising the work of the Party in rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

Until now, the situation was that quite a number of rural districts were governed by small groups of people connected more with the uyezd and gubernia administrations than with the rural population. The result of this

was that those who governed the rural districts mostly looked to the top, to the uyezd, and least of all looked to the bottom, to the rural population; they felt responsible not to the villages, not to their electors, but to the uyezd and gubernia administrations, evidently failing to understand that the "top" and the "bottom" constitute here a single chain, and that if the chain is broken below, the whole of it must collapse. The result of this was unchecked arbitrariness and tyranny of the rulers, on the one hand, and discontent and murmuring in the countryside, on the other. We are now putting an end to this state of affairs in the countryside, resolutely, once and for all.

Until now the situation was that in quite a number of districts elections to the Soviets in the countryside were not real elections, but merely a bureaucratic procedure of smuggling in "deputies" by means of all kinds of trickery and of pressure exercised by the small groups of rulers who were afraid of losing power. The result of this was that the Soviets stood in danger of being transformed from bodies that are near and dear to the masses into bodies alien to the masses; and the leadership of the peasants by the workers, that foundation and fortress of the proletarian dictatorship, stood in danger of becoming a fiction. You know that in view of this the Party was obliged to arrange for new elections of Soviets, and these elections showed that the old election practices in quite a number of districts were a survival of war communism, and that they had to be abolished as harmful and utterly rotten. We are now putting an end to such election practices in the countryside.

That is the basis of the concession, the basis of the extension of democracy in the countryside.

It is not only the peasantry who need this concession. It is needed just as much by the proletariat, for it strengthens the proletariat, raises its prestige in the countryside and increases the peasants' confidence in the proletariat. As is known, the main purpose of concessions, and of compromises generally, is that they should, in the long run, reinforce and strengthen the proletariat.

What are the limits of these concessions at the present time?

The limits of these concessions were laid down by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.³⁵ You know that they are not very wide; they are restricted to the limits I have just spoken about. That, however, does not mean that they will remain unalterable forever. On the contrary, they will undoubtedly be expanded, in proportion to the development of our national economy, in proportion to the growth in strength of the economic and political might of the proletariat, in proportion to the development of the revolutionary movement in the West and East, in proportion to the growth in strength of the international positions of the Soviet state. In 1918, Lenin spoke of the necessity of "extending the Soviet Constitution to the *entire* population *in proportion as* the resistance of the exploiters ceases" (see Vol. XXII, p. 372). As you see, it is a matter of extending the Constitution to the *entire* population, including the bourgeoisie. That was said in March 1918. From that time until Lenin died more than five years

passed; but not once during that period did Lenin even hint that it was time to put that proposition into practice. Why? Because the time to make that extension had not yet come. There can be no doubt, however, that it will come some day, when the internal and international positions of the Soviet state are finally consolidated.

That is why, although foreseeing the further extension of democracy in the future, we nevertheless consider it necessary at the present time to restrict the concessions in the sphere of democracy to the limits laid down by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

Do these concessions change the character of the governmental power in the country?

No, they do not.

Do they introduce into the system of the proletarian dictatorship any changes that would weaken it?

Not in the least, not in the slightest degree.

Far from being weakened, the proletarian dictatorship is strengthened by revitalising the Soviets and drawing the best elements of the peasantry into the work of administration. The leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is not only maintained by the expansion of democracy, but it acquires additional strength, creating an atmosphere of confidence around the proletariat. And surely that is the chief thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, as regards the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in the system of the dictatorship.

Those comrades who assert that the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is limited to the concept of

violence are wrong. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not only *violence*; it is also *leadership* of the toiling masses of the non-proletarian classes, it is also the *building* of a socialist economy, which is a higher type of economy than capitalist economy, with a higher productivity of labour than capitalist economy. The dictatorship of the proletariat is: 1) violence, unrestricted by law, *in relation to the capitalists and landlords*, 2) leadership by the proletariat *in relation to the peasantry*, 3) the building of socialism *in relation to the whole of society*. Not one of these three aspects of the dictatorship can be excluded without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only by taking all these three aspects together do we get a complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Does the Party's new course in the sphere of Soviet democracy introduce any deterioration into the system of the proletarian dictatorship?

No, it does not. On the contrary! The new course can but improve matters by strengthening the system of the proletarian dictatorship. As regards the element of *violence* in the system of the dictatorship, the instrument of that violence being the Red Army, it scarcely needs proof that the implanting of Soviet democracy in the countryside can but improve the state of the Red Army by rallying it more closely around the Soviet power, for our army consists mainly of peasants. As regards the element of *leadership* in the system of the dictatorship, there can be scarcely any doubt that the slogan of revitalising the Soviets can but facilitate the proletariat's leadership by strengthening the peasants' confidence in the working class. And as regards the

element of *building* in the system of the dictatorship, it scarcely needs proof that the Party's new course can but facilitate the building of socialism, for it has been put into effect for the purpose of strengthening the bond, and it is impossible to build socialism without this bond.

Only one conclusion follows: concessions to the peasantry in the present situation strengthen the proletariat and consolidate its dictatorship without changing the character of the governmental power in the country one iota.

That is how the matter stands with the fifth question.

Let us pass to the sixth question.

VI

Is our Party making any concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern in connection with the stabilisation of capitalism, and if so, is such a tactical manoeuvre really necessary?

Evidently, this refers to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the agreement concluded with the group headed by Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky against the Right elements in that Party.

I do not think our Party has made any concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern. On the contrary, the key-note of the entire enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern³⁶ was the isolation of the Right elements in the Comintern. Read the Comintern's resolution on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, read the resolution on Bolshevisation, and you

will easily see that the Comintern's chief target was the Right elements in the communist movement.

That is why it is impossible to say that our Party has made concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern.

Strictly speaking, Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky are not Rights. They do not accept the platform of the Rights, the platform of the Brünnites. The nearest description would be that they are vacillators between the Leninists and the Rights, with an inclination toward the Rights. The specific feature of their behaviour at the enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was that, under the pressure of our criticism, on the one hand, and as a result of the dangerous prospect of a split created by the Rights, on the other, they, on this occasion, swung to our side, the side of the Leninists, and pledged themselves to keep in alliance with the Leninists against the Rights. That is to their credit. But do the comrades think that we should not have offered a hand to the vacillators when the latter swung to the side of the Leninists, when they made concessions to the Leninists against the Rights? It would be strange and deplorable if people were to be found among us who are incapable of understanding the elementary truths of Bolshevik tactics. Has not experience already shown that the Comintern's policy on the question of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is the only correct policy? Are not Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky continuing to fight in the ranks of the Leninists against the Rights? Are not the Brünnites in the Czechoslovak Party already isolated?

It may be asked: will this be for long? Of course, I do not know whether this will be for long; I do not

undertake to prophesy. It is obvious, at all events, that as long as the Šmeralites fight the Rights, the agreement with the former will remain in force; but as soon as the Šmeralites abandon their present position, the agreement with them will cease to hold good. But that is not at all the point now. The point now is that the present agreement against the Rights *strengthens* the Leninists, creates *new possibilities* for them to carry the vacillators with them. That is the main thing now, and not how Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky may vacillate again in the future.

Some people think that it is the duty of the Leninists to support every Left tub-thumper and neurasthenic, that everywhere and in everything the Leninists are the inveterate Lefts among the Communists. That is not true, comrades. We are Lefts in relation to the non-communist parties of the working class; but we have never pledged ourselves to be “more Left than everybody,” as the late Parvus demanded at one time, and for which he received a severe telling-off from Lenin. Among Communists we are neither Lefts nor Rights, we are simply Leninists. Lenin knew what he was doing when he fought on two fronts, against both the Left and the Right deviations in the communist movement. It is not for nothing that one of Lenin’s best pamphlets deals with the subject: “*Left-Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*.

I think that the comrades would not have asked me the sixth question had they paid timely attention to this latter circumstance.

That is how the matter stands with the sixth question.

Let us pass to the seventh question.

VII

Owing to the weakness of the Party organisations in the countryside, is there not a danger that, with the adoption of the new course, anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form?

Yes, there is such a danger. There can be scarcely any doubt that conducting elections to the Soviets under the slogan of revitalising the Soviets means freedom of local election propaganda. Needless to say, the anti-Soviet elements will not miss such a convenient opportunity to squeeze through the loop-hole and once more make trouble for the Soviet regime. Hence the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase and assume definite form. The elections in the Kuban, in Siberia and in the Ukraine provide eloquent proof of this. Undoubtedly, the weakness of our rural organisations in a number of districts enhances this danger. It is beyond doubt, too, that the interventionist proclivities of the imperialist powers also enhance this danger.

What fosters this danger, what are its sources?

There are at least two such sources.

Firstly, the anti-Soviet elements sense that a certain change in favour of the kulaks has taken place recently in the countryside, that in a number of districts the middle peasants have turned towards the kulaks. That might have been guessed before the elections; after the elections the guess became a certainty. That is the first and chief basis of the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form.

Secondly, in quite a number of districts our concessions to the peasantry were regarded as a sign of weakness. Before the elections there might have been some doubt about that; after the elections, there is no room for doubt. Hence the cry issued by the whiteguard elements in the countryside: "Press harder!" That is the second, although less important, basis of the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase.

Communists must understand, first of all, that *the present period in the countryside is a period of struggle to win over the middle peasants, that to win the middle peasants to the side of the proletariat is the Party's paramount task in the countryside*, that unless this task is carried out, the danger that anti-Soviet agitation will assume definite form will increase, and the Party's new course may benefit only the whiteguard elements.

Communists must understand, secondly, that the middle peasants can be won over now only on the basis of the Party's new policy in the sphere of the Soviets, co-operation, credit, the agricultural tax, local budgets, and so forth; that measures of administrative pressure can only do harm and ruin the work; that the middle peasants must be convinced of the correctness of our policy by means of measures of an economic and political character; that the middle peasants can be "captured" only by means of example, by practical proof.

Communists must understand, furthermore, that the new course has been taken not to stimulate the anti-Soviet elements, but to revitalise the Soviets and to win over the bulk of the peasant masses, that the new course does not preclude, but presupposes, a deter-

mined struggle against the anti-Soviet elements, that if the anti-Soviet elements, regarding the concessions to the peasantry as a sign of our weakness and utilising them for the benefit of counter-revolution, say: "Press harder," then we must, without fail, show them that the Soviet power is strong, and remind them of the prisons, which have long been waiting to receive them.

I think that the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form and increase will certainly be completely removed if these tasks of ours are understood and carried out.

That is how the matter stands with the seventh question.

Let us pass to the eighth question.

VIII

In view of the increased influence of the non-Party people, is there not a danger that non-Party groups will be formed in the Soviets?

One can speak of danger in this case only with reservations. There is nothing dangerous in the growth of the influence of more or less organised non-Party people in places where the influence of Communists has not yet penetrated. Such is the case, for example, with the trade unions in the towns and with non-Party, more or less Soviet organisations in the countryside. Danger arises the moment non-Party organisations begin to think of usurping the place of the Party.

What is the source of this danger?

It is characteristic that no sign, or very little sign of such danger is to be observed in our working class.

How is this to be explained? By the fact that around our Party in the working class there is a large active of non-Party workers who surround the Party with an atmosphere of confidence and link it with the vast masses of the working class.

It is no less characteristic that such a danger is especially acute among the peasantry. Why? Because the Party is weak among the peasantry, the Party has not yet a large active of non-Party peasants to link it with the tens of millions of peasants. And yet nowhere, perhaps, is the need of a non-Party active felt as acutely as it is among the peasantry.

Only one conclusion follows: to remove the danger of the non-Party peasant masses becoming divorced and alienated from the Party we must create around the Party a large non-Party peasant active.

But such an active cannot be created at one stroke, or in a couple of months. It can be created and singled out from the mass of the peasantry only in the course of time, in the course of work, in the course of revitalising the Soviets, in the course of implanting a co-operative communal life. For this purpose the Communist must change his very approach to the non-Party person. For this purpose the Communist must treat the non-Party person as an equal. For this purpose the Communist must learn to treat the non-Party person with confidence, to treat him as a brother. The non-Party person cannot be expected to display confidence when treated with distrust in return. Lenin said that the relations between Party and non-Party people must be those of "mutual confidence." Those words of Lenin's must not be forgotten. The creation of an atmosphere of mutual confi-

dence between Party and non-Party people—that is what is needed first of all in order to prepare the conditions for the creation of a large non-Party peasant active around the Party.

But how is this mutual confidence to be created? Not at one stroke, of course, and not by order. It can be created, as Lenin said, only by means of “mutual testing” of Party and non-Party people, mutual testing in the course of the daily practical work. During the first purge of the Party, the Party members were tested through the medium of non-Party people, and this was beneficial for the Party, for it created around it an atmosphere of extraordinary confidence. Already at that time Lenin said in this connection that the lessons of the first purge as regards the mutual testing of Party and non-Party people should be extended to all branches of activity. I think it is high time to recall this advice of Lenin’s and to take measures to put it into practice.

Thus, mutual criticism and mutual testing of Party and non-Party people in the course of the daily practical work as the means of creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence between them—such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to remove the danger of the alienation of the millions of non-Party people from the Party, if it wants to create a large non-Party peasant active around its organisations in the countryside.

That is how the matter stands with the eighth question.

Let us pass to the ninth question.

IX

Shall we really be able to carry out the re-equipment and considerable enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry without foreign assistance?

This question can be interpreted in two ways.

Either that the questioners have in mind immediate assistance to the Soviet state in the shape of credits from the existing capitalist states as an essential condition for the development of Soviet industry—in which case one answer would have to be given, corresponding to that way of presenting the question

Or that the questioners have in mind assistance to the Soviet state on the part of the Western proletariat in the future, after it has achieved victory, as an essential condition for the building of a socialist economy—in which case a different answer would have to be given.

To avoid offending anybody, I shall try to answer both possible interpretations of this question.

Let us start with the first interpretation.

Is it possible to develop large-scale Soviet industry in the conditions of capitalist encirclement without credits from abroad?

Yes, it is possible. It will be accompanied by great difficulties, we shall have to go through severe trials, nevertheless we can industrialise our country without credits from abroad, in spite of all those difficulties.

History up to now knows three ways of the formation and development of powerful industrial states.

The first way is the seizure and plunder of colonies. That was the way Britain, for example, developed.

After seizing colonies in all parts of the world, she for two centuries squeezed "extra capital" out of them for the purpose of strengthening her industry, and eventually she became the "workshop of the world." You know that this path of development is unacceptable for us, for the seizure and plunder of colonies are incompatible with the nature of the Soviet system.

The second way is the military defeat of one country by another and the imposition of indemnities upon the defeated country. Such was the case with Germany, for example. After defeating France in the Franco-Prussian war, Germany squeezed an indemnity of 5,000 millions out of France and poured this money into the channels of her own industry. You know that this path of development is also incompatible with the nature of the Soviet system, for, in essence, it differs in no way from the first.

The third way is for capitalistically backward countries to grant concessions to and accept loans from capitalistically developed countries on enslaving terms. Such was the case with tsarist Russia, for example. She granted concessions to and accepted loans from the Western powers on such terms and thereby imposed upon herself the yoke of a semi-colonial existence, which, however, did not preclude the possibility of her eventually emerging on to the road of independent industrial development, not, of course, without the aid of more or less "successful" wars, and, of course, not without plundering neighbouring countries. It scarcely needs proof that this path is also unacceptable for the Land of Soviets. We did not shed our blood in the three-years' war against the imperialists of all countries in order to go

into voluntary bondage to imperialism the very next day after the victorious termination of the civil war.

It would be wrong to think that in real life each of these paths of development is necessarily travelled in its pure form, and is absolutely isolated from the others. Actually, in the history of individual countries those paths often intercrossed and supplemented one another, presenting an interwoven pattern. An example of such an interweaving of paths is provided by the history of the development of the United States of America. That is explained by the fact that, notwithstanding all the differences between them, those diverse paths of development have certain features in common, which bring them close to one another and make their interweaving possible: firstly, all lead to the formation of *capitalist* industrial states; secondly, all presuppose an influx from outside of "extra capital," obtained in one way or another, *as an essential condition* for the formation of such states. It would be still more wrong, however, on these grounds to confuse those paths, to jumble them together, failing to understand that, after all, those three paths of development imply three different modes of formation of industrial capitalist states, that each of those paths puts its own special impress upon the complexion of those states.

What, then, is the Soviet state to do if the old paths of industrialisation are unacceptable for it, and if an influx of new capital on other than enslaving terms is still out of the question?

It can take a new path of development, a path not yet fully explored by other countries, the path of developing large-scale industry without credits from abroad,

the path of industrialising the country without necessarily having an influx of foreign capital, the path indicated by Lenin in his article "Better Fewer, but Better."

"We must strive," says Lenin, "to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from their social relations.

"We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. . . . If we see to it that the working class retains the leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification. . . . Only when we have done this," says Lenin further, "will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, from the horse of economies adapted to a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroï, etc." (see Vol. XXVII, p. 417).

That is the path our country has already taken, and along which it must proceed, in order to develop its large-scale industry and in order that it may itself develop into a powerful, industrial, proletarian state.

As I have already said, that path has not been explored by the bourgeois states, but that does not mean in the least that it cannot be taken by the proletarian state. What in this case is impossible, or almost impossible, for bourgeois states, is quite possible for the proletarian state. The fact of the matter is that, in this respect, the proletarian state possesses advantages which bourgeois states do not, and, perhaps, cannot possess. Nationalised land, nationalised industry, nationalised

transport and credit, monopoly of foreign trade and state-regulated home trade—these are all new sources of “extra capital,” which can be used for developing our country’s industry, and which hitherto no bourgeois state has possessed. You know that the proletarian government is already using these and similar new sources for developing our industry. You know that along this path we have already achieved some successes of no little importance.

That is why the path of development that is impossible for bourgeois states is quite possible for the proletarian state, in spite of all the difficulties and trials involved.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the absence at the present time of an influx of capital from abroad on other than enslaving terms cannot be eternal and absolute. You know that some influx of capital into our country from abroad has already begun. There is scarcely any room for doubt that this influx will increase in proportion as our national economy grows and becomes consolidated.

That is how the matter stands with the first interpretation of the question.

Let us pass to the second interpretation of the question.

Is it possible to build a socialist economy in our country before socialism is victorious in the major European countries, without direct assistance in machinery and equipment from the victorious European proletariat?

Before dealing with this question, which, by the by, I have already answered in the beginning of my speech,

I should like to dispel a very widespread misconception concerning it. The misconception is that some comrades are inclined to identify the question of “the re-equipment and enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry” with the question of building a socialist economy in our country. Can we agree to such an identification? No, we cannot. Why? Because the scope of the first question is narrower than that of the second. Because the first question concerning the enlargement of the fixed capital of industry embraces only *a part* of the national economy, namely, industry, whereas the question concerning the building of a socialist economy embraces the *whole* national economy, namely, *both* industry *and* agriculture. Because the problem of building socialism is the problem of *organising* the national economy as a whole, the problem of *correctly combining* industry and agriculture, whereas, strictly speaking, the question of enlarging the fixed capital of industry does not even touch that problem. We can picture to ourselves that the fixed capital of industry is already being re-equipped and enlarged, but that would not at all mean that the problem of building a socialist economy has already been solved. Socialist society is a producers’ and consumers’ association of those who work in industry and agriculture. If, in this association, industry is not linked up with agriculture, which provides raw materials and food and absorbs the products of industry, if industry and agriculture do not thus constitute a single, national-economic whole, there will be no socialism whatever.

That is why the question of the relations between industry and agriculture, the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, is a

fundamental question in the problem of building a socialist economy.

That is why the question of the re-equipment and enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry cannot be identified with the question of building a socialist economy.

And so, is it possible to build a socialist economy in our country before socialism is victorious in other countries, without direct assistance in machinery and equipment from the victorious Western proletariat?

Yes, it is possible. It is not only possible, but necessary and inevitable. For we are already building socialism by developing nationalised industry and linking it with agriculture, implanting co-operatives in the countryside and drawing peasant economy into the general system of Soviet development, revitalising the Soviets and merging the state apparatus with the vast masses of the people, building a new culture and implanting a new social life. Undoubtedly, a multitude of difficulties face us on this path, and we shall have to go through a number of trials. Undoubtedly, things would be vastly easier if the victory of socialism in the West came to our aid. But, firstly, the victory of socialism in the West is not "happening" as quickly as we would like; and, secondly, those difficulties can be surmounted and we are already surmounting them, as you know.

I spoke about all this in the beginning of my speech. I spoke about it even before, in my report to the Moscow active.* And still earlier I spoke about it in my "Pref-

* See this volume, pp. 90-134.—*Ed.*

ace” to the book *On the Road to October*. I said that denial of the possibility of building socialism in our country is liquidationism, which leads to the degeneration of the Party. It is scarcely worth while repeating now what has already been said several times before. Therefore, I refer you to the works of Lenin, where you will find sufficient material and propositions on this subject.

I should like, however, to say a few words about the history of the question, and about the significance it has for the Party at the present time.

If we leave out of account the discussion that took place in 1905-06, we can say that the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country was first raised in the Party during the imperialist war, in 1915. As is known, Lenin then for the first time formulated his proposition about “the possibility of the victory of socialism” first of all “in one capitalist country taken separately” (see Vol. XVIII, p. 232). That was the period of the turn from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. As is known, Trotsky, already at that time, disputed this proposition of Lenin’s, declaring that “it would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe” (see Vol. III of Trotsky’s *Works*, Part I, p. 90).

In 1921, after the October Revolution and the civil war, when questions of construction came to the fore, the question of building socialism again rose in the Party. That was the period when some comrades regarded the turn towards the “New Economic Policy” as the abandonment of socialist aims, as the abandonment of the building of socialism. As is known, Lenin, in his pamphlet

The Tax in Kind,³⁷ then defined the turn towards the “New Economic Policy” as a necessary condition for linking industry with peasant economy, as a condition for building the foundation of a socialist economy, as the path to the successful building of socialism. That was in April 1921. As if in answer to this, Trotsky, in January 1922, in the preface to his book *The Year 1905*, advanced a totally opposite proposition on the question of building socialism in our country, declaring that “the contradictions in the position of a workers’ government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.”

A year later (in 1922) we again get two statements in opposition to one another: that of Lenin at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet, saying “NEP Russia will become socialist Russia,” and that of Trotsky in the postscript to his *Peace Programme*, saying “real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries.”

Finally, still another year later, shortly before his death, Lenin reverted to this question again in his article “On Co-operation” (May 1923), stating that here in the Soviet Union, we have “all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society.”

Such is the brief history of the question.

This reference to history alone is sufficient to show that the problem of building socialism in our country is one of the major problems of our Party’s practical work. It scarcely needs proof that Lenin would not have

reverted to it repeatedly had he not regarded it as a major problem of our practical work.

The subsequent development of our economy, the intensification of the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements within it, and particularly the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, only served to make the question of the possibility of building socialism in our country more acute and to enhance its importance.

Why is this question so important from the standpoint of the Party's practical work?

Because it affects the question of the prospects of our work of construction, the question of the aims and objects of that work. You cannot build effectively if you do not know what you are building for. You cannot move a step forward if you do not know in what direction to go. The question of prospects is a cardinal question for our Party, which is accustomed to have a clear and definite goal. Are we building for socialism, in anticipation of victory in the building of socialism? Or are we building at haphazard, blindly, so as, "in anticipation of a socialist revolution throughout the world" to manure the soil for bourgeois democracy? That is a fundamental question today. We cannot work and build effectively unless we have a clear answer to this no less clear question. Hundreds and thousands of Party workers, trade-unionists and co-operators, business executives and cultural workers, military men and Young Communist Leaguers turn to us, asking us, asking our Party: What is the aim of our work? What are we building for? Woe betide those leaders who are unable, or unwilling, to give a clear and definite answer to that

question, who begin to shuffle, to send people from Pontius to Pilate, and drown the socialist prospects of our work of construction in intellectualist scepticism.

The great significance of Leninism lies, among other things, in that it does not recognise building at haphazard, blindly, that it cannot conceive of building without prospects, that it gives a clear and definite answer to the question of the prospects of our work, declaring that we have all that is needed to build a socialist economy in our country, that we can and must build a complete socialist society.

That is how the matter stands with the question of the possibility of building a socialist economy.

Whether we shall succeed for certain in building a socialist economy is another question. That does not depend upon us alone. It also depends upon the strength, or weakness, of our enemies and of our friends outside our country. We shall build it if we are allowed to do so, if we succeed in prolonging the period of "respite," if there is no serious intervention, if intervention is not victorious, if the international revolutionary movement on the one hand, and our own country on the other, are sufficiently strong and mighty to make a serious attempt at intervention impossible. And vice versa, we shall not build it if we are crushed as the result of successful intervention.

That is how the matter stands with the ninth question.

Let us pass to the last question.

X

Indicate the greatest forthcoming difficulties in our Party and Soviet affairs arising from stabilisation and the delay of the world revolution, especially difficulties in the sphere of the relations between the Party and the working class, and between the working class and the peasantry.

I have counted five such difficulties, having in mind the chief ones. The part played by the stabilisation of capitalism is that it somewhat increases these difficulties.

The first difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the danger of foreign armed intervention. That does not mean that we are confronted with the immediate danger of intervention, that the imperialists are already prepared and fully in a position to intervene in our country immediately. To be able to do that, imperialism would have to be at least as strong as it was, for example, before the war, which is not the case, as is known. The present war in Morocco³⁸ and intervention in China,³⁹ those rehearsals of future wars and intervention, clearly demonstrate that the backbone of imperialism has weakened. Therefore, it is not a matter of immediate intervention; the point is that, as long as capitalist encirclement exists, there will always be the danger of intervention in general, and as long as the danger of intervention exists we shall have to maintain, for the purpose of defence, an army and navy, which cost us hundreds of millions of rubles every year. What does the annual expenditure of hundreds of millions of rubles on the army and navy mean? It means a corresponding reduction of expenditure on cultural and economic

development. Needless to say, if there were no danger of intervention we could use these sums, or at least the greater part of them, to strengthen industry, to improve agriculture, to introduce, for example, a reform like universal compulsory primary education, and so forth. Hence the difficulties in the sphere of constructive work which arise from the danger of intervention.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which distinguishes it from all the others, is that to overcome it does not depend upon us alone, that it can be removed only by the joint efforts of our country and of the revolutionary movement in all other countries.

The second difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry. I spoke about those contradictions when dealing with the question of the class struggle in the countryside. There is no need whatever to repeat what has already been said. Those contradictions manifest themselves in the sphere of the policy relating to prices of agricultural produce and manufactured goods, in the sphere of the agricultural tax, rural administration, and so forth. The danger here is that the bond may be disrupted and that the idea of the proletariat leading the peasantry may be discredited. Hence the difficulty arising from this danger.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which distinguishes it from the preceding one, is that it can be overcome by our own internal forces. The new course in the countryside—such is the path that must be taken to overcome this difficulty.

The third difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the national contradictions within our

Union, from the contradictions between the “centre” and the “border regions.” Those contradictions develop as a result of the dissimilarity between the economic and cultural conditions of development at the “centre” and those in the “border regions,” as a result of the fact that the latter lag behind the former. Whereas the political contradictions in this sphere may be regarded as already overcome, the cultural, and more especially, the economic contradictions, are only just arising and taking shape; consequently, they still have to be overcome. The danger here is twofold: on the one hand, the danger of dominant-nation arrogance and bureaucratic arbitrariness on the part of those central institutions in the Union which are unable, or unwilling, to display the necessary sensitiveness to the requirements of the national republics, and, on the other hand, the danger of the republics and regions becoming imbued with national distrust and national insularity in relation to the “centre.” To combat those dangers, especially the first—such is the path that must be taken to overcome the difficulties in the sphere of the national question.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, like the second one, it can be overcome by the internal forces of the Union.

The fourth difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the danger that the state apparatus may become divorced from the Party, the danger that the Party’s leadership of the state apparatus may be weakened. I spoke about that danger when dealing with the dangers of the Party’s degeneration. It is hardly necessary to repeat what has already been said. That danger is fostered by the presence of bourgeois-bureaucratic

elements in the state apparatus. It is intensified and aggravated by the growth of the state apparatus and its increased importance. The task is to reduce the state apparatus as much as possible, systematically to expel the elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois decay from it, to place leading Party forces in the key positions of the state apparatus and thus ensure the Party's leadership of it.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, like the third one, it can be overcome by our own forces.

The fifth difficulty. This consists of the danger of a partial divorce of the Party organisations and trade unions from the broad working-class masses, from the needs and requirements of these masses. That danger arises and develops as a result of the domination of bureaucratic elements in quite a number of Party and trade-union bodies, not excluding Party units and factory committees. That danger has increased lately owing to the slogan "face to the countryside," which has shifted the attention of our organisations from the town to the country, from the proletariat to the peasantry. Many comrades have failed to understand that when turning to face the countryside they must not turn their backs on the proletariat, that the slogan "face to the countryside" can be implemented only through the medium of the proletariat and with the forces of the proletariat, that inattention to the requirements of the working class can only increase the danger of the Party and trade-union organisations becoming divorced from the masses of the workers.

What are the signs of this danger?

Firstly, loss of sensitiveness and inadequate attention of our Party and trade-union organisations to the requirements and needs of the broad working-class masses; secondly, failure to understand that the workers now have a higher sense of dignity and a sense of being the ruling class, that they will not understand or tolerate a bureaucratic attitude on the part of Party and trade-union organisations; thirdly, failure to understand that one should not thrust oneself on the workers with ill-considered orders, that attention must now be focussed not on such "measures," but on winning for the Party the confidence of the whole working class; fourthly, failure to understand that no measures at all extensive affecting the masses of the workers (for example, going over to the three-loom system in the textile area) should be carried out without first conducting a campaign among the workers, without first holding broad production conferences.

All this results in a number of Party and trade-union organisations becoming divorced from the broad working-class masses and in conflicts in the factories. As is known, the conflicts which flared up in the textile area recently revealed the existence of all these evils in a number of our Party and trade-union organisations.

Such are the characteristic features of the fifth difficulty on our path of development.

To overcome these difficulties it is necessary above all to rid our Party and trade-union organisations of the manifestly bureaucratic elements, to set about renewing the composition of the factory committees, to revive without fail the production conferences, to centre Party

work on the large Party units in industrial enterprises and to assign the best Party workers to them.

More attention and thought to the requirements and needs of the working class, less bureaucratic formalism in the practical work of our Party and trade-union organisations, more sensitiveness and responsiveness to the sense of class dignity of the working class—such is now the task.

That is how the matter stands with the tenth question.

Pravda, Nos. 139, 141,
142 and 145, June 21,
24, 25 and 28, 1925

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY

On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade-Union Courses

The Sverdlov University is one of the most powerful instruments in training the Party's commanding personnel for leading the masses.

During the years it has been in existence the Sverdlov University has already given the Party whole detachments of active workers who are now operating on all the fronts of socialist construction.

The University is now handing over for Party work another detachment of 214 students, the majority of whom are workers.

In order that the forthcoming work of this detachment may be fruitful in view of the complex tasks of construction that confront the Party, this detachment must bear in mind certain new circumstances in our situation which are of decisive importance at the present time.

What are these circumstances?

Firstly, the fact that the basic classes in our country, the proletariat and the peasantry, have lately undergone a substantial change. They have become more active both in the political and in the economic field, and this requires that the Party should adopt a new approach

to them. We no longer have a declassed working class; that class is now a fully-formed and full-blooded proletarian class, culturally and politically developed. This requires that the Party's leadership should become more flexible and thought-out. The same can be said about the peasantry. It is no longer the old peasantry, under the scourge of the old scorpions, dreading the loss of the land that formerly belonged to the landlords and cowed by the rigours of the surplus appropriation system. It is now a new peasantry, which has culturally developed, which has already forgotten about the landlords and the surplus appropriation system, which is demanding cheap goods and high prices for grain and is able to exploit to the full the Party's slogan of revitalising the Soviets. The utmost flexibility in relation to the present-day peasantry—that is what is demanded of the Party now. To win the peasantry anew to the side of the proletariat—that is now the Party's task.

Secondly, the circumstance that in a number of districts the middle peasants have been found to be in a bloc with the kulaks. That is a fundamental fact that must not be forgotten for a single moment. From the standpoint of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, the dictatorship of the proletariat is leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat. But what does leading the peasantry mean? It means fully restoring the confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working class and its Party. If there is no such confidence there is no proletarian leadership, and if there is no such leadership there is no proletarian dictatorship. Hence, to work in the direction of fully restoring the

confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working class—that is the task of the Party and of the Party workers.

Thirdly, the circumstance that, because of the slogan “face to the countryside,” our Party workers have of late gradually begun to forget the workers, they have lost sight of the fact that in facing the countryside we must not turn our backs on the towns, especially on the proletariat. That, too, is a new fact which must not be forgotten for a single moment. It must be borne in mind that of late a sense of its power and dignity has especially developed and grown strong in the working class. It is the sense of being the master which has developed in the class which in our country is the ruling class. That, comrades, is an immense achievement in all our work, for a working class that feels that it is not only the class that works, but also the class that governs—such a class can perform miracles. But from this it follows that a Communist who in his work fails to reckon with this sense of being the master felt by the proletarian class, fails to understand anything about the new situation; strictly speaking, he is not a Communist, he is certainly riding for a fall. Therefore, when speaking about the slogan “face to the countryside” we must at the same time remember that the main class which is called upon to implement this slogan is the working class, that this slogan can be put into practice only to the degree that the working class really becomes the leading force in the country. That is why the Party’s immediate task is to make our local Party workers understand, at last, the absolute necessity of adopting a most attentive and thoughtful attitude to absolutely all

the requirements of the working class, whether material or cultural.

