

# Attacks Against One Time Pad



*MSc in Information Security & Digital Forensics.*



**Mark Cummins**  
**Institute of Technology Blanchardstown**  
**Phone:** +353 1-885-1156  
**Email:** [mark.cummins@itb.ie](mailto:mark.cummins@itb.ie)



- Cipher over  $(K, M, C)$ : a pair of “efficient” algs  $(E, D)$  s.t.

$$\forall m \in M, k \in K: D(k, E(k, m)) = m$$

- Weak ciphers: subs. cipher, Vigenere, ...

- A good cipher: **OTP**  $M=C=K=\{0,1\}^n$

$$E(k, m) = k \oplus m, \quad D(k, c) = k \oplus c$$

- Lemma: OTP has perfect secrecy (i.e. no CT only attacks)
- Bad news: perfect-secrecy  $\Rightarrow$  key-len  $\geq$  msg-len



## Idea: replace “random” key by “pseudorandom” key

A Pseudo random generator (PRG) take an input (**seed**) and generates a random stream of output.

It is computed by a **deterministic** algorithm.

We basically use the output from our PRG as if it were our key to a OTP.

Real key would have been our input to the PRG, our **seed** and would be much shorter than any key needed for a OTP





## Can a stream cipher have perfect secrecy?

- Yes, if the PRG is really “secure”
- No, there are no ciphers with perfect secrecy
- Yes, every cipher has perfect secrecy
- No, since the key is shorter than the message



**Stream cipher:**  $E(k,m) = m \oplus G(k)$  ,  $D(k,c) = c \oplus G(k)$

Security: PRG must be unpredictable

We should never use weak PRGs, as these make the entire stream cipher insecure.

Some weak PRGs are commonly used and should be avoided:

- Random(), should never be used for crypto (Kerberos V4)
- linear congruential generator



## Attack 1: Two time pad is insecure !!

Never use stream cipher key more than once !!

$$C_1 \leftarrow m_1 \oplus \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$C_2 \leftarrow m_2 \oplus \text{PRG}(k)$$

Eavesdropper does:

$$C_1 \oplus C_2 \rightarrow m_1 \oplus m_2$$

Enough redundancy in English and ASCII encoding that:

$$m_1 \oplus m_2 \rightarrow m_1, m_2$$



## Real World Examples

- Project Venona
- MS-PPTP (windows NT)
- 802.11b WEP
- Disk Encryption



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## Two Time Pad: Summary

- Never use stream cipher key more than once !!
- Network traffic: negotiate new key for every session (e.g. TLS)
- Disk encryption: typically do not use a stream cipher




## Attack 2: No Integrity (OTP is malleable)



Modifications to ciphertext are undetected and have predictable impact on plaintext



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Modifications to ciphertext are undetected and have predictable impact on plaintext



# Thank You !

## End of Section



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