

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Contemplation and Action

1902–14

Edited by
Richard A. Rempel
Andrew Brink
and
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Bertrand Russell: Campaign photograph for the Wimbledon By-Election, 1907.

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The frontispiece and plates III–VIII are photographs of documents in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. Plates I and II are photographs of documents in the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, Austin, Texas. Plate VI, a photograph from the *Daily Mirror* of 16 May 1907, was given to McMaster through the courtesy of the Durham County Record Office. All manuscripts are shown reduced from their original size, which is given at the head of each set of textual notes.

Abbreviations

TO GIVE THE reader an uncluttered text, abbreviations and symbols have been kept to a minimum. The few necessary to the referencing system are as follows.

The papers printed in the volume are given a boldface number for easy reference. For example, "Mysticism and Logic" is Paper 10. Angle brackets in the text distinguish rare editorial insertions from Russell's more common square brackets.

Bibliographical references are usually in the form of author, date and page, e.g. "Russell 1967, 20". Consultation of the Bibliographical Index shows that this reference is to *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1872–1914*, Vol. I (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 20.

The location of archival documents cited in the edition is the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University ("RA"), unless a different location is given. File numbers of documents in the Russell Archives are provided only when manuscripts of papers printed here are cited or when files are difficult to identify. "RA REC. ACQ." refers to the files of recent acquisitions in the Russell Archives.

Cross-references to annotations are preceded by "A" and followed by page and line numbers (as in "A5:14").

Cross-references to textual notes are preceded by "T". Further abbreviations are used in the Textual Notes, but they are identified at the beginning of each set of notes.

The numbers and dates of Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell refer to photocopies in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster. The original letters are at The Harry Ransom Research Center, University of Texas, Austin. The numbering was established while the letters were still in the possession of Lady Ottoline and it has not been revised. When a letter is dated by Russell that date is simply given; but when the date is taken from a postmark, "pmk." signifies the fact, while a date inferred from other evidence is put in square brackets.

Introduction

The good life is not contemplation only, but action based on contemplation, action attempting to incarnate the infinite in the world.

CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION, 1902–14 is the first volume devoted exclusively to Russell's non-technical writings. It follows chronologically Volume 1, *Cambridge Essays: 1888–99* which presented his earliest papers. The gap from 1899 to 1902 is explained by the fact that in those years he seems to have concentrated exclusively on philosophy and mathematics. Aged thirty in 1902, Russell was already gaining recognition from his work in those disciplines. He had been twelve years away from what he considered the suffocating atmosphere of Pembroke Lodge and the enclosed world of the Whig aristocracy. By his marriage to Alys Pearsall Smith late in 1894, he had defied his family and detached himself more completely from their society. His milieu was now that of the Liberal intellectuals of Cambridge, Oxford and London. But needless to say, he was not attracted by the self-indulgent pursuits which diverted so many Edwardians. At Cambridge Russell had become aware of his extraordinary intellectual talents and of the need to direct almost all of his energies to their fulfilment. After the award of a fellowship at Cambridge in 1895, he kept to his decision to devote himself primarily to mathematics and philosophy, even though occasionally he found time to absorb himself in public issues. His curious position in twentieth-century life—a thinker whose influence sprang from a combination of the force of his writings with his hereditary eminence in English society—was beginning to take shape. Volume 1 of *The Collected Papers* introduced the polymath whose wide-ranging interests included German social democracy, the foundations of geometry, and the philosophy of science. Such papers from his early years include but do not exhaust many of the themes he was to develop over a lifetime. Some new explorations, both literary and practical, are contained in *Contemplation and Action*. Although these papers permitted much greater latitude in style and content than his professional work, they have enough features in common with the latter to allow for fruitful comparison.

Nine papers written during these years remained unpublished. The “Journal” (1) Russell kept intermittently from 1902 to 1905, the twenty-one

fragments of “The Pilgrimage of Life” (2), “The Education of the Emotions” (3), parts of “Prisons” (7) and “Dramatic and Utilitarian Ethics” (36) are published here for the first time. Virtually unknown are the unpublished papers on current political issues: “On the Democratic Ideal” (18), “The Status of Women” (19), “The Present Situation” (24) and “Address to the Bedford Liberal Association” (26). Twenty-four papers, including all those on free trade and the reviews, though published, have been difficult for researchers to find. The volume also contains seven well known essays such as “The Free Man’s Worship” (4). New understanding of Russell’s emotional travail, his literary aspirations and his varied contributions outside the areas of philosophy and mathematics is made possible when writings which have hitherto escaped much notice take their places alongside the widely read.

I. CONTEMPLATION

The title *Contemplation and Action* captures a central concern of the volume: how insight, thought and deed can be compellingly linked. As Russell wrote in “Prisons” (7c), there are two possible ways to approach the world—through action and contemplation. Action, using Power, aims to bring some desirable change, while contemplation aims only at wisdom. Ideally, action “becomes impregnated with contemplation; it becomes calm, not insistent”, and with the access of wisdom there is no place for force (104). Similarly, in “The Essence of Religion” (8) he speaks of the “contemplative vision, which finds mystery and joy in all that exists” (117) and of a wisdom “in which there is no rivalry, no essential enmity” (122). Escape from the everyday world is not his aim but rather to implant the vision of the “universal soul ... in the midst of action” (114). The tenor of these statements prepares the reader to understand what Russell wrote when he was most urgently searching for meaning outside the confines of strict philosophical investigation. The period 1901 to 1914 was momentous and disturbing for him. It is plausible to say that the religious and moral transformations through which he went in these years set his attitudes as a social prophet for the rest of his life; later deflections were from standards at which he had arrived intuitively by his “conversion” of 1901, and reinforced by his relationship with Lady Ottoline Morrell, and had supported by reasoned arguments such as those found in “Prisons”.

The papers gathered in Parts II and III document a quest on which Russell embarked in moral dissatisfaction with himself and in despair growing out of the bleak agnosticism which carried over from his earliest reflections on religion (1983, Papers 1 and 9). The significance of his excursions into religious meanings for life is not diminished by their incompleteness or by the sometimes negative outcomes. By nature Russell hardly seemed a mystic or quietist: he wrote to Lady Ottoline of quietism as “a religion only

for the victims and passive sufferers of the world"; something more "fiery" was needed (#429, 30 April 1912). And in the lucid mood of this same letter he wrote: "There are two worlds, the world of illusion and the world of fact. Everything mystical, all beauty that is intoxicating, almost all happiness, belong to the world of illusion". Yet his quest for wisdom had taken him rewardingly into that very world of "illusion", as Lady Ottoline well knew from reading the fragmentary "*Pilgrimage of Life*" of 1902–03 and from their shared work on the treatise on religion, "*Prisons*". There is a bipolarity in Russell's nature which makes it difficult but necessary to discuss the toughness of his intellect along with the tenderness of humane and even religious feelings which on occasion almost overwhelmed him. Above all he valued intellect, his own extraordinary powers of mind to penetrate where others foundered and gave up. But in some moods Russell knew the gift of intellect to be an impediment, and the titanic passion with which he said he did philosophy indeed a barrier to the humanness he also craved. It is therefore hard to introduce convincingly the materials in Parts II and III which discover Russell in an unaccustomed passive and receptive state, attempting to be a creative writer drawing on the deepest springs of feeling. If the "sceptical intellect" is never fully in abeyance, it had least hold on him during the time the papers in Part II were composed. Revealing him at his most vulnerable, they consider his own past and promptings of religious experience; the papers in Part III continue the enquiry but in more disciplined literary modes, ending with the sensitive yet trenchant "*Mysticism and Logic*" (10).

Russell was at his most self-consciously literary and confessional during the period 1902 to 1914. Not before and never again would he try so hard to shape the materials of personal experience into literary statements. If the search for a literary form to embody views of self eluded him, it was not for want of repeated attempts. Meditative essay, allegory, lay sermon, spiritual autobiography, treatise on the philosophy of religion and novella: each served as a vehicle of insight and, by their formal containment of ideals, they assisted him in coming to terms with "the love of the great ends of which the pursuit makes good lives", as he had written in "*The Education of the Emotions*" (60). There is no single, definitive statement of how contemplative truths should be translated into action; but taken together these papers show Russell to have possessed a Carlyle-like impulse to speak prophetically to his age. Sometimes he despaired of the enterprise: "contemplation may only universalize our griefs; it may show us all life as a tragedy, so full of pain as to make us wish that consciousness could vanish wholly from the world" (119). But by passing through a sort of secular "dark night of the soul" during which remote feelings emerged into words about past sufferings, he was able at least to begin to shape a statement about the meaning of life. Seeking wisdom, not principally logical coherence, Russell underwent a

sort of moral regeneration; the words he wrote at the time sound strange to those who know him mainly as a great rationalist.

For Man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that enoble his little day. (4, 72)

That Russell never ceased to be a philosopher should not be forgotten in reading his literary and religious writings. They emerged from the afterglow of the neo-Hegelian idealism to which he had been committed as a Cambridge undergraduate, and they reach into a Platonic realm of ideas to which he had been enticed by the study of mathematics. In the Pythagorean "Study of Mathematics" (6), written in 1902, he is seen at his most desirous of transcending human limitations through the "absolute necessity" of mathematics. In this frame of mind he could write: "real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible" (86). Russell thus desired an idealism which could not be sustained, and he had to work his way back into a mode of thinking more consistent with the social action he knew to be necessary, but the ideal of "love of truth" always remained even after "The Study of Mathematics" had "come to seem to me largely nonsense, partly for technical reasons and partly from a change in my general outlook upon the world" (1959, 211). In reflecting on his eightieth birthday he could still write: "I have lived in the pursuit of a vision, both personal and social", commanding "moments of insight to give wisdom" (1956, 57).

A brief review of Russell's philosophical accomplishment before World War I, together with some biography, will help to put in perspective the literary quest on which also he was briefly engaged. In 1895, when Russell still espoused neo-Hegelianism, he had the ambition of constructing a vast system of thought:

I thought that I would write one series of books on the philosophy of the sciences from pure mathematics to physiology, and another series of books on social questions. I hoped that the two series might ultimately meet in a synthesis at once scientific and practical. (1967, 125)

With his abandonment of neo-Hegelianism in 1897 or 1898, he still felt an obligation to discover a connection between life and thought. His rejection of neo-Hegelianism as intellectually untenable meant that he had to abandon a view of the universe as an interconnected whole, the Absolute, in which the Good and the Real were identical. He lost the certainty that all apparent contradictions would of necessity resolve themselves as thought

proceeded. The universe came to seem more like "a heap of shot" than "a pot of treacle", as the Hegelians pictured it (1956, 40-1).

Russell developed a new mathematical logic which enabled him to think of things in the world as having hard and precise boundaries. With Alfred North Whitehead in August 1900 he attended the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris—a major turning point in his intellectual career. There he met the mathematician Giuseppe Peano and realized that logic was the foundation of mathematics. Yet in his new system of thought, contradictions became incapacitating enough to cause Russell to stare for days at a blank sheet of paper—as he graphically put it—fearing that all his life might be spent in the same fruitless manner (1967, 151). What made the situation more vexing was that the logical contradictions, though capable of holding up his work, seemed in themselves so trivial as to be "unworthy of serious attention" (*ibid.*, 152). He completed *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903) leaving the solution to these problems in abeyance. "The final product is not a work of art, as I had hoped it would be", he gravely admitted to Alys (16 May 1902). In this state of inconclusiveness, he began work with Whitehead on what became the three volumes of *Principia Mathematica*. Theory of descriptions and theory of types, both discovered by Russell, provided techniques that made possible *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13). Russell sometimes spoke disparagingly of *The Principles of Mathematics*, describing it as a "crude and rather immature draft of the subsequent work, from which, however, it differed in containing controversy with other philosophies of mathematics" (1959, 74). But he never doubted that in it and in *Principia* he had made important contributions to symbolic logic.

As with the contradictions in logic, there were also acute contradictions in his emotional life in these years as relations with Alys worsened. Torn between the wish to be kind and the urge to be rid of her, Russell found that his marriage had become impossible. Late in 1901, or early 1902, after great perplexity, awareness that love had ended burst upon him with the suddenness characteristic of this period of Russell's life. As his personal myth had it, on a bicycle ride in the country he suddenly "realized that I no longer loved Alys" (1967, 147). He reacted strongly against Alys, her mother and indeed the entire Quaker Pearsall Smith family of Philadelphia which, by his marriage in 1894, had delivered him from the upper-class restrictiveness of his own family at Pembroke Lodge. The disruptive effects of the failed marriage are evident throughout the "Journal" he kept from 1902 to 1905. The "Journal" intertwines personal and social themes in Russell's life, showing him in a greatly changed milieu from those of his earlier journals (1983, 1 and 9). Fortunately this journal survives; without it his early literary papers would seem much more puzzling than they are.

While Russell's interest in logic and the foundations of mathematics continued up to 1914, his philosophical output after the publication of the

first volumes of *Principia* focused primarily on epistemology. In 1912 he published his classic, *The Problems of Philosophy*, a layman's guide to philosophy written at the prompting of Gilbert Murray for the Home University Library. In 1913 he worked on his projected book, *Theory of Knowledge* (1984), which remained largely unpublished owing to the criticisms of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The prewar period closed with *Our Knowledge of the External World*, the Lowell lectures Russell gave at Boston in the spring of 1914. Complementing these books are many shorter technical writings in Volumes 2 to 8 of *The Collected Papers*.

From the turn of the century to the outbreak of the Great War Russell's thought was probably in its greatest flux. For one whose "mental life" was "a perpetual battle", and for whose ideas a final synthesis was never found (1956, 56), it is risky to point to a particular period of strife. But as Russell's most original work in philosophy was done in this era, it should not be surprising that ideas about religion and ethics should also appear in rich, and sometimes confusing, array. In ethics he moved away from denying that there is a relation between what ought to be and what is (as stated in a student paper of 1893 written at Cambridge for Henry Sidgwick [see 1983, 32]) to holding that the good is objective, only to return to something like the early position, asserting that good is relative to desire. Russell at the later stage was reacting against the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore whose objectivist ethics had once impressed him. Both Russell and Bloomsbury took from Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903) the belief that right actions are only valuable in so far as they are means towards achieving good states of mind. Moore never meant this to be taken as an excuse, freeing people from the Victorian moral imperative that they undertake socially useful projects, and Russell felt that some members of the Bloomsbury set misunderstood Moore when they claimed that his ethic obliged them to concentrate all their attention on cultivating aesthetic ideals and close friendships. Russell, however, drew "no doubt sensibly, on older moralities" (Skidelsky 1983, 146) to justify participation in public issues rather than "retirement among fine shades and nice feelings" (1967, 70). Convinced by Santayana's *Winds of Doctrine* (1913) that the objectivist position in ethical theory is untenable, Russell reaffirmed in 1914 his earlier view by saying that "good and bad ... are the reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in themselves" (174). But this subjectivist ethic, and an unwillingness to allow ethical considerations to enter philosophy, did not hamper his urge to advocate reforms. If Russell could not deduce what ought to be done, in a Platonic fashion, from the contemplation of the eternally good, he could nonetheless follow the precepts of right action enjoined by the Liberalism and Protestantism in which he was raised and as they were transformed by a kind of mystical experience. That Russell was later to examine mysticism with more scepticism than credence

does not set aside the force of his own illumination in 1901. This experience seems to be the main origin of his pacifist and social reformist impulses, ambiguous though they sometimes were. (His Puritan ancestry and the political Liberalism of his family should not be forgotten as determiners of his reformism.) Contemplation and action were never securely joined, but they cohered enough for him to write in "Mysticism and Logic": "The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our power to create—the good in our own lives and in our attitude towards the world" (176). By what route did he come to this humanistic conviction?

The meaning of Russell's first "conversion" is debatable. Some may see it as a temporary aberration in a time of intellectual and marital tension. Judging by the negative outcome of his adolescent struggles to retain Christian belief, as seen in the "Greek Exercises" and "A Locked Diary", where John Stuart Mill's question "Who made God?" brought the despairing reflection that "the universe may be hurrying blindly towards all that is bad" (1983, 56), a conversion to any sort of Christianity seems unlikely. But there was always a note of regret about loss of belief. As Russell later wrote to Helen Thomas (after 1903, Flexner) about the loss of Christianity, he was "not one of those who think it can ever be other than a very serious loss" (16 May 1905). Nevertheless, his examination of the arguments for Christian belief left no chance of return, and he became known for attacks on Christian dogma and the church in such essays as "What I Believe" (1925) and "Why I am not a Christian" (1927), in which the religious impulse is seen as fear: "fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death", which if we face it honestly makes unnecessary the invention of "allies in the sky" (1957a, 16). In 1901, however, he had not been able to speak so dismissively.

There is another, non-Christian, religious motif in Russell's writings appearing as early as April 1889 in the ecstatic passage on nature worship which closes "Greek Exercises". As Russell wrote, when he fancied hearing "the music of the spheres, a new aspect of God burst in upon me" (1983, 20). This suggests the alternative route to metaphysical truths spoken of later as his "mathematical soul, which is attuned by nature to the visions of Pythagoras and Plato" (1956, 42)—an idealistic dream cherished well into the period of these papers and seen especially in "The Study of Mathematics". If even mathematical idealism was subject to doubts, Russell still wanted to retain some hold on religion: "The scepticism which had led me to doubt even mathematics had also led me to question the fundamental dogmas of religion, but I ardently desired to find a way of preserving at least something that could be called religious belief" (*ibid.*, 21). The area of possible religious truth was greatly narrowed but never completely given up. As late as "Man's Peril from the Hydrogen Bomb" Russell could still commend religion: "On art and literature and religion, some men have

shown a sublimity of feeling which makes the species worth preserving" (1954a, 1136).

Russell's wish for "something that could be called religious belief" suggests that he may have been open to the secular forms of conversion—affirmative changes in moral outlook having more to do with inward experience than with true or false statements about the universe such as those made in the Book of Genesis. For example his "godfather", John Stuart Mill, raised a strict utilitarian, became depressed at age twenty-two, a depression from which he was helped to recover by reading Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality". For Mill, trained to be severely intellectual, cultivation of the feelings supplied a balance missing in his education. Russell, who well knew Mill's story, must have recognized a similar imbalance in his own education and early life. Another affinity may have been with Mark Rutherford (W. Hale White), with whose writings Russell also was familiar. Rutherford, who, like Russell, had had a restrictive Calvinist upbringing, was converted to a sort of humanistic pantheism by reading Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads*. Further, Russell's brother-in-law Bernard Berenson reported his own profoundly moving aesthetic conversion, occurring before 1900; it too may have a bearing on the form of Russell's partly aesthetically induced religious experience of 10 February 1901, though he later denied having known anyone who had had such an experience.

Russell's need for religious certainty, uneasily coupled with scepticism about it, appears in his post-conversion attempts to formulate his beliefs. Much of the interest in the literary papers comes from watching Russell struggle with the two sides of his nature, the contemplative and mystical and the rational. (For Russell at this time contemplating unseen objects and ideals seems to have promised mystical awareness, though the terms are never clearly defined.) The *Autobiography* gives centrality to a few intensely intuitive moments which he felt explained his subsequent moral development leading to his inescapable sense of "unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind", as he put it in the prologue. He called his conversion "a sort of mystic illumination" (1967, 146), a regenerative experience such as William James was describing in his Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). The illumination began with an aesthetic experience as Gilbert Murray read from his new translation of Euripides's *Hippolytus*. While still stirred by the language and grief of the play, Russell was thrown into a crisis when Whitehead's wife Evelyn suffered a severe angina attack in the presence of the Whiteheads' three year old son. "She seemed cut off from everyone and everything by walls of agony, and the sense of the solitude of each human soul suddenly overwhelmed me" (*ibid.*). It has been conjectured that Russell's early trauma of losing both his parents at about the same age may have been awakened, because he implies that a deep

reorganization of his personality took place in response to this tragic scene (Simon and Simon 1974). His "flippant cleverness" gave way to a new sense of human suffering.

Within five minutes I went through some such reflections as the following: the loneliness of the human soul is unendurable; nothing can penetrate it except the highest intensity of the sort of love that religious teachers have preached; whatever does not spring from this motive is harmful, or at best useless; it follows that war is wrong, that a public school education is abominable, that the use of force is to be deprecated, and that in human relations one should penetrate to the core of loneliness in each person and speak to that. (1967, 146)

Although non-theistic, his experience was a mystic illumination startling in its suddenness and in its moral concreteness. Ironically, little of the formal reasoning he professed appears in his statement of what "follows" from the "reflections". Russell had made a leap of faith but one he would in part regret. In the retrospective autobiographical account, when the immediacy had worn off and the habit of analysis returned, he called it "a sort of mystic illumination" which brought "semi-mystical feelings about beauty". True to his scepticism, he spoke of "The mystic insight which I then *imagined* myself to possess" (*ibid.*, italics supplied). No total transformation had occurred, and Russell remained formidably intellectual; but he had also been enriched by pity for human suffering. As he later wrote to Lady Ottoline, "I became infinitely gentle for a time" but he admits that there were "many faults and many backslidings" (#154, pmk. 22 July 1911). He struggled to keep the vision before him. While the "Journal" tells of marital and mental strife, it also shows Russell remembering the conversion and trying to maintain the high moral standard it had established (see the entry for 10 Feb. 1903). The aspirations aroused by the conversion were certainly beyond realization: "a desire almost as profound as that of the Buddha to find some philosophy which should make human life endurable" (1967, 146). A significant effect, however, was to turn him in "The Pilgrimage of Life" toward literary examination of his own past, preparing for his lyric statement about the tragic vulnerability and pain of each human being—his first and most moving pacifist credo (Paper 4).

Russell's new "religion of sorrow", as he termed it to Lady Ottoline (#98, June 1911), was revived and redirected by a second conversion occasioned by his relationship with her (see #162, pmk. 30 July 1911). Thus the conversions are also detectable in "Prisons" and *The Perplexities of John Forstice* (9), and they reach into his life beyond the materials in this volume to supply a permanent link between "contemplation" and "action". A measure of this transformation may be taken from the autobiographical

revelation, "Self-Appreciation" (see 1983, 11) written in 1897 at the request of his brother-in-law Logan Pearsall Smith. It is the portrait of a self-absorbed and coldly analytical man. Concerns about the plight of others are overlaid by smugness and callousness. He admitted as much to Lady Ottoline on 18 May 1911 when he observed: "My love of mankind, which I was saying was intermittent, did not exist at all in the first years of my marriage. At the time I was quite hard and intellectual.... Other feelings began to revive in me with the [South African] war—then various other people's great troubles touched me very nearly" (#72, dated by Russell). It may be significant that, in addition to these autobiographical letters, in 1901 and again in 1912 Russell tried to write spiritual autobiographies to mark the changes taking place; neither satisfied him. In the realm of action, Russell credits his first conversion with not only reawakening his compassion for humanity but with banishing his earlier fervent attachment to the British military cause in South Africa and his short-lived sympathy for the Liberal Imperialists who supported the war. The conviction brought by the first conversion that "force is the evil thing, and strife is the root of all evil, and gentleness is the only balm" (#154 to Lady Ottoline) guided his view of political strife. His pacifist political morality had its severest challenge during World War I, but it never ceased to be an issue—even during World War II, when he accepted the necessity of fighting Hitler, and into the age of nuclear weapons.

Three of the four writings in Part III centre on the religious debate with Lady Ottoline, while the fourth, "Mysticism and Logic", seems to conclude it for his own satisfaction. Whereas in the papers in Part II, stemming in part from his first conversion, contemplation appears to mean insight into his own past and recognition of the vulnerability of people in general, in Papers 7 and 8 contemplation implies desire for mystical religion. The exact nature of this mystical religion is never fully defined, but there is a strong intellectual attempt to do so.

Russell's intimate relationship with Lady Ottoline Morrell began on 19 March 1911. Lady Ottoline (1873–1938) was an aristocrat with a flair for the arts. She cultivated friendships with artists and writers by holding salons at 44, Bedford Square and later at Garsington Manor in Oxfordshire. Her husband was Philip Morrell, a lawyer and Liberal politician. Russell's affair with Lady Ottoline renewed his aspiration after mystical religion, but following an initial enthusiasm the revived mysticism proved to be inadequate. Scepticism prevails in a letter of 15 May 1911 (#68a) to Lady Ottoline remarking on a discussion with G. Lowes Dickinson and Major Sanger:

After the ladies were gone we had a long discussion as to whether the intellect is the only means of attaining truth—I yes, Goldie no, Major

slightly no, but not decidedly. You would have been against me. Goldie, as usual, defended mystical illumination; I said it was mere illusion.

The judgment seems decisive, but it was the sort of negation that in certain moods Russell could not resist making. An ardent erotic mysticism nonetheless developed during the love affair. It was romantically sensual and high-minded in the manner of Petrarch and Dante, not devotional in nature. Russell sought to give philosophical substance to the affair by allying it to the thought of Spinoza, whose respect for reason Russell admired. When a new mysticism began to flourish in the relationship with Lady Ottoline, Russell wrote to her about 21 July 1911 describing his "first conversion". A somewhat different emphasis appears in the letter from that in the *Autobiography* (1967, 146). The account to Lady Ottoline nevertheless shows the conversion to have been intensely moral, arising from empathy with Mrs. Whitehead's suffering and generalizing to all human loneliness and to the need for love to conquer it. But as Russell says in the letter, the wisdom he had learned from the encounter with Mrs. Whitehead's suffering "had been fading for some time and I had begun to grow incapable of living with so much pain." In Lady Ottoline he discovered another suffering woman whose thoughts and feelings moved him; again empathy prompted a conversion, but this time romantic ardour and aestheticism predominated. As Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline in a letter postmarked 13 February 1912, remarking on Dickinson's interest in mystical experience:

I don't know any man who has (had mystical experiences), except myself, and I only twice: ten years ago, and at the time of our summer crisis. I think it is much rarer, certainly among men, than you imagine. I have never known any woman either, intimately enough to find out about it, except you, who really know what it is. (#342)

The summer crisis with Lady Ottoline at Peppard Cottage, near Henley-on-Thames, seems to have arisen from a difference of opinion over Christian belief. It was exacerbated by Russell's being too demanding of her time and attention. The crisis was surmounted during an exultant journey which Russell said at last brought him "inward harmony": "All I have felt and thought is fused into a whole, in which I can live without constraint" (#159 [28 July 1911]). Russell tells Lady Ottoline that she is "the embodiment of all that I love in the world" (#154). She makes possible his "Vita Nuova"; the love letters disclose a new life of emotion and the senses to which she raised him by her love.

As much as we are likely to learn of his second conversion, and of the new "wisdom" it brought, appears in a letter, postmarked 30 July 1911.

It is very seldom that one's inmost being is altered. Mine was nine and ten years ago; it began to be as soon as I began really to know you, but it was not complete till these last days. I had not supposed it possible to learn wisdom in the midst of happiness.... You make me dare to think and feel what it really is my best nature to think and feel—it is like emerging into sunlight from a cavern. I feel such new power—as though shackles had fallen from my mind. (#162)

Elsewhere he describes romantic feeling as a "sacred and mystical joy" (#175, pmk. 29 Aug. 1911) and as "mystical absorption" (#176 [15 Sept. 1911]). The scepticism which had appeared in a letter in mid-May (#68a) was thus lessened as Russell gave way to the sense of unity through love. The guardianship of reason is reintroduced in "Prisons", an unfinished treatise on the philosophy of religion. Yet mysticism is very much in evidence in "Prisons" with Russell advocating "contemplative vision" and "union with the universe" as the highest attainment of religious consciousness.

Alteration of viewpoint was predictable. As he wrote to Lady Ottoline on hearing of Dickinson reading Evelyn Underhill's *Mysticism* (1911):

All that I felt last summer when I was thinking of Prisons is still very real to me, I mean I don't at all discard what belongs with mysticism, but I feel it is rather an inspiration and a refuge in great moments than a mood to live in while one has difficult work to do. It rises up at the last moment, when I might go to the devil, and turns me the other way instead. (#427, pmk. 28 April 1912)

By early July 1912, when Russell completed his novella, *The Perplexities of John Forstice*, the issue had become the excessive rationalism of Forstice (Russell's persona), which stood in the way of sympathy for an ailing wife. The central question in Forstice's quest for wholeness is: which is more desirable, contemplation or action. Russell decided that a vision of the eternal is possible even in the midst of ordinary daily events. In *Forstice* the mystic in Russell was again qualified and balanced by rational claims. The paradox of his personality is nowhere more evident. The impulses to mysticism, with its inevitable defeat by logic, are brought together in "Mysticism and Logic". The essay weighs the competing claims to knowledge, and while telling strongly against mysticism in the name of "scientific philosophy" gives a most sympathetic account of its tenets. As to the personal meaning of mysticism, so urgent at the outset of their affair,

Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline in September, 1915 when their ardour had waned: "I half thought, at first, that I had found wisdom in mysticism. But I now see clearly that that is only an element in wisdom. It is an element, but not the whole" (#1321). From this point on mysticism ceased to be a critical feature of Russell's debate with himself and with the world. Social action in a war-torn Europe took over.

Love for Lady Ottoline lessened the stoical pessimism of "The Free Man's Worship" and led to engagement with the reasoned mystical thought of Spinoza. Early in their affair Russell sent Lady Ottoline drafts of "The Pilgrimage of Life" and associated writings of a decade before to introduce her to his spiritual struggles. As noted, her influence liberated Russell from his pessimism and asceticism, and from Alys's Quaker plainness and concern with philanthropy, into a richer, ampler world of the senses. Their letters tell of the sensual and spiritual pleasures they enjoyed: especially reading poetry from Blake to Leopardi, walking and taking delight in nature. Not that Russell and Alys had failed to take such pleasures, but with Lady Ottoline they acquired a regenerative aura. "She gradually cured me of the belief that I was seething with appalling wickedness which could only be kept under by an iron self-control", he wrote in his *Autobiography* (1967, 205). Predictably the cost in further suffering and guilt was exorbitant, as Alys became pathologically depressed and Lady Ottoline's husband Philip suffered by the intrusion in his marriage. Russell's affair with Lady Ottoline was certainly as romantic and erotic as they and their biographers have portrayed it. But their correspondence shows it to have been a sort of pseudo-religion of sensual love in the midst of which the mysteries of religious belief were intensely examined. Lady Ottoline was by conviction a Christian, whereas Russell was not. The appeal of Spinoza had the effect of deflecting the discussion of ultimates into a language more neutral than that of Christianity. Russell hoped that they might find in the thought of Spinoza a foundation for their love affair.

Russell thus turned to the seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) whom he later called "the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers" and ethically supreme among them (1945, 569). When he turned to Spinoza, Russell revived interest in a philosopher he had studied as early as 1894. (See his 1983, 27, 28.) Russell wrote to Alys on 28 January 1894: "I wish I had got hold of Spinoza two years ago instead of Thomas à Kempis: he would have suited me far better: he preaches a rich voluptuous asceticism based on a vast undefined mysticism, which even now has seized hold of my imagination most powerfully." "What Shall I Read?" shows him to have been again reading the *Ethics* in March, 1899. Spinoza was a pantheist whose "intellectual love of God" offered a possible basis for shared belief. He spoke of the strict logical necessity of everything that happens in the universe. Because God directs

every action, no action can be entirely wrong in an ultimate sense. Russell seemed pleased that this mystical doctrine could not be “reconciled with the orthodox doctrine of sin and damnation” (1945, 572). In 1907 Russell wrote for *The Nation* “Spinoza’s Moral Code”, an unsigned review of J. Allanson Picton, *Spinoza, A Handbook of Ethics*, and in 1910 he wrote also for *The Nation* “Spinoza”, a review of *The Ethics* translated by W. Hale White.

Russell summarized his commitment to Spinoza in a letter to Lady Ottoline:

I am so glad you like the Spinoza so much. I think when he speaks of “intellect” he doesn’t mean what one usually means. I don’t quite know what he does mean, but the essence of it is to be universal, not particular, to be somehow in touch with the whole. I don’t believe he means to shut out what you want to keep in. What he wants is that one should think and feel as part of God, not as a separate Self. But he is very hard to understand fully, though one gets what is most important without very great difficulty. (#375, pmk. 10 March 1912)

It is “mystical knowledge” Spinoza imparts (#386 [16 March 1912]) and Russell exclaims, “Spinoza has it all—intellect and love. It *can* be done” (#372, pmk. 8 March 1912). He was urging a non-dogmatic, non-sectarian religious philosophy formulated by an intellect he could admire.

Lady Ottoline was less enthusiastic about Spinoza, and after 1912 the theme of a new rational religion based on his thought is not as prominent in their letters. She confessed herself to live more by the senses and imagination than by the sort of intellect valued by Russell and his Cambridge circle. And Spinoza’s recommendation to deal with unwanted passion by developing the intellectual life she thought to be impracticable for most people. Lady Ottoline had been impressed by “the beauty of (Russell’s) mind, the pure fire of his soul”, remarking that “our spirits united in a single flame, as if his soul penetrated mine” (1974, 278); but there were also deep reservations about him as an aloof intellectual and a “psychological surgeon” (*ibid.*, 272–3). She listened to Russell, marvelling at his ability to articulate ideas and hopes, but she kept her autonomy in matters of imagination and belief. She held to the Anglicanism of her childhood, a religion reinforced by the Anglican nun Mother Julian who had been mother-surrogate after the death of Lady Ottoline’s own mother.

As for Russell, Lady Ottoline’s effect was to further refine the more radical mystical aspirations of 1902 with the help of appreciation of the arts and experiences of the senses. She introduced him to writers and artists in an atmosphere of aesthetic luxuriance in London and later, during wartime, at Garsington Manor. Russell thus became acquainted with the painters

Augustus John and Mark Gertler, and with Joseph Conrad and later D. H. Lawrence among other writers. Undeniably they broadened him but their influence was not decisive for his writing. Recourse to Spinoza had altered Russell's view of mysticism to a function balancing reason and emotion. Indeed, he had written "Prisons" as an express means of amalgamating the claims of reason and emotion, an amalgamation sometimes discussed with Lady Ottoline in the context of religion. He could not complete the task, perhaps because no accommodation of his unbelief to her belief ever could be reached. The main ideas of "Prisons" were salvaged for publication in "The Essence of Religion". The mystical conclusions remind us that in the immediate pre-war years thoughtful scholars, intent on preserving the essence of religious truth from the ravages of unbelief, turned to historical mysticism. Friedrich von Hügel's *The Mystical Element of Religion*, a study of St. Catherine of Genoa, appeared in 1908; Rufus M. Jones' *Studies in Mystical Religion* was published in 1909; and Evelyn Underhill's famous *Mysticism* appeared in 1911. Each of these writers had a theistic basis absent from Russell's attempt to define the essence of religion. On this topic, Russell was analytical and ahistorical, having little sympathy with a seemingly obscurantist tradition. Spinoza typified the severity of reason needed to think about religion at all, and Russell's conclusions have a reserve not found in the historians of mysticism.

The exercise of reasoned debate is much the same in Russell's novella *The Perplexities of John Forstice* where he again canvassed the Spinozistic intellectual love of God. The rigidity of the novella's dialogue form indicates the cautious inhibition with which Russell approached this compelling subject—religious belief. With the years he returned to discuss religion in a less experiential and more anti-Christian fashion. His method became increasingly that of argument used in an anti-theological way as in "Why I am Not a Christian" (1927). The exploratory mood of the 1902–14 period had left him. Russell became a vehement anti-religionist, in a way that is foreshadowed in the controversy about "The Ordination Service" (39). Thus the papers on religion presented in this volume show Russell in a unique moment of sensitivity to the fundamental questions of belief. He briefly joined that company of seekers who have asked what care the universe has for us and what our place in it may be. Like other twentieth-century writers—Eliot in *The Waste Land* (1922) for instance—Russell felt spiritually abandoned, left struggling outside the structures of meaning which for generations had sustained his forebears. The sense of cosmic loneliness had a parallel in personal experience. He had indeed been orphaned and brought up by a grandmother who once remarked that his atheist parents were better off dead. Russell naturally felt twinges of doubt about any benevolence in a universe that permits young life, such as that of his parents, to be so easily snuffed out. But Russell did not become an

absurdist or nihilist. He sought to build back lost meaning, to do the work which Christian apologists were unable to do. His excursions into an imaginative review of the past, and into the possibility of caring for humanity in its largest dimension, are evidence of the most positive kind of creativity. Russell's disappointments in the literary results were on a scale with the questions he asked, but the effort, even in its fragmentary remains, was heroic. The contemplative papers in this volume register a failure to attain the metaphysical certainty that Russell needed; yet they stand as testimony to the questing spirit which tries for definitive answers where, in all likelihood, there are none available to man. As he wrote in "My Mental Development", "My intellectual journeys have been, in some respects, disappointing" (1944, 19).

A.B.

III. ACTION

In old age Russell could summarize the great aims of his life:

I wanted, on the one hand, to find out whether anything could be known; and, on the other hand, to do whatever might be possible towards creating a happier world. Up to the age of thirty-eight I gave most of my energies to the first of these tasks. (1956, 53)

"Contemplation" dominates "Action" in the years between the Boer War and the outbreak of the First World War. But the need to make the world a better place for ordinary people, as well as to justify his own existence, is demonstrated by his participation in two main political campaigns—the defence of free trade and the struggle to extend the franchise. These commitments, as well as his guarded advocacy of eugenics, were clearly formed in the years before 1914. The themes of his many subsequent social and political books are presented, even if only sketchily, in this volume. However, Russell had "nothing approaching an integrated political philosophy" (Vellacott 1980, 4) and it is fair to say that most of his political values before the Great War were developed from ideas imbibed at Pembroke Lodge.

Russell did not write at all extensively about many controversies which beset Edwardian Britain. British foreign policy, the armaments race (and notably the Anglo-German naval race), the growing militarism evident in parts of British society, and "the condition of the people" are mentioned only in passing in his papers. This detachment, especially from social issues, reflects not only his intense concentration on intellectual questions but his privileged position. Indeed, in a country of nearly forty-five million people, Russell was among the top one percent of the population who were "formally unoccupied" (Thompson 1975, 17); that is, he had no need for a

job in the conventional sense. Great Britain was probably the most class-ridden of all the industrial societies. Nearly eighty percent of the population was working class, marked off by their manual labour, generally lower incomes and patterns of dress, leisure and sustenance. His limited understanding of the grim conditions of working-class life is unsettling to those who know his later writings on the needs and aspirations of common people. With surprising innocence, Russell remarked to Lady Ottoline Morrell, for example, that he "didn't know hours in mills were so long" in Lancashire cotton factories (#878, pmk. 28 Sept. 1913). This rueful observation illustrates his growing attention after 1910 to what he viewed as the unjust conditions under which so many workers toiled. In *Portraits from Memory*, he recognized his pre-war insularity: "But it was not until 1914 that social questions became my main preoccupation" (1956, 44). Despite his disclaimers, Russell's public activities before then are important enough to enlarge our understanding of certain aspects of Edwardian social and political life and thought.

Free trade and suffrage were long-standing Liberal causes, especially the former. Russell's concentration in his earlier years on these campaigns, to the virtual exclusion of interest in social reforms and theory, illustrates the degree to which important dimensions of the New Liberalism were still relatively undeveloped in him. The award in May 1910 of a lectureship at Trinity College and the beginning of his affair with Lady Ottoline early in 1911 served temporarily to reduce his participation in public issues. Nevertheless, the range of his political and social interests increased. His letters to her reveal his keen awareness of the depth of labour unrest during the strike-ridden years 1910–14 and his sympathy for the protesting workers.

Russell found participation in public life a release from the rigours of philosophy, mathematics and his contemplative endeavours. The rhythm of his work was such that throughout the period 1902–10 he could take time only in the winters for political questions (1967, 153), while his work on *Principia Mathematica* took most of his energy during the rest of the year. His role in the free-trade campaign gave him satisfaction, particularly as he perceived the struggle as one in which libertarianism was confronted by authoritarian and even quasi-despotic political and economic powers. Similarly, his involvement in the struggle for women's suffrage fulfilled his moral imperative to work on behalf of worthwhile causes, whatever the cost in public opprobrium. Reminiscing in his *Autobiography* about his belief that women in the "civilized world" had experienced a victory, Russell expressed his satisfaction in having contributed to their success (*ibid.*, 155). He believed that participation in elections was essential, for he was confident that Parliament rather than other institutions, such as trade unions or employers' associations, directed the destiny of Britain. When

Lady Ottoline told him just how much the harsh lives of people in her husband's constituency at Burnley appalled her, Russell lectured her: "I don't think though that you need feel helpless ... but if anything is to be done, it must be mainly through politics" (#876, pmk. 25 Sept. 1915). By "politics", Russell meant Liberal social reform policies. Like most Liberal Radicals, Russell shared the Gladstonian belief that new policy proposals, if they were morally right and their timing opportune, would be grasped by politicians and electors alike, and implemented as sensible legislation. This was the creed of optimists, largely unaware of the destructive national forces which would soon threaten their faith. Integral to Russell's belief in Parliament was a faith in the electoral process, a faith which he expressed to Lady Ottoline in a letter postmarked 21 December 1912:

You *can* help me, and it really is worth much sacrifice to bear one's part in great undertakings—I have always felt that with the little bits of political work at election-times—the whole is great, and makes one's own part inspiring, however little it may be the main great work. (#655)

Russell's admiration for great leaders who constructively lead the state, and conversely his contempt for vacillating or stupid politicians, exemplified an aspect of his élitism: his belief that only a few men have the character and intellect to direct the nation properly. His personal correspondence, particularly with Lady Ottoline, contains many references to what Russell considered the fluctuating qualities of the Liberal Ministry as a whole and to the qualities or limitations of individual ministers. At the time of the passage of the Parliament Act in 1911 Russell wrote rhapsodically to her:

Sometimes I think people who see politics from too close don't realize the greatness of the age—they don't quite feel what is being done, because they are so aware of what is not being done. The Reform Bill (1832) was a heroic epoch, yet in (Francis) Place's diary you find nothing but abuse of "the dirty sneaking Whigs" for not doing more. Compare this Government with most, and they are angels of light. (#169a, 11 Aug. 1911)

On other occasions, as when Asquith and his Government appeared insensitive to the miners during their famous strike of the winter and early spring of 1912, Russell contemplated joining the Labour Party. Only fear that no party but the Liberals could pass Home Rule held him to his traditional party allegiance. Indeed this sympathy for the workers during the massive labour unrest from 1910 to 1914 laid the foundation for his later advocacy of Guild Socialism. (See his 1918b, particularly pp. 141–3.)

Despite the occasional disillusionment that led to an ultimate severance with the Liberal Party, Russell remained a Liberal throughout the period 1902–14. Indeed, some of the rationale for participation in his first crusade, the defence of free trade, was motivated by a desire to bring the still disunited Liberals together and back into power. Russell's "Journal" covers the free-trade campaign and coincides almost exactly in time with the Unionist Administration of Arthur Balfour, who became Prime Minister on 12 July 1902 and resigned on 4 December 1905. Russell loathed this Ministry which represented the twilight of almost twenty years of Unionist dominance of British politics. Balfour embodied for Russell, and for many other British people, the inglorious legacies of Unionist policies resulting from the Boer War, such as the mistreatment of Chinese workers in South Africa and indifference to the needs of labour at home. In the country which controlled the most extensive Empire in history, over one third of the inhabitants, according to the shocking revelations of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, suffered from malnutrition. While not responsible for many of the problems which beset Britain, Balfour's administration did little to alleviate these social problems, or to restore national self-confidence in the early Edwardian period.

