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CHAPTER 12

Psychology of Women and Gender

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Psychology of women and gender has a short history: It coalesced as a formal subdiscipline of psychology during the early years of the women's movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Stewart & Dottolo, 2006). In contrast to this short history, the field has a much longer past when one considers that treatises on female (or feminine) subjectivity/psychology and on the relations between the sexes have been written throughout history (e.g., Wollstonecraft, 1792/1891). Likewise, despite the use of the word *gender* since at least the 15th century (according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*), the term came into use in psychology only after John Money's introduction of the phrase "gender roles" in 1955 (Money, 1955). Use of the term *gender* subsequently increased as a result of the linguistic and conceptual practices of feminist scholars who, despite insisting that gender referred to socially constructed masculinity and femininity, were nonetheless unsuccessful in securing this meaning of the term. In much of the academic literature, and certainly in psychology, the term *gender* is now used interchangeably with the term *sex* to refer to the categorization of an individual as male or female based on presumed biological characteristics (Crawford & Fox, 2007; Haig, 2004; Vanwesenbeeck, 2009).

In an effort to bring the historical record into alignment with the field's long past, we begin our historical overview of the psychology of women and gender at one turning point in this long past, specifically, the inception of scientific psychology in Western Europe and North America in the late 1800s. Although most male founders of this science were neither particularly aware of nor concerned about issues of sex or gender, their female colleagues could ill afford *not* to be. Women's sex categorization and the prevailing constructions of masculinity and femininity directly influenced whether they could gain access to university training in psychology and, if so, where and with what possible outcomes. Furthermore, societal beliefs about the unsuitability of women for higher education and intellectual work, especially in the sciences, made their status as "women-scientists" exceptional, even an oxymoron. Then, as now, women worked in an era rife with social beliefs and scientific doctrines about the "nature" and abilities of women versus men (see Shields, 1975a, 1982, 1984, 2007). They did not, however, have the legal protections and rights that women in most Western high-income societies had earned by the end of the 20th century. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of these women made the empirical investigation of supposedly natural male–female differences the focus of their scientific work (e.g., Hollingworth, 1914; Nevers & Calkins, 1895; Thompson, 1903). Indeed, their very entry into and participation in the scientific community called some of the presumed sex differences into question.

The history of the psychological study of women and gender is thus closely linked not only to a body of

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scholarship and research, but also to the personal experiences of the women who developed it and the heavily gendered contexts in which they worked. Political, social, and cultural changes in the status of women have unfolded synergistically with the social scientific study of women and gender. As Rosenberg (1982) has noted, although the work of early female social scientists was affected and supported by changing social beliefs about women, their work simultaneously helped alter these beliefs: "Trained as social scientists in the new research universities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, these women formulated theories about intelligence, personality development, and sex roles that not only altered American thinking about the nature of women and men, but also affected the whole course of American social science" (p. xiii).

In this chapter, we first describe the long past of women's struggles for a presence in the field, noting how those struggles often animated their scholarly projects. Our goal is to point to women who might otherwise be forgotten and to the conditions of work they faced. (An extensive online resource featuring biographical information about women in psychology and contemporary feminist psychologists can be found at `www.feministvoices.com`).

Then we turn to the era in which a subfield of psychology concerned with women and gender developed. We briefly note some areas of study that emerged over the 40-year history of this subfield, topics that were closely linked to the social issues of the day and to persisting cultural preoccupations concerning sexual difference and gender relations. For many feminist psychologists, the study of women and gender often led to critical examinations of methods of research. These examinations began with critiques of conventional research technologies, but soon extended to reflections on epistemological foundations of the discipline and proposals for innovative approaches. We then turn to clinical practice, an arena where feminist psychologists have made major contributions to theory, practice, and ethical discussions. In the final section, we describe some of the many organizations that have brought together psychologists concerned with gender equality, the status of women in the profession, and social change.

BEGINNINGS: WOMEN IN PSYCHOLOGY DOING PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN

In this section, we provide a descriptive overview of the efforts of select female psychologists who challenged sexism and widely held social beliefs about women from psychology's inception in the late 1800s through to the emergence of feminist psychology in the 1960s and 1970s. We discuss the social and disciplinary contexts in which they worked—and how these contexts changed as the 20th century progressed—often due to their efforts.

Early-20th-Century Women in U.S. Psychology

From the vantage point of the present, we can identify scholarly work that contributed to a "psychology of women" beginning quite early in the history of U.S. psychology—as soon as there were women to undertake it (Milar, 2000; Minton, 2000). Such work emerged more slowly (if at all) in other parts of the world, its development clearly linked both to the institutional status of psychology and to a combination of extradisciplinary factors unique to each geopolitical region (see Rutherford, Capdevila, Undurti, & Palmary, 2011). For example, although Canada is geographically near the United States, psychology in Canada professionalized several decades later than in the United States. Separate psychology departments were not established until the 1920s, and a national professional organization did not form until 1939—fully 47 years after its American counterpart (Wright & Myers, 1982). Although there were women present in the early years of Canadian psychology, their experiences differed in many ways from the first generation of U.S. women (Keates & Stam, 2009). Furthermore, scholarly work on the psychology of women did not appear in the Canadian context until the 1970s (Radtke, 2011).

To return to the United States, only a small cohort of women held higher degrees in psychology in the early years of the 20th century. All were from relatively privileged backgrounds (see Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987). Nonetheless, from its beginning, the new discipline admitted a higher proportion of women to its professional ranks than did other sciences. Moreover, the proportion of U.S. psychologists who were women increased more rapidly than in other sciences throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Furumoto, 1987; Hogan & Sexton, 1991; Rossiter, 1982). While it is tempting to assume that this reflected psychologists' more progressive attitudes toward women, there is ample evidence that this was not the case. Perhaps as a young field trying to prove both its professional and practical worth, psychology could not afford to turn away promising students and was slower to adopt the exclusionary practices of more established sciences. In these decades, women certainly did not attain positions of leadership or prestige in proportion to their numbers, either within professional societies or in academe (see Bryan & Boring, 1946; Mitchell, 1951).

At the same time that psychology in the United States was coalescing as a discipline, the first feminist movement was gaining considerable momentum and social and political visibility. Pro-suffrage activism and the increasing numbers of women seeking higher education and entering the industrialized workforce highlighted gender stereotypes and social expectations about men's and women's behavior. In this context, the first generation of women psychologists in the United States often found themselves using science to challenge persistent stereotypes about women—stereotypes fundamentally at odds with their personal experience. Others used their hard-won professional status and scientific eminence to challenge exclusionary practices in the field of psychology itself. One of the first women to challenge blatant sex discrimination in psychology and to work to expand opportunities for women was Christine Ladd-Franklin.

Born in 1847, Christine Ladd entered Vassar College in 1866, where she was heavily influenced by Maria Mitchell, an acclaimed astronomer, suffragist, and member of the Vassar faculty. After her graduation in 1869, Ladd taught math and science at girls' high schools. Lacking funds to continue her education, she continued her studies independently, attending classes at various colleges without formally enrolling. In 1876, she approached a well-known mathematician at the newly established Johns Hopkins University about undertaking doctoral research. Although he supported her application, the trustees of the university refused to enroll her as a regular student because she was a woman. Ladd completed all of the requirements for a doctoral degree in mathematics and symbolic logic in 1882 as a "special student." She was not awarded her degree officially until 1926, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Johns Hopkins. She was then 78 years old (see Furumoto, 1992).

After Ladd completed her doctoral studies, she married Fabian Franklin, also a mathematician. Her marriage presented another obstacle to her full participation in academia: Married women were ineligible for faculty appointments. Although she had solved one of the most vexing problems in symbolic logic, developed a highly influential theory of color vision (Ladd-Franklin, 1929), and was one of only three women psychologists starred in the 1903 edition of *American Men of Science*, Ladd-Franklin never obtained a formal faculty appointment. She did, however, exert considerable effort to fight sexist practices in psychology. For example, she repeatedly confronted the prominent Cornell University psychologist E. B. Titchener concerning his refusal to allow women to attend the meetings of the prestigious Society of Experimentalists. Despite her persistence, she was not able to persuade him to change the policy, which remained in place until his death. In 1909, she established the Sarah Berliner Postdoctoral Fellowship, an award that enabled recently graduated female PhDs to continue their research at an institution of their choice. Although Ladd-Franklin's scientific contributions did not concern the psychology of women and gender, her professional contributions were important in creating opportunities for women in the discipline.

