

MOBILE PENETRATION TESTING: THE TRILOGY

Episode III
ATTACK OF THE CODE



MOBILE PENETRATION TESTING: THE TRILOGY

Episode I
THE FORENSIC
MENACE

Episode II
RETURN OF THE
NETWORK/BACK-END

Episode III
ATTACK OF
THE CODE





Michael Krueger

Solutions Engineer | NowSecure



Jake Van Dyke

Mobile Security Researcher | NowSecure

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RSA Conference 2017: Visit us at **booth N3334**

And save a seat for NowSecure CEO Andrew Hoog's conference talk:

"[How Android and iOS Security Enhancements Complicate Threat Detection](#)"

Thursday, February 16 or Friday, February 17



Contents

- What is reverse engineering and source code analysis?
- How to do it and recommended tools
- Android app analysis example
- iOS app analysis example
- Questions

MOBILE PENETRATION TESTING AREAS OF ANALYSIS

1

**Mobile
forensics &
data recovery**

2

**Network, web
services, and
API testing**

3

**Server-side
penetration
testing**

4

**Reverse
engineering &
code analysis**

REVERSE ENGINEERING & CODE ANALYSIS

What does it mean to reverse engineer an app?

What is reverse engineering?	Taking executable code (not human readable), and translating it into something that's easier to understand. It also involves disassembling code into its component parts (e.g., classes, libraries, scripts, etc.).
What's the purpose?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Analyzing an app's code• Identifying vulnerabilities• Finding hardcoded sensitive data• Analyzing malware• Modifying an app's functionality

