

# Declining Potential Growth in Korea\*

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❖The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Bank of Korea or Korea Development Institute.


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- 3. 'Japanization' of Korea?
- 4. Declining Natural Interest Rate and Monetary Policy
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# 2. Growth Trend

**XOTE SECULATION** When the Secular decline since the 90s.

**Growth Trends: Korea and the World** 



# 2. Growth Trend: Accounting

\* All 3 components (labor, capital, TFP) have decelerated.

### **Growth Accounting of Korea**

|           | GDP (A+B+C) | Capital (A) | Employment (B) | TFP (C) |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------------|---------|
| 1981~1990 | 9.9         | 4.1         | 1.7            | 3.6     |
| 1991~2000 | 7.0         | 3.8         | 1.0            | 1.9     |
| 2001~2005 | 4.7         | 2.1         | 1.0            | 1.5     |
| 2006~2010 | 4.1         | 1.8         | 0.5            | 1.8     |
| 2011~2015 | 3.0         | 1.4         | 1.0            | 0.5     |
| 2016~2020 | 1.7+?       | 1.1         | 0.6            | ?       |
| 2021~2025 | 1.3+??      | 1.0         | 0.3            | ??      |
| 2026~2030 | 0.7+???     | 0.8         | -0.1           | ???     |
| 2031~2035 | 0.2+????    | 0.6         | -0.4           | ????    |
| 2036~2040 | 0.0+?????   | 0.5         | -0.5           | ?????   |

Source: Kwon (2017)


# 2. Growth Trend: Accounting

- **Extremely low fertility rate Iabor contraction in future**
- **♦** High capital to output ratio → steady state in future

### **Fertility Rates**

# (children per woman) KOR ---USA GER ---JPN 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15

### **Capital to Output Ratios**



# 2. Growth Trend: Efficiency

**TFP:** the only source of growth left for Korea


- However, its future prospect does not seem rosy.
  - **Technology gap** vis-à-vis the frontier will narrow as Korea converges.
  - Demography will age, hampering TFP progress.
  - Improvement of institutions to achieve more efficient resource allocation is the key factor that Korea should rely on.


# 2. Growth Trend: Efficiency

- **\*** Evidences on allocation efficiency are not encouraging.
  - Labor mobility has been significantly lowered. (Kwon and Kim (2014))
  - Financial market efficiency is eroded by zombies. (Jeong (2014))
  - **Product market efficiency** has been declining. (Oh (2017))

# 3. Japanization?: Similarities

- Some fundamentals of Korea are similar to those of Japan.
  - Korea's **demography** follows Japan's with a lag of approximately 20 yrs.








# 3. Japanization?: Similarities

- Some fundamentals of Korea are similar to those of Japan.
  - **Industrial structures** are similar. (Note SITC 7 industry)

### **Revealed Comparative Advantages**








# 3. Japanization?: Similarities

- Some fundamentals of Korea are similar to those of Japan.
  - Korea's **nominal income growth** trails Japan's by 20 years.

### **Trends in Nominal GDP Growth Rates**




# 3. Japanization?: Differences

# Will Korea fall into chronic deflation as in Japan?

• Recent data, however, send a relieving signal.


### **Trends in Nominal GDP Growth Rates**



# 3. Japanization?: Differences

- The pace of disinflation was milder in Korea,
  - while inflation has been lowered to a worrisome level since 2013.


### **CPI Inflation Rates**



# 3. Japanization?: Differences

- **\*** The dissemblance may stem from difference in asset prices.
  - Korea's housing prices have risen roughly in accordance with CPI.

### **Real Estate Price and CPI**




- There is no a priori reason to believe that Korea should follow Japan into deflation,
  - as far as inflation/deflation is a monetary phenomenon.

- Yet, the changes in fundamentals do carry important implications on monetary policy.
  - The most important example is the decline in the 'natural interest rate,' which increases the probability of hitting the 'zero lower bound.'


- \* Korea's (nominal) interest rate has been declining rapidly.
  - Long-term rates finally fell to the levels similar to those of the US.

### **Interest Rate of Korea**

### **Nominal and Real Interest Rates (3-year)**



### **Yield Curve (as of June 30, 2017)**




# Simulation exercises utilizing an OG model for Korea

| Chang                              | es in Simulated N | (%P)             |                    |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
|                                    | 1990~2015<br>(A)  | 1990~2040<br>(B) | 2015~2040<br>(B-A) |
| Change in<br>Natural Interest Rate | -4.3              | -5.9             | -1.6               |
| (1) Mortality Rate                 | -1.2              | -2.0             | -0.8               |
| (2) Fertility Rate                 | -0.5              | -1.8             | -1.3               |
| (3) TFP Progress Rate              | -1.0              | -1.2             | -0.2               |
| (4) Relative Price                 | -0.4              | -0.5             | -0.1               |
| (5) Others                         | -1.2              | -0.4             | +0.8               |

Changes in Cimulated Natural Interest Data

**\*** Changes in demography have prolonged effects.

**Effects of the Changes in Fundamental Variables on the Natural Interest Rates** 



# 5. Conclusion

# **\*** Korea's potential growth will likely continue to decline.

- Given the current demography and capital deepening.
- Not so promising prospect for TFP improvement.

# Natural interest rate, too, is likely to decline.

- The neutral interest rate for short-term safe assets may well fall below zero in the not-so-distant future, given that its estimate is currently below 1.0%.
- The probability of interest rate hitting the zero lower bound will increase.

# 5. Conclusion

# In order to avoid deflation that Japan experienced:

- Keep inflation expectations from falling below the target level of 2%;
- Prepare emergency policy measures, including unconventional ones.

# Most desirable would be to improve TFP,

• which will alleviate the decline of the natural interest rate and thus reduce the probability of hitting zero lower bound.

### **Bold structural reforms are needed.**

• How to overcome resistance of vested interest groups?

