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1. Homage to Visnu, the sole cause of the origin, subsistence and annihilation of the world, the sole cause of perfect bliss, for whom everything is as instantly evident as a myrobala in the hand.

To Yamuna, God's omniscience consists in this unlimited percipience, so that, as he will argue below (§ 109), the validity of Pancarātra does not rest only on Scripture, but also on Perception.

2. Those of my contemporaries who are 'profoundly dishonest and will condemn a penetrating treatise, however great its merits, because they are envious, (may condemn it.) There are many others, who have an excellent judgment of what is essential and what is not-honest students who do not cavil; and they will praise my work

3. Even erudite scholars may err when their critical acumen is dominated by partisan views; yet, let the sagacious without envy study the Bhāgavata doctrine as I shall present it here.

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4. There are certain people whose minds are confused by the noise of multitudes of sophisms and falsehoods which are borrowed from anyone that comes and claiming superiority for their own studies and learning, and pretending to protect the Way of the Veda,' they refuse to accept the authority of Pañcaratra Tantra which, being composed by the Supreme Person Himself, leads to unparalleled beatitude.

In the purva paksa the principal opponents introduced are what one may already call smārta brahmins, and among them especially the orthodox followers of Mimāmsa. Vedanta opposition will be discussed.

And they contend:

It has been decided that Verbal Testimony is a means of knowledge in two ways: dependent testimony which depends on other authority, and independent testimony.

shabda, and its synonyms, have been translated variously as Verbal Testimony, Verbal Evidence in general, or Scripture in particular, depending on the context.

These two kinds are thus distinguished:

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No verbal assertion can be a means of valid knowledge if it has been formulated by a person;

for a verbal assertion to be authoritative, it must by definition be independent.

That is to say: verbal evidence which originates from a person carries authority only then when it is used to corroborate a fact which has already been truly established by other means of knowledge, and which enables the speaker to take this fact for granted.

prāmāna has generally been rendered with "means of knowledge," sometimes with "criterion."

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Now, Perception and the other means of knowledge which involve Perception.

cannot produce the knowledge

that the Pañcaratra Tantra does indeed set forth that the desired heaven, release and other supernatural ends

can be attained by means of such ritual acts as Consecration and such devotional acts as worship of the Bhagavan etc., for this relation of means and ends is not of the order of Perception.

For if we consider Consecration, worship etc. merely with the aid of Perception,

we cannot say that they are means to realize the summum bonum.

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Not only, therefore, is Perception of an ordinary kind unavailing, but there is also no way to know that there have been recently certain persons of superhuman sensibility who would have had perceptual evidence that such acts really are means of attaining the desired ends; for the sense-organs of such persons, too, cannot surpass the boundaries of sensitiveness as we know it commonly.

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5. An objection may be raised here:

However, perception of a superior kind is possible, depending on its percipient.

Perception, therefore, may become perfect if the percipient is perfect.

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[[3]] That is to say:

a finite thing may be found to become infinite; for instance, extent becomes infinite in space,

which is infinitely extended.

Similarly, we find that finite Perception is considerably widened in air-borne creatures, like crows, owls, vultures etc.,

so that Perception might conceivably become infinite in some being.

 This indeed is the uppermost limit of knowledge where it encompasses every knowable thing; for we know from experience that knowledges exceed one another as their contents exceed one another.

jagati or toke??: "in the world of experience, in common experience."

That is why the wise can say that there is Someone in Whom such finite qualities as supremacy, dispassionateness, power etc. subsist in an infinite and unequalled condition.

That is why the wise can say that there is Someone in Whom such finite qualities as supremacy, dispassionateness, power etc. subsist in an infinite and unequalled condition.

Consequently, this Person whose immediate perception encompasses the entire range of things that are present in the world is hereby explained to be the Bhagavan who has immediate perceptual knowledge that Consecration, worship and so forth are dharma.

So what remains unproved? (is improper).

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6. This objection is thus refuted:

The supreme perceptual knowledge which you assume is just a fancy. Perceptual knowledge can never go beyond its own sphere and trespass on another.

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For instance:

A superior kind of visual perception, as well as a superior perceptible object, must necessarily occur in loci where inherent relations of one kind, as between colour and coloured, obtain in one object.

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No knowledge that is received through one of the senses can encompass all that is knowable through all senses.

So how can perceptual knowledge by itself make all things known,

i.e. also things known only through other means of ... knowledge?

7. The objector resumes:

However, the sensitivity which we attribute to Perception is directed toward the perceiving of what exists at present.

Of course, if Perception did not have this function of perceiving what exists at present as its natural function, it would cease to be Perception at all.

Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that a superior kind of Perception,

defined as encompassing all objects, is a priori impossible because it is limited to being Perception!

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8. The objection is refuted:

If from finite Perception you conclude to infinite Perception, then I ask you to explain:

can a finite quantity ever attain to such expansion that it cannot be further expanded?

You insist, as it were, on full maturity in a little boy! even as a boy, after attaining the full growth, cannot grow physically fur-

Punctuate after iti which closes the question introduced in prsto vyā-castām:

abhi-ni-vis "to stick to a partisan view (in the teeth of contrary evidence)." I take bala iva as sandhi for bāle iva,

the meaning being that the objector takes the view that something limited (the boy) is really unlimited (mature adult).

There are two possibilities: either the infinite exists in the finite, or the finite gradually becomes infinite.

The former cannot stand, for there is no Perception to support it: we have never seen a bowl or a similar finite object which had the same expansion as space.

[[5]] And suppose a finite quantity could assume inconceivable infinitude: why, then any single jar or pitcher could fill up the entire space within the Egg of Brahma,

so that all other things would be pushed out and perish accordingly!

If you take space itself as the subject, you merely prove the proved.

In the alternative

you cannot avoid the illogicality we have pointed out:

siddhasadhana, one of the defects of an argumentation by which proof is sought of that which is already proved or established. Space (akāta) is, by definition, unlimited and cannot illustrate the thesis that something finite can be infinite.

as a matter of fact, never before has anybody seen a finite pillar which was pervaded by an infinite pillar

Consequently, there remains the defect of mutual exclusion.

vibhu in the sense of "omnipresent, infinite."

Let us also consider your illustration,

namely that in space we have an example of a finite extent becoming infinite.

Extent is by definition a limited extension of space, a relative quantity, something that can be entirely circumscribed.

 Extent in this definition does not subsist in space as such, so how can you adduce it as an example?

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Besides, if one were to infer extent in space,

one would simultaneously infer the possibility that space might be surpassed in extent by another quantity.

And so the illustration again falls short of the thesis.

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Nor is there any evidence for the thesis

that a superior perception reveals that Consecration, worship etc. are actually dharma.

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To sum up:

For all these reasons

it would appear to us that the supposition that

some, otherwise unperceived, supreme spiritual being exists with a superior sensibility

is very weak;

and this being so,

we conclude that Perception offers no authority

for the postulated relation of means to ends;

and since the authority of Pañcaratra is based upon the Perception of this supposed relation,

its authority is entirely non-existent.

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Relation of means to ends - namely, the Pañcaratra postulation that such tantric ceremonies as consecration (ditsa), etc, are means leading to the

summum bonum.

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9. Not only is there no Perception,

but there cannot possibly be an Inference to support the thesis in question,

for it is wholly suprasensible:

and Inference, of course, can only take place

after an invariable concomitance has been observed by means of Perception.

If no fires have ever been observed before,

they cannot prove that smoke is invariably concomitant with them."

In the standard inference:

the mountain has fire, because it has smoke, as in the case of the kitchen.

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10. Nor do we find scriptural evidence which sets forth

that the performance of all the rites which are established in the Satvata doctrine is mandatory;

such evidence would have proved that the Pañcaratra Tradition, being based upon this mandate, carried authority.

Yamuna throughout treats Satvata and Bhāgavata as synonymous.

Nor is it possible, in the absence of explicit revelation, to infer such evidence from Scripture.

For just as the relation of means to certain ends which are their fruits, e.g., heaven, as Pafcarātra maintains Consecration, worship etc. to be, does not allow of being inferred

because no such relation can be (determined) verified by Perception,

just so, no scriptural authority to furnish the basis of such a relation can be inferred from Scripture.

Nor is any verbal testimony capable of providing valid knowledge that Scripture is the basis of the Tradition concerned - Verbal testimony is of two kinds, originating from a person or not originating from a person.

pauruşėya and apauruseya; the latter has in the sequel been rendered with "preterpersonal." Person here does not mean only "human person" but "any being endowed with personal features, including God."

"Eternal Scripture" (āgama) is preter-personal scripture, since any verbal statement originating from a person is cotemporal with that person, and the purvapaksin does not admit the existence of an eternal personal deity.

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Personal speech cannot be proof of it, for persons may lie in order to deceive their hearers.

For even today, we find philosophers who pretend to be scriptural and yet expound an interpretation which is wholly unscriptural.

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[[7]]

So we have our doubts whether the claim made by the authors of the Pañcaratra texts

that their own compositions are founded in the Veda is really the result of an honest conviction that such is indeed the case, or nothing but the self-glorification of authors who write as their fancy takes them!

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This argumentation by itself suffices to disprove the contended authority of Pañcarātra,

for there is no eternal Scripture to support the claim.

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Nor can Analogy prove that Scripture is its basis, for this criterion cannot be properly applied; for how could the proof we need, which cannot be found by the other means of knowledge, be within the scope of the mere knowledge of similitude?

Nor can it be argued that, since the Tradition cannot be proved by other means, Implication proves that Scripture is its basis. The argument is as follows, circumstantial Implication must prove the tradition, as it cannot be proved otherwise.

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Implication - namely, the relation of being a means to a certain end.

arthapatti, throughout translated "circumstantial-implication".

It is a kind of inference

by which is established something

that must be established,

yet is not established by another means of knowledge; for example:

"Devadatta, who is well-fed,

does not eat by day:"

since he cannot be well-fed without eating at all,

it is deduced, by circumstantial implication, that he eats by night.

the authors of the Pañcaratra, clearly have this tradition that Consecration, worship, etc. are dharma and this tradition is comparable to the tradition of Manu and others that certain non-Vedic rites, as the astaka etc., are dharma;

KMS 1.3.2 api od kartrsamanyāt pramāṇam anumānam syat - "smrti is authoritative, because both smrti and Veda have the same agent performing its mandates,"

aştaka is the name of the 8th day after Full Moon in the winter and śiśira months.

on which an oblation is performed for the deceased (Manu 4.119; 150).

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now there can be no tradition of a fact unless that fact has been cognized before;

but here we have the tradition of a fact that cannot be proved by Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony or Analogy;

therefore the cognition of the fact can only have originated from Scripture...

[[8]]

However, this argument would only prove its point if there were any authority for the assumption that cognitions are invariably true.

But when certain notions which are produced by the false cognitions of people

whose judgement is clouded by hatred, prejudice and obstinacy, cause such "traditions" to be written in accordance with these false cognitions,

could these traditions possibly be true?

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11. Here an objection may be raised:

However, the same arguments may be advanced against the authority of the traditions of Manu etc. The observation of the aṣṭaka rite does not produce any perceptual knowledge that this rite is indeed a means to realize the postulated end.

Nor can it be inferred, because no relation is perceptually given. Nor is there any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found. Nor is there any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found.

Nor again can such evidence be inferred from Scripture where it is not found explicitly,

because no relation is perceptually given.

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Nor can it be proved, through Analogy, as there is no apparent analogue.

Nor through circumstantial Implication, because of the reasons given above against the argument that it is otherwise unprovable.

Now, if it is legitimate in one case to presume scriptural authority in support of it because there happens to be a well-established tradition about it among Vedic experts,

well, in Pancarãtra, too, ...

great sages are traditionally known as the founders of the sacred transmission, sages like Narada, Sanḍilya and others.

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The same objections and the same justifications can be advanced about both the tradition of Manu etc. and the tradition of Pancarātra.

Either both are authoritative or neither is.

There are no grounds to show that the two traditions differ in some essential respect.

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Either we must reject the authority of Manu's tradition as well, or we must indeed show in which respect the Pancaratra tradition is different from Manu's.

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12. This objection is refuted: $\Box\Box$ The author of the Sutras, by making the Sutra:

"Tradition is also valid, because it has the same agent as Scripture",

has clearly indicated that in his opinion no essential difference exists between Scriptural and Traditional validity.

Accordingly, we find that those who are qualified for the three Vedas perform equally for purposes of higher benefits both the ritual acts which are enjoined by Scripture (e.g., agnihōtra, pūrṇaderšamāsa, ivolistoma,etc.)

and the ritual acts enjoined by Tradition (e.g., aṣṭakā, ācamana, sandhya worship, etc.),

because they have been instructed in both varieties of acts by their fathers or preceptors.

The morning and evening oblations, the New and Full Moon oblations, and the soma sacrifice,

examples respectively of nitya (daily recurring), naimittika (occasional) and kamya (desiderative) rites.

sandhya worship = the crepuscular observances.

The firmness with which so highly qualified exemplary persons have adopted these traditional rites as incumbent upon the three higher estates

goes to show that the knowledge

that rites of this kind, astaka etc., obviously found to exist, are mandatory ultimately derives from Scripture itself.

On the other hand, we find that those who observe the scriptural rites of agnihotra etc.

do not observe the Tantric customs in the same manner as they observe such traditional customs as acamana investiture with the sacred thread etc

On the contrary, the Vedic experts condemn those who do.

It follows that the validity which we attribute to different Traditions "because", as the Sutra says, "they have the same agent as Scripture", cannot well apply to heterodox Traditions as the Pañcaratra;

to heterodox Traditions as the Pañcaratra; for exemplary exponents of the three estates do not accept the doctrines of Traditions of this kind.

13. OBJECTION:

Nevertheless, the fact that Bhāgavata Brahmins, who wear the hair-tuft, the sacred thread etc. prescribed in Scripture, perform daily the rites of Pañcarātra should then justify the presumption that these rites likewise ultimately derive from the Veda. On what grounds, then, are we to assume that this same Pañcarātra Tradition really has its origins in error, deceit and

the like,

the very negation of valid authority?.

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14. REFUTATION:

We reply: Well! So you really argue that the Bhāgavatas, who are hated by the three estates, are exemplary and hence authoritative?!

Objection:

But they are Brahmins, and Brahmins are considered to be the highest estate: why should they not be exemplary?

Refutation:

Brahmins? Far from it!

We do not regard Brahmins as a distinct species, different from the species man, with specific characteristics which mere sensory perception permits us to recognize as present in some specific bodies and absent in others.

Hair-tuft, sacred thread etc. which are prescribed for Brahmins and the other two estates,

do not make a man a Brahmin.

Nor do they demonstrate that a man is a Brahmin, for we see them worn illegally by blackguards, outcastes and the like. [[11]]

Therefore, the sole criterion by which we can tell whether a man is indeed a Brahmin

is acceptance of undisputed expressions by older persons, which give us irrefutable proof.

Nor do ordinary people, use without hesitation the term Brahmin to describe Bhāgavatas.

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There is also a distinct difference in the two appellations: here Brahmins, there Bhāgavatas.

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15. OBJECTION:

The people do not use the word Brahmin' to refer to Bhāgavatas. The reference is only difference as this much Brahmins and this much Bhāgavatas.

Be that as it may, still, the appellations Satvata, Bhāgavata etc. are also used to name Brahmins,

by some sort of transference of properties, just as the word parivrajaka is used to designate a Brahmin.

The point is taken up in detail infra §§ 119 f.

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REFUTATION: The argument is false.

Persons of certain inferior castes are commonly referred to as Satvatas; the name is used to denote these castes, and not anything else.

The grammarians have the rule

that it is improper to use a certain word in its etymological sense if it can also be taken in a customary sense which is more common, e.g., rathakāra.

Respectively yoga, whereby the component parts of the word are given their own meaning;

and rūḍhi, the total meaning of a word that has become conventional and does not necessarily correspond to the meanings of its [[125]]component parts.

Rathakara means by yoga "chariot-maker, cartwright." by rūḍhi a caste which is not at all characterized by this profession

If there were no such rule,

how could the word *rathakara give up its etymological meaning of "chariotmaker" to become the name of a particular caste,

even to the extent of cancelling all connotations which we have learnt?

adhyayanasiddhabuddhyangato??abkangenāpi.

Such a "connotation" is, for example, that the rathakara in the literal sense of cartwright

is disqualified for Vedic ritual, because a cartwright is a śūdra; on this point see infra.

Similarly, Satvata refers to a person who has been born from a vrutya vaishya

and belongs to the lowest castes,

and is thus excluded from the sacraments of initiation, etc.

upanayana, which is the first step to his acquisition of Vedic knowledge.

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Manu (Manu 10.23.) says:

"The issue of a vaisya vratya extraction is called Sudhanvā or Bharuşa or Nijangha or Maitra or Satvata"

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It cannot be disputed that Bhagavata is another name for Satvata;

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Smrti has it that

"the fifth, called Satvata, worships the temples and sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree; he is also called Bhagavata."

the term "by royal decree" shows that it is a caste profession. Quotation not identified

The Smrti thus describes which profession the descendants of the said vratya vaisya pursue

and with our own eyes we indeed see them pursue this profession.

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Thus Uśanas:

"They all live by the plough and the sword, the Acaryas and the Satvatas live on the worship of the Deity."

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not found in Ausanasasmrti (AAS 48).
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   Similarly, in the Brahma Purāṇa-
"He worships the sanctuaries of Visnu by royal decree."
Elsewhere (unidentified) the same is stated thus:
   "The profession of the Satvatas
   is to clean up the sanctuaries of the Deity
   and the eatables offered to the idol, as well as to guard it."
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   And, to dispel the last doubt about the sort of people they are,
Manu (Manu 10.40) declares:
   "Whether disguised or not, they can be known by their deeds."
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16. Their conduct, moreover, proves that they cannot be Brahmins.
For a living they perform pūjā to the Deity, undergo their Consecration,
eat themselves the food which is offered to the idols
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observe deviating sacraments-
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from the prenatal garbhadhāna rite to the funerary rituals-,

omit to perform the shrauta ritual and avoid contact with Brahmins.

These and other habits show conclusively that they cannot be Brahmins.

Smrtis declare that the reason of their disqualification for Vedic rites is this that they perform pūjā to the Deity in order to earn a living:

[[13]]

"Those who from generation to generation have worshipped the Deity professionally are disqualified for the study of the Veda, for participation in the sacrifices and for officiating in sacrifices."

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Their own Parama Samhita states the same prohibition:

"Whether in disaster or emergency, in terror or in straits, one must never worship the God of gods for a living."

This point is detailed upon infra § 134 f

Such habits as wearing the garlands that are offered to the God and eating the food that is presented to the idol and other practices of that kind, which are condemned by all right-thinking

people,

shows plainly that they are not Brahmins.

Furthermore, we wonder how it can be presumed that the authority of these people proves that Scripture is the basis of their way of life: at the mere sight of them all respectable men perform expiatory rites such as candrayana

Smrti declares that if one sets eyes on a devalaka, it is necessary to perform an expiation.

A devalaka is someone who lives on temple treasure and worships the idol for a livelihood.

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Thus Devala:

"One who lives on temple treasure. is called a devalaka."

not in Devalasmrti.

Likewise:

"A Brahmin who has worshipped the deity for three years in order to make a living is called a devalaka and he is held to be unworthy to partake in any ritual."

Those who have been known to worship the God as a hereditary profession are automatically regarded as devalakas.

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The rite of expiation is set forth in the precept:

"A Brahmin who is taking his meal should not look at ordure, a pig, a eunuch, a sacrificial pole, a devalaka or a corpse; if he does he must observe the candrayana."

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Atri, too, very explicitly declares that they are not Brahmins:

"The Avalukas, Devalakas, Kalpadevalakas, Ganabhogadevalakas and fourthly those of the Bhagavata profession are corrupt Brahmins.""

not in Atrismrti:

Avaluka is unknown to me.

kalpa devalaka can be explained as a professional kalpa priest, kalpa either in the sense of ("unorthodox) ritual," or 'astrological mansion"; gapabhogadevalaka is likewise obscure,

but probably refers to unorthodox priest engaged in gap??a worship.

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Also the venerable Vyasa:

"The Ahvāyakas, Devalakas, Nakṣatragrāmayājakas and Mahapathikas are outcaste Brahmins." 15

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Therefore, the fact that Pañcarātra recognizes the authority of the Bhagavatas

who by birth and by deeds have deviated from the Way of the Veda is sufficient ground to deny authority to the Pañcaratra Scriptures.

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17. Furthermore, the class of texts with which we are here concerned are not valid means of knowing which acts are good and which are evil inasmuch as they are accepted by heretics, and thus are of the same kind as the Buddhist statements on stupa worship.

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Besides, their own texts relate that the instruction in all their dharmas presupposes the abandoning of the Way of the Veda;

"having failed to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Sandilya learnt this doctrine...."

But how can we presume that a certain text can teach that a certain object, which is known from the four Vedas,

is man's supreme goal in life

if he rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as sources of knowledge

about the means which lead to bliss?

But how can we presume that a certain text can teach that a certain object, which is known from the four Vedas,

is man's supreme goal in life

if he rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as sources of knowledge

about the means which lead to bliss?

On the contrary,

we find that Manu and other authors of Traditions declare that their works which expound as their teaching the means of attaining all kinds of desirable ends derive solely from Scripture:

"The Veda in its entirety is the basis of the Law, as well as of the traditions and customs of those who are expert in Law":

"the Law is enjoined by Scripture and Tradition";

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"it is entirely expressed in the Veda; for the Veda contains all knowledge."

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Further, the assertion that those who have already been consecrated by the sacraments of Investiture etc.

and are thereby qualified for all the Vedic rituals, agnihotra etc., must yet undergo another sacrament, called Consecration (namely, dīkṣā), in order to be qualified for the worship of the Bhagavan, demonstrates that the system is non-Vedic;

for if it were Vedic,

they would be qualified for Tantric ritual by the regular sacraments.

Again, another indication of its non-Vedic character is the fact that the system is not included among the fourteen sources of knowledge, which all orthodox people recognize as giving authoritative information on the Law.

If it were authoritative,

then it would have been recognized as such by tradition;

fourteen sources of knowledge - namely, the four Vedas, six Vedāngas, the Purāṇas, Mimansā, Nyāya and Dharmaśāstra.

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but as it is not so recognized, this proves that the Pañcarātra tradition is non-Vedic.

For this reason the venerable Badarāyaṇa, when he has occasion to refute the heterodox doctrines of Kanāda, Akṣa-pada, the Buddha etc. as inimical to the Way of the Veda, also refutes the Pancarãtra in his Sutra (BrS. 2.2.42.): "Because of the impossibility of origin.

Therefore, as the Vedic experts regard the Pañcaratra doctrine as non-Vedic

since it is not included among the Vedic systems and because of other reasons which will be advanced in the sequel, it cannot be compared with the Tradition of Manu etc.

In view of all this it is our opinion that such infrequent good rites- e.g., the worship of the Bhagavān - which are described by the Pañcaratricas (who teach a good many others,

mostly black arts of exciting hatred, haunting a person out of his occupation, envoutement etc.)

are merely added to deceive people about their real attentions and do not deserve our faith or consideration: they are like milk that is put in a dog's bladder!

[[16]]

To sum up,

it is not proper to assume that Pancarātra is based on the Veda and therefore equally authoritative as the doctrinal works of Manu' and others.

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DISCURSUS:

18. At this point someone interjects:

If you please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute the cause of the delegated and indirect authority of the Tradition of Manu etc.

A Naiyayika. Traditionally, Nyaya does not accept the Mimānsā view that the Vedas have not originated from a person.

But is there any reason why we should have to depend exclusively on the Veda

as the basis of the Pañcarātra tradition too?

The same direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the authority of the Vedas themselves

is also the foundation of the authority of the Pañcarâtra doctrine;

the authority of the latter is not based upon the relation of supporting authority

and supported authority which characterizes typical smarta injunctions,

e.g., astakā and acamana which have their common basis in the Veda. In fact, the two traditions of the aştaka rite and the acamana rite are not interdependent, but, they are equally and independently authoritative.

Similarly, Pañcarātra and Scripture are not interdependent.

If Pancaratra collapses as soon as it is denied the support of the Veda, why then should the Veda not collapse when the support of Pancaratra is taken away from it?

19. The Vedas derive their authority

from direct knowledge which originates from a person and must therefore naturally derive from a person?

Who can doubt it?

For we perceive that words, from their very nature, depend for their composition

on some entity that is different from themselves.

[[17]]

How else could they exist at all?