Executable code compared to disassembled code

Executable code

```
0000000010001D100 F4 4F BE A9 FD 7B 01 A9 FD 43 00 91 F3 03 00 AA {0+~^ { .~^ C. æ= . .
0000000010001D1E0 A8 1B 00 F0 00 01 45 F9 68 1B 00 00 01 11 41 F9 68 1B 00 00 01 11 41 F9
0000000010001D1F0 33 F6 08 94 FD 03 1D AA 46 F6 08 94 F4 03 00 AA 3+; 0^ . ~F+; 0( . ~
0000000010001D200 68 1B 00 00 01 7D 43 F9 2D F6 08 94 E0 03 14 AA h. . | } C+~; 0a. .
0000000010001D210 34 F6 08 94 A8 1B 00 F0 00 89 45 F9 68 1B 00 00 4+; 00. =. 0E+ h. |
0000000010001D220 01 31 41 F9 26 F6 08 94 FD 03 1D AA 39 F6 08 94 . 1A+ 0+; 0^ . ~9+; 0
0000000010001D230 F4 03 00 AA 68 1B 00 00 01 19 47 F9 E3 03 00 32 (. . ~h. . | . G. p. . 2
0000000010001D240 E2 03 13 AA 1E F6 08 94 E0 03 14 AA FD 7B 41 A9 G. . ~; 0a. . ~^ (A+
0000000010001D250 F4 F4 C2 A8 23 F6 08 94 FC F6 0A A9 FA 67 01 A9 (0+0+; . no+ ~g. ~
0000000010001D260 F8 5F 02 A9 F6 57 03 A9 F4 F4 04 A9 FD 7B 05 A9 ~+~W. ~ (0+~ { .
0000000010001D270 FD 43 01 91 FF C3 00 D1 E0 03 00 F9 A8 1B 00 F0 ^ C. æ+ . ~a. . ~. =
0000000010001D280 14 59 46 F9 B7 1B 00 F0 E0 7A 45 F9 F3 03 17 AA . YF+ . . =azE+ . .
0000000010001D290 68 1B 00 00 15 ED 40 F9 E1 03 15 AA 08 F6 08 94 h. . | . f0+ 0. . ~; 0
0000000010001D2A0 FD 03 1D AA 1B F6 08 94 F8 03 00 AA 68 1B 00 00 ^ . ~; 0^ . ~h. |
0000000010001D2B0 16 F1 40 F9 04 00 00 D2 E2 16 00 00 42 40 23 91 . +0+ . ~ C+ G. . | B0+æ
0000000010001D2C0 D7 16 00 00 F7 C2 01 91 E1 03 16 AA E3 03 17 AA +. | ~. æ0. . ~p. ~
0000000010001D2D0 FB F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA 0E F6 08 94 F9 03 00 AA v). 0^ . ~; 0^ . ~
0000000010001D2E0 68 7A 45 F9 FC 03 13 AA E1 03 15 AA F4 F5 08 94 ^ZE+ n. . ~0. . | . 0
0000000010001D2F0 FD 03 1D AA 07 F6 08 94 FA 03 00 AA 04 00 00 D2 ^ . ~; 0^ . ~. ~. ~ C+
0000000010001D300 E2 16 00 00 42 C0 23 91 E1 03 16 AA E3 03 17 AA G. . | B+æ0. . ~p. ~
0000000010001D310 EB F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA FE F5 08 94 FB 03 00 AA d). 0^ . ~. | . 0v. ~
0000000010001D320 68 1B 00 00 01 11 44 F9 E4 03 00 32 E0 03 14 AA h. . | . D+ S. . 2a. ~
0000000010001D330 E2 03 19 AA E3 03 1B AA E1 F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA G. . ~p. ~ 0). 0^ . ~
0000000010001D340 F4 F5 08 94 F4 03 00 AA E0 03 1B AA E5 F5 08 94 (. . 0( . ~a. . ~s). 0
0000000010001D350 E0 03 1A AA E3 F5 08 94 E0 03 19 AA E1 F5 08 94 a. . ~p). 0a. . ~0). 0
0000000010001D360 E0 03 1A AA DF F5 08 94 03 1B 00 F0 79 66 46 F9 a. . ~. | . 0! . ~y+ F+
0000000010001D370 00 7B 45 F9 E1 03 15 AA D1 F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA C{E+ 0. ~. ~. ~ C+ G. . |
0000000010001D380 E4 F5 08 94 FA 03 00 AA 04 00 00 D2 E2 16 00 00 S). 0^ . ~. ~. ~ C+ G. . |
0000000010001D390 42 40 24 91 E1 03 16 AA E3 03 17 AA C8 F5 08 94 B0+æ0. . ~p. ~+). 0
0000000010001D3A0 FD 03 1D AA D8 F5 08 94 FB 03 00 AA 68 1B 00 00 ^ . ~. | . 0v. ~h. |
0000000010001D3B0 1B 19 44 F9 E3 03 00 32 E0 03 19 AA E1 03 18 AA . . D. p. . 2a. ~0. ~
0000000010001D3C0 E2 03 1B AA 04 00 00 D2 0D F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA G. . ~. ~ C+). 0^ . ~
0000000010001D3D0 D0 F5 08 94 FC 03 00 AA 68 1B 00 00 19 1D 44 F9 ~). 0n. ~h. . | . D+
0000000010001D3E0 E0 03 14 AA E1 03 19 AA E2 03 1C AA B4 F5 08 94 a. . ~0. ~. ~ G. . ~| . 0
0000000010001D3F0 E0 03 1C AA BB F5 08 94 E0 03 1B AA B9 F5 08 94 a. . ~+). 0a. . ~| . 0
0000000010001D400 E0 03 1A AA B7 F5 08 94 7A 66 46 F9 A8 1B 00 F0 a. . ~+). 0zf F+ 0. =
0000000010001D410 00 79 45 F9 E1 03 15 AA A9 F5 08 94 FD 03 1D AA . YF+ 0. ~. ~. 0^ . ~
0000000010001D420 BC F5 08 94 F5 03 00 AA 04 00 00 D2 E2 16 00 00 +). 0). ~. ~. ~ C+ G. . |
0000000010001D430 42 C0 24 91 E1 03 16 AA E3 03 17 AA A0 F5 08 94 B+æ0. . ~p. ~+). 0
```