There were other women of this early era who made scientific contributions to what is now the field of psychology of women. Many of them used empirical methods to challenge or refute sexist assumptions about women's nature and women's abilities that prevailed in the culture and had been imported wholesale into the scientific canon of psychology. Helen Thompson Woolley, who earned her PhD at the University of Chicago in 1900 (see Morse, 2002), produced the first dissertation in psychology concerned with sex differences, *The Mental Traits of Sex* (Thompson, 1903). In this work, she first conducted a review of the literature on male–female differences. Her review indicated that this literature contained more confusion and contradiction than scientific evidence. She then conducted an empirical study of the motor and sensory abilities of a group of 25 female and 25 male University of Chicago undergraduates. In a move that was innovative for its time, Thompson Woolley graphed the distributions of the scores of the men and the women instead of reporting results for the ability tests in terms of averages. She found that in every case, the curves overlapped almost completely. Although there were a small number of reliable differences between the mean scores of the two groups (e.g., on motor ability and puzzle solving), men and women were actually more similar than different on most tests. This similarity finding included her tests of emotionality, a trait believed to be highly sex-typed. In discussing her results, Thompson Woolley cautioned against hereditarian interpretations, arguing forcefully for a consideration of the effects of socialization practices, differential environments, and different social expectations for men and women. Her arguments against the hereditarian position on sex differences were to be voiced repeatedly by women psychologists in the ensuing years.

Another widely held social belief in this period, heavily influenced by Darwinian evolutionary theory, was the variability hypothesis: the assertion that men exhibit greater range and variability of physical and psychological traits than do women. Men's greater variability was said to account for the greater numbers of men of both superior

and inferior talent and for the mediocrity of women. Men's greater variability—both physically and mentally—was also assumed to drive evolutionary progress (see Shields, 1982). This greater variability among men, along with beliefs about men's and women's *different* strengths, was also assumed to equip men and women for different roles in society, a view known as the *complementarity hypothesis* (see Shields, 2007). Another prevalent belief, known as functional periodicity, was that women were dysfunctional a certain portion of each month because of their menstrual cycles, making them unsuitable for various types of work. Both the variability hypothesis and the functional periodicity hypothesis were challenged by a pioneer of the psychology of women, Leta Stetter Hollingworth (Shields, 1975b).

Leta Stetter Hollingworth's story is well known among historians of U.S. psychology. After training and working as a teacher in her native Nebraska, Hollingworth married and moved to New York City where she planned to continue her career while her husband, Harry Hollingworth, attended graduate school. These plans were curtailed when she learned that it was illegal for married women to work in the New York City public school system. Without employment and a much-needed income, Hollingworth endured a period of highly uncomfortable domestic confinement until her husband received funding for a research project. The project provided her with both employment and funds to attend graduate school. She trained with E. L. Thorndike at Columbia University Teachers College and conducted her dissertation research on the question of whether women's performance on a variety of physical and psychological tests was impaired during certain phases of their menstrual cycle (Hollingworth, 1914). Hollingworth's interest in this question reflected her conviction that claims of monthly impairment had little validity and served mainly to restrict women's professional opportunities. Having experienced restrictions due to her sex, she was particularly sensitized to this issue.

Hollingworth's scientific interests were consistent with her commitment to feminist politics. She was an active suffragist and a member of the New York Women Suffrage Party. In 1912, she and 24 other women founded the Heterodoxy Club, an all-women group devoted to the discussion of unorthodox opinions. Heterodoxy members included some of the era's most radical intellectuals: Rose Pastor Stokes, the founder of the American Communist Party; Charlotte Perkins Gilman, noted feminist writer; and Mary Ware Dennett, the cofounder of the National Birth Control League (Rosenberg, 2008). Hollingworth, although not as radical in her political and social views as her peers, remained an active member of Heterodoxy for 25 years. Arguably, her involvement with Heterodoxy and her participation in the organized women's movement were important influences on her psychological research. In turn, she used psychology to advance feminism.

In 1914, one of the members of the Heterodoxy Club, Henrietta Rodman, formed another group called the Feminist Alliance. Hollingworth was at the founding meeting (Klein, 2002). One of the primary goals of the Feminist Alliance was to fight sex discrimination, particularly as it affected women's access to work. At the group's organizational meeting, Hollingworth was appointed to chair its Committee on the Biologic Status of Women. With another member of the committee, Robert Lowie, a former student of the cultural anthropologist Franz Boas, Hollingworth prepared arguments refuting the "ancient slander that woman is essentially man's inferior" (as cited in Klein, 2002, p. 102). Together, they wrote an article called "Science and Feminism" for *The Scientific Monthly*.

In their article, Lowie and Hollingworth connected science and feminism by arguing for the use of empirical data to justify feminist objectives: "Feminism," they wrote, "demands the removal of restrictions placed on woman's activity" and noted that opponents of feminism justified these restrictions because of "the alleged unfitness of women to undertake certain forms of activity" (Lowie & Hollingworth, 1916, p. 277). They then reviewed anthropological, anthropometric, and psychological research for empirical evidence of innate differences in ability or intellect that would render women unsuitable for employment. Hollingworth reviewed evidence about female intellectual inferiority, noting that scientific studies had convinced many, including many men of science, that beliefs about female inferiority were unfounded. Despite this, Hollingworth noted, there remained a belief in the greater variability of the male of the species, based on the history of men's greater intellectual accomplishment. Hollingworth then reviewed her own and others' work showing absolutely no demonstrable differences in variability between the sexes. "The theory," she wrote, "exists, but the evidence does not" (Lowie & Hollingworth, 1916, p. 283).

Lowie and Hollingworth then took on the claim of menstrual impairment, noting:

> A long and patient search through this literature brings to light a veritable mass of conflicting statements by men of science, misogynists, practitioners, and general writers, as to the dire effects of periodicity on the mental and physical life of women; but the search reveals scarcely a single fact. . . ." (p. 283)

Lowie and Hollingworth concluded that restrictions placed on women on the grounds that certain occupations were not *natural* for women were utterly spurious, given evidence that under varying social conditions women engaged in a broad range of activities, including activities that some social groups might deem "unnatural."

Such a conclusion might not seem particularly radical to today's readers. However, writings such as these by Hollingworth and other feminists in the early generations of psychologists helped to dismantle some of the social beliefs about gender that had tightly constrained women of the Victorian era. Feminism joined with psychology to offer a view of female potential that was at odds with previous beliefs and that offered a new framework in which women could envision their lives, capacities, and opportunities. Several of the women in the early generations of psychologists lived out this potential, but they also actively helped to construct it by using psychological research to challenge entrenched beliefs. The net effect of their efforts is hard to assess. Certainly, more and more women entered the field as the 20th century unfolded, but they faced new challenges as well as lingering stereotypes.

Midcentury Women in U.S. Psychology: Challenges and Contributions

The period after World War I saw the emergence and expansion of applied psychology, a development that created a separate sphere of women's work in psychology. Many female psychologists were formally and informally guided toward positions in hospitals, clinics, courts, and schools, positions that often required only master's-level training. In addition, cultural and material factors led many women into fields that centered on children and families, such as child development and child guidance. In the 1920s, funds from philanthropic organizations, such as the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, led to the establishment of several child development institutes in the United States and Canada (see Lomax, 1977). Because of prevailing antinepotism rules, many female psychologists in dual-academic-career couples took lower prestige jobs as research assistants and associates at such institutes while their husbands were given faculty appointments (Johnston & Johnson, 2008). More generally, the prevailing stereotypes affirming women's special qualities of nurturance and specialized interest in children meant that women entering psychology were channeled into the study of children and families (Cameron & Hagen, 2005).

After the passage of the constitutional amendment granting American women the right to vote in 1920, fractures occurred in the feminist movement, and its sense of common purpose eroded (see Rosenberg, 2008). The years of the Great Depression and the advent of World War II were not facilitative of *collective* feminist action, either in society or in psychology. In psychology, an important exception was the National Council of Women Psychologists (NCWP), founded in 1941, which was a direct response to the exclusion of women psychologists from the war effort. (We describe the NCWP below.)

The collaboration between psychologists Alice Bryan and Edwin Boring affords a poignant example of the difficulty of speaking out on women's issues at this time. Alice Bryan earned her doctorate in 1934 at Columbia University in New York City. There, she took a broad range of courses, exceeding the requirements in order to maximize her chances of succeeding in the male-dominated job market. Acknowledging her marginal status, she wrote,

> I wanted to prepare as broadly and soundly as possible for effective competition in the job market, for it was tacitly agreed among the graduate students that men were the preferred candidates . . . for most teaching positions at the college level. And I did want to teach (Bryan, 1983, p. 75).

Bryan did go on to teach, but she spent several years patching together part-time jobs, as was not uncommon during the Depression era. In 1939, she was offered a full-time position as assistant professor in the School of Library Services at Columbia, where she had been teaching a night course in psychology for practicing librarians. From this point on, Bryan split her time between publishing in psychology journals and publishing in library science journals. She earned a master's degree in library science at the University of Chicago and went on to publish a landmark survey of public library personnel. Entitled *The Public Librarian,* it called attention to the unfairness of the dual career track in the field: Ninety-two percent of the public librarians she surveyed were female, but directorships almost always went to men. Bryan was also centrally involved in the formation of the NCWP.