The task of your detachment of graduates is to take all these circumstances into account in your work in the localities.

I have no doubt that you will be able to carry out this task.

Permit me to wish you complete success in your forthcoming work.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 132,
June 13, 1925

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN

Concerning the Article by Semich

One can only welcome the fact that now, after the discussion that took place in the Yugoslav Commission, Semich, in his article, wholly and entirely associates himself with the stand taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation in the Comintern. It would be wrong, however, to think on these grounds that there were no disagreements between the R.C.P.(B.) delegation and Semich before or during the discussion in the Yugoslav Commission. Evidently, that is exactly what Semich is inclined to think about the disagreements on the national question, in trying to reduce them just to misunderstandings. Unfortunately, he is profoundly mistaken. He asserts in his article that the dispute with him is based on a "series of misunderstandings" caused by "one, not fully translated," speech he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission. In other words, it follows that we must make a scapegoat of the person who, for some reason, did not translate Semich's speech in full. In the interests of the truth I must declare that this assertion of Semich's is quite contrary to the facts. It would have been better, of course, had Semich supported his assertion with passages from the speech he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission, the report of

which is kept in the Comintern files. But for some reason he did not do this. Consequently, I am compelled to go through this not very pleasant, but very necessary, procedure for him.

This is all the more necessary since even now, after Semich has wholly associated himself with the stand taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation, there is still much that is unclear in his present position.

In my speech in the Yugoslav Commission (see *Bolshevik*,⁴⁰ No. 7)* I spoke of disagreements on three questions: 1) the question of the ways of solving the national question, 2) the question of the internal social content of the national movement in the present historical epoch, and 3) the question of the role of the international factor in the national question.

On the first question I said that Semich had “not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question,” that he separated the national question from the general question of the revolution, and that, consequently, he was inclined to reduce the national question to a constitutional issue.

Is all that true?

Read the following passage from Semich’s speech in the Yugoslav Commission (March 30, 1925) and judge for yourselves:

“Can the national question be reduced to a constitutional issue? First of all, let us make a theoretical supposition. Let us suppose that in state X there are three nations A, B, and C. These three nations express the wish to live in one state. What is the

* See this volume, pp. 69-76.—*Ed.*

issue in this case? It is, of course, the regulation of the internal relationships within this state. Hence, it is a constitutional issue. In this theoretical case the national question amounts to a constitutional issue. . . . If, in this theoretical case, we reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, it must be said—as I have always emphasised—that the self-determination of nations, including secession, is a condition for the solution of the constitutional issue. And it is solely on this plane that I put the constitutional issue.”

I think that this passage from Semich’s speech needs no further comment. Clearly, whoever regards the national question as a component part of the general question of the proletarian revolution cannot reduce it to a constitutional issue. And vice versa, only one who separates the national question from the general question of the proletarian revolution can reduce it to a constitutional issue.

Semich’s speech contains a statement to the effect that the right to national self-determination cannot be won without a revolutionary struggle. Semich says: “Of course, such rights can be won only by means of a revolutionary struggle. They cannot be won by parliamentary means; they can result only from mass revolutionary actions.” But what do “revolutionary struggle” and “revolutionary actions” mean? Can “revolutionary struggle” and “revolutionary actions” be identified with the overthrow of the ruling class, with the seizure of power, with the victory of the revolution as a condition for the solution of the national question? Of course not. To speak of the victory of the revolution as the fundamental condition for the solution of the national question is one thing; but it is quite another thing to put

“revolutionary actions” and “revolutionary struggle” as the condition for the solution of the national question. It must be observed that the path of reforms, the constitutional path, by no means excludes “revolutionary actions” and “revolutionary struggle.” Decisive in determining whether a given party is revolutionary or reformist are not “revolutionary actions” in themselves, but the political aims and objects for the sake of which the party undertakes and employs these actions. As is known, in 1906, after the first Duma was dispersed, the Russian Mensheviks proposed the organisation of a “general strike” and even of an “armed uprising.” But that did not in the least prevent them from remaining Mensheviks, for why did they propose all this at that time? Not, of course, to smash tsarism and to organise the complete victory of the revolution, but in order to “exert pressure” on the tsarist government with the object of winning reforms, with the object of widening the “constitution,” with the object of securing the convocation of an “improved” Duma. “Revolutionary actions” *for the purpose of* reforming the old order, *while* power remains in the hands of the ruling class is one thing—that is the constitutional path. “Revolutionary actions” for the purpose of breaking up the old order, for overthrowing the ruling class, is another thing—that is the revolutionary path, the path of the complete victory of the revolution. There is a fundamental difference here.

That is why I think that Semich’s reference to “revolutionary struggle” *while* reducing the national question to a constitutional issue does not refute, but, on the contrary, only confirms my statement that Semich

had “not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question,” for he failed to understand that the national question must be regarded not in isolation from, but in inseparable connection with, the question of the victory of the revolution, as part of the general question of the revolution.

While insisting on this, I do not in the least mean to imply that I have said anything new about Semich’s mistake on this question. Not at all. This mistake of Semich’s was already mentioned by Comrade Manuisky at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern⁴¹ when he said:

“In his pamphlet *The National Question in the Light of Marxism*, and in a number of articles published in *Radnik*, the organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Semich advocates a struggle for the revision of the Constitution as a practical slogan for the Communist Party, that is, he in fact reduces the whole question of self-determination of nations exclusively to a constitutional issue” (see *Stenographic Report of the Fifth Congress*, pp. 596-97).

Zinoviev, too, spoke about this same mistake in the Yugoslav Commission, when he said:

“In the prospect drawn by Semich it appears that only one little thing is lacking, namely, revolution,” that the national question is a “revolutionary and not a constitutional” problem (see *Pravda*, No. 83).

These remarks by representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) in the Comintern concerning Semich’s mistake could not have been accidental, groundless. There is no smoke without fire.

That is how matters stand with Semich's first and fundamental mistake.

His other mistakes arise directly from this fundamental mistake.

Concerning the second question, I said in my speech (see *Bolshevik*, No. 7) that Semich "refuses to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question."*

Is that true?

Read the following passage from Semich's speech in the Yugoslav Commission and judge for yourselves:

"What is the social significance of the national movement in Yugoslavia?" asks Semich, and he answers there: "Its social content is the competitive struggle between Serb capital on the one hand and Croat and Slovene capital on the other" (see Semich's speech in the Yugoslav Commission).

There can be no doubt, of course, that the competitive struggle between the Slovene and Croat bourgeoisie and the Serb bourgeoisie is bound to play a certain role here. But it is equally beyond doubt that a man who thinks that the social significance of the national movement lies in the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of the different nationalities cannot regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. What is the essence of the national question today, when this question has been transformed from a local, intra-state question into a world question, a question of the struggle waged by the colonies and dependent nationalities against imperialism? The essence of the national

* See this volume, p. 71.—*Ed.*

question today lies in the struggle that the masses of the people of the colonies and dependent nationalities are waging against financial exploitation, against the political enslavement and cultural effacement of those colonies and nationalities by the imperialist bourgeoisie of the ruling nationality. What significance can the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities have when the national question is presented in that way? Certainly not decisive significance, and, in certain cases, not even important significance. It is quite evident that the main point here is not that the bourgeoisie of one nationality is beating, or may beat, the bourgeoisie of another nationality in the competitive struggle, but that the imperialist group of the ruling nationality is exploiting and oppressing the bulk of the masses, above all the peasant masses, of the colonies and dependent nationalities and that, by oppressing and exploiting them, it is drawing them into the struggle against imperialism, converting them into allies of the proletarian revolution. The national question cannot be regarded as being, in essence, a peasant question if the social significance of the national movement is reduced to the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities. And vice versa, the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities cannot be regarded as constituting the social significance of the national movement if the national question is regarded as being, in essence, a peasant question. These two formulas cannot possibly be taken as equivalent.

Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, written at the end

of 1912. There it says that "the national struggle under the conditions of *rising* capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves." Evidently, by this Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining the social significance of the national movement under the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists' fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,"⁴² Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. I do not even mention subsequent works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. After all this, what significance can Semich's reference to the passage in Stalin's pamphlet, written in the period of the *bourgeois*-democratic revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when, as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the epoch of *proletarian* revolution?

It can only signify that Semich quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the most elementary requirements of dialectics, and ignores the fact that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation. In my speech in the Yugoslav Commission I said that two stages must be distinguished in the presentation of the national question by the Russian Bolsheviks: the pre-October stage, when the bourgeois-democratic revolution was the issue and the national question was regarded as a part of the general democratic movement; and the October stage, when the proletarian revolution was already the issue and the national question had become a component part of the proletarian revolution. It scarcely needs proof that this distinction is of decisive significance. I am afraid that Semich still fails to understand the meaning and significance of this difference between the two stages in the presentation of the national question.

That is why I think Semich's attempt to regard the national movement as not being, in essence, a peasant question, but as a question of the competition between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities "is due to an under-estimation of the inherent strength of the national movement and a failure to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the national movement" (see *Bolshevik*, No. 7).*

That is how the matter stands with Semich's second mistake.

* See this volume, p. 72.—*Ed.*

It is characteristic that the same thing about this mistake of Semich's was said by Zinoviev in his speech in the Yugoslav Commission:

"Semich is wrong when he says that the peasant movement in Yugoslavia is headed by the bourgeoisie and is therefore not revolutionary" (see *Pravda*, No. 83).

Is this coincidence accidental? Of course, not!

Once again: there is no smoke without fire.

Finally, on the third question I stated that Semich makes an "attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia in isolation from the international situation and the probable prospects in Europe."*

Is that true?

Yes, it is, for in his speech Semich did not even remotely hint at the fact that the international situation under present conditions, especially in relation to Yugoslavia, is a major factor in the solution of the national question. The fact that the Yugoslav state itself was formed as a result of the clash between the two major imperialist coalitions, that Yugoslavia cannot escape from the big play of forces that is now going on in the surrounding imperialist states—all this remained outside of Semich's field of vision. Semich's statement that he can fully conceive of certain changes taking place in the international situation which may cause the question of self-determination to become an urgent and practical one, must now, in the present international situation, be regarded as inadequate. Now it is by no means a matter of admitting that the question of the

* *Ibid.*—Ed.

right of nations to self-determination may become urgent, given certain changes in the international situation, in a possible and distant future; this could, if need be, now be admitted as a prospect even by bourgeois democrats. That is not the point now. The point now is to avoid making the present frontiers of the Yugoslav state, which came into being as a result of war and violence, the starting point and legal basis for the solution of the national question. One thing or the other: either the question of national self-determination, i.e., the question of radically altering the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is an *appendage* to the national programme, dimly looming in the distant future, or it is the *basis* of the national programme. At all events it is clear that the point about the right to self-determination cannot be at one and the same time *both* an appendage to *and* the basis of the national programme of the Yugoslav Communist Party. I am afraid that Semich still continues to regard the right to self-determination as an appendage concerning prospects added to the national programme.

That is why I think that Semich divorces the national question from the question of the general international situation and, as a consequence, for him the question of self-determination, i.e., the question of altering the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is, in essence, not an urgent question, but an academic one.

That is how the matter stands with Semich's third mistake.

It is characteristic that the same thing about this mistake of Semich's was said by Comrade Manuilsky in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern:

“The fundamental premise of Semich’s whole presentation of the national question is the idea that the proletariat must accept the bourgeois *state within those frontiers which have been set up by a series of wars and acts of violence*”* (see *Stenographic Report of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern*, p. 597).

Can this coincidence be regarded as accidental? Of course, not!

Once again: there is no smoke without fire.

The magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 11-12,
June 30, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

* My italics.—*J. St.*

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST

*Interview Given to Mr. Fuse,
Japanese Correspondent of Nichi-Nichi*

MR. FUSE'S QUESTIONS AND J. V. STALIN'S ANSWERS

First question. The Japanese people, being the most advanced of the peoples of the East, are most of all interested in the successes of the liberation movement of the peoples of the East. They would willingly become the ally of the U.S.S.R. in this great cause, the cause of liberating the enslaved peoples of the East from the imperialist yoke of the Western powers. Being, however, at the same time a capitalist state, Japan is sometimes obliged to go against this movement, joining in the same front as the Western powers. (For example: the Anglo-Japanese alliance, by virtue of which Japan had to help Britain in her struggle against the insurgents in India, and Japan's joint action with Britain, America and France against the Chinese workers during the recent events in Shanghai.)

What, in your opinion, could be the way out of this embarrassing situation created by the contradiction between the national strivings of the Japanese people, on the one hand, and the political and social structure of the Japanese state, on the other?

Answer. It is true that the Japanese people are the most advanced of the peoples of the East and that they are interested in the successes of the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples. An alliance between the Japanese people and the peoples of the Soviet Union would be a decisive step towards the liberation of the peoples of the East. Such an alliance would mark the beginning of the end of the big colonial empires, the beginning of the end of world imperialism. That alliance would be invincible.

But it is also true that the political and social structure of Japan impels the Japanese people along the path of imperialism and makes them an instrument of the enslavement and not of the liberation of the peoples of the East.

You ask: What is the way out of this contradiction between the interests of the Japanese people and the political and social structure of Japan?

There is only one way out: change the political and social structure of Japan to make it fit the fundamental interests of the Japanese people.

Russia, at one time, was the terror of the peoples of the East, the gendarme against every liberation movement. What is the explanation of the fact that Russia, formerly the gendarme against the liberation movement, has become its friend and standard-bearer? The only explanation is that Russia's political and social structure has been changed.

Second question. The Eastern nationalities who inhabit the U.S.S.R. are many centuries behind the times as a result of the despotic tsarist regime, and they acquired the right to an independent development of

industry, agriculture, culture, etc., only after the revolution.

Approximately how many years, in your opinion, will it take the Eastern nationalities in the U.S.S.R. to reach the cultural level of the other nationalities of the U.S.S.R.?

Answer. You ask: Approximately how many years will it take the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union to reach the cultural level of the other peoples of the Soviet Union?

It is hard to say. The tempo of cultural development of these peoples will depend upon numerous internal and external conditions. In general, I must say that forecasts about the tempo of development have never been very accurate, especially as regards number of years. The main thing that facilitates the cultural development of these countries is that the chief obstacles to development, such as tsarism, Russian imperialism, the regime of exploitation of the border regions by the centre, have already been removed from the path. This circumstance gives a tremendous impulse to the cultural development of the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union. But how fully this main facilitating circumstance will be taken advantage of depends upon the Eastern peoples themselves, and primarily, upon the stage of cultural development in which they were at the time of the Soviet revolution.

At any rate, one thing can be said without hesitation: under present conditions of development, the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union have far more chances of a rapid and all-round development of their national culture than they could have under the most "free" and most "cultured" capitalist regime.

Third question. You say that the link between the national-liberation movement of the enslaved peoples of the East and the proletarian movement in the advanced Western countries will ensure the victory of the world revolution. We, the Japanese people, have the slogan: "Asia for the Asiatics." Do you not think that there is something in common between our strivings and your revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial countries of the East?

Answer. You ask: Is there not something in common between the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial countries of the East?

To the extent that the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" is a call for a revolutionary war against Western imperialism—but only to that extent—there is, undoubtedly, something in common between them.

But the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" embraces not only that aspect of the matter. It contains two other component elements that are totally incompatible with the Bolsheviks' tactics. Firstly, it evades the question of Eastern imperialism, as if suggesting that Eastern imperialism is better than Western, and that there is no need to fight Eastern imperialism. Secondly, that slogan imbues the workers of Asia with a feeling of distrust towards the European workers, alienates the former from the latter, breaks the international ties between them and thereby saps the very foundations of the liberation movement.

The revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks are directed not only against Western imperialism, but against imperialism in general, including Eastern imperialism.

These tactics are directed not towards weakening the international ties between the workers of Asia and the workers of the European and American countries, but towards expanding and strengthening them.

Hence, as you see, in addition to something in common, there are points of fundamental difference between the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and the Bolshevik tactics in the East.

Fourth question. In answer to my question: "Where has communism the greater chances of success, in the West or in the East?" Vladimir Ilyich, in my interview with him in 1920, said: "For the time being real communism can achieve success only in the West. The West, however, lives at the expense of the East. The European capitalist powers amass their wealth mainly by exploiting the Eastern colonies; but at the same time they are arming their colonies and teaching them how to fight, and thereby the West is digging its own grave in the East." Do you not think that the events that are occurring more and more often in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other Eastern countries are a sign that the time is drawing near when the Western powers will have to bury themselves in the grave they have dug for themselves in the East?

Answer. You ask: Do I not think that the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other Eastern countries is a sign that the time is drawing near when the Western powers will bury themselves in the grave they have dug for themselves in the East?

Yes, I do. The colonial countries constitute the principal rear of imperialism. The revolutionisation of this

rear is bound to undermine imperialism not only in the sense that imperialism will be deprived of its rear, but also in the sense that the revolutionisation of the East is bound to give a powerful impulse to the intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the West. Attacked on two sides—in the rear as well as in front—imperialism will be forced to admit that it is doomed.

Pravda, No. 150,
July 4, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY

Comrade Yermakovsky,

Many apologies for this late reply. I have been on holiday these last two months, returned to Moscow yesterday and was able to read your note only today. However, better late than never.

Engels's negative answer to the question: "Can this revolution take place in one country alone?" wholly reflects the epoch of pre-monopolist capitalism, the pre-imperialist epoch, when the conditions did not yet exist for the uneven, spasmodic development of the capitalist countries, when, consequently, the premises did not yet exist for the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country (as is known, the possibility of the victory of such a revolution in one country follows from the law of uneven development of capitalist countries under imperialism). The law of uneven development of capitalist countries, and the concomitant thesis that the victory of the proletarian revolution is possible in one country, were, and could be, advanced by Lenin only in the period of imperialism. That, incidentally, explains why Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism, why it is

a further development of Marxism, which arose in the pre-imperialist epoch. Genius though he was, Engels could not see what did not yet exist in the pre-monopolist period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, when he wrote his *Principles of Communism*,⁴³ and which arose only later, in the monopolist period of capitalism. On the other hand, Lenin, being a Marxist of genius, could not fail to see what had already arisen after Engels's death, in the period of imperialism. The difference between Lenin and Engels is the difference between the two historical periods that separate them.

The idea that "Trotsky's theory is identical with Engels's doctrine" is quite out of the question. Engels had grounds for giving a negative reply to Question 19 (see his *Principles of Communism*) in the pre-monopolist period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, when there could be no question of the law of uneven development of capitalist countries. Trotsky, on the contrary, has no grounds whatever for repeating in the twentieth century Engels's old answer, taken from an epoch that has already passed away, and applying it mechanically to the new, imperialist epoch, when the law of uneven development is a widely known fact. Engels based his answer on an *analysis* of the pre-monopolist capitalism of his time. Trotsky, however, does not analyse, but *ignores* the present epoch, forgets that he is not living in the forties of the last century, but in the twentieth century, in the epoch of imperialism, and slyly adds the nose of Ivan Ivanovich of the forties of the nineteenth century to the chin of Ivan Nikiforovich of the beginning of the twentieth century, evidently in the belief

that it is possible in that way to outwit history. I do not think that these two diametrically opposite methods can give grounds for saying that “Trotsky’s theory is identical with Engels’s doctrine.”

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

15.IX.25

Published for the first time

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENTS

October 14, 1925

Question. Have any changes taken place in the stabilisation of capitalism since the last congress of the Comintern?

Answer. In our Party circles we usually speak of two stabilisations: the stabilisation of capitalism and the stabilisation of the Soviet system. The stabilisation of capitalism signifies a certain temporary relaxation of the crisis of capitalism accompanied by a growth within capitalism of irreconcilable contradictions, the development of which must lead to the next, fresh crisis of capitalism. No matter what changes take place in this sphere, a new crisis cannot be averted. As regards the stabilisation of the Soviet system, it is developing with increasing tempo, consolidating the forces of socialism in our country and uprooting the capitalist elements. There can be no doubt that the complete victory of the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist elements is a matter of the next few years.

Question. Will not the growing Left-wing movement in the Western trade unions lead to some part of the proletariat becoming divorced from the Communist Parties?

Answer. No, it should not. On the contrary, the swing of the trade unions to the Left should strengthen the influence of the Communist Parties in the working-class movement. The social-reformists are strong in the working-class movement not only, and even not so much, because they have Social-Democratic parties at their command, but mainly because they have the backing of the workers' trade unions. It will be enough to deprive them of this backing for them to be left hanging in mid-air. The swing of the trade unions to the Left means that a considerable section of the organised workers is beginning to desert the old, reformist leaders and is seeking new, Left leaders. The mistake that the Communist Parties make is that they fail to understand this beneficent process, and instead of offering a hand to the Social-Democratic workers who are moving to the Left and helping them to extricate themselves from the mire, they begin to abuse them as traitors and repel them.

It must be borne in mind that the situation as regards the trade unions in the West is different from what it is here, in our country. Here, the trade unions arose after the Party had appeared, after the Party had already become strong and had gained great prestige among the workers. Here, the trade unions were implanted and organised by the efforts of the Party, under the leadership of the Party, with the assistance of the Party. It is this, incidentally, that explains the fact that, here, the Party's prestige among the workers is much higher than that of the trade unions. We see an entirely different picture in the West. There, the trade unions arose much earlier than the working-class political parties. There were no parties yet in the West when the trade unions were leading

the workers in strikes, organising them and helping them to defend their interests in the struggle against the capitalists. More than that. There, the parties arose out of the trade unions. It is this, incidentally, that explains the fact that the trade unions in the West enjoy much more prestige among the masses than the parties. Whether the trade unions and their leaders there are good or bad, one thing is clear, namely, that the workers regard the trade unions as their bastions against the capitalists. All these specific features must be taken into account when exposing the reformist trade-union leaders. Hurling abuse and violent epithets at the reformist leaders will not help. On the contrary, abuse and violent epithets can only create the impression among the workers that the aim is not to secure the removal of bad leaders, but to wreck the trade unions.

Question. What is the position of the German Communist Party after the removal of the “ultra-Lefts”?

Answer. Undoubtedly, the removal of the “ultra-Lefts” has improved the position of the German Communist Party. The “ultra-Lefts” are people alien to the working class. What can Ruth Fischer and Maslow⁴⁴ have in common with the working class of Germany? The result of the removal of the “ultra-Lefts” has been that new leaders of the Communist Party have come to the fore from the workers. That is a great gain for the German working-class movement.

Question. Is a new orientation of the U.S.S.R. contemplated in connection with the pact with Germany?

Answer. No. We have always had and always will have but one orientation: our orientation is on the U.S.S.R.

and its success both at home and abroad. We need no other orientation. Whatever pacts are concluded, they cannot change anything in this respect.

Question. What is our chief method of Party work among the broad masses?

Answer. The elimination of the survivals of war communism in Party work and transition to the method of persuasion. In relation to the exploiting elements in our country, we have the old, tried method—the method of coercion. In relation to the working people of our country, the workers, peasants, and so forth, we must employ the method of persuasion. The point is not that the Party's instructions and directives are correct. That, of course, is a good thing, but it is not enough. The point now is to convince the broad masses of the working people that these directives and instructions are correct. The point is that the masses themselves should by their own experience become convinced that the Party's directives and instructions are correct. That calls for extensive, intricate, flexible and patient Party work; but that is the only correct method of work under present conditions, when the activity of the masses of the working people is growing.

Question. What questions should the agitation and propaganda departments pay attention to in view of the forthcoming Party Congress?

Answer. Firstly, the question of the industrialisation of our country; and secondly, the peasant question. On the first question, the point must be stressed that industrialisation is the principal means by which we can preserve the economic independence of our country, that

if we do not industrialise our country it will run the risk of becoming an appendage of the world capitalist system. On the second question, more efforts must be devoted to the problem of strengthening the bond between the working class and the peasantry, between industry and peasant economy, for without this bond it will be impossible to build socialism in our country.

Question. What problems arise out of the Party's growth and the necessity of regulating its membership?

Answer. The growth of the Party membership has been proceeding rapidly of late. That, of course, is good, for the Party's rapid growth is an indication of the growing confidence of the working class in our Party. But it also has serious drawbacks. The drawbacks are that the Party's rapid growth leads to a certain lowering of the level of political understanding of the Party membership, to some deterioration of the Party's quality. But quality should be of no less, if not more, importance to us than quantity. To remove those drawbacks we must put an end to the excessive passion of some of our comrades for a quantitative growth of the Party; we must stop the wholesale influx into the Party and make it a rule in future to accept new members with great discrimination. That is the first thing. Secondly, we must organise intensive political education of the new Party members in order to raise their political understanding to the requisite level.

Question. What can now best ensure contact with the non-Party peasant masses—drawing the peasants into the Party, or the creation of a non-Party active around the Party?

Answer. We need both. It will be very difficult to create a broad, non-Party, peasant active around our Party unless we have in the countryside a certain minimum of peasants organised in the Party. It will be still more difficult to create effective Party organisations in the countryside unless we have a broad, non-Party, peasant active, for Party organisations are usually created out of such an active. Nevertheless, the creation of a broad, non-Party, peasant active is the more important task.

What makes the Party strong from the standpoint of its connections with the masses? The fact that it has around itself a broad, non-Party active of sympathisers. The Party could not have led the vast working-class masses into the struggle if it had not had this broad active of sympathisers around itself. Without the aid of such an active the Party cannot exercise leadership of the vast masses of the people. That is one of the fundamental laws of leadership.

Do you remember the Lenin Enrolment, when, in the course of a few days, 200,000 new members, the finest sons of the working class, joined the Party? Where did those 200,000 come from? They came from the ranks of the broad, non-Party active of workers in sympathy with our Party.

Hence, the non-Party active is the medium that provides the sap on which the Party lives and develops. That is true not only in relation to the working class. It is also true in relation to the labouring peasantry.

Question. What concrete results for the expansion of industry are expected from concessions?

Answer. Lenin in his day already said that nothing had come of concessions in our country. We are now in possession of new data which confirm Lenin's words. We can now quite confidently say that there are no prospects for concessions in our country. It is a fact that the proportion of the output of concession industry to our total industrial output is insignificant, and that proportion is tending to drop to zero.

Published for the first time

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

*Answer to Questions Submitted by the Editorial
Board of Komsomolskaya Pravda*

I

What, in the main, are the duties of the Young Communist League resulting from the Soviet Union's present international and internal position?

The formulation of the question is too general; hence, the answer can be couched only in general terms. In the main, the Soviet Union's present international and internal position imposes upon the Young Communist League the duty of supporting by word and deed the revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes in all countries and the struggle of the proletariat of the Soviet Union to build socialism, and for the freedom and independence of the proletarian state. It follows from this, however, that the Young Communist League will be able to perform this general duty only if it is guided in all its work by the directives issued by the Communist International and the Russian Communist Party.

II

What tasks confront the Young Communist League in connection with the dangers of l i q u i d a t i o n i s m (loss of perspective in the building of socialism), of

n a t i o n a l i s m (loss of the international revolutionary perspective) and of the b e l i t t l i n g of the Party leadership, i.e., in connection with the dangers mentioned in the pamphlet Questions and Answers?

Briefly, the task of the Young Communist League in this sphere is to educate our young workers and peasants in the spirit of Leninism. But what does educating the youth in the spirit of Leninism mean? It means, firstly, imbuing them with the consciousness that victory in the building of socialism in our country is fully possible and necessary. It means, secondly, strengthening their conviction that our workers' state is the offspring of the international proletariat, that it is the base for developing the revolution in all countries, that the final victory of our revolution is the cause of the international proletariat. It means, thirdly, educating the young people in a spirit of confidence in the leadership of the Russian Communist Party. It is necessary to create in the Young Communist League such cadres and such an active as will be able to educate the youth precisely along those lines.

Young Communist Leaguers are active in all spheres of construction: industry, agriculture, the co-operatives, the Soviets, cultural and educational organisations, and so forth. Every member of the Young Communist League active must link his daily work in all spheres of construction with the prospect of building socialist society. He must be able to conduct his daily work in the spirit and direction of realising this prospect.

Young Communist Leaguers conduct work among the workers and peasants of the most diverse nationalities.

The Young Communist League itself is something in the nature of an International. A role is played here not only by the national composition of the Young Communist League, but also by the fact that the latter is directly linked with the R.C.P.(B.), one of the most important detachments of the world proletarian International. Internationalism is the fundamental idea that permeates the work of the Young Communist League. That is what makes it strong. That is what makes it mighty. The spirit of internationalism must always hover over the Young Communist League. The successes and setbacks in the struggle that the proletariat of our country is waging must be linked in the minds of Young Communist Leaguers with the successes and setbacks of the international revolutionary movement. Young Communist Leaguers must learn to regard our revolution not as an end in itself, but as a means and an aid towards the victory of the proletarian revolution in all countries.

Formally, the Young Communist League is a non-Party organisation. But it is at the same time a communist organisation. This means that, while being formally a non-Party organisation of workers and peasants, the Young Communist League must, nevertheless, work under the leadership of our Party. The task is to ensure that the youth has confidence in our Party, to ensure our Party's leadership in the Young Communist League. The Young Communist Leaguer must remember that ensuring the Party's leadership is the chief and most important thing in the entire work of the Young Communist League. The Young Communist Leaguer must remember that without that leadership the Young

Communist League will be unable to fulfil its main task namely, that of educating the young workers and peasants in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and of communism.

III

How should the question of the growth of the Young Communist League be presented at the present time: should it continue, in the main, the policy of drawing all the young workers, agricultural labourers and poor peasants and the best of the young middle peasants into its ranks, or should it concentrate attention mainly on holding and educating the mass of the youth already in the League?

It is wrong to say: either—or. Both must be done. As far as possible, all the young workers and the best elements of the young poor and middle peasants must be drawn into the League. At the same time, attention must be concentrated on the education of the new members by the Young Communist League active. The most important immediate task of the Young Communist League is to strengthen its proletarian core. The carrying out of this task will be a guarantee that the Young Communist League will proceed along the right road. But the Young Communist League is not only a young workers organisation. It is a young workers' and peasants' organisation. Therefore, in addition to strengthening its proletarian core, it must work to recruit the best elements of the peasant youth, it must work to ensure a firm alliance between the proletarian core and the peasant section of the League. If that is not done, leadership of the young peasants in the League by the proletarian core will be impossible.

IV

Some Gubernia Committees of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League, taking as their example the women's delegate meetings, have begun to organise delegate meetings of young non-Party peasants, attended by permanent delegates. The function of those meetings is to form a young peasant, mainly middle peasant, active, under the leadership of the Young Communist League. Is that standpoint correct? Does not this harbour the danger of those delegate meetings degenerating into a sort of non-Party peasant-youth leagues, which may set themselves up against our Young Communist League?

In my opinion that standpoint is incorrect. Why? For the following reasons.

Firstly, there is concealed here a fear of the middle peasant, a desire to keep the young middle peasants at a distance, an attempt to wash one's hands of them. Is that a proper desire? Of course not. We must not keep the young middle peasants at a distance; on the contrary, we must draw them closer to us, draw them closer to the Young Communist League. Only in this way will it be possible to imbue the young middle peasants with confidence in the workers, with confidence in the proletarian core of the Young Communist League, with confidence in our Party.

Secondly, there is no doubt that, under present circumstances, when all sections of the peasantry are becoming more active, special delegate meetings of young middle peasants convened by the Young Communist League will inevitably be transformed into a separate middle-peasant youth league. This separate league will by force of necessity be compelled to set itself up against

the existing youth league and its leader, the R.C.P.(B.); it will draw towards itself the peasant section of the Young Communist League and thereby create the danger of the League splitting into two leagues—a young workers' league and a young peasants' league. Can we ignore such a danger? Of course not. Do we want such a split, especially under present circumstances, especially under the present conditions of our development? Of course not. On the contrary, what is necessary now is not to keep the young peasants at a distance, but to draw them closer to the proletarian core of the Young Communist League, not discord, but a firm alliance between them.

Thirdly, the organisation of delegate meetings of young middle peasants cannot be justified on the plea of the existence of delegate meetings of working women and peasant women. The young workers and peasants, who have their own separate organisation in the shape of the Young Communist League, cannot be put on a par with the working women and peasant women, who have no separate organisation of their own, just as the young middle *peasants* must not be confused with working women, who are a part of the *working class*. The existence of delegate meetings of young middle peasants gives rise to a danger for the Young Communist League, whereas the existence of delegate meetings of working women and peasant women creates no danger to anybody, for at the present time the working women and peasant women have no separate permanent organisation of their own like the Young Communist League.

That is why I think that the organisation of special delegate meetings of young middle peasants by the Young Communist League is superfluous.

I think that the Sixth Congress of the Young Communist League⁴⁵ acted rightly in confining itself to the proposal to form around the Young Communist League in the countryside auxiliary organisations, such as self-education circles, groups for the study of agriculture, and so forth.

V

Is it possible, under our conditions, for the active of the Young Communist League to combine practical work with a thorough study of Marxism and Leninism; and what must the Young Communist League organisations and the individual Young Communist Leaguers do in this direction?

