

Principles of Finance

Risk Aversion and Certainty Equivalent

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Utility theory

- In utility theory, when there is uncertainty, people make choices by maximizing the expected utility of future wealth:

$$E(u(W)) = \sum_s \pi_s u(w_s)$$

- where W is a random variable that represents wealth, w_s is its future value in state s , π_s is the probability of state s , and $u(\cdot)$ is a utility function which is assumed to be monotonically increasing.
- The utility function represents the **preferences** of investors.

Keyword:
Expected utility

Expected utility: an example

Suppose your utility function of wealth is $u(W) = \sqrt{W}$ and you have two investment opportunities:

- A: Your future wealth will be \$100 with certainty (100%);
- B: Your future wealth will be \$50 with 50% possibility and \$150 with 50% possibility.

Questions:

1. What is your expected wealth with each opportunity?
2. What are your expected utilities of future wealth?
3. Which opportunity will you choose?


Expected utility: an example

Suppose your utility function of wealth is $u(W) = \sqrt{W}$ and you have two investment opportunities:

- The expected wealth levels are
 - A: $E[W] = 100$
 - B: $E[W] = 0.5 \times 50 + 0.5 \times 150 = 100$.
- The expected utilities of future wealth are:
 - A: $E[u(W)] = \sqrt{100} = 10$
 - B: $E[u(W)] = 0.5 \times \sqrt{50} + 0.5 \times \sqrt{150} \approx 9.66$.

→ **Choose opportunity A.**

Expected utility: an example



Risk aversion

- An agent is **risk-averse** if she prefers getting the expected value of a bet to the bet itself, i.e., $u(E(W)) > E(u(W))$. In this case, her utility function is **concave** ($u'' < 0$)
- An agent is **risk-neutral** if she is indifferent between the two, i.e., $u(E(W)) = E(u(W))$. In this case, her utility function is linear ($u'' = 0$)
- An agent is **risk-loving** if she prefers getting the bet itself, i.e., $u(E(W)) < E(u(W))$. In this case, her utility function is convex ($u'' > 0$).

Back to our example

- Calculate $u(E(W))$ and $E(u(W))$ for the uncertain opportunity:
 - $u(E(W)) = \sqrt{100} = 10$
 - $E(u(W)) \approx 0.66 < u(E(W))$
- This is an example of risk-averse agent.
- Check the concavity of the utility function:
 - $U(W) = \sqrt{W} \rightarrow U'(W) = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{W}} = \frac{1}{2W^{1/2}}$
 - $\rightarrow U''(W) = \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} W^{-1/2} \times \left(-\frac{1}{W}\right) = -\frac{1}{4W^{3/2}} < 0$ for $W > 0$.
 - $\rightarrow U$ is concave.

$$\left(\frac{1}{x^k}\right)' = -\frac{k}{x^{k+1}}$$

Risk aversion




Figure 4.6


Three utility functions with positive marginal utility: (a) risk lover; (b) risk neutral; (c) risk averter.

Certainty equivalent

- The **certainty equivalent** of a bet is the amount of wealth CE that will make the agent indifferent between A: receiving this amount for sure and B: making the bet.
- If the agent chooses A, her expected utility is $u(CE)$
- If she chooses the bet W , her expected utility is $E(u(W))$
- Therefore the certainty equivalent is such that

$$u(CE) = E(u(W))$$

Certainty equivalent



Risk premium

- Recall that the **risk premium** is given by

$$RP = E[R] - r_f$$

- Here the risky return is

$$E[R] = \frac{E[W] - W_0}{W_0}$$

- Obtaining the certainty equivalent is by definition risk-free, therefore

$$r_f = \frac{CE - W_0}{W_0}$$

- Putting everything together we have

$$RP = \frac{E[W] - CE}{W_0}$$

Risk premium

- Risk aversion implies

$$E[W] - CE > 0$$

and therefore

$$RP = \frac{E[W] - CE}{W_0} > 0$$

- Insurance premium: how much are you ready to pay to be hedged against the uncertainty of the lottery?

$$W_0 + IP = CE$$

Back to our example

What is the certainty equivalent and the risk premium?

- Remember:

- A: $E[u(W)] = \sqrt{100} = 10$
- B: $E[u(W)] = 0.5 \times \sqrt{50} + 0.5 \times \sqrt{150} \approx 9.66$.

- The CE satisfies

- A: $u(CE) = E[u(W)] = 10$ therefore $CE = u^{-1}(10) = 10^2 = 100$
- B: $u(CE) = E[u(W)] \approx 9.66$ therefore $CE \approx u^{-1}(9.66) = 9.66^2 \approx 93.32$.

