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PROFESSIONAL
INTERESTS Development Economics (Education, Labor, Political Economy)

EDUCATION **Ph.D in Econmics**, São Paulo School of Economics, FGV, 2021
M.A., Economics, São Paulo School of Economics, FGV, 2017
B.A., Economics, University of São Paulo, 2013

PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE **Institute of Education and Research, Insper** **2023-present**
Post-doctoral researcher funded by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP).
Institute for Fiscal Studies **2022**
Research consultant.
São Paulo School of Economics, FGV **2019-2022**
College lecturer in Mathematics, Statistics and Econometrics
FGV LEARN **2018–2020**
Research assistant at the São Paulo School of Economics' Lab for Evaluation Analysis
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FGV Clear **2016-2018**
Research assistant at the regional Center for Learning on Evaluation and Results for
Brazil and Lusophone Africa.

WORK IN
PROGRESS **Domestic Violence Law Enforcement and Women's Labor Market Participation**

This paper uses Brazilian data to investigate the effects of a policy aimed at enforcing the combat against domestic violence on women's labor market participation in a difference-in-differences framework. While the primary objective is combatting domestic violence, it also redistributes bargaining power to women, placing them in a stronger position to implement their preferred allocation of resources. The main finding indicates that after the policy there was a 4% increase in women's labor market participation rate for women living closer to police stations – where the threat of punishment for DV perpetrators is higher – relative to the counterfactual scenario of living far from a police station. This effect is mainly driven by the what happened to low educated women.

Peer Effects in Active Learning (with Priscilla Tavares and Vladimir Ponczek)

The paper studies peer effects in higher education. We observe students interacting in an environment of active learning in which there are high returns for peer interaction. We estimate nonlinear peer effects, recognizing that peers can have different impacts on a student's performance depending on both students and peers ability. The identification of peer effects relies on the random assignment of students to groups and explore variation in terms of group ability composition as well as variation on the number of times that peers can interact. We show evidence that when peers meet in more than one group, low ability students are 33% more likely to report high ability peers as relevant components of their groups. Then, we find that for low ability

students an increase in the fraction of this kind of high ability peer could increase their average performance in the exams by 5.7% of a standard deviation

Tit-for-Tat between Legislative and Executive (with Eduardo Ferraz and Lucas Finamor)

In this paper, we look to elections and local governments in Brazil to analyze how the inter- play between executive and legislative powers affects governance. With new data on budget management and a microfounded definition of close proportional elections we identify the causal effect of stronger legislative support on governance. Our findings highlight that the legislative- executive relationship interacts with electoral incentives in shaping how mayors use increased support. Under the possibility of reelection, mayors seem to use the flexibility they gain from more support to make a better government and improve their reputation. With no reelection incentives, though, mayors prioritize rent extraction

Limits on Electoral Coalition Size (with Eduardo Ferraz)

This paper studies the impact of a reform that limited the maximum number of candidates in electoral coalitions disputing local legislative elections in Brazil. The reform targeted municipalities with more than 100,000 voters, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design to estimate its effects on the entry of candidates and political selection. The reform increased political competition by raising the number of effective coalitions by 13.6%. This attracted candidates 20.9% richer in terms of self-reported wealth and consequently elected legislators were 32.3% richer, on average. We show that this is mainly due to richer candidates running for large parties after the reform. Finally, we show that increased competition affected policy by increasing on 5.4% the share of educational spending. These results provide evidence of a causal link between electoral rules and political selection through a rearrangement of electoral coalitions.

REFERENCES

Rodrigo Soares (Institute of Education and Research, Insper)

Vladimir Ponczek (São Paulo School of Economics, FGV)

Cristine Pinto (Institute of Education and Research, Insper)