VINCENT WANG-MAŚCIANICA

STRING DIAGRAMS FOR TEXT

Contents

(Acknowledgements will go in a margin note here.)

1
A palette for toy models

1.1 Continuous Relations for iconic semantics



Figure 1.1: Sometimes it is very helpful to illustrate concepts using iconic representations in cartoons. For instance in the *conduit metaphor* CITE , `words` are considered *containers* for `ideas`, and `communication` is considered a *conduit* along which those containers are sent.

The aim of this chapter is to formally paint pictures with words. More verbosely, to formalise cartoon doodles like the one above in a symmetric monoidal category so that we can give semantics to text circuits in terms of graphical, iconic representations – cartoons, in short. To do so, we introduce the category **ContRel** of *continuous relations*, which are a naïve extension of the category **Top** of topological spaces and continuous functions towards continuous relations.

The main reason we prefer **ContRel** to either **Rel** or **Top** for our purposes is that we can diagrammatically characterise set-indexed collections of mutually disjoint open sets as *sticky-spiders*: a generalisation of spiders that interact with idempotents. We can then treat the indexing set as a collection of labels, and an indexed open set as a doodle. Notably, spiders don't exist in cartesian **Top** except for the one-point space, and the spatial structure of open sets doesn't exist in **Rel**.

$$placeholder : stickyspiderlaws$$

But there are all kinds of poorly behaved open sets even on the plane, so enter the next benefit: In **ContRel**, we can diagrammatically characterise the reals as a topological space up to homeomorphism, which gives us a diagrammatic handle on paths and homotopies, mathematical concepts that enable us to diagrammatically characterise when open sets are connected, how they might move and transform continuously in space, and when open sets are contained inside others.

$$realcharacterisation$$

And once we've formalised doodles we'll be able to treat ourselves to cartoons as formal semantics for language and nobody can stop us.

SIDENOTE FOR CATEGORY THEORISTS

The naïve approach I take is to observe that the preimages of functions are precisely relational converses when functions are viewed as relations, so the preimage-preserves-opens condition that defines continuous functions directly translates to the relational case. To the best of my knowledge, the study of **ContRel** is a novel contribution. I venture two potential reasons.

First, it is because and not despite of the naïvity of the construction. Usually, the relationship between **Rel** and **Set** is often understood in sophisticated general methods which are inappropriate in different ways. I have tried applying Kliesli machinery which generalises to "relationification" of arbitrary categories via appropriate analogs of the powerset monad to relate **Top** and **ContRel**, but it is not evident to me whether there is such a monad. The view of relations as spans of maps in the base category should work, since **Top** has pullbacks, but this makes calculation difficult and especially cumbersome when monoidal structure is involved. See Section ref for details.

Second, the relational nature of **ContRel** means that the category has poor exactness properties. Even if the sophisticated machinery mentioned in the first reason do manage to work, relational variants of **Top** are poor candidates for any kind of serious mathematics because they lack many limits and colimits. Since we take an entirely "monoidal" approach, we are able to find and make use of the rich structure of **ContRel** with a different toolkit.

ITINERARY OF THE CHAPTER: First we'll build some intuitions about what continuous relations are by example in Section ref . Before we can start reasoning diagrammatically, we ought to define the category **ContRel** and show it is symmetric monoidal, which will be the work in Section ref . Then we introduce sticky spiders and prove the following theorem:

Theorem 1.1.1.

$$placeholder : thmstatement$$

Finally, in Section ref , we build a vocabulary of topological concepts upon sticky spiders diagrammatically, where the point is to demonstrate sufficient expressivity to reason about whatever we want in principle. We start with the unit interval and isometries, through to rigid motions of shapes in configuration, connectedness and contractibility of shapes via homotopies, until we get to sketching some cognitively primitive relations like parthood, touching, and insideness.

1.2 Continuous Relations by examples

Reminder 1.2.1 (Topological Space)**.** A *topological space* is a pair (X, τ), where X is a set, and $\tau \subset \mathcal{P}(X)$ are the *open sets* of X, such that:

"nothing" and "everything" are open

$$\varnothing, X \in \tau$$

Arbitrary unions of opens are open

$$\{U_i : i \in I\} \subseteq \tau \Rightarrow \bigcup_{i \in I} U_i \in \tau$$

Finite intersections of opens are open $n \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$U_1, \cdots, U_n \in \tau \Rightarrow \bigcap_{1 \cdots, i, \cdots n} U_i \in \tau$$

Reminder 1.2.2 (Relational Converse)**.** Recall that a relation $R : S \to T$ is a subset $R \subseteq S \times T$.

$$R^{\dagger} : T \to S := \{(t, s) : (s, t) \in R\}$$

Reminder 1.2.3 (Continuous function)**.** A function between sets $f : X \to Y$ is a continuous function between topologies $f : (X, \tau) \to (Y, \sigma)$ if

$$U \in \sigma \Rightarrow f^{-1}(U) \in \tau$$

where f^{-1} denotes the inverse image.

Recall that functions are relations, and the inverse image used in the definition of continuous maps is equivalent to the relational converse when functions are viewed as relations. So we can naïvely extend the notion of continuous maps to continuous relations between topological spaces.

Notation 1.2.4. For shorthand, we denote the topology (X, τ) as X^{τ}. As special cases, we denote the discrete topology on X as $X^{\star}$, and the indiscrete topology X°.

The symmetric monoidal structure is that of product topologies on objects, and products of relations on morphisms.

Definition 1.2.7 (Continuous Relation)**.** A continuous relation $R : (X, \tau) \to (Y, \sigma)$ is a relation $R : X \to Y$ such that

$$U \in \sigma \Rightarrow R^{\dagger}(U) \in \tau$$

where $\dagger$ denotes the relational converse.

Let's consider three topological spaces and examine the continuous relations between them. This way we can build up intuitions, and prove some tool results in the process.

The **singleton space** consists of a single point which is both open and closed. We denote this space $\bullet$. Concretely, the underlying set and topology is

$$(\{\star\}\ ,\ \{\{\star\}, \varnothing\})$$



The **Sierpiński space** consists of two points, one of which (in yellow) is open, and the other (in cyan) is closed. We denote this space $\mathcal{S}$. Concretely, the underlying set and topology is:

$$\big(\{0, 1\}\ ,\ \{\varnothing, \{1\}, \{0, 1\}\}\big)$$



The **unit square** has $[0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ as its underlying set. Open sets are "blobs" painted with open balls. Points, lines, and bounded shapes are closed. We denote this space $\blacksquare$.



$\bullet \to \bullet$: There are two relations from the singleton to the singleton; the identity relation $\{(\bullet,\bullet)\}$, and the empty relation $\varnothing$. Both are topological.

$\bullet \to \mathcal{S}$: There are four relations from the singleton to the Sierpiński space, corresponding to the subsets of $\mathcal{S}$. All of them are topological.

$\mathcal{S} \to \bullet$: There four candidate relations from the Sierpiński space to the singleton, but as we see in Example 1.2.8, not all of them are topological.

Now we need some abstraction. We cannot study the continuous relations between the singleton and the unit square case by case. We discover that continuous relations out of the singleton indicate arbitrary subsets, and that continuous relations into the singleton indicate arbitrary opens.

$\bullet \to \blacksquare$: Proposition 1.2.10 tells us that there are as many continuous relations from the singleton to the unit square as there are subsets of the unit square.

$\blacksquare \to \bullet$: Proposition 1.2.11 tells us that there are as many continuous relations from the unit square to the singleton as there are open sets of the unit square.

There are 16 candidate relations $\mathcal{S} \to \mathcal{S}$ to check. A case-by-case approach won't scale, so we could instead identify the building blocks of continuous relations with the same source and target space.

Given two continuous relations $R, S : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$, how can we combine them?

Proposition 1.2.13. If $R, S : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ are continuous relations, so are $R \cap S$ and $R \cup S$.

Proof. Replace $\square$ with either $\cup$ or $\cap$. For any non-$\varnothing$ open $U \in \sigma$:

$$(R\square S)^\dagger(U) = R^\dagger(U)\square S^\dagger(U)$$

As R, S are continuous relations, $R^\dagger(U), S^\dagger(U) \in \tau$, so $R^\dagger(U)\square S^\dagger(U) = (R\square S)^\dagger(U) \in \tau$. Thus $R\square S$ is also a continuous relation. □

Corollary 1.2.14. Continuous relations $X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ are closed under arbitrary union and finite intersection. Hence, continuous relations $X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ form a topological space where each continuous relation is an open set on the base space $X \times Y$, where the full relation $X \to Y$ is "everything", and the empty relation is "nothing".

A topological basis for spaces of continuous relations

Reminder 1.2.5 (Product Topology)**.** We denote the product topology of X^τ and Y^σ as $(X \times Y)^{(\tau\times\sigma)}$. $\tau \times \sigma$ is the topology on $X \times Y$ generated by the basis $\{t \times s \ : \ t \in \mathfrak{b}_\tau, s \in \mathfrak{b}_\sigma\}$, where $\mathfrak{b}_\tau$ and $\mathfrak{b}_\sigma$ are bases for τ and σ respectively.

Reminder 1.2.6 (Product of relations)**.** For relations between sets $R : X \to Y, S : A \to B$, the product relation $R \times S : X \times A \to Y \times B$ is defined to be

$$\{((x,a),(y,b)) : (x,y) \in R, (a,b) \in S\}$$

Example 1.2.8 (A noncontinuous relation)**.** The relation $\{(0,\bullet)\} \subset \mathcal{S} \times \bullet$ is not a continuous relation: the preimage of the open set $\{\bullet\}$ under this relation is the non-open set $\{0\}$.

Terminology 1.2.9. Call a continuous relation $\bullet \to X^\tau$ a **state** of X^τ, and a continuous relation $X^\tau \to \bullet$ a **test** of X^τ.

Proposition 1.2.10. States $R : \bullet \to X^\tau$ correspond with subsets of X.

Proof. The preimage $R^\dagger(U)$ of a (non-$\varnothing$) open $U \in \tau$ is $\star$ if $R(\star) \cap U$ is nonempty, and $\varnothing$ otherwise. Both $\star$ and $\varnothing$ are open in $\{\star\}^\bullet$. $R(\star)$ is free to specify any non-$\varnothing$ subset of X. The empty relation handles $\varnothing$ as an open of X^τ. □

Proposition 1.2.11. Tests $R : X^\tau \to \bullet$ correspond with open sets $U \in \tau$.

Proof. The preimage $R^\dagger(\star)$ of $\star$ must be an open set of X^τ by definition **??**. $R^\dagger(\star)$ is free to specify any open set of X^τ. □

Reminder 1.2.12 (Union, intersection, and ordering of relations)**.** Recall that relations $X \to Y$ can be viewed as subsets of $X \times Y$. So it makes sense to speak of the union and intersection of relations, and of partially ordering them by inclusion.



Figure 1.2: Regions of $\blacksquare$ in the image of the yellow point alone will be coloured yellow, and regions in the image of both yellow and cyan will be coloured green:



Figure 1.3: Regions in the image of the cyan point alone cannot be open sets by continuity, so they are either points or lines. Points and lines in cyan must be surrounded by an open region in either yellow or green, or else we violate continuity (open sets in red).



Figure 1.4: A continuous relation $\mathcal{S} \to \blacksquare$: "Flower and critter in a sunny field".



Figure 1.5: A continuous relation $\blacksquare \to \mathcal{S}$: "still math?". Black lines and dots indicate gaps.

Reminder 1.2.15 (Topological Basis)**.** $\mathfrak{b} \subseteq \tau$ is a basis of the topology τ if every $U \in \tau$ is expressible as a union of elements of $\mathfrak{b}$. Every topology has a basis (itself). Minimal bases are not necessarily unique.

Having a tangible topological basis for continuous relations is good for intuition: we can think of breaking down or constructing complex relations to or from simpler parts. Luckily, there do exist nice topological bases for continuous relations!

