

An Untold Story of Redundant Clouds: Making Your Service Deployment Truly Reliable

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Road-Map

- Motivations
- Goal & Insight
- iRec System
- Next Steps



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Background

- Application providers:
 - enjoy the simplicity of using the clouds



Background

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 - have no idea about what happen in the clouds



Background

- Application providers:
 - enjoy the simplicity of using the clouds
 - have no idea about what happen in the clouds
 - rent multiple clouds for redundancy



Example 1: Netflix



Example 2: iCloud



iCloud Application Service

App




Amazon EC2 Service




Microsoft Azure Service

IaaS

Problem




Problem






Third-party infrastructure components


Problem



Problem




Problem



Problem

Become unavailable !



Problem

Lightning strikes Amazon's European cloud

Summary: *The lightning strike damaged a power company's transformer, causing disruption to Amazon Web Services's European cloud, and may have affected Microsoft's BPOS as well*

The outage, which [Amazon Web Services](#) (AWS) acknowledged on Sunday evening, affected its Dublin-based Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Relational Database Service (RDS) cloud services, among others. The damage to the electricity infrastructure may have affected Microsoft's [Business Productivity Online Services](#) (BPOS) cloud as well, Microsoft said in a separate statement.

Existing Efforts

- Cloud providers allocate or tolerate failures via:
 - diagnosis systems, e.g., Sherlock.
 - fault-tolerant systems, e.g., F10, Skute.

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- Solving the problem after the outage occurs
- We want to prevent the problem before the outage occurs
- Recommending truly independent redundancy services when deploying applications

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Road-Map




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Goal & Insight



App Provider






Goal & Insight



App Provider

Select two clouds for redundancy






Goal & Insight



A and B ?

App Provider






Goal & Insight



App Provider

B and C ?






Goal & Insight



App Provider

A and C ?



Goal & Insight






App Provider

Select two clouds for redundancy: A&B? B&C?
or A&C?



Recommender






Goal & Insight




App Provider






Recommender



Goal & Insight



Assessing independence by the # of overlapping components between clouds




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender



Goal & Insight







App Provider




Recommender

ISP A
Power A
Power B



Goal & Insight




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender






Goal & Insight



App Provider

ISP A
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power A
Power B



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B



Recommender






Goal & Insight



App Provider

ISP A
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power A
Power B



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B



Power C



Recommender




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender



Goal & Insight



App Provider






Recommender

Deployment	h

ISP A
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power C



ISP A



Power A




Power B



ISP B



Power C



Goal & Insight




App Provider



Recommender

Deployment	h



Goal & Insight




App Provider



Recommender

Deployment	h




Goal & Insight

 App Provider

 Recommender

Deployment	h
Cloud A, B	2



Goal & Insight



App Provider






Recommender

Deployment	h
Cloud A, B	2

ISP A
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power A
Power B

ISP B
Power C



ISP A



Power A




Power B



ISP B








Power C



Goal & Insight




 App Provider



Goal & Insight



App Provider



Deployment	h
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

Goal & Insight




App Provider



Recommender

Deployment	h
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2



Goal & Insight




App Provider



Recommender

Deployment	n
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

ISP A
Power A
Power B




ISP A



Power A


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Cloud B



Power B

ISP B
Power C



ISP B



Power C

Goal & Insight




App Provider



Recommender

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

ISP A
Power A
Power B




ISP A



Power A


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Cloud B



Power B

ISP B
Power C



ISP B



Power C




Goal & Insight



App Provider



Recommender



Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

Goal & Insight

App Provider



Ranking List




Deployment	h
1. Cloud A, C	0
2. Cloud B, C	1
3. Cloud A, B	2


Recommender




Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2



Cloud A



Cloud B



Cloud C

Road-Map

- Motivations
- Goal & Insight
- iRec System
- Next Steps




Road-Map


- Motivations
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- iRec System
- Next Steps




Strawman Solution 1




Strawman Solution 1




Strawman Solution 2



Strawman Solution 2



Strawman Solution 3



Strawman Solution 3

[Xiao et al, CCSW'13]



SMPC is difficult to scale!