Hence, while the gloom which permeates Russell's "Journal" is largely the product of his own unhappiness, it also reflects the dissatisfaction he felt with "humbugs like Balfour" (21 Nov. 1902). Russell thought that Unionist attempts to strengthen the Empire were misguided because he was convinced it was "not worth preserving" (26 July 1903). Russell reiterated the views expressed in J. A. Hobson's famous book *Imperialism* (1902) that international financiers had manipulated the Unionist Government to extend the Empire, by war if necessary. As he commented cynically, after meeting at dinner at the Webbs' both the international financier Julius Wernher and Balfour: "Though Balfour governs the Empire, Werner (*sic*) governs Balfour" (to Lucy Donnelly, 8 Feb. 1905). Russell's growing pro-Boer opposition to Unionism and imperialism had been intensified by the deaths of women and children in the British concentration camps in South Africa.

Russell's reaction against Unionist policies explains his enthusiasm in defending free trade. When Joseph Chamberlain on 15 May 1903 called upon the country to abandon free trade in favour of tariff reform to unite the Empire and promote domestic protection, Russell was "immensely" interested (26 July 1903). His presence at free-trade meetings early in 1904, and his often weekly attendance at suffrage society meetings from 1906 to 1910, demonstrated his capacity to accommodate himself to administrative work. This work prefigured the long hours of grinding labour he was prepared to devote to the No-Conscription Fellowship. Commitment to free trade was not merely a family legacy deriving from Lord John's famous and

decisive support in 1846 of Sir Robert Peel's measure to repeal the Corn Laws. Nor did defence of free trade attract him solely because it gave him an unparalleled opportunity to hone his logician's skills by dissecting the contradictions in policies proposed by Balfour and Chamberlain and indeed the contradictions within Chamberlain's own programme. Primarily, the defence of free trade represented for Russell a crusade for the traditional values of political morality, class harmony, prosperity and international peace and good will.

Because Russell was so committed to free trade, he was biased against the genuine insights Chamberlain had into the problem of unemployment and Britain's relative decline in productivity *vis à vis* other industrial states. He also refused to acknowledge Chamberlain's idealism, however chimerical, about imperial union. Russell's tendency to see leaders divided into heroes and villains is also evident in his historical writings (Papers 32 and 40). This habit is reflected in his praise of the Italian nationalists Garibaldi and Mazzini, and his condemnation of Napoleon and the younger Pitt. For Russell, free trade was an essential aspect of internationalism, which he saw as the only means of avoiding wars created by the pernicious effects of competing nation states. His role as a pacifist during the Great War is thus foreshadowed. In 1904 Russell argued that free trade was wholly beneficent and that internationalism would bring about world peace. (Thirty years later he perceived that free trade could in some instances be imperialistic and that "internationalism" could sometimes be a cloak to advance British economic interests [1934, 159 and *passim*].) Certainly Russell before 1914 had no objection to Britain applying "internationalism" to those parts of her formal and informal Empire populated by "less advanced" peoples. Russell held a variant of the common view of "the White Man's Burden" with its implication of a duty for an advanced civilization to dominate an inferior culture whose inhabitants were considered less able. As he wrote in one of his reviews of Robertson (p. 328): "No one would deny that a spaniel and a retriever have differences of natural aptitude; and it is difficult not to believe the same of a negro and a European".

Russell saw hope in fighting the Unionists on free trade, a traditional policy which had been elevated into a virtual religious creed by Liberals and many others since 1846. As a doctrine, free trade had caused Liberal sentiment to coalesce—to "deepen a consciousness of party lineage and close down the possibility of admitting counter-theses dangerous for stability" (Bentley 1983, 147). There was nothing in the least unexpected about Russell's decision to defend free trade, but it may be surprising that he did so to the exclusion of other issues. Although many hitherto warring Liberal factions—Imperialists and Radicals alike—were already reuniting in opposition to the 1902 Education Act, which provided financial aid to Angli-

can and Catholic schools and hence infuriated Nonconformists, Russell saw no reason to arouse himself over that measure presumably since it extended secondary education to many. Nor does it appear that he had either the concern or knowledge of the social problem to consider urging on the Liberals a coherent policy of reform incorporating such advanced ideas as old age pensions and measures to relieve unemployment. In Berlin in 1895, while preparing *German Social Democracy* (1896), he had seen how Bismarckian welfare legislation had increased state power. Such control offended his libertarian beliefs (pp. 107–8). Thus, he could well have been reluctant to endorse bureaucratic developments which could be similar in Britain. Certainly, his rejection of Fabianism and his later advocacy of Guild Socialism demonstrate his repugnance to enlarging state power. Russell, an Edwardian Radical, had only limited involvement in the programme advocated by the New Liberals, of whom J. A. Hobson and Leonard Hobhouse were leading exponents. Perhaps his neglect of the theory behind New Liberal social reform came from his dislike, following G. E. Moore, of the evolutionary ethics espoused by Hobhouse and other New Liberals (expressed in Paper 31). His philosophical rejection of the teleology of the New Liberals did not imply a lack of sympathy for the particular reforms they advocated, especially insurance against unemployment and sickness. Similarly, he fought for women's suffrage without sharing the theory of natural rights held by the leadership of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies.

The characteristics of his Radicalism are seen not only in his espousal of free trade but also in his advocacy of the taxation of land values. Russell felt the need to make only passing reference to new directions in Liberal social reform taken after 1906, for example the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908, because such legislation was accepted by the Unionist opposition. Anxious to placate the Labour movement in order to win any future elections, most Unionists, and certainly their leadership, were prepared to accept measures such as the Provisions of Meals Act (1906) and the Medical Inspection Act (1907). What Unionists could not abide was proposed legislation, such as advocated in the Newcastle Programme of 1891, which attacked their traditional social, economic and political powers and set forth alternative Radical measures such as reform of the land laws, an end to plural voting and employers' liability for accidents. Of course, Russell endorsed the New Liberal social reforms, but seldom found the need to work for their passage, confining himself to occasional encouragements as in the "Address to the Bedford Liberal Association". By 1909 Russell's other political concerns were subordinated to the Lloyd George Budget which was designed to provide the revenue necessary to finance New Liberal reforms as well as to attack the landlords specifically. As Russell stated at Bedford, reform

should be paid for through progressive, direct taxation on the wealthy, rather than indirect taxes which would fall most heavily on the poor if tariffs were imposed. The rejection by the Lords of this famous Budget late in 1909 infuriated him, for as he had written to Helen Flexner on 27 October of that year, "the Budget seems to me the best thing that has happened in my time." The old-fashioned Liberal in Russell was outraged by the Lords' flouting of traditional constitutional convention, while the New Liberal in him was dismayed by the practical effects of the rejection.

Russell's free-trade papers indicate how effectively he argued the theoretical and practical merits of free trade. *The Spectator*, in its weekly column assessing the national and international scene, commented most favourably upon Russell's free-trade arguments, in lines probably written by the editor, St. Loe Strachey. (If they were written by Strachey, he was admittedly biased, being an ardent Unionist free trader—but he was widely respected as a journalist and a free-trade theorist.) Referring to Russell's article in *The Contemporary Review*, "The Literature of the Fiscal Controversy" (11), the author claimed:

Mr. Russell is generally admitted to be one of our greatest living mathematicians, dealing in speculations so transcendental that few but Senior Wranglers can follow them. He has shown in this paper a gift of lucid and businesslike exposition unsurpassed by any writer on the subject. (6 Feb. 1904, p. 223)

Russell was confident of his ability to convey the validity of the free-trade argument to the average voter. As he declared to Gilbert Murray on 19 January 1904:

My experience is, that any one who has no economic interest in protection can be converted by having the free trade case properly stated; but that very few free traders know what the case is. I believe if voters could be given elementary instruction in the theory of exports and imports, not twenty per cent would be protectionists. And I find everybody anxious to hear the case and listen to reason. These are some of the grounds I cherish for hopefulness.

Some of Russell's correspondence of the time, especially that with the French historian Elie Halévy, also revealed a firm and detailed knowledge of the political scene in Britain as the fiscal campaign of 1903–04 reached its climax. Russell showed considerable insight in his arguments against Halévy's fears that Chamberlain would win, and in his analysis of the shifting power structure within the political parties generally and the Liberal Party in particular.

The two summers of 1903 and 1904 were times of intellectual deadlock in the writing of *Principia Mathematica*. The first major political campaign of his life clearly helped him through this impasse, for as he recorded in his "Journal" early in 1905:

The beginning of a more durable life for me was my time in politics last winter. I was less unsuccessful as a speaker than I had expected to be; but what I liked was the cooperation with such a large part of the nation in an object which I believe to be very important. The relations with other people engaged in the same work were very agreeable to me. And the relief to my philanthropic impulses (which I have usually repressed with great severity) had made me ever since less restive in doing my own work. (14 Jan.)

Russell felt no need to engage further in free-trade politics, since, as he told Lucy Donnelly on 10 November 1905, "Balfour's government has ceased to do any harm, having grown impotent" and because "the Liberals are almost certain of an overwhelming majority in the next Parliament". He had no positive programme of his own to offer, and therefore could remain absorbed in mathematics, according only an observer's attention to political and social developments. However, as his correspondence attests, he still remained watchful of the fortunes of free trade. Almost half a century after Chamberlain's campaign, Russell recalled his faith in "Hopes: Realized and Disappointed": "I hoped that everybody would in time see the wisdom of Cobden's arguments for Free Trade, and that nationalism might gradually fade into a universal humanism" (1956, 46).

The political optimism Russell absorbed at Pembroke Lodge seemed validated when the Liberals came to power late in December 1905. He described as "excellent" the Cabinet which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman formed after Balfour's resignation. He was particularly pleased that the working man and respected Lib-Lab stalwart, John Burns, had been included. However, as election day approached, his apprehension increased about the possible size of the Liberal majority. As he told Lucy Donnelly on 1 January 1906 a few days before the election began, "The question is: Will the Liberals be independent of the Irish? It is bound to be a near thing one way or other". Russell, like some other knowledgeable commentators, was wrong, for the Liberals won an electoral victory the dimensions of which had not been seen since 1832. With four hundred M.P.s elected, the Liberals had a majority of one hundred and thirty over all other parties—Unionists, Irish, Nationalists and Labour combined. Despite his continued personal anxieties, he had, as he again told Lucy Donnelly, "two things which really make me happier—one is the result of the general election, which does mean that for the next few years at least public affairs in

England will be more or less what one could wish; the other, more personal, is that my work has prospered amazingly" (18 Feb. 1906). And to the French logician Louis Couturat he wrote that "the fall of the Conservatives (Unionists) pleases me much.... Never has a Party suffered such a reversal since 1832" (17 Jan. 1906).

In the event, Russell's rosy views about the political future were to be sadly disappointed. The years from 1906 until the two elections of 1910 were times of increasing frustration to Liberals because the Unionist-controlled House of Lords rejected much of the proposed Liberal legislation. Unionist intentions had been signalled by Balfour even before the election was over, when on 15 January 1906 in a speech to a large number of his supporters at Nottingham, he avowed that it was everyone's duty to ensure that "the great Unionist party shall still control, whether in power or whether in opposition, the destinies of this great Empire" (*The Times*, 16 Jan. 1906, p. 6). Only a few Liberals, such as Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, grasped the ominous implications for Liberal policy of this obviously calculated statement. The many joyous Liberals such as Russell were to learn only later by bitter experience the truth of David Lloyd George's vitriolic remark in June 1907 that the House of Lords was not "the watch-dog of the Constitution, but Mr. Balfour's poodle". Despite Russell's slow disillusionment with the Liberals because of their failures to achieve their legislative ambitions, he still made the sweeping statement that this election was "the most important I could remember" solely because of the crisis between free trade and protection (to Lucy Donnelly, 2 Jan. 1910).

Russell's second major public commitment—to women's suffrage, and later, in 1909, to adult suffrage—is readily intelligible to anyone familiar with his family background and his writings. Although he had long regarded the denial of women's suffrage as a grave injustice, he did not marshal his energies to the cause until 1906, when the political realities seemed to make the effort worthwhile. Russell's belief in women's suffrage, as he describes in his *Autobiography*, developed early:

I had been a passionate advocate of equality for women ever since in adolescence I read Mill on the subject. This was some years before I became aware of the fact that my mother used to campaign in favour of women's suffrage in the 'sixties. (1967, 155)

He scarcely needed Mill to convince him that, given an opportunity for independent thinking (or merely seizing the opportunity), women were capable of clear and decisive political activity. He had only to reflect upon the intelligence, force of character and political activities of his two grandmothers, not to mention his close maternal aunts, the *avant garde* Lady Carlisle and the sagacious Maude Stanley, Countess Russell, an ardent

Home Ruler and opponent of the powers of the House of Lords, was, by Russell's own account, "much more Radical than Lord John" (Russell and Russell 1937, 1: 29–30). Lady Stanley was an active promoter of women's education and one of the founders of Girton College, Cambridge. At her famous country residence, Castle Howard, Lady Carlisle gathered around her young Radicals whom she exhorted to work for progressive change. Maude Stanley, Russell's "perfect aunt" (*ibid.*, 23), was renowned for her altruism. Growing up surrounded by such strong, informed women, Russell hardly could have imagined them lacking the acumen and independence to vote without male guidance. For women to be denied the franchise was, to him, ridiculous (see Harrison 1984). Men defending women's rights made themselves vulnerable to many innuendoes, particularly effeminacy. Since women's right to vote seemed so indisputable to Russell, he found it easy to disregard such an aspersion.

Russell often chose to have strong-willed women about him, whether in a conjugal relationship, an affair or a friendship. With their forceful character and mental agility, they provided emotional support and intellectual stimulation, irritating though he often found them to be. Even to Alys, who was easily daunted by him, Russell responded intellectually as well as romantically. His desire for rapport with formidable women (and men) is evident in his admission to Lady Ottoline: "I am instinctively masterful, and yet I always immensely prefer people whom I cannot master" (#56 [7 May 1911]). His need to confide in women whom he respected is apparent in his correspondences with Lucy Donnelly, who taught English at Bryn Mawr, and Helen Thomas (also from Bryn Mawr), both of whom he had met through Alys. An example of his dependency on female friends is evident in his letters to Helen Thomas. On 11 November 1902, he wrote: "By the way, I hope you remember that my letters are only for you and Lucy: it is a comfort to me to let out my depression and discouragement, and to speak of what consolations the wreck of religion has left me; but the condition of my writing frankly is that you do not repeat things ... as it is part of my business to be always cheerful". These friendships were complemented from 1906 by a long correspondence with the active socialist and feminist Margaret Llewelyn Davies (the sister of his old Cambridge friends Crompton and Theodore). It was she, Russell later claimed, who convinced him to transfer in 1909 his efforts from the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) in order to campaign for adult suffrage through the People's Suffrage Federation (PSF). Russell also admired and enjoyed the company of the distinguished Cambridge classicist, Jane E. Harrison. Of all such friendships his most wary was with Beatrice Webb. While he admired "first and foremost her ability", then her "integrity" and also valued her as a "warm and kind friend" (1967, 77–8), he had serious reservations. Russell was uneasy about her concessions to religiosity, her

support (real or affected) for imperialism and her devotion to Fabian state socialism; the latter he regarded as possibly leading to authoritarianism and even tyranny.

Ironically, the nadir of his relationship with Alys coincided with the zenith of his involvement with women's rights. But guilt over his marital failure cannot alone explain his choice of this cause when political realities made women's suffrage seem possible to him. From painful experience, evident in the "Journal", he had come to believe that equality between the sexes could only be achieved if it were legislated at Westminster, since individuals in their domestic isolation were helpless to accomplish such a dramatic social change. In his emphasis on the need for parliamentary action to gain women's equality, Russell was following in the footsteps of John Stuart Mill. Naturally, in advocating the strategy of committing the Liberal Party as a whole to women's suffrage, Russell understood how far Edwardian party whips had wrested authority from the individual M.P.

Of course, Russell's suffrage writings never had the impact of Mill's, and among his own contemporaries, Russell could not match George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells. Yet Mill's arguments for women's suffrage, rather than those of any Edwardian, were his inspiration. Mill's lifelong theme according to the philosopher Alexander Bain was "the abuses of power" (see Bain 1882, 130). This concern was also central to Russell and is expressed in his theoretical writing on suffrage (see particularly 19, 20 and 26). Like Mill, he argued that no class or individual can fairly look after the interests of any other class or individual. Both he and Mill claimed that sexual inequality often produces domineering males and manipulative females. From the starting-point that the most important relationship is an equal one between males and females, particularly in the conjugal state, both men proceeded to argue for the extension of liberty generally.

To a degree never attempted by Mill, Russell uses economic arguments to justify equality (see particularly 19, 23 and 27). The economic advances of the past few generations, he asserts, have rendered labour so productive as to allow for the removal of much of the time-devouring drudgery which used to stand in the way of female equality. Writing to Margaret Llewelyn Davies and other suffragists, Russell endorsed the still revolutionary idea of payment for motherhood. (This idea, derived from Bebel, he had discussed with Alys as early as 20 Oct. 1894.) To Davies, on 29 November 1907, he observed: "It is true, of course, that state-payment of mothers does not solve matters completely, but it is surely a step in the right direction, and an improvement on the present necessity for choosing between economic dependence and neglecting the children". He advocated, moreover, that women should have a right not only to a part of their husband's salary but also to the household savings if their economic independence were to be secure. The ways of achieving greater and diverse economic independence

for women were developed in *Marriage and Morals* (1929, 65–76). Writing much later than Mill, after many of the legal disabilities of women that had been emphasized in *The Subjection of Women* (1869) had been removed, Russell could concentrate more on economic questions.

Russell's active work on suffrage came to a halt in 1910 after the writing of *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* (27) except for involvement in the Cambridge Branch of the PSF. He remained interested in women's suffrage, and even asked Lady Ottoline early in 1913 to be sure to tell Philip Morrell how to vote on the Franchise Bill: "To my mind, it is far more important than Home Rule or anything else this Parliament has to do" (#678, 22 Jan.). His own cessation of activity, despite this exhortation, must be explained. To a great extent his energies were taken up from the summer of 1910 by his academic duties consequent upon his appointment to a lectureship in logic and the principles of mathematics at Trinity College. Growing pessimism about the achievement of female or adult suffrage in the near future also contributed to his retreat. This dispirited view is revealed most clearly late in 1913 in a letter to Lady Ottoline: "My mother's letters are full of suffrage meetings, anti-war propaganda, etc.—things seem just at the same point still; it is discouraging" (#951).

Russell's determination to become involved in activities which could have future beneficial effects for mankind are evident in his reflections concerning history and science. "On History" and "Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic" (32), develop themes he was, on the whole, to pursue throughout his life and to apply in his large corpus of historical and political writings. These two papers also indicate the degree of his indoctrination at Pembroke Lodge in the Whig interpretation of history. This approach presumed that the reading of history was a spur to action, that it enjoined moral improvement, particularly through the enlargement of liberty, and that the betterment of mankind was promoted primarily through the actions of great individuals. History also presented an opportunity for the reader to detach himself from prosaic or selfish concerns. As Russell wrote in "On History", the discipline "suggests possibilities of action and feeling which would not have occurred to an uninstructed mind ... it fills our thoughts with splendid examples, and with the desire for greater ends than unaided reflection would have discovered". In later years, Russell recalled how the political initiatives of Lord John Russell had led to the passing of the great Reform Bill of 1832 and how Garibaldi's military audacity had dramatically advanced the cause of Italian unity. "Such things stimulated my ambition to live to some purpose" (1944, 6).

Russell's emphasis on the role of the individual in history and his belief in the constructive possibilities of science converge in his guarded approval of eugenics (see particularly p. 372). In this advocacy, he was typical of one fashionable strand of thought in the British intelligentsia. His early argu-

ment that special financial concessions are needed to provide the environment to nurture genius is expounded in "The Uses of Luxury" (1983, 47). As early as 1894 Russell had found inspiration in Francis Galton's views on eugenics. Hence by 1907–08, he was prepared cautiously to advance, in Papers 33 and 34, arguments in favour of eugenist policies to improve the national stock by financial rewards from the state to "desirable" parents and "penalties" to the "undesirable". By the time he wrote *Marriage and Morals* in 1929, he was sufficiently interested in the possibility of "positive eugenics" to devote an entire chapter to the subject. Certainly Russell was aware of the constraints on liberty which some forms of human "scientific breeding" would inevitably bring, for he foresaw "the time when all who care for the freedom of the human spirit will have to rebel against a scientific tyranny" (1929, 214). After 1933, Russell did not emphasize the term, eugenics, probably because of its association with the racial policies of the Nazis. But he continued to be concerned about the failure of modern societies to provide gifted people with incentives to procreate.

One of Russell's last important papers before the war broke out was "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education" (38). In that essay, Russell anticipated changes in public education which would emphasize the scientific method as opposed to concentration on Greek and Latin. The inculcation of the scientific method would permit people to avoid the expectation that the universe must be designed to satisfy human needs. The method would also encourage the material improvements conducive to happiness. With its attack on grand systems of thought, this paper is also an attempt to make philosophy more scientific in its method—a task Russell initiated in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) and pursued thereafter. The paper, however, does not confront the possible authoritarian implications in an increasingly scientifically arranged world (as would be a preoccupation in *The Scientific Outlook*, 1931). Nor does the essay betray the tensions between scientific advancement and the threat to liberty which Russell implies in his reviews of books on eugenics.

At the end of the volume Russell's papers are more forward-looking. He was not defeated by Wittgenstein's attacks on his philosophy or by the attrition of his relationship with Lady Ottoline. Moreover, the cosmic despair of the early years of the Edwardian period, reflected especially in "The Pilgrimage of Life" and "The Free Man's Worship", had somewhat dissipated. Russell's more optimistic outlook was the result of the success of his philosophical work and the increasing recognition it was receiving, notably by his election in 1908 to the Royal Society. He was further encouraged by his emancipation from Alys, his active participation in public issues, and his confidence, characteristic of the liberal intelligentsia of the day, that the transformation of Victorian values and society was being progressively and democratically achieved. The precariousness of this

confidence was starkly revealed by the outbreak of the Great War early in August 1914. As he wrote in dismay to Margaret Llewelyn Davies on the day Britain declared war on Germany:

I *feel* as if it meant an end of all happiness for the rest of our lives—but perhaps in the end the forces making for peace may be strengthened—perhaps we shall emerge into a saner world—Anyhow everything has to be begun afresh—old fixed points are gone. I feel it *utter madness* for us to join this war. (4 Aug.)

R.A.R. and M.M.

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Chronology:

Russell's Life and Writings, 1902–14

	Life	Writings
c. 8 Jan. 1902	Returns to Mill House, Grantchester, the Whiteheads' house near Cambridge.	Continues giving lectures on mathematical logic.
c. Jan. 1902	Realizes he no longer loves Alys (the bicycle ride).	
Mar.–June 1902	Alternately at Friday's Hill, near Fernhurst, W. Sussex and Mill House, Grantchester.	Parts of 2 written. Claims in <i>Autobiography</i> (1967, 150) that 4 was begun.
May–June 1902	The Webbs stay at Friday's Hill.	
14 Apr.–28 June 1902	Depression caused by marital problems forces Alys to take a rest cure alone at Brighton.	
23 May 1902		<i>The Principles of Mathematics</i> completed.
c. June 1902	Spends four days at Pembroke Lodge with Aunt Agatha.	
July 1902	At Trinity College, Cambridge. Alys recuperating in Switzerland with Beatrice Webb.	
Aug. 1902	At Little Buckland, a farm house near Broadway, Worcs. with Alys.	
early Sept. 1902	At Friday's Hill and then Mill House, Grantchester.	
16 Sept. 1902	Joins the Coefficients Dining Club organized by the Webbs.	
20 Sept. 1902–1 Apr. 1903	At 14, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea.	
Oct. 1902		6 written.

1 Nov. 1902	Becomes a full member of Newnham College Council.	
12 Nov. 1902	Decides to join the English League for Taxation of Land Values.	First entry in 1.
21 Nov. 1902	Attends <i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i> dinner.	
c. 14–17 Dec. 1902		Lost paper on Carlyle written.
1902		3 probably written.
18 Dec. 1902– 13 Jan. 1903	Visits Italy with Alys, staying with the Berenzons.	Part of 4 written; continues work on parts of 2.
27 Jan. 1903		4 completed.
c. Feb. 1903		2 abandoned.
early Mar. 1903		5 written.
c. 19 Mar.–c. 13 May 1903		Two lost lay sermons written.
25 Mar.–1 Apr. 1903	Takes a walking tour in Devonshire with George Trevelyan.	
1 Apr.–late Aug. 1903	At Churt, Surrey.	
13 Apr. 1903		Considers writing “Satan’s joys”.
May 1903		<i>Principles of Mathematics</i> published.
early summer 1903		Lost paper on Maeterlinck perhaps written.
July 1903	Leaves the Coefficients Dining Club.	
Aug. 1903	Begins intensive reading on the free trade issue.	
Sept. 1903	In Normandy with Alys and the Webbs for one week, and then in the Lake District.	
5 Oct. 1903– c. 1 Feb. 1904	At 13, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea.	
Dec. 1903	His resignation from the Society announced in <i>Fabian News</i> .	4 published.
Jan.–Mar. 1904	Gives numerous free trade speeches.	
Jan. 1904		11 published.

15 Jan. 1904		12 published.
16 Jan. 1904		13 published.
23 Jan. 1904		14 published.
30 Jan. 1904		15 published.
Feb. 1904		16 published.
10 Feb. 1904		17 published.
mid-Feb.—c. 2	At 14, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea.	
Apr. 1904		
c. 19–29 Mar.	Takes a walking tour in Devon and	
1904	Cornwall with Desmond MacCarthy.	
c. 2 Apr. 1904—	At Ivy Lodge, Tilford, Surrey.	
Jan. 1905		
July 1904		5 published.
13–22 Aug.	At Castle Howard, Yorks., with the	
1904	Gilbert Murrays.	
c. 20 Aug. 1904	Joins the Cambridge Free Trade As-	
	sociation.	
23 Sept.–8	In Brittany with Theodore Llewelyn	
Oct. 1904	Davies.	
Feb.–Apr.	At 4, Ralston Street and 14, Cheyne	
1905	Walk, Chelsea.	
3 Apr. 1905		Last entry in 1.
12–c. 22 Apr.	Takes a walking tour in Somerset and	
1905	Gloucestershire with R. C. Trevel-	
	yan.	
24 Apr. 1905	Moves into Bagley Wood, near Ox-	
	ford, his permanent residence until	
	1910.	
25 July 1905	Death of Theodore Llewelyn Davies.	
c. 28 July 1905	In Ireland with Alys for three days.	
10–24 Aug.	In Normandy with Crompton	
1905	Llewelyn Davies, staying with the	
	Roger Frys and then the Whiteheads.	
Oct. 1905		"On Denoting" publish-
		ed in <i>Mind</i> (the theory of
		descriptions).
late Jan.–c. 24	In the south of France with Alys and	
Feb. 1906	the Rev. John and Margaret Llewelyn	
	Davies.	
1906 (perhaps		18 and 19 probably
spring)		written.

Apr. 1906		28 published.
c. 13 Apr.-5 June 1906	At Clovelly, Devon, alone.	
10-c. 14 May 1906	Leaves Clovelly to attend academic meetings in London and Cambridge.	
4 June 1906		29 published.
early Aug. 1906	In Ireland with Alys.	
4 Aug. 1906		30 published.
Feb. 1907		31 published.
c. 4 Feb. 1907	Elected to the Executive Committee of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS).	
Feb.-Dec. 1907	Attends NUWSS meetings regularly.	
Apr. 1907		32 published.
c. 13-23 Apr. 1907	Takes a bicycling and walking tour in Somerset, Wiltshire and Devon with Val Worthington.	
2-14 May 1907	Unsuccessful candidate for the NUWSS in the Wimbledon by-election (20).	
late May 1907	At Kirkby Lonsdale, Westmorland, with the Davies family.	
late July-early Aug. 1907	Takes a walking tour of the Lake District with North Whitehead.	
9-31 Aug. 1907	With Alys in Scotland joined by Crompton Llewelyn Davies, Arthur Dakyns and others.	
Oct. 1907		33 published.
Nov. 1907		6 published.
Jan.-Dec. 1908	Continues to attend NUWSS meetings regularly.	
12 Mar. 1908		21 published.
3-30 Apr. 1908	Attends International Congress of Mathematicians in Rome; then retraces, with George Trevelyan, Garibaldi's route from Marsala to Palermo.	
21 May 1908	Elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.	
28 May 1908		22 published.
11-14 July 1908	At Kirkby Lonsdale, Westmorland, and then Edinburgh.	
July 1908		23 published.

1–29 Aug. 1908	In north Devon with the Gilbert Murrays.	
26 Sept. 1908		34 published.
Christinas 1908	With Aly's and his brother, Frank, at Telegraph House, near Chichester, W. Sussex for a fortnight.	
Jan.–Dec. 1909	Continues to attend NUWSS meetings regularly.	
17 Feb. 1909		24 written.
Apr. 1909	Elected to the Athenaeum Club.	
15–c. 22 July 1909	At St. Ives, Cornwall with the White- heads.	
30 July–28 Aug. 1909	Takes a walking tour of the Tyrol and the Italian Dolomites with C. P. Sanger.	
18 Oct. 1909	Announces he has decided to join the People's Suffrage Federation (PSF).	
19 Oct. 1909		Delivers major part of <i>Principia Mathematica</i> to the press.
25 Nov. 1909	Resigns from NUWSS Executive Committee.	
9 Dec. 1909		25 published.
13 Dec. 1909– Jan. 1910	Works in support of some Liberal candidates in the General Election.	
Jan. 1910	Appointed to the Executive of the PSF.	
Feb.–Dec. 1910	Attends PSF meetings regularly.	
26 Apr. 1910	Addresses Bedford Liberal Associa- tion as a possible candidate (26).	
27 May 1910	Informed by Whitehead that Cam- bridge was going to offer him a five- year lectureship in logic and the prin- ciples of mathematics.	
June 1910		27 published.
29 July–c. 27 Aug. 1910	Takes a walking tour, with C. P. Sanger, of Carinthia, Styria and north-east Italy, ending in Venice.	
3 Oct. 1910	Takes up Cambridge lectureship; lives in Neville's Court.	
Oct. 1910	Tries to sell Bagley Wood; rents Van Bridge Cottage, Fernhurst, W. Sussex for Aly's.	

10 Oct. 1910		Agrees to write <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i> for the Home University Library series.
Dec. 1910		<i>Principia Mathematica</i> , Vol. I and <i>Philosophical Essays</i> published.
Jan.–Mar. 1911	In lodgings at Cambridge with Alys.	
Feb.–Mar. 1911	Organizes a Cambridge PSF branch.	
19 Mar. 1911	Begins affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell in London.	
17 May 1911	Receives first invitation from Professor Ralph Barton Perry to lecture at Harvard.	
29 May 1911	Terms of marital separation agreed on.	
9 June 1911	Resigns from Newnham College Council.	
1–13 July 1911	At Upper Wyche, near Great Malvern, Worcs. with North Whitehead.	Writes part of <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i> .
24 July–23 Aug. 1911	In lodgings at Ipsden, Oxon. (six miles from Lady Ottoline at Peppard Cottage, near Henley-on-Thames).	Begins work on 7.
c. 20 Aug. 1911		Completes <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i> .
27 Aug. 1911	Lady Ottoline leaves for Marienbad, Bohemia.	
23 Aug.–8 Sept. 1911	In lodgings at Checkendon, Oxon.	Works on 7.
c. 9–13 Sept. 1911	At Marienbad, Bohemia with Lady Ottoline.	
16–29 Sept. 1911	In lodgings at Ipsden, Oxon.	Works on 7.
30 Sept. 1911	Returns to Cambridge.	
10 Oct. 1911	Cambridge term begins.	
Oct. 1911	Resigns his Cambridge PSF branch duties.	
c. 24 Oct. 1911	Takes a flat in Russell Chambers, Bury Street, London.	
16 Nov. 1911		35 published.
18 Nov. 1911	First meets Ludwig Wittgenstein.	

8 Dec. 1911	Cambridge term ends.	
Dec. 1911	Spends Christmas with the White-heads in Wiltshire.	
1911		36 possibly written.
16 Jan. 1912	Cambridge term begins.	
18 Jan. 1912		37 published.
Jan.–Dec. 1912	Continues to attend PSF meetings regularly.	
c. Jan.–May 1912		Works on lost spiritual autobiography.
Feb. 1912		8 written.
Feb.–Mar. 1912		Renews work on 7.
8 Feb. 1912	George Santayana urges acceptance of Professor Perry's invitation to lecture at Harvard.	
15 Mar. 1912	Cambridge term ends.	
mid-Mar.–early Apr. 1912	Takes a walking trip along the South coast, followed by a motoring vacation with Frank in the West Country.	
Apr. 1912		Begins work on 9; <i>Principia Mathematica</i> , Vol. 2 published.
19 Apr. 1912	Cambridge term begins.	
May 1912		Lost review of Belfort Bax's <i>Problems of Men, Mind and Morals</i> written.
5 June–5 July 1912	In Lausanne and Paris with Lady Ottoline.	
8 June 1912	Cambridge term ends.	
2 July 1912		9 completed in first draft.
5–8 July 1912	At Fontainebleau with Lucy Donnelly.	
later summer 1912 and at times in 1913		Continues to work on 9.
22–28 Aug. 1912	Attends International Congress of Mathematicians at Cambridge.	
11 Oct. 1912	Cambridge term begins.	
19–22 Oct. 1912	In Lausanne with Lady Ottoline.	
16 Nov. 1912	Finally accepts Professor Perry's invitation to lecture at Harvard.	
9 Dec. 1912	Cambridge term ends.	

9–14 Dec. 1912	Takes a walking trip in the West Country.	
Dec. 1912	Spends Christmas with the White- heads in Wiltshire.	
30 Dec. 1912– c. 14 Jan. 1913	At the Beetle and Wedge, Moulsford, Berks. (close to Lady Ottoline at Breach House, Cholsey).	Works on a study of matter.
14 Jan. 1913	Cambridge term begins.	
early spring 1913		38 probably written.
8 Mar. 1913	Cambridge term ends.	
Mar. 1913	Takes a walking trip ending in Exmoor, Somerset.	
Apr. 1913		<i>Principia Mathematica</i> , Vol. 3 published.
18 Apr. 1913	Cambridge term begins.	
7 May–19 June 1913		<i>Theory of Knowledge</i> writ- ten but not completed.
13 June 1913	Cambridge term ends.	
24 & 31 May 1913		38 published.
4–c. 28 July 1913	In Cornwall.	
1–c. 29 Aug. 1913	Takes an Alpine walking tour with C. P. Sanger, starting from Innsbruck and ending in Italy.	
10 Sept. 1913	First meets Joseph Conrad.	
10 Oct. 1913	Cambridge term begins.	
Nov. 1913	Begins informal classes in philosophy for science students.	
22 Nov. 1913		39a published.
4 Dec. 1913		40 published.
6 Dec. 1913		39b published.
8 Dec. 1913	Cambridge term ends.	
c. 19–c. 30 Dec. 1913	Sees Lady Ottoline in Rome and travels in Italy.	
9–15 Jan. 1914	At Cambridge.	10 written.
16 Jan. 1914	Cambridge term begins.	
31 Jan. 1914		39c published.
7–14 Mar. 1914	Sails for the U.S.A.	
14 Mar.–26 May 1914	Lectures at Harvard on logic and the theory of knowledge.	

16 Mar.—9	Delivers the bi-weekly Lowell Lectures in Boston.
Apr. 1914	
18—25 Apr. 1914	Lecture tour of some eastern universities and colleges.
26 May—6 June 1914	Lecture tour of the mid-west (Chicago, Madison, Ann Arbor).
6—14 June 1914	Sails for Britain.
July 1914	
Aug. 1914	War declared. 10 published. <i>Our Knowledge of the External World</i> published.

Part I

“Ashes of Dead Hopes”

Journal [1902–05]

THE VICTORIAN JOURNAL writer Charles Greville thought that a journal or diary should be written without plans for publication but without any fear of it. He no doubt meant this of journals even as private as that Russell kept between 12 November 1902 and 3 April 1905. Russell admired Greville whose *Memoirs* (1874) he began reading in 1897, but there is little indication that he wished to emulate the asperity of Greville's social and political commentary. Russell certainly speaks of public events, chronicling his contemporaries while assessing himself. He notes key events and records attitudes much as English diarists had done since John Evelyn and Samuel Pepys in the seventeenth century. Occasionally, the 1902–05 "Journal" attains a cryptic brilliance, as in the aphorism: "Nature is my inspiration, and Mathematics is my purifier" (12 Nov. 1902). The most important theme in this journal is the crisis of relationship with his wife Alys. This crisis gives the writing its drive and its poignancy, but Russell's emergence as a force in the intellectual world is also a notable feature.

The 1902–05 "Journal" belongs to a discontinuous series of journals beginning in adolescence with the "Greek Exercises" of 1888–89 and the "Locked Diary" of 1890–94. These emphasized a young man's religious doubts, an emphasis not present in the later journal. All three give a sharp and exact picture of Russell's ambience, reaching out from his introspection to the milieu in which he takes his place. Each is an exercise designed to face a crisis, whether it be what to believe or the durability of a human relationship. Around these concerns a full picture of Russell's life and times at formative stages takes shape. At age thirty he was naturally more master of his circumstances than he had been earlier, and the public frame of reference expands from Pembroke Lodge and undergraduate Cambridge to include an accomplished and stimulating new circle of people. The "Journal" is not so polished a piece of writing as the "Greek Exercises", but it takes the form of developed paragraphs found there and in the "Locked Diary". The "Journal", however, seems more rapidly paced and conversational than its predecessors. It similarly conveys the sense of inward growth which suggests that Russell would eventually become an autobiographer. The later journal gives his measure when he was becoming an intellectual force to be reckoned with, tentative as a writer in some modes but formidable as a thinker bent on great work. He undoubtedly wrote the "Journal" without plans for its publication, but he could not have feared its appearance in print as a document of literary quality.

Unlike the "Locked Diary", the "Journal" contains very few references to the aristocrats whose presence dominated Russell's life at Pembroke Lodge. Of his Russell and Stanley relatives only Aunt Agatha and brother Frank make brief appearances. Indeed, with the exception of some references to a few friends made at Cambridge in the period 1890-94, the "Journal" describes an almost entirely different cast of characters from those mentioned in the "Locked Diary". Russell clearly had decided to emancipate himself from aristocrats, because, as he confided to Alys as early as 3 September 1894, he had come to "dread them", since they were "rigid and stiff and conventional, and horrified at the minutest divergence from family tradition".

The "Journal" is also important for its many allusions to Alfred North Whitehead as well as numerous other philosophers, thinkers and political figures with whom Russell was in contact. His observations on associations with many of the leading Liberal Party intelligentsia and with Sidney and Beatrice Webb help to place him in the political context of early Edwardian Britain. Of special interest are his reflections on the imperialist "brains trust" called the Coefficients and views on his first political campaign, the defence of free trade.

Russell drew little if anything from the "Journal" when he wrote his *Autobiography*. Unlike the "Greek Exercises", which are liberally quoted, and the "Locked Diary", which is briefly discussed, the "Journal" is not mentioned by Russell. Allusions are made to some of its incidents, but the material is not transferred into the new writing as might have been expected of an autobiographer who printed letters and passages from journals to give immediacy to past events. He may have forgotten its existence, or deliberately have chosen not to use it in the *Autobiography*—perhaps because he thought of it as still too private and painful to impart. The "Locked Diary" had been shared with his fiancée and then wife who sometimes made entries of her own. The "Journal", however, is strictly Russell's because its recurring theme is Alys's character and their troubled relationship. By November 1902 the marriage with Alys was in full disintegration. Russell was painfully disengaging himself after eight years of marriage and moving, however slowly, in the direction of divorce which occurred in 1921. At the same time he was struggling with Alys's depression, and fearing one of his own. Russell was reorienting himself by testing old friendships and intellectual alliances while also seeking new ones. He dramatizes the critical event in his *Autobiography* as occurring in the early months of 1902: "I went out bicycling one afternoon, and suddenly, as I was riding along a country road, I realized that I no longer loved Alys. I had had no idea until this moment that my love for her was even lessening. The problem presented by this discovery was very grave" (1967, 147). The "problem" was the complete breakdown of a relationship which had begun idealistically but is here displayed in its dissolution.

The literary inspiration of the "Journal" is similar to that of the "Locked Diary". The habit of recording introspection, of tallying spiritual accounts, descended from seventeenth-century English Puritanism. With the Reformation, Protestants had

substituted diary-keeping for aural confession to unburden guilt and to record the experience of grace. The practice began to be secularized by the diarists Evelyn and Pepys. The Russells were Protestant, aligning themselves in the seventeenth century with the Puritan cause. From the time of Francis, Fourth Earl of Bedford (1593–1641) they were conspicuously Puritan, with the Fourth Earl himself keeping a voluminous diary or commonplace book (Blakiston 1980, 52). As Russell discovered, his Victorian parents continued the tradition. The importance of diary-keeping was probably reinforced by Alys's recommendation of the Quaker religious journals of George Fox and John Woolman which belong to the same Puritan tradition. But the major stimulus to Russell in his loneliness was reading his parents' journals. Writing from Pembroke Lodge as early as 19 December, 1893 he tells Alys:

Since I wrote to you last I have got hold of my father's journals: I send you some extracts. I have felt as if this book were another self speaking to me, so that it was almost uncanny: the very echo of my own thoughts, the repetition of the same events at the same age. I am glad I did not know any of the things I have found in the journal before: I could hardly have believed that I was not influenced by the knowledge. The journal is largely written in a sort of shorthand which I had never seen before so that I have had some difficulty in deciphering it; so I should be glad to have the extracts back on Friday as they give the key to the rest which I have not yet deciphered.

He further reports on 24 December that he had been reading his mother's journal:

I find the volume I couldn't open is my mother's journal for 1864: it tells the same events as my father's, but in a much drier way: and as I expected, her sentiments on every occasion are thoroughly correct: until my father has spoken she takes no more interest in him than in other ball partners: when they are separated she quotes Sartor on the vanity of wishing for happiness and ends up with Thy will be done: in the evening she goes to a ball and hates all her partners, and wakes up next morning with a racking headache. Her sentiments have an air of unreality about them, not because they are not genuine but because knowing them to be correct she allows herself to express them with unnecessary strength. But if you like I will bring her journals with me on Thursday and then you can judge for yourself. She does not know herself as my father does.

His brother Frank, the second Earl Russell, also kept a journal in adolescence and young manhood, but it lacks the directness and pungency of Russell's own. It is copious and diffuse as his parents' accounts tend to be.

The "Journal" is found on thirty-six pages of a copy-book which contains much unrelated matter. Like the "Greek Exercises", the "Journal" lies amidst completely impersonal technical exercises, and it comes as a surprise to anyone inspecting the

book. This placement might have been for secrecy or simply for convenience. The "Journal" was given by Russell to his mistress and confidante Lady Ottoline Morrell, probably in 1911, together with his drafts for "The Pilgrimage of Life" (2) and such other writings as "The Education of the Emotions" (3). She and her heirs held the "Journal" until her papers were sold to the Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin. It is published here for the first time.