In 1942, Bryan was invited to serve on a committee charged with reorganizing the American Psychological Association (APA). She was the only woman on the committee. Here, she met Edwin Boring, an experimental psychologist working at Harvard University. Like many other male psychologists, Boring had become increasingly provoked by Bryan's assertion that women did not hold representation in APA offices proportionate to their numbers. Noting their shared interest in what became referred to as the "woman problem," Boring suggested that he and Bryan collaborate on an empirical study of the question.

The Bryan–Boring collaboration resulted in three articles reporting the results from a large survey of American psychologists (Bryan & Boring, 1944, 1946, 1947). Even though the data supported Bryan's original claim (and vindicated her complaints), the reports are strangely quiet about what may have been *causing* women's underrepresentation. In his later autobiography, Boring characterized his collaboration with Bryan as one in which she, with her feminist convictions, and he, with his conviction that women, for both biological and cultural reasons, "determined most of the conditions about which she complained" (Boring, 1961, p. 72), could temper each other's positions and thereby reveal the "truth." Whatever truth might have been revealed, it appears that the pair reached a compromise over their interpretive differences by presenting their results in largely descriptive format (see Capshew, 1999, pp. 84–88).

Boring, however, later communicated his interpretive framework in a sole-authored article entitled "The Woman Problem" (Boring, 1951). Here, he ventured that two of the primary reasons for women's proportionate lack of prestige in psychology were (a) a natural predisposition in women to prefer "particularistic" tasks (e.g., working with single cases, as in clinical work) over the task of generalization that was the true calling of the scientist; and (b) that women suffered from "job concentration" difficulties. With regard to the latter, he reasoned that because the culture tends to reward a fanatic devotion to work, women would inevitably experience conflict between job concentration and family orientation. He also addressed the question of whether a woman could be a work fanatic and remain marriageable, remarking that she must be "abnormally bright to combine charm with concentration" and noting that some women "make the synthesis by being charmingly enthusiastic" (Boring, 1951, p. 681).

As Boring's comments intimate, the late 1930s and 1940s were challenging years for women and feminist activism in psychology despite the foundations laid by their first-generation forerunners. American women in this midcentury or "second-generation" cohort of psychologists were more racially and religiously diverse than their first-generation counterparts (Johnston & Johnson, 2008). Some experienced both racism and sexism (e.g., Mamie Phipps Clark), and some experienced anti-Semitism and sexism (e.g. Mary Henle and Marguerite Hertz). Indeed, it was not until the 1930s that the first African American women were awarded doctorates in psychology (see Guthrie, 1998). Inez Prosser received her PhD in educational psychology in 1933 but died a year later (Benjamin, Henry, & McMahon, 2005). Ruth Howard received her PhD in developmental psychology in 1934 at the University of Minnesota (Howard, 1983). Mamie Phipps Clark, one of the best known African American women in psychology, was awarded her PhD from Columbia University in 1944.

As a Black woman in psychology, Clark faced tremendous obstacles. Her PhD supervisor had openly communicated his expectation that she would return to the southern United States and teach at a Black high school when she completed her PhD. Clark, however, did not allow racist and sexist expectations to constrain her. After a series of unsatisfying research positions, she decided to create her own opportunities. Perceiving the immense need for psychological services for disadvantaged children and families in the Harlem neighborhood of New York City, she established the Northside Center for Child Development in 1946 and served as its director until her retirement in 1979 (Clark, 1983; Lal, 2002; Rutherford, 2012).

The post-WWII period was one in which issues of gender equality were temporarily sidelined as American soldiers returned to civilian life. In psychology, men quickly filled both the academic positions they had vacated during the war *and* the new positions in clinical psychology that were created in response to the mental health needs of returning veterans. Much of popular psychology churned out calls for traditional gendered divisions of labor in families, as well as claims about children's need for full-time mothering. However, one psychologist of this era whose scholarly work went beyond propaganda to investigate empirical questions regarding women's capacities was Georgene Seward.

Seward, a social and clinical psychologist, was continually thwarted in her career advancement by both sex discrimination and the antinepotism rules that were common in the 1940s. After graduating from Columbia in 1926, she took a 1-year position at Hunter College and then moved to Barnard College. There she taught for 7 years but never advanced in rank. Finally, after moving from New York to Connecticut and then to Massachusetts in search of satisfying work, Georgene Seward and her psychologist-husband John Seward finally found positions in Los Angeles, he at the University of California, Los Angeles, and she at the University of Southern California. As a researcher, Seward was interested in evaluating the persistent cultural belief that women's performance and productivity were impaired during menstruation (Seward, 1944). This was a belief that her friend Leta Hollingworth had challenged earlier in the century. However, the context in which Seward took on this topic was quite different: "Today when women are playing an increasingly important part in winning the war,

the question of their reputed biological handicaps becomes especially pertinent" (Seward, 1944, p. 90).

Seward reviewed the empirical evidence and found no reliable differences between menstruating women and nonmenstruating controls on either basic or complex laboratory tasks. She argued that any differences based on women's *subjective reports* of impairment had to be understood in relation to the overwhelming negativity with which menstruation was viewed. The problem, in other words, lay in the cultural messages conveyed to women about menstruation, not in women themselves. She concluded that, as cultural attitudes toward menstruation shifted, women would confidently "assume their places beside men in the work of the world" (Seward, 1944, p. 99).

When WWII ended, Seward became involved in a committee that was jointly sponsored by the National Council of Women Psychologists and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. The committee was concerned with the roles of men and women in postwar society. In 1946, as part of this committee's work, she published a book called *Sex and the Social Order* in which she reviewed studies of sex differences in behavior in species ranging from rats and chicks to human beings. She concluded that, as one moved along the evolutionary scale, sex differences had increasingly social rather than biological origins. Despite this, humans were almost always assigned to social roles on the basis of biological sex. She suggested that this disjuncture produced considerable psychological distress and conflict, especially for women (Seward, 1946).

In the last chapter of her book, Seward noted that World War II had provided many women with the opportunity to participate fully in the work force, often in traditionally masculine occupations. She argued that a successful and democratic postwar society required the dramatic reconfiguration of traditional sex roles. To accomplish this, Seward made the following recommendations:

1. Promote the expression of the traditionally feminine values of giving and loving in the socialization of every child.
2. Develop economic reforms to enable the equal participation of both women and men in the workforce.
3. Create cooperative housing and day care to relieve worker-mothers of the sole burden of domestic responsibilities.
4. Increase training in mathematics and mechanics for girls and training in child care and parenting for boys in order to prepare both sexes to participate equitably in all aspects of the world's work.

Seward's recommendations for reformulating the social roles of women and the gendered division of labor in public and private life were not without precedent, nor have they yet been achieved. Nonetheless, Seward's work dispels the notion that there was no feminist scholarship for gender equality in this midcentury period, even if it had limited impact. As Morawski (1994) has noted, "The decades following Seward's systematic appraisal . . . produced a quite different understanding of sex and gender, realizing not hers, but another's postwar agenda" (p. 41). By the 1960s, however, this postwar agenda gave way to an agenda of a very different kind.

Women's Liberation and the Emergence of Feminist Psychology in America

In 1963, the publication of *The Feminine Mystique*, which has been described as "the book that pulled the trigger on history," riveted American readers. Betty Friedan, its author, depicted middle-class American homemakers whose superficially "perfect" lives were permeated by diffuse demoralization and discontent. The origins of this "problem that has no name," Friedan argued, lay in societal norms prescribing full-time domesticity, which left educated women unfulfilled and stifled. Whether Friedan's book triggered a revolution or simply caught a wave about to crest, the Women's Liberation Movement was fully engaged within a few years. The National Organization for Women, established in 1966, issued a mandate with statements and priorities that closely paralleled Georgene Seward's demands of 2 decades earlier:

> NOW demanded a national system of child care, a new "concept of marriage," which would include "an equitable sharing of the responsibilities of home and children," and an "end to all policies and practices, which, in the guise of protectiveness, not only deny opportunities, but also foster in women self-denigration and dependence." (Rosenberg, 2008, p. 190)

Many women in psychology had reason to be sympathetic to the cause of women's liberation. They had ample experiences of discrimination, exclusion, belittlement, harassment, and presumed inferiority. Moreover, many had been active in the civil rights movement, the antiwar movement, and other progressive movements of the 1960s. Groups soon formed to demand that the psychology reexamine its treatment of women—as objects of knowledge, patients, students, and professionals. At the 1970 APA convention, for example, a group of women demonstrated in protest of sexism in the interviewing and hiring

practices at the onsite Employment Bureau. Another early initiative demanded masked review of scholarly work, which would conceal an author's identity from reviewers, as a necessary protection against sex bias and favoritism. In clinical psychology, feminists campaigned for reforms in the ethical code in order to protect female therapy clients and female students from sexual abuse and harassment.

