

WEEK 10

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Introduction: Talkin' the Talk!¹

Recent work on whiteness has engaged a range of questions ... This scholarship helps make it evident that the formation of specifically white subject positions has in fact been key, at times as cause and at times as effect, to the sociopolitical processes inherent in taking land and making nations (Frankenberg 1997:2).

The protocol for introducing one's self to other Indigenous people is to provide information about one's cultural location, so that connections can be made on political, cultural and social grounds and relations established.² Following this protocol, I introduce myself to the reader. Unlike the majority of white people in Australia, I belong to the Koenpul people of the country known as Quandamooka. White people, who thought they discovered our country, named it Moreton Bay. It is a bay formed by a group of islands, approximately 16 kilometres from the mainland, which surround the coastline from north of the Brisbane River to Southport on the Gold Coast in Queensland, Australia. As such, I am of the salt water and sand; I am Yulubirribah. I am also of the owl people; I am Mooknook, and my yurri is Kabool, the carpet snake. I was born in the 1950s, a time when governments separated "half caste" children from their families and country. My grandparents, Lavinia and Alfred Moreton, on Minjerribah (Stradbroke Island) raised me. They taught me not to be afraid to speak my truth to white people. Many times I have been given the responsibility by women elders in my community and in the Brisbane Indigenous community to talk up to white people.

This book is an extension of my communal responsibilities; I am representing an Indigenous standpoint within Australian feminism. The explicit acknowledgment of this standpoint does not make my work a special case because the standpoint of each and every academic is embedded in their texts. In recognition of this I have — where possible — refused to use the third person plural “they” to refer to other Indigenous women. My role as an academic analyst is inextricable from my embodiment as an Indigenous woman.

An Indigenous woman’s standpoint is informed by social worlds imbued with meaning grounded in knowledges of different realities from those of white women. And we have become extremely knowledgeable about white women in ways that are unknown to most of them. I use the term “white” in this book because skin colour is the marker for objectifying difference in the social construction of “race”. All Indigenous women share the common experience of living in a society that deprecates us. An Indigenous woman’s standpoint is shaped by the following themes. They include sharing an inalienable connection to land; a legacy of dispossession, racism and sexism; resisting and replacing disparaging images of ourselves with self-defined images; continuing our activism as mothers, sisters, aunts, daughters, grandmothers and community leaders, as well as negotiating sexual politics across and within cultures (Collins 1991). Such a standpoint does not deny the diversity of Indigenous women’s experiences. Indigenous women will have different concrete experiences that shape our relations to core themes.

In Australia, in the 1990s, I was situated in three particular contexts in feminism as an embodied Indigenous subject. It was in these contexts that I experienced white feminists engaging with my racialised difference. The first experience involved Indigenous women, including myself, challenging a white feminist anthropologist’s right to speak on behalf of all Indigenous women about rape in our communities. Certain white feminists vigorously opposed the challenge (some in public and others in private) on the grounds that all women have the right to speak out about violence. The second experience was teaching in the same faculty with a young white feminist. She lectured on inequal-

ity and was intolerant of racism in the classroom, but her idea of working with me as an Indigenous woman meant in practice my working for her. The third experience came as a result of being asked by a university (with one day’s notice) to be part of a welcoming committee to meet a white feminist professor at the International Airport at 5:30 a.m. The professor had been invited to receive an honorary doctorate from the university, but she threatened not to come to Australia unless she was met and welcomed by Indigenous women. This seemingly noble but colonial gesture by the professor was soon eroded by her questioning us on what we were going to do at the Sydney Olympics about the denial of Indigenous rights in this country. She offered her unsolicited advice about what we should do and wanted us to advise her about what we might want her to do. Finally I responded by asking her to tell us what the limits were to what she would do. She did not answer my question — instead she changed the subject.

On each of these occasions the white feminists positioned themselves as anti-racist women who were doing the right thing, unaware that their actions were not interpreted by Indigenous women in the same way. The Indigenous women involved, including myself, perceived their actions as those of white middle-class women who were acting from a subject position of dominance. I use the concept “subject position” to denote a socially constructed position whereby one’s behaviour is significantly shaped by what is expected of that position rather than by conscious intention. I use the term “middle class” in this book in the Weberian sense to refer to one’s social status and prestige based on capital, occupation, skill and education. Indigenous women are familiar with this “white middle-class woman” subject position because we have become accustomed to its presence in our daily interaction.

These experiences led me to an exploration of feminist texts where I found women of colour, African American and lesbian feminists contesting the homogeneity of the category “woman”. Their collective work identified “woman” as diversity, multiplicity and heterogeneity through highlighting the specific concrete particularity of different women in different contexts and her-

stories (Moraga & Anzaldua 1983; Smith 1983; Minh-ha 1989; Collins 1991; Mohanty, Russo & Torres 1991; Chaudhuri & Strobel 1992; Busia 1993; Moghadam 1994; Monsen & Kinnaird 1993; Prakash 1995). Critiques by these writers facilitated a politics of difference within feminism and disrupted representations of the white middle-class woman as the universal woman. Some western feminists responded to these critiques by redefining the way in which "difference" had been theorised. There was a shift from theorising the subject in relation to categories of "difference" (such as sexuality, gender, class and race) to theorising these categories as "differences" within the subject. In spite of this shift, white feminist discourse on "difference" continues to be underpinned by a deracialised but gendered universal subject.

In Australia, a small number of feminists have written within the framework of a feminist politics of difference, including Bottomley et al. (1991), Jeffreys (1991), Gunew & Yeatman (1993) and Pettman (1992). The Australian works vary in their focus, from asking what is "difference" in feminist theory and practice, to addressing how feminists theorise and operationalise "difference" in practice. "Difference" becomes a marker of that which is not the same. Even though this literature acknowledges in theory that some "differences" are irreducible and incommensurable, in feminist political practice "differences" are managed by allowing "Others" voice and space within already established forums. This practical form of managing difference incorporates all "Others" into a homogenous sameness.

In the Australian literature whiteness is not interrogated or named as a "difference", even though it is the standard by which certain "differences" are measured, centred and normalised. Whiteness as race, as privilege and as social construction is not interrogated as a "difference" within feminist political practice and theory. This is not to say that some feminists have not made whiteness visible. In recent years, in Britain and the United States, thinking and writing about whiteness has begun to generate new intellectual and practical approaches to living in a multi-racial society. This emerging literature on whiteness is slowly impacting on the study of race in Australia. However, despite — or perhaps because of — feminism's commitment to a politics of difference,

thinking and writing about whiteness has not yet had widespread impact on theorising difference. Whiteness remains the invisible omnipresent norm. As long as whiteness remains invisible in analyses "race" is the prison reserved for the "Other". However, some feminists have addressed whiteness by examining the relationship between theory and standpoint. Perhaps the first piece to be written specifically on whiteness was by Adrienne Rich (1979) who argued that white feminists practise white solipsism; they view the world through a form of tunnel vision of which their experiences of the world are the centre. Marilyn Frye (1983, 1992) later explained that white women practice whiteness as "an ingrained way of being in the world". Frye and Rich both suggest that feminists should be disloyal to whiteness by refusing the material and ego rewards conferred on them through their association with white men; they should actively work against their white race privilege. Elizabeth Spelman (1990) demonstrated how the white middle-class woman is centred in feminist theory. She urged white feminists to be conscious of the ways in which the legacies of white privilege appear "in our confusing imagining women with knowing them; in priding ourselves on tolerance; and in appropriating others' identities through our desperate rush to find similarity" (1990:185). Ruth Frankenberg's (1993) seminal work on the social construction of whiteness elucidated how race is salient in shaping the lives of white women. She argues that racial hierarchies need to be changed in material and discursive forms in order to redistribute power in society. Connected to this transformation is the altering of the meanings of white and other racial and cultural identities. Kate Davy theorises white womanhood as an institution in the service of white supremacy based on a form of civility "that encompasses a plethora of values, morals, and mores that determine sexual propriety, as well as the tenets of respectability in general" (1997:212). It is an institution containing different ideologies which are invoked differentially depending on the historical conditions and needs of white control. Davy's political strategy is to "out" whiteness by examining how white women participate in and use a politics of respectability. Peggy McIntosh's (1992) much quoted paper on white privilege

and male privilege identifies forty-six conditions of unearned white race privilege. For McIntosh, silences and denials about unearned privilege protect systems of inequality and she asks herself what she should do with such knowledge. Minne Bruce Pratt (1992), reflecting on her white identity, discusses aspects of her race privilege as she walks through her white neighbourhood. Pratt concluded that rather than appropriate the other's experience of racism she needs to do work on her own racism and privilege.

The work of these feminists recognises that white race privilege makes a difference to women's life chances. Yet these authors fail to appreciate that their position as situated knowers within white race privilege is inextricably connected to the systemic racism they criticise but do not experience. "The situated knower is always also a participant in the social she is discovering. Her inquiry is developed as a form of that participation. Her experience is always active as a way of knowing whether or not she makes it an explicit resource" (Smith 1999:6). In other words, feminists' knowledge of systemic racism is easily abstracted from their embodied experience as white middle-class women.

In this book I show that white middle-class women's privilege is tied to colonisation and the dispossession of Indigenous people. Notions of race are closely linked to ideas about legitimate ownership and formation of the nation, with whiteness and nationality woven tightly together. In America and Australia, white men who governed the nation state limited naturalised citizenship to white immigrants (Lipsitz 1998). In Australia, blackness was, and is, congruent with Indigenous subjugation and subordination. In the emerging feminist literature on whiteness and race in America, the black/white binary distinction works to reserve "race" for the African American Other. First nation people remain largely invisible due to this distinction. However, the social construction of whiteness in America is tied to the appropriation of Indigenous lands and the incarceration and enslavement of Indigenous people by colonial and subsequent governments. This is evident in the literature on whiteness outside feminism, which illustrates that the creation of white subject positions is inherent to, and an outcome of, colonisation

and the development of nationhood (Brodkin 1989; Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Nakayama and Martin 1999; Allen 1994).

The British invasion and subsequent colonisation of Australia began the process whereby whiteness became institutionalised. The Australian mode of production is derived from, and is part of, the western system of capitalism; Australian systems of government are based on both British and American models; the system of law is British as is the system of education. Decisions that affect the nation in politics, bureaucracies, policy and business are made predominantly by white males. Australia's immigration policy up until 1962 was "whites only", and although government promotes a multicultural and tolerant society our institutions remain white in ethos and practice.

The work of feminists such as Rich (1979), Frye (1983, 1992), McIntosh (1992), Ware (1992) and Frankenberger (1993) provides valuable insights about white race privilege. However, it derives from and is limited by the standpoint of these authors. This book is not about how white women perceive their whiteness. Instead, the experiences and writings of Indigenous women and our histories inform the book. And it is informed by my embodiment as an Indigenous subject situated in particular feminist contexts. This book reveals how whiteness as ideology and practice confers privilege and dominance in power relations between white feminists and Indigenous women.

This book makes whiteness visible in power relations between white feminists and Indigenous women through examining their respective self-presentation and representation in various discourses. I use the term discourse to mean "those distinctive forms of social organisation that are like conversations mediated by texts and are carried on by and co-ordinate subjects situated in multiple local sites" (Smith 1991:159). Postmodern feminists influence my approach. They argue that multiple subject positions and the relations between those positions constitute subjectivities. However, the limit of theorising subjectivity in this way is that it has the effect of equalising subject positions. It fails to connect subjectivity to relations of ruling whereby white racial difference shapes those on whom it confers privilege as well as those it oppresses. My research demonstrates that there are

dominant subject positions in society that are implicated in relations of ruling. These subject positions are historically constituted and are represented in discourse through and beyond the activity and experience of individual subjects. I argue that the subject position middle-class white woman is structurally located as an ideological position within whiteness. Examining a variety of discourses, I show how the representations of this dominant subject position collide with the self-presentations of Indigenous women.

This book draws on the postcolonial critique of epistemological foundationalism to argue that all knowledge is situated and therefore partial. Spivak identifies two dimensions to the act of representation (Spivak 1988a, 1988b). One dimension is to perceive representation as "speaking for"; the other is to comprehend representation as involving interpretation. The latter Spivak identifies as re-presentation; thus all representations are based on interpretation. I utilise Spivak's definition of representation in my work, and the concept "self-presentation" is operationalised to distinguish between how one represents oneself through interpretation as opposed to how one is represented by another. Representations are more than mere symbols. They are a means by which we come to know, embody and perform reality. Our different representations of reality arise "out of differences in the position of knowing subjects in relation to the historicity of interconnected relationships of domination and contestation" (Yeatman 1991:17). Although my work is centrally concerned with representation, it does not seek to answer questions about the causes of white representation. Nor does it posit that the subject position middle-class white woman is constituted the same way in all social and historical locations. As a consequence this book is not so much a study of white womanhood as an exposure of an invisible racialised subject position that is represented and deployed in power relations with Indigenous women through discourse.

My methodology provides a new framework for analysing whiteness as a dominant subject position. In comparing the self-presentation and representation of the subject positions "middle-class white woman" and "Indigenous woman", my re-

search provides a context for different bodies of knowledge to meet and disrupt each other. Consistent with this meeting, I use both Indigenous English and standard English in the title of my chapters. In the first chapter I argue that Indigenous women's self-presentation in our life writings — as state-indentured domestic servants — reveals that our experiences are grounded in a different history from those who deploy the subject position middle-class white woman. Indigenous women are the bearers of subjugated knowledges and our ethics, behaviour and values repudiate the moral and intellectual hegemony of white domination and oppression.³

Indigenous women's life writings unmask the complicity of white women in gendered racial oppression. They reveal the imperative to negotiate Indigenous subjectivity in relations with white women. We are conscious of a dominant subject position that we actively resist through the deployment of a variety of subject positions. Our resistances are therefore not reducible to overtly defiant behaviours. They are multifaceted. Our resistances can be visible and invisible, conscious and unconscious, explicit and covert, partial and incomplete and intentional and unintentional. They are profoundly political acts that are neither one dimensional or fixed and they do not always lead to conflict or self-destruction.

In Chapter 2 an overview is provided of feminist literature from different countries, whose debates on "difference" such as "race" inform the Australian feminist conceptual landscape. By mapping the white feminist literature on "difference" I show how the identification, interrogation and elucidation of whiteness as "difference" is absent, as is an engagement with an Indigenous critical gaze. What my review of the literature most clearly demonstrates is that whiteness is not perceived as a category of difference by most white feminists, yet it is a standpoint and subject position from which they view the world, theorise and practise their politics. In the third chapter I examine representations of the "Indigenous woman" by white feminist anthropologists. I argue that they position Indigenous women in contradiction and juxtaposition to the subject position middle-class white woman and deny the subjectivity of Indigenous

women through methodological erasure. I further argue that their representations of the "Indigenous woman", in the knowledges they have constructed about us, conceal the colonising process by relegating Indigenous women to the imagination. White feminists draw on these representations without interrogating them or recognising their importance in shaping the subject position middle-class white woman.

The subject position middle-class white woman has been historically shaped, redefined and represented in Australian culture as the embodiment of true womanhood. In Chapter 4 I argue that white feminists have been and continue to be implicated in the colonising process. My analysis of the history of feminist relations with Indigenous women reveals that first- and second-wave feminists defined, normalised and represented themselves within feminist discourse through their centring as the all-knowing subject who constructs the Indigenous "Other". First-wave feminists, by deploying respectability and sexual propriety embodied in the subject position middle-class white woman, sought to remake Indigenous women by civilising us (in particular our sexuality) to minimise racial impurity. Second-wave feminists in Australia seek Indigenous women's ideological reconstruction as middle-class white woman feminist, despite their theorising of difference and incommensurability.

The degree to which white feminists today in Australia understand that they belong to the white centre and are implicated in power relations that have been historically constituted is assessed in Chapter 5. Through their self-presentation in interviews, white feminist academics illuminate the contradictory and inconsistent nature of their positioning on race, gender and cultural differences. "Race" and "racism" are important intellectually to feminists. However, white feminist academics' anti-racist practice is reduced to teaching within a limited paradigm, which has little impact on their subject positions within and outside the university. I argue that feminists need to analyse and interrogate this subject position and its relationship to the dominant white male centre of Australian society in order to understand how such a subject position is represented, complies with and maintains

the racial order. The knowledge produced from such analyses can inform feminist theory and be used in antiracist practice.

In Chapter 6 I show how Indigenous women have challenged the authority of white feminist knowledge through their self-presentation in a counter hegemonic discourse. Indigenous women do not want to be white; our politics are concerned with sustaining and maintaining our cultural integrity and achieving self-determination as a people. The subject position middle-class white woman is embedded in particular material conditions which shape the nature of power relations between white feminists and Indigenous women. These inter-subjective relations reflect the structural relationship between white society and Indigenous society.

For Indigenous women all white feminists benefit from colonisation; they are overwhelmingly represented and disproportionately predominant, have the key roles, and constitute the norm, the ordinary and the standard of womanhood in Australia. White women are not represented to themselves as being white; instead they position themselves as variously classed, sexualised, aged and abled. The disjunction between representation and self-presentation of both Indigenous women and white feminists means that the involvement of Indigenous women in Australian feminism is, and will remain, partial. This partiality in practice requires white feminists to relinquish some power, dominance and privilege in Australian feminism to give Indigenous women's interests some priority. To do any less means that the subject position middle-class white woman will remain centred as a site of dominance participating in maintaining the racial order in Australian society.

White people may find this book difficult to read because my representations will challenge and discomfort them. My hope is that this book stimulates new ways of thinking about racialised inter-subjective relations and contributes to the development of an understanding of, and respect and appreciation for, each other in the struggle for racial justice and Indigenous rights.

CHAPTER FIVE

White Women's Way: Self-Presentation within White Feminist Academics' Talk¹

Progressive white feminists, with anti-racist politics, seeking to educate and explain the experience of sexism, often compare sexism to racism. The use of this analogy suggests that the "analogizer" believes her situation is the same as that of a person of color. Nothing in the comparison process challenges this belief, and the analogizer may think that she understands the other's situation in its fullness. The analogy makes the analogizer forget any difference and allows her to stay focused on her own situation without grappling with the person of color's reality (Grillo & Widman 1995:17).

White women are represented everywhere in Australian feminism, but are not racialised as whites. Instead they are presented as variously classed, sexualised, aged and abled even though the social construction of their racialised subject position is tied to the way in which whiteness "is taught, learned, experienced and identified in certain forms of knowledges, values and privileges" (Giroux 1997:296). What is evident from the previous chapters is that middle-class white feminists and Indigenous women speak out of different subject positions. The different knowledges that inform both Indigenous and middle-class white feminists' speaking positions disclose that there are limits to knowing the "Other". These limitations exist in any inter-subjective relationship. The degree to which they influence relations depends on the power and privilege derived from the structural location of the subject position deployed.