NOVEMBER 12. 1902. Yesterday I went to the Murray's at Churt. Gilbert told me of Podmore's book on Spiritualism, containing an account of "the grass-eating atheists of Ham Common, who slept with their toes out of window". We discussed how far glory or respect is the main thing people desire: I instanced FitzGerald to the contrary. Mary and I discussed Gilbert's work: she thinks he gives too little time to poetry, too much to scholarship, and wishes he would discontinue his Euripides text. I instanced as a parallel my preference of mathematics to philosophy: the temptation to do work in which achievement is certain is a very hard one to resist. They are going to have staying with them a youth who has double identity and goes sudden journeys, forgetting who he is; also his mother, broken by sudden anxiety, and determined never to let him out of her sight. This is a virtue on the part of both, especially Mary.

From there I went on to Aunt Agatha's: she was very affectionate, poor lady. I found there Miss Jones, and stayed up talking to her till near midnight: a very good girl, not at all clever, but genuinely serious, though full of fun. She still wears sandals and eschews meat; also she still believes her sister's handicrafts will arrest rural depopulation and generally regenerate society. Her father is eighty, and till he dies she cannot take up work. We discussed what she should do when that consummation should be attained: 20 I tried gently to wean her from handicrafts to philanthropic work in some big town; but it seemed to her good to display the spectacle of work under ideal conditions—poor young lady! I spoke much—before urging her to live in towns—of the horror of London, the terrible absence of the great non-human things, the feeling of being imprisoned in this life and this planet, the lack in Londoners' minds of the great wind-swept prairies that refresh one in intercourse with those who live with Nature and history and away from the turmoil of today and tomorrow. Then the conversation drifted to religion; also to people. I learned that the only wife of Hinton, the "conscientious bigamist", is a daughter of Boole; that Miss Jones admires Mrs. 30 Boole and her daughters. Though I knew I should offend, I thought it right to talk against Mrs. Boole's philosophy, as its mysticism struck me as more or less erotic. This morning, I walked (again with Miss Jones) to Waggoner's Wells. After a day and night of drenching rain, the sun shone, bright and warm, the sky was covered with exquisite little mottled clouds, every twig had a rainbow-tinted raindrop, the bracken was deep brown, the beeches were still a burnished bronze, and all the oaks had turned. It was an exquisite moment: tender, calm, with melancholy melted into almost joyous resignation—a picture of the old age which the wise may hope to attain. If only, she remarked, people could learn to view Death as like such a 40 day—a good saying, but she was too young to know the difficulty of doing so, which, though agreeing with her, I attempted to explain. [She died of enteric in South Africa, 1904.]

I reached home (after a wonderful sunset) about five, and found Stein, with whom I talked aesthetics for an hour. He wishes to discover the part played by meaning in the beauty of literature; I tried, very unsuccessfully, to explain why I think it an added beauty in literature if it has a good moral. I urged that the death of Socrates in Plato is better because we admire him; but I produced no valid arguments for my main position.

Then Alys, who had been out, returned, and I sat with her, making conversation to the best of my ability. But she remarked that whenever I return after an absence I am silent, and as though living in another world. I must improve in this respect.—I dined with the Davies's: Crompton seemed to be on Theodore's nerves, for what reason I do not know. Crompton talked against the Bishop of London, whom he had been seeing receiving the adulation of fashionable ladies. He began saying how miserable it is for Charles Trevelyan always having his ancestry trotted out, and was in the middle of saying that no one need be proud that his grandfather was a monkey, when Theodore frowned at him to make him stop—a very unnecessary delicacy towards me. Theodore has been spending the day at the House over the Education Bill; he had been impressed by Balfour's being so charming and witty and amiable, and yet such a creature. I don't believe, I said, that the best people are ever amiable.—John Woolman? he replied—We agreed that the *very* best may be; and that, of course, is the truth. Let me remember that, for I am in no danger of being too amiable.—Crompton and I discussed land values as usual, and I agreed to join his league for taxing them, though I don't share his rosy hopes.

I have got over the jar of Meredith's bounder-friend Mathews, and Meredith's remarks against Evelyn's dress, and the wedding-party at the Pollocks, where rows of females inspected the poor bride as though she were a prize potato at an agricultural show, and the disgust of conscientious lust. Nature is my inspiration, and Mathematics is my purifier.

- 30 November 13. 1902. A very mundane day. Read Graham Wallas on Kindergarten, attacking Fröbel, and wrote to him agreeing. Alys and I lunched at the Prothero's: nobody else but Mrs. Napier and Gooch. I could remember nothing about Mrs. Napier except that I had heard a great deal about her. She made brave efforts to get on with me, but everything fell flat. We began on Miss Harrison, whom she envied for her power of enduring excess in whiskey and cigarettes. I (not taking up her tone) said Miss Harrison was one of the rare instances of women who had made a success of that kind of life. Yes, she said, most of them marry and are happy ever after. And the rest, I replied, don't marry and are unhappy ever after. Then I found that I had opened the sluices of an indecent mind, worthy to be Miss Fletcher's friend. She began talking of a Frenchman who had written on *Les Femmes célibataires en Angleterre*—a title which she described as a crescendo of

horror. She remarked after awhile that Miss Fletcher was another instance of success in the life which so astonished her Frenchman: we neither of us let on that the success in both cases is really of another kind. À propos of the Marshalls she said "Rien comprendre c'est tout pardonner"—I imagine that is her high-water mark in the way of wit. At last we got onto William James and John Morley, and having escaped from indecency, I launched forth and the conversation flowed. Poor lady, she had had a difficult time pumping me. A hard, cynical, worldly woman, whom I emphatically dislike.

Mrs. Prothero afterwards was refreshing by contrast, though she is 10 stupid.—On the way home we saw the Wallace collection. I read proofs, dined with Grace (very dull), then we went to the Hugh Bells: I made the acquaintance of Gertrude Bell at last. She said she would not like to live in a University town, because they know nothing of the great world without. I replied that they live in a far greater world, the world of ideas, and that only with them do I feel really among comrades—very priggish, but appropriate. I was introduced to Sir F. Pollock for the fourth time: he (foolish old man) tried to explain the circular points at infinity to Gertrude Bell, and to make parabolas by shadows from the electric light, which wouldn't work. Geoffrey Drage was there, and I had a long talk with him. He seemed quite the 20 fool I expected, the more so as he thought it worth while to make up to me. O these worldlings!

November 20. 1902. I returned yesterday from four days at Cambridge, two of which were spent out of prison. Evelyn was very kind, Alfred agreeable, and the children adorable. We discussed the place of Art: poor Evelyn had abused John Woolman to Theodore for being too Utilitarian and not caring about beauty; he had said beauty was nonsense, and ended by blaspheming against mathematics. She has been feeling—as I have—that the world is too serious a place for Art; but she cannot stand having it said by people who don't love beautiful things. Tiny and North have long observed that I am 30 unhappy; Tiny said she used to hope she would be able to lift my unhappiness, but now she was afraid she would never succeed. Dear children!—George Trevy and I had a conversation which was very intimate on both sides, though in general terms; he is a person whom I love very warmly. He says I have been a help to him for a long time past, and that is in some ways the greatest happiness I have had of late. We agreed that the compensation for courage in hell is the power it gives of helping others. He had been disappointed; he passed the Centre of Indifference at Wallington this autumn, and now the world exists for him again. His trouble was a perfectly finite one, no bar to future happiness.—Jack Pollock says his sister enjoyed 40 a smart wedding, perhaps truly, though it has made Meredith hate him.—On Sunday Mary Bateson came to tea at Grantchester; I praised

History as superior to Science, which was a comfort to her, being a counterpoise to Willie's perpetual hard hitting about the futility and uselessness of her work. I talked about the great ends of life: the building of the Temple of Humanity: the edifice of the Past, the edifice of reason, the City of God. Against Evelyn I defended the people whose pursuits are merely utilitarian, and generally those whose work is democratic, on the ground that the City of God cannot be built on slavery. The talk, the atmosphere of people who care for great things, was balm to me; every moment of the two days I expanded and became a better person. Indeed it is hard to know my duty, 10 and harder still to do it; on Monday she came, and I collapsed like a punctured tyre. I had a long and delightful conversation with Mrs. Shuckburgh, though Florence was present. Poor Mrs. Shuck feels (as I often do) that consciousness in itself is an evil, and that no heaven could possibly be as good as oblivion. I do not really agree; the society of our loved ones, freely and without the shadow of Death, is to me better than sleep. I tried to describe a heaven which one could accept without regret; Florence broke in, wishing for a place where those we love do not do wrong. Her state of mind is far from good—she has no impersonality. Mrs. Shuck was not persuaded, though I used my best eloquence. She is a very good 20 woman.—Alys has not learnt to respect people's liberty; she kept interfering in the Mill House housekeeping. Alys's power of making people quarrel is quite extraordinary. There were two dinner-parties, at neither of which I spoke a word. Mrs. Verrall said on Saturday: "I hear we are to dine with you both at the Mill House on Monday: it will be quite like old times." As like as a gibbering spectre is to flesh and blood, I thought.—I went to see Jourdain, who was allowed the Ordinary on the Mathematics Tripos. He is very ill, partially paralyzed, and at first sight almost half-witted. But as soon as he begins to talk of Mathematics, his face shines, his eyes sparkle, he speaks with fire and ability, one forgets that he is ill, or remembers it only in 30 passionate admiration of the triumph of mind. He has done some quite good work, which he is sending in for Smith's Prize. I saw his mother for a moment; she pressed my hand, I loved her, and she seemed deeply grateful to me for encouraging her son: it was a moment of deep intimacy, though not a single word was said by either of us, and I had never met her before. Evelyn went to see them in consequence of my account, and got the same impression. There are good things in the world. She also told me the history of Kanthack, who died of cancer: another profoundly good life. I am a new man, alive again, and free of cynicism.

November 21. '02. Yesterday I went to a concert with the Bobby Trevelyan. To my surprise the Waterlows were there with Lady Pollock: people have odd ways of spending honeymoons. She seemed already much changed: her eyes had a deeper expression, and (I thought) a sadder one. I

hope all is well; during the music I was distracted by the haunting sense of the irony of things. Afterwards there was a rather terrible scene between Bobby and his wife. I proposed coming Thursday to Dorking; he said they might be gone; she said she *could not* get away by then, as MacCarthy was to be with them Wednesday: he insisted, and she grew piteous: *Please, Bob, don't insist,* she said. But I want to see my publisher, he replied. Her tone revealed depths of suffering often caused by his selfishness. Poor lonely woman!

Today I went to Elstree to have lunch and tea with Lion and Bobby Phillimore. I talked with her about her work, and told her some rather 10 severe home-truths, which she bore very well, though she had tears in her eyes. She is lonely, and I think means to be good; but her self-absorption is terrible. When I got home, Alys had a crying fit; I know it is my fault, and I must manage better, but it is hard. She too is lonely—good God, what a lonely world it is, though there are so many people in it.—In the evening, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* dinner: an advertisement under the guise of honouring learning. Heard that Cantor is mad and in an asylum. Sat between Larmor and Hobson of Christ's, who, when the Empire was praised, laughed in such loud derision that every one heard him. I liked him. A hollow affair: humbugs like Balfour and Lubbock, praise of the 20 Navy and Army and Royal Family, no genuine celebration of learning. It was an occasion to make one wish to be a foreigner. Tansley in the distance gave me a bad conscience.

November 25. (1902.) On Sunday we went to Hampton Court to the Creightons: Alys was at last informed of her election to the Cambridge Women's Dining Club, which pleased her exceedingly.¹ She said to Mrs. Creighton that she would like to stay with Evelyn when the dinners occur, that Evelyn was her dearest friend, to whom she felt as to a sister, and so on. It made me so sick that I blushed, and it made me dislike her, though according to her lights she was doing rather a fine thing. If only she were not 30 so crude! On the way home I paid an unfortunate visit to the Sandersons. Mrs. Sanderson talked against Italy, and against the people who are getting up the new Review (Trevy and Co.), both of which irritated me. Then Sanderson told me he didn't like my paper on Mathematics, and wouldn't print it, which hurt me very much, making me feel that the new work I have been trying is futile, and all the ordeal of pain so much waste. But I showed no vexation until Mrs. Sanderson began abusing dons; then I fairly lost my temper and abused her roundly. I got home very tired, and with all the life gone out of me; slept ten hours, woke exhausted, and passed my morning between dozing and misery. After lunch I roused myself to read to Alys. 40

¹ Yet she was only asked to one of their dinners. I wonder what she did at it?

Then it rained and Britten came to tea, and the world looked horribly dreary. At this moment Gilbert Murray arrived bringing his *Euripides*: he only stayed a minute, but it was a minute of sunshine, and I revived at once. I read over again all the dear lyrics about which my life is entwined, and fatigue and misery fell from me. We had a beastly dinner, Lion Phillimore, Alberto Ball, Mackinder, the de Filippi's, and Miss Hurlbatt of Bedford College, who seemed nice, as did de Filippi. Most of the people jarred me, misanthropy and misogyny settled on me like a cloud. At night, I didn't kiss Alys often enough, and she began to cry when I put out the light; but I did
 10 nothing to comfort her. Today she is unhappy: at breakfast I made some generalization against women, and she said bitterly to Lion that I knew a great deal about all women now-a-days. (I remember, I said they were all intolerant—God knows I am intolerant still.) Lion wasted my morning talking as usual in favour of religion; it was better when she talked against Logan, who, she says, used in Paris to be called "frightened Smith", because he was so afraid of not having the correct opinion. Alys went out to play golf, hating it. Lion made plans for her to play at Kendals in future, which was kind.

I must not fall back into hating every one except my friends; I had quite
 20 got out of it, but I must not let myself be at her mercy in those ways. London grows more and more odious to me, and I feel myself again growing rebellious. I must continue not to think of my own happiness—in the early autumn I was in a much better moral state, and poor Alys is suffering for my relapse.

(At this point, a leaf has been torn from the journal.)

November 28. (1902.) At luncheon, Alys had just come from seeing the Kinsellas, whose sister Joe had a baby this morning, and nearly died of it, being in fact not yet out of danger. The Kinsellas and Douglas had sat up all night in terrible anxiety. *I*: "It is a terrible position for a man, because he
 30 always feels as if he were to blame." *She* (in a tone of evident pleasure): "Yes, and Kate and Louise had been telling him he was." *I*: "That is one of those brutal actions that put people quite out of court. Doesn't thee feel it so?" *She* (feeling my disapproval of her levity): "Yes I do. They didn't tell him so, they only agreed when he said it." I went on for some time trying to make her see why I was shocked at her tone; at last she said: "Yes, I think it just as bad as a husband I knew who abused his wife when for the fourth time she had a daughter instead of a son." This was to turn the thing into a man-and-woman question, and make out that misogyny was at the bottom of my remarks. Then she began to cry, and I changed the subject while she
 40 took a second help of pudding (as I did also). Afterwards we went to Battersea Park for the innocent purpose of playing ball, and she returned to the matter, explaining away and denying her obvious pleasure in evil and in

the bullying of a MAN. Oh dear! when will she learn to understand things! Self-control is impossible for her even to imagine; at first she excused the Kinsellas because they were anxious about their sister, then she said she blamed them just as much as I did, but didn't think it necessary always to express a moral judgment in telling a story.—The incident was very painful to us both—I am exhausted by it.

December 1. (1902.) We spent Saturday to Monday at Oxford with the Stouts. She is a simple friendly good-natured Scotchwoman, educated and intelligent in books, but apparently very ignorant in human things. She has no fault I know of except fussiness; she shaves her husband, turns up his trousers for him when he goes out, tells him (and me) to put on dry shoes when we come in, makes one go much too early to dress or to catch a train. She likes Alys very much, finding her beauty (so she told me) a great delight to look at. She observed me closely, but I could not discover what she saw in me. Alys took her to supper at the Sidney Balls, where they talked of people she doesn't know, and she came home rather discontented at living so out of the world. I scented Alys's usual ways, and warned her this morning that she must cure herself of the habit of making people rebellious. She denied having it, and asked, very suspiciously, whether people told me she had that effect. I replied I had observed it. Stout has a quiet way of making one aware 20 when one has done wrong, without any possibility of one's taking offence, which is very admirable. He said (what is true) that the morality of my article in the *International Monthly* was questionable. Alys said that in playing golf with Emily Dawson she lets Emily win, and he asked her how she reconciled it to her veracity to do so.

Stout took me to see Bradley—a black-bearded man, with a very intellectual, very sensitive face, beautiful by the beauty of the mind that appears in it. His manners are very courteous and slightly shy. He has the spirituality of those who have worked in spite of great physical pain. I loved the man warmly. We discussed philosophy for some time. I vexed him very much 30 (quite unintentionally) by saying that in philosophical discussion, so far as I could see, one arrives usually at an ultimate difference as to premisses, where argument is no longer possible. This seemed to him scepticism and an attack upon his life's work. He controlled himself completely, but with difficulty. I was very sorry I had vexed him.

In the evening I dined in Corpus, where I met a young German named Shultz, who first did medicine and is now doing psychology. We argued as to the subjectivity of the object of knowledge, he for, I against; I thought him crude and youthfully confident, but able, and full of the divine fire. Afterwards I made a fierce onslaught on F. C. S. Schiller, with his William-James doctrine that the truth is what it pays to believe. I began really meaning to convince him, but the excitement of the game and the hatred of

his views overcame me, and I finally argued for the applause of the audience. I argued very well, and completely refuted him in every one's opinion, but I doubt if I affected his opinions much. In the morning, Stout quietly asked if I felt any compunction for my behaviour.

Mrs. Shuckburgh and May came to luncheon. Poor May, whom I hadn't seen since her tragedy, looked terribly pale and ill. I tried not to be too nice to her, but it was very difficult, she is so confiding. She begins at once talking of real things, with perfect assurance that I shall answer as she would wish; and it is impossible to withhold from her whatever of good I may have to give. It was very nice seeing them—they are very good people. When they went, I felt lost and lonely again; but it was a delightful moment.

December 2. (1902.) I am haunted by the memory of a day in January of this year. I walked alone through the woods: a cold frosty sun faintly illuminated a wintry landscape. Alys was ill at home; anguish lay behind, sorrow and difficulty ahead. It seemed as though winter would never end, and dimly I felt that the springs of other years were gone for ever. But out of the snow two pale untimely primroses raised their struggling heads, giving an earnest of better days to come, when the sun would be warm, the air mild, and sadness merely a poetic memory. Surely, I thought, with the flowers and the nightingales joy too will return, again love will gladden our hearts, and discord will be forgotten. Joy is not dead, but chilled by wintry blasts into sleep; soon, soon, our sorrows will be over, and she will recover the buoyant happiness that used to brighten every moment. I took the two primroses from their bed of snow, and offered them to her as a little token of love. Both of us were touched, deeply touched, and for a moment hope whispered honeyed words; but in our hearts we knew they were lies, we knew that spring was gone and youth was dead, we knew that never again would the sun shine for us as he had shone, never again would our hearts sing with the chorus of morning birds. The pathos of her life lived in my imagination in that moment, and I longed, with an infinite tenderness, to revivify my dying love. Almost I succeeded; but it was too late. The spring of which those poor flowers fondly dreamed never came, and never will come; in human lives, there is but one spring, and winter, when it comes, is not thawed by gentle winds from southern seas, but deepens slowly into Arctic night.

This morning I wrote the Preface to my book. This evening I dined with Tom Moore, who read me some of his unpublished poems. He is a most loveable man, and I think he is exceedingly high-minded. We praised Matthew Arnold; he had not understood "The Voice", which I interpret, in the obvious way, as referring to a woman he had renounced. Moore thought it referred to Dr. Arnold. His room has a deal table, a number of pictures, largely Japanese, two chairs, a very plain sofa, and no books. It looks very like St. Jerome's cell. We dined on a polished table with no tablecloth. He

appears to have achieved the combination of simplicity and austerity with beauty. Certainly he is a most remarkable man.

December 10. (1902.) Friday 5th to Monday 8th I spent at Cambridge. Alan Beeton and a French friend Rochot were at Grantchester; the friend had impressed Alan with Nietzsche and self-development as the creed for an artist. I combated the worship of force—successfully I think, for I was inspired by beautiful sentences on man as an exile in a hostile world. Evelyn was very ill; I read the *Bacchae* to the company. My visit was most profitable to myself and others. I returned to the dinner of the Coefficients at Haldane's, where we discussed the mechanism for political unity in the empire. 10 People's intellects impressed me as good; Sir E. Grey was very interesting; but I felt no sympathy with any of them except Reeves and Wells. Yesterday Fry went with us to a Dolmetsch concert, and Alys cried visibly during the music. Today she is very depressed. At Cambridge this time the notion of the Pilgrimage to the Mountain of Truth shaped itself in my mind—an idea in which I hope to find all the expression I want for my religion. Yesterday we had Mrs. Thackeray Ritchie to lunch. She told me how various friends of Carlyle had bought a clock to give him, and Grandma Stanley at Dover Street had presented it. This was after his wife's death. He had merely said: "Eh, what have I to do with Time any more?" Mrs. Ritchie said it was more 20 chilling than one could possibly imagine, the more so as it was true. She said she loved Carlyle more than his wife, though she was afraid of him.

December 13. (1902.) Last night when I went to bed Alys asked the time, which was 12.40. After the light was out she asked if I remembered the date—I had forgotten it was our wedding-day. Then presently her misery became uncontrollable, and I had to comfort her somehow. Poor woman! On the 9th we went to a Dolmetsch concert, and she cried visibly the whole time, because I had seemed a little vexed at her lending Murray's book without asking me. I was very vexed as a matter of fact, for it is one of the few refuges of privacy I have. Next day we went to see the Hobhouses, and 30 after we arrived she got so depressed that she went away without seeing them, leaving me to explain somehow. Leonard Hobhouse is bitter and despairing, saying philosophy is useless and futile, unprogressive and not worthy to be studied; not one among philosophers, he says, cares for truth, but only for maintaining some system. "I wrote a book", he exclaimed, "in which I tried to look at each question on its own account, and the only effect was that people said it was a farrago." Next day he came and apologised, saying it was not about philosophy, but about his own philosophy, that he was pessimistic. I comforted him as best I could by praising his book. His bitterness, I imagine, is due to the fact that his life has been ruined by his 40 wife's family, and I cannot believe he is fond of her, for she is frivolous and

silly. On the 10th I dined at the Courtney's, which was agreeable; she and I talked pro-Boer, and I got on with her very well. Afterwards I went to my dear brother's party—a shocking occasion, nasty women and silly men, and a debauchee Jepson, author of *The Passion for Romance*, the hero of which work, according to Molly's banter, is Frank. "You ought to write a second volume", she said, "in which the wicked Lord turns good." Ugh! On the 11th we dined with the Cobden-Sandersons to meet the Mackails. I liked him very much, though I thought his intellect very limited, and found his principles more democratic than they should be—he seemed to despise whatever does not appeal to the uneducated good heart. His charwoman, he said, is more in contact with reality than any one else he knows. He struck me as fanatical and unbalanced—very inferior to Gilbert.

December 17. (1902.) Jane Harrison stayed with us Friday to Monday. Gilbert and Mary came to lunch on Saturday, we went to Carlyle's House, and began a dispute, for he disapproves of both the Carlyles. I wrote out my views afterwards, and he agreed. Mary is very far from well; she is constantly in tears, and gets emotional on the slightest provocation. I don't think he is in any way to blame; he appears to me to do as much as possible. But of course it is impossible to know. Her face is that of a very good woman. Jane Harrison says she (Mary) has a great admiration for me, which is comforting, as I am very fond of her. Murray too I like better and better.—George Trevy told me his whole history, which is not concerned with any one I know. He is a good boy; I told him of my literary intentions, of which the execution is prospering.—On Monday the much-talked of meeting of the Webbs and Whiteheads was effected, with great success: there was mutual liking.—Monday night we dined with Aunt Maude, and I sat between Lady Hermione Blackwood, whom I believe I met in Paris, and Mrs. Jeyes, whom I had met as Miss Sherman, when she lived in Uncle Rollo's cottage. Lady Hermione was shy and rather stiff, her face at first sight heavy; but her smile and laugh were beautiful, and I thought her a very good woman. Alys told me afterwards that she is a nurse. Mrs. Jeyes, whom I had to talk to most of the time, was an odious but amusing adventuress. In an interval, alluding to Aunt Maude, she said "I believe they are talking of the Case (meaning a divorce-case which is going on). Sir Francis Jeune was terribly disappointed at not getting it—he loves such cases. And oddly enough, he likes to spend his leisure reading low French novels. He is a very cynical man—but not as cynical as you are. You are very old." "No one is old while he still likes to pose", I replied. "And what is your pose?" "Cynicism". At this point the conversation grew too complicated for her intelligence, and she had to begin afresh. After dinner, politeness compelled me to talk to Mrs. Lowndes, who described how she writes about good people providing Christmas amusements for children, though she herself

hates the little brats and never goes near them. I felt Lady Hermione to be a person I could have grown very fond of, but I did not succeed in saying anything to make her take an interest in me.

This morning I went to breakfast at Hampstead with the Beetons, in order to talk mathematics with Wickstead. He took me to task for my popular article in the *International Monthly*, and I admitted its flippancy. But in argument he was rather stupid, and the occasion was tiring. I saw Alfred and North and Tiny, but not Evelyn who was still in bed. Tonight Alan Beeton dines here for his good, to meet Tom Sturge Moore. Tomorrow Italy and exile. 10

Alys and I discussed the future, and I urged her being mostly in town, and my being mostly in the country, on account of our work. She said she would be willing if I loved her. Odd woman! She won't leave me unless I don't want her to do so—she is determined I should suffer somehow. But that is an unjust way of putting it.

January 14. 1903. Returned yesterday morning from Florence, where Alys was very unhappy, though I did my best for her. The atmosphere of Art and luxury was rather trying to me, and at first I couldn't understand why I had liked Bernard Berenson, but gradually I got to like him again. The place was exquisitely beautiful. I wrote part of an Essay on the Free Man's Worship; 20 also more of the Pilgrimage of Life; but I was rather uninspired. I read enormously to make up. Last night MacCarthy came and I talked to him in a way that I hoped would be useful. Today I heard from Gilbert that a rhapsody on tragedy I had sent him had induced him to start writing one. I dined tonight at the Davies's. Alys seems fairly happy. The river is by now an old friend to me—I could gladly live with it always.

January 27. (1903.) I spent some days at Cambridge. Evelyn is very ill with rheumatoid arthritis. My essay on the Free Man's Worship, which is finished, is all right; my more imaginative attempts are weak and affected, and must be discontinued. Alys came to Cambridge for a night, and was 30 terribly unhappy, because, being pressed and pressed as to why I wouldn't live in Cambridge, I had had to tell her (about six weeks ago) that she got on my nerves when she was with Cambridge people. She is behaving very well—at present she is working as a factory-girl in a factory to get knowledge about drink and so on. I am unhappy beyond what I know how to bear—dull, aching depression, not anguish—would it were! Happiness is gone for ever, my work is second-rate, and all I cared for is gone or going. The fire and inspiration I had has left me, and I cannot believe I shall do any more useful things to make the long pain worth while.

On Monday of last week, the Coefficients dined, and we discussed 40 Imperial Protection, or preferential tariffs in favour of the Colonies. Hewins

advocated them well, but I was relieved to find there was still a good deal of Free Trade sentiment even in that company. I said we ought not to offend foreign nations by a Tariff for fear of a League of Cambrai, for like Turkey we survive by international jealousies; but I was laughed at.

February 2. 1903. I spent two days with Aunt Agatha, then Saturday to Monday at the Murrays (where Alys joined me). Miss Gray, at Aunt Agatha's, was so stupid that she led me into an unkindness. She said (in answer to my regretting that England has fallen behind in electricity) that she was glad of it, for abroad they have so many earthquakes, and no one
10 knows what electricity may do. I argued mildly for some time, and then I said: Do you think it dangerous to see the new moon through glass, for I should think you would.—Alys at Churt spent the first evening trying to make me appear odious and ridiculous to Gilbert and Mary. Then she told them we were going back to the country entirely on my account, and Mary afterwards took me to task. So I told her town had been a terrible grievance the whole time. I told both of them a good deal. He told me a great deal about his troubles, which rather resemble mine. He is rather heroic in his endurance; for bad health worries him perpetually as well. He and I cheered each other greatly. In spite of all, I like her; but it is a pity. I have hopes that
20 he will reconcile me to being alive—life at this moment seems quite endurable.

February 10. (1903.) Two years ago today Gilbert read his *Hippolytus* at Cambridge. A year ago yesterday I told Alys not to be indiscreet. Today "The Free Man's Worship" came back from the typewriter—the total result of so much suffering.—Spent the morning making my Index; lunched alone (Alys had gone to the factory where she worked the week before last); afterwards rode with Alys in Battersea Park, and went with her to the Prothero's—Mrs. Prothero very agreeable. Mrs. Mackail was there—she makes me uncomfortable by her self-possession and apparent
30 indifference to what one thinks of her; I feel that she dislikes my fastidiousness and undemocraticness. She said Italy made her acutely miserable by its decay, and I replied that I felt happier where there was no hope, because hope is uncomfortable and involves fear. At this she went away. In the evening we had Beatrice Creighton and John Shuckburgh. I rather disliked her. She made fun of a certain lady-novelist (author of *Red Pottage*) for taking her work seriously, and praised Fitzgerald for his innocent *dolce far niente* existence, saying there was quite enough good poetry in the world already. At this I became vexed, and thumped the fire with the poker; after which I gave half an hour's lecture on poetry. She thinks herself competent
40 to judge things she can't understand. John was very preferable.

February 4-7 I spent at Cambridge—a very satisfactory time. There

seems reason to think that "The Free Man's Worship" is good. Alys dislikes the part about charity at the end! It was written as exhortation to myself to treat her decently. But she has never felt the kind of comradeship in disaster of which I speak—her unhappiness shut her up more than ever in herself.—I am learning not to feel tragic always. There are many times when existence seems unbearable; but if I see what work to do, and a reasonable prospect of accomplishing it, I can bear misery. It is when my life seems useless that despair comes. But fortunately now-a-days despair puts me to sleep—I sometimes doze most of the day. I am planning a work on the aim and scope of Philosophy.

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February 11. (1903.) Lunched with Masterman and George Trevy. Masterman was too Christian for me, and I liked him less than I had expected. George and I walked back here along the river, discussing History. He abused Bury's inaugural lecture, because it said the documentary style was alone legitimate. Then he talked of his own views, which are virtually that history should consist of political pamphlets. I talked of history as an art, but he was not interested, because, as he himself said, he couldn't do that sort of thing. So I pointed out that he was committing a fault just like Bury's. His self-absorption is sometimes painful.—I gave him the "Free Man's Worship", and he was overcome by it; he said it was the best thing he had ever read.—Then I had tea with May Shuckburgh, which was perfectly delightful. She is a real comfort to me.—I dined with Theodore, who talked as usual very interestingly about his work. He has suffered since childhood from the sense of the unreality of everything. I spoke of the revelation through Pain; and he doubted whether one could feel that in the presence of Death. He seems to me very unhappy, I don't know why.—The river tonight was beautiful beyond endurance—we walked across to Lambeth, and the Houses of Parliament looked utterly unreal. The river is becoming to me a passionate absorbing love; I could drown myself to be one with it. I have never loved anything inanimate so much.

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February 19. (1903.) Saturday to Monday we spent at the Verrals; I made friends with her, and liked her except for the fact that she does not care for perfection. On Monday Alys went to Manchester with her mother, and I went Tuesday to Thursday to Churt, having arranged the visit before I knew Gilbert would be gone. My two days there were very happy ones. Mary is very fond of me, and I like her better than she deserves. She sees, poor woman, so much more of what is right than she can accomplish. Her faults are (1) jealousy (2) too much care for her rights and for those of people she cares for (3) too much anxiety over trivial things, such as details of housekeeping (4) bad temper (5) general restlessness and rebellion (6) lack of self-control. Her virtues are (1) public spirit (2) a great love of virtue and

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desire to do right (3) a very strong impulse to all sorts of kind actions (4) a real care for good work, even Gilbert's. Both lists might no doubt be lengthened. Her attitude to Gilbert is curious. She is terribly anxious about his welfare, proud of his ability, eager for him to achieve as much as possible. But it rather vexes her to have him praised, because she feels as though it were at her expense; and she cannot refrain from little remarks designed to suggest that he has his faults. She has something of the same attitude about her children. She showed me verses to her that he had put in books given her when they were engaged; this made me so sad that I was
10 unable to say a single word about them. O the irony and emptiness and hollowness of everything that precedes disenchantment and hell! He wrote that my "Free Man's Worship" was not quite true, and I said I knew no one with such a scrupulous care for truth in general statements. She said that was odd, as he was given to embroidering yarns in a way that had been rather stopped since marriage.—Agnes is very friendly, and I am grateful to her. It is a happiness to me to be where there are children.

(At this point, two leaves have been cut out of the journal.)

March 8. (1903.) I spent March 3-6 at Cambridge—a quiet pleasant time. There is something peaceful in looking back upon the emotions of youth, as
20 an extinct crater, covered with green vegetation, might remember the hot fire and lava that once issued from it. The present is less interesting, less living, but more beneficent.—Friday 6th, Miss Birch to lunch: clever, worldly, with the phrases of a real person, but not the heart; I do not think there is the root of the matter in her. [This judgment is mistaken; her worldliness is only an armour against ridicule (1905).] In the evening I dined with the Davies's: the absence of women gave me a moment of real delight, and the talk, as usual, was balm to me. Yesterday the Whiteheads came, and left this evening: a successful visit, though Alys was unhappy till this morning. I was throughout in a mood of blank misery; I have been realizing
30 that I don't do enough for Alys, but the thought of doing more is unbearable almost. There is only one thing more I can do, and that is children; if medically not inadvisable, that is what I must do. Suppose I have a child full of Carey and Mrs. Smith, and see all its faults being exaggerated! It may drive one or other of us mad; but probably it is worth trying. The thought is hell, but so is the fear of her suicide. Tonight I had a long affectionate talk with her, in hopes of giving her some happiness. She is making heroic efforts; yet she told me it was such a comfort to be able to listen to Evelyn's troubles without getting depressed! Strange woman! I am sorry for her, infinitely sorry.

40 I have been writing on History, but without any great success.

March 13. (1903.) I saw Dr. Savage yesterday, who said it was my duty to run the risk of conception, the fear of heredity being grossly exaggerated. He says 50 per cent of insane have alcoholic parentage, only 15 per cent insane parentage. This seems to settle the matter.² But probably no result will follow from the attempt.—Lion was here all day yesterday, and told me the history of Mrs. Sanger. She talked much and intimately: I disliked her less than usual. But I wish she were less indecent.

March 15. (1903.) Today we went to call on Cousin Maggie Elliot. The servant said "at home", and as we walked up the stairs my heart warmed at the thought of her kind smile, and I rejoiced that I was going to see her. But a strange lady received us, and in answer to our inquiries replied: "Oh, she has been dead two years." I seldom thought of her, but when I did, she was a bright spot in the world to me—so good and cheerful and full of fun: and to be greeted so suddenly with her ghost! It was horrible. We walked away in silence; at last, with all the composure I could muster, I said: "That was very disconcerting." "Yes", she replied, "one hates to do a thing that makes one look so silly. I hope the lady didn't catch our name." "Oh well, I dare say she knows nothing about us", I replied. And then we lapsed into silence again. The first time we went there together, Cousin Maggie gave an account of her connection with the founding of the Metropolitan Association for Befriending Young Servants, and said she considered herself its grandmother. "Very young grandmother", Alys replied, with a complimentary smirk. That was in June 1894: Cousin Maggie must have been sixty-five or so at the time. She had the good taste to pretend not to hear.

March 18. (1903.) Last night for the first time I made the last possible sacrifice. In return I am to have three weeks' liberty. Perhaps that will give me time to recover myself for the moment: till it all begins again.

April 8. (1903.) Churt. My three weeks' holiday was reduced to a week with George Trevy in Devonshire, because Moore, to whose reading party I was going, wrote curtly to say he didn't want me. He has never forgiven my homilies, though they produced the reformation I hoped for. The last sacrifice to Alys was not adequately carried out, and failed totally: she has been very depressed, and explained, with perfect clear-sightedness, why she had hated it, and didn't want a repetition at present. I shirked my duty on that occasion: I ought to have been more self-forgetful. But one good effect has resulted: her feelings won my respect, and I like her better than I

² But he didn't say what proportions of the total population are insane and drunken respectively, so that his argument is formally worthless.

have done for a long time. Consequently I have been able to have more pseudo-intimate talk with her, and she is much cheered up the last two days. Until then, I was about as miserable as I have ever been, though without any sharp anguish. The power of writing has for the present deserted me completely; I began on *Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. II, but made no progress; then an imperative need of achievement possessed me, so I am writing an article on Meinong. Some few shreds of self-respect come to me in this way.—Mary Murray is infinitely kind; she is definitely on my side, but does a great deal for Alys. It is not the least use attempting not to like

10 Mary Murray.—I see her faults very plainly, yet she is a great comfort to me, and her liking warms me when my soul seems frozen. I read Tolstoï's *Roman du Mariage* the other day: it is very much my own case, and extraordinarily true, like everything of his. That and *Quisanté* together express most of it.—Gilbert is still in Italy; I long for his return. I wonder how long one can preserve a friendship before it becomes a source of pain³—if one could avoid even the smallest sins, the joy might last a good while. But such tiny sins destroy it all! However, the Murrays are still both a source of joy to me, and so are their children.

May 18. (1903.) Churt. My birthday, as Alys reminded me when I woke.

20 Poor woman! Anniversaries and such things are infinitely important to her, and I can never remember them. But it has set me thinking how “the bygone year ... made my tossed heart its very life-blood spill, yet could not break it.”

This day last year I was at Friday's Hill with the Webbs and Jane Harrison, finishing my book. The day, I remember, stood out as one of not utter misery. At that time, I was inspired; my energy was ten times what it usually is, I had a swift insight and sympathy, the sense of new and wonderful wisdom intoxicated me. But I was writing cold letters to Alys, in the deliberate hope of destroying her affection; I was cruel still, and ruthless

30 where I saw no self-denial practised. Also I was reckless in giving sympathy in cases where it would have been better to withhold it; and I had not learnt to forego the affection of people I was fond of. In these ways I have improved, though in all other ways I have gone down hill, and shall necessarily continue to do so.

As regards the achievements of the year, I finished my book at the Mill House on May 23. The next day (I think) was the peace, and we decorated the whole place with bunting, and all was gladness. And I too felt a great joy that the outer world was not such a ruin as the inner; but yet, the contrast was all but unbearable, and in solitude I sobbed uncontrollably. In June

40 came May Shuckburgh's tragedy, which was very overwhelming; and the

³ Nearly two years in this case [1905].

next day came Alys's return, the direct question, and the answer that love was dead; and then, in the bedroom, her loud, heart-rending sobs, while I worked at my desk next door. In the evening I walked with Berenson: the beauty of the western twilight, in that strange wood, was disquieting, wonderful, inspiring. I came home and wrote "Monotonous, melancholy, eternal", etc.; a strange, unimaginable, unforgettable day. The early part of it I spent reading Maeterlinck's *Le Trésor des Humbles*, in which he says souls are now in closer contact than formerly; certainly that was a day of close contact. Oh the pity of it! How she was crushed and broken! How nearly I relented and said it had been all lies! And how my soul hardened from moment to moment because I left her to sob! In the middle of the night, she came to my door to say she was calmer now, and would hope—poor, poor woman. And she still hopes, but now it is hardly more than a phrase, and I doubt if the old thing would really please her now—except that it would enable her to despise me so very thoroughly. I do not believe, in my soul, that I was justified; and I don't know whether I am justified now. But I have certainly effected a great moral reformation in her; and that depends upon keeping her hopes alive but unfulfilled. This requires vacillation—occasional great friendliness, occasional censure. And this I do. But heaven knows it is difficult; and it absorbs my best energies in an inconceivable degree.

Then came that strange life in the Past, first at Pembroke Lodge, afterwards in College; where the real world seemed a dream, and only the dead appeared real. And I sat alone, reading ghostly books; and I worked at Frege, Meinong, and proofs, feeling all work a mere hollow sham. And I went to Mrs. Shuckburgh and spoke about the Book of Job; and a deep affection grew up on both sides; and I became friends with Mrs. Frank Darwin.

Then Little Buckland: in a glass bowl, a gold-fish swam round and round, pressing his nose against the glass, endlessly longing to escape from his prison into the world of light. There I felt that Mrs. Webb had gone over to the other side, and I quarrelled with her. I worked ten hours a day, till I could hardly stand or see for fatigue; I realized that Alys's love must not be killed, and that her virtue must be my care, probably for ever; and day by day the inspiration left me, and the long task claimed me. But still, often, I said cruel things that stabbed her, and I felt dimly that only what gives pleasure is wrong, but what gives pain is always either right or at least pardonable.

Then came her September collapse, when she made me realize that I must never leave her for long.

And then came those strange months in town, where I learnt to be a social being and not a person of fire and insight; and where she was miserable the whole time, in spite of the pleasure of getting on. There I wrote my paper on

Mathematics, in October, while the autumn leaves fell. That and "The Free Man's Worship" make up the sum-total of my achievement in permanent form from September to March (both included). But since coming here, the last chink of daylight has been shut out from my prison, and I have gone back to the old work; it is difficult, so difficult that from sheer despairing fatigue I feel often ready for suicide; and its value has come to seem to me very small; and I make no progress with the Contradiction. But Alys says it is a comfort to her to feel that I am happy now-a-days, and that I never get tired; and that is one successful piece of work I have accomplished.

10 Of permanent possessions for myself I have acquired a good many; a year ago, I was only just beginning to have friendships, and to live in the lives of others. And the river at night is another acquisition which I value very deeply. Thus there is gain and loss; anguish is dead, weariness and work remain, and she must still be helped.

May 23. (1903.) A year ago today I finished my book. Four days ago I solved the Contradiction—the relief of this is unspeakable.—Alys is fast robbing me of Mary's friendship. Mary Murray and Gilbert were talking of guardians for their children in the event of their dying, and he suggested me. She said there was no knowing whether I should be a fit person twenty
20 years hence—Alys had evidently been telling her I was unstable. Today she said she had discovered I took no real interest in human things, because she found I didn't tell Alys things I had been told, showing I had forgotten them. I do not know quite what to do under these circumstances. I hate losing her friendship, and I think Alys will be bad for her, while I should do her good. But it seems hard on Alys to stand in the way of her making good friends, and to assume that fundamentally she has not improved. I must wait and see how things develop.

July 26. (1903.) No improvement in the last two months. She is still miserable; she still says things that make me feel rasped through and
30 through, and still day by day I wonder how another twenty-four hours of such utter misery can be endured. But there is every reason to expect forty years of just such torture. In some ways, her illness makes things easier; when she is bouncing and metallic, she is much harder to bear. Poor woman! When she is not present, I am sorry for her; but when I see and hear her, I become all nerves, and can think of nothing but the wish to escape. She is always bumping into furniture, treading on one's toes, and upsetting lamps; and mentally she does just the same sort of thing. She asked me why I won't undress in her presence. The other day she wept, and said she had gone right out of my life: I tried to say gently that I had had to learn to live
40 alone: "I know", she replied, "the ascent to the stars must be made in solitude." N.B. This is flattery, and is designed to please, for it is well

known that all *men* like flattery.—My work goes badly: new difficulties come up as fast as the old ones are solved. The political events interest me immensely, and if I could get away from her, I could work at Free Trade as well as mathematics; but I am spending on not being cruel to her as much energy as would make a whole political campaign. And the irony is that we are both wretched, and that she would be quite happy if I were dead, and no longer there to remind her of the wound to her vanity. Oh it is damnable. My mind is going. I can no longer write. But if I go away, even for two days, I become a different person.