At the same time as feminists mounted campaigns to alter the social relations and conditions of work in psychology, scholarship about women and gender was emerging as a distinct field called the psychology of women. One way to chart the course of the field is to note the development of course offerings and textbooks. Until the late 1960s, few, if any, psychology departments offered courses about women. Two decades later, 51% of U.S. psychology departments offered an undergraduate course on women and gender; in addition, 172 departments offered graduate courses (Women's Programs Office, 1991). There were no textbooks on the psychology of women until 1971, when Judith M. Bardwick's *Psychology of Women: A Study of Biomedical Conflict* appeared (Bardwick, 1971). Bardwick, a personality psychologist, leaned heavily toward a psychodynamic account of women's intrapsychic conflicts, an approach that many teachers found less than satisfying. Within a few years, Bardwick's text was superseded by textbooks with more social–psychological or sociological emphases, such as *Psychology of Women*: *Behavior in a Biosocial Context* by Juanita Williams (1977) and *Women and Sex Roles* by Irene Frieze, Jacquelynne Parsons (Eccles), Paula Johnson, Diane Ruble, and Gail Zellman (1978). Today, dozens of textbooks are available, representing varying points of view and emphases, as well as a vast array of supplemental texts, teaching manuals, videos, and Web-based materials. There are specialty graduate courses, including courses for students training to be counselors and therapists. Many graduate psychology programs also allow students to obtain certificates or minors in women's studies or gender studies to complement what they learn in their psychology courses. Of course, as we noted above, all of these developments depend on a body of research and scholarship in psychology of women and gender. From the 1970s to today, this body of knowledge has been growing exponentially.

OPENINGS: MAKING NEW KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WOMEN AND GENDER

In this section, we highlight some areas of scholarly research that have emerged in the period from the 1970s to the present. The work has been two-pronged, involving both the reexamination of conventional knowledge and the development of new knowledge. The field has encompassed a wide range of topics, as well as a diverse array of research methods and epistemologies. Furthermore, many feminist psychologists have actively participated in interdisciplinary gender studies programs, and their work has been enriched by the perspectives of other disciplines. We cannot survey these developments in their entirety. Instead, we highlight selected areas of research, theory, and critique that have characterized successive epochs.

Recovering a Legacy: Toward Understanding the Social Relations of Psychology

Perhaps it is not surprising that the fledgling field of psychology of women should have desired to recover a history. Nor is it surprising that women—newly admitted into the field and sometimes not entirely welcome—should wish to learn about the women who preceded them. In the 1970s, following trends in other areas of history, historians of psychology began to replace women and their contributions in psychology's history (e.g., Bernstein & Russo, 1974; Furumoto, 1979; Shields, 1975b). At this time, their efforts were a necessary corrective to a historiography that had largely omitted or obscured women psychologists' lives and careers. For example, in 1974, psychologists Maxine Bernstein and Nancy Russo published "The history of psychology revisited, or up with our foremothers," one of the earliest efforts to point out the invisibility of women in accounts of psychology's history. They argued that the discipline's documenting practices and androcentric biases had led many psychologists to assume that women had not made any important contributions to the field. Moreover, they argued, "If psychologists are taught to acknowledge, appreciate, and respect the contributions of women . . . their image of women cannot help but be altered" (Bernstein & Russo, 1974, p. 131). Searching for information about women's contributions and replacing women in the historical record was thus not only a matter of writing more inclusive history, it was also a matter of challenging the assumptions about women that were embedded in the discipline.

The recovery project continued and, as it developed, it came to be combined with astute analyses of the contextual factors and social relations that shaped women's experiences as psychologists (see Bohan, 1990, 1995; Johnston & Johnson, 2008; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987). As a result, there is now, at least for the United States, a fairly extensive historiography on women in psychology. There

is a comparatively smaller body of historical work on early women in psychology in Canada, in Europe, and elsewhere; however, such information is growing (cf. Campos, 2001; de la Cour, 1987; Gundlach, Roe, Sinatra, & Tanucci, 2010; Valentine, 2006; Wright, 1992).

Masculinities, Femininities, and Androgyny

An early project in the psychology of women was a sustained examination and critique of psychology's conception and measurement of masculinity and femininity (Morawski, 1985). Constantinople (1973) pointed out that standard psychological measures of these traits were constructed with masculinity and femininity as the opposite ends of a single bipolar continuum, a format that rendered them mutually exclusive. Constantinople argued against this built-in assumption, pointing out that an individual could embrace both masculine and feminine traits and behaviors. Going a step further, Sandra Bem (1974) argued that optimal psychological functioning and personal adjustment demanded that individuals possess both masculine and feminine qualities and flexibly deploy them in everyday life. Bem referred to this as an androgynous sex-role identity. To evaluate these propositions, Bem designed the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), a measure that permitted respondents to endorse both (or neither) masculine and feminine attributes. Bem's ideas, the BSRI, and an alternate measure of sex-related attributes, the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence & Helmreich, 1978) framed a good deal of personality research in the latter part of the 1970s. The notion of androgyny and the modes of measuring it were soon subjected to a number of conceptual and methodological critiques (e.g., Locksley & Colten, 1979; Morawski, 1985). Nonetheless, the critical examination of masculinity and femininity that Constantinople and Bem undertook set the stage for further critique and reformulation.

Women-Centered Theories: Rehabilitating the Feminine

Spurred by such influential works of feminist theory as Nancy Chodorow's *Reproduction of Mothering* (1978) and Jean Baker Miller's *Toward a New Psychology of Women* (1976), some feminist psychologists in the 1980s turned to a search for women's unique emotional capacities, identities, and relational needs, and a call for reassessing what had been devalued in the larger culture (and sometimes in feminist writings as well). In psychology, Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* (1982) was a popular instance of this line of endeavor. By putting women at the center of inquiry, Gilligan intended to highlight distinctly feminine qualities that had been viewed as deficiencies or signs of immaturity. For example, she put forward the notion of a distinctive feminine mode of moral decision making that emphasized what she named an ethic of care. Jean Baker Miller claimed that women were endowed with special capacities and needs for emotional connection, empathy, and relatedness, as well as a propensity for nurturing and caring for others. Miller (1976) celebrated these characteristics as "closer to psychological essentials" and "therefore, the bases of a more advanced form of living" (p. 27). Subsequently, Miller and her colleagues at the Stone Center at Wellesley College in the United States put forward a model of women's development that expanded on these ideas (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991). Originally called the self-in-relation model and then renamed the relational/cultural model, the model tied these feminine characteristics to early mother–daughter interactions.

Woman-as-Problem or Women-in-Context?

Psychologists have often accounted for women's experiences and difficulties in terms of personal traits and attributes. This way of understanding gendered behavior, which Crawford and Marecek (1989) called the woman-as-problem framework, fits comfortably with the individualist leanings of both North American culture and North American psychology (Becker & Marecek, 2008). Many constructs advanced by feminist psychologists during the 1970s provided ample instances of such "woman-as-problem" thinking, which has never gone out of style, especially in self-help psychology (Worell, 1988). Women have been said to suffer from fear of success (Horner, 1970); the impostor phenomenon (Clance, Dingman, Reviere, & Stober, 1995); the Cinderella complex, self-silencing (Jack, 1991); and the tendency to ruminate (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Women in corporate management have been characterized as lacking leadership ability, assertiveness, and knowledge of the secret "tricks of the trade." In such "women-as-problem" thinking, gender-linked deficits in early socialization are held responsible; individualized technologies, such as psychotherapy or psychoeducation retraining are held out as the remedies.

An alternate strain of feminist analysis, based in a sociological framework, offered a counterpoint to women-as-problem thinking. Such analyses shifted the locus of causality from personal shortcomings to influences in the social context, such as institutionalized sex discrimination

in the workplace (Nieva & Gutek, 1981) or unequal power relations in private life (Stoppard, 2000). For example, women may appear to be unassertive because unassertive speech is an adaptive response to the power relations in the immediate situation, not because they failed to acquire the skills to speak assertively when they were young (Crawford, 1995).

Sex Differences and Similarities

As we have noted, for much of the history of psychology, psychologists assumed profound differences between men and women. One of the central projects undertakings of feminist psychologists in the 1970s was a reexamination of purported differences between men and women. In 1974, Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin published a massive review of sex-difference research in psychology. Surveying over 1,400 studies, they found consistent evidence for sex differences in only 4 out of the 80 areas of behavior they reviewed. Indeed, many of the studies they reviewed were so flawed that nothing could be concluded from them at all (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).

Controversies about differences and similarities between men and women still rage among psychologists and in the popular culture. Since the 1970s, for example, claims have been made about the evolutionary basis of a variety of sex differences in courtship, mating behavior, pair bonding, and sexuality. At the same time, there have been numerous methodological and conceptual advances in this area. Feminist researchers have pointed out repeatedly that a sex-difference finding does not signify a difference that is inherent or biologically determined. The correlational design of most sex-difference studies (even those carried out in a laboratory) makes it impossible to draw any conclusions about causality. The scales, measures, and experimental apparatuses used to assess various traits have also come under critique; critics noted that, in many cases, the biases embedded in such instruments made the results a foregone conclusion. Moreover, researchers have amassed a great deal of evidence about the gender-related roles, norms, and expectations that influence men's and women's behavior, as well as the penalties incurred for violating norms (e.g., Eagly, Steinberg, & Beall, 2004).