If it is objected that

the significance of the Book called Veda just consists in this that it does in fact exist as Word though nobody has composed it,

then we reply;

why, if this were true,

then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists in this that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire! It is utterly out of the question.

The argument is thus:

The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language;

language is invariably found to originate from persons.

The Naiyayika compares the Mimasaka's view in the terms of this argument with the standard inference:

the mountain has fire, because it has smoke.

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20. OBJECTION. But since the applicability' of the dharma

cannot be shown by any of the means of knowledge, how can a book on it be composed?

REPLY. Don't argue like that:

for the Bhagavan who, of course, has an immediate intuition of dharma and adharma

through the knowledge which is natural to Him

has had this Book called Veda composed out of compassion for the world.

avatara "descent, emergence." The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the Incans-end?? relation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority.

21. OBJECTION. But does this intuition or perception also encompass dharma and adharma?

REPLY. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavān be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.?

For the maker of such effects must be one who is capable of perceiving their material and instrumental causes.

Now, dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes of the world; this is also the consensus of the Mimāmsakas.

Consequently we must postulate a certain person who has this perceptual knowledge;

and that person must also be the one who created the Veda at the beginning.

This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (phala) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation.

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22. If one contends that such entities as mountains, earth and the like are not effects,

the "answer is as follows:

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The entities in question, earth etc., are effects, because they have a complex construction, like a king's palace (cf. Udayana, Kusumanjali 4.1.).
Similarly, from the fact that they are made up of parts we conclude that they are subject to destruction.

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Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed by someone who knows the means by which they can be destroyed,

just as we can destroy clay vessels etc.

when we know by what means to destroy them.

In the case of entities that are shattered, for instance, by a falling tree, that is without perceptible intelligent agency,

the cause of their destruction remains dubious:

but because of this very dubiety

there can also be not positive certainty that the cause of their destruction is entirely occasional.

to destruction.

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to infer in this world that an entity which has mass and can move is subject to origination and

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed effects, on the grounds adduced above,

it follows that the Bhagavan has knowledge of dharma and adharma which are the instrumental causes of origination and annihilation.

Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma).

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Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, mountains and the like, have been created by a maker who possesses the described knowledge.

Everything that has origin and end is, in our experience, created by such a maker.

just because it is subject to origination and annihilation, like a house.

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23. Let it not be argued that

there is no intermediate production of effects like body, world

between acts that bring about the desires of the person who undertakes them,

This is the Mimamsā view

which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being whose body is itself the product of dharma and adharma

and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them.

The Mimimsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction,

but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

[[127]]

The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally.

No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act,

by either beginning or ending the universe.

On this cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prabhakara view, and Slokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhitta view.[[127]] The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally.

No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act,

by either beginning or ending the universe.

On this cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prabhakara view, and Slokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhāṭṭa view.

for these acts are unable to produce anything unless they are used as an instrument by a spiritual being,

since they are non-spiritual themselves, like an adze:

without the operation of a spiritual being-- the carpenteran adze is incapable of effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole,

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And we are not able to create through the instrumentality of apurva factors:

for before the actual fruition of the ritual act we cannot know their instrumentality,

apūrva lit. "that which is unprecedented, not known before, se. by other means of knowledge" in Mimāmsā it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result.

and it has been said that only a person who has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental causes can be a maker with respect to these causes.

The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized;

thus the act's power- apūrva- cannot be known beforehand as the instrument of effectuation.(5)

By the Naiyayika's definition

only one who knows what instruments are effective in production can actually produce.

And there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, to be capable of having the required actual knowledge of the apurva that is to arise from the act.

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the entire Universe with dharma and adharma of all embodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc., and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted knowledge etc. subsist.

As they say (unidentified source): "The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together."

As they say: "The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together."

Mantras, arthavadas, epic and purana corroborate this point; e.g.

mantra and arthavada: the terms indicate that the Naiyayika continues to address the Mimimsaka, for these of course are Mimāmsā terms, mantra being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, arthavada the descriptive, non-injunctive passages of Brahmana and later Vedic texts.

"The one god, Prajapati, creating heaven and earth, created the Vedas," etc. (RV. 10. 90. 14)

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At the moment of inception

the great Grace of this Person who is the Bhagavan is evoked by a glance at the aggregate of individual souls who are almost in a state of non-spiritual stupor, their instruments for the experiencing of karmic results- body, senses and other organs-being completely dissolved.

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His Grace evoked, he originates the entire universe and simultaneously He creates the triple Veda which states pellucidly the means by which the souls in transmigration can realize the objects of their desires.

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Then again, perceiving that they are in a pitiable condition, being immersed in the ocean of existence which is perturbed by wave upon wave of all manner of iniquities,

His heart burns with supreme compassion and He promulgates, through Sanatkumara, Narada etc., the Pancarãtra Samhitās

which constitute the sources of knowledge about the manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to perfect bliss.

Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord

and are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas,

can they belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu or anyone?

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REFUTATION.

24. If this is true, then on what authority is such a creator of the Vedas known to exist?

He is not directly perceived.

Yamuna concurs in the Mimāmsaka's refutation of the Naiyayika's views, to the extent that

he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he will counter the Mimagisa assertion that God cannot be proved at all.

that in fact there is neither room nor purpose for a God in the universe. For Yamuna, God has all the characteristics He has for the Naiyayika, but he proves them from Scripture, not reason.(5)

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is word that it therefore must have an author, for that would entail the total reversion of your special contentions.

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for its composition on the agency of some being

is also perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied being ...

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whose happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and evil karman,

and who therefore cannot be God.

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Moreover, in that case it would be impossible to establish the authority of the Vedas themselves; for if dharma-the Law-is not independent of other means of knowledge, there is no exclusive authority of the Vedas.

That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of apurva facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertaining to dharma.


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25. OBJECTION.

But why should dharma be independent of other means of knowledge? For we have asserted that

He has actual knowledge of dharma and adharma: how else could He produce the world of which dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes?

REPLY.

That has indeed been asserted,

but the assertion is fallacious: for no creator of the entire universe can be found of whom this can be assumed.

To your argument that the world must be effected because it has a complex construction can be objected that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities:

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g. pots and the like; those which are not found to be made at all (the individual soul) (eg. sky); and those whose creation remained doubtful, like the earth etc.

In the two first-mentioned cases there is no room for God's activity.

As to the third, the earth etc. are not involved in a total origination or disintegrations,

but merely, as now, subject to varying degrees of increase and decrease which are adventitious.

To say that the Mimāmsakas accept origination and annihilation in this sense is to prove the proved.

The Mimimsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction,

but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

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In our opinion, too, these intelligent agents bring about various results by means of sacrifices and other acts, in order to enjoy these results themselves; and the assumption that they are indeed, as is proved for both of us, instrumental therein is quite correct, for we can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, donations and the like.

However, the special power described with terms like apurva can never be open to perception.

How then can we have use for a supervising God?

Since the apūrva power is suprasensible, it can never be perceived, and the assumption of a God who 'supervises' and controls this power because he perceives it is absurd.

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for instance a potter, when he wishes to produce a certain product- potsmust first have direct knowledge of the power of their material cause- clayand instrumental cause- stick- to produce these products before he can actually undertake their production.

Else people who are unaware of the power of the requisite causes would never be able to employ these causes in order to produce the results they want.

In the case under discussion the persons concerned do indeed know which causes are required to bring about the results they want, for they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc.,

through the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scripture. Thus, aided by these causes, they render manifest such products as earth etc.

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Also, there is no invariable rule that only an agent to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully

is capable of undertaking an action and nobody else.

A man can still be an agent in the action of knowing without perceiving in his own mind the material and instrumental causes that go into the making of this action of knowing.

Why, then, contend that the causes must be known first?

27. The contention that the entire Universe is subject to annihilation because it has parts is incorrect. Such a conclusion is [[23]] cancelled by stronger perceptual evidence against it.

For the knowledge that does arise in the world of here and now is plainly this:

'Here is the meru; here is the sun; here is the earth.'

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that these entities are related to different times; and certainly both in former and later ages there arise similar persons who have the same notion of these entities' present existence.

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To put it in syllogistic form:

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and mountain, because the past is time, like the present.

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard to the future.

This reasoning does not entail the fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal.

for in their case origination and annihilation are directly evident.

It does not follow that,

when a certain fact cannot be proved on the strength of a certain ground, since this ground involves a contradiction, this same ground cannot prove the same fact when it does not involve a contradiction.

read na labhyate .avirodhe" pi; the meaning is this: when a certain fact (the eternality of pots) cannot be proved by a ground (recollection)

because this ground contains a contradiction (it is recollected that pots having existed cease to exist), this does not prove that the same ground (recollection) cannot prove the eternality of earth, mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain).

The other inference that has been given to prove that the world is subject to origination and annihilation, namely on the ground of motion when there is mass, is likewise incorrect; for this ground, too, is cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition. Consequently, inference cannot provide positive proof that the world is subject to origination and annihilation.

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28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on the ground that the world is a product;

but this ground precludes a specially qualified producer.

For a product generally implies on the part of its producer

a number of properties which are natural to him

and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the concomitance between him and his product -

Properties like being in possession of a body,

having something left to desire,

being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc.

How, then, can the fact that the world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it

possesses the postulated properties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties,

that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow?

The production of a product requires the activation of the body, which requires on the producer's part an effort whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condition bodiless person can be an agent.

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argument, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself subject to origination or not? If it be subject to origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, then your contention that whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true.

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The solution of others, namely that God's special properties can be demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion, does not hold good either.

adhikaranasiddhanta is a conclusion which, as soon as one thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator), establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience). On this question, ef. Tarkabhāsā 43.

For that rule holds only of a case where a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does not actually exist.

In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

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29. OBJECTION. But if even a well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all logical process of deduction is done with.

But if deduction can indeed convey true knowledge,

that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

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REPLY. We do not say

that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as many properties in this producer

as at the moment of grasping the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

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Nor do we carry our point too far.

In a case where the term

which we seek to establish through deduction

can also be known through another means of knowledge,

then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties

which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone.

In the present instance, however, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge;

in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance

elicited through positive and negative consideration are indiscriminately established by the deduction,

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A similarly occasional relationship between producer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person's action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural,

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30. Another question to be considered is from what point in space, at what point in time, and to what purpose a person who is satisfied in all eternity would produce the universe. Every agent, e.g., a potter, produces a product by means of certain instruments, while occupying a certain space at a certain time and aiming at a certain result which he wants.

If the production of the world is purely sport and without ulterior motivation,

since God does not want anything, beware,

for this states clearly that the Lord is by nature independent from anything beside Himself.

Yet willynilly, without regard for anything He might wish, He shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and destroying the world.

Is He in creating the creatures prompted by His compassion? But why, then, does He not create them happy? If you reply, because God takes karman into account, then you deny his complete independence. Besides, if their karman provides sufficient causes for these creatures' variety,

why assume God at all?

Therefore, there cannot be such a person who is capable of creating the universe, of perceiving immediately dharma and adharma, and of composing the Vedas.

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31. Moreover, if the Vedas were created by someone, this creator would be remembered: 'He is the one who has composed them."

It is not proper to assume that he has been forgotten, just as the digger of an exhausted well is forgotten. The latter is justifiable because the well no longer serves a purpose.

But in the case of the Vedas, who, without remembering that the author was reliable, would give credence to all the Vedic rites which are to be performed at the expense of great trouble involving the loss of various properties?

Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas that they have been composed by a person, because this person, however worthy of remembrance, is not remembered.

they can no more prove that God was their author than the Mahabharata and similar books can.

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Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person.

In consequence, the contention that the validity of Pañcaratra is based upon the same immediate cognition which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself is the contention of those whose discrimination has been warped by their bias in favour of their own conclusions.

32. OBJECTION. But in what does this 'preterpersonal' character of the Veda consist?

If it consists in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words, the same holds true of the Pañicarātra Tantra.

It is the contention of Mimamsa that words and their capacity of conveying meaning are eternal.

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Or if it is the eternity of the words that constitute it, again the same is true.

It could not be the eternity of the word-sequence, for sequence cannot be natural to eternal entities.

Sequence, of course, supposes priority and posteriority of the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal.

If it is said that it is the sequence of the sounds in so far as these sounds are pronounced in one particular sequence, then we reply that since a sequence of pronunciation is non-eternal,

the sequence of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal.

So where does the difference lie between Pañçaratra and Vedic revelation?

[[28]]

REPLY.

The difference lies herein that in the case of the Pañcaratra the sequence is created by an independent person,

whereas in the case of the Veda,

a dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact sequence which had been laid down before him by students who preceded him.

A category of a different degree

which is established on the strength of recognition should not be denied.

And with this we conclude our lengthy disquisition.

kramāvāntarajati; the difference resides in the createdness of the Pancarātra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, which introduces a difference of degree between the word sequences of both corpora of verbal statements.

33. The preceding has proved

that the proposition that the Pancaratra is authoritative

because it is based upon an immediate cognition of a person categorically different from other persons, is not viable at all.

Since there is no means of knowledge by which the existence of a person who has im-

by which the existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of good and evil can be proved,

it follows that this Tantra must have been promulgated by some human being with the purpose of deceiving the world.

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34. OBJECTION. This would be true if proof of the existence of the Lord could only be sought on the strength of logical argumentation. As it is, this is a fallacy,

for the great Lord is known on the authority of the upanisads.

This is Yamuna's objection, which states the extent to which he concurs in the preceding Mimāmsā argument against Nyaya.

When we hear the multitudinous statements of the eternal Scriptures which set forth the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme Personality

who is capable of creating the entire universe,

how then can we refuse to accept the authority of a tradition which derives from His immediate cognition?

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Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority

because of the consideration that since either a proving or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up

there remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or reversed; for the same may equally well happen to a statement concerning, not a fact, but a karya.

The validity of shabda lies in its communicating contents that cannot be known through other means of knowledge.

What I translate as 'facts' are more literally "established [[129]] entities," established, that is, by other means of knowledge than shabda.

A scriptural statement of the kind "grass is green" is not strictly valid in the sense that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a scriptural statement to that effect.

Another proving factor, c.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn up conceivably

and thus make the scriptural statement superfluous; or we may find that grass is not invariably green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the scriptural statement.

Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture's being a means of knowledge, is to the Prabhakara Mimimsaka, its being the sole means of knowing a particular thing.

To the Prabhakara this validity is ideal in the case of injunctions concerning actions which, suprasensibly, lead to a certain desired end.

A kārya, too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for it must be admitted that ordinary karyas, like 'fetch firewood' are also known through other means of knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the odana.

(The injunction concerning the odana oblation includes an injunction concerning the preparation of the odana and the fetching of firewood for the cooking. Since experience shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this karya is not strictly known on scriptural authority.)

\$ Vide Prakaraṇapañcikā II, p. 180-

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Or if it be claimed that,

inasmuch as a karya concerning a categorically different thing like the agnihotra etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority,

therefore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing must needs be its authority,

well, then we may say that there is not a ghost of another authority for the Bhagavan

whose form consists in unsurpassed knowledge, supremacy and beatitude;

so that it should follow that everything is entirely the same in both cases, depending on one's particular partisan views.

(it is all the same, depending on what partisan view one takes!)

Moreover, the theory is that since another means of knowledge can apply to a fact.

a verbal statement concerning this fact cannot validly prove it: but why should not this other means of knowledge itself be the repetitious one

since verbal testimony concerning its fact may conceivably turn up?

or, why should other means of knowledge which themselves are liable to [[30]]various deficiencies

entail the negation of a notion that arises from eternal Scripture untouched by all defects inherent in persons,

merely because it is deduced that its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge?

This is absurd.

This objection ignores the priorities among pramanas, or means of knowl-

for the Prabhakara, Perception, etc. are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of perceptible, etc. contents.

Generally Perception is prior to Inference.

To Yamuna, therefore, no priority of Perception to Scripture is given, which is expected since in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God's) Perception,

as in the case of Pancaratra.

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily follow from the induction, e.g. absence of omniscience", possession of a body etc., find no room in the Bhagavan whose supernal manifestation of miraculous knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from hundreds of shrutis, just as cold can find no place in fire.

This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both the Naiyayika's and Mimamsaka's views:

the defects consequent upon the Nyaya proofs of God are avoided on the basis of scriptural examination,

since Scripture can indeed validly pronounce on God.

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And, in consequence,

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the Tantra is false, while it is composed by the Omniscient One Himself who is known through the Upanisads?

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Alas for the fool's grand exhibition of labour in Mimāmsā! How can a mind schooled in Mimāmsā be so mistaken?

The Prabhakaras, who are notorious for the gaurava 'complicatedness' of their argumentations.(5)

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36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers command respect, maintain that all Vedic testimony carries authority only concerning such karyas as cannot presuppose any other authority.

Since words are considered to have their true sense only when they concern such a karya, it is impossible that any statement can be denotative if it concerns something else than a karya.

Therefore, when a man has observed that in an exchange between two adult persons

a certain inherently related action of one of them takes place immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the other, he concludes with certainty that the denoting power of the sentence as inferred by means of circumstantial-implication terminates completely in the karya that has been conveyed by that sentence.

"Denotation, denoting power, denotativeness" in the following Prabhakara discussions

have to be understood as the power of verbal statements to provide unprecedented and non-superfluous knowledge concerning their contents.

In the Prabhakara view, a verbal statement by itself is denotative only in injunctive forms,

while substantive statements have denotation either through contextual connection with injunctive statements,

or (but this is not strictly "true" denotation) through repetition of otherwise knowable facts.

This view, which has obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the first place,

is thereupon extended to ordinary language as well,

and is thus expressed in the following theory about learning language which is here understood.

A child learns what certain sentences 'mean'

by observing the action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences,

When he knows no language meaning (vyutpatti),

he may acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another to "get the cow."

and subsequently observing that the other is getting the cow: by associating the two events he knows that an order to get the cow was the content of the first adult's statement "get the cow." A remark without consequent action (e.g., "It is hot today,")

cannot convey any such knowledge to one who does not know language.

The process of the child knowing the sentence meaning

is here described as arthapatti "reasoning by circumstantial implication;" since there is no other ground for the second man's getting the cow, it must have been the first man's statement.

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The very awareness of karya

is known to relate to one's own karya;

so the onlooker, observing the same process in the present case, realizes that the one person's action has been caused by the other person's variously differentiated behaviour.

"Surely this person has been made aware by the other of this karya

that he proceed to his action immediately upon become aware of what he has to do."

[[130]]

Thus śalikanatha, Prakaranapancika, p. 182: niyo?? yali?? sarvakarye yaft soakiyalvena?? budhyate.

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This leads the observer to the conclusion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly denotative in so far as it serves to convey a karya whose specific motivation conforms to the entire statement, then whatever bits of meaning come to mind as a result of the addition or omission of words are denoted by these words only in strict accordance to this kārya, 71 which thus constitutes the primarily known principal element of the statement.

That is to say that the denotativeness of the words composing the statement

is dependent upon the injunctive denotation of the statement as a whole.

In such a statement the imperative and optative verbal terminations, which unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of karya, convey by themselves the body of the karya, whereas the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a contextual relation with the karya

by describing consequent matters which required by the karya, e.g. a person's qualification to accomplish it etc.

The linādi verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries like "should, must, to be to, ought to."

[[131]]

For example, a sentence:
"He desires to go to heaven,"
which has the verb in the indicative,
followed by a statement
"he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice,"
where the verb is injunctive,
is truly denotative in spite of its indicative form,
since it is obviously subordinated to the injunctive sentence,
to which it describes the performer's qualification:

only one who desires to go to heaven has title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma sacrifice.

37. Take for example the statement that a son has been born to the person spoken to,

a purely substantive statement;

the aggregate of words which convey nothing more than this bare fact that a son has been born,

is not definitely proved to possess the power [[32]] of denoting the postulated birth of the son

by means of such resultant effects as cheerful looks or joyfully bristling hairs on the part of the father.

For, it is impossible to establish definitely

that the occurrence of a cause for various joys in future, past and present is really due to the denotative power of the statement.

This is an example like "it is hot today;" the young father's happy countenance is not considered an action,

Therefore, also in the case

when we have a verb in the present indicative

collocated with words that have their proper signification

(in that they refer to things that presuppose no other means of knowledge), it must be assumed that

in it we have a substitute with a positive (i.e. injunctive) denotation of words without actually having explicit reference to a kārya.

E.g., the sentence "he who desires to go to heaven offers the soma sacrifice," is an injunctive statement in indicative form.

38. A person knows that a certain word has a certain denotation, when it is known what is the denotation, of the other words with which it

is collocated.

This is the Prabhakara view of the denotativeness of single words, summarized in the formula anvitābhidhāna, which is short for kāryānvitābhidhana "denotation of words syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence."

It is proved that words have the power of denoting things only in so far as they are contextually connected with a karya; consequently, their validity concerning an established fact is based on this that they give rise to the notion of karya.

It is contended that this denotation of karya is only occasional in words, but this contention is incorrect; the ground for words to be denotative is that they deal with a karya, so that the contention suffers of the vice of being unproved.

This point will be taken up and confirmed infra §04.

For a notion that arises from a verbal statement can never terminate in any object whatsoever that is not a karya.

[[33]

The cognitions of contextual relations which arise immediately upon hearing a profane statement are said to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from Inference. 78 Thus it is right that these cognitions do not terminate in karyas.

E.g., a statement "there are fruits on the river bank" does not by itself, self-sufficiently, create in the hearer the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank; the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the hearer must

infer

that the speaker knows what he is talking about, that he knows that fruit means "fruit", river bank 'river bank," etc.

39. If it were not accepted that verbal statements always bear on karyas, on what grounds then could an indicative statement like agnihotram juhoti "he offers the agnihotra"

be accepted as an injunction?

Or if it be claimed that in this case, even though the statement as it stands has no complete validity,

it is accepted as an injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a purpose,

we reply that this claim is incorrect, since the operation of means of knowledge is not dependent on purpose, but rather is the acceptance of purpose dependent on the operation of the means of knowledge.

It is not proper to assume that since one does not like to find rocks when one is looking for gold therefore one finds gold!

As long as we do not assume that a statement is denotative only when it bears on a karya, we cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative contains an injunction.(5)

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40. In the same manner the meaning of the upanisads must also be interpreted as being subordinate to such injunctions as "One must know the soul, meditate on it, etc." which are expressed in differnt passages;

this meaning, then, is that

one must know the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunction.

This is again the Prabhakara view. The Bhatta view is somewhat different; according to the latter the upanisads are arthavadas (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory of elements of injunctions) to the eternality of the performer's personality (atman),(5)

which eternality is presupposed by the efficacy of the injunction:

e.g., the injunction "he who desires heaven must offer with the soma sacrifice"

supposes the immortality of the performer.

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That the soul is the object of an injunction does not by itself however prove that the soul exists as an established fact; for there can also be an injunction that a certain thing be such while actually it is not so;

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for example the injunction, "Know your father in someone who is not your father."

or "Know that the[[34]] syllable OM, which is not the udgitha, is the udgitha." (Ch Up. 1.5.1. [[132]])

All statements that set forth the reality and the eternality of the soul only serve to convey that there is a spiritual agent, who is required in order to experience the otherworldly fruits that are mentioned in ritual injunctions where the time of fruition is not specified.

In this the Prabhakara concurs with the Bhatta. Injunctions without time of fruition specified are not guaranteed to bring about the desired effect during the present lifetime of the performer.

Therefore, no verbal statement whatever is a means of knowing a thing as such.

Thus, by denying that the arthavādas, too, can serve to convey knowledge of facts like Rudra's weeping, it is shown that they merely serve to give praise in contextual connection with an injunction, which may be comparatively remote.

I read ata avarthavādānām.

On this point see KMS 1.2.1. with Sabara's bhāṣya.

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated divine person, whose personality is the product of the baseless beliefs of people that have failed to consider the true denotation of preceding or succeeding statements,

is eliminated.

with which we conclude our extensive discussion.

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture.

Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed convey knowledge of facts;

even so, what possible basis is there for the assumption that there exists a person who knows dharma and adharma, when we take into account the cognition that arises from injunction?

Omniscience is possible only if the omniscient person knows the objects exactly as they are known by means of the different means of knowledge;

On the Bhatta view of omniscience, cf. Kumārila, Samb. 47-59; 114-116.

for there is no statement which declares omniscience by cancelling the normal means of knowledge.

[[35]]

Even if there were such a statement, it would have to be explained as an arthavada since its word-meanings would not allow of mutual relation.