First of all, a brief remark about Marxism and Leninism. Such a formulation of the question might lead one to think that Marxism is one thing and Leninism another, that one can be a Leninist without being a Marxist. Such an idea cannot be regarded as correct. Leninism is not Lenin's teaching *minus* Marxism. Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In other words, Leninism includes all that was taught by Marx plus Lenin's new contribution to the treasury of Marxism, and what necessarily follows from all that was taught by Marx (teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant question, the national question, the Party, the question of the social roots of reformism, the question of the principal deviations in communism, and so forth). It would be better, therefore, to formulate the question in such a way as to speak of Marxism or of Leninism (which fundamentally are the same) and not of Marxism *and* Leninism.

Secondly, there cannot be the slightest doubt that unless the practical work of the active of the Young Communist League is *combined* with theoretical training ("the study of Leninism"), no kind of intelligent communist work in the Young Communist League will be possible. Leninism is the generalisation of the experience of the revolutionary movement of the workers of all countries. That experience is the guiding star which lights up the path of the practical workers in their daily work and gives them direction. The practical workers cannot have confidence in their work or know whether it is correct without having mastered that experience, at least to some degree. To grope, to work in the dark—such is the lot of practical workers if they do not study Leninism, if they do not strive to master Leninism, if they refuse to combine their practical work with the necessary theoretical training. Therefore, the study of Leninism, Leninist education, is an essential condition for converting the present active of the Young Communist League into a genuine Leninist active, capable of educating the many millions of Young Communist Leaguers in the spirit of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of communism.

But is such a combination of theory and practice possible under present conditions, when the active of the Young Communist League is so overworked? Yes, it is. It is difficult, that goes without saying; but it is quite possible, since it is so necessary, since a genuine Leninist active in the Young Communist League cannot be created without it. We must not behave like weaklings who run away from difficulties and look for easy work. Difficulties exist to be combated

and overcome. The Bolsheviks would certainly have perished in their struggle against capitalism had they not learned to overcome difficulties. The Young Communist League would not be a Young Communist League if it were daunted by difficulties. The active of the Young Communist League has undertaken a great task. Therefore, it must find the strength to overcome all difficulties in the path to the goal.

The patient and persevering study of Leninism—such is the path the active of the Young Communist League must travel if it really wants to educate the millions of young people in the spirit of the proletarian revolution.

Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 133,
October 29, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL OF M. V. FRUNZE

November 3, 1925

Comrades, I cannot make a long speech. In my present state of mind I am not in the mood for that. I shall say, merely, that in Comrade Frunze we have lost one of the purest, most honest and most fearless revolutionaries of our time.

In Comrade Frunze, the Party has lost one of its most faithful and most disciplined leaders.

In Comrade Frunze, the Soviet Government has lost one of the boldest and wisest builders of our country and of our state.

In Comrade Frunze, the Army has lost one of its most beloved and respected leaders and creators.

That is why the Party so deeply mourns the loss of Comrade Frunze.

Comrades, this year has been an affliction to us. It has torn a number of leading comrades from our midst. But it appears that this was not enough; still another sacrifice was needed. Perhaps it is indeed necessary that our old comrades should so easily and simply go down to their graves. Unfortunately, our young comrades do not so easily and by no means so simply come to the fore to take the place of the old ones.

Let us believe and hope that the Party and the working class will take all measures to facilitate the forging of new cadres to take the place of the old.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has instructed me to express the grief of the whole Party at the loss of Comrade Frunze.

Let my short speech be the expression of that grief, which is boundless, and does not need long speeches.

Pravda, No. 253,
November 5, 1925

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT

I think that the period of preparation for October, eight years ago, and the present period, eight years after October, have a certain common feature notwithstanding the enormous difference between them. This common feature is that both periods mark turning points in the development of our revolution. Then, in 1917, the task was to make the transition from the power of the bourgeoisie to the power of the proletariat. Now, in 1925, the task is to make the transition from the present economy, which cannot, as a whole, be called socialist, to socialist economy, to the economy that must serve as the material basis of a socialist society.

What was the situation in the period of October, when, on October 10, 1917, the Central Committee of our Party, under Lenin's leadership, took the decision to organise the armed uprising?

Firstly, the war between the two European coalitions, the growth of the elements of a socialist revolution all over Europe, and the threat of a separate peace with Germany with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia. That was the external situation. Secondly, the fact that our Party had won a majority in the Soviets, peasant revolts throughout the country, the upsurge of

the revolutionary movement at the front, the isolation of the bourgeois Kerensky Government and the threat of another Kornilov revolt. That was the internal situation.

That was mainly a front of political struggle.

At that time the turning point resulted in the victorious uprising of the workers and peasants and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What is the situation now, eight years after the overthrow of bourgeois rule?

Firstly, there are two camps in the world: the camp of *capitalism*, which is temporarily undergoing stabilisation, along with an obvious growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries (China, Morocco, Syria, etc.); and the camp of *socialism*, the Soviet Union, the economic development of which is increasing and which is rallying around itself both the workers of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries—a circumstance which makes it possible to convert the brief “respite” into a whole period of “respite.” That is the external situation. Secondly, the increasing industrial and co-operative development of our country, the improvement in the material conditions of the workers and peasants, the undoubted improvement in the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the enhanced prestige of the Party among the workers and peasants—a circumstance which makes it possible to go ahead with the building of socialism in conjunction with the peasantry and under the leadership of the proletariat and its Party. That is the internal situation.

That is mainly a front of economic construction.

Whether the present turning-point period will end with the victory of the proletariat depends primarily upon the successes we achieve in our work of construction, upon the successes achieved by the revolutionary movement in the West and East, upon the development of the contradictions that are corroding the capitalist world.

Eight years ago, the task was to link the proletariat with the poorest strata of the peasantry, to neutralise the middle strata of the peasantry, to take advantage of the mortal struggle between the two imperialist coalitions and to overthrow the bourgeois government in Russia in order to organise the dictatorship of the proletariat, to get out of the imperialist war, to strengthen the ties with the proletarians of all countries and to promote the cause of the proletarian revolution in all countries.

Now, eight years later, the task is, on the one hand, to link the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants on the basis of a firm alliance between them, to ensure the leadership of the proletariat within that alliance, to accelerate the development and re-equipment of our industry, to draw the vast masses of the peasantry into the co-operatives and thereby ensure the victory of the socialist core of our economy over the capitalist elements; on the other hand, the task is to establish an alliance both with the proletarians of all countries and with the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries in order to help the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for victory over capitalism.

The neutralisation of the middle peasants is not enough now. The task now is to establish a firm alliance

with the middle peasants in order to establish correct relations between the proletariat and the peasantry; for if Lenin's thesis that "*ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured*"^{46*} is true, then Lenin's words "*. . . to advance now as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry*"^{47*} are equally true.

The simple development of state industry is not enough now. Still less is the pre-war level of industry enough. The task now is to push forward the *re-equipment* of our state industry and to expand it further *on a new technical basis*; for our state industry is a socialist type of industry, it is the principal base of the proletarian dictatorship in our country. Without such a base it is impossible to talk of transforming our country into an industrial country, of converting NEP Russia into socialist Russia.

The simple development of the co-operatives in the countryside is not enough now. The task now is to draw the vast masses of the peasantry into the co-operatives and *to implant a co-operative communal life in the countryside*; for under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and with the existence of a socialist type of industry, co-operation is the *principal* means by which the peasantry can be drawn into the work of building socialism.

Such, in general, are the necessary conditions for victory in building socialism in our country.

Eight years ago, the Party achieved victory over bourgeois rule because it was able to display Leninist firmness in carrying out the tasks of the proletariat in

* My italics.—*J. St.*

spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the wavering of some of its detachments.

Today, eight years later, the Party has every possibility of ensuring victory over the capitalist elements in our national economy, provided it is able to display the old, Leninist firmness in carrying out its tasks in spite of the host of difficulties that confront it, in spite of the possible wavering of some of its detachments.

Leninist firmness in carrying out the immediate tasks of the proletariat is also one of the essential conditions for victory in building socialism.

Pravda, No. 255,
November 7, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

A LETTER TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE TWENTY-SECOND LENINGRAD GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE⁴⁸

Dear comrades,

Information has reached the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the effect that certain members of your conference are of the opinion that the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth Moscow Party Conference on the Central Committee's report⁴⁹ is directed against the Leningrad organisation, and that those comrades are calling for an open fight by the Leningrad delegation at the Party congress. If that information is correct, I consider it my duty to declare to you the following.

At the Moscow conference a resolution based on principle was adopted on questions of principle. The stenographic reports of the speeches delivered at the Moscow conference and at the district conferences, as well as the above-mentioned resolution, can easily convince one that nobody in Moscow thought either of discrediting the Leningrad organisation or of calling for a fight against it. In view of this, it seems to me that the speeches delivered by Sarkis, Safarov and others at the district conferences and repeated at your gubernia conference give cause for alarm. Particularly alarming, it seems to me, are the speeches made during the last few days by

certain comrades at your conference calling for an open fight at the Party congress. Under present conditions, unity among the Leninists, even if there is some disagreement between them on certain questions, is more necessary than ever before. Unity among the Leninists can be not only maintained, but also strengthened if you firmly wish it. The Leningrad organisation is and must remain one of our Party's most important supports.

I consider it my duty to inform you of all this as a member of the presidium of your conference.

Member of the Presidium of
the conference of the Leningrad
organisation

J. Stalin

December 8, 1925

The magazine *Krasnaya Letopis*,
No. 1 (58), 1934

**THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)⁵⁰**
December 18-31, 1925

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POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 18

Comrades, during the past two weeks you have had an opportunity of hearing reports on the activities of the C.C. between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses from a number of members of the C.C. and members of the Political Bureau; extensive reports which, fundamentally, were certainly correct. I believe that there would hardly be any point in repeating those reports. I think that this circumstance eases my task at the present moment, and in view of this I consider it expedient to confine myself to presenting a number of problems connected with the activities of the C.C. of our Party between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses.

Usually, the report of the C.C. begins with the external situation. I am not going to violate that custom. I, too, will begin with the external situation.

I THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The basic and new feature, the decisive feature that has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign relations during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country, which is building socialism, and the

countries of the capitalist world, an equilibrium which has determined the present period of "peaceful co-existence" between the Land of Soviets and the capitalist countries. What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after the war has become a whole period of respite. Hence a certain equilibrium of forces and a certain period of "peaceful co-existence" between the bourgeois world and the proletarian world.

At the bottom of all this lies an internal weakness, the weakness and infirmity of world capitalism, on the one hand, and the growth of the workers' revolutionary movement in general, and particularly the growth of strength in our country, the Land of Soviets, on the other.

What lies at the bottom of this weakness of the capitalist world?

At the bottom of this weakness lie the contradictions which capitalism cannot overcome, and within the framework of which the entire international situation is taking shape—contradictions which the capitalist countries cannot overcome, and which can be overcome only in the course of development of the proletarian revolution in the West.

What are these contradictions? They can be reduced to five groups.

The first group of contradictions are those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries.

The second group of contradictions are those between imperialism and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

The third group of contradictions are those that are developing, and cannot but develop, between the

countries that were victorious in the imperialist war and those that were defeated.

The fourth group of contradictions are those that are developing, and cannot but develop, among the victor countries themselves.

And the fifth group of contradictions are those that are developing between the Land of Soviets and the countries of capitalism as a whole.

Such are the five principal groups of contradictions, within the framework of which the development of our international position is proceeding.

Comrades, unless we briefly examine the nature and the growth of these contradictions, we shall not be able to understand the present international position of our country. Therefore, a brief review of these contradictions must necessarily form part of my report.

1. The Stabilisation of Capitalism

And so, let us begin with the first series of contradictions, those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries. In this sphere, the basic facts may be reduced to the following.

Firstly. Capitalism is emerging, or has already emerged, from the chaos in production, trade and in the sphere of finance which set in, and in which it found itself, after the war. The Party called this the partial, or temporary, stabilisation of capitalism. What does that mean? It means that the production and trade of the capitalist countries, which had become terribly low at one time in the period of the post-war crisis (I have in mind the years 1919-20), have begun to make progress,

and the political power of the bourgeoisie has begun to become more or less consolidated. It means that capitalism has temporarily extricated itself from the chaos in which it found itself after the war.

Here are the figures, if we take Europe.

Production in all the advanced countries of Europe is either making progress compared with 1919, is growing, reaching in some places 80-90 per cent of the pre-war level, or is keeping on one level. Only in Britain are there some branches of production which have not yet straightened themselves out. In the main, if we take Europe as a whole, production and trade are making progress, although they have not yet reached the pre-war level. If we take the production of grain, we find that Britain has reached 80-85 per cent of the pre-war level, France 83 per cent, and Germany 68 per cent. In Germany, the production of grain is rising very slowly. In France it is not rising, and in Britain it is sinking. All this is compensated for by imports of grain from America. Coal output in Britain in 1925 amounts to 90 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 107 per cent of the pre-war level, in Germany to 93 per cent. Steel production in Britain amounts to 98 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 102 per cent, in Germany to 78 per cent. Consumption of raw cotton in Britain is equal to 82 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 83 per cent, in Germany to 81 per cent. Britain's foreign trade shows an unfavourable balance and amounts to 94 per cent of pre-war; that of Germany is slightly higher than in 1919 and also shows an unfavourable balance; that of France is now higher than the pre-war level—102 per cent. The level of European trade as a whole, taking 1921, was

63 per cent of the pre-war level, but now, in 1925, it has reached 82 per cent of that level. The budgets of these countries balance in one way or another, but the balance is obtained by imposing a frightful burden of taxation upon the population. There is a fluctuation in the currency in some countries, but, in general, the former chaos is not observed.

The general picture is that the post-war economic crisis in Europe is passing away, production and trade are approaching the pre-war level. One of the European countries, France, has already surpassed the pre-war level in the sphere of trade and production, while another European country—I refer to Britain—still remains at one and the same, or almost one and the same, level without reaching the pre-war level.

Secondly. Instead of the period of flow of the revolutionary tide that we observed in Europe in the years of the post-war crisis, we now see a period of ebb. This means that the question of taking power, of the proletariat capturing power any day, is not now on the order of the day in Europe. The period of rising revolutionary tide, when the movement pushes forward and upward and the Party's slogans cannot keep pace with the movement, as was the case in our country, for example, in 1905 or in 1917—that period of rising tide still lies ahead. At present, however, it does not exist; instead, there is a period of temporary ebb, a period in which the proletariat is accumulating forces, a period which is giving big results as regards indicating new forms of the movement, as regards the existence and growth of a mass movement under the banner of the struggle for trade-union unity, as regards establishing and strengthening

ties between the working-class movement in the West and the working-class movement in the Soviet Union, as regards a swing to the Left—the British working-class movement for example—as regards the disintegration of Amsterdam, the deep fissure in it, etc., etc. I repeat, we are in a period of accumulation of forces, which is of great importance for future revolutionary actions. It is the period in which the conquest of the mass organisations of the proletariat (the trade unions, etc.) and the “removal from their posts” of the Social-Democratic leaders becomes the slogan of the communist movement, as was the case in our country in 1911-12.

Thirdly. The centre of financial power in the capitalist world, the centre of the financial exploitation of the whole world, has shifted from Europe to America. Formerly, France, Germany and Britain usually formed the centre of the financial exploitation of the world. That cannot be said now without special reservations. Now, the centre of the financial exploitation of the world is mainly the United States of America. That country is growing in every respect: as regards production, as regards trade, and as regards accumulation. I shall quote some figures. The production of grain in North America has risen above the pre-war level; it is now 104 per cent of that level. Coal output has reached 90 per cent of the pre-war level, but the deficit is compensated for by an enormous increase in the output of oil. And it must be pointed out that the oil output of America amounts to 70 per cent of world output. Steel production has risen to 147 per cent—47 per cent above the pre-war level. The national income amounts to 130 per cent of pre-war—

exceeding the pre-war level by 30 per cent. Foreign trade has reached 143 per cent of the pre-war level and has an enormous favourable balance in relation to the European countries. Of the total world gold reserve amounting to 9,000 millions, about 5,000 millions are in America. United States currency is the most stable of all currencies. As regards export of capital, America, at the present time, is almost the only country that is exporting capital in ever-growing proportions. The amount exported by France and Germany is terribly small; Britain has also considerably reduced her export of capital.

Fourthly. The temporary stabilisation of European capitalism to which I referred above has been achieved mainly with the aid of American capital, and at the price of the financial subordination of Western Europe to America. To prove this, it is sufficient to quote the figure of Europe's state indebtedness to America. That figure amounts to no less than 26,000 million rubles. This is apart from private debts to America, i.e., American investments in European enterprises, amounting for Europe to the sum of several thousand millions. What does that show? It shows that Europe has begun to get on its feet, more or less, as a result of the influx of capital from America (and partly from Britain). At what price? At the price of Europe's financial subordination to America.

Fifthly. In view of this, in order to be able to pay interest and principal, Europe is forced to increase the burden of taxation on the population, to worsen the conditions of the workers. That is precisely what is happening now in the European countries. Already, before the payment of principal and interest has properly started,

in Britain, for example, the burden of taxation as a percentage of the total national income has increased from 11 per cent (in 1913) to 23 per cent in 1924; in France it has increased from 13 per cent of the national income to 21 per cent, and in Italy—from 13 per cent to 19 per cent. Needless to say, in the very near future the burden of taxation will grow still heavier. In view of this, the material conditions of the working people in Europe, and primarily those of the working class, will certainly deteriorate and the working class will inevitably become revolutionised. Symptoms of this revolutionisation are already to be observed in Britain and in other European countries. I have in mind the definite swing to the Left of the working class in Europe.

Such are the principal facts which show that the temporary stabilisation of capitalism which Europe has achieved is a putrid stabilisation that has grown up on putrid soil.

It is very likely—I do not exclude the possibility—that production and trade in Europe will reach the pre-war level. But that does not mean that capitalism will thereby reach the degree of stability it possessed before the war. That degree of stability it will never reach again. Why? Because, firstly, Europe has purchased her temporary stability at the price of financial subordination to America, which is leading to a colossal increase in the burden of taxation, to the inevitable deterioration of the conditions of the workers, and to the revolutionisation of the European countries; secondly, because of a number of other reasons—about which I will speak later—that make the present stabilisation undurable, unstable.

The general conclusion, if we sum up all that I have just said about the analysis of the first series of contradictions—the general conclusion is that the circle of major states exploiting the world has shrunk to an extreme degree compared with the period before the war. Formerly, the chief exploiters were Britain, France, Germany, and partly America; that circle has now shrunk to an extreme degree. Today, the major financial exploiters of the world, and hence its major creditors, are North America and to some extent her assistant—Britain.

That does not mean that Europe has sunk to the position of a colony. The European countries, while continuing to exploit their colonies, have themselves now fallen into a state of financial subordination to America and, as a consequence, are in their turn being exploited, and will continue to be exploited by America. In that sense, the circle of major states which exploit the world financially has shrunk to a minimum, whereas the circle of exploited countries has expanded.

That is one of the reasons for the instability and internal weakness of the present stabilisation of capitalism.

2. Imperialism, the Colonies and Semi-Colonies

Let us pass to the second series of contradictions, those between the imperialist countries and the colonial countries.

The basic facts in this sphere are: the development and growth of industry and of the proletariat in the colonies, especially during and after the war; the growth

of culture in general, and of the national intelligentsia in particular, in these countries; the growth of the national-revolutionary movement in the colonies and the crisis in the world domination of imperialism in general; the struggle for liberation waged by India and Egypt against British imperialism; the war for liberation waged by Syria and Morocco against French imperialism; China's struggle for liberation against Anglo-Japanese-American imperialism, etc.; the growth of the working-class movement in India and China and the increasingly important role of the working class in these countries in the national-revolutionary movement.

From this it follows that the Great Powers are faced with the danger of losing their chief rear, i.e., the colonies. Here, the stabilisation of capitalism is in a bad way; for the revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries, growing step by step, is beginning in some places to assume the form of open war against imperialism (Morocco, Syria, China), while imperialism is obviously unable to cope with the task of curbing "its" colonies.

It is said—especially by bourgeois writers—that the Bolsheviks are to blame for the growing crisis in the colonies. I must say that they do us too much honour by blaming us for that. Unfortunately, we are not yet strong enough to render all the colonial countries direct assistance in securing their liberation. It is necessary to delve deeper to find the cause. The cause is, apart from everything else, that the European states, being obliged to pay interest on debts to America, are compelled to intensify oppression and exploitation in the colonies and dependent countries, and this cannot

but lead to an intensification of the crisis and of the revolutionary movement in these countries.

All this goes to show that, in this sphere, the affairs of world imperialism are more than in a bad way. Whereas, in the sphere of the first series of contradictions, European capitalism has become partly stabilised and the question of the proletariat seizing power any day does not arise for the time being, in the colonies the crisis has reached a climax and the question of expelling the imperialists from a number of colonies is on the order of the day.

3. Victors and Vanquished

I pass to the third series of contradictions, those between the victor countries and the defeated countries.

The basic facts in this sphere are the following. Firstly, after the Versailles Peace, Europe found herself split up into two camps—the camp of the vanquished (Germany, Austria and other countries) and the camp of the victors (the Entente plus America). Secondly, the circumstance must be noted that the victors, who had previously tried to strangle the defeated countries by means of occupation (I remind you of the Ruhr), have abandoned this line and have adopted a different method, the method of financial exploitation—of Germany in the first place, and of Austria in the second place. This new method finds expression in the Dawes Plan, the unfavourable results of which are only now making themselves felt. Thirdly, the Locarno Conference,⁵¹ which was supposed to have eliminated all the

contradictions between the victors and the vanquished, but which, actually, in spite of all the hullabaloo around this question, did not eliminate any of the contradictions but only aggravated them.

The intention of the Dawes Plan is that Germany must pay the Entente no less than some 130,000 million gold marks in several instalments. The results of the Dawes Plan are already making themselves felt in the deterioration of Germany's economic position, in the bankruptcy of a whole group of enterprises, in growing unemployment, etc. The Dawes Plan, which was drawn up in America, is as follows: Europe is to pay her debts to America at the expense of Germany, who is obliged to pay Europe reparations; but as Germany is unable to pump this sum out of a vacuum, she must be given a number of free markets, not yet occupied by other capitalist countries, from which she could gain fresh strength and fresh blood for the reparation payments. In addition to a number of unimportant markets, America has in view our Russian markets. According to the Dawes Plan, they are to be placed at Germany's disposal in order that she may be able to squeeze something out of them and have the wherewithal to make reparation payments to Europe, which, in its turn, must make payments to America on account of state debts. The whole plan is well constructed, but it reckons without the host, for it means for the German people a double yoke—the yoke of the German bourgeoisie on the German proletariat, and the yoke of foreign capital on the whole German people. To say that this double yoke will have no effect upon the German people would be a mistake. That is why I think that in this respect the Dawes

Plan is fraught with an inevitable revolution in Germany. It was created for the pacification of Germany, but it, the Dawes Plan, must inevitably lead to a revolution in Germany. The second part of this plan, which says that Germany must squeeze money out of the Russian markets for the benefit of Europe, is also a decision that reckons without the host. Why? Because, we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, including Germany. We ourselves will manufacture machinery and other means of production. Therefore, to reckon that we shall agree to convert our Motherland into an agrarian country for the benefit of Germany, means reckoning without the host. In this respect, the Dawes Plan stands on feet of clay.

As for Locarno, it is merely a continuation of Versailles, and the only object it can have is to preserve the "status quo," as they say in the language of diplomacy, i.e., to preserve the existing order of things, under which Germany is the defeated country and the Entente the victor. The Locarno Conference gives this order of things juridical sanction in the sense that Germany's new frontiers are preserved to the advantage of Poland, are preserved to the advantage of France; that Germany loses her colonies, and at the same time, pinioned and forced into a Procrustean bed, must take all measures to pump out 130,000 million gold marks. To believe that Germany, which is growing and pushing forward, will resign herself to this situation means counting on a miracle. If, in the past, after the Franco-Prussian War, the question of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the key points of the contradictions of that time, served as one of the

gravest causes of the imperialist war, what guarantee is there that the Versailles Peace and its continuation, Locarno, which legalise and give juridical sanction to Germany's loss of Silesia, the Danzig Corridor and Danzig; the Ukraine's loss of Galicia and Western Volhynia; Byelorussia's loss of her western territory; Lithuania's loss of Vilna, etc.—what guarantee is there that this treaty, which has carved up a number of states and has created a number of key points of contradiction, will not share the fate of the old Franco-Prussian Treaty which, after the Franco-Prussian War, tore Alsace-Lorraine from France?

There is no such guarantee, nor can there be.

If the Dawes Plan is fraught with a revolution in Germany, Locarno is fraught with a new war in Europe.

The British Conservatives think that they can both maintain the "status quo" against Germany and use Germany against the Soviet Union. Are they not wanting too much?

There is talk about pacifism, there is talk about peace among the states of Europe. Briand and Chamberlain embrace, Stresemann lavishes compliments on Britain. That is all nonsense. We know from the history of Europe that every time treaties were concluded about the disposition of forces for a new war, those treaties were called peace treaties. Treaties were concluded that determined the elements of the subsequent war, and the conclusion of such treaties was always accompanied by a hullabaloo and clamour about peace. False bards of peace were always found on those occasions. I recall facts from the history of the period after the Franco-Prussian War, when Germany was the victor, when France

was the vanquished, when Bismarck did everything to maintain the “status quo,” i.e., the order of things that was created after Germany’s victorious war against France. At that time Bismarck stood for peace, because that peace gave him a whole series of privileges over France. France, too, stood for peace, at all events at the beginning, until she had recovered from the unsuccessful war. Well, in that period, when everybody was talking about peace and the false bards were lauding Bismarck’s peaceful intentions, Germany and Austria concluded an agreement, an absolutely peaceful and absolutely pacifist agreement, which later served as one of the bases of the subsequent imperialist war. I am speaking of the agreement between Austria and Germany in 1879. Against whom was that agreement directed? Against Russia and France. What did that agreement say? Listen:

“Whereas close collaboration between Germany and Austria threatens nobody and is calculated to consolidate peace in Europe on the principles laid down in the Berlin Treaty, their Majesties, i.e., the two Sovereigns, have resolved to conclude a peace alliance and a mutual agreement.”

Do you hear: close collaboration between Germany and Austria *for the sake of peace in Europe*. That agreement was treated as a “peace alliance,” nevertheless all historians agree that the agreement served as a direct preparation for the imperialist war of 1914. A consequence of that agreement for peace in Europe, but actually for war in Europe, was another agreement, the agreement between Russia and France of 1891-93—also for peace—for nothing else! What did that agreement say? It said:

“France and Russia, animated by an equal desire to maintain peace, have reached the following agreement.”

What agreement—was not *openly* stated at that time. But the secret text of the agreement said: in the event of war, Russia must put up against Germany 700,000 troops and France (I think) 1,300,000.

Both these agreements were officially called agreements for peace, friendship and tranquillity throughout Europe.

To crown all this, six years later, in 1899, the Hague Peace Conference assembled and the question of reduction of armaments was brought up there. That was at the time when, on the basis of the agreement between France and Russia, French General Staff officers came to Russia to draw up plans for troop movements in the event of war, and Russian General Staff officers went to France to draw up plans in conjunction with the French generals for future military operations against Germany. That was at the time when the General Staffs of Germany and Austria were drawing up a plan and drafting the terms on which Austria and Germany were jointly to attack their neighbours in the West and in the East. At that very time (all this, of course, was done on the quiet, behind the scenes) the Hague Conference of 1899 assembled, and there peace was proclaimed and a lot of hypocritical noise was raised about reducing armaments.

There you have an example of the matchless hypocrisy of bourgeois diplomacy, when by shouting and singing about peace they try to cover up preparations for a new war.

Have we any grounds, after this, for believing the songs about the League of Nations and Locarno? Of course not. That is why we can believe neither Chamberlain and Briand when they embrace, nor Stresemann when he is lavish with his compliments. That is why we think that Locarno is a plan for the disposition of forces for a new war and not for peace.

Interesting is the role played by the Second International in this question. It is the leaders of the Second International who most of all are leaping and dancing, assuring the workers that Locarno is an instrument of peace and the League of Nations an ark of peace, that the Bolsheviks refuse to join the League of Nations because they are opposed to peace, etc. What does all this noise made by the Second International amount to, taking into account what has been said above and, in particular, the historical information that I cited about the conclusion after the Franco-Prussian War of a whole series of agreements that were called peace agreements, but which actually proved to be war agreements? What does the present position of the Second International in relation to Locarno show? That the Second International is not only an organisation for the bourgeois corruption of the working class, but also an organisation for the moral justification of all the injustices of the Versailles Peace; that the Second International is a subsidiary of the Entente, an organisation whose function is, by its activities and its clamour in support of Locarno and the League of Nations, to give moral justification to all the injustices and all the oppression that have been created by the Versailles-Locarno regime.

4. The Contradictions between the Victor Countries

I pass to the fourth series of contradictions, to those between the victor countries. The basic facts here are that, in spite of the existence of a sort of bloc between America and Britain, a bloc founded on an agreement between America and Britain against the annulment of Allied debts, in spite of this bloc, I say, the conflict of interests between Britain and America is not being allayed, on the contrary, it is becoming more intense. One of the principal problems now facing the world powers is the problem of oil. If, for example, we take America, we find that she produces about 70 per cent of the world output of oil and accounts for over 60 per cent of total world consumption. Well, it is just in this sphere, which is the principal nerve of the entire economic and military activities of the world powers, that America everywhere and always encounters opposition from Britain. If we take the two world oil companies—Standard Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell, the former representing America and the latter Britain—we find that the struggle between those companies is going on in all parts of the world, wherever oil is obtainable. It is a struggle between America and Britain. For the problem of oil is a vital one; because who will command in the next war depends on who will have most oil. Who will command world industry and trade depends on who will have most oil. Now that the fleets of the advanced countries are passing over to oil propulsion, oil is the vital nerve of the struggle among the world states for supremacy both in peace and in war. It is precisely in this sphere that the struggle

between the British oil companies and the American oil companies is a mortal one, not always coming into the open, it is true, but always going on and smouldering, as is evident from the history of the negotiations and from the history of the clashes between Britain and America on this ground. It is sufficient to recall the series of Notes of Hughes, when he was United States Secretary of State, directed against Britain on the oil question. The struggle is going on in South America, in Persia, in Europe, in those districts of Rumania and Galicia where oil is to be found, in all parts of the world, sometimes in a concealed and sometimes in an open form. That is apart from such a fact of no little importance as the conflict of interests between Britain and America in China. You no doubt know that the struggle there is a concealed one, and that very often America, operating in a more flexible manner and refraining from the crude colonial methods which the British lords have not yet abandoned, succeeds in putting a spoke in Britain's wheel in China in order to oust Britain and pave the way for herself in China. Obviously, Britain cannot look upon this with indifference.

I shall not dwell at length on the opposition of interests between France and Britain arising from the struggle for supremacy on the European continent. That is a generally known fact. It is also clear that the conflict of interests between Britain and France takes place not only over the question of hegemony on the continent, but also in the colonies. Information has got into the press that the war in Syria and Morocco against French imperialism was organised not without Britain's participation. I have no documents, but I think that this information is not altogether groundless.

Nor shall I dwell on the opposition of interests between America and Japan—that, too, is common knowledge. It is enough to recall the recent American naval manoeuvres in the Pacific and the Japanese naval manoeuvres to understand why they took place.

Lastly, I must mention a fact which must surprise everybody, namely, the colossal growth of armaments in the victor countries. I am speaking about the victors, about the contradictions among the victor states. These victors are called allies. True, America does not belong to the Entente, but she fought in alliance with it against Germany. Well, those allies are now arming themselves to the utmost. Against whom are they arming? In the past, when the Entente countries piled up armaments, they usually referred to Germany, saying that she was armed to the teeth and constituted a danger to world peace, owing to which it was necessary to arm for defence. But what about now? Germany as an armed force no longer exists; she has been disarmed. Nevertheless, the growth of armaments in the victor countries is proceeding as never before. How, for example, is the monstrous growth of the air force in France to be explained? How is the monstrous growth of armaments, and especially of the navy, in Britain to be explained? How is the monstrous growth of the navies of America and Japan to be explained? What and whom are Messieurs the “Allies,” who jointly defeated Germany and disarmed her, afraid of? What are they afraid of, and why are they arming? And where is the pacifism of the Second International, which shouts about peace and does not see—pretends that it does not see—that the “Allies,” who have officially called each other friends, are feverishly arming against

a “non-existent” enemy? What have the League of Nations and the Second International done to put a stop to this furious growth of armaments? Don’t they know that with the growth of armaments “the guns begin to go off of their own accord”? Don’t expect a reply from the League of Nations and the Second International. The point here is that the conflict of interests among the victor countries is growing and becoming more intense, that a collision among them is becoming inevitable, and, in anticipation of a new war, they are arming with might and main. I shall not be exaggerating if I say that in this case we have not a friendly peace among the victor countries, but an armed peace, a state of armed peace that is fraught with war. What is now going on in the victor countries reminds us very much of the situation that prevailed before the war of 1914—a state of armed peace.

The rulers of Europe are now trying to cover up this fact with clamour about pacifism. But I have already said what this pacifism is worth and what value should be attached to it. The Bolsheviks have been demanding disarmament ever since the time of Genoa.⁵² Why do not the Second International and all the others who are chattering about pacifism support our proposal?

