

BOOLEAN GRÖBNER BASIS REDUCTIONS ON DATAPATH CIRCUITS USING THE UNATE CUBE SET ALGEBRA

Abstract—Recent developments in formal datapath verification make efficient use of symbolic computer algebra algorithms for formal verification. The circuit is modeled as a set of polynomials over Boolean (or pseudo-Boolean) rings, and Gröbner basis (GB) reductions are performed over these polynomials to derive a canonical representation. GB reductions of Boolean polynomials tend to cause intermediate expression swell (term explosion problem) – often making the approach infeasible in a practical setting. To overcome these problems, this paper describes a logic synthesis analogue of GB reductions over Boolean polynomials, using the unate cube set algebra over characteristic sets. By representing Boolean polynomials as characteristic sets using Zero-suppressed BDDs (ZBDDs), implicit algorithms can be efficiently designed for GB-reduction on digital circuits. We show that imposition of circuit-topology based monomial orders on ZBDDs enables an implicit implementation of polynomial division, canceling multiple monomials in one-step. Experiments performed over various finite field arithmetic architectures demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithms and implementations as compared to conventional explicit methods.

I. INTRODUCTION

Automated formal verification and equivalence checking of arithmetic datapath circuits is challenging. Conventional verification techniques, such as those based on binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [1], And-Invert-Graph (AIG) based reductions with SAT or SMT-solvers [2], etc., are infeasible in verifying complex datapath designs. Such designs often implement algebraic computations over bit-vector operands, therefore finite integer rings [3] or finite fields [4] are considered appropriate models to devise decision procedures for verification. For this reason, the verification community has explored the use of algebraic geometry and symbolic algebra algorithms for verification. In such a setting, the circuit is modeled by way of a set of polynomials that generate an ideal, and the verification problem is formulated using Gröbner basis (GB) reduction techniques [5].

The GB problem exhibits high computational complexity. Indeed, computing a GB (using Buchberger’s [6] or the F_4 algorithm [7]) for large circuits is practically infeasible. Managing this complexity ought to be a major goal of any approach.

State-of-the-art & Limitations: Recent approaches [3] [8] have discovered that particularly for circuit verification problems, the expensive GB computation can be avoided altogether. For arbitrary combinational [3] [8] and sequential circuits [9], a specialized term order $>$ can be derived by analyzing the topology of the given circuit. This term order is derived by performing a reverse topological traversal of the circuit, and in this manuscript we refer to it as the *Reverse Topological Term Order* (RTTO). Imposition of RTTO $>$ on the polynomial ring renders the set of polynomials of the circuit itself a GB. Subsequently, the verification problems can be solved solely by way of GB-reduction (using multi-variate polynomial division), without any need to explicitly compute a GB. The techniques of [3] [8] have been extended and improved further to verify integer arithmetic circuits. For instance, [10] and [11]

get more insights from the circuit structure that dictate specific rules on the order of polynomials chosen in GB-reduction – by accounting for topological levels, reconvergent fanouts, AND-XOR gates with common inputs, etc. The authors in [12] show that the reduction process can be parallelized by performing reduction for each output bit independently.

A common theme among all these relevant works is that *they move the complexity of verification from one of computing a GB to that of GB-reduction (multivariate polynomial division)*. These will benefit greatly by a dedicated, domain-specific implementation of GB-reduction carried out on the given circuit under RTTO $>$. So far, the above techniques [3], [4], [8], [11], [10], [12] use a general-purpose polynomial division approach, together with explicit set representation, for this GB-reduction. While some of these approaches do perform the reduction in some specific ways – e.g., mimicking GB-reduction under RTTO $>$ by substitution [11], or using TEDs to perform input-output signature comparisons [10], or the use of F_4 -style GB-reduction on a coefficient matrix [8] – the overall concept of polynomial division is still utilized in its rudimentary form, involving iterative cancellation of monomials “1-step at a time” on explicit data-structures. We show in the sequel, that despite recent efforts, such GB-reductions can still lead to a *worst-case size explosion problem*.

Proposed Solution: To make this GB-reduction on circuits more efficient, this paper describes new techniques and implementations, specifically targeted for circuit verification under RTTO $>$. In particular, we make use of implicit characteristic set representation of Zero-Suppressed BDDs [13]. By analyzing the structure of ZBDDs for polynomial representation under RTTO $>$, we show how this GB-reduction can be efficiently implemented using algorithms that specifically manipulate the ZBDD graph, by interpreting Boolean polynomial manipulation as the algebra of unate cube sets.

Rationale: The algebraic objects used to model the polynomial ideals derived from digital circuits are rings of Boolean polynomials. When Boolean functions are represented in \mathbb{F}_2 using AND/XOR expressions, and that too as a canonical Gröbner basis, the representation tends to explode. Polynomial representations employed in computer algebra tools, such as the *dense-distributive data-structure* of the SINGULAR computer algebra tool [14], are inefficient for this purpose. Since addition (mod 2) and multiplication are equivalent to XOR and AND operations, respectively, GB-reduction can be viewed as a specialized *AND/XOR Boolean function decomposition* problem. Clearly, implicit Boolean set representations such as decision diagrams could be employed for this purpose. The decision diagram of choice here is the ZBDD [13], because of its power to represent and manipulate sparse combinatorial problems – particularly “sets of combinations” using the unate cube set algebra framework.