Definition 1.2.16 (Partial Functions)**.** A **partial function** $X \to Y$ is a relation for which each $x \in X$ has at most a single element in its image. In particular, all functions are special cases of partial functions, as is the empty relation.

Lemma 1.2.17 (Partial functions are a $\cap$-ideal)**.** The intersection $f \cap R$ of a partial function $f : X \to Y$ with any other relation $R : X \to Y$ is again a partial function.

Proof. Consider an arbitrary $x \in X$. $R(x) \cap f(x) \subseteq f(x)$, so the image of x under $f \cap R$ contains at most one element, since $f(x)$ contains at most one element. □

Lemma 1.2.18 (Any single edge can be extended to a continuous partial function)**.** Given any $(x, y) \in X \times Y$, there exists a continuous partial function $X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ that contains (x, y).

Proof. Let $\mathcal{N}(x)$ denote some open neighbourhood of x with respect to the topology τ. Then $\{(z, y) : z \in \mathcal{N}(x)\}$ is a continuous partial function that contains (x, y). □

Proposition 1.2.19. Continuous partial functions form a topological basis for the space $(X \times Y)^{(\tau \multimap \sigma)}$, where the opens are continuous relations $X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$.

Proof. We will show that every continuous relation $R : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ arises as a union of continuous partial functions. Denote the set of continuous partial functions $\mathfrak{f}$. We claim that:

$$R = \bigcup_{F \in \mathfrak{f}} (R \cap F)$$

The $\supseteq$ direction is evident, while the $\subseteq$ direction follows from Lemma 1.2.18. By Lemma 1.2.17, every $R \cap F$ term is a partial function, and by Corollary 1.2.14, continuous. □

$\mathcal{S} \to \mathcal{S}$: We can use Proposition 1.2.19 to write out the topological basis of continuous partial functions, from which we can take unions to find all the continuous relations, which we depict in Figure 1.6.

$\mathcal{S} \to \blacksquare$: Now we use the colour convention of the points in $\mathcal{S}$ to "paint" continuous relations on the unit square "canvas", as in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. So each continuous relation is a painting, and we can characterise the paintings that correspond to continuous relations $\mathcal{S} \to \blacksquare$ in words as follows: Cyan only in points and lines, and either contained in or at the boundary of yellow or green. Have as much yellow and green as you like.

$\blacksquare \to \mathcal{S}$: The preimage of all of $\mathcal{S}$ must be an open set. So the painting cannot have stray lines or points outside of blobs. The preimage of yellow must be open, so the union of yellow and green in the painting cannot have stray lines or points outside of blobs. Point or line gaps within blobs are ok. Each connected blob can contain any colours in any shapes, subject to the constraint that if cyan appears anywhere, then either yellow or green must occur somewhere. Open blobs with no lines or points outside. Yellow and green considered alone is a painting made of blobs with no stray lines or points. If cyan appears anywhere, then either yellow or green have to appear somewhere.



Figure 1.6: Hasse diagram of all continuous relations from the Sierpiński space to itself. Each relation is depicted left to right, and inclusion order is bottom-to-top. Relations that form the topological basis are boxed.

One more example for fun: $[0,1] \to \blacksquare$: We know how continuous functions from the unit line into the unit square look.

Then what are the partial continuous functions? If we understand these, we can obtain all continuous relations by arbitrary unions of the basis. Observe that the restriction of any continuous function to an open set in the source is a continuous partial function. The open sets of $[0,1]$ are collections of open intervals, each of which is homeomorphic to $(0,1)$, which is close enough to $[0,1]$.

Any painting is a continuous relation $[0,1] \to \blacksquare$. By colour-coding $[0,1]$ and controlling brushstrokes, we can do quite a lot. So, like it or not, here's a continuous relation $[0,1] \to \blacksquare$.

Now we would like to develop the abstract machinery required to *formally* paint pictures with words.



Figure 1.7: continuous functions $[0,1] \to \blacksquare$ follow the naïve notion of continuity: a line one can draw on paper without lifting the pen off the page.



Figure 1.8: So a continuous partial function is `"(countably) many (open-ended) lines, each of which one can draw on paper without lifting the pen off the page."`



Figure 1.9: We can control the thickness of the brush-stroke, by taking the union of (uncountably) many lines.

Figure 1.10: Assign the visible spectrum of light to $[0,1]$. Colour open sets according to perceptual addition of light, computing brightness by normalising the measure of the open set.

1.3 The category *ContRel*

Proposition 1.3.1. Continuous functions are always continuous. If $f : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ is a continuous function, then it is also a continuous relation.

Proof. Functions are special cases of relations. The relational converse of a function viewed in this way is the same thing as the preimage. □

Corollary 1.3.2. There is a faithful, identity-on-objects monoidal embedding **Top** $\hookrightarrow$ **ContRel**.

Proposition 1.3.3. The **identity relation** $X \to X$ relates anything to itself. It is defined $\{(x,x) : x \in X\} \subseteq X \times X$. The identity relation is always continuous.

Proof. The preimage of any open set under the identity relation is itself, which is open by assumption. The identity relation is also the trivial continuous function from a space to itself, so this also follows from Proposition 1.3.1. □



Figure 1.11: The *copy* map $X^\tau \to X^\tau \times X^\tau$, $\{(x, \begin{pmatrix} x \\ x \end{pmatrix}) \mid x \in X\}$.

Proposition 1.3.4. Copy maps are continuous relations.

Proof. For a direct proof, we draw on the fact that given a basis $\mathfrak{b}$ for a topology τ, ordered pairs of $\mathfrak{b}$ form a basis for the product topology $\tau \times \tau$. To show that the preimage of an open in $\tau \times \tau$ is open in τ, we may consider the preimage under the copy map of basis elements of $\tau \times \tau$, which are intersections of pairs of basis elements of τ, and hence definitionally open. By closure of opens under arbitrary unions, all opens of $\tau \times \tau$ have an open preimage in τ. □

Definition 1.3.9 (ContRel). The (purported) category **ContRel** has topological spaces for objects and continuous relations for morphisms.

Proposition 1.3.10 (ContRel is a category). continuous relations form a category **ContRel**.

Proof. Identities: Identity relations, which are always continuous since the preimage of an open U is itself.

Composition: The normal composition of relations. We verify that the composite $X^\tau \xrightarrow{R} Y^\sigma \xrightarrow{S} Z^\theta$ of continuous relations is again continuous as follows:

$$U \in \theta \implies S^\dagger(U) \in \sigma \implies R^\dagger \circ S^\dagger(U) = (S \circ R)^\dagger \in \tau$$

Associativity of composition: Inherited from **Rel**. □

1.3.1 Symmetric Monoidal structure

Proposition 1.3.11. (**ContRel**, $\bullet$, $X^\tau \otimes Y^\sigma := (X \times Y)^{(\tau \times \sigma)}$) is a symmetric monoidal closed category.

Proof. Tensor Unit: The one-point space $\bullet$. Explicitly, $\{\star\}$ with topology $\{\varnothing, \{\star\}\}$.

Tensor Product: For objects, $X^\tau \otimes Y^\sigma$ has base set $X \times Y$ equipped with the product topology $\tau \times \sigma$. For morphisms, $R \otimes S$ the product of relations. We show that the tensor of continuous relations is again a continuous relation. Take continuous relations $R : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$, $S : A^\alpha \to B^\beta$, and let U be open in the product topology $(\sigma \times \beta)$. We need to prove that $(R \times S)^\dagger(U) \in (\tau \times \alpha)$. We may express U as $\bigcup_{i \in I} y_i \times b_i$, where the y_i and b_i are in the bases $\mathfrak{b}_\sigma$ and $\mathfrak{b}_\beta$ respectively. Since for any relations we have that $R(A \cup B) = R(A) \cup R(B)$ and $(R \times S)^\dagger = R^\dagger \times S^\dagger$:

$$\begin{aligned} &(R \times S)^\dagger(\bigcup_{i \in I} y_i \times b_i) \\ &= \bigcup_{i \in I} (R \times S)^\dagger(y_i \times b_i) \\ &= \bigcup_{i \in I} (R^\dagger \times S^\dagger)(y_i \times b_i) \end{aligned}$$

Since each y_i is open and R is continuous, $R^{\dagger}(y_i) \in \tau$. Symmetrically, $S^{\dagger}(b_i) \in \alpha$. So each $(R^{\dagger} \times S^{\dagger})(y_i \times b_i) \in (\tau \times \alpha)$. Topologies are closed under arbitrary union, so we are done.

THE NATURAL ISOMORPHISMS ARE INHERITED FROM **REL**. We will be explicit with the unitor, but for the rest, we will only check that the usual isomorphisms from **Rel** are continuous in **ContRel**. To avoid bracket-glut, we will vertically stack some tensored expressions.

UNITORS: The left unitors are defined as the relations $\lambda_{X^\tau} : \bullet \times X^\tau \to X^\tau := \{(\begin{pmatrix} \star \\ x \end{pmatrix}, x) \mid x \in X\}$, and we reverse the pairs to obtain the inverse $\lambda^{-1}_{X^\tau}$. These relations are continuous since the product topology of τ with the singleton is homeomorphic to τ: $U \in \tau \iff (\bullet, U) \in (\bullet \times \tau)$. These relations are evidently inverses that compose to the identity. The construction is symmetric for the right unitors ρ_{X^τ}.

ASSOCIATORS: The associators $\alpha_{X^\tau Y^\sigma Z^\rho} : ((X \times Y) \times Z)^{((\tau \times \sigma) \times \rho)} \to (X \times (Y \times Z))^{(\tau \times (\sigma \times \rho))}$ are inherited from **Rel**. They are:

$$\alpha_{X^\tau Y^\sigma Z^\rho} := \{ ((\begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix}, z) , (x, \begin{pmatrix} y \\ z \end{pmatrix})) \mid x \in X , y \in Y , z \in Z\}$$

To check the continuity of the associator, observe that product topologies are isomorphic in **Top** up to bracketing, and these isomorphisms are inherited by **ContRel**. The inverse of the associator has the pairs of the relation reversed and is evidently an inverse that composes to the identity.

BRAIDS: The braidings $\theta_{X^\tau Y^\sigma} : (X \times Y)^{\tau \times \sigma} \to (Y \times X)^{\sigma \times \tau}$ are defined:

$$\{(\begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} , \begin{pmatrix} y \\ x \end{pmatrix}) \mid x \in X , y \in Y\}$$

The braidings inherit continuity from the isomorphisms between $X^\tau \times Y^\sigma$ and $Y^\sigma \times X^\tau$ in **Top**. They inherit everything else from **Rel**

COHERENCES: Since we have verified all of the natural isomorphisms are continuous, it suffices to say that the coherences [] are inherited from the symmetric monoidal structure of **Rel** up to marking objects with topologies. □

MONOIDAL CLOSURE: Here is the evaluator.

placeholder

$$\begin{tikzcd} & X^\tau \arrow[dl, "id"'] \arrow[d, "copy"] \arrow[dr, "id"] & \\ X^\tau & (X \times X)^{(\tau \times \tau)} \arrow[l, "\pi_0"] \arrow[r, "\pi_1"'] & X^\tau \end{tikzcd}$$

Figure 1.12: An alternative proof of Proposition 1.3.4 follows from Proposition 1.3.1, Corollary 1.3.2, and the definition of the product topology as the coarsest topology that satisfies categorical product for the diagram above.

Figure 1.13: The *everything* state is the relation $\{((\star, x) \mid x \in X\}$, notated as above.

Proposition 1.3.5. The everything states are continuous relations.

Proof. The preimage of any subset of X – in particular the opens – is the whole of the singleton space, which is open. □

Figure 1.14: The *delete* test, $\{((x, \star) \mid x \in X\}$.

Proposition 1.3.6. The delete tests are continuous relations.