In this chapter it is argued that middle-class white feminist

academics, who advocate an anti-racist practice, unconsciously and consciously exercise their race privilege. The analysis of the interviews of feminist academics discloses a deployment of the subject position middle-class white woman in professional and personal practice. The chapter begins by providing a description of the methodology, followed by an analysis of the interviews showing how feminist academics engage with race and how the subject position middle-class white woman is implicated in this engagement.

Indigenous on white: the interviewees and the method

Ruth Frankenberg argues that "race shapes meaning and experiences for social, political, historical and cultural reasons rather than as a result of essential race difference" (1993:148). In the earlier analysis of multiple texts, the subject position middle-class white woman was revealed in different historically constituted discourses. In these discourses, race as construct and category has been reserved for those designated "Other" and this subject position is invisible for those who occupy and deploy it. However, what is missing from the analysis is how whiteness, as a racial identity, was performed by feminist academics in their personal and professional practice in Australia in the late 1990s. The degree to which "race" continues to be externalised and yet shapes feminist thinking and practice requires further examination in the contemporary Australian context.

In order to explore the way in which race shapes the thought and experiences of white feminist academics, twenty women were selected for interview from three universities between November 1996 and February 1997. However, eight women did not consent to be interviewed as they were too busy or said they did not teach anything on Indigenous women. Feminist academics were chosen because since the second wave of feminism in Australia the feminist movement's presence is strongest in academia and the bureaucracy.² The ages of the women ranged from the early 30s to the mid 50s; all were middle-class but some had working-class origins.³ They were predominantly single and the majority were positioned to be heterosexual.⁴ Three women had migrated from England, one from South Africa, one from the United States of

America and another had been born in Canada but raised in South Australia. The remaining six women were born and raised in Australia. The interviews ranged in duration from twenty minutes to three hours. Copies of the transcripts were sent to each of the women for their perusal and amendment.⁵ Some women provided additional information, some did not respond and some deleted sentences within the text. Only one of the women refused to allow me to use a number of pages of her transcript, because, she said, she was not aware that the tape was still on when we engaged with each other's comments. The women's status in academia varied. Three women were professors, two women were associate professors, and the rest were either at senior lecturer, lecturer or associate lecturer level. Although the group is not representative of the white female population as a whole, it is representative of the small number of white feminists in Australia who write on race, endorse an anti-racist politics and are members of the educated middle-class.

Framing and conducting the research: researcher and power

In order to elicit in-depth and diverse responses the questions were made as general as possible. The purpose of the questions was to gain an insight into the relationship between the interviewee's professional (public) life and their personal (private) life in relation to race and cultural difference. The questions were structured to move interviewees from their pedagogical practice and theory to life experiences as white feminists. Five questions were developed, influenced by the work of Ruth Frankenberg on the social construction of whiteness and my textual analysis of the relations between Indigenous women and white feminists in Australia.

The first and second questions were concerned with the ways in which these women gendered their curriculum and how they included cultural difference. The third question asked women to identify themselves as belonging to a racial or cultural group and whether they knew people from racial and cultural groups other than their own. The fourth question was concerned with asking when or how they knew that cultural difference was manifesting

itself before them, and the final question asked them to discuss their relationship to racism. My research approach to the interviews was what Frankenberg names as "dialogical" (Frankenberg 1993:30). As the interviewer, I shared some information about my life and experiences in relation to cultural difference, race and racism with interviewees throughout the research process. I was aware of the discomfort my questions could bring to white feminists who, for the first time, were subject to an Indigenous gaze on social phenomena in which both researcher and interviewees were historically implicated. Feminists have long acknowledged the subjectivity of both researcher and interviewees and the imbalance in power relations between them (Harding 1987, Alcock & Potter 1993, Behar & Gordon 1995). They have sought to minimise their power in the research process through various strategies, such as information exchange and interviewee interrogation of their analyses (Harding 1987:181-2, Frankenberg 1993:29-32). However, most empirical research undertaken by feminists involves researching women of their own race or white women researching non-white women. The capacity to share information or offer interrogation of one's analysis can easily be made from the location of privilege and power. I have not found any empirically based research conducted by a woman of colour on white women about their "Othering" and their experiences of the research process. Therefore, based on my experiences and knowledge about whiteness and the responses received from women who did not want to participate in the study, I would be positioned as both object and subject in the research process. "Race" would predominantly be perceived as belonging to me, the Indigenous "Other".

Unlike other informants or interviewees, who usually do not have knowledge of and experience in western research processes, the women I interviewed had both the knowledge and the skills to give measured and intellectualised responses. In order to minimise measured responses, I asked direct questions that specifically identified the subject matter but were generalised in format. The generalised nature of the questions yielded diverse and varied responses and allowed me some degree of intervention, despite the interviewees' familiarity with research processes.

This method was successful but it was limited by race. For example, when I compare the type of responses given by white women in Ruth Frankenberg's work on "race" with those in my study, it is obvious that Frankenberg's racial identity was invisible and unfamiliar; not a reference point for racial difference. This indicates to me that had I been white I would probably have elicited a different range of responses from the feminist academics I interviewed. The interviews were both coherent and contradictory, and they provide insights about the deployment of the subject position middle-class white woman and her racialised invisibility.

Pedagogical practice

Feminists argue that universities are knowledge production sites where knowledges are contested, accommodated, created, reconstructed and deconstructed. They are sites for producing oppositional, revisionist and authorised knowledges which enter public discourses "in ways that may reinforce or unsettle our understandings of social problems, provide language for explaining or obscuring connections, and widen or foreclose conceivable political options" (Pettman 1992:131). In asking feminists the general question about how they gendered their curriculum, I wanted to ascertain to what degree the subject position middle-class white woman was centred in their pedagogical practice. All of the women interviewed stated that they gendered their curriculum, but in different ways.

Five of the women structured their courses specifically on the social construction of white masculinity and femininity. For these feminists, white women's gender is the primary difference acknowledged and engaged with; the universal subjects are white woman and white man. Whiteness is culturally central and normalised in their pedagogical practice. An unintended consequence is that the subject position middle-class white woman is essentialised as the embodiment of true womanhood. That is, through the exclusion of other women, the white woman becomes the universal standard for all women (Spelman 1990). The other seven women organised their courses around race, cultural difference, class and gender. They teach about structural inequality and the intersection of race, class and gender differences; they

are concerned with social structures that determine the characteristics and actions of individuals. However, in the interviews they did not discuss the relationship between knowledges, social responsibility and collective struggle which one would expect to find in an anti-racist pedagogy (Mohanty 1990:192). Instead they teach about the structural location of race as racial oppression and do not engage with their whiteness or the subjugated knowledges of those who experience such oppression. Their pedagogy is inclusive of the race of the "Other" but masks the subject position middle-class white woman from which they teach. Their pedagogy works to supports white people's externalisation of race by restricting it to structure and "Other". In denying whiteness as a racial identity, "race" is removed from white agency in their analyses and this can diminish their students' scope for self-reflection as an anti-racist practice.

A decolonising pedagogical practice places importance on the relations between different knowledges, learning and experiences to understand differences (Mohanty 1990:192). Some of the women interviewed sought to engage in a decolonising pedagogical practice. One feminist incorporated race and colonisation in her teaching on gender in Australian history. She sees her role as

to understand what happened and to use my education and training to bring it to other people's knowledge so that they can come to terms with what is our collective past. Because we have a collective past. We have a separate history, but we have a collective past as well and where it comes together is of course the total discrepancy of power.

The pedagogical aim is to develop critical thinking among students so they can inform themselves and transform their world view. The idea is to convey to their predominantly white students that their respective positionings influence the way they interpret the world. What is not taught as being problematic is "how whiteness as a racial identity and social construction is taught, learned, experienced and identified in certain forms of knowledge, values and privileges" (Giroux 1997:296). The determinate connection between white feminist academic and white student lives in the centre, and the lives of Indigenous women and students on the margins remain invisible. Perspectives that ac-

knowlege the "Other" on the margins inadvertently privilege the subject position middle-class white woman because she remains uninterrogated and unnamed (Apple 1997:127).

In my questions, I sought to ascertain if cultural difference was included in their curriculum and how it was represented and interrogated. As stated previously, some of the feminists interviewed did not deal with cultural difference in their subjects. Three women gave priority to imparting knowledge that centres whiteness within the boundaries of white-male-dominated institutions. The subject position middle-class white woman — naturalised, unmarked and unnamed — is the centre of their gendered curriculum. The omission of the cultural difference of other women reinscribes a hierarchy of white cultural values that are enforced and built into the powerstructure of their respective universities. Other feminists sought to transform their curriculum and decentre the subject position middle-class white woman by including cultural difference through the use of texts by Toni Morrison, bell hooks and Gayatri Spivak. As one feminist stated:

Racial/cultural difference questions are taken up to some degree in all these subjects but more so (sometimes much more so) in some rather than others — although cultural difference in one way or another is always an issue.

Cultural difference is incorporated within the curriculum through an "Other" literature that does little to disrupt the experiential knowledge of students in the Australian context. The racialised "Other" belongs to another country and is therefore culturally safe for interrogation. An assumption that underpins such a teaching strategy is: racialisation is the same everywhere. Other feminists taught cultural difference in terms of the problems faced by Indigenous and migrant women in the health care system in Australia. This suggests that students are not taught to recognise whiteness as shaping, for political, cultural and historical reasons, the normative practices and diverse relationships within the health system. Instead, the health system, like other institutions, is often presented as having shortcomings but it is racially neutral; whiteness remains invisible and unnamed. Similarly, another feminist taught cultural difference in terms of its impact on the legal personality:

One of the things I tend to do certainly in a first year subject, also I do it where the issue comes up in other subjects, there is this whole idea of legal personality which is one of those basics about who is entitled to claim legal redress and working with the idea that it isn't a natural concept. Law structures who is entitled to speak to it and in what contexts. In the last century, for example, companies enjoyed a far greater degree of legal personality than women, and women's legal personality tended to be structured according to marital status and according to race.

The primary referent here is the female gender (read "white"), although race (read "black") is identified as a marker that also changes the relationship of the female to the Law. Cultural difference is reduced to the way the law treats women. Although it is acknowledged that "race" is a factor that shaped a woman's legal personality, "race" is synonymous with the non-white "Other". "[S]ociety operates in such a way as to put whiteness at the centre of everything, including individual consciousness — so much so that we seldom question the centrality of whiteness, and most people, on hearing 'race', hear 'black'. That is, whiteness is treated as the norm, against which all differences are measured" (Reddy 1994:12). The legal personality of white women was tied to their marital status in the 19th century whereas the legal personality of black women was connected first and foremost to their "race" (Williams 1991; McGrath 1993).

The absence of an interrogation of whiteness as cultural difference is evident in the response of another feminist who utilises critical race theory to unmask the way race and gender position people differently within the Law. However, she claims that it leaves white students with a dilemma. Critical race theory accepts that all speaking positions are valid even though it forces students to recognise that the Law is grounded in a white value system that privileges white people over others. All speaking positions are valid but are not of equal worth. Who is listened to or heard depends on their ability and capacity to exercise power as part of the dominant group. White feminists and their white students practice cultural relativism every day, but do not perceive this as a dilemma for those positioned as "Other". In this way whiteness remains centred and is masked in pedagogy. It was clear from the interviews that where a feminist had a consciousness of her subject position as a middle-class white woman, and drew on her

experiences and cultural locatedness to inform her pedagogy, whiteness was unnamed as the dominant cultural form. Her students are taught about how cultural differences are manifest in values, behaviour and ideas; different knowledges inform different behaviour. Although students can be taught to recognise that meanings have a culture specific context, only certain meanings are legitimate and accepted as official knowledge within Australian society. "These meanings, of course, will be contested, will be resisted and sometimes transformed but this does not lessen the fact that hegemonic cultures have greater power to make themselves known and acceptable" (Apple 1997:124).

The hegemony of whiteness manifests itself in pedagogical practice when feminists seek to recentre themselves by making "oppressions" the common denominator between themselves and Indigenous women. White women's oppression was mentioned repeatedly in the interviews, specifically in relation to the issue of cultural difference. So while cultural difference was equated with Indigenous women, the white race privilege, which confers dominance on its female members, remained unnamed and invisible. Race, class and sex oppressions were the key representations of the "Other's" cultural difference given by feminists. This reveals a limited capacity to identify the specificities of cultural differences grounded in different knowledges and realities from their own. The interviews also provide insights about how the invisibility of whiteness works in feminist pedagogy to normalise, naturalise and maintain its privilege while appearing to be culturally and racially neutral, progressive and inclusive. The way in which cultural difference is taught centres the concerns of the subject position middle-class white woman. As Carlson argues, "In the twentieth century, white hegemony has been maintained less through the legal denial of rights and military force and more through control of popular culture and education" (Carlson 1997:137).

Self-presentation, identity and sociality

Sociality plays an important part in affirming or disrupting subject positions in cultural contexts. As such, inter-cultural inter-

subjectivity provides opportunities for encountering differences and similarities that may lead to the disruption of assumptions about the "Other". Ruth Frankenberg (1993) found that white women who socialise and work with the "Other" tend to advocate an anti-racist practice more than white women who remained socially distant. As the feminists I interviewed subscribed to an anti-racist politics, I was interested in ascertaining whether or not they socialised outside their racial group. I asked the questions: "Do you have contact with people of different racial or cultural groups from that of your own?" and "Do you see yourself as belonging to an ethnic or cultural group?"

All the women had contact with people from different cultural or racial groups. Four of the women had contact in their childhood. Two socialised with migrant children from their schools. One lived next door to a Chinese family and spent time with them; her mother suffered from mental illness and she found refuge in their company. Another went to boarding school with Asian students. These women now have limited contact with students or colleagues from different cultural and racial groups; most contact occurs through their work as academics. This limited contact with the "Other" was the case for most of the other feminists, with the exception of three women who had socialised or worked with people from different cultural or racial groups. One feminist had been involved politically with Indigenous women and another shared a house with Chinese and Indigenous women. Another feminist had been active in the civil rights movement in the United States and had a continuing friendship with an Australian Indigenous couple. However, outside the academic environment they socialised predominantly with white people. Their interaction with difference is a matter of *choice* — not an imperative.

Intersubjective relations with the "Other" in academia occur through research or teaching. Here the power relations between student and lecturer, or researcher and researched, centre white dominance through the social organisation of the academic structure and the learning and exercising of western knowledges. These feminists have no imperative to step outside the beliefs, values and behaviours embodied in the subject position middle-

class white woman. They live in a country where cities have been developed around invisible conveniences that give social preferences to whiteness in the location of municipal and other services. The design of suburbs and the naming of streets have been planned to serve white neighbourhoods and preserve their whiteness.⁶ As one feminist noted:

I live in — which is middle-class, white, orthodox, affluent, comfortable ... So I meet absolutely nobody in my suburban community who is anything other than myself. The place where I meet the "Other" is in my research.

The engagement with the "Other" remains predominantly, for these women, a dimension of their work practice — their public world — where their academic knowledges engage with difference to varying degrees. This reduces the opportunity for their experiential knowledges about the "Other" to be interrogated and disrupted, although their academic knowledge allows an empathetic appreciation of difference. Although these feminists advocate an anti-racist politics in academic contexts this appears to have little impact on their construction of subjectivity outside of academia. Their anti-racist politics are restricted to ensuring that they teach about the "race" of the "Other" in some manner, do not condone racial hatred in their classrooms, and make class and sex oppression explicit as social justice issues. In most cases the subject position middle-class white woman is not deployed in any social or political activity with "Other" outside the confines of academia.

When asked the question "Do you see yourself as belonging to an ethnic or cultural group?", all the feminists were confident and certain that they were white and middle-class, but they were ambiguous about different ethnicities. The mixed ethnicities identified by the women were Anglo/Celtic/Saxon or Scottish or Irish or English; one stated that she was of Jewish heritage and another Prussian. Their self-presentation as white implies that they recognise their racial assignment. The ambiguity of their ethnicities suggests that they unconsciously acknowledge the power that they possess because their race privilege is connected to a white cultural system that exists as omnipresent and natural. However, such a consciousness did not lead these feminists to

discuss or mention what being white meant in terms of their ethnicity, identity and their anti-racist politics. It was taken for granted that they had options: they could claim a specific ethnicity, or be just white, and they could choose which of their European ancestry to include in their description of their identities. They were able to exercise their race privilege to choose or not choose an ethnic identity because as white feminist academics they are part of the white majority centre in Australian society. As Waters argues, "The option of choosing among different ethnicities in their family backgrounds exists because the degree of discrimination and social distance attached to specific European backgrounds has diminished over time" (1998:404). Ethnicity is a choice because there is no social cost involved in what are predominantly symbolic ethnicities. That is, the ethnicities of these feminists do not influence their lives unless they want them to; in effect their ethnicities are individualistic in nature. The problem with such a positioning on ethnicity is that it is easy to assume that all ethnic identities are in some sense interchangeable. Most of these white feminists, when consciously deploying the subject position middle-class white woman, did not recognise that their race privilege meant they were accorded choices about their ethnicities.

For some feminists, whiteness as a racial identity that confers dominance and privilege remains unmarked and unnamed in a different way. One feminist who comes from South Africa sees herself as white but not belonging to an ethnic or cultural group; rather she positions herself as an outsider. Another said she just did not see any ethnic differences. These feminists want to deny their racially assigned power. Both feminists want to remove themselves from white race privilege, one by individualising difference, and the other by invoking the notion of sameness. As one feminist said:

I tend to bounce off my feelings of otherness as a woman and a particular sort of outsider woman because of breaking the rules of being a mother but not married, bright but not ugly, heterosexual but single [inaudible], so racism in its crude sense is of the greatest debate; it helps fuel my desire to press for more to be a transformative instrument and it also really does tend to isolate [inaudible] what we define as my feminist ethics.

Another feminist also denied her racially conferred privilege and dominance but in a different way. She identified as being white and stated that she could claim she had "Welsh blood" and "Irish blood" but they were not significant parts of her identity; she was "straight down the line, boring Anglo". It was interesting that this woman was the only feminist interviewed who used the metaphor of blood in terms of culture and ethnicity. Frankenberger (1993:144) argues: "The blood metaphor ... used is crucial, for it located sameness in the body — precisely the location of difference in genetic or biological theories of white superiority. Further, of course, blood is under the skin, and skin has been and remains the foremost signifier of racial difference". Sameness is a way of rejecting the idea of white racial superiority and distancing "race" and "racism" from the subject position middle-class white woman.