A cognition about a sentence-meaning arises from the individual words and it presupposes in these words such properties as appropriateness etc. which are learnt through other means of knowledge; now we wonder how such a cognition could arise at all, if there were a conflict with these other means of knowledge that are required primarily for the cognition to arise!

i.e, the appropriateness or propriety of a word in collocation with other

words; in the sentence "his mother is barren," "barren" is obviously inappropriate.

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If a statement concerning an object that is contradicted by perception etc., were authoritative,

who could then reject the identity of sun and sacrificial pole? (5)

The identification is considered an arthavada, i,e., laudatory of the sacrificial pole

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And if there is a person who possesses this peculiar excellency, what happens to the authority of the texts which is sought to be proved?87

The relation between God and the texts has to be proved. I read yadi ca for api ca.

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43. OBJECTION. However, those who follow the Pancaratra clan have the tradition that this Pancaratra has been composed by this person.

REFUTATION. But why do the Pasupatas then not agree with their view? They, too, claim that the Sovereign of the universe is the promulgator of their own system,

and others have the same claims.

Now they cannot all of them be omniscient,

because then it would be impossible for them to set forth mutually contradictory teachings.

The same ground which allows one among several discussants to prove an omniscient promulgator must hold equally for all of them.

But which one among the many omniscient beings who propound mutually conflicting teachings while claiming each for himself the prerogative of omniscience, which one do we conclude is the one and only omniscient God?

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[[36]]

As the (unidentified) text says,

"If there are several omniscient beings who propound incompatible doctrines and if for each of them the arguments are equally valid, then whom can we elicit as the true and only one?"

When each omniscient being is assumed on the basis of one's own Tantra doctrine

since the various tantric doctrines are mutually in conflict, the result will be that none of them is authoritative, !

44. OBIECTION.

How can the teaching of Vasudeva himself,

who is well-known in Revelation and Tradition, be brought to the same level as other Tantras?

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For the manifestation of His power has been revealed in the Purusa Hymn (RV. 10.90 14),

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"The earth sprang from his feet,
the quarters of the sky from his ears;"
and again,
"The creator created sun and moon as before;"
likewise, "He is Brahma, he is śiva;" (Mahānār Up 11.12.)
"Visnu's highest step" (Kath Up. 3.9.)
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No one is his lord in this world, no one his commander; he has no sign. (Svet Up. 6.9.)

In this way, the statements of Revelation describe his manifestation characterized by His origination, maintenance and annihilation of the world.

Similarly, the Tradition:

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"From Visnu arose the world, in him does it subsist; he is the one who causes it to exist and to perish," (Visnu Pur. 1.1.31.)
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said Parāśara;

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Manu, too, declared that He is the lord:

"Nārāyaṇa is above the unmanifest, and the World-egg is produced by the unmanifest."93

Not in Manusmrti; reference perhaps to Manu 1.9-10? I read tatha pi.

This Supreme Person

who is continually praised for His knowledge and supremacy in the statements of Revelation and of the sages

has created Pañcaratra.

If this Tantra is then on a level with Tantras that are apostate from the path of Revelation,

then one might as well reason that a soma-drinker is on a level with a winebeer-drinker,

just because he is a drinker!

[[37]]

Is this Tantra not superior?

Wherefore, then, are the qualities of immaculate knowledge, supremacy etc. of the Bhagavan

not currently attributed also to the Destroyer of the Three Cities in the texts of Revelation?

Therefore it is absurd to hold the equality of the Tantras promulgated by both.

Or, since He is the God who is the cause of the origination, protection and destruction of the universe

and for whom the entire Vedanta furnishes evidence to the exclusion of anyone else,

how could He promulgate a doctrine that is outside the pale of the Veda?

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45. OBIECTION.

Nevertheless, a fair number of śrutis are found which ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to lord Pasupati as well:

"He who is allknowing, omniscient;" (Mund Up. 1.1.9.)

"The supreme great sovereign of sovereigns." (Svet Up. 6.7.)

• The above argument of the Siddhantin is refuted by the Mimāmsaka.

REPLY. By secondary denotation these two words "omniscient" and "sovereign" apply not only to the one who actually is omniscient and sovereign, but also to others, not excepting God Siva, who are as it were all-knowing and supreme.

Besides, if in the above quotation "ya sarvajnah sarvavit" the word sarvajiia were indeed used to describe the omniscient one, there would be tautology of sarvavit.

Consequently, the word sarvajia refers only to Mahadeva;

The above argument, says the Mīmāmsaka, is favourable to the Pāšupatas since the text " yassarvajñah sarvavit " (Mundaka- I. 1. 9) cannot be properly explained in favour of the Pañcarātrins.

"If the term 'sarvajña' be etymologically taken as referring to Visnu, what about the term sarvavit'?"

he asks. This term too has to be explained as all-knower', which lands the Pancaratrin in the defect of redundance of explanation

Therefore, the Pasupata method of explanation is in sooth, proper- the term sarvajña' refers to Śiva conventionally, while the term 'sarvavit' does so, through etymology.

and so the Skanda-Purana, Linga-Purāņa and other Purāņas exhaust themselves

in describing this all knowing and sovereign character of Siva.

[[38]]

Therefore, since the Pasupata Tantra has been promulgated by this Pasupati,

it acquires authority in this way;

but the reversion of the authority of all Tantras in consequence of their mutual contradictions

applies to this Pasupata Tantra too.

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46. Further, granted that the Lord Vasudeva is the Person known in the upaniṣads,

how then can the theory be held of him that he has promulgated the Pañcarātra Tantra which conflicts with Revelation of him who said, "Revelation and Tradition are my commands?" (unidentified)

☐ The popular reading of the Viṣṇudharma-verse, in which this statement occurs is-

śrutismṛti mamaivājñā yastāmullaighya vartate ājñācchedi mama drohi madbhaktopi na vaiṣṇavaḥ.

But the following reading is found in the printed edition, ch- 76, Śl. 31-

śrutissmṛtir mamaivājñā tāmullanghya yajan subhe sarvasvenāpi mām devi napnotyājñāvilaṁghanāt.

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Thus we conclude that there has been a deceiver who assumed the name of 'Vasudeva' and under that name composed the Tantra under discussion.

$\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi$?

Or else, suppose that Vasudeva Himself, ruler of the entire universe, was the promulgator of this Tantra; they still say that

Hari, whose personal manifestations are deceptive because of his power of illusion, has promulgated these unholy texts deceivingly under the guise of holy texts in order to destroy the whole mass of enemies of the gods. Now, has he indeed composed this Tantra, leading the faithful into the mysterious abyss of his grand power of illusion, or not?

This is the question that now arises. How are we to resolve it?

Visnupurāna- (Jivānanda's edn.) Arśa- III. chs. 17 - 18 give the story of Mayamohana, preaching non-Vedic doctrines to demons, with a view to delude them. Other instances of Viṣṇu assuming different forms out of his Māyā, are to be found in the Lingapurana and the Kāsikhanda.

Or are we rather to understand that he composed this Tantra while he himself was in error, since it is not accepted by the followers of the Veda, just as the doctrine of the Jainas is not accepted?

That the followers of the Veda do not accept it has been set forth at length above.100

Consequently, then, Pancaratra Tantra is not authoritative because it derives from the cognition of an independent Person.

supra § 12.

47. Nor is it proper to argue the validity of the Pancaratra Tradition "like the Manu Tradition etc. 101

supra §11.

[[39]

If the God has composed the Tantra after having, like manu etc., learnt the meaning of the Veda from a teacher who was satisfied with his pupil's

obedience,

then the assumption that He was independent is purposeless and false.

It is not borne out by human experience that the Veda was immediately manifest to him, even though he never learnt it. The defects which the Author of the Varttika enumerates, those of personal superiority and inferiority etc., (Kumarila, Slokavārttika 2.114) are all to be presumed in the case of Pañcarātra,

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48. Moreover, the Saivite, Pasupata, Buddhist, Jainist, Kāpālika and Pañcarātra teachings are traditionally known as heretical.

\$ To be identified.

On the basis of the distinction between Vedic and Tantric we arrive at the conclusion that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda.

• Vide Anandasamhitā ch. XIII, folios 43b-44a-

athāto devasyarcanam dvividham śruņu [sic] vaikhānasam pañcarātram vaidikam tantrikam kramāt 🛮 tayor vaikhānasam śreṣṭham aihikāmuṣmikapradam 1

The (Maha) Sanatkumārasamhitā draws a distinction among the Vaisnavamantras in terms of Vaidika Tantrika and Vaidika-tantrika. Cf. Rsirātra IX. 35vaidikam tāntrikam caiva tathā vaidikatāntrikam mantratrayaṁ kramenoktam....... 🏾

Cf. Vasisthasamhità XIII. 16b-17a-

Vaidikam tantrikam caiva tatha vaidikatāntrikam miśritam vaidikam mantraih tasmāt vaidikatāntrikam []

Harita in his Dharmasastra, says- srutiśca dvividhā, vaidiki tantriki ca (Quoted in the Lingadharanacandrikā, p. 240). 44

"Tantra is of four kinds: Saiva, Pasupata, Saumya and Laguḍa; thus are described the divisions of Tantra; one should not confuse them."

§ The Vaikhanosāgamas call the Vaikhānasa and the Pañcarātra systems "saumya" and "agneya" respectively. Cf. Kasyapajñānakāṇḍa, p. 171- vaikhanasaṁ saumyam; agneyaṁ pañcarātram. See also Vimānārcanākalpa, patala 77, p. 467-

vaiṣṇavam dvividham, vaikhānasam pañcarātramiti; vaikhānasam vaidikam, vaidikairarcitam aihikāmuṣmikaphalapradam; pāñcarātramagneyam avaidikam āmuṣmikaphalapradam; saumyam sarvatra sampūjyam.

Cf. also Bhagavata XI. 27. 7, 49-

vaidikastantriko miśra iti me trividho makhaḥ 🛮 trayāṇāmīpsitenaiva vidhinā mām samarcayet 🗈 evam kriyāyoga-pathaiḥ puman vaidikatāntrikaiḥ 🗈 arcayannubhayataḥ siddhim matto vindatyabhīpsitam 🗈

It may be noted that such a division is found even among the Saivāgamas. Thus, the Vayu Samhita of the Sivapurāṇa (uttarabhāga XXIV. 177-178) says-

śivagamopi dvividhaḥ śrauto 'śrautaśca samsmrlah 🏻 śrutisāramayah śrautah svatantra itarassmṛtaḥ 🏻 (Quoted in Linga- dhāraṇucandrikā, p. 290).

Also see Saivasiddhānta p. 43-6.

Āgamas are of two kinds- Śrauta and Asrauta. The Śrautagamas are dependent upon the Vedas and are full of their essence; not so the Asrauta. The former Agamas are accepted but not the latter. The asrauta-agamas have been declared by the Lord in order to delude some people. These Agamas are Vāma, Pasupata, Lakula, Bhairava, etc. "

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Likewise:

"There are three distinct doctrines, the Bhakta, the Bhagavata and the Satvata;" this description of the divisions of Tantra is also found in Pancarātra.

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49. Furthermore, that a doctrine destitute of all logic and embracing the view that the soul knows birth, which is rejected by Revelation and Tradition, should be Truth is a highly ludicrous contention.

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Thus we find the śruti,
                   "Verily, this soul is unperishing, essentially indestructible;
                   it is not conjoined with sizes" (BA Up. 4.5.14.)
and,
                   "This dies without the soul; the soul does not die."*104 (Ch Up.
                    6.11.3.)
                    OBJECTION.
This is all very well,
but all that this statement says is that the soul is not destroyed,
not that it is not born.
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REFUTATION. No, by stating that it cannot be destroyed,
it also decides that it cannot be born;
it is impossible that an entity that has been born
does not perish.
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OBIECTION.
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Nonetheless, from the emphasis which in the statement "only sat was here" (ChUp.6.2.1.) is laid on the uniqueness of sat,

it follows that there were no souls before the time of creation.

Had the individual soul existed before why then this emphasis of "only sat" on sat's absolute solitariness?

[[40]]

REFUTATION.

The reply to this is that here the emphasis on sat's uniqueness is with regard to the elements of wind, water and ether that were about to be created by sat.

Were the soul excluded by this statement of sat's solitariness, then the soul's origin would have been described in the sequel, just as the creation of ether is described.

This is not done; therefore the soul does not know birth, since in the sequel "That sat created fire, etc. (Ch Up. 6.2.3.) we do not hear of the creation of the individual soul.

OBJECTION. However, in the text yato va imani bhūtāni etc. we hear that the souls too know origin, continuance and reabsorption.

Here the word bhuta denotes the jiva, the individual soul; for thus we find the word used in the passage bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni,

The verb jianti "they live" in the text can only apply to the souls, the expression tena jayante "by whom they are born" evidently refers to

these same souls.

Taitt Up. 3.1.1. The whole sentence includes tena jivanti, on which the present exegesis of bhuta is based.

[[41]] REFUTATION. This is not right.

The word bhuta commonly deonly the elements ether, wind, fire, water and earth.

If the word is used for something else, it is used metaphorically. Of these elements, ether etc. which are primarily understood by the word bhuta, it is stated that they are variously modified and that they live.

namely, that they are born (jātāri) and die (prayanti).

The verb "they live" describes a condition of being analogous to living. And if the word bhuta be used in the sense of individual soul, then too the statement declares that the soul is born only in the sense that its entrance into a body is a birth.

Therefore, when the word bhuta refers to the individual soul, it can rightly be said that the souls are born, just as it is said that the cow, once born walks about.

There are śrutis to this effect, like "For the soul, unborn, alone" (Svet Up. 4.5.) and we also have other Śrutis which declare that the soul is unborn. Similarly, the word of the Lord:

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"Know that both matter and spirit are without beginning;" (Bh G. 13.19.)

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"this ancient spirit is unborn, eternal, everlasting;" (Kath Up. 2.18.)

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"it is never born nor does it die" etc. (Kath Up. 2.17.)

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Finally there is the syllogism:

the individual soul in question never knows birth; for, while being substantial, it is bodiless,

as it consists of spirit, like the Supreme Soul.

50. There are some who notice the logical defects inherent in the view that Scripture of a personal origin,

which we have explained above, and having no other course open posit that Tantra too must be eternal.

Against this position, we state that it is sublated by the fact that its author, who is patent enough and tacitly remembered, is not forgotten at all; and hence this position does not deserve our notice.

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[[42]

51. Besides, why has the argument about the Pasupatas etc. been swept aside with a stick?

If one replies, let the argument stand, we shall have the defect of mutual exclusion.

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And Vasudeva's authorship of the Tantra, which is commonly known to everybody,

can no more be rejected than the preferpersonal origin of the Veda.

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Or else, if someone says that

- (Is) any of the three means of knowledge is, in the case of Pasupata Tantra, cancelled by non-appearance (sc. of knowledge.), reversion and dubiety,
- Cf. Slokavārtika (I. 1. 2) \$1.54a- " 0000000000 000000 000000 000000

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000 00000000 000000-0000 0000000 00000 0 the answer is, your own postulation applies equally well to the Laguda doctrine (here used as synonymous with Pasupata), and once you know this, it is refuted. Your worship better keep guiet.

52. To sum up. For the reasons set forth above we maintain that the exposure of this Tantra's incompatibility with Revelation, Tradition, Epic and Purana as well as with the conclusions of our logical demonstration, and the inacceptability of this Tantra to all exemplary persons go to show that the Pañcaratra texts must have been composed by someone

who pretended to teach a path that would lead to heaven and salvation, but actually wished to deceive the world.

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Concerning its apocryphal character, which we have now exposed, we have the declaration:

"The traditional teachings that are outside the Veda and all other false doctrines remain fruitless in the afterworld, for they are considered to derive from tamas."

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Those who follow the Veda are forbidden to speak with those who follow such evil paths:

"The following are not to be honoured even with a word: heretics, criminals, impostors, crooks, thieves and hypocrites are not to be honoured even with a word."

[[43]]

53. In the manner116 presented above the primafacie case can be made that the Pañcaritra in its entirety has no validity whatever as a means of knowledge.

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Against this prima-facie case

we now submit that the Tantra in question must be accepted as valid, because it produces faultless knowledge,

like the scriptural statements on the Vedic sacrifices jyotiştoma etc.

54. Now, such defects as are elicited by the science of logic cannot be detected in this inference. Let us consider the Object of the Proposition.

The Object of the Proposition is, by definition, the content of a certain thesis is proposed; it is a term which itself is established, and of which it is now to be proved that it is particularized by another term, which is also established."

pratijñārthah, the object or content of the pratijñā, which is the first step of the five-membered syllogism, e.g., "the mountain has fire" (parvatasya agnimattvam). It does not therefore coincide with the Subject. In the proposition both S and P must be siddha, established as existing somewhere; a non-thing like a hare's horn can be neither S nor P.

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In the present case the term which particularizes the object is not unknown,

for this term, ie. "validity," is for both parties established with regard to the valid means of knowledge, Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony

Nor is the subject itself unknown, for the Pañcaratra system is known universally.

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Nor is the Object to be proved already proved, for this Object, "The Pañcaratra is valid," is not proved for the opponent.

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Nor is this Object incompatible with Perception, since its opposite, ie. nonvalidity, is beyond perceptual verifiability.

Nor is this Object incompatible with Inference, because no inference proving non-validity is found.

55. OBJECTION. But such an inference is actually found: Pañcarātra Sastra is non-authoritative,

because it is non-Vedic, like Buddhism,

REFUTATION. We reply, What is this nonauthoritativeness which this reasoning seeks to prove?

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If it is defined by the fact that the Tantra does not produce knowledge, then this definition militates against Perception;

for the knowledge which arises in a student, who is able to comprehend the relation between word and meaning, concerning the meaning of the sentences of Pañcaratra Sastra

he hears is perceptually evident.

Nor is the predicate, sc. "nonauthoritativeness," defined by dubiety, since then we have the same conflict with Perception; for the statement, "One must worship the four-armed Supreme Person in the centre of the lotus,"

does not occasion a doubtful cognition:

"Must one worship Him thus or not?"

Nor, in the third place, is the predicate, defined by reversion, since there is no non-apprehension of what should be there, and since, the presumption of future reversion militates against Perception and would put an end to all operations.

This point shall be discussed in detail later on.

this "non-apprehension of what should be there (yogānupalambha) is the criterion by which we know the absence of a thing. Here it is the absence of truth in Pañcarātra that needs be proved by yoganupalambha, if the objector's contention that Pañcarātra is invalid-through-reversion be correct.

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56. Still, the proposed validity of Pañcarātra militates against Scripture. Since in Pañcarātra Agama we have its meaning conveyed exactly as it is, this conflict between Scripture and Pañcarātra is not vicious only if Pañcaratra is not authoritative.

The claim that Pañcarātra is invalid is opposed by the Pañcarātra Agama itself. In Pañcarātra, it's validity is understood. Or you say -

As Pañcarātra itself is invalid, it's opposition (to our inference of invalidity) is not a fault.

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REFUTATION.

Why, if that were so, that would mean that if its authority is disproved by Scripture it is proved by Inference, and if it is proved by inference it is disproved by Scripture; which is a vicious circle.

Why, if that were so, that would mean that for proving it's invalidity, you want (your) inference's validity accepted. But where we infer it's validity, you want it's invalidity (to counter us).

I have difficulty in understanding the argument unless I assume an illogicality. By stating as his ground since in agama we have its meaning exactly conveyed as it is the objector not only agrees with the preceding argumentation that on inferential grounds Pañcaratra is not invalid, but even goes so far as accepting that it is valid in other words, confuse non-invalidity with validity.

Then, because of this validity (svarthasya tathātvāvabodhanāt), there arises a conflict with a deviating statement of the Veda which has its own validity; since only one can be true, it follows that when Pancarãtra is true by inference, it is untrue by Veda.

But I don't see how the objector can reasonably infer the validity of Pañ-carātra, since its meaning or content is admittedly suprasensible. Yamuna himself has not argued that Inference proves the validity, but that Inference cannot disprove the correctness of the thesis. [[134]]

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57. Besides, what does this mean, "being nonVedic, or outside the Veda?"

[[45]]

If it means that Pañcaratra is different from the Veda, we have an occasional application to Perception etc., which are also different from the Veda.

If, in order to avoid this defect, the ground is thus specified, 'because, while being language, it is different from the Veda,' we have a hetvantaram deadlock,

which, as they say, occurs when into a syllogism with an unqualified ground and additional qualification is accepted 120

a hetvantaram constitutes on the part of the debator a confession of importance

since the ground which he gave does not hold and he has to produce a different ground. By the rules of debate this means a defeat.

Also, we then have an occasional application to the statements of Manu, which also are language and different from the Veda,

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If then, my slow-witted opponent, in order to remove this defect from your ground

you claim that being outside the Veda means "not deriving from the Veda," then what do you, logician, think of it?

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Well, by this definition of the ground we get meaning,

"something, namely in case there is question of languagestatements, is non-Vedic, because it does not derive from the Veda."

But then there is an occasional application to the Veda itself, which does not derive from the Veda!

When the ground is redefined as

"because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a language-statement but not a Vedic statement,"

then again there would inevitably be an occasional application to statements of reliable persons which do not derive from the Veda and yet are valid, like "There are trees on the river-bank."

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If the reason is further corrected into:

"because it does not derive from the Veda, namely, in case of a languagestatement -but not a Vedic statementand this statement concerns an action to be taken," then still we have a vicious applicability to such precepts as "One must eat little when one has indigestion."

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Again, if the ground is then reformulated as

"because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a statement specified by all the above specifications and also concerned with dharma and adharma,"

then this ground is partly impertinent, because Pancarātra Sastra does not deal with dharma and adharma exclusively,

since the great majority of its Statements concern Brahman.

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If then, the specification is added

"....when it deals with objects that are outside the scope of other pramāṇas,"

then again the ground does not fully apply,

for hundreds of śrutis demonstrate

that the Perception of God encompasses all things related to dharma and adharma.

We shall discuss this point presently (infra §§ 76 F.); this suffices for the time being to expose the baseless fancies of those who have not made a study of Akṣapada's system.

Akshapada - The founder of the school of logic.

Other conceivable inferences will be presented; and refuted, later on. We conclude therefore, that the proposition "Pañcarātra is authoritative," is not in conflict with Inference.

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58. Nor is it in conflict with Scripture, for hundreds of scriptural statements, like idam mahopaniṣadam, will be adduced which set forth that Pañcarātra is authoritative.

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There are no grounds to suspect in our proposition anyone of the three kinds of contradiction of language-statements; namely, contradiction within the terms of the statement; contradiction with one's own thesis; or contradiction with universally accepted facts.

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First, there is no contradiction within the statement. This type of contradiction is of three kinds of mere utterance; or utterance of property; and of utterance of substance.

Firstly, the proposition is not contradicted by its mere utterance, for the statement of the thesis "Pañcarātra Sastra is authoritative" does not cancel its own content, as does, for instance, the statement: "During my entire life I have kept silence."

Secondly, there is no contradiction through utterance of property, as for example the statement: "All statements are untrue:"

for the authoritativeness predicated of Pañcarātra does not cancel the proposition.

Thirdly, there is no contradiction through utterance of substance, since in the given substance a connection with the given property is not contradictory:

Pancarātra is not contradicted by its property authoritativeness, as motherhood is contradicted by the property sterility.

For upon the assertion of the authoritativeness of the substance in question.

it is not contradicted by any particular substance named in Revelation, since the imputation of questionableness is secondary, as in the case of the assertion that

certain acts of violence which are enjoined are against the dharma,12

The Vedic injunction na hinnsyāt sarvabhūtāni "one should not injure any being"

raises the question of the validity of injunctions which do require injury to beings.

But this is a secondary question which does not affect the validity of the Veda as a whole.

Similarly, the thesis "Pañcaratra is valid" is not disproved by the possible mention in the valid Veda of something that conflicts with something in Pañcaratra. So far the argument is not for validity but against invalidity.

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There is, therefore, no contradiction by language statement; so that we conclude that the proposition is presentable.

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59. Nor is the ground affected by logical defects, like occasional application etc.

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The ground is not occasionally applicable to other terms.

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This fallacy of occasionalness is of two kinds, general occasionalness and special occasionalness.

An instance of the first kind provides the ground in the argument: "The earth is eternal, because it is knowable."

Of the second kind: "The earth is eternal, because it, possesses smell."

Since pots are knowable, the ground would also apply to prove the eternality of pots and all things that are knowable.

Since only earth (as an element) possesses smell, this ground has no general applicability.