I have left the Coefficients, because the Empire has come to seem to me 10 not worth preserving. Theodore seems to me more and more admirable: he works magnificently, though he is so unhappy that he hardly knows how to keep from suicide. I tried to persuade Alys she would give more help to other people if she could give up the struggle for private happiness, but she assured me that people come to her rather than me with their troubles, as a proof of the contrary. She also instanced Evelyn on her side. What a strangely unreal world she lives in! She told me once that Mary Murray was more intimate with her than with me—I suppose because she talks more about the children's clothes. I suppose she will never learn that other people have more important things than clothes and food in their lives. She says 20 Mary Murray is a person one could get intimate with in five minutes, and she doesn't know the bare outline of her emotional life. She still, in her instincts, despises every one except her mother.

April 6. 1904. This journal gives an unduly bad view of Alys. I think she has improved greatly, and that I was for a time very unjust to her. She had most of the faults I attributed to her, but she had many virtues that I forgot all about. She has shown great pluck, and a great desire, mainly successful, to be unselfish towards me. But she is still full of jealousy, though she never consciously acts upon it. To many other people she is a great help, almost an inspiration; and she is the very soul of kindness to people who do not come 30 into competition with her. But she dislikes my helping people. She said the other night that Evelyn had told her my friends feel that I am fickle, and my friendship is not to be counted on. She said Evelyn had instanced herself and Alfred, the Davies's and Sanger; to whom Alys added my people and hers. When I think of the causes of my changes towards all of these, I do not feel blameless, but I wonder that she dares to instance them. She went on to suggest that, as I was so variable, I had better not try to help people, since I should only cause them pain in the end by getting tired of them. She instanced Miss Pretious as a person it is a mistake to befriend. It was so plausible, and so nearly true, that, if I had not been on my guard, I might 40 have been angry with Evelyn, and have given up trying to be useful to people in trouble, which has become my chief consolation, and which, I am

sure, I do well. But she didn't know her own motives.—It is too true that I am changeable. Helen Thomas is here, and I quite dislike her. She is always reminding me of Grace. But broadly all changes hitherto are connected with my changes towards Alys, which, I think, are not a sign of fickleness.

January 14. 1905. 4 Ralston Street, Chelsea. My circumstances have much improved during the past year; as for me, I have improved in some ways and deteriorated seriously in others. I have got over my chief sorrow pretty completely—more completely than is desirable, but that can't be helped. I have learnt a *modus vivendi* with Alys: I never look at her, so that I avoid the
10 pain of her insincere expression and the petty irritation of her awkwardness of movement. I know less of what she feels, in consequence of this plan; but that makes me better able to be uniformly kind to her (in which I have made great progress), and also better able to act in ways she dislikes, without consciously and deliberately thwarting her. She has consequently grown much less unhappy, though I think she will never be happy as long as I remain alive. Our relations have become more fixed and formal, and it is no longer necessary to fight for so much of liberty as I consider it justifiable to claim. Her character is not greatly amended; in one case, in which she had conceived a jealousy, she permitted herself definitely untrue slanders with a
20 view to causing me to dislike the object of her jealousy. Whether she has done so in any other case, I do not know. I have been less angry with her for serious faults than for a thing in which the blame attaching to her was small. During the summer, at a time when I was away, she gave my mother's miniature to Barrett to clean; Barrett spilled water on it, smudged it, and destroyed it. I said no word of blame to Alys; but I did what was perhaps worse, I said a few words of blame of Alys to Lucy Donnelly, who was with us at the time. However, I said very little: only that I had refrained from blaming her for giving it to a servant to clean, and that she couldn't understand why I wouldn't have it restored by Mrs. Mason, whom I think
30 sentimental and self-absorbed and an intolerably bad miniature-painter, and who in any case could not have given me back the thing I had loved, with the more intensity because I had not permitted the same sort of love to grow up towards any other possession. I was vexed, not only because of the loss, but also because she thought she knew better than I did how to take care of things I valued, and therefore took the opportunity of my absence to do what she knew I should not have wished; also because she did not feel the sacrilege of giving such a thing to a common whore, which goes with her asking Barrett to sit down and join a children's party she gave in the spring. I minded the loss of the picture quite immensely; I don't know how long it
40 will take me really to forgive her.

The beginning of a more durable life for me was my time in politics last winter. I was less unsuccessful as a speaker than I had expected to be; but

what I liked was the cooperation with such a large part of the nation in an object which I believed to be very important. The relations with other people engaged in the same work were very agreeable to me. And the relief to my philanthropic impulses (which I have usually repressed with great severity) has made me ever since less restive in doing my own work. And of course the work was made pleasant by the fact that it occurred just at the time when numbers of people were beginning to see through Chamberlain, so that the work was associated with the success of free trade.

I have made myself again less observant of people than I had become; this was necessary in order to remain fit for my work. Yet the number of my friends has increased, and many of the friendships I already had have improved. This is what chiefly makes life easily endurable. But old temptations, which I had thought conquered, have returned upon me; and I am in danger of getting a love of power—the power of the father confessor.

I have changed my mind about Gilbert Murray and Mary Murray in consequence of new facts. I now think her less blameworthy than him.

March 9. 1905. Chelsea. It is strangely difficult for me to live a good life; I feel temptations that I cannot think decent people feel. As I have lost the fire and inspiration that for a time helped me over all difficulties, I have grown aware of new possibilities of serious wrong-doing. The habit of not speaking to Alys about anything that really interests me, and the instinct of concealing my feelings from her, make it very hard not to be untruthful with her, and not to keep silence about things that I ought to tell her about. I do not always resist this temptation successfully; and what is worse, it is making me generally secretive. But that is not the worst. I foresee that continence will become increasingly difficult, and that I shall be tempted to get into more or less flirtatious relations with women I don't respect. Where I feel respect or real affection, it is fairly easy to behave rightly; the difficulty is where I feel that a slightly wrong behaviour would not do any moral injury to its object. There is no doubt a sexual element in my desire to be intimate with women I respect; but in that I see no harm. It is only to be discovered by inference and general principles, and if duly kept in check, seems rather good than bad. But the other is wholly bad; it not only ought not to be indulged, but it ought not to be felt. The worst of it is that, unless I find some way of dealing with it, it will presumably grow stronger; and some day, in a moment of weakness, I may persuade myself there is no harm in acting upon it. It is rather a mental than a physical feeling; it is a desire for excitement, and for a respite from the incessant checking of every impulse. Another difficulty, connected with this, is the very slight interest I take in my work and in philosophy generally. If this can't be cured, my fertility will cease. A sort of paralysis of impulse has passed from my life into my thinking, and seems to me very serious for my intellectual future. But I

don't know at all how to deal with these problems.

April 3. 1905. A definite step in further estrangement from Alys has been taken lately, and as a result she has been almost as miserable as she ever was. But I think now, when she is miserable, she only thinks of leaving me, not of suicide. She has behaved, under the influence of an utterly groundless jealousy, just as badly as at her worst. In this case, since her jealousy can hardly injure any one but herself, I have taken very little trouble to allay it. One day, after discovering various slanders she had been spreading, I found her so unhappy that my anger vanished, and out of mere kindness I began to assure her, quietly and seriously, that there was no reason for jealousy. Thereupon she swore she had no such feeling, that I showed a complete misunderstanding of her by such an accusation, that she had entirely got over the habit of lying, and so on. Since then, in all the ways I have been able to discover, she has lavished fulsome praises on the object of her jealousy whenever she has mentioned her or had to do with her. Her lies to me were so bland and so apparently candid that my heart hardened towards her again, and I have let her suffer without making any endeavour to comfort her. She has given up kissing me morning and evening, which is a great gain. In other ways too, she has realized more than before that our relations must be purely formal. My impression is that, unless I relent, she will get tired of living with me, and will take to paying longer and longer visits to her people. They are her only real friends: every one else who knows her well dislikes her. And yet almost all her faults spring from the desire to be liked. Stupidity is really the main thing in her character; for the rest, I think she is impulsive and very unconscious. I think even her elaborate schemes of malice are concocted in a moment, and acted on before she knows what she is doing. She never says anything, either in praise or blame, because it is the fact, but always with an ulterior motive. I have now definitely given up the hope of any serious improvement in her, and I look forward to a gradually increasing separation, which will probably make the future much easier for me.

Part II

“Refuge in Pure Contemplation”

The Pilgrimage of Life [1902–03]

ON 14 JANUARY 1903 Russell noted in his “Journal” (1): “I wrote part of an Essay on the Free Man’s Worship; also more of the Pilgrimage of Life; but I was rather uninspired.” The drafts of an unfinished writing, which Russell planned to call “The Pilgrimage of Life”, are probably the set of twenty-one “disjointed reflections” he sent Lady Ottoline Morrell on 26 April 1911. On 22 April he had offered to let her see “various unsuccessful attempts at writing, mixed up with private reflections, that I made nine years ago. You will see just how they fail, and why I had to give it up. The only point of your reading them would be to see how they fail” (#37). On 26 April he explained further:

Here is a mass of stuff, mostly not up to much—still, in parts it may interest you. They are a set of disjointed reflections, for the most part, with which I tried to solace myself when I much needed solace. To me they are reminiscent of the places where I wrote them. The first was written out of doors on a hill near Midhurst—others in various places—Cambridge, Fernhurst, Salisbury Plain, Cheyne Walk. (#43b)

This evidence allows for the conjectural identification of the meditative passages, although it is possible that discovery of missing documents will change the picture.

There are useful clues to tracing the composition of the “disjointed reflections”. On 10 December 1902 Russell noted in his “Journal”: “At Cambridge this time the notion of the Pilgrimage to the Mountain of Truth shaped itself in my mind—an idea in which I hope to find all the expression I want for my religion.” This may have been a plan to organize material at which he had been working for some months. They are strongly religious and a refinement of his plan would have been a natural development in pursuing the religious theme. The concept of a journey to the allegorical Mountain of Truth does not, however, give structure to the surviving writings. Another “Journal” reference concerning a conversation with G. M. Trevelyan is suggestive: “I told him of my literary intentions, of which the execution is prospering” (17 Dec. 1902), but Russell does not specify a literary subject.

On 18 May 1903, his thirty-first birthday, Russell recalled, in reviewing the past year, “a strange, unimaginable, unforgettable day” when he came home to write “‘Monotonous, melancholy, eternal’ etc.”, the opening words of “The Ocean of Life” (2p), dated on the manuscript June 1902. The reference in the “Journal” on 18

May 1903 to his "strange life in the Past" suggests "The Past" (2i), possibly composed in the year under review. Discouragement with the literary project soon led Russell to write in his "Journal" on 27 January 1903 that, while he was satisfied with "The Free Man's Worship" (4), "my more imaginative attempts are weak and affected, and must be discontinued." These strictures were very likely on "The Pilgrimage of Life" the writing of which had been frustrated. He repeated the complaint in a letter of 28 February 1903 to Bernard Berenson, the connoisseur and art critic with whom he had discussed aesthetic matters. Reacting earlier to Berenson's sumptuous surroundings at I Tatti near Florence, Russell had commented: "the business of existing beautifully, except when it is hereditary, always slightly shocks my Puritan soul" (1967, 162); there is something of Russell's Puritan soul in his remark on attempts to write beautifully:

After much labour, I have abandoned, at any rate for the present, the hope of writing anything of a purely imaginative kind. The intellectual habit is too imperious with me, and I cannot get it out of my instincts. (28 Feb. 1903)

Russell's powers of self-criticism led him to confess further to Berenson that, while the essay is his natural literary form, "all my other attempts have been utter failures, palpably so even to me".

The writings probably intended to become "The Pilgrimage of Life" were left incomplete. Russell commented to Lady Ottoline that the materials seemed unpublishable:

I don't want my old papers back—I am sure they are not right either in matter or in form. One wants something much more restrained—they were written chiefly as a relief—it is a comfort to write things out in those moods, but it is not a good method of producing things fit for publication. (# 100, [2 June 1911])

The surviving sections are assembled here for the first time. Some units may be seen as detachable and movable to other positions, but their thematic interconnections and repetitions are so many that each fragment comments on others. For example, "2a" might initially be judged as autonomous because of the length and the single use of a philosophical title. However, the emphasis here on the nostalgia for the lost ideal, the brevity and pain of life and the consequent need for austerity recurs so often throughout all the fragments as to argue for the unity of the whole. The reader will doubtless be enticed to find still other patterns.

The meditations which were to be "The Pilgrimage of Life" belong to a period of reappraisal in Russell's life induced by marital tensions. As outlined in the headnote to 1, Alys was seriously depressed and Russell verged on the same state. The needs for solace which he expressed to Lady Ottoline on 26 April 1911 had been mentioned also to Gilbert Murray on 16 December 1902.

I have been making myself a shrine, during the last eight months, where I worship the things of beauty that I have known; and I have learnt to live in this worship even when I am outwardly occupied with things that formerly would have been unendurable to me. A private world, a world of pure contemplation, is a wonderful refuge; but it is very necessary to preserve it from pollution. Strange, the isolation in which we all live; what we call friendship is really the discovery of an isolation like our own, a secret worship of the same gods.

The reference may be specifically to the fragments, with the language suggesting that found in "The Pilgrimage" pieces. There were three main factors influencing their mood. First was the "conversion" (of February 1901) from "flippant cleverness" to deepened human concern (1967, 146). Another factor was the intellectual set-back caused by his discovery of the class paradox; and finally there was the catastrophic realization that he no longer loved his wife Alys. "The Pilgrimage of Life" was thus to be Russell's literary response to crises of ethical values, intellectual work and personal relationships.

The literary inspiration is various, and the project is more ambitious than Russell's first religious reflections in the "Greek Exercises" (1888–89) and "A Locked Diary" (1890–94). "The Pilgrimage of Life" appears to have been intended as an introspective journey, allegorical and meditative rather than a forthright confession of religious aspiration and doubt. Russell wrote as a prose poet, drawing on John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* (1678), a classic English allegory of spiritual search undoubtedly known to him from his Nonconformist upbringing. His library copy was published in 1902, suggesting renewed interest in Bunyan. Russell's familiarity since boyhood with Dante's *Divine Comedy* had further alerted him to the possibility of writing allegory. The distinctly allegorical pieces of "The Pilgrimage of Life" are "The Return to the Cave", "The Two Races of Man" and "Duty and Fate". Russell's "florid and rhetorical ambitions" at this time, to which he confesses in "How I Write" (1956b, 196), were inspired by the seventeenth-century prose styles of the Nonconformist John Milton and the high Anglican Jeremy Taylor. Taylor's baroque style may be found particularly in "The Ocean of Life". There is an Emersonian ring in "The Message of Nature", a rhetorical arousal reminiscent of Carlyle in "The Communion of Saints" and Platonic metaphor in "The Return to the Cave". Thus the centuries and cultures are spanned in an effort to find the appropriate way to express religious anxieties and hopes in literary language.

Russell's immediate literary inspiration at this time was the Belgian playwright, thinker and popular mystic, Maurice Maeterlinck. Looking back in his *Autobiography*, Russell says that in his unhappiness he "even descended to reading Maeterlinck" (1967, 151). But at the time he had been filled with enthusiasm for all of his works, writing to Alys on 12 and 13 June 1902 recommending *Le Temple enseveli* (1902) and asking whether she knew of the rest of his writings. On 27 June he also recommended the book to Helen Thomas Flexner for its "admirable morality,

expressed in very exquisite prose", and on 2 August he recommended a section from *Le Temple enseveli* on "The Past" as spiritual medicine by which to turn past discouragements of life to good account. On 6 July he told Lucy Donnelly, "I have been reading Maeterlinck's works straight through" (1967, 162). Maeterlinck's elevated style and the brief, sententious meditative form of his prose poems inspired Russell's style and form in "The Pilgrimage of Life" fragments.

A further inspiration was *Trivia*, written by Russell's brother-in-law Logan Pearsall Smith and published in a limited run of three hundred copies in 1902. On 4 June 1902 Russell wrote to Alys, "I have read *Trivia*, and I think many of the things quite charming". Like Maeterlinck's evocative paragraphs, these brief thoughts comment on the wonder, curiosity and sadness of life. Pearsall Smith had earlier recommended the decorative prose of Walter Pater, and suggestions of it too may be found. For instance Pater's "A Child in the House" (1878) hints at Russell's theme and, to some extent, his manner in 2c.

Twenty-one discrete fragments form part of Lady Ottoline Morrell's collection of Russelliana at the Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin. A full bibliographical account of the manuscripts to which we attribute the title "The Pilgrimage of Life" is found in the textual notes.

2a The Return to the Cave

H E WHO WOULD be a wise statesman, Plato tells us, must emerge from the cave of common life into the daylight of the ideal world; he must learn to look upon the sun, to know and love the good. But when this education is completed, he must return again to the shadows, to the tasks and disgusts of the cave, putting away, for the service of his fellow-men, the spectacle of what is best. In the realm of light, the sun shines and the day vibrates with joy; there is the world of our choice, the world of beauty and hope, the home of the soul. But below, from the dwellers in shadow, comes a dumb cry for help, for tidings of the upper air, 10 for guidance in the winding passages of the twilight. Confused sounds of weeping, of strife, of hatred and cruelty, of ruin and shame and despair, bring an appeal which dare not be gainsaid; for Pity, the messenger from the inhabitants of darkness, summons us back into the abyss.

The return to the cave, in some form and at some time, is unavoidable if we would employ our time aright. For some knowledge of the good that ought to exist seems essential to right action; and yet right action, as a rule, involves the renunciation, in our own lives, of much that the knowledge of the good shows to be precious.

It is good, when it is possible, that the young should possess liberty and a 20 power of deciding their own lives; but it is not good to seek to keep liberty. We can choose, within limits, what part of the machine of society we will be; but only by becoming a part can we serve the life of the whole. Thus manifold ties grow out of every right use of freedom; and external freedom is only wisely used when it is surrendered. But in losing freedom, it is essential that we should not allow the world to smirch our ideals, or to renounce the worship which we learnt in our unfettered times. In the darkness of the cave, we must remember the golden world above; for only so can we keep before us the distant goal of all the weariness and the labour. There are voices in the air that whisper sweet hopes, on the horizon there are shadows 30 of a forbidden beauty. Although we may not seek their home, for we are exiles from the land of the heart's desire, yet we must not lose the light which they shed upon our path.

But in an evil world, where only a few struggling years are given to each of us, it is needful that we should forego many things which must form part of any heaven we can imagine, and might, if we so chose, form part also of our own possessions. And among these things are included some which, if duty permitted them, would be the very best of all. Thus austerity must invade every part of our emotions, and to no one of them, except the love of goodness in itself, can we allow a free and unfettered growth. Of human 40 affections, as of all else, this cruel necessity holds. Whether, by the strength that comes of right action, and by the community in sorrow and devotion, a

substitute may be found which outweighs the loss, is a question which every man must answer by his own experience; certain it is, in any case, that a most precious aroma of tenderness, possible to those who serve no greater gods, must be lost where love is subordinated to sterner ends. And owing to the excellence of what must be foregone, many fail to perceive the rightness of such a sacrifice. But great as it is, it is not without its compensations, if only it is rightly made. Some goods there are—and perhaps they are the greatest that are possible in this life—which result from the renunciation of private desires, and are attainable only by those who give a lodging within
10 their inmost sanctuary to all the evil of the world.

When first from the kingdom of dreams the exile arrives, friendless and unfamiliar, in the dim region of fact, an utter loneliness, a feeling of the unreality and littleness of all things, oppresses and paralyzes him. "Men still come and go, they talk, they laugh, they pursue their business, they seek eagerly a phantom happiness. Strange! what object can they find worth so much activity? From an infinite distance I watch their movements, like the movements of ghosts in a dream: unintelligible to me are their desires, their hopes, their aims, as of beings from another world. Alone, infinitely alone, I wonder about human life: when desire and hope are dead, mankind become
20 a riddle to which the key is lost. Alien to me are the ways of men, remote from my dream are all their thoughts. Yet this is the human race! For this, life is sacrificed, pain is endured; for this happiness is to be put away, for this the soul is to be covered with a black veil of agony, through which the sunlight barely shimmers. Why be active among the ghosts, why speak to them as though they were flesh and blood, or work for them as though they had living human souls? Life is a cruel enigma, and the insight that sometimes seems to come is but the last mockery of our weakness." So he reflects, while the darkness is still new, while the memory of the sun still blinds his vision to the shapes that move through the gloom.

30 But gradually, in his new environment, he learns to find again much of what was best in his former habitation, and to see new goods springing from the bond that ties him to the under world. By the growth of wisdom, by the death of Self, by the feeling of participating in the vast process by which humanity is developing its unknown destiny, he learns to unlock the hearts of men, to know the strange power of the pageant of history, and to draw peace from the silent strength of Nature. He finds in the world many things that he can love: some with the love that is born of admiration, more with that other love that arises through service and through the bonds of duty.

The greatness of Self, its virtue, its wisdom, its beauty, have been set
40 before men by many moralists. Christianity, which preached abasement before God, has given place to a cult of the dignity of Man. In Carlyle, in Ibsen, in Nietzsche, the aim proposed to the individual lies within himself: he is to be strong, to develop himself freely, to be a lord of life, the

unfettered master of all his acts. Of the rest of mankind, of the inanimate world, and of the realm of truth, nothing is said except in so far as they may minister to the single soul.

But this creed forgets that every man is placed in a society, in a world where others have ends as legitimate as his own, where his deeds can alter, for good or evil, the lives of those about him. That it is good to be great, when it is possible, is doubtless true; but it is not the end of any one man's life, and it is not best achieved, as a rule, by proposing it as our aim. The ends of each life lie mainly outside itself; and by placing them within, the door is opened to anarchy, cruelty, and oppression.

10

There is a marriage with the world to which the soul that would bear fruit must submit. No joy is in this marriage, and the love that it brings has nothing of lyric delight. Well may the soul quail before such a union; for the world woos in rough fashion, promising nothing, giving nothing, but like a conqueror demanding all, the uttermost farthing, and then the very life-blood, drop by drop, slowly, relentlessly, till all is gone. By the bond of its demands it holds the soul to its service, of which the value is appraised by the value of what it causes to be sacrificed. In the years of bondage, the memory of freedom fades away, regrets become rarer, the iron enters into the soul, and the image of untrammelled joys grows pale. But to the soul that 20 the world has subdued children are born through the portal of pain, immortal children, that the world must love and cannot cause to suffer. They are the light of the world, shining, untroubled, untouched by the torture that heralded their birth. For them that marriage must be endured; for them the soul must forego its solitary calm, admitting into its sanctuary the turmoil, the cruelty, the ruthless dominion of the world.

The children of the soul belong to the world, and to it alone they give joy: to the soul belongs only the labour and the pain. But to the soul, when it is not broken in the service of the world, comforters come, whose friendly voices ease the weariness of the road.

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These comforters are Courage, Love, and Peace. The world at first terrifies the soul, for its countenance is stern and sad and relentless, and drives into madness those who cannot bear the full terror of its majestic frown. But after the advent of Courage, the soul dares to see the world's evil, though it may not yet have eyes for the world's good. Courage is the first consoler, the friend of a soul that still remembers other days, that still feels the pangs of its bondage, that still, in moments of weakness, dreams of flight to the green meadows of careless joy.

"To be stoical and yet gentle, to bear the torment and still have pity for others—that is the problem. Easy were it to be indifferent to all suffering; 40 but to be only indifferent to one's own is hard indeed. And death ends all: there is no forgiveness of virtues. All is pain, save what is sunk in sordid

degradation—pain, pain, pain, rendering the spectacle of martyrdom intolerable. Life is but a slow *auto-da-fé*, in which some have the good fortune to be victims, while others must watch passively, the horror increased each moment by the heroism of the sufferers. And those who heap the fuel laugh and are happy, and the world rewards them with honours. And every thought that seems consoling is but a temptation—there is nothing to redeem the tragedy, nothing, and to forget this is to join the happy worshippers of infamy. Goodbye, happiness, goodbye; be mine henceforth to suffer with the good. Courage for a little while—and then death and the eternal silence.”

So speaks the soul at the call of courage, while pain is still unfamiliar and the goods renounced are still loved. But in the impatience of the yoke, in the envy of the wicked, there is still sin; and in the passionate protest against suffering there lurks a secret worship of pleasure. Gradually, as the goods of a selfish life cease to be loved, pity kills indignation, and the fierce protest gives place to a calmer sorrow. And through pity, the service of the world grows easier, and courage grows less necessary.

For pity ushers in love—a kind of love different from any that is possible without the marriage of the world, a love through which we can find a home even in this life of failure and evil. The reckless love of youth, the love that seeks its own joys, and the love that demands at all costs the good of its object, must be tamed and purified by austerity, which compels willingness to sacrifice what is loved to what is not loved, and enforces, in the name of truth, the recognition of faults where we wish to think that all is gold. The joys of love, in great part, must be foregone; but the new love that comes through discipline gives more of insight and wisdom, and by moulding us to the service of the world, enables us to endure its evils with patience.

To those who still desire the comradeship and the unrestrained devotion of a separate and particular affection, the loneliness of a sterner love appears intolerable.

The cloister, it is commonly supposed, has disappeared from modern life. But when we consider the men who do most for the service of humanity, we find still a consecration, less conscious and explicit, less complete perhaps, but no less real, than that of any hermit in the Thebaid; and this consecration is no longer, as then, to the worship of a God who will show his gratitude hereafter by making the saint a partaker in unending joys. The service of humanity is undertaken without hope of reward, without a thought of gratitude from those who profit by the labour, in the hurry and turmoil of an active life, the leisure for friendship is lost, and the power of entering into the lives of others is weakened by weariness. The nearest and dearest, often, must be allowed to suffer lest the general good should be sacrificed; and they, if they are lacking in generosity or in public spirit, may

come to resent the apparent indifference to their welfare. All these things the priest of Man must endure, yet there are heroes, not a few, who live this life, quietly, unostentatiously, almost without knowledge of its many renunciations. We have been accustomed too long to call a life innocent when it is free from those sins of commission that traditional morality condemns; in a world so full of pain and degradation, no man capable of work can be called innocent who does not labour, according to his power, to ameliorate the evil or increase the sum of good

The love which springs from admiration can only reach perfection in those who know what most deserves to be admired. But few men can live ¹⁰ lives of the highest excellence except by a devotion to what is best, which leaves little leisure for the private relations of friendship and affection. Hence love is robbed of its full development, and a world of loneliness surrounds men. Friendship becomes comradeship in an army, common endurance of the march and the dangers of battle. In youth men dream of a love in which the impersonal goods are absorbed as a part, in the stress of the fight, they come to love through devotion to the same ends, they no longer love ideals through comrades, but comrades through community of ideals.

In the love of God, religion combined all that is best in love. It was a stern and exacting love, to which, where conflicts occurred, all other loves must ²⁰ be sacrificed. But great was the return that the sacrifice secured. To please God was always to act rightly; and to love him was a duty. He could not suffer, and yet, by all their best, men felt that they served him. He was eternal and immutable: Death and pain and sorrow never touched him. And above all, he was strong. To lean on him was not, as in human loves, a selfish shifting of the burden; there was no fear that he would be wearied or broken by the troubles of the world. In the love of God, no restraint was required; no circumstances could demand that he should be displeased or forgotten. But the shrine of his worship was enriched by the free gift of all conflicting desires, by the renunciation of all incompatible hopes; the love of God was ³⁰ ennobled by sacrifice, the last sacrament of love. And dwelling remote in heaven, God remained untouched by the compromises, the sordidnesses, the sullyng impurities of earth; the devotion to the unseen retained the freshness, the purity as of morning dew, that is so soon lost in all earthly loves by the cold contact of the world

The love of God cannot be replaced by anything similar in the lives of those to whom belief has grown impossible. For the only love that need never be checked is the love of goodness itself; and when we cease to personify goodness, to believe that it lives and exists eternally, the repose of the divine love is lost, and we are left to create, by our own efforts, whatever ⁴⁰ of good our powers may render possible. In varying degrees, the good is embodied in the things that exist; but all are transient, and human beings,

the best of all, are among the most transient. And love is no longer combined with service; for it is not only the best human beings to whom service is due. Thus solitude too often becomes a duty. Alone on the mountain-peak, the priest of Man tends the sacred fire; in the distance, he sees the flame of other fires burning across the night, and knows that others are consecrated to the same service; but no voice can come into his solitude, no fellowship but the solemn silence of the stars. Far off in the plain, the wayfarer sees the shining beacon above the fog of fear and perplexity, but rarely does he climb the mountain-side and tell how he was guided thither.

- 10 It is necessary, for those who would escape this solitude, to learn the love of pure contemplation. Mazzini, speaking of the affections of his youth, says: "I had not reached the ideal of love, love that has no hope in this life. I had worshipped not love, but the joys of love." In contemplative love, we seek no relation with those whom we love, no benefit to them, no happiness to ourselves; we merely see that a good thing forms part of the world, and from the fountain of the love of goodness some of the waters flow to where the good thing lives. In the love of the dead, when the impatience of impotent rebellion has died away, contemplation can still find a sober joy; they too were in this world, they too are forever a part of the strange fabric of
20 existence. And all the glorious company of heroes, who lived on earth in undismayed possession of their own souls, in undeterred pursuit of the high purposes which nature appeared to thwart, whose worship was undimmed by the failures, the meannesses, and the tragedies surrounding them; who alone and unfriended fought the sacred fight, and amid storms and snows kept the sacred fire perennially burning these men's spirits still live in the air about us, still speak to those who dare to support the burden, who dare to live in the proud fellowship of the great

As we grow in wisdom, the treasure-house of the ages opens to our view; more and more we learn to know and love the men through whose devotion
30 all this wealth has become ours.

But although contemplative love may be an inspiration, a shining light upon our path, it is love of another kind that must give the motive power. We are all born into the world single, separate, imprisoned as in a dungeon by strong walls of Self To the question, why should I serve my neighbour? reason alone can give no answer. And even to those who habitually feel the obligations of life, there comes, in moments of weariness, or when a strong emotion makes a barrier against the outer world, a haunting sense of the unreality of the mass of men, of the futility and folly of all endeavours. In tired hearts the devil whispers that all is vanity; and an answer can only be
40 found in active love, in the love that binds us to the world, that leaves us no option but to serve it, that purges Self from the secret chambers of our instincts. In the lives of women, the mysterious bond of motherhood,

consecrated in its very beginning by pain and the shadow of death, creates a tie which is deeper, more lasting, more profound, than any that men can know. By this tie the generations are linked, up through past ages till the dawn of thought, downward through the unknown future to the death of the last man. Motherhood, by the strange power of instinct, gives value to the welfare of the helpless, and creates a well-spring of pity for all who suffer. But the other relations of the family also, in a less degree, teach a love not dependent upon admiration, a love which no disenchantment can destroy. The family, though often full of suffering, and sometimes (it must be admitted) a Moloch on whose altar all the members but one are slowly 10 sacrificed, is yet the school in which the true nature of human life is learnt, and in which obligations not dependent upon merit are most readily seen. Without the family, it is difficult to believe that men would ever acquire a profound or serious conception of human relations, or of the eternal process that makes one life of all the generations that are born and die.

But the love of family takes us only a little way towards the universal love which ought to prompt our actions. Wider and broader sympathies are required in the service of man

One of these broader springs of action is the love of country. The home of our joys and our sorrows, where we have lived with the life of nature, where 20 the gentle release of spring, the long delights of June, and the dewy enchantment of autumn mornings, come to us with all the richness and depth of many memories; where every hedgerow, every primrose, every winter robin, has the strange aroma of sadness, the mystical magic, that lives like a wraith in scenes of the past; where the deep intimacy of childhood, the thought of smiles that are gone and of voices we shall hear no more, hallows the earth; where green fields welcome us across the sea when the first light of morning ends our exile; this native land, which our ancestors made and our children will inherit, has a claim upon our hearts which no misdeeds, no wrongs and tyrannies, no shame and no disaster can 30 undo. The untamed love of the multitude desires for its country what it desires for itself: the glitter of success, the homage of the nations, the pride and pomp of dominion. But in these sordid ambitions, if we love our country wisely, if we seek for it those goods which in our own life we should most prize, we shall find a pain which is poignant in proportion to our love: we shall value whatever traditions of magnanimity, of great achievement in generous causes, our history contains, and we shall seek to make our nation the embodiment of the ideals that we cherish.

But the love of country is still too narrow: the whole life of man must find a lodging within the walls of our Self. We must learn to love all men, not 40 because they fulfil our ideals in any way, but because our life is bound up with theirs, because we are their comrades in this troubled pilgrimage from darkness to darkness. To love the good and hate the wicked is not wisdom; it

is part of the untamed and ruthless demand for a world adequate to our ideals. Very difficult it is to hold fast the vision of heaven, and still to give kindness to those who remind us that heaven is forever unattainable. Nevertheless, this must be learnt; and the weak require love more than the strong, for only through the strength of others can they achieve goodness. The strong must live separate lives, encouraged by the knowledge that there are others toiling at other labours, and upheld by the devotion which grows gradually out of unquestioning and unrepinning service. We are all orphans and exiles, lost children wandering in the night, with hopes, ideals, aspirations that must not be choked by a heartless world. If some grow too soon weary and faint-hearted, it is for those whose courage is strong to give brave words, to keep alive the dreams of the Golden City

2b Untitled

WE MUST DISTINGUISH two very different kinds of love, the kind that springs from admiration, and the kind that springs from some sort of bond. The love of man and woman, when it deserves the name of love at all, is of the first kind, at least in its inception; but in marriage, where there is no gross neglect of duty, the other kind enters gradually more and more. The love of the great men of the past, and above all the love of God, are of the first kind. But the love of parents and children, the love of country, the love of mankind, are of the second kind: we love them, not because we have chosen them, or because they fulfil our ideals in any way, or because they are useful, but because, by duty or by association, our life is bound up with theirs, and they, in some mysterious way, have found a home within the walls of our Self. The joys of love belong almost entirely to the first kind; but its insight and wisdom, its power of reconciling us to the world and moulding us to its service, are to be found far more in the second. The love that springs from admiration is primarily contemplative, the other is always and essentially practical.

2c Untitled

BEAUTIFUL ARE THE memories of childhood! The bright dancing sea, the summer sunrise which I watched daily from my window, the dewy fragrance of the morning earth, the shining raindrops of April showers, the red earth and golden grass of sunset, the rustle of poplars nightly lulling me to sleep—all these I felt with the freshness, the poetry, of a mind not closed to impressions by the restless crowd of doubts and disappointments. And now the magic of Time has transfigured them. They

glow in a calm, motionless world, bathed in eternal sunshine, and sanctified by regret into the likeness of a dear friend dead. So our own past becomes a ghost, whom every new sorrow renders more terrible, and with every accession of wisdom, a world of joys is turned into pale and ghastly spectres.

2d The Worship of Truth

TRUTH IS A stern and pitiless God; he exacts his hecatombs of human sacrifices, he slays with jealous thunder every love which is unfaithful to him, he drives into madness those who cannot bear the full terror of his majestic frown, his whispers are fanged adders whose stung ¹⁰ poisons trust and human fellowship. In happiest moments, his commands enjoin doubt, his cold commentary freezes the blood. Only those who resolutely turn away from him escape his tyranny, only for them the sun shines and flowers are gay. Why worship such a God? Why not fly to oblivion and ease, to kindness and love? Yet an inner voice speaks, with an absolute authority that no vain words can diminish, bidding us follow Truth though he slay us, though he blast the lives of those we love, though he wither the flowers of joy and dry up with his parched breath the pleasant springs of happiness. In his service is courage, in his service only can the soul grow great, in his service only the shining lights are kindled on the ²⁰ mountain-tops by which, far off in the plain, humanity is guided in the night of fear and perplexity. Alone, the priest of Truth lives in the service of the generations to come, and keeps ever bright the sacred flame, pity he may feel for those who dwell below, but fellowship only in the mystic communion of those who create and tend the lights which illumine the world.

2e The Message of Nature

THE SETTING SUN illuminates an enchanted world, the grass is golden, in the summer air the tree-tops tremble as for the passing of a soul. Again Nature speaks her message—no longer now a haunting mystery, no longer an unfathomable depth of wisdom filling the heart with ³⁰ wistful yearning for hidden knowledge, but a voice speaking straight to experience and sorrow. Peace and beauty, beauty and peace, the voice says; human suffering is but of yesterday, and tomorrow it will be no more, but beauty is eternal, and peace is for those who have learnt to live with the things that endure for ever.

2f Untitled

SO OUT OF pity grows service, out of service grows love, and out of love grows wisdom and the power of endurance. And when endurance has been learnt, a strange, sad beauty shines through the life of man, for tenderness, pity, and the wisdom of infinite love ennable the tragic burden of humanity. And beyond the life of man, the untroubled world of sea and stars and sun endures, a reproach, and yet a balm, to the wounded spirit stricken by the terror of its own brief torture. "Peace and beauty, beauty and peace, human suffering is but of yesterday, and tomorrow it will be no more, but beauty is eternal, and peace will endure when man has fallen asleep on the bosom of the past." This is the message of the voice that speaks in the stars, in the dawn, in the rustle of midnight breezes, in the lonely ripple of mountain tarns, in the ceaseless sighing of pines, and in the tender grace of willows whitened by the passing wind.

2g Duty and Fate

ALEVEL PLAIN, stretching, far as the eye can reach, with field after field of dull brown earth; a uniform grey sky, a drizzle blurring all outlines in the twilight; a long straight railway, with telegraph poles marching, marching, marching, unremittingly, to other scenes no less desolate: here is the true emblem of Duty, monotonous, interminable, inevitable.

Suddenly, through the gathering darkness, a train crashed past with purposeless speed, hurrying from one abode of sorrow to another. Even so Fate hurries on, and its rails are built of human souls.

2h Wisdom

INFINITE IS THE sadness of wisdom. She is old, old with the weight of human suffering, stern and melancholy, the kind and ever watchful mother of sorrows. She has seen the generations of man come and go, she has known the hopes, the disappointments, the despairing cries to Fate for mercy, the failures and the victories, the rashness, the punishment, and the weary, weary acquiescence, that each in turn must endure before seeking her love and her healing counsel. Eagerly, boldly, imperiously, we call for happiness, for ease, for the fiery joys of a too possessive love; but Duty stands ever at the door with warning voice, telling of the burden to be borne, the happiness to be renounced, the awful truth from which cowardice recoils. More and more terrible grow the commands of Duty, more and

more impossible the fevered struggle to forget the hated monitor. But behind Duty, Wisdom calmly waits, serene and beautiful, ever ready to give balm to those who loyally follow Duty through the dark and tangled wilderness of abnegation. Only to those who truly love her are her treasures given; not to those who seek them, but to those who ask for nothing but an upright life, are her soothing words spoken. O weary warrior, lifeless almost with the wounds of deadly battle, the victory has not been vain, the triumph is not wholly barren. When joy and pain are overcome, peace and love remain, and Wisdom softly whispers words of rest and calm.

2i The Past

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THERE IS NO sadness so poignant as the sadness of vanished days. The Past is a calm and smiling land, bathed in eternal sunshine, from which life's voyage has separated us by a whole sea of sorrow, renunciation, and loss. The icy touch of experience has chilled for ever those joys which relentless memory still recalls as minutely as in the happy moments when Fate, to punish us the more surely, first permitted us to know them. Gone, for ever gone, is the careless happiness of summer, the gentle release of spring, and the dewy magic of autumn mornings. Only as ghosts they haunt us, while the dreary load of Duty weighs like lead upon the soul. Ever as we toil along the parched and dusty road of life, the mirage moves with us, but never again can we enter that enchanted country; for the Past returns not, and eating cares have destroyed all hope. And at length the Past so invades the inmost recesses of feeling that happiness, even in the very moment of its being, seems already gone, and present joys bring with them their own wraiths as uninvited guests.

2j Untitled

ONE BY ONE hopes die, and the kingdom of the Past receives them; but still their spectres inhabit our wintry world. There are words we dare not utter, places we dare not see, books we dare not read, lest we summon the pale army of memories, and they imprison us in the dungeon of despair, lest, for a moment of terror, we live once more the life of pain. Long ago we put away joy and sorrow, but still in dreams the sharp stab of loss pierces our hearts. And all that beautiful country of the Past, we dare not look towards it, for there dwell the loves, the friendships, the joys, from which the sea of Time has parted us. Would that when our better part is dead, we too might die; but still, in some shadowy way, we live. Yet at last we too shall enter those happy fields, for Death will open the door to our

prayers; we ourselves shall be but a memory, and in that quiet land we shall rest, while the toiling generations struggle towards the silent portal. And there at last we shall rejoin those whom we loved in this brief valley of darkness, and sleep will end our weariness for ever

2k The Two Races of Man

SORROW CAME TO me and said: Behold the races of man. And I saw before me a shady garden, with roses and tall palms, and many souls rejoicing, and a fountain in the midst refreshing the earth and softly plashing in the cool and pleasant air. And Sorrow said: that is the fountain of joy, and to those who drink of its waters pain comes not. Then I saw that beyond the garden was desert, and the desert was hot and parched, and the sun shone down pitilessly. And in the desert were innumerable spirits weeping, weeping, weeping; and of their tears was made a stream, and from the stream sprang the fountain of joy. And Sorrow said: These are my worshippers; they dwell far from the fountain of joy, and the worshippers of joy behold them not, and know not whence the pleasant waters flow. But those who weep know that their tears water the garden of delight, and they weep that it may be green for others. And do they never drink of the fountain? I asked. Once only, Sorrow replied: Death takes them by the hand, and leads them to the garden, and they drink one deep draught, and all is ended. But some there are who will not leave their comrades in the desert even at the bidding of Death, and they never drink, but beside their loved ones they fall asleep.

2l Untitled

THERE WAS A youth who, when his soul descended to earth, drank less deeply than his comrades of the waters of oblivion, and bore still with him dim memories of the world of joy. And since he knew not that on earth these memories cannot find a home, he sought, with ever renewed hope, for the realization of his dreams. Where any imperfection marred what he saw, he rejected it ruthlessly, and turned elsewhere his restless search. His parents, as a child, he loved with a love that was worship; but when he saw their faults, they fell from the shrine of his heart. Friends, one by one, friends who loved him, he loved for a while in return; then, like his parents, they were thrown aside, regardless of their pain. But, when despair seemed ready to seize him, love instead, the golden vision of love, unlocked all the inner chambers of his soul, and released imprisoned voices that sang for joy. And now at last he found rest: here was what he

sought, here his worship was unchecked. But this too proved delusive, and the object of his devotion was, after all, but a mortal among mortals. Bitterly he turned away, and wandered in solitude through cities and deserts.