(by all appearances random junk)

Same code disassembled

```
; LoginDisclosureViewController - (void)accept
; void _cdecl -[LoginDisclosureViewController accept](struct LoginDisclosureViewController *self, SEL)
_loginDisclosureViewController_accept_

var_20 = -0x20
var_10 = -0x10

STP                X20, X19, [SP, #var_20]!
STP                X29, X30, [SP, #0x20+var_10]
ADD                X29, SP, #0x20+var_10
MOV                X19, X0
ADRP                X8, #classRef_UIApplication@PAGE
LDR                X0, [X8, #classRef_UIApplication@PAGEOFF]
ADRP                X8, #selRef_sharedApplication@PAGE
LDR                X1, [X8, #selRef_sharedApplication@PAGEOFF]
BL                 _objc_msgSend
MOV                X29, X29
BL                 _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV                X20, X0
ADRP                X8, #selRef_displayModalViewWorking@PAGE
LDR                X1, [X8, #selRef_displayModalViewWorking@PAGEOFF]
BL                 _objc_msgSend
MOV                X0, X20
BL                 _objc_release
ADRP                X8, #classRef_ServiceCall@PAGE
LDR                X0, [X8, #classRef_ServiceCall@PAGEOFF]
ADRP                X8, #selRef_instance@PAGE
LDR                X1, [X8, #selRef_instance@PAGEOFF]
BL                 _objc_msgSend
MOV                X29, X29
BL                 _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV                X20, X0
ADRP                X8, #selRef_secondaryDisclosureWithDelegate_acceptDisclosure_@PAGE
LDR                X1, [X8, #selRef_secondaryDisclosureWithDelegate_acceptDisclosure_@PAGEOFF]
MOV                W3, #1
MOV                X2, X19
BL                 _objc_msgSend
MOV                X0, X20
LDP                X29, X30, [SP, #0x20+var_10]
LDP                X20, X19, [SP, #0x20+var_20] #0x20
```

(something that starts to make some sense)

Why reverse engineer an app you developed?



**Know what's exposed
if a third party
reverse engineers
your app**



**Find hard-coded
API keys, credentials,
etc. that make
you vulnerable**



**Ensure debugging
information
is stripped
from binaries**



**Verify that
your toolchain
built your
code properly**

Why reverse engineer an app someone else developed?



**Clients pay you to
assess the security of
their mobile apps**
(see previous slide)



**To make sure an app
is secure for your own
personal use**



**To participate in bug
bounty programs
offered by a vendor**




**To learn
and practice
reverse engineering**

Reverse engineering answers questions such as:

- **Can you tamper with the app?**
- **Can you modify the app during runtime?**
- **Does the app allow you to pull it from a device, re-sign it, and re-install it?**
 - Can you also modify the app's main executable?
 - Can you also modify supplementary files like scripts and native libraries?
- **What can you see as a result of hooking APIs?**
 - Filesystem
 - Cryptography—dump keys, initialization vectors (IVs), identify cipher, dump the decrypted blob
 - Network—what servers and IP addresses does the app talk to?
 - Observe the app as it writes files or transmits data—is interesting/private data leaked?

Reverse engineering focus in the OWASP Mobile Top 10



Read more: [“Building blocks for secure mobile development: Testing for the OWASP Mobile Top 10”](#)

Specific vulnerabilities identified with reverse engineering

- **Insecure network communication / sensitive data leaking over the network**
- **Interprocess communication (IPC) issues**
 - Relevant to Android apps (iOS apps don't really talk to one another)
 - Content providers with directory traversal or SQLi vulns
- **Hard-coded encryption keys**
- **AES with null initialization vector (IV)**
- **Helpful logging is disabled at runtime**
 - But logging statements still available during static analysis
 - Can be used to determine names for classes and variables
 - Common in Java
 - Common in C, C++, Obj-C via non-standard toolchain (bootloaders and hypervisors)
- **Logic flaws or easily circumvented security**

