

# Cyber Grand Shellphish




DEFCON 24  
August 7, 2016 · Track 2 - 3pm



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THE COMPUTER SECURITY GROUP AT UC SANTA BARBARA




Giovanni Vigna



Christopher Kruegel



zanardi



VOID

An aerial photograph of a coastal town, likely Santa Barbara, California. In the foreground, there's a sandy beach and a rocky coastline where the ocean meets the land. A winding river or creek flows from the interior towards the sea. The town itself is built on a hillside overlooking the water, featuring numerous houses, larger buildings, and green spaces. In the background, a range of mountains stretches across the horizon under a clear blue sky.

SHELLPHISH

HEX on THE BEACH

SHED/PHISH

SIMULATION  
2004

*uc santa barbara*

SICKO    IRISH  
NULLPTR **zanardi**  
BALZAROTH    VOID

**SHED/PHISH**

**SIMULATION  
2005**



*santa barbara*

VOID


engimani

PIzzaman

TU

# SHED/PHISH

SIMULATION  
2006 - 2011



# SHED/PHISH

SIMULATION  
2011 - 2014

*uc santa barbara*

ANTONOOB  
SALLS zardus cavedon SPERMACHINE  
SUBWIRE FISH ODO GIULLO VOLTAIRE KIRAT  
jay COLLIN SICKO IRISH virus weaver reyammer  
**zanardi** marco adamD  
BALZAROTH VOID веетаL НАСОРО  
PIZZAMANCAO BBOE GIANLUCA  
rHELMOT nezorg mw VITOR

~~NORTHEASTERN AND BOSTON UNIVERSITY~~

nullptr mw acez  
engiman crowell  
collin mossberg PIZZAMAN

# SHED/PHISH

ANTONOOB  
SALLS zardus  
SUBWIRE FISH ODO  
DONFOS jay  
DOUBLE  
acez  
mIKE\_PIZZA

*UC London*  
Gianluca

*ASU*  
adAMD

*EURECOM*  
BALZAROTH

*uc santa barbara*

cavedon SPERMACHINE  
GIULLO iNSH VOLTAIRE KIRAT  
SICKO virus weaver reyammer  
**zanardi** marco adAMD  
BALZAROTH VOID beetal HACOPO  
cao BBOE gIANLUCA  
HELMOT nezorg VITOR

*NORTHEASTERN AND BOSTON UNIVERSITY*  
NULLPTR mw acez  
engiman crowell  
COLLIn mossberg Pizzaman

**SIMULATION**  
2015

# SHED/PHISH

ANTONOOB  
SALLS zardus  
SUBWIRE FISH ODO  
DONFOS jay  
DOUBLE acez  
MIKE\_PIZZA

*uc London*  
Gianluca

*ASU*

adAMD

**SIMULATION MODern day**

*Eurecom*

BALZAROTH

*uc SANTA BARBARA*

cavedon SPERMACHINE  
GIULLO VOLTAIRE kirat  
SICKO IRISH virus weaver reyammer  
**zanardi** marco  
VOID Beetal НАСОРО  
cao BBOE  
rHELMOT nezorg VITOR

*NORTHEASTERN AND BOSTON UNIVERSITY*

nullptr mw  
engiman crowell  
collin mossberg Pizzaman

# SHED/PHISH

ANTONOOB  
SALLS zardus  
SUBWIRE FISH ODO  
DONFOS jay

acez  
mIKE\_PIZZA

*uc london*  
gianluca

*ASU*  
adAMD

**SIMULATION MODERN DAY**

*EURECOM*  
BALZAROTH

*uc santa barbara*

reyammer

нАСОРО

**zanardi**

VOID  
cao  
rHELMOT nezorg

**NORTHEASTERN AND BOSTON UNIVERSITY**

nullptr mw  
engiman crowell  
mossberg pizzaman



**CYBER**  
GRAND\_CHALLENGE

# DARPA Competitions

Self-driving Cars




Robots



# The DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge

Programs!









SHIRPHIS





analyze

pwn

patch



# analyze

## pwn

## patch

- Linux-inspired environment, with only 7 syscalls
  - transmit / receive / fdwait (~select)
  - allocate / deallocate
  - random
  - terminate
- No need to model the POSIX API!
- Otherwise real(istic) programs.



analyze

pwn

patch

- No filesystem -> no flag?
- CGC Quals: crash == exploit
- CGC Finals: two types of exploits
  1. "flag overwrite": set a register to X, crash at Y
  2. "flag read": leak the "secret flag" from memory



analyze

pwn

patch

~~int main() { return 0; }~~

fails functionality checks...