Proof. There are only two opens in the singleton space. The preimage of the empty set is the empty set, and the preimage of the singleton is the whole of X; both are opens in X by definition. □



Figure 1.15: Copy and delete satisfy the above properties, expressed as diagrammatic equations.

1.3.2 *Rig category structure*

Definition 1.3.12 (Biproducts and zero objects)**.** A *biproduct* is simultaneously a categorical product and coproduct. A *zero object* is both an initial and a terminal object. **Rel** has biproducts (the coproduct of sets equipped with reversible injections) and a zero object (the empty set).

Proposition 1.3.13. **ContRel** has a zero object.

Proof. As in **Rel**, there is a unique relation from every object to and from the empty set with the empty topology. □

Proposition 1.3.14. **ContRel** has biproducts.

Proof. The biproduct of topologies X^τ and Y^σ is their direct sum topology $(X \sqcup Y)^{(\tau+\sigma)}$ – the coarsest topology that contains the disjoint union $\tau \sqcup \sigma$. As in **Rel**, the (in/pro)jections are partial identities, which are continuous by construction. To verify that it is a coproduct, given continuous relations $R : X^\tau \to Z^\rho$ and $S : Y^\sigma \to Z^\rho$, where the disjoint union $X \sqcup Y$ of sets is $\{x_1 \mid x \in X\} \cup \{y_2 \mid y \in Y\}$, we observe that $R + S := \{(x_1, z) \mid (x, z) \in R\} \cup \{(y_2, z) \mid y \in S\}$ is continuous and commutes with the injections as required. The argument that it is a product is symmetric. □

Remark 1.3.15. Biproducts yield another symmetric monoidal structure which the $\times$ monoidal product distributes over appropriately to yield a rig category. Throughout the chapter we will use $\cup$, but we could have also "diagrammatised" $\cup$ by treating it as a monoid internal to **ContRel** viewed as a symmetric monoidal category with respect to the biproduct. There are at leasy two diagrammatic formalisms for rig categories that we could have used, CITE and CITE . Neither case is perfectly suitable due to the fact that we sometimes took unions over arbitrary indexing sets, which is alright in topology but not depictable as a finite diagram in the $\oplus$-structure. A neat fact that follows is that a topological space is compact precisely when any arbitrarily indexed $\cup$ of tests in the $\times$-structure is *depictable* in the $\oplus$-structure of either diagrammatic calculus for rig categories. **FdHilb** also has a monoidal product notated $\otimes$ that distributes over the monoidal structure given by biproducts $\oplus$. In contrast, we have used $\times$ – the cartesian product notation – for the monoidal product of **ContRel** since that is closer to what is familiar for sets.

That's all we need for the diagrams. The remainder of this section are endnotes for category theorists addressing the question of how **ContRel** relates to **Rel** and **Top**, and some conceptual motivations for topological relations. If none of that interests you, ignore the main body: the margins carry on with diagrammatic facts about **ContRel**.

1.3.3 *Category-theoretic endnotes*

ContRel and Rel are related by a free-forgetful adjunction

We provide free-forgetful adjunctions relating **ContRel** to **Rel** by "forgetting topology" and sending sets to "free" discrete topologies. We exhibit a free-forgetful adjunction between **Rel** and **ContRel**.

Lemma 1.3.16 (Any relation R between discrete topologies is continuous)**.** *Proof.* All subsets in a discrete topologies are open. □

Definition 1.3.17 (L: **Rel** → **ContRel**)**.** We define the action of the functor L:

On objects $L(X) := X^\star$, (X with the discrete topology)

On morphisms $L(X \xrightarrow{R} Y) := X^\star \xrightarrow{R} Y^\star$, the existence of which in **ContRel** is provided by Lemma 1.3.16.

Evidently identities and associativity of composition are preserved.

Definition 1.3.18 (R: **ContRel** → **Rel**)**.** We define the action of the functor R as forgetting the topological structure.

On objects $R(X^\tau) := X$

On morphisms $R(X^\tau \xrightarrow{S} Y^\sigma) := X \xrightarrow{S} Y$

Evidently identities and associativity of composition are preserved.

Lemma 1.3.19 ($RL = 1_{\mathbf{Rel}}$)**.** The composite RL (first L, then R) is precisely equal to the identity functor on **Rel**.

Proof. On objects, $FU(X) = F(X^\star) = X$. On morphisms, $FU(X \xrightarrow{R} Y) = F(X^\star \xrightarrow{R} Y^\star) = X \xrightarrow{R} Y$ □

Reminder 1.3.20 (Coarser and finer)**.** Given a set of points X with two topologies X^τ and X^σ, if $\tau \subset \sigma$, we say that τ *is coarser than* σ, or σ *is finer than* τ.

Lemma 1.3.21 (Coarsening is a continuous relation)**.** Let X^σ be coarser than X^τ. The identity relation on underlying points $X^\tau \xrightarrow{1_X} X^\sigma$ is then a continuous relation.

Proof. The preimage of the identity of any open set $U \in \sigma, U \subseteq X$ is again U. By definition of coarseness, $U \in \tau$. □



Figure 1.16: Relations that interact with copy and delete are nice, and we notate them with the same black dots as for copy and delete to mark them. States are singletons, or points, when they are copiable. Partial continuous functions are those that commute with copy. Left-total relations are those that commute with delete. Continuous functions are those that satisfy the latter two criteria.

Proposition 1.3.7. The **full relation** $X \to Y$ relates everything to everything. It is all of $X \times Y$. Full relations are always continuous.

Proof. For a direct proof, the preimage of any subset of Y under the full relation is the whole of X, which is open by definition. Alternatively, the full relation is the composite of delete and then everything. □

Figure 1.17: The **empty state** $\bullet \to X^\tau$ and **empty test** relate nothing. The **empty relation** $X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$ is the composite of empty tests and states, and relates nothing: as a relation it is $\varnothing \subset X \times Y$.

Proposition 1.3.8. Empty states, tests, and relations are continuous.

Proof. The preimage of any empty relation is the empty set, which is definitionally open. □



Figure 1.19: There is a zero-morphism for every input-output pair of objects in **ContRel**, which is diagrammatically the composition of the empty test and state. Zero scalars turn any relation into a zero relation. Substituting the zero relation into the LHS of the above equation means that zero relations also spawn zero scalars.

Proposition 1.3.22 ($L \dashv R$). *Proof.* We verify the triangular identities governing the unit and counit of the adjunction, which we first provide. By Lemma 1.3.19, we take the natural transformation $1_{\mathbf{Rel}} \Rightarrow RL$ we take to be the identity morphism:

$$\eta_X := 1_X$$

The counit natural transformation $LR \Rightarrow 1_{\mathbf{ContRel}}$ we define to be a coarsening, the existence of which in **ContRel** is granted by Lemma 1.3.21.

$$\epsilon_{X^\tau} : X^\star \to X^\tau := \{(x, x) : x \in X\}$$

First we evaluate $L \overset{L\eta}{\to} LRL \overset{\epsilon L}{\to} L$ at an arbitrary object (set) $X \in \mathbf{Rel}$. $L(X) = X^\star = LRL(X)$, where the latter equality holds because LR is precisely the identity functor on **Rel**. For the first leg from the left, $L(\eta_X) = L(1_X) = X^\star \overset{1_X}{\to} X^\star = 1_{X^\star}$. For the second, $\epsilon_{L(X)} = \epsilon_{X^\star} = X^\star \overset{1_X}{\to} X^\star = 1_{X^\star}$. So we have that $L\eta; \epsilon L = L$ as required.

Now we evaluate $R \overset{\eta R}{\to} RLR \overset{R\epsilon}{\to} R$ at an arbitrary object (topological space) $X^\tau \in \mathbf{ContRel}$. $R(X^\tau) = X = RLR(X^\tau)$, where the latter equality again holds because $LR = 1_{\mathbf{Rel}}$. For the first leg from the left, $\eta_{R(X^\tau)} = \eta_X = 1_X$. For the second, $R(\epsilon_{X^\tau}) = R(X^\star \overset{1_X}{\to} X^\tau) = X \overset{1_X}{\to} X = 1_X$. So $\eta R; R\epsilon = R$, as required. □

The usual forgetful functor from **ContRel** to **Loc** has no left adjoint. Just as the forgetful functor from **ContRel** to **Rel** "forgets topology while keeping the points", we might consider a forgetful functor to **Loc** that "forgets points while remembering topology". But we show that there is no such functor that forms a free-forgetful adjunction.

Reminder 1.3.23 (The category **Loc**). CITE A *frame* is a poset with all joins and finite meets satisfying the infinite distributive law:

$$x \wedge (\bigvee_i y_i) = \bigvee_i (x \wedge y_i)$$

A *frame homomorphism* $\phi : A \to B$ is a function between frames that preserves finite meets and arbitrary joins, i.e.:

$$\phi(x \wedge_A y) = \phi(x) \wedge_B \phi(y) \qquad \phi(x \vee_A y) = \phi(x) \vee_B \phi(y)$$

The category **Frm** has frames as objects and frame homomorphisms as morphisms. The category **Loc** is defined to be $\mathbf{Frm}^{\mathrm{op}}$.

Remark 1.3.24. Here are informal intuitions to ease the definition. The lattice of open sets of a given topology ordered by inclusion forms a frame – observe the analogy "arbitrary unions" : "all joins" :: "finite intersections" : "finite meets". Closure under arbitrary joins guarantees a maximal element corresponding to the open set that is the whole space. So frames are a setting to speak of topological structure alone, without referring to a set of underlying points, hence, pointless topology. Observe that in the definition of continuous functions, open sets in the *codomain* must correspond (uniquely) to open sets in the *domain* – so every continuous function induces a frame homomorphism going in the opposite direction that the function does between spaces, hence, to obtain the category **Loc** such that directions align, we reverse the arrows of **Frm**. Observe that continuous relations induce frame homomorphisms in the same way. These observations give us insight into how to construct the free and forgetful functors.

Definition 1.3.25 (U : **ContRel** → **Loc**)**.** On objects, U sends a topology X^τ to the frame of opens in τ, which we denote $\hat{\tau}$.

On morphisms $R : X^\tau \to Y^\sigma$, the corresponding partial frame morphism $\hat{\tau} \leftarrow \hat{\sigma}$ (notice the direction reversal for **Loc**), we define to be $\{(U_{\in\sigma}, R^\dagger(U)_{\in\tau}) \mid U \in \sigma\}$. We ascertain that this is (1) a function that is (2) a frame homomorphism. For (1), since the relational converse picks out precisely one subset given any subset as input, these pairs do define a function. For (2), we observe that the relational converse (as all relations) preserve arbitrary unions and intersections, i.e. $R^\dagger(\bigcap_i U_i) = \bigcap_i R^\dagger(U_i)$ and $R^\dagger(\bigcup_i U_i) = \bigcup_i R^\dagger(U_i)$, so we do have a frame homomorphism. Associativity follows easily.

Proposition 1.3.26 (U has no left adjoint)**.** *Proof.* Seeking contradiction, if U were a right adjoint, it would preserve limits. The terminal object in **Loc** is the two-element lattice $\bot < \top$, where the unique frame homomorphism to any $\mathcal{L}$ sends $\top$ to the top element of $\mathcal{L}$ and $\bot$ to the bottom element. In **ContRel**, the empty topology $\mathbf{0} = (\varnothing, \{\varnothing\})$ is terminal (and initial). However, $U\mathbf{0}$ is the singleton lattice, not $\bot < \top$ (which is the image under U of the singleton topology). □



Figure 1.20: So, whenever a zero-process appears in a diagram, it spawns zero scalars which infect all other processes, turning them all into zero-processes. The same holds for whenever a zero-scalar appears; it makes copies of itself to infect all other processes.