This circumstance shows once again that the stabilisation, the temporary, partial stabilisation, that Europe has achieved at the price of its own enslavement, is not lasting, for the contradictions between the victor countries are growing and becoming more intense, not to speak of the contradictions between the victor countries and the defeated countries.

5. The Capitalist World and the Soviet Union

I pass to the fifth series of contradictions, those between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

The basic fact in this sphere is that an all-embracing world capitalism no longer exists. After the Land of Soviets came into being, after the old Russia was transformed into the Soviet Union, an all-embracing world capitalism ceased to exist. The world split up into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of the struggle against imperialism. That is the first point that must be noted.

The second point that must be noted in this sphere is that two major countries—Britain and America, as an Anglo-American alliance—are coming to stand at the head of the capitalist countries. Our country—the Soviet Union—is coming to stand at the head of those discontented with imperialism and who are engaged in mortal struggle against it.

The third point is that two major, but opposite, centres of attraction are being created and, in conformity with this, two lines of attraction towards those centres all over the world: Britain and America—for the bourgeois governments, and the Soviet Union—for the workers of the West and for the revolutionaries of the East. The power of attraction of Britain and America lies in their wealth; credits can be obtained there. The power of attraction of the Soviet Union lies in its revolutionary experience, its experience in the struggle for the emancipation of the workers from capitalism and of the oppressed peoples from im-

perialism. I am speaking of the attraction of the workers of Europe and of the revolutionaries of the East towards our country. You know what a visit to our country means to a European worker or to a revolutionary from an oppressed country, how they make pilgrimages to our country, and what an attraction our country has for all that is honest and revolutionary all over the world.

Two camps, two centres of attraction.

The fourth point is that in the other camp, the camp of capitalism, there is no unity of interests and no solidarity; that what reigns there is a conflict of interests, disintegration, a struggle between victors and vanquished, a struggle among the victors themselves, a struggle among all the imperialist countries for colonies, for profits; and that, because of all this, stabilisation in that camp cannot be lasting. On the other hand, in our country there is a healthy process of stabilisation, which is gaining strength, our economy is growing, our socialist construction is growing, and in the whole of our camp all the discontented elements and strata of both the West and the East are gradually and steadily rallying around the proletariat of our country, rallying around the Soviet Union.

Over there, in the camp of capitalism, there is discord and disintegration. Over here, in the camp of socialism, there is solidarity and an ever-increasing unity of interests against the common enemy—against imperialism.

Such are the basic facts which I wanted to point out in the sphere of the fifth series of contradictions—the contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet world.

I should like to dwell particularly on the fact which I have called the attraction of the revolutionary and socialist elements of the whole world towards the proletariat of our country. I have in mind the workers' delegations which come to our country, delegations which carefully probe every detail of our work of construction in order to convince themselves that we are able not only to destroy, but also to build the new. What is the significance of these workers' delegations—this pilgrimage of workers to our country—delegations which today reflect an entire stage in the development of the working-class movement in the West? You have heard how leaders of the Soviet state met a British workers' delegation, and a German workers' delegation. Have you noticed that our comrades, directors of various spheres of administration, not only provided the representatives of the workers' delegations with information, but actually rendered account to them? I was not in Moscow at the time, I was away, but I read the newspapers, and I read that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, head of the Supreme Council of National Economy, not merely gave the German workers' delegation information, but rendered account to them. That is something new and special in our life, and special attention should be paid to it. I have read that the directors of our oil industry—Kosior in Grozny and Serebrovsky in Baku—not merely gave the workers' delegates information as is done to tourists, but rendered account to these workers' delegations as if to a higher supervising authority. I have read that all our higher institutions, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, right down to the local Executive Committees of Soviets, were prepared to render

account to the workers' delegations, whose visits to us they regarded as the friendly, fraternal supervision by the working class of the West of our work of construction, of our workers' state.

What do all those facts show? They show two things. Firstly, that the working class of Europe, at all events the revolutionary part of the working class of Europe, regards our state as its own child, that the working class sends its delegations to our country not out of curiosity, but in order to see how things are here, and what is being done; for, evidently, they regard themselves as being morally responsible for everything that we are building here. Secondly, that the revolutionary part of the proletariat of Europe, having adopted our state, and regarding it as its child, is ready to defend it and to fight for it if need be. Name another state, even the most democratic, that would dare to submit to fraternal supervision by workers' delegations from other countries! You cannot name such a state, because there is no such state in the world. Only our state, the workers' and peasants' state, is capable of taking such a step. But, in placing the utmost confidence in the workers' delegations, our country thereby wins the utmost confidence of the working class of Europe. And that confidence is more valuable to us than any loans, because the workers' confidence in our state is the fundamental antidote to imperialism and its interventionist machinations.

That is what lies at the bottom of the change in the mutual relations between our state and the proletariat of the West that has taken place, or is taking place, on the basis of the workers' pilgrimages to our country. That is the new factor, which many have failed to

discern, but which is decisive at the present time. For if we are regarded as a part, as the child, of the working class of Europe, if on those grounds the working class of Europe assumes moral responsibility, undertakes the task of defending our state in case, say, of intervention by capitalism, the task of defending our interests against imperialism, what does that show? It shows that our forces are growing and will continue to grow very rapidly. It shows that the weakness of capitalism will increase very rapidly. For without the workers it is impossible to wage war nowadays. If the workers refuse to fight against our Republic, if they regard our Republic as their child in whose fate they are closely concerned, then war against our country becomes impossible. That is the secret, that is the root, that is the significance of the pilgrimages to our country that we have had, which we shall have more of, and which it is our duty to encourage to the utmost as a pledge of solidarity and a pledge that the ties of friendship between the workers of our country and the workers of the Western countries will be strengthened.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to say a word or two about the number of the delegations that have visited our country. I heard recently that at the Moscow Conference a comrade asked Rykov: "Are not those delegations costing us too much?" Comrades, we must not say such things. We must never talk in that strain about the workers' delegations that visit us. It is disgraceful to talk like that. We cannot and must not shrink from any expense, or any sacrifice, to help the working class in the West to send their delegates to us, to help them to convince themselves that the working class, after capturing power, is capable not only of destroying capitalism,

but also of building socialism. They, the workers of the West, many of them at any rate, are still convinced that the working class cannot do without the bourgeoisie. That prejudice is the chief disease of the working class in the West, injected into it by the Social-Democrats. We shall not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working class in the West the opportunity, through their delegates, to convince themselves that the working class, after capturing power, is capable not only of destroying the old order, but also of building socialism. We shall not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working class in the West the opportunity to convince themselves that our country is the only state in the world that is a workers' state, which they in the West ought to fight for, and which is worth defending against their own capitalism. (*Applause.*)

Three kinds of delegations have visited us: delegations of intellectuals—teachers and so forth; delegations of adult workers, I think there have been, roughly, about ten of them; and delegations of young workers. In all, 550 delegates and tourists have visited our country. Another sixteen delegations, registered with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, are expected. We shall continue to promote these visits in the future in order to strengthen the ties between the working class of our country and the working class in the West, and thereby erect a barrier against any possibility of intervention.

Such are the characteristic features of the basic contradictions that are corroding capitalism.

What follows from all these contradictions? What do they show? They show that the capitalist world is

being corroded by a whole series of internal contradictions which are enfeebling capitalism; that, on the other hand, our world, the world of socialism, is becoming more and more closely welded, more united; that because of this, on precisely this basis, there arose that temporary equilibrium of forces that put an end to war against us, that ushered in the period of "peaceful co-existence" between the Soviet state and the capitalist states.

I must mention two other facts which also helped to bring it about that instead of a period of war we have a period of "peaceful co-existence."

The first fact is that at the present moment America does not want war in Europe. It is as though she were saying to Europe: I have loaned you thousands of millions; sit still and behave yourself if you want to get more money in future, if you don't want your currency to get into a mess; get down to work, earn money and pay the interest on your debts. It scarcely needs proof that this advice of America's, even if it is not decisive for Europe, is bound to have some effect.

The second fact is that since the victory of the proletarian revolution in our country, a whole vast country with tremendous markets and tremendous sources of raw materials has dropped out of the world capitalist system, and this, of course, was bound to affect the economic situation in Europe. The loss of one-sixth of the globe, the loss of the markets and sources of raw materials of our country, means for capitalist Europe that its production is reduced and experiences a severe shaking. And so, in order to put a stop to this alienation of European capital from our country, from our markets and sources

of raw materials, it was found necessary to agree to a certain period of "peaceful co-existence" with us, in order to be able to find a way to our markets and sources of raw materials—without this, it appears, it is impossible to achieve any economic stability in Europe.

6. The External Position of the U.S.S.R.

Such are all those factors that have led to a certain equilibrium of forces between the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism all over the world; that have caused the period of war to be replaced by a period of respite; that have converted the brief respite into a whole period of respite, and have enabled us to carry out a sort of "collaboration," as Ilyich called it, with the capitalist world.

Hence the series of "recognitions" of the Soviet Union which has commenced, and which is bound to continue.

I shall not enumerate the countries that have "recognised" us. I think that America is the only one of the big countries that has not done so. Nor shall I dilate on the fact that after these "recognitions" we concluded trade agreements, with Germany and Italy, for example. I shall not deal at length with the fact that our foreign trade has grown considerably, that America, a country which exports cotton to us, and Britain and Germany, countries which import our grain and agricultural produce, are particularly interested in this trade. There is one thing I must say, namely, that this year is the first year since the advent of the period of "co-existence"

with the capitalist states in which we are entering into rich and wide commercial relations with the capitalist world on a more or less large scale.

That, of course, does not mean that we have already done away with all those, so to speak, reservations, and all those claims and counter-claims, as they might be called, that have existed and still exist between our state and the states of the West. We know that payment of debts is being demanded of us. Europe has not yet forgotten this, and probably will not forget it, at any rate, not so soon. We are told that our pre-war debts to Europe amount to 6,000 millions, that the war debts are estimated at over 7,000 million rubles, hence, a total of 13,000 millions. Allowing for depreciation of currency, and subtracting from this sum the share of the border countries, it works out that we owe the West-European states not less than 7,000 millions. It is known that our counter-claims in connection with the intervention of Britain, France and America during the civil war amount, I think, to the figure (if we take Larin's calculations) of 50,000 million rubles. Consequently, they owe us five-times more than we owe them. (*Larin, from his seat*: "We shall get it.") Comrade Larin says that in good time we shall get all of it. (*Laughter.*) If, however, we make a more conservative calculation, as the People's Commissariat of Finance does, it will amount to no less than 20,000 million. Even then we stand to gain. (*Laughter.*) But the capitalist countries refuse to reconcile themselves to this, and we still figure in their lists as debtors.

It is on this ground that snags and stumbling-blocks arise during our negotiations with the capitalists. That

was the case with Britain, and it will probably be the case with France as well.

What is the position of the Central Committee of our Party on this question?

It is still what it was when the agreement was being concluded with MacDonald.⁵³

We cannot repeal the well-known law of our country, promulgated in 1918, annulling the tsarist debts.⁵⁴ We stand by that law. We cannot repeal the decrees which were proclaimed, and which gave legal sanction to the expropriation of the expropriators in our country. We stand by those laws and will continue to do so. But we are not averse to making certain exceptions in the course of practical negotiations, in the case of both Britain and France, concerning the former tsarist debts, on the understanding that we pay a small part and get something for it. We are not averse to satisfying the former private owners by granting them concessions, but again on the understanding that the terms of those concessions are not enslaving. On that basis we were able to reach agreement with MacDonald. The underlying basis of those negotiations was the idea of virtually annulling the war debts. It was precisely for this reason that this agreement was frustrated. By whom? Undoubtedly, by America. Although America did not take part in the negotiations between Rakovsky and MacDonald, although MacDonald and Rakovsky arrived at a draft agreement, and although that draft agreement provided a way out for both parties and more or less satisfied the interests of both parties, nevertheless, since that draft was based on the idea of annulling the war debts, and America did not want to create such a precedent, for she would then

have stood to lose the thousands of millions that Europe owed her, she, i.e., America, "advised," and the agreement did not come about.

Nevertheless, we still take our stand on the basis of the above-mentioned draft.

Of the questions concerning our foreign policy, of the questions that arose in the period under review, questions that are exceptionally delicate and urgent, that concern the relations between our government and the governments of the West-European countries, I should like to mention two: firstly, the question that the British Conservatives have raised more than once and will raise again—that of propaganda; and, secondly, the question of the Communist International.

We are accused of conducting special propaganda against imperialism both in Europe and in the colonies and dependent countries. The British Conservatives assert that the Russian Communists are people whose mission it is to destroy the might of the British Empire. I should like to state here that all this is utter nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda, either in the West or in the East, now that workers' delegations visit our country, see for themselves the state of things here and carry their information about the state of things here to all the Western countries. We do not need any other propaganda. That is the best, the most potent and most effective propaganda for the Soviet system and against the capitalist system. (*Applause.*)

We are told that we are conducting propaganda in the East. I assert that this, too, is utter nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda in the East, now that, as we know, the whole of our state system rests on the

basis of the co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the extremely diverse nationalities in our country. Any Chinese, any Egyptian, any Indian, who comes to our country and stays here six months, has an opportunity of convincing himself that our country is the only country that understands the spirit of the oppressed peoples and is able to arrange co-operation between the proletarians of the formerly dominant nationality and the proletarians of the formerly oppressed nationalities. We need no other propaganda, no other agitation, in the East except that the delegations that come here from China, India and Egypt, after working here and looking about them, should carry their information about our state of things all over the world. That is the best propaganda, and it is the most effective of all forms and types of propaganda.

But there is a force that can and certainly will destroy the British Empire. That force is the British Conservatives. That is the force that will certainly, inevitably, lead the British Empire to its doom. It is sufficient to recall the Conservatives' policy when they came to power.⁵⁵ What did they begin with? They began by putting the curb on Egypt, by increasing the pressure on India, by intervening in China, and so forth. That is the policy of the Conservatives. Who is to blame, who is to be accused, if the British lords are incapable of any other policy? Is it difficult to understand that by proceeding on these lines the Conservatives must, inevitably, as surely as twice two are four, lead the British Empire to its doom?

A few words about the Comintern. Hirelings of the imperialists and authors of forged letters are spreading

rumours in the West to the effect that the Comintern is an organisation of conspirators and terrorists, that Communists are touring the Western countries for the purpose of hatching plots against the European rulers. Among other things, the Sofia explosion in Bulgaria is being linked with Communists. I must declare what every cultured person must know, if he is not an utter ignoramus, and if he has not been bribed—I must declare that Communists never had, do not have, and cannot have, anything in common with the theory and practice of individual terrorism; that Communists never had, do not have, and cannot have, anything in common with the theory of conspiracies against individual persons. The theory and practice of the Comintern consists in organising the mass revolutionary movement against capitalism. That is true. That is the task of the Communists. Only ignoramuses and idiots can confuse plots and individual terrorism with the Comintern's policy in the mass revolutionary movement.

Two words about Japan. Some of our enemies in the West are rubbing their hands with glee, as much as to say: See, a revolutionary movement has begun in China. It is, of course, the Bolsheviks who have bribed the Chinese people—who else could bribe a people numbering 400 millions?—and this will lead to the “Russians” fighting the Japanese. All that is nonsense, comrades. The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are unbelievably vast. They have not yet made themselves felt as they should. They will make themselves felt in the future. The rulers in the East and West who do not see those forces and do not reckon with them to the degree that they deserve will suffer for this. We, as a state,

cannot but reckon with this force. We consider that China is faced with the same problem that faced North America when she was uniting in a single state, that faced Germany when she was taking shape as a state and was uniting, and that faced Italy when she was uniting and freeing herself from external enemies. Here, truth and justice are wholly on the side of the Chinese revolution. That is why we sympathise and will continue to sympathise with the Chinese revolution in its struggle to liberate the Chinese people from the yoke of the imperialists and to unite China in a single state. Whoever does not and will not reckon with this force will certainly lose. I think that Japan will understand that she, too, must reckon with this growing force of the national movement in China, a force that is pushing forward and sweeping everything from its path. It is precisely because he has not understood this that Chang Tso-lin is going under. But he is going under also because he based his whole policy on conflicts between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, on a deterioration of relations between them. Every general, every ruler of Manchuria, who bases his policy on conflicts between us and Japan, on a deterioration of our relations with Japan, is certain to go under. Only the one who bases his policy on an improvement of our relations with Japan, on a rapprochement between us and Japan, will remain on his feet; only such a general, and such a ruler, can sit firmly in Manchuria, because we have no interests that lead to our relations with Japan becoming strained. Our interests lie in the direction of rapprochement between our country and Japan.

7. The Party's Tasks

I pass to the question of our Party's tasks in connection with the external situation.

I think that here our Party's tasks, in the sense of its work, should be outlined in two spheres: the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement, and then in the sphere of the Soviet Union's *foreign policy*.

What are the tasks in the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement?

The tasks are, firstly, to work in the direction of strengthening the Communist Parties in the West, of their winning a majority among the masses of the workers. Secondly, to work in the direction of intensifying the struggle of the workers in the West for trade-union unity, for strengthening the friendship between the proletariat in our Union and the proletariat in the capitalist countries. This includes the pilgrimages of which I have spoken and the significance of which I described above. Thirdly, to work in the direction of strengthening the link between the proletariat in our country and the movement for liberation in the oppressed countries, for they are our allies in the struggle against imperialism. And fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening the socialist elements in our country, in the direction of the victory of these elements over the capitalist elements, a victory that will be of decisive significance for revolutionising the workers of all countries. Usually, when speaking about our Party's tasks in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement, our comrades confine themselves to the first three tasks and forget about the fourth task, namely, that our struggle in our

country, the struggle for the victory of the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist elements, our struggle in the work of construction, is also of international significance, for our country is the base of the international revolution, for our country is the principal lever for expanding the international revolutionary movement; and if our work of construction here, in our country, proceeds at the proper tempo, it means that we are performing our work in all the other channels of the international revolutionary movement precisely in the way the Party demands that we should perform it.

Such are the Party's tasks in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement.

Now about the Party's tasks in the sphere of our Union's *foreign* policy.

Firstly, to work in the direction of fighting against new wars, in the direction of maintaining peace and ensuring so-called normal relations with the capitalist countries. The basis of our government's policy, of its foreign policy, is the idea of peace. The struggle for peace, the struggle against new wars, the exposure of all the steps that are being taken to prepare a new war, the exposure of those steps that cover up actual preparation of war with the flag of pacifism—such is the task. It is precisely for this reason that we refuse to join the League of Nations, for the League of Nations is an organisation for covering up the preparations for war; for, to join the League of Nations, we must choose, as Comrade Litvinov has rightly expressed it, between the hammer and the anvil. Well, we do not wish to be either a hammer for the weak nations or an anvil for the strong ones. We want

neither the one nor the other; we stand for peace, we stand for the exposure of all those steps that lead to war, no matter by what pacifist bunting they may be concealed. Whether the League of Nations or Locarno, it makes no difference—they can't fool us with a flag, nor frighten us with noise.

Secondly, to work in the direction of expanding our trade with the outside world on the basis of the monopoly of foreign trade.

Thirdly, to work in the direction of rapprochement with the countries that were defeated in the imperialist war, with those capitalist countries which were most humiliated and came off worst, and which, owing to this, are in opposition to the ruling alliance of Great Powers.

Fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening our link with the dependent and colonial countries.

Such are the tasks that face the Party at the present time in the sphere of international relations and the international working-class movement.

II THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

I pass to the second part of the Central Committee's report. This part deals with the internal situation in our state and with the Central Committee's policy on questions concerning the internal situation. I should like to quote some figures. Although quite a number of figures have been published in the press recently, we cannot, unfortunately, avoid quoting some here.

1. The National Economy as a Whole

But, before passing to the figures, permit me to set out several general propositions which define our work in the building of a socialist economy (I intend to start with our economy).

The first proposition. We are working and building in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement. That means that our economy and work of construction will develop in the contradiction, in conflicts, between our system of economy and the capitalist system of economy. We cannot possibly avoid this contradiction. It is the framework within which the struggle between the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist systems, must proceed. It means, furthermore, that our economy must be built not only amidst its opposition to the capitalist economy outside our country, but also amidst the opposition between the different elements within it, the opposition between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements.

Hence the conclusion: we must build our economy in such a way as to prevent our country from becoming an appendage of the world capitalist system, to prevent it from being drawn into the general system of capitalist development as a subsidiary enterprise of this system, so that our economy develops not as a subsidiary enterprise of world capitalism, but as an independent economic unit, based mainly on the home market, based on the bond between our industry and peasant economy in our country.

There are two general lines: one takes as its starting point that our country must for a long time yet remain

an agrarian country, must export agricultural produce and import equipment, that we must adopt this standpoint and develop along this line in the future. In essence, this line demands that we should wind up our industry. It found expression recently in Shanin's theses (perhaps some of you have read them in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*⁵⁶). To follow this line would mean that our country would never be able, or almost never be able, to become really industrialised; that instead of being an economically independent unit based on the home market, our country would, objectively, have to become an appendage of the general capitalist system. That line means the abandonment of our construction tasks.

That is not our line.

There is another general line, which takes as its starting point that we must exert all efforts to make our country an economically self-reliant, independent country based on the home market; a country that will serve as a centre of attraction for all other countries that little by little drop out of capitalism and enter the channel of socialist economy. That line demands the utmost expansion of our industry, but proportionate to and in conformity with the resources at our command. It emphatically rejects the policy of converting our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system. That is our line of construction, the line followed by the Party and which it will continue to follow in the future. That line is imperative as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Things will be different when the revolution is victorious in Germany or France, or in both countries together, when the building of socialism begins there on a higher technical basis. We shall then pass from the

policy of transforming our country into an independent economic unit to the policy of drawing our country into the general channel of socialist development. But until that happens, it will be absolutely essential for us to have that minimum of independence for our national economy without which it will be impossible to safeguard our country from economic subordination to the world capitalist system.

That is the first proposition.

The second proposition, by which we must be guided in our work of construction as much as by the first, is that we must on each occasion take into account the specific features of our management of the national economy distinguishing it from such management in capitalist countries. There, in the capitalist countries, private capital reigns; there, the mistakes committed by individual capitalist trusts, syndicates, or one or other group of capitalists, are corrected by the elemental forces of the market. If too much is produced—a crisis ensues; but later, after the crisis, the economy resumes its normal course. If they indulge too much in imports and an unfavourable balance of trade results—the rate of exchange will be shaken, inflation will ensue, imports will drop and exports will rise. All this in the form of crises. No mistake of any magnitude, no overproduction of any magnitude, or serious discrepancy between production and total demand takes place in capitalist countries without the blunders, mistakes and discrepancies being corrected by some crisis or other. That is how they live in capitalist countries. But we cannot live like that. There we see economic, commercial and financial crises, which affect individual groups of capitalists. Here, in

our country, things are different. Every serious hitch in trade, in production, every serious miscalculation in our economy, results not in some individual crisis or other, but hits the whole of our national economy. In our country, every crisis, whether commercial, financial or industrial, may develop into a general crisis that will hit the whole state. That is why special circumspection and foresight in construction are demanded of us. That is why we here must manage our economy in a planned way so that there are fewer miscalculations, so that our management of economy is conducted with supreme foresight, circumspection and accuracy. But since, comrades, we, unfortunately, do not possess exceptional foresight, exceptional circumspection, or an exceptional ability to manage our economy without error, since we are only just learning to build, we make mistakes, and will continue to do so in the future. That is why, in building, we must have reserves; we must have reserves with which to correct our blunders. Our entire work during the past two years has shown that we are not guaranteed either against fortuities or against errors. In the sphere of agriculture, very much depends in our country not only on the way we manage, but also on the forces of nature (crop failures, etc.). In the sphere of industry, very much depends not only on the way we manage, but also on the home market, which we have not yet mastered. In the sphere of foreign trade, very much depends not only on us, but also on the behaviour of the West-European capitalists; and the more our exports and imports grow, the more dependent we become upon the capitalist West, the more vulnerable we become to the blows of our enemies. To guarantee our-

selves against all these fortuities and inevitable mistakes, we need to accept the idea that we must accumulate reserves.

We are not guaranteed against crop failures in agriculture. Hence we need reserves. We are not guaranteed against the fortuities of the home market in the sphere of the development of our industry. That is apart from the fact that, living on the funds that we ourselves accumulate, we must be exceptionally frugal and restrained in spending accumulated funds; we must try to invest every kopek wisely, i.e., in such undertakings as it is absolutely essential to develop at the given moment. Hence the need for reserves for industry. We are not guaranteed against fortuities in the sphere of foreign trade (covert boycott, covert blockade, etc.). Hence the need for reserves.

We could double the sum allocated for agricultural credits; but then the necessary reserve for financing industry would not be left, the development of industry would lag far behind agriculture, the output of manufactured goods would shrink, resulting in inflated prices of manufactured goods and all the consequences following from that.

We could double the assignments for the expansion of industry; but that would mean a rapid rate of industrial development which we would not be able to maintain owing to the great shortage of free capital, and it would certainly lead to a breakdown, not to speak of the fact that the reserve from which to provide credits for agriculture would be lacking.

We could push forward the growth of our imports, chiefly import of equipment, to twice the amount

we import now, in order to promote the rapid development of industry; but that might cause an excess of imports over exports, which would result in an unfavourable balance of trade and in the depreciation of our currency, i.e., the only basis on which it is possible to plan and develop industry would be undermined.

We could recklessly develop exports to the utmost, ignoring the state of the home market; but that would certainly cause great complications in the towns in the form of a rapid rise in the prices of agricultural produce and, consequently, in the form of the undermining of wages and a certain degree of artificially organised famine with all the consequences resulting from that.

We could raise wages of the workers to the utmost, not merely to the pre-war level, but higher; but that would reduce the tempo of development of our industry, because under our conditions, in the absence of loans from abroad, in the absence of credits, etc., the expansion of industry is possible only on the basis of the accumulation of a certain amount of profit necessary for financing and promoting industry, which, however, would be excluded, i.e., accumulations of any serious magnitude would be excluded if the tempo of raising wages was excessively accelerated.

And so on, and so forth.

Such are the two fundamental guiding propositions that must serve as the torch, the beacon, in our work of construction in our country.

Permit me now to pass to the figures.

But just one more digression. Our system of economy exhibits a certain diversity, it contains no less than five forms. There is one form of economy that is almost

on the level of natural economy: the peasant farms that produce very little for the market. There is a second form of economy, the commodity production form—the peasant farms which produce chiefly for the market. There is a third form of economy—private capitalism, which is not dead, which has revived and will continue to revive, within certain limits, as long as we have NEP. The fourth form of economy is state capitalism, i.e., the capitalism that we have permitted and are able to control and restrict in the way the proletarian state wishes. Lastly, there is the fifth form—socialist industry, i.e., our state industry, in which production does not involve two antagonistic classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—but only one class—the proletariat.

I should like to say a word or two about these five forms of economy, because otherwise it will be difficult to understand the group of figures I intend to quote and the trend that is observed in the development of our industry; the more so that Lenin already dealt in considerable detail with these five forms of economy in our social system⁵⁷ and taught us to take the struggle among these forms into account in our work of construction.

I should like to say a word or two about state capitalism and about state industry, the latter being of a socialist type, in order to clear up the misunderstandings and confusion that have arisen in the Party around this question.

Would it be right to call our state industry, state-capitalist industry? No. Why? Because under the dictatorship of the proletariat, state capitalism is a form of organisation of production involving two classes: an exploiting class which owns the means of

production, and an exploited class which does not own the means of production. No matter what special form state capitalism may assume, it must nevertheless remain capitalist in its nature. When Ilyich analysed state capitalism, he had in mind primarily concessions. Let us take concessions and see whether two classes are involved in them. Yes, they are. The class of capitalists, i.e., the concessionaires, who exploit and temporarily own the means of production, and the class of proletarians, whom the concessionaire exploits. That we have no elements of socialism here is evident if only from the fact that nobody would dare turn up at a concession enterprise to start a campaign to increase productivity of labour; for everybody knows that a concession enterprise is not a socialist enterprise, but one alien to socialism.

Let us take another type of enterprise—state enterprises. Are they state-capitalist enterprises? No, they are not. Why? Because they involve not two classes, but one class, the working class, which through its state owns the instruments and means of production and which is not exploited; for the maximum amount of what is produced in these enterprises over and above wages is used for the further expansion of industry, i.e., for the improvement of the conditions of the working class as a whole.

It may be said that, after all, this is not complete socialism, bearing in mind the survivals of bureaucracy persisting in the managing bodies of our enterprises. That is true, but it does not contradict the fact that state industry belongs to the socialist type of production. There are two types of production: the capitalist,

including the state-capitalist, type, where there are two classes, where production is carried on for the profit of the capitalist; and there is the other type, the socialist type of production, where there is no exploitation, where the means of production belong to the working class, and where the enterprises are run not for the profit of an alien class, but for the expansion of industry in the interests of the workers as a whole. That is just what Lenin said, that our state enterprises are enterprises of a consistently socialist type.

Here an analogy with our state could be drawn. Our state, too, is not called a bourgeois state, for, according to Lenin, it is a new type of state, the *proletarian* type of state. Why? Because our state apparatus does not function for the purpose of oppressing the working class, as is the case with all bourgeois states without exception, but for the purpose of emancipating the working class from the oppression of the bourgeoisie. That is why our state is a proletarian type of state, although any amount of trash and survivals of the past can be found in the state apparatus. Lenin, who proclaimed our Soviet system a proletarian type of state, castigated it for its bureaucratic survivals more strongly than anybody else. Nevertheless, he asserted all the time that our state is a new proletarian type of state. A distinction must be drawn between the type of state and the heritage and survivals still persisting in the system and apparatus of the state. It is equally imperative to draw a distinction between the bureaucratic survivals in state enterprises and the type of structure of industry that we call the socialist type. It is wrong to say that because our economic bodies, or our trusts, suffer

from mistakes, bureaucracy, and so forth, our state industry is not socialist. It is wrong to say that. If that were true, our state, which is of the proletarian type, would also not be proletarian. I can name quite a number of bourgeois apparatuses that function better and more economically than our proletarian state apparatus; but that does not mean that our state apparatus is not proletarian, that our type of state apparatus is not superior to the bourgeois type. Why? Because, although that bourgeois apparatus functions better, it functions for the capitalist, whereas our proletarian state apparatus, even if it does fumble sometimes, after all functions for the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie.

That fundamental difference must not be forgotten.

The same must be said about state industry. We must not, because of the defects and survivals of bureaucracy that are to be found in the managing bodies of our state enterprises, and which will exist for some time yet, we must not, because of those survivals and defects, forget that, in their nature, our enterprises are socialist enterprises. At the Ford plants, for example, which function efficiently, there may be less thieving, nevertheless they function for the benefit of Ford, a capitalist, whereas our enterprises, where thieving takes place sometimes, and things do not always run smoothly, nevertheless function for the benefit of the proletariat.

That fundamental difference must not be forgotten.

Let us now pass to the figures concerning our national economy as a whole.

Agriculture. Its gross output in 1924-25, comparing its level with the pre-war level, that of 1913, reached 71 per cent. In other words, the output in 1913 amounted

to something over 12,000 million rubles at pre-war prices, and in 1924-25, the output amounted to something over 9,000 million rubles. In the coming year, 1925-26, we anticipate, on the basis of data of our planning bodies, a further rise that will bring the output up to 11,000 million rubles, i.e., up to 91 per cent of the pre-war level. Agriculture is growing—such is the natural conclusion to be drawn.

Industry. Taking all industry—state, concession and private—its gross output in 1913 amounted to 7,000 million rubles; in 1924-25, the gross output amounted to 5,000 million. That is 71 per cent of the pre-war level. Our planning bodies anticipate that next year output will reach 6,500 million, i.e., it will amount to about 93 per cent of the pre-war level. Industry is rising. This year it rose faster than agriculture.

Special reference must be made to the question of electrification. The GOELRO plan in 1921 provided for the erection in the course of 10-15 years of thirty electric power stations of a total capacity of 1,500,000 kw. at a cost of 800,000,000 gold rubles. Before the October Revolution, the total capacity of electric power stations amounted to 402,000 kw. Up to the present we have built stations with a total capacity of 152,350 kw. and it is planned to put into operation in 1926 a total capacity of 326,000 kw. If development continues at that rate, the plan for the electrification of the U.S.S.R. will be fulfilled in ten years, i.e., approximately by 1932 (the earliest date planned for). Parallel with the growth in electric power construction runs the growth of the electrical engineering industry, the 1925-26 programme of which provides for bringing output up to

165-170 per cent of the pre-war level. It must be observed, however, that the erection of big hydro-electric power stations leads to a large over-expenditure of funds compared with what had been planned. For example, the original estimate for the Volkhov project amounted to 24,300,000 "conventional" rubles, but by September 1925 it had risen to 95,200,000 chervonets rubles, which is 59 per cent of the funds spent on the erection of the first priority stations, although the capacity of the Volkhov project amounts to 30 per cent of the capacity of those stations. The original estimate for the Zemo-Avchaly station amounted to 2,600,000 gold rubles, but the latest request amounts to about 16,000,000 chervonets rubles, of which about 12,000,000 have already been spent.

If we compare the output of state and co-operative industry, associated in one way or another, with the output of private industry, we get the following: in 1923-24, the output of state and co-operative industry amounted to 76.3 per cent of the total industrial output for the year, while that of private industry amounted to 23.7 per cent; in 1924-25, however, the output of state and co-operative industry amounted to 79.3 per cent of the total, and that of private industry was no longer 23.7 per cent, but 20.7 per cent.