~~signal(SIGSEGV, exit)~~

no signal handling!

inline QEMU-based CFI?

performance penalties...

# Mechanical Phish (CQE)

A completely autonomous system

- Patch
- Crash



# Mechanical Phish (CFE)

Completely autonomous system

- Patch
- Crash
- Exploit



# The DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge



# The CGC Final Event (CFE)

- The competition is divided in rounds (96), with short breaks between rounds
- The competition begins: The system provides a set of Challenge Binaries (CBs) to the teams' CRSs
  - Each CB provides a service (e.g., an HTTP server)
  - Initially, all teams are running the same binaries to implement each service
- For each round, a score for each (team, service) tuple is generated

# The CGC Final Event (CFE)


$$\sum_{i=0}^{\#CB} \text{Availability} \times \text{Security} \times \text{Evaluation}$$

- Availability: how badly did you fuck up the binary?
- Security: did you defend against *all* exploits?
- Evaluation: how many n00bs did you pwn?
- When you are shooting blindfolded automatic weapons, it's easy to shoot yourself in the foot...



LUNGES		EAGLES			CRANE		CROW		NINJA	
SPACE SHIFT	3	1	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1
LIGHT										
MEDIUM										
HEAVY										
FL DEET										
BITFLIP										

woundedawake.com



# Code Freeze?



**cao** 4:01 PM

farnsworth has been freezed

all outstanding merge requests have been merged in



**mike\_pizza** 4:01 PM

holy shit



**cao** 4:02 PM

*set the channel topic: meister and farnsworth are in code freeze*

The image shows a large, semi-transparent watermark in the center of the page. The word "oops!" is written in a bold, rounded font, with each letter having a thick stroke. The letters are slightly overlapping, creating a sense of depth. The watermark is white against a dark background.

2016-07-22 22:28:18 -0700 [cafeccf](#) Fix comparison for prev\_round  
2016-07-22 22:28:18 -0700 Merge branch 'fix/bump-rex-lexer-memroy-limit' into 'master'  
2016-07-22 15:19:55 -0700 [cafeccf](#) Merge pull request #255 from jkunst/fix-lexer-memory-limit

2016-07-26 16:02:17 -0700 **5619314** Bump up hex 5's upper memory limit to 150  
2016-07-26 16:02:17 -0700 **5619314** Bump to version 1.0.0




**God please forgive me for this commit**

Francesco Disperati authored 22 days ago



72a44980



**Fixes**

Francesco Disperati authored 22 days ago



18849985



**Disable IDSSubmitter**

Francesco Disperati authored 23 days ago



460fc02c



**Capitalize constant**

Francesco Disperati authored 23 days ago



60cb8fe0



**pass patchtype to PatcherexJob**

Antonio Bianchi authored 23 days ago




160a89d4

15 Jul, 2016 20 commits

A photograph of a hotel lobby at night. Four men are sitting on a long dark sofa, each working on a laptop. One man is looking at his phone. A fifth man is lying face down on the floor in front of the sofa, also working on a laptop. The room has a red patterned wall, a bar area with stools, and large windows showing the city outside.

Tue 2 Aug, 23:54  
~15 hours before access shutdown





# Farnsworth

Object-relational model for database:

- What CS are fielded this round?
- Do we have crashes?
- Do we have a good patch?
- ...

Our ground truth and the only  
component reasonably well tested\*



\* 69% coverage

# Meister

## Job scheduler:

- Looks at game state
- Asks creators for jobs
- Schedules them based on priority

```
2016-08-03 12:42:26 -0700 bfec79f Merge branch 'fix/colorguard-only-trace-those-untraced' into 'master'
2016-08-03 12:41:30 -0700 f90c995 Log failed pod deletion
2016-08-03 12:41:23 -0700 6f0ac2e Delete failed pods
2016-08-03 12:35:05 -0700 1290f67 Only trace testcases which have been untraced by colorguard
2016-08-03 08:02:29 -0700 ecbe399 create the list in parallel
2016-08-03 06:32:11 -0700 fce13f8 Select only crash.id for colorguard
2016-08-03 06:27:04 -0700 58cc1f7 Fix colorguard and driller creators
2016-08-03 06:22:08 -0700 169b96d Set creator time limit to 15
2016-08-03 05:05:50 -0700 983d261 Use minimum of 2 seconds as a minimum rate for staggering
2016-08-03 04:56:37 -0700 f042428 Fix number of pods needed
2016-08-03 04:55:23 -0700 d582e92 Use runtime to determine jobs to stagger
2016-08-03 04:26:07 -0700 0a90221 Do not kill jobs unnecessarily
2016-08-03 03:34:58 -0700 eb82518 Fix job_ids_to_kill for staggered scheduling
2016-08-03 02:20:23 -0700 c1e8e3e Merge branch 'feature/staggered-priority' into 'master'
2016-08-03 02:11:15 -0700 3fbab06 Use set for jobs_to_ignore
2016-08-03 02:03:45 -0700 b76594c Staggered pod creation
2016-08-03 02:01:16 -0700 5eb57fd Merge branch 'fix/pov_fuzzing_devshm' into 'master'
2016-08-03 01:57:55 -0700 a60f7ee up memory for using dev shm
```