Identifying cultural difference in practice

In answering the questions "What does cultural difference mean for you in practice?" and "How are you conscious of it?", a variety of responses were given which indicated that cultural difference meant different things to different feminists. I expected to find that feminists who think that cultural difference means a different way of thinking, acting and behaving would be conscious of how these differences impact on their own behaviour in practice. I anticipated that they were conscious of how subjectivity is shaped by white culture, because they had knowledge about, and challenged, patriarchy — which would require deploying different subject positions.

The feminists who were most conscious of cultural differences had experienced the disruption of their subjectivity when socialising with the "Other" or they were raised in a household in which their mother's mental illness dominated daily life. They understood that living with such differences in practice meant living with uncertainty and sometimes denial in uncomfortable and liminal spaces. For example, the feminist who spent a good deal of time as a child with the Chinese family next door, because of her mother's mental illness, learnt an appreciation of cultural difference from the Chinese family, which she viewed as the

antithesis, in many respects, of her own family. She learnt that there was a different way of dealing with conflict which contrasted with her white middle-class family's pretension and denial. The scope for deploying a different subject position was broadened. Another feminist was also raised in a household with a mother who suffered from mental illness:

Her madness couldn't be fixed or ignored so you learn a new sense of tolerance and diversity where you are not in control as a kid [inaudible]. Because of this experience of being utterly powerless at the hands of a woman I find some of the feminist stuff a bit "twee" about all women being good. My feelings about difference and diversity are more complex and cynical and more aware of the real limits and frustrations. It left me with a different view of the world that you cannot change and managing living with that kind of uncomfortableness and madness. Life is about learning tolerance that's basically intolerably different, discomforted and there is a level at which you have to learn to live with incommensurate difference and discomfort and my mother taught me that. Although I grew up a white in many ways and privileged in many ways I think that [it] was the difference that made me think about oppression and power.

A disrupted childhood provided an awareness of cultural differences and tolerance, and this early training gave insights about living with difference that were drawn on when sharing houses with women from different cultures. However, her experience of living with the "Other" in different relations of power was that "in reality real tolerance of incommensurable difference is very hard to achieve ... who dominates matters a lot". Living with cultural difference means one has to deploy and negotiate different subject positions in order to function within an environment where a variety of power relations exist. In these contexts it matters who has the power to dominate; if one wants to work at minimising the oppression of others from a subject position of white privilege, one has to alter one's behaviour and attitude. Another feminist also lived with cultural difference through a childhood of family discord between a Dutch mother and an Australian father, but as soon as she left home "difference" became outside and beyond her experiences. Her ability to experience otherness disappearing off her horizon meant that cultural difference only mattered in her life when it was unavoidable. She was able to feel culturally safe in her new context at

university because her white race privilege gave her the power to be able to choose whether or not she interacted with the cultural difference of the "Other". Despite the fact that all three feminists have an awareness of changing their subject positions in relation to cultural difference, they speak from a dominant subject position located within the centre of white Australian society. Cultural difference made an impact on their formative years, but its impact on their subjectivity was reduced when they left home and were able to exercise choice about their sociality in Australian society.

Another feminist's experience of living in France and China meant that she deployed different subject positions but retained her white race privilege in these contexts:

I spent a lot of time in France and I feel very comfortable there, but I'm also very conscious of the way in which when you become part of a different cultural context different things become possible. There are different things you can say and different things you can do [inaudible]. In China it was a very different culture — we were honoured guests — [inaudible]. I had a badge that said I was [a] foreign expert so I was treated with great deference and people made a fuss of me, which was wonderful. [inaudible]. I am very much aware of the sort of things that what cultural differences consist of, but I think it's important to say that I have always been able to participate from a position of privilege which I think really does make a difference.

Her experiences reveal that she not only has a consciousness of her structural location in a different cultural context, but that she is also conscious of the need to deploy different subject positions to accommodate and enable cultural difference. She tries to resist the power of her structural location as a middle-class white woman at the inter-subjective level by having a consciousness of its privileges.

Other feminists interviewed had an awareness of structural inequality. However, this consciousness did not inform changes to their subject positioning on cultural difference. For some feminists cultural differences meant class and race differences:

Now with Aboriginal cultural difference — at that stage there was more of a tension around that because this Purfleet township was poor. We used to drive through it on the way to Sydney or if we were going to the beach and I used to feel a little bit frightened because

the houses were run down compared to most of them in the town. And I do not know, but we might have stopped and bought something from the shop a couple of times, but mostly we just drove through it and I was sort of aware of a kind of tension. That might not be the right word, a sort of a stress or something with my mother and father that this was something that they were not neutral about, you know, and the children were wandering around a bit.

Poverty here is equated with cultural difference and is perceived negatively because of the value held for material things in the white system. The fear of the "Other" is derived from associating poverty with badness. What is missing from this gaze is that Indigenous people might not have the same values about these conditions because they share a different system of values. Within this narrative there is an awareness that cultural differences can manifest through behaviour and language, but the Indigenous social world imbued with meaning grounded in knowledges of different realities remains unknown. Several of the remaining feminists acknowledged that cultural differences exist within the landscape of the university, but they do not alter their subjectivity to accommodate it in their engagement with students and colleagues. That is, they do not position themselves through the eyes of the "Other" to change their behaviour and attitude, nor are any strategies in place for a reflexive anti-racist practice within their classrooms and the university landscape. In the words of Frye (1983: 115), "The concept of whiteness is not just used, in these cases, it is *wielded*". In deployment of the subject position middle-class white women these feminists are able to exercise their race privilege to make choices about how and when they engage with, have an awareness of, or ignore the cultural difference of "Others".

Racism as a relationship

Racism is often represented and taught in universities throughout Australia as a problem associated with people of colour, and the study of Indigenous Australians has been informed by anthropological knowledge (Cowlishaw 1986a). Five of the feminists interviewed teach from the position that racism is not a white problem; they are not personally implicated in it and the gaze is fixed firmly on the "Other". As one feminist said:

I do not like it but obviously I am someone who is not directly affected by it. I might get offended by it but it is not as though I am an Asian or a black person except for this Jewish thing ... So my relationship to racism then in terms of being a political person of one kind or another and my academic work, my intellectual work, is to try and work against that.

The positioning here is contradictory in that she denies a personal relationship to racism because white women are not affected by racism, but she forms one in her pedagogical practice because this is the politically correct thing to do as a white feminist. She does not perceive herself as a racialised being who operates in racialised contexts; instead, her deployment of the subject position middle-class white woman allows her to exercise the privilege of racial invisibility. She is able to have an intellectual relationship to racism that is not personal and does not inform any altering of her subjectivity. "Racism" is thus relegated to something that operates in the public sphere but not the private.

Another feminist located her relationship to racism through her academic engagement. She says that her relationship to racism revolves around the word "racism" and what is associated with that label:

I am very interested in the way in which our understanding of the language reflects a large part of our mental construct of who and what we are. My interest in psychoanalysis comes about through understanding our psychic relationship to language that I think gives us a transformative potential. Racism and racism in its crude sense of delivering the [inaudible] of cultural otherness as an [inaudible] for criticism is a place of great academic inspiration to work.

Here the person's relationship to racism is one through which she enhances her transformative potential as a feminist. Her intellectual engagement with racism inspires her and enhances her personal development. However, racism here too is treated as something public and external to the subject position middle-class white woman; it is something that one gets involved in by choice. Other feminists also implied that they had a choice about being involved in racism for moral as well as intellectual reasons:

I suppose, in a sense to talk about it in terms of a relationship, it is something that on one level I suspect I see, this goes into a whole set of tensions about ideology and about where I position myself ideologically. I see racism in part, on an intellectual level at least, as a sign

that we have not yet buried what I refer to in some of the things I have written as the old loyalties of hearth and clan in the universal subject which liberalism was supposed to herald, because racism is a way of harping back to ways of defining citizenship [inaudible]. On another level there is another set of things going on which I suspect, on a much more contemporary level, this is true. I believe in Australia [inaudible] racism is one way of enabling members of the dominant group, who perhaps are unemployed or not making it or unsuccessful in a range of ways, to deflect away from themselves any possibility of accepting any responsibility for the fact that they have stuffed up. By laying that responsibility on a group, and it is easy to do it with a racial or ethnic group because there is the definition by visibility. Now so in those two, my understandings of what is going on with responses that are racist, which makes them somewhat less simple than they might otherwise be. The other element I suppose on a moral level is an understanding of it as evil and I have no trouble using the vocabulary of evil myself. I am certainly not a religious person but there is evil and there is good and they are thoroughly clear and distinct. The other thing, of course, it is a learned response.

At an ideological level this feminist understands that the practice of racism is connected to loyalty to the dominant group and allows for the scapegoating of "Others". Morally it is something evil and it is learned. However, white people as the dominant racial group remain invisible. Only the "Other" is visible; white race privilege is not perceived as being inscribed on white bodies. Here one's personal relationship with racism is through a moral position that allows one to put distance between oneself and other members of the dominant group who are evil and racist. By implication one is not an evil person, therefore one is not racist. One can deploy the subject position middle-class white woman to signify virtue and purity, because racism is perceived as racial hatred, not as racial supremacy in which all members of the dominant group are systemically implicated. As another feminist acknowledged:

I spend a lot of my career thinking about it and writing about it and trying to understand. I probably feel that racism is so pervasive in our culture that we never really escape it. It's there. You can consciously overcome a lot of it, you can academically understand it, but I think at some subterranean level it is always there in your psyche and what I am doing as a person who wants to promote social change and to have an Australia where we can have had separate histories but we [inaudible] what we did together and try and take it on from there.

I've overcome it more perhaps than a lot of people. But I think if you are honest there are bits and pieces [inaudible] but you are brought up to think that European culture is superior and that other cultures are exotic and that for various reasons Westerners should have been dominant. It's unfortunate, but what the subberranean things are we don't know, because we want to academicise to a certain degree and in that sense maybe you are not as honest. Maybe the person who just comes out with the abuse is more honest than the highly educated self-aware academic.

This feminist recognises that she has a personal and political relationship with racism that occurs on several levels. She registers discomfort at being in the subject position middle-class white woman because she perceives racism as integral to white culture and recognises the difficulties in struggling to forge out an anti-racist practice. She implies that an intellectual engagement with racism allows one to distance oneself from being personally located within racist practice while she acknowledges that she cannot escape it. Her relationship to racism reveals that, despite her consciousness of the pervasiveness of racism, she chooses to locate her anti-racist practice in an environment where her subject position will be safe, secure and invisible to her students. Her ability to make such a choice is part of her privilege as a middle-class white woman.

Most of these feminists positioned themselves as having an intellectual relationship with racism. It is positioned as an ideological and academic engagement by the subject position middle-class white woman academic and remains something that shapes the lives of "Others" rather than white experiences and choices. The reason one does not have to connect with racism in all aspects of one's life is the inability to see race as shaping one's life, and, as Frye (1983) argues this is part of the privilege of being white. Teaching racism as a people of colour issue fails to interrogate and locate white complicity. Intellectualising about racism allows the subject position middle-class white woman academic to be professionally, but not personally, engaged and is predicated on a mind/body split that works to allow the white female body to be separated from the mind. In other words, the mind creates a virtual non-racialised disembodied subject that knows and practises racism but does not experience it.

Some feminists were more overt than others in distancing

themselves from their white race privilege when describing their relationship to racism; inadvertently whiteness was recentered in their discussions. As one feminist stated:

It's clear to me from the engagements I've had — I've gone out to having engagements about being a white woman — let me just say this straight — you get beaten up a lot — because you get it wrong all the time — you get beaten up for being racist — not in the physical sense — but verbally beaten up and of course you get pissed off because, you know, I am really trying — why won't they accept that I am really trying! Of course, it [is] just like when men were trying to be pro-feminist and they suffered all the time and the women would slap them around and they would think well bugger this for a joke [inaudible] and I won't be a pro-feminist any more. I thought for a long time that I would try harder and get better and better and stop making these mistakes and I'm really learning something in this book about [inaudible] called *Racism and the Lives of Women*. It was written by mainly women working in the counselling type area. This woman described this racial incident where there were two [black] women in the office and one of the white women came in and called her Della for example; in fact the other woman was Delta and said it's just an example of racism, we all look the same to them. I was thinking — I've done that — maybe it is! Maybe it is an example of racism and they all look the same, but you sometimes mix all sorts of people up with all sorts — oh God, we will never get it right; it doesn't matter what we do. You know what I mean?

The relationship to racism here is not perceived as being informed by the legacy of white colonisation in Australia, and one is able to distance oneself from white domination by adhering to a liberal position of universal sameness that evades power and erases race. She perceives herself to be a victim of the power relations involved in engaging with the "Other", and by implication the "Other" is not appreciative or grateful for her efforts. Her engagement with the "Other" is something she is doing for them, not for herself; the "Other" is the problem, not white domination. There is a denial of having white race privilege as a middle-class white woman, while being able to exercise it. Despite her intentions to be anti-racist, she preserves the power structure by recentering whiteness, as did others, who said:

I suppose sometimes I wonder whether I am racist — I wonder sometimes whether I don't find myself making allowances for someone because they are from a different race and I must be nice to them and I think that is racist. I think a funny thing about racism — in that

basically I am colour blind, I don't actually notice people's race very much, and yet that's not true as I'm aware that this person is Asian and you're Aboriginal and I'm European, but it doesn't impinge on me somehow; they are just people.

I don't think I have to try — I just won't have any feeling about it at all. I don't notice. Well, for example, one of the things that my relatives commented on, when they came out from the country, that there is a lot more Asians around than there were the last time they were here. I don't know, there are just more people around, but I'm not conscious of their background. Is that strange?

The idea that one does not notice colour is an explanation that allows these feminists to distance themselves from racism by rejecting white racial superiority. Both feminists have a relationship to racism that is power evasive in the sense that, if treating or noticing people of colour as different is racist, by implication treating them the same as members of the dominant group is not racist. As Frankenberg points out, if noticing a person's race is not a good thing to do, then by implication colour, meaning non-white, is seen as being bad in and of itself (1993:145). Whiteness is recentred by rendering it invisible, unnamed and unmarked in their relationship to racism. Another feminist said:

I think racism is the thing inside me I must fear and I think that I've had a lot of resistance to wanting to open it. I shudder to think what's there. I also know that [wallowing] in guilt is not the way to deal with that either. We have to figure out what a non-oppressive whiteness can be like, and I think there is a big fear, in that men must fear [in] relation to women. [inaudible] I think there is a difference to sort of throwing that back in a defensive way — oh, you know you are not the only ones — to sort of being aware that it is [inaudible]. We'll ultimately find ways about being assertive without being oppressive [inaudible]. I think the next millennium will be Asian. Obviously the Pauline Hanson stuff taps into the kinds of fears that we have about that, but people dare not talk about it. Bring back the white Australia or something, that is the context in which whiteness has to be renegotiated. [inaudible] I mean, it does mean that in terms of reconciliation and indeed reading out multiculturally, I mean we do that in a sense of not necessarily drawing boundaries about who we are, but enlarging who we are and creating new identities rather than seeing identity as something that is fixed.

There is an implicit acknowledgement about who has power in this statement: white people have to learn to be assertive without being oppressive. What underpins her idea of some form of

resolution of racism is to create new identities, which implies that ethnicity is individualistic, voluntary and therefore changeable. Symbolic ethnicities are confined to white Australians, who, as Waters points out, "have a lot more choice and room for manoeuvre than they themselves think they do" (1998:405). Having a place in the centre of white culture confers privilege and the capacity to be able to make choices about one's identity that is not accorded those positioned in the margins.

Race does matter in shaping the meaning and experiences of white feminist academics, for political, historical, economic and cultural reasons. White feminist academics who participated in this study utilise "race" as a marker of difference that is deployed in modes of thinking on race, gender and cultural difference. This illuminates the contradictory and inconsistent, complex deployment of the subject position middle-class white woman. In discursive practices the subject position middle-class white woman remains centred, but is unmarked, unnamed and structurally invisible. White feminist academics perceive themselves as autonomous independent individuals, whose antiracist practice is orchestrated through an intellectual engagement based on objective rational thinking and behaviour. They speak with certainty and confidence from a subject position structurally located in a white cultural system that exists as omnipresent and natural yet invisible — a cultural system that confers on white people certain privileges and dominance.

The complex and contradictory positioning of white feminist academics on "race" demonstrates that their consciousness of structural inequality, without an interrogation of, and change in, the subject position middle-class white woman, results in intersubjective practice that centres whiteness and reproduces inequality. Teaching "race" in terms of structural inequality more often than not results in reducing it to a biological category that has social consequences only for the "Other". By not naming and interrogating white race privilege in such analyses "race" remains extrinsic to white subjects whose complicity in racial oppression is intentional and unintentional. "Race" remains extraneous to whites and its relevance and meaning is depoliticised for those positioned as "Other".

In their social lives, sociality is restricted to mixing predominantly with one's own race, thereby reducing the chances of evaluating one's anti-racist practice. The lack of sociality with "Others" reinforces the disparity in experience and meaning between women who are "Other" and white feminists in relation to systems of domination and the depth of cultural differences. The knowledge these feminists have about "race" in relation to women who are "Other" is predominantly derived from texts; they have academic knowledge. If there is limited or no intersubjectivity between women who are "Other" and white feminists, then knowledge of the "Other" is restricted to imagination and theory.

In imagining someone there is never resistance from the image:

... for you never find anything in an image except what you put there. You don't investigate or interrogate an image to find out about it, there is nothing to learn from it because it only contains what you posit as being in it. Objects of the imagination only exist insofar as they are thought of, and they can be destroyed by the simple act of turning away from them in consciousness (Spelman 1990:180).

Social distance between white feminist academics and women who are "Other" reduces the risk of disruption to and interrogation of the subject position middle-class white woman. Their white race privilege means that there is no imperative for these feminists to change their sociality. For most of the white feminists, teaching race difference within academic institutions means including the literature of women who are "Other" in the curriculum without challenging the subject position middle-class white woman in either theory or practice. Any inter-subjectivity in the cultural borderland of the university between white feminist academics and the "Other" is always circumscribed by the way in which white normality and otherness is invisibly retained. In effect, the cultural values, norms and beliefs of "Others" are subordinated to those of the institution.