One day, as he lingered in the valley of Pain, watching the sad souls that mourned at the graves of dead hopes, his heart spoke to him, saying: Cease this cruel thirst for perfection, behold the unhappiness about you; if nothing else is great in this world, pain at least is great; and see, she whom you loved is among the mourners, and you stabbed the young hope at whose tomb-stone she is offering flowers. And pity possessed him, and he spoke to her; and from that day, to all in trouble he gave kind words, and wherever sorrow was deepest, he was present with sympathy and courage. And all loved him and followed him, and he forgot perfection, and sought no more for what seemed unattainable. But when Death came to him, and those whom he had cheered wept and were inconsolable, a new thought came: he saw that he must leave them, and that the world must be as though he had never lived. And again the love of perfection returned, and he saw that his had been a solitary and stern duty, which, for the joy of kind deeds, he had thrown aside; but now it was too late. And the light went out of his eyes; his comrades faded from his sight, and only the beauty which he should have created seemed to mourn that it was still unborn. And alone again, as he had begun, he ended the life he had not dared to live 10 20

2m Untitled

OH MAY OLD age bring wisdom! When weariness has stilled the fiery passion, the fierce restlessness of yearning, leaving a spirit open to Nature's gentle beauty, to the soothing balm of sunshine, of woods and streams, of flowers and meadows and the dews of early morning; when Self and its sorrows stand no longer like a spectral shadow between the soul and all calm and lovely things, when the unchanging stars are no longer a flaunting insult to tortured thought, and the peaceful dawn is not a hated call to labour and renunciation. Ah then may love fill my soul, love for all 30 who suffer, and sympathy for the pangs which each in turn must endure. It is not happiness that life can give: generation after generation is born into the world lonely, restless, full of eager desire; with endless effort and pain another generation is made capable of a like doom, and swiftly Death claims the few who make life precious. But away from man, away from the struggle and the fret, eternal beauty is ready to stanch the wounds which man inflicts on man: only a humble spirit, only a soul purged of rebellion, is required for that pure and ennobling joy.

2n The Communion of Saints

HEROES I HEAR your call! Not to the happiness of those who gather flowers by the way, who loiter through long summer afternoons and wander in the by-paths of gardens and shady groves—no, not to happiness you summon me, but to think with your thoughts, to know with your knowledge, and to sorrow with your sorrows. As, from a lofty promontory, the bell of an ancient cathedral, unchanged since the day when Dante returned from the kingdom of the dead, still sends its solemn warning across the waters, so your voice still sounds across the intervening sea of time: still, as then, its calm, deep tones speak to the solitary tortures of cloistered aspiration, putting the serenity of things eternal in place of the doubtful struggle against ignoble joys and transient pleasures. Not by those about you were you heard, but you spoke to the winds of heaven, and the winds of heaven tell the tale to the great of other times. The great are not solitary—through the night come the voices of those who have gone before, clear and courageous; and so through the ages they march, a mighty procession, proud, undaunted, unconquerable. To join in this glorious company, to swell the immortal paean of those whom Fate could not subdue—this is not happiness, no; but what is happiness to those whose souls are filled with that celestial music? To them is given what is better than happiness: to know the fellowship of the great, to live in the inspiration of lofty thoughts, and to be illumined in every perplexity by the fire of nobility and truth.

2o Untitled

NATURE IS great, and strong, and calm. All night I tossed, fretted and fevered by the little problems of my petty life. At last the nightingale ceased, the birds of day began to salute the light, and I looked out upon the dawn—exquisite, still, serene, the same now as in all the ages of man's sorrow. Little clouds drifted slowly across the sky, and the morning star shone through them. The unruffled water reflected the trees and the mill, and over the meadows lay a quiet mist, white and beautiful in the first light of morning. Not all that is external to man is hostile—from age to age that beauty has endured and will endure, a soothing balm, and yet a tonic, to the wounded soul crushed by the terror of its own brief torture.

2p The Ocean of Life

MONOTONOUS, MELANCHOLY, ETERNAL, the waves break on the beach, travelling from the grey horizon to their destined end. So souls emerge from the mystery of birth, and one by one they reach the moaning shore of Death. Vast and sad is the ocean of life, yet calm with an infinite peace, not restless, rebellious, eager, full of yearning for the sunny land from which Death parts it, but great and free, deep, unsearchable and sublime. O struggling anxious soul, forget thy fretful desires, forget thy hopes and fears, thy joys and thy pains, and look upon the world with open eyes. Then will mortality be no longer a great enigma, no longer ¹⁰ terrible, but beautiful as the fading light of evening; then will sorrow become divine, a voice revealing in the darkness the secret message of nature, then will Time and Change and Fate lose their cruel empire, while tenderness, pity, and the wisdom of infinite love enoble the tragic burden of humanity. So may man become one with that great soul of sadness that speaks in the stars, in the dawn, in the rustle of midnight breezes, in the lonely ripple of mountain tarns, in the ceaseless sighing of pines, and in the tender grace of willows whitened by the passing wind.

2q Austerity

AUSTERITY IS THE greatest of virtues or the noblest of sins. It is a ²⁰ virtue when it is the complete readiness to sacrifice any good, however great, to a greater still; it is a sin when it maintains that the lesser goods are evil.

All greatness of soul is rooted in renunciation—not only of actual and particular goods, but still more of the greed for personal goods of some kind. Not this or that only must be abandoned, but the whole cry of nature for something to make life happy. To be happy is to be callous to all the evil surrounding us, our own circumstances can never justify contentment. If we enlarge our passions, we must enlarge our miseries too; but by universalizing our thoughts we eliminate the restless indignant demand that we ³⁰ specially should be happy. Each human being is born single, separate, enclosed as in a dungeon by strong walls of egotism. But self and its happiness are petty things, unless self has broken down the wall of self and taken the whole world into its inmost sanctuary. Through love the wall of self may be broken down; but if we merely substitute another self as the subject for our greed of happiness, we gain little through love. Such love is not yet purified in the fire of renunciation. Love, to be good, must be the love of what is good because it is good, and must extend its austerity to the object of love as to itself. To love my neighbour as myself is but a paltry

achievement, unless my self-love has been ennobled by the love of goodness. Passion, intense and devouring, is necessary to greatness of soul, but passion purged of all greed and all personal dross. And passion always, in all moments, must be dominated by a calm and godlike reason, judging, criticizing, restraining and purifying. This is the only peace of mind which in an evil world the good man may rightly feel: to have rejected for ever the lust for this or that good thing, and to have put in its place the love of goodness in itself. The victory of austerity is won when we desire nothing, however excellent, so exclusively that the reason cannot compel its sacrifice
10 to what is better. A righteous life is often but a long slow martyrdom, which at any moment a recantation of virtue could have evaded. This martyrdom the good must suffer; and if we love the good, we must help them to inflict this pain upon themselves; we must watch their sorrow, and never urge them to lighten it by one iota.

But, my friend, do not worship sorrow, do not persuade yourself that suffering is good. This thought is but a lightening of the burden by a lie. Sorrow is evil, is terrible, and happiness must be rejected only because the world is bad. Truth is a ruthless taskmaster, and truth demands that we should recognize the goodness of what austerity compels us to forego. For
20 this sacrifice, truth permits no legitimate consolation, not even the belief that human greatness is truly great. Fate is great, and the irresistible march of matter; they are the Lords of the world, while man and his doings are but of the moment. Though you sacrifice all other goods to greatness of soul, yet in a moment all is over, and the universe pursues its course regardless of good and evil. This is the last cruellest irony, that the knowledge of good and evil is confined to beings powerless to produce the one or destroy the other. Virtue requires renunciation, requires a life of pain and effort and repression, and the result, in the end, is trivial. But little as it is, it is the greatest thing permitted to poor humanity by the purposeless but omnipotent procession of fleeting worlds. And the desire that virtue should not be trivial is merely the last refuge of self-love. This too must be renounced; virtue is painful and transitory, but still it remains virtue; and beyond this
30 we must ask nothing.

2r Gentleness

FEW SPECTACLES, TO the contemplative mind, are more terrible than a busy street. Thousands of hard, eager faces hurry past, each intent on its own ends, with no thought, not even for an instant, of each other, or of the object to be achieved by so much activity. Ruthlessly men push one another aside, they struggle for their little *me*, they rejoice in
40 the downfall and the failure of others, they grind the life out (of) all who are

so unfortunate as to be in their power. And not one of them ever asks himself why *his* success should be of such supreme moment, and that of others indifferent or even annoying. In the spectator, with no such purpose of his own, there rises a blind rage, a despair of human life, a rebellious longing to see some end to the struggle, the brutality, and the cruelty which constitute success and failure in the world. Between the good, he says to himself, there is no need of struggle; only because the ends are bad do the means involve conflict. It seems then as though the only crime in the world were brutality—the unbending resolve to pursue one's own good whatever sacrifice the pursuit may entail on others. Brutality makes men oppress their ¹⁰ wives, parents their children, employers their operatives; brutality makes wars, and makes the major part of the horrors of war; brutality makes power a source of infinite misery to the inferior, and fills the slave with a wild destructive hatred of his master.

At such times, the first thought that occurs is the desire for emancipation—let us abolish all power, and make the slave the equal of his master. Then, surely, all will be well, for brutality will no longer be able to find scope. This is the creed of the Anarchist—a creed rooted and grounded in sympathy for suffering and indignation at its infliction.

But, alas, power is not so easily abolished as the Anarchist ²⁰ imagines. Wherever any relation arises between two human beings, either has power to inflict pain upon the other, and often moral and intellectual degradation as well. Especially in the most important relations, those of husband and wife and of parent and child, power is essentially and necessarily present, however the laws may endeavour to minimise it.

For this evil, the cure must be found, if anywhere, in each individual soul. It is necessary to know, not with mere knowledge, but with feeling, that each separate person, and not myself only, is an end in himself, that his happiness, and still more his virtue, have the same importance as my own. To know this with the lips is common, but to know it with feeling is very ³⁰ rare. In this lies the chief horror of death: to the dying, it is a stupendous matter, outweighing in importance the fall of empires; it is the last crude, barbaric, irrefutable proof that after all the universe was not made for me, that for all my worldly success I am left at last more helpless than any beggar. To others, meanwhile, it is a very ordinary matter—merely another in the list of those whose greed has had its last reproof. But how few of the living reflect that they too will some day be dying, that they too will want sympathy, but will find themselves alone with a solitude so absolute and terrible that death itself seems a welcome escape. Such is the death of the brutal, and such the callousness of the brutal to the death of others. ⁴⁰

But to the gentle, their own death is not the end of all things, and the death of others has all the tragedy that may of right belong to it. The gentle, in death, can still find sympathy in the gentle; while yet there is breath,

there is friendship, there is community of feeling No final refutation comes to them, for their hopes and fears are not confined to their own brief moment of consciousness. In death, love receives its last and ultimate test: whatever of selfish dross was there will now appear, horrible, naked, ghastly; whatever was noble will shine forth, and make the ultimate tragedy also the crowning beauty of life Without gentleness, death is terrific, but hideous; with it, death becomes beautiful, the last sacrament of friendship, terrible still, but sublime.

2s The Forgiveness of Sins

10 **W**HEN THE INTOXICATION of sin is past, and the soul is left naked to contemplate its own deformity, when we realize that we no longer deserve the respect of those we love, that we have brought pain, perhaps even sin, into innocent lives; when, worst of all, Death awakens us to an injury which it is now too late to repair: then remorse, black, swift, fierce and terrible, takes possession of us, branding, scorching, withering, filling us with hatred of all sinners and a fiery desire for punishment For ourselves, for others, we long for pain, intolerable pain, pain that shall expiate the awful load of guilt. But in this feeling, Self is still the centre; and since we suffer gladly, we too easily believe that other 20 sinners should be made to suffer. And so we pass from the old sins to new ones, we remain as full of sin as before, and our remorse is endlessly renewed. Thus there seems no forgiveness of sins, and our own ruthlessness becomes a law of nature.

Happy the sinner who escapes from remorse into amendment! Suddenly the world is transformed: gentle emotions grow again, pity revives, the love of goodness replaces the fiery hatred of evil, and removes for ever the temptations which remorse could only intensify It is necessary to escape from Self, to learn to think of other lives, and through love to forget the guilty desires which remorse vainly reprobates. And so a new man is born, a 30 man to whom the old sins have become impossible, to whom sinners are an object of compassion rather than hatred Then the forgiveness of past wrongs grows from within, with the knowledge that they are past forever; and then, with the thought of future duties, the perpetual brooding on former failures is put away From that day, a new life begins, and a new virtue rules our thoughts.

2t The Atonement

THE LAMB OF God, it is said, bore upon the Cross the sins of the world, and sinners, by his merit, may escape the punishment which God would otherwise inflict upon them. The beauty and the profound significance of this myth are lost by regarding it from the point of view of the avenging Deity and not of the suffering Christ. God's justice cannot be saved by vicarious punishment, and a God who admits the suffering of the good for the bad cannot deserve our worship. But the forces that govern human life are such a Deity; they demand that there shall be suffering when there has been sin, but they care nothing whether the sufferer is the sinner or an innocent person. The Christian myth offers us only the part of the sinner who profits by the sacrifice of another; but real life offers always the nobler part of the sacred victim. In every generation, there must be some who voluntarily bear the sin and sorrow of the world, lest the powers of nature should demand vengeance. To each one the choice is open, whether to add to the burden of humanity or to bear it, to crucify or to be crucified. To die, and still more often to live, upon the Cross, to endure toil and pain that others may escape the penalty which is demanded by inexorable laws, is the part of those who choose the right. Seriousness, truth, and fearless love are needed by the world's saviours in every age, and they alone preserve from destruction whatever of good mankind has achieved. To those who decide for the better part, life may have but few joys to offer save the pure joy of giving, weariness and labour must fill their days, and the pleasures that come to others must pass them by. But their pure souls will remain unclouded mirrors of the heaven which their own longings have built, and their sun of love will not be obscured by the mists and vapours of self. Fears and terrors will not assail them, and ever-present duty will banish listlessness and the dreary disenchantment of the disappointed seeker after private goods. And to them Death is a kind and faithful friend, a beneficent healer of all wounds, a deliverer who never fails, but comes at last, calm and sublime, to wipe away all tears for ever, and give eternal peace to the loyal soldier in the great battle for the right.

2u Religion

WHAT IS THE true essence of religion, when all unnecessary dogma, all mere shell and clothing, has been stripped from it? The most usual answer would be, that religion is the belief that the Universe is somehow good, or, as moralists would say, that ultimately it is on the side of the right. This view seems to be mistaken. The Everlasting No, the defiance to the Devil: "I am not thine, but free, and forever hate

thee", is religious, however much it may regard the Devil as the Prince of this world. And conversely, the optimism of the comfortable Pot "He's a Good Fellow and 'twill all be well", is emphatically not religious. Religion requires not even so much of a creed as is involved in the vaguest optimism, it is a way of feeling, an emotional tone, rather than any specific belief

Religion is the passionate determination that human life is to be capable of importance, that virtue and excellence are to be at least in the same rank with the great facts of Nature—the heavens, the march of Time, and Destiny. Irreligion is the feeling of the triviality of life:

10

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
Who struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

This is the absolute denial of religion. To assert religion is to believe that virtue is momentous, that human greatness is truly great, and that it is possible for man to achieve an existence which shall have significance. Something of positive creed is involved, but far more of sheer determination. For the greatness or littleness of our lives are largely in our own

20 control, and by stern resolution almost any achievement becomes possible.

Religion, then, is concerned with human life, but is not the same thing as morality. Religion is not the good life, but a certain attitude towards the good life. It is thus, in a sense, a department of morality, provided only that the religious view of the world can be justified. But a little element of dogma still remains in religion, and it is from the desire to justify this that all the superstructure of creeds has gradually arisen. We have to ask ourselves whether, without the creeds, religion can still be defended. If not, morality demands its abandonment. It will be a necessary part of virtue to believe virtue unimportant. Such a belief will add to the difficulty of virtue, but will

30 not make it impossible. But is such a belief unavoidable?

In almost all those who achieve some degree of morality, there exists instinctively, as is shown in the torture of remorse, an overpowering conviction that the goodness or badness of human actions is a thing of immense moment. But in the face of facts it becomes difficult to retain this conviction unless by the aid of some kind of mysticism. The individual life, it seems plain, is extinguished by Death, the life of the human race must be extinguished sooner or later. The only thing of whose eternity we feel fairly assured is matter: before life began, matter calmly went its way; accidentally it produced life, to which however it remains indifferent, and accidentally 40 but inevitably it will again destroy life. Ruthless, inexorable, careless alike of good and evil, matter unceasingly pursues its purposeless journeys to and

fro through the blank abyss of space; matter alone is powerful, matter alone seems God.

What a contrast is presented by human life! A little moment of struggle and fret, of passionate, puny, impotent self-assertion; a foolish, fatuous outcry against the bland tyranny of matter—and then all is as though it had never been, vanished like the ripple of a stone in a restless ocean. Surely so momentary a phenomenon can only be trivial, and its good or evil can count for nothing beside the growth and decay of universes.

Thus whole point of view, however, is slavish, mean and oriental. The worship of power—encouraged by optimism, which suggests that what is strong must be good—the rhetoric by which God answered Job out of the whirlwind, is the root of this belief in the pettiness of human life. Human goodness is impotent, yes: but if power is the Devil's, let us turn our reverence away from power. And man is not wholly impotent: over himself, during the brief span of his life, and over others in some degree, he has power for good or evil. Alone in the universe as he knows it, he cares for what is truly important—for it is excellence, not power, that gives importance. Matter is important only because it is a means of evil: in itself, it is as nothing. But a heroic human life is the best, the only truly good thing; it is therefore in itself important and alone important. Matter can annihilate us,
but it cannot diminish the goodness of what is ours while we live. Amid an indifferent universe, the good life shines bright brief and solitary, but beautiful like a star through storm-clouds.

Religion, then, is justified in its belief. So great is the value of human virtue that it alone redeems the universe; it is for us to protest, seriously and sadly, against the evil world which is omnipotent except over our thoughts; the terrible duty is ours of creating, in the brief and painful struggle against the Gods, whatever of excellence the world is to contain. True, the good is transitory, and truth permits no mysticism which would render its value eternal; but in its little moment, which alone is ours, the good is good, and
this must be enough for us. Let us defy Fate, let us be rebels against the all-but omnipotence of matter. Evil, however powerful, deserves our hatred and our contempt; and good, however weak and passing, is alone worthy of our reverence. O my friends, let us endure our little moment with heroism: the pain adds but a drop to the ocean of evil, but the good shines with unearthly radiance, illuminating the darkness with sublime and supernatural beauty.

The Education of the Emotions [c.1902]

THE EARLIEST KNOWN of Russell's many writings on education is "The Education of the Emotions", probably written in 1902. The paper and the handwriting place the manuscript in the same era as "The Pilgrimage of Life" (2), with which it was kept among the papers Russell gave Lady Ottoline Morrell in 1911.

Education was a topic close to Russell's heart long before the Beacon Hill School experiment began in 1927. As early as 12 September 1894, for instance, he had written to Alys: "I should almost like to start a co-education school for the purpose of applying my theories" about how to overcome a Puritan bias against sexuality. His interest in the fundamentals of education persisted, as remarks in several of his correspondences show. Russell's private and irregular education at Pembroke Lodge prompted thought about the very principles of education. Although he had no direct experience of it, his conversion of 1901 compelled him to condemn public school education. His brother Frank also felt compelled to consider educational principles, publishing "The Education of Children" among his *Lay Sermons* (1902). This essay bears comparison with Russell's early remarks on the subject. "The Education of the Emotions" seems to have been stimulated in a more important way by Graham Wallas, whose educational theory Russell noted in his "Journal" for 13 November 1902: "Read Graham Wallas on Kindergarten, attacking Frobel, and wrote to him agreeing." Wallas's address to the Conference of the Froebel Society in January 1901 was published in *Child Life* for July, 1901 as "A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy". Russell agreed with Wallas in a letter of 13 November 1902.

The broad fact on which one would take one's stand in opposing Frobel is, I suppose, original sin, and (what is just as bad) original stupidity. I have more sympathy with Calvin than with Rousseau, if one must look to Geneva for guidance. Indeed, I have seldom known people attain a high moral level unless their childhood had been very stern and almost destitute of happiness.

It is likely that "The Education of the Emotions" was part of a larger programme of writing on education since the manuscript is marked "Chapter 1" above the title and in the first paragraph Russell promises to address "the more scholastic sides of education" after early education has been dealt with. The concern with education can also be detected in "The Study of Mathematics" (6, the verso of folio 1 being marked "Chapter v 63"), indicating that the essay began at page 63). "On History"

(5) is written with much the same didactic advocacy and may have been conceived, if not completed, for the same purpose. In a letter of 31 March 1902 to Helen Thomas, Russell discusses literature as he would teach it—another evidence of the didactic design he seems to have had at this time. The extended controversy over the Education Act, which was ultimately passed in November 1902, may have given an added incentive for interest in education.

The copy-text is the manuscript held in the Humanities Research Center. The essay is published here for the first time.

THE DIVISION OF the mind between the intellect and the emotions, however convenient, is no doubt largely fictitious. Men understand best what most interests them, and their interests are derived from their emotions. Nevertheless, the various aspects of the mind cannot, practically, be discussed all together, and some analysis, however inadequate, is unavoidable. We may, then, roughly, distinguish the training of the emotions from the imparting of knowledge, and as the most important part of the training of emotions belongs to the very early years of childhood, it may be convenient to consider this first, before the more scholastic sides of education.

Many persons of wide experience have maintained that the most essential part in the formation of a mind belongs to the first seven years of life. And it would certainly seem that most of what we regard as the instinctive parts of character, the habits which are so deeply rooted as to be unconscious and unalterable, the intimate texture which makes the difference between different epochs, different nations, or different classes, are mainly decided by the influences of those years during which the tablets of the mind are still ready to receive any impress that may be made upon them. Of what, in mental things, we commonly regard as heredity, it is probable that the greater part is acquired by imitation during infancy, and soon becomes so fixed that subsequent influences can no longer change it. How profound this early impress is, may be seen in many cases where changed circumstances or deliberate effort have, for a time, appeared to cause their disappearance, where yet, when any stress of feeling has stirred the deep pools of instinct, forgotten habits of thought and feeling have suddenly reasserted themselves with startling violence. Early influences, therefore, form perhaps the most important of all the elements that make education; for what is lacking in later years can, to some extent, be supplied in after life, but whatever has been amiss in childhood remains, like an inexorable fate, to mar and thwart the utmost efforts of maturity.

To foster good emotions and eradicate such as are evil, is the principal task of those who have the care of infancy. And good emotions constitute nearly the whole of the moral life; for virtue, when it is complete, springs from the love of what is good rather than the renunciation of what is bad; or rather, renunciation and self-sacrifice, where they become necessary, are usually dictated, and always facilitated, by a devotion to the end for the sake of which they are required. It is one of the main defects of an ascetic morality, and perhaps of Christian morals in general, that too much attention is directed to the avoidance of sin, too little to the fostering of the impulses that tend of themselves to right action. To teach that unkindness is sinful will produce far less of kindness than to foster a quick sympathy and an awareness of what others are feeling. And of the greater and more splendid virtues, such as public spirit, devotion to the pursuit of truth, or

love of beauty, the neglect comes in hardly any catalogue of sins: yet it is such virtues as these that give nobility and grandeur to great lives

The parent, then, must endeavour to foster in the child the love of those things that enlarge the bounds of the Self, until all mankind and all that mankind ought to be are included in the realm of habitual desire. The difficulty in all education, and in this respect especially, is, that very few have themselves a sufficient elevation of mind to perform so great a task. For example is here potent beyond all the wealth of precept that the assembled Parliament of moralists can produce; and the example can only be given by those who possess those rare qualities which it should be their aim to impart 10

A great character requires a blend of self-assertion and self-forgetfulness which it is all but impossible to attain; and it is the duty of parents to do whatever is feasible towards this object. All great achievement demands courage, and faith in one's own ideals, and willingness to undertake tasks in which most men would fail, it demands also a certain energy of desire and will, a power of withstanding discouragement and temporary failure, an ability to remain unshaken by a hostile universe. These qualities are all of the nature of self-assertion. But it is necessary also to be able to forego private happiness whenever the circumstances make it not rightly attainable, to have the strength that renders a life without joy possible, the equity 20 that compares the ends of others impartially with our own, the magnanimity that dwells habitually upon what is great, and the submission to the world that enables us to desire no particular good at the expense of what is best on the whole. All these qualities constitute a kind of self-effacement; and these, as much as the others, are essential to virtue. Broadly, self-assertion is necessary in the realm of ideals, self-effacement in the realm of action. It is not from experience of the world, but from our own vision, that we must learn our aspirations and our hopes; it is the unbending pride of dauntless idealism that brings new goods into the world, and supplies the force that drags men from the mire of sordid comfort. If we believed, with the Platonic 30 myth, that souls at birth must descend from heaven to the earthly prison, we should suppose that some drink less deeply than others of the waters of oblivion, and remember still, dimly and confusedly, the happy valleys and unrestricted converse of their former country. And these, the poets, the artists, the philosophers, the passionate lovers, wander through the world as through a strange land, expecting always the realization of their dreams, finding always the failures, the disenchantments, the basenesses, the thousand impediments in the way of every splendid hope, that make up this mundane life. But these are the men whose mere attempts redeem the human race, and their fragments of success form the inspiration of all that is 40 best. And in the world of fact, there is no heaven but in their dreams. It is the duty, then, of all who have dealings with the young, to fill them with faith in the goodness of what is good, and with determination not to lower

their standard to what is easily attainable; to instil into them a passionate love of excellence, and of the things that make excellence; to turn their desires and their hopes towards the achievement of whatever is great. Current morality, in this respect, is gravely deficient; the usual moral education aims only at producing respectability and what is called blamelessness; by preaching humility it discourages the undertaking of great and difficult tasks, and teaches the young that it is almost a virtue to remain in the beaten track of little aims and petty thoughts. It is not so that great ages feel, not so that great men are bred. A broad, free, adventurous spirit, a spirit of bold hope, of reckless daring, a spirit swept by a breath as uncontrollable as the Atlantic winds—this is what makes the splendid achievements of the world, and sways the sluggard mass of humanity as the breeze sways the ripening corn. And if this spirit is to be fostered, the young must be fed with great examples, with stories of the heroic past, with admiration of whatever is great in the present. Admiration above all—the noblest and most unalloyed of all delights—passionate admiration must be encouraged by every means that can be devised.

The love of the great ends of which the pursuit makes good lives is perhaps the most important of all the things that ought to be taught in childhood. In some respects, it is even more important than discipline and self-control. For every great love brings with it unaided its own discipline and its own self-control; and life, of itself, teaches these qualities in its ruthless way. But life will not teach such things as devotion to beauty or the pursuit of truth, for what is called success is just as possible, perhaps more possible, without them, life also will not teach public spirit, for worldly gain results rather from the public spirit of others than from our own. In such matters as these, we are concerned with ends which appear, if one may so express it, to be not the ends of nature, but purely human objects of desire—objects without which we could, in a biological sense, prosper as well or better, though every valid reason for desiring such prosperity would be removed. The ground for pursuing these objects being merely that they are valuable on their own account, no experience of life can teach the pursuit of them to one who does not value them; for though he,

Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away,
Richer than all his tribe,

yet, being base, and not knowing how to prize his pearl, he remains ignorant of his loss and unregretful of his folly.

Discipline, though second to magnanimity, is yet of almost immeasurable importance; and no age is too young for it. From earliest infancy, instruction in discipline is possible and necessary; but the necessity, at first, is so patent that it has hardly ever been questioned. There is, however, a theory

of education, founded, apparently, upon a belief in the natural goodness of man, which holds that the need of discipline has been immensely exaggerated; that an un thwarted child, on the whole, has only good impulses, and that what is required is merely to allow free play for their development. This view appears to be held, in varying degrees, by all disciples of Froebel, and, in regard to their own children, by many fond parents untainted by the systems of theorizers.

In this theory, as a reaction against the Calvinistic view of virtue as a suppression of all the desires of the natural man, there is undoubtedly a great measure of truth. In many children, many good impulses grow ¹⁰ spontaneously, and many more spring up as soon as a little encouragement is given. And a good deed resulting from a direct impulse is always very greatly preferable to one which comes from what is called principle, i.e. from a general belief that a certain kind of actions ought to be performed. Discipline is necessary for the restraint of impulses, and most of the impulses that ought to be restrained are bad. Hence most discipline is a mark of imperfect virtue, and would disappear with a better character. The training of good impulses, therefore, in so far as it is feasible, is in every way preferable to the restraining of such as are bad; and to this extent, the theory in question is both true and important. ²⁰

But the virtue that springs from impulse can seldom or never be sufficient by itself. A good impulse, almost always, is more evanescent than the need for the actions to which it prompts; and many necessary actions are so remotely connected with the goal towards which they tend, that no desire for the goal seems adequate to make them other than burdensome. Whoever has not learnt to endure tedium and pain is incapable of persistence, or of mastering difficulties which resist prolonged and repeated assaults. Moreover, it is not only bad or even indifferent impulses that have to be restrained. Good impulses also, which ought to exist in every one, must often be checked. For example, desire for the welfare of friends, or of ³⁰ children, is a potent cause of injustice to others, and of abandonment of unpopular or dangerous pursuits. Yet it is essential to a right disposition to have this desire; and thus even the perfect man would have need of self-restraint. It becomes, consequently, an unavoidable element in education to teach the habit of judging all desires, even the best, in the court of reason, and of allowing scope only to such as are acquitted in that tribunal.

The Free Man's Worship [1903]

"THE FREE MAN'S WORSHIP" is Russell's most famous, frequently anthologized and translated essay. It ranks high among twentieth-century literary statements of cosmic despair. Russell began it while staying with Alys's brother-in-law Bernard Berenson at his villa I Tatti near Florence (though in his *Autobiography*, 1967, 150 Russell claimed that it was begun at Grantchester). Looking back, Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell on 22 August 1912

Italy inspires one so extraordinarily—I wrote the free man's worship at I Tatti, where the human surroundings were ideally the worst, but I spent long days alone on the hillsides and in the groves of olive and cypress, with the Duomo below and the austere barren country above (#547)

In a letter to Berenson of 28 February 1903 Russell takes a disapproving view of "The Free Man's Worship" and perhaps baits Berenson a bit

So I finished the Essay I began when I was at I Tatti; it is very short, and very inferior to what it should be, but I do not expect to achieve anything better I am convinced the Essay is the proper style for me, it is indeed the only one I can believe in while I am doing it, and all my other attempts have been utter failures, palpably so even to me. And in my heart, the whole business about Art is external to me—I believe it with my intellect, but in feeling I am a good British Philistine Please return my Essay when you have done with it I do not expect any parts of it to please you except those you have already seen.

Replying on 22 March 1903 Berenson commends Russell for the completed essay which is worthy of "the two splendid passages you wrote here" A postcard from Russell at Setugnano to Gilbert Murray sent 31 December 1902, quoting the essay's passage on tragedy (69: 24–34), shows this part of the argument to have reached its final form at I Tatti. There is nothing to show what other passage was written there Russell simply records in his "Journal" on 14 January 1903 that at I Tatti "I wrote part of an Essay on the Free Man's Worship; also more of the Pilgrimage of Life, but I was rather uninspired" The essay was finished in London by 27 January 1903, with Russell noting in his "Journal" that it was "all right" Russell reported in his "Journal" on 10 February "Today 'the free man's worship' came back from the

typewriter—the total result of so much suffering” The next day he gave it to G M Trevelyan who “was overcome by it, he said it was the best thing he had ever read” It was Trevelyan, with G Lowes Dickinson’s support, who arranged its first publication in *The Independent Review*

While Berenson and Trevelyan both liked the essay, other reactions were not so positive On 19 February 1903 Russell notes in his “Journal” that Gilbert Murray “wrote that my Free Man’s Worship was not quite true, and I said I knew no one with such a scrupulous care for the truth in general statements” Murray could not be reconciled to the essay’s implications, writing on 24 February “I think my real difficulty is that the paper implies a Metaphysic of some kind, and I don’t see what” In his largely negative set of comments on the essay Murray does say, however, “Bravo about Tragedy!”. Dickinson wrote on 17 February 1903 that Russell had “drunk deeper of the cup than I have; and though I can follow you with my intelligence, I can only partly follow with my imagination” Dickinson thought that Russell’s attitude may perhaps be “ultimately the only great one”, but he is more optimistic about life and is unconvinced that the scientific view of the universe is the only true one He calls the paper “too good and too serious to be praised or commented on”, asking simply to publish it. Further responses were more terse Writing to Lady Ottoline in 1918 Russell says, “I remember Theodore Davies disliked my free man’s worship—‘better just say Damn and go on’ was his criticism” But Lady Ottoline herself had called the essay “incredibly beautiful” (26 April 1911), no doubt seeing in it Russell’s thirst for beauty and his power of verbal artistry Joseph Conrad called it “a gift from the gods” (22 Dec. 1913) Still later when T S Eliot reviewed *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* in *The Nation* (23 March 1918), he objected that the prose of “The Free Man’s Worship” is “not Mr Russell’s best prose” Eliot went so far as to suggest how the style might be improved, noting that “the possibilities of lyricism are limited” “Mr Russell’s vision is not here”, he concluded of the essay, a comment which should be seen in the light of the complicated literary and personal relations between Russell and Eliot. Writing on 17 June 1918, Russell remarked to Miss Rinder of the No-Conscription Fellowship “Much the best review of *Mysticism*, the only one with distinction, was Eliot’s in *Nation*”

Surprisingly little is said of “The Free Man’s Worship” in Russell’s *Autobiography*, though the context is clearly drawn as the crisis of relations with Alys. It is the same personal context as that of the projected “Pilgrimage of Life” (2) in which Russell tried by still more self-consciously literary means to evoke the sadness and grandeur of life All of the “Pilgrimage” meditations reflect Russell’s conversion of 1901 narrated in 1967, 145–6 He helpfully notes in a letter of 30 July 1918 to Miss Rinder that “the free man’s worship is merely the expression of the pacifist outlook when it was new to me” (1968, 88) By the sense of tragedy which came to him in his conversion, Russell felt with new intensity the loneliness and brevity of human life

Russell’s own view of “The Free Man’s Worship” altered with time More than fifty years after writing, he regarded it as “a work of which I do not now think well”

(1956, 196) Writing a preface to Thomas Mosher's edition of 1923, Russell however had affirmed what he said in 1902:

Fundamentally, my view of man's place in the cosmos remains unchanged I still believe that the major processes of the universe proceed according to the laws of physics; that they have no reference to our wishes, and are likely to involve the extinction of life on this planet, that there is no good reason for expecting a life after death, and that good and evil are ideas which throw no light upon the non-human world. (Pp ix-x)

He was, if anything, more convinced that the essay's attitude offered support to those distressed by the kind of world he saw about him Although he did not revise the text, Russell took the opportunity to note two corrections in the preface He felt that the original formulation was defective in two respects: the too simplified account of matter in view of that given by high energy physics and the question of the objectivity of good and evil Commenting on style from the vantage point of more than two decades he says that changes in outlook "would lead me to use somewhat different words if I were writing on the same theme now, but I see no reason to think that they would be better words" In 1925 Russell commented: "As to what I think best in my own writing, 'The Free Man's Worship' is the best in one style, but it is a style which I have deliberately abandoned as too rhetorical" In the same letter to Josephine K. Piercy for her book *Modern Writers at Work* (1930) Russell speaks of "the seventeenth-century influences", principally the baroque prose of Jeremy Taylor and John Milton These are important clues to the essay's cosmic frame of reference and hence to the grandeur of its style. In old age he made a final judgment explaining in a reply to an inquiry

(1) I have continued to think "The Free Man's Worship" "florid and rhetorical" since somewhere about 1920; (2) This observation concerns only the style; (3) I do not now regard ethical values as objective, as I did when I wrote the essays (presumably the early papers collected in *Mysticism and Logic*) However, my outlook on the cosmos and on human life is substantially unchanged (1969, 172-3)

The origin of Russell's title is conjectural Perhaps it came from Spinoza, whom Russell quotes in *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945) on how to be liberated (as a Stoic would wish) from fear: "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life" (574). Possibly the phrase is Russell's own, it was certainly in his mind well before writing the essay He wrote to Helen Thomas on 11 November 1902

But I have learnt at last the old Stoic secret hope nothing, fear nothing, desire nothing, forget joy and sorrow; and now impatience hardly ever comes

to me It is a strange, sad secret, only to be learnt by those who have fearlessly passed through the fires of Hell, but when learnt, it makes us free men, whom Fate can break if it will, but cannot bend

The sense of cosmic despair had certainly been with Russell at least since adolescence according to the report he made about reading *King Lear* as a youth (1961a, 30–1), in “The Free Man’s Worship” he consciously gives it literary shape

The manuscript (RA 220 010880) is a little-corrected fair copy. It is marked on the verso of the last page in different hands, one of them probably Gilbert Murray’s “14 Cheyne Walk Chelsea” and “3 Onslow Crescent op(posite) the Ken(sington) sta(tion)”. No drafts are known, nor has a typescript been found. Between the 1910 and the 1918 editions the title was changed to the more modest “A Free Man’s Worship”, the original title is here maintained. The essay is a natural companion to “The Study of Mathematics” (6), “On History” (5), and the projected “The Pilgrimage of Life” which shares its inspiration and sometimes its themes

The copy-text is the manuscript. The paper appeared in *The Independent Review*, 1 (Dec 1903): 415–24

To DR. FAUSTUS in his study Mephistophilis told the history of the Creation, saying:

The endless praises of the choirs of angels had begun to grow wearisome, for, after all, did he not deserve their praise? Had he not given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeserved praise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured? He smiled inwardly, and resolved that the great drama should be performed.

For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlessly through space. At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets, the planets cooled, boiling seas and burning mountains heaved and tossed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the ocean, and developed rapidly, in the fructifying warmth, into vast forest trees, huge ferns springing from the damp mould, sea-monsters breeding, fighting, devouring, and passing away. And from the monsters, as the play unfolded itself, Man was born, with the power of thought, the knowledge of good and evil, and the cruel thirst for worship. And Man saw that all is passing in this mad monstrous world, that all is struggling to snatch, at any cost, a few brief moments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And Man said: "There is a hidden purpose, could we but fathom it, and the purpose is good; for we must reverence something, and in the visible world there is nothing worthy of reverence". And Man stood aside from the struggle, resolving that God intended harmony to come out of chaos by human efforts. And when he followed the instincts which God had transmitted to him from his ancestry of beasts of prey, he called it Sin, and asked God to forgive him. But he doubted whether he could be justly forgiven, until he invented a divine Plan by which God's wrath was to have been appeased. And seeing the present was bad, he made it yet worse, that thereby the future might be better. And he gave God thanks for the strength that enabled him to forego even the joys that were possible. And God smiled; and when he saw that Man had become perfect in renunciation and worship, he sent another sun through the sky, which crashed into Man's sun; and all returned again to nebula.

"Yes," he murmured, "it was a good play; I will have it performed again."

Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That Man is the product

of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms, that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave, that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.

How, in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature as Man preserve his aspirations untarnished? A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurrys through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother In spite of Death, the mark and seal of the parental control, Man is yet free, during his brief years, to examine, to criticize, to know, and in imagination to create To him alone, in the world with which he is acquainted, this freedom belongs, and in this lies his superiority to the resistless forces that control his outward life.

The savage, like ourselves, feels the oppression of his impotence before the powers of Nature; but having in himself nothing that he respects more than Power, he is willing to prostrate himself before his gods, without inquiring whether they are worthy of his worship. Pathetic and very terrible is the long history of cruelty and torture, of degradation and human sacrifice, endured in the hope of placating the jealous gods: surely, the trembling believer thinks, when what is most precious has been freely given, their lust for blood must be appeased, and more will not be required. The religion of Moloch—as such creeds may be generically called—is in essence the cringing submission of the slave, who dare not, even in his heart, allow the thought that his master deserves no adulation. Since the independence of ideals is not yet acknowledged, Power may be freely worshipped, and receive an unlimited respect despite its wanton infliction of pain.

But gradually, as morality grows bolder, the claim of the ideal world begins to be felt, and worship, if it is not to cease, must be given to gods of another kind than those created by the savage. Some, though they feel the demands of the ideal, will still consciously reject them, still urging that naked Power is worthy of worship. Such is the attitude inculcated in God's answer to Job out of the whirlwind: the divine power and knowledge are

paraded, but of the divine goodness there is no hint. Such, also, is the attitude of those who, in our own day, base their morality upon the struggle for survival, maintaining that the survivors are necessarily the fittest. But others, not content with an answer so repugnant to the moral sense, will adopt the position which we have become accustomed to regard as specially religious, maintaining that, in some hidden manner, the world of fact is really harmonious with the world of ideals. Thus Man creates God, all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be.

But the world of fact, after all, is not good, and in submitting our judgment to it there is an element of slavishness from which our thoughts must be purged. For in all things it is well to exalt the dignity of Man, by freeing him, as far as possible, from the tyranny of non-human Power. When we have realized that Power is largely bad, that man, with his knowledge of good and evil, is but a helpless atom in a world which has no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us. Shall we worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and be evil, or shall he be recognized as the creation of our own conscience?

The answer to this question is very momentous, and affects profoundly our whole morality. The worship of Force, to which Carlyle and Nietzsche 20 and the creed of Militarism have accustomed us, is the result of failure to maintain our own ideals against a hostile universe. It is itself a prostrate submission to evil, a sacrifice of our best to Moloch. If strength indeed is to be respected, let us respect rather the strength of those who refuse that false "recognition of facts" which fails to recognize that facts are often bad. Let us admit that, in the world we know, there are many things that would be better otherwise, and that the ideals to which we do and must adhere are not realized in the realm of matter. Let us preserve our respect for truth, for beauty, for the ideal of perfection which life does not permit us to attain, though none of these things meet with the approval of the unconscious 30 universe. If Power is bad, as it seems to be, let us reject it from our hearts. In this lies Man's true freedom: in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our best moments. In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death. Let us learn, then, that energy of faith which enables us to live constantly in the vision of the good; and let us descend, in action, into the world of fact, with that vision always before us.

40 When first the opposition of fact and ideal grows fully visible, a spirit of fiery revolt, of fierce hatred of the gods, seems necessary to the assertion of freedom. To defy with Promethean constancy a hostile universe, to keep its evil always in view, always actively hated, to refuse no pain that the malice of

Power can invent, appears to be the duty of all who will not bow before the inevitable. But indignation is still a bondage, for it compels our thoughts to be occupied with an evil world; and in the fierceness of desire from which rebellion springs, there is a kind of self-assertion which it is necessary for the wise to overcome. Indignation is a submussion of our thoughts, but not of our desires; the Stoic freedom in which wisdom consists is found in the submission of our desires, but not of our thoughts. From the submussion of our desires springs the virtue of resignation, from the freedom of our thoughts springs the whole world of art and philosophy, and the vision of beauty by which, at last, we half reconquer the reluctant world. But the ¹⁰ vision of beauty is possible only to unfettered contemplation, to thoughts not weighted by the load of eager wishes; and thus Freedom comes only to those who no longer ask of life that it shall yield them any of those personal goods that are subject to the mutations of Time.

Although the necessity of renunciation is evidence of the existence of evil, yet Christianity, in preaching it, has shown a wisdom exceeding that of the Promethean philosophy of rebellion. It must be admitted that, of the things we desire, some, though they prove impossible, are yet real goods, others, however, as ardently longed for, do not form part of a fully purified ideal. The belief that what must be renounced is bad, though sometimes false, is ²⁰ far less often false than untamed passion supposes; and the creed of religion, by providing a reason for proving that it is never false, has been the means of purifying our hopes by the discovery of many austere truths.