# On the Shoulders of Giants



**Z3**



**ubuntu**



**PostgreSQL**



**angr**



**VEX**



**AFL**



**pebble**

**Capstone  
Engine**



**kubernetes**

**QEMU**  
open source processor emulator



**Unicorn  
Engine**



**pypy**



**docker**




# angr

- Framework for the analysis of binaries, developed at UCSB
- Supports a number of architectures
  - x86, MIPS, ARM, PPC, etc. (all 32 and 64 bit)
- Open-source, free for commercial use (!)
  - <http://angr.io>
  - <https://github.com/angr>
  - [angr@lists.cs.ucsb.edu](mailto:angr@lists.cs.ucsb.edu)

anGr












# angr



Concolic  
Execution



Automatic  
Exploitation




Patching




# Fuzzing

- Fuzzing is an automated procedure to send inputs and record safety condition violations as crashes
  - Assumption: crashes are potentially exploitable
- Several dimensions in the fuzzing space
  - How to supply inputs to the program under test?
  - How to generate inputs?
  - How to generate more “relevant” crashes?
  - How to change inputs between runs?
- Goal: maximized effectiveness of the process

# Gray/White-box Fuzzing



# How do we find crashes?



# Fuzzing: American Fuzzy Lop



```
x = int(input())
if x >= 10:
    if x < 100:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```



Let's fuzz it!

1 ⇒ "You lose!"

593 ⇒ "You lose!"

183 ⇒ "You lose!"


4 ⇒ "You lose!"

498 ⇒ "You lose!"

42 ⇒ "You win!"

```
x = int(input())
if x >= 10:
    if x^2 == 152399025:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```

## Let's fuzz it!



1 ⇒ "You lose!"

593 ⇒ "You lose!"

183 ⇒ "You lose!"

4 ⇒ "You lose!"


498 ⇒ "You lose!"

42 ⇒ "You lose!"

3 ⇒ "You lose!"

.....


57 ⇒ "You lose!"



- Very fast!
- Very effective!
- Unable to deal with certain situations:
  - magic numbers
  - hashes
  - specific identifiers




```
x = input()
if x >= 10:
    if x % 1337 == 0:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```







```
x = input()
if x >= 10:
    if x % 1337 == 0:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```



# Driller = AFL + angr




# Driller



Test Cases

# Driller

“Cheap” fuzzing coverage






Test Cases




“X”

“Y”




# Driller



# Driller



# Driller





# Auto Exploitation - Simplified

```
typedef struct component {  
    char name[32];  
    int (*do_something)(int arg);  
} comp_t;  
  
comp_t *initialize_component(char *cmp_name) {  
    int i = 0;  
    struct component *cmp;  
  
    cmp = malloc(sizeof(struct component));  
    cmp->do_something = sample_func;  
  
    while (*cmp_name)  
        cmp->name[i++] = *cmp_name++;  
  
    cmp->name[i] = '\0';  
    return cmp;  
}  
x = get_input();  
cmp = initialize_component(x);  
cmp->do_something(1);
```

## HEAP

```
Symbolic Byte[0]  
Symbolic Byte[1]  
Symbolic Byte[2]  
Symbolic Byte[3]  
Symbolic Byte[4]  
Symbolic Byte[5]  
Symbolic Byte[6]  
Symbolic Byte[7]  
...
```

```
Symbolic Byte[32] ...  
Symbolic Byte[36]
```

```
'\0'
```

call <symbolic  
byte[36:32]>

# Auto Exploitation - Simplified

Turning the state into an **exploited** state

```
: angr
```

```
: assert state.se.symbolic(state.regs.pc)
```

Constrain **buffer** to contain our shellcode

```
: angr
```

```
: buf_addr = find_symbolic_buffer(state, len(shellcode))
: mem = state.memory.load(buf_addr, len(shellcode))
: state.add_constraints(mem == state.se.bvv(shellcode))
```

