



MOBILEUM

5G SEPP



Contents

- 5G overview
- Mobileum integrated firewall / SEPP



5G signalling (API) – protocol stack

JSON

- Serialisation data format for 3gpp information elements
- De-facto standard for web services
- Straightforward to specify. Widely available tooling

HTTP/2


- Binary framing
- Multiplexing requests
- Header compression

TCP

- De-facto standard for web services
- More widespread than SCTP
- Redundancy and load balancing via “cloud magic”



Protocol evolution



| | | | | |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Parameters | Mostly fixed | Mostly fixed | Flexible AVPs | Free text |
| E2E security | Not used | Not used | Not used | Being defined |
| Session | TCAP dialogue | TCAP dialogue | Diameter Req/Resp (id) | Http Req/resp (id) |
| E2E routing | Global title | Global title | Host/realm route record | Host |



5G interconnect security requirements

- Encryption of sensitive parameters not needed by IPX
 - E.g. SUPI/IMSI, keys, (location)
- Protection against replay attacks
- Integrity of message
- Authentication of sender
- For IPX (i.e. outsource routing, billing, services)
- Ability to modify parameters (as allowed by operators)
- Log of IPX making changes
- Integrity of message

Authentication

Who is the real sender?

Integrity

Was the message /parameter modified?

Replay protection


Can a message be recorded and replayed

Confidentiality

Can the message /parameter be read




Routing evolution and risks



- Defence – protection not implication
 - End to End encryption and authentication
- IPX needs to inspect and modify messages
 - Provide commercial benefit particularly to smaller operators
 - Roaming hub – i.e. Merge small operator to “look” the same
 - Roaming services – e.g. VHE, Sponsored roaming




5G interconnect security overview



SEPP – Provides encryption, integrity and authentication

- SEPPs authenticated using TLS (N32-c)
 - Negotiate cipher suites for messages over interconnect
 - Exchange protection policies per NE roaming partner – what is encrypted
 - E.g. SUPI, location, keys, authorisation tokens
 - Policies on what can be modified per IPX and per roaming partner
- SEPPs encrypt and sign all messages over N32-f using JOSE (JSON web signing encryption)
 - Using JWE – JSON web encryption & signature (with symmetric key from TLS key export)
- IPX modify, append and sign changes
 - Using JWS JSON web signature (IPX private key from client PLMN)

5G interconnect security overview (N32)



See TS 33.501




5G Summary

- SEPP secures 5G interconnect – encryption, integrity and authentication of signalling
- Improves security of interconnect versus 2G/3G and 4G
- Additional to firewall and potentially combined
- Enables IPX business model, but allows operators to control what is modified



4G retrofit - DESS

- DESS Diameter end to end security (i.e. encryption/authentication on Diameter)
- Add for SMS interface initially
- New AVPs
 - Signing realm
 - Signature
 - Encrypted container
- Discussion still on encryption / discovery






Contents

- 5G overview
- Mobileum integrated firewall / SEPP



Mobileum SEPP

- SEPP
 - › As per 23.501
 - › N32c and N32f
 - › Authentication, Encryption and key exchange
- Combined SEPP and 3G/4G/5G firewall
 - › 5G firewall – i.e. rules AND SEPP authentication/encryption
 - › Consistency and state/location checks
 - › Cross protocol correlation (e.g. service information, location)
- Support for DESS (once defined)
 - › i.e. Encryption and authentication on 4G (diameter) signalling
- Available 2020
- Common architecture with 2G/3G/4G (i.e. NIF / application / data analytics)





MOBILEUM
THANK YOU