

Today - Special Topic: Cryptography

- Commitments
- Zero-Knowledge Proofs

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- Best Algorithm: $e^{(3^{2/3} - o(1))(\log p)^{1/3} (\log \log p)^{2/3}}$

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- Using large enough primes the discrete log problem is believed to be hard!

Commitment Schemes

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- ▶ **Binding:** C can not find $(0, s_0)$ and $(1, s_1)$ such that R outputs 1 on both.

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
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
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


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
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
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
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Output 1 if $g^b h^{s_C} \stackrel{?}{=} Y$
Else output 0

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- Y contains no information about b .
- If $g^b h^s = Y$ then $g^{1-b} h^{s'} = Y$ where $s' = \frac{2b-1}{x} + s \pmod{p-1}$.¹

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- Given (g, X, p) we are trying to find $d \log_g X$. We set $h = X$ on behalf of R . Now given $(0, s_0)$ and $(1, s_1)$ (and because R outputs 1 on both) we have that $x \cdot s_0 = 1 + x \cdot s_1$. Therefore, $x = \frac{1}{s_0 - s_1} \bmod p - 1$

How would you prove that a NP problem is true?

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
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- A NP problem I is true if there exists a solution S such that $\mathcal{C}(I, S) = \text{true}$, where \mathcal{C} is the checking algorithms.
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- However, this leaks the solution to your friend.

Graph 3-coloring


Europe in Four Colours



Created with mapchart.net ©

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
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


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- Can you color a map in 3 colors?
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- This problem is NP-complete.

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 - ▶ Correctness: Execution with honest \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} always leads \mathcal{V} to output 1.
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 - ▶ Zero-Knowledge: No cheating \mathcal{V}^* learns anything about \mathcal{P} 's coloring function c .

Zero-Knowledge Protocol

$$\mathcal{P}(G, c; r)$$

π be a random function

$$\{\textcolor{red}{R}, \textcolor{blue}{B}, \textcolor{green}{G}\} \rightarrow \{\textcolor{red}{R}, \textcolor{blue}{B}, \textcolor{green}{G}\}$$

$$\mathcal{V}(G, s)$$

Zero-Knowledge Protocol

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Output 1
if diff
Else 0

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- **Must use fresh randomness (namely π) in each.**

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- What does a cheating verifier \mathcal{V}^* learn in one execution?
- Nothing! :)

- CS194 on Cryptography: Next Semester