Our ground, namely,

'Pañcaratra is authoritative, because it produces faultless knowledge', does not apply equally whether it is authoritative or not, which would render the ground generally-occasional.126

Like the ground "because it is knowable" which applies to things regardless of whether they are eternal or not.

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For this ground, namely its being a cause of faultless knowledge, has not been found before in the alternative propositions that Pañcaratra is deceptive and hence nonauthoritative.

Neither does the ground have a specially occasional application, because the illustration "like statements on Vedic sacrifices such as jyotistoma etc."

shows its connection with other instances on the same side of the argument.

Nor is the ground precluded,

since there is no concomitance of its opposite; being a cause of faultless knowledge is not invariably accompanied by nonauthoritativeness.

Nor is the ground cancelled by lapse of time, since there is no conflict with Perception and in this it is analogous with Scripture.

Nor is the ground itself unproved or unestablished. If a ground is unestablished, this is because either its locus or its essence is unestablished. The first does not apply, for its locus is Pañicarātra Sastra, which is proved to exist.

Nor does the second apply:

for there are three ways in which a ground may be unestablished as to its essence:

through ignorance, through dubiety, or through reversion.

Ignorance does not apply,

as follows from the fact that the words describing the ground are pronounced.

Obviously, if the ground were not known, it could not be stated.

Nor does dubiety apply,

for that the ground is correct is undoubted and self-evident to the defender of the proposition,

while for the opponent the same is easily proved by the fact that no defects are apprehended in it.

[[49]]

That the ground would be unestablished through reversal is utterly out of the question.

60. OBJECTION. But how can we discard the supposition that the Pañcaratra texts are faulty?128

This supposition arises instantly since the texts are of personal origin.

This objection seems to speak to the summary denial that the ground is unestablished through reversion.

REFUTATION. How do you avoid the same supposition in the case of the Vedas?

There too it arises instantly, since the Vedas are language-statements.

When you reply, it is avoided because the Vedas have no personal author, then you may realize that in our case, too, it is avoided, since the Tantras have been composed by the Supreme Person, who is omniscient and eternally satisfied,

and you may keep quiet!

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What I mean to say is this.

Our position is that in language as such there are no defects that invalidate its authority;

as language, language is authoritative,

Be it repeated that the validity, authoritativeness, etc. of Verbal Statements (ie, shabdapramāna) is founded on the basic assumption that statements truly and accurately communicate their things-meant (artha), that a word accurately conveys its meaning.

Among these things meant Yamuna includes facts as well as karyas, hence the following debate with the Prabhakara,

Its authority is in certain cases invalidated by defects in the character of the speaker,

for instance in a language statement,

"There is a herd of elephants on my finger-tip."

The statements in the upanisad portion of the Veda remove whatever suspicion we may have about any defects in the character of the speaker in the text collection here under discussion.

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For the Vedanta texts set forth that the omniscient Lord of the world is supremely compassionate;

then how can we suppose Him to be deceitful etc.?

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61. OBJECTION.

However, I have said that language statements have no authority when they concern established facts, on the ground that when terms are applied to such facts they do not have proper denotative power.

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REFUTATION.

This view is not correct, language, eliciting a fact by direct application, even though this fact is established, really operates its denoting power as fully as it does by applications which concern karyas.

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Consider the illustration that has been given above (supra § 37.), When certain manifestations (of joy) in a man's face, which follow on his hearing the statement "A son has been born to you," make it appear that the man spoken-to is happy, one instantly understands that his happiness is the result of his receiving from this statement a knowledge of an agreeable meaning, and one then infers that, for a medium-aged person too, this happiness derives from the statement. Thus one concludes that, since this happiness came to exist upon the existence of the statement, the statement itself has the power to convey an agreeable meaning.

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If there arises a doubt as to

which particular ground of happiness amongst the many different grounds that may occur according to past, present and future, then consider this.

(A young boy, who wants to understand the meaning of speech, immediately upon hearing the same statement receives knowledge that a birth ceremony is being held.)

He thinks to himself, "There must be a reason for this."
Then he considers,
"Is the agreeable meaning which has been understood from the statement the cause of this knowledge that a birth ceremony is to be held?"

and he realizes that this meaning was precisely this that a son had been born. 13

Yamuna here takes up the Prabhakara's theory that a child learns the meaning of language

through the action his elders take on hearing a statement,

so that the denotativeness of language is defined by its injunctiveness.

He uses the Prabhakara's example of the factual statement: "A child is born to you."

A child who does not know language has no way of understanding the meaning of this statement

because the young father's happiness conveys nothing specific.

But, asks Yamuna, suppose the same child has witnessed his father reception of the cheering news

and the subsequent preparations for a birth ceremony.

Since one follows immediately upon the other,

the child associates one with the other

and can thus understand the meaning of the statement,

though the statement itself was no injunction,

but a communication of an established fact,

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And on that issue:

Definite knowledge of the denotion of words in a sentence is had through the words that are included or excluded. This being so, [51] words denote their meanings, whether these are established things or not.

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62. OBJECTION. However, the relation of cause and effect is not just known from the fact that one comes into existence upon the existence of the other, for that would mean over-extension.

Nor does the realization that a birth ceremony is to be held follow invariably upon the knowledge of an agreeable meaning;

for we find also that the same realization follows upon a feeling of distress, namely when the informed father is vexed by the trouble of maintaining his family.132

132: Then, one may suppose, the child would not so readily associate the birth ceremony with the previous communication.

REFUTATION. Don't we find that the realization of a kārya is caused by a verbal statement, so that we can agree that, for example, the realization that a cow is to be fetched following a statement "Fetch the cow" is indeed caused by that statement?

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When you say that, since this realization cannot occur without a cause therefore the proximate statement must in that case be the cause of the realization, then I maintain that the same holds also in the case of "A son is born."

It has been decided by our opponent that the verbal denotation of a meaning which causes an action to be taken is a result of the inclusion in the statement of a linādi suffix.133

133: supra §36.

He who maintains that all words only bear meaningfully on kārya,

maintains in effect that padārthas134 exist only in kārya statements and that e.g. in the case of cows, horses and the like, which are related to bodies, their being a padārtha is ascertained by the inclusion or exclusion of the words denoting them in a statement concerning kārya.

134: The things-meant or denoted by the word,

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If he says, indeed, whenever their being a padartha is significantly construed, it is construed just as connected with kārya, we reply, Stop being obstinate; for verbal exchange is also possible through denotation of words that are connected with other things than kāryas.135

135: Yāmuna's argument is that the injunctive, etc. terminations of the verb denote the injunction as their thing-meant (padārtha); but what makes this injunction 'meaningful' is not that it is an injunction,

but that it is connected with someone who is qualified to accept the injunction,

e.g., in the injunction svargakāmo yajeta.

The injunctive yajña has no meaning or purpose unless there is a "desire for heaven:"

the meaning of the injunction thus is connected with the consequence of this desire of heaven,

namely, that somebody who has this desire is prepared to do something about it.

63. It is necessary to accept the position that words are denotative of connected meanings, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain that they are denotative of meanings connected with kāryas.

Yāmuna emphasises here that no speciality should be attached to a statement that speaks of something to be done (kārya).

Words, he says, generally depend upon some factors

Words, he says, generally depend upon some factors and those factors need not necessarily be 'kārya'.

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The definition 'the thing meant by a word is always connected with a kārya' fails to cover the defined topic completely; for it does not apply in the case of injunctive suffixes,

Pointing out the untenability of the theory of 'kārya', he says that it goes astray in the instance of 'lin' the optative itself.

since these suffixes denote their own meanings as connected, not with kārya, but with consequences of already established facts, such as proper qualification on the part of the person enjoined etc.

Even the 'lin'-suffix is found to depend upon a host of factors like the qualified aspirant (adhikārin), the means (sādhana) and the thing to be attained (sādhya). Cf. the following verse:

Or if it is said that in their case there is denotation of connected meanings and in the other case denotation of meanings connected with kārya, we reply that this is a neither old nor young, argument;136 it is more appropriate simply to accept the view that there is denotation of connected meanings in general.

136: ardhajaratī is a half-old woman; the ardhajaratīyanyāya is used to indicate that the opponent wants to have it both ways and that consequently his argument, like a half-old and half-young woman, is useless either way.

For an explanation of the ardhajaratī-nyāya see Nyāyasudhā under I. iii. 1, p. 135:

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64. Therefore, the adherents of all schools should accept that words have proper denotation for the meanings they denote because these meanings are connected with other meanings that are required to complete the sense of the statement, are closely collocated and are appropriate.

Words convey their sense only in connection with such other idea or factor that is complete to its sense (ākāṅkṣita), that is compatible with it (yogya) and which is supplied by a word uttered along with it (āsanna). Kārya should therefore occupy a subordinate but not the supreme position in the scheme of significance of words.

Even if the denoting power of word is to be known only through the impossibility of operation,

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Even if the denoting power of language were to be understood only through its proper signification in kārya statements alone,137

137: Miśra's text here has pady api prartly anu papattisamadhigamaniyaiva śabdaśaktis "the denoting power of language is to be known only through the impossibility of operation," which makes no sense. The reading must be corrupt, in anu papatti we may find a corruption of vyutpatti, in pravṛtti perhaps a corruption of kāryārthe or kāryārtha-. I read conjecturally kāryārthe vyutpatti-samadhigamanīyaiva, which gives the required sense.

it is correct when we decide the denotation of language to take the standpoint that kārya is just one of the inessential factors of denotation, like the identity of the speaker, the extent of space in which a statement can be heard etc.

The logicians hold the view that the meaning of a language statement cannot be known except by language statement.138 Consequently, there exists no inherent relationship with kārya as cause of denotation in uses of words that have their proper signification,

just as is the case with floating precious stones on water.

The quality of gems is tested by putting them in water. If they float, that is an indication of their superiority. This method of testing or the knowledge regarding the test is no doubt useful in determining the class of gems; but it is of no avail at the time of wearing them. On this analogy, it is argued that the knowledge of 'karya' though useful to arrive at the significance of words, is not useful at the time of using those words.

Just as this floating, however helpful it may be to determine the identity of certain diamonds, e.g. the brahmin diamond, serves no purpose when a stone is being transacted which has already been properly identified, similarly the kārya, however helpful to understand the proper signification of a word, serves no purpose once its proper signification has been identified.

For a classification of gems as 'male' and 'female, see Ratnadipikā of Candeśvara, Śls. 11-13, and for a classification into the four castes' brāhmana', Kşatriya', 'vaisya' and 'śūdra see Ratnasāstra: sls. 21 and 23.

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65. Moreover, if words denote their meanings only as connected with kārya, then how can we know from them that, for example, there is a relation between a fruit and a river-bank, as in a statement: "There is a fruit on the river-bank?"

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If you say that a statement of such a substantive relation does not denote the relation it states through its primary sense, but through secondary sense, then, we may ask, where do statements then have their primary sense?

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If you answer

in a kārya which is not previously known through other means of knowledge,

we reply: no, for then no use of words would be possible, since their meaning would not yet have been identified.

138: This holds for those statements which are not verifiable by other means of knowledge, for if they are verifiable, they are no means of knowledge in their own right.

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Naturally there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a word when that word denotes a meaning not previously known through other means of knowledge,

and no cognition can arise from words with unknown meanings, for that would entail over-extension.

Yamuna here attacks the theory advanced by the Prabhakaras that the words uttered by human beings gain validity only on inferential evidence because those beings are liable to defects.

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66. OBJECTION. My position is this.

In ordinary language a statement is understood to have its proper signification

when it bears on a kārya that is to be accomplished with a certain action.

In Vedic language a statement enjoys a special power of denotation

which transcends the transitory root-sense of the word "sacrificing",

and it has this power of denotation

because it is the means of realizing a certain fruit and acquires this power on account of the collocation of words describing this fruit;

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whereas in ordinary language,

since there verbal exchange is possible also to the unsophisticated,

this determination of the nature of word and meaning is not attended to.

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Cf. Prakaranapañcikā V. p. 95:

REFUTATION. This position is just wishful thinking;

for a language statement,

even if understood in your way as bearing meaningfully only on a kārya to be accomplished with an action,

does not by that token set forth a permanent kārya,140 since that would mean over-extension.

139: read na hi kriyākārye vyutpannaḥ sthāyi kāryam.

140: a?? sthāyi; the Prābhākara view is that the kārya has a lasting efficacy beyond the inevitably transient action it involves; for the kārya must remain in order to effect the fruit of the action at any time after the completion of the action.

Yāmuna objects that we cannot have two altogether different denoting powers in language,

one to convey a transitory thing, another to convey a non-transitory thing.

The only possible explanation is that of lakṣaṇā "figurative usage," which remains related to the mukhyā "principal usage." But he will deny the entire construction (67).

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If we cannot know the true connection of words even when the usage of our elders, through which the denotations of these words is understood, takes place in accordance with these words, then we can never know their connection!

If a language statement has lost its postulated true denoting power because it is impossible,

it does not thereby acquire another denoting power.

In such cases we surely must assume lakṣaṇā.

For when certain words are collocated that have incompatible meanings, these words do not therefore denote something else altogether, for then all word meanings would become unreliable.

67. Besides, we do not admit that the fact that a word has the power to communicate a kārya that is not previously known through other means of knowledge proves that there actually exists a relationship between itself and the fruit of the action it enjoins.

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The only relation proved of it is that with injunction, not with instrumentality.

That in a statement there subsists a relation with a kārya which transcends the root-sense of the verb

cannot be proved except by the relation of karya with the fruit of the act, and the latter relation cannot be proved without the former.

And therefore there is a vicious interdependence that cannot be refuted.

If there is no factor which activates the person who, according to the injunction, is specified by the heaven that is to be achieved, the injunction itself cannot be the means of achieving the desired heaven.

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The root-sense of the words being transitory, the statement itself cannot function as this means.141

Therefore the assertion that a language statement communicates as its proper meaning a kārya which exceeds this transitory root-sense, cannot be correct.

141: This is the Prābhākara view, which holds that in the injunction (niyoga) svargakāmo

yajeta the sādhya (object to be realized) is not svarga, but the entire niyoga (cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190), so that the statement of the injunction would become the means (sādhana) to realize that sādhya, sc. the injunction.

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A person is not specified by heaven as the object to be achieved,142 but it is the person who desires heaven who is enjoined upon to accomplish the act.

142: {{Cr. | Cf.}} {{Prakaraṇapañcikā}} p. 182.

Heaven can not be the specification of the person's qualification, because heaven is yet to be achieved.

Only something that has already been achieved, that actually exists, can specify the person upon whom an act is enjoined, for instance, the real fact of his being alive etc. Consequently only his desire can specify his qualification for the act.

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(see Sābarabhāsya under II iv I)

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68. Furthermore, precisely how is heaven, which in your opinion functions as the specification of the person enjoined, an object to be realized, a sād-hya?

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If its being a sādhya means that it is fit for a relation with a sādhana, it is impossible for heaven to be siddha, as long as its relatability obtains,

since it cannot become siddha in the meantime.143

143: Nothing can become a fact (siddha) as long as it is still to be made a fact (sādhya) by a "factualizing" means (sādhana);

thus as long as it is related with such a means it cannot be a fact.

The only authority that exists for heaven becoming siddha in the end is the injunction itself, while the only authority for the injunction is just this that heaven does become siddha. This is plainly a vicious circle.

** 'Niyoga' is another name coined by Prabhakara to denote Apurva. See Karmamimāmsā, pp. 74-75-

Mīmāmsā does not believe in any God that receives the offerings from the votaries and rewards them accordingly.

"There must, therefore, be a capacity, which does not exist prior to the sacrificial action, either in the principal performance or in the agent, but which is generated in the course of the performance.

Before a man performs a sacrifice, which will lead to heaven,

there is an incapacity in the offering and in the man himself to secure that result,

but when he has performed it, he becomes, as a result of the action, endowed with a potency, styled 'apūrva', which in the course of time, will secure for him the end desired.

The existence of this potency is testified to in the scriptures;

its necessity is apparent by the means of proof known as Presumption (arthāpatti).

We find in the Veda, assertions that sacrifices produce certain results,

and, as the operation of the sacrifice, as we see it, is transient, the truth of the scripture would be vitiated if we did not accept the theory of Apūrva.

Nor is there anything illogical in this doctrine;

every action sets in force activities in substances or agents,

and these come to fruition when the necessary auxiliaries are present.

The action specified is called into existence by the

injunction contained in the form of an optative in a sentence in the Veda.

From this doctrine, Prabhakara dissents, elaborating instead, a theory which is obviously a refinement on the simple view which Kumārila accepts from the older writers of the school and which best suits the Mimämsä Sūtras.

In his opinion, the injunction rests in the sentence as a whole, not in the optative verb,

and he denies that from the action there arises directly the Apurva.

On the contrary the process is that the injunctive sentence lays down A Mandate, Niyoga;

this excites the man to exertion,

and this exertion pertains to some form of action, indicated by the verb of the injunctive sentence.

The exertion produces in the agent a result (karya) to which also the name of Niyoga is given by Prabhakara,

on the ground that it is this which acts as an Incentive to the agent to put forth exertion towards the performance of the action denoted by the verb of the injunctive clause.

The Niyoga, however, is unable to produce its result, unless aided by something which Śālikanatha styles fate,

nor is it apparent that either in his terminology, or in his view of the process,

Prabhakara's doctrine is any superior to that of Kumārila.

It seems as if primarily it arose from nothing more important than the observation that The result produced in the agent was in one sense his motive to action

as much As the sentence directing the action to be done, leading to a transfer of the term Niyoga, naturally applicable to the sentence.

to the condition in the agent to which the more orthodox name of Apurva was usually applied. "

" In simple sacrifices, there is only one Apūrva produced, but in more complicated sacrifices, there may be several, as a rule, four

But it is not every action which brings out an Apurva; these actions, which are devoted simply to some material result, though a part of the sacrifice, such as the appointment of priests or the threshing of corn are not credited with any such effect, as they serve an immediate purpose and need no further explanation".

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If heaven is the sādhya, the injunction is not the sādhya. It is not possible to combine two sādhyas in one sentence.144

144: This is the principle of ekavākyatā: a statement can contain only one injunction, otherwise there is vākyabheda: what should be one sentence is split up into two.

69. OBJECTION. Indeed, the unity of a sentence is broken up when it contains two sādhyas that are independent, but not when the two are interdependent.

And here the two sādhyas are interdependent since the realization of heaven is contained in the realization of the injunction.

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That is what the Author says: "When the niyoga is realized, everything else in accordance with it is also realized;" and: "Why should the realization of the fruit not be held to be subservient to the realization of the injunction?"145 Therefore there is no conflict here.

145: Quotations not identified; but for the argument, see Prakaraṇapañ-cikā, p 183 f.

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REFUTATION. No;

When heaven is not realized, what of the injunction/ apUrva can not be realized? Neither the qualification, nor the object, nor anything else required by the injunction is not realized.

REFUTATION. No;

unless heaven is realized, how can the injunction not be realized? Without the realization of heaven neither the qualification, nor the object, nor anything else required by the injunction is realized.

70. OBJECTION. In the case of the qualifications for periodical rites the injunction (apUrva) does not require the 'realization of any fruit.'146

146: No specific fruits are attached to nitya rites.

Nor does an injunction to one act fail to apply to a person who really desires another fruit.

The pre-eminence147 is really the injunction's; a person is enjoined upon by the injunction to any act in the same way as he is enjoined upon to perform the periodical acts.

147: māhātmya, which corresponds to prādhānya, pradhānatā.

For the injunction draws unto itself the desirous person who himself thinks that the heaven which he desires is the principal object, in the same way as the injunction to perform the periodical acts activates a person, even though he does not desire anything, to these acts which bear no fruit at all.

Besides, a person who is desirous of heaven also opens and shuts his eyes; for you these actions do not subserve his realization of heaven. Why not consider the sacrificing an action of the same kind?

There are some who do not accept that it is a means of realizing heaven. [[57]]

71. REFUTATION. If that is the view, we ask: Are the sacrifice etc., which are to be grasped by the cognition that they are such means, eliminated from the injunction?

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On this point: When the injunction does not mean to convey a relation between the object to be realized and the means of realizing it, then all acts are fruitless.

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Therefore, it is sound to maintain that from the injunctive suffixes there results first the cognition that they are indeed the means to realize the desired object, and that subsequently the desire for this object prompts a person to undertake the act of realization.

But it is improper to maintain that

the primary denotation occurs in the expressing of a meaning that was previously unknown,

and that

the denotation in the expressing of any other meaning is secondary.

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We conclude that ordinary, non-Vedic statements give rise to cognitions concerning meanings that are just so established by these statements.

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72. OBJECTION. But these cognitions do not arise from the denoting power of language, but result from Inference.

This view of Prabhakara regarding the validity pertaining to the statements made by human beings,

has already been stated and refuted briefly by Yamuna.

He now exposes in detail, the untenability and absurdity of this view and proves that even sentences uttered by people in the world possess verbal authority,

but not inferential authority.

See the verse "tasmādasti madillie", etc., following.

For these statements, though their denotations in conveying certain meanings are consciously known once their proper meanings have been learnt,

do not furnish complete certainty about their meanings merely upon being heard by a listener,

when they are accompanied by doubt which is created by the listener's observation that in one case or other statements have deviated from their proper meanings.

1 Cf. Prakaranapañcikā II. 24, p. 14- shankyamAnAyatharthatva-racanam tena pumvacaḥ

śruta-mātrakam evärthe na tavan niścayāvaham [][] Also vide ibid[] \$1. 36, p. 15-arthenaiva višeşo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām [][] na cApratitenarthena visesaścāvakalpate [][]

 And, unless there be complete certainty, the meaning will remain unknown; for no knowledge can arise in one's mind from uncertainty.

If the meaning of a statement is not known, the listener wants to discover it: "The speaker uses words whose meanings apparently admit of being connected:

and reliable persons do not use words whose connections are unknown;"

and the listener realizes that therefore the speaker has knowledge of such a connection.

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4 Cf. ibid. II. 38-40, p. 16-
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If the knowledge of connection is thus inferred, the meaning discovered by the listener does not require the authority of verbal testimony.

Consequently, since ordinary language statements are dependent on the speaker's cognition; they terminate in that cognition through Inference alone.

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73. REFUTATION. This view is not correct;

for a word conveys its right meaning as its natural function, and the observation that in one case the statement happened to be untrue under the influence of defects in the speaker's character should not give rise to a general suspicion which would cause all statement to give up its natural capacity of conveying its meaning.149

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The suspicion that a fire may not burn in other cases because in one case, when obstructed by mantras, it fails to burn, does not make fire fail to burn!

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And the fact that the sense of vision may give rise to a cognition which does not correspond to reality-e.g. that nacre is silver-as the result of some optical error does not signify that the visual sense cannot produce true cognition of the visible presence of a pitcher etc.

Therefore, a statement does indeed instantly convey a certain meaning to the listener if he knows the relation between the words and their meanings. 000-00000000000000000

It does not require knowledge of the basis. Before there is complete knowledge on the part of the listener about the basic knowledge of the speaker, and, further, when the meaning has been expressed, the question rises: "How does he know this?" and Inference proceeds to resolve that question.

You want to infer: "Did the speaker know something?" or wish to infer his knowledge of the connection of the different meanings.

But the mere knowledge that the speaker knew something is not enough for utterance and action concerning a statement-meaning to proceed.

Inference of a cognition concerning the connection of different meanings is impossible without a prior cognition of such a connection.

This being so, the meaning of the statement must be known first.

For cognitions whose particular objects are not connected, are not connected separated themselves.

Nor is a particular meaning established by cognitions that are inferred to be such.

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If you say that

any word combination which is able to convey a certain connection produces knowledge of just this connection,

I maintain that the connection of the particular meanings must be known previously;

unless a connection has already reached the level of cognition it cannot give rise to being expressed in a statement.

74. To conclude, the cognition of an established fact in statements like "there is a fruit on the riverbank" is strictly of verbal origin and does not arise from Inference.

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Therefore the position that statements produce valid knowledge only if they deal with a previously unknown kārya

is taken only by people whose judgments are stultified by their continuous preoccupation with their own theories.

In the manner set forth above

it is true that statements may bear meaningfully and informatively on other meanings as well.

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Consequently, all the statements of the Upanisads which set forth the existence of a categorically different Person

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e.g.
"He is the overlord of the Universe,
sovereign of all.
He commands all the world,"150
"All this is manifest to Him" etc.
148: BĀ Up. 5.6.1.
149: Not to be found in the major Upaniṣads.
[[59]]
150: supra §35.
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are authoritative as to what they state, since they produce indubitable and unreversed knowledge of their contents.