In academic institutions, race privilege accords white feminist academics choices about altering their subject positions to accommodate the "Other's" cultural difference. There is no imperative for them to acknowledge, own and change their complicity in racial domination, because the mind/body split

allows them to position "race" as extrinsic. Their anti-racist practice, as an intellectual engagement, is evidence of their compassion, but racism is not experienced as part of their interiority. Their extrinsic and almost extraneous relationship to "race" is evidence of why the subject position middle-class white woman, as a site of dominance, needs to be interrogated.

Making the subject position middle-class white woman visible in white feminist academic discourse can only displace it from the unmarked and unnamed status that is itself an effect of its domination. The dominance of this subject position diminishes the inclusiveness of a politics of difference in Australian feminism. White feminists who teach about "race" leave whiteness uninterrogated and centred but invisible. "Race" and "racism" in relation to the "Other" are important intellectually to the politics of the subject position middle-class white woman academic. However, her anti-racist practice is reduced to teaching within a limited paradigm that has little impact on her subject position both outside and within the university context. Finding ways to put a politics of difference into practice will require more than including Indigenous women in Australian feminism and allowing us to speak. It requires white race privilege to be owned and challenged by feminists engaged in anti-racist pedagogy and politics.

Plumwood, Val.

Chapter 1

Feminism and ecofeminism

In what does man's pre-eminence over the brute creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a half is less than a whole, in Reason. For what purpose were the passions implanted? That man by struggling with them might attain a degree of knowledge denied to the brutes. Consequently the perfection of our nature and capability of happiness must be estimated by the degree of reason, virtue and humanity that distinguish the individual and that from the exercise of reason, knowledge and virtue naturally flow.

(Mary Wollstonecraft)

That women's inclusion in the sphere of nature has been a major tool in their oppression emerges clearly from a glance at traditional sources: 'Woman is a violent and uncontrolled animal' (Cato 1989: 193); 'A woman is but an animal and an animal not of the highest order' (Burke 1989: 187); 'I cannot conceive of you to be human creatures, but a sort of species hardly a degree above a monkey' (Swift 1989: 191); 'Howe'er man rules in science and in art/The sphere of women's glories is the heart' (Moore 1989: 166); 'Women represent the interests of the family and sexual life; the work of civilisation has become more and more men's business' (Freud 1989: 80); 'Women are certainly capable of learning, but they are not made for the higher forms of science, such as philosophy and certain types of creative activity; these require a universal ingredient' (Hegel 1989: 62); 'A necessary object, woman, who is needed to preserve the species or to provide food and drink' (Aquinas 1989: 183). Feminine 'closeness to nature' has hardly been a compliment.

There are, however, many traps for feminists in extracting themselves from this problematic. Both rationality and nature have a confusing array of meanings; in most of these meanings reason contrasts systematically with nature in one of its many senses. Nature, as the excluded and devalued contrast of reason, includes the emotions, the body, the passions, animality, the primitive or uncivilised, the non-

human world, matter, physicality and sense experience, as well as the sphere of irrationality, of faith and of madness. In other words, nature includes everything that reason excludes. It is important to note this point because some ecofeminists have endorsed the association between women and nature without critically examining how the association is produced by exclusion. On the other hand, some equality feminists, equally uncritically, have endorsed women's ascent from the sphere of nature into that of culture or reason without remarking the problematic, oppositional nature of a concept of reason defined by such exclusions. In this chapter, I will point to a route of escape from the problematic that the traditional association between women and nature creates for feminists, to a position which neither accepts women's exclusion from reason nor accepts the construction of nature as inferior.¹

THE WOMAN-NATURE CONNECTION - OUTDATED AND OPPRESSIVE?

The dominant and ancient traditions connecting men with culture and women with nature are also overlain by some more recent and conflicting ones in which unchangeable 'male' essence ('virility') is connected to a nature no longer viewed as reproductive and providing but as 'wild', violent, competitive and sexual (as in the ideas of Victorianism, Darwinism and recent sociobiology), and 'the female' is viewed in contrasting terms as insipid, domestic, asexual and civilising.² As Lloyd (1984) has noted too, the attitude to both women and nature resulting from the traditional identification has not always been a simple one. Also, as Merchant (1981) notes, it has not always been purely negative. The connection has sometimes been used to provide a limited affirmation of both women and nature, as, for instance, in the romantic tradition (Ruether 1975: 193).³ But both the dominant tradition of men as reason and women as nature, and the more recent conflicting one of men as forceful and wild and women as tamed and domestic, have had the effect of confirming masculine power.

It is not surprising that many feminists regard with some suspicion the view expressed by a growing number of women who describe themselves as 'ecofeminists': that there may be something to be said in favour of women's connectedness with nature. The very idea of a feminine connection with nature seems to many to be regressive and insulting, summoning up images of women as earth mothers, as passive, reproductive animals, contented cows immersed in the body and in the unreflective experiencing of life. It is both tempting and common therefore for feminists to view the traditional connection between women and nature as no more than an instrument of

oppression, a relic of patriarchy which should simply be allowed to wither away now that its roots in an oppressive tradition are exposed (Echols 1989: 288).⁴

But there are reasons why this widespread, 'common-sense' approach to the issue is unsatisfactory, why the question of a woman-nature connection cannot just be set aside, but must remain a central issue for feminism. The connection still constitutes the dynamic behind much of the treatment of both women and nature in contemporary society. As I will show, it is perilous for feminism to ignore the issue because it has an important bearing on the model of humanity into which women will be fitted and within which they will claim equality. And as I argue in this chapter, how it is that women and nature have been thrown into an alliance remains to be analysed. This analysis forms the basis for a critical ecological feminism in which women consciously position themselves *with* nature.

The inferiorisation of human qualities and aspects of life associated with necessity, nature and women – of nature-as-body, of nature-as-passion or emotion, of nature as the pre-symbolic, of nature-as-primitive, of nature-as-animal and of nature as the feminine – continues to operate to the disadvantage of women, nature and the quality of human life. The connection between women and nature and their mutual inferiorisation is by no means a thing of the past, and continues to drive, for example, the denial of women's activity and indeed of the whole sphere of reproduction.⁵ One of the most common forms of denial of women and nature is what I will term backgrounding, their treatment as providing the background to a dominant, foreground sphere of recognised achievement or causation. This backgrounding of women and nature is deeply embedded in the rationality of the economic system and in the structures of contemporary society (Ekins 1986; Waring 1988).⁶ What is involved in the backgrounding of nature is the denial of dependence on biospheric processes, and a view of humans as apart, outside of nature, which is treated as a limitless provider without needs of its own. Dominant western culture has systematically inferiorised, backgrounded and denied dependency on the whole sphere of reproduction and subsistence.⁷ This denial of dependency is a major factor in the perpetuation of the non-sustainable modes of using nature which loom as such a threat to the future of western society.

The backgrounding and instrumentalisation of nature and that of women run closely parallel. For women, their backgrounded and instrumental status as nature does not usually need to be explicit, for it structures their major roles in both public and private spheres. Women are systematically backgrounded and instrumentalised as housewives, as nurses and secretaries (Pringle 1988),⁸ as colleagues and workmates.

Their labour in traditional roles is also systematically omitted from account in the economic system (Waring 1988) and omitted from consideration when the story of what is important in human history and culture is told. Traditionally, women are 'the environment' – they provide the environment and conditions against which male 'achievement' takes place, but what they do is not itself accounted as achievement (Irigaray 1985a; Le Doeuff 1977). Women are vulnerable to backgrounding even when they step outside their traditional roles, as the history of areas such as DNA research makes plain (Watson 1969), but are most strongly backgrounded in their traditional roles and especially in their roles as mothers.

Diverse strands of feminist theory converge on the invisibility of the mother. The immensely important physical, personal and social skills the mother teaches the child are merely the background to *real* learning, which is defined as part of the male sphere of reason and knowledge (Benjamin 1988; Jaggar 1983: 314). The mother herself is background and is defined in relation to her child or its father (Irigaray 1982), just as nature is defined in relation to the human as 'the environment'. And just as human identity in the west is defined in opposition to and through the denial of nature, so the mother's product – paradigmatically the male child – defines his masculine identity in opposition to the mother's being, and especially her nurturance, expelling it from his own makeup and substituting domination and the reduction of others to instrumental status (Chodorow 1979; Irigaray 1982; Kristeva 1987; Brennan 1993). He resists the recognition of dependence, but continues to conceptually order his world in terms of a male (and truly human) sphere of free activity taking place against a female (and natural) background of necessity.

HUMANITY AND EXCLUSION

The view that the connection of women with nature should simply be set aside as a relic of the past assumes that the task for both women and men is now that of becoming simply, unproblematically and fully *human*. But this takes as unproblematic what is not unproblematic, the concept of the human itself, which has in turn been constructed in the framework of exclusion, denial and denigration of the feminine sphere, the natural sphere and the sphere associated with subsistence. The question of what is human is itself now problematised, and one of the areas in which it is most problematic is in the relation of humans to nature, especially to the non-human world.

The framework of assumptions in which the human/nature contrast has been formed in the west is one not only of *feminine* connectedness with and passivity towards nature, but also and complementarily one of

exclusion and domination of the sphere of nature by a white, largely male elite, which I shall call the master model. But the assumptions in the master model are not seen as such, because this model is taken for granted as simply a *human* model, while the feminine is seen as a deviation from it. Hence to simply repudiate the old tradition of feminine connection with nature, and to put nothing in its place, usually amounts to the implicit endorsing of an alternative master model of the human, and of human relations to nature, and to female absorption into this model. It does not yield, as it might seem to do at first, a *gender-neutral* position; unless the question of relation to nature is explicitly put up for consideration and renegotiation, it is already settled – and settled in an unsatisfactory way – by the dominant western model of humanity into which women will be fitted. This is a model of domination and transcendence of nature, in which freedom and virtue are construed in terms of control over, and distance from, the sphere of nature, necessity and the feminine. The critique of the domination of nature developed by environmental thinkers in the last twenty years has shown, I think, that there are excellent reasons to be critical of this model of human/nature relations. Unless there is some critical re-evaluation of this master model in the area of relations to nature, the old female/nature connection will be replaced by the dominant model of human distance from and transcendence and control of nature. Critical examination of the question then has to have an important place on the feminist agenda if this highly problematic model of the human and of human relations to nature is not to triumph by default. If the model of what it is to be human involves the exclusion of the feminine, then only a shallow feminism could rest content with affirming the 'full humanity' of women without challenging this model.

There is another reason then why the issue of nature cannot now be set aside as irrelevant to feminism. As Karen Warren (1987) has observed, many forms of feminism need to put their *own* house in order on this issue.⁹ Feminists have rightly insisted that women cannot be handed the main burden of ecological morality, especially in the form of holding the private sphere and the household responsible for the bulk of the needed changes (Ruether 1975: 200–1; Instone 1991). The attempt to lodge responsibility mainly with women as household managers and consumers should be rejected because it continues to conceive the household as women's burden, because it misconceives the power of the private household to halt environmental degradation, and because it appeals to women's traditional self-abnegation, asking them to carry the world's ills in recognition of motherly duty. Nevertheless, women cannot base their own freedom on endorsing the continued lowly status of the sphere of nature with which they have been identified and from which they have lately risen. Moves upwards in

human groups are often accompanied by the vociferous insistence that those new recruits to the privileged class are utterly dissociated from the despised group from which they have emerged – hence the phenomenon of lower middle-class respectability, the officer risen from the ranks, and the recently assimilated colonised (Memmi 1965: 16). Arguments for women's freedom cannot convincingly be based on a similar putdown of the non-human world.

But much of the traditional argument has been so based. For Mary Wollstonecraft, for example, what is valuable in the human character ideal to which women must aspire and be admitted is defined in *contrast* to the inferior sphere of brute creation. In her argument that women do have the capacity to join men in 'superiority to the brute creation', the inferiority of the natural order is simply taken for granted.¹⁰

THE MASCULINITY OF THE DOMINANT MODEL

Several critiques have converged to necessitate reconsideration of the model of feminine connectedness with nature and masculine distance from and domination of it and to problematise the concept of the human. They are:

- 1 the critique of masculinity and the valuing of traits traditionally associated with it (Chodorow 1979; Easthope 1986).
- 2 the critique of rationality. Relevant here is not only the masculine and instrumental character of rationality (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Marcuse 1968), but also the overvaluation of reason and its use as a tool for the exclusion and oppression of the contrasting classes of the non-human (since rationality is often taken as the distinguishing mark of the human [Ruether 1975; Midgley 1980; Le Doeuff 1977]), of women (because of its association with maleness [Lloyd 1984]), and, as well, of those inferiorised through class and race (since greater rationality is also taken to distinguish the civilised from the primitive and the higher from the lower classes [Kant 1981: 9]). The overvaluation of rationality and its oppositional conception are deeply entrenched in western culture and its intellectual traditions. This overvaluation does not always take the extreme form of some of the classical philosophers (for example, the Platonic view that the unexamined life was worthless), but appears in many more subtle modern forms, such as the limitation of moral consideration to rational moral agents.
- 3 the critique of the human domination of nature, human chauvinism, speciesism, or anthropocentrism (Naess 1973; Plumwood 1975); of the treatment of nature in purely instrumental terms (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979) and the low valuation placed on it in relation to

the human and cultural spheres. Included in this is a critique of the model of the ideal human character and of human virtue, which points out that the western human ideal is one which maximises difference and distance from the animal, the primitive and the natural; the traits thought distinctively human, and valued as a result, are not only those associated with certain kinds of masculinity but also those unshared with animals (Rodman 1980; Midgley 1980). Usually these are taken to be mental characteristics. An associated move is the identification of the human with the higher, mental capabilities and of the animal or natural with the lower bodily ones, and the identification of the authentic or fully human sphere with the mental sphere. This mental sphere is not associated with maleness as such but rather with the elite masculinism of the masters (male and female) who leave to slaves and women the business of providing for the necessities of life, who regard this sphere of necessity as lower and who conceive virtue in terms of distance from it.

The critiques converge for several reasons. A major one is that the characteristics traditionally associated with dominant masculinism are also those used to define what is distinctively human: for example, rationality (and selected mental characteristics and skills); transcendence and intervention in and domination and control of nature, as opposed to passive immersion in it (consider the characterisation of 'savages' as lower orders of humanity on this account); productive labour, sociability and culture. Some traditional feminist arguments also provide striking examples of this convergence of concepts of the human and the masculine. Thus Mary Wollstonecraft in the *Vindication of the Rights of Women* appeals strongly to the notion of an ungendered human character as an ideal for both sexes ('the first object of laudable ambition is to obtain a character as a human being' [1982: 5]), but in her account this human character is implicitly masculine. The human character ideal she espouses diverges sharply from the feminine character ideal, which she rejects, 'despising that weak elegancy of mind, exquisite sensibility, and sweet docility of manners'. Instead she urges that women become 'more masculine and respectable'. The complementary feminine character ideal is rejected – both sexes should participate in a common human character ideal (1982: 23) which despite some minor modifications (men are to become more modest and chaste and in that respect to take on feminine characteristics) coincides in its specifications with certain masculine ideals. A single supposedly 'unsexed' character ideal is substituted for the old two-sexed one, where the old feminine ideal was perceived as subsidiary and sexed.

The key concepts of rationality (or mentality) and nature then create crucial links between the human and the masculine, so that to problematise masculinity and rationality is at the same time to problematise the human and, with it, the relation of the human to the contrasted non-human sphere. As we shall see, however, these concepts also form links to other areas of exclusion, for it is not just any kind of masculinity which is usually involved here, but a particular kind which is formed in the context of class and race as well as gender domination (which I have called the master model). The western rationalist ideals of the human embody norms not only of gender exclusion but of race, class and species exclusion. The view that women's humanity is unproblematic mistakenly takes the concept of the human to be unproblematic and fails to observe these biases and exclusions. This connection is then another reason why the issue of the traditional connection of women and nature cannot simply be ignored, why the problems raised must be considered by feminists.

The concept of the human is itself very heavily normative. The notion of being fully or properly human is made to carry enormous positive weight, usually with little examination of the assumptions behind this, or the inferiorisation of the class of non-humans this involves. Thus, for example, behind the view that there is something insulting or degrading about linking women and nature stands an unstated set of assumptions about the inferior status of the non-human world. In modern discourses of liberation, things are deplored or praised in terms of conformity to a concept of 'full humanity'. But the dignity of humanity, like that of masculinity, is maintained by contrast with an excluded inferiorised class.¹¹

Once these assumptions are made explicit, the connection between the stance adopted on the issue of the woman/nature connection and the different options for feminism becomes clearer. In terms of this framework the main traditional position – the point of departure for feminism – can be seen as one in which the ideals of human character are not, as they often pretend to be, gender-neutral, but instead converge with those of mastery, while the ideals of womanhood diverge. Thus, as Simone de Beauvoir (1965) has so powerfully stated, the tragedy of being a woman consisted not only in having one's life and choices impoverished and limited, but also in the fact that to be a good woman was to be a second-rate human being. To the extent that these 'neutral' human character ideals were subscribed to and absorbed and the traditional feminine role also accepted, women must forever be forced to see themselves as inferiors and to be so seen. Because women were excluded from the activities and characteristics which were highly valorised and seen as *distinctively human*, they were forced to be satisfied

with being mere spectators of what the *distinctively human* business of life was all about, the real business of the struggle with nature.

Simone de Beauvoir's solution to this tragic dilemma is also stated with great force and clarity – change was to come about by women fitting themselves and being *allowed* to fit themselves into the dominant model of the human, and women were thus to become *fully human*. The model itself – and the model of freedom via the domination of nature it is based on – is never brought into question, and indeed women's eagerness to participate in it confirms and supports the superiority of the model.

THE FEMINISM OF UNCRITICAL EQUALITY

From the perspective of the second wave of feminism, the earlier, first wave form of feminism which made itself felt in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to fit women uncritically into a masculine pattern of life and a masculine model of humanity and culture which was presented as gender-neutral. This first wave position is most closely associated in current terms with liberal feminism, although, as many feminists have pointed out (O'Brien 1981; Young 1985; Benhabib and Cornell 1987; Nicholson 1987; Nye 1988; MacKinnon 1989), the attempt to fit women to a masculine ideal of selfhood goes beyond liberal feminism and is also found in those forms of socialist or humanist-Marxist feminism which are uncritical of the model of the human as a producer or worker. It is also found in some forms of social ecology (Biehl 1991).¹² The second wave thesis requires qualification, I have suggested, since it is the dominator identity of the master rather than a masculine identity as such which has formed the ideals of western culture and humanity as oppositional to nature and necessity. But with appropriate qualifications the basic point still stands. The position rejected as 'masculinising' is one which sees the task for women as one of laying claim to full humanity, in terms of women adapting themselves to the ideals of culture and the corresponding social institutions of the public sphere. The position can be summed up as one which demands participation by women in exclusionary ideals of humanity and culture. The associated activist strategy can be seen as one of uncritical equality, demanding equal admittance for women to a sphere marked out for elite males and to dominant institutions which are themselves viewed critically only to the extent that they exclude women (and elite women especially).