This is a rather frustrating result, because U does turn continuous relations into backwards frame homomorphisms on lattices of opens; see Proposition 1.2.13, and note that in the frame of opens associated with a topology, the empty set becomes the bottom element. The obstacle is the fact that the empty topology is both initial and terminal in **ContRel**. We may be tempted to try treating U as a right adjoint going to **Frm** instead, but then the monad induced by the injunction on **Loc** would trivialise: left adjoints preserve colimits, so any putative left adjoint F must send $\bot < \top$ (initial in **Frm** by duality) to the empty toplogy, and the empty topology as terminal object must be sent to the terminal singleton frame, which implies that the monad UF on **Frm** sends everything to the singleton lattice.

Why not Span(**Top**)? One common generalisation of relations is to take spans of monics in the base category []. This actually produces a different category than the one we have defined. Below is an example of a span of monic continuous functions from **Top** that corresponds to a relation that doesn't live in **ContRel**. It is the span with the singleton as apex, with maps from the singleton to the closed points of a two Sierpiński spaces.



Why not a Kleisli construction on **Top**? Another way to view the category **Rel** is as the Kleisli category $K_{\mathcal{P}}$ of the powerset monad on **Set**; that is, every relation $A \to B$ can be viewed as a function $A \to \mathcal{P}B$, and composition works by exploiting the monad multiplication: $A \xrightarrow{f} \mathcal{P}B \xrightarrow{\mathcal{P}g} \mathcal{P}\mathcal{P}C \xrightarrow{\mu_{\mathcal{P}C}} \mathcal{P}C$. So it is reasonable to investigate whether there is a monad T on **Top** such that K_T is equivalent to **ContRel**. We observe that the usual free-forgetful adjunction between **Set** and **Top** sends the former to a full subcategory (of continuous functions between discrete topologies) of the latter, so a reasonable coherence condition we might ask for the putative monad T to satisfy is that it is related to $\mathcal{P}$ via the free-forgetful adjunction. This amounts to asking for the following commutative diagram (in addition to the usual ones stipulating that T and $\mathcal{P}$ are monadic):

$$\begin{tikzcd}
\mathbf{Top} \arrow[r, "T"] \arrow[d, bend left] \arrow[d, phantom, "\dashv"] & \mathbf{Top} \arrow[d, bend left] \arrow[d, phantom, "\dashv"] \\
\mathbf{Set} \arrow[r, "\mathcal{P}"] \arrow[u, bend left] & \mathbf{Set} \arrow[u, bend left]
\end{tikzcd}$$

This condition would be nice to have because it witnesses $K_{\mathcal{P}}$ as precisely K_T restricted to the discrete topologies, so that T really behaves as a conservative generalisation of the notion of relations to accommodate topologies. As a consequence of this condition, we may observe that discrete topologies $X^{\star}$ must be sent to discrete topologies on their powerset $\mathcal{P}X^{\star}$. In particular, this means the singleton topology is sent to the the discrete topology on a two-element set; $T\bullet = \mathbf{2}$. This sinks us. We know from Proposition 1.2.11 that the continuous relations $X^{\tau} \to \bullet$ are precisely the open sets of τ, which correspond to continuous functions into Sierpiński space $X^{\tau} \to \mathbb{S}$, and $\mathbb{S} \neq \mathbf{2}$.

Where is the topology coming from?

It is category-theoretically natural to ask whether **ContRel** is "giving topology to relations" or "powering up topologies with relations", but we have explored those techniques and it doesn't seem to be that. It is possible that the failure of these regular avenues may explain why I had such difficulty finding **ContRel** in the literature. However, we do have a free-forgetful adjunction between **ContRel** and **Rel**, and if we focus on this, it *is* possible to crack the nut of where topology is coming from with enough machinery; here is one such sketch. Observe that the forgetful functor looks like it could be a kind of fibration, where the elements of the fibre over any set A in **Rel** correspond to all possible topologies on A. Moreover, these topologies may be partially ordered by coarseness-fineness to form a frame (though a considering it a preorder will suffice.) The fibre over a relation $R : A \to B$ is all pairs of topologies τ, σ such that R is continuous between A^τ and B^σ. The crucial observation is that if R is continuous between τ and σ, then R will be continuous for any finer topology in the domain, $\tau \leq \tau'$, and any coarser topology in the codomain $\sigma' \leq \sigma$; that is, the fibre over R displays a boolean-valued profunctor between preorders. So **ContRel** can be viewed as the display category induced by a functor **Rel** $\to \mathcal{C}$, where $\mathcal{C}$ is a category with preorders for objects and boolean-enriched profunctors as morphisms, and the functor encodes topological data by sending sets in **Rel** to preorders of all possible topologies, and relations to profunctors. I have deliberately left this as a sketch because it doesn't seem worth it to view something so simple in such a complex way (I accept the charges of hypocrisy having just used weak n-categories to present TAGs.)

1.3.4 Conceptual motivations



Figure 1.21: Points in space are a useful mathematical fiction. Suppose we have a point on a unit interval. Consider how we might tell someone else about where this point is. We could point at it with a pudgy appendage, or the tip of a pencil, or give some finite decimal approximation. But in each case we are only speaking of a vicinity, a neighbourhood, an *open set in the borel basis of the reals* that contains the point. Identifying a true point on a real line requires an infinite intersection of open balls of decreasing radius; an infinite process of pointing again and again, which nobody has the time to do. In the same way, most language outside of mathematics is only capable of offering successively finer, finite approximations to whatever it is that occurs in the mind or in reality.

Why are continuous relations worth the trouble? Apart from enabling us to paint pictures with words, because the opens of topological spaces crudely model how we talk about concepts, and the points of a topological space crudely model instances of concepts. Figure 1.21 generalises to a sketch argument that insofar as we conceive of concepts in spatial terms, the meanings of words are modellable as shared strategies for spatial deixis; absolute precision is communicatively impossible, and the next best thing mathematically requires topology. This may explain the asymmetry of why tests are open sets, but why are states allowed to be arbitrary subsets? One could argue that states in this model represent what is conceived or perceived. Suppose we have an analog photograph whether in hand or in mind, and we want to remark on a particular shade of red in some uniform patch of the photograph. As in the case of pointing out a point on the real interval, we have successively finer approximations with a vocabulary of concepts: "red", "burgundy", "hex code #800021"... but never the point in colourspace itself. If someone takes our linguistic description of the colour and tries to reproduce it, they will be off in a manner that we can in principle detect, cognize, and correct: "make it a little darker" or "add a little blue to it". That is to say, there are in principle differences in mind that we cannot distinguish linguistically in a finite manner; we would have to continue the process of "even darker" and "add a bit less blue than last time" forever. All this is just the mathematical formulation of a very common observation: sometimes you cannot do an experience justice with words, and you eventually give up with "I guess you just had to be there". Yet the experience is there and we can perform linguistic operations on it, and the states accommodate this.

Top is symmetric monoidal closed with respect to product, why didn't you just work there from the start? Because **Top** is cartesian monoidal, which in particular means that there is only one test (the map into the terminal singleton topology), and worse, all states are tensor-separable. The latter fact means that we cannot reason natively in diagrams about correlated states, which are extremely useful representing entangled quantum states [dodo], and for reasoning about spatial relations [talkspace]. I'll briefly explain the gist of the analogy in prose because it is already presented formally in the cited works and elaborated in [bobcomp]. The Fregean notion of compositionality is roughly that to know a composite system is equivalent to knowing all of its parts, and diagrammatically this amounts to tensor-separability, which arises as a consequence of cartesian monoidality. Schrödinger suggests an alternative of compositionality via a lesson from entangled states in quantum mechanics: *perfect knowledge of the whole does not entail perfect knowledge of the parts.* Let's say we have information about a composite system if we can restrict the range of possible outcomes; this is the case for the bell-state, where we know that there is an even chance both qubits measure up or both measure down, and we can rule out mismatched measurements. However, discarding one entangled qubit from a bell-state means we only know that the remaining qubit has a 50/50 of measuring up or down, which is the minimal state of information we can have about a qubit. So we have a case where we can know things about the whole, but nothing about its parts. A more familiar example from everyday life is if I ask you to imagine `a cup on a table in a room`. There are many ways to envision or realise this scenario in your mind's eye, all drawn from a restricted set of permissable positions of the cup and the table in some room. The spatial locations of the cup and table are entangled, in that you can only consider the positions of both together. If you discard either the cup or the table from your memory, there are no restrictions about where the other object could be in the room; that is, the meaning of the utterance is not localised in any of the parts, it resides in the entangled whole.

1.4 Populating space with shapes using sticky spiders

1.4.1 When does an object have a spider (or something close to one)?

Reminder 1.4.1 (copy-compare spiders of **Rel**). For a set X, the *copy* map $X \to X \times X$ is defined:

$$\{(x, (x, x)) : x \in X\}$$

the *compare* map $X \times X \to X$ is defined:

$$\{((x, x), x) : x \in X\}$$

These two maps are the (co)multiplications of special frobenius algebras. The (co)units are *delete*:

$$\{(x, \star) : x \in X\}$$

and *everything*:

$$\{(\star, x) : x \in X\}$$

Example 1.4.2 (The copy-compare spiders of **Rel** are not always continuous). The compare map for the Sierpiński space is not continuous, because the preimage of $\{0, 1\}$ is $\{(0, 0), (1, 1)\}$, which is not open in the product space of $\mathcal{S}$ with itself.

Proposition 1.4.3. The copy map is a spider iff the topology is discrete.

Proof. Discrete topologies inherit the usual copy-compare spiders from **Rel**, so we have to show that when the copy map is a spider, the underlying wire must have a discrete topology. Suppose that some wire has a spider, and construct the following open set using an arbitrary point p:



It will suffice to show that this open set is the singleton $\{p\}$ – when all singletons are open, the topology is discrete. As a lemma, using frobenius rules and the property of zero morphisms, we can show that compar-



Figure 1.22: The generators (in dashed boxes) and relations that make a spider. When the spider satisfies in addition the three inequalities b1-3, we call it a **relation-spider**.

ing distinct points $p \neq q$ yields the $\varnothing$ state.



The following case analysis shows that our open set only contains the point p.



□

It will be more aesthetic going forward to colour processes and treat the colours as variables instead of labelling them.

We can use split idempotents to transform copy-spiders from discrete topologies to almost-spiders on other spaces. We can graphically express the behaviour of a split idempotent e as follows, where the semicircles for the section and retract r, s form a visual pun.

Reminder 1.4.4 (Split idempotents)**.** An **idempotent** in a category is a map $e : A \to A$ such that

$$A \xrightarrow{e} A \xrightarrow{e} A = A \xrightarrow{e} A$$

A **split idempotent** is an idempotent $e : A \to A$ along with a **retract** $r : A \to B$ and a **section** $s : B \to A$ such that:

$$A \xrightarrow{e} A = A \xrightarrow{r} B \xrightarrow{s} A$$
$$B \xrightarrow{s} A \xrightarrow{r} B = B \xrightarrow{id} B$$





Definition 1.4.5 (Sticky spiders)**.** A **sticky spider** (or just an e-spider, if we know that e is a split idempotent), is a spider *except* every identity wire on any side of an equation in Figure 1.22 is replaced by the idempotent e.



e-(co)unitality



e-special

The desired graphical behaviour of a sticky spider is that one can still coalesce all connected spider-bodies together, but the 1-1 spider "sticks around" rather than disappearing as the identity. This is achieved by the following rules that cohere the idempotent e with the (co)unit and (co)multiplications; they are the same as the usual rules for a special commutative frobenius algebra with two exceptions. First, where an identity wire appears in an equation, we replace it with an idempotent. Second, the monoid and comonoid components freely emit and absorb idempotents. By these rules, the usual proof [] for the normal form of spiders follows, except the idempotent becomes an explicit 1-1 spider, rather than the identity.



