

## A Hardware Design Methodology to Prevent Microarchitectural Transition Leakages

April 3<sup>rd</sup> 2025

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Cyberphysical and connected objets have been widely adopted to address some important societal challenges. They are the subject of two trends:

- ① **Increasing complexity:** typically following System On Chip (SoC) architectures.
- ② **Increasing attack surface:** with hardware-oriented attacks.


# Side-Channel Attacks

## Overview

- Side-channel attacks (SCA) are gaining momentum since they are an effective way to break cryptography (along with fault injection).
- This presentation focus on power-based side-channel attacks, i.e. extracting secrets from energy consumption or electromagnetic field.



# Side-Channel Leakage Sources

## Overview



# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation


## State Of The Art



Several methods and tools have been proposed to verify security and harden software or hardware against SCA, with possible interactions, to increase the security level of a cryptographic implementation.

# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation


## State Of The Art



**Masking:** Method to allow side-channel observation without leaking secret, based on a formal model of the attacker ( $t$ -probing for instance).  
**Challenge:** Implement masking with minimal security loss.

# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation

## State Of The Art


**FENL:**

- ① ISA modification to add fencing instructions to overwrite hardware registers and prevent transitions between the previous/next instructions.

**Limitation:** Recompilation required and security assessment on simulated or real hardware required.


# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation

## State Of The Art



# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation

## State Of The Art


**COCO:**


- ① Hardening process split between hardware and software.
- ② Deeply hidden transitions in hardware only.

**Limitation:** Important part is still delegated to the software:  
successive instructions or architectural overwriting. Usefull for simple  
processors without pipeline.

# Side-Channel Analysis and Mitigation

## State Of The Art





## ① Microarchitectural Hardening (mutually exclusive)


- $S_1$  Complete Stage Overwriting
- $S_1$  Delayed Data Multiplexing
- $S_2$  Microarchitecture Register Duplication

## ② Architectural Hardening

- $S_3$  Architectural Register Pre-Writing
- $S_3$  Decoupled Memory Operations

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Overview



## Objective

Full pipeline cleaning (including combinatorial logic):


Before:  $S_0 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow S_2$

After:  $S_0 \rightarrow 0x0 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow 0x0 \rightarrow S_2$

Remark: Only 1 buffer is represented, but all data dependent buffers in a stage are patched with 0x0 insertion synchronized.

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting


## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle



cycle  
Register's value |

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1
Register's value	$S_0$

Propagation of  $S_0$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinatorial logic.

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0

Stage buffers and all combinatorial logic cleaning (i.e. set to 0).

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_1$

Propagation of  $S_1$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinatorial logic.

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_1$	0x0

Stage buffers and all combinatorial logic cleaning (i.e. set to 0).

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_2$

Propagation of  $S_2$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinatorial logic.

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5	6
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_2$	0x0

Stage buffers and all combinatorial logic cleaning (i.e. set to 0).

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Register's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_2$	0x0	$S_3$

Propagation of  $S_3$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinatorial logic.

# Strategy S1: Complete Stage Overwriting

## Security exposed to ISA



Combinatorial Logic


## Security Property

For a given pipeline stage and all possible instruction's sequence manipulating data stored in the Register File, no transition leakage can occur in the **stage** (buffer + logic behind) *by design*.

Remark: Since ID/EX buffer must be patched, there is no reason to change strategy for following stages because the 2 cycles penalty will be propagated to the other stages.

# Strategy S1: Delayed Data Multiplexing

## Standard Pipeline Issue




Data can come from different sources  
→ need multiplexing with 0x0 insertion guarantees.

Targeted mechanisms: register forwarding, load resize buffer, skid buffer (memory controller).

# Strategy S1: Delayed Data Multiplexing

## Standard Pipeline Issue




- Definition of a *Slot* Finite State Machine to alternate between inputs.
- Ready not displayed but required to delay inputs.