Central to these ideals of humanity to which women must seek admittance on the uncritical equality strategy is the domination of nature. Women, in this strategy, are to join elite men in participation in

areas which especially exhibit human freedom, such as science and technology, from which they have been especially strongly excluded. These areas are strongly marked for elite men because their style heavily involves the highly valorised traits of objectivity, abstractness, rationality and suppression of emotionality; and also because of their function, which exhibits most strongly the virtues of transcendence of, control of and struggle with nature. In the equal admission strategy, women enter science, but science itself and its orientation to the domination of nature (and domination of excluded groups) remain unchanged.

The uncritical equality strategy associated with liberal feminism has been rejected to varying degrees by several recent forms of feminism. It has been widely seen as a very incomplete escape from the more subtle forms of male cultural domination, and as lacking a basis for adequate critique of the masculinity of the dominant western culture. Perhaps the major criticism levelled at it is that it has failed to observe the implicit masculinity of the rational subject of liberal theory and public discourse, as well as the implicit masculinity of the parties in the myth of the founding contract (Jaggar 1983; Harding 1984; Lloyd 1984; Irigaray 1985b; Tapper 1986; Fox Keller 1985; Gilligan 1987; Benhabib 1987; Young 1987; Nye 1988; Pateman 1988; MacKinnon 1989). A critical ecofeminist account can broaden and extend this objection in a number of directions. First, the approach of liberal feminism fails to notice not only the implicit masculinity of the conception of the individual subject in the public sphere (and indeed the subject of post-enlightenment rational discourse generally), but also its other exclusionary biases, and fails to challenge the resulting bias of the dominant model of the *human* and of human culture as oppositional to nature. Thus uncritical equality endorses a model which is doubly phallocentric, for it is implicitly masculine not only in its account of the individual in society, but in its assumption that what constitutes and is valuable in human identity and culture is in opposition to nature. Second, the liberal approach fails to notice that such a rationalist model of the human as exclusive of nature is one which writes in assumptions not only of gender supremacy, but also of class, race and species supremacy.

The implicit masculinity and the other biases of these models also mean that the hope of equality for women within them will be largely illusory, except for a privileged few. The master model of both the human and the individual citizen and of corresponding social institutions has been arrived at by exclusion and devaluation of women, women's life-patterns and feminine characteristics, as well as by exclusion of those others and areas of life which have been construed as nature. Because this model has been defined by *exclusion*, it is loaded

against women in a variety of more and less subtle ways. Most women will not benefit from formal admission to it and will not attain real equality within it. As Genevieve Lloyd notes, 'Women cannot easily be accommodated into a cultural ideal that has defined itself in opposition to the feminine' (1984: 104). Absorption into the master model of humanity, culture and social life is not likely to be successful then for most women, who will remain down at the bottom of the social and cultural hierarchy.¹³ For women, more than altruism is involved in challenging such models.

But even if the absorption of women into the master model of human culture were to be widely successful, ecological feminists would argue, it would be objectionable, because it amounts to having women join elite men in belonging to a privileged class, in turn defined by excluding the inferior class of the non-human and those counted as less human. That is to say, it is a strategy of making some women equal in a now *wider* dominating class, without questioning the structure of or the necessity for domination. The criticism here is that the conceptual apparatus relating superior to inferior orders remains intact and unquestioned; what is achieved is a broadening of the dominating class, without the basis of domination itself being challenged. And the attempt to simply enlarge the privileged class by extending it to, and including, certain women not only ignores a crucial *moral* dimension of the problem; it ignores the way in which different kinds of domination act as models, support and reinforcement, for one another, and the way in which the same conceptual structure of domination reappears in very different inferiorised groups: as we have seen, it marks women, nature, 'primitive' people, slaves, animals, manual labourers, 'savages', people of colour – all supposedly 'closer to the animals'.

When the problem of the women-nature connection is simply set aside, then, it is implicitly assumed that the solution is for women to fit into a model of human relations to nature which does not require change or challenge. Thus a critical and thoroughgoing contemporary feminism is and must be engaged in a lot more than merely challenging and revising explicit ideals of feminine character and behaviour. It is and must be engaged in revising and challenging as well the ideals of both *masculine* and of *human* character. It must take up the challenge to western culture, issued by the early feminists, to conceive women as being as equally and fully human as men. But it can only do this properly if it problematises the dominant conception of the human, and of human culture, as well as that of the rational individual. The challenge then to dominant conceptions of the human involves but is more than a challenge to male domination. It involves also, as we shall see, the challenge to other forms of domination.

RADICAL FEMINISM AND THE MASCULINITY OF CULTURE

What has been variously called cultural feminism or radical feminism has been a major rival to and critic of the feminism of uncritical equality.¹⁴ If liberal feminism rejects the ideals of feminine character, radical feminism (as well as certain forms of socialist feminism) rejects masculine ideals. This rejection gives rise to several themes in ecological feminism. Ideals thought of as masculine are similarly rejected by some ecofeminists and by some feminist theorists of non-violence (Ruddick 1989; McAllister 1982; Harris and King 1989), who link masculine identity and its character ideal (and biological maleness in the case of Gearhart 1982 and Collard 1988) to aggression against fellow humans, especially women, as well as against nature. They reject the absorption of women into this male mould, which is perceived as yielding a culture not of life but of misogyny and death (Daly 1978: 62). The principle behind this critique is important and illuminating, even if it is sometimes presented in an oversimplified form: it is not only women who have been damaged and oppressed by assimilation to the sphere of nature, but also western culture itself which has been deformed by its masculinisation and denial of the sphere associated with women. According to this cultural critique, the dominant forms of western culture have been constructed in part at least through control, exclusion and devaluation of the feminine and hence of the natural. Because western culture has conceived the central features of humanity in terms of the dominator identity of the master, and has empowered qualities and areas of life classed as masculine over those classed as feminine, it has evolved as hierarchical, aggressive and destructive of nature and of life, including human life (Ruether 1975; McAllister 1982; Caldecott and Leland 1983; Miller 1986: 88; Eisler 1988). For women, the real task of liberation is not equal participation or absorption in such a male dominant culture, but rather subversion, resistance and replacement.

While such a critique of male-dominant culture is powerful, it can be interpreted in different ways and accordingly gives rise to different forms of ecological feminism and radical feminism. On the basis of assimilation to certain characteristics of radical feminism, ecological feminism is both critiqued and stereotyped. Radical feminist cultural critiques have suffered from various problems: they often assume women's oppression to be the foundational form of oppression from which all others are derived; the denial of the feminine is conceived as the origin point of the distortion of culture. It has been tempting too for some radical feminist opponents of the dominant culture to try to resolve the problem of the inferiorisation of what that culture has denied and subordinated by the reversal strategy: giving a positive

value to what was previously despised and excluded – the feminine and the natural. But very different interpretations of reversal strategies are open to us. One of the major forms of it, the feminism of uncritical reversal, is just as problematic as the feminism of uncritical equality, I shall argue, and perpetuates women's oppression in a new and subtle form. The uncritical reversal position expresses both a strong tendency within, a potential danger for, and a stereotype of ecological feminism. Some critics of ecofeminism do battle with this stereotype rather than with the substantive concerns and the work (which they do not reference) of ecofeminists (Prentice 1988; Echols 1989: 288; Biehl 1991). On the other hand, while some ecofeminist writers do fall into this stereotype, and while there is an essentially correct insight in the idea of affirming a difference that has been denied and inferiorised, a great deal depends on how the revaluation is carried out and on what is affirmed, as I argue in subsequent chapters.

The simple reversal model, which affirms women as 'nurturant' and celebrates their life-giving powers in a way which confirms their immersion in nature, conceives the alternatives for remaking culture in terms of rival masculinising and feminising strategies. If the masculinising strategy of feminism rejected the feminine character ideal and affirmed a masculine one for both sexes, such a feminising strategy would reject the masculine character ideal and affirm a rival feminine one for both sexes. Several slogans sum up this feminising strategy: 'The future is female', 'Adam was a rough draft, Eve is a fair copy'. But although this is an obvious way to try to find a basis for an ecological feminist argument, it is not, as I will suggest, either the only way or the best way.

THE FEMINISM OF UNCRITICAL REVERSAL

The concept of dualism is central to an understanding of what is problematic in the attempt to reverse the value both of the feminine and of nature. The dualism of western culture has come under sustained criticism from many directions in contemporary feminist and critical thought, from poststructuralist and postmodernist feminism to ecofeminism. Dualism is the process by which contrasting concepts (for example, masculine and feminine gender identities) are formed by domination and subordination and constructed as oppositional and exclusive. Thus as Alison Jaggar writes:

Male-dominant culture, as all feminists have observed, defines masculinity and femininity as contrasting forms. In contemporary society, men are defined as active, women as passive; men are intellectual, women are intuitive; men are inexpressive, women

emotional; men are strong, women weak; men are dominant, women submissive, etc.; ad nauseam. . . . To the extent that women and men conform to gendered definitions of their humanity, they are bound to be alienated from themselves. The concepts of femininity and masculinity force both men and women to overdevelop certain of their capacities at the expense of others. For instance men become excessively competitive and detached from others; women become excessively nurturant and altruistic.

(Jaggar 1983: 316)

Dualism, as a way of construing difference in terms of the logic of hierarchy (Derrida 1981), has been discussed by many feminist and ecological feminist thinkers (Griffin 1978; Jaggar 1983; Plumwood 1986; Warren 1987; King 1989). Only liberal feminism, which accepts the dominant culture, has not had much use for the concept. In dualism, the more highly valued side (males, humans) is construed as alien to and of a different nature or order of being from the 'lower', inferiorised side (women, nature) and each is treated as lacking in qualities which make possible overlap, kinship, or continuity. The nature of each is constructed in polarised ways by the exclusion of qualities shared with the other; the dominant side is taken as primary, the subordinated side is defined in relation to it. Thus woman is constructed as the other, as the exception, the aberration or the subsumed, and man treated as the primary model. The effect of dualism is, in Rosemary Radford Ruether's words, to 'naturalise domination', to make it part of the very natures or identities of both the dominant and subordinated items and thus to appear to be inevitable, 'natural' (Ruether 1975: 189).

As I show in chapter 2, dualism is a process in which power forms identity, one which distorts both sides of what it splits apart, the master *and* the slave, the coloniser *and* the colonised, the sadist *and* the masochist, the egoist *and* the self-abnegating altruist, the masculine *and* the feminine, human *and* nature. But if this is so, clearly we cannot resolve the problem by a simple strategy of reversal, affirming the slave's character or culture, for this character as it stands is not an independently constituted nature, but equally represents a distortion. It is a reflection in the dualistic mirror of the master's character and culture. Thus, for example, to the extent that women's 'closeness to nature' is mainly a product of their powerlessness in and exclusion from culture, and from access to technological means of separating from and mastering nature, affirmation of these qualities, which are the products of powerlessness, will not provide a genuine liberatory alternative. Rather, it reactively preserves and maintains the original dualism in the character of what is now affirmed.

In chapter 2 I develop a more thorough theoretical account of dualism and its politics, and show how to affirm the underside of a dualistic contrast (for example, how to affirm nature in contrast to reason) without employing a reversal of values strategy. Here I want to show how the concept of dualism can illuminate the problem of distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable reversal positions, and the clearer formulation of positions in feminism and ecofeminism.

What is at issue here is not the distinctions between women/men, and human/nature, but their dualistic construction. The concept of the human has a masculine bias (among others) because the male/female and human/nature dualisms are closely intertwined, so much so that neither can be fully understood in isolation from the other. The dualistic distortion of culture and the historical inferiority of women and nature in the west have been based, as we have seen, on a network of assumptions involving a range of closely related dualistic contrasts, especially the dualism of reason and nature, or (in a virtually equivalent formulation), of humanity and culture on the one side and nature on the other. It is necessary to set these assumptions out clearly to dispel the fog of charges that essentialism, biologism and reverse sexism are inherent in ecofeminism (Echols 1983; Prentice 1988: 9; Biehl 1991), and to chart clearly a path which avoids these pitfalls. Setting these assumptions out more fully makes it clearer what the problematic form of the reversal argument is. There are three parts to each set of assumptions which are important for our discussion:

- (A) 1 the identification of the female with the sphere of physicality and nature (women = nature assumption)
- 2 the assumed inferiority of the sphere of women and of nature (inferiority of nature assumption)
- 3 the conception of both women and nature in terms of a set of dualistic contrasts opposing the sphere of nature to that of reason or the human (dualistic assumption)
- (B) 1 the corresponding identification of the male with the sphere of reason, of true humanity and culture (men = reason assumption)
- 2 the assumption of the superiority of the sphere of reason, humanity and culture to that of nature (superiority of reason assumption)
- 3 the conception of the human or cultural sphere in terms of a set of dualistic assumptions opposing it to nature (dualistic assumption).

The fact that there are three parts to each corresponding set of gender assumptions helps to explain why a thoroughgoing development of feminism leads in the direction of a critical, anti-dualist ecological

feminism. For the feminism of uncritical equality can be seen as rejecting only the first item in these two sets of assumptions, namely (A)1 (the women = nature assumption), but as accepting the further assumptions of each set, (A)2 and (A)3, and (B)1 and (B)2, which inferiorise nature and define it dualistically. Thus liberal feminism rejects the idea of a special feminine (connection to) nature, the traditional feminine model for women, and the exclusion of women from true humanity. Its problem, I have suggested, is that it merely aims to disengage women from the sphere of nature. It does so without questioning either the assumption that the natural sphere itself is inferior, or the dualistic assumptions which yield the masculine model of the human itself, namely (A)2 and (A)3.

The form in which the reversal argument is problematic for radical feminism and ecofeminism is one which does just the opposite of this. The problematic form rejects the premises which assert the traditional inferiority of the feminine and of nature, (A)2 and (B)2. Thus it reverses the low or negative value traditionally assigned to the feminine and to nature, but without disturbing the further assumptions, (A)3 and (B)3, which define this sphere as the contrast term of the masculine model of culture and reason. Here, I shall argue, it is not the assumptions (A)1 and (B)1 which are the problem (although much depends on the form in which these are asserted) so much as the dualistic assumptions (A)3 and (B)3.

PREMISE (A)1: THE IDENTITY OF WOMEN AND NATURE

While an ecological feminist argument cannot be based satisfactorily on accepting premises (A)3 and (B)3, there are a number of different ways ecological feminism can go with respect to premise (A)1, which asserts the identity of women and nature. I want to suggest that (A)1 needs to be refined, and whether or not it is acceptable depends on modifications. Premises (A)1 and (B)1 raise a number of difficult issues, which I shall treat first.

First, we might note that (A)1 and (B)1 yield an important part of the master model of human identity: women's alignment with nature has been matched by the development of an elite masculine identity centring around distance from the feminine, from nature as necessity, from such 'natural' areas in human life as reproduction, and around control, domination and inferiorisation of the natural sphere. Such distance has been obtained by the location of value in the area of human character and culture; this expresses masculine ideals as human ideals, and distinguishes humans from the non-human world. This model then yields the dualistic conception of human identity and culture which a critical ecological feminist position should challenge.

Thus as they stand, these two premises would usually be understood as asserting the identity of women with nature conceived as distinct from and exclusive of culture. Conversely, they assert the identity of men with culture as exclusive of and distinct from nature. (That is, (A)1 would read 'Women are, and men are not, part of nature', and (B)2 would read 'Men are, and women are not, part of culture'.) But once we have begun to question human/nature dualism these assumptions are no longer acceptable. As I argue in chapter 2, human identity has, as part of its dualistic construction, been conceived of in terms which are exclusive of and in opposition to nature. A major point of the critical ecological feminist position I shall develop is to argue that we should reject the master model¹⁵ and conceive human identity in less dualistic and oppositional ways; such a critical ecofeminism would conclude that both women and men are part of both nature and culture. This form of ecological feminism, in reconceiving human identity, is not placing women, or in fact men either, back in undifferentiated nature.¹⁶ For critical ecological feminism, premises (A)1 and (B)1 would be acceptable only in a highly qualified form.

Second, premises (A)1 and (B)1 raise the issue of how women's association with nature reflects women's difference, of whether such a difference exists and how it is based. As we have seen, a common misconception is that the critique of the masculinity of dominant culture requires us to affirm women's difference in the form of a special, biologically based feminine connection to nature, now worn as a badge of pride rather than as one of shame, as in the reversal argument (Prentice 1988: 9). But the argument that women have a different relation to nature need not rest on either reversal or 'essentialism', the appeal to a quality of empathy or mysterious power shared by all women and inherent in women's biology.¹⁷ Such differences may instead be seen as due to women's different social and historical position.

Ecological feminists can also be discriminating about the characteristics and aspects of culture they choose to affirm; they need not be confined, as I argue in later chapters, to a choice between Biehl's alternatives of 'demolishing' the complete inheritance of women's past identity or 'enthusiastically embracing it' in its entirety (Biehl 1991: 12). To the extent that women's lives have been lived in ways which are less directly oppositional to nature than those of men, and have involved different and less oppositional practices, qualities of care and kinds of selfhood, an ecological feminist position could and should privilege some of the experiences and practices of women over those of men as a source of change without being committed to any form of naturalism.

Ecofeminist critics, as well as some theorists,¹⁸ often write as if ecological feminism is a unitary position. Both critics and sympathisers

need to acknowledge ecological feminism as diverse and as containing, in varying degrees of development, different and sometimes conflicting positions and political commitments. But there is some ground common to all positions which can be called ecological feminist, namely the rejection of (A)2 and (B)2, which state the inferiority of women and nature. The rejection of these assumptions also provides part of the basic common ground between ecological feminism and those other positions in environmental thought which reject the inferiority of nature, although usually without giving attention to its connection with the inferiorising of women.¹⁹ A more complete and critical ecological feminism, I have argued, goes further still, beyond both the feminism of equality and the feminism of reversal to query *both* sets of assumptions, (A)2 and (A)3, and (B)2 and (B)3, and to call the dualistic construction of both gender identity and human identity into question in a thoroughgoing way.