But there is in resignation a further good element: even real goods, when they are unattainable, ought not to be fretfully desired. To every man comes, sooner or later, the great renunciation. For the young, there is nothing unattainable, a good thing, desired with the whole force of a passionate will, and yet impossible, is to them not credible. Yet, by death, by illness, by poverty, or by the voice of duty, we must learn, each one of us, that the world was not made for us, and that, however beautiful may be the ³⁰ things we crave, Fate may nevertheless forbid them. It is the part of courage, when misfortune comes, to bear without repining the ruin of our hopes, to turn away our thoughts from vain regrets. This degree of submussion to Power is not only just and right, it is the very gate of wisdom.

But passive renunciation is not the whole of wisdom, for not by renunciation alone can we build a temple for the worship of our own ideals. Haunting foreshadowings of the temple appear in the realm of imagination, in music, in architecture, in the untroubled kingdom of reason, and in the golden sunset magic of lyrics, where beauty shines and glows, remote from the touch of sorrow, remote from the fear of change, remote from the failures ⁴⁰ and disenchantments of the world of fact. In the contemplation of these things, the vision of heaven will shape itself in our hearts, giving at once a touchstone to judge the world about us, and an inspiration by which to

fashion to our needs whatever is not incapable of serving as a stone in the sacred temple

Except for those rare spirits that are born without sin, there is a cavern of darkness to be traversed before that temple can be entered. The gate of the cavern is despair, and its floor is paved with the grave-stones of abandoned hopes. There Self must die, there the eagerness, the greed of untamed desire must be slain, for only so can the soul be freed from the empire of Fate. But out of the cavern the Gate of Renunciation leads again to the daylight of wisdom, by whose radiance a new insight, a new joy, a new tenderness shine
10 forth to gladden the pilgrim's heart

When, without the bitterness of impotent rebellion, we have learnt both to resign ourselves to the outward rule of Fate and to recognize that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship, it becomes possible at last so to transform and refashion the unconscious universe, so to transmute it in the crucible of imagination, that a new image of shining gold replaces the old idol of clay. In all the multi-form facts of the world—in the visual shapes of trees and mountains and clouds, in the events of the life of man, even in the very omnipotence of Death—the insight of creative idealism can find the reflection of a beauty which its own thoughts first made. In this way mind
20 asserts its subtle mastery over the thoughtless forces of Nature. The more evil the material with which it deals, the more thwarting to untainted desire, the greater is its achievement in inducing the reluctant rock to yield up its hidden treasures, the prouder its victory in compelling the opposing forces to swell the pageant of its triumph. Of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant; for it builds its shining citadel in the very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain; from its impregnable watch-towers, his camps and arsenals, his columns and forts, are all revealed; within its walls the free life continues, while the legions of Death and Pain and Despair, and all the servile captains of tyrant Fate,
30 afford the burghers of that dauntless city new spectacles of beauty. Happy those sacred ramparts, thrice happy the dwellers on that all-seeing eminence. Honour to those brave warriors who, through countless ages of warfare, have preserved for us the priceless heritage of liberty, and have kept undefiled by sacrilegious invaders the home of the unsubdued

But the beauty of Tragedy does but make visible a quality which, in more or less obvious shapes, is present always and everywhere in life. In the spectacle of Death, in the endurance of intolerable pain, and in the irreversableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an overpowering awe, a feeling of the vastness, the depth, the inexhaustible mystery of existence, in
40 which, as by some strange marriage of pain, the sufferer is bound to the world by bonds of sorrow. In these moments of insight, we lose all eagerness of temporary desire, all struggling and striving for petty ends, all care for the little trivial things that, to a superficial view, make up the common life of

day by day, we see, surrounding the narrow raft illumined by the flickering light of human comradeship, the dark ocean on whose rolling waves we toss for a brief hour, from the great night without, a chill blast breaks in upon our refuge; all the loneliness of humanity amid hostile forces is concentrated upon the individual soul, which must struggle alone, with what of courage it can command, against the whole weight of a universe that cares nothing for its hopes and fears. Victory, in this struggle with the powers of darkness, is the true baptism into the glorious company of heroes, the true initiation into the overmastering beauty of human existence. From that awful encounter of the soul with the outer world, renunciation, wisdom, and charity are born, ¹⁰ and with their birth a new life begins To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be—Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the powerlessness of man before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity—to feel these things and know them is to conquer them

This is the reason why the Past has such magical power The beauty of its motionless and silent pictures is like the enchanted purity of late autumn, when the leaves, though one breath would make them fall, still glow against the sky in golden glory The Past does not change or strive, like Duncan, after life's fitful fever it sleeps well, what was eager and grasping, what was ²⁰ petty and transitory, has faded away, the things that were beautiful and eternal shine out of it like stars in the night Its beauty, to a soul not worthy of it, is unendurable; but to a soul which has conquered Fate it is the key of religion

The life of Man, viewed outwardly, is but a small thing in comparison with the forces of Nature The slave is doomed to worship Time and Fate and Death, because they are greater than anything he finds in himself, and because all his thoughts are of things which they devour. But great as they are, to think of them greatly, to feel their passionless splendour, is greater still And such thought makes us free men; we no longer bow before the ³⁰ inevitable in oriental subjection, but we absorb it, and make it a part of ourselves To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship And this liberation is effected by a contemplation of Fate, for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fire of Time.

United with his fellow-men by the strongest of all ties, the tie of a common doom, the free man finds that a new vision is with him always, shedding over every daily task the light of love. The life of Man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death Very brief is the time

in which we can help them, in which their happiness or misery is decided. Be it ours to shed sunshine on their path, to lighten their sorrows by the balm of sympathy, to give them the pure joy of a never-tiring affection, to strengthen failing courage, to instil faith in hours of despair. Let us not weigh in grudging scales their merits and demerits, but let us think only of their need, of the sorrows, the difficulties, perhaps the blindnesses, that make the misery of their lives; let us remember that they are fellow-sufferers in the same darkness, actors in the same tragedy with ourselves. And so, when their day is over, when their good and their evil have become eternal,
10 by the immortality of the past, be it ours to feel that where they suffered, where they failed, no deed of ours was the cause, but wherever a spark of the divine fire kindled in their hearts, we were ready with encouragement, with sympathy, with brave words in which high courage glowed.

Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way, for Man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennable his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to
20 worship at the shrine that his own hands have built, undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.

On History [1904]

RUSSELL WROTE "On History" at the request of his friend, G. M. Trevelyan, who wanted to enlist him in an intellectual campaign against the controversial theory of J. B. Bury, the recently appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. In his inaugural lecture on 26 January 1903, Bury argued that the study of history should be made scientific by the systematic and minute analysis of sources so as to secure the facts "history is a science, no less and no more" (1903, 7). Trevelyan was enraged, and according to Russell's biased and self-important account

abused Bury's inaugural lecture, because it said the documentary style was alone legitimate. Then he talked of his own views, which are virtually that history should consist of political pamphlets. I talked of history as an art, but he was not interested, because, as he himself said, he couldn't do that sort of thing. So I pointed out that he was committing a fault just like Bury's. I gave him the "Free Man's Worship", and he was overcome by it, he said it was the best thing he had ever read ("Journal", 11 Feb. [1903])

Since Trevelyan was always so generous in his praise of Russell, these encomiums should be viewed as deriving from the friendship. Nevertheless, Russell's arguments about history as an art, as well as the literary quality of "The Free Man's Worship" (4), must have prompted Trevelyan to entreat his friend to join the campaign against Bury about to be launched in the recently founded periodical, *The Independent Review*. Trevelyan's piece appeared in December 1903 as "The Latest View of History" (substantially altered and lengthened later to "Clio, A Muse"), and Russell's article was published in Vol. 3 (July 1904) 207–15.

To judge from three letters from Trevelyan in 1903, both men must have profited from their discussions. Certainly Russell's essay emphasized the three distinct functions Trevelyan attributed to history: the gaining by citizens of some lessons of political wisdom, the spreading of the knowledge of great men, and the opportunity, in moments of solitude, "to feel the Poetry of Time" (Trevelyan 1903, 410). Russell, however, gives less weight to the first function. He develops with greater intensity the belief that history's prime function is to enlarge our imagination, not only to appreciate great deeds, but also to grasp the travails and triumphs of unnumbered generations. Both essays are written in lyrical language, but Russell, perhaps reflecting on his personal unhappiness, is elegiac to a degree not attempted by

Trevelyan Russell's later writings on history were more detached, less given to elevated diction, but he always held to the view, shared by Trevelyan, that history could never be viewed "as solely or chiefly a causal science" (77 37-8) (See particularly Russell 1943, 16, 1957, 38)

The essays by the two friends did contribute to the growing groundswell of English criticism of Bury's thesis. But neither Trevelyan nor Russell endeavoured to become significant theorists like the German Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who, in attacking Bury's positivism and historical empiricism, opened new avenues of historical investigation by insisting, for example, on the way in which the historian's own value system and individual psychology must be taken into account when interpreting the past. In all fairness to Russell, he should not be judged according to the criteria applied to the works of acknowledged great historians, for as he admitted (1954, 1), he wrote as a "consumer, not a producer" of professional history.

Trevelyan's request came at a time in Russell's life when his heightened awareness of the cosmic loneliness of mankind had given him a new appreciation of history. He had just finished "The Free Man's Worship" and was intermittently at work on "The Pilgrimage of Life" (2). The experience of writing "Pilgrimage", with its recurring lament for the individual's past, left Russell with a heightened tendency to brood upon the shared past of mankind. He was particularly attracted to those works, such as Edward Gibbon's great classic, about the decline and fall of lost societies. The lyrical and mystical qualities of "Pilgrimage" characterize "On History" and indeed almost all of one fragment, "The Communion of Saints", reappears. His boyhood fascination with history, described in his *Autobiography* (1967, 30), and in "An Education in History" (1961a, 35-40), had been essentially immature, focused as it was on a narrow Whig interpretation of that period of English history in which many of his relatives had played a conspicuous part. Ironically, Russell's training in Whig interpretation came just when that tradition began to come under serious attack from professional historians as anachronistic (Blaas 1978, xi-xii). History books in his boyhood room were random in topic and so heavy in content that, as he later told Lady Ottoline Morrell, "there was hardly one title I could understand" (#432, April 1912). During his courtship with Alys, Russell had counterbalanced her enthusiasm with a playfully irreverent attitude to the subject—"personally I think History is a much overrated study—it seems to me usually both dull and irrelevant" (5 Oct 1894).

By November 1902 his regard for the discipline had deepened so that he could assert to the historian Mary Bateson, wife of the geneticist William Bateson, that he had "praised History as superior to science and talked about the great ends of life the building of the Temple of Humanity the edifice of the Past" ("Journal", 20 Nov.). Still, the composition of the essay did not come easily. He recorded in his "Journal" early in March 1903 that he had "been writing on History, but without any great success" (8 March). Nevertheless, the quality of his essay was such that Trevelyan, in undated letters written probably in the spring or summer of 1903, lavishly praised Russell "Your 'History' makes me feel ashamed of the essay I am

attempting on the same subject" (RA 710 056912) In another letter he stated that Russell's article was "about the best thing we have a chance of publishing in our Review" (RA 710 056914) Gilbert Murray's commendation must have been equally gratifying "It is a comfort you approve the History on the whole" (24 March 1904), Russell wrote.

In its nostalgia for the consolations of the past, "On History" is unrepresentative of Russell's many reflections on the value of studying history. In his other writings on history, he advocated analyzing history for the purpose of understanding "the rise of civilization" (1961a, 90) and the possibilities of improving man's lot, through scientific and educational advancement. Such pride in the past, with its record of English liberty, and such confidence about the future reveal how wedded he was, "On History" notwithstanding, to the Whig interpretation of history.

Despite its atypical nature within Russell's historical writings, he continued to take satisfaction from "On History". This sustained interest in the article was evident when he sent Lady Ottoline a typewritten copy of the article (26 April 1911) and when he quoted the entire last paragraph in a letter to her of 1 June 1912. In "How to Read and Understand History" (1943) he repeated many of the ideas from "On History". He included "On History" unchanged in the revised edition of *Philosophical Essays* (1966).

The copy-text is *The Independent Review* article published in July, 1904. The typescript he sent to Lady Ottoline is not now extant "I think it contains some things I cut out before publishing", he told her (#43, 26 April 1911)

OF ALL THE studies by which men acquire citizenship of the intellectual commonwealth, no single one is so indispensable as the study of the past. To know how the world developed to the point at which our individual memory begins; how the religions, the institutions, the nations among which we live, became what they are; to be acquainted with the great of other times, with customs and beliefs differing widely from our own—these things are indispensable to any consciousness of our position, and to any emancipation from the accidental circumstances of our education. It is not only to the historian that history is valuable, not only to the professed student of archives and documents, but to all who are capable of a contemplative survey of human life. But the value of history is so multiform, that those to whom some one of its sides appeals with especial force are in constant danger of forgetting all the others.

I

History is valuable, to begin with, because it is true; and this, though not the whole of its value, is the foundation and condition of all the rest. That all knowledge, as such, is in some degree good, would appear to be at least probable; and the knowledge of every historical fact possesses this element of goodness, even if it possesses no other. Modern historians, for the most part, seem to regard truth as constituting the whole of the value of history. On this ground they urge the self-effacement of the historian before the document; every intrusion of his own personality, they fear, will involve some degree of falsification. Objectivity before all things is to be sought, they tell us; let the facts be merely narrated, and allowed to speak for themselves—if they can find tongues. It follows, as a part of the position, that all facts are equally important; and, although this doctrine can never be quite conformed to in practice, it seems nevertheless to float before many minds as an ideal toward which research may gradually approximate.

That the writing of history should be based on the study of documents, is an opinion which it would be absurd to controvert. For they alone contain evidence as to what really occurred; and it is plain that untrue history can have no great value. Moreover, there is more life in one document than in fifty histories (omitting a very few of the best); by the mere fact that it contains what belongs to that actual past time, it has a strangely vivid life-in-death, such as belongs to our own past when some sound or scent awakens it. And a history written after the event can hardly make us realize that the actors were ignorant of the future; it is difficult to believe that the late Romans did not know their empire was about to fall, or that Charles I was unaware of so notorious a fact as his own execution.

But if documents are, in so many ways, superior to any deliberate history, what function remains to the historian? There is, to begin with, the business

of selection. This would be admitted by all; for the materials are so vast, that it is impossible to present the whole of them. But it is not always realized that selection involves a standard of value among facts, and therefore implies that truth is not the sole aim in recording the past. For all facts are equally true, and selection among them is only possible by means of some other criterion than their truth. And the existence of some such criterion is obvious; no one would maintain, for example, that the little Restoration scandals recorded by Grammont are as important as the letters on the Piedmontese massacres, by which Milton, in the name of Cromwell, summoned the tardy potentates of Europe.

It may be said, however, that the only true principle of selection is the purely scientific one, those facts are to be regarded as important which lead to the establishment of general laws. Whether there ever will be a science of history, it is quite impossible to guess; at any rate it is certain that no such science exists at present, except to some slight degree in the province of economics. In order that the scientific criterion of importance among facts should be applicable, it is necessary that two or more hypotheses should have been invented, each accounting for a large number of the facts, and that then a crucial fact should be discovered which discriminates between the rivals. Facts are important, in the inductive sciences, solely in relation to theories, and new theories give importance to new facts. So, for example, the doctrine of Natural Selection brought into prominence all transitional and intermediate species, the existence of rudiments, and the embryological record of descent. But it will hardly be maintained that history has reached, or is soon likely to reach, a point where such standards are applicable to its facts. History, considered as a body of truth, seems destined long to remain almost purely descriptive. Such generalizations as have been suggested—omitting the sphere of economics—are, for the most part, so plainly unwarranted as to be not even worthy of refutation. Burke argued that all revolutions end in military tyrannies, and predicted Napoleon. In so far as his argument was based on the analogy of Cromwell, it was a very lucky hit, but certainly not a scientific law. It is true that numerous instances are not always necessary to establish a law, provided the essential and relevant circumstances can be easily disentangled. But, in history, so many circumstances of a small and accidental nature are relevant, that no broad and simple uniformities are possible.

And there is a further point against this view of history as solely or chiefly a causal science. Where our main endeavour is to discover general laws, we regard these as intrinsically more valuable than any of the facts which they inter-connect. In astronomy, the law of gravitation is plainly better worth knowing than the position of a particular planet on a particular night, or even on every night throughout a year. There are in the law a splendour and simplicity and sense of mastery, which illuminate a mass of otherwise

uninteresting details. And so again in biology: until the theory of evolution put meaning into the bewildering variety of organic structures, the particular facts were interesting only to the professed naturalist. But in history the matter is far otherwise. In economics, it is true, the data are often subordinate to the attempts at science which are based upon them; but in all other departments, the data are more interesting, and the scientific superstructure less satisfactory. Historical facts, many of them, have an intrinsic value, a profound interest on their own account, which makes them worthy of study, quite apart from any possibility of linking them together by means

10 of causal laws

The study of history is often recommended on the ground of its utility in regard to the problems of present-day politics. That history has great utility in this respect, it is impossible to deny; but it is necessary very carefully to limit and define the kind of guidance to be expected from it. The "teachings of history", in the crude sense, presuppose the discovery of causal laws, usually of a very sweeping kind; and "teachings" of this sort, though in certain cases they may do no harm, are always theoretically unsound. In the eighteenth century perpetually, and in our own day occasionally, arguments as to the value of liberty or democracy are drawn from Greece and Rome; 20 their greatness or their decay, according to the bias of the author, is attributed to these causes. What can be more grotesque than to hear the rhetoric of the Romans applied to the circumstances of the French Revolution! The whole organization of a City State, based on slavery, without representative institutions, and without printing, is so utterly remote from any modern democracy as to make all analogy, except of the vaguest kind, totally frivolous and unreal. So with regard to imperialism, arguments are drawn from the successes and failures of the ancients. Shall we believe, for example, that Rome was ruined by the perpetual extension of her frontiers? Or shall we believe, with Mommsen, that the failure to conquer the Germans between the Rhine and the Danube was one of her most fatal errors? 30 All such arguments will always be conducted according to the prejudices of the author; and all alike, even if they have some measure of truth in regard to the past, must be quite inapplicable to the present.

This evil is greatest when history is regarded as teaching some general philosophical doctrine, such as. Right, in the long run, is Might; Truth always prevails in the end; or, Progress is a universal law of society. All such doctrines require, for their support, a careful choice of place and time, and, what is worse, a falsification of values. A very flagrant instance of this danger is Carlyle. In the case of Puritanism, it led him to justify all Cromwell's acts 40 of impatience and illegality, and arbitrarily to arrest his survey in 1658; how he accounted for the Restoration, it is impossible to say. In other cases, it led him still further astray. For it is often hard to discover on which side the Right lies, but the Might is visible to all men; thus the doctrine that Right is

Might slides insensibly into the belief that Might is Right. Hence the praise of Frederick and Napoleon and Bismarck, the pitiless contempt for the negroes, the Irish, and the "thirty-thousand distressed needlewomen". In some such way, every general theory that all is for the best must be forced by the facts into defence of the indefensible

Nevertheless, history has a function in regard to current affairs, but a function less direct, less exact, and less decisive. It may, in the first place, suggest minor maxims, whose truth, when they are once propounded, can be seen without the help of the events that suggested them. This is largely the case in economics, where most of the motives concerned are simple. It is 10 the case also, for a similar reason, in regard to strategy. Wherever, out of the facts, a simple deductive argument from indubitable premisses can be elicited, history may yield useful precepts. But these will only apply where the end is given, and are therefore of a technical nature. They can never tell the statesman what end to pursue, but only, within certain limits, how some of the more definite ends, such as wealth, or victory in war, are to be attained.

II

Another and a greater utility, however, belongs also to history. It enlarges the imagination, and suggests possibilities of action and feeling which 20 would not have occurred to an uninstructed mind. It selects from past lives the elements which were significant and important; it fills our thoughts with splendid examples, and with the desire for greater ends than unaided reflection would have discovered. It relates the present to the past, and thereby the future to the present. It makes visible and living the growth and greatness of nations, enabling us to extend our hopes beyond the span of our own lives. In all these ways, a knowledge of history is capable of giving to statesmanship, and to our daily thoughts, a breadth and scope unattainable by those whose view is limited to the present.

What the past does for us may be judged, perhaps, by the consideration of 30 those younger nations whose energy and enterprise are winning the envy of Europe. In them we see developing a type of man, endowed with all the hopefulness of the Renaissance or of the Age of Pericles, persuaded that his more vigorous efforts can quickly achieve whatever has proved too difficult for the generations that preceded him. Ignorant and contemptuous of the aims that inspired those generations, unaware of the complex problems that they attempted to solve, his rapid success in comparatively simple achievements encourages his confident belief that the future belongs to him. But to those who have grown up surrounded by monuments of men and deeds whose memory they cherish, there is a curious thinness about the thoughts 40 and emotions that inspire this confidence, optimism seems to be sustained by a too exclusive pursuit of what can be easily achieved; and hopes are not

transmuted into ideals by the habit of appraising current events by their relation to the history of the past. Whatever is different from the present is despised. That among those who contributed nothing to the dominion of Mammon great men lived, that wisdom may reside in those whose thoughts are not dominated by the machine, is incredible to this temper of mind. Action, Success, Change, are its watchwords; whether the action is noble, the success in a good cause, or the change an improvement in anything except wealth, are questions which there is no time to ask. Against this spirit, whereby all leisure, all care for the ends of life, are sacrificed to the struggle to be first in a worthless race, history and the habit of living with the past are the surest antidotes; and in our age, more than ever before, such antidotes are needed.

The record of great deeds is a defeat of Time; for it prolongs their power through many ages after they and their authors have been swallowed by the abyss of the non-existent. And, in regard to the past, where contemplation is not obscured by desire and the need for action, we see, more clearly than in the lives about us, the value, for good and evil, of the aims men have pursued and the means they have adopted. It is good, from time to time, to view the present as already past, and to examine what elements it contains that will add to the world's store of permanent possessions, that will live and give life when we and all our generation have perished. In the light of this contemplation, all human experience is transformed, and whatever is sordid or personal is purged away. And, as we grow in wisdom, the treasure-house of the ages opens to our view; more and more we learn to know and love the men through whose devotion all this wealth has become ours. Gradually, by the contemplation of great lives, a mystic communion becomes possible, filling the soul like music from an invisible choir. Still, out of the past, the voices of heroes call us. As, from a lofty promontory, the bell of an ancient cathedral, unchanged since the day when Dante returned from the kingdom of the dead, still sends its solemn warning across the waters, so their voice still sounds across the intervening sea of time; still, as then, its calm deep tones speak to the solitary tortures of cloistered aspiration, putting the serenity of things eternal in place of the doubtful struggle against ignoble joys and transient pleasures. Not by those about them were they heard; but they spoke to the winds of heaven, and the winds of heaven tell the tale to the great of later days. The great are not solitary; out of the night come the voices of those who have gone before, clear and courageous; and so through the ages they march, a mighty procession, proud, undaunted, unconquerable. To join in this glorious company, to swell the immortal paean of those whom fate could not subdue—this may not be happiness, but what is happiness to those whose souls are filled with that celestial music? To them is given what is better than happiness: to know the fellowship of the great, to live in the inspiration of lofty thoughts, and to be illumined in every

perplexity by the fire of nobility and truth

But history is more than the record of individual men, however great: it is the province of history to tell the biography, not only of men, but of Man; to present the long procession of generations as but the passing thoughts of one continuous life; to transcend their blindness and brevity in the slow unfolding of the tremendous drama in which all play their part. In the migrations of races, in the birth and death of religions, in the rise and fall of empires, the unconscious units, without any purpose beyond the moment, have contributed unwittingly to the pageant of the ages; and, from the greatness of the whole, some breath of greatness breathes over all who participated in the march. In this lies the haunting power of the dim history beyond written records. There, nothing is known but the cloudy outlines of huge events; and, of all the separate lives that came and went, no memory remains. Through unnumbered generations, forgotten sons worshipped at the tombs of forgotten fathers, forgotten mothers bore warriors whose bones whitened the silent steppes of Asia. The clash of arms, the hatreds and oppressions, the blind conflicts of dumb nations, are all still, like a distant waterfall; but slowly, out of the strife, the nations that we know emerged, with a heritage of poetry and piety transmitted from the buried past.

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And this quality, which is all that remains of pre-historic times, belongs also to the later periods where the knowledge of details is apt to obscure the movement of the whole. We, too, in all our deeds, bear our part in a process of which we cannot guess the development: even the obscurest are actors in a drama of which we know only that it is great. Whether any purpose that we value will be achieved, we cannot tell; but the drama itself, in any case, is full of Titanic grandeur. This quality it is the business of the historian to extract from the bewildering multitude of irrelevant details. From old books, wherein the loves, the hopes, the faiths of bygone generations lie embalmed, he calls pictures before our minds, pictures of high endeavours and brave hopes, living still through his care, in spite of failure and death. Before all is wrapped in oblivion, the historian must compose afresh, in each succeeding age, the epitaph upon the life of Man.

The past alone is truly real: the present is but a painful, struggling birth into the immutable being of what is no longer. Only the dead exist fully. The lives of the living are fragmentary, doubtful, and subject to change, but the lives of the dead are complete, free from the sway of Time, the all-but omnipotent lord of the world. Their failures and successes, their hopes and fears, their joys and pains, have become eternal—our efforts cannot now abate one jot of them. Sorrows long buried in the grave, tragedies of which only a fading memory remains, loves immortalized by Death's hallowing touch—these have a power, a magic, an untroubled calm, to which no present can attain.

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Year by year, comrades die, hopes prove vain, ideals fade, the enchanted land of youth grows more remote, the road of life more wearisome; the burden of the world increases, until the labour and the pain become almost too heavy to be borne; joy fades from the weary nations of the earth, and the tyranny of the future saps men's vital force; all that we love is waning, waning from the dying world. But the past, ever devouring the transient offspring of the present, lives by the universal death, steadily, irresistibly, it adds new trophies to its silent temple, which all the ages build; every great deed, every splendid life, every achievement and every heroic failure, is there enshrined. On the banks of the river of Time, the sad procession of human generations is marching slowly to the grave; in the quiet country of the Past, the march is ended, the tired wanderers rest, and all their weeping is hushed.

The Study of Mathematics [1907]

WRITTEN IN LONDON in October, 1902 (see "Journal", 18 May 1903), "The Study of Mathematics" was published in *The New Quarterly*, 1 (Nov 1907). 29–44 The essay may have originally had another title since the editor, Desmond MacCarthy (AII 4), wrote to Russell saying "I want you to alter the title of your article, if you do not mind—Our first number (it appears Oct 25th) is rather forbidding Your article is not such severe reading as the title suggests and therefore I am anxious that this fact should be suggested in the list of contents" (7 Sept 1907) Whatever the essay's original title, "The Study of Mathematics" gives Russell's view of how mathematics should be learned, together with his ultimate reason for its study—its supreme beauty

If Russell was certain of anything at this time, it was of the value of mathematics As he wrote to Lucy Donnelly in a despondent mood "Mathematics is a haven of peace without which I don't know how I should get on" (18 Feb 1906) He emphasizes this view in impersonal terms in the essay's early passages Donnelly remarked that she had read the essay twice "for the pleasure of the prose" (7 Dec 1907), but for Russell much more was intended than carefully turned phrases "The Study of Mathematics" is his most eloquent declaration of belief in the "dignity of reason" and his plea for the rational purity of mathematics rivalling the highest arts.

In mood and intention "The Study of Mathematics" belongs with his two other appeals in this period to transcendent value "The Free Man's Worship" (4) and "On History" (5) In the Preface of September, 1917 to *Mysticism and Logic* Russell linked "The Free Man's Worship" and "The Study of Mathematics", both of which had been published in *Philosophical Essays* (1910) In the latter Preface he explained that he included the essay "among the ethical essays" because it "is concerned rather with the *value* of mathematics than with an attempt to state what mathematics is" (v) Some years later, he associated "The Free Man's Worship", "On History" and "The Study of Mathematics" as expressing a similar outlook (1927, xi)

"The Study of Mathematics" is a conscious literary effort very different from Russell's technical mathematical writings It is thus difficult to understand why the literary connoisseur and publisher, T J Cobden-Sanderson (who in childhood had been designated his guardian) should have disliked the piece. Russell notes in his Journal for 25 November 1902 that "S told me he didn't like my paper on Mathematics, and wouldn't print it, which hurt me very much, making me feel that the new work I have been trying is futile" "S" is Cobden-Sanderson, who indeed could have

published the piece at the Doves Press which issued fine editions in small runs, for instance J W. Mackail's address on William Morris (1902) (Cobden-Sanderson later praised "Mysticism and Logic", but he published nothing of Russell's) The censure may account for Russell's unaccustomed delay in publishing "The Study of Mathematics" When the essay reached proof, Lytton Strachey wrote on 23 October 1907:

I have just read your article on Mathematics and can't resist writing to say how much I was carried away by it. Really it's magnificent—one's carried upwards into sublime heights—perhaps the sublimest of all! Your statement of the great thing about it seems to me absolutely clear and absolutely convincing it gives one a new conception of the glories of the human mind The simile of the Italian Castle struck me as particularly fine, and the simplicity of the expression added tremendously to the effect What scoundrels the *Independent* editors were! And what fools!

Russell's note on this letter printed in his *Autobiography* (1967, 197) says "They had refused to print the article", without explaining why or when in fact *The Independent Review* had turned the essay down

It is possible that "The Study of Mathematics", of which folio 1 of the manuscript is marked on the verso "Chapter v 63", had been written for a book on education of which "The Education of the Emotions" (3) was to be the first chapter The essay on education is marked "Chapter I" above its title and calls for discussion of "the more scholastic sides of education". Whatever the truth of this conjecture, remarks throughout "The Study of Mathematics" show that Russell was critical of how mathematics was taught at every level of education. He wrote not only to forecast his own future programme "an examination of the foundations upon which the whole edifice of reasoning is built", but to criticize mathematical study at Cambridge It was there that his intellectual discontents had been fuelled by defects in the curriculum Since the nineteenth century emphasis had been on applied rather than pure mathematics Treatment of pure mathematics was rudimentary to accommodate large numbers of students required to take the subject The system was largely the work of William Whewell in whose concept of a liberal education mathematics was to play the role of training the reason (see Becher 1980). By about 1848, Whewell (1794-1866) had analytic methods, used on the Continent and introduced by 1820 in Cambridge, removed from the syllabus in favour of eighteenth century methods, aided by intuition Furthermore, through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth the mathematical tripos encouraged manipulative skills—"artful dodges and ingenious devices" as Russell put it (1956, 20)—rather than logical reasoning The tripos system was reformed in 1907 along lines which had Russell's approval

The copy-text is the manuscript (RA 220 011150)

IN REGARD TO every form of human activity it is necessary that the question should be asked from time to time What is its purpose and ideal? In what way does it contribute to the beauty of human existence? As respects those pursuits which contribute only remotely, by providing the mechanism of life, it is well to be reminded that not the mere fact of living is to be desired, but the art of living in the contemplation of great things. Still more in regard to those avocations which have no end outside themselves, which are to be justified, if at all, as actually adding to the sum of the world's permanent possessions, it is necessary to keep alive a knowledge of their aims, a clear prefiguring vision of the temple in which creative imagination ¹⁰ is to be embodied.

The fulfilment of this need, in what concerns the studies forming the material upon which custom has decided to train the youthful mind, is indeed sadly remote—so remote as to make the mere statement of such a claim appear preposterous. Great men, fully alive to the beauty of the contemplations to whose service their lives are devoted, desiring that others may share in their joys, persuade mankind to impart to the successive generations the mechanical knowledge without which it is impossible to cross the threshold. Dry pedants possess themselves of the privilege of instilling this knowledge; they forget that it is to serve but as a key to open ²⁰ the doors of the temple; though they spend their lives on the steps leading up to those sacred doors, they turn their backs upon the temple so resolutely that its very existence is forgotten, and the eager youth, who would press forward to be initiated to its domes and arches, is bidden to turn back and count the steps.

Mathematics, perhaps more even than the study of Greece and Rome, has suffered from this oblivion of its due place in civilization. Although tradition has decreed that the great bulk of educated men shall know at least the elements of the subject, the reasons for which the tradition arose are forgotten, buried beneath a great rubbish-heap of pedantries and ³⁰ trivialities. To those who inquire as to the purpose of mathematics, the usual answer will be that it facilitates the making of machines, the travelling from place to place, and the victory over foreign nations, whether in war or commerce. If it be objected that these ends—all of which are of doubtful value—are not furthered by the merely elementary study imposed upon those who do not become expert mathematicians, the reply, it is true, will probably be that mathematics trains the reasoning faculties. Yet the very men who make this reply are, for the most part, unwilling to abandon the teaching of definite fallacies, known to be such, and instinctively rejected by the unsophisticated mind of every intelligent learner. And the reasoning ⁴⁰ faculty itself is generally conceived, by those who urge its cultivation, as merely a means for the avoidance of pitfalls, and a help in the discovery of rules for the guidance of practical life. All these are undeniably important

achievements to the credit of mathematics; yet it is none of these that entitles mathematics to a place in every liberal education. Plato, we know, regarded the contemplation of mathematical truths as worthy of the Deity; and Plato realized, more perhaps than any other single man, what those elements are in human life which merit a place in heaven. There is in Mathematics, he says, "something which is *necessary* and cannot be set aside ... and, if I mistake not, of divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which the Many talk in this connection, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words *Cleistos*. And what are these necessities of knowledge, Stranger, which are divine and not human?" *Athenian*. Those things without some use or knowledge of which, a man cannot become a God in the world, nor a spirit, nor yet a hero, nor able earnestly to think and care for man" (*Laws*, 818).¹ Such was Plato's judgment of mathematics; but the mathematicians do not read Plato, while those who read him know no mathematics, and regard his opinion upon this question as merely a curious aberration.

Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry. What is best in mathematics deserves not merely to be learnt as a task, but to be assimilated as a part of daily thought, and brought again and again before the mind with ever-renewed encouragement. Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible, but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world.

So little, however, have mathematicians aimed at beauty, that hardly anything in their work has had this conscious purpose. Much, owing to irrepressible instincts, which were better than avowed beliefs, has been moulded by an unconscious taste; but much also has been spoilt by false notions of what was fitting. The characteristic excellence of mathematics is only to be found where the reasoning is rigidly logical: the rules of logic are to mathematics what those of structure are to architecture. In the most

¹ This passage was pointed out to me by Professor Gilbert Murray

beautiful work, a chain of argument is presented in which every link is important on its own account, in which there is an air of ease and lucidity throughout, and the premisses achieve more than would have been thought possible, by means which appear natural and inevitable. Literature embodies what is general in particular circumstances whose universal significance shines through their individual dress; but mathematics endeavours to present whatever is most general in its purity, without any irrelevant trappings.

How should the teaching of mathematics be conducted so as to communicate to the learner as much as possible of this high ideal? Here experience must, in a great measure, be our guide; but some maxims may result from our consideration of the ultimate purpose to be achieved.

One of the chief ends served by mathematics, when rightly taught, is to awaken the learner's belief in reason, his confidence in the truth of what has been demonstrated and in the value of demonstration. This purpose is not served by existing instruction; but it is easy to see ways in which it might be served. At present, in what concerns Arithmetic, the boy or girl is given a set of rules, which present themselves as neither true nor false, but as merely the will of the teacher, the way in which, for some unfathomable reason, the teacher prefers to have the game played. To some degree, in a study of such definite practical utility, this is no doubt unavoidable; but as soon as possible, the reasons of rules should be set forth by whatever means most readily appeal to the childish mind. In Geometry, instead of the tedious apparatus of fallacious proofs for obvious truisms which constitutes the beginning of Euclid, the learner should be allowed at first to assume the truth of everything obvious, and should be instructed in the demonstrations of theorems which are at once startling and easily verifiable by actual drawing, such as those in which it is shown that three or more lines meet in a point. In this way belief is generated; it is seen that reasoning may lead to startling conclusions, which nevertheless the facts will verify; and thus the instinctive distrust of whatever is abstract or rational is gradually overcome. Where theorems are difficult, they should be first taught as exercises in geometrical drawing, until the figure has become thoroughly familiar; it will then be an agreeable advance to be taught the logical connections of the various lines or circles that occur. It is desirable also that the figure illustrating a theorem should be drawn in all possible cases and shapes, that so the abstract relations with which Geometry is concerned may of themselves emerge as the residue of similarity amid such great apparent diversity. In this way, the abstract demonstrations should form but a small part of the instruction, and should be given when, by familiarity with concrete illustrations, they have come to be felt as the natural embodiment of visible fact. In this early stage, proofs should not be given with pedantic fullness, definitely fallacious methods, such as that of superposition, should be

rigidly excluded from the first, but where, without such methods, the proof would be very difficult, the result should be rendered acceptable by arguments and illustrations which are explicitly contrasted with demonstrations.

In the beginning of Algebra, even the most intelligent child finds as a rule very great difficulty. The use of letters is a mystery, which seems to have no purpose except mystification. It is almost impossible, at first, not to think that every letter stands for some particular number, if only the teacher would reveal *what* number it stands for. The fact is that in Algebra the mind
10 is first taught to consider general truths, truths which are not asserted to hold only of this or that particular thing, but of any one of a whole group of things. It is in the power of understanding and discovering such truths that the mastery of the intellect over the whole world of things actual and possible resides; and ability to deal with the general as such is one of the gifts that a mathematical education should bestow. But how little, as a rule, is the teacher of Algebra able to explain the chasm which divides it from Arithmetic, and how little is the learner assisted in his groping efforts at comprehension! Usually the method that has been adopted in Arithmetic is continued: rules are set forth, with no adequate explanation of their grounds; the pupil
20 learns to use the rules blindly, and presently, when he is able to obtain the answer that the teacher desires, he feels that he has mastered the difficulties of the subject. But of inner comprehension of the processes employed, he has probably acquired almost nothing.

When Algebra has been learnt, all goes smoothly until we reach those studies in which the notion of infinity is employed—the infinitesimal calculus and the whole of higher mathematics. The solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably the greatest achievement of which our own age has to boast. Since the beginnings of Greek thought, these difficulties have been known: in every age,
30 the finest intellects have vainly endeavoured to answer the apparently unanswerable questions that had been asked by Zeno the Eleatic. At last Georg Cantor has found the answer, and has conquered for the intellect a new and vast province which had been given over to Chaos and old Night. It was assumed as self-evident, until Cantor and Dedekind established the opposite, that if, from any collection of things, some were taken away, the number of things left must always be less than the original number of things. This assumption, as a matter of fact, holds only of finite collections; and the rejection of it, where the infinite is concerned, has been shown to remove all the difficulties that had hitherto baffled human reason in this
40 matter, and to render possible the creation of an exact science of the infinite. This stupendous fact ought to produce a revolution in the higher teaching of mathematics, it has itself added immeasurably to the educational value of the subject, and it has at last given the means of treating with logical

precision many studies which, until lately, were wrapped in fallacy and obscurity. By those who were educated on the old lines, the new work is considered to be appallingly difficult, abstruse, and obscure; and it must be confessed that the discoverer, as is so often the case, has hardly himself emerged from the mists which the light of his intellect is dispelling. But inherently, the new doctrine of the infinite, to all candid and inquiring minds, has facilitated the mastery of higher mathematics; for hitherto, it has been necessary to learn, by a long process of sophistication, to give assent to arguments which, on first acquaintance, were rightly judged to be confused and erroneous. So far from producing a fearless belief in reason, a bold ¹⁰ rejection of whatever failed to fulfil the strictest requirements of logic, a mathematical training, during the past two centuries, encouraged the belief that many things, which a rigid inquiry would reject as fallacious, must yet be accepted because they work in what the mathematician calls "practice". By this means, a timid, compromising spirit, or else a sacerdotal belief in mysteries not intelligible to the profane, has been bred where reason alone should have ruled. All this it is now time to sweep away; let those who wish to penetrate into the arcana of mathematics be taught at once the true theory in all its logical purity, and in the concatenation established by the very essence of the entities concerned.

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If we are considering mathematics as an end in itself, and not as a technical training for engineers, it is very desirable to preserve the purity and strictness of its reasoning. Accordingly those who have attained a sufficient familiarity with its easier portions should be led backward from propositions to which they have assented as self-evident to more and more fundamental principles from which what had previously appeared as premisses can be deduced. They should be taught—what the theory of infinity very aptly illustrates—that many propositions seem self-evident to the untrained mind which, nevertheless, a nearer scrutiny shows to be false. By this means they will be led to a sceptical inquiry into first principles, an ³⁰ examination of the foundations upon which the whole edifice of reasoning is built, or, to take perhaps a more fitting metaphor, the great trunk from which the spreading branches spring. At this stage, it is well to study afresh the elementary portions of mathematics, asking no longer merely whether a given proposition is true, but also how it grows out of the central principles of logic. Questions of this nature can now be answered with a precision and certainty which were formerly quite impossible; and in the chains of reasoning that the answer requires the unity of all mathematical studies at last unfolds itself.

In the great majority of mathematical text-books there is a total lack of ⁴⁰ unity in method and of systematic development of a central theme. Propositions of very diverse kinds are proved by whatever means are thought most easily intelligible, and much space is devoted to mere curiosities which in no

way contribute to the main argument. But in the greatest works, unity and inevitability are felt as in the unfolding of a drama. In the premisses a subject is proposed for consideration, and in every subsequent step some definite advance is made towards mastery of its nature. The love of system, of interconnection, which is perhaps the inmost essence of the intellectual impulse, can find free play in mathematics as nowhere else. The learner who feels this impulse must not be repelled by an array of meaningless examples, or distracted by amusing oddities, but must be encouraged to dwell upon central principles, to become familiar with the structure of the various subjects which are put before him, to travel easily over the steps of the more important deductions. In this way, a good tone of mind is cultivated, and selective attention is taught to dwell by preference upon what is weighty and essential.

When the separate studies, into which mathematics is divided, have each been viewed as a logical whole, as a natural growth from the propositions which constitute their principles, the learner will be able to understand the fundamental science which unifies and systematizes the whole of deductive reasoning. This is Symbolic Logic—a study which, though it owes its inception to Aristotle, is yet, in its wider developments, a product, almost wholly, of the nineteenth century, and is indeed, in the present day, still growing with great rapidity. The true method of discovery, in Symbolic Logic, and probably also the best method for introducing the study to a learner acquainted with other parts of mathematics, is the analysis of actual examples of deductive reasoning, with a view to the discovery of the principles employed. These principles, for the most part, are so embedded in our ratiocinative instincts, that they are employed quite unconsciously, and can be dragged to light only by much patient effort. But when at last they have been found, they are seen to be few in number, and to be the sole source of everything in pure mathematics. The discovery that all mathematics follows inevitably from a small collection of fundamental laws, is one which immeasurably enhances the intellectual beauty of the whole: to those who have been oppressed by the fragmentary and incomplete nature of most existing chains of deduction, this discovery comes with all the overwhelming force of a revelation: like a palace emerging from the autumn mist as the traveller ascends an Italian hill-side, the stately storeys of the mathematical edifice appear in their due order and proportion, with a new perfection in every part.