Construction 1.4.6 (Sticky spiders from split idempotents)**.** Given an idempotent $e : Y^\sigma \to Y^\sigma$ that splits through a discrete topology $X^\star$, we construct a new (co)multiplication as follows:

Proposition 1.4.7 (Every idempotent that splits through a discrete topology gives a sticky spider)**.**



is a sticky spider

Proof. We can check that our construction satisfies the frobenius rules as follows. We only present one equality; the rest follow the same idea.

(defn.) (idem.) (fro



(split) (defn.)

To verify the sticky spider rules, we first observe that since

$$X^\star \xrightarrow{s} Y^\sigma \xrightarrow{r} X^\star = X^\star \xrightarrow{id} X^\star$$

r must have all of $X^\star$ in its image, and s must have all of $X^\star$ in its preimage, so we have the following:



Now we show that e-unitality holds:





The proofs of e-counitality, and e-speciality follow similarly. □

We can prove a partial converse of Proposition 1.4.7: we can identify two diagrammatic equations that tell us precisely when a sticky spider has an idempotent that splits though some discrete topology.

Theorem 1.4.8. A sticky spider has an idempotent that splits through a discrete topology if and only if in addition to the sticky spider equalities, the following relations are also satisfied.

Unit/everything



Comult/copy



The proof is rather involved, so we provide a map below of the various lemmas and propositions that will yield the claim.


basis decomposition : comultiplication
Prop. 1.4.9
comult/copy
counit/delete
basis decomposition : multiplication
Lemma 1.4.17
Lemma 1.4.10
basis decomposition : idem.
Lemma 1.4.18
Prop. 1.4.21
Prop. 1.4.11
Prop. 1.4.12
Prop. 1.4.13
Prop. 1.4.14
Prop. 1.4.20
Lemma 1.4.15
unit/everything
copiable-basis
basis decomposition : counit

Proposition 1.4.9 (comult/copy implies counit/delete).



Proof.



So:

So:



□

Lemma 1.4.10 (All-or-Nothing)**.** Consider the set $e(\{x\})$ obtained by applying the idempotent e to a singleton $\{x\}$, and take an arbitrary element $y \in e(x)$ of this set. Then $e(\{y\}) = \varnothing$ or $e(\{x\}) = e(\{y\})$. Diagrammatically:



Proof.

Suppose



For the claim, we seek:

We have the following inclusion:



Therefore:



So we have the following equality:



Which implies:



and symmetrically,



So we have the claim:



□

Proposition 1.4.11 (*e* of any point is *e*-copiable)**.**



Proof.



□

Proposition 1.4.12 (The unit is the union of all *e*-copiables)**.**



Proof.

The union of *all* *e*-copiables is a subset of the unit.



(Lem. 1.4.18) (evr.) (unit/evr.)

The unit is *some* union of *e*-copiables.



(unit/evr.) (Prop. 1.4.11)

So the containment must be an equality.



□

Proposition 1.4.13 (e-copiable decomposition of e)**.**



Proof.



(Prop. 1.4.12) (e-copiable)

□

Proposition 1.4.14 (*e*-copiable decomposition of counit)**.**



Proof.

(Prop. 1.4.13)



□

The e-copiable states really do behave like an orthonormal basis, as the following Lemmas show.

Lemma 1.4.15 (e-copiables are orthogonal under multiplication).



Proof.



So:



□

Convention 1.4.16 (Shorthand for the open set associated with an e-copiable)**.** We introduce the following diagrammatic shorthand.



Including the coloured dot is justified, because these open sets are co-copiable with respect to the multiplication of the sticky spider.



Lemma 1.4.17 (Co-match)**.**



Proof.



The claim then follows by applying Lemma 1.4.15 to the final diagram. ☐

Lemma 1.4.18 (e-copiables are e-fixpoints)**.**



Proof.

(e-counit) (coun/del) (e-copy)



Observe that the final equation of the proof also holds when the initial e-copiable is the empty set. □

Lemma 1.4.19 (*e*-copiables are normal)**.**



Proof.

(coun/del) (Lem. 1.4.18) (Prem.)



□

Proposition 1.4.20 (*e*-copiable decomposition of multiplication)**.**



Proof.



(e-spider) (Prop. 1.4.13) (Lem. 1.4.15)

□

Proposition 1.4.21 (*e*-copiable decomposition of comultiplication)**.**



Proof.

(comult/copy) (idem.) (comult/copy)





(Prop. 1.4.13) (Lem. 1.4.17)

□

Now we can prove Theorem 1.4.8.

Proof. First a reminder of the claim; we want to show that when given a sticky spider, the following relations hold if and only if the idempotent splits through a discrete topology.

Unit/everything



Comult/copy



The crucial observation is that the e-copiable decomposition of the idempotent given by Proposition 1.4.13 is equivalent to a split idempotent though the set of e-copiables equipped with discrete topology.



(Prop. X)



$:= \{(x,i) \mid i \in \mathcal{I}\ ,\ x \in |i>\}$



$:= \{(i,x) \mid i \in \mathcal{I}\ ,\ x \in <i|\}$

By copiable basis Proposition 1.4.12 and the decompositions Propositions 1.4.14, 1.4.20, 1.4.21, we obtain the only-if direction.

(unit/evr.) (Prop. 1.4.12)



(Prop. 1.4.9) (Prop. 1.4.14)

(Prop. 1.4.21)



(Prop. 1.4.20)



The if direction is an easy check. For the unit/everything relation, we have:

(split) (Prop. 1.4.7) (split)



For the counit/delete relation, we observe that for any split idempotent, the retract must be a partial function. To see this, suppose the split idempotent $e = r; s$ is on (X, τ) and the discrete topology is $Y^\star$. Seeking contradiction, if the retract is not a partial function, then there is some point $x \in X$ such that $x \in e(x)$, and the image $I := r(x) \subseteq Y$ contains more than one point, which we denote and discriminate $a, b \in r(x) \subseteq Y$ and $a \neq b$. Because the composite $s; r = 1_Y$ of the section and retract must recover the identity on $Y^\star$, the section s must be total – i.e. the image $s(X) = Y$. So $x \in s(a) \cap s(b)$. Now we have that $(a, x), (b, x) \in s$, and $(x, a), (x, b) \in r$, therefore $(a, b), (b, a) \in s; r$, which by $a \neq b$ contradicts that $s; r$ is the identity relation 1_Y.

(split) (pfn.) (split)



□

1.5 *Topological concepts in flatland via* ***ContRel***

The goal of this section is to demonstrate the use of sticky spiders as formal semantics for the kinds of schematic doodles or cartoons we would like to draw. Throughout we consider sticky spiders on $\mathbb{R}^2$. In Section 1.5.1, we introduce how sticky spiders may be viewed as labelled collections of shapes. In service of defining *configuration spaces* of shapes up to rigid displacement, we diagrammatically characterise the topological subgroup of isometries of $\mathbb{R}^2$ by building up in Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 the diagrammatic presentations of the unit interval, metrics, and topological groups. To further isolate rigid displacements that arise from continuous sliding motion of shapes in the plane (thus excluding displacements that result in mirror-images), in Sections 1.5.4 and 1.5.5 we diagrammatically characterise an analogue of homotopy in the relational setting. Finally, in Sections 1.5.6 and 1.5.7 we build up a stock of topological concepts and study by examples how implementing these concepts within text circuits explains some idiosyncrasies of the theory: namely why noun wires are labelled by their noun, why adjective gates ought to commute, and why verb gates do not.

1.5.1 *Shapes and places*

Definition 1.5.1 (Labels, shapes, cores, halos)**.** Recall by Proposition 1.4.13 that we can express the idempotent as a union of continuous relations formed of a state and test, for some indexing set of *labels* $\mathcal{L}$.



A *shape* is a component of this union corresponding to some arbitary $l \in L$. So we refer to a sticky spider as a labelled collection of shapes. The state of a shape is the *halo* of the shape. The halos are precisely the copiables of the sticky spider. The test of a shape is the *core*. The cores are precisely the cocopiables of the sticky spider.



Proposition 1.5.2 (Core exclusion: Distinct cores cannot overlap)**.** *Proof.* A direct consequence of Lemma 1.4.17. □

Proposition 1.5.3 (Core-halo exclusion: Each core only overlaps with its corresponding halo)**.** *Proof.* Seeking contradiction, if a core overlapped with multiple halos, Lemma 1.4.18 would be violated. □

Proposition 1.5.4 (Halo non-exclusion: halos may overlap)**.** *Proof.* By example:



The two shapes are colour coded cyan and magenta. The halos are two triangles which overlap at a yellow region, and partially overlap with their blobby cores. The cores are outlined in dotted blue and orange respectively. Observe that cores and halos do not have to be simply connected; in this example the core of the magenta shape has two connected components. Viewing these sticky spiders as a process, any shape that overlaps with the magenta core will be deleted and replaced by the magenta triangle, and similarly with the cyan cores and triangle. Any shape that overlaps with both the magenta and cyan cores will be deleted and replaced by the union of the triangles. Any shape that overlaps with neither core will be deleted and not replaced. □

Remark 1.5.5. When we draw on a finite canvas representing all of euclidean space, properly there should be a fishbowl effect that relatively magnifies shapes close to the origin and shrinks those at the periphery, but that is only an artefact of representing all of euclidean space on a finite canvas. Since all the usual metrics are still really there, going forward we will ignore this fishbowl effect and just doodle shapes as we see fit.



Example 1.5.6 (Where is a piece on a chessboard?). How is it that we quotient away the continuous structure of positions on a chessboard to locate pieces among a discrete set of squares? Evidently shifting a piece a little off the centre of a square doesn't change the state of the game, and this resistance to small perturbations suggests that a topological model is appropriate. We construct two spiders, one for pieces, and one for places on the chessboard. For the spider that represents the position of pieces, we open balls of some radius r, and we consider the places spider to consist of square halos (which tile the chessboard), containing a core inset by the same radius r; in this way, any piece can only overlap at most one square. As a technical aside, to keep the core of the tiles open, we can choose an arbitrarily sharp curvature ϵ at the corners.



Now we observe that the calculation of positions corresponds to composing sticky spiders. We take the initial state to be the sticky spider that assigns a ball of radius r on the board for each piece. We can then obtain the set of positions of each piece by composing with the places spider. The composite (pieces;places) will send the king to a2, the bishop to b4, and the knight to d1, i.e. $\langle K| \mapsto \langle a2|$, $\langle B| \mapsto \langle b4|$ and $\langle N| \mapsto \langle d1|$. In other words, we have obtained a process that models how we pass from continuous states-of-affairs on a physical chessboard to an abstract and discrete game-state.



1.5.2 *The unit interval*

To begin modelling more complex concepts, we first need to extend our topological tools. If we have the unit interval, we can begin to define what it would mean for spaces to be connected (by drawing lines between points in those spaces), and we can also move towards defining motion as movement along a line. There are many spaces homeomorphic to the real line. How do we know when we have one of them? The following theorem provides an answer:

Theorem 1.5.7 (Friedman)**.** Let $\big((X,\tau),<\big)$ be a topological space with a total order. If there exists a continuous map $f : X \times X \to X$ such that $\forall a, b_{\in X} : a < f(a,b) < b$, then X is homeomorphic to $\mathbb{R}$. CITE



Figure 1.23: We can express the theorem using diagrammatic equations. First we define a total order $<$ as an open set on $X \times X$ that obeys the usual axiomatic rules:

Trichotomy $(\forall x y : x < y \vee y < x \vee x = y)$



Figure 1.24: Trichotomy requires us to appeal to the rig structure, which is nonstandard for process-theoretic equations, but algebraically permissible. Going forward we will also introduce quantifiers into process-theoretic equations, essentially treating process-equations as we would any other symbolic algebraic specification.

We can introduce endpoints for open intervals directly by asking for the space X to have points that are less than or greater than all other points. Another method, which we will use here for primarily aesthetic reasons, is to use endocombinators to define suprema. Endocombinators are like functional expressions applied to diagrams. For a motivating example, consider the case when we have a locally indiscrete topology:

Definition 1.5.8 (Locally indiscrete topology)**.** (X, τ) is *locally indiscrete* when every open set is also closed.