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AS AN INTEGRATIVE PROJECT

Women have faced an unacceptable choice within patriarchy with respect to their ancient identity as nature. They either accept it (naturalism) or reject it (and endorse the dominant mastery model). Attention to the dualistic problematic shows a way of resolving this dilemma. Women must be treated as just as fully human and as fully part of human culture as men. But both men and women must challenge the dualised conception of human identity and develop an alternative culture which fully recognises *human* identity as continuous with, not alien from, nature. The dualised conception of nature as inert, passive and mechanistic would also be challenged as part of this development.

Thus the anti-dualist approach reveals a third way which does not force women into the choice of uncritical participation in a masculine-biased and dualised construction of culture or into accepting an old and oppressive identity as 'earth mothers': outside of culture, opposed to culture, not fully human. In this alternative, women are not seen as purely part of nature any more than men are; both men and women are part of both nature and culture (Warren 1987; Ynestra King 1989).²⁰ Both men and women can stand with nature (Ynestra King 1989) and work for breaking down the dualistic construction of culture, but in doing so they will come from different historical places and have different things to contribute to this process. Because of their placement in the sphere of nature and exclusion from an oppositional culture, what women have to contribute to this process may be especially significant. Their life-choices and historical positioning often

compel a deeper discomfort with dualistic structures and foster a deeper questioning of a dualised culture.

Writing from a perspective influenced by the Frankfurt school, Patricia Jagentowicz Mills has argued that those ecological feminists who reject the negative value that western culture has attributed to the sphere of nature (which I have argued above is the core assumption of all ecological feminisms) have adopted an 'abstract pro-nature stance'. This is 'theoretically unsound and paves the way for the erosion of women's reproductive freedom' (Mills 1991), by obliging them to oppose abortion rights. Her own proposed solution to the problem would modify the 'abstract pro-nature stance' to take account of the regressive moment of nature, the moment of nature 'red in tooth and claw', which it is essential for women to rise above. A rejection of the negative value traditionally accorded nature, she suggests, would make this impossible.

There are a number of grounds on which to reject Mills's argument. To reject the western construction of nature as an inferior sphere of exclusion is not by any means to adopt an 'abstract pro-nature stance' in the sense of agreeing to abandon oneself to necessity, to accept anything which may happen without resistance, nor to agree to any moral precepts such as 'Nature knows best', whatever they may mean. We do not have to accept a choice between treating 'nature' as our slave or treating it as our master. We do not have to assume that nature is a sphere of harmony and peace, with which we as humans will never be in conflict. A rejection of the western treatment of nature implies a careful, critical and political look at the category of nature. In short, what is involved is not, as assumed in Mills's argument, a simple reversal of the value of nature which embraces the category without further deconstruction.

This approach has major implications for the assignment of women's reproductive activity to the sphere of nature, which has formed much of the traditional basis for their inferiorisation. But this placement of reproduction within a framework of nature/culture dualism is precisely what is now thrown open to question. Much feminist discussion has shown how problematic this dualising framework has been for women (Le Doeuff 1977; McMillan 1982; MacKenzie 1986). A rejection of nature/culture dualism can actually provide a much better framework for thinking about women's reproductive issues than the dualising framework which creates an opposition between the body and free subjectivity.

In terms of the assumptions of nature/culture dualism, women's 'uncontrollable' bodies make them part of the sphere of nature. Such an assumption of women's 'closeness to nature', where nature is taken as the realm of necessity over that of freedom, is of course extremely

problematic for feminists. A contemporary example of the attempt to use the dualistic conception of reproduction to control women is the position (let us call it 'papal ecofeminism') which aims to upgrade traditional women's sphere as nature while denying their freedom to choose, control and structure it, thus denying the basis of their claim as culture. It seeks to imprison women in nature by denying access to available cultural means to mediate nature, and to affirm passivity for women and not for men. In *The Second Sex* Simone de Beauvoir presented a powerful analysis of the effect on women of the conception and treatment of their reproductive as dualised nature. Because reproduction is construed not as a creative act, indeed not the act of an agent at all, it becomes something which is undergone not undertaken, at worst tortured and passive, at best a field for acceptance and resignation. When women's agency and choice are denied, the female body itself comes to be seen as oppressive, the instrument of an invading nature hostile to human subjecthood and alien to true humanity, a nature which can only be subdued or transcended.²¹

The attempt to view women and reproduction in terms of nature/culture dualism is distorting whichever of the alternatives, nature or culture, is chosen. The construction of reproduction as the field of nature makes it the work of instinct, lacking skill, care and value. It is an unshareable and insupportable 'natural' burden which can be allowed to dominate and distort women's lives and destroy their capacity for choice and participation in a wider sphere of life. But if the escape route is meant to be the entry to culture by the rational mastery of the body as nature, then the results are also problematic. If in the rationalistic paradigm (for example, in Hegel), the male body is made rational by being made the instrument of a rationality which transforms nature, the female body is made part of culture by being subject to the control of others taken to represent rationality: medical and other experts, abortion tribunals and the like. As dualised nature, conceived as inert, passive, non-subjects, women have offered a fertile field for such control and manipulation by a rationality which structures women's experience of reproduction in two Cartesian halves: the suffering body deprived of agency, and the mastering, external rational agent.

But reproduction only becomes intelligible as a *project for women* if it is seen in non-dualistic ways, if the body and agency are not split. If it is seen as pure nature it is not a project for the woman, only a process, although it is a project for others, those who actively 'deliver her'. If it is seen as pure culture, it is a project, but one with the wrong features. In the case of its construal as pure culture, the 'project', conceived in instrumental terms as the production of a child, is perhaps best transferred to a surrogate, whether human or mechanical, and directed in the most efficient way to that end, by scientific personnel. It is only

when women are conceived as free agents and choosers with respect to their bodies and as full agents in their reproductive activity that this split is avoided. It is only in such freedom that women's reproductive life is not distorted.

Accordingly, a critical ecological feminism can reject both the distorted choices generated by nature/culture dualism; it can reject the model of women and women's reproducitvity as undifferentiated nature, but it is also critical of the attempt to fit them into a model of oppositional and masculinised culture. The woman-directed movement towards redefining reproduction as powerful, creative and involving skill, care and knowledge with the reproductive woman as subject, should also be understood as the movement to transcending nature/culture dualism. The critical ecological feminism which results from this approach would contain no assumptions which were not acceptable from a feminist standpoint, and would represent a fuller development of feminist thought in taking better account of the category of nature: the key to so much of women's past and present oppression. As a political movement it would represent women's willingness to move to a further stage in their relations with nature, beyond that of powerless inclusion in nature, beyond that of reaction against their old exclusion from culture, and towards an active, deliberate and reflective positioning of themselves *with* nature against a destructive and dualising form of culture.

The programme of a critical ecological feminism orientated to the critique of dualism is a highly integrative one (Plumwood 1986: 137; Warren 1987: 17; 1990: 132), and gives it a claim to be a third wave or stage of feminism moving beyond the conventional divisions in feminist theory. It is not a *tsunami*, a freak tidal wave which has appeared out of nowhere sweeping all before it. Rather, it is prefigured in and builds on work not only in ecofeminism but in radical feminism, cultural feminism and socialist feminism over the last decade and a half. At the same time, this critical ecological feminism conflicts with various other feminisms, by making an account of the connection to nature central in its understanding of feminism (Warren 1990). It rejects especially those aspects or approaches to women's liberation which endorse or fail to challenge the dualistic definition of women and nature and/or the inferior status of nature.

But, as I indicated, critical ecological feminism would also draw strength and integrate key insights from other forms of feminism, and hence have a basis for partial agreement with each. From early and liberal feminism it would take the original impulse to integrate women fully into human culture. Like cultural feminism, it believes this integration is only possible within a culture and concept of the human which is profoundly different from the one we have, one which

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abandons the dualisms which have shaped western culture. But it does not see this in terms of a gynocentric model of the human, or a 'women's culture' grown from women's essential nature. From black, anti-colonialist and socialist feminism, I will argue in the next and subsequent chapters, a critical ecofeminism can draw an understanding of many of the processes and structures of power and domination which are embedded in dualisms. Such an anti-dualist ecological feminism must also be understood then as an integrative project with respect to other liberation struggles, for the dualisms which have characterised western culture, and which are linked philosophically to rationalism, also correspond in important ways to its main forms of repression, alienation and domination, as I argue next.

Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics

Michael E. Zimmerman

Introduction

In this essay, I examine the feminist contention that both reform environmentalism and deep ecology are inadequate means for ending the human domination of nature, because both approaches ignore the decisive phenomena of patriarchy and androcentrism. For example, one of the most important of the reform movements in environmental ethics urges us to "extend" rights to nonhuman beings in order to protect them from human abuse.¹ For many feminists, however, the concept of rights is so bound up with a masculinist interpretation of self and reality that it cannot serve to end the exploitation of nature that arises from that interpretation. At first glance, deep ecology would appear to be in agreement with the feminist critique of reformist environmental ethics. Deep ecology maintains that the humanity-nature relation cannot be transformed by moral "extensionism" or any other variety of reformism.² Instead, this transformation can only begin with the elimination of the anthropocentric world view that portrays humanity itself as the source of all value and that depicts nature solely as raw material for human purposes. Feminists claim, however, that deep ecology obscures the crucial issue by talking about *human-centeredness*, instead of about male-centeredness (*androcentrism*).³ A truly "deep" ecology would have to be informed by the insights of eco-feminists, who link the male domination of nature with the male domination of woman. As Ariel Kay Salleh remarks, in deep ecology:

There is a concerted effort to rethink Western metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics..., but this "rethink" remains an idealism closed in on itself because it fails to face up to the uncomfortable psychosexual origins of our culture and its crisis.... Sadly, from the eco-feminist point of view, deep ecology is simply another self-congratulatory reformist move: the transvaluation of values it claims for itself is quite peripheral.... [T]he deep ecology movement will not truly happen until men are brave enough to rediscover and to love the woman inside themselves.⁴

In what follows I first present a brief account of the feminist explanation for the male domination of nature and woman. This account provides a context helpful for seeing why feminists are dissatisfied with the programs that some males have offered for healing the humanity-nature relationship. I then discuss, in turn, feminist critiques of the reformist "moral extensionism" and of deep ecology. Finally, I offer some critical reflections about some aspects of the feminist critique of deep ecology.

The Feminist Critique of the Domination of Nature

Contemporary feminism is a complex movement, with its share of disagreement about the origins, nature, and importance of patriarchy and androcentrism.⁵ Most feminists would agree, however, that a major source of contemporary social and environmental ills is the fact that patriarchal culture has, on the one hand, repressed and devalued female experience and, on the other hand, has both absolutized and universalized male experience.... Ending this male domination could have dramatic consequences. According to Virginia Held, "If feminists can succeed not only in making visible but also in keeping within our awareness the aspects of 'mankind' that have been obscured and misrepresented by taking the 'human' to be the masculine, virtually all existing thought may be turned on its head."⁶ So long as patriarchally raised men fear and hate women, and so long as men conceive of nature as female, men will continue in their attempts to deny what they consider to be the feminine/natural within themselves and to control what they regard as the feminine/natural outside themselves.

Marilyn French offers the following account of the origin of the male aversion to woman and nature.⁷ Thousands of years ago, men gradually began to define the male as truly human, in contrast with the female, who was portrayed as being only partly human insofar as she was so closely identified with natural processes (birth, lactation, child rearing, menstrual cycles, etc.). The discovery by men of their role in pregnancy may also have enabled them to conceive of women no longer as a miraculous source of life from within themselves, but instead as mere carriers and nourishers of the seed implanted in them by men. The experience of being able to create something with so little personal involvement may have, in turn, led men to conceive of God as a transcendent, nonnatural, "male" source of power. This God replaced the Goddess who had emphasized pleasure, affiliation, mutual caring, harmony between nature and humanity. The idea of God emphasized power, hierarchy, independence, and dualism between nature and males. According to French, the rise of the transcendent, male power-god symbolizes the beginning of the human worship of power. She summarizes her views in the following way:

Patriarchy is an ideology founded on the assumption that man is distinct from the animal and superior to it. The basis for this superiority is man's contact with a higher power/knowledge called god, reason, or control. The reason for man's existence is to shed all animal residue and realize fully his "divine" nature, the part that *seems* unlike any part owned by animals—mind, spirit, or control. In the process of achieving this, man has attempted to subdue nature both outside and inside himself; he has created a substitute environment in which he appears to be no longer dependent upon nature. The aim of the most influential human minds has been to create an entirely factitious world, a world dominated by man, the one creature in control of his own destiny. This world, if complete, would be *entirely* in man's control..., and man himself would have eradicated or concealed his basic bodily and emotional bonds to nature.⁸

The male's conception of himself as essentially cultural, nonmale, nonnatural, immortal, and transcendent, as opposed to the

essentially natural, noncultural, mortal woman, has continued in various guises for several thousand years.⁹ Carolyn Merchant maintains, however, that the patriarchal view of nature as fearsome, threatening, wild, and uncontrollable was tempered for a long time by the alternative vision of Mother Nature: bounteous, kind, life-giving. But with the coming of the modern age, the motherly dimension of nature was eclipsed by the fearsome vision of a wild woman who must be known (Bacon) in order to be controlled. It is probably no accident that the great witchcraft trials raged during the time Europe was making the transition to a mechanistic world view. About this transition, Merchant remarks that:

The metaphor of the earth as a nurturing mother was gradually to vanish as a dominant image as the Scientific Revolution proceeded to mechanize and rationalize the world view. The second image, nature as disorder, called forth an important modern idea, that of power over nature. Two new ideas, those of mechanism and of the domination and mastery of nature, became core concepts of the modern world.... As Western culture became increasingly mechanized in the 1600s, the female earth and virgin earth were subdued by the machine.¹⁰

At the basis of man's attempt to control nature is what has been called the "the God project": the quest to become divine, immortal, incorruptible.¹¹ The drive for such immortality may be said to motivate both the technological domination of nature as well as the nuclear arms race, either of which may result in the destruction of the Earth.¹² Men at war project death and evil onto the enemy: both sides are under the illusion that by killing the enemy, they will have eradicated both mortality and wickedness. Paradoxically, male humanity's effort to deny death and to control all things seems to hasten the death of all things. Rosemary Radford Reuther writes that:

It is not extreme to see this [self-destructive] denouement as inherent in the fundamental patriarchal revolution of consciousness that sought to deny that the spiritual component of humanity was a dimension of the maternal matrix of being.... Patriarchal religion split apart from the dialectical unities of mother religion into absolute dualism, elevating a male-identified consciousness to

transcendent apriority. Fundamentally this is rooted in an effort to deny one's own mortality, to identify essential (male) humanity with a transcendent divine sphere beyond the matrix of coming-to-be-and-passing-away.¹³

While Judeao-Christian scripture sometimes accords nature goodness insofar as it is a creature of God, more often these scriptures assert the absolute difference between God and creation.¹⁴ Genesis tells us that only humans are made "in the image of God" and, hence, are given dominion over the rest of creation. In the patriarchal culture of Jews and Christians, this idea of human dominion over creation was conceived as *male* dominion. In early modern times, the view of the special status of humanity in general, and males in particular, was secularized. Today, even nonreligious modern people take it for granted that there is a natural hierarchy at the top of which stands humankind.¹⁵ Modern Western humanity presumes that only humans are the source of truth, value, and meaning; nature is merely an object whose sole value lies in its usefulness for man. Nature must be channeled and repressed for the purpose of human control, security, and survival. In industrial society, men are trained and disciplined in ways that repress the "useless" and "counterproductive" aspects of nature at work in them, including feelings, emotions, and other "womanly" sensibilities. Power over the human organism is a crucial ingredient of the technological domination of the rest of nature.¹⁶

The technological project is closely linked to the scientific revolution initiated by thinkers such as Descartes. Descartes' extreme rationalism and his subject-object dualism are the products of an extremely masculinist view of self and reality, a view that is shared by many males in modern society. Cut off from their feelings, men become isolated, rigid, overly rational, and committed to abstract principles at the expense of concrete personal relationships. As a result of their attachment to abstract doctrines, males have developed highly rationalistic moral philosophies. Such philosophies include little or no role for *caring* and *feeling* as preconditions for ethics, including the ethic concerning humanity's relation to nature. Marti Kheel notes:

What seems to be lacking in much of the literature in environmental ethics (and in ethics in general) is the open admission that we cannot even begin to talk about the issue of ethics unless we admit that we *care* (*or feel something*). And it is here that the emphasis of many feminists on personal experience and emotion has much to offer in the way of reformulating our traditional notion of ethics.¹⁷

Feminists maintain that most modern moral theory is linked to the very androcentric-patriarchal way of thinking that is responsible for the domination of nature. The rationalistic subject-object dualism is mirrored in the abstract, calculative, rational, and atomistic ethical systems that have arisen to govern competition among men after the death of their biblical God. Such systems lack the relational-intuitive sensibility that feminists maintain is required for the new *ethos* in which the nature-humanity dualism is overcome. The doctrine of "the natural rights of man" is allegedly an example of such an androcentric ethical system. In recent years, a number of environmental philosophers have attempted to "extend" rights to nonhuman beings, in order to protect those beings from human abuse. In the next section, I examine the feminist contention that such moral reformism cannot heal the nature-humanity dualism, since the concept of "rights" is linked to the rationalistic-atomistic metaphysics that has led to the domination of nature.

The Feminist Critique of the "Natural Rights of Man"

It has been argued that moral philosophers attempting to "expand" prevailing moral categories to "cover" the cases of animals or plants are analogous to the "normal scientists" trying to shore up the prevailing paradigm in the face of anomalies (cf. Kuhn).¹⁸ In the face of the anomalous moral issues involved in the human exploitation of nature, however, refinements of the existing ethical paradigms will not be of much help. What is needed, we are told, is a "paradigm shift" that produces a nonandrocentric framework in which nature will appear as something other than an object to be dominated. Such a shift is *not* involved in the efforts by some reformers to "extend" rights to nonhuman beings in order to protect them from human abuse.