Hardware implementation: input selection using a `slct`  $\log_2(N_{inputs})$ -bit register, force zero using a `zero` 1-bit register after each processed operation.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Overview




## Objective

Stage buffer cleaning:

Before:	$S_0$	$\rightarrow$	$S_1$	$\rightarrow$	$S_2$	$\rightarrow$	$S_3$	
After:	$R_{above}$	$S_0$	$\rightarrow$	$0x0$	$\rightarrow$	$S_2$	$\rightarrow$	$0x0$
	$R_{below}$	$0x0$	$\rightarrow$	$S_1$	$\rightarrow$	$0x0$	$\rightarrow$	$S_3$
	<i>output</i>	$S_0$	$\rightarrow$	$S_1$	$\rightarrow$	$S_2$	$\rightarrow$	$S_3$

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle

$R_{above}$ 's value

$R_{below}$ 's value

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0

Propagation of  $S_0$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	0x0
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0	$S_1$

Propagation of  $S_1$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_2$
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0	$S_1$	0x0

Propagation of  $S_2$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_2$	0x0
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_3$

Propagation of  $S_3$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinatorial logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_2$	0x0	$S_4$
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_3$	0x0

Propagation of  $S_4$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5	6
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	$0x0$	$S_2$	$0x0$	$S_4$	$0x0$
$R_{below}$ 's value	$0x0$	$S_1$	$0x0$	$S_3$	$0x0$	$S_5$

Propagation of  $S_5$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: $\mu$ arch. Register Duplication

## Stage Evolution Cycle By Cycle




cycle	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
$R_{above}$ 's value	$S_0$	0x0	$S_2$	0x0	$S_4$	0x0	$S_6$
$R_{below}$ 's value	0x0	$S_1$	0x0	$S_3$	0x0	$S_5$	0x0

Propagation of  $S_6$  bits (+ all outputs from other stage buffers) through the combinational logic.

# Strategy S2: *μarch.* Register Duplication

## Security exposed to ISA




## Security Property

For a given pipeline stage and all possible instruction's sequence manipulating data stored in the Register File, no transition leakage can occur in the **buffer** by design.

# Strategy S3.a: Arch. Register Pre-Writing


## General Purpose Register File Hardening



Same strategy than  $S_1$  Complete Stage Overwriting, but the Write Back allow anticipate which register must be cleaned.

# Strategy S3.b: Decoupled Memory Operations

## Memory Controller Hardening



**Trash**: a reserved memory location to perform hardware hardening operations.

**Read**: after each valid read, a second read is performed from the trash to clean the **rdata** signal.

**Write**: before each write, a previous operation overwrite **wdata** and the memory value / after, a write is performed to the trash to clean the **wdata** signal.

# Implementation Results

## Configurations Evaluated

- ① Target Architecture: RISCV32IM\_Zicsr
- ② Specifications in CHISEL
- ③ Validation with microbenchmarks:
  - In simulation with Verilator
  - In real target with chipwhisperer


Conf.	Stages	S1.a	S1.b	S2	S3.a	S3.b
C5U	5					
C5S1	5	✓	✓		✓	✓
C5S2	5			✓	✓	*
C7U	7					
C7S1	7	✓	✓		✓	✓
C7S2	7			✓	✓	*

\* : Partial support, trash operations not needed to clean signals.


# Implementation Results

## Security with Correlation Power Analysis





C5U



C5S1



C5S2



Above Arithmetical and logical operations sequence.

Below Store operations sequence.

Configuration: 50,000 traces

# Implementation Results

## Performance

Conf.	Embench	LUT	FF
C5U	1	1	1
C5S1	1.8635	1.0533	1.0088
C5S2	1.0266	1.3746	1.2418
C7U	1	1	1
C7S1	1.4821	1.1116	1.0215
C7S2	1.0002	1.2751	1.3343

Ratio with unprotected cores (CU5 and CU7).

# Conclusion

- ① Addressing transition leakage from its root cause is possible (and implementable).
- ② Design choices between security, area and cycles overhead are required (with possible software countermeasures).
- ③ Glitches may still occur here since it's not a µarchitectural issue (circuit layer), and are not clearly identified after removing other leakage.

Other layers consideration:

- Application** Impact of the different hardware strategies?
- ISA** Possibility to enable/disable a strategy only when needed
- Physical** Impact of synthesis / place-and-route steps?

Thanks for your attention. Don't hesitate to ask your questions.