Until Symbolic Logic had acquired its present development, the principles upon which mathematics depends were always supposed to be philosophical, and discoverable only by the uncertain, unprogressive methods hitherto employed by philosophers. So long as this was thought, mathematics seemed to be not autonomous, but dependent upon a study which had quite other methods than its own. Moreover, since the nature of

the postulates, from which arithmetic, analysis and geometry are to be deduced, was wrapped in all the traditional obscurities of metaphysical discussion, the edifice built upon such dubious foundations began to be viewed as no better than a castle in the air. In this respect, the discovery that the true principles are as much a part of mathematics as any of their consequences, has very greatly increased the intellectual satisfaction to be obtained This satisfaction ought not to be refused to learners capable of enjoying it, for it is of a kind to increase our respect for human powers and our knowledge of the beauties belonging to the abstract world.

Philosophers have commonly held that the laws of logic, which underlie 10 mathematics, are laws of thought, laws regulating the operations of our minds. By this opinion, the true dignity of reason is very greatly lowered it ceases to be an investigation into the very heart and immutable essence of all things actual and possible, becoming, instead, an inquiry into something more or less human and subject to our limitations. The contemplation of what is non-human, the discovery that our minds are capable of dealing with material not created by them, above all, the realization that beauty belongs to the outer world as to the inner, are the chief means of overcoming the terrible sense of impotence, of weakness, of exile amid hostile powers, which is too apt to result from acknowledging the all-but omnipotence of 20 alien forces. To reconcile us, by the exhibition of its awful beauty, to the reign of Fate—which is merely the literary personification of these forces—is the task of tragedy But mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform; and even here it builds a habitation, or rather finds a habitation eternally standing, where our ideals are fully satisfied and our best hopes are not thwarted It is only when we thoroughly understand the entire independence of ourselves, which belongs to this world that reason finds, that we can adequately realize the profound importance of its beauty 30

Not only is mathematics independent of us and our thoughts, but in another sense we and the whole universe of existing things are independent of mathematics The apprehension of this purely ideal character is indispensable, if we are to understand rightly the place of mathematics as one among the arts. It was formerly supposed that pure reason could decide, in some respects, as to the nature of the actual world Geometry, at least, was thought to deal with the space in which we live. But we now know that pure mathematics can never pronounce upon questions of actual existence: the world of reason, in a sense, controls the world of fact, but it is not at any point creative of fact, and in the application of its results to the world in time 40 and space, its certainty and precision are lost among approximations and working hypotheses The objects considered by mathematicians have, in the past, been mainly of a kind suggested by phenomena; but from such

restrictions the abstract imagination should be wholly free. A reciprocal liberty must thus be accorded reason cannot dictate to the world of facts, but the facts cannot restrict reason's privilege of dealing with whatever objects its love of beauty may cause to seem worthy of consideration. Here, as elsewhere, we build up our own ideals out of the fragments to be found in the world; and in the end it is hard to say whether the result is a creation or a discovery.

It is very desirable, in instruction, not merely to persuade the student of the accuracy of important theorems, but to persuade him in the way which 10 itself has, of all possible ways, the most beauty. The true interest of a demonstration is not, as traditional modes of exposition suggest, concentrated wholly in the result, where this does occur, it must be viewed as a defect, to be remedied, if possible, by so generalizing the steps of the proof that each becomes important in and for itself. An argument which serves only to prove a conclusion is like a story subordinated to some moral which it is meant to teach for aesthetic perfection, no part of the whole should be merely a means. A certain practical spirit, a desire for rapid progress, for conquest of new realms, is responsible for the undue emphasis upon results which prevails in mathematical instruction. The better way is to propose 20 some theme for consideration—in Geometry, a figure having important properties, in analysis, a function of which the study is illuminating, and so on. Whenever proofs depend upon some only of the marks by which we define the object to be studied, these marks should be isolated and investigated on their own account. For it is a defect, in an argument, to employ more premisses than the conclusion demands: what mathematicians call elegance results from employing only the essential principles in virtue of which the thesis is true. It is a merit in Euclid that he advances as far as he is able to go without employing the axiom of parallels—not, as is often said, because this axiom is inherently objectionable, but because, in mathematics, 30 every new axiom diminishes the generality of the resulting theorems, and the greatest possible generality is before all things to be sought.

Of the effects of mathematics outside its own sphere, more has been written than on the subject of its own proper ideal. The effect upon philosophy has, in the past, been most notable, but most varied; in the seventeenth century, idealism and rationalism, in the eighteenth, materialism and sensationalism, seemed equally its offspring. Of the effect which it is likely to have in the future, it would be very rash to say much; but in one respect a good result appears probable. Against that kind of scepticism which abandons the pursuit of ideals because the road is arduous and 40 the goal not certainly attainable, mathematics, within its own sphere, is a complete answer. Too often it is said that there is no absolute truth, but only opinion and private judgment, that each of us is conditioned, in his view of the world, by his own peculiarities, his own taste and bias; that there is no

external kingdom of truth to which, by patience and discipline, we may at last obtain admittance, but only truth for me, for you, for every separate person. By this habit of mind, one of the chief ends of human effort is denied, and the supreme virtue of candour, of fearless acknowledgment of what is, disappears from our moral vision. Of such scepticism, mathematics is a perpetual reproof; for its edifice of truths stands unshakeable and inexpugnable to all the weapons of doubting cynicism.

The effects of mathematics upon practical life, though they should not be regarded as the motive of our studies, may be used to answer a doubt to which the solitary student must always be liable. In a world so full of evil and suffering, retirement into the cloister of contemplation, to the enjoyment of delights which, however noble, must always be for the few only, cannot but appear as a somewhat selfish refusal to share the burden imposed upon others by accidents in which justice plays no part. Have any of us the right, we ask, to withdraw from present evils, to leave our fellow-men unaided, while we live a life which, though arduous and austere, is yet plainly good in its own nature? When these questions arise, the true answer is, no doubt, that some must keep alive the sacred fire, some must preserve, in every generation, the haunting vision which shadows forth the goal of so much striving. But when, as must sometimes occur, this answer seems too cold, when we are almost maddened by the spectacle of sorrows to which we bring no help, then we may reflect that indirectly the mathematician often does more for human happiness than any of his more practically active contemporaries. The history of science abundantly proves that a body of abstract propositions—even if, as in the case of conic sections, it remains two thousand years without effect upon daily life—may yet, at any moment, be used to cause a revolution in the habitual thoughts and occupations of every citizen. The use of steam and electricity—to take striking instances—is rendered possible only by mathematics. In the results of abstract thought, the world possesses a capital, of which the employment in enriching the common round has no hitherto discoverable limits. Nor does experience give any means of deciding what parts of mathematics will be found useful Utility, therefore, can be only a consolation in moments of discouragement, not a guide in directing our studies.

For the health of the moral life, for ennobling the tone of an age or a nation, the austerer virtues have a strange power, exceeding the power of those not informed and purified by thought. Of these austerer virtues, the love of truth is the chief, and in mathematics, more than elsewhere, the love of truth may find encouragement for waning faith. Every great study is not only an end in itself, but also a means of creating and sustaining a lofty habit of mind, and this purpose should be kept always in view throughout the teaching and learning of mathematics.

Part III

“Of the Two Natures in Man”

Prisons [1911]

AMONG THE LEAST finished of Russell's unfinished books is "Prisons", which we print as a series of drafts. It belongs to the period of the final stages of *Principia Mathematica* and *The Problems of Philosophy*. "Prisons" was to be a very different sort of book from either of these, taking into account mystical feeling as well as intellect, with emphasis on mystical "union with the universe". As noted in the Introduction, the book arose from Russell's love affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell. Like Hamlet, Russell had felt imprisoned in a Denmark of his own soul until Lady Ottoline's love offered release. On 18 May 1903, Russell had spoken in his "Journal" of the "prison" of bad relations with his first wife Alys. The prison metaphor recurs in his correspondence with Lady Ottoline, becoming central during his emergence from a life of rarefied intellect and conventional morality. As he wrote to her on 1 April 1911

Dearest I long to be with you in wild open places, with the freedom of wind and sky and sea—life is so full of prisons, and I love the free spaces of the world. Wherever you are is my heaven, and imagination can do much for the rest (#14)

Their letters record not only the delights of their rendezvous but the gains in self-awareness, enhanced life of the senses and reflections on that life. At times the relationship was stormy. Russell did not succeed in parting Lady Ottoline from her husband, nor did he have a child with her. Their "child" was instead to be a book called "Prisons" inspired by discussions of religion (Alternatively, the book was to be called "On Contemplative Freedom" or "The Religion of Contemplation"). Their main differences were over religion, because she was a believer, while his sceptical intellect made him resistant. "Prisons" was to strike a balance.

The final draft of "Prisons", Russell's most mystical work, is now lost, while what appear here are early fragmentary drafts. That it was to be a book we know from letters to Lady Ottoline written in late July or early August, 1911. By 6 March 1912 there were at least 129 typed pages, as is evident from Lady Ottoline's detailed criticism enclosed with the letter of that date. Her comments range from criticisms of sentences to general remarks on worship and impartial love. Lady Ottoline had written the previous day asking for clarification about worship and desire, but in general she found what Russell had written "most beautiful". On 12 December 1911

he had seen that "Prisons" should be "differently constructed" (#284), but he found it difficult to make the revisions. Christmas vacation passed and still by 8 March, despite meditating on Wordsworth's pantheistic religion and mysticism, he was not ready to proceed. He had written on 10 February 1912 "In the summer I thought Prisons was great—now I see it was only great in idea, not in achievement" (#339). Two days later he lamented, "*Prisons* was wrong, I think, simply because it was expository. One must have a more artistic form" (#341). Lady Ottoline had commented as early as 19 October 1911 that parts of "Prisons" were "rather too kept down for the subject" and "too much like a Lecture". Russell had hoped to enlarge the mystic vision to complement intellect (#386, 15 March 1912), in order that "Prisons" might say all that he felt. There is nothing to show that the revisions were made, and it is likely that the typescript was simply abandoned prior to the upsurge of enthusiasm for his autobiographical novella, *The Perplexities of John Forstice*—enthusiasm first appearing in a letter to Lady Ottoline of 15 April 1912. The typescript sent to Lady Ottoline in Vienna on 29 September 1911 is lost, as is the second copy sent for criticism to Alfred North and Evelyn Whitehead.

There are two surviving outlines for "Prisons", neither of which completely describes the material presented here, although the outline below comes closer than the one printed as 7a. Paper 7c may be Chapter vi, and Paper 7e Chapter i, while Paper 7f is perhaps Chapter vii. The material is ordered as closely as possible according to the brief outline with which it begins. However, since there is no clear documentary evidence to indicate where the various fragments were eventually intended to be placed, their ordering here must be understood as hypothetical. The more elaborate outline sent by Russell on 18 August 1911 to Lady Ottoline calls for seven chapters and represents a state to which the writing may or may not have then attained. This outline at least indicates the contents of the typescript sent to Lady Ottoline and to the Whiteheads.

I have at last a really clear vision of *Prisons*. I have just finished writing out a long abstract *Chapter I* The Nature and value of religion. Religion provides worship, acquiescence, love. Some discussion of nature of worship. Contemplation, to a great extent, provides all three. Must learn to view things in regard to which we can act as we should view things in regard to which we cannot act. This requires a discipline, through contemplation where action is impossible. This discipline in following Chapters *Chapter II* The world of universals Will deal with mathematics, etc showing their value *Chapter III* The physical world. Deals with the empire of matter, the immensity of space, and the beauty of nature *Chapter IV* The Past. Here objects contemplated are of same sort as those in regard to which we have to act, but being past we see them without distortion. Value of history. At this point, the preliminary discipline is supposed finished, and we apply contemplation to purify emotion and action *Chapter V* Contemplation and the Emotions. *Chapter VI* Contemplation and Action *Chapter VII* Union with the uni-

verse These chapters will merely expand what I wrote before, I think the last might actually be what I wrote before, which sums up the whole (#173)

Russell felt as often discouraged as elated while writing "Prisons" Much emotion was re-awakened in his affair with Lady Ottoline through poetry, nature and a return to reading Spinoza While he hoped that the re-awakening would lead to "the larger life of impersonal contemplation" (103 7), it was perhaps too soon to write so ambitious a book Russell had hoped to exemplify the search for a selfless higher life which others might share, if only he could put into words the "contemplative vision" But he could not draw together feeling and thought into prophetic utterance as he admired Thomas Carlyle for having done in *Sartor Resartus* (1834) (to Lady Ottoline, pmk. 24 July 1911) The project to offer post-Christian religious consolation was left incomplete, to be revived and treated indirectly in the dialogue *Forstice* (9), and more directly in "Mysticism and Logic" (10) By the end of 1912, with the affair with Lady Ottoline past its incandescence, Russell again seriously turned to technical philosophy, preparing his Lowell lectures and writing *Theory of Knowledge* which itself was left unfinished "Prisons" belonged very much to its era, and when that passed Russell could sustain interest no further It had been a testimony to his second "conversion", and consequently he paid high tribute to the immediacy of Lady Ottoline's effect upon him As he wrote on 12 October 1911

You were much more than with me when I wrote Prisons. If it hadn't been for our crisis (over religion at Peppard in the summer), and your refusal to be imprisoned, and the whole emotion of that time, it would never have come into existence. large parts of it are transcripts of what I have observed in you You have shown me how to live without barriers, in the free love of Good (#216)

Like Russell, Lady Ottoline had high hopes for "Prisons", writing on 12 August [1911] "I believe it will have a *very* great effect on many people and be the thing that will lift them out into Life and freedom and Love and union with others and Service" When Russell's writing did not go well, out of kindness, her comments and criticisms were few Instead, Mrs Whitehead's strictures seem to have decided the fate of "Prisons" As Russell candidly told Lady Ottoline on 18 October 1911·

Mrs Whitehead criticized it very severely—not the ideas, which she agrees with, but the style. She says it is dull—the most severe criticism there is. She says it appears *voulu*; that the emotions spoken of are not spoken of so as to be felt, and that the intellectual and emotional parts don't belong together The gist of the matter is that being written when I was happy it fails to appeal to those who are not so—not that she put it that way

I knew in my instincts she would not like it She says the beauty of the Free Man's Worship is lacking (#224)

Russell salvaged what appears in the outline sent to Lady Ottoline as Chapter I, on the "Nature and Value of Religion", for publication as "The Essence of Religion" (8) in *The Hibbert Journal* on 11 October 1912. Passages from the surviving fragment "Prisons I", a few lines from "The Good of the Emotions" and all of "Wisdom" were transferred there (For the variants, see the textual notes for "The Essence of Religion") Occasional remarks in letters to Lady Ottoline show that he had seen the chapter on religion to be at the core of "Prisons". On 23 February 1912 he said, for instance, "I have been going over *Prisons* again, cutting out odd pages and sticking them in to the chapter on Religion, it grows longer, but not, I think, unduly disjointed. I haven't yet settled some points, so I haven't shown it to (G. Lowes) Dickinson" (#355). Not only did Russell find another use for the chapter on religion, he transplanted passages from "Prisons" into *The Problems of Philosophy*.

The six closing paragraphs of the final chapter in *The Problems of Philosophy*, "The Value of Philosophy", are synthesized from sentences and passages found in the "Prisons" fragments. It is not necessary to list the transferred materials to show that Russell sought to conserve his thoughts in "Prisons" about self-enlargement by impersonal contemplative knowledge. For instance, the image of the beleaguered fortress (1912, 244-5) is taken from "Wisdom", over half of "The Good of the Intellect" is incorporated verbatim and the passage beginning "The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth" (1912, 249) is expanded from "Action and Contemplation".

The challenge to write something like "Prisons" remained. On 8 April 1913 Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline about being appointed to lecture at the Lowell Institute in Boston, Mass. In his first rush of excitement, a plan was set out for the lectures which were to be given during the spring of 1914. Although he finally settled on a different topic Russell's initial plan was that the Lowell Lectures would realize his failed aspirations for "Prisons". "I feel convinced I can do the lectures—they will be what Prisons failed to be" (#737), he told her. He was unsure whether to call the lectures "the search for wisdom" or "the search for insight", favouring the latter but still feeling uncertain about it. He proposed the following heads, to which an eighth was to be added, perhaps on history.

- I Nature and importance of the problem
- II Insight in politics Lincoln, Mazzini
- III Insight in human relations who? Lamb
- IV. Insight in poetry: Dante
- V Insight in science: Galileo
- VI Insight in philosophy Spinoza
- VII The nature of insight.

The texts printed here are not the rewritten version of "Prisons" on which Lady Ottoline commented but earlier, less developed drafts of chapters sent independently to her when the book was first being planned. These fragments remained

among her papers and are deposited with them at the Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin. In the letter of 18 August 1911 containing the plan for "Prisons" Russell, as noted, said, "these chapters will merely expand what I wrote before, I think the last might actually be what I wrote before, which sums up the whole." In all likelihood the fragments printed here are what he "wrote before" and may already have been in her possession, having been superseded and forgotten when new drafts arrived.

The copy-texts are the manuscripts held in Austin. Their bibliographical description is found in the textual notes.

7a Untitled Outline

<i>Prisons</i>	Body, Mind Habit Prejudice Error Possessiveness
	SELF
<i>Freedom</i>	Attainable? In part <i>Intellectual</i> : impartiality; is truth a prison? pragmatism; idealism, subjectivism, objectivity, realism the true intellectual freedom. Truth may be to some degree a bondage but less than error—Universe>Self
10	<i>Emotional</i> : begins and ends in <i>contemplation</i> beauty; contemplation the most impersonal of emotions; comparison with knowledge v. error <i>Sub specie aeternitatis</i> Unpossessiveness
	<i>Morals</i> . Self, children, friends, country, all prisons. Service of the world, “whose service is perfect freedom” Austerity in the affections.
<i>The Reward</i>	The communion of saints Liberation from hopes and fears. The Vision

7b Contemplation

20 **T**HE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS of action are only things within our power These are few and comparatively small. Thus the active life alone never achieves a free vision or a true proportion and never knows that its success or failure is not of fundamental importance; nor, if it does come to know this, can it bear the knowledge without being paralyzed by it. But the life which is primarily contemplative is not hemmed in by limitations of human power, it is limited only by the limitations of human knowledge—and these, great as they are, are not comparable to the limitations of power Moreover to the active life, what is unconquerable is hostile; to the contemplative life this is not so. Thus contemplation gives proportion, shows our active life as the transitory thing that it is, and raises us out of the anxieties that beset eager desires. It enables us to live in a world where most of what concerns us is stable, and where, if our actions fail, what is lost is an infinitesimal fragment of the things that fill our life. Hence acquiescence becomes less difficult

30

What is prison? Self-interest, subjectivity, insistence. Why a prison? because shuts out the love, the knowledge, and the attainment of goods otherwise possible. What the universe allows, what it forbids: It forbids the freedom of omnipotence, it permits the freedom of contemplation It permits the freedom of oneness with it; three forms of union. love, admiration,

knowledge All three are escapes from prison. All three combined give wisdom, peace, virtue; joy in part, infinite melancholy too

Self in all its forms—in thought, in feeling, in action—is a prison. It shuts out the soul from that complete union with the world, in which true freedom consists To be free wholly from self is not possible to man, his separate body entails always some separateness of mind. But to become progressively freer, to live more and more the larger life of impersonal contemplation, is possible, and is the road by which we pass into the world of freedom from the prison of strife and private hopes In the world of freedom there is still sorrow: there is infinite compassion for the failures and tragedies and the ever-renewed toil through which the generations pass one by one into the grave; there is the tragedy of man's weakness in the struggle with the forces of indifferent Nature, and the pain of our own impotence to achieve more than an infinitesimal fraction of the good that imagination reveals. But the worst sorrows do not survive in the world of freedom: there is not the grinding torment of unsuccessful conflict, nor the destruction of the good we love in our eagerness to make it our private possession. There is liberation from the anxiety of hopes and fears, there is union in thought with all that has hitherto been great in human life, and in more than thought with whatever of good has come within the scope of our private experience. The loves that make what is best in the natural life survive, but enlarged, harmonized with universal love, not setting up walls of division between the loved and the unloved And above all is the contemplative Vision partly sad, partly filled with a solemn joy, wholly beautiful, wholly great the vision of all the ages of the earth, the depths of space, and the hierarchy of the eternal truths, met and mirrored in one mind whose being ends almost as soon as its knowledge has come to exist.

7c Action and Contemplation

TWO ATTITUDES POSSIBLE towards objects action, contemplation. Action essentially aims at producing some change, therefore depends on opposition of good and bad, or useful and useless. Contemplation is impartial it does not divide objects into two opposed camps Animals only have the active view: men both, contemplative more when further from animal. The active side aims at *Power*, the contemplative at *Wisdom* The soul instinctively views the world as material for its own greatness; the method to which instinct prompts is the method of *action*: power, possession, make a man greater than what he possesses. But they do so by making the possession smaller; thus they do not enlarge the soul. Contemplation is not limited, like Power, and does not demand that the object shall be made small. It enlarges the Soul to the greatness of the object.

It embraces past and future, and the whole extent of space, and the world of essence as well as the world of existence. In living with such objects the soul becomes great like them; the objects of power become petty by comparison, and the world of action is seen in its true proportions. Thus action, as well as thought, becomes impregnated with contemplation, it becomes calm, not insistent, and the greatness of the soul remains independent of its success or failure. Love, also, when based on contemplation, is calm and sees what is loved as part of the whole ocean of Being: it knows that love is a light to illumine part of the ocean, and that the greater the area of light, the more of the ocean is seen in its truth. It knows that all limitation is evil. The impartiality of contemplation leads to justice, and inspires action and love. Thus the soul becomes free from the bonds of friend and foe, a citizen of the universe and not only of one walled City at war with all the rest.

7d Freedom and Bondage

BONDAGE REQUIRES TWO things a desire, and the impossibility of satisfying it. Freedom demands either the satisfaction of desire, or its cessation. It is no bondage to be unable to satisfy a desire which does not exist.

There is, however, an essential bondage where the desire is one which ought to exist, and yet one which cannot be satisfied. There are many such desires, and therefore complete freedom is impossible. But such desires ought not to be insistent, and the less insistent they are, the less they limit freedom. The life of reason consists of the pursuit of ends only partially realizable; hence the life of reason is not *wholly* free. Complete freedom is incompatible with activity, but some activity is essential to the life of reason, since this life entails service. Thus freedom is a goal towards which we can approach indefinitely, but it is not an end which can be reached wholly and fully in a world where Matter controls our outward lives.

7e Prisons I

REILIGION CONSISTS IN union with the universe. Formerly, union was achieved by assimilating the universe to our own conception of the Good union with God was easy since God was love. But the decay of traditional beliefs has made this way of union no longer one which can be relied upon. Hence those who know of no other way lose the religious attitude towards the world; with this, their outlook becomes finite, and their world is impoverished even in its finite parts. It is therefore important to preserve religion. But if this is to be possible, we must find a mode of union

which asks nothing of the world, and depends solely upon ourselves. Such a mode of union is possible, and of immeasurable value to those who achieve it.

The moralist divides the world into good and bad, and this division is true and important. But besides this dualistic attitude, there is another, wholly compatible with it, but monistic an attitude which ignores the difference between the good and the bad, and loves all alike. This is the essence of religion, but because it has not been clearly distinguished from the moralist's attitude, it has been supposed, wrongly, to require the belief that the world is good. Since this belief had been found scarcely tenable, it has ¹⁰ become vital to religion to free it from any dependence upon this belief. In order to do so, it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards Every such demand is an endeavour to impose Self upon the world From this endeavour, the religion which can survive the decay of dogma must be freed And in being freed from this endeavour, religion is freed from an element extraneous to its spirit, and not compatible with its unhampered development. The essence of religion is union with the universe achieved by subordination of the demands of Self. This subordination is not complete if it depends upon a belief that the universe satisfies some at least of the demands of Self Hence for the sake of ²⁰ religion itself, as well as because such a belief appears unfounded, it is important to discover a form of union with the universe which is independent of all beliefs as to the nature of the universe. Such a religion is possible; and to those who achieve it it gives nearly all, and in some ways more than all, that the religions of the past have given.

7f The Good

I. THE GOOD OF THE INTELLECT

ALL THE GOODS men seek consist in *some* form of union of Self and not-Self. The union sought by the life of instinct, which belongs to the particular soul, starts from the Self and consists in domination ³⁰ over the not-Self Thus when this good is attained, the not-Self is made smaller than the Self, and the Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods. The union sought by the life of reason, which belongs to the universal soul, starts from the not-Self and consists in knowledge, love, and service of the not-Self: by this union, the boundaries of Self are enlarged, and the greatness of the not-Self becomes the greatness of the Self. The good of the intellect is *knowledge*. This good, though not perhaps the greatest of the three goods of reason, is the foundation and condition of the others. The intellect must first achieve knowledge of the not-Self before feeling and will

can give love and service The intellect, like every other passion, may be instinctive or rational. It is instinctive when, starting from what it already is, it desires to subdue the known world to its pre-existing faculties. It is rational when, by an impartial contemplation, it attains to knowledge of what is wholly other than itself The instinctive contemplation desires to assimilate the world to man "Man is the measure of all things" it says; "truth is man-made, space and time and the eternal truths are properties of the mind, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us " Thus contemplation is fettered to Self; what is called knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law.

The rational contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal and private—everything that depends upon habit, education, self-interest, desire—distorts the object, and thereby impairs the union which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a *here* and *now*, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge—knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they reveal.

II. THE GOOD OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotions may be monistic or dualistic. They are dualistic when they depend upon the character of the object, and have an opposite which is called forth by different objects They are monistic when they can be felt towards any object, regardless of its character. All the emotions dependent upon whether the object helps or hinders our own life are dualistic At a higher stage, the emotions dependent upon beauty or goodness in the object are dualistic, since ugliness and badness will call forth the opposite emotions. Thus friendship, admiration, and most worship are dualistic: to friends are opposed foes; to saints, sinners; to God, the Devil. The dualistic emotions introduce disunion into the world: they introduce hostile camps and a doubtful warfare They provide objects for hatred as well as objects for

love.

But besides the earthly love, which demands that the object shall be useful, beautiful or good, there is a heavenly love, which loves all indifferently. It is not compassion, though it produces compassion where there is misfortune, it is not benevolence, since it is not *merely* active. It is love, but it is not balanced by any opposing hatred. To this love, the division of the world into good and bad, though it remains true, seems of less import than the oneness of the world in love.

The dualistic emotions are necessary, and survive even as ingredients of the monistic love, for this love will wish good rather than evil to its objects, 10 and will wish to give, if possible, admiration and worship as well. But if this is impossible in any case, the monistic love nevertheless survives; and if it is possible, the monistic love nevertheless remains the deeper, the foundation upon which the other love is built. The best love is the combination of the two; but since this is not possible universally, it is only the monistic love that unites the world, and gives that union with the universe which religion seeks to attain.

III THE GOOD OF THE WILL

The Will is less easily rendered impersonal than the intellect. the Will is the very essence of the Self, the energy by which the Self lives, the self-assertion 20 by which it secures its place in the universe. The Will seeks always some good. The instinctive will seeks primarily a good for the Self. It may enlarge the Self to include those with whom there is an alliance of instinctive interest. family, friends, country. The instinctive Will, since it wills the good of some more than the good of others, is the source of strife. jealousy, envy, competition, warfare, are among its fruits. Its demands are in their nature unlimited: only omnipotence can wholly satisfy them. Thus the instinctive Will finds itself hemmed in by the not-Self, by all that is not included among those whose good it desires. Since man is not omnipotent, the forces that oppose the instinctive Will become its enemies, and its 30 self-assertion, instead of giving freedom, imprisons it in a City of Despair.

The rational Will, on the contrary, does not start from a personal good. It starts from an impersonal good, a good of which the desire may be shared by all, since it is not regarded as *mine* or *yours*, but simply as good. It absorbs into itself that realization of goods which the instinctive Will provides; it does not reject the impulse to serve family, friends, or country to which the instinctive Will can attain, it rejects only the exclusiveness of this impulse, and extends to the world as a whole the impulse which the instinctive Will feels only towards a few. It thus removes strife from its inward being, and seeks that union with the world which consists in impartial service. In this it 40 finds the greatest measure of freedom that is possible to it; for all the goods which others seek are included in the universal good which is its object.

The Will is, however, less capable than the intellect of complete freedom and complete union with the world. So long as others are insistent, so long as their demands are incompatible with the universal good, there must be strife. And so long as the universe opposes our pursuit of universal good, we cannot feel a complete union with the universe. Something, however, is possible to mitigate even these conflicts. Our Will towards the good, like all Will, must not be insistent, but hypothetical: we must will the good *if it be possible*, and in so far as it is possible. In this way, if conflicts cannot be made to cease, they can at least be freed from bitterness, and made compatible with love towards those who must be resisted. More than this, in a world where evil is strong, seems not possible, and thus some degree of bondage is essential to the Will, even when it is purified of all dross.

IV. WISDOM

Of the two souls in man, the particular or animal being lives in instinct, and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendants, while the universal or divine being seeks union with the universe, and desires freedom from all that impedes its seeking. The animal being is neither good nor bad in itself; it is good or bad solely as it helps or hinders the divine being in its search for union with the world. In union with the world the soul finds its freedom.

20 There are three kinds of union—union in thought, union in feeling, union in will. Union in thought is knowledge, union in feeling is love, union in will is service. There are three kinds of disunion—error, hatred, and strife. What promotes disunion is insistent instinct, which is of the animal part of man; what promotes union is reason, which is of the divine part. The combination of knowledge, love, and consequent service is Wisdom, which is the supreme good of man. The life of instinct views the world as a means for the ends of instinct; thus it makes the world of less account than Self. It confines knowledge to what is useful, love to allies in the conflict of rival instincts, service to those with whom there is some instinctive tie. The world in which

30 it finds a home is a narrow world, surrounded by alien and probably hostile forces; it is imprisoned in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that ultimate surrender is inevitable. The life of reason seeks an impartial end, in which there is no rivalry, no essential enmity. The union it seeks has no boundaries: it wishes to know all, to love all, and to serve all. Thus it finds its home everywhere: no lines of circumvallation bar its progress. In knowledge it makes no division of useful and useless, in love it makes no division of friend and foe, in service it makes no division of deserving and undeserving. The animal part of man, knowing that the individual life is brief and impotent, is appalled by the fact of death, and, unwilling to admit the hopelessness of its

40 struggle, it postulates a prolongation in which its failures shall be turned into triumphs. The divine part of man, feeling the individual to be but of

small account, thinks little of death, and finds its hopes independent of personal continuance. The animal part of man, being filled with the importance of its own desires, finds it intolerable to suppose that the universe is less aware of this importance: a blank indifference to its hopes and fears is too painful to contemplate, and is therefore not regarded as admissible. The divine part of man does not demand that the world shall conform to a pattern: it accepts the world, and finds in wisdom a union which demands nothing of the world. Its energy is not checked by what seems hostile, but interpenetrates it and becomes one with it. It is not the strength of our ideals, but their weakness, that makes us dread the admission that they are ours, not the world's. We with our ideals must stand alone, and conquer, inwardly, the world's indifference. It is instinct, not reason, that finds this difficult and shivers at the solitude it seems to entail. Reason does not feel this solitude, because it can achieve union even with what seems most alien. The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realized in the world is the last prison from which reason must be freed. Every demand is a prison; and reason is only free when it asks nothing.¹⁰

The Essence of Religion [1912]

"THE ESSENCE OF Religion" was first published on 11 October 1912, in *The Hibbert Journal*, a liberal review of religion, theology and philosophy. It extends Russell's thinking about religion in the drafts of "Prisons". "Prisons" has as its leading theme spiritual incarceration from which there is release only through "union with the universe" (104. 30) and "The Essence of Religion" enlarges upon that liberation. It submits many of the same thoughts to a more systematic analysis of religious belief. "The Essence of Religion" develops the idea of the self as a prison which must be escaped by surrendering "the finite self to the infinite life" (113). To this Russell adds an analysis of the elements of Christianity: worship, acquiescence and love. The plan of "Prisons", set out in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell of 18 August 1911, calls for discussion of these elements. The essay thus extends the search for a personal religion free of dogmatism.

On 9 February 1912 Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline: "I forgot to speak about the Chapter on Religion in 'Prisons' (last but one). If you have time, you might look at it, with a view to the *Hibbert Journal* or some such place" (#336). Exactly when he altered his original intention to deal with the subject in the first chapter is not known. They discussed the matter and Russell wrote on 13 February: "Our talk confirmed me in thinking it worthwhile to publish something like my chapter on Religion otherwise intellectual difficulties prevent people from profiting by religious impulses" (#342). He later remarked on 21 February 1912 that he planned to fill out the piece by "adding in some pages of the earlier parts of 'Prisons'" (#353). The result, he said on 23 February, was "longer, but not, I think, unduly disjointed" (#355).

Lady Ottoline wrote to Russell on 5 March 1912, reporting that she had read his essay on religion and thought it "very very beautiful—more so than I had remembered". She took him to task, however, over worship, saying that the ideal to be worshipped needed to be made clearer. Lady Ottoline also had difficulty with Russell's idea of desire and with Christ's alleged egotism. She reread the essay with care sending Russell a list of comments but concluding with the strong affirmation that the paper "really does enter into one's Life".

Reactions to "The Essence of Religion" were mixed. A paper entitled "The Religion of Mr Bertrand Russell" was read by J H Burn to the Heretics at Cambridge on 20 October 1912. The Heretics were a Cambridge group devoted to free-ranging examination of religion. A few days later, Russell led the Heretics in a

discussion of “The Essence of Religion”. Neither Burn’s paper nor public reports of the discussion’s content are known to have survived, but Russell gave his impression of the experience to Lady Ottoline on 1 November 1912

Yesterday evening I had a large infusion of the “Heretics”, including the young man who had read a paper on my religion while I was at Lausanne I had to discuss it before them all—they forced me to—it was rather an effort, but I dare say it was a good thing really (#618)

Private reactions were still more critical, with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s being the most severe. Russell wrote on 8 October to Lady Ottoline: “Here is Wittgenstein just arrived, frightfully pained by my *Hibbert* article which he evidently *detests*” (#597). Russell later explained on 11 October the criticism’s full burden “Wittgenstein was really unhappy about my paper on religion. He felt I had been a traitor to the gospel of exactness, and wantonly used words vaguely, also that such things are too intimate for print I minded very much, because I half agree with him” Others thought better of the essay G M Trevelyan “seemed to agree in the main, except about the impartial worship” (#617). Russell continued to Lady Ottoline on 31 October with self-criticism “Perhaps my words were wrong, but I am sure what I meant was right. Perhaps reverence would have been a better word than worship—that was what you suggested, wasn’t it?” (*ibid.*) Sir Francis Younghusband, the explorer and mystic, was very appreciative as were T J Cobden-Sanderson and Rabindranath Tagore (But Russell was disappointed that so few people commented.) His Cambridge tutor James Ward (a former clergyman), however, thought that “The Essence of Religion”, being “much less grim and grey” (#624, 5 Nov. 1912), showed progress beyond “The Free Man’s Worship” (4). In *The Hibbert Journal* a year later Professor Pringle-Pattison suggested that “The Essence of Religion” was at variance with the ideas in “The Free Man’s Worship”. On 15 February 1963 Russell told a Miss Reed who interviewed him for *Realités*, “The essay you quote from *Hibbert Journal* soon came to seem to me too religious, and I never reprinted it”

The copy-text is *The Hibbert Journal*. The textual notes provide a collation of the relevant passages in “The Essence of Religion” with their originals in “Prisons I”, “The Good of the Emotions”, and “Wisdom”

THE DECAY OF traditional religious beliefs, bitterly bewailed by up-holders of the Churches, welcomed with joy by those who regard the old creeds as mere superstition, is an undeniable fact. Yet when the dogmas have been rejected, the question of the place of religion in life is by no means decided. The dogmas have been valued, not so much on their own account, as because they were believed to facilitate a certain attitude towards the world, an habitual direction of our thoughts, a life in the whole, free from the finiteness of self and providing an escape from the tyranny of desire and daily cares. Such a life in the whole is possible without dogma, 10 and ought not to perish through the indifference of those to whom the beliefs of former ages are no longer credible. Acts inspired by religion have some quality of infinity in them: they seem done in obedience to a command, and though they may achieve great ends, yet it is no clear knowledge of these ends that makes them seem imperative. The beliefs which underlie such acts are often so deep and so instinctive as to remain unknown to those whose lives are built upon them. Indeed, it may be not belief but feeling that makes religion: a feeling which, when brought into the sphere of belief, may involve the conviction that this or that is good, but may, if it remains untouched by intellect, be only a feeling and yet be dominant in action. It is 20 the quality of infinity that makes religion, the selfless, untrammelled life in the whole which frees men from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts. This liberation from the prison is given by religion, but only by a religion without fettering dogmas; and dogmas become fettering as soon as assent to them becomes unnatural.

The soul of man is a strange mixture of God and brute, a battle-ground of two natures, the one particular, finite, self-centred, the other universal, infinite, and impartial. The finite life, which man shares with the brutes, is tied to the body, and views the world from the standpoint of the *here* and *now*. All those loves and hatreds which are based upon some service to the 30 self belong to the finite life. The love of man and woman, and the love of parents and children, when they do not go beyond the promptings of instinct, are still part of the animal nature: they do not pass into the infinite life until they overcome instinct and cease to be subservient only to the purposes of the finite self. The hatred of enemies and the love of allies in battle are part of what man shares with other gregarious animals: they view the universe as grouped about one point, the single struggling self. Thus the finite part of our life contains all that makes the individual man essentially separate from other men and from the rest of the universe, all those thoughts and desires that cannot, in their nature, be shared by the inhabitant of a 40 different body, all the distortions that make error, and all the insistent claims that lead to strife.

The infinite part of our life does not see the world from one point of view. It shines impartially, like the diffused light on a cloudy sea. Distant ages and

remote regions of space are as real to it as what is present and near. In thought, it rises above the life of the senses, seeking always what is general and open to all men. In desire and will, it aims simply at the good, without regarding the good as mine or yours. In feeling, it gives love to all, not only to those who further the purposes of self. Unlike the finite life, it is impartial: its impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling. Unlike the nature which man shares with the brutes, it has a life without barriers, embracing in its survey the whole universe of existence and essence; nothing in it is essentially private, but its thoughts and desires are such as all may share, since none depend upon the exclusiveness of *here* and *now* and *me*. Thus the infinite nature is the principle of union in the world, as the finite nature is the principle of division. Between the infinite nature in one man and the infinite nature in another, there can be no essential conflict. If its embodiments are incomplete, they supplement each other; its division among different men is accidental to its character, and the infinite in all constitutes one universal nature. There is thus a union of all the infinite natures of different men in a sense in which there is no union of all the finite natures. In proportion as the infinite grows strong in us, we live more completely the life of that one universal nature which embraces what is infinite in each of us.

The finite self, impelled by the desire for self-preservation, builds prison-walls round the infinite part of our nature, and endeavours to restrain it from that free life in the whole which constitutes its being. The finite self aims at dominion: it sees the world in concentric circles round the *here* and *now*, and itself as the God of that wished-for heaven. The universal soul mocks at this vision, but the finite self hopes always to make it true, and thus to quiet its troublesome critic. In many men, the finite self remains always the gaoler of the universal soul; in others, there is a rare and momentary escape, in a few, the prison-walls are demolished wholly, and the universal soul remains free through life. It is the escape from prison that gives to some moments and some thoughts a quality of infinity, like light breaking through from some greater world beyond. Sudden beauty in the midst of strife, uncalculating love, or the night-wind in the trees, seem to suggest the possibility of a life free from the conflicts and pettinesses of our everyday world, a life where there is peace which no misfortune can disturb. The things which have this quality of infinity seem to give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of our daily life. A life dominated by this insight, we feel, would be a life free from struggle, a life in harmony with the whole, outside the prison-walls built by the instinctive desires of the finite self.

It is this experience of sudden wisdom which is the source of what is essential in religion. Mysticism interprets this experience as a contact with a deeper, truer, more unified world than that of our common beliefs. Behind a

thin veil, it sees the glory of God, dimly as a rule, sometimes with dazzling brightness All the evils of our daily world it regards as merely shadows on the veil, illusions, nothings, which vanish from the sight of those who see the splendour beyond But in this interpretation mysticism diminishes the value of the experience upon which it is based The quality of infinity, which we feel, is not to be accounted for by the perception of new objects, other than those that at most times seem finite, it is to be accounted for, rather, by a different way of regarding the same objects, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, more filled with love, than the fragmentary, disquiet consideration we give to things when we view them as means to help or hinder our own purposes It is not in some other world that that beauty and that peace are to be found; it is in this actual everyday world, in the midst of action and the business of life. But it is in the everyday world as viewed by the universal soul, and in the midst of action and business inspired by its vision. The evils and the smallnesses are not illusions, but the universal soul finds within itself a love to which imperfections are no barrier, and thus unifies the world by the unity of its own contemplation.

The transition from the life of the finite self to the infinite life in the whole requires a moment of absolute self-surrender, when all personal will seems to cease, and the soul feels itself in passive submission to the universe. After passionate struggle for some particular good, there comes some inward or outward necessity to abandon the pursuit of the object which has absorbed all our desire, and no other desire is ready to replace the one that has been relinquished Hence arises a state of suspension of the will, when the soul no longer seeks to impose itself upon the world, but is open to every impression that comes to it from the world. It is at such a time that the contemplative vision first comes into being, bringing with it universal love and universal worship From universal worship comes joy, from universal love comes a new desire, and thence the birth of that seeking after universal good which constitutes the will of our infinite nature. Thus from the moment of self-surrender, which to the finite self appears like death, a new life begins, with a larger vision, a new happiness, and wider hopes

The self-surrender in which the infinite life is born may be made easier to some men by belief in an all-wise God to whom submission is a duty. But it is not in its essence dependent upon this belief or upon any other The religions of the past, it is true, have all depended to a greater or less degree upon dogma, upon some theory as to the nature and the purpose of the universe. But the decay of traditional beliefs has made every religion that rests on dogma precarious, and even impossible, to many whose nature is strongly religious. Hence those who cannot accept the creeds of the past, and yet believe that a religious outlook requires dogma, lose what is infinite in life, and become limited in their thoughts to everyday matters, they lose consciousness of the life of the whole, they lose that inexplicable sense of

union which gives rise to compassion and the unhesitating service of humanity. They do not see in beauty the adumbration of a glory which a richer vision would see in every common thing, or in love a gateway to that transfigured world in which our union with the universe is fulfilled. Thus their outlook is impoverished, and their life is rendered smaller even in its finite parts. For right action they are thrown back upon bare morality; and bare morality is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and thirst after the infinite. Thus it has become a matter of the first importance to preserve religion without any dependence upon dogmas to which an intellectually honest assent grows daily more difficult.

There are in Christianity three elements which it is desirable to preserve if possible worship, acquiescence, and love. Worship is given by Christianity to God; acquiescence is given to the inevitable because it is the will of God; love is enjoined towards my neighbours, my enemies, and, in fact, towards all men. The love which Christianity enjoins, and indeed any love which is to be universal and yet strong, seems in some way dependent upon worship and acquiescence. Yet these, in the form in which they appear in Christianity, depend upon belief in God, and are therefore no longer possible to those who cannot entertain this belief. Something, in worship, must be lost when we lose belief in the existence of supreme goodness and power combined. But much can be preserved, and what can be preserved seems sufficient to constitute a very strong religious life. Acquiescence, also, is rendered more difficult by loss of belief in God, since it takes away the assurance that apparent evil in the constitution of the world is really good. But it is not rendered impossible; and in consequence of its greater difficulty it becomes, when achieved, nobler, deeper, more filled by self-surrender than any acquiescence which Christianity produces. In some ways, therefore, the religion which has no dogma is greater and more religious than one which rests upon the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world.