# Auto Exploitation - Simplified

Constrain **PC** to point to the buffer

```
from angr import SimState

state = SimState()
state.se.add_constraints(state.regs.pc == buf_addr)
```

**Synthesize!**

```
from angr import SimState

state = SimState()
exploit = state.posix.dumps(0)
```

# Auto Exploitation - Simplified

Vulnerable Symbolic State (PC hijack)

Constraints to add shellcode to the address space

+

Constraints to make PC point to shellcode

---

Exploit



# Detecting Leaks of the Flag Page

- Make only the flag page symbolic
- Everything else is completely concrete
  - Can execute most basic block with the Unicorn Engine!
- When we have idle cores on the CRS, trace all our testcases
- Solved DEFCON CTF LEGIT\_00009 challenge



# Patcherex



Patching Techniques:

- Stack randomization
- Return pointer encryption
- ...

Patches:

- Insert code
- Insert data
- ...


Patching Backend:

- Detour
- Reassembler
- Reassembler Optimized

# Adversarial Patches 1/2

Detect QEMU

```
xor eax, eax  
inc eax  
push eax  
push eax  
push eax  
fld TBYTE PTR [esp]  
fsqrt
```



# Adversarial Patches 2/2

Transmit the flag

- To **stderr!**

Backdoor

- hash-based challenge-response backdoor
- not “cryptographically secure” → good enough to defeat automatic systems

# Generic Patches

Return pointer encryption

Protect indirect calls/jmps

Extended Malloc allocations

Randomly shift the stack (ASLR)

Clean uninitialized stack space

# Targeted Patches

Qualification event → avoid crashes!


# Targeted Patches

Final event →


# Reassembler & Optimizer


- Prototypes in 3 days  
angr is awesome!!
- A big bag of tricks integrated, which worked out

## CPU



## Memory





# CGC CFE Statistics 1/3

- 82 Challenge Sets fielded
- 2442 Exploits generated
- 1709 Exploits for 14/82 CS with 100% Reliability
- Longest exploit: 3791 lines of C code
- Shortest exploit: 226 lines of C code
- crackaddr: 517 lines of C code

# CGC CFE Statistics 2/3

100% reliable exploits generated for:

- YAN01\_000{15,16}
- CROMU\_000{46,51,55,65,94,98}
- NRFIN\_000{52,59,63}
- KPRCA\_00{065,094,112}

Rematch Challenges:

- SQLSlammer (CROMU\_00094)
- crackaddr (CROMU\_00098)

# CGC CFE Statistics 3/3

## Vulnerabilities in CS we exploited:

- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
- CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-126: Buffer Over-read
- CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
- CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- CWE-193 Off-by-one Error
- CWE-201: Information Exposure Through Sent Data
- CWE-202: Exposure of Sensitive Data Through Data Queries)
- CWE-291: Information Exposure Through Sent Data
- CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
- CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
- CWE-788: Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer

**DEFCON**





IVAN  
RE  
AD:

# Human augmentation...

Awesome:

- CRS assisted with 5 exploits
- Human exploration  
-> CRS exploitation
- Backdoors!

Tough:

- API incompatibilities are brutal
- Computer programs are brittle

# Open source all the code!



@shellphish

# Stay in touch!

**twitter:** @Shellphish

**email:** [team@shellphish.net](mailto:team@shellphish.net) or [cgc@shellphish.net](mailto:cgc@shellphish.net)

**irc:** #shellphish on freenode

**CRS chat:** #shellphish-crs on freenode

**angr chat:** #angr on freenode

# Backup

# Conclusions

- Automated vulnerability analysis and mitigation is a growing field
- The DARPA CGC Competition is pushing the limits of what can be done in a **self-managed, autonomous** setting
- This is a first of this kind, but not the last
- ... to the singularity!

# Self-Managing Hacking

- Infrastructure availability
  - (Almost) No event can cause a catastrophic downtime
    - Novel approaches to orchestration for resilience
- Analysis scalability
  - Being able to direct efficiently (and autonomously) fuzzing and state exploration is key
    - Novel techniques for state exploration triaging
- Performance/security trade-off
  - Many patched binaries, many approaches: which patched binary to field?
    - Smart approaches to security performance evaluation


# Hacking Binary Code

- Low abstraction level
- No structured types
- No modules or clearly defined functions
- Compiler optimization and other artifacts can make the code more complex to analyze
- WYSIWYE: What you see is what you execute