If we know that a topology is locally indiscrete and we are given an open U, we would like to notate the complement X/U – which we know to be open – as any of the following, which only differ up to notation.



Using the technology in the margins, we can define:

Upper Bound



And we can add in further equations governing the upper bound endocombinator to turn it into a supremum, where the lower endpoint is obtained as the supremum of the empty set, and the upper endpoint is the supremum of the whole set.

Supremum



Now we can define endpoints purely graphically:

Lower endpoint



Upper endpoint



Going forward, we will denote the unit interval using a thick dotted wire.

Unfortunately, the complementation operation $X/-$ is not in general a continuous relation, hence in the lattermost expression above we resort to using bubbles as a syntactic sugar. Formally, these bubbles are *endocombinators*, the semantics and notation for which we borrow and modify from CITE .

Definition 1.5.9 (Partial endocombinator)**.** In a category $\mathcal{C}$, a *partial endocombinator* on a homset $(\mathcal{C})(A, B)$ is a function $(\mathcal{C})(A, B) \to (\mathcal{C})(A, B)$

Simply connected spaces

Once we have a unit interval, we can define the usual topological notion of a simply connected space: one where any two points can be connected by a continuous line without leaving the space.

Figure 1.25:

Definition 1.5.10 (Simple connectivity)**.**

In prose: for any pair of points that are within the open V, there exists some continuous function from the unit interval into the space that starts at one of the points and ends at the other.

V is *simply connected* when:



Simple connectivity is a useful enough concept that we will notate simply connected open sets as follows, where the hole is a reminder that simply connected spaces might still have holes in them.



1.5.3 *Displacing shapes*

Static shapes in space are nice, but moving them around would be nicer. So we have to define a stock of concepts to express rigid motion. Rigidity however is a difficult concept to express in topological spaces up to homeomorphism – everyone is well aware of the popular gloss of topology in terms of coffee cups being homeomorphic to donuts. To obtain rigid transformations as we have in Euclidean space, we need to define metrics, and in order to do that, we need addition.

Rigid displacements

Now we return to our sticky spiders. From now we consider sticky spiders on the open unit square, so that we can speak of shapes on a canvas. Now we will try to displace the shapes of a sticky spider. We know

Figure 1.26:

Definition 1.5.11 (Addition)**.**

More precisely, we only need an additive monoid structure on the unit interval. We do not care about obtaining precise values from our metric, and we will not need to subtract distances from each other. All we need to know is that the lower endpoint stands in for "zero distance" – as the unit of the monoid – and that adding positive distances together will give you a larger positive distance deterministically.



Figure 1.27:

Definition 1.5.12 (Metric)**.**

A metric on a space is a continuous map $X \to \mathbf{R}^+$ to the positive reals that satisfies these axioms.



Figure 1.28:

Definition 1.5.13 (Open balls)**.** Once we have metrics, we can define the usual topological notion of open balls. Open balls will come in handy later, and a side-effect which we note but do not explore is that open balls form a basis for any metric space, so in the future whenever we construct spaces that come with natural metrics, we can speak of their topology without any further work.



Figure 1.29:

Definition 1.5.14 (Topological groups)**.**

It is no trouble to depict collections of invertible transformations of spaces $X \to X$. A consequence of invertibility and the requirement that the identity transform is a group element forces all transformations in a topological group to be functions.



Figure 1.30:

Definition 1.5.15 (Isometry)**.**

But recall that the collections of invertible transformations we are really interested in are the *rigid* ones, the ones that move objects in space without deforming them, i.e. the isometries. Iso-metry means same-distance. A distance preserving transformation is one such that applying the metric pointwise before and after the transformation of a shape gives a fixed value. RHS should be dotted output!



the planar isometries of Euclidean space can be expressed as a translation, rotation, and a bit to indicate the chirality of the shape – as mirror reflections are also an isometry.

Isometries of $\mathbf{R}^2$



$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{R}^2$

$\theta \in S^1 \simeq [0, 2\pi)$

$c \in \{-1, 1\}$

With this in mind, we have the following condition relating different spiders, telling us when one is the same as the other up to rigidly displacing shapes.

Rigid displacement



Chirality leaves us with a wrinkle: in flatland, we do not expect shapes to suddenly flip over. We would like to express just those rigid transformations that leave the chirality of the shape intact, because really we want to only be able to slide the shapes around the canvas, not leave the canvas to flip over. So we go on to define rigid continuous motion in flatland.

1.5.4 *Moving shapes*

If we want continuous transformations in the plane from the configuration of shapes in one spider to end at the configuration of shapes in another, we ought to define an analogue of *homotopy*: the continuous deformation of one map to another. However, we will have to massage the definition a little to work in our setting of continuous relations.

Homotopy in **ContRel**

Usually, when we are restricted to speaking of topological spaces and continuous functions, a homotopy is defined:

Definition 1.5.16 (Homotopy in **Top**). where f and g are continuous maps $A \to B$, a *homotopy* $\eta : f \Rightarrow g$ is a continuous function $\eta : [0,1] \times A \to B$ such that $\eta(0,-) = f(-)$ and $\eta(1,-) = g(1,-)$.

In other words, a homotopy is like a short film where at the beginning there is an f, which continuously deforms to end the film being a g. Directly replacing "function" with "relation" in the above definition does not quite do what we want, because we would be able to define the following "homotopy" between open sets.



What is happening in the above film is that we have our starting open set, which stays constant for a while. Then suddenly the ending open set appears, the starting open disappears, and we are left with our ending; while *technically* there was no discontinuous jump, this isn't the notion of sliding we want. The exemplified issue is that we can patch together (by union of continuous relations) vignettes of continuous relations that are not individually total on $[0, 1]$. We can patch this problem by asking for homotopies in **ContRel** to satisfy the additional condition that they are expressible as a union of continuous partial maps that are total on the unit interval.

$\eta(0,-) = f(-)$



$\eta(1,-) = g(-)$





Observe that the second condition asking for decomposition in terms of partial comes for free by Proposition 1.2.19; the constraint of the definition is provided by the first condition, which is a stronger condition than just asking that the original continuous relation be total on I:



This definition is "natural" in light of Proposition 1.2.19, that the partial continuous functions $A \to B$ form a basis for $\mathbf{ContRel}(A, B)$: we are just asking that homotopies between partial continuous functions – which can be viewed as regular homotopies with domain restricted to the subspace topology induced by an open set – form a basis for homotopies between continuous relations.



Contractible spaces

With homotopies in hand, we can define a stronger notion of connected shapes with no holes, which are usually called *contractible*. The reason for the terminology reflects the method by which we can guarantee a shape in flatland has no holes: when any loop in the shape is *contractible* to a point.

V is *contractible* when:



Contractible open sets are worth their own notation too; a solid black effect, this time with no hole.



1.5.5 Rigid motion

Configuration spaces

1.5.6 Modelling linguistic topological concepts

By "linguistic", I mean to refer to the kinds of concepts we use in everyday language. These are concepts that even young children have an intuitive grasp of [], but their formal definitions are difficult to pin down. One such relation modelled here – touching – is in fact a *semantic prime* []: a word that is present in essentially all natural languages that is conceptually primitive, in the sense that it resists definition in simpler terms. It is among the ranks of concepts like *wanting* or *living*, words that are understood by the experience of being



Figure 1.31: Now at last we can define sliding shapes. What we mean by two sticky spiders being relatable by sliding shapes is that we have a homotopy that begins at one and ends at the other, such that every point in between is itself a sticky spider related to the first by rigid displacement.



Figure 1.32: We can depict the *configuration space* of shapes that are obtainable by displacing the shapes of a given spider by a split idempotent through the n-fold tensor of rigid transformations – a restriction to the subspace of the largest open set contained in the subset of all valid (with correct chirality) combinations of displacements that yield another spider.

human, rather than by school. As such, I make no claim that these definitions are "correct" or "canonical", just that they are good enough to build upon moving forward.



Figure 1.33: Observe that the data of rigid motion on a sticky spider as we have defined above can be captured as a continuous map from the unit interval to rigid transformations: one for each shape in the spider. This is precisely a continuous path in configuration space.

Parthood

Let's say that a "part" refers to an entire simply connected component. Simply connected is already a concept in our toolkit. A shape U is disjoint from another shape V intuitively when we can cover U in a blob with no holes such that the blob has no overlap with V. So, U is a part of V when it is simply connect, wholly contained in V, and there exists a contractible open that is disjoint from V that covers U. Diagrammatically, this is:



Figure 1.34: What are the connected components of configuration space? Evidently, there are pairs of spiders that are both valid displacements, but not mutually reachable by rigid motion. For example, shapes might *enclose* or *trap* other shapes, or shapes might be *interlocked*. Depicted are some pairs of configurations that are mutually unreachable by rigid transformations. Now we have the conceptual toolkit to begin modelling these concepts in the configuration space of a sticky spider.

U is *a part of* V



Touching

Let's distinguish touching from overlap. Two shapes are "touching" intuitively when they are as close as they can be to each other, somewhere; any closer and they would overlap. Let's assume that we can restrict our attention to the parts of the shape that are touching, and that we can fill in the holes of these parts. At the point of touching, there is an infinitesimal gap – just as when we touch things in meatspace, there is a very small gap between us and the object due to the repulsive electromagnetic force between atoms. To deal with infinitesimals we borrow the $\epsilon - \delta$ trick from mathematical analysis; for any arbitrarily small δ, we can pick an even smaller ball of radius ϵ such that if we stick the ball in the gap, the ball forms a bridge that overlaps the two filled-in shapes, which allows us to draw a continuous line between them. Diagrammatically, this is:

U and V are *touching*



Within

If U surrounds V, or equivalently, if V is within U, then we are saying that leaving V in almost any direction, we will see some of U before we go off to infinity. We can once again use open balls for this purpose, which correspond to possible places you can get to from a starting point $\mathbf{x}$ within a distance ϵ. In prose, we are asking that any open ball that contains all of U must also contain all of V.

V is within U, or U surrounds V



Containers and enclosure

There is a strong version of within-ness, which we will call enclosure. As in when we are in elevators and the door is shut, nothing gets in or out of the container. Intuitively, there is a hole in the container surrounded on all sides, and the contained shape lives within the hole. To give a real-world example, honey lives within a honeycomb cell in a beehive, but whether the honey is enclosed in the cell depends on whether it is sealed off from air with beeswax. So in prose we are asking that any way we fill in the holes of the container with a blob, that blob must cover the contained shape. Diagrammatically, this amounts to levelling up from open balls in our previous definition to contractible sets:

U encloses V



Trapped

There is an intermediate notion between within-ness and enclosure; for instance, standing in the stonehenge you are surrounded by the pillars, but you can always walk away, whereas if the pillars are very close, such as the bars of a jail cell, a human would not be able to leave the trap while still being able to see the outside. The difficulty here is that relative sizes come into play: small animals would still consider it a case of mere within-ness, because they can still walk away between the bars. So we would like to say that no matter how the pair of objects move rigidly, being trapped means that the trapped V stays within U. In other words, that in configuration space, if we forget about all other shapes, we can partition our space of configurations by two concepts, whether V is within U or not, and moreover that these two components is disjoint – i.e. not simply connected – so there is no rigid motion that can allow V to escape from being within U if V starts off trapped inside in U.