Cloud Provider1



Cloud Provider2



Cloud Provider3

Our Approach - iRec

- The first cloud independence recommender sys:
 - achieving our goal
 - preserving privacy of each cloud provider
 - practical

Our Approach - iRec

- The first cloud independence recommender sys:
 - achieving our goal
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
Preliminary background: PSI-CA

Preliminary: PSI-CA

- Private set-intersection cardinality proposed by [Freedman et al, EuroCrypt'04].
- Allows k parties to compute the # of overlapping elements without learning other information.


Preliminary: PSI-CA

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
Preliminary: PSI-CA

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- Allows k parties to compute the # of overlapping elements without learning other information.




Preliminary: PSI-CA

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



Preliminary: PSI-CA

- Private set-intersection cardinality proposed by [Freedman et al, EuroCrypt'04].
- Allows k parties to compute the # of overlapping elements without learning other information.



Preliminary: PSI-CA



- Alice and Bob has set A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.

Preliminary: PSI-CA

Alice 

$$\begin{aligned}P &= (X-12)(X-5)(X-4) \\&= x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240\end{aligned}$$

12
5
4

Data Set A


Bob 

1
4
6
2

Data Set B


- Alice and Bob has set A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.
- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.

Preliminary: PSI-CA




$$\begin{aligned} P &= (X-12)(X-5)(X-4) \\ &= x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240 \end{aligned}$$

The polynomial $P = x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240$ is shown above. Red arrows point from the terms $-21x^2$, $128x$, and -240 to the encrypted versions $E(-21)$, $E(128)$, and $E(-240)$ respectively. These encrypted values are enclosed in curly braces: $\{E(1), E(-21), E(128), E(-240)\}$.




- Alice and Bob have sets A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.
- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.
- Alice encrypts the coefficients of P and sends them to Bob. Note that Alice sends homomorphic encryptions of the coefficients to Bob.

Preliminary: PSI-CA




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- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.
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- Bob evaluates $P(B_i)$ for each element in data set B.

Preliminary: PSI-CA



$$\begin{array}{c} \{E(1), E(-21), E(128), E(-240)\} \\ \hline \{E(P(1)), E(P(4))\} \end{array}$$



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Preliminary: PSI-CA

Alice



$$\begin{aligned}P &= (X-12)(X-5)(X-4) \\&= x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240\end{aligned}$$

12
5
4

Data Set A

$$\{E(1), E(-21), E(128), E(-240)\}$$

$$\xrightarrow{\hspace{1cm}} \{E(P(1)), E(P(4)), E(P(6)), E(P(2))\}$$


Bob

1
4
6
2


Data Set B

- Alice and Bob have sets A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.
- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.
- Alice encrypts the coefficients of P and sends them to Bob. Note that Alice sends homomorphic encryptions of the coefficients to Bob.
- Bob evaluates $P(B_i)$ for each element in data set B.

Preliminary: PSI-CA




$$\begin{array}{c} \{E(1), E(-21), E(128), E(-240)\} \\ \xrightarrow{\hspace{10em}} \\ \{E(-132), E(0), E(-12), E(-60)\} \end{array}$$



- Alice and Bob have sets A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.
- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.
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Preliminary: PSI-CA



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- Bob returns the encrypted evaluations to Alice.

Preliminary: PSI-CA



Alice

$$\begin{aligned}P &= (X-12)(X-5)(X-4) \\&= x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240\end{aligned}$$

12
5
4

Data Set A

$$\{-132, 0, -12, -60\}$$

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- Bob evaluates $P(B_i)$ for each element in data set B.
- Bob returns the encrypted evaluations to Alice.
- Alice decrypts it and counts the number of zeroes.