(1). *Worship* —Worship is not easily defined, because it grows and changes as the worshipper grows. In crude religions it may be inspired by fear alone, and given to whatever is powerful. This element lingers in the worship of God, which may consist largely of fear and be given largely from respect for power. But the element of fear tends more and more to be banished by love, and in all the best worship fear is wholly absent. As soon as the worship inspired by fear has been surpassed, worship brings joy in the contemplation of what is worshipped. But joy alone does not constitute worship: there must be also some reverence and sense of mystery not easy to define. These three things, contemplation with joy, reverence, and sense of mystery, seem essential to constitute any of the higher forms of worship.

Within worship in this very wide sense there are varieties which it is important to distinguish. There is a selective worship, which demands that its object shall be good, and admits an opposite attitude towards a bad

object; and there is an impartial worship, which can be given to whatever exists, regardless of its goodness or badness. Besides this division, there is another, equally important. There is a worship which can only be given to an actually existing object, and another worship which can be given to what merely has its place in the world of ideals, these two kinds may be distinguished as worship of the actual and worship of the ideal. The two are combined in worship of God, since God is conceived as both actual and the complete embodiment of the ideal.

Worship of God is selective, since it depends upon God's goodness. So is all worship of great men or great deeds, and of everything of which the worship depends upon some pre-eminent quality which calls forth our admiration. Worship of this sort, though it can be given to much of what exists in the actual world, cannot be given unreservedly and so as to produce a religious attitude towards the universe as a whole, except by those who believe in an omnipotent Creator or in a pantheistic all-pervading spiritual unity. For those in whom there is no such belief, the selective worship finds its full object only in the ideal good which creative contemplation imagines. The ideal good forms an essential part of the religious life, since it supplies the motive to action by giving content to the desire for universal good which forms a part of universal love. Without the knowledge and worship of the ideal good, the love of man is blind, not knowing in what direction to seek the welfare of those whom it loves. Every embodiment of good in the actual world is imperfect, if only by its brevity. Only the ideal good can satisfy fully our hunger for perfection. Only the ideal good demands no surrender to power, no sacrifice of aspiration to possibility, and no slavery of thought to fact. Only the vision of the ideal good gives infinity to our pursuit, in action, of those fragments of good which the world permits us to create, but the worship of the ideal good, though it brings with it the joy that springs from the contemplation of what is perfect, brings with it also the pain that results from the imperfection of the actual world. When this worship stands alone, it produces a sense of exile in a world of shadows, of infinite solitude amid alien forces. Thus this worship, though necessary to all religious action, does not alone suffice, since it does not produce that sense of union with the actual world which compels us to descend from the world of contemplation and seek, with however little success, to realize what is possible of the good here on earth.

For this purpose we need the kind of worship which is only given to what exists. Such worship, where there is belief in God, can be selective, since God exists and is completely good. Where there is not belief in God, such worship may be selective in regard to great men and great deeds, but towards such objects selective worship is always hampered by their imperfection and their limitation of duration and extent. The worship which can be given to whatever exists must not be selective, it must not involve any

judgment as to the goodness of what is worshipped, but must be a direct impartial emotion. Such a worship is given by the contemplative vision, which finds mystery and joy in all that exists, and brings with it love to all that has life. This impartial worship has been thought, wrongly, to require belief in God, since it has been thought to involve the judgment that whatever exists is good. In fact, however, it involves no judgment whatever; hence it cannot be intellectually mistaken, and cannot be in any way dependent upon dogma. Thus the combination of this worship with the ideal good gives a faith wholly independent of beliefs as to the nature of the actual world, and therefore not assailable by the arguments which have ¹⁰ destroyed the tenets of traditional religion.

Religion, therefore, results from the combination of two different kinds of worship—the selective, which is given to the good on account of its goodness, and the impartial, which is given to everything that exists. The former is the source of the belief in theism, the latter of the belief in pantheism, but in neither case is such a belief necessary for the worship which gives rise to it. The object of the selective worship is the ideal good, which belongs to the world of universals. Owing to oblivion of the world of universals, men have supposed that the ideal good could not have being or be worshipped unless it formed part of the actual world, hence they have ²⁰ believed that without God this worship could not survive. But the study of the world of universals shows that this was an error: the object of this worship need not exist, though it will be an essential part of the worship to wish it to exist as fully as possible. The object of the impartial worship, on the other hand, is whatever exists; in this case, though the object is known to exist, it is not known to be good, but it is an essential part of the worship to wish that it may be as good as possible. Pantheism, from the contemplative joy of impartial worship, and from the unity of its outlook on the universe, infers, mistakenly, that such worship involves the belief that the universe is good and is one. This belief is no more necessary to the impartial worship ³⁰ than the belief in God is to the selective worship. The two worships subsist side by side, without any dogma: the one involving the goodness but not the existence of its object, the other involving the existence but not the goodness of its object. Religious action is a continual endeavour to bridge the gulf between the objects of these two worships, by making more good exist and more of existence good. Only in the complete union of the two could the soul find permanent rest.

(2). *Acquiescence*—Although, in a world where much evil exists and much good does not exist, no religion which is true can give permanent rest or free the soul from the need for action, yet religion can give acquiescence ⁴⁰ in evil which it is not within our power to cure. Christianity effects this by the belief that, since the apparent evil is in accordance with the will of God, it cannot really be evil. This view, however, demands a falsification of our

standard of good and evil, since much that exists is evil to any unbiased consideration Moreover, if pursued to a conclusion, it destroys all motive to action, since the reason given for acquiescence, namely that whatever happens must be for the best, is a reason which renders our efforts after the best superfluous If, to avoid this consequence, we limit either the omnipotence or the goodness of God, acquiescence can no longer be urged on the same ground, since what happens may be either not in accordance with the will of God, or not good in spite of being in accordance with His will For these reasons, though Christianity is in fact often effective both in causing 10 acquiescence and in providing a religious motive for action, yet this effectiveness is due to a confusion of thought, and tends to cease as men grow more clear-sighted.

The problem we have to deal with is more difficult than the Christian's problem. We have to learn to acquiesce in the inevitable without judging that the inevitable must be good, to keep the feeling which prompts Christians to say, "Thy will be done", while yet admitting that what is done may be evil.

Acquiescence, whatever our religion may be, must always require a large element of moral discipline But this discipline may be made easier, and 20 more visibly worth the pain which it involves, by religious considerations. There are two different though closely related kinds of acquiescence, the one in our private griefs, the other in the fundamental evils of the world Acquiescence in our private griefs comes in the moment of submission which brings about the birth of the impartial will Our private life, when it absorbs our thoughts and wishes, becomes a prison, from which, in times of grief, there is no escape but by submission By submission our thoughts are freed, and our will is led to new aims which, before, had been hidden by the personal goods which had been uselessly desired A large contemplation, or the growth of universal love, will produce a certain shame of absorption in 30 our own life; hence the will is led away from protest against the inevitable, towards the pursuit of more general goods which are not wholly unattainable. Thus acquiescence in private griefs is an essential element in the growth of universal love and the impartial will

Acquiescence does not consist in judging that things are not bad when in fact they are so. It consists in freedom from anger and indignation and preoccupied regret Anger and indignation against those who cause our griefs will not be felt if universal love is strong; preoccupied regret will be avoided where the desire of contemplative freedom exists The man to whom a large contemplation has become habitual will not readily allow 40 himself to be long turned aside from the thoughts which give breadth to his life: in the absence of such thoughts he will feel something small and unworthy, a bondage of the infinite to the finite. In this way both contemplation and universal love will promote acquiescence so far as our own

sorrows are concerned.

It is possible, however, to emerge from private protest, not into complete acquiescence, but into a Promethean indignation against the universe. Contemplation may only universalize our griefs, it may show us all life as a tragedy, so full of pain as to make us wish that consciousness could vanish wholly from the world. The belief that this would be desirable if it were possible is one which cannot be refuted, though it also cannot be shown to be true. But even this belief is not incompatible with acquiescence. What is incompatible is indignation, and a preoccupation with evils which makes goods invisible or only partially visible. Indignation seems scarcely possible 10 in regard to evils for which no one is responsible, those who feel indignation in regard to the fundamental evils of the universe feel it against God or the Devil or an imaginatively personified Fate. When it is realized that the fundamental evils are due to the blind empire of matter, and are the wholly necessary effects of forces which have no consciousness and are therefore neither good nor bad in themselves, indignation becomes absurd, like Xerxes chastizing the Hellespont. Thus the realization of necessity is the liberation from indignation. This alone, however, will not prevent an undue preoccupation with evil. It is obvious that some things that exist are good, some bad, and we have no means of knowing whether the good or the bad 20 preponderate. In action, it is essential to have knowledge of good and evil; thus in all the matters subject to our will, the question what is good and what bad must be borne in mind. But in matters which lie outside our power, the question of good or bad, though knowledge about it, like all knowledge, is worth acquiring, has not that fundamental religious importance which has been assigned to it in discussions of theism and optimism. The dualism of good and bad, when it is too strongly present to our minds, prevents impartial contemplation and interferes with universal love and worship. There is, in fact, something finite and unduly human about the practice of emphasizing good and bad in regard to matters with which action is not 30 concerned. Thus acquiescence in fundamental evils, like acquiescence in personal griefs, is furthered by the impartiality of contemplation and universal love and worship, and must already exist to some extent before these become possible. Acquiescence is at once a cause and an effect of faith, in much the same way when faith dispenses with dogma as when it rests upon a belief in God. In so far as acquiescence is a cause of faith, it rests upon moral discipline, a suppression of self and its demands, which is necessary to any life in harmony with the universe, and to any emergence from the finite into the infinite. This discipline is more severe in the absence of all optimistic dogma, but in proportion as it is more severe its outcome is greater, more 40 unshakable, more capable of so enlarging the bounds of self as to make it welcome with love whatever of good or evil may come before it.

(3). *Love* — Love is of two kinds, the selective earthly love, which is

given to what is delightful, beautiful, or good, and the impartial heavenly love, which is given to all indifferently. The earthly love is balanced by an opposing hatred: to friends are opposed foes; to saints, sinners, to God, the Devil. Thus this love introduces disunion into the world, with hostile camps and a doubtful warfare. But the heavenly love does not demand that its object shall be delightful, beautiful, or good, it can be given to everything that has life, to the best and the worst, to the greatest and to the least. It is not merely compassion, since it does not merely wish to relieve misfortune, but finds joy in what it loves, and is given to the fortunate as well as to the unfortunate. Though it includes benevolence, it is greater than benevolence. It is contemplative as well as active, and can be given where there is no possibility of benefiting the object. It is love, contemplative in origin, but becoming active wherever action is possible, and it is a kind of love to which there is no opposing hatred.

To the divine love, the division of the world into good and bad, though it remains true, seems lacking in depth; it seems finite and limited in comparison with the boundlessness of love. The division into two hostile camps seems unreal, what is felt to be real is the oneness of the world in love.

It is in the birth of divine love that the life of feeling begins for the universal soul. What contemplation is to the intellect of the universal soul, divine love is to its emotions. More than anything else, divine love frees the soul from its prison and breaks down the walls of self that prevent its union with the world. Where it is strong, duties become easy, and all service is filled with joy. Sorrow, it is true, remains, perhaps deeper and wider than before, since the lives of most human beings are largely tragic. But the bitterness of personal defeat is avoided, and aims become so wide that no complete overthrow of all hopes is possible. The loves of the natural life survive, but harmonized with universal love, and no longer setting up walls of division between the loved and the unloved. And above all, through the bond of universal love the soul escapes from the separate loneliness in which it is born, and from which no permanent deliverance is possible while it remains within the walls of its prison.

Christianity enjoins love of God and love of man as the two great commandments. Love of God differs, however, from love of man, since we cannot benefit God, while we cannot regard man as wholly good. Thus love of God is more contemplative and full of worship, while love of man is more active and full of service. In a religion which is not theistic, love of God is replaced by worship of the ideal good. As in Christianity, this worship is quite as necessary as love of man, since without it love of man is left without guidance in its wish to create the good in human lives. The worship of good is indeed the greater of the two commandments, since it leads us to know that love of man is good, and this knowledge helps us to feel the love of man. Moreover, it makes us conscious of what human life might be, and of the

gulf between what it might be and what it is; hence springs an infinite compassion, which is a large part of love of man, and is apt to cause the whole Acquiescence, also, greatly furthers love of man, since in its absence anger and indignation and strife come between the soul and the world, preventing the union in which love of man has its birth. The three elements of religion, namely worship, acquiescence, and love, are intimately interconnected, each helps to produce the others, and all three together form a unity in which it is impossible to say which comes first, which last. All three can exist without dogma, in a form which is capable of dominating life and of giving infinity to action and thought and feeling; and life in the infinite, ¹⁰ which is the combination of the three, contains all that is essential to religion, in spite of its absence of dogmatic beliefs.

Religion derives its power from the sense of union with the universe which it is able to give. Formerly, union was achieved by assimilating the universe to our own conception of the good, union with God was easy since God was love. But the decay of traditional beliefs has made this way of union no longer one which can be relied upon: we must find a mode of union which asks nothing of the world and depends only upon ourselves. Such a mode of union is possible through impartial worship and universal love, which ignore the difference of good and bad and are given to all alike. In order to ²⁰ free religion from all dependence upon dogma, it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards. Every such demand is an endeavour to impose self upon the world. From this endeavour the religion which can survive the decay of dogma must be freed. And in being freed from this endeavour, religion is freed from an element extraneous to its spirit and not compatible with its unhampered development. Religion seeks union with the universe by subordination of the demands of self; but this subordination is not complete if it depends upon a belief that the universe satisfies some at least of the demands of self. Hence for the sake of religion itself, as well as because such a belief appears ³⁰ unfounded, it is important to discover a form of union with the universe which is independent of all beliefs as to the nature of the universe. By life in the infinite, such a form of union is rendered possible; and to those who achieve it, it gives nearly all, and in some ways more than all, that has been given by the religions of the past.

The essence of religion, then, lies in subordination of the finite part of our life to the infinite part. Of the two natures in man, the particular or animal being lives in instinct, and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendants, while the universal or divine being seeks union with the universe, and desires freedom from all that impedes its seeking. The animal being is ⁴⁰ neither good nor bad in itself; it is good or bad solely as it helps or hinders the divine being in its search for union with the world. In union with the world the soul finds its freedom. There are three kinds of union: union in

thought, union in feeling, union in will. Union in thought is knowledge, union in feeling is love, union in will is service. There are three kinds of disunion: error, hatred, and strife. What promotes disunion is insistent instinct, which is of the animal part of man; what promotes union is the combination of knowledge, love, and consequent service which is wisdom, the supreme good of man.

The life of instinct views the world as a means for the ends of instinct, thus it makes the world of less account than self. It confines knowledge to what is useful, love to allies in conflict of rival instincts, service to those with whom there is some instinctive tie. The world in which it finds a home is a narrow world, surrounded by alien and probably hostile forces, it is imprisoned in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that ultimate surrender is inevitable.

The life of wisdom seeks an impartial end, in which there is no rivalry, no essential enmity. The union which it seeks has no boundaries: it wishes to know all, to love all, and to serve all. Thus it finds its home everywhere, no lines of circumvallation bar its progress. In knowledge it makes no division of useful and useless, in love it makes no division of friend and foe, in service it makes no division of deserving and undeserving.

20 The animal part of man, knowing that the individual life is brief and impotent, is appalled by the fact of death, and, unwilling to admit the hopelessness of the struggle, it postulates a prolongation in which its failures shall be turned into triumphs. The divine part of man, feeling the individual to be but of small account, thinks little of death, and finds its hopes independent of personal continuance.

The animal part of man, being filled with the importance of its own desires, finds it intolerable to suppose that the universe is less aware of this importance; a blank indifference to its hopes and fears is too painful to contemplate, and is therefore not regarded as admissible. The divine part of 30 man does not demand that the world shall conform to a pattern: it accepts the world, and finds in wisdom a union which demands nothing of the world. Its energy is not checked by what seems hostile, but interpenetrates it and becomes one with it. It is not the strength of our ideals, but their weakness, that makes us dread the admission that they are ours, not the world's. We with our ideals must stand alone, and conquer, inwardly, the world's indifference. It is instinct, not wisdom, that finds this difficult and shivers at the solitude it seems to entail. Wisdom does not feel this solitude, because it can achieve union even with what seems most alien. The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realized in the world is the last prison 40 from which wisdom must be freed. Every demand is a prison, and wisdom is only free when it asks nothing.

The Perplexities of John Forstice [1912]

THE PERPLEXITIES OF JOHN FORSTICE is Russell's only fictional work before he turned to the short story in his eighties. Based on the forms of the Platonic dialogue and the spiritual autobiography, *Forstice* is conventional, yet it is also imaginative in a way attempted in "The Pilgrimage of Life" (2). It was Russell's test of creating literary characters and convincing dialogue, coming at a critical juncture in his life when the arts took on new importance through the stimulus of Lady Ottoline Morrell. The book was inspired by his affair with her and she became a collaborator. If *Forstice* failed to answer Russell's highest literary hopes, it was not for neglect in the attempt. Its effortful composition is well documented in letters to Lady Ottoline.

A critical estimate of *Forstice* is less our task than an explanation of its literary background and genesis. Like "The Pilgrimage of Life" and "Prisons" (7), *Forstice* is a transmutation of spiritual autobiography. This time, however, Russell uses characters to personify ideas of importance to him. By using dialogue he departs from his admired prototype in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* (1834). He effects a high degree of detachment from his autobiographical subject, while still retaining the intimacy of discourse found in interior monologue. *Forstice* thus absorbs earlier intentions to write spiritual autobiography. Two such attempts (both lost) are known. As early as 3 July 1901 Russell told Helen Thomas that he was dictating an autobiography to Alys which Helen Thomas was to read critically and forward to Evelyn Whitehead, wife of A. N. Whitehead. When Russell revived the autobiography about a decade later he again sent the draft to Mrs. Whitehead who labelled it egotistical, causing him to revise the project. Russell had projected a spiritual autobiography by a fictional "Simon Styles" which in *Forstice* becomes the full-scale dramatic debate the man of reason, in crisis, might have with himself. Russell remarked to Lady Ottoline (#459, 21 May 1912) that the autobiography might work out best as a conversation between a passionate young man and an older, wiser one. Thus the dialogue took shape. As Russell saw it, only a fictional protagonist such as John Forstice, set in the midst of other fictional presences, could satisfy his wish to know his own mind in the confused era of his affair with Lady Ottoline.

Russell's immediate predecessor in the dialogue was G. Lowes Dickinson, whose *A Modern Symposium* (1905) uses Platonic dialogue to state points of view from a series of male speakers gathered for an evening of serious conversation about politics. Russell's library contains a copy of this work in which the characters orate and then briefly react to the last speaker's statement. Dickinson, who had been a

Cambridge Apostle and whose judgment Russell valued, gave *Forstice* high literary praise Indeed Apostolic debate may itself have been an inspiration to dialogue, as we see by Russell first conceiving of the Apostolic essay "Lövborg or Hedda" (1894) as a dialogue in which "Alys" was to be convinced by "Bertie" By Russell's own account, he patterned *Forstice* on W H Mallock's dialogue novel, *The New Republic, or, Culture, Faith, and Philosophy in an English Country House* (1877) Mallock's debt to Plato is minimal, he writes a satirical *roman à clef*, presenting as fictional characters such Victorian worthies as the scientists John Tyndall and T H Huxley, the mathematician W K Clifford, and the men of culture Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater Some characters are composites and all are well disguised so as to emphasize type rather than individuality. *The New Republic's* satire arises from a "menu" of topics, which the characters discuss at length in a country house setting Russell alters this to a garden-party, appropriate to the Edwardian period, but he shifts the ambience to Florence Thus the suggestion of Ficino's Renaissance Platonic academy adds weight to the dialogue There are many precursors of Russell's practice through literary history from Lucian and Cicero to Boethius, to Castiglione and thence to Berkeley and Hume On the lighter side, along with Mallock, the conversational novels of Thomas Love Peacock may be seen as influences In such novels as *Crochet Castle* (1831) and *Gryll Grange* (1861) Peacock chooses a romantic setting, reduces the plot to almost nothing and permits his characters to talk until their pretensions are exposed "What Shall I Read?" (1891-1902) shows that Russell read four Peacock novels between December 1892 and March 1895, his library accumulated seven of them The spirit of Peacock's satire is detectable in *Forstice*; yet Russell's dialogue is a much more serious testimony to personal need and search. He is less interested in satirizing attitudes of people who shaped the Edwardian age in a *roman à clef* than in voicing possibilities for selfhood in a quest for identity

Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline reveal the spiritual state that led to and arose from composing *Forstice* His affair was indeed a liberation from the deteriorated marriage to Alys, but it was also wounding to his conscience as Forstice's struggle over his ill wife suggests As is well known, Russell's view of his own creative possibilities was greatly broadened by Lady Ottoline. From a life guided mainly by reason, Russell changed course to revive the aesthetic and religious awareness of his early manhood. For a short time, he thought that he might abandon the writing of philosophy. In a letter postmarked 26 August 1912, he says "The discovery that love of truth springs from reverence has made a bridge for me between intellect and vision" (#552) The benefits of writing *Forstice* are found in the correspondence with Lady Ottoline between 15 April and 27 October 1912 The stages of composition are also indicated In a letter of 21 May 1912 Russell says as was noted

The plan of turning the autobiography into conversations between an old man and a young one seems to me the right one, but I will put the bulk of it—all the passion and the experiences—into the mouth of the young one,

leaving the old one merely occasional comments The old one shall be "I" and see the young one at intervals throughout a number of years Do you think that a good plan? (#459)

The plan was altered and enlarged to include a concluding section by Lady Ottoline herself on Sister Catherine, a reworking of her actual experience with the Mother Julian of her girlhood (Morrell 1963, 96–8). In a letter from Lausanne of 28 June 1912, Lady Ottoline gave Russell the passage on Sister Catherine which he adopted with minor changes as lines 149 9–150 8 and 151. 4–36 of the finished story If she made any other contributions, these are not known On 2 July 1912 he wrote triumphantly

Tonight I finished *Forstice* after a fashion, and then read it through It wants changes, but it really is good, the best part of it is your part, *really*; I am sure anybody would say so I have much less doubt about it than I had about *Prisons* even at the time, it really is worth something, I feel sure And I think it is only the beginning of many things It is all due to you, my Dearest (#485)

By 14 July the story was typed, yet there were still adjustments to be made, especially to accommodate Mrs Whitehead's comment that the nun's long speech added by Russell to Lady Ottoline's portrayal was too intellectual By 14 August Russell was having more general doubts about its characterization and amplitude

About *Forstice*, shall I, at the beginning, give a great deal more of his past life by way of his reflections on the way to the garden-party? Then when he gets home, his wife I suppose ought to be less shadowy, oughtn't she? At present she is not alive at all on her own account I am thinking about it constantly, and after a while I shall probably be able to do it quickly. I feel as if it ought really to be a *long* book, not a very short one, I believe I ought to work at it for years and years, gradually inventing new incidents I wish I knew more of the world—it is a dreadful thing to have been a student up to the age of forty! (#527)

Three days later, doubts had mounted to the point that he was considering a fundamental rewriting

Yes, the later parts of *Forstice* want filling out, but in the beginning the *tempo* is too quick, if you don't know already what the mood is to be, you get to it before it has been quite created in the reader. I want to begin at the beginning with the re-writing, and I think it should be chiefly through his thoughts that the beginning should be lengthened Of course it wants something before the dialogue part, but I don't know at all what to put there The thing is

constantly in my mind, but I want it to simmer a bit longer before doing much at it (#543)

Russell did not make the adjustments he had come to see as necessary Self-criticism and the criticism of others simply compounded his discontent with Forstace Russell knew too much great literature not to realize the deficiencies of his own In letter 570 (pmk 8 Sept 1912) he wrote that an acquaintance, Lucy Silcox, headmistress of Southwold School, had advised him that there was "quite enough mere discussion, and that there would have to be incident and action in any addition" He proposed as a remedy

What I should like to do would be to exhibit some kind of strife resulting from too finite an outlook in the people concerned But I can't think how to do it I am afraid of being too didactic One ought to show Forstace like Dostojewsky's idiot, or like the Fool in *Lear*, vaguely feeling something bigger than the matter of contention But that wants so much Art

As to the possibility of action giving vitality to fiction, Russell rejected it

I was wrong in thinking Forstace ought to see wars and pestilences and so on—those are not the things I can do He must see remarkable people of various sorts—as many as possible—men who believe in war are more useful for my purpose than war itself There ought to be all kinds of theoretic sinners, all the people whose ideal contains strife in some form—imperialists, plutocrats, futurists, Bergson, etc etc Strindberg could come in—hosts of people really. All these *before* the Amanti del Pensiero I will try to do them all with love, not with contempt—make them seem blind and worthy of pity, not successful and strong though they think themselves so (#552, pmk 26 Aug. 1912)

Comparisons with contemporary writers' successes similarly intensified doubts about his ability ever to bring off the project he had begun Arnold Bennett's *Milestones* (1912) prompted these despairing remarks

I feel so hampered by want of art and lack of knowledge I long to know all human life and all history and everything Arnold Bennett gets his effects through his immense knowledge of industrial life It is quite useless to get things up, as Flaubert did, in order to write about them. One must have some genuine interest in them or some real contact with them before they become sufficiently part of one to be written about. It is hard for a student to change his spots (#563, pmk 3 Sept 1912)

This letter also elaborated a fantastic plan involving additional characters and the use of exotic settings that could not possibly be carried out. Russell proved too good at "thinking" his story, little good at all at imagining it into being. By 25 September 1912 he had grown quite depressed about "the failure to get on with *Forstice*" (#587).

Russell's final literary misfortune, in 1914, was perhaps to submit *Forstice* for an opinion to his new friend, the novelist Joseph Conrad. While Conrad sought to be constructive, he was also realistic about Russell's achievement. As Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline on 22 July 1914:

His view is that I might leave the first and third parts as they are, but that the middle part, in Florence, should be expanded into a long book, with conversations of the various characters singly. He says I must not attempt to embody the dialogue—I rebelled, but he was inexorable. I can't bear to sacrifice the poet's speech! He seemed to think by a great deal of work I could make something of it, but not to be sure whether it was worth my while to give so much time to it. He seemed to think very well of the garden party at the beginning. And I am happy to say he liked the nun. (#1055)

But these expert prescriptions for changing the narrative must have seemed too drastic since Russell put aside *Forstice*, not permitting its publication until after his death. On 6 April 1968 he wrote, "Whilst I am satisfied with the first part of the work, the second part represented my opinions during only a very short period. My views in the second part were very sentimental, much too mild, and much too favourable to religion. In all this I was unduly influenced by Lady Ottoline Morrell" (Clark 1975, 182). It was Russell's wish that this disclaimer appear in any edition of *Forstice*. The story was published by Barry Feinberg (ed.), Russell 1972.

The copy-text is the manuscript of 1912 (RA 210.147502). Russell's subsequent revisions in typescripts have not survived.

EVERYONE WAS ASTONISHED by the change in John Forstice, when he returned after his year of absence

He had been a single-minded enthusiast, innocent as a child in worldly matters, wholly wrapped up in his test-tubes and calculations, known to physicists as a brilliant investigator of the constitution of matter, but appearing to others an unsophisticated kindly dreamer. In an interval between two investigations, he had become dimly aware of a witty and charming young woman who was among his pupils, and—whether by his initiative or by hers—had married her. But after a fortnight's honeymoon at Cromer, to the indignation of her younger admirers, he became absorbed in a new series of calculations, and for years did not see her again except as a dim phantom half hidden by a mist of symbols. Even of the town in which he lived he knew nothing but the way from his house to the laboratory and the lecture-room.

Now he had just brought to an end a vast research, to which his last four years had been devoted. In spite of his child-like modesty, a feeling of satisfaction pervaded his thoughts as he reflected on the astonishing and yet solid results achieved by a combination of ingenious experiment and mathematical skill. A sense of emptiness and freedom, of unusual openness to impressions, of escape from the narrow concentration of a great task, left him the leisure of mind to enjoy the beauty of the sunny afternoon in May, for years past he had not noticed spring flowers or heard the song of birds, and as he walked he wondered at the blindness that had passed them by.

Forstice was doing a thing he had never done before: he was going to a garden-party. He had anxiously consulted his wife as to what he should wear on such an anomalous occasion, fortified by her opinion, he now had no misgivings on that subject, though he still suffered from a certain shyness and struggled against an impulse to turn back and go home.

It so happened that Mr. Hatfield Lane, the famous Empire builder, had come down for the week-end, and was to be seen that afternoon at the garden-party, to which Forstice had been invited because the distinguished guest had expressed a wish to meet him. To his surprise he found Mr. Lane, whom he had imagined as a sedate man of affairs after the model of the statues in Parliament Square, engaged in light badinage with a circle of admiring ladies. The great man, however, who prided himself on the universality of his interests, and moreover respected physics as the basis of engineering, which was to him the essential condition of Empire, had heard of some of Forstice's minor discoveries, and at once began to cross-question him as to the progress of his work. Forstice answered briefly and hesitatingly, disappointing his interlocutor by his deficiency in the power of self-advertisement. Very soon he dropped out of the conversation, and

remained a listener while the ladies resumed their attacks

Gradually the party began to fade away. When almost all were gone, an intellectual lady who had arrived late came with a serious air and said: "Mr. Lane, whenever I meet a great man I like to carry away a great thought. I believe that you know more of the world than any other living man. Do tell me whether there is more good than evil in the world, and whether the amount of good is increasing."

"My dear lady", replied the Empire Builder, "I know nothing of good and evil, which are terms that I have never been able to understand. I only know that I like some things and dislike others. As to that, there are many more of the things I dislike in the world than of the things I like. What with the ascendancy of snivelling Little-Englanders, the treachery of the Admiralty, and the dishonest incompetence of the War Office, I find the world at present very little to my taste."

"But", she answered, "apart from these troubles, which we may hope are temporary, do you see any tendencies in the world which give you pleasure?"

"Yes", he said, "there are some. The great problem of modern times is the harnessing of inferior races to the industrial machine. The blacks, when they are left alone, are so contented that they won't work. But civilized government and civilized taxation are rapidly spreading discontent among them, and there is hope that soon all will have to work to live. I want to exploit to the utmost the natural resources of the earth. Why? I hardly know why, but I suppose in order to make men richer."

Forstice, who had never taken any interest in political questions, was puzzled by this answer. "But will the blacks be richer when you have succeeded?" he asked.

"I don't know about the blacks—it is bad for them to have more than the bare necessities; they only spend their surplus in drink and become demoralized."

"Then you propose to make them discontented without expecting that in the end they will be the better for your efforts?" Forstice persisted.

"Well, I suppose that is what it comes to. But the world was not made for the blacks, nor yet for the average of white men. It is a world where the strong prosper and make things advance, while the weak must submit to be tools in carrying out the purposes of the strong."

"And does such a world content you? Do you wish it to go on existing, or would you be glad to think that it was soon coming to an end?" asked Breitstein the pessimist financier

"Personally I wish it to go on existing, because I am one of the strong. But if I were one of the weak, I suppose I should feel differently. And of course the weak are the vast majority."

"Then you like the world", said Forstice, "because the many are

sacrificed to the few, and you are one of the few?"

"If you choose to put it that way, yes, though I should have preferred a less brutal way of putting it."

By this time, no one remained except Breitstein, who, having long ago seen through Empire-Building along with everything else, listened with kindly tolerance to Lane's naive enthusiasm, and Shifsky the Socialist, who had stayed, though with growing indignation, in order to acquire material for a description of the modern capitalist with which he meant to adorn his next speech. At this point, he could endure silence no longer, and burst
10) vehemently into the discussion

"Don't believe him, Forstice", he exclaimed, "Lane may be strong for the moment, but the future is not for him and his strong man. The weak have been exploited too long by the strong, everywhere they are uniting, and by union they in turn will become the stronger. And the very energy of Lane and his allies only increases the forces against him. Every ounce of African gold which his helpless negroes are driven to extract from the mines which he calls his diminishes the purchasing power of wages in Europe, and intensifies the labour unrest which must in the end bring about the downfall of capitalism. Then at last we shall have justice, and the world will be a place
20) where even those who love mankind can be happy."

"Bravo", said Lane, "that will make a n excellent peroration the next time you meet the united class-conscious proletariat in the back parlour of some East-End public house. I must leave you to persuade Forstice of your millennium if you can. But with Breitstein at hand to prick your bubbles, I should think you will have a difficult task."

But Breitstein merely smiled a lazy smile, and left Shifsky to develop his hopes uninterrupted.

"Poor Lane", said Shifsky as soon as his back was turned, "he is pathetic with his self-confidence and his belief in his own strength. He really believes
30) that human will—particularly his will—can alter the course of events. But Man is a mere embodiment of economic forces, a mere channel of the world-desire which sweeps through him as through everything else. Mankind is like a vast organ, with pipes of many sizes. Lane, I admit, is one of the largest, but he fancies he is the wind that blows through the other pipes. He sees himself controlling the destinies of Continents, one of a band of heroic pirate Vikings, the circumcised Northmen of our day. But he is only one of the penultimate phases of capitalism, as it works out its own destruction by the inherent logic of competition. A few more forced amalgamations, a few more internecine combats, and the people, happier than
40) Caligula, will find that their enemies have only one head. Whether that head is the head of Lane (poor fellow) or of another, its fall will inaugurate the reign of communism and justice, of whose kingdom there shall be no end. Then no one will be very rich, and no one will be poor; wars will cease,

useful inventions will no longer be suppressed by trade rivals, and all life will be conducted with the order and regularity of the Post Office ”

“Then do you think”, Forstice asked, “that there would be no evils apart from poverty?”

“Yes”, he said, “I am sure of it, and poverty is due to bad laws. Alter the laws, and the earth will become a Paradise ”

“I like your Post Office Paradise”, said Breitstein, yawning “I hope I may live to be the serpent in it, and drive men out of it by the knowledge of good and evil, especially the latter I like too your view that there is no evil except poverty, because as I have much more than you would give to your Postmaster-General, I must be happier than any one in your Paradise, which is a consoling reflection. Besides, it is a comfort to have done with art and science, literature and philosophy, friendship and all such trifles. When I was very young, they persuaded me that all these things had some value, but now, like you, I think poverty the only evil and wealth the only good So I spend my days in the City, and divide my evenings between flirtation and stamp-collecting Stamp-collecting interests me more, because there is more difference between stamps than between women, but its joys grow rarer because my collection, I am sorry to say, is nearly perfect.

“But I think much of your Paradise already exists Consider for instance the City Clerk, that finest flower of our civilization: day after day he travels in the same corner of the same train, hangs his coat and hat on the same peg, and greets his wife in the evening with the same cheery platitude. How admirable! how perfect! with all the splendid regularity of the stars in their courses, and like ‘the most ancient heavens, fresh and strong’ No foolish passions distract his breast, no ‘moving about in worlds not realized’. The halfpenny paper, the fog, the price of coal—these are tangible sensible topics, with which even a civilized man may occupy his rare and unwelcome moments of leisure Later on, the marriage of his virtuous daughters to younger editions of himself, the easy success of his sons without the struggles that made him the man he is, may worthily fill an occasional evening with a respectable friend. Whatever may be our professions, we all really agree with you in admiring this manner of life; for the whole effort of preachers, philanthropists, and social reformers is directed to increasing its amount and heightening its intensity.”

“What a ghastly travesty of the Socialist’s ideal!” exclaimed Shifsky “Of course art and all such things will flourish under socialism as never before. It is the hurry and pressure of competition that kills them in our present society But I have no patience to argue with such effete flippancy.”

And with these words he went, not even saying goodbye.

“Would you mind”, said Forstice, “telling me what is your real opinion? I gather you were not quite serious in what you said, and that you do not think the world would be good even if every one were prosperous and well-

behaved All these problems are new to me, I do not know what to think, and if you can help me I shall be really grateful ”

“I am tired of this garden”, Breitstein replied, “come out into the fields and I will try to answer your question.”

“My view of life”, he began when they reached the fields, “is not a very cheerful one, and I don’t myself see much use in expressing it. But I suppose your motive is scientific, if you are making a statistical classification of people’s opinions, you may as well have mine along with others. Our friend Shifsky thinks that if life were freed from its obvious misfortunes, all would
10 be well, I think that the real misfortune would only be intensified a thousand-fold. The real misfortune to my mind is *ennui*, absence of interest in anything. Poverty, physical pain, unhappy affections—all such things I regard as blessings, because they prevent boredom. No great misfortune has ever come to me. I have always been well-to-do, healthy, able to secure affection wherever I desired it. But I am pursued day and night by an utter weariness of life, an intolerable lack of desire. In youth I had some slight intellectual interests, but unfortunately for me I had good abilities, and found learning so easy that it seemed not worth while. Metaphysics held me longest, because I thought it the most difficult; but soon I saw that what is
20 thought difficult is really impossible, and that what is possible is easy and uninteresting. Alpine climbing, at first, gave me a little excitement, but when all the risks had grown familiar, when I had become famous by the ascent of virgin peaks in various parts of the world, the mountains became as dull to me as Piccadilly. I have found the same experience in what is called love. The pursuit is sometimes interesting, but conquest is usually too easy; and even when conquest is hardest, unutterable *ennui* returns in the moment when the goal is attained. The pleasures of gambling lasted me rather longer, because the conflict is sharper and more intellect is brought into play. Sometimes on the Stock Exchange, in contests with the best practitioners of the art, when ruin or a great fortune hung in the balance, I have felt a pleasant titillation, but there too, invariable success has abated my zest. You may wonder why I continue to live. I hardly know—perhaps I feel suicide too pronounced a step, a little vulgar in fact, and—well yes, if you want the truth, my poor old mother rejoices in my successes and knows nothing of my inward indifference to everything. But when she is dead I shall no longer have any tie to life ”

“Then you would be glad if you thought the whole world would come to an end tomorrow?”

“Glad? yes, only that is too strong a word—I should feel a mild satisfaction.”

“You are the first man I have ever met who has felt as you do”, said Forstice; “and what is strange, you are the first who has had no complaint to make of outward circumstances. I don’t understand how this can be, I must

try to get to the bottom of it."

Wearied with his long afternoon of unfamiliar thoughts, Forstice walked slowly homeward. The pessimism of Breitstein bewildered him. "I had always imagined", he said to himself, "that a man who is invariably successful must be happy, yet Breitstein is utterly miserable. Am I happy? I never asked myself the question before. I suppose I was happy while my work absorbed me. But then I never reflected; perhaps if I had done so, I should not have been happy. And now Breitstein says that all is worthless pleasure and pain, work and play—he sees no value in any of it. I wonder whether he is right. Most people, I see, are blinded by the instinctive wish to live, he alone among my acquaintance is not. Perhaps it is only instinct that makes people continue to live, perhaps, if we were reasonable, we should all agree with Breitstein. I must think of this question reasonably, without prejudice, as I should think of a question in physics. But if Breitstein is right, there can be no balancing of the goods against the evils in the world, because the goods are all dust and ashes as soon as they are stripped of the glamour of desire, they are seen to be of no account. I do not see how his opinion can be tested. I wonder whether there is any other way of approaching the question? If there is another way, I must try to discover it."

At this point in his reflections he reached home

After dinner, instead of going to his study, as he usually did even on a Sunday, he resolved to ask his wife what she thought of Breitstein's views. "My dear", he said, "do you find happiness in life, or do you think all human hopes are dust and ashes?"

But instead of answering, she burst into tears, to his infinite distress, and in spite of all his efforts, it was a long time before he could discover the reason. "Do you know?", she said at last, "that in all the years of our marriage this is the first time you have shown any real interest in me? We have lived side by side, yet utterly separate; you were so absorbed in your projects and your calculations that often you did not hear what I said, when you were at leisure, you were tired, and wished only for relaxation. Don't think I undervalue what you do, if I did, I would not have borne the long solitude to which your work has condemned me. But since you have asked, I will tell you what I had meant to keep from you as long as possible."

She then told him that a year ago, when he believed her to be paying an ordinary visit to her mother, she had had an operation for cancer, now the cancer had recurred, and operation was no longer possible.

Forstice, utterly overwhelmed, forgot all his previous preoccupations, and became conscious, for the first time, of the affection which his absent-mindedness had concealed both from her and from himself. Filled with remorse, he saw with terrible distinctness all the loneliness of her life with him, and especially of the last twelve months, in instant response, with a wild yearning to bridge the gulf, and repair in some degree the wasted years,

his whole being went forth to her, in longing to make his passionate sympathy felt and known; all his abstract interests were thrust out utterly, leaving only a great elemental human devotion. Through long months of growing misery he showed a boundless solicitude and care, the tenderness and understanding of his thought for her increased as her pain increased; every little service that was possible was an alleviation of his grief, and an occasion for showing the depth and strength of his love.

Not only towards his wife, but towards all with whom he came in contact, a new impulse of tenderness possessed him, giving a new insight into their needs and aspirations. The doctor, the nurse, the maids, even the faces he passed in the street, were no longer to him, as hitherto, mere shadows, hardly reaching to the centre of consciousness; they became to him now living and real, as real as his own grief. With a sympathy which he had never known before, he saw the thoughts and feelings of others; the force of one great devotion set free the pent-up waters of love towards all the world.

Everywhere around him he saw strife and greed, eager grasping after pleasures bought by others' pain, a thirst for mastery as the completion of one's own being. Hard, heartless faces passed him in the street, full of struggle and fight, full of the bitter determination that Self should succeed at whatever cost to others. Those others too he saw—broken wrecks, helpless and hopeless, wandering aimlessly, with vague eyes and halting step. But he gave love to all—the tyrant as much as the victim, the rich and prosperous as much as the destitute. True, the love brought its own pain—some were in misery, some had discord in the soul, some lived in a blind and headstrong devotion to evil, and for each of these, love brought a separate drop of sorrow to fill the ocean of compassion. But beneath all this load of pain, beneath the anguish and remorse of his private sorrow, some new hope, some glimmering of what was almost joy, began to dawn in his soul, bringing an unintelligible hint of solemn peace beneath all the bitterness of loss.

Day by day his love increased, down to the last solemn hours when in her final colloquy with Death the things of this world grew remote, the eternal silence called, and other voices were hushed. All anxieties and frets seemed to him then a very little thing beside the majestic mystery of Death, shame held him dumb, and rebuked even the passionate outcry of his nature against the destruction of a cherished life. Death, it seemed, was something greater and deeper than our judgments of good and evil, the undeviating march of Fate, revealing the littleness of our human world of hopes and fears, the greatness of the unruffled world of outer night. Bowed, crushed, with a wild rebellion held in check by a new awe, he went forth from her deathbed bewildered, not knowing what remained standing, yet knowing that some new wisdom was struggling into birth, making all his previous thought seem small, trivial, unstable, mere thistle-down to be blown away.

by the first breath from the unknown

PART II

The sense of a hitherto unsuspected wisdom, now dimly felt but not yet fully known, remained with Forstice in the empty days that followed his wife's death. He found that he could not attach the same importance as in former times to abstract work and the things of the intellect, they, he felt, were fair-weather friends who had proved faithless in the