Interlocked

Two shapes might be tightly interlocked without being inside one another. Some potentially familiar examples are plastic models of molecular structure that we encounter in school, metal lids in cold weather that are too tightly hugging the glass jar, or stubborn Lego pieces that refuse to come apart. The commonality of all these cases is that the two shapes must move together as one, unless deformed or broken. In other words, when two shapes are interlocked, knowing the position in space of one shape determines the position of the other, and this determination is a fixed isometry of space. So we only need to specify a range of positions S for the entire subconfiguration of interlocked shapes U and V, and we may obtain their respective positions by a fixed rigid motion ρ. Since objects may interlock in multiple ways, we may have a sum of these expressions. We additionally observe that interlocking shapes should also be touching, which translates to containment inside the touching concept. Finally, we observe that as in the case of entrapment and enclosure, rigid motions are interlocking-invariant, which translates diagrammatically to the constraint that each S, ρ expression is an entire connected component in configuration space.



Constrained motion

A weaker notion of interlocking is when shapes only imperfectly determine each other's potential displacements, by specifying an allowed range. Here is an understatement: there is some interest in studying how shapes mutually constrain each other's movements in this way.



There are as many definitions to go through here as there are potential mechanical models, and among other things, there are mechanically realised clocks [], computers [], and analogues of electric circuits []. So instead, we will allow ourselves to additionally specify open sets as concepts in configuration space that correspond to whatever mechanical concepts we please, and we assure the reader seeking rigour that blueprints exist for all the mechanisms humans have built. Of course in reality mechanical motions are reversible among rigid objects, and directional behaviour is provided by a source of energy, such as gravitational potential, or wound springs. But we may in principle replace these sources of energy by a belt that we choose to spin in one direction – our own arrow of time. We postpone discussion of causal-mechanistic understanding and analogy for a later section.

1.5.7 States, actions, manner

Configuration space explains why we label noun wires: each wire in expanded configuration space must be labelled with the shape within the sticky spider it corresponds to so that the section and retract know how to reconstruct the shapes, since each shape may have a different spatial extent.



Concretely, for each shape in a sticky spider,
in order to reconstruct the shape,
the data of configuration space
only has to remember a basepoint
(which the isometries act upon)
paired with a label naming the shape
(so that the extent of the shape is reconstructible)





All of the concepts we have defined so far are open sets in configuration space – and for any concept that isn't, we are always free to take the interior of the set; the largest open set contained within the concept. Pass-ing through the split idempotent, we can recast each as a circuit gate using copy maps.



Going forward, we will just label the wires with the names of each shape when necessary. We notice that one feature of this procedure to get gates from open sets is that all gates commute, due to the commutativity of copy.



Moreover, since each gate of this form is a restriction to an open set, the gates are idempotent. So the concepts we have defined so far behave as if describing *states* of affairs in space, as if we adding commuting adjectives to space to elaborate detail. For example, `fast red car`, `fast car that is red`, `car is (red and fast)` all mean the same thing. As we add on progressively more concepts, we get diminishing subspaces of configurations in the intersection of all the concepts. So the natural extension is to ask how states of affairs can change with motion. A simple example is the case of *collision*, where two shapes start off not touching, and then they move rigidly towards one another to end up touching.

A particular collision trajectory



At $t = 0$, the shapes do not touch

At $t = 1$, the shapes touch

Recalling that homotopies between relations are the unions of homotopies between maps, we have a homotopy that is the union of all collision trajectories, which we mark ∀. Now we seek to define the interior i(∀) as the concept of collision; the expressible collection of all particular collisions. But this is not just an open set on the potential configuration of shapes, it is a collection of open sets parameterised by homotopy.



Once we have the open set i(∀) that corresponds to all expressible collisions, we have a homotopy-parameterised gate. Following a similar procedure, we can construct gates of motion that satisfy whatever pre- and postconditions we like.



We can compose multiple rigid motions sequentially by a continuous function ; that splits a single unit interval into two: ; $:= x \mapsto \begin{cases} (2x, 0) \text{ if } x \in [0, \frac{1}{2}) \\ (1, 2x-1) \text{ if} x \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \end{cases}$. The effect of the map is to splice two vignettes of the same length together by doubling their speed, then placing them one after the other. We can achieve the same thing without resorting to units of measurement, because recall by Theorem 1.5.7 and by construction that we have access to a map that selects midpoints for us; we will revisit a string-diagrammatic treatment of homotopy and tenses in a later section. We can also compose multiple motions in parallel by copying the unit interval, allowing it to parameterise multiple gates simultaneously.

Sequential composition of motions



Parallel composition of motions



It is easy to see that the gates can always be rewritten to respect the composition order given by ; and copy, since for any input point at the unit interval the gates behave as restrictions to open sets. These new gates do not generally commute; consider comparing the situation where a tenant moves into one apartment and then another, with the situation where the tenant reverses the order of the apartments. These are different paths, as the postconditions must be different. So now we have noncommuting gates that model *actions*, or verbs. What kinds of actions are there? In our toy setting, in general we can define actions that arbitrarily change states of affairs if we do not restrict ourselves to rigid motions. The trick to doing this is the observation that arbitrary homotopies allow deformations, so our verb gates allow shapes to shrink and open and bend in the process of a homotopy, as long as at the end they arrive at a rigid displacement of their original form.



We can further generalise by noting that completely different spiders can be related by homotopy, so we can model a situation where there is a permanent bend, or how a rigid shape might shatter.



We provide the following construction as a general recipe to construct homotopies between spiders.

Construction 1.5.17 (Morphing sticky spiders with homotopies)**.** We aim to construct homotopies relating (almost) arbitrary sticky spiders. For now we focus on just changing one shape into another arbitrary one. The idea is as follows. First, we need a cover of open balls $\cup\mathcal{J} = T^0$ and $\cup\mathcal{K} = T^1$ of the start and end cores T^0 and T^1 such that each $k \in T^1$ is expressible as a rigid isometry of some core $j \in \mathcal{J}$; this is so we can slide and rearrange open balls comprising T^0 and reconstruct them as T^1. As an intermediate step to eliminate holes and unify connected components, we gather all of the balls at a meeting point m (to be determined shortly.)

Intuitively we can illustrate this process as follows:



Second, in order to perform the sliding of open balls, we observe that, given a basepoint to act as origin (which we assume is provided by the data of the split idempotent of configuration space) we can express the group action of rigid isometries $\mathbf{Iso}(\mathbf{R}^2)$ on $\mathbf{R}^2$ as a continuous function:



$$\big((\mathbf{a}, \theta), \mathbf{b}\big) \mapsto \begin{bmatrix} \cos\theta & -\sin\theta \\ \sin\theta & \cos\theta \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{a}$$

Third, before we begin sliding the open balls, we must ensure that the halo of the shape cooperates. We observe that a given shape i in a sticky spider may be expressed as the union of a family of constant continuous partial functions in the following way. Given an open cover $\mathcal{J}$ such that $\cup\mathcal{J} = T_i$, where T_i is the core of the shape i, each function is a constant map from some $T_j \in \mathcal{J}$ to some point $x \in S_i$, where S_i is the halo of the shape i. For each $T_j \in \mathcal{J}$ and every point $x \in S_i$, the constant partial function that maps T_j to x is in the family.



By definition of sticky spiders, there must exist some point m that is in both the core and the halo: we pick such a point as the rendezvous for the open balls. For each partial map in the family, we provide a homotopy that varies only the image point x continuously in the space to finish at m. Now we can slide the open balls to the rendezvous m. Since homotopies are reversible by the continuous map $t \mapsto (1-t)$ on the interval, we can perform the above steps for shapes T^0 and T^1 to finish at the same open ball, reversing the process for T^1 and composing sequentially to obtain a finished transformation. The final wrinkle to address is when dealing with multiple shapes. Recalling our exclusion conditions **??** for shapes, it may be that parts of one shape are enclosed in another, so the processes must be coordinated so that there are no overlaps. For example, the enclosing shape must be first opened, so that the enclosed shape may leave. I will keep it an article of faith that such coordinations exist. I struggle to come up with a proof that all spiders $\mathbf{R}^2$ are mutually transformable by homotopy in this (or any other) way, so that will remain a conjecture. But it is clear that a great deal of spiders are mutually transformable; almost certainly any we would care to draw. So this will just be a construction for now.

Going forward, I will consider any linguistic semantics that can be grounded by a mechanical or tabletop model to be formal. The preceding analysis extends to talk of rigid and deforming bodies and the manner, order, and coordination of their movement and interaction three-dimensional Euclidean space. At this point, I have sketched out enough to, in principle, linguistically specify mechanical models. Further, by Example 1.5.6, we have enough technology to speak of locations in space, so we have access to "tabletop semantics": anything that in principle can be represented by counters and meeples in a boardgame, with for instance reserved spaces on the board for health and hunger and whatever else is necessary. Wherever this talk falls short, I consider videogame design to be applied formal semantics, so I permit myself more or less any conceivable interactive world with its own internal logic.

Objection: That is way outside the scope of formal semantics. Insofar as semantics is sensemaking, we certainly are capable of making sense of things in terms of mechanical models and games by means of metaphor, the mathematical treatment of which is concern of Section 1.6.2, so I claim that I am, definitionally, *doing formal semantics for natural language.* Whether or not I'm exceeding the scope of what a linguist might consider formal semantics is ultimately irrelevant, as I am not ultimately concerned with the modal human mechanism. There is maybe also a prejudice that formal semantics must necessarily resolve in some symbolic logic, to which I might charitably respond that I'm working with algebraic system, just not a one-dimensional one. Less charitably, I don't care what these people think.

1.6 Formal models from figurative language

Figurative language is when language is used non-literally, e.g. `to bathe in another's affection`. Figurative language subsumes analogy (`built like a mountain`), metaphor (`she got a lot out of that lecture`) and some idioms (`raining cats and dogs`). The issue with figurative language for formal semantics, insofar as formal semantics is concerned with truth-conditions, is that one requires an underlying model in order to begin truth-conditional analysis. The role of figurative language, especially that of metaphor, is in some sense to provide those models in the first place[1], so the truth-theoretic level of analysis operates at an inappropriate stage of abstraction. We might illustrate or depict schema to represent figurative language, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no formal account of how the systematicity of a chosen schematic corresponds to the organisation of a metaphor or concept. So what is required is a methodology to construct the underlying models from the figurative language in a more-or-less systematic way.

The whole point of mucking around with **ContRel** earlier is this: figurative language can be formally interpreted as vignettes involving topological figures. I will demonstrate here that cofunctors from **ContRel** into text-circuits representing utterances are promising candidates for the formalisation of figurative language. My focus will exclude idiomatic language and one-off analogies in favour of metaphor just because the latter is most interesting, though the methodology applies in other cases of figurative language. I will take a *metaphor* to be figurative language that utilises the systematic structure in one conceptual domain to give partial structure in another conceptual domain[2]. This may subsume some cases of what would otherwise be called *similes* or *analogies*. The differences far as I can tell between a metaphor and an analogy is the presence of systematicity in the former, and a weak requirement that the correspondence involves separate conceptual domains. It doesn't really matter for this discussion what the difference is.

First, we observe that we can model certain kinds of analogies between conceptual spaces by considering structure-preserving maps between them. For example, Planck's law gives a partial continuous function from part of the positive reals measuring tempature of a black body in Kelvin to wavelengths of light emitted, and the restriction of this mapping to the visible spectrum gives the so-called "colour temperature" framework used by colourists. It will turn out that a decategorified cofunctor has the right kind of structure.

Second, we observe that we can use simple natural language to describe conceptual spaces, instead of geometric or topological models. Back to the example of colour temperature, instead of precise values in Kelvin, we may instead speak of landmark regions that represent both temperature and colour such as `incandescent` and `daylight`, which obey both temperature-relations (e.g. `incandescent is cooler than daylight` and colour-relations (e.g. `daylight is bluer than incandescent`).

Third, we observe that we can also use simple natural language to describe more complex conceptual schemes with interacting agents, roles, objects, and abilities. This will require a cofunctor. Organising this linguistic data in the concrete structure of a text circuit allows us to formally specify what it means for one conceptual scheme to structure another by describing structure-preserving maps between the text circuits.