By the late 1980s, meta-analysis was frequently used to assess and synthesize sex difference research (Hyde & Linn, 1988). Like a narrative review, meta-analysis collates the results of selected studies into a single integrated summary. Meta-analysis, however, cumulates these results mathematically. Furthermore, it goes beyond assessing whether a difference is reliable to offer an estimate of size and practical import of a sex difference (B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 2000). Perhaps one of the most important meta-analyses of sex differences concerns mathematical abilities, long believed to be an area of male superiority. A recent study of the mathematics performance of seven million U.S. children between 7 and 17 years old found that at present there are practically no differences between these girls and boys, regardless of age (Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis &Williams, 2008).

Even after several thousand empirical studies, questions about male-female differences versus similarities remain unresolved. This has led some feminist theorists to question the usefulness of pursuing such empirical comparisons (cf. the essays collected by Kitzinger, 1994). The focus on sex-as-difference, they said, distracted researchers from examining the power relations between men and women. In addition, because the focus on male–female difference presumes that each sex category is homogenous, it distracts attention from differences within each sex category that are associated with ethnicity, social class, sexuality, and other markers of social status (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990). But even if the sex-difference question is a received question, sex difference research remains an important aspect of the field. Feminists' voices are crucial in the ongoing cultural contestation over women's and men's proper place and proper treatment in society, and their scientific contributions offer a counterpoint to the stream of claims about male–female difference.

MOVING FORWARD: INNOVATIONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH PRACTICES

Since its formal inception in the early 1970s, the psychology of women and gender has undergone conceptual and methodological changes. Here we highlight several of the issues that have unfolded over this short history and are animating the field as it moves into the 21st century.

Diversity of Women's Lives

For the most part, research on the psychology of women that emerged as the field first coalesced took "women" as a unified category. This is hardly surprising: The pursuit of knowledge about generic human beings and the search for universal principles of behavior characterizes much of North American psychology. However, by the early 1980s, calls for attention to the diversity and specificity of women's experience mounted. Women of color—both

in the academy and in the feminist movement—protested that their experiences had been excluded and their voices had gone unheard (Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1981; hooks, 1981), and little had been done to dismantle the interlocking systems of racism, sexism, and classism that oppressed them. Psychology as a whole—and the subfield of psychology of women—was certainly not immune to this accusation. With a few notable exceptions, psychologists had paid little attention to women and girls who were members of ethnic minority groups, poor, or working class except to study them as social problems, for example, sexually-active teenagers, crack-addicted mothers, or school dropouts.

In the 1990s, work began in earnest to develop an inclusive psychology of women, one that attended to the lives and experiences of women and girls who had been understudied, as well as to the processes of racialization, marginalization, and stigmatization they experienced. This work included studies of poor and working-class young women coping with cuts in welfare (Fine & Weis, 1998); Guatemalan women living amidst political upheaval and state-sponsored terrorism (Lykes, 1989); lesbian and gay teenagers (Russell, Bohan, & Lilly, 2000); rural White working-class girls (L. M. Brown, 1998); Japanese American women and girls interned in camps during World War II (Nagata, 2003); Muslim American teenagers in post–September 11 Manhattan (Sirin & Fine, 2008); and women of color (Espín, 1997; Hurtado, 2003; Landrine, 1995).

This shift of interest has demanded new theoretical tools to analyze the ways in which categories of identity interlock and mutually define one another, as well as new tools for investigating subjectivity and personal identity. It also has demanded new modes of investigation that enable psychologists to take collective life and social structure into account in trying to understand life experiences. The heuristic of intersectionality, along with new research methods such as narrative psychology, discursive psychology, and biographical inquiry, has been important for such research.

From Traits to Social Processes

In an *American Psychologist* article published in 1979, Rhoda Unger described in detail the theoretical construct *gender*, which she defined as "those characteristics and traits socio-culturally considered appropriate to males and females." Like other feminist scholars of that time, Unger wanted to set apart social aspects of maleness and femaleness from biological mechanisms, so that the former would become the focus of scientific scrutiny (Unger, 1979). Unger's proposal was the first of many theorizations of gender and sex, most of which have moved far beyond her reformulation. The subsequent theoretical developments set aside definitions of gender that rely on static traits that reside in individuals. Instead, they shift the meaning of gender to socio-cultural processes and interpersonal practices. Kay Deaux (1985), for example, argued that gender could not be fully understood as a biological category, a finite list of sex differences, or a set of stable personality traits. The model proposed by Deaux and Brenda Major (1987) conceptualized gender as an interactive social process. Other feminist theorists have conceptualized gender as a set of principles that organizes male–female relations in a particular social group or culture; as such, gender serves as an axis along which status, hierarchy, and social power are distributed (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). Others have conceptualized gender as the set of practices by which masculinity and femininity are brought into being in everyday life and in social institutions (Bohan, 1993; Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Magnusson & Marecek, in press; West & Zimmerman, 1987). These alternative ways to conceptualize gender have opened new research questions: What are the habits, language practices, and social institutions by which masculinities and femininities are constituted? What are the practices that sustain gender distinctions sustained in particular social groups and settings? What are the practices lead people to see such gendered behavior as "natural" or as a freely chosen way of being who they "really" are (Magnusson & Marecek, 2010). In addition to new theoretical formulations of gender, feminists also offered new theorizations of sex. They questioned the notion that biological sex could fully separated from social meanings and cultural practices. They brought forth historical and cultural evidence of the changing meanings and materializations of sexed bodies, as well as evidence that scientists' interpretations of biological processes bore the imprint of prereflective assumptions (Jordan-Young, 2010; Laqueur, 1990).

Gender-Linked Violence

If one had to name a single topic that has been emblematic of feminist psychology at the turn of the 21st century, it is gender-linked violence. This includes rape and sexual assault, acquaintance rape, incest and childhood sexual abuse, wife battering, and sexual harassment. Intimate violence is all but ubiquitous in women's lives; even when they are not victims, threats of violence and concerns for safety thread through much of women's day-to-day behavior (Gordon & Riger, 1989). Feminist psychologists have played a key role in documenting the incidence of gender-linked violence and the harm done to the victims (e.g., Koss, 1993; Walker, 1979; for an overview, see

Rutherford, 2011b). They have also sketched societal attitudes about male-on-female violence, as well as cultural ideologies about gender and heterosexual relations that form what Nicola Gavey (2005) has termed the "cultural scaffolding" of rape. Psychologists of color have challenged models of rape myth acceptance and interventions based on White women only, noting that sexual violence in the lives of women of color is embedded in an overarching sociopolitical system imbued with *both* racism and sexism (White, Strube, & Fisher, 1998; Wyatt, 1992).

Another important area of research has examined the ways that victims' engagements with the medical, police, and legal systems often serve to increase their distress, leading to what some termed a second rape (Campbell, 2008). Treating victims/survivors of intimate violence, sexual abuse, and childhood sexual abuse has been a special focus of feminist therapists. In addition, some activist psychologists have developed programs aimed at preventing acquaintance rapes on college campuses (e.g., Senn, 2011). Despite the intense pace of research, activism, legal reforms, and policy interventions, there is little sign that male-on-female violence, sexual coercion, and sexual abuse have diminished. Gender-linked violence has thus come to be recognized generally as a social problem. In 2008, the APA sponsored a summit on violence and abuse in relationships, the proceedings of which can be found in a two-volume compendium (Koss, White & Kazdin, 2010; White, Koss, & Kazdin, 2010).

BUILDING FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS

Very early in the emergence of psychology of women, feminists began to register concerns about psychology's research methods (see Rutherford, 2011a). One line of criticism pointed to flaws and biases in the application of the methods (e.g., McHugh, Koeske, & Frieze, 1986). Other lines of criticism raised more fundamental concerns about the methods themselves. For example, many feminist psychologists argued that laboratory experimentation stripped away social context (Parlee, 1979). The demand for more socially and culturally situated investigations led many to explore qualitative and interpretative methods of inquiry, including fieldwork, semistructured interviews, focus groups, case studies, and participatory action research. A special double issue of *Psychology of Women Quarterly* (Crawford & Kimmel, 1999) showcased several of these approaches. A growing number of feminist psychologists use these methods of data collection along with analytic approaches derived from narrative psychology, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and discursive psychology (cf. Marecek, Fine, & Kidder, 1997; Tolman & Brydon-Miller, 2001; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001). We predict that this trend toward methodological pluralism will continue as the national boundaries of psychologies become more porous. In consequence, U.S.-based psychologists will benefit from gaining familiarity with a wider array of methods of inquiry than those usually taught in U.S. graduate programs.

Intersectionality: Doing Diversity Differently

In real life, there is no one who is only "gendered" or "classed" or "racialized." Social categories like sex, class, and race always are interrelated and mutually constituted, or as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), a Black feminist legal scholar, put it, intersectional. The concept of intersectionality calls on researchers to bring multiple lines of difference into simultaneous focus, in order to observe how such categories as gender, race, ethnicity, and class takes their meanings partly from one another. Intersectionality researchers further seek to understand how the meanings and salience of social categories shift both in day-to-day social relations and in broader historical perspective (Ferree, 2009).

