

# Ethics and Decision-making Session 7

DSBA

May 25th, 2021

# Final papers and oral presentations : a restatement

- Oral presentations : sessions 8 second part, 9 and 10
- Oral presentations : 30mn, discussion included – session 10, 25mn discussion included
- Written versions deadline for the final collective and individual papers : June 18th, 5 p.m..

# Final papers and oral presentations : a restatement

- Oral presentations :
  - All the team members participate
  - Presentation of the topic, the reasons why you choosed it, the main related stakes, your conclusions / opinions about it
  - The oral presentation does not present the whole written paper, it favours a discussion on the topic with the participants

# An illustration of absence : Tenerife

- Due to circumstances – the terrorist attack at Las Palmas – the traffic is re-oriented towards Los Rodeos
  - Stress in the control tower at Los Rodeos due to the exceptional traffic and to the presence of the two Boeing 747 – new innovative aircraft
  - Stress in the Pan Am : after an 11 hours flight, waiting for 1,5 hour more waiting at Los Rodeos

# On Tenerife

- Stress in the KLM cockpit : short-termism due to the Rotterdam rule related to security – no permission to be late which would mean that the crew members are tired – e.g. less vigilant
- The triggering event : in quite complex circumstances – accumulation of small interruptions of routines - regression of the KLM Captain to his dominant ongoing routine as an instructor :

# On Tenerife

- He unconsciously plays the role of the control tower and gives himself the clearance for take off
  - The KLM Co-pilot : « we do not have the clearance »
  - The KLM Captain : « you are right, tell them »
  - The KLM Co-pilot to the control tower : « we are at take off »
  - « okay, we call you back. When you take off etc »
  - « I missed C3. I'll exit in C4 »

# On Tenerife

- The control tower to the KLM : « okay, we call you back. When you take off etc »
- On the same time (the sentences overlap, they are very difficult to understand, but they are understandable), the Pan Am to the control tower : « I missed C3, I'll exit in C4 »
- The KLM flight engineer : « isn't it clear that Pan Am ? »

# An Illustration of Presence : the Hudson Landing Case

- A Short term routinized operation
- The Emergence of the Unpredictable (the two engines break)
  - No Available Protocols
  - Disagreeing with the Control Tower
  - Checking that the Co-pilot agrees on « ending up on the Hudson »
  - Dividing and coordinating tasks to do so
  - Obligation of means
- Vigilant routines and uncertainty shifts



# The Hudson : the control / uncertainty sequence

- Take off
- Starting the engines
- Protocoles
- La Guardia
- Rescue Airport
- « No » – « My control »
- Birds
- Failiure
- Nothing
  - « We will probably end up on the Hudson »
  - « Unable » x 4
- « Do you see another solution ? »
- « Be prepared to something violent »

# The Hudson : some takeaways

- Playing the game – « dancing » - of the tension between control and uncertainty
- Improvising : we all have our « waterplanes » and / or planners
  - Resulting in disruptive imagination: separating the passengers from the plane
- Sometimes, disobeying the rule (denying the control tower)
- Team commitment (*« Do you see another solution ? »*)
- Obligation of means – not of results

# Contrasting Tenerife and the Hudson case

- Tenerife
- Accumulation of small, not clearly visible problems
- Unconsciously disobeying a rule to the profit of another rule
- Invaded by a routine
- Not committing the colleagues
- Hudson
- A huge evident technical problem
- Deliberately disobeying the control tower
- Mobilizing ancient routines
- Committing the co-pilot

# Favouring real vigilance

- We all « know how » infinitely more than we know – we may **trust** each other
- We all ignore infinitely more than we believe – we should always remain **humble** and open-minded
- Knowing our ignorance amounts to training for an attitude of « learning »
- A real « presence » amounts to shifting on a flexible and adaptative way between « control » and « uncertainty »

# Some Practical Lessons from Above

- Doubt and Ignorance as Competences
  - Knowing that We Do not Know amounts to be able to learn – e.g. ask questions
- Favour People Confidence and Dialogue
  - Hierarchical and Functional Proximity
  - From Sanction to Collective Learning from Errors
- Favour Debrief of « taken for granted » actions, even when operations work the right way
- Never Neglect Small Wins
- Making steps back – common sense

# A proposal : homework when back at your offices

- Identify a practice your are *excellent* in, *and make clear to what extent, why and how you are excellent*
- When done, identify how you could *improve* your competence about the concerned practice
- Do the same (the 2 steps) for a colleague / colleagues of yours : *asking positive and right questions*
- Start becoming vigilant, agile, flexible, able to make people change
- You know that you don't know – *and so what ?*  
Continuously continue learning ... by doing and by asking questions and making people doing the same – favor learning teams.

# Added references

- Weick K., & Sutcliffe K., *Managing the Unexpected : Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty*, Wiley & sons, 2007.