The relative importance of private industry declined in this period. It is anticipated that next year the share of state and co-operative industry will amount to about 80 per cent, while that of private industry will sink to 20 percent. In absolute figures, private industry is growing, but as state and co-operative industry is growing faster, the relative importance of private industry is progressively declining.

That is a fact that must be reckoned with, and which shows that the preponderance of socialist industry over private industry is an indisputable fact.

If we take property concentrated in the hands of the state and property in the hands of private business people, we find that in this sphere too—I have the State Planning Commission's control figures in mind—preponderance is on the side of the proletarian state, for the state possesses capital funds amounting to not less than 11,700 millions (chervonets rubles), whereas private owners, mainly peasant farms, possess funds amounting to not more than 7,500 millions.

This fact shows that socialised funds constitute a very large share of the total, and this share is growing compared with the share of property in the non-socialised sector.

For all that, our system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist. Our system as a whole is transitional from capitalism to socialism—a system in which privately-owned peasant production still preponderates as regards volume of output, but in which the share of socialist industry is steadily growing. The share of socialist industry is growing in such a way that, taking advantage of its concentration and organisation, taking advantage of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, that transport is in the hands of the state, that the credit system and the banks are ours—taking advantage of all this, our socialist industry, the share of which in the total volume of national production is growing step by step, this industry is advancing and is beginning to gain the upper hand over private industry and to adapt to itself

and take the lead over all the other forms of economy. Such is the fate of the countryside—it must follow the lead of the towns, of large-scale industry.

That is the fundamental conclusion that follows if we raise the question of the character of our system, of the share of socialist industry in this system, of the share of private capitalist industry in it and, lastly, of the share of small commodity—chiefly peasant—production in the total national economy.

A word or two about the state budget. You no doubt know that it has grown to 4,000 million rubles. Counting in pre-war rubles, our state budget amounts to not less than 71 per cent of the state budget of the pre-war period. Further, if to the amount of the general state budget we add the amounts of the local budgets, as far as they can be calculated, our total state budget will amount to not less than 74.6 per cent of the 1913 budget. A characteristic feature is that in our state budget the proportion of non-tax revenues is much higher than that of revenues from taxes. All this also shows that our economy is growing and making progress.

The question of the profits that we obtained from our state and co-operative enterprises last year is of very great importance, because ours is a country poor in capital, a country that does not obtain big loans from abroad. We must closely scrutinise our industrial and trading enterprises, our banks and co-operatives, in order to ascertain what we can have at our disposal for the purpose of further expanding our industry. In 1923-24, state industry of Union importance and industry under the Chief Metal Board yielded a profit of, I think, about 142,000,000 chervonets rubles. Of this sum, 71,000,000

were assigned as state revenue. In 1924-25 we already have 315,000,000. Of this sum, it is planned to assign 173,000,000 as state revenue.

State trade of Union importance yielded in 1923-24 about 37,000,000, of which 14,000,000 went as state revenue. In 1925, the amount is smaller—22,000,000, as a result of the policy of reducing prices. Of this sum about 10,000,000 will go as state revenue.

From our foreign trade in 1923-24 we obtained a profit of something over 26,000,000 rubles, of which about 17,000,000 went as state revenue. In 1925, foreign trade will yield or, rather, has already yielded, 44,000,000. Of this sum 29,000,000 will go as state revenue.

According to the calculations of the People's Commissariat of Finance, in 1923-24 the banks yielded a profit of 46,000,000, of which 18,000,000 went as state revenue; in 1924-25 the profit amounted to over 97,000,000, of which 51,000,000 have gone as state revenue.

The consumer co-operatives in 1923-24 yielded a profit of 57,000,000 and the agricultural co-operatives—4,000,000.

The figures I have just quoted are more or less understated. You know why. You know how our economic bodies calculate with a view to keeping as much as possible for the expansion of their enterprises. If these figures seem small to you, as indeed they are, then bear in mind that they are slightly understated.

A few words about our foreign trade turn-over.

If we take our trade turn-over for 1913 as 100, we shall find that our foreign trade in 1923-24 reached 21 per cent of the pre-war level, and in 1924-25—26 per cent of the pre-war level. Exports in 1923-24 amounted to

522,000,000 rubles; imports—439,000,000; total turn-over—961,000,000; favourable balance—83,000,000. In 1923-24 we had a favourable balance of trade. In 1924-25 exports amounted to 564,000,000; imports—708,000,000; total turn-over—1,272 million; balance—minus 144,000,000. This year we ended our foreign trade with an unfavourable balance of 144,000,000.

Permit me to dwell on this somewhat.

People here are often inclined to attribute this unfavourable balance of trade in the past economic year to the fact that we imported a large quantity of grain this year owing to the crop failure. But we imported grain amounting to 83,000,000, whereas the trade deficit amounts to 144,000,000. What does that deficit lead to? To this: by buying more than we sell, by importing more than we export, we put in jeopardy our balance of payments and therefore our currency as well. We received a directive from the Thirteenth Party Congress that the Party should at all costs secure a favourable balance of trade.⁵⁸ I must admit that all of us, both the Soviet bodies and the Central Committee, committed a gross error here in failing to carry out the directive given us. It was difficult to carry it out; nevertheless we could have obtained at least a small favourable balance if we had made a real effort. We committed this gross error and the congress must rectify it. Incidentally, the Central Committee itself attempted to rectify it in November this year at a special meeting at which it examined the figures of our imports and exports and adopted a decision that next year—at that meeting we outlined the chief elements of our foreign trade for the coming year—that next year our foreign trade should end with a favourable balance

of at least 100,000,000. That is essential. That is absolutely essential for a country like ours, where we have little capital, where import of capital from abroad does not take place, or only to a minimal degree, and where the balance of payments, its equilibrium, must be maintained by the balance of trade in order to prevent our chervonets currency from being shaken and in order, by maintaining our currency, to preserve the possibility of further expanding our industry and agriculture. You have all experienced what an unstable currency means. We must not fall into such an unfortunate position again; we must take all measures to eradicate all factors that could later on result in conditions capable of shaking our currency.

Such are the figures and considerations concerning our national economy as a whole, concerning industry and agriculture in particular, concerning the relative importance of socialist industry in relation to the other forms of economy, and concerning those leading ideas in the building of socialism of which I have spoken, and which the Central Committee of our Party takes as the basis for its stand.

2. Industry and Agriculture

If, further, we take the questions that directly concern the interrelations of industry and agriculture now and in the immediate future, they can be reduced to the following points.

Firstly. We are still an agrarian country: agricultural output predominated over industrial output. As regards industry, the main thing is that it has

already approached the limit of the pre-war level, that further steps in industry mean developing it on a new technical basis, with the utilisation of new equipment and the building of new plants. That is a very difficult matter. To step across this threshold, to pass from the policy of utilising to the utmost all that we have had in industry to the policy of building up a new industry on a new technical basis, on the basis of building new plants, to cross this threshold calls for large amounts of capital. As, however, we suffer from a considerable shortage of capital, the further development of our industry will, in all probability, proceed at a less rapid tempo than it has done up to now.

That is not the case in agriculture. It cannot be said that all the potentialities latent in agriculture on its present technical basis are already exhausted. Unlike industry, agriculture can make rapid progress for a certain time even on its present technical basis. Even simply raising the culture of the peasant, literacy, even a simple thing like cleaning seed, could increase the gross output of agriculture 10-15 per cent. Just reckon up what that means for the entire country. Such are the potentialities still latent in agriculture. That is why the further development of agriculture does not, for the time being, encounter the technical difficulties that our industry does. That is why the discrepancy between the balance of output of industry and the balance of output of agriculture will continue to grow during the next few years, because agriculture possesses a number of inherent potentialities which are far from being utilised yet, and which are due to be utilised during the next few years.

What are our tasks in view of this circumstance?

First of all, to raise our large-scale state industry at all costs, overcoming the difficulties that confront us. Next, to raise the *local* type of Soviet industry. Comrades, we cannot concentrate only on the development of Union industry, because Union industry, our centralised trusts and syndicates, cannot satisfy all the diverse tastes and requirements of a 140,000,000-population. To be able to satisfy these requirements, we must see to it that life, industrial life, is pulsating in every district, in every okrug, in every gubernia, region and national republic. Unless we unleash the forces latent in the localities for the purpose of economic construction, unless we lend local industry every support, beginning with the districts and okrugs, unless we unleash all these forces, we shall not be able to achieve that general upswing of economic construction in our country that Lenin spoke about. Unless we do this, unless we link the interests and benefits of the centre with the interests and benefits of the localities, we shall not solve the problem of stimulating initiative in the work of construction, the problem of a general economic upswing in the country, the problem of securing the speediest industrialisation of the country.

Secondly. Formerly, the problem in relation to fuel was that of over-production. Now we are approaching the problem of a fuel crisis, because our industry is growing faster than the fuel supply. We are approaching the level on which our country stood under the bourgeois system, when there was a shortage of fuel and we were obliged to import it. In other words, the position is that there is a discrepancy between the balance of fuel output and the balance of output of industry, the requirements

of industry. Hence the task of accelerating the development of our fuel industry, of improving its technical equipment, so that its development should overtake, should be able to overtake, the development of industry.

Thirdly. There is some discrepancy between the balance of output of metals and the balance of the national economy as a whole. If we calculate the minimum metal requirements and the maximum possibility of producing metals, we shall find that we have a shortage running into tens of millions. Under these conditions, our economy, and our industry in particular, cannot make further progress. That is why this circumstance must receive special attention. Metal is the foundation of foundations of our industry, and its balance of output must be made to correspond to the balance of industry and transport.

Fourthly. The discrepancy between the balance of our skilled labour power and the balance of our industry. A number of figures have been published in the press and I will not quote them; I will merely say that the additional skilled labour power required for the whole of industry in 1925-26 amounts to 433,000 people, and we can supply only a fourth of the number required.

Fifthly. I should like to mention one other defect and discrepancy, namely, that the standards for using railway rolling stock exceed all limits. The demand for rolling stock is so great that next year we shall be obliged to use locomotives and freight wagons, not to 100 per cent of their capacity, but to 120-130 per cent. Thus, the fixed capital of the People's Commissariat of Transport will be subjected to excessive wear and tear, and we may be faced with disaster in the near future if we do not take resolute measures.

Such are all the defects and discrepancies which exist in our national economy in general, and in our industry in particular, and which must be overcome.

3. Questions Concerning Trade

Permit me now to pass to questions concerning trade. The figures show that in this sphere, as in the industrial sphere, the relative importance of state-based trade is increasing as compared with trade on a private capitalist basis. If we take the total internal trade turn-over before the war as being equal to 20,000 million commodity rubles, we find that the turn-over for 1923-24 amounted to 10,000 million, i.e., 50 per cent of pre-war, while that for 1924-25 equals 14,000 million, i.e., 70 per cent. The general growth of the internal turn-over is beyond doubt. Speaking of the state's share in that turn-over, we find that in 1923-24, the state's share amounted to 45 per cent of the total internal trade turn-over; the share of the co-operatives was 19 per cent, and the share of private capital 35 per cent. In the following year, i.e., in 1924-25, the state's share amounted to 50 per cent; the share of the co-operatives, instead of 19 per cent, was 24.7 per cent, and the share of private capital, instead of 35 per cent, was 24.9 per cent. The share of private capital in the total turn-over is falling; the shares of the state and of the co-operatives are rising. If we divide the turn-over into two parts, wholesale and retail, we shall see the same trend. The state's share of wholesale trade in 1923-24 amounted to something over 62 per cent of the total turn-over; in 1924-25 it amounted to 68.9 per cent. An obvious increase. The share of

the co-operatives shows an increase from 15 to 19 per cent. The share of private trade was 21 per cent; now it is 11 per cent. In retail trade, the state's share in 1923-24 amounted to 16 per cent; in 1924-25 it was almost 23 per cent. The co-operatives' share of retail trade last year was 25.9 per cent, and in 1924-25 it was 32.9 per cent. The growth is beyond doubt. Private capital's share of the retail trade in 1923-24 amounted to 57 per cent; now it is 44.3 per cent. We have obviously crossed the threshold in the sphere of retail trade. Last year, private capital predominated in retail trade; this year, the state and the co-operatives predominate.

The growth of the importance of the state and the co-operatives in the procurement of raw materials and grain is shown by the following figures: oil seeds in 1924-25—65 per cent; flax—94 per cent; raw cotton—almost 100 per cent; grain in 1923-24—75 per cent and in 1924-25—70 per cent. Here we have a slight drop. On the whole, the growth of the state and co-operative bases in the sphere of internal trade is beyond doubt, both as regards wholesale and retail trade.

Although the state's share of grain procurement is preponderant, nevertheless, it is not growing as much as it did last year, and that points to mistakes committed in the procurement of grain. The fact of the matter is that the miscalculation in regard to procurement was a miscalculation not only on the part of the Soviet bodies, but also of the Central Committee, for it is the latter's duty to supervise the Soviet bodies, and it is responsible for everything they do. The miscalculation consists in the fact that when planning we failed to take into account that this year the state of the mar-

ket, the conditions for grain procurement, presented something new, something special, compared with last year and the year before. This is the first year in which we have come into the grain market without resorting to coercive administrative measures, in which we have reduced the burden of taxation, the tax pressure, to a minimum, and in which the peasants and the government's agents come face to face in the market as equals. These were the circumstances that were left out of account by our planning bodies, which intended by January 1, 1926, to procure 70 per cent of the total grain procurement for the year. We failed to take into account the fact that the peasant is also able to manoeuvre, that he puts his currency commodity—wheat—into store for the future in anticipation of a further rise in prices, and prefers, for the time being, to come into the market with other, less valuable grain. That is what we failed to take into account. In view of this, the plan for grain procurement has been revised, and the plan for grain exports has been reduced, just as the plan for imports is also being correspondingly reduced. The exports and imports plan is being revised; it has to show a favourable balance of trade of not less than a hundred million rubles, but it has not yet been finally drawn up.

4. Classes, Their Activity, Their Correlation

The development of the national economy in the country has led to an improvement in the material conditions primarily of the working class. The declassing of the working class has become a thing of the remote

past. The restoration and growth of the working class are proceeding at a rapid rate. Here are the figures according to data of the People's Commissariat of Labour: on April 1, 1924, counting all workers, in all forms of industry, including small-scale industry, including seasonal workers and agricultural labourers, we had 5,500,000 workers, of whom 1,000,000 were agricultural labourers and 760,000 unemployed. On October 1, 1925, we already had over 7,000,000 workers, of whom 1,200,000 were agricultural labourers and 715,000 unemployed. The growth of the working class is beyond doubt.

The average monthly wage per worker in industry as a whole, in chervonets rubles, amounted in April 1925 to 35 rubles, or 62 per cent of the pre-war average. In September 1925 it was 50 rubles, or 88.5 per cent of the pre-war average. Some branches have exceeded the pre-war level. The average daily real wage per worker in commodity rubles amounted in April 1925 to 0.88 ruble and in September 1925 to 1 ruble 21 kopeks. The average output per man-day worked in industry as a whole amounted, in pre-war rubles, to 4.18 in April 1924, but in 1925 it amounted to 6.14, i.e., 85 per cent of the pre-war average. If we take the relation between wages and productivity of labour month by month we shall find that they run in parallel lines: when wages rise, productivity of labour rises. But in June and July wages rose; productivity of labour, however, rose less than wages. That was due to holidays and to the influx of new strata of workers—semi-peasants—into the mills and factories.

Now as regards *wage funds*. According to data of the People's Commissariat of Labour, wage funds

(I have in mind industry, leaving out other branches) amounted in 1923-24 to 808,000,000; in 1924-25 they amounted to over 1,200 million; the estimate for 1925-26 is 1,700 million rubles.

I shall not, comrades, speak of the needs for which the *social insurance* funds are used, everybody knows that. Permit me to mention one general figure to enable you to judge how much the proletarian state spends on workers' insurance. The total number of insured workers in 1924-25 was 6,700,000; the estimate for 1925-26 is 7,000,000. The average assignment calculated on the wage budget amounted in 1924-25 to 14.6 per cent; the estimate for 1925-26 is 13.84 per cent. Expressing this in gross figures, the amount expended on this in 1924-25 was 422,000,000 rubles; the estimate for 1925-26 is 588,000,000. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform you that from the fund that was allocated last year a certain sum was left in the social insurance coffers, amounting to 71,000,000 rubles.

As regards the peasants, the increase in the output of agriculture was naturally bound to be reflected in an improvement in the material conditions of the peasant population. According to data of our planning bodies, the personal consumption of the peasant population, the percentage increase in this consumption, is higher than the percentage increase in the consumption of the urban population. The peasant has begun to feed better, and he retains a far larger share of his production for himself, for his personal consumption, than was the case last year.

What assistance did the proletarian state render the households of the poor peasants, those who had

suffered from the crop failure? The People's Commissariat of Finance calculates that financial assistance to poor peasants in 1924-25 amounted, in preliminary figures, not quite exact, to 100-105 million rubles, of which tax and insurance exemptions constituted about 60,000,000 rubles; furthermore, disbursements from the fund for combating the consequences of the crop failure amounted to 24,000,000 rubles, and credits to 12,000,000 rubles. Assistance to victims of the crop failure in 1924 covered an area with a population of over 7,000,000. The total spent for this purpose amounted to 108-110 million rubles, of which 71,000,000 came from the state budget and 38,000,000 from the funds of public organisations and banking institutions. In addition to this, a fund of 77,000,000 was set up for combating drought. Such was the assistance that the proletarian state rendered the poor strata of the peasantry, inadequate assistance, of course, but such as deserves a word or two of comment.

Improvement of the material conditions of the working class and of the peasantry is a fundamental premise of all progress in the sphere of our construction work. We see that this premise already exists.

A few words about the increase in the activity of the masses. The chief thing in our internal situation, that which strikes the eye and which one cannot possibly get away from, is that as a consequence of the improvement in the material conditions of the workers and peasants there has been an increase in their political activity, they have become more critical in their attitude towards our shortcomings, they are speaking more loudly about the defects in our practical work. We have entered

a period of greater activity of all classes and all social groupings. The working class has become more active, the peasantry, with all its groupings, has become more active, as also the new bourgeoisie, its agents in the countryside (the kulaks) and its representatives among the intelligentsia. This fact served as the basis for the turn in our policy which is expressed in the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference. The policy of revitalising the Soviets, the policy of revitalising the co-operatives and the trade unions, the concessions to the peasantry as regards precise regulation of questions of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, the material assistance for the poor peasants, the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, the elimination of the remnants of war communism—it is these, chiefly, that express the Party's new course in the countryside. You are well aware what the situation was in the countryside at the end of last year and in the beginning of this year. General discontent among the peasantry was growing, and here and there even attempts at revolt occurred. Those were the circumstances which determined the Party's new course in the countryside.

Such are the foundations of the Party's policy towards the peasantry in the period of the rise in the activity and organisation of the masses; a policy calculated to regulate relationships in the countryside, to raise there the prestige of the proletariat and its Party, and to ensure a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasantry.

You know that this policy has fully justified itself.

5. Lenin's Three Slogans on the Peasant Question

Did we act rightly in steering a course towards the middle peasantry? How does the matter stand with the new course from the aspect of principle? Have we any directives from Lenin on this score?

It is said that the Second Congress of the Comintern adopted a resolution on the peasant question stating that only the poor peasants can be the ally of the proletariat in the epoch of the struggle for power, that the middle peasants can only be neutralised. Is that true? It is true. In writing that resolution,⁵⁹ Lenin had in mind parties advancing towards power. We, however, are a party that has already come to power. That is where the difference lies. On the question of the peasantry, on the question of the alliance between the workers and the peasantry, or individual strata of the peasantry, Leninism has three basic slogans, corresponding to the three periods of the revolution. The whole point is correctly to discern the transition from one slogan to the next, and from that to the third.

Formerly, when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, when we Bolsheviks first outlined our tactics in relation to the peasantry, Lenin said: alliance *with the whole* of the peasantry against the tsar and the landlords, at the same time neutralising the Cadet bourgeoisie. With that slogan we, at that time, advanced towards the bourgeois revolution and we achieved victory. That was the first stage of our revolution.

Later, when we had reached the second stage, October, Lenin issued a new slogan, corresponding to the new

situation: alliance of the proletariat *with the poor peasantry* against all the bourgeois, at the same time *neutralising* the middle peasantry. That is a slogan essential for Communist Parties which are advancing towards power. And even when they have won power, but have not yet consolidated it, they cannot count on an alliance with the middle peasant. The middle peasant is a cautious man. He looks round to see who is going to come out on top, he waits, and only when you have gained the upper hand, when you have expelled the landlords and the bourgeois, does he enter into alliance with you. That is the nature of the middle peasant. Hence, at the second stage of the revolution we no longer advanced the slogan of alliance of the workers *with the whole* of the peasantry, but the slogan of alliance of the proletariat *with the poor* peasantry.

And after that? After that, when we had sufficiently consolidated our power, when we had repulsed the attacks of the imperialists and had entered the period of extensive socialist construction, Lenin advanced a third slogan—a *stable alliance* of the proletariat and poor peasantry with the middle peasantry. That is the only correct slogan corresponding to the new period of our revolution, the period of extensive construction. It is correct not only because we can now count on an alliance, but also because, in building socialism, we have to operate not only with millions, but tens of millions of people of the countryside. It is impossible to build socialism otherwise. Socialism does not embrace only the towns. Socialism is that organisation of economy which unites industry and agriculture on the basis of the socialisation of the means and instruments of production.

If those two branches of economy are not united, socialism is impossible.

That is how the matter stands with the slogans of Leninism on alliance with the peasantry.

What Lenin said at the Second Congress of the Comintern was absolutely correct, for when you are advancing towards power, or have not yet managed to consolidate power after capturing it, you can count only on an alliance with the poor peasantry and on neutralising the middle peasantry. But when you have consolidated your position, after you have captured power, have begun to build, and when you already have to operate with tens of millions of people, alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants is the only correct slogan.

This transition from the old slogan "alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry," from the old slogan of neutralising the middle peasantry to the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasantry, took place as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party. Permit me to quote a passage from Ilyich's speech in opening the congress. Here it is:

"The best representatives of socialism of the old days—when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically and ideologically—spoke of *neutralising* the peasantry, i.e., of turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder it, would be neutral and not take the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem is perfectly clear to us. *But it is not enough.* We have entered a *phase of socialist construction in which we must* draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the countryside, and by which

we must be guided in order *to achieve a stable alliance with the middle peasantry.*"*⁶⁰

Such is the theoretical basis of the Party's policy, calculated to achieve in the present historical period a stable alliance with the middle peasantry.

Whoever thinks of using the resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern, which Lenin wrote, to refute these words of Lenin's, let him say so frankly.

That is how the question stands in theory. We do not take a separate part of Lenin's teaching, we take the whole. Lenin had three slogans in relation to the peasantry: one—during the bourgeois revolution, another—during the October Revolution, and a third—after the consolidation of the power of the Soviets. Whoever thinks of substituting some single general slogan for these three, commits a very gross error.

That is how the question stands in theory. In practice, it stands as follows: after carrying through the October Revolution, after expelling the landlords and distributing the land among the peasants, it is clear that we have made Russia into a more or less middle-peasant country, as Lenin expressed it, and today the middle peasants constitute the majority in the countryside, notwithstanding the process of differentiation.

Differentiation is, of course, proceeding. Under NEP at the present stage, it cannot be otherwise. But it is proceeding at a slow pace. Recently, I read a handbook, issued, I think, by the Agitation and Propaganda

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Department of the Central Committee, and another handbook, issued, if I am not mistaken, by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Leningrad organisation. If we are to believe these handbooks, it appears that under the tsar the poor peasants in this country constituted somewhere about 60 per cent, but now they constitute 75 per cent; that under the tsar the kulaks constituted 5 per cent, but now—8 or 12 per cent; under the tsar there were so many middle peasants, but now there are fewer. I don't want to indulge in strong language, but it must be said that these figures are worse than counter-revolution. How can a man who thinks in a Marxist way invent a thing like that, and print it, too, and in a handbook at that? As a member of the Central Committee, I, too, of course, am answerable for this incredible blunder. If, under the tsar, a policy of creating kulaks was practised, private property in land existed and land could be bought and sold (which exceptionally aggravates differentiation), if the government was such that it forced differentiation to the utmost, and, for all that, the poor peasants constituted no more than 60 per cent, how could it happen that under our government, under the Soviet Government, when private property in land does not exist, i.e., the land is withdrawn from circulation and, consequently, this obstacle to differentiation exists, after we have been busy with dekulakisation for a couple of years and to this day have not abandoned all methods of dekulakisation, when we are conducting a special credit and co-operative policy which is unfavourable to differentiation—how could it happen that with these obstacles it turns out, allegedly, that there is much more differentiation

today than under the tsar, many more kulaks and poor peasants than in the past? How can people who call themselves Marxists talk such absurd nonsense? It is at once comic and tragic. (*Laughter.*)

The same must be said about the ill-starred grain and fodder balance sheet issued by the Central Statistical Board in June, according to which the well-to-do peasants held 61 per cent of the surplus market grain, the poor peasants none, while the middle peasants held the rest. The funny thing about this is that a few months later the C.S.B. came out with a different figure: not 61 per cent, but 52 per cent. And recently, the C.S.B. has given a figure, not 52 per cent this time, but 42 per cent. Is that the way to calculate? We believe that the C.S.B. is a citadel of science. We are of the opinion that without the C.S.B.'s figures not a single administrative body could calculate or plan. We consider that the C.S.B. should provide objective statistics free from all pre-conceived opinions, for the attempt to fit statistics to any pre-conceived opinion is a crime. But, after this, how can we believe the C.S.B.'s figures if it has ceased to believe them itself?

More briefly. Since we have made the countryside middle-peasant in character as a result of the agrarian revolution, since the middle peasants constitute the majority in the countryside, in spite of the process of differentiation, and since our work of construction and Lenin's co-operative plan call for the enlistment of the bulk of the peasant masses in this work, then the policy of alliance with the middle peasants is, under NEP conditions, the only correct policy.

Such is the practical aspect of the question.

See how Lenin formulated our tasks when he gave the grounds for the New Economic Policy. Before me lies the draft of the pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*, written by Lenin, in which he clearly and distinctly gives the fundamental guiding lines:

“Now, increasing the output of produce is becoming (has become) the *pivot*, the *touchstone*. . . . Consequently: ‘stake’ on the middle peasants in agriculture.

“The diligent peasant as the ‘central figure’ of our economic upsurge” (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 312-13).

Thus, stake on the middle peasant in agriculture, the diligent peasant as the central figure of our economic upsurge. That is what Comrade Lenin wrote in 1921.

It was this idea, comrades, that served as the basis of the decisions and of the concessions to the peasantry adopted at the Fourteenth, April, Conference of our Party.

In what relation do the resolutions of the Fourteenth, April, Party Conference stand to the resolution on work among the poor peasants that the Central Committee unanimously adopted in October,⁶¹ just as it unanimously adopted the resolutions of the Fourteenth Conference? The main task that confronted us at the October Plenum of the Central Committee was to prevent the disruption of the policy we had worked out at the April Conference, the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants; to prevent the disruption of this policy, for sentiments were observed in the Party expressing the view that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants was wrong or unsuitable. Sentiments were also

observed expressing the view that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants implied forgetting the poor peasants, that somebody was trying to bring about a stable alliance with the middle peasants over the heads of the poor peasants. That is silly, comrades, but it is a fact, for such sentiments did exist. Was the question of the poor peasants something new for us when we gathered at the October Plenum? Of course not. As long as there are poor peasants, we must be in alliance with them. We learned that as far back as 1903, when Lenin's pamphlet *To the Village Poor*⁶² first appeared. Precisely because we are Marxists, because we are Communists, we must lean on the poor peasants in the countryside. Upon whom else can we lean? This question is not a new one; there was nothing new in it for us, whether in April or in October, whether at the conference or at the plenum of the Central Committee, nor could there be anything new in it. If the question of the poor peasants did come up after all, it did so in connection with the experience we had gained during the elections to the Soviets. What did we find? We had revitalised the Soviets. We had begun to implant Soviet democracy. But what for? After all, Soviet democracy means leadership by the working class. No Soviet democracy can be called genuinely Soviet and genuinely proletarian democracy if there is no leadership there by the proletariat and by its Party. But what does Soviet democracy with the leadership of the proletariat mean? It means that the proletariat must have its agents in the countryside. Who must those agents be? Representatives of the poor peasants. But in what condition did the poor peasants find themselves when we revitalised the Soviets?

In the most scattered and dispersed condition. It seemed, not only to certain elements among the poor peasants, but also to certain Communists, that abandoning dekulakisation and administrative pressure meant abandoning the poor peasants, forgetting their interests. And instead of conducting an organised struggle against the kulaks, they began to whine in the most disgraceful manner.

What had to be done to overcome those sentiments? Firstly, it was necessary to carry out the task that the Fourteenth Party Conference had set the Party, i.e., to define the conditions, methods and measures for providing material assistance for the poor peasants. Secondly, it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising special groups of poor peasants for conducting an open political struggle to win over the middle peasants and to isolate the kulaks during the elections to the Soviets, elections in the co-operatives, etc.

That is exactly what Comrade Molotov did in the theses on work among the poor peasants, as a result of his three months' work on the Rural Commission of the Central Committee, theses that were unanimously approved by the October Plenum of the Central Committee.

As you see, the resolution of the October Plenum of the Central Committee is the direct continuation of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference.

It was necessary, firstly, to present the question of material assistance concretely, so as to improve the material conditions of the poor peasants; and, secondly, it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising the poor peasants. That is the new feature, the credit for

which belongs wholly to Comrade Molotov; the slogan of organising groups of poor peasants was his idea.

Why was the slogan of organising groups of poor peasants needed? It was needed in order to put an end to the dispersion of the poor peasants and to give them an opportunity of organising, with the aid of the Communists, into an independent political force capable of serving as an organised bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside in the struggle against the kulaks, in the struggle to win over the middle peasants. The poor peasants are still imbued with a dependent mentality; they put their hopes in the GPU, in officials, in whatever you like, except in themselves, in their own strength. It is from this passivity and dependent mentality that the minds of the poor peasants must be freed. We must issue the slogan for the poor peasants that they must, at last, stand on their own feet, that they must, with the aid of the Communist Party and with the aid of the state, organise themselves into groups; that in the arena of the Soviets, in the arena of the co-operatives, in the arena of the Peasant Committees, in all the arenas of rural public life, they must learn to fight the kulaks, to fight, however, not by appealing to the GPU, but by a political struggle, by an organised struggle. Only in that way can the poor peasants become steeled, only in that way can the poor peasants be organised, only in that way can the poor peasants be transformed from a dependent group into a bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside.

That is why the question of the poor peasants was brought forward in October.

6. Two Dangers and Two Deviations in Regard to the Peasant Question

In connection with the peasant question, two deviations are observed in our Party. A deviation in the direction of belittling the kulak danger, and a deviation in the direction of exaggerating it, in the direction of belittling and under-estimating the role of the middle peasants. I will not say that there is anything fatal for us in these deviations. A deviation is a deviation; a deviation is something that has not yet taken definite shape. A deviation is the beginning of an error. Either we allow this error to develop—and then things will become serious; or we nip it in the bud—and then the danger will be removed. A deviation is something erroneous that will produce its results later if not checked in time.

A word or two about under-estimating the kulak danger. There is talk about a kulak deviation. That is foolish, of course. There cannot be a kulak deviation in the Party. The point at issue is not a kulak deviation, but a deviation in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger. Even if nobody had fallen victim to this deviation, even if nobody had adopted the standpoint of this deviation, some people would have done so eventually, because development in our country is proceeding in the direction of some revival of capitalism, and the revival of capitalism is bound to create confusion around our Party. On the other hand, socialist industry is developing in our country, and a struggle is going on between it and private capital. Which will outstrip the other? At present, preponderance is on the side of the

socialist elements. We shall get both the kulaks and the urban private capitalists under our control. So far, however, the fact remains that the kulaks are growing, and we have not beaten them economically by a long way yet. The kulaks are mustering their forces, that is indisputable; and whoever fails to see this, whoever says that this is of no importance, that the kulak is a bogey, puts the Party in danger of losing its vigilance and of finding itself disarmed in the struggle against the kulaks, in the struggle against capitalism, for the kulak is the agent of capitalism in the countryside.

There is talk about Bogushevsky. Of course, his is not a kulak deviation. His deviation is in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger. If his were a kulak deviation, he would have to be expelled from the Party. Up to now, however, as far as I know, nobody has demanded his expulsion from the Party. This deviation is in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger in the countryside, a deviation which hinders us from keeping the Party in a constant state of readiness for the struggle, and which disarms the Party in its struggle against the capitalist elements; as is known, this deviation was condemned by the decision of the Central Committee of the Party.

But there is another deviation—in the direction of over-estimating the kulak danger, in the direction of consternation in face of the kulak danger, in the direction of panic: “The kulak is coming, help!” A strange thing! People introduced NEP, knowing that NEP is a revival of capitalism, a revival of the kulaks, that the kulaks would inevitably raise their heads. But it was enough for the kulaks to appear for people

to start shouting "help!" and to lose their heads. And their consternation reached such a point that they forgot about the middle peasants. And yet, the basic task in the countryside at the present time lies in the fight to win over the middle peasants, the fight to wrest the middle peasants from the kulaks, the fight to isolate the kulaks by establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That is forgotten by those comrades who have become panic-stricken in the face of the kulak danger.