[1] CITE argues convincingly that the metaphor `IDEAS are CONTAINERS` is pervasive in English; it is just about the only way we talk about communication. Yet there is no literal sense in which one can 'get something' out of a lecture or 'pack a lot' into a book. Evidently the *systematicity of the metaphor itself* yields the common structure from which we can even begin to consider pedestrian truth-conditional analyses; i.e. language has a role to play in constructing the stage, and afterwards we can reason logically about the actors and events. The process by which language constructs the underlying model is not by nature truth-conditional: there is no fact of the matter before it is read of a fictional character's eye-colour, but it does become a facet of the reader's world-model afterwards. Therefore: of which truth-conditions cannot speak, thereof truth-conditionalists must remain silent.

[2] Meta, beyond. Phor, as in amphora, an agent, carrier, or producer. Metaphor carries meaning beyond one domain to another. It bears and produces meaning. Metaphors are the primary agents of meaning.

This will allow us construct topological models of metaphors such as `TIME is MONEY`.

Finally, I will describe a preliminary taxonomy of different kinds of metaphor, and discuss what is to be done.

1.6.1 *Temperature and colour: the Planckian Locus*

Example 1.6.1 (The Physicists' Planckian Locus)**.** Planck's law describes the spectral radiation intensity of an idealised incandescent black body as a function of light frequency and temperature. Integrating over light frequencies in the visible spectrum yields a function from temperature of the black body to chromaticity.



Figure 1.35: The Planckian Locus in the CIE 1931 chromaticity diagram. Chromaticity refers only to the hue of a colour, without other domains such as saturation.

Abstractly, the Planckian Locus is a continuous function mapping the positive real line representing the conceptual domain of temperature into the plane representing the conceptual domain of colour. The Planckian locus is the basis of colourist-talk about colour schemes in terms of temperature, which allows them to coordinate movements in colourspace using the terminology of temperaturespace, e.g. `make this shot warmer`. This fits with what we would prototypically expect a metaphor to allow us to do with meanings.

However, the particular mathematical conception of metaphor-as-map in Example 1.6.1 is too rigid: it only goes one way. It is a specific and inflexible kind of metaphor that does not behave at all outside its specified boundaries. For example, colourists have to deal with offsets towards green and magenta, which are not in the chromaticity codomain of the function given by Planck's law. It would be truer to life if we further analysed the function as mediated by a strip.

Example 1.6.2 (The colourist's Planckian Locus)**.** Now we aim to extend our mathematical model to accommodate the fact that colourists deal with chromatic offsets or deviations from the mathematically precise locus given by Planck's law.



Figure 1.36: Consider the unit square (depicted as a strip) as a fiber bundle over the unit interval representing temperature range. There is an injective continuous map from the strip into colourspace that is centered on the Planck Locus.



Figure 1.37: The left leg is bijective in the image restriction, so any point or displacement in the offset-strip in colourspace can be lifted to a point in the apex strip, which is then projected down along with other points in the vertical fiber to a point in temperaturespace. So we have a decategorified cofunctor!

A refinement we have just captured is the partial nature of metaphor CITE . In the language of our running example, pure green is outside the scope of the colour-temperature correspondence given by the Planckian Locus, so the metaphor is only a partial structuring of the colour domain according to the temperature domain. This partiality in the colour domain means that it would have been inappropriate to model the passage of colour-talk to temperature-talk as a function from colour to temperature, as functions are total, rather than partial, on their domain. While it is conceptually nice that we are on the way to recovering monoidal cofunctors as a model of metaphor, why didn't we stay simple and just use a partial function? The answer is that the strip at the apex represents the *talk* part of colour- and temperature-talk.

Example 1.6.3 (Conceptual transfer between domains)**.** When colourists use the temperature metaphor they might say "hot", "warm", "cooler", which are not specific temperature ranges in Kelvin, but concepts in temperature-space. Recalling that we may consider concepts to be open sets of a topology (and comparatives as opens of the product), we observe that we can linguistically model regions on the positive reals with words `little` (labelled l), `lot` (labelled L), and `more` (labelled M), an algebraic basis from which derive `less` by symmetry, and other regions such as `more than a little, less than a lot`. In this particular running example, it happens that both legs of the span of functors have a lifting property, which explains how we might model the fact that conceptual colourist-talk of "daylight" or "candlelight" in the colour domain can be sensibly interpreted in the temperature domain. The formalisation of this fact follows by symmetry from this example.



Figure 1.38: Starting from the right, the lifting property of the right leg is what lets us map "hotter and colder" temperature talk into the more abstract quantity-talk of "more and less" in the apex strip. Then the left functor sends quantity-talk into the colour domain, which allows "hotter and colder" to be used in the colour domain.



Figure 1.39: The additional expressive power that the apex strip gives is the concept of vertical offset, which doesn't appear in the real line. So the apex strip allows talk of quantity and offset, and this offset, when translated into the colour domain, allows talk of offset towards and away from, for instance, green.

1.6.2 Time and Money: complex conceptual structure

Metaphor is perhaps the only methodology we have for making sense of certain abstract concepts, such as Time. For example, many languages make use of the metaphor `TIME is SPACE`, in which space-talk is used to structure time. In English, the future is ahead of us and the past behind, while conversely, for the Aymara the future is behind and the past is ahead. Orthogonally, in Mandarin the future is below and the past is above. We have already demonstrated that we have the tools to deal with conceptual transfer between static conceptual spaces viewed as topological spaces via spans of continuous maps. What is of concern to us are *dynamic* metaphors that involve a conceptual space-*time* with agents and capabilities and so on. The following discussion draws heavily from CITE .

For example, in English, we make ample use[3] of the metaphor `TIME is MONEY`. There two mathematically relevant aspects of metaphor that I want to draw attention to for this metaphor. Firstly, that the conceptual affordances money-talk is marshalled to give structure to time-talk, where there is no such structure were it not for the metaphor. Secondly, that metaphor has a partial nature, in that it is not the case that the metaphor licenses all kinds of money-talk to structure time-talk.

[3] To our detriment. We could just as well have chosen the metaphor `TIME is FOOD`, which provides a liberating sense of mastery (at least in a context where food is abundant): time can be prepared, produced, consumed, spiced if dull and best shared with loved ones.

To establish the first point of conceptual transfer, a phrase like `Do you have time to look at this?` is completely sensible to us, but literally meaningless; even if we had an oracle to measure possession, what would we point it at to measure a person's possession of time? Even if we accept some argument that the concept of possession is innate to the human faculty, when we say `This is definitely worth your time!` or `What a waste of time.`, we are drawing upon value-talk that is properly contingent in the socially constructed sense upon the conceptual complex of money.

To establish the second point of partiality, consider that money can be stored in a bank, whereas there is no real corresponding thing in the common conceptual vocabulary which one can store time and withdraw it for later use[4]. But the partiality constraint is itself partial. For instance, one can invest money into an enterprise in the expectation of greater returns, and this is not appropriate for many domains of time-talk, but there is a metaphorical match in some specific contexts, such as text-editor-talk: `learning vim slows you down at first but it will save you time later`.

[4] Although, in a wonderful example of 'pataphysical thinking, "Time Banks" have existed since the 19th century, which are practices of reciprocal service exchange that use units of time as currency.

Now I'll try to demonstrate by example that cofunctors between text circuits do all of the things we have asked for. The components of text circuits serve as an algebraic basis for dynamic conceptual complexes, while the cofunctor handles partial structuring of one conceptual domain in terms of another.

Example 1.6.4 (`Vincent spends his morning writing`)**.** To begin a formal figurative interpretation via the metaphor `TIME is MONEY`, we require some model of the conceptual domain of money, as well as a topological interpretation. As a first pass, we understand that money can be exchanged for goods and services, so we will settle for a text-circuit signature for trade to serve as the conceptual domain as the apex of a cofunctor, given in Figure 1.40. The elements of the topological model are given in Figure 1.41. The behaviour of the fibration part of the cofunctor is detailed in Figure 1.42, and that of the identity-on-objects functor in

Figures 1.43, 1.44, and 1.45. The figurative model serves as a foundation from which truth-theoretical semantics can begin. In the sketched interpretation, there aren't too many interesting questions one can ask, but the purpose of this example is to point out that in principle, we can exploit the systematicity of metaphor by constructing figurative mechanical models for which interesting questions can be asked and answered truth-theoretically, as in Figure 1.46.



Figure 1.40: In the TRADE signature, we define two roles as wires: TRADERS and TRADEABLES. There is one static relation HAS to indicate a trader's ownership of a tradeable, which can be further elaborated with equations to indicate e.g. exclusivity of ownership by interpreting violations of exclusivity as a zero morphism, assumed but elided for brevity. There is one dynamic verb (treated as a homotopy) TRADE, which at time 0 enforces a precondition that the traders have their respective tradables, and at time 1 (completion of the trade), the traders swap possession of their tradeables. The TRADE signature contains all nominal instantiations of nouns with respect to roles, which will be illustrated shortly.



Figure 1.41: We build the topological model from two sticky spiders in the Euclidean plane. The `TRADER` spider will distinguish two regions of possession, so that `HAS` may be interpreted as a region-test. The `TRADEABLES` spider will specify four meeples or counters, three for time, and one for thesiswriting; we will use the configuration space of the `TRADEABLES` spider to regulate their movement and distribution.



Figure 1.42: Next, we have to specify what the discrete opfibration is doing. Recalling our functor box notation, we can consider the job of the discrete fibration to be role assignment from the verb `SPEND` in the utterance to the verb `TRADE` in the conceptual domain. The fibration forgets about role-assignments in its domain by sending them to the monoidal unit. The lift of the fibration is a role-assignment. (Arguably) unambiguously in this example, `Vincent` is the spender and the first trader, and `A.M` is the cost and the first tradeable. However, there are two options to resolve `writing` treated as a noun-phrase in the role of `GOOD`. In the first lift, `writing` is resolved as the other trader, and the implicit good as `thesis`. In the second lift, `writing` is the tradeable and something else is the trading counterparty, such as `the world`.



Figure 1.43: The section of the fibration over the `SPEND` verb is a tabulation of all the ways in which conceptual roles in the `TRADING` domain can be assigned. To continue the example, we will assume the first lift in Example 1.42 as our interpretation. The identity-on-objects functor part of the cofunctor maps our chosen interpretation into the following diagram in **ContRel**. Precise details of the monoidal structure of a process theory acting upon implicit substrates may be found in CITE . Recalling REF , the configuration space of the `TRADEABLES` spider is expanded via split idempotent so that all thin wires in the diagram are typed as the Euclidean plane. Recalling Example REF , `HAS` is interpreted as the intersection of the position of a counter with the possessive region of the respective trader.



Figure 1.44: We may verify that the equations governing `TRADE` cohere with our topological figures. At time 0, before the trade, we can calculate that the permissible figures have `Vincent` in possession of `A.M` and `writing` in possession of `thesis`.



Figure 1.45: At time 1, we may calculate that the permissible figures must be such that `Vincent` is in possession of `thesis` and `writing` is in possession of what was previously my morning.



Figure 1.46: In a more detailed conceptual model of `TIME is MONEY`, rather than just `TRADE`, we might consider income, the spender's agency, and cost. In Euclidean 3-space, we might model income as a clock-gated mechanism that deposits time-tokens serially into Vincent's possession, along with his agency as a gated chute, and the time cost of writing a thesis as a dispenser that requires a certain number of tokens to release a thesis-token into Vincent's possession. In this sketch model, one obtains short films for `He used to waste his mornings but now he spends them writing`, or `He once spent an evening writing but made no progress`. One can then ascertain certain consequences truth-theoretically; for instance that there is at least one morning that was not spent on writing, or that there is at least one evening spent on writing but not inside the slot that would help a thesis-release mechanism trigger. In every case, cofunctoriality handles bookkeeping for role-interpretation choices and guarantees systematicity of the topological figure according to the signature at the apex model that models the organising concept.