

# PhD Thesis

Fintan S. Nagle

January 17, 2014

Supervisors: Alan Johnston and Peter McOwan  
 $n$  words as counted by the TeXcount script at  
<http://app.uio.no/ifi/texcount/index.html>.

*Acknowledgements*

...

# Contents

0.1	Introduction . . . . .	3
0.2	Thesis organisation . . . . .	3
0.3	Literature review . . . . .	3
0.4	Terms . . . . .	3
0.5	The overall goal . . . . .	3
0.6	Modularity . . . . .	3
0.7	Forms of neural coding . . . . .	3
0.8	Static and dynamic faces are processed differently . . . . .	3
0.9	Identity vs. expression . . . . .	3
0.10	Correlates between the two decouplings . . . . .	4
<b>1</b>	<b>Unsorted</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1	Characterising fire . . . . .	5
1.2	Evolutionary value . . . . .	5

## 0.1 Introduction

## 0.2 Thesis organisation

This document is organised into the following sections:

## 0.3 Literature review

## 0.4 Terms

## 0.5 The overall goal

## 0.6 Modularity

The property of modularity is the possibility to divide a system into multiple components!

## 0.7 Forms of neural coding

- **Single neuron activation.** The firing of a single neuron can convey binary information.
- **Single spike frequency** can code a real-valued quantity.
- **Spike frequency across multiple neurons** can code relative information between two real-valued quantities.
- **Connection patterns** between neurons (the existence of a connection, or its strength) can code complex information, but this information cannot be extracted without activating the neurons and monitoring the outputs.

## 0.8 Static and dynamic faces are processed differently

The first evidence of a difference in the perception of expression between static and dynamic faces was found in 1991[1].

## 0.9 Identity vs. expression

There is a substantial body of evidence that identity (information which is invariant within individuals) and expression (information which is invariant across perceived emotional states) are processed differently. On the high level, identity judgement and expression judgement have been observed to be doubly dissociated in prosopagnosics[2]. However, this observation may not allow us to generalise deductions to the normally-functional population, as prosopagnosics may have developed alternative recognition strategies such as non-holistic feature recognition (as is used to recognise classes of objects for which we do not possess a specialised representation or processing system).

On a slightly lower level, judgement reaction times differ depending on whether expression or identity is being judged; when judging identity, familiar faces are matched faster, but familiarity confers no advantage when judging expression[3]. This could imply that the computation of identity is intrinsically more complex or that other neural actions such as memory retrieval of biographical data are triggered.

On the lowest level, it is possible to find individual neurons which are receptive to either identity or expression[4]. Multidimensional scaling methods on their spike train data allow stimuli to be classified in either identity or expression space solely by neural response.

However, the location in one test subject of a small number of individual neurons which correlate with a particular condition provides no information about the algorithmics of face processing; it simply demonstrates that the brain can judge identity and expression at some level (which is intuitively obvious) and that this information can be coded by neural activation as opposed to connection patterning or higher-level codes such as spike train phase.

## **0.10 Correlates between the two decouplings**

It is tempting to connect the identity-expression dichotomy with the static-dynamic dichotomy, as dynamic faces have constant identity but changing expression. This would be erroneous, as static faces can vary in both expression and identity.

# Chapter 1

## Unsorted

### 1.1 Characterising fire

### 1.2 Evolutionary value

From an evolutionary point of view, mastery of fire was key to human development. Being able to control fire allowed early humans to cook food, defend themselves from predators and survive in cold, challenging environments. Fire was the first of a long line of technologies which release stored energy from fuel and turn it to human purposes; the earliest archaeological evidence of fire use dates back 1.8 million years, with frequent use found from 100,000 years ago[5]. Even before this, hominids regularly encountered flame in the form of bushfires, although these were perceived as a threat, not a controllable, exploitable entity.

The evolving human visual system has therefore been exposed to a large amount of flamelike stimuli in the last 1.8 million years. These stimuli have often appeared in dangerous or life-threatening contexts, either posing a threat or aiding survival. In sufficiently extreme situations, such as extreme cold or heavy predation, those early humans who could successfully control fire had an increased chance of survival.

It is therefore natural to enquire whether the human visual system has become adapted in any way to the perception of flamelike stimuli. Does the visual system employ any specific representations or specialised models when attending to fire, does it use the same general-purpose systems employed when observing a novel moving stimulus?

This question recalls the ongoing debate concerning the specialisation of face perception. We find increased activation of the fusiform face area and inferior temporal sulcus while viewing faces[6]; this can be explained either by innate specialisation or learned proficiency. In the same way, observation of fire may recruit neurons and systems which respond preferentially to, and perform better on, flame stimuli. On the other hand, observing fire may stimulate the same neural populations as observing other moving stimuli.

### 1.3 High-level and low-level representations

The goal of neuroscience is to impose structure and explanatory power on the neural systems present in the brain. Such constructs are described in different domains of representation. Some are traditional and canonical:

Domain	Spatial primitives	Temporal primitives
Neurons	Neurons	Spikes
Modules	Brain areas	Levels of activation

# Bibliography

- [1] G.W. Humphreys, N. Donnelly, and M.J. Riddoch. Expression is computed separately from facial identity, and it is computed separately for moving and static faces: Neuropsychological evidence. *Neuropsychologia*, 31(2):173–181, 1993.
- [2] J. Archer, DC Hay, and AW Young. Movement, face processing and schizophrenia: evidence of a differential deficit in expression analysis. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 33(4):517–528, 1994.
- [3] V. Bruce and A. Young. Understanding face recognition. *British journal of psychology*, 1986.
- [4] M.E. Hasselmo, E.T. Rolls, and G.C. Baylis. The role of expression and identity in the face-selective responses of neurons in the temporal visual cortex of the monkey. *Behavioural brain research*, 32(3):203–218, 1989.
- [5] David MJS Bowman, Jennifer K Balch, Paulo Artaxo, William J Bond, Jean M Carlson, Mark A Cochrane, Carla M DAntonio, Ruth S DeFries, John C Doyle, Sandy P Harrison, et al. Fire in the earth system. *science*, 324(5926):481–484, 2009.
- [6] Truett Allison, Aina Puce, and Gregory McCarthy. Social perception from visual cues: role of the sts region. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 4(7):267–278, 2000.

Appendices here