Natural rights theory is a typical example of a masculinist moral system, i.e., a system based on a male way of perceiving self, other, and nature.¹⁹ The fundamental claims of natural rights theory are: that humans are endowed with certain inalienable rights, including life, liberty, and property; that humans are morally prohibited from interfering with another person's rights so long as that person does not interfere with legitimate rights of their own; and that humans have a right to defend their rights against those who would attempt wrongfully to deprive them of their rights. Natural rights theorists tend to restrict rights (and moral standing) to human beings, and they portray nonhuman beings as being virtually devoid of intrinsic worth. Locke argued that labor ontologically transforms natural things; they go from being valueless entities to valuable ones when human labor is mixed with them.²⁰ The fact that Locke is one of the founders of liberal capitalism, and that his labor theory of value was very influential on Karl Marx, helps to explain why both capitalism and communism treat nature primarily as an object for human use.²¹

Feminists are not alone in criticizing the doctrine of natural rights, but they maintain that only the feminist critique enables us to grasp both the origins and impact of the atomistic and egoist self-understanding lying at the base of the "rights of man." The doctrine of natural rights, we are told, is androcentric, hierarchical, dualistic, atomistic, and abstract. It is *androcentric* because its conception of human beings is based on a masculinist experience which excludes (and implicitly negates) female experience; it is *hierarchical* because it gives preference to male experience, and also because it portrays humans as radically more important than any other sort of beings; it is *dualistic* because of its distinction between humans (rational, intrinsically valuable, rights-possessing) and nonhumans (nonrational, instrumentally valuable, rights-lacking); it is *atomistic* because its portrayal of human beings (as separate egos) is consistent with the atomistic metaphysics of modern science; and it is *abstract* because conflicts about rights are resolved in rationalistic and impersonal terms that ignore both the feelings and the particular traits/needs of the individuals involved. Founders of the doctrine of natural rights were men who presupposed that the male experience of self, world,

and morality was universal. According to Naomi Scheman, this view is perpetuated by the way in which males are raised within patriarchal structure:

The view of a separate, autonomous, sharply individuated self embedded in liberal political and economic ideology and in the individualist philosophies of mind can be seen as a defensive reification of the process of ego development in males raised by women in a patriarchal society. Patriarchal family structure tends to produce men of whom these political and philosophical views seem factually descriptive and who are, moreover, deeply motivated to accept the truth of those views as the truth about themselves.²²

The idea of the self as an isolated ego competing with other egos for scarce resources was most forcibly articulated by Hobbes. Later, this idea was reinforced by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine, which itself seems to reflect his own experience of competitive, egoistic social relations in nineteenth-century England.²³ Thus, the theory that competitive behavior is "natural" and "necessary" seems based at least in part on the fact that Darwin saw nature through the framework of competitive social categories. It has been argued that the "state of nature" was neither so belligerent nor so male-dominated as Hobbes and Darwin would have had us believe.²⁴ So long as people conceive of themselves as isolated, autonomous egos, who are only externally related to others and to nature, they inevitably tend to see life in terms of scarcity and competition. When people conceive of themselves as internally related to others and to nature, however, they tend to see life in terms of bounty, not scarcity; cooperation, not aggressive competition.

The isolationist-competitive view of human nature, then, reflects not a fact about human nature, but instead the experience of men raised in a patriarchal culture. Feminists argue that liberal political philosophers can adhere to a doctrine of the isolated, independent male ego because they presuppose that *women at home* will continue to knit together the social fabric on which the competing male egos depend.²⁵ Scheman maintains that:

Men have been free to imagine themselves as self-defining only because women have held the intimate social world together, in part by seeing ourselves as inseparable from it. The norms of personhood, which liberals would strive to make as genuinely universal as they now only pretend to be, depend in fact on their not being so—just what we should expect from an ideology.²⁶

From the masculinist perspective, the self appears not to be constituted by relationships with others, but instead is a self-contained entity which constitutes temporary, external relationships with other self-contained entities. If a relationship is terminated (that is, if a contract is ended or broken), the self-contained self is not changed, since the relationship is wholly external. According to Nancy Chodorow, a leading proponent of the psychological school called "object relations" theory, this male view of the self as an isolated ego stems from early childhood relations between son and mother.²⁷ At first, the little boy identifies himself with his mother; later, however, he discovers that he is sexually differentiated from her. Seeking to gain his own sexual identity, the boy experiences his own withdrawal from his mother as abandonment. Experiencing profound anger and grief because of this perceived abandonment, he subsequently fears, mistrusts, and hates women. Moreover, he tends to define himself in a negative way as *not female*. His fear and anger lead him to want to dominate both the woman (mother image) within himself and the woman outside of him. As he grows up, he shields himself from his feelings, which overwhelmed him during the trauma of separation, and he defines himself as radically separate from others: he is hesitant to involve himself once again in relationship, since his most important relationship ended in such pain. Because "mother" was originally identified with all of reality, boys and men tend to regard as "female" the undifferentiated natural background against which individual entities stand out. Mother Nature, then, appears as a threatening, unpredictable force from which a man must differentiate himself and which he must control. Because girls maintain their sense of identity with their mothers for a much longer time than do boys, their sense of self is bound up with relationship. Many women claim that they do not experience themselves as radically separate,

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self-contained egos, but instead as a network of personal relationships. These relationships are not external, but internal and constitutive of the "self." If a relationship is removed or disrupted, the "self" is inevitably affected. Hence, the notion of fending only for "oneself" does not have the same persuasiveness for many women as it tends to have for men, who conceive of themselves as essentially unrelated to others. Caring for others is, for a woman, difficult to distinguish from caring for herself. If men often have difficulty in relating to others, women often have difficulty in assuming their own identity. Carol Gilligan has postulated that the differing senses of self possessed by males and females lead to differences both in moral perception and moral decision making.²⁸ Hence, the male preoccupation with "rights" can be related to the male sense of being an isolated ego competing with other egos for ostensibly scarce resources.

When social atomism was being developed in the seventeenth century, it reflected the scientific trend to conceive of material reality atomistically. Hobbes, for example, explicitly modeled his philosophical anthropology on mechanistic-atomistic scientific principles. Most other thinkers, however, were less strong-minded than Hobbes; partly because they clung to religious ideas about man's immortal soul, they hesitated to reduce man to the state of a mere machine. Thus, they employed Cartesian dualism to distinguish "rational" humanity from "extended" material reality. This dualism allowed them to depict nature as a mere thing without intrinsic value, since nature lacks mind or soul. The doctrine that human beings are intrinsically valuable because they alone possess an immortal soul is based on ingredients drawn from the Greek and Judaeo-Christian traditions. Even after the decline of Greek metaphysics and the Judeo-Christian tradition, modern people continue to maintain that human beings are somehow "special."

This continuing sense of human specialness played an important role in the development of modern moral and legal philosophy, which is notoriously anthropocentric. Hugo Grotius, for example, transformed the Roman doctrine of *jus naturae* (natural right or law) so that it no longer applied to all creatures, but only to rational, self-interested creatures capable of entering into contracts.²⁹ Plants and

Kant, moreover, argued that animals lack moral standing because they are not rational; we are prohibited from abusing them only because such practices may encourage humans to abuse each other.

In part, these changes in moral and legal philosophy stemmed from the modern scientific view that the universe is without meaning or purpose, that it is composed of externally related atoms, and that the atomistic human ego is the source of purpose, value, and meaning. Today, however, many scientists no longer view reality as being constituted by individual, isolated, externally related entities, but instead as a network of internal relationships.³⁰ It is, then, an example of what Whitehead called "misplaced concreteness" to define an animal apart from the environment (air, land, trees, food chains, predators, etc.) that constitutes its "niche." Nothing is separate; all is connected internally. Internal relations are such that they constitute the "reality" of the thing in question; if you alter the relationships, you alter the thing, since it does not exist apart from those relationships. Humanity, too, is an aspect of the fabric of life on Earth; we are not apart. Hence, the emergence of self-conscious human beings can be interpreted as an event by which nature can observe and evaluate *itself*.

The fact-value distinction so important for modern science and philosophy may be undermined by the realization that the universe itself generates novelty, purpose, and diversity. The current dialogue between science and theology reflects the growing trend to regard categories such as "meaning" and "purpose" not as anthropomorphic projections, but instead as ingredients in the cosmos.³¹ Furthermore, the subject-object dualism lying at the base of the fact-value dichotomy is now being overcome by significant changes in the idea of what constitutes scientific research. The masculinist conception of science as an abstract and rationalistic quest for the universal ignores the fact that the quest for understanding must involve moods and feelings that disclose crucial aspects of the particular and unique.³² Androcentric thinking denigrates feelings by asserting that they lack the persuasiveness and universality of conclusions arrived at by way of rational argumentation. Supposedly, rational calculation alone

can serve as the proper guide for the ego in its quest for survival in the harsh, competitive world. From this viewpoint, the only limits to humanity's use of nature are *prudent* ones. Before our enormous industrial activity causes the biosphere to collapse, market mechanisms and technological innovations will lead self-interested human beings to adjust their behavior in order to preserve the conditions needed for human life. Yet the purely prudent and self-interested calculations at work in the exploitation of the nonhuman world can go forward smoothly only so long as one does not allow oneself to *feel* the consequences those calculations have for life on Earth—human as well as nonhuman.³³

In summary, while many feminists acknowledge that the concept of human rights reveals a genuine concern for respecting the interests of other individuals, many feminists are critical of the concept because it is based on masculinist experience that is wrongly universalized and because it fails to include moral categories that arise from a feminine experience of self and world. The experience of relatedness reported by many women gives rise to a morality of caring for the concrete needs of those with whom one is related. This sense of concrete relationship and kinship extends to the natural world as well. Hence, feminists argue that the domination of nature is a masculinist project, one rooted in man's disassociation from the natural world. The doctrine of natural rights is unsuitable for establishing a nondomineering relation between humanity and nature because it (1) is androcentric, (2) regards nonhuman beings as having only instrumental value, (3) is hierarchical, (4) is dualistic, (5) is atomistic, (6) adheres to abstract ethical principles that overemphasize the importance of the isolated individual, (7) denies the importance of feeling for informing moral behavior, and (8) fails to see the essential relatedness of human life with the biosphere that gave us birth. Hence, environmental ethicists who hope to protect nature by "extending" rights to nonhuman beings are part of a reform movement that cannot succeed.

Before concluding this section, some critical observations are in order. After having gone through the phase of seeking to dissolve differences between men and women, many feminists began to affirm

those differences—and to conclude that woman is better than man.³⁴ Hence, some feminists have praised relatedness and feelings at the expense of allegedly "masculinist" traits of individuality and rationality. But other feminists warn that this move runs the risk of simply reaffirming traditional views that women are "feelers," while men are "thinkers." Affirmation of such views is rooted in "essentialist" doctrines of the differences between men and women. Feminists opposed to such essentialism argue that reasoning and feeling are *human* capabilities that do not belong exclusively to one sex or the other. In a non-patriarchal society, human beings would presumably manifest a healthy interplay between emotion and thinking—and moral issues would be informed by both as well. Yet, the notion that a healthy human being would be androgynous, that is, a "combination" of traits currently described as "male" or "female," is problematic insofar as that notion maintains the dualism between male and female. At this stage in human history, we are still groping to understand what it would mean to be a mature man or woman in a non-patriarchal society.³⁵

In any event, many feminists are cautious about simply rejecting the morality of rights and replacing it with a morality of feelings. According to Carole Pateman, for example, some feminists have argued that "since 'justice' is the work of men and an aspect of the domination of women, women should reject it totally and remake their lives on the basis of love, sentiment, and personal relations."³⁶ Pateman counters by arguing that the liberal concepts of rights, justice, and the individual help guide the dialectic that goes on "between the particular or personal and the universal or political...."³⁷

Carol Gilligan has also suggested that a morality of compassion based on the feminine sense of relatedness is complementary with the morality of justice based on the masculine sense of separateness. By overemphasizing interrelatedness, feminists run the risk of leaving no categories for conceiving of people as individuals, or for making moral choices when faced with conflicts between individuals. As Jane Flax notes, "Women, in part because of their own history as daughters, have problems with differentiation and the development of a true self and reciprocal relations."³⁸

Overemphasizing internal relatedness can also be a problem when it comes to environmental ethics. Marti Kheel warns of the danger of a kind of environmental totalitarianism that sacrifices the individual for the good of the whole. Kheel insists that while individuals are not radically separate, but instead are internally related “knots” within the fabric of reality, these knots are intrinsically important:

A vision of nature that perceives value both in the individual and in the whole of which it is a part is a vision that entails a reclaiming of the term *holism* from those for whom it signifies a new form of hierarchy (namely, a valuing of the whole over the individual). Such a vision asks us to abandon the dualistic way of thinking that sees value as inherently exclusive (i.e., they believe that the value of the whole cannot also be the value of the individual).³⁹

Thinkers such as Pateman and Kheel help justify the conclusion that the doctrine of natural rights may be useful if applied in a non-patriarchal, nonatomistic view of humanity and nature, i.e., a view which emphasizes both the essential interrelatedness of all things and the concrete character of the relations between individual “knots” in the cosmic whole. However, so long as natural rights theory presupposes that possessors of rights must be self-interested, rational agents capable of fulfilling the “duties” corresponding to rights; and moreover, so long as natural rights theory clings to metaphysical atomism and egoism, then natural rights theory will not be very useful in correcting current moral problems in the humanity-nature relationship. The reformist impulse behind the extension of rights to nonhuman beings must transform itself into a profound critique of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of patriarchal culture. These androcentric and anthropocentric presuppositions blind us to the fact that human beings are not radically separate from nature, but instead are manifestations of it. We tend to assign rights to those beings which possess attributes (such as consciousness or awareness) resembling our own, for we assume that our attributes are the measure for the rest of reality. A more humble humanity attuned to the internal relatedness of all things would presumably respect all things as ingredients in a social cosmos.

Radical Feminism and Deep Ecology

At first glance, deep ecology may seem to be in almost complete agreement with the feminist view that abstract, dualistic, atomistic, and hierarchical categories are responsible for the domination of nature. A new *ethos*, according to deep ecologists, is required for humans to dwell appropriately on Earth. Moreover deep ecologists—like feminists—have been critical of reformist attempts to extend modern moral categories to “protect” nonhuman beings from human abuse. Feminist critics of deep ecology, however, assert that it speaks of a gender-neutral “anthropocentrism” as the root of the domination of nature, when in fact androcentrism is the real root. Only the interpretive lens of androcentrism enables us to understand the origin and scope of dualistic, atomistic, hierarchical, and mechanistic categories. Deep ecologists are still only reformists: they want to improve the humanity-nature relationship without taking the radical step of eliminating both man’s domination of woman (including the woman inside of each man) and the culturally enforced self-denigration of woman. Moreover, since deep ecology was formulated almost exclusively by men, and since men under patriarchy allegedly think in distorted ways, the similarity between the principles of deep ecology and what we might call eco-feminism may be largely superficial.

In her article “Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection,” Ariel Salleh makes a number of specific criticisms of deep ecology, especially certain works by Arne Naess and Bill Devall.⁴⁰ First, deep ecologists often use sexist language, as for example when they speak unself-consciously of the need for improving “man’s relation with nature.” Use of such language reveals that deep ecologists have not acknowledged the basic social inequality between men and women. Salleh argues that “The master-slave role which marks man’s relation with nature is replicated in man’s relation with woman.” Deep ecologists argue that artificial control of population is a necessary means for developing a new relation with nature. Here, deep

ecologists seem to preach the same gospel as other men before them: controlling female reproductive processes by technical means will solve problems allegedly caused by a natural process. Deep ecologists use highly rationalistic arguments that betray their ongoing commitment to masculinist-scientistic modes of thought. Because their experience is deformed by masculinist modes of thought, male deep ecologists should consult women who are more in tune with the natural world than are men, and who are open to the experience of reality in an alternative way. Solutions proposed by deep ecologists are naive, according to Salleh, insofar as they are offered outside of the context of the critique of patriarchy. For example, when deep ecologists call for decentralizing society, they ignore the fact that patriarchal culture has always favored hierarchy and centralization—and that unless patriarchal consciousness is abandoned, schemes for decentralization are hopeless. Despite their good intentions, then, deep ecologists exhibit a pervasive masculinist bias that works against their aims. Salleh says that

In arguing for an eco-phenomenology, [Bill] Devall certainly attempts to bypass this ideological noose [mechanistic metaphysics]—“Let us think like a mountain,” he says—but again the analysis here rests on what is called a gestalt of person-in-nature: a conceptual effort, a grim intellectual determination to care; to show reverence for Earth’s household and “to let” nature follow “its separate” evolutionary path.⁴¹

Salleh concludes that deep ecologists are males who, damaged by patriarchy, are seeking to heal themselves:

Watts, Snyder, Devall, all want education for the spiritual development of “personhood.” This is the self-estranged male reaching for the original androgynous natural unity within himself. The deep ecology movement is very much a spiritual search for people in a barren secular age; but how much of this quest for self-realization is driven by ego and will? If, on the one hand, the search seems to be stuck at an abstract cognitive level, on the other, it may be led full circle and sabotaged by the ancient compulsion to fabricate performativity. Men’s ungrounded restless search

for the alienated Other part of themselves has led to a society where not life itself, but “change,” bigger and better, whiter than white, has become the consumptive end.... But the deep ecology movement will not truly happen until men are brave enough to rediscover and to love the woman inside themselves. And we women, too, have to be allowed to love what we are, if we are to make a better world.⁴²

Salleh’s critique is, in my opinion, only partly accurate, and her accusatory tone may limit her audience as much as the misogyny of a great deal of systematic thinking diminishes its applicability. It may well be, of course, that men—especially those men who are seeking to move beyond the constricted categories of modern manhood—need to experience the righteous anger of women who have for so long experienced the repressiveness of patriarchal society. Salleh is right, moreover, in saying that most deep ecologists continue to write in the technical-rationalistic style that gives their work some measure of credibility within patriarchy. Yet feminists themselves are familiar with the problem of discovering their own “voice.” And Salleh herself uses a style of writing and argumentation that does not seem radically different from that of deep ecologists such as Devall or Naess. The fact is that in order to gain a hearing within “establishment” journals and presses, authors (male and female alike) must conform to traditional linguistic forms, even though those forms may be aligned with patriarchal social structures.

It is not surprising, of course, to hear that deep ecologists tend to write in ways that are called masculinist, since this is how men and women alike are socialized to write. Is it not possible, however, that despite such a writing style, and despite how they’ve been socialized, male deep ecologists may in fact open to their own feelings and to their relatedness to nature in ways that evade the effects of patriarchy? What to women might appear as a clumsy, obviously male way of speaking might be for the male speaker an expression of a genuine sense of kinship with nature, including the nature within him.

