## Semi-parametric dynamic contextual pricing

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## **Dynamic pricing**

- Several platforms have access to data describing history of different users.
- ▶ Platforms can leverage this information to price different products and optimize revenue.
- ► This requires learning online the mapping from user context to optimal price, efficiently.

#### **Basic Framework**

- ightharpoonup Discrete times  $1, 2, \dots, n$ , one user arrives per time step
- ► Each user is shown one product, which is ex-ante fixed
- ▶ Let  $V_t$  be the value  $t^{th}$  user assigns to the product.
- ightharpoonup Let  $p_t$  be the price set by the platform.
- ▶ The user buys the product if  $p_t \leq V_t$ .
- ▶ Platform does not know or observe  $V_t$ , but has access to covariates  $X_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$  which may describe user's history and product's type
- ▶ Goal: set prices  $p_1, \ldots, p_n$  so as to maximize  $\sum_{t=1}^n p_t \mathbf{1} \{ p_t \leq V_t \}$ .

## Predicting $V_t$ : The Data

- Input:  $\{X_i, p_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$ .  $X_t$ : covariate.  $p_t$ : price
- ▶ Output:  $\{Y_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$ , where

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V_i - p_i \ge 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

In other words,  $Y_i$  captures whether  $i^{\text{th}}$  was success or failure.

## Predicting $V_t$ : The Model

Suppose,

$$V_i = \theta_0^{\mathsf{T}} X_i + Z_i$$

 $\theta_0$ : unknown parameters,  $Z_i$ : unknown demand-shock/noise.

- If we assume  $Z_1, \ldots, Z_{t-1}$  are i.i.d. **Gaussian**, then we obtain **Probit** model with input  $\{X_i, p_i\}_{i=1}^t$ .
- Similarly, we obtain Logistic model for i.i.d. Logistic distributed demand-shocks.

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- Even if we knew  $\theta_0$  exactly, the actual structure of distribution of demand-shocks is important to set optimal markups.
- $\triangleright$  Can we learn the actual distribution of shocks along with  $\theta_0$ ?

# Predicting $V_t$ : Our Semi-parametric Model

► Let

$$\ln V_i = \theta_0^{\mathsf{T}} X_i + Z_i$$

 $\theta_0$ : unknown parameters,  $Z_i$ : unknown demand-shock/noise.

- Demand-shocks are i.i.d. with arbitrary (non-parametric) distribution.
- ▶ Input:  $\{X_i, p_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$ , Output:  $\{Y_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$  where  $Y_i = \mathbf{1} \{V_i p_i \ge 0\}$ .

# Semi-parametric Model: Curse of Dimensionality

- Usually, such semi-parametric models with binary feedback are hard to learn.
- ► That is one of the reasons why previous works on dynamic contextual pricing only consider probit/logistic/generalized-linear models.

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- ► That is one of the reasons why previous works on dynamic contextual pricing only consider probit/logistic/generalized-linear models.
- Key leverage we find and use: Platform controls prices, and it is possible to focus learning in the regions which are revenue maximizing.

## **Price Experimentation**

#### Conflicting goals:

- ▶ Observe  $X_t$ . Set price  $p_t$  to better learn  $\theta_0$  and distribution of Z. (exploration)
- ▶ Observe  $X_t$ . Set price  $p_t$  to maximize revenue. (exploitation)

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As we learn more, we can zero in the further exploration near profit maximizing regions.

### The Oracle

Let us first consider a simpler problem.

- ▶ Consider an Oracle which actually knows  $\theta_0$  and the distribution of Z.
- Now, let

$$F(z)=z\mathbb{P}(Z\geq \ln z), \text{ and } z^*=\arg\sup_z F(z).$$

#### **Proposition**

The following pricing policy maximizes revenue for the Oracle: At each time t set price  $p_t^*$  such that

$$\ln p_t^* = \theta_0^\intercal X_t + \ln z^*.$$

## Regret

- ▶ Platform's revenue:  $\Gamma_n = \sum_{t=1}^n p_t \mathbf{1} \{ p_t \leq V_t \}.$
- ▶ Oracle's expected revenue:  $\Gamma_n^* = \sum_{t=1}^n p_t^* \mathbf{1} \{ p_t^* \leq V_t \}.$
- ▶ Expected regret:  $\mathbb{E}[R_n] = \mathbb{E}[\Gamma_n^*] \mathbb{E}[\Gamma_n]$ .
- Maximizing  $\mathbb{E}[\Gamma_n]$  is equivalent to minimizing  $\mathbb{E}[R_n]$ .
- ▶ We will focus on minimizing  $\mathbb{E}[R_n]$ , asymptotically in n.

# **Designing Optimal Algorithm: Key Ideas**

- ▶ Recall, revenue maximizing policy for Oracle:  $\ln p_t^* = \theta_0^{\mathsf{T}} X_t + \ln z^*$ .
- For each z and  $\theta$ , think of  $(z,\theta)$  as an arm (i.e. a potential option). Pulling arm  $(z,\theta)$  is equivalent to setting price  $p_t$  such that  $\ln p_t = \theta^\intercal X_t + \ln z$ .
- $ightharpoonup (z, \theta) \in \mathbb{R}^{d+1}$ : Curse of dimensionality?
- Important observation: Given  $X_t$ , for each choice of price  $p_t$  we simultaneously obtain information about the expected revenue for a range of pairs  $(z, \theta)$ .

# **DEEP-C Pricing Algorithm: Summary**

DEEP-C: Dynamic Experimentation and Elimination of Prices - with Covariates.

- ▶ Maintain a set A(t) of 'active arms'  $(z, \theta)$  at each time.
- $\blacktriangleright$  At time t, observe  $X_t$  and compute the set of active prices:

$$P(t) = \{ p_t : \exists (z, \theta) \in A(t) \text{ s.t. } \ln p_t = \theta^{\mathsf{T}} X_t + \ln z \}.$$

- ▶ Choose price  $p_t$  at random from P(t).
- Description Observe the revenue obtained. Eliminate  $(z,\theta)$ 's from A(t) for which there is enough information about sub-optimality.

#### The main result

Under some smoothness, compactness, independence, etc. assumptions, the following holds.

#### **Theorem**

The expected regret of DEEP-C algorithm satisfies the following: there exists a constant c such that

$$\mathbb{E}[R_n] = O\left(d^c\sqrt{n}\right).$$

### **Conclusions**

- ► To learn via price experimentation, we do not need to make parametric (probit/logistic type) assumptions.
- We have a provably efficient algorithm which works under a 'very general' setting.