I think that if we delved down to the roots of these two deviations it would be possible to trace them to the following starting points.

The first deviation consists in belittling the role of the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, in the countryside, in slurring over the kulak danger. It starts out from the wrong assumption that the development of NEP does not lead to the revival of the capitalist elements in the countryside, that in our country the kulaks, and the capitalist elements generally, are passing, or have already passed, into the sphere of history, that differentiation is not taking place in the countryside, that the kulaks are an echo of the past, a bogey, and nothing more.

What does that deviation lead to?

In practice, that deviation leads to the denial of the class struggle in the countryside.

The second deviation consists in exaggerating the role of the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, in the countryside, in becoming panic-stricken in the face of those elements, in denying that an alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants is possible and expedient.

That deviation starts from the belief that what is taking place in the countryside is a simple restoration of capitalism, that this process of the restoration of capitalism is an all-absorbing process that also embraces the whole, or the overwhelming part, of our co-operatives, that the result of such a development must be a continuous and large-scale growth of differentiation among the peasantry, that the extreme groups, i.e., the kulaks and the poor peasants, must grow in strength and numbers year by year, while year by year, too, the middle groups, i.e., the middle peasants, grow weaker and melt away.

In practice, that deviation leads to fomenting class struggle in the countryside, to a reversion to the dekulakisation policy of the Poor Peasants' Committees, consequently, to proclaiming civil war in our country, and thus to the disruption of all our work of construction, and thereby to the repudiation of Lenin's co-operative plan for drawing the millions of peasant farms into the system of socialist construction.

You will ask: which deviation is worse? It is wrong to put the question that way. One is as bad as the other. And if those deviations are allowed to develop they may disintegrate and destroy the Party. Fortunately there are forces in our Party capable of ridding it of both deviations. (*Applause.*) Although one deviation is as bad as the other, and it is foolish to ask which of them is more dangerous, nevertheless, there is another point of view from which these two deviations must be approached. Against which deviation is the Party best prepared to fight—the first or the second? That is how, in practice, the question should be put. Both deviations are dangerous, one is as bad as the other; it is wrong to ask which of

them is more dangerous; but it is possible and necessary to ask: against which deviation is the Party best prepared to fight? If we were to ask Communists what the Party is better prepared for—to strip the kulaks, or not to do that but to go in for an alliance with the middle peasants—I think that 99 Communists out of 100 would say that the Party is best prepared for the slogan: strike at the kulaks. Just let them—they would strip the kulaks in a moment. As for refraining from dekulakisation and pursuing the more complex policy of isolating the kulaks by entering into an alliance with the middle peasants—that is something not so easily assimilated. That is why I think that in its struggle against both deviations, the Party must, after all, concentrate its fire on the second deviation. (*Applause.*) No talk of Marxism, no talk of Leninism can cover up the thesis that the kulaks are dangerous. The kulaks are kulaks, they are dangerous, no matter how much Bogushevsky may talk about bogeys. No quotations can obliterate this from the mind of a Communist. But the thesis that a stable alliance with the middle peasants is necessary—although Ilyich, in the resolution of the Second Congress, wrote about neutralising the middle peasants—this thesis can always be slurred over, obscured with phrases about Leninism, about Marxism. Here there is a rich field for quotations, here there is a rich field for everyone who wants to confuse the Party, who wants to conceal the truth from the Party, the truth that in relation to the peasantry Lenin had not one, but three slogans. Here, all sorts of manipulations can be performed in regard to Marxism. And precisely for that reason, fire must be concentrated on the second deviation.

That is how the matter stands with the question of the internal situation in the Union, its economy, its industry and agriculture, the classes, the activity of the classes, the revitalisation of the Soviets, the peasantry, and so forth.

I shall not stop to deal with certain questions concerning the state apparatus, which is growing and is striving to escape from leadership by the Party, in which, of course, it will not succeed.

Nor shall I speak about the bureaucracy of our state apparatus; I shall not do so because my report has already taken too long. I shall not deal with that question because it is in no way a new one for the Party.

7. The Party's Tasks

I pass to the Party's tasks in the sphere of internal policy.

In the sphere of *developing the national economy* as a whole we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of further increasing the output of the national economy;

b) in the direction of transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial country;

c) in the direction of ensuring within the national economy a decisive preponderance of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements;

d) in the direction of ensuring for the national economy of the Soviet Union the necessary independence in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement;

e) in the direction of increasing the proportion of non-tax revenue in the total state budget.

In the sphere of *industry and agriculture* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of expanding our socialist industry on a higher technical level, of increasing the productivity of labour, reducing the cost of production and accelerating the turn-over of capital;

b) in the direction of bringing the balance of output of fuel and metals, and also the fixed capital of railway transport, into conformity with the country's growing requirements;

c) in the direction of accelerating the development of Soviet local industry;

d) in the direction of increasing the fertility of the soil, raising the technical level of agriculture, developing the cultivation of industrial crops, industrialising agriculture;

e) in the direction of drawing the scattered peasant farms into socialist construction by organising co-operatives on a mass scale and by raising the cultural level of the peasantry.

In the sphere of *trade* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of expanding further and improving the quality of the network of trading channels (co-operatives of all kinds, state trade);

b) in the direction of accelerating trade turn-over to the utmost;

c) in the direction of reducing retail prices and further increasing the preponderance of Soviet and co-operative trade over private trade;

d) in the direction of establishing a united front and strict discipline in procurement among all the procurement bodies;

e) in the direction of increasing the trade turn-over with the outside world, while ensuring a favourable balance of trade, and hence, a favourable balance of payments, which is an indispensable condition for maintaining the stability of our currency and a necessary guarantee against inflation.

In the sphere of *planning*, we must conduct work in the direction of absolutely ensuring the necessary reserves.

A word or two, by the way, about one of the sources of reserves—vodka. There are people who think that it is possible to build socialism in white gloves. That is a very gross mistake, comrades. Since we are not receiving loans, since we are poor in capital, and since, furthermore, we cannot go into bondage to the West-European capitalists, not being able to accept the enslaving terms that they offer us and which we have rejected, only one alternative remains—to seek sources in other spheres. After all, that is better than bondage. Here we have to choose between bondage and vodka, and those people who think that it is possible to build socialism in white gloves are grievously mistaken.

In the sphere of the *correlation of classes* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of ensuring an alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the middle peasants;

b) in the direction of ensuring the leadership of the proletariat in this alliance;

c) in the direction of politically isolating and economically ousting the kulaks and the urban capitalists.

In the sphere of *Soviet affairs* we must work in the direction of a resolute struggle against bureaucracy, in

the direction of enlisting the broad masses of the working class in this struggle.

I should like to say a word or two about the new bourgeoisie and its ideologists—the Smena-Vekhites. Smena-Vekhism is the ideology of the new bourgeoisie, which is growing and little by little linking up with the kulaks and the intelligentsia in the government service. The new bourgeoisie has put forward its own ideology, the Smena-Vekh ideology, which consists in the view that the Communist Party is bound to degenerate and the new bourgeoisie to consolidate itself, while it appears that, without ourselves noticing it, we Bolsheviks are bound to reach the threshold of the democratic republic, then to cross that threshold and, with the assistance of some “Caesar,” who will come forward, perhaps from the ranks of the military, or perhaps from the government service officials, to find ourselves in the position of an ordinary bourgeois republic.

Such is the new ideology with which attempts are being made to fool our government service intelligentsia, and not only them, but also certain circles that stand close to us. I shall not refute the thesis that our Party is degenerating. It is not worth while refuting nonsense. Our Party is not degenerating, and will not do so. It is not made of such stuff, and it was not forged by such a man, that it should degenerate. (*Applause.*) Our cadres, young and old, are growing ideologically. It is a fortunate thing for us that we have managed to publish several editions of Lenin’s *Works*. People are now reading, learning and beginning to understand. Not only the leaders, but also the average Party members are beginning to understand, and they cannot be fooled. Shouting about degeneration

will not frighten anybody now. People will be able to see clearly for themselves. Those others can shout as much as they please, they may try to frighten us with quotations as much as they please, but the average Party member will listen and see clearly, because he now has the works of Lenin in his hands. (*Applause.*) That fact is one of the fundamental guarantees that our Party will not depart from the path of Leninism. (*Loud applause.*)

If I have mentioned the Smena-Vekhites after all, it is only in order to answer in a few words all those who are counting on the degeneration of our Party and our Central Committee. Ustryalov is the author of this ideology. He is in the transport service. It is said that he is serving well. I think that if he is serving well, let him go on dreaming about the degeneration of our Party. Dreaming is not prohibited in our country. Let him dream to his heart's content. But let him know that while dreaming about our degeneration, he must, at the same time, bring grist to our Bolshevik mill. Otherwise, it will go badly with him. (*Applause.*)

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party. I do not put the Party at the end of my report because it is the last in importance of all the factors of our development. No, not because of that, but because, with us, the Party crowns the whole edifice.

I have spoken about the successes that the proletarian dictatorship has achieved in the sphere of foreign and internal policy, in the sphere of manoeuvring abroad, in

the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement, and in the sphere of socialist construction within the country. But these successes would not have been possible had our Party not been equal to its tasks, had it not grown and gained strength. The Party's importance in this respect, as the guiding force, is immeasurable. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not exercised automatically; it is exercised primarily by the Party's forces, under its leadership. Without the Party's leadership, in the present conditions of capitalist encirclement, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible. It would be enough to shake the Party, to weaken it, for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be shaken and weakened in an instant. It is precisely for this reason that all the bourgeois in all countries talk with such fury about our Party.

By that I do not at all mean to say that our Party is identical with the state. Not in the least. The Party is the guiding force in our state. It would be foolish to say on these grounds, as some comrades do, that the Political Bureau is the supreme organ in the state. That is not true. It is a confusion that brings grist to the mill of our enemies. The Political Bureau is the supreme organ not of the state, but of the Party, while the Party is the supreme guiding force in the state. The Central Committee and the Political Bureau are organs of the Party. I do not want to identify the state institutions with the Party. All I want to say is that in all the fundamental questions of our internal and foreign policy, the Party has played the leading role. And it was solely due to this that we achieved successes in our internal and foreign policy. That is why the question of the Party's composition, of its ideological level, of the Party's cadres, of

its ability to guide in the presentation of questions concerning economic construction and Soviet affairs, of its weight in the working class and among the peasantry, and, lastly, of its internal condition generally—is a fundamental question of our policy.

First of all, about the Party's composition. The total numerical strength of the Party by April 1, 1924, not including the Lenin Enrolment, amounted to 446,000 Party members and candidates. Of these, workers numbered 196,000, i.e., 44 per cent; peasants, 128,000, i.e., 28.8 per cent; office employees and others, 121,000, i.e., 27.2 per cent. By July 1, 1925, we had in the Party not 446,000, but 911,000 members and candidates; of these, workers—534,000, i.e., 58.6 per cent; peasants—216,000, i.e., 23.8 per cent; office employees and others—160,000, i.e., 17.6 per cent. On November 1, 1925, we had 1,025,000 Communists.

What percentage of the working class (if we take the whole working class) is organised in our Party? At the Thirteenth Congress I said in my report on organisation that the total number of workers in our country was 4,100,000 (including agricultural workers). I did not then include the workers employed in small industry who could not be counted, as social insurance had not yet been extended to them and statistics did not deal with them. At that time I gave the figures for January 1924. Later, when it became possible to take into account the workers employed in small industry, it was found that by July 1, 1924, the total number of workers was 5,500,000, including agricultural workers. Of these, 390,000 workers, i.e., 7 per cent of the entire working class, were in the Party. By July 1, 1925, the workers

numbered 6,500,000; of these, 534,000, i.e., 8 per cent of the entire working class, were in the Party. By October 1, 1925, we had 7,000,000 workers, agricultural and industrial, of small, medium and large-scale industry without distinction. Of these, 570,000, i.e., 8 per cent, were in the Party.

I am saying all this in order to show how unreasonable it is to talk about getting 90 per cent of the entire working class in the country organised in the Party in one or two years.

Now let us see in what proportion the working class section of the R.C.P.(B.) stands to the number of workers employed in statistically registered industry. The number of permanent workers, not seasonal, in large-scale statistically registered industry, state and non-state, including also the war industry, the chief railway workshops and main depots—the number of workers in all these branches, by January 1, 1924, was 1,605,000. At that time we had 196,000 workers in the Party. That amounts to 12 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. If, however, we take the number of workers at the bench who are Party members and see what percentage of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry they represent, we shall find that by January 1 we had in the Party 83,000 workers at the bench, and that they constituted 5 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. All this was by January 1, 1924. By June 1, 1924, 1,780,000 workers were employed in large-scale industry; in the Party at that time there were 389,000 workers, i.e., 21.8 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale

industry. Of workers at the bench, there were 267,000 in the Party, i.e., 15 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. By January 1, 1925, 1,845,000 workers were employed in large-scale statistically registered industry; the total number of workers in the Party, those at the bench and those not at the bench, was 429,000, i.e., 23.2 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry; of workers at the bench, we had in the Party 302,000, i.e., 16.3 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. By July 1, 1925, 2,094,000 workers were employed in large-scale industry; the number of workers in the Party was 534,000, i.e., 25.5 per cent; the number of workers at the bench was 383,000, i.e., 18.2 percent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry.

You see that, whereas in relation to the entire working class the growth of the proportion of workers organised in the Party to the total working class is slower than the growth of the working class itself, in large-scale industry we have the opposite: the growth of the percentage of workers in the Party is faster than the growth of the working class in large-scale industry. That must be noted in order to have in mind what our Party's complexion is like when we speak of its working-class core; it consists mainly of workers employed in large-scale industry.

Can we now, looking at all this, speak of bringing the number of workers at the bench in the Party up to 90 per cent in the course of one year? No, we cannot, because we do not want to indulge in fantasy. Because, since we have 380,000 workers at the bench in the Party, then, to get all the rest—that is about 700,000 not at the

bench—to constitute 10 per cent, we would have to raise the Party membership in the course of one year to 7,000,000. The comrades have simply failed to count, and have put their foot in it with their figure of 90 per cent.

Is the Party's weight in the working class growing? This self-evident truth scarcely needs proof. You know that our Party is, in essence, a party elected by the working class. In this respect we have achieved what no other party in the world has achieved. This fact alone shows that our Party's weight in the ranks of the working class is immeasurable, and that our Party enjoys a monopoly in the working class.

As regards our Party's weight in the countryside, the situation is rather displeasing. At the time of the Thirteenth Congress, the rural population from the age of 18 to 60 in our country amounted to 53,000,000; at the time of the Fourteenth Congress it is over 54,000,000. But the Communists in village units of the Party at the time of the Thirteenth Congress numbered 136,000, i.e., 0.26 per cent of the total adult rural population; at the time of the Fourteenth Congress we have 202,000 peasants in the Party, i.e., 0.37 per cent. Our Party's growth in the countryside is terribly slow. I do not mean to say that it ought to grow by leaps and bounds, but the percentage of the peasantry that we have in the Party is, after all, very insignificant. Our Party is a workers' party. Workers will always preponderate in it. That is an expression of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it is also clear that without an alliance with the peasantry the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible, that the Party must have a certain percentage of the best people among the peas-

antry in its ranks as an essential foothold in the countryside. From this aspect, matters are still far from well.

Further, I must note a general rise in our Party's ideological level. As regards the organisational side, Comrade Molotov will report to you and, therefore, I shall not dwell on it; but I cannot refrain from saying one thing, namely, that all the evidence shows that the ideological level of our leading cadres, young and old, has risen considerably. One could take as an example the discussion we had with Trotskyism last year. As you know, the point at issue was the revision of Leninism, changing the leadership of the Party while on the march, so to speak. How solidly the Party encountered that anti-Party wave, you all know. What does that show? It shows that the Party has grown up. Its cadres have become strong; it is not afraid of discussion. Today, unfortunately, we have entered the period of a new discussion. I am sure that the Party will quickly get over this discussion too and nothing exceptional can happen. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*) In order not to anticipate events and not to irritate people, I shall not at the present moment touch upon the essence of the Leningrad comrades' behaviour at their conference and upon the way the Moscow comrades reacted to it. I think that the members of this congress will speak about that themselves, and I shall sum up in my reply to the discussion.

I am coming to the end of my report.

I have spoken about our foreign policy, about the contradictions that are corroding the capitalist world. I said that those contradictions can be overcome only by a workers' revolution in the West.

Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions within the framework of which our interrelations, the interrelations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist states, develop. I said that those states will strive to convert our country into an appendage of the capitalist system, that they will try intervention against us, but that we shall repel them; that in this we count on the utmost support of the working class in the West, particularly after the workers of the West have begun to visit us frequently and to fraternise with us. Moreover, we are of the opinion that for the capitalists this fraternisation will not be without its cost. We are overcoming those contradictions too. But in the last analysis, we cannot overcome the contradictions outside our country between the capitalist world and the socialist world solely by our own efforts; for that we need the assistance of a victorious proletarian revolution in a number of countries.

Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions within our country, between the capitalist elements and the socialist elements. I said that we can overcome these contradictions by our own efforts. Whoever does not believe that this is possible is a liquidator, does not believe that we can build socialism. We shall overcome these contradictions; we are already doing so. Of course, the sooner assistance comes from the West the better, the sooner shall we overcome these contradictions in order to deliver the finishing stroke to private capital and to achieve the complete victory of socialism in our country, the building of a complete socialist society. But even if we do not receive outside assistance we shall not become despondent, we shall not cry out for help, we shall not abandon our work (*applause*) and we shall not be daunted

by difficulties. Whoever is weary, whoever is scared by difficulties, whoever is losing his head, let him make way for those who have retained their courage and staunchness. (*Applause.*) We are not the kind of people to be scared by difficulties. We are Bolsheviki, we have been steeled by Lenin, and we do not run away from difficulties, but face them and overcome them. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

Furthermore, comrades, I have spoken about our Party's successes and mistakes. Of mistakes there have been not a few. In the field of foreign trade, in the field of procurement, and in several other of our fields of work there have been not a few mistakes. Ilyich taught us not to become conceited. We shall not become conceited. There have been not a few mistakes. But there are also successes. Whatever the case may be, we have achieved one thing that cannot possibly be taken from us, namely, that by our extensive constructive work, by our Bolshevik assault on the economic front, by the successes we have gained in this field, we have shown the whole world that the workers, after capturing power, are able not only to beat capitalism, not only to destroy, but also to build the new society, to build socialism. That achievement, the fact that we have made this truth obvious, nobody can take from us. That is the biggest and most difficult of all our achievements up to now. For we have shown the working class of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East that the workers, who throughout history were able only to work for masters, while the masters governed, that these workers, after capturing power, have proved capable of governing a great country, of building socialism under the most difficult conditions.

What is needed to enable the proletarians of the West to win? First of all, confidence in their own strength, the consciousness that the working class can do without the bourgeoisie, that the working class is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, of building socialism. The entire work of Social-Democracy consists in imbuing the workers with scepticism, with distrust in their own strength, with disbelief in the possibility of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie by force. The significance of all our work, of all our construction, lies in that this work and this construction convince the working class in the capitalist countries that it can do without the bourgeoisie and can build the new society by its own efforts.

The workers' pilgrimages to our country, the fact that the workers' delegations that come to our country probe every detail of our work of construction and try to get the feel of our successes in construction, all this shows that, in spite of the Social-Democrats, the working class in the capitalist countries is beginning to acquire confidence in its own strength and in the ability of the working class to build the new society on the ruins of the old.

I do not say that we have achieved much during the year under review, but, after all, one thing must be admitted, namely, that by our successes in socialist construction we have demonstrated and proved that the working class, after overthrowing the bourgeoisie and taking power into its own hands, is capable of rebuilding capitalist society on a socialist basis. This we have achieved, and nobody can take this from us, whatever happens. This success is inestimable. For what does its

achievement mean? It means giving the workers in the capitalist countries confidence in their own strength, confidence in their victory. It means placing into their hands a new weapon against the bourgeoisie. That they are taking up this weapon and are prepared to use it is evident if only from the fact that workers' pilgrimages to our country are not ceasing, but are becoming more numerous. And when the workers in the capitalist countries become imbued with confidence in their own strength, you may be sure that this will be the beginning of the end of capitalism and a sure sign of the victory of the proletarian revolution.

That is why I think that we are not working in vain in building socialism. That is why I think that in this work we are bound to achieve victory on an international scale. (*Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire congress.*)

**REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION
ON THE POLITICAL REPORT
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

December 23

Comrades, I shall not answer separately the notes on particular questions, because the whole of my speech in reply to the discussion will in substance be an answer to these notes.

Nor do I intend to answer personal attacks or any verbal thrusts of a purely personal character, for I think that the congress is in possession of sufficient material with which to verify the motives of those attacks and what is behind them.

Nor shall I deal with the "cave men," the people who gathered somewhere near Kislovodsk and devised all sorts of schemes in regard to the organs of the Central Committee. Well, let them make schemes, that is their business. I should only like to emphasise that Lashevich, who spoke here with aplomb against politics of scheming, was himself found to be one of the schemers and, it turns out, at the "cave men's" conference near Kislovodsk he played a role that was far from unimportant. Well, so much for him. (*Laughter.*)

I pass to the matter in hand.

1. SOKOLNIKOV AND THE DAWESATION OF OUR COUNTRY

First of all, a few rejoinders. First rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He said in his speech: “When Stalin indicated two general lines, two lines in the building of our economy, he misled us, because he should have formulated these two lines differently, he should have talked not about importing equipment, but about importing finished goods.” I assert that this statement of Sokolnikov’s utterly exposes him as a supporter of Shanin’s theses. I want to say that here Sokolnikov in point of fact speaks as an advocate of the Dawesation of our country. What did I speak about in my report? Did I speak about the exports and imports plan? Of course not. Everybody knows that we *are obliged at present* to import equipment. But Sokolnikov converts this necessity into a principle, a theory, a prospect of development. That is where Sokolnikov’s mistake lies. In my report I spoke about two fundamental, guiding, general lines in building our national economy. I spoke about that in order to clear up the question of the ways of ensuring for our country independent economic development in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. In my report I spoke about our general line, about our prospects as regards transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial country. What is an agrarian country? An agrarian country is one that exports agricultural produce and imports equipment, but does not itself manufacture, or manufactures very little, equipment (machinery, etc.) by its own efforts. If we get stranded at the stage of development at which we have to import equip-

ment and machinery and not produce them by our own efforts, we can have no guarantee against the conversion of our country into an appendage of the capitalist system. That is precisely why we must steer a course towards the development of the production of the means of production in our country. Can it be that Sokolnikov fails to understand such an elementary thing? Yet it was only about this that I spoke in my report.

What does the Dawes Plan demand? It demands that Germany should pump out money for the payment of reparations from markets, chiefly from our Soviet markets. What follows from this? From this it follows that Germany will supply us with equipment, we shall import it and export agricultural produce. We, i.e., our industry, will thus find itself tethered to Europe. That is precisely the basis of the Dawes Plan. Concerning that, I said in my report, in so far as it affects our country, the Dawes Plan is built on sand. Why? "Because," I said, "we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, including Germany," because, "we ourselves will manufacture machinery and other means of production." The conversion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country able to produce the equipment it needs by its own efforts—that is the essence, the basis of our general line. We must so arrange things that the thoughts and strivings of our business executives are directed precisely towards this aspect, the aspect of transforming our country from one that imports equipment into one that manufactures this equipment. For that is the chief guarantee of the economic independence of our country. For that is the guarantee that our country will not be

converted into an appendage of the capitalist countries. Sokolnikov refuses to understand this simple and obvious thing. They, the authors of the Dawes Plan, would like to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, calico; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only calico, but also the machinery needed for manufacturing calico. They would like us to restrict ourselves to the manufacture of, say, automobiles; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only automobiles, but also the machinery for making automobiles. They want to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, shoes; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only shoes, but also the machinery for making shoes. And so on, and so forth.

That is the difference between the two general lines; and that is what Sokolnikov refuses to understand.

To abandon our line means abandoning the tasks of socialist construction, means adopting the standpoint of the Dawesation of our country.

2. KAMENEV AND OUR CONCESSIONS TO THE PEASANTRY

Second rejoinder—to Kamenev. He said that by adopting at the Fourteenth Party Conference the well-known decisions on economic development, on revitalising the Soviets, on eliminating the survivals of war communism, on precise regulation of the question of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, we had made concessions to the kulaks and not to the peasants, that these are concessions not to the peasantry, but to the capitalist elements. Is that true? I assert that it is not

true; that it is a slander against the Party. I assert that a Marxist cannot approach the question in that way; that only a Liberal can approach the question in that way.

What are the concessions that we made at the Fourteenth Party Conference? Do those concessions fit into the framework of NEP, or not? Undoubtedly they do. Perhaps we expanded NEP at the April Conference? Let the opposition answer: Did we expand NEP in April, or not? If we expanded it, why did they vote for the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference? And is it not well known that we are all opposed to an expansion of NEP? What is the point, then? The point is that Kamenev has got himself mixed up; for NEP includes permission of trade, capitalism, hired labour; and the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference are an expression of NEP, which was introduced when Lenin was with us. Did Lenin know that in the first stages, NEP would be taken advantage of primarily by the capitalists, the merchants, the kulaks? Of course he knew. But did Lenin say that in introducing NEP we were making concessions to the profiteers and capitalist elements and not to the peasantry? No, he did not and could not say that. On the contrary, he always said that, in permitting trade and capitalism, and in changing our policy in the direction of NEP, we were making concessions to the peasantry for the sake of maintaining and strengthening our bond with it; since under the given conditions, the peasantry could not exist without trade, without some revival of capitalism being permitted; since at the given time we could not establish the bond in any way except through trade; since only in that way could we strengthen the bond and build the foundations of

a socialist economy. That is how Lenin approached the question of concessions. That is how the question of the concessions made in April 1925 should be approached.

Allow me to read to you Lenin's opinion on this subject. This is how he substantiated the Party's transition to the new policy, to the policy of NEP, in his address on "The Tax in Kind" at the conference of secretaries of Party units of the Moscow Gubernia:

"I want to dwell on the question how this policy can be reconciled with the point of view of communism, and how it comes about that the communist Soviet state is facilitating the development of free trade. Is this good from the point of view of communism? In order to answer this question we must carefully examine the changes that have taken place in peasant economy. At first the position was that we saw the whole of the peasantry fighting against the rule of the landlords. The landlords were equally opposed by the poor peasants and the kulaks, although, of course, with different intentions: the kulaks fought with the aim of taking the land from the landlords and developing their own farming on it. It was then that it became revealed that the kulaks and the poor peasants had different interests and different aims. In the Ukraine, even today, we see this difference of interests much more clearly than here. The poor peasants could obtain very little direct advantage from the transfer of the land from the landlords because they had neither the materials nor the implements for that. And we saw the poor peasants organising to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land that had been taken from the landlords. The Soviet Government assisted the Poor Peasants' Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine. What was the result? *The result was that the middle peasants became the predominant element in the countryside. . . .* The extremes of kulaks and poor peasants have diminished; the majority of the population has come nearer to the position of the middle peasant. If we want to raise the productivity of our peasant economy we must first of all reckon with the middle peasant. *It was in accordance with this circumstance that the Communist Party had to mould its*

policy. . . . Thus, the change in the policy towards the peasantry is to be explained by the change in the position of the peasantry itself. The countryside has become more middle-peasant, and in order to increase the productive forces we must reckon with this"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-05).

And in the same volume, on page 247, Lenin draws the general conclusion:

*"We must build our state economy in relation to the economy of the middle peasants,"*** which we have been unable to transform in three years, and will not be able to transform in ten years."

In other words, we introduced freedom of trade, we permitted a revival of capitalism, we introduced NEP, in order to accelerate the growth of productive forces, to increase the quantity of products in the country, to strengthen the bond with the peasantry. The bond, the interests of the bond with the peasantry as the basis of our concessions along the line of NEP—such was Lenin's approach to the subject.

Did Lenin know at that time that the profiteers, the capitalists, the kulaks would take advantage of NEP, of the concessions to the peasantry? Of course he did. Does that mean that these concessions were in point of fact concessions to the profiteers and kulaks? No, it does not. For NEP in general, and trade in particular, is being taken advantage of not only by the capitalists and kulaks, but also by the state and co-operative bodies; for it is not only the capitalists and kulaks who trade, but also the state bodies and co-operatives; and when our state bodies and co-operatives learn

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

** My italics.—*J. St.*

how to trade, they will gain (they are already gaining!) the upper hand over the private traders, linking our industry with peasant economy.

What follows from this? It follows from this that our concessions proceed basically in the direction of strengthening our bond, and for the sake of our bond, with the peasantry.

Whoever fails to understand that, approaches the subject not as a Leninist, but as a Liberal.

3. WHOSE MISCALCULATIONS?

Third rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He says: “The considerable losses that we have sustained on the economic front since the autumn are due precisely to an over-estimation of our forces, to an over-estimation of our socialist maturity, an over-estimation of our ability, the ability of our state economy, to guide the whole of the national economy already at the present time.”

It turns out, then, that the miscalculations in regard to procurement and foreign trade—I have in mind the unfavourable balance of trade in 1924-25—that those miscalculations were due not to the error of our regulating bodies, but to an over-estimation of the socialist maturity of our economy. And it appears that the blame for this rests upon Bukharin, whose “school” deliberately cultivates exaggerated ideas about the socialist maturity of our economy.

Of course, in making speeches one “can” play all sorts of tricks, as Sokolnikov often does. But, after all, one should know how far one can go. How can one talk such utter nonsense and downright untruth at a congress?

Does not Sokolnikov know about the special meeting of the Political Bureau held in the beginning of November, at which procurement and foreign trade were discussed, at which the errors of the regulating bodies were rectified by the Central Committee, by the majority of the Central Committee, which is alleged to have over-estimated our socialist potentialities? How can one talk such nonsense at a congress? And what has Bukharin's "school," or Bukharin himself, to do with it? What a way of behaving—to blame others for one's own sins! Does not Sokolnikov know that the stenographic report of the speeches delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee on the question of miscalculations was sent to all the Gubernia Party Committees? How can one fly in the face of obvious facts? One "can" play tricks when making speeches, but one should know how far one can go.

4. HOW SOKOLNIKOV PROTECTS THE POOR PEASANTS

Fourth rejoinder—also to Sokolnikov. He said here that he, as People's Commissar of Finance, don't you see, strives in every way to ensure that our agricultural tax is collected in proportion to income, but he is hindered in this, he is hindered because he is not allowed to protect the poor peasants and to curb the kulaks. That is not true, comrades. It is a slander against the Party. The question of officially revising the agricultural tax on the basis of income—I say officially, because actually it is an income tax—this question was raised at the plenum of the Central Committee in October this year, but nobody except Sokolnikov supported the proposal that

it be raised at the congress, because it was not yet ready for presentation at the congress. At that time Sokolnikov did not insist on his proposal. But now it turns out that Sokolnikov is not averse to using this against the Central Committee, not in the interests of the poor peasants, of course, but in the interests of the opposition. Well, since Sokolnikov talks here about the poor peasants, permit me to tell you a fact which exposes the actual stand taken by Sokolnikov, this alleged thorough-going protector of the poor peasants. Not so long ago, Comrade Milyutin, People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., took a decision to exempt poor peasant farms from taxation in cases where the tax amounts to less than a ruble. From Comrade Milyutin's memorandum to the Central Committee it is evident that the total revenue from taxation of less than a ruble, taxation which irritates the peasantry, amounts to about 300-400 thousand rubles for the whole of the R.S.F.S.R., and that the cost alone of collecting this tax is only a little less than the revenue from it. What did Sokolnikov, this protector of the poor peasants, do? He annulled Comrade Milyutin's decision. The Central Committee received protests about this from fifteen Gubernia Party Committees. Sokolnikov would not give way. The Central Committee had to exercise pressure to compel Sokolnikov to rescind his veto on the absolutely correct decision of the People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. not to collect taxes of less than a ruble. That is what Sokolnikov calls "protecting" the interests of the poor peasants. And people like that, with such a weight on their conscience, have the—what's the mildest way of putting it?—the audacity to speak against the Central Committee. It is strange, comrades, strange.

5. IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE OR SLANDER?

Lastly, one more rejoinder. I have in mind a rejoinder to the authors of *A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions*. Yesterday, *A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions*, only just issued, was secretly distributed here, for members of the congress only. In this collection it is stated, among other things, that in April this year I received a delegation of village correspondents and expressed sympathy with the idea of restoring private property in land. It appears that analogous “impressions” of one of the village correspondents were published in *Bednota*⁶³; I did not know about these “impressions,” I did not see them. I learned about them in October this year. Earlier than that, in April, the Riga news agency, which is distinguished from all other news agencies by the fact that it fabricates all the false rumours about us, had circulated a similar report to the foreign press, about which we were informed by our people in Paris, who telegraphed to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs demanding that it be refuted. At the time I answered Comrade Chicherin, through my assistant, saying: “If Comrade Chicherin thinks it necessary to refute all kinds of nonsense and slander, let him refute it” (see archives of the Central Committee).

Are the authors of this sacramental “*Collection*” aware of all that? Of course they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate all kinds of nonsense and fable? How can they, how can the opposition, resort to the methods of the Riga news agency? Have they really sunk so low as that? (*A voice*: “Shame!”)