The idea that social categories are coformed and also continually shifting in meaning demands formidable conceptual and methodological adjustments to the ways that American psychologists typically study social categories. Rather than taking such categories as static, *a priori* independent variables, proponents of intersectionality regard them as dynamic meaning systems. Feminist psychologists in other national contexts have led the way in investigating the coformation of social categories (and social identities more broadly). These researchers have drawn on theories of subjectification and positioning, and on the research tools of discursive and narrative psychology (Magnusson, 2011; Prins, 2006; Staunaes, 2003). In the U.S. context, a special issue of *Sex Roles*, edited by Stephanie Shields (2008), has introduced intersectional thinking to psychologists.

Epistemological Debates: Objectivity, Reflexivity, and Subjectivity

Many philosophers and historians of science have questioned the idea of objectivity, that is, the possibility of knowledge uninfluenced by values (Harding, 1986). In this view, knowers inevitably perceive, think, and speak from a standpoint generated by their social location and

experience. Research inevitably reflects the social, political, economic, and ideological contexts of its time and place and thus yields only partial truths (Haraway, 1988; Morawski, 1994). From the time of Helen Thompson Woolley to the present, feminists in psychology, too, have doubted whether the research process could be sealed off from the influence of the researcher. When they reviewed research on women's nature and capacities, they uncovered profound effects of researchers' standpoints at every stage of the research process, including formulating questions, designing studies, collecting and analyzing data, and making interpretations.

In response to the concern that knowledge is always inevitably value-inflected, many feminists have advocated the practice of researcher reflexivity. A classic paper by Sue Wilkinson (1988) set out some aspects of researcher reflexivity. They include striving to discern and acknowledge one's standpoints, investments, and value commitments, disclosing who has sponsored the research and who will benefit from the findings, and considering closely one's social position, politics, and values might influence one's interpretations. Deborah Belle's (1994) work with low-income White and African American women affords a good illustration of this. Belle reflected on how her position as a young, middle-class, White professional affected her relationship with her respondents, as well as her understanding of their experiences and narratives. By pondering the similarities and differences between herself and her respondents, Belle gained insights about the limited utility of conceiving of race and class merely as categories of individual identity, the complex significance of social networks for poor women, and the error of equating poverty and current household income.

Another dimension of reflexivity involves assuming a critical perspective on the discipline. Such disciplinary reflexivity aims to understand the nature and history of the discipline more deeply, as well as to explore critically how the discipline has influenced the larger society. Classic pieces of feminist critical reflexivity include works by Leta Stetter Hollingworth (1916), Naomi Weisstein (1971) and Carolyn Sherif (1979). In writing this chapter, we intend not only to offer a history of feminist contributions to psychology, but also to contribute critical reflections on psychology's disciplinary practices and values.

CLINICAL PRACTICE, COUNSELING, AND FEMINIST THERAPY

The mental health professions came under heavy criticism during the early days of the Women's Liberation Movement. In psychology, Phyllis Chesler's widely read *Women and Madness* (1972) rallied numerous feminist critics. At that time, psychoanalytic theory held sway among most psychotherapists in the United States, including many clinical psychologists. Feminists assailed many assertions about femininity that had been put forward by the now-outmoded versions of psychoanalysis that reigned in those days—for example, assertions that heterosexuality, marriage, and motherhood were criteria for women's normality and maturity; claims that women's ambition and achievement were manifestations of penis envy; the idea of dual female orgasms; and a proclivity for mother bashing (Lerman, 1986). Many feminists argued that such claims were little more than cultural ideologies recycled to bolster male supremacy.

Another concern voiced by feminists in that era was that men dominated the mental health professions. Men held most of the powerful positions in professional organizations, training programs, and mental health research settings. Most psychiatrists and clinical psychologists were men, even though most consumers of psychotherapy were women. The predominance of men in the field, feminists argued, positioned men as the arbiters of women's normality and women as dependent on male approval. Feminists demanded that women share control of the field and that perspectives centered in women's experiences be brought into clinical theory and practice.

Such criticisms touched off what became a sustained and successful movement to reform and expand knowledge and practice in clinical and counseling psychology. Key concerns were that cultural biases permeated scientific constructs and diagnostic practices; that therapists too readily ignored social context and material realities; and that power differences in therapy (irrespective of the sex of the therapist and the client) often worked against the client's interest. In response to these concerns, feminists developed new clinical theories, as well as feminist-inspired therapies and diagnostic practices (e.g., L. S. Brown, 1994; Enns, 2010; Worell & Remer, 1992). Feminists have also worked to assure the rights of therapy clients. For example, in the 1970s, they broke the silence surrounding sexual contact between therapist and client (Hare-Mustin, 1974). They argued that because of the inevitable power differences between therapists and their clients, it was impossible for sexual relations in therapy to be consensual. After considerable pressure, the APA altered its ethical code to include an explicit injunction against sexual contact in therapy.

The scope of feminist activities in clinical psychology is wide. In the United States, there are three journals

specifically devoted to feminist clinical practice: *Women and Therapy,* the *Journal of Feminist Family Therapy,* and *Affilia*. In addition, *Feminism & Psychology* and *Psychology of Women Quarterly* frequently carry articles relevant to mental health. Feminists have also engaged in clinical training and practice. For example, in 1977, the Division of Counseling Psychology initiated a 2-year program of conferences and special issues of *The Counseling Psychologist* designed to provide information and skills for working with women and girls and to raise counselors' awareness of sex bias in their work. Around the same time, an APA Task Force on Sex Bias and Sex Role Stereotyping produced guidelines for nonsexist therapy (American Psychological Association, 1978). In 1979, the APA and the National Institute of Mental Health convened an interdisciplinary conference of mental health specialists to identify priorities for clinical research on women (cf. Brodsky & Hare-Mustin, 1980). Other initiatives include a Task Force on Women and Depression initiated in 1987 (McGrath, Keita, Strickland, & Russo, 1990) and a Summit Conference on depression in 2000 (Mazure & Keita, 2006). Engagements with antiracism, diversity, and multiculturalism include the 1986 Advanced Feminist Therapy Institute (L. S. Brown & Root, 1990).

Biases in Diagnosis and Clinical Judgment

Feminists in clinical psychology have continually trained a critical eye on psychiatric diagnoses and diagnostic practices. There are good reasons for this: Formal diagnoses often play a determining role in treatment planning, especially with the growing reliance on drug treatments and the growth of bureaucratized treatment systems. Moreover, psychiatric diagnoses enter into sociopolitical life more broadly via, for example, judicial proceedings, employment decisions, insurance payments, and welfare policy. Furthermore, the historical record shows that diagnostic categories have often reflected cultural stereotypes about oppressed groups, whether women, ethnic minority groups, poor people, or colonized subjects.

A good deal of feminist critique has focused on the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In the United States (and increasingly throughout the world), the DSM is the compendium of officially recognized diagnoses. The number of such diagnoses has expanded substantially over time. Successive editions also give evidence of "bracket creep," that is, criteria have broadened so that more and more behavior is deemed pathological and in need of remedy. This has raised concerns about disease mongering and about the widening scope of psychiatric scrutiny over personal life. Many feminists have further objected to psychiatric diagnoses because they medicalize psychological suffering, that is, they frame people's troubles as if they were akin to physical diseases. Such medicalization diverts attention from the societal contexts and social relations that figure in much psychological suffering (Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009; Tiefer, 2006).

Specific diagnostic categories have also come under feminist scrutiny (Caplan & Cosgrove, 2004). In the early 1970s, for example, feminist critics joined in the movement to expunge homosexuality from the official list of psychiatric diagnoses, a change that was agreed to in 1973 (Bayer, 1987). Later, feminists in psychology presented critical analyses of certain diagnostic categories that were proposed for the third edition of the DSM, including self-defeating personality disorder, paraphilic rapism, and premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD). Mary Parlee (1994) offered a close account of the claims-making activities of pharmaceutical companies, psychiatrists, and obstetricians/gynecologists, all of whom had economic interests in PMDD, in the diagnostic discussions; these activities, in her view, handily trumped the empirical evidence presented by social scientists. At this writing, feminist psychologists are focusing efforts on proposals for the fifth edition of the DSM. Activities include a special issue of *Feminism & Psychology* (Marecek & Gavey, in preparation); a public information portal on the Web site of the Association for Women in Psychology (`www.awpsych.org`); and a teaching curriculum regarding women's sexuality (Tiefer, Brick, & Kaplan, n.d.)