# Finding Vulnerabilities



Human



Semi-Automated



Fully Automated

# Manual Vulnerability Analysis

- “Look at the code and see what you can find”
- Requires substantial expertise
  - The analysis is as good as the person performing it
- Allows for the identification of complex vulnerabilities (e.g., logic-based)
- Expensive, does not scale

# Tool-Assisted Vulnerability Analysis

- “Run these tools and verify/expand the results”
- Tools help in identifying areas of interest
  - By ruling out known code
  - By identifying potential vulnerabilities
- Since a human is involved, expertise and scale are still issues

# Automated Vulnerability Analysis

- “Run this tool and it will find the vulnerability”
  - ... and possibly generate an exploit...
  - ...and possibly generate a patch
- Requires well-defined models for the vulnerabilities
- Can only detect the vulnerabilities that are modeled
- Can scale (not always!)
- The problem with halting...

# Vulnerability Analysis Systems

- Usually a composition of static and dynamic techniques
- Model how attacker-controlled information enter the system
- Model how information is processed
- Model a number of unsafe conditions

# Static Analysis

- The goal of static analysis techniques is to characterize all possible run-time behaviors over all possible inputs without actually running the program
- Find possible bugs, or prove the absence of certain kinds of vulnerabilities
- Static analysis has been around for a long while
  - Type checkers, compilers
  - Formal verification
- Challenges: soundness, precision, and scalability

# Example Analyses

- Control-flow analysis: Finds and reasons about all possible control-flow transfers (sources and destinations)
- Data-flow analysis: Reasons about how data flows within the program
- Data dependency analysis: Reasons about how data influences other data
- Points-to analysis: Reasons about what values can pointers take
- Alias analysis: Determines if two pointers might point to the same address
- Value-set analysis: Reasons about what are the set of values that variables can hold


# Dynamic Analysis

- Dynamic approaches are very precise for particular environments and inputs
  - Existential proofs
- However, they provide no guarantee of coverage
  - Limited power

# Example Analyses

- Dynamic taint analysis: Keeps track of how data flows from sources (files, network connections) to sinks (buffers, output operations, database queries)
- Fuzzing: Provides (semi)random inputs to the program, looking for crashes
- Forward symbolic execution: Models values in an abstract way and keeps track of constraints

# The Shellphish CRS: Mechanical Phish



# Interactive, Online CTFs

- Very difficult to organize
- Require substantial infrastructure
- Difficult to scale
- Focused on both attacking and defending in real time
- From ctftime.org: 100+ events listed
- Online attack-defense competitions:
  - UCSB iCTF 13 editions
  - RuCTF 5 editions
  - FAUST 1 edition


# CTFs Are Playgrounds...

- For people (hackers)
- For tools (attack, defense)
- But can they be used to advance science?


# DECREE API

- void \_terminate(unsigned int status);
- int allocate(size\_t length, int prot, void \*\*addr);
- int deallocate(void \*addr, size\_t length);
- int fdwait(int nfds, fd\_set \*readfds, fd\_set \*writefds,  
              struct timeval \*timeout, int \*readyfds);
- int random(void \*buf, size\_t count, size\_t \*rnd\_bytes);
- int receive(int fd, void \*buf, size\_t count,  
              size\_t \*rx\_bytes);
- int transmit(int fd, const void \*buf, size\_t count,  
              size\_t \*tx\_bytes);

# Soundness and Completeness




# Soundness and Completeness




# Soundness and Completeness


More precise over-approximation (sound)



# Soundness and Completeness



# Soundness and Completeness




# Hidden

# Changed with "All the things" meme

Open the source!



# Human + Machine = WIN!



# Simulation For Team Shellphish

- R00: Competition fields CB1, CB2, CB3
- R01: CRS generates PoV1, RB2
  - Points for round 00:
    - (CB1, CB2, CB3): Availability=1, Security=2, Evaluation=1 → Score = 2
    - Total score: 6
- R02: Competition fields CB1, RB2, CB3
  - Points for round 01
    - CB1: Availability=1, Security=1, Evaluation=  $1+(6/6)$  → Score = 2
    - RB2: 0
    - CB3: Availability=1, Security=2, Evaluation=1 → Score = 2
    - Total score: 4

# Simulation For Team Shellphish

- R03: Competition fields CB1, RB2, CB3
  - Points for round 02
    - CB1: Availability=1, Security=1, Evaluation=1+(3/6) → Score = 1.5
    - RB2: Availability=0.8, Security=2, Evaluation=1 → Score = 1.6
    - CB3: Availability=1, Security=2, Evaluation=1 → Score = 2
    - Total score: 5.1

