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 INFORMATION São Paulo, Brazil

EDUCATION	São Paulo School of Economics, FGV	2017–2021
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ph.D. in Economics • Dissertation: Essays in Applied Microeconomics • Advisor: Prof. Vladimir Ponczek 	
	São Paulo School of Economics, FGV	2015–2017
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master in Economics • Dissertation: Peer Effects in Active Learning • Advisor: Prof. Vladimir Ponczek 	
	University of São Paulo	2009–2013
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • B.A. in Economics. 	
WORK EXPERIENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute of Education and Research, Insper 	2023–present
	Post-doctoral researcher funded by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • São Paulo School of Economics 	2019–2023
	College lecturer in Mathematics, Statistics and Econometrics.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FGV LEARN 	2018–2020
	Research assistant at the São Paulo School of Economics' Lab for Evaluation Analysis and Research in Learning.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FGV EESP Clear 	2016–2017
	Research assistant at the regional Center for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Brazil and Lusophone Africa.	
WORK IN PROGRESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic Violence Law Enforcement and Women's Labor Market Participation 	
	<p>This paper uses Brazilian data to investigate the effects of a policy aimed at enforcing the combat against domestic violence on women's labor market participation in a difference-in-differences framework. While the primary objective is combatting domestic violence, it also redistributes bargaining power to women, placing them in a stronger position to implement their preferred allocation. The main finding indicates that a 60% decrease in the average distance of married women to a police station would lead to a 2.7% increase in their participation in the labor market. The effects are primarily driven by educated women, who are likely to have higher initial bargaining power. I show supporting evidence of reduced women's hospitalization due to violence and that reporting of crimes related to domestic violence responded consistently. These findings shed light on the interplay between law enforcement, household dynamics, and labor market outcomes.</p>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peer Effects in Active Learning 	
	<p><i>with Priscilla Tavares and Vladimir Ponczek</i></p> <p>The paper studies peer effects in higher education. We observe students interacting in an environment of <i>active learning</i> in which there are high returns for peer interaction. We estimate nonlinear peer effects, recognizing that peers can have different impacts on a student's performance depending on both students and peers ability. The identification of peer effects relies on the random assignment of students to groups and explore variation in terms of group ability composition as well as variation on the number of times that peers can interact. We show evidence that when peers meet in more than one group, low ability students are 33% more likely to report high ability peers as relevant components of their groups. Then, we find that for low ability students an increase in the fraction of this kind of high ability peer could increase their average performance in the exams by 5.7% of a standard deviation.</p>	

- **Tit-for-Tat between Legislative and Executive**

with Eduardo Ferraz and Lucas Finamor

In this paper, we look to elections and local governments in Brazil to analyze how the interplay between executive and legislative powers affects governance. With new data on budget management and a microfounded definition of close proportional elections we identify the causal effect of stronger legislative support on governance. Our findings highlight that the legislative-executive relationship interacts with electoral incentives in shaping how mayors use increased support. Under the possibility of reelection, mayors seem to use the flexibility they gain from more support to make a better government and improve their reputation. With no reelection incentives, though, mayors prioritize rent extraction.

- **Limits on Electoral Coalition Size**

with Eduardo Ferraz

This paper studies the impact of a reform that limited the maximum number of candidates in electoral coalitions disputing local legislative elections in Brazil. The reform targeted municipalities with more than 100,000 voters, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design to estimate its effects on the entry of candidates and political selection. The reform increased political competition by raising the number of effective coalitions by 13.6%. This attracted candidates 20.9% richer in terms of self-reported wealth and consequently elected legislators were 32.3% richer, on average. We show that this is mainly due to richer candidates running for large parties after the reform. Finally, we show that increased competition affected policy by increasing on 5.4% the share of educational spending. These results provide evidence of a causal link between electoral rules and political selection through a rearrangement of electoral coalitions.

REFERENCES

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