Feminist Approaches to Therapy

The term *feminist therapy* came into use in the early 1970s. The first therapists to identify themselves as feminist therapists deliberately positioned themselves in collectives outside the mental health system. By the 1980s, however, feminist therapy had for the most part moved beyond its separatist, counterculture beginnings and into more mainstream settings, such as universities, public and private hospitals and clinics, private agencies, and college counseling centers, as well as independent practice. Feminist practitioners embraced a variety of theoretical orientations. Interestingly, psychodynamic theory—which had earlier been the target of feminist ire—had by the 1980s become a generative and fruitful site of feminist theory and practice (e.g., Goldner, 1991; Haaken, 1998; Layton, 1998). Feminists also contributed significantly to the development of theory and practice in family therapy and couples therapy

(e.g., Goodrich, 1991; Hare-Mustin, 1978), and narrative therapy (C. Brown & Augusta-Fox, 2007).

Feminists in clinical psychology and counseling psychology have developed many specific practices, programs, and bodies of knowledge, far more than we can detail here. A key idea is the centrality of gender—inevitably intertwined with other social categories—to personal development, to relationships, and to the difficulties and strengths that clients bring to therapy (L. S. Brown, 1994; Greene, White, Whitten, & Jackson, 2000). For feminist therapists, institutions, societal practices, language, and normative beliefs constitute a gender system that creates patterned social relations, including patterns of domination and subordination, as well as patterned ways of being and feeling. Some early feminist therapists drew on the slogan "the personal is political" to insist that private troubles were connected to societal expectations and women's subordinate status (Brodsky, 1977). Not only did this angle of vision go beyond cataloguing symptoms and syndromes; it also sometimes overturned orthodox views of what would constitute women's mental health. Moreover, it led many feminist practitioners to argue that active engagement in social change efforts was an obligatory complement to the feminist practice of psychotherapy (Feminist Therapy Institute, 2000).

By incorporating a focus on social and cultural life into their understanding of psychopathology, feminists have made important contributions to theory and treatment of a number of psychological problems. Some examples are women's eating disorders (e.g., Bloom, Gitter, Gutwill, Kogel, & Zaphiropoulos, 1994; Frederickson & Roberts, 1997), gender-linked violence in intimate relations (Goldner, 1999; McLean, Carey, & White, 1996), sexual abuse of women and girls (Courtois, 1996; Herman, 1992; Lamb, 1996, 1999), and borderline personality disorder (Becker, 1997).

Another important contribution of feminist therapists has been their continuing scrutiny, dialogue, and reflexive appraisal of power relations in therapy. Feminists' discussions about power in therapy have been far-reaching, and their insights have been integrated into many elements of therapeutic practice. These include early efforts at sharing power such as contracting and consumer education. Other discussions have deepened and extended the analysis of power in therapy to consider boundary violations, the therapeutic use of self-disclosure, and dual relationships and conflicts of interest (Wyche & Rice, 1997).

In sum, feminist therapists and counselors introduced distinctive perspectives on gender, gender relations, and well-being into clinical and counseling psychology and marital and family therapy. They challenged certain theoretical constructs, diagnostic practices, and therapeutic practices and they offered innovative ideas. Their work has sensitized practitioners (both feminists and others) to the power relations embedded in therapy and in mental health institutions and led the field to a greater awareness of sexism, heteronormativity, racial/ethnic, and other biases.

ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVISM

For many feminist psychologists, exposing and addressing sources of injustice and inequity is the very core of their work. The social justice imperative has required organizational structures that support and foster research, practice, and activism. Since the early 1940s, several organizations have developed to address important issues in the field of the psychology of women and gender. These organizations have tackled a broad range of social issues, such as reproductive rights and poverty, as well as directly confronted issues of discrimination and gender bias in academic and professional psychology.

Rallying Points

Organizations dedicated to the psychology of women and gender have not developed out of a straightforward convergence of academic or professional interests. Instead, they have tended to develop around a particular rallying point, often the recognition of common experiences of discrimination. During World War II, women were explicitly excluded from participating in the Emergency Committee in Psychology, which was formed to mobilize psychologists' contributions to the war effort. When a group of concerned women psychologists confronted their male colleagues about their exclusion, they were told to be patient and to wait quietly until plans could be made that would include them (Schwesinger, 1943). Almost two years later, in 1941, when nothing had changed, some 50 New York-based women began meeting to discuss how they could use their professional skills in the war effort. Shortly thereafter, the National Council of Women Psychologists (NCWP) was formed. By the middle of 1942, almost 250 doctoral-level women psychologists had joined the NCWP (Capshew & Laszlo, 1986). They offered their services to help to select women for the military, prepared public recommendations on how to remain calm during war, and gave child-rearing advice to working mothers, among other initiatives. (For summaries of the group's contributions, see Capshew & Laszlo, 1986; A. Johnson & Johnston, 2010.)

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Although the political values of NCWP members varied tremendously, and it would be misleading to label most of them "feminist" by contemporary standards, their work during and following the war certainly sustained interest in women's concerns within the professional context of psychology (A. Johnson & Johnston, 2010). The organization remained a women's organization until 1960; at that point, men were admitted and the group was renamed the International Council of Psychologists.

In the 1960s and 1970s, many women in psychology were part of the groundswell of social and political activism in the United States. Women had been marginalized in psychology over the course of many decades. However, it was the raised consciousness fostered by the women's movement that made it possible for women to understand their experiences as the result of institutionalized sexism rather than personal limitations (Unger, Sheese, & Main, 2010). At this time, political activism by other groups in psychology had led to some important successes. For example, in protest of police brutality at the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago in 1968, Psychologists for Social Responsibility launched a successful campaign to have APA relocate the 1969 convention from Chicago to Washington, DC. Such actions helped to inspire a sense among organizing women that the status quo in psychology did not have to be taken for granted and that radical change was indeed possible (Tiefer, 1991).

In March 1969, a group of women in the Psychologists for Social Action formed a Women's Consortium. They organized a symposium for the 1969 APA convention called "Woman as Subject" (as opposed to "Woman as Sex Object"). Although the symposium was not sponsored by any division and was publicized only via flyers posted around the convention hotel, 400 people, mostly women, attended (Berman, 1995). Two other groups of women independently organized paper sessions and workshops, also unofficially. During these sessions, a petition was circulated demanding that the APA examine and rectify sexist discrimination in the organization and in psychology departments. Another petition called for the APA to pass a resolution stating that abortion (then illegal in most states) was a civil right of pregnant women. A core group of about 35 psychologists (women and men) continued to meet in the months following the convention, and they laid the groundwork for a new organization, the Association for Women in Psychology (AWP).

In 1970, the AWP presented 32 resolutions and 18 motions to the APA at its yearly convention. These were designed to overhaul the way the APA and university departments of psychology operated (Tiefer, 1991). In response, the APA appointed a Task Force on the Status of Women, chaired by Helen (Lena) S. Astin. The Task Force Report (Astin, Roose, Andersen, & Sorenson, 1973) documented inequities within the field. One key recommendation was that a division of the APA be created to address deficiencies in psychological knowledge about women. Despite much skepticism and covert resistance, the division of the psychology of women, Division 35, was formally approved in 1973.

In Canada, the women's movement had a similar influence on women in psychology. Canadian women began organizing in large numbers following the release of the Royal Commission Report on the Status of Women in 1970 (Pyke, 2001). In 1972, when a number of feminist psychologists at York University in Toronto discovered that all their submissions to the Canadian Psychological Association's (CPA) Convention had been rejected, they booked a meeting room at the convention hotel and present them independently. When the hotel succumbed to pressure from the CPA to reject the women's request, they booked a room at a hotel across the street and held what is now known as the "Underground Symposium" (Pyke, 2001). Publicized through leaflets, the Underground Symposium was an enormous success, attracting close to 200 audience members and extensive coverage in the *Montreal Star* (Pyke, 2001).

In response to the United Nations' declaration of International Women's Year in 1975, the honorary president of the CPA, Mary Wright, recommended convening a Task Force on the Status of Women in Canadian Psychology. The Task Force took on four principal issues: the status of women in psychology; the education and training of women in psychology; sex bias in psychological research; and psychological services for women (Pyke, 2001). In 1976, the Task Force presented almost 100 recommendations to the board of directors, including the recommendation to establish a special interest group on the psychology of women. This special-interest group became what is now the Section on Women and Psychology (SWAP).

Although many organizations dedicated to the psychology of women and gender are now firmly established, early organizing efforts were met with varying degrees of resistance. Women had to make important choices about whether to challenge the status quo from within the established structures of psychology or whether their efforts might be more effective if they were independent and autonomous (see Burman, 2011).

Inside or Out?

The Psychology of Women Section (POWS) of the British Psychological Society (BPS) was established in 1988 following earlier proposals that had been rejected. Grounds

for rejection had included the objection that the proposed section didn't really "fit with" other BPS sections, that the focus was political, and that a "women's" section was inherently sexist (Wilkinson & Burns, 1990). These concerns about feminist work were not unique to the British context. Indeed, similar arguments had been raised against the formation of women's organizations and against the inclusion of feminist psychological work at conferences in Australia, the United States, and Canada (Greenglass, 1973; Russo & Dumont, 1997; Wilkinson & Burns, 1990).