Is it not too sweeping a generalization to say that women are more attuned to nature than are men? Not for Salleh, who claims

that deep ecologists are attuned to nature only in a manner distorted by patriarchal culture, and that their masculinist forms of speaking and writing are signs of that distorted experience. She asserts that such distorted experience occurs because deep ecologists are out of touch with the woman within them. Is the term *woman* meant to refer to the feelings, emotions, and relational sensibility with which many men are out of touch? Yet to conceive of such traits as "feminine" seems to suggest an essentialist and/or genetic doctrine of the differences between men and women: that man is thinker, woman is feeler. Is such a doctrine consistent with the conviction of many feminists that men and women alike are distorted products of the psychological, social, and cultural practices of patriarchy? If we humans are essentially or naturally dichotomized by sex-linked traits (reason vs. feeling), then there is no real point in trying to change human cultural practices. In recent years, a number of feminists have favored such an essentialist view and have concluded that woman is better than man.

This variety of essentialist feminism often rejects reason, science, technology, abstraction, individuation, hierarchy, and so on, as the bitter fruits of patriarchal culture. Other feminists, however, argue that such categories and practices are not intrinsically evil; instead, they become destructive when utilized in a one-sided culture such as patriarchy. The fact that these categories arose within the history of patriarchy does *not* mean that truly liberated women should eschew them entirely in order to avoid being "infected" with patriarchy. Great scientists report that their work is not merely rational and deductive, but involves insight into particular relationships and concrete events. Modern science has gone astray by its pretense to pure objectivity and rationality. Contemporary feminist criticism may help bring about a change in our understanding of the nature of scientific inquiry. Modern science and technology are potentially liberating, but have been misdirected because of the patriarchal view that nature (including human nature) must be exploited to enhance power and security. When social categories change, feminists argue, the technological domination of nature will change accordingly. The fact that all people tend to be distorted under patriarchal

culture leads to another observation about Salleh's critique of deep ecology. If deep ecologists cannot get to the heart of the matter because their experience is too deeply distorted by patriarchy, cannot we say something analogous about women? How can authentic female experience and self-expression be possible under patriarchy? And what can be meant by the concept of "authentic" female experience? Leaving aside essentialist arguments, we would have to conclude that authentic experience cannot be identical with "natural" experience, since human experience is always culturally mediated. Would authentic female experience be that formed by a feminist culture? But what then of authentic male experience? Would it be possible in such a culture? Or must there be two separate cultures, male and female, for members of the two sexes to become truly human? If patriarchy is an interpretive framework, is feminism itself not another such framework? Does feminism pretend to provide a nondistorted, impartial way of interpreting experience? Are feminists raised under patriarchy motivated by their own version of the power drive that is essential to patriarchy?

To such questions, feminists might reply in a two-fold way. First, the quest to articulate feminine experience is motivated by the conviction that many women experience self and world in a way different from that reported by men. Women want and need to validate the fact that there is *another mode* of experience. Such validation is important, even if the experience of women is distorted by patriarchy. Second, this validation makes possible the next stage of development: the search not simply for authentic female experience, but for authentic *human* experience. Required for such experience are cultural arrangements and categories compatible with the development of people who are aware both of their own uniqueness, and of their profound relationships with other people and the rest of the natural world. Cultural practices, then, not genetic differences, are responsible for the current differentiation between "masculine" and "feminine" experience. Ultimately, then, feminism seeks to liberate women and men alike from the distorted mode of existence necessitated under patriarchy. Authentic human existence would inevitably transform the current exploitative treatment of nature.

Critics of feminism, however, regard as disingenuous the claim that the real motive of feminism is to liberate *all* people. Such critics contend that feminists have their own power agenda. Feminists make patriarchy responsible for too much; they portray men as the villains of world history, even though some feminists try to temper this portrayal by saying that *individual* men are not to blame, since they have been socialized to behave in a domineering and destructive way. Further, radical feminism accuses men of projecting unwanted traits onto women and nature. Yet projection is surely not something in which men alone engage. What traits, then, are women projecting such traits? And what benefits accrue to women through projecting such traits? Do women split off from themselves and project onto men violence, aggressiveness, selfishness, greed, anger, hostility, death hating, nature fearing, individuality, and responsibility? And as a result of bearing these projected traits, do men behave much more violently, selfishly, etc., than they would if these projected traits were withdrawn by women? If women do project these traits, one benefit gained would be for them to regard themselves as peaceful, charitable, concerned about others, compassionate, emotional, in harmony with nature, loving, thoughtful, and more truly human. But can such positive, "good" characteristics belong only to one sex? In searching for their own "voice," are feminists willing to acknowledge their own "dark side," which is all too easily projected onto men? And do they realize that men, too, are the victims of patriarchy, that they lack a real "voice" of their own, apart from the impersonal voice that they have assumed in the process of having to split off their own feelings? While benefiting from the material well-being and technological progress made possible by masculinist science and industry, do women rid themselves of responsibility for the negative side effects of such progress by attributing them to rapacious male behavior? Feminists can say that patriarchal categories are the problem, and that changing those categories according to feminist principles will bring about an end to the domination of woman and nature. Yet there is no assurance that new forms of domination and power will not arise in the process.

By way of reply, many feminists acknowledge that individual men

turn out as they do as a result of ancient child-rearing and socialization processes that they themselves did not choose, that women must own up to what they project onto men, that women have their own fears about mortality and have their own resentment against nature, and that the feminist critique of patriarchy must engage in searching self-criticism. Feminists would remind critics, however, of the danger involved in *blaming the victim* for her present condition. For example, in medieval China mothers were responsible for enforcing upon their daughters the terrible practice of foot binding. It is wrong to conclude, however, that women were responsible for this practice, since they were part of a patriarchal culture which *expected* them to behave in this way. Moreover, the fact that women tend to split off from themselves and to project "masculine" traits onto men tends to *disempower* women, and is encouraged by men. Women suffer from being the "second sex." Finally, feminists insist that they are not interested in instituting new forms of control and domination, but instead are seeking to design a participatory process that empowers women and men alike. At present, many people find it difficult to imagine an alternative to a society based on hierarchy and control, since this is the only sort of society we have known for centuries. Human imagination, courage, commitment, and lots of time will be necessary to bring to fruition the dream of a process-oriented society.

To the extent that some women have been less socialized by the atomistic, dualistic, hierarchical categories that—when employed under patriarchy—appear to be responsible for much ill-treatment of nature and woman, it is plausible to suggest that those women are in a better position than most men to help reconstruct the humanity-nature relation in light of their ongoing sensitivity toward and involvement with their own bodies and the rest of nature. We must be careful, however, not to fall prey to the sex-based stereotyping that has been so crucial to maintaining patriarchy. Men and women are both capable of becoming more open to and at harmony with the natural world. Deep ecologists and eco-feminists need to unite in reconstructing Western humanity's current attitudes toward nature.

Notes

1. Examples of such efforts include Christopher D. Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects* (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, 1974); Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York: New York Review, 1975); Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in *Philosophy and Environmental Crisis*, ed. William T. Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974).
2. Some important works on deep ecology include: Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement," *Inquiry* 16 (1973): 95–100; Arne Naess, "The Arrogance of Anti-humanism?" *Ecophilosophy* 6 (1984); Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes," in *Deep Ecology*, ed. Michael Tobias (San Diego: Avant Books, 1984); George Sessions, "Shallow and Deep Ecology: A Review of the Philosophical Literature," in *Ecological Consciousness: Essays from the Earthday X Colloquium*, ed. Robert C. Schultz and J. Donald Hughes (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981); Sessions, "Ecological Consciousness and Paradigm Change," in *Deep Ecology*; William B. Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (1980): 299–322; Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985); Warwick Fox, "Deep Ecology: Toward a New Philosophy for Our Time?" *The Ecologist* 14 (1984): 194–204; Alan Drengson, *Shifting Paradigms: From Technocrat to Planetary Person* (Victoria, BC: LightStar Press, 1983); Michael E. Zimmerman, "Toward a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism," *Environmental Ethics* 5 (1983): 99–131; Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy* (Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982). Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, in *The Green Movement: The Global Promise* (New York: Dutton, 1984), provide a synthesis of deep ecology and radical feminism which can be called eco-feminism. In his book, *The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), Fritjof Capra argues that the decline of patriarchy is one of the three crucial changes that will usher in a new era of improved relations between humanity and the natural world.
3. For bibliographical help on the woman-nature relationship, cf. Jane Yen, "Women and Their Environment: A Bibliography for Research

and Teaching," *Environmental Review* 8 (1984): 86–94. Significant contributions to the literature include: Marti Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," *Environmental Ethics* 7 (1985): 135–149; Ynestra King, "Toward an Ecological Feminism and a Feminist Ecology," in Joan Rothschild, ed., *Machina ex Dea: Feminist Perspectives on Technology* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983); Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Annette Kolodny, *The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as History in American Life and Letters* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); Kolodny, *The Land Before Her* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Brian Easlea, *Science and Sexual Oppression: Patriarchy's Confrontation with Woman and Nature* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981); Elizabeth Dodson Gray, *Green Paradise Lost* (Wellesley, MA: Roundtable Press, 1979).

4. Ariel Kay Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection," *Environmental Ethics* 6 (1984): 339–45.

5. In *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), Alison M. Jaggar provides an insightful account of four major schools of feminism: liberal, traditional Marxist, radical, and socialist. Jaggar favors the Marxist approach. Radical feminists maintain that socialist, Marxist, and liberal feminists make use of masculinist political ideologies. A change of class structure, or the extension of rights to women, cannot solve the problems created by patriarchal consciousness. Other very helpful analyses of the history of modern feminism can be found in Hester Eisenstein, *Contemporary Feminist Thought* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983); and Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds., *The Future of Difference* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985).

6. Virginia Held, "Feminism and Epistemology: Recent Work on the Connection between Gender and Knowledge," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 (1985): 296–307. For a thoughtful critical discussion of the radical feminist critique of masculinist epistemology, cf. Lorraine B. Code, "Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?" *Metaphysics* 12 (1981): 267–276.

7. Marilyn French, *Beyond Power: Women, Men, and Morality* (New York: Summit Books, 1985). According to Ellen Messer-Davidow (personal communication), "Feminist anthropologists point out that some peoples do not align male/female and culture/nature, a construct of the

Enlightenment..., but use generations, language proficiency, or residence (clearing and bush) as constructs to organize their cultures." The male/female, culture/language relationship, then, is apparently not as universal as French seems to think. For an insightful treatment, from a male perspective, of the love-hate relation men have with women, cf. Wolfgang Lederer, *The Fear of Women* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1968).

8. French, *Beyond Power*, p. 341.

9. On the patriarchal attitude toward nature, cf. Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?" in Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., *Woman, Culture, and Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); and Joan Bamberger, "The Myth of Patriarchy: Why Men Rule in Primitive Society," in *Woman, Culture, and Society*.

10. Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature*, p. 2. Cf. also Brian Easlea, *Witch-Hunting, Magic, and the New Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980); and Mary Daly, *Gyn/Ecology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).

11. Cf. R. Reuther, *New Woman, New Earth* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); also cf. Ken Wilber, *The Atman Project* (Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 1980); Wilber, *Up From Eden: A Transpersonal View of Evolution* (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1981).

12. Cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, "Humanism, Ontology, and the Nuclear Arms Race," *Research in Philosophy and Technology* 6 (1983): 151-72; Zimmerman, "Anthropocentric Humanism and the Arms Race," *Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Michael Fox and Leo Groarke (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 1985).

13. Reuther, *New Woman, New Earth*, pp. 154 ff.

14. The pioneering essay criticizing the environmental consequences of the Judaeo-Christian tradition is Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis," *Science* 155 (1967): 1203-07. Cf. also David Crownfield, "The Curse of Abel," *North American Review*, Summer, 1973, pp. 58-63. Cf. Mary Daly's famous feminist critique of patriarchal Christianity, *Beyond God the Father* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973); also Reuther, *New Woman, New Earth*. In defense of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, cf. Loren Wilkinson, *Earthkeeping: Christian Stewardship of Natural Resources* (Grand Rapids: Erdman's, 1980); Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, *A Worldly Spirituality: The Call to Redeem the*

Earth (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). Cf. also the work done by Vincent Rossi and his colleagues of The Eleventh Commandment Fellowship, PO Box 14606, San Francisco, CA 94114. The "eleventh commandment" reads: "The Earth is the Lord's and the Fullness thereof: Thou shalt not despoil the Earth, nor destroy the Life thereon."

15. Cf. William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

16. Concerning the idea that modern technology shapes both human body and mind to its purposes, cf. the work of members of the Frankfurt Critical School, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse; more recently, cf. the work of Michel Foucault; also cf. David Michael Levin, "The Body Politic: Political Economy and the Human Body," *Human Studies* 8 (1985): 235-78.

17. Kheet, "The Liberation of Nature," pp. 143-44.

18. Cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

19. For a review of criticisms of natural rights, cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, "The Crisis of Natural Rights and the Search for a Non-Anthropocentric Basis for Moral Behavior," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 19 (1985): 43-53. Notable critiques include: Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in his *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, *Philosophical Perspectives*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); H.J. McCloskey, "Rights," *Philosophical Quarterly* 15 (1966): 115-27; H.J. McCloskey, "Moral Rights and Animals," *Inquiry* 22 (1979): 23-25. Cf. also Tom Regan's critical response to McCloskey, "McCloskey on Why Animals Cannot Have Rights," *Philosophical Quarterly* 26 (1976): 251-257. And cf. Michael Zimmerman, "The Crisis of Natural Rights" and Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," *Philosophy and Environmental Crisis*, ed. William T. Blackstone (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 43-68. Also cf. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," *Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1978): 308-25. Goodpaster maintains that Feinberg mistakenly restricts rights to individual animals, and insists that entire bioregions can be said to have an interest of their own, too. Cf. also Christopher D. Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects*, along with John Rodman's critique of Stone in Rodman's incisive essay, "The Liberation of Nature?" *Inquiry* 20 (1977): 83-131.

For a critique of the "natural rights" approach to environmental ethics, cf. J. Baird Callicott's review of Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, *Environmental Ethics* 7 (1985): 365–72. Finally, cf. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "From Egoism to Environmentalism," in *Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Century*, ed. Kenneth E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1979).

20. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government*, in Burtt, *The English Philosophers from Hobbes to Mill* (New York: Modern Library) pp. 419–420: "For it is labor indeed that puts the difference of value on everything.... Nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves." Cf. Lorenne M.G. Clark, "Women and Locke: Who Owns the Apples in the Garden of Eden?" in *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche*, ed. Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1979). Ellen Messer-Davidow (personal communication) has argued that "Locke is not guilty of dualism... because he does not divide beings into two categories. Instead of only humans and animals or only males and females, he recognizes several categories: animals, women, men, children, various socioeconomic classes, and people who do not have full use of their faculties (his terms: idiots, etc.). In other words,... Locke does not construct living beings in rigid dichotomies. He distinguishes not two but several categories."

21. On the Marxist treatment of nature, cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, "Marx and Heidegger on the Technological Domination of Nature," *Philosophy Today* 23 (1979): 99–112; Kostas Axelos, *Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx*, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976); Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: New Left Books, 1971); Albrecht Wellmer, *The Critical Theory of Society*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971).

22. Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science*, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), p. 234.

23. Cf. Ruth Hubbard, "Have Only Men Evolved?" in *Discovering Reality*. For a nonfeminist criticism of the circularity of Darwin's rea-

soning about "natural" competition, cf. Jeremy Rifkin, *Algeny* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984).

24. Michael Gross and Mary Beth Averill, "Evolution and Patriarchal Myths of Scarcity and Competition," *Discovering Reality*, p. 72. Cf. Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious," in *Discovering Reality*, for an insightful account of how Hobbes' competitive view of human nature is rooted in a masculinist philosophical anthropology.

25. On the antagonism between family and society, personal and public relationships, cf. Carole Pateman, "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice," *Ethics* 91 (1980): 20–34.

26. Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in *Discovering Reality*.

27. On object-relations theory, cf. Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Chodorow, "Family Structure and the Feminine Personality," in *Woman, Culture, and Society*; Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Political Unconscious." For a critical exchange on object-relations theory, cf. Judith Lorber, Rose Laub Coser, Alice S. Rossi, and Nancy Chodorow, "On the Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate," *Signs* 6 (1981): 482–514.

28. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). For an appraisal of the moral development approach to ethical issues, cf. the essays in the special issue of *Ethics*, vol. 92 (April 1982).

29. Cf. John Rodman, "Animal Justice: The Counter-Revolution in Natural Rights and Law," *Inquiry* 22 (1979): 3–22.

30. Cf. John P. Briggs and F. David Peat, *Looking Glass Universe: The Emerging Science of Wholeness* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Nick Herbert, *Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics* (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1985); John Briggan, *In Search of Shroedinger's Cat: Quantum Physics and Reality* (New York: Bantam Books, 1984); Paul Davies, *Other Worlds: Space, Superspace and the Quantum Universe* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); Fritjof Capra, *The Tao of Physics* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Roger S. Jones, *Physics of Metaphor* (New York: New American Library, 1982); Charles

Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., *The Liberation of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For a feminist approach to the new physics, cf. Robin Morgan, *The Anatomy of Freedom: Feminism, Physics, and Global Politics* (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1982), especially the chapter called "The New Physics of Meta-Politics," and Marti Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair." For a deep ecological approach to the new physics, cf. J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics," *Environmental Ethics* 7 (1985): 257-75.

31. Cf. A.R. Peacocke, *Creation and the World of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

32. On the importance of feeling as a mode of disclosure in such realms as physical science, cf. Evelyn Fox Keller, *A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983); *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); "Feminism and Science," in *The Signs Reader: Women, Gender, and Scholarship*, ed. Elizabeth Abel and Emily K. Abel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); "Gender and Science," *Discovering Reality: "Women, Science, and Popular Mythology," Machina ex Dea*.

33. There have been male philosophers who have emphasized the importance of feeling and sentiment in moral theory. David Hume is the most important example. Concerning the value of Hume's thought for environmental ethics, cf. J. Baird Callicott, "Elements of an Environmental Ethic," *Environmental Ethics* 1 (1979): 71-81; Callicott, "Hume's Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology of Leopold's Land Ethic," *Environmental Ethics* 4 (1982): 163-74.

34. On this shift in the feminist movement, cf. Eisenstein, *Contemporary Feminist Thought*, and Eisenstein and Jardine, eds., *The Future of Difference*.

35. My thanks to Kathryn Carter for conversations that helped to clarify these issues.

36. Carole Pateman, "'The Disorder of Women': Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice," *Ethics* 91 (1980): 33.

37. Ibid.

38. Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious," *Discovering Reality*.

39. Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature," p. 140.

40. Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology." The essays she criticizes are Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement," and Bill Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement."
41. Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology," p. 311.
42. Ibid.