Further, knowing the habits of the “cave men,” knowing that they are capable of repeating the methods of the Riga news agency, I sent a refutation to the editorial board of *Bednota*. It is ridiculous to refute such nonsense, but knowing with whom I have to deal, I, for all that, sent a refutation. Here it is:

“To the Editorial Board of *Bednota*.

“Comrade editor, recently I learned from some comrades that in a sketch, published in *Bednota* of 5/IV, 1925, of a village correspondent’s impressions of an interview with me by a delegation of village correspondents, which I had not the opportunity to read at the time, it is reported that I expressed sympathy with the idea of guaranteeing ownership of land for 40 years or more, with the idea of private property in land, etc. Although this fantastic report needs no refutation because of its obvious absurdity, nevertheless, perhaps it will not be superfluous to ask your permission to state in *Bednota* that this report is a gross mistake and must be attributed entirely to the author’s imagination.

“*J. Stalin.*”

Are the authors of the “*Collection*” aware of this letter? Undoubtedly they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate tittle-tattle, fables? What method of fighting is this? They say that this is an ideological struggle. But no, comrades, it is not an ideological struggle. In our Russian language it is called simply *slander*.

Permit me now to pass to the fundamental questions of principle.

6. CONCERNING NEP

The question of NEP. I have in mind Comrade Krupskaya and the speech she delivered on NEP. She says: “In essence, NEP is capitalism permitted

under certain conditions, capitalism that the proletarian state keeps on a chain. . . .” Is that true? Yes, and no. That we are keeping capitalism on a chain, and will keep it so as long as it exists, is a fact, that is true. But to say that NEP is capitalism—that is nonsense, utter nonsense. NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state aimed at permitting capitalism while the commanding positions are held by the proletarian state, aimed at a struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, aimed at increasing the role of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements, aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, aimed at the abolition of classes and the building of the foundations of a socialist economy. Whoever fails to understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP departs from Leninism. If NEP were capitalism, then NEP Russia that Lenin spoke about would be capitalist Russia. But is present-day Russia a capitalist country and not a country that is in transition from capitalism to socialism? Why then, did Lenin not say simply: “*Capitalist* Russia will be socialist Russia,” but preferred a different formula: “*NEP* Russia will become socialist Russia”? Does the opposition agree with Comrade Krupskaya that NEP is capitalism, or does it not? I think that not a single member of this congress will be found who would agree with Comrade Krupskaya’s formula. Comrade Krupskaya (may she forgive me for saying so) talked utter nonsense about NEP. One cannot come out here in defence of Lenin against Bukharin with nonsense like that.

7. CONCERNING STATE CAPITALISM

Connected with this question is Bukharin's mistake. What was his mistake? On what questions did Lenin dispute with Bukharin? Lenin maintained that the category of state capitalism is compatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Bukharin denied this. He was of the opinion, and with him the "Left" Communists, too, including Safarov, were of the opinion that the category of state capitalism is incompatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was right, of course. Bukharin was wrong. He admitted this mistake of his. Such was Bukharin's mistake. But that was in the past. If now, in 1925, in May, he repeats that he disagrees with Lenin on the question of state capitalism, I suppose it is simply a misunderstanding. Either he ought frankly to withdraw that statement, or it is a misunderstanding; for the line he is now defending on the question of the nature of state industry is Lenin's line. Lenin did not come to Bukharin; on the contrary, Bukharin came to Lenin. And precisely for that reason we back Bukharin. (*Applause.*)

The chief mistake of Kamenev and Zinoviev is that they regard the question of state capitalism scholastically, undialectically, divorced from the historical situation. Such an approach to the question is abhorrent to the whole spirit of Leninism. How did Lenin present the question? In 1921, Lenin, knowing that our industry was under-developed and that the peasantry needed goods, knowing that it (industry) could not be raised at one stroke, that the workers, because of certain circumstances, were engaged not so much in industry as in making

cigarette lighters—in that situation Lenin was of the opinion that the best of all possibilities was to invite foreign capital, to set industry on its feet with its aid, to introduce state capitalism in this way and *through* it to establish a bond between Soviet power and the countryside. That line was absolutely correct at that time, because we had no other means then of satisfying the peasantry; for our industry was in a bad way, transport was at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was a lack, a shortage, of fuel. Did Lenin at that time consider state capitalism permissible and desirable as the predominant form in our economy? Yes, he did. But that was then, in 1921. What about now? Can we now say that we have no industry, that transport is at a standstill, that there is no fuel, etc.? No, we cannot. Can it be denied that our industry and trade are already establishing a bond between industry (*our* industry) and peasant economy *directly*, by their own efforts? No, it cannot. Can it be denied that in the sphere of industry “state capitalism” and “socialism” have already exchanged roles, for socialist industry has become predominant and the relative importance of concessions and leases (the former have 50,000 workers and the latter 35,000) is minute? No, it cannot. Already in 1922 Lenin said that nothing had come of concessions and leases in our country.

What follows from this? From this it follows that since 1921, the situation in our country has undergone a substantial change, that in this period our socialist industry and Soviet and co-operative trade have already succeeded in becoming the predominant force, that we have already learned to establish a bond between town and country by our own efforts, that the most striking

forms of state capitalism—concessions and leases—have not developed to any extent during this period, that to speak *now*, in 1925, of state capitalism as the predominant form in our economy, means distorting the socialist nature of our state industry, means failing to understand the whole difference between the past and the present situation, means approaching the question of state capitalism not dialectically, but scholastically, meta-physically.

Would you care to hear Sokolnikov? In his speech he said:

“Our foreign trade is being conducted as a state-capitalist enterprise. . . . Our internal trading companies are also state-capitalist enterprises. And I must say, comrades, that the State Bank is just as much a state-capitalist enterprise. What about our monetary system? Our monetary system is based on the fact that in Soviet economy, under the conditions in which socialism is being built, there has been adopted a monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy.”

That is what Sokolnikov says.

Soon he will go to the length of declaring that the People's Commissariat of Finance is also state capitalism. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that the State Bank is part of the state apparatus. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that our People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, not counting the state-capitalist institutions that encompass it, is part of the state apparatus, that our state apparatus is the apparatus of a proletarian type of state. We all thought so up to now, for the proletarian state is the sole master of these institutions. But now, according to Sokolnikov, it turns out that these institutions, which are part of our state apparatus, are

state-capitalist institutions. Perhaps our Soviet apparatus is also state capitalism and not a proletarian type of state, as Lenin declared it to be? Why not? Does not our Soviet apparatus utilise a “monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy?” Such is the nonsense a man can talk himself into.

Permit me first of all to quote Lenin’s opinion on the nature and significance of the State Bank. I should like, comrades, to refer to a passage from a book written by Lenin in 1917. I have in mind the pamphlet: *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* in which Lenin still held the viewpoint of control of industry (and not nationalisation) and, notwithstanding that, regarded the State Bank in the hands of the proletarian state as being nine-tenths a socialist apparatus. This is what he wrote about the State Bank:

“The big banks *are* the ‘state apparatus’ we *need* for bringing about socialism, and which we take *ready-made* from capitalism; our task here is merely to *lop off* what *capitalistically distorts* this excellent apparatus, to make it *still bigger*, still more democratic, still more all-embracing. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the biggest, with branches in every volost, in every factory, will already be nine-tenths of the *socialist* apparatus. That will be nation-wide *book-keeping*, nation-wide *accounting* of the production and distribution of goods, that will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the *skeleton* of socialist society” (see Vol. XXI, p. 260).

Compare these words of Lenin’s with Sokolnikov’s speech and you will understand what Sokolnikov is slipping into. I shall not be surprised if he declares the People’s Commissariat of Finance to be state capitalism.

What is the point here? Why does Sokolnikov fall into such errors?

The point is that Sokolnikov fails to understand the dual nature of NEP, the dual nature of trade under the present conditions of the struggle between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements; he fails to understand the dialectics of development in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, in the conditions of the transition period, in which the methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie are utilised by the socialist elements for the purpose of overcoming and eliminating the capitalist elements. The point is not at all that trade and the monetary system are methods of "capitalist economy." The point is that in fighting the capitalist elements, the socialist elements of our economy master these methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of overcoming the capitalist elements, that they *successfully* use them *against* capitalism, *successfully* use them for the purpose of building the socialist foundation of our economy. Hence, the point is that, thanks to the dialectics of our development, the functions and purpose of those instruments of the bourgeoisie change *in principle*, fundamentally; they change in favour of socialism to the detriment of capitalism. Sokolnikov's mistake lies in his failure to understand all the complexity and contradictory nature of the processes that are taking place in our economy.

Permit me now to refer to Lenin on the question of the historical character of state capitalism, to quote a passage on the question as to when and why he proposed state capitalism as the chief form, as to what induced him to do that, and as to precisely under what concrete conditions he proposed it. (*A voice*: "Please do!")

"We cannot under any circumstances forget what we very often observe, namely, the socialist attitude of the workers in factories belonging to the state, where they themselves collect fuel raw materials and produce, or when the workers try properly to distribute the products of industry among the peasantry and to deliver them by means of the transport system. *That is socialism.* But side by side with it there is small economy, which very often exists *independently* of it. Why can it exist independently of it? *Because* large-scale industry has not been restored, *because* the socialist factories can receive only one-tenth, perhaps, of what they should receive; and in so far as they do not receive what they should, small economy remains independent of the socialist factories. The incredible state of ruin of the country, and the shortage of fuel, raw materials and transport facilities, lead to small production existing *separately* from socialism. And I say: Under these circumstances, what is state capitalism? It will mean the amalgamation of small production. Capital amalgamates small production, capital grows out of small production. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of course, *freedom of trade means the growth of capitalism*; one cannot get away from it. And whoever thinks of getting away from it and brushing it aside is only consoling himself with words. If small economy exists, if there is freedom of exchange, capitalism will appear. But has this capitalism any *terrors* for us *if we hold the factories, works, transport and foreign trade in our hands*? And so I said then, and will say now, and I think it is incontrovertible, that this capitalism has no terrors for us. Concessions are capitalism of that kind"* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 306).

That is how Lenin approached the question of state capitalism.

In 1921, when we had scarcely any industry of our own, when there was a shortage of raw materials, and transport was at a standstill, Lenin proposed state capitalism as a means by which he thought of linking peasant economy with industry. And that was correct. But does

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

that mean that Lenin regarded this line as desirable *under all* circumstances? Of course not. He was willing to establish the bond through the medium of state capitalism because we had no developed socialist industry. But now? Can it be said that we have no developed state industry now? Of course not. Development proceeded along a different channel, concessions scarcely took root, state industry grew, state trade grew, the co-operatives grew, and the bond between town and country began to be established through socialist industry. We found ourselves in a better position than we had expected. How can one, after this, say that state capitalism is the chief form of managing our economy?

The trouble with the opposition is that it refuses to understand these simple things.

8. ZINOVIEV AND THE PEASANTRY

The question of the peasantry. I said in my report, and speakers here have asserted, that Zinoviev is deviating in the direction of under-estimating the middle peasants; that only recently he definitely held the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants, and is only now, after the struggle in the Party, trying to go over to, to establish himself on, the other viewpoint, the viewpoint of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Is all that true? Permit me to quote some documents.

In an article on "Bolshevisation," Zinoviev wrote this year:

"There are a number of tasks which are *absolutely common to all the Parties of the Comintern*. Such, for example, are . . . the proper approach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agri-

cultural population of the whole world, which can and must be won over by us and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural proletariat, the semi-proletarians—the small-holder peasants and the small peasantry who do not hire labour). There is another stratum of the peasantry (the middle peasants), which must be at least *neutralised by us*”* (*Pravda*, January 18, 1925).

That is what Zinoviev writes about the middle peasantry six years after the Eighth Party Congress, at which Lenin rejected the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants and substituted for it the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Bakayev asks, what is there terrible about that? But I will ask you to compare Zinoviev’s article with Lenin’s thesis on staking on the middle peasants and to answer the question: has Zinoviev departed from Lenin’s thesis or not. . . ? (*A voice from the hall*: “It refers to countries other than Russia.” *Commotion*.) It is not so, comrade, because in Zinoviev’s article it says: “tasks which are *absolutely common to all* the Parties of the Comintern.” Will you really deny that our Party is also a part of the Comintern? Here it is directly stated: “to all the Parties.” (*A voice from the benches of the Leningrad delegation*: “At definite moments.” *General laughter*.)

Compare this passage from Zinoviev’s article *about neutralisation* with the passage from Lenin’s speech at the Eighth Party Congress in which he said that we must have a *stable alliance* with the middle peasants, and you will realise that there is nothing in common between them.

* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

It is characteristic that after reading these lines in Zinoviev's article, Comrade Larin, that advocate of "a second revolution" in the countryside, hastened to associate himself with them. I think that although Comrade Larin spoke in opposition to Kamenev and Zinoviev the other day, and spoke rather well, this does not exclude the fact that there are points on which we disagree with him and that we must here dissociate ourselves from him. Here is the opinion Comrade Larin expressed about this article of Zinoviev's:

"‘The proper approach to the peasantry’ from the point of view of the common tasks of *all** the Parties of the Comintern was quite correctly formulated by its Chairman, Zinoviev" (Larin, *The Soviet Countryside*, p. 80).

I see that Comrade Larin protests, saying that he makes a reservation in his book about his disagreeing with Zinoviev in so far as Zinoviev extends the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants to Russia as well. It is true that in his book he makes this reservation and says that neutralisation is not enough for us, that we must take "a step farther" in the direction of "agreement with the middle peasants against the kulaks." But here, unfortunately, Comrade Larin drags in his scheme of "a second revolution" against kulak domination, with which we disagree, which brings him near to Zinoviev and compels me to dissociate myself from him to some extent.

As you see, in the document I have quoted, Zinoviev speaks openly and definitely in favour of the slogan

* My italics.—*J. St.*

of neutralising the middle peasants, in spite of Lenin, who proclaimed that neutralisation was not enough, and that a stable alliance with the middle peasants was necessary.

The next document. In his book *Leninism*, Zinoviev, quoting from Lenin the following passage dating from 1918: "With the peasantry to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; with the poor, the proletarian and the semi-proletarian section of the peasantry, forward to the socialist revolution!", draws the following conclusion:

"The fundamental . . . problem that is engaging our minds at the present moment . . . is elucidated fully and to the end in the above-quoted theses of Lenin's. *To this nothing can be added, not a single word can be subtracted.*"* Here everything is said with Ilyich's terseness and explicitness, concisely and clearly, so that it simply asks to be put into a textbook" (*Leninism*, p. 60).

Such, according to Zinoviev, is the *exhaustive* characterisation of the peasant question given by Leninism. With the peasantry as a whole against the tsar and the landlords—that is the bourgeois revolution. With the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie—that is the October Revolution. That is all very well. It gives two of Lenin's slogans. But what about Lenin's third slogan—with the middle peasants against the kulaks for building socialism? What has become of Lenin's third slogan? It is not in Zinoviev's book. It has disappeared. Although Zinoviev asserts that "to this nothing can be added," nevertheless, if we do not add here Lenin's third slogan about a stable alliance of the proletariat

* My italics.—*J. St.*

and poor peasants with the middle peasants, we run the risk of distorting Lenin, as Zinoviev distorts him. Can we regard it as an accident that Lenin's third slogan, which is our most urgent slogan today, has disappeared, that Zinoviev has lost it? No, it cannot be regarded as an accident, because he holds the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants. The only difference between the first and second document is that in the first he opposed the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, while in the second he kept silent about this slogan.

The third document is Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch." I am speaking of the original version of that article, which does not contain the changes and additions that were made later by members of the Central Committee. The characteristic feature of that article is that, like the second document, it is completely silent about the question of the middle peasants and, evading this most urgent question, talks about some kind of indefinite, Narodnik equality, without pointing to the class background of equality. You will find in it the rural poor, the kulaks, the capitalists, attacks on Bukharin, Socialist-Revolutionary equality, and Ustryalov; but you will not find the middle peasants or Lenin's co-operative plan, although the article is entitled "The Philosophy of the Epoch." When Comrade Molotov sent me that article (I was away at the time), I sent back a blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, comrades, I am straightforward and blunt; that's true, I don't deny it. (*Laughter.*) I sent back a blunt criticism, because it is intolerable that Zinoviev should for a whole year systematically ignore or distort the most characteristic features of Leninism in regard to the peasant question, our Party's

present-day slogan of alliance with the bulk of the peasantry. Here is the answer that I sent then to Comrade Molotov:

“Zinoviev’s article ‘The Philosophy of the Epoch’ is a distortion of the Party line in the Larin spirit. It treats of the Fourteenth Conference, but the main theme of this conference—the middle peasants and the co-operatives—is evaded. The middle peasants and Lenin’s co-operative plan have vanished. That is no accident. To talk, after this, about a ‘struggle around the interpretation’ of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference—means pursuing a line towards the violation of those decisions. To mix up Bukharin with Stolypin, as Zinoviev does—means slandering Bukharin. On such lines it would be possible to mix up with Stolypin even Lenin, who said: ‘trade, and learn to trade.’ At the present time the slogan about equality is Socialist-Revolutionary demagoguery. There can be no equality so long as classes exist, and so long as skilled and unskilled labour exist (see Lenin’s *State and Revolution*). We must speak not about an indefinite equality, but about abolishing classes, about socialism. To say that our revolution is ‘not classical’ means slipping into Menshevism. In my opinion, the article must be thoroughly revised in such a way that it should not bear the character of a platform for the Fourteenth Congress.

“September 12, 1925

“*J. Stalin.*”

I am ready to defend the whole of this today. Every word, every sentence.

One must not speak about equality in a principal leading article without strictly defining what kind of equality is meant—equality between the peasantry and the working class, equality among the peasantry, equality within the working class, between skilled and unskilled workers, or equality in the sense of abolishing classes. One must not in a leading article keep silent about the Party’s immediate slogans on work in the in countryside. One must not play with phrases about equal-

ity, because that means playing with fire, just as one must not play with phrases about Leninism while keeping silent about the immediate slogan of Leninism on the question of the peasantry.

Such are the three documents: Zinoviev's article (January 1925) in favour of neutralising the middle peasants, Zinoviev's book *Leninism* (September 1925), which kept silent about Lenin's third slogan about the middle peasants, and Zinoviev's new article "The Philosophy of the Epoch" (September 1925), which kept silent about the middle peasants and Lenin's co-operative plan.

Is this constant wobbling of Zinoviev's on the peasant question accidental?

You see that it is not accidental.

Recently, in a speech delivered by Zinoviev in Leningrad on the report of the Central Committee, he at last made up his mind to speak in favour of the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That was after the struggle, after the friction, after the conflicts in the Central Committee. That is all very well. But I am not sure that he will not repudiate it later on. For, as facts show, Zinoviev has never displayed the firmness of line on the peasant question that we need. (*Applause.*)

Here are a few facts illustrating Zinoviev's vacillations on the' peasant question. In 1924, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Zinoviev insisted on a "peasant" policy of organising non-Party peasant groups, at the centre and in the localities, with a weekly newspaper. That proposal was rejected because of the objections raised in the Central Committee. Shortly before that, Zinoviev had even boasted that he had a "peasant

deviation." Here is what he said, for example, at the Twelfth Congress of the Party: "When I am told: You have a 'deviation,' you are deviating towards the peasantry—I answer: Yes, we should not only 'deviate' towards the peasantry and its economic requirements, but *bow down* and, if need be, *kneel down* before the economic requirements of the peasant who follows our proletariat." Do you hear: "deviate," "bow down," "kneel down." (*Laughter, applause.*) Later, when things improved with the peasantry, when our position in the countryside improved, Zinoviev made a "turn" from his infatuation, cast suspicion upon the middle peasants and proclaimed the slogan of neutralisation. A little later he made a new "turn" and demanded what was in point of fact a revision of the decisions of the Fourteenth

Conference ("The Philosophy of the Epoch") and, accusing almost the whole of the Central Committee of a peasant deviation, began to "deviate" more emphatically against the middle peasants. Finally, just before the Fourteenth Congress of the Party he once more made a "turn," this time in favour of alliance with the middle peasants and, perhaps, he will yet begin to boast that he is again ready to "adore" the peasantry.

What guarantee is there that Zinoviev will not vacillate once again?

But, comrades, this is wobbling, not politics. (*Laughter, applause.*) This is hysterics, not politics. (*Voices: "Quite right!"*)

We are told that there is no need to pay special attention to the struggle against the second deviation. That is wrong. Since there are two deviations among us—ogushevsky's deviation and Zinoviev's deviation—

you must understand that Bogushevsky is not to be compared with Zinoviev. Bogushevsky is done for. (*Laughter.*) Bogushevsky does not have an organ of the press. But the deviation towards neutralising the middle peasants, the deviation against a stable alliance with the middle peasants, the Zinoviev deviation, has its organ of the press and continues to fight against the Central Committee to this day. That organ is called *Leningradskaya Pravda*.⁶⁴ For what is the term "middle-peasant Bolshevism" recently concocted in Leningrad, and about which *Leningradskaya Pravda* foams at the mouth, if not an indication that that newspaper has departed from Leninism on the peasant question? Is it not clear, if only from this circumstance alone, that the struggle against the second deviation is more difficult than the struggle against the first, against Bogushevsky's deviation? That is why, being confronted by such a representative of the second deviation, or such a defender and protector of the second deviation, as *Leningradskaya Pravda*, we must adopt all measures to make the Party specially prepared to fight that deviation, which is strong, which is complex, and against which we must concentrate our fire. That is why this second deviation must be the object of our Party's special attention. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

9. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF THE DISAGREEMENTS

Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal struggle within the majority of the Central Committee. What did our disaccord start from? It started from the question: "What is to be done with Trotsky?" That

was at the end of 1924. The group of Leningrad comrades at first proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. Here I have in mind the period of the discussion in 1924. The Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee passed a resolution that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. We, i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did not agree with this (*voices*: "Quite right!"), we had some struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded them to delete the point about expulsion from their resolution. Shortly after this, when the plenum of the Central Committee met and the Leningrad comrades, together with Kamenev, demanded Trotsky's immediate expulsion from the Political Bureau, we also disagreed with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained a majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves to removing Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. We disagreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation was fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of amputation, the method of blood-letting—and they demanded blood—was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third—what will we have left in the Party? (*Applause.*)

This first clash within the majority on the Central Committee was the expression of the fundamental difference between us on questions of organisational policy in the Party.

The second question that caused disagreements among us was that connected with Sarkis's speech against Bukharin. That was at the Twenty-First Leningrad

Conference in January 1925. Sarkis at that time accused Bukharin of syndicalism. Here is what he said:

“We have read in the Moscow *Pravda* Bukharin’s article on worker and village correspondents. The views that Bukharin develops have no supporters in our organisation. But one might say that such views, which in their way are *syndicalist, un-Bolshevik*, anti-Party, are held even by a number of responsible comrades (I repeat, not in the Leningrad organisation, but in others). Those views treat of the independence and extra-territoriality of various mass public organisations of workers and peasants in relation to the Communist Party” (Stenographic Report of the Twenty-First Leningrad Conference).

That speech was, firstly, a fundamental mistake on Sarkis’s part, for Bukharin was absolutely right on the question of the worker and village correspondent movement; secondly, it was, not without the encouragement of the leaders of the Leningrad organisation, a gross violation of the elementary rules of comradely discussion of a question. Needless to say, this circumstance was bound to worsen relations within the Central Committee. The matter ended with Sarkis’s open admission of his mistake in the press.

This incident showed that open admission of a mistake is the best way of avoiding an open discussion and of eliminating disagreements privately.

The third question was that of the Leningrad Young Communist League. There are members of Gubernia Party Committees here, and they probably remember that the Political Bureau adopted a decision relating to the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League, which had tried to convene in Leningrad

almost an all-Russian conference of the Young Communist League without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the youth league. With the decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) you are familiar. We could not permit the existence, parallel with the Central Committee of the Young Communist League, of another centre, competing with and opposing the first. We, as Bolsheviks, could not permit the existence of two centres. That is why the Central Committee considered it necessary to take measures to infuse fresh blood into the Central Committee of the youth league, which had tolerated this separatism, and to remove Safarov from the post of leader of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League.

This incident showed that the Leningrad comrades have a tendency to convert their Leningrad organisation into a centre of struggle against the Central Committee.

The fourth question was the question, raised by Zinoviev, of organising in Leningrad a special magazine to be called *Bolshevik*, the editorial board of which was to consist of Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, Sarkis and Tarkhanov. We did not agree with this and said that such a magazine, running parallel with the Moscow *Bolshevik*, would inevitably become the organ of a group, a factional organ of the opposition; that such a step was dangerous and would undermine the unity of the Party. In other words, we prohibited the publication of that magazine. Now, attempts are being made to frighten us with the word "prohibition." But that is nonsense, comrades. We are not Liberals. For us, the interests of

the Party stand above formal democracy. Yes, we prohibited the publication of a factional organ, and we shall prohibit things of that kind in future. (*Voices*: "Quite right! Of course!" *Loud applause*.)

This incident showed that the Leningrad leadership wants to segregate itself in a separate group.

Next, the question of Bukharin. I have in mind the slogan "enrich yourselves." I have in mind the speech Bukharin delivered in April, when he let slip the phrase "enrich yourselves." Two days later the April Conference of our Party opened. It was I who, in the Conference Presidium, in the presence of Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Kalinin, stated that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was not our slogan. I do not remember Bukharin making any rejoinder to that protest. When Comrade Larin asked for the floor at the conference, to speak against Bukharin, I think, it was Zinoviev who then demanded that no speeches be permitted against Bukharin. However, after that, Comrade Krupskaya sent in an article against Bukharin, demanding that it be published. Bukharin, of course, gave tit for tat, and, in his turn, wrote an article against Comrade Krupskaya. The majority on the Central Committee decided not to publish any discussion articles, not to open a discussion, and to call on Bukharin to state in the press that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was a mistake; Bukharin agreed to that and later did so, on his return from holiday, in an article against Ustryalov. Now, Kamenev and Zinoviev think they can frighten somebody with the "prohibition" bogey, expressing indignation like Liberals at our having prohibited the publication of Comrade Krupskaya's article. You will not frighten anybody with that. Firstly,

we refrained from publishing not only Comrade Krupskaya's article, but also Bukharin's. Secondly, why not prohibit the publication of Comrade Krupskaya's article if the interests of Party unity demand that of us? In what way is Comrade Krupskaya different from every other responsible comrade? Perhaps you think that the interests of individual comrades should be placed above the interests of the Party and its unity? Are not the comrades of the opposition aware that for us, for Bolsheviks, formal democracy is an empty shell, but the real interests of the Party are everything? (*Applause.*)

Let the comrades point to a single article in the Party's Central Organ, in *Pravda*, that directly or indirectly approves of the slogan "enrich yourselves." They cannot do so, because no such articles exist. There was one case, the only one, when *Komsomolskaya Pravda* published an article by Stetsky, in which he tried to justify the "enrich yourselves" slogan in a mild and barely perceptible way. But what happened? The very next day the Secretariat of the Central Committee called the editorial board of that newspaper to order in a special letter signed by Molotov, Andreyev and Stalin. That was on June 2, 1925. Several days later, the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, with the full consent of Bukharin, adopted a resolution to the effect that the editor of that newspaper be removed. Here is an excerpt from that letter:

"Moscow, June 2, 1925. To all the members of the editorial board of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

"We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky's articles 'A New Stage in the New Economic Policy' evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to

the slogan 'enrich yourselves.' That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a leading article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan." . . .

Is the opposition aware of all these facts? Of course it is. In that case, why don't they stop baiting Bukharin? How much longer are they going to shout about Bukharin's mistake?

I know of mistakes made by some comrades, in October 1917, for example, compared with which Bukharin's mistake is not even worth noticing. Those comrades were not only mistaken then, but they had the "audacity," on two occasions, to violate a vital decision of the Central Committee adopted under the direction and in the presence of Lenin. Nevertheless, the Party forgot about those mistakes as soon as those comrades admitted them. But compared with those comrades, Bukharin committed an insignificant error. And he did not violate a single Central Committee decision. How is it to be explained that, in spite of this, the unrestrained baiting of Bukharin still continues? What do they really want of Bukharin?

That is how the matter stands with Bukharin's mistake.

Next came the question of Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch" and Kamenev's report at the meeting of the Moscow Plenum in the autumn of this year, at the end of the summer—a question which also strained our internal Party relations. I spoke about

this in my speech and I shall not repeat myself. The issue then was "The Philosophy of the Epoch," the mistakes in that article, how we rectified those mistakes, Kamenev's mistakes in connection with the Central Statistical Board's balance of output of grain and fodder, how Kamenev credulously accepted the C.S.B.'s figure of 61 per cent as being the proportion of the market grain in the hands of the upper groups of the peasantry, and how, later, under pressure of our comrades, he was obliged to rectify his mistake in a special statement he made in the Council of Labour and Defence, and which was published in the newspapers, to the effect that more than half of the market grain was in the hands of the middle peasants. All this undoubtedly strained our relations.

Then came questions connected with the October Plenum—new complications, where the opposition demanded an open discussion, where the question of Zatlutsky's so-called "Thermidor" came up, and at the end of all this the Leningrad Conference, which on the very first day opened fire on the Central Committee. I have in mind the speeches delivered by Safarov, Sarkis, Shelavin and others. I have in mind Zinoviev's speech, one of his last speeches at the close of the conference, in which he called upon the conference to wage war against the Moscow comrades and proposed that a delegation be elected consisting of people who were willing to fight the Central Committee. That is how it was. And that is precisely why the Bolshevik workers Komarov and Lobov were not included in the Leningrad delegation (they refused to accept the platform of struggle against the Central Committee). Their places in the delegation were filled by

Gordon and Tarkhanov. Put Gordon and Tarkhanov in one scale and Komarov and Lobov in the other, and any unbiassed person will say that the former are not to be compared with the latter. (*Applause.*) What were Lobov and Komarov guilty of? All they were guilty of was that they refused to go against the Central Committee. That was their entire guilt. But only a month before that, the Leningrad comrades nominated Komarov as first secretary of their organisation. That is how it was. Was it so or not? (*Voices from the Leningrad delegation: "It was! It was!"*) What could have happened to Komarov in a month? (*Bukharin: "He degenerated in a month."*) What could have happened in a month to bring it about that a member of the Central Committee, Komarov, whom you yourselves nominated as first secretary of your organisation, was kicked out of the Secretariat of the Leningrad Committee, and that it was not considered possible to elect him as a delegate to the congress? (*A voice from the Leningrad benches: "He insulted the conference."* *A voice: "That's a lie, Naumov!" Commotion.*)

10. THE OPPOSITION'S PLATFORM

Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev and Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is time to say something about the opposition's platform. It is rather an original one. Many speeches of different kinds have been delivered here by the opposition. Kamenev said one thing, he pulled in one direction; Zinoviev said another thing, he pulled in another direction; Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But in spite of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what

were they agreed? What indeed is their platform? Their platform is—reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The only thing they have in common and that completely unites them is the question of the Secretariat. That is strange and ridiculous, but it is a fact.

This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth Congress, the people who gathered in the “cave” (*laughter*) drew up a platform for the abolition of the Political Bureau and for politicising the Secretariat, i.e., for transforming the Secretariat into a political and organisational directing body to consist of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What was the idea behind that platform? What did it mean? It meant leading the Party without Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of that platform, not only because it was unprincipled at that time, but also because, without the comrades I have mentioned, it is impossible to lead the Party at the present time. To a question sent to me in writing from the depths of Kislovodsk I answered in the negative, stating that, if the comrades were to insist, I was willing to clear out without a fuss, without a discussion, open or concealed, and without demanding guarantees for the rights of the minority. (*Laughter.*)

That was, so to speak, the first stage.

And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered in, opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not the politicisation, but the technicalisation of the Secretariat; not the abolition of the Political Bureau, but full powers for it.

Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple technical apparatus is really convenient for

Kamenev, perhaps we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, however, that the Party will not agree to it. (*A voice*: "Quite right!") Whether a technical Secretariat would prepare, whether it would be capable of preparing, the questions it would have to prepare both for the Organising Bureau and for the Political Bureau, I have my doubts.

But when they talk about a Political Bureau with full powers, such a platform deserves to be made into a laughing-stock. Hasn't the Political Bureau full powers? Are not the Secretariat and the Organising Bureau subordinate to the Political Bureau? And what about the plenum of the Central Committee? Why does not our opposition speak about the plenum of the Central Committee? Is it thinking of giving the Political Bureau fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum?

No, the opposition is positively unlucky with its platform, or platforms, concerning the Secretariat.

11. THEIR "DESIRE FOR PEACE"

What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we do to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been created? This question has engaged our minds all the time, during the congress as well as before it. We need unity of the Party ranks—that is the question now. The opposition is fond of talking about difficulties. But there is one difficulty that is more dangerous than all others, and which the opposition has created for us—the danger of confusion and disorganisation in the Party. (*Applause.*) We must above all overcome that difficulty. We had this in mind when, two days before the congress,

we offered the opposition terms of a compromise agreement aimed at a possible reconciliation. Here is the text of our offer:

“The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe that the preparation for the Party congress by a number of leading comrades of the Leningrad organisation was conducted contrary to the line of the Central Committee of the Party and in opposition to the supporters of this line in Leningrad. The undersigned members of the Central Committee regard the resolution of the Moscow Conference as being absolutely correct both in substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central Committee’s duty to rebuff all tendencies that run counter to the Party line and disorganise the Party.