Preliminary: PSI-CA

Result
is: 1

Alice



$$P = (X-12)(X-5)(X-4)$$
$$= x^3 - 21x^2 + 128x - 240$$

12

5


4

Data Set A

{-132, 0, -12, -60}

- Alice and Bob has set A and B respectively and Alice wants to jointly compute $|A \cap B|$.
- Alice makes a polynomial P whose roots are the elements of data set A.
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- Bob returns the encrypted evaluations to Alice.
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Preliminary: PSI-CA






Our Approach - iRec



App Provider




iRec



ISP A



Power A




Power B





ISP B





Power C




Our Approach - iRec



Step 1



Step 2



Step 3




App Provider




iRec


ISP A
Power A
Power B



ISP B
Power A
Power B



ISP B
Power C



ISP A



Power A




Power B




ISP B




Power C



Step 3



Step 4



Step 5




App Provider




Recommender

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2



Step 5



An Improvement Version

- Different infrastructure components play different roles in the clouds

An Improvement Version

- Different infrastructure components play different roles in the clouds
- Power source might be much more likely to fail than ISPs


An Improvement Version

- Different infrastructure components play different roles in the clouds
- Power source might be much more likely to fail than ISPs
- We propose an improvement version

An Improvement Version


- Different infrastructure components play different roles in the clouds
- Power source might be much more likely to fail than ISPs
- We propose an improvement version
 - Using Weighted PSI-CA (W-PSI-CA) to instead of PSI-CA in Step3
 - No other improvement

Recall: Step 3




Recall: Step 3


Result is 2



Using W-PSI-CA




Using W-PSI-CA




Using W-PSI-CA

ISP A	1
Power A	2
Power B	2



ISP B	1
Power A	2
Power B	2




ISP A


Power A

Power B


ISP B




Using W-PSI-CA




Using W-PSI-CA



Using W-PSI-CA




Using W-PSI-CA



Using W-PSI-CA

Result is 4




Case Study



Step 1




Select two clouds for redundancy: A&B? B&C?
or A&C?



Step 1



Step 2



Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider




iRec

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2


ISP A	3
Power A	1
Power B	1



ISP B	3
Power A	1
Power B	1



ISP B	3
Power C	1



ISP A



Power A




Power B



ISP B



Power C




Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA



App Provider


ISP A	3
Power A	1
Power B	1

ISP A	



ISP B	3
Power A	1
Power B	1

ISP B	




iRec

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

ISP B	3

ISP B	



ISP A



Power A




Power B



ISP B



Power C




Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider


ISP A
ISP A
ISP A
Power A
Power B



ISP B
ISP B
ISP B
Power A
Power B



ISP B
ISP B
ISP B
Power C



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B



Power C

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2




iRec

Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA





App Provider




iRec

Deployment	$ h $
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2


↔
PSI-CA




ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B




Power C

Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA





App Provider



iRec

Deployment	$ h $
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2

↔
PSI-CA



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B




Power C

Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider

ISP A
ISP A
ISP A
Power A
Power B





ISP B
ISP B
ISP B
Power A
Power B



iRec

Deployment	$ h $
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	1
Cloud A, B	2



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B




Power C

Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider

ISP A
ISP A
ISP A
Power A
Power B





ISP B
ISP B
ISP B
Power A
Power B



iRec

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	3
Cloud A, B	2



ISP A



Power A



Power B



ISP B



Power C

Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	3
Cloud A, B	2



iRec



Step 3 & 4 with W-PSI-CA




App Provider

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	3
Cloud A, B	2



iRec






Step 5



iRec

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	3
Cloud A, B	2






Step 5



iRec




Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud B, C	3
Cloud A, B	2



Step 5



Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud A, B	2
Cloud B, C	3



Step 5

 App Provider




Ranking List




Deployment	h
1. Cloud A, C	0
2. Cloud A, B	2
3. Cloud B, C	3

 iRec

Deployment	h
Cloud A, C	0
Cloud A, B	2
Cloud B, C	3



Step 5



Road-Map

- Motivations
- Goal & Insight
- iRec System
- Next Steps



Road-Map

- Motivations
- Goal & Insight
- iRec System
- Next Steps



Next Steps

- Can we provide stronger privacy preservation?

Next Steps

- Can we provide stronger privacy preservation?
- Do cloud providers have incentives to join?

Next Steps

- Can we provide stronger privacy preservation?
- Do cloud providers have incentives to join?
- Will the clouds behave honestly?

Next Steps

- Can we provide stronger privacy preservation?
- Do cloud providers have incentives to join?
- Will the clouds behave honestly?
- Can we make iRec more scalable?
- How do we evaluate iRec with realistic cloud dependency datasets?

Thanks!

Questions?