- The risk premium is proportional to $E[W] - CE$

- A: $RP = E[W] - CE = 0$ (no risk)
- B: $RP \propto E[W] - CE \approx 100 - 93.32 = 6.68$.

If $u(x) = y$, the inverse of u satisfies $x = u^{-1}(y)$. In the case where $u(x) = \sqrt{x} = y$, the inverse can be found by taking the square: $x = y^2$. Therefore $u^{-1}(y) = y^2$.

Example

Consider two gambles:

- Gamble X: equal chance of winning 1 or 5 dollars
- Gamble Y: 5/6 chance of winning 2, 1/6 chance of winning 8

Which gamble is preferred if $u(W) = \ln(W)$?

What if $u(W) = 9W - W^2$?

Steps?

Example

Calculate the expected utility of final wealth:

- Gamble X: $E[u(W)] = 0.5 \times u(\$1) + 0.5 \times u(\$5)$
 $= 0.5 \times \ln(1) + 0.5 \times \ln(5) = 0.8047.$
- Gamble Y: $E[u(W)] = \frac{5}{6} \times \ln(2) + \frac{1}{6} \ln(8) = 0.9242.$
→ Gamble Y is preferred.

Do the same with $u(W) = 9W - W^2$:

- Gamble X: $E[u(W)] = 0.5 \times u(\$1) + 0.5 \times u(\$5) = 14.$
- Gamble Y: $E[u(W)] = \frac{5}{6} \times \ln(2) + \frac{1}{6} \ln(8) = 13.$
→ Gamble X is preferred.

Special cases

- A particular case of risk-aversion is when only the mean and the variance of the lottery matters, i.e,

$$E(u(W)) = f(E(W), Var(W)), \quad \frac{\partial f}{\partial E(W)} > 0, \frac{\partial f}{\partial Var(W)} < 0$$

- This representation holds if
 - Wealth is normally distributed **or** if
 - The utility function is quadratic: $u(W) = a + bW + cW^2$. Indeed, in this case,
 - $E(u(W)) = a + bE(W) + cE(W^2) = a + bE(W) + c(Var(W) + E(W)^2)$
 - $\frac{\partial f}{\partial E(W)} = b + 2cE[W] > 0 \rightarrow \frac{-b}{2c} < E[W]$
 - $\frac{\partial f}{\partial Var(W)} = c < 0$


Use here that
 $Var(X) = E(X^2) - E(X)^2$
Therefore
 $E(X^2) = Var(X) + E(X)^2$

Special case of normally distributed wealth

- Example:

$$E[u(W)] = E[W] - 0.5A \times Var(W)$$

- Investors have a preference for higher expected return and lower standard deviation (variance).



Example

Consider 3 types of portfolios

Portfolio	Risk Premium	Expected Return	Risk (SD)
<i>L</i> (low risk)	2%	7%	5%
<i>M</i> (medium risk)	4	9	10
<i>H</i> (high risk)	8	13	20

- Consider an expected utility of the form $E[u(W)] = E[W] - 0.5AVar(W)$. Calculate the expected utility of each portfolio for $A = 2, 3.5$ and 5 .

Example

Investor Risk Aversion (A)	Utility Score of Portfolio L [$E(r) = .07$; $\sigma = .05$]	Utility Score of Portfolio M [$E(r) = .09$; $\sigma = .10$]	Utility Score of Portfolio H [$E(r) = .13$; $\sigma = .20$]
2.0	$.07 - \frac{1}{2} \times 2 \times .05^2 = .0675$	$.09 - \frac{1}{2} \times 2 \times .1^2 = .0800$	$.13 - \frac{1}{2} \times 2 \times .2^2 = .09$
3.5	$.07 - \frac{1}{2} \times 3.5 \times .05^2 = .0656$	$.09 - \frac{1}{2} \times 3.5 \times .1^2 = .0725$	$.13 - \frac{1}{2} \times 3.5 \times .2^2 = .06$
5.0	$.07 - \frac{1}{2} \times 5 \times .05^2 = .0638$	$.09 - \frac{1}{2} \times 5 \times .1^2 = .0650$	$.13 - \frac{1}{2} \times 5 \times .2^2 = .03$

- A more risk-averse investor will get less utility from a bet than a less risk-averse investor.
- When the risk is low, the difference in utility is small. But when the risk is high, the difference is large.

Challenges

- **Modelling challenge:**

- In general, investors do not just care about mean and variance of the risk
- It is tricky to find a utility function that is tractable and realistic

- **Estimation challenge**

- How does one estimate risk aversion?