Contending with this kind of resistance, women's organizations needed to make strategic decisions about whether it would be more fruitful to push for change by working within traditional structures or by operating autonomously. On the one hand, for fledgling organizations, the financial and structural support as well as the academic and professional legitimization offered by organizations such as the BPS or the APA would be immensely valuable. On the other hand, the structure and ideologies of such organizations were often at odds with feminist values and seen as constraining of political activism (Russo & Dumont, 1997; Tiefer, 1991; Wilkinson & Burns, 1990).

In the early 1980s, after two rejections by the BPS, organizers decided to found an autonomous, all-women organization called Women in Psychology that quickly recruited more than 200 members (Wilkinson & Burns, 1990). By 1986, however, another submission to BPS was being considered:

> Several of us felt very strongly that there should be a forum for our work within the national psychological organization, and that the refusal to admit one was ensuring the continued marginalization of women within psychology. In addition, Women in Psychology, while functioning very effectively at a local level, was experiencing the problems of administrative continuity (common to all small, independent organizations) in its national organization, and its long-term future appeared uncertain. (Wilkinson & Burns, 1990, p. 148)

U.S. organizations had to make similar decisions. The AWP, for example, did not dissolve with the establishment of Division 35; instead, it continues to exist as a parallel organization independent of the APA. There was a great deal of discussion in the AWP about the possibility of disbanding, but members thought it would be valuable to have an autonomous voice to "provide radical pressure on APA and to deal with feminist subjects that would probably never interest APA" (Tiefer, 1991, p. 641). In addition, its members endeavored to devise methods to govern themselves that did not recapitulate the hierarchical structures of the organizations they were trying to change (Tiefer, 1991). Indeed, for Division 35, how to create an organization that would suit the APA's hierarchical structure without abandoning central feminist values of inclusion, openness, and egalitarianism has been an ongoing concern (Russo & Dumont, 1997). As a result, the division has a hierarchical structure with an internal organization that fosters wide participation. Decision making often proceeds via group discussion, with attempts to reach consensus (Russo & Dumont, 1997).

The Value and Contributions of Feminist Organizations in Psychology

Organizations dedicated to the psychology of women not only have provided a space for engaging with and organizing around issues related to women, they also have provided important opportunities for networking and mentorship, as well as for legitimizing feminist work in psychology. Networking and mentorship offer opportunities for collaborative intellectual endeavors, professional development, jobs, leadership, and social support. Particularly in their early years, these organizations were important in providing psychosocial support, often serving as refuges from otherwise hostile professional environments (Unger, Sheese, & Main, 2010). Additionally, having psychology of women sections of organizations like the BPS, CPA, or APA has meant that women's work has had a guaranteed platform (Wilkinson & Burns, 1990) and that women have "no longer had to beg, borrow and steal from other divisions or a tight-fisted convention board for a chance to present our work" (Mednick, in Russo & Dumont, 1997). Guaranteeing access to these spaces and to venues for publication, such as Division 35's *Psychology of Women Quarterly* (PWQ), has contributed significantly to legitimizing the psychology of women and gender as a scholarly pursuit. Indeed, Mednick and Urbanski (1991) have remarked that establishing PWQ was "the step most critical to legitimizing research in the field" (p. 654; see also Rutherford & Yoder, 2011).

Feminist psychological organizations have made significant academic and professional contributions, promoting and supporting issues of diversity, gender equity, ethnic minorities, and women's leadership, influencing the practice of clinical psychology, and fostering productive collaborations with other organizations. The AWP, for example, provided lesbian psychologists their earliest organizational home. In 1973, the organization expanded its bylaws to incorporate the following statement of purpose: "Helping women create individual sexual identities through which they may freely and responsibly express

themselves, provided such expression does not oppress other individuals" (AWP, 1973, p. 1). In 1993, Division 35 organized a National Conference on Education and Training in Feminist Practice (defined broadly to include research, writing, clinical practice, clinical supervision, and leadership), held in Boston, Massachusetts. *Shaping the Future of Feminist Psychology* (Worell & Johnson, 1997) is a summation of the conference. Division 35 was one of the first divisions that gave priority to including psychologists from racial, ethnic, and other minority groups in its membership. It also took steps to assure that its leadership represented the diversity of women in psychology. The division has also worked to ensure that women from ethnic minority groups were considered for leadership positions in the APA. The division has had a section on the psychology of Black women for many years; among other activities, the section has promoted research on and by women of color (see Rutherford, 2007).

Other important contributions were made by the Feminist Therapy Institute (FTI), which was established in 1983 and had an independent existence until 2008. The FTI held conferences and training workshops and sponsored publications concerned with the development of feminist therapy. It developed and promulgated a feminist code of ethics. The FTI also helped to organize feminists in psychology and other mental health professions to protest against diagnoses detrimental to women that had been proposed for the DSM.

In sum, a number of organizations have been founded to further the development of the field of psychology of women and gender. All have made important contributions to feminist psychology. Many continue to make contributions to feminist psychology and, in turn, to changing the field of psychology and the way its practices affect society.

CONCLUSION

Many of the changes that feminists of the 1970s struggled to accomplish have become accepted practice in many parts of the world: equal pay for equal work; equal access to education; acceptance of women's working outside the home; and the repudiation of wife beating and marital rape. Indeed, in many locales, these principles are no longer identified with feminism. Ironically, at the same time as many feminist goals have been attained, the term feminism has come to be disparaged. In the United States, for example, most young women disavow the label, even though they support many feminist goals and the ideology of gender equality and women's rights (Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004; Liss, Morosky, O'Connor, & Crawford, 2001; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Moreover, the legal gains achieved in such areas as reproductive rights, affirmative action, gender equity in education, and pay equity have eroded; other needed reforms—such as improved family leave policies and supports for women living in poverty—have stalled. This suggests a vital continuing need for the psychology of women and gender and the academic, practical, and activist work that feminist psychologists do.

Has the psychology of women and gender significantly altered the field of psychology? Some see fundamental transformations (e.g., Worell & Johnson, 1997), while others argue that only weakened, nonthreatening versions of feminist ideas have been assimilated into the field as a whole (e.g., Burman, 1997). We argue that although alliances between psychology and feminism have sometimes been uneasy, feminist psychologists have put forward a number of provocative claims and challenges. Perhaps the foremost claim is that gender is an important constituent of social life. Moreover, feminist research and critique has offered close analyses of the perspectives, politics, and practices that inevitably shape the production of knowledge. In clinical practice, feminists have offered new perspectives on disorders of women and new ideas about psychological assessment, the conduct of therapy, and ethics. Often, these efforts have led to change. Even when they have not, they have raised awareness that policies and practices in the mental health field are not the outcome of unassailable scientific evidence, but rather a concatenation of science, popular beliefs, and vested interests.

In the United States, conditions for women in psychology who are faculty members, students, and therapists have improved vastly since 1970, in large part because of feminist activism. Knowledge about gender and its intersections with other social categories is now available to students of psychology. Moreover, the proportion of doctorates awarded to women has increased. In the United States, for example, women were awarded fewer than 25% of doctorates in psychology in 1971; by 1999, they received 66%. Many women have attained recognition for their academic accomplishments—they are professors, department chairs, program directors, and editors of journals. Many now serve as gatekeepers: They have influence in the publication process, hiring and promotion, grants, and awards (Stewart & Shields, 2001). Although only 2 women held the presidency of APA from its inception

in 1892 up to 1970 (Mary Whiton Calkins in 1905 and Margaret Washburn in 1921), 11 women have held the presidency since 1970. The 11 women who have served as presidents since 1970 are Anne Anastasi, Leona Tyler, Florence Denmark, Janet Spence, Bonnie Strickland, Dorothy Cantor, Norine G. Johnson, Diana Halpern, Sharon Brehm, Carol Goodheart, and Melba Vasquez. In the 11 years between 2001 and 2011, 5 of APA's presidents of APA have been women. This is a sign that women are getting closer to achieving representation at the highest levels of APA in proportion to their numbers in the discipline as a whole. Many women have also held positions on boards and committees and been elected to offices in divisions. As of 2011, the executive directors of three of APA's four major directorates are women: Gwendolyn Puryear Keita (Public Interest Directorate); Katherine Nordal (Practice Directorate); and Cynthia Belar (Education Directorate). All of these developments signal a transformation in psychology as a whole.

At its best, feminist thought is generative: It challenges cultural assumptions, raises fundamental questions about social life, and questions what is taken for granted. In psychology, feminist psychologists have consistently advocated for broad inclusion and for bringing marginalized voices into the discipline and into the institutional power structures. Feminist psychologists, by viewing the knowledge, methods, and practices of psychology with a critical eye, have provided generative knowledge for the discipline. Feminist work incites debate, offers new forms of social action, and ultimately can help to transform social reality.

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Queries in Chapter 12

Q1. Please provide opening quotation mark in the sentence "...but the search reveals scarcely a single fact."

Q2. Please provide the year in the reference section for "Crawford & Kimmel, 1999".

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