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Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority

because of the consideration that since either a proving or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up

there remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or reversed; for the same may equally well happen to a statement concerning, not a fact, but a karya.

The validity of shabda lies in its communicating contents that cannot be known through other means of knowledge.

What I translate as 'facts' are more literally "established [[129]] entities," established, that is, by other means of knowledge than shabda.

A scriptural statement of the kind "grass is green" is not strictly valid in the sense that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a scriptural statement to that effect.

Another proving factor, c.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn up conceivably

and thus make the scriptural statement superfluous; or we may find that grass is not invariably green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the scriptural statement.

Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture's being a means of knowledge, is to the Prabhakara Mimimsaka, its being the sole means of knowing a particular thing.

To the Prabhakara this validity is ideal in the case of injunctions concerning actions which, suprasensibly, lead to a certain desired end.

A kārya, too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for it must be admitted that ordinary karyas, like 'fetch firewood' are also known through other means of knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the odana.

(The injunction concerning the odana oblation includes an injunction concerning the preparation of the odana and the fetching of firewood for the cooking. Since experience shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this karya is not strictly known on scriptural authority.)

\$ Vide Prakaraņapañcikā II, p. 180-

Or if it be claimed that,

inasmuch as a karya concerning a categorically different thing like the agnihotra etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority, therefore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing must needs be its authority,

well, then we may say that there is not a ghost of another authority for the Bhagavan

whose form consists in unsurpassed knowledge, supremacy and beatitude;

so that it should follow that everything is entirely the same in both cases, depending on one's particular partisan views.

(it is all the same, depending on what partisan view one takes!)

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Moreover,

if a cognition concerning a content that is also known through another means of knowledge does not recognize its own content as authoritative, since it has already been taken care of by another authority,

this non-authoritativeness of its content is beyond experience for it is a mere matter of assumption.

Therefore it must be maintained that all indubitable and unreversed knowledge is authoritative, regardless of whether its content is established, or yet to be performed, or anything else.

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Hence we reject our opponent's position. [[61]]
76. The objections that omniscience is acquired by means of the regular senses is incorrect,

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because śruti contradicts it:

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"He sees without eyes, hears without ears; he who does not see with the eye, who sees the eyes, has neither effect nor instrument;"153

153: Śvet Up. 3.19.

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"knowledge, strength and action are natural to Him,"154

etc.

154: Śvet Up. 6.8.

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These śrutis do not speak metaphorically, for there is no authority for this assumption.

Metaphorical usage is assumed when the primary meanings of the śrutis make no sense.

Since the primary meaning here makes sense, the assumption of metaphorical use is baseless.

[[62]]

77. OBJECTION. But in this case we have in fact reason to cancel the primary meaning, because the primary sense militates against other means of knowledge.

REFUTATION. What other means of knowledge? Not, to start, Perception,

for we see no Perception occur which shows that the said Person is nonexistent.

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If you retort that non-existence is decided by the nonapprehension of what should be there.

we reply that this does not hold in our case since the object, that is the said Person, is actually apprehended through Scripture itself, which is the highest-ranking among the assembly of the means of knowledge.

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Nor does it militate against Inference;

for how could an Inference which disproves that Person arise at all, slow-moving as it is, when its object is instantly refuted by the rapidly arising scriptural cognition?

Moreover, if this were so, the relation of sacrificing etc. to heaven, apūrva155 etc. (155: cf supra note.), would logically be contradicted by the fact that sacrificing etc. are actions, when Scripture did not cancel such reasoning.

True, the identity of sacrificial pole and sun, which is asserted by Scripture, is cancelled by another means of knowledge, namely Perception alone, because the difference between a piece of wood and the disc of the sun is indeed obvious.

Besides, in this case it is legitimate to assume metaphorical usage, for the statement of this identity is an arthavāda,156 since it forms one single statement with the proximate injunction about the unction of the sacrificial pole.

156: supra note 86.

f See p. 47 above for the Mimāmsaka's argument. The illustration of the arthavāda - "ādityo yūpah" [Taittiriya Brāhmana - II-i-5-2] was put forth there. This view is now being refuted. The figurative statement "adityo yūpaḥ" is made on the ground of simi- larity of brightness (tejasvitva) between the Sun and the sacrificial post. The relevant sūtra is "sārupyat" [Pūrvamimāmsā - I. iv. 25]. § The rk to be repeated while anointing the yupa with ghee is-"añjanti tvāmadhvare devayantah" (Taittiriya Brāhmana - VIii. p. 142). For the deri- vation of the term yūpa, see ibid- VI-i, the opening part.

There is no other injunction to which it could be accessory as an arthavāda.157

157: supra § 36.

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Alternatively, inasmuch as the human importance of a statement would be lost if there were no injunction to connect it with,

an injunction may be supplemented and then the arthavāda is regarded as accessory to that supplemented injunction.

[[63]]

78. The objection158 that as long as statements fail to prompt the operator of the means of knowledge to being active or to prevent him from being active, they do not communicate self-sufficient information.

does not hold good.

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For, we find that statements have human importance also outside any connection with an injunction; in such a case it will be as in the statement "A son has been born to you," and the like.

Nor need an injunction be supplemented in these cases. For without an injunction, too, joy arises from the information that a son has been born.

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Likewise, a statement which is self-sufficient in merely expressing particular actions which questioners want to know in exchanges of question and answer-e.g. "Which action?" "Cooking!"-do not require the supplementation of an injunction.

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In the upaniṣadic texts the knowledge of brahman is declared to be rewarded by great bliss: "the brahman-knower becomes brahman";159 "the brahman-knower attains the supreme";160

158: This must refer to the śruti sa yo ha vai tat paraṃ veda brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati (quoted Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṃgraha, 91), which I have been unable to locate.

159: Taitt Up. 2.1.1. {{brahmatid|brahmavid}} āpnoti param.

"the sāman cantor attains with brahman all that he desires:"161

the human importance of statements without injunctions is quite clear from these and other scriptural words.

160: This must refer to Taitt Up. 2.1.1 so'snute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā, but sa sāmagāḥ is obscure, unless one may regard it as a corruption of vipaścitā.

To sum up, when it is established that the Bhagavān is the treasury solely of beautiful qualities of direct universal cognition, compassionateness etc., qualities which are true and natural to Him, and which we know from hundreds of quoted śrutis, then it is also established that the Tantra which is based on His universal cognition is authoritative indeed.

Note the way in which Yamuna connects the previous discussion with the main theme, viz, the validity of the Pāñcarātra-texts, based upon the author- ship of Narayana, the Supreme and Omniscient Being.

• Cf. Aniruddhasamhitā- II. 7-8-

Also cf. Visnusamhitā - ch. II-

[[64]]

79. OBJECTION. Granted that, as you have described it, there exists some Person who is endowed with natural omniscience, as it is known from the upaniṣads, yet, unless it is absolutely certain that this Person is indeed Hari, Pañcaratra will not be authoritative.

†The doubt expressed here by the opponent is as to who, among the trinity—Brahmā, Visnu and Siva, is the Supreme Deity.

§ The following is a brief exposition of the Supremacy of Nārāyaṇa. The Purusanirnaya of Yamuna, solely devoted to this question is yet to be traced.

REFUTATION. This is a worthless remark; no experts in the Veda dispute that the Supreme Soul, cause of the entire universe, is Vāsudeva.

For He is revealed in the upanișads as the Supreme Soul: "Truth, knowledge, infinite; that is the supreme step of Viṣṇu. Vāsudeva is the ultimate matter, the ultimate spirit".161

161: Partial quotations from Taitt Up. 2.1.1, Muṇḍ Up. and an unidentified source.

He was alone beyond who became this world;162 "higher than whom there is nothing at all".

In accordance with the subject expressed in these statements there are passages like:

"From whom these beings..." "Sat alone, my son..."

Therefore Viṣṇu's perfect knowledge is established by the upaniṣads.

162: Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanī Up. 2.4 (which reads purastāt for parastāt) and Śvet Up. 3.9.

And it is not declared in śruti that the origination, subsistence and destruction of the world are caused by anyone but Him. Hence there is a consensus that He is the supreme omniscient soul.

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That He is the Supreme Soul we learn also from the statements of Dvaipāyana, Parāśara, Nārada and other great seers.

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"Know thou, O tormentor of thy foes, that the entire world rests on Viṣṇu. The Great Viṣṇu creates the totality of creatures, moving and unmoving.

In him they go to their reabsorption, from Him they originate,"

"The glorious Sage Nārāyaṇa, without beginning or end, is the sovereign Lord. He creates the creatures, those that stand still and those that move."163

163: not identified.

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That He is the Supreme Brahman is also learnt elsewhere.

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"Kesava, O best of the Bhāratas, the Blessed One, is the sovereign, the supreme soul, the entire universe: thus it stands revealed in many places of the Scripture." 164

164: not identified.

For those who seek to know the supreme principle by means of many-sided reasonings Hari alone is the Principle, the great Yogin, Nārāyaṇa the Lord.165

165: Could this refer to Varāha Purāṇa Cf. infra.

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Likewise in the Dānadharma,

"Padmanābha is the Supreme Soul, the highest One, the pure One, the Refuge. This is the secret doctrine of the Veda; dost thou not know, sacker of cities?

By His grace do we all cause the worlds to exist. And the trusted ones, and the first among the immortals, and the gods are held to be His representatives, If Viṣṇu is indifferent, no good will come to us."

Thus Rudra's word.166 Similarly, in the Mahābhārata and Matsya Purāṇa,

166: Viṣṇu Pur., 1.1.31.

"He who amongst them is the Supreme Soul, He indeed is the eternal, unqualified, perfect One; He is to be known as Nārāyana, for He is the world-soul, the Spirit."

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Likewise in the Varāha Purāņa,

"Who, excepting the Lord Nārāyaṇa, is superior to the God whose conduct has become the life-order on the earth?"

"There has been no God greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of the Vedas and the Purāṇas, O excellent ones."

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Likewise in the Linga Purāṇa,

"Janārdana is the sole Spirit, the highest One, the Supreme Soul, from whom Brahmā was born; from Him Rudra and from Him all the world."

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Likewise Parāśara's word,

The world has originated from Viṣṇu and on Him it rests. He is the maker of its subsistence and its destruction."

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167 Likewise in the Mānavadharmaśāstra,168

"Nārāyaṇa is higher than the unmanifest; the World-Egg originates from the unmanifest. Within the Egg are all these worlds as well as the earth with her seven continents."

167: Not in {{Manusmrti|Manusmrti}}.

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Therefore, the study of these and similar śrutis, smṛtis, epical texts and Purānas proves that Vāsudeva is the universal cause, the Supreme Soul.

80. Nor do the śrutis declare that Rudra is the Supreme Soul, or that any other deity is. On the contrary, the followers of the Ekāyana śākhā 169 say that he has an origin,

168: A little known Vedic branch (if it was a Vedic tradition), from which certain Vaiṣṇava sects derive their authority; cf. infra §138.

and the same is found in the Veda itself:

"Darkness was here.... from which Rudra is born; that is the greatest in all the worlds,"

169: These quotations could not be identified.

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"that indeed is the oldest in the worlds."

Similarly, Rudra's position is clearly known to be a result of his karman: "He obtained his greatness by propitiating Viṣṇu."

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"From the forehead sprang a drop; from that Rudra was born,"170 These and other śrutis declare that Rudra was born.

170: BĀ Up 4.1.5.

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This being so, the statements that in appearance convey the greatness of Rudra and others really serve as laudatory statements, like the śruti: "the ear is brahman."

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Consequently, the passages in the Purāṇas which declare Rudra etc. to be the Supreme Soul have not their primary meaning, because they are in conflict with Perception and clear Scripture.

81. Concerning the objection that the assertions of the doctrines of the Tantras are to be rejected

since their greatness is set forth only in non-Vedic Tantric texts,

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we say that Viṣṇu is stated to be the Supreme One in the texts of the Way of the Vedic doctrine.

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For example in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, "The Supreme Soul, the Basis of all creatures, the Supreme Lord is called by the name of Viṣṇu in Vedas and Upaniṣads."171

171: Vişnu Pur. 6.4.40.

In the Varāha Purāṇa, "The Supreme Brahman is Viṣṇu; the triple division in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine is here set forth; the ignorant do not know this."172

172: cf. Varāha Pur., 72.4, which reads pūjyate in b.

"There has been no god greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of Vedas and Purāṇas, O excellent ones."173

173: cf. Varāha Pur. 70.26 na tasmāt parato devo bhavitā na bhaviṣyati. It is clear from several quotations from this Purāṇa that Yāmuna's text had different readings, not all of them better.

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Likewise in the Matsya Purāṇa, "In those aeons where sattva prevails, the greatness of Viṣṇu is declared. In aeons predominated by tamas the greatness of Fire and Śiva is expounded."174

174: Matsya Pur. 290.15.

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Likewise in the Linga Purāṇa,

"For there is no other recourse ordained but Viṣṇu; this the Vedas constantly declare, no doubt about it."175

175: The Linga, Vāyu and Bhaviṣyat quotations could not be verified.

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[[68]]

Likewise in the Vāyu Purāņa,

"The Spirit that belongs to the Way of the Veda is explained to be the thousand-armed supreme lord of creatures."

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Likewise in the Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa, "Visnu is traditionally known to be the Supreme in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine. Viṣṇu is the greatest among persons, the most exalted Supreme Person."

All this has already been explained in great detail in the Puruṣanirṇaya 176 and is therefore not further enlarged upon here.

176: Title of one of Yāmuna's treatises.

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Therefore, how can our tongue endeavour to say that the Tantra which is revealed by Viṣṇu who is known from the Upaniṣads is false?

For He is such that He has an immediate insight into the dharma of Consecration, Propitiation etc., by virtue of the omniscience that is natural to Him.177

177: read sa hi

82. Considering that

the sensual pleasure to be had from attainment of heaven, the birth of a son etc. is inseparable from various forms of misery and does not, continue for long,

the supreme sages Sandilya,. Narada and others have rejected this pleasure,

which in their view was really misery,

and in order to attain the release left their dwellings to become mendicants;

and they have decided definitively that He has created the Pañcarātra Sastra

which sets forth the knowledge and manner of propitiation of Himself which constitute the sole means of attaining the unparalleled beatitude they sought.

83. This argument cannot be extended to other Tantras, for in the various authors of those Tantras error etc. is possible.

It is impossible that Perception [[69]] or another means of knowledge forms the basis for the other Tantras,

and they themselves do also not claim that Scripture is the basis.

Besides, because they communicate a meaning that is incompatible with the conclusions of the upanisads the view that these Tantras are based on Perception or Scripture is sublated.

For there are four kinds of followers of the way of life set forth in those Tantras,

the Kāpālikas, Kālamukhas, Pasupatas and Saivas. The Kapalika doctrine is described as follows:

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the reward of release is attained by knowing what the six mudrikas are and by wearing them, not by knowing Brahman.

External signs worn by Saiva sectarians.

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As they say,

"He who knows the identities of the six mudrikas and is expert in the supreme Mudra, and meditates upon the self in the vulva posture, attains nirvana."

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The six mudrikas of the Kāpālikas are stated to be the earring, necklace, pendent, head ornament, ashes and the sacrificial thread:

there are two more subsidiary mudras described, namely skull and skull-staff

One whose body is marked by these mudras will not be reborn in the world."

Now, the śrutis do not bear out their view that the knowledge of such paraphernalia, the wearing of them and the concentration on the body in the immoral vulva posture are means to attain release,

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for the śrutis expound that

release is attainable only by one who has renounced all sensual desires of this world and the other world

and who concentrates on the soul Vasudeva as the cause of the entire Universe:

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"knowing Him one goes beyond death; there is no other path to tread etc." (Svet Up. 3.8.)

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The same is, true of the Kalamukhas who teach that certain practices, which are condemned by all the [[70]] sāstras, like eating from a skull, bathing in and tasting of ashes of cremated corpses, carrying a laguda staff, putting up wine-cups and worshipping the deity in them, will secure all material and immaterial desires:

these teachings are outside the Veda.

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84. Also some of the teachings of the Pasupatas and the Saivas in which compatible and incompatible elements are indiscriminately mixed are likewise outside the Veda,

The Pasupata system is as follows:

there are individual souls which are called pasus, cattle, and their overlord is Siva, the Lord of Cattle.

To assist the souls Siva has composed the Paficādhyāyi. ("The Doctrine of the Five Chapters.")

There the five Categories are explained, namely, Cause, Effect, Injunction, Yoga and the Cessation of Misery.

The Cause is of two kinds, material and instrumental. Rudra is the instrumental cause and a sixteenth part of him is the material cause.

The Effect comprises the elements from Mahat to earth. The Injunction is stated to comprehend principally a number of rites, secret practices, bathing and lying in ashes etc. 182

Mahat - The highest material evolute; the sloka is out of order.

The text reads güṭhācāramukhasmasānabhasitāvasānaḥ pareļi??, which is a corruption; I read, wholly conjecturally gūḍhācabhasmasnānaśa yanādikrijāparaḥ.

The Yoga is said to be concentration and the muttering of formula, OM etc. The Cessation of Misery is held to be release;

The term "cessation' of misery" means total and final cessation of misery. thus the five Categories are enumerated.

The text reads yogo dharanam ucjate hydi dhiyām onkarapuream tatha, and seems out of order. The sense is clear however.

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The system holds that this cessation or release is defined by the annihilation of all the qualities of the differential soul.

This conception of God is held by the Saivas as well as the others.

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[[71]]

And this view of God is entirely, incompatible with Scripture, for

it is revealed in śruti that the Supreme Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the Universe.

Also, it is repeatedly revealed in the scriptures that release consists in perfect bliss.

As the authoritativeness of these Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradictions.

it is not really necessary for them to be rejected with the stick of the Veda.

85. Moreover, the Saivas etc. accept stages of life etc. that are outside the varnasrama system

that is proved by the Veda and are consequently outside the Veda.

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As they say," merely by entering Consecration one becomes instantly a Brahmin.

A man becomes an ascetic by accepting the Kāpālika vow."

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86. Let it not be said, How could Rudra, who is very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of texts which are not authoritative?

Nor is it right to hold

that these texts are based upon the recollection of an author of the same name as Siva,

because the ground is overextensive.

For the theory that the author was in error and could be in error, because he was not Siva but some other person with the same name, can only follow if the Veda sublates the system; this latter ground is sufficient to prove the lack of authority of these texts and entails no overextension to other texts.

And error is not entirely impossible in the case of such persons as Rudra etc.

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Or else one may reason that since Rudra may have composed such a system

for the purpose of deceiving the world because he is known as a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even necessary to assume error on his part.

[[72]]

For thus it reads in the Varaha Purana,

"For Thou, strong-armed Rudra, must cause deluding doctrines to be expounded, the deceptions of jugglers (sic) and the like as well as conflicting practices.

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Having shown that the fruit can be won with little effort, you must delude all these people quickly."84

[[139]]

corresponds to Varaha Purana. 70.36 tvam ca rudra mahabaho mokatastrāni kāraya al pajasam?? darsayitva mahajātu mahetoarah.

Similarly, the venerable Rudra himself shows in the same Purana that the Saiva and the like scriptures which are there being discussed are apostate from the Veda,

that only apostates from the Veda are qualified for these doctrines and that their only purpose is just to deceive them.

"I have propounded this sastra as though it were correct doctrine in order to deceive those who have deserted the Way of the Veda.185

cf. Varāha Pur., 70.41, which in cd reads nayasiddhanta sam jñabhir maya shāstran tu darshitam.

From that time onward, O excellent Ones, the people who believe in the scriptures promulgated by myself do not respect the Vedas.16

cf. Variha Pur., 70.38, which reads in cd shastrejo?? abhirato loko bahuljena bhaved atah.

Thus the Pasupata and like doctrines are active in the Kali Age.

nearest is Varaha Pur., 70.42, tada pasupatam sastram jāyate vedasanjaitam.

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Likewise he shows that the worship concerning himself as it is propounded in the Pasupata Tantras and other such Tantras is different

and does not form part of the worship of the Bhagavan:

"The said act of worship concerning me which is being observed is really outside the Veda.

This ritual called Pasupata is the lowliest and deceives men.188"

cf. Varaha Pur., 70.21, yad vedabāḥyam karma ṣṣācchāstram udditya senzate I tad raudram iti cikk?? yatam tan nestam gaditam nṛṇām.

"Only the lowest people worship me with exclusion of Visņu."

The large numbers of statements like the preceding ones will not be written out here.

because they are too numerous.

[189]: cf. Varaha Pur., 70.40, mam vimor oyatiriktam ye brahmasiat ca doijottama bhajante pāpakarmāņas te panti narakam narāḥ,

It is clear enough that those who follow these scriptures are outside the Veda,

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as is stated in the same Purana:

"He cursed those who kept the observances of hairtuft, ashes and skull,

Be you outside the Veda and disqualified for Vedic rites.

[[73]] In the Kali Age all those who assume that appearance, wearing hairtuft and carrying a laguda stick, exhibiting arbitrary observances and carrying false lingas about, all these hair-tuft wearing devotees of Rudra are consumed by the fire of

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Brahma's curse."
(not identified.)
These practices are well-known in the Saiva scriptures:
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   "Rosary, and bracelet in the hand, a hair-tuft on the head, a skull, bathing
in ashes etc."
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Similarly, he declares in the Aditya Purana that
along with relinquishing the Bhagavan they relinquish the Veda:
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"Others, those that wear ashes and hair-tufts as described
have formerly been made to relinguish the Veda
as well as God Nārāyana on account of Gautama's curse."
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Moreover, those fools who pass censure on Vasudeva
are to be regarded as heretics,
for thus it is declared in the Linga Purina,
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   "Those who consider the Supreme Person to be equal (to Siva)
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are to be regarded as heretics who are expelled from the Way of the Veda,"

(not identified.)

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To conclude, it is these followers of other Tantras of whom it is said, in the smrtis:

"Heretics, criminals etc.", that they should not be honoured even with a word;

read yesAm for eṣām.

supra §52.

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and the declaration "Which are outside the Veda..." refers to them. Consequently, since it cannot properly be said of the other Tantras that they are based either on Veda or on Perception, another cause must be assumed for them.

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87. OBJECTION. If it is true that for these Tantras another basis must be assumed.

let the defect be granted. But is in your own view knowledge not self-proved?

[[74]]

REFUTATION.

Certainly; but this self-validity of knowledge is here negated by these two defects of sublation,

namely, sublation through Perception origin and through Scripture, for both these defects are plain in their case.

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The equality of Pañcaratra Tantra and those other Tantras which has been postulated on the ground that both happen to be Tantra, while in fact one of the two is incompatible with Scripture and plainly shows a different provenance,

would mean that Brahmin Murder and Horse Sacrifice are on the same level because both are actions, (which are seen in the scripture, For in that case, we've determined their source).

For in the case of Pañcaratra Sastra we have positive certainty that it is based on Scripture and Perception.

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88. OBJECTION. I made the objections (supra 12) that

if its being based on Scripture follows from its being established by the Veda,

then it cannot be assumed that the author was independent.

REFUTATION. No. Surely, we can assume no independence in man, but for God it is revealed in Scripture, e.g., "To Him all the world is manifest..." (Taitt Up. 2.8.1.) "From fear for Him..." (Aitareya Br.)

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89. OBJECTION.

But if the Pañcaratra traditions are really derived from the Veda, then how is it that no recollection of the Vedic words which furnishes this basis

has persisted among the Pañcaratrikas, whereas the meaning of these words apparently does persist?

It is not right to contend that

only the recollection of the meaning is important

because that has purpose

while the recollection of the actual Vedic statements is to be disregarded because it is purposeless;

for it is not proper to forget that from which the meaning's authority derives.

[[75]]

Or if, in order to justify this oblivion,

the standpoint is taken that the doctrine is based on a Vedic sakha which has been lost or which is always deducible,

then whatever doctrine a person adopts

he can always make authoritative simply by attributing it to a lost śākhā; however, it is hard to prove what a lost or deducible śākhā actually contain.

Or if these traditions are based on an extant Sakha, then others would know it as well as the author, and hence his taking the trouble of promulgating these texts would be purposeless.

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REFUTATION.

The reply to this is as follows:

The Bhagavan, who has an immediate presentation of the entire collection of the Veda

by virtue of the perfect knowledge that is natural to Him, observed that his devotees were not firm enough in their minds to retain and transmit the lessons of all the various sakhas which consist of widely scattered injunctions, arthavadas and mantras of many different kinds,

and having observed this he was moved by his compassion to condense the meaning of the Veda in an easily comprehensible way and to teach it so.