Good reverse engineering tools

APKTool	For reverse engineering third party, closed, binary Android apps. Decodes resources to nearly original form and rebuilds them after making some modifications.
dex2jar	Suite of utilities for working with the classes.dex file.
jd-gui	Standalone graphical utility that displays Java source code from “.class” files.
Frida	Dynamic instrumentation framework that injects JavaScript and explores native apps on multiple platforms, including mobile platforms.
Radare (R2)	Portable reverse engineering framework.
classdump	Command-line utility for examining the Objective-C runtime information stored in Mach-O files. Also generates declarations for classes, categories, and protocols.
clutch	iOS decryption tool.
cycrypt	Allows you to analyze and modify running iOS or OS X apps.

A full suite of mobile tools (including most of these): [Santoku Linux](#)

ANDROID


Using Apktool to get Smali code from an app

```
$ java -jar apktool_2.2.1.jar d com.tinder_1720.apk
$ cat com.tinder_1720/smali/com/tinder/paywall/PaywallItemInteractor.smali | sed '/^$/d'
.class public Lcom/tinder/paywall/PaywallItemInteractor;
.super Ljava/lang/Object;
.source "PaywallItemInteractor.java"
# direct methods
.method public constructor <init>()V
    .locals 0
    .prologue
    .line 21
    invoke-direct {p0}, Ljava/lang/Object;-><init>()V
    .line 23
    return-void
```

Analyzing an Android app's code


Using dex2jar, you get a .jar file that can be loaded in jd-gui for decompilation to produce Java code

```
$ dex2jar-2.0/d2j-dex2jar.sh -f -o tinder.jar com.tinder_1720.apk
```



Reverse Engineering Native Code

A disassembler takes compiled code (e.g., ELF and MACH-O files) and displays assembly and flow using boxes and arrows.



A decompiler tries to generate C code from those same binary formats.

```

while ( v13 != v18 )
{
    v19[v13] = v15[v13] | v14[v13];
    ++v13;
}
convert1(&v32, 2);
flipConv(v15);
convert1(v15, 3);
flipConv(v14);
v21 = strlen(v14);
convert1(v14, v21);
convert1(v14, 4);
v22 = (char *)calloc(v30 + n + 1 + v25 + v29 + v13, 1u);
strncpy(v22, v17, n);
strncat(v22, v20, v13);
strncat(v22, v15, v25);
strncat(v22, (const char *)&v32, v30);
strncat(v22, v14, v29);
SHA1_Init((int)&v35);
v23 = strlen(v22);
SHA1_Update((int)&v35, v22, v23);
SHA1_Final((int)&v35, (int)&v33, v24);
dth((int)&v33, (int)&v34);
convert2(&v34, 1);

```

IOS

Analyzing an iOS app's code (similar concepts)

1. Get the app from the store
2. Decrypt the app on the device
3. Pull the app from the iOS device
4. Feed it to your disassembler and/or decompiler

```
iPhone:~ root# Clutch2 -i
Installed apps:
1:   Associated Credit Union <com.intuit.mobilebanking03919>
...
iPhone:~ root# Clutch2 -b 1
...
Finished dumping com.intuit.mobilebanking03919 to
/var/tmp/clutch/2734E965-9D88-41BC-830E-7B3E47623E4F
Finished dumping com.intuit.mobilebanking03919 in 2.6 seconds

$ scp -r
root@192.168.2.23:/var/tmp/clutch/2734E965-9D88-41BC-830E-7B3E47623E4F/com.intuit.mobilebanking03919
/ .
Associated Credit Union                                100% 7567KB
7.4MB/s   00:00
$ file com.intuit.mobilebanking03919/*
com.intuit.mobilebanking03919/Associated Credit Union: Mach-O universal binary with 2 architectures:
[arm_v7: Mach-O arm_v7 executable] [64-bit architecture=12]
```