“However, for the sake of maintaining the unity of the Party, peace within the Party, of averting the possible danger of alienating the Leningrad organisation, one of the best organisations in the R.C.P., from the Party’s Central Committee—the undersigned consider it possible, if the congress endorses the Central Committee’s distinct and clear political line, to make a number of concessions. With this in view we make the following proposals:

“1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committee’s report, to take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis but to tone down some of its formulations.

“2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the letter of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committee’s reply to that letter to be regarded as inexpedient in the interests of unity.

“3. Members of the Political Bureau . . . are not to speak against each other at the congress.

“4. In speeches at the congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis (on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov (on state capitalism).

“5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and Moskvín to be rectified by organisational measures.

“6. The Central Committee’s decision to include a Leningrad comrade in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put into effect immediately after the congress.

“7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central Organ, one Party worker from Leningrad to be included in the editorial board of the Central Organ.

“8. In view of the incompetence of the editor of *Leningradskaya Pravda* (Gladnev), to recognise the need to replace him by a more competent comrade by agreement with the Central Committee.

“Kalinin, Stalin, Molotov, Dzerzhinsky, and others.

“15. XII. 1925”

That is the compromise we offered, comrades.

But the opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement. Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce struggle at the congress. Such is the opposition’s “desire for peace.”

12. THE PARTY WILL ACHIEVE UNITY

In the main, we still adhere to the viewpoint of that document. In our draft resolution, as you know, we have already toned down some of the formulations in the interests of peace in the Party.

We are against amputation. We are against the policy of amputation. That does not mean that leaders will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs and ride roughshod over the Party. No, excuse us from that. There will be no obeisances to leaders. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Applause*.) We stand for unity, we are against amputation. The policy of amputation is abhorrent to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve it *with* Kamenev and Zinoviev, if they are willing, *without them* if they are unwilling. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Applause*.)

What is needed for unity? That the minority should submit to the majority. Without that there is no unity of the Party, nor can there be.

We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion sheet. *Bolshevik* has a discussion section. That will be quite enough. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by discussions. We are a Party that is governing a country—do not forget that. Do not forget that every disaccord at the top finds an echo in the country that is harmful to us, not to speak of the effect it has abroad.

The organs of the Central Committee will probably remain in their present shape. The Party is hardly likely to agree to break them up. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Applause*.) The Political Bureau has full powers as it is, it is superior to all the organs of the Central Committee except the plenum. But the supreme organ is the plenum—that is sometimes forgotten. Our plenum decides everything, and it calls its leaders to order when they begin to lose their balance. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Laughter. Applause*.)

There must be unity among us, and there will be if the Party, if the congress displays firmness of character and does not allow itself to be scared. (*Voices*: “We won’t. We are seasoned people.”) If any of us go too far, we shall be called to order—that is essential, that is necessary. To lead the Party otherwise than collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (*applause*), it is silly to talk about it.

Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee,

with the minority submitting to the majority—that is what we need now.

As regards the Leningrad communist workers, I have no doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of our Party. With them we built the Party, with them we reared it, with them we raised the banner of the uprising in October 1917, with them we defeated the bourgeoisie, with them we combated, and will combat, the difficulties in the path of our work of construction. I am sure that the Leningrad communist workers will not lag behind their friends in the other industrial centres in the struggle for iron, Leninist unity in the Party. (*Stormy applause. The “Internationale” is sung.*)

NOTES

- ¹ The All-Union Teachers' Congress took place in Moscow, January 12-17, 1925. The congress was attended by 1,660 delegates representing 49 nationalities of the Soviet Union. Three-fourths of the delegates were village school-teachers. The congress heard and discussed reports on: the immediate tasks in the sphere of Soviet affairs; the teachers and the proletarian revolution; the tasks of education in the system of Soviet affairs; the Soviet school; the national question and the schools; teachers and the Young Communist League; the international position of the U.S.S.R., etc. The congress adopted a declaration stating that the teachers did not separate their tasks from those of the Communist Party, from its struggle to build socialism. p. 3
- ² *Krasnaya Molodyozh (Red Youth)*—a monthly students' magazine published by the Central Bureau and Moscow Bureau of Proletarian Students from May 1924 to November 1925. V. M. Molotov was the editor-in-chief. In November 1925 the name of the magazine was changed to *Krasnoye Studenchestvo (Red Students)*. p. 4
- ³ From January 17 to 20, 1925, a plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) took place. On January 17, a joint meeting of the plenums of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) was held. At this joint meeting, after hearing a statement by J. V. Stalin on the resolutions passed by local organisations on Trotsky's action, the plenums passed a resolution qualifying Trotsky's action as a revision of Bolshevism, as an attempt to substitute Trots-

kyism for Leninism. On January 19, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on M. V. Frunze's report on "Budget Assignments for the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of the U.S.S.R." (see this volume, pp. 11-14). p. 6

- ⁴ This refers to the defeat in the autumn of 1924 of the Spanish army, 150,000 strong, sent by Primo de Rivera, the fascist dictator of Spain, to suppress the national-liberation movement in the Riff, the Spanish zone of Morocco. As a result of the victory gained by the Moroccans, two-thirds of the territory occupied by the Spanish forces was liberated. p. 12
- ⁵ In the summer of 1924, as a result of the revolutionary-progressive movement in Albania, the reactionary government of Ahmet Zogu was overthrown. The Government of Fan-Noli, which came into power, opened negotiations with the Soviet Government for the establishment of diplomatic and friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Albania. The two countries exchanged diplomatic representatives. The Governments of Great Britain, Italy and Yugoslavia demanded that the Albanian Government should break off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. In December 1924, armed gangs organised by Ahmet Zogu and supported by the armed forces of the fascist government of Yugoslavia invaded Albania and overthrew the Government of Fan-Noli. The rule of Ahmet Zogu was restored in Albania. p. 13
- ⁶ *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Newspaper*), a daily newspaper of a mass character, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1922 to January 1932. It first appeared under the title of *Rabochy* (*Worker*), but in July 1922 it was renamed *Rabochaya Gazeta*. p. 15
- ⁷ This refers to J. V. Stalin's article "October and Trotsky's Theory of 'Permanent' Revolution" published in *Pravda*, No. 290, December 20, 1924. The article was part of the preface to the book *On the Road to October*. The preface was written by J. V. Stalin in December 1924 and was published in full only

in that book. The greater part of the preface, under the title of "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," was published in various collections of articles, in separate pamphlets and in all the editions of J. V. Stalin's book *Problems of Leninism*, and is included in Vol. 6 of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin, pp. 374-420. p. 16

- ⁸ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. p. 17

- ⁹ The symposium *Against the Stream* was published in Petrograd in 1918. It contained the following articles by V. I. Lenin, written in the period 1914-17: "The United States of Europe Slogan," "On Junius's Pamphlet," "The National Pride of the Great Russians," "The Two Lines of the Revolution," "The Collapse of the Second International," and others, which later were included in Volumes XVIII and XIX of the 3rd edition of the *Works* of V. I. Lenin (see Vols. 21 and 22 of the 4th Russ. ed. of the *Works*). p. 18

- ¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302). p. 18

- ¹¹ V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, *An Infantile Disorder* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 18

- ¹² J. V. Stalin spoke at the meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) during the discussion of the events that took place in the village of Dymovka (Nikolayev Okrug, Odessa Gubernia). In Dymovka, on March 28, 1924, a gang of criminals, instigated by the kulaks, killed a village correspondent named Grigory Malinovsky. The resolution passed by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) on the events in Dymovka in connection with the murder of the village correspondent Malinovsky was published in *Pravda*, No. 30, February 6, 1925. p. 19

- ¹³ This refers to the kulak revolt in the Tambov Gubernia in 1919-21, and to the counter-revolutionary Kronstadt mutiny

in March 1921, which were organised by whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and agents of foreign states. p. 23

- 14 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt in Georgia on August 28, 1924, organised by the remnants of the defeated bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the émigré Menshevik “government” headed by Jordania on the instructions and with the financial support of the imperialist states and leaders of the Second International. On August 29 the revolt was put an end to with the active support of the Georgian workers and toiling peasants. p. 23
- 15 The Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) took place from January 24 to 28, 1925. There were present 1,150 delegates representing 64,078 members and 30,770 candidate members of the Party. The conference discussed the report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); the report of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the co-report of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League; a report on the work of the Moscow Control Commission; the budget and the economic situation of the Moscow Gubernia; the question of work in the countryside. It also elected the leading bodies. J. V. Stalin spoke at the conference on the question of work in the countryside. p. 25
- 16 The Dawes Plan was the name given to the scheme for the payment of reparations by Germany drawn up by an international committee of experts under the chairmanship of the American financier, General Dawes, and endorsed at the London Conference of Allied States on August 16, 1924 (concerning the Dawes Plan see this volume, pp. 277-79). p. 35
- 17 Brandler and Thalheimer—leaders of the Right-opportunist group, who in 1922-23 stood at the head of the Communist Party of Germany. The treacherous policy pursued by Brandler and Thalheimer led to the defeat of the working class of Germany

during the revolutionary events in 1923. In April 1924, at the Frankfurt Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, Brandler and Thalheimer were removed from the Party leadership. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern (1924) condemned the defeatist line of the Brandler-Thalheimer group. In 1929, Brandler and Thalheimer were expelled from the Communist Party on account of factional, anti-Party activity. p. 42

- 18 This refers to the trial of the “Barmat Brothers Concern” at the beginning of 1925. During that trial it was revealed that prominent leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, headed by Weis, had received heavy bribes from this concern, and also that they had used funds obtained from this concern and banks connected with it to fight the Communist Party of Germany during the Reichstag elections in December 1924. p. 44

- 19 Kuomintang—the political party in China founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 for the purpose of fighting for a republic and for the national independence of the country. Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925. In his testament he enjoined the Kuomintang to maintain the alliance with the Communist Party of China, to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union and to expand the national-liberation movement of the workers and peasants of China. In the period of the development of the revolution in China in 1925-27, the Right wing of the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, violated the behests of Sun Yat-sen. In alliance with imperialists of foreign states, it waged a struggle against the democratic forces of China led by the Communist Party. p. 50

- 20 The Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions was formed in July 1919 at an international congress held in Amsterdam. It consisted of the reformist trade unions of a number of countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A. In 1919 its affiliated membership reached 24,000,000, but by the end of 1923 it had dropped to 16,000,000. In subsequent years the influence and membership of the Amsterdam Federation steadily

declined. During the Second World War it practically ceased to function. It was dissolved in December 1945 owing to the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. p. 53

- 21 The Czechoslovak Commission was set up by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925. The plenum discussed the following questions: the international prospects and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties; the struggle for world trade-union unity; the peasant question; the discussion in the R.C.P.(B.); questions concerning individual sections of the Comintern; etc. The plenum set up a number of commissions: political, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav, among others. J. V. Stalin was elected a member of the political and Czechoslovak commissions. On March 30, J. V. Stalin spoke in the Yugoslav Commission on the national question in Yugoslavia (see this volume, pp. 69-76). p. 58
- 22 See J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (*Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 300-81). p. 70
- 23 See V. I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 365-424). p. 71
- 24 The First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students was held in Moscow from April 13 to 17, 1925. There were present about 300 delegates representing 250,000 students at higher educational institutions, technical schools and workers' faculties. The conference discussed the following questions: the international position of the U.S.S.R. and its internal situation; trade unions and the students; a report on the work of the Central Bureau of Proletarian Students; a report on the work of the Chief Vocational Education Boards of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.; the connection between higher educational institutions and industry. On April 13, J. V. Stalin had an interview with a delegation from the conference, and on April 15 he sent to the conference the address published in the present volume. p. 85

- 25 The Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) took place in Moscow, April 27-29, 1925. The conference discussed the following questions: Party affairs; the co-operatives; the single agricultural tax; the metal industry; revolutionary law; the tasks of the Comintern and of the R.C.P.(B.) in connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (For the decisions of the conference see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II 1941, pp. 4-31.) p. 90
- 26 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. 95
- 27 Field Marshal Hindenburg, a furious monarchist and an instrument of German imperialism and militarism, was elected President of Germany on April 26, 1925. p. 99
- 28 On April 16, 1925, an explosion occurred at the "Sveta Nedelya" Cathedral in Sofia when the members of the fascist government of Bulgaria, headed by Tsankoff, were attending a service Tsankoff sent to the United States a slanderous statement accusing the Soviet Government of instigating the explosion. The reactionary foreign press launched a campaign against the U.S.S.R., calling upon the governments of their respective countries to revise their relations with the Soviet Union. The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., held in May 1925, issued an appeal to the working people of the whole world concerning the brutal treatment of the best representatives of the Bulgarian people by the Tsankoff Government and in this statement repudiated the slanderous attacks upon the Soviet Union. p. 100
- 29 This refers to the theses on the Bolshevisation of the parties affiliated to the Communist International adopted by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held in Moscow, March 21-April 6, 1925. p. 102
- 30 This refers to the national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics in Central Asia (the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorasm

republics) carried through in 1924. As a result of this national delimitation there were formed: the Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Uzbek S.S.R., the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region of the R.S.F.S.R. (subsequently it became the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic), and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region of the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (later of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic). The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. held in May 1925 accepted the Uzbek and Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R. and amended the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. accordingly. The national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics in Central Asia was carried through under the immediate direction of J. V. Stalin. p. 138

- ³¹ See V. I. Lenin's article, "Critical Remarks on the National Question" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 1-34). p. 110
- ³² This refers to the armed uprising of the workers in Revel (Tallinn) on December 1, 1924, provoked by the sentence passed by an Estonian court at the end of November 1924 on 149 political offenders accused of conducting communist propaganda. The majority of the accused were sentenced to long terms of penal servitude, thirty-nine were sentenced to penal servitude for life, and Tomp, the leader of the Estonian workers, was shot. The uprising was cruelly suppressed by the reactionary Estonian government. p. 152
- ³³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Y.C.L. Truth*), a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, began publication in May 1925 in conformity with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Sixth Congress of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League. p. 155
- ³⁴ *Posledniye Novosti* (*Latest News*), a daily newspaper of Cadet white émigrés; began publication in Paris in April 1920; was edited by the Cadet leader P. N. Milyukov. p. 167

- ³⁵ The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, May 13-20, 1925. The congress discussed the following questions: the acceptance of the Turkmenian and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R.; report of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; the state of industry in the U.S.S.R. questions concerning Soviet affairs; measures for improving and strengthening peasant economy; the Red Army etc. The report on questions concerning Soviet affairs was delivered by M. I. Kalinin. p. 187
- ³⁶ This refers to the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held in Moscow, March 21-April 6, 1925 (for the speech delivered by J. V. Stalin on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Czechoslovak Commission of the plenum see this volume, pp. 58-68). p. 190
- ³⁷ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43. p. 206
- ³⁸ This refers to the war for national liberation launched by the Riffs in Morocco against French imperialism in the spring of 1925. After the defeat of the Spanish army of occupation in Morocco in the autumn of 1924, France resolved to seize the Riff, the Spanish zone of Morocco, and provoked a war. In the spring and summer of 1925 the Riffs inflicted a series of heavy defeats upon the French. The Riffs were defeated in May 1926 only after the conclusion of a military alliance between France and Spain. p. 209
- ³⁹ This refers to the intervention of Anglo-American and Japanese imperialism in the internal affairs of China in the second half of 1924. In South China, British naval forces supported the revolt of the counter-revolutionary Canton merchants against the revolutionary Canton Government headed by Sun Yat-sen. In the North, the Anglo-American and Japanese imperialists instigated war between their respective protégés, the Chinese generals Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, for the partition of

China. This intervention gave a powerful impetus to the struggle for national liberation in China, which led to the revolution of 1925-27. p. 209

- 40 *Bolshevik*, a fortnightly theoretical and political magazine, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.); began publication in April 1924. p. 220

- 41 The Fifth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, June 17-July 8, 1924. On June 30, D. Z. Manuilsky delivered a report on the national question. p. 223

- 42 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 306-44. p. 226

- 43 See Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. I, B. 6, S. 503-22. p. 238

- 44 Ruth Fischer and Maslow—leaders of the Trotskyite group in the Communist Party of Germany. In April 1924, at the Frankfurt Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, after the removal of the bankrupt Right-opportunist Brandler-Thalheimer group from the Party leadership, the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group seized the leadership in the newly-elected Central Committee of the C.P.G. In the autumn of 1925, Ruth Fischer and Maslow and their supporters were removed from the leading posts in the Communist Party of Germany and in 1926 they were expelled from the Party as agents of the class enemy. After that the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany was headed by E. Thälmann. p. 242

- 45 The Sixth Congress of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, July 12-18, 1924. The congress discussed the following questions: the change of name from the Russian Young Communist League to the Russian Leninist Young Communist League; the political situation and the tasks of the youth the report of the Russian Leninist Y.C.L. delegation on the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International;

the report of the Central Committee of the Russian Leninist Y.C.L.; the prospects of youth labour and the tasks of the economic activities of the R.L.Y.C.L.; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. in the countryside; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. in the Red Army and Navy, etc. The Sixth Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L. associated itself with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and condemned the opportunist theory that the Y.C.L. should be neutral in the struggle against anti-Party deviations. (For the decisions adopted by the Sixth Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L. see *Resolutions and Decisions of the Sixth All-Union Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L.*, Moscow, 1924.) p. 253

- 46 V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 302). p. 261
- 47 V. I. Lenin, speech in closing the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), April 2, 1922 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol 33) p. 291). p. 261
- 48 The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on December 1-10 1925, just before the Fourteenth Party Congress. This letter from J. V. Stalin was read at a private session of the conference held on December 8, 1925. p. 263
- 49 The Fourteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference was held on December 5-13, 1925, just before the Fourteenth Party Congress. In its resolution on the report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) the conference approved the political and organisational work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 263
- 50 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 18-31, 1925. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee the reports of the Auditing Commission, of the Central Control

Commission and of the representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and also reports on: the work of the trade unions; the work of the Young Communist League; revision of the Party Rules, etc. The congress fully approved the political and organisational line of the Central Committee, indicated the further path of struggle for the victory of socialism, endorsed the Party's general line for the socialist industrialisation of the country, rejected the defeatist plans of the oppositionists and instructed the Central Committee resolutely to combat all attempts to undermine the unity of the Party. The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has taken its place in the history of the Party as the Industrialisation Congress. The key-note of this congress was the struggle against the "new opposition," which denied the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. By decision of the Fourteenth Congress, the Party adopted the name of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) —C.P.S.U.(B.). (Concerning the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 423-28.)
p. 265

- ⁵¹ This refers to the conference held in Locarno (Switzerland), October 5-16, 1925, at which Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany were represented. (Concerning the Locarno Conference see pp. 279-80 in this volume.)
p. 277
- ⁵² In Genoa (Italy), April 10-May 19, 1922, an international economic conference was held in which Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium Japan and other capitalist states, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia, on the other, took part. The Genoa Conference was called for the purpose of determining the relations between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia. At the opening of the conference the Soviet delegation submitted an extensive programme for the rehabilitation of Europe and also a scheme for universal disarmament. The conference did not accept the Soviet delegation's proposals.

On December 2, 1922, the Soviet Government convened in Moscow a conference of representatives of the neighbouring Western states (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania), at which it submitted for discussion a plan for proportional reduction of armaments. On December 27, 1922, the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in an appeal "To All the Peoples of the World," reaffirmed the Soviet Government's peace policy and called upon the working people all over the world to support this policy. In February 1924, at the Naval Conference held in Rome, the Soviet representative submitted concrete proposals for reducing naval armaments. p. 287

- 53 This refers to the general and commercial treaties between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. signed in London on August 8, 1924, by representatives of the Soviet Government and of the MacDonald Labour Government. The British Conservative Government, which came into office in Britain in November 1924, refused to ratify those treaties. p. 297
- 54 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies annulling the state debts of the tsarist government was adopted on January 21, 1918. p. 297
- 55 This refers to the Conservative Baldwin-Austen Chamberlain Government that came into power in November 1924 in place of the MacDonald Labour Government. p. 299
- 56 *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn (Economic Life)*, a daily newspaper organ of the economic and financial People's Commissariats and institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. (Supreme Council of National Economy, Council of Labour and Defence, the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, the People's Commissariat of Finance, and others); published from November 1918 to November 1937. p. 306
- 57 This refers to V. I. Lenin's works: "*Left-Wing*" *Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality (Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp.

291-319), *Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Secretaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Units of the City of Moscow and of the Moscow Gubernia on April 9, 1921*, and *The Tax in Kind* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 262-76, 308-43), and *Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution* (Report delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922) (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. 311

- 58 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, p. 566. p. 320
- 59 See V. I. Lenin's "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. 332
- 60 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 124-25. p. 336
- 61 This refers to the resolution adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) (October 3-10, 1925) on V. M. Molotov's report on "The Party's Work among the Rural Poor" (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1941, pp. 38-41). p. 338
- 62 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 6, pp. 325-92. p. 339
- 63 *Bednota (The Poor)*, a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published from March 1918 to January 1931. p. 372
- 64 *Leningradskaya Pravda (Leningrad Truth)*, a daily newspaper, organ of the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and Leningrad Regional and City Soviets of Work-

ing People's Deputies; started publication in 1918 under the title of *Petrogradskaya Pravda*. In 1924 it was renamed *Leningradskaya Pravda*. At the end of 1925, *Leningradskaya Pravda*, the organ of the North-Western Regional Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee, the Leningrad Gubernia Council of Trade Unions, and the Regional Economic Conference, was utilised by the "new opposition" for its factional anti-Party aims. p. 389

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

1 9 2 5

- Beginning of January* J. V. Stalin has an interview with the members of the editorial board of *Krasnaya Molodyozh* on the tasks of that magazine. A report of the interview was published in *Krasnaya Molodyozh*, No. 1 (5), January 1925.
- January 5* J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of the Stalino (Yuzovka) Party School who had come on an excursion to Moscow.
- J. V. Stalin writes the appeal "Working Women and Peasant Women, Remember and Carry Out Ilyich's Behests!" The appeal was published in the magazine *Rabotnitsa (Working Woman)*, No. 1, January 1925.
- January 6* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the All-Union Teachers' Congress. The letter was published in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta (Teacher's Newspaper)*, No. 2, January 10, 1925.
- January 9* J. V. Stalin has an interview with a group of Communists assigned for work in the countryside.
- January 10* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the leaders of the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers

concerning the convocation of a conference of proletarian writers.

- January 17-20* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
- January 17* At a joint session of the plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin reports on the resolutions passed by local organisations on Trotsky's action.
- January 19* J. V. Stalin speaks at the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on M. V. Frunze's report on "Budget Assignments for the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of the U.S.S.R."
- January 21* J. V. Stalin's letter to *Rabochaya Gazeta* on the first anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin is published in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 17.
- January 25* J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Comrade D—ov's letter concerning the question of the victory of socialism in one country.
- January 26* J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on "Dymovka."
- January 27* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) "Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and the Peasantry."
- January 28* J. V. Stalin takes part in the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.) and of its Presidium.

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- January 30* In greetings telegraphed to the first congresses of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, J. V. Stalin defines the tasks of the Communist Parties in those republics after the national delimitation that had been carried out in Central Asia. The telegrams were published in the newspapers *Pravda Vostoka* (*Truth of the East*), No. 29, February 6, 1925, and *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (*Turkmenian Spark*), No. 34, February 14, 1925.
- January 31* The Twenty-First Gubernia Party Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee.
- February 2* J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers on questions concerning proletarian literature.
- February 3* J. V. Stalin's interview with Herzog on "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and Bolshevisation" is published in *Pravda*, No. 27.
- February 6* J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League on questions concerning the work of the League.
- February 7* J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the plenum of the "Proletkult" organisation on questions concerning the further work of this organisation.
- February 9* J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee of the

- R.L.Y.C.L. on questions concerning the work of the League.
- February 15* J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Seventh Tsaritsyn Gubernia Congress of Soviets.
- February 18* J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
- February 20* J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of Party and Soviet bodies in the Tula Gubernia on questions concerning the work of the co-operatives and on housing.
- February 26* J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
- February 28* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Me—rt concerning the situation in the Communist Party of Germany.
- March 6* J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the working people of Tajikistan on the occasion of the formation of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The greetings were published in *Pravda Vostoka*, No. 58, March 12, 1925.
- March 8* J. V. Stalin's article "International Women's Day" is published in *Pravda*, No. 56.
- March 9* J. V. Stalin signs the notice "To all organisations of the R.C.P.(B.);" announcing the convocation of an All-Union Party Conference and agenda of this conference.
- March 10* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the cadets and to the commanding, political and teaching staff of the Stalin Infantry School in Nizhni Novgorod in connection with his election as an honorary cadet of the school. The letter

was published in *Nizhegorodskaya Kommuna (Nizhni-Novgorod Commune)*, No. 45, February 23, 1930

J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Tsaritsyn Gubernia congress of agricultural co-operative delegates, wishing them success in drawing the toiling peasantry into the work of building socialism.

March 13

J. V. Stalin writes the message of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) sent to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in connection with the death of Sun Yat-sen. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 60, March 14, 1925.

March 14 and 16

J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the First All-Union Congress of Village Correspondents.

March 15

J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the First Party Conference of the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region in which he defines the tasks confronting the Communists of Kara-Kirghizia. The greetings were published in *Pravda Vostoka*, No. 67, March 26, 1925.

March 17

J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which had arrived for the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

*March 21 —
April 6*

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

March 21

J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the political and Czechoslovak commissions set up by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

- March 22* J. V. Stalin's article "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties" is published in *Pravda*, No. 66.
- March 25* J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegations from the workers at the Vladimir Ilyich and Dynamo factories who had come to invite him to attend their meetings for the election of deputies to the Moscow and District Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies.
- J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the crew of the torpedo-boat "Stalin" of the Red Baltic Fleet.
- J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading members of the staff of the Lenin Institute on questions concerning the work of the Institute.
- March 27* J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation from the Communist Party of France which had arrived for the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
- J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak Commission of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."
- March 28* At a meeting of the workers of Section No. 1 of the Locomotive Service of the Northern Railway, J. V. Stalin is elected a deputy to the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies.
- March 30* J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak subcommission of the Fifth Enlarged

Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Yugoslav Commission of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on "Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia."

J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the Kirghiz Republic on the situation in Kirghizia.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of the editorial board of the newspaper *Bednota* on questions concerning the work of the peasant department of that newspaper.

April 1

J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation of workers from Section No. 1 of the Locomotive Service of the Northern Railway who had come to hand him his credentials as a deputy to the Moscow Soviet.

April 3

In a telegram to S. M. Kirov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, J. V. Stalin greets the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on the occasion of its fifth anniversary. The telegram was published in *Bakinsky Rabochy (Baku Worker)*, No. 75, April 5, 1925.

April 6

J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Active of the Young Communist League in the Countryside."

April 7

J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the E.C.C.I.

- April 13* J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students.
- April 15* J. V. Stalin writes an address "To the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students." The address was published in *Pravda*, No. 87, April 16, 1925.
- April 23-30* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
- April 27-29* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
- May 1* J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade and a demonstration of the working people in the Red Square, Moscow.
- May 2* J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the editorial board of *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent) on the occasion of Press Day. The greetings were published in a special issue of *Pravda Vostoka*, May 6, 1925.
- May 5* J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation of workers from the October Railway.
- May 6* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the newspaper *Pod Znamenem Ilyicha* (*Under Ilyich's Banner*), organ of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, in which he defines the tasks confronting that newspaper.
- May 7-11, 16* J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
- May 9* J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of

the R.C.P.(B.)” at a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.).

- May 11* The Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
- The first session of the All-Russian C.E.C., Twelfth Convocation, elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium of the All-Russian C.E.C.
- May 13-20* J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
- May 18* J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of students at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East on “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East.”
- May 20* The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Union Soviet of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
- May 21* The first session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.
- May 22* J. V. Stalin has an interview with delegates from the Turkmenian and Uzbek republics at the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
- May 23* J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading workers of Party and Soviet bodies in the South-Ossetian and North-Ossetian Autonomous Regions.
- May 25* J. V. Stalin has an interview with delegates at the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

from the Turkmenian S.S.R. and the Tajik and Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics on the situation in these republics.

May 29 J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.

June 1 J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading officials of the Uzbek S.S.R. and of the Daghestan and Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics.

June 2 J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Andreyev send a letter to the members of the editorial board of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

June 3 J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of the courses organised by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) for uyezd Party workers.

June 5 J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.

June 9 J. V. Stalin speaks at the Sverdlov Communist University, answering questions put to him by students of the University.

June 13 J. V. Stalin's greetings "To the Sverdlov University (On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade-Union Courses)" are published in *Pravda*, No. 132.

June 27 J. V. Stalin has an interview with the chairmen of the Tambov, Orel, Voronezh and Kursk Gubernia Executive Committees of Soviets on the measures to be taken to rehabilitate the national economy in the black-earth belt.

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- June 30* J. V. Stalin's article "The National Question Once Again (Concerning the Article by Semich)" is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 11-12.
- July 3* At a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission on the Polish question.
- July 4* J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the Communist Party of Poland.
- J. V. Stalin's interview with Mr. Fuse, Japanese correspondent of the newspaper *Nichi-Nichi*, on "The Revolutionary Movement in the East" is published in *Pravda*, No. 150.
- July 29* The Presidium of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin to the commission on the German question.
- August 18* J. V. Stalin sends a letter to the Cossacks of Goryachevodskaya Stanitsa acknowledging the receipt of the certificate of his election as an Honorary Cossack of that stanitsa on the occasion of its centenary. The letter was published in the newspaper *Terek*, No. 189, August 22, 1925.
- September 12* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. M. Molotov concerning the anti-Bolshevik character of Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch."
- September 15* J. V. Stalin writes an answer to a note by Comrade Yermakovsky.
- September 19* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the patients at the Uch-Dere Sanatorium are published in the newspaper *Sovietsky Yug* (*Soviet South*), No. 215.

- September 24* The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission set up to examine the proposals of the Central Asian Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) for land and irrigation reform in Central Asia.
- September 28* J. V. Stalin discusses with representatives of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic the national and state structure of that republic.
- October 3-10* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
- October 10* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Klara Zetkin concerning the state of affairs in the Communist Party of Germany.
- October 12* J. V. Stalin has an interview with members of the staffs of the Agitation and Propaganda Departments of the Tiflis and Nizhni-Novgorod Party Committees, participants in the conference of heads of Agitation and Propaganda Departments convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
- October 14* J. V. Stalin has an interview with participants in the conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
- October 15* The announcement, signed by J. V. Stalin, of the convocation of the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) is published in *Pravda*, No. 236.
- October 19* J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of the South-Ossetian and North-Osse-

tian Autonomous Regions on the question of uniting the two regions.

J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the work of the Tatar Party organisation.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with the Chairman of the Kursk Gubernia Executive Committee of Soviets and the Secretary of the Kursk Gubernia Party Committee on questions concerning work in the countryside.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with the manager of the Tula Small Arms Factory on questions concerning the work of the factory.

October 23 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the workers at the Baltic Shipbuilding Yard on the occasion of the launching of the first Soviet-built timber-carrier, the "Comrade Stalin." The greetings were published in *Izvestia*, No. 246, October 27, 1925.

October 29 *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 133, publishes J. V. Stalin's answers to questions put to him by the editorial board concerning the tasks of the Young Communist League.

J. V. Stalin visits M. V. Frunze, then lying ill in the Botkin (Soldatenkov) Hospital.

October 31 J. V. Stalin visits the Botkin Hospital where the body of M. V. Frunze was lying in state.

November 2 J. V. Stalin attends the Frunze memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre.

- November 3* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the funeral of M. V. Frunze in the Red Square.
- November 7* J. V. Stalin's article "October, Lenin, and the Prospects of Our Development" is published in *Pravda*, No. 255.
- November 9* J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the R.L.Y.C.L. on questions concerning the work of the League.
- Before November 15* A Party meeting of the workers at the Stalin Workshops of the October Railway elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fifth Party Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow.
- November 16* J. V. Stalin has an interview with the leaders of the Azerbaijan sections of the Metalworkers' and Miners' Unions on the conditions of the workers.
- November 18* J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.G. of the U.S.S.R.
- J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Fifth Party Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow. The greetings were published in the newspaper *Gudok (Siren)*, No. 265, November 20, 1925.
- November 29* J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to Comrade Yarovslavsky in Leningrad concerning the preparations for the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.).
- December 1* The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin an honorary member of the presidium of the conference.

- December 5* The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin an honorary member of the presidium of the conference.
- J. V. Stalin's letter to the editorial board of *Bednota* is published in No. 2,278 of that newspaper.
- December 8* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the presidium of the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.). The letter was published in the magazine *Krasnaya Letopis (Red Annals)*, No. 1 (58), 1934.
- December 9* The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee.
- December 13* The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
- December 15* J. V. Stalin signs the appeal by members of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the "new opposition" concerning the maintenance of Party unity.
- J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and delivers a speech on the subject of changing the name of the R.C.P.(B.) to Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)—C.P.S.U.(B.).

- December 18-31* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- December 18* J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- December 20* J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the political report of the Central Committee.
- J. V. Stalin makes a statement concerning the draft resolution on the Central Committee's report to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The statement was published in *Pravda*, No. 298, December 31, 1925.
- December 28* J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the Party and delivers a speech on the newspaper *Leningradskaya Pravda* owing to the "new opposition" utilising that newspaper for their factional anti-Party aims.
- December 31* The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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