On this showing, nothing is unestablished.

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As they say

"The blessed Hari took the essence of the Upanisads and condensed it,

the Sage, out of compassion with his devotees for their convenience."

The other objections made, which are equally applicable to all Traditions of Manu and the others,

are easily answered by all those who have made a diligent study of the commentaries on the Tantras and are not further enlarged upon here.

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90. OBJECTION.

The thesis that the Pañcarātra Tantras are based on the Veda is disproved by the fact that we find in these very Tantras a condemnation of the Veda.

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For it is said that

Sandilya, failing to find a meaning of human importance in the four Vedas, learnt this shastra.

REFUTATION.

This is the objection of someone

who does not know the distinct meaning of the statement.

For this censure does not mean to censure something deserving of censure.

but rather to praise something else than that which is censured.

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For instance, in the Aitareya Brahmana the censure passed on the pre-dawn oblation "Morning upon morning they speak untruth," is understood to praise the post-dawn oblation.

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It is as in the Manavadharma Shastra (Manusmrti, 4.124.):

"The Rgveda is of gods and deities, the Yajurveda of man, and the Samaveda of the deceased; therefore its sound is impure;"

here the censure of the Samaveda serves to praise the other Vedas.

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Or as in the Mahabharata (Mahabharata 1.265 f): "Formerly the assembled seers placed the four Vedas and the Mahabharata in the balance.

one at one side, the other at the other side. And since in bulk and in weight the latter preponderated, it is called the Great Bharata for its bulk and weight." This is said, not to belittle the Vedas, but to bestow praise on the Mahabharata.

In this same way the above statement must be taken as praise of the Pancarãtra.

Just as the censure of the pre-dawn oblation etc. does not really intend censure, since elsewhere in the same texts they are praised, so will it be in our case too.

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In Pañcaratra, too, we frequently find praise of the Veda;

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for example: "Nothing that is made up of words is superior to the Veda, thou who art seated on the Lotus.

That is said by the Upanisads which set forth the knowledge of truth" etc.

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91. Besides in the quotation caturşu vedeşu (supra §17)

the meaning is not that there is no purpose of human importance in the Vedas

but simply "failing to find the purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas..."

OBJECTION. However, the principal connection in this sentence is between "failing to find" and "a purpose of human importance;" not between "purpose of human importance" and "in the Vedas."

REFUTATION. Don't argue like that, for there is no negation in the sentence.

For it is not so that this purpose of human importance is absent from the Vedas:

hence the sentence "failing to find that purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas, and desirous of finding it, he learnt the Pañcarātra Sastra," conveys that both Revelation and Pañcaratra have the same meaning.

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92. The further objection (Supra § 17) that Pañcaratra is non-Vedic because of the injunction that

those who are qualified for Vedic sacraments etc.

must undergo such sacraments described as Consecration

because they are propitiations of the Lord,

does not hold good.

For such statements as agnavaiṣṇavam.. 201

which enjoin the sacrament of consecration upon those qualified for Initiation etc. as accessory to the ritual of the jyotiştoma etc. do not therefore become non-Vedic.

āgnavaisNava, name of a sacrificial cake offered at the dikşaniyeşti.

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Or if the ground for its non-Vedic character is the injunction of sacraments other than the Vedic ones,

the ground is inappropriate,

because of the circular argument it involves:

only if the non-Vedic character of Pancarātra Sastra is proved,

it is proved that these sacraments are really different;

and if the latter is proved, it is proved that Pañcaratra Sastra is non Vedic.

Moreover, the ground is either that the Pancarātra sacraments are different from all Vedic sacraments,

or that they are different from some Vedic sacraments.

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Not the latter alternative,

for this would mean that the sacrament of Initiation ctc. is non-Vedic because it is different from the sacrament of Tonsure;

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nor the first alternative,

because it does not escape the said defect?

for the sacrament of Initiation is not different from all Vedic sacraments; and we have said that the difference (of Pañcarātra sacraments) from Vedic sacraments

is disproved on the ground that Pañcarātra Sastra is Vedic.

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93. The objection (supra § 17) that Pancarātra is outside the Veda, because like the Pasupata Tantra it is not included among the fourteen sciences

which are held to be authoritative of dharma,

would also have an occasional application to the texts of the Bharata and Rāmāyaṇa composed by Dvaipayana and Valmiki.

The objection that Pancharatra is non-Vedic because it is rejected by the blessed Badarayana is incorrect. For how could the blessed dvaipAyana be thought to reject the Bhagavata doctrine, while he himself is a supreme Bhagavata, model for the all the world?

[[140]] The author of the Brahmasutras is identified with Vyasa Dvaipayana, composer of the Mahabharata

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[[79]] This has been extracted from the Bharata in its full length of thousand Slokas after it had been churned with the stick of thought, as butter is extracted from curds,

and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Aranyaka from the Vedas, and the amrta from the herbs

this Mahopanisada which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Sankhya and Yoga is called the Pañcaratra.

This is bliss, this is brahman, this is the summum bonum. Being consistent with Rk, Yajuh and Saman and the Atharvāngirasas,

this discipline will of a certainty be authoritative. (Mahabharata, 12 340 (129.76) ff.)

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And in the Bhismaparvan too:

"Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sūdras as described are all to worship, serve and honour Madhava

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according to the Satvata ritual that has been promulgated by Samkarṣaṇa, at the end of the Dvapara age and the beginning of the Kali age." (Mahabharata, 6.66 (3012).)

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Also in the Śāntiparvan:

"Certainly, the Vaisnava must undergo Consecration with all effort: for Hari will be particularly graceful to one who has been consecrated and to no one else.204

204: Mahabharata not identified.

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One should consecrate a Brahmin in spring, a Kşatriya in summer, a Vaiśya in the autumn, a Śūdra in winter, a woman in the rainy season according to the Pañcarātra doctrine."205

205: Mahabharata not identified.

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And likewise: "It has been made commensurate with the four Vedas on the great Mountain Meru." 206

206: Mahabharata not identified.

Now, how could Dvaipāyana reject the Pañcaratra, which is his own supreme doctrine, comprising the sense of the Upaniṣads, as follows from these and a hundred direct and circumlocutory declarations made with full respect?

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3 Yamuna holds Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata to be one with Badarayana, the author of the Brahmasutra.

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95. OBJECTION. But then how to explain the sūtra utpattyasaṃbhavāt!? 207

207: BrS, 2.2.42.

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REPLY. What is the intention of the sūtra?

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OBJECTION. The following: Since it is expounded in the Bhāgavata Śāstra that the individual soul has an origin, and since this is impossible as it militates against Scripture and Logic, therefore this śāstra is erroneous.

The 'purvapakşa' arguments advanced here are those made by Sankara-See his commentary on the four sutras comprising the Utpattyasambhava or the 'Pañcarūtra' section [] Brahmasūtra II. ii. 42-45.

REPLY. If that is the meaning of the sūtra, the sūtra is intended to reject the Pāñcarātra Śāstra.

then how can the sūtra be intended to reject the Pāñcarātra Śāstra?

For the Pāñcarātra Śāstras do not accept that the individual soul has an origin, which assumption would have justified the sūtra's rejection.

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OBJECTION. But is it not their assertion that Vāsudeva is at once the supreme material cause and the supreme spirit; that from him the individual soul Saṅkarṣaṇa is born, from Saṅkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna, and from the latter the ego called Aniruddha?

- Cf. Ahirbudhnya Samhitā V. 28a

REPLY. NO. The personal manifestation of God is described as being constituted by vyūhas,208

208: 'Divisions' of the Supreme God as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.

Cf. Ahirbudhnya Samhitā, ch. V-

and the word "individual soul" is assigned to one of these vyūhas for practical purposes, in order to prove clearly the differences that exist within the Adorable One, which differences are in accordance with those of the varnas.

Cf. Ahirbudhnya Samhitā- V. 44-

This Samhita thus clarifies that the four-fold manifestation of the Supreme Lord Vasudeva, as Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha is for the welfare of the creation, by facilitating mental concentration in different degrees for aspirants of different capacities. This four-fold manifestation has got a purpose, says the Sattvata Samhitā, namely, facilitating the worship by the four castes, Brāhmana, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Sūdra, respectively. It is only the Brāhmaṇa that is entitled to worship all these four manifestations of God, viz., Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. For the remaining castes, however, only particular forms of God are ordained for worship For further details, see the Sättvata Samhitā ch. VII.

Cf. the following passages from the Sattvata Samhitā

the following from the Parama Samhita 11. 99b-101-

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The above passages from the Parama Samhita point out that the four forms of the Lord, viz., Vasudeva, Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are intended by the Lord to initiate the qualities of Dharma, Jñana, Vimukti and Avarya respectively, in the beings created.

The fact that the four manifestations of the Lord are designed by the Ford Himself to facilitate the worship by the four different castes is briefly set both by the Pauskara Samhita (ch. 38. śl. 4a, 5a), which Rāmānuja quotes in his SribhaSya under II. ii. 41, p. 829-

C. also Visvaksena Samhitä XI. 146-147-

C. also Visvaksena Samhitā XI. 146-147-

It is as they say: "The four vyūhas are to be worshipped successively by the four varnas successively."

To be identified.

Besides, the words 'individual soul,' 'mind' and 'ego' do not denote these tanmātras 209 themselves, but refer to a person who is the superintending deity of these orders and whose personality is entirely different from the order he superintends.

(209: tanmātras here in the sense of the "higher evolutes.")

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Birth is described as the acquisition of various bodies, as is said in the statement toyena jīvān in the Yajurmūrdhan.210

210: toyena jīvān vyasarjayad bhūmyām, MahānārUp., 1.4.

Taittiriya Aranyaka X - i-1b; also Mahānārāyana I - 4b.

Besides, the Author of the Sūtras has already discarded the śruti, smṛti and profane views concerning the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul in the sūtra carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktas tadbhāvabhāvitvāt.211

211: BrS. 2.3.16 (17). Translation: "A word descriptive of moving or unmoving beings, has got a secondary meaning [in referring to Brahman], because such a being's existence depends on Brahman's existence."

† Here Yamuna points out the discrepancy in Sankara's division of the Brahmasutra into Adhikaraṇas. According to Sankara, the aphorism "cara- caravyapāśrayastu" etc., forms another topic (adhikarana). He argues that the origination of the jiva is not of primary significance. But according to Yamuna, this point has already been clarified by the sutra- "nātmā śruteḥ", etc., so much so that the sutra "caracara" etc., becomes redundant and thus becomes "anadhikaraṇīya", that is to say that it does not deserve treatment as a separate topic.

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And since, moreover, the origination of the individual soul out of Brahman has been rejected in the sūtras

"nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ",212

it does not occasion a renewed exposition: an issue which does not need being made a topic would then be made a topic.

212: BrS., 2.3.17 (18). Translation:

"The ātman is not born because there is no śruti to that effect, and because of its eternality, which is proved by the śrutis."

[[81]]

96. This also explains the sūtra na ca kartuḥ karaṇam;213 213: BrS, 2.2.43.

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for it is not said here

that the instrument, Sc. the mind, originates from the agent, sc. Saṅkarsana.

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For we have already stated that these names solely refer to the persons who uperintend these orders but are themselves different from them

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OBJECTION. Then why this sūtra at all?

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For we do not find that instruments, like a hatchet, originate from an agent, like Devadatta, so that an instrument out of an agent makes no sense.

† Cf. Sankara on IIii-43-

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REFUTATION. Well, then you reject the general view that all instruments, vital airs, mind etc. have their origin in Brahman which itself is without the entire collection of all instruments and rests solely on its own power; this view is stated in the text: "From it springs the vital air, the mind and all the senses."214

214: Muṇḍ Up., 2.1.3.

Or if you do agree on this because it is clearly proved in Revelation, I ask you why you don't agree on it because it is clearly proved in Pañcaratra.

It is not a very proper procedure to deny things that are proved by smṛti; since both śruti and smṛti spring from perfect knowledge, they are equally valid.

[[82]]

Yamuna here pleads for the validity of the Pañcaratragamas on the ground that they, like the Vedas, are based upon knowledge that is free from all defects. Cf. the inferential statement made by Yamuna above - $\Box\Box$

vivādādhyāsitam tantram pramāṇamiti gṛhyatām 🛭 nirdoṣajñānajanmatvāt jyotiṣṭomādivākyavat

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The Author raises the question which one of two alternatives may be true:

Are these four equally and independently sovereign, or has one a quaternity of personalities which he has assumed at his own desire?

and then he points out the defect: if they are equally sovereign, none of them can be effects because they are equal; when they are different forms of one, what is the purpose of this division?

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97. OBJECTION. The sūtra vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ (215: BrS., 2.2.44.) is explained as follows: above.

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$ Cf. Sankara on II. ii. 44.
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REFUTATION. That is not correct, because an alternative is impossible.

For no one who holds that there is a God theorizes that the world has several Gods, least of all the Pāñcarātrikas who hold that "Vāsudeva is the ultimate material cause".

But this one Bhagavān, who has divided Himself into four for reasons of sport, protects the entire world.

• Cf. Ahirbudhnya Samhita V-28a-

Cf. Philosophy of Visistādvaita, p. 156-99 "Vasudeva, the perfect self, manifests Himself in the interests of the meditational needs of the devotee, as Sankarṣaṇa with the two qualities of jñāna and bala, as Pradyumna with the qualities of aiśvarya and virya, and as Aniruddha with Sakti and Tejas without any diminution of Divinity".

And this position is not unjustified, because it is justified in the same manner as the appearance of second-born and first-born brothers like Bala and Bharata.

For just as the Bhagavān, who has created the variety of phenomena of ether, Wind, Śiva, Brahmā etc. for His sport, whose sole motivation is the sport of his unfathomable power, has voluntarily assumed the personalities of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata, Śatrughna etc., without there being the possibility of logical conflict in the same manner the divisions of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, too, are unconflicting.

[[83]]

The cause behind the manifestation of the Lord into different forms is His mere sport (krīḍā or lilā) and the purpose of this manifestation is protection for the good.

Cf. Ahirbudhnya Samhitā ch. 36 Śls. 64, 65.

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98. Furthermore, vipratiședhāt 216 may mean "because of conflict with Revelation".

on the basis of the citation "failing to find in the four Vedas..." or "because of mutual conflict between the Tantras themselves".

216: BrS., 2.2.45.

Shankara on II-ii-42 -

The former alternative, incompatibility with Revelation has already been refuted as being without valid basis.

Mutual conflict between the Pañcarātra Tantras themselves, whose terminological precision has been perfected by the rules of logic governing principal matter, generality, peculiarity, quality and the like, does not exist.

On the other hand, statements that lack the corroboration of logic can have no cogency;

as the maxim says:

"A statement must have precision perfected by logic before it can communicate its meaning."

f The source is yet to be identified. This verse, however, is quoted in full by Sudarśani, in his commentary on the Sribhāsya, I-i-1; pp. 168-169-

Vedantadeśika too guotes this in his Nyayapariśuddhi, p.151.

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Consequently, the Author of the Sūtras gives the lie to those exegetes who, by superimposing on the Pañcarātra Tantras

(whose validity he strongly affirms as no less than that of the Vedas, in such assertions as "idam mahopanisadam," etc.)

the non-existent doctrine of the soul's origination,

explain that the sūtra means to reject the Pañcaratra Tantras.

Enough.

8 Mahābhārata, Sānti, ch. 326.100.

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99. The meaning of the Sūtras is this. First the Author has set forth that the doctrines of Kapila, Kaśyapa, Buddha, Jina and Paśupati, who oppose the Author's own accepted doctrine, are unnatural217 because they conflict with Revelation and logic.

217: In BrS., 2,2.

218: āsamañjasya, taken from BrS., 2.2.37.

Now, in order to remove the suspicion that the Pancarãtra Tantras (which are his own accepted doctrine) are equally unnatural with the other doctrines because their usual enumeration on an equal plane with the others has made them closely associated with them in people's thinking, he elicits their validity.

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In the first two Sūtras the prima-facie case is laid down:

§ According to Sankara, all the four aphorisms of the utpattyasambhava section $\[\]$ 11-ii-42-45 $\]$ put forth the refutation of the Pañcarātra.

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the Pancaratra likewise has no validity, utpattyasambhavāt, i.e., on account of the impossibility of Sankarṣaṇa's origination which is taught there.

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Why should it be impossible? Because it cannot be established in either of two possible cases;

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either the four vyūhas are equally sovereign, or else one God exists in four persons; and in either case there is impossibility of origination.

If they are equally sovereign, they cannot be created because they are equal; if only one being is admitted no origination is possible either, since a distribution within one being of creating and created parts is inconceivable.

[[84]]

100. Similarly na ca kartuḥ karaṇam: Pañcarātra has no validity for the further reason that it is impossible that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates from the agent, sc. the individual soul called Saṅkarṣaṇa, for the hatchet does not originate from Devadatta.

t Cf. Sribhāsya under II. ii. 40, where almost the same words are used. \$ Mundakopanisad II. 1. 3.

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Or there is this alternative explanation of na ca kartuḥ karaṇam: and for the further reason that the instrument does not originate from the agent Saṅkarṣaṇa, since according to the text:

"From it spring the vital air, the mind and all the senses,"

it is revealed that all instruments really originate from Brahman.

\$ Mundakopanisad II. 1. 3.

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101. Then follows: vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ. By the particle va this prima-facie case is now reversed.

Cf. Sribhāsya under IIii. 41- where again the same words are used.

What has been said, viz., that there is no validity since in neither case origination of Sankarṣaṇa etc. is possible, is untrue:

it is not contradictory that Sankarṣaṇa etc. have originated.

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Indeed, it would be contradictory if they were not vijñānādi.

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Vijñānādi is a dvandva compound: "knowledge and beginning," that means: Brahman:

thus vijñānādibhāve means brahmabhāve.

Inasmuch as they are Brahman (brahmabhāve), the origination is not contradictory.

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That is to say by virtue of the fact that the unique Supreme Soul Vāsudeva, whose omnipotence is unbounded, enters into them through His māyā, a cause-effect relation is justified.

· Vide Ahirbudhnya Samhità Ch. V-

The words "ananta eva bhagavān" occuring in 34a, 35a, 36a & 38b quoted above, stress the point that he Lord is One and only One and that He assumes different forms, without any diminution of His powers and perfections in this process. Therefore, the question raised by Sankara regarding the plurality of God is unwarranted.

\$ This Māyā is the Sakti or the Power of the Lord, termed also Jñāna, Vidya, Sankalpa and so on.

The objection that the mind cannot originate from Saṅkarṣaṇa, on the authority of the śruti that the mind originates from Brahman, is invalidated by the fact that he, sc. Saṅkarṣaṇa is vijñānādi, i.e., Brahman.

[[85]]

102. Furthermore, what is being said in the argument na ca kartuḥ karaṇam?

These different interpretations are not included by Ramanuja in his Sribhasya.

Is it that the instrument of a certain action does not originate from the agent of that same action;

or that no instrument of any action whatever originates from any agent whatsoever?

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If the first view is taken, we have a conflict with Inference, because the argument contains the fallacy of proving the proved.

The mind, originating from the agent Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot be the instrument of Saṅkarṣaṇa's action of originating it, since it itself is the object of the action;

nor can it be the instrument of the action of being originated, since it itself is the agent of that action.

If the alternative view is taken, we have a conflict with Perception, because we see that for instance a pitcher, though it be the instrument of an action of fetching water, yet originates from the agent of such an action, the potter.

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This the Author says in the sūtra vipratiṣedhāt: 'because there is conflict.'

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Or, we state an alternative explation for the two sutras.

[[86]]

103. As to the other explanation that has been given of these two Sūtras,219

219: supra §§96, 97.

since it is vijñānādi, i.e. "a ground for validity",220 the denial of the validity of Pāñcarātra is not justified, because it entails overextension.

220: i.e., as a tatpuruṣa compound "the beginning (source) of (valid) knowledge:" vijñānādibhāvāt "since He (God) is a source of valid knowledge."

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The invalidity, which is defined by the non-origination of knowledge through repetition or dubiety in the Tantras, is rejected, because vijnAna is taken up here knowledge is actually had from them.

In order to remove the suspicion of untruth occasioned by the speaker's character, the word ādi is used to convey the intended meaning that the Tantras are in fact spoken by a trustworthy person.

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Consequently the meaning is this: He always has direct knowledge of the entire world by virtue of the omniscience which is part of His nature; He bestows man's wishes upon him, when He is satisfied—and he is satisfied by meditation alone; Him the experts in the Veda describe as eternally satisfied in all His desires: how then can there be defects in Him like error, deceit etc.?

Cf. The following verse, which, according to tradition, forms the opening verse of Nāthamuni's Nyāyatattva-

104. The 'impossibility of origination,' which has been stated in the first two Sūtras, is thereupon denied for Saṅkarṣaṇa and the other forms of God in the sūtra vipratiṣedhāt.

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This means either; "Because there is conflict with the Bhagavān's perception which is inferred through Pañcaratra;" or "Because there is conflict with Śruti which is inferred from the same Tradition."

[[87]]

Brahmasutra II.ii. 42.

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105. Or there is another interpretation: since the Sūtras intend to illustrate the rules of exegesis, the author first assumes that there is a conflict between Śruti and Pañcaratra, though in fact there is no such conflict, and then reasons this out as follows:

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suppose that Pañcaratra is in conflict with the veda, is this śāstra then, like the statements of Manu etc., valid or invalid?

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This question is thereupon answered: "It is invalid, because of the impossibility of the origination of valid knowledge concerning a conflicting sense; and this impossibility itself is proved on the ground that there is independence of something that is dependent."

Thus the sūtra utpattyasambhavāt means:

"because it is impossible that a valid knowledge originates, since, as long as the dependent Pañcaratra Tradition does not start proving the validity of its own sense by establishing the validity of its basis, the cognition which originates from the independent preterpersonal scripture

determines the Tradition's sense as being different, and consequently conflicting with itself.

For Pāñcarātra conveys that scripture is its basis only as long as the sword of direct scripture does not cut its root.

For a discussion on the validity of smrtis when they are in opposition to more powerful means of knowledge, see Tantravārtika under Iiii 3, pp. 82-103. 5 Cf. ibid. p. 87-

tāvadeva sphurantyarthaḥ purastādānumānikāḥ 🛭 yāvat pratyakṣaśāstreṇa mūlameṣāṁ na kṛntyate 🗈

106. OBJECTION. But why should the Vedas themselves be independent, since their validity, too, depends on the direct cognition of the Bhagavān, because this cognition is their cause?221

221: cf. supra § 18.

\$ This is the contention of the Naiyāyika. He does not accept the "apauruṣeyatva" of the Vedas. They, according to him, are dependent upon the Supreme Being, like the Pāñcarātrāgamas, for their validity, so much so they too are "pauruṣeya", i.e., composed by the Divine Person. This is the point on which Yamuna differs from the Naiyayika. The aphorism "na ca kartuḥ harapum" (Brahmasūtra II. ii. 40) is ingeniously interpreted by Yāmuna to elute the above concept of the Logician, and to establish the "apauruṣe- vatva" or the revealed character of the Vedas.

Just as the Pāñcarātra Traditions are dependent on His cognition, so are the Vedas too dependent on His cognition.

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REFUTATION. To refute this view, the statement is made:

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam:

The Vedas are not the product of a maker, i.e. the Bhagavān.

Karaṇa here in the sense of "things that are made or produced", by the rule "suffix lyuṭ" in the sense of the object of the action. This then means that the Vedas are preterhuman.

222: Karmaņi Lyuţ Pāņini.

[[88]]

107. Vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratişedhah.

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If, on the other hand, it is not true that the Pāñcarātra Śāstra is invalid,

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then what? tadapratisedhah,

i e. non-rejection of the origination of valid knowledge (namely, even when partly conflicting, the conflicting statement may be valid optionally),

because it is based upon the direct cognition of the Bhagavān in whom error and deceit are impossible as He is a source of vijñāna (vijñānādibhāve):

Vijñāna means "knowledge par excellence in which no mistake is possible.

For since all other authors of Dharmaśāstras are not omniscient, as they are involved in saṃsāra, and since therefore they are also not entirely self-sufficient,

various lapses are conceivable in their knowledge.

Whereas in the case of the Bhagavān, whose supremacy is natural and unlimited, His knowledge is the immediate insight in all dharma and adharma, which is natural to Him and true, as is known from hundreds of śrutis; it is this knowledge which in the sūtra is described as vijñāna,

When such knowledge is the 'beginning,' i.e. the basis, there is non-rejection, sc. the śāstra is valid.