Disassembled iOS app

Functions window

Function name	Segment
-[Application resetTimeLastTouched]	_text
-[Application startInActivityDetection]	_text
-[Application stopInActivityDetection]	_text
-[Application disableInActivityDetection]	_text
-[Application isModalViewWorkingActive]	_text
-[Application displayModalViewWorking]	_text
-[Application dismissModalViewWorking]	_text
-[Application dealloc]	_text
-[Application viewWorking]	_text
-[Application setViewWorking:]	_text
-[Application _cxx_destruct]	_text
+[EnumTypes initialize]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController viewDidLoad]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController setUpWebView]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController didFailToLoadDisclosure:]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController viewDidAppear:]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController accept]	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController decline]	_text
sub_10001D520	_text
sub_10001D5A8	_text
sub_10001D5B0	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController fCustomerDisclosureDeclin...	_text
-[LoginDisclosureViewController fCustomerDisclosureAccept...	_text
sub_10001D744	_text
sub_10001D7E4	_text
sub_10001D7F4	_text
sub_10001D7FC	_text
sub_10001D804	_text
sub_10001D82C	_text

Line 438 of 13219

Graph overview

IDA View-A

HexView-1

Structures

Enums

Imports

Exports

```
; LoginDisclosureViewController - (void)accept

; void _cdecl -[LoginDisclosureViewController accept](struct LoginDisclosureViewController *self, SEL)
__LoginDisclosureViewController_accept_

var_20 = -0x20
var_10 = -0x10

STP     X20, X19, [SP, #var_20]!
STP     X29, X30, [SP, #0x20+var_10]
ADD     X29, SP, #0x20+var_10
MOV     X19, X0
ADRP    X8, #classRef_UIApplication@PAGE
LDR     X0, [X8, #classRef_UIApplication@PAGEOFF]
ADRP    X8, #selRef_sharedApplication@PAGE
LDR     X1, [X8, #selRef_sharedApplication@PAGEOFF]
BL      _objc_msgSend
MOV     X29, X29
BL      _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV     X20, X0
ADRP    X8, #selRef_displayModalViewWorking@PAGE
LDR     X1, [X8, #selRef_displayModalViewWorking@PAGEOFF]
BL      _objc_msgSend
MOV     X0, X20
BL      _objc_release
ADRP    X8, #classRef_ServiceCall@PAGE
LDR     X0, [X8, #classRef_ServiceCall@PAGEOFF]
ADRP    X8, #selRef_instance@PAGE
LDR     X1, [X8, #selRef_instance@PAGEOFF]
BL      _objc_msgSend
MOV     X29, X29
BL      _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV     X20, X0
ADRP    X8, #selRef_secondaryDisclosureWithDelegate_acceptDisclosure_@PAGE
LDR     X1, [X8, #selRef_secondaryDisclosureWithDelegate_acceptDisclosure_@PAGEOFF]
MOV     W3, #1
MOV     X2, X19
BL      _objc_msgSend
MOV     X0, X20
LDP     X29, X30, [SP, #0x20+var_10]
LDP     X20, X19, [SP, #0x20+var_20]! #0x20
```

100.00% [(-311,9) (12,100) 003911D0 0000000010001B530: -[Application resetTimeLastTouched] (Synchronized with Hex View-1)]

ANALYZING THE OUTPUT

What Do I Do Next?

The answer is there's no right answer.

- Dig around
- Look for interesting keywords
- Start at an interesting function and follow the parameters and branches

While you're digging around, you look for things like the following:

- Logic bugs
- Additional debugging info
- Examine any closed source libraries you may be linking to in your app
- Hardcoded API keys and credentials
- Look in resources for other files that may be included in your .apk accidentally

TAKE-AWAYS: EPISODE III

1

Reverse engineering exposes flaws you might otherwise miss

2

Reverse engineer your app from the attacker's perspective ("black box" testing)

3

Apply your own creativity/ingenuity for the best results

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