Technical Contributions: We describe when and how the GB-reduction encounters a term-explosion (exponential blow-up) under RTTO $>$, which cannot be easily overcome by

explicit representations. We show that ZBDDs can avoid this exponential blow-up – thereby justifying their use. We describe how the rudimentary polynomial division algorithms, that iteratively cancel one monomial in every step, can be implemented on ZBDDs under $RTTO >$. Subsequently, we show that $RTTO >$ imposes a special structure on ZBDDs that allows us to cancel multiple monomials in every step of polynomial division, thus improving GB-reduction in both space and time! Finally, experiments conducted on finite field arithmetic (crypto-circuits) benchmarks show an order of magnitude improvement using our implementation of GB-reduction.

Relationship to prior work in Boolean Gröbner Basis: The symbolic algebra community has studied properties of Boolean GB [15] [16] [17]. From among these, the work of PolyBori [17] comes closest to ours, and is a source of inspiration for this work. PolyBori proposed the use of ZBDDs to compute Gröbner bases for Boolean polynomials. PolyBori is a *generic* Boolean GB computational engine that caters to many permissible term orders. Its division algorithm is also based on the conventional concept of canceling one monomial in every step of reduction. In contrast, our algorithms are tailored for GB-reduction under the $RTTO >$. The efficiency of our approach stems from the observation that the $RTTO >$ imposes a special structure on the ZBDDs, which allows for multiple monomials to be canceled in one division-step.

II. PRELIMINARIES: NOTATION AND BACKGROUND

A. Computer Algebra

This section provides a brief description of the fundamental concepts of commutative algebra including polynomial rings, polynomial division, ideals, Gröbner basis and their application in verification of circuits.

Let $\mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\}$ denote the Boolean domain, \mathbb{F}_2 the finite field of 2 elements ($\mathbb{B} \equiv \mathbb{F}_2$), and $R = \mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ denote the polynomial ring over variables x_1, \dots, x_n with coefficients in \mathbb{F}_2 . Operations in \mathbb{F}_2 are performed (mod 2), so $-1 = +1$ in \mathbb{F}_2 . We will use $+$, \cdot to denote addition and multiplication in R , and \vee , \wedge and \oplus to denote Boolean OR, AND and XOR operations, respectively.

A polynomial $f \in R$ is written as a finite sum of terms $f = c_1X_1 + c_2X_2 + \dots + c_tX_t$. Here c_1, \dots, c_t are coefficients and X_1, \dots, X_t are monomials, i.e. power products of the type $x_1^{e_1} \cdot x_2^{e_2} \cdot \dots \cdot x_n^{e_n}$, $e_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$. To systematically manipulate the polynomials, a monomial order $>$ (also called a term order) is imposed on the ring such that $X_1 > X_2 > \dots > X_t$. Subject to $>$, $lt(f) = c_1X_1$, $lm(f) = X_1$, $lc(f) = c_1$, are the *leading term*, *leading monomial* and *leading coefficient* of f , respectively. We also denote $tail(f) = f - lt(f) = c_2X_2 + \dots + c_tX_t$. In this work, we are mostly concerned with terms ordered lexicographically (*lex*).

Definition II.1. Let $f = c_1X_1 + \dots + c_tX_t$ be a polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ such that the coefficients $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$, and monomials $X = x_1^{e_1} \cdot x_2^{e_2} \cdot \dots \cdot x_n^{e_n}$, $e_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then f is called a **Boolean polynomial**. For Boolean polynomials $lt(f) = lm(f)$.

A gate-level circuit can be modeled with Boolean polynomials, where every Boolean logic gate operator is mapped from \mathbb{B} to a polynomial function over \mathbb{F}_2 :

$$\begin{aligned} z &= \neg a \rightarrow z + a + 1 \pmod{2} \\ z &= a \wedge b \rightarrow z + a \cdot b \pmod{2} \\ z &= a \vee b \rightarrow z + a + b + a \cdot b \pmod{2} \\ z &= a \oplus b \rightarrow z + a + b \pmod{2} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Polynomial division: Let f, g be polynomials. If $lt(f)$ is divisible by $lt(g)$, then we say that f is *reducible to r modulo g* , denoted $f \xrightarrow{g} r$, where $r = f - \frac{lt(f)}{lt(g)} \cdot g$. Similarly, f can be *reduced w.r.t. a set of polynomials $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$* to obtain a remainder r . This reduction is denoted as $f \xrightarrow{F} r$, and the remainder r has the property that no term in r is divisible by the leading term of any polynomial f_i in F . Algorithm 1 shows the step-by-step procedure to perform this classical division.

Algorithm 1 Multivariate Division of f by $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$

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1: procedure multi_variate_division( $f, \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}, f_i \neq 0$ )
2:    $u_i \leftarrow 0; r \leftarrow 0, h \leftarrow f$ 
3:   while  $h \neq 0$  do
4:     if  $\exists i$  s.t.  $lm(f_i) \mid lm(h)$  then
5:       choose  $i$  least s.t.  $lm(f_i) \mid lm(h)$ 
6:        $u_i = u_i + \frac{lt(h)}{lt(f_i)}$ 
7:        $h = h - \frac{lt(h)}{lt(f_i)} f_i$ 
8:     else
9:        $r = r + lt(h)$ 
10:       $h = h - lt(h)$ 
11:   return  $(\{u_1, \dots, u_s\}, r)$ 

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The algorithm initializes a h with the polynomial f and tries to cancel its leading term by some polynomial f_i . If the leading term cannot be canceled by any f_i , then it is added to the final remainder r .