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108. OBJECTION. But how can it be assumed that the Tantra, which conflicts with scripture, has validity?

For if it is valid,

it becomes optional beside 89 scripture;

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and optionality is deficient in the case of the Tantras by eight defects.

Option is assumed

when there is no invariable rule that something should be such and not otherwise,

because there is no reason to reject, in one case or another, an alternative statement;

for instance: "He must sacrifice with rice," beside "he must sacrifice with barley."

In the latter case it is impossible to eliminate one or the other because both neither of these statements is characterized by independence.

In the former case, however, there can be no such option between scripture and Pafcarātra.

because the two are not equal;

for the Vedic statement is independent, because it is preterhuman, whereas the Pañcaratra statement is dependent. So how can they be alternatives and optional?

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109. REFUTATION. Listen: because Pañcarātra too is independent.

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OBJECTION. How can a statement deriving from a person be independent?

REFUTATION.

Let us ask the logician to explain thismust dependence on something else be assumed for a statement to be informative, to give positive certainty, or to state the truth about its content, or to serve a purpose of human importance? All four are impossible.

When the statement is heard,

"One must worship the Bhagavan with the attendance due an emperor," (not identified)

nothing else is required for this statement to be informative, because the meaning of the words has already become known from other contexts.

Nor does this small measure of dependence prove the weakness of the statement's [[90]] validity, for the same weakness would follow for śruthi too.

in order to understand any statement, one must first know the meaning of the words that compose it;

this may be called dependence,

so that to this extent any statement is dependent for its informativeness on other and prior knowledge;

but this must also apply to Vedic statements.

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Nor is anything else required for the statement to give positive certainty; for the statement "One must worship...." does not occasion doubt whether one must or must not worship,

since that would entail a negation of the direct declaration of the real sense.

Nor is anything required for the statement to be true to the facts, for the knowledge produced by the statement does not require anything outside its own cause 226 to be true to the facts,

because secondary validity is inappropriate and not admitted.

If the cause (here: God) is above suspicion, the statement will be accurate.

gunataḥ prāmāṇyasyājuktateūd anabhjupagamãe; my understanding is that a statement has its validity by itself,

and no secondary validity in the sense that its content must first be validated by some other means.

The validity itself must be proved (namely by the character of the personal author or by its preterpersonal origin), but once proved, the statement itself is valid.

Nor is it necessary for the statement to be dependent on something else in order to serve a purpose of human importance, for the proof of this purpose follows from a consideration of the entire body of doctrine.

In this case, those who have undergone the afore-mentioned sacraments have knowledge of the content of the statement when they have heard the doctrine, and hence they perform the "five-timesa-day" rites ([228]: Vaisnava rite observed five times a day: pañcakálika.), which form this content, and hence they attain to supreme perfection; this is learnt solely from the Sastra itself.

110. Or if the objection is raised that, granted the self-validity of Pañcaratra, this validity is not complete as long as it has not been made certain that there are no defects, after it has been made certain that the speaker is reliable,-

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I reply that this view is not correct;

knowledge that there are no defects does not completely establish validity, since the validity arises from the cause itself of defectless knowledge and not from the defectlessness of this knowledge.

[[91]] 111. Nor is positive certainty about such of the speaker's qualities as his reliability

required for his statement to be defectless,

because the statement's defectlessness is proved solely by its being defectless.

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As the Author of the Varttika declares,

"Then the qualities (of the speaker) do not exert any influence (on the validity of his statement) because (its defectlessness) is already known."229

[229]: ślokavārttika, 2.6 7 ab.

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The same Author also shows that, even when there is certainty about its defectlessness, the existence of qualities (like reliability in the speaker) is helpful:

"When defectlessness is known, they are helpful by merely existing."

[230]: ib. 2.67 cd.

Nor does the validity, when it has been established require something else in order that consequent actions of acceptance, rejection etc. proceed, because action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire.

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As they say,

"Action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire."

[231]: not identified.

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Moreover, in the case of the self-valid Vedas, too, we find this same dependence in that their validity would not be completely established

as long as there were no certainty of their defectlessness after the certainty about the non-existence of their author.

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112. OBJECTION. But when the non-existence of their author is proved without effort

by the non-apprehension of what ought to be there, the question of the non-validity does not arise for the Veda, for defects are impossible without something or someone in which they could reside.

As they say:

"In that case (the Veda) the absence of non-validity follows quite naturally from the absence of an author; therefore its validity cannot be questioned."**"

[[92]]

REFUTATION. Why, in the case of Pañcarátra too no question can arise about its validity, since the absence of defects is easily proved by the fact that the omniscient and omnipotent God is its speaker; so the argument is the same.

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In other words, in both cases of self-validity there is positive certainty that there are no defects; in the case of the Veda because there is positive certainty that no person is involved who could possess these defects; in the case of Pañcarātra because there is positive certainty that its speaker possesses virtues which preclude defects.

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It is here as in the following two cases of absence of heat: there is no heat in ether because it is certain that there is no locus for heat in ether; nor is there heat in cold water because there is coldness which precludes heat.

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113. Moreover, neither dependence nor independence is by itself a cause of invalidation.29

[232] this speaks to 108, that the independent cognition cancels the dependent cognition, if there is conflict between them. Yamuna makes the point that this is not invariably true; that neither dependence nor independence is a cause of invalidation, sapeksanirapeksatve is a dual and requires the correction of karanam into kārane, If my understanding of the text is correct.(4)

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The independent cognition that some substance is silver while in reality it is nacre is invalidated by the cognition: "This is not silver:" this cognition itself is considered as dependent.

([233]: namely, because it requires another cognition in order to be denied.)

The cognition "This is that flame," is found to be invalidated by the inferential cognition that arises from the disappearance of oil"; the latter cognition itself is dependent because it arises from a senseperception.

[234]: namely, in the example of the burning lamp: is it the same flame that burns at six o'clock and at seven o'clock? We don't see the flame change or be succeeded by another flame. Only inference shows that since there is a different amount of oil in the lamp at different times, it is different oil that is burning as a flame, so that the flame is really different. The sense perception is of the varying amounts of oil.

The simple truth therefore is that which is susceptible to invalidation is invalidated by that which is not so susceptible; in our present case there is no such susceptibility either of Scripture or of Pañcaratra.

[[93]]

114. Or if you think that it is impossible to give positive certainty that the Tantra is promulgated by Vasudeva, as it is in conflict with Scripture,

I ask you:

Why then does the knowledge arise that Scripture is preterpersonal, while it is invalidated because it conflicts with Pañcaratra?

They accept it that the Veda is preterpersonal just because it is Veda; but then one can equally claim that Pañcaratra is promulgated by Vasudeva just because it is Pañcaratra.

If the preterpersonal origin of the Veda is proved by the fact that there is no recollection of an author, then why not agree that Pañcaratra is promulgated by Vasudeva just because there is recollection of his authorship?

For there exists a strong transmission of the recollection, extending to women and children, that Kesava is the author of the Pancarãtra.

So great a faith do people have in His authorship that they erect monuments according to the precepts of Pañcarātra, donating elephants, horses and great wealth in various fees,

In the Skanda Purana it is said that "Kapila is the promulgator of Samkhya, Kesava of Pañcaratra."

Likewise in the Mahabharata:

"Narayana Himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañcaratra. This great Upanisada, consistent with the four Vedas,

as well as with the doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga, called Pañcaratra,

which was revealed by Nārāyaṇa's tongue, has been taught to the sages by Narada as he had seen it and heard it in the abode of Brahma."

From these and thousands of other statements in the Puranas, which are

supported by the rules of interpretation, the conclusion follows naturally that Pañcaratra was indeed composed by Vasudeva Himself.

On the other hand, some experts dispute that the Veda is eternal! ([[142]] [235]: The Naiyayikas.) [[91]]

Therefore, the real ground for the thesis that the validity of the doctrine of the Bhagavan and that of the Veda is above question is this that both are causes of defectless knowledge.

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Consequently, because both are equally exemplary, they are optionally valid. It is with this view in mind that the wise Author of the Sūtras has explained: vijñanādibhave vaa tadapratiṣedhah.

115. OBJECTION. However, granted that error is made inconceivable by the Bhagavan's omniscience, yet, since He is also omnipotent, He can also have composed the Pancarātra in order to deceive.

Now, when people, considering this possibility, are confused in their minds as to which view they should take, that this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them,

that this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them, or that it has been stated according to the truth with complete attentiveness of mind,

what way is there to resolve their dilemma? We should prefer to decide that since it militates against Scripture it results in disaster.

REFUTATION. To this objection the Author replies vipratisedhat, i.e., on account of the contradiction of all śruti, epic, purana and worldly experience.

If, without any reason, merely because the Bhagavan is omnipotent, the question is raised

if He might bave intended to ruin His devotees,

why, then one could also raise the question whether He would not hurl even the virtuous into hell by a whim of His omnipotence and consequently the whole world would fall into inactivity!

[[95]]

Besides, we could also raise the question whether He did not wish to deceive people, because He is omnipotent, and thus created in the beginning

the Vedas themselves with false meanings, which are also suprasensible, took away from Brahma etc. also the power of recollecting that He was the creator of the Vedas,

and from then onward set in motion the transmission of Vedic instruction until the present day:

how can we be sure about it?

[236]: Since Brahma is the creator of the world, he can know whether there were Vedas or not before creation; by taking away Brahma's memory, God in His omnipotence could start the myth of the preterpersonal origin of the Veda..

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Or the position can be taken that since there is no evidence that, while He is indeed omnipotent, He acted up to the full measure of His omnipotence,

since there is no purpose for Him to deceive people because He is satisfied in all His desires.

and since He is not in the least affected by defects of partiality and cruelty etc.

because He abides with natural affection for all living beings;

and since, if He had composed the Pañcaratra in order to deceive, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the wise men who, up to now, learn its instructions and perform the contents of these instructions

have forgotten the defects of its author, it must follow that such a suspicion does not arise;

and if this view is taken, all this will equally apply to the other Vedas as well.

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Therefore,

what possible purpose could He who is satisfied in all His desires, who is omniscient and a treasury of compassion have in deceiving the poor people who have failed to understand the meaning (of the Veda)?

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Or how could the supreme sages everywhere praise the Tantra as being equal to the Upanisads,

if it had been composed in order to deceive?

For thus the saints declare in Vārāha Purana, the Ramayana and the Bharata etc. that this Tantra is an equally esoteric doctrine as the Vedas; and we declare the same.

[[96]]

"Through Veda, Pañcaratra, through devotion and sacrifice, O Brahmin, I can be attained, and not in any other way, even in hundreds of lacs of years.

If one among thousands will grasp the Pañcarātra and, at the expiry of his karman, will die my devotee, the Vedas and the Pañcarātra will dwell in his heart forever.237

[237]: not identified.

This supreme Pañcarātra doctrine of mine, which is not difficult to grasp, that you shall reach to all the world by my grace, doubtless.25

[238]: not identified.

The Yogins mediate upon the Eternal One with Puranas, Vedas and Pañcaratras, and worship Him with the proper rites.

Thus Samkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Veda and Aranyaka on the other hand are one and the same; all together they are the members that constitute Pañcaratra

O excellent one! He who sees through Veda and Pañcaratra sees truly; this great Upanisada, consistent with the four Vedas...."

Since the number of these and similar statements is infinite, we stop here. If you still raise the question if there cannot be ruin in such a Tantra, then there can be no faith in anything. It is with this view in mind that the Author sets forth:

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Therefore, even if there were a conflict between the Bhagavan's doctrine and the Veda, there still would be option between them; but we have already expounded that there is no conflict between them at all.

116. OBJECTION. However, how can the venerable Author of the Bhasya239 state that those parts which are in conflict are invalid:

Sabarabhasya and KMS.

REFUTATION. "If there be conflict, it is carefully eliminated." This statement means that those of frail minds, who are not strong enough to plunge into the deep ocean of rules of interpretation, must not be [[97]] disrespectful to the Veda.

This is comparable to the venerable Jaimini's exposition that the fruits of acts serve to increase people's faith in the acts.

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117. The contention has been voiced that Pañcarātra is invalid because it is accepted by those who are outside the Veda."
But why could one not equally well contend that the Vedas are invalid because they are accepted by those who are outside Pancarātra?

Furthermore, what exactly does this mean, being "outside the Veda," and what means "accepted by those who are outside the Veda?"

Does "being outside the Veda" mean "being different from the Veda" or "doing what is forbidden by the Veda" or "being hostile to the Vedas?"

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Likewise we must inquire whether "accepted" means learnt" or "known" or "observed."

In all cases the ground proves to be defective, 35

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First of all, if "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "learnt", then the ground proves to be occasional, since it equally applies to the Vedas themselves: the Vedic statements, which are valid, are "learnt" by members of the three estates, which themselves are "different from the Veda."

If you take "accepted" to mean "known," you do not get rid of the same defect.

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If the term "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "observed," then there would likewise be an occasional application of the ground to the Vedas themselves.

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If "outside the Veda" is taken to mean "performing forbidden acts," the ground has an occasional application to those statements of the Veda which enjoin expiatory ceremonies. ([241]: Manusmrti, 8.107.)

For since statements enjoining expiations, e.g. "One must sacrifice with the kusmanda verses,"

whose content is to be "learnt", "known" and "observed," by those who perform forbidden acts, are authoritative,

it would follow that the ground "because they are accepted by people outside the Veda" is occasional,242

People who do prohibited acts follow Vedic expiations; but if acceptance by people who commit forbidden acts is sufficient to deny the validity of what they accept, this means that the validity of the Veda would be denied.

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Nor are the Pañcaratra Tantras invalid because they are "accepted" by people hostile to the Veda, for the ground is unproved.

Besides, acceptance by people hostile to the Veda does not by itself refute the validity of what is accepted. (5)

If it did, the Path of the Heretics would be unbarred; for they endeavour to uproot the validity of the Veda.

Thus the naked Jainas could effortlessly render the Vedas untruthful simply by accepting" the Vedas in some manner by way of deception.

118. OBJECTION, A consideration of such statements as "He should never use the Veda, except at a funerary offering," (Manusmrti) shows that the defect affects only the unqualified students, not the defectless Vedic statements themselves.

REPLY. Then the defect affects only the unqualified students in the case of the Tantras under discussion as well,

and not the defectless Tantras themselves;

so everything is the same, depending on what partisan view one takes.

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244 Or if it be held that "outside the Veda" means "unqualified to perform Vedic acts."

and that Pañcaratra is invalid, like the caityavandana statements," because it is accepted by those who, being unqualified, are outside the Veda.

supra § 17: this Buddhist injunction is outside the Veda

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the following distinction must be 99 considered is the ground here that the Tantras are accepted by people unqualified for all Vedic rites,

or by people who are unqualified for some Vedic rites? This point should be clarified.

Now, the first alternative cannot be adopted, because the ground is not proved.

For there is no human being who is not qualified for any shrauta rite whatsoever, e.g. non-violence etc.,

because his humanity as such provides his qualification.

Otherwise candālas etc. would do no wrong

if they committed such crimes a brahmin-murder, theft of brahmin wealth, miscegenation with caste-women, study of the Veda etc., simply because they were not qualified to observe these prohibitions.

If a man does something he should not do, he commits an offence.

It follows that everybody is qualified to these Vedic rites,243 which shows that the ground is not proved and that the illustration falls short of the means of proof.

in one sense.

For the observance of a prohibition is as much a ritual action as the observance of an injunction.

Nor can the second alternative be adopted that the Tantras are invalid because they are accepted by people who are unqualified for certain Vedic rites,

because that would entail the conclusion that all Vedic statements are invalid.

For every man has some Vedic rites for which he is not qualified: the brahmin is not qualified for the Royal Consecration, the ksatriya not for the ritual drinking of soma.

Consequently, this ground has an occasional application to the Vedic statements,

which are accepted by qualified persons belonging to the three estates, and is therefore inconclusive.

As to the illustration, the view that heaven is attained by worshipping a caitya is not invalidated by its being accepted by heretics, but by the deficiency of its cause, [[100]]

119. We have already said that Pancarâtra has been accepted by the Vedic, and among all orthodox pre-eminent, sages Bhṛgu, Bharadvāja, Dvaipāyana etc.

And in the present day we can also observe how exemplary persons of great learning,

believing that these rites are most effective in attaining bliss,

perform the rites of temple-building, erection of idols, prostration, circumambulation and particular festival ceremonies, just as they perform the agnihotra and other rituals enjoined directly by Scripture.

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And it is improper to maintain that their conduct has no foundation, for that would entail that such smārta rites as crepuscular worship, astaka etc., are similarly without foundation.

It has been said that the conduct of exemplary people is authoritative,26 and also that even when they do not know the cause of their custom, they do know what is proper custom.

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120. If the ground for the invalidity of Pañcaratra is that it is accepted by Bhagavatas, well, then the scriptural statements of the Ekayana Sakha and the Vājasaneyaka sakhas and the means of knowledge Perception, Inference etc., would also be invalid since the Bhagavatas accept those too!

This same ground, moreover, namely that Pancarãtra is invalid because it is accepted by the Bhagavatas, suffers from two defects; it is both specially-occasional and unproved.249

Why is Pañcarātra rendered invalid by their acceptance?

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If it is because they do not belong to the three estates, then the Atharvanic statements whose content is accepted and observed by rathakaras, nisadas and other groups which do not belong to the three estates (Statements like "The rathakara must add fuel," "With [[101]] that he must sacrifice for the chief of the Niṣādas," etc.) would also be invalid.

Or, be it granted that the acceptance of certain rites by outcastes renders them invalid;

yet, in view of the fact that the eminent brahminhood of these Bhagavatas who follow the doctrine of the Bhagavān is evident by all criteria of knowledge,

their acceptance of Pancaratra rather confirms its validity.

He says: By the same means of knowledge by which the brahminhood of one set of people is evident

the brahminhood of another set of people is evident.

121. OBJECTION. But when one sees the small sons of the twice-born who wear the customary hairtuft, sacred thread, palasa wood stick and munjagrass girdle, one knows, the moment the eyes fall on them, that they are brahmins.

REFUTATION. And in our case, when one sees learned people who day after day study the Vajasaneyaka and Ekāyana śākhās, wear prominently their

sacred threads, upper garments and hairtufts, impart teaching, sacrifice, receive priestly stipends---does one not instantly know that they are brahmins?

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If it be held that outcastes, low-caste people etc., may also illegitimately sacrifice, teach, carry palata sticks etc. and that they behave as though they were legitimate brahmins, and that therefore neither costume nor conduct provides positive certainty that a man is a brahmin, then the same applies to other priests than Bhagavatas.

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Or be it granted that there are cases where people illegitimately display the marks of brahminhood;

still, [[102]] though there may be doubt about the legitimacy of these marks in others because of their resemblance to pretenders (just as when there is a doubt that one may be mistaken about real silver

too because one has mistaken nacre for silver), then there can be certainty of their being genuine brahmins in all cases when no misapprehension occurs,

because otherwise doubt would conflict with Perception and lead to infinite regress.

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122. Or if it be held that the others are genuine brahmins because they recollect those gotras which are peculiar to brahmins, the same applies to the Bhagavatas;

for the Bhagavatas have the tradition: "We are descendants of Bharadvaja, of Kasyapa, of Gotama, of Upagava."

Nor is this recollection or tradition of gotras unfounded or merely contemporary, for the same can be argued for all tradition of gotras.

If there were doubt about descent since error could conceivably occur, this would confuse the whole world about the authenticity of their brahminhood.

After all, anyone may fear that he really is a candala if he suspects his mother of having had a lover; and how, my excellent opponent, can you be quite sure yourself that your birth entitled you to Veda-study?

Therefore if the brahminhood of Bhagavatas,

which is completely established by the recollection of the various gotras which has been passed on in uninterrupted transmission, stands unchallenged,

then there is no difference whatever in this between the brahminhood of Bhagavatas and of others.

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123. Further, if some who believe in the Supreme Person are monotheists and others who believe in [[103]] petty godlings are polytheists,

is then the same authority stated for the brahminhood of the ones as well as of the others.

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or how else is their brahminhood known if not by that same authority?

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If this is the question, then listen:

there remains a criterion to determine brahminhood in either case, either Perception, or Inference, or Circumstantial-Implication.

124. OBJECTION. But how can Perception convey that they are brahmins?

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For when we are close to two individuals whom we have not seen before, one a brahmin, the other a ksatriya, of the same age and the same appearance, we do not immediately observe the distinction that one is a brahmin and the other a ksatriya in the same way as we instantly observe the differentness of a goat, an elephant, a buffalo etc.

Nor is it proper to maintain that

the visual sense conveys the brahminhood of a nearby individual

in dependence on our recollection of his father's brahminhood etc.;

for that recollection itself is impossible without a previous immediate cognition,

just as the recollection of the son of a sterile mother is impossible.

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Nor can we know from Inference that a man is a brahmin, for we do not find a concomitant mark.

And such qualities as tranquillity, self-restraint, austerity, purity etc., cannot be taken as marks of brahminhood, because they are available only in the case of a good brahmin and because they are not exclusively confined to brahmins.

Nor can Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof of brahmin-hood,

because it is not lacking in reason

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[[104]]

and the fact that the sentence-meaning of the statement,

"In spring the brahmin must add fuel to the fire,"

is otherwise unestablished does not therefore by Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof that a man is a brahmin; for knowledge of that sentencemeaning presupposes knowledge of the word-meaning of brahminhood etc.

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125. REFUTATION. All this does not make for a defect in my argument.

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There is no invariable rule that

Perception becomes manifest only at the first contact between sense and object and not otherwise.

Perception is that which illumines the unmanifest while there is continuity of the operation of the senses.

Thus there can be Perception of brahminhood;

for when we keep our eyes open we note,

immediately upon observing the particular differentiae of the genus brahminhood,

that the brahminhood is quite clearly noticeable in those who belong to the families of the different gotras-Vasistha, Kasyapiya Sathamarṣaṇa etc.-

who are pure in their conduct, and who display the sacred thread, upper cloth, hairtuft and munja grass girdle.

Nor does it run counter to ordinary experience that the eyes can convey brahminhood in dependence on the observation of the peculiarities of genus.

every case the sense becomes the cause of the rise of determination of sense-object when favoured by the accompanying circumstances of place, time, configuration etc.

It is the natural function of the sense-organ as such to relate itself to these accompanying circumstances.

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As the author says:

"No organ of knowledge, whether in Veda or in ordinary process, becomes efficacious in determining the object that is to be realized through the accompanying circumstances unless it is favoured by these circumstances.

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Consequently the visual sense, when favoured by the recollection of genus, gives knowledge of brahminhood without the object giving up its perceptuality.

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So it is evident that the visual sense can be the instrument of knowledge of genus in dependence on a variety of accompanying factors.

Gold becomes manifest through its colour fromcopper etc., gheeis differentiated from oil, through its smell and taste;

fire, which is hidden by ashes, perceived through touching the ashes.

Sound may provide us with proof that there is a horse in the distance;

a pitcher etc. are known through their configuration; brahminhood through descent, and also through conduct in certain particulars, which is completely protected by the king.

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It has been contended that when we see two individuals of the same age and appearance, the difference between the two does not immediately appear to eye;

but the perceptuality of their differentness is not refuted by just this.

In this case the non-perception of their differentness is caused by the defect of similarity.

The difference between nacre and silver, which are similar in appearance and configuration, may not be immediately visible, yet that does not mean that their difference is not visible at another time; and the same holds for the difference between brahmin, kṣatriya and vaisya.

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Or else, brahminhood is that which arises from the differentiae of genus,

and such a product can empirically be known just like any other product by a process of positive and negative consideration,

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e.g. "what are the specific characteristics to which the elders apply the term brahminhood, or to which characteristics is the term applied?"

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It has been said often that it applies to those who possess recollection of gotra, Vedic ancestry etc.; let us not start discussing this question again, or we must repeat our old argument:

it is established that the Bhagavatas are brahmins, because they possess gotra etc.

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126. The objection that was made that the Bhāgavatas are born from a vaiśya vratya:

([253]: supra § 15. [[143]])

"The fifth one, the Sarvata, must worship the sanctuaries of Visnu by royal decree;"

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and

"he is also called a Bhagavata; he is born from a vaisya vratya."

- On the authority of the two statements.

To this we reply: precisely what do we learn from these two statements? Is there a simple connection of names, or must an invariable rule be stated?

[254]: ie., is the same name used for several groups or only one?

In It is impossible to make it a rule that the words Bhagavata and Satvata denote a vaisya vratya, for that is not known from the text, and it involves overextension.

In the statement, "the fifth one, Satvata," we do not find a denial that the words Bhagavata and Satvata denote other meanings, for that would mean ignoring the explicit and inventing the unstated.

In our statement the fifth one, who is born from an vaisya vratya, is understood to bear the name of Satvata:

"The fifth one, Sarvata...", since the word 'fifth' is the operative term as it is mentioned first.

And if the fifth is the Satvata, the Satvata is not necessarily also be the fifth, namely the vaisya vratya.

For when the stated subject (e.g. a mountain) is possessed of fire, the predicated fire does not necessarily possess smoke.255

255. The argument is: if S is P, then P is not therefore S.

The example is 'parvato 'gnimin dhumavattvāt if we interchange S and P, we get parvato dhumavin agnimattvåt, but this is not true, for though there is no fireless smoke, there is smokeless fire. Similarly here: the fifth may be a sitvata or a vaidya vratya, but being the fifth does not make the sitvata a vaidya vratya,

Consequently the consideration if a smrti statement of this kind cannot give certainty that the words Satvata, Bhagavata etc mean vratya.

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127. If it be argued that since these two words also may denote another caste (namely of the vaisya vratyas),

then the mere fact that certain brahmins are denoted by these words proves that these brahmins belong to that caste,

even though they follow the doctrine of the Bbagavan,

it would also follow that, since we find the collocated word acaryas also used to denote the issue of a lowly vaisya,

therefore an eminent brahmin who is an acarya imparting teaching of the Veda with its ancillae and its esoteric teachings is thereby denoted as being a vaisya vratya!

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If, on the other hand, even though a true brahmin is denoted by the word ācārya which dea vratya, there still can be no suspicion that he actually is a vratya, because there is positive certainty of his brabminhood which is

clearly proved by other means of knowledge, and because it is possible that the word acarya is used figuratively (ācārya as one who "accumulates"—acinoti the pupil's knowledge) for a Brahmin teacher,

then in our case, too, the same argument can be made, namely thus: even though they are denoted by the terms Satvata and Bhagavata, which denote another caste, yet there can rise no suspicion that they actually are vratyas, because the brahminhood of these followers of the Bhagavan's doctrine is firmly known from the recollection of completely obvious clans, Vedic ancestry etc., and because it is possible that the terms Sātvata and Bhāgavata have a figurative denotation of sattva-vat and bhaga-vat.

(257, explained below, § 130.)

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In other words,

the fact that the same word denotes both classes of people does not mean that therefore both belong to one and the same caste, lest the true brahmin be not made into a low-caste man because he is also denoted by the word AchArya.

We find that the word hari also means 'frog.' Does it follow that a lion is a frog because both are denoted by the same word? Then word itself would be horned, since 'word' is denoted by gau!"

([259]: gauḥ can mean 'cow' and 'word.")

Consequently, just as the words sudhanvan, ācārya etc., which denote more than one meaning, are also used for someone born from a vaiśya vratya, so also the words Bhagavata and Satvata.

128. The contention that when the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning of a word collide, it is right to assume the conventional meaning of the term, in this case of the terms Bhagavata and Satvata,

[260]: supra §15.

is not correct;

for when a denotation is appropriate

which is the composite of the denotations of the component elements of the words,

then it is not right to assume a non-composite denotation.

For he who theorizes that the words satvata and bhagavata have their conventional meaning

in denoting someone born from a vaisya vratya,

must also theorize that the words sattvavat and bhagarut, which are the stem and the taddhita suffix built on the stem,261 have a different meaning in a sentence like, "having observed the satvata rules, a man becomes a Bhagavata because of the merits he has won in a previous existence." 262

[261]: taddhita suffix, cf. Panini.

[262]: "conventionally the two words are synonymous, 'etymologically' they have different meanings.

This goes to prove the assumption that

in this case the word may have a double meaning by etymology alone, because it is possible for it to be used in the sense of "issue of a vaisya vratya."

And it is possible that those vratyas too, despite the fact that they fail to [[109]] worship the Bhagavan directly,

yet may be denoted by the words satvata and bhagavata,

because of their work discipline of cleaning up Vasudeva's temple, clearing away the bali offerings,

guarding the idol etc., for it is taught that the can suffix may occur in the sense of a simple relation, "this is of that." (263, Panini.)

And it is declared that the issue of a vaiśya vratya has the work discipline of cleaning the Bhagavan's temple etc.,

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"and (the task) of the satvatas is the cleaning of the deity's temple, the eating of the offerings, the quarding of the idol;"

and "he must worship Visnu's sanctuaries." 264 ([264]: quoted supra.)

129. Herewith is also rejected the contention that the Bhāgavatas are vratyas because they would have the same profession.

For it is one thing to clean the temple, clear away the bali offerings, guard the idol.

and quite another thing to perform the variety of actions that are daily observed by the Bhagavatas: the cleaning of the way to the idol approaching, the preparation for worship, offering, daily study, and meditation. It is as it is in the case of the jyotistoma etc.

In the jyotistoma, too, a carpenter has a task in making the various receptacles, soma-cups, soma-decanters, ladles etc., while the officiating priests have their tasks in reciting various different mantra recitations, representing the deity, pressing of the soma etc. (5)

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And this occupational similarity, limited as it is, does not raise the question whether the priests have the same caste as the carpenters!

So here, too, there is a difference between those who perform the pañ-cakālikā ritual, which is established by the Bhagavan's doctrine, and the low-caste people who do the cleaning-up of the temple and are also called temple-guards.

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130. Further, the contention that, if the words bhāgavata and satvata have their etymological meaning, this entails that the word rathakara in the injunction the "rathakara must build a fire" desomeone belonging to the three varias on account of its etymology of chariot-making,268 is not correct.

[268]: For the word means etymologically "maker of chariots, carts."" [269]: not identified.

For in the case of rathakāra

it is correct that the term refers to someone belonging to the three varṇas, because otherwise the springtime etc.,

which are given in the statement on the origin of this fire-building, would be invalidated,

and because usages of a word in the sense of different castes, which is given in the mantra

"saudhanvanā rbhavaḥ sūracakṣasaḥ"

would be invalidated.

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Despite the fact that rathakāra is also a name for another caste-as learnt from the smṛti

"the rathakāra is born out of a kāriņī by a māhiṣya"

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nevertheless, since, on Śaṅkha's evidence that so that the rathakāra is born from an anuloma marriage of a kṣatriya man and a vaiśya woman,265 the rathakāra is not forbidden to perform rites of sacrificing, fire-building and initiation,266

265: supra § 15. 266: not identified.

there is no conflict of qualification for rites that can only be realized through knowledge of the Veda,267

267: which is the prerogative only of the three varṇas.

and since the word rathakāra (in its etymological meaning) is inappropriate for members of the three varṇas because they are forbidden to follow an artisan's profession, therefore we can only conclude that in both cases different castes are denoted by the term,

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and so there is no conflict (here).

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Moreover, when knowledge of the thing meant by a word is obtained from the denotation of the separate members that compose the word, then the Author of the Sūtras rules out the validity of a denotation in which the meanings of the component members are lost, namely in prokṣaṇīṣv arthasaṃyogāt. 268

268: KMS.

[[111]]

Therefore, those emine~nt brahmins are called sattvatas and bhagavatas who because of their pure character (sattva) devote themselves to the Bhagavan who is the Supreme Person.

Later on we shall show that other smrtis set forth the eminent brahmin-hood of the bhāgavatas.

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131. The further objection,269 namely why these people should invariably be denoted by the exclusive names of Sāttvata and Bhāgavata, if their brahminhood were the same as that of others, can be answered thus: there is no defect in that, for it is as it is in the case of the names parivrājaka and nigada.

269: supra § 15.

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Certain brahmins are called bhāgavatas, just as certain brahmins are called parivrājakas, and certain yajuḥ formulae nigadas, though both are equally brahmins and equally vajuh formulae; namely in the statements:

The brahmins should remain, the parivrājakas must be fetched; 270 "the yajuḥ formulae take place, not the nigadas; the nigadas take place, not the yajuḥ formulae;"271

270: not identified.271: not identified.

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and this is so because of the interpretation:

"the nigadas are the fourth mantra collection, or the yajuḥ formulae, because they are identical."

132. The contention that the bhāgavatas are bad brahmins because they perform pūjā to the God, partake of the offering substance etc. for a livelihood, is countered in the following manner:

Surely not all bhāgavatas worship Hari for their profession, for many Sātvatas are found who perform pūjā for themselves.

If there are certain people who, while being Sātvatas, follow a reprehensible profession and perform sacrifices for respectable bhāgavatas professionally,

this fact alone does not mean that one may say that they are not brahmins. A vedic priest who officiates as an adhvaryu at a jyotiṣṭoma does not thereby lose caste.

If the priest were not to receive fees, the pūjā itself would remain fruitless; they take fees in order to realize completely the excellence of the pūjā.

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At the conclusion of the worship one must give gold to the priest according to capacity; otherwise the fruit will go to the pūjā priest himself, as is shown by the smṛti: "A sacrifice for which a small fee is given kills (the sacrificer)."272

It is however prohibited that a covetous Vedic priest officiate as a priest after he himself has put up his demands for a fee,

("There is an error called 'garbage"").
When the sacrificer appoints as an officiant priest
who covets the office, thinking either
"He should give me (a fee)"
or "He should choose me."
"This is as far from the sacrificer as garbage; this does not benefit the sacrificer."273

273: AitBr., 3.46.

The donation of the sacerdotal fee which is purified by faith is felicitous for both,

as according to the smrti, "He who receives the offering and he who {{deit|gives it}} both go to heaven."274

274: not identified.

[[112]]

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133. The statements that professional worship of the deity and living off the god's treasure makes a man a devalaka275

275: supra § 16.

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must be taken to refer to the professional worship of, and the living off the treasure of, other deities than Vāsudeva.

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Thus the blessed Vyāsa: "A devalaka is he who lives on Rudra etc."

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And there is also Śāṇḍilya's word:

"All those who perform sacrifices professionally and are also not consecrated are the only ones who are traditionally known as karmadevalakas in this world, O sage.

One should not touch them or consort with them for a year."

Likewise:

"Certain people who are karmadevalakas and kalpadevalakas are unqualified for ritual before the deity for a period of three years.

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Those brahmins who, without being consecrated, perform rites set forth in the Kalpa, either professionally or for the fame of it, are kalpadevalakas.

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One must have pūjā offered by another professional priest who has been properly consecrated; (if) one is unable to worship the god oneself. This is the principal offering; in another manner it is secondary."

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"In another manner," that is to say, when it is done by a non-consecrated priest.

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This the author elucidates:

"The rite performed professionally by 'some priest who has not been properly consecrated is called of the lowest degree."

By considering these and a hundred similar smṛti statements we can be sure that living off the deity's treasure and professional pūjā offering of brahmins who go without the sacrament of consecration as established by Pañcaratra renders them sub-Brahmins and devalakas.276

276: This and the following quotations could not be identified.

[[113]]

134. As to the statement that the bhāgavatas cannot pass for exemplary persons because they make use of flower and food offerings, which practice is abhorred by exemplary persons, to this we say: what does the śrotriya 277 mean by left-over flowers and leftover food?

277: a Brahman erudite in the Veda and following its observances.

When he takes it only as the flowers and the cakes,278 he is contradicted by all the world, for nobody approves of wasting flowers and cakes.

278: If he does not believe that God is present in the effigy, the offerings are obviously not used and cannot be characterized as left-overs. The priest's avoidance of them would simply amount to sinful waste.(4)

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Also, a particularized prohibition is not in order, because it is not established.

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No notion of a particularized thing occurs when the particularization is not determined:

and here it is impossible to determine the particularization.

OBJECTION. Why should it be impossible, since the particularization is that it is forbidden to use food what has been offered up to the deity?

REPLY. Are you now accepting the validity of Pañcaratra? For only when one admits that there is a deity present in the idols that are erected with the sacred formulae enjoined by Pañcaratra Tantra can one postulate that the particularization of the prohibition lies in the offering-up to the deity.

For unless the validity of the Tantra is admitted, how can an idol which is set forth in the Tantra be a deity, and, a fortiori, how can the substance that is offered up for this deity's sake be nirmālya and nivedya,

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For a deity does not exist by just being a deity; only that deity which is known to be correlated with an oblation on the authority of scriptural testimony is the deity to that oblation;

that is your own doctrine.

Or if it be held that

something is nirmālya and nivedya because it is admitted by the Pāñcarātrikas that it is offered up to the deity,

well, in that case you must also admit its purity because the Pāñcarātrikas accept also that the utilization of nirmālya and nivedya is perfectly pure.

Or if you do not accept this peculiar excellence, since in your opinion the Pāñcarātrikas have accepted as pure something that is really impure,

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—well, in that case you must accept it that the substance which is offered up is not really nirmālya and nivedya, since then you opine that the Pañcarātrikas have adopted someone who is not really a deity by mistaking him for a deity!

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In other words, inasmuch as the offering up abandonment of mere flowers, cakes etc. 289 is not approved,

and because it is impossible to particularize the prohibition of utilizing these substances according to the terms of one's own doctrine,

therefore the particularization must be determined in the terms of the others', i.e. the Pañcarātrikas', doctrine;

and thus the offering up becomes greatly purifying.

And inasmuch as therefore the utilization of nirmālya and nivedya becomes most purifying,

it must needs be accepted by those who admit the validity of the Pañcarātra Tantra as well by others who do not.

[[114]]

135. OBJECTION. But how is it possible then that even one who admits the validity of Pāñcarātra should reject nevertheless the nirmālya and nivedya?

For in the Tantras the tasting etc. of the nirmālya is prohibited. For instance, it is said in the Sanatkumārīya Saṃhitā:

"The offering that is proffered (to the deity), flower or fruit, is called nirmālya; that must be avoided meticulously."

Similarly in another passage: "When one has eaten nirmālya, or the foodrests of someone who is not one's guru, one must observe a milk-vow for a month, continuously recite the eight-syllable formula, and drink the pañcagavya,279 in order to be purified."

279: The {{pancagavya|pañcagavya}} is a substance in which the 5 products of the cow are mingled.

Likewise in the Indrarātra: "One should not live off the Supreme God, nor eat the nirmālya offerings."

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God, nor eat the nirmālya offe
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"And the nirmālya offerings are never fit for consumption."

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Similarly in another Samhitā:

"One should not eat the nirmālya offerings, nor smell them, nor step over them."

How then can one accept the purity of the utilization of the nirmālya when we thus know from several Saṃhitā that it is prohibited?

REFUTATION. To this he says: The utilization of a proffered substance which has been offered up to the deity is not condemned if it is done within after a period of ten nāḍikās.280

280: one nādikā is a half muhūrta.

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Thus in the same Indrarātra:

"The wise one must let the offering-cake stand for ten nāḍikās. This period of time has been prescribed both for night and for day.

They condemn the nirmālya that has stood for more other than this period of time;

thereupon he must throw it in water, or in fire, or bury it in the ground."

OBJECTION. But what is said here is not to praise the tasting etc. of the nirmālya, but to prescribe that the substance of the cake pūjā is thrown away after a period of ten nāḍikās.

In the statement:

"He must let the offering cake stand for over ten nāḍikās,"

the injunction is laid down that when the proffered flowers, cake etc. in general have been taken off as nirmālya,

because they have now fulfilled their ritual function,

they must be kept by way of accessory pūjā rite for a period of ten nāḍikās.

And consequently even a study of the conclusions of your own Tantras shows that the touching etc. of the turmeric powder, the food offerings and the water used to clean the idol's feet is not established by Tantric doctrine. Now, where are you!

REFUTATION. Where are you, loquacious debaters, witless fools who have been swallowed by your own tongue which plays around with a grain of knowledge! Your objection looks black and white at once, like the moon with its spots.

This prohibition applies only to fools like you,

since all this is indeed to be observed by Vaiṣṇavas who are qualified to do so, and thus it is capable of wiping off a multitude of sins in the same way as the drinking of soma at a Vedic sacrifice;

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for it is not to be touched by others, just as the purodasa cake is not to be touched by dogs!

Thus in the Īśvara Samhitā,

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"It is difficult to find in this world a true votary of the lord, my son,
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and, among those who are, it is even more difficult to find a disposition which is truly pure enough for the footwater, or to use the garlands etc. which have been mentioned in the doctrine,

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Therefore, O six-faced One, all this which is purified by the formulae and the glance of the Bhagavān is forbidden to those who lack this disposition and are not votaries."

And in another passage: "The saffron, sandal, camphor and oils that have been taken off Viṣṇu's body are supremely purifying."

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Likewise in the Padmodbhava: "He who wears the powder that is taken of Viṣṇu's body on his head obtains the fruit of a Horse Sacrifice and glories in Viṣṇu's heaven."

Similarly in the İśvara Samhitā,

"No blame should be put by statements arising from ignorance on all that is used, the perfume, flowers etc., (the water) of the idol's bath etc., and the curds, milk etc.

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Those who condemn this divine purifying agent because they consider it nirmālya, those witless detractors of its power will go to hell."

The above statements which to the consecrated prohibit the use of nirmālya at the time mentioned in the time instruction must be understood to mean a time subsequent to that when the (offerings to) the chief of the Bhagavān's retinue281 is being used.

281: Viśvaksena, to whom pūjā is performed after the main pūjā.

Since the garlands, sandal etc, which are offered up to the Bhagavān, later on, after the Viśvaksena offering, become unfit to eat,

therefore the Sātvatas use the nivedya etc. before that time. Consequently the use of the nirmālya is a cause of excellence for the Sātvatas.

136. Moreover, it is our postulation that the exemplary people hold the nirmālya of other gods in contempt; this is postulated like the drinking of soma (which is good) because it is Vedic (in contrast to the drinking of liquor which is evil).

So I have said that those who do not accept the validity of the Bhagavān's doctrine are unable to determine what is nirmālya.

When it is properly determined (namely according to the Bhagavān's doctrine) the Bhagavān's nirmālya proves to be extremely purifying, as is demonstrated by the statements of all Vedic teachers.

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In a matter for which the only means of knowledge is verbal testimony, it must be so as verbal testimony says that it is. Unless one is deaf, one cannot say that there is no verbal testimony concerning it.

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For instance it is said in the Brahma Purāṇa:

"The nivedya of Viṣṇu is declared by the sages to be pure and fit for consumption; one who eats other nirmālya and nivedya must perform the cāndrāyaṇa in expiation.

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The mālya which is taken from the body of Viṣṇu takes away evil and is holy.

He who wears it on his head goes to supreme bliss."

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It follows that the smṛti statement that a man who eats nirmālya and nivedya must perform the cāndrāyaṇa should be taken to bear upon the nirmālya of Rudra, Kālī etc.

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(282: Mahābhārata quotations not verifiable.)

Thus in the Mahābhārata:

"Meditating in one's heart upon Hari, one must offer food to Him with full attention, thereupon pick up this food again with the middlefinger and the thumb,

and then sacrifice it bit by bit, saying: "Prāṇāya svāhā, Apānāya svāhā, Vyānāya svāhā, Udānāya svāhā, Samānāya svāhā."

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Likewise in another passage, "what has been offered to the god must be given to a brahmacārin."

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Thus in the Mahābhārata:

"The saintly knowers of the Pañcaratra ate in his house that which had been left over by the Bhagavān, as a means to attain to bliss, as supreme nourishment."

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And likewise the blessed Śaunaka: "He himself eats the nivedya."

He who condemns Viṣṇu's nivedya, whose purity is proved by hundreds of similar smṛtis and which dispels the fear of rebirth, really ignores the statements of the smṛti because of his heterodoxy and ought to have his tongue cut off.

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137. OBJECTION. But how can the nivedya be a means for the prāṇāgnihotra?283

The exemplary people do not approve of a means for homa etc. for which no building bricks are used.?? (no sacrifice has been made.)

283: The ritual taking of food is considered a performance of the prāṇāg-nihotra.

Nor can a substitution of another substance do duty as a homa, because he lives off food that has been obtained according to taste.

Nor can a substitution of another consumption be made to replace the nivedya,

for scripture enjoins upon the twiceborn a meal in the evening and a meal in the morning,

as follows from the prohibition: "One should not take food in between."

REFUTATION. That is no defect, since the multitude of deities, like prāṇa etc. are revealed to be parts of Viṣṇu, in the same way as Viśvaksena, the chief of Viṣṇu's retinue.

For just as the flowers, cake etc., though proffered to the Bhagavān but actually given to Viśvaksena shows that.

He is familiar under various guises, or just as at a sacrifice the soma juice that is left over by the hotr is pure to the adhvaryu, so it is also with the nirmālya.284

284: The hotr is the principal reciting priest at the soma sacrifice, the adhvaryu the main executive.

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Moreover, only scripture can be our criterion for what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten. When it says that something is fit to be eaten, what injunction are we to invent ourselves?

Just as the same rule governs both the periodical and the desiderative agnihotra, so the same rule governing the eating of the nivedya applies also to the prāṇāgnihotra.

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138. As to the remark299 that from the observance of different sacraments,

from conception ceremony to cremation,

it follows that the Bhagavatas are not brahmins,

here again ignorance is to blame.

It is not your Honour's fault

that the Bhagavatas, who have the Vājasanevasakha in the transmission of their family line,

observe the sacraments of conception ceremony etc. according to the manner laid down by the grhyasutras of Katyayana etc.

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Those who perform the forty sacraments which are enjoined by the Ekayana scripture while giving up the dharmas of the Veda, from the recitation of the gayatri onward, [[300]] they properly follow the rules laid down by the grhyasutras of their own sakha

and do not abdicate their brahminhood because they fail to follow the rites of a different shakha; since otherwise it would follow that other brahmins too would forfeit their brahminhood because they fail to perform the rites enjoined by other [[121]] people's Sakha.

For everywhere among brahmins we find customs that differ according to birth, carana, gotra, qualification etc.

Even though one ritual is understood for all śākhās, still all the various dharmas relating to mutually different qualified performers

do not all together accumulate in any one place.

And the Aspirants who are distinct from those brahmins who are qualified for rites of the aindragneya etc.,

which are means leading to the enjoyment of rewards like heaven etc., as enjoined by the three Vedas,

and who themselves are qualified for the rites of the Ekayana, rites which alone are the means of attaining to the Bhagavan, viz. knowledge, cleansing the way to the Lord, preparation of worship and oblation, as enjoined by the Ekayana scripture, are brahmins too. It follows that the non-observance of certain rites enjoined by different sākhās

does not mean that either one forfeits his brahminhood-

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that the Ekāyana sākhā is preterpersonal scripture has been enlarged upon in the Treatise on the Validity of Kasmira Agama,* and is therefore here not further discussed.

But since it is quite obvious that the Bhagavatas, which we are discussing here,

are connected with the dharmas of the three Vedas, like the savitri recitation.

there is no possible support for the suspicion that they are really vratyas

because they would have abandoned these Vedic dharmas.

139. May Nāthamuni 285 be victorious, he to whom the Three Principles are immediately evident by virtue of his own miraculous power, he by whose pupils the arrogance of the rivals of the Sāttvata Doctrine is terminated after their own view was rent to pieces by variously apposite arguments, he whose spirit is for ever the abode of the feet of Mukunda.

285: Predecessor of Yāmuna at Śrīraṅga.

May, for the length of this Aeon, play on the pious, enchanting and irreproachable sayings of the extensive collection of prose and verse compositions which eclipse the cleverness of the befuddled, conceited and witless assembly of the evil crowd of the rivals of the Sāttvata doctrine, whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nāthamunīndra,286 and by which all the unholy powers are cleansed,

286: Nāthamuni compiled the sayings of the Vaiṣṇava saints, the Ālvārs. [[122]]

Appendix - +Dyugangā 00000000

Goals 00000000

Dyugangā (https://rebrand.ly/dyuganga) is a work group dedicated to the promotion of ever-victorious Hindu ideals and arts. It's current focus is in presenting important texts for easy study.

The texts may be presented as

- audio files (eg: MahAbhArata audio book project),
- as web pages (eg: Apastamba-gRhya-sUtra, Apastamba-dharma-sUtra, EkAgnikANDa commentary, manu-smRti, raghuvaMsha, more kalpa-texts, tattva-texts, universal subhAShita DB),
- as dictionaries (eg: stardict)
- ebooks distributed on various platforms (eg: book-pub, amazon, google play).

You may subscribe to mail-streams for past and future announcements (dg, hv, san).

The choice of material heavily depends on the special interests of its current lead (vedas, kalpa, purANa-s).

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