Polynomial Ideals: Given a set of polynomials $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\} \in \mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \dots, x_n]$, denote the ideal J generated by F as $J = \langle F \rangle = \langle f_1, \dots, f_s \rangle = \{\sum_{i=1}^s h_i \cdot f_i : h_i \in R\}$. The ideal J may have many different generators, i.e. it is possible to have $J = \langle f_1, \dots, f_s \rangle = \langle g_1, \dots, g_t \rangle = \dots = \langle h_1, \dots, h_r \rangle$. A Gröbner basis G of ideal J is one such set of polynomials $G = GB(J) = \{g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ that is a canonical representation of the ideal.

Definition II.2. [Gröbner Basis] [5]: For a monomial ordering $>$, a set of non-zero polynomials $G = \{g_1, g_2, \dots, g_t\}$ contained in an ideal J , is called a *Gröbner basis of J* iff $\forall f \in J, f \neq 0$, there exists $i \in \{1, \dots, t\}$ such that $lm(g_i)$ divides $lm(f)$.

Gröbner basis G of an ideal $J = \langle f_1, \dots, f_s \rangle$ is computed using the Buchberger's algorithm [6]. The algorithm initializes the set G with the given generators of J i.e. $\{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$. The algorithm is based on the computation of *Spoly* of pairwise combination of polynomials in G using the following formula,

$$Spoly(f_i, f_j) = \frac{L}{lt(f)} \cdot f - \frac{L}{lt(g)} \cdot f \quad (2)$$

where $L = LCM(f_i, f_j)$. The *Spoly* is then reduced w.r.t. the polynomials in G to get h . If h is non-zero, it is added to G . The algorithm terminates when there are no new non-zero h generated from the set G . The idea of the algorithm is to cancel leading terms of polynomials to **get new polynomials** which provide additional information regarding the basis.

Definition II.3. [Gröbner Basis Reduction] [5]: Let $G = \{g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ be a Gröbner basis of ideal J , and let f be another polynomial. Then the remainder r obtained by reduction of f modulo G , denoted $f \xrightarrow{G}_+ r$, is called the **Gröbner basis reduction (GBR)** of f . Moreover, the remainder r so obtained by GBR of f is a canonical expression modulo G .

Proposition II.1. Given a circuit C , we can represent all the gates using (Boolean) polynomials $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$ in $\mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ by means of Eqn. (1), s.t. ideal $J = \langle F \rangle$. Let z_i , $i = 0, \dots, k-1$ denote the k -bit primary output variables of the circuit. Compute a Gröbner basis $G = GB(J) = \{g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ for the polynomials of the circuit, and perform the GBR $z_i \xrightarrow{G}_+ r_i$ for all $0 \leq i < k$. Then all r_i 's are a canonical representation and can be used for formal verification/equivalence checking.

This verification requires the computation of a Gröbner basis. The Buchberger's algorithm for computation of Gröbner basis has high complexity ($2^{O(n)}$ in our setting). The work of [8] showed that the GB computation can be avoided.

Product Criterion [18]: For two polynomials f_i, f_j in any polynomial ring R , if the equality $lt(f_i) \cdot lt(f_j) = LCM(f_i, f_j)$ holds, then $Spoly(f_i, f_j) \xrightarrow{G}_+ 0$.

Using this criterion we can say that when the leading terms of all polynomials in the basis $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$ are relatively prime, then F is already a Gröbner basis ($F = GB(J)$). For a combinational circuit C , a term order $>$ can be derived by analyzing the circuit topology which ensures this property is true [3] [8]:

Proposition II.2. (From [8]) Let C be any arbitrary combinational circuit. Let $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ denote the set of all variables (signals) in C . Starting from the primary outputs, perform a reverse topological traversal of the circuit and order the variables such that $x_i > x_j$ if x_i appears earlier in the reverse topological order. Impose a lex term order $>$ to represent each gate as a polynomial f_i , s.t. $f_i = x_i + tail(f_i)$. Then the set of all polynomials $\{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$ forms a Gröbner basis G , as $lt(f_i) = x_i$ and $lt(f_j) = x_j$ for $i \neq j$ are relatively prime. This term order $>$ is called the **Reverse Topological Term Order (RTTO)**.

Subsequently, by imposing RTTO on the polynomials of the circuit, the explosive GB computation is avoided, and verification is performed by the canonical GB-reduction: $z_i \xrightarrow{G}_+ r_i$. **Example II.1. Demonstration of the approach:** Consider the circuit given in Fig. 1. Impose RTTO on the circuit. The primary outputs z_0, z_1 are both at level-0, variables r_0, c_0, c_3 are at level-1, c_1, c_2 are at level-2, and the primary inputs a_0, a_1, b_0, b_1 are at level-3. Order the variables $\{z_0 > z_1\} > \{r_0 > c_0 > c_3\} > \{c_1 > c_2\} > \{a_0 > a_1 > b_0 > b_1\}$. Using this variable order, we impose a lex term order on the




Fig. 1: A 2-bit modulo Multiplier circuit.

$$\begin{aligned} f_1 : c_0 + a_0 \cdot b_0, \quad lm = c_0; \quad f_2 : c_1 + a_0 \cdot b_1, \quad lm = c_1 \\ f_3 : c_2 + a_1 \cdot b_0, \quad lm = c_2; \quad f_4 : c_3 + a_1 \cdot b_1, \quad lm = c_3 \\ f_5 : r_0 + c_1 + c_2, \quad lm = r_0; \quad f_6 : z_0 + c_0 + c_3, \quad lm = z_0 \\ f_7 : z_1 + r_0 + c_3, \quad lm = z_1 \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 2: Polynomials of the circuit under RTTO constitute a GB.

monomials. Then all the polynomials extracted from the circuit have relatively prime leading terms, as shown in Fig. 2, and $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_7\}$ forms a GB.

Then the GBRs $z_1 \xrightarrow{F}_+ a_0 \cdot b_0 + a_1 \cdot b_1$ and $z_0 \xrightarrow{F}_+ a_0 \cdot b_1 + a_1 \cdot b_0 + a_1 \cdot b_1$ are canonical expressions of the output bits.

B. Unate Cube Sets & Boolean Polynomials

A Boolean variable represents a dimension of the Boolean space \mathbb{B}^n , a *literal* is an instance of a variable x_i or its complement $\neg x_i$. A *cube* is a product of literals which denotes a set of points in the Boolean space. A *cube set* consists of a number of cubes, each of which is a combination of literals. *Unate cube sets* allow the use of only positive literals, not negative/complemented literals. Each cube in a unate cube set represents a combination, and each literal represents an object selected in the combination.

When cube sets are used to represent Boolean functions, they are usually *binate* cube sets containing negative literals. In binate cube sets, literals x_i and $\neg x_i$ represent $x_i = 1$ and $x_i = 0$, respectively; while the absence of a literal implies a *don't care*. In unate cube sets, literal x_i implies $x_i = 1$ whereas its absence implies $x_i = 0$. For example, the cube set $\{a, bc\}$ represents $(abc) : \{111, 110, 101, 100, 011\}$ in the binate cube set representation, whereas it represents $(abc) : \{100, 011\}$ in the unate cube set representation.

Each monomial of a Boolean polynomial can be viewed as a unate cube – a product of positive literals – and a Boolean polynomial as a unate cube set. Then the GBR $z_i \xrightarrow{G}_+ r_i$ can be interpreted as algebra over unate cube sets, resembling a classical logic synthesis problem, as shown below. Let us (re)consider the one-step division for Boolean polynomials: $f \xrightarrow{g} r$. This division is implemented as:

$$\begin{aligned} f \xrightarrow{g} r &= f - \frac{lt(f)}{lt(g)} \cdot g = f - \frac{lm(f)}{lm(g)} \cdot g \\ &= f + \frac{lm(f)}{lm(g)} \cdot g = f \oplus \frac{lm(f)}{lm(g)} \wedge g \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

We can replace $lt(f)$ with $lm(f)$ as coefficients are either 0 or 1. Notice that $\frac{lm(f)}{lm(g)}$ is a unate product of literals, i.e. a unate cube. The \oplus operation cancels common cubes from f and $\frac{lm(f)}{lm(g)} \cdot g$.

C. Zero Suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams (ZBDDs)

A Binary Decision Diagram is a directed graph with two terminal nodes 0 and 1. Each node in the diagram has two edges, solid edge (1-edge) and dotted edge (0-edge). A ZBDD [13] can be obtained from a BDD by eliminating all the nodes whose 1-edge points to 0 terminal node and by sharing all the isomorphic sub-graphs for two nodes. Given the order of the variables, a ZBDD represents a Boolean function canonically.




Fig. 3: ZBDD for the polynomial $r_1 = yd + y + d$.

In [19] *Minato* demonstrated that ZBDDs are an efficient data-structure for implicit manipulation (algebra) of unate cube sets. Fig. 3 is a ZBDD for the unate cube set $\{yd, y, d\}$ with the variable order $y > d$. The paths beginning from the root node y and terminating in the 1-terminal node are the cubes of the set. A variable is in a cube if its 1-edge is in the path and is not in the cube if its 0-edge is in the path. The ZBDD can also be interpreted as a polynomial $r_1 = yd + y + d$ where the monomials can be obtained the same way we obtain the cubes for the equivalent set.

Based on the above discussion, we will: i) model GBR as the algebra of unate cube sets; ii) use ZBDDs as the implicit data-structure for this GBR; and iii) devise efficient implementation of the GBR by exploiting the special structure imposed by RTTO on the ZBDD graph. For details on the use of unate cube set algebra in classical logic synthesis, and its implementation on ZBDDs, we refer the reader to [13] [19].

III. THEORY AND ALGORITHMS




Fig. 4: A chain of OR gates.

Consider the circuit in Fig. 4, impose RTTO: *lex* term order with variable ordering as, $z > y > x > d > c > b > a$. The polynomials for the circuit are: $f_1 = z + y \cdot d + y + d$, $f_2 = y + x \cdot c + x + c$, $f_3 = x + b \cdot a + b + a$. Under RTTO, f_1, f_2, f_3 forms a GB, G . For verification, we have to reduce the output z modulo G . A classical symbolic algebra reduction using an explicit representation is carried out as:

- 1) $z \xrightarrow{f_1} yd + y + d$
- 2) $yd + y + d \xrightarrow{f_2} y + xdc + xd + dc + d \xrightarrow{f_2} xdc + xd + xc + x + dc + d + c$
- 3) $xdc + xd + xc + x + dc + d + c \xrightarrow{f_3} xd + xc + x + dcba + dcb + dca + dc + d + c \xrightarrow{f_3} xc + x + dcba + dcb + dca + dc + dba + db + da + d + c \xrightarrow{f_3} x + dcba + dcb + dca + dc + dba + db + da + d + cba + cb + ca + c \xrightarrow{f_3} dcba + dcb + dca + dc + dba + db + da + d + cba + cb + ca + c + ba + b + a = r$

In the first step, z is reduced by f_1 just *once* as that's the only term. In the second step, the result of step one is reduced *twice* by f_2 as the result has two terms containing variable y . Similarly, *four* reductions by f_3 are required to reduce the result of step two into an expression containing only primary inputs (which cannot be reduced further).

Observations: i) Notice that the size of the final remainder corresponds to that of the worst case of a Boolean polynomial: i.e. r contains $2^n - 1$ ($= 15$) monomial terms for n ($= 4$) variables. ii) Classical division algorithms reduce the polynomials 1-step at a time, where only one monomial is canceled in each step. iii) The number of 1-step reductions can increase exponentially as GBR progresses across the circuit.

It is clear that any data-structure that *explicitly* represents each monomial will encounter space and time explosion: this includes the dense-distributive representation of SINGULAR computer algebra tool [14], or the ones used by [10], [11]. The F_4 -style polynomial reduction of [8], [4] simulates division on a matrix M representing the problem. However, each column of M corresponds to monomial generated in the division process, therefore [8], [4] also encounter this size explosion.

The use of ZBDDs can help overcome this explosion. Fig. 5 shows the same reduction of z by f_1, f_2, f_3 using ZBDDs (exact procedure discussed later). The size of the ZBDDs after complete reduction by f_1, f_2, f_3 increases linearly in the number of nodes. Subsequently, the final remainder has $2 \cdot n - 1$ ($= 7$) nodes (excluding the terminal 1 and 0 nodes) for n ($= 4$) variables.

ZBDD Representation: The following steps describe the procedure for building ZBDDs for the polynomials of the gates of circuits.

- 1) Obtain the RTTO for the variables (signals) of the circuits as $x_1 > x_2 > \dots > x_n$.
- 2) Impose the same order on the ZBDDs.
- 3) Declare ZBDDs for each of these variables.
- 4) Use Eqn. 1 to model the gates of the circuit as Boolean polynomials. Build ZBDDs for these polynomials using the $+$ and \cdot binary operations for modulo 2 sum and product of variables. The $+$ operation can be implemented as $f + g = f \cup g - f \cap g$. However, in order to avoid the large intermediate ZBDDs for the union we have implemented this operation as presented in [17].
- 5) Traversing only the solid edges from the root node of a ZBDD to terminal 1 delivers the leading monomial of that polynomial. The child node of the root at the solid edge's end will be referred to as *then* and the other child as *else*.

Once the ZBDDs for the circuit have been built and stored in G , we need to perform the reduction $z_i \xrightarrow{G} r_i$ for each output




Fig. 5: Reduction of output of the circuit in Fig. 4 by f_1, f_2, f_3 .

bit z_i . The polynomial r_i will be a canonical representation of z_i in terms of primary inputs only.

Consider the step 2 of division corresponding to Fig. 4, where the polynomial $r_1 = yd + y + d$ needs to be reduced by f_2 . The ZBDDs for r_1 and f_2 are shown in Fig. 6. Checking if $lt(f_2)$ divides $lt(r_1)$ becomes trivial as we just need to compare the indices (each variable has a unique index) of top-most nodes of ZBDDs for the polynomials r_1 and f_2 , which in this case are equal. Recall that the $lt(f_i)$ of the polynomials for gates of the circuit will always be x_i .

Division with ZBDDs: Cancel 1 monomial in every step

The algorithm for conventional reduction procedure using ZBDDs is shown in Algorithm 2. The input parameters are the ZBDD of the output bit of the circuit z_i and $poly_list$ containing the ZBDDs for the set of polynomials corresponding to the gates of the circuit. The algorithm is based on the classical division procedure (Algorithm 1).

Due to RTTO, the circuit polynomials are represented as $f_1 = x_1 + \text{else}(f_1), \dots, f_d = x_d + \text{else}(P_d)$ with variable order $x_1 > \dots > x_d$ (Prop. II.2). Then the elements in $poly_list$ are ordered $f_1 > f_2 > \dots > f_d$. Populating $poly_list$ in this way avoids the search (Line 4, Algorithm 1) required to find a polynomial $g \in poly_list$ that can divide the leading term of z_i . While iterating over the polynomials $g \in poly_list$ if a certain polynomial does not divide the leading term of z_i , it will imply the polynomial is not in the logical cone of z_i .




Fig. 6: ZBDDs for polynomial r_1 and f_2 .

The procedure $leading_term(g)$ returns the leading term of the ZBDD representation of polynomial g . If g divides f , then the procedure $ZBDD_Divide(f, g)$ (performs cube division) returns the quotient of the division, else it returns zero. Line 8 iteratively computes $z_i = z_i + \frac{lt(z_i)}{lt(g)} \cdot g$. The polynomial z_i is completely reduced w.r.t. the polynomial g in the while loop.

Algorithm 2 Reduction: Cancel 1 monomial every iteration

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1: procedure single_mon_red( $z_i, poly\_list$ )
2:   for each  $g \in poly\_list$  do
3:      $lead\_g = leading\_term(g)$ 
4:      $lead\_z_i = leading\_term(z_i)$ 
5:      $quotient = ZBDD\_Divide(lead\_z_i, lead\_g)$ 
6:     while  $quotient \neq zero$  do
7:        $prod = quotient \cdot g$ 
8:        $z_i = z_i + prod$ 
9:        $lead\_z_i = leading\_term(z_i)$ 
10:       $quotient = ZBDD\_Divide(lead\_z_i, lead\_g)$ 
11:   return  $z_i$ 

```

Improved Reduction: Cancel multiple monomials in 1 step:

Next, we will show how z_i can be reduced by a polynomial g in one step. In the example of Fig. 4, the output z is reduced by f_1 to get r_1 . To demonstrate our approach we will show how the reduction of r_1 by f_2 can be achieved in one step.

If we check the *then-child* of r_1 (Fig. 5), it represents the polynomial $d + 1$ providing all the terms in r_1 that appear with y . So the reduction can be performed by multiplying $d + 1$ with f_2 and adding this product to $r_1 \pmod{2}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (yd + y + d) + (d + 1) \cdot (y + xc + x + c) &\pmod{2} \\
 = 2 \cdot (yd + y) + d + (d + 1) \cdot (xc + x + c) &\pmod{2} \\
 = d + (d + 1) \cdot (xc + x + c) &\pmod{2}
 \end{aligned}$$

Notice that $\text{else}(r_1) = d$ and $\text{else}(f_2) = xc + x + c$. In addition, we know that $2 \cdot (fd + f) \pmod{2}$ is going to be zero. Therefore, in order to reduce number of operations, we directly use the last step as a formula for reduction:

$$\begin{aligned}
 r_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} &= d + (d + 1) \cdot (xc + x + c) \\
 &\quad \text{else}(r_1) + \text{then}(r_1) \cdot \text{else}(f_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

So the reduction process effectively involves just two operations, a modulo 2 sum and a product. This has the effect of canceling all the terms in r_1 that can be canceled by $lt(f_2)$ in one-go, implicitly canceling multiple monomials in one step.

The algorithm for Multiple Monomial Reduction is shown in Algorithm 3, where the notations, z_i and $poly_list$, are same as in Algorithm 2. Unlike in Algorithm 2, however, where we need to find the quotient of $lead_z_i / lead_g$, Algorithm 3 only determines if $lead_g$ can divide z_i at all (in this case the quotient is $\text{then}(z_i)$). This can be accomplished by just

comparing the indices of top-most nodes of z_i and g . This algorithm significantly reduces the number of iterations, which now exactly equals the size of $poly_list$. For the example of Fig. 4, the number of iterations is 3 using Algorithm 3, whereas 7 iterations are required using Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 3 Reduction: Cancel multiple monomials

```

1: procedure multi_mon_red( $z, poly\_list$ )
2:   for each  $g \in poly\_list$  do
3:     if  $index(g) == index(z)$  then
4:        $z = else(z) + then(z) \cdot else(g)$ 
5:   return  $z$ 

```

We have implemented the above GBR procedures directly using the CUDD package [20]. The circuit under verification is analyzed, RTTO based variable order is imposed on the ZBDDs, and the Boolean polynomials of the circuit are represented as unate cube sets. The polynomials of the gates of circuit, $f_i \in G$, are inserted in $poly_list$ according to the variable order $x_1 > \dots > x_i > \dots > x_n$, where $f_i = x_i + else(f_i)$ (this is due to Prop. II.2). To perform GBR $z_i \xrightarrow{G} r_i$ Algorithm 3 is invoked to obtain the remainder.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This section presents the results of using our implementation (Algorithm 3) for reducing circuits used in cryptography. We compare our results against F4-style reduction [4], parallelized approach for performing reductions on Galois field multipliers [12], and PolyBori [17] that uses the conventional reduction procedure on top of ZBDDs. The experiments are performed on a 3.5GHz Intel Core™ i7-4770K Quad-Core CPU with 32 GB of RAM.

A. Mastrovito Multipliers

Modular multiplication is an important computation used in cryptography. A Mastrovito multiplier architecture can be employed for performing this computation. Mastrovito multipliers compute $Z = A \times B \pmod{P}$ where P is a given primitive polynomial for the datapath size k .

The product $A \times B$ is computed using an array multiplier architecture, and then the result is reduced modulo P . The following example demonstrates the Mastrovito multiplier computation [8].

Example IV.1. Consider the field \mathbb{F}_{2^4} . Let the inputs be: $A = a_0 + a_1 \cdot \alpha + a_2 \cdot \alpha^2 + a_3 \cdot \alpha^3$ and $B = b_0 + b_1 \cdot \alpha + b_2 \cdot \alpha^2 + b_3 \cdot \alpha^3$, and the irreducible polynomial be $P(x) = x^4 + x^3 + 1$. The coefficients of $A = \{a_0, \dots, a_3\}, B = \{b_0, \dots, b_3\}$ are in $\mathbb{F}_2 = \{0, 1\}$. First, we perform the multiplication as:

$$\begin{array}{rcccc}
 & & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 \\
 \times & & b_3 & b_2 & b_1 & b_0 \\
 \hline
 & & a_3 \cdot b_0 & a_2 \cdot b_0 & a_1 \cdot b_0 & a_0 \cdot b_0 \\
 & a_3 \cdot b_1 & a_2 \cdot b_1 & a_1 \cdot b_1 & a_0 \cdot b_1 & \\
 & a_3 \cdot b_2 & a_2 \cdot b_2 & a_1 \cdot b_2 & a_0 \cdot b_2 & \\
 a_3 \cdot b_3 & a_2 \cdot b_3 & a_1 \cdot b_3 & a_0 \cdot b_3 & & \\
 \hline
 s_6 & s_5 & s_4 & s_3 & s_2 & s_1 & s_0
 \end{array}$$

The result $Sum = s_0 + s_1 \cdot \alpha + s_2 \cdot \alpha^2 + s_3 \cdot \alpha^3 + s_4 \cdot \alpha^4 + s_5 \cdot \alpha^5 + s_6 \cdot \alpha^6$, where, $s_0 = a_0 \cdot b_0$, $s_1 = a_0 \cdot b_1 + a_1 \cdot b_0$, $s_2 =$

$a_0 \cdot b_2 + a_1 \cdot b_1 + a_2 \cdot b_0$, and so on. Here the multiply “.” and add “+” operations are performed modulo 2, and hence implemented in a circuit using AND and XOR gates. As the coefficients are always reduced modulo $p = 2$, there are no carry-chains in the design. Next, the result is reduced modulo the primitive polynomial $P(x) = x^4 + x^3 + 1$, as:

s_3	s_2	s_1	s_0	
s_4	0	0	s_4	$s_4 \cdot \alpha^4 \pmod{P(\alpha)} = s_4 \cdot (\alpha^3 + 1)$
s_5	0	s_5	s_5	$s_5 \cdot \alpha^5 \pmod{P(\alpha)} = s_5 \cdot (\alpha^3 + \alpha + 1)$
s_6	s_6	s_6	s_6	$s_6 \cdot \alpha^6 \pmod{P(\alpha)} = s_6 \cdot (\alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + \alpha + 1)$
z_3	z_2	z_1	z_0	

The final output of the circuit is: $Z = z_0 + z_1\alpha + z_2\alpha^2 + z_3\alpha^3$; where $z_0 = s_0 + s_4 + s_5 + s_6$; $z_1 = s_1 + s_5 + s_6$; $z_2 = s_2 + s_6$; $z_3 = s_3 + s_4 + s_5 + s_6$.

Table I provides the results for **Mastrovito multipliers**. The benchmarks are taken from [8] which are optimized using ABC [21] with the same commands and library as mentioned in [12]. Algorithm 3 reduces each output bit independent of other bits. Therefore, we have presented the results **for both**, running our reduction algorithm parallelly and sequentially for each output bit. Similarly, the results for implementation in PolyBori are also presented for both cases. The maximum number of parallel processes is decided by the memory usage of each process (*i.e.* reducing one bit) for our implementation and the total available memory. The larger benchmarks are run with **less number of** parallel processes as they consume more memory.

In the table, the column #T represents the number of parallel processes. (S) refers to the case when **we are running** the experiments sequentially and (P) refers to the case when the respective implementations are parallelized.

TABLE I: Mastrovito Multipliers (Time in seconds); k = Datapath Size, #Gates = No. of gates, #T = No. of threads, Time-Out = 30 hrs, (P): Parallel Execution, (S): Sequential Execution, K = 10^3 , M = 10^6 , PB: PolyBori, ZR: Algorithm 3

k	#Gates	F4 [4]	#T	[12](P)	PB		ZR	
					(P)	(WP)	(P)	(WP)
64	11.5K	1.3	20	3.70	3.60	2.21	0.73	0.27
128	46K	9.89	20	27.54	23.99	16.76	5.08	1.63
163	73.5K	32.61	20	55.96	48.67	34.30	11.41	3.11
233	122K	86.30	20	127.61	112.96	77.23	21.77	3.63
283	193K	274.68	20	253.05	247.77	157.45	49.89	11.41
409	386K	2,528.48	10	716.80	659.64	431.45	163.52	17.68
571*	1.6M	TO	3	5,331	CR	CR	2,126.65	566

The 571-bit multiplier could not be synthesized and mapped with the given memory. Therefore, we have provided results for a structured (but not optimized) 571-bit multiplier benchmark. Our implementation outperforms the explicit approaches of [4] and [12] for Mastrovito multipliers. For the 571-bit multiplier, the implementation of [4] does not finish for the given time period of 30 hours and the PolyBori implementation crashes (CR) **during the variable declaration part for the same benchmark.**

An interesting point to note in the Table I is that our implementation takes less time when we are running it sequentially. There is a certain overhead involved when we declare variables and build ZBDDs for each gate of the

circuit. In the case of Mastrovito multipliers benchmarks, this overhead is substantially greater than the reduction time for each output bit. Therefore, when we run these benchmarks parallelly this overhead time hampers the overall run time. For example, for the 64-bit multiplier the overhead is 22.09 ms (when running it sequentially), whereas the reduction time for most of the bits is ~ 0.30 ms. The sequential reduction time with these values is $22.09 + 64(0.3) = 41.29$ ms. On the other hand, with 20 processes this time is approximately $(64/20)(22.09 + 0.3) = 71.65$ ms.

B. Montgomery Multipliers

Exponentiation (repeated multiplication) is often required in cryptosystems. For such applications, Montgomery architecture [22] [23] [24] are considered more efficient than Mastrovito multipliers as they do not require explicit reduction modulo P after each step. Fig. 7 shows the structure of a Montgomery multiplier. Each MR block computes $A \cdot B \cdot R^{-1}$, where R is selected as a power of a base (α^k) and R^{-1} is the multiplicative inverse of R in \mathbb{F}_{2^k} . As this operation cannot compute $A \cdot B$ directly, we need to pre-compute $A \cdot R$ and $B \cdot R$ as shown in the Fig. 7. We denote the leftmost two blocks as Block A (upper) and B (lower), the middle block as Block C and the output block as Block D.




Fig. 7: Montgomery multiplication.

Table II provides the results for flattened and optimized Montgomery multipliers. For most of these benchmarks the overhead is quite small than the reduction time for one bit except for the 233 and 409 bit multipliers. Therefore, we benefit from parallelizing the reduction process for these cases other than 283 and 409 bit multipliers. The 571-bit benchmark is structured but not optimized. We again get a significant improvement over the explicit approaches except for the case of 283 bit multiplier.

TABLE II: Montgomery Multipliers (Time in seconds); k = Datapath Size, #Gates = No. of gates, #T = No. of threads, Time-Out = 30 hrs, (P): Parallel Execution, (S): Sequential Execution, K = 10^3 , M = 10^6 , PB: PolyBori, ZR: Algorithm 3

k	#Gates	F4 [4]	#T	[12](P)	PB		ZR	
					(P)	(WP)	(P)	(WP)
64	9.5K	16.29	20	10.69	6.27	9.22	3.75	8.37
128	35K	621.90	20	36.19	28.93	34.59	13.76	24.73
163	56.5K	2,608.4	20	204.94	167.73	335.24	141.68	321.60
233	111K	385.92	20	132.51	119.77	99.36	42.16	31.88
283	165K	5,344	20	704.13	1,194.2	2,078.1	1,065.3	2,113.0
409	340K	7,104	10	697.91	737.23	722.05	303.91	299.92
571*	1.97M	TO	3	TO	CR	CR	43,813	99,042

Table III presents the statistics for hierarchical Montgomery multipliers for the blocks A, B, C, and D. The experiment first reduces the outputs of a block modulo the gates of that

block, and then reduces the primary outputs modulo these four sets of remainders (ZBDDs), thus exploiting the hierarchy of these circuits. Table III shows the time for reduction of each block and the time for reducing the primary outputs across the four levels. The time for reducing the primary outputs across levels in case of F4 implementation is <1 second, and is not explicitly mentioned in the table. The row labeled *Total* presents the sum of time of reduction across levels and the maximum reduction time for each block (as the reductions for the four levels are independent of each other and are done in parallel).

TABLE III: Montgomery Blocks (Time in seconds); k = Datapath Size, #Gates = No. of gates, Time-Out = 30 hrs, Red. = time for reduction, Coll. = time to reduce across the 4 levels. K = 10^3 , M = 10^6 , PB: PolyBori, ZR: Algorithm 3

k	#Gates	Block	F4 [4]	PB		ZR	
				Red.	Coll.	Red.	Coll.
163	33K	Block A	25				
	33K	Block B	25				
	85K	Block C	73				
	32K	Block D	24				
	Total		73				
233	55K	Block A	142				
	55K	Block B	141				
	163K	Block C	408				
	54K	Block D	140				
	Total		408				
283	82K	Block A	330				
	82K	Block B	329				
	241K	Block C	883				
	81K	Block D	321				
	Total		883				
409	168K	Block A	1,322			<1	
	168K	Block B	1,335	189	36	<1	
	502K	Block C	4,471	200		117	58
	168K	Block D	1,338	191		<1	
	Total		4,471		236		175
571	330K	Block A	5,371	1,620		725	
	330K	Block B	5,421	1,843		752	
	980K	Block C	37,804	5445	1,566	4,164	1,516
	328K	Block D	5,539	1,831		747	
	Total		37,804		7,011		5,680

C. Point Addition over Elliptic Curves

Point addition is an important operation required for the task of encryption, decryption and authentication in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This operation requires the expensive computation of multiplicative inverses over the field. This computation is avoided by representing the points in projective coordinate systems, e.g., the López-Dahab (LD) projective coordinate [25].

Example IV.2. Consider point addition in López-Dahab (LD) projective coordinate. Given an elliptic curve: $Y^2 + XYZ = X^3Z + aX^2Z^2 + bZ^4$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^k} , where X, Y, Z are k -bit vectors that are elements in \mathbb{F}_{2^k} and similarly, a, b are constants from the field. We represent point addition over the elliptic curve as $(X_3, Y_3, Z_3) = (X_1, Y_1, Z_1) + (X_2, Y_2, 1)$. Then X_3, Y_3, Z_3 can be computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
A &= Y_2 \cdot Z_1^2 + Y_1 & B &= X_2 \cdot Z_1 + X_1 \\
C &= Z_1 \cdot B & D &= B^2 \cdot (C + aZ_1^2) \\
Z_3 &= C^2 & E &= A \cdot C \\
X_3 &= A^2 + D + E & F &= X_3 + X_2 \cdot Z_3 \\
G &= X_3 + Y_2 \cdot Z_3 & Y_3 &= E \cdot F + Z_3 \cdot G
\end{aligned}$$

TABLE IV: Point Addition Circuits (Time in seconds); k = Datapath Size, #Gates = No. of gates, K = 10^3 , M = 10^6

k	#Gates	F4 [4]	PB	ZR
64	15.3K	1.78	3.32	0.72
128	64K	40.55	27.41	6.03
163	104K	130.24	57.57	13.13
233	139K	335.60	106.85	19.62
283	281K	1,787.96	273.53	64.48
409	423K	5,077.50	578.15	115.20
571	1.14M	48,162.29	CR	725.95

The word-level abstraction approach in [4] presents the results for extracting the above representation for each of $A, B, \dots, X_3, Y_3, Z_3$. It first performs a bit-level reduction and then a bit to word substitution for the primary input bit variables. Table IV shows the comparison of the bit-level reduction of ECC Point addition circuits as done in [4] against our implementation. **This bit level reduction is for the intermediate computation of D that takes longest time for the implementation in [4].** This result demonstrates that our implementation can be integrated with that of [4] to improve the overall process.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper has presented an approach to derive a canonical polynomial representation for each output bit z_i of a circuit, by modeling the gates of the circuit as a set of polynomials G over \mathbb{F}_2 , and performing the reduction $z_i \xrightarrow{G} r_i$. The unate cube set algebra prowess of ZBDDs is exploited to represent the polynomials implicitly. We take further advantage of this data structure to improve the classical Gröbner basis reduction method that relies on canceling only 1 monomial in every iteration of division. Our approach cancels multiple monomials in each step of division, thus speeding up the reduction. The efficiency of our approach is demonstrated by completing the reduction for up to 571-bit modulo multipliers in the allotted time, and significant improvement is achieved over the F4-style reduction, parallelized reductions and PolyBori based techniques. As part of our future work, we will be pursuing word-level implementation of the polynomials reduction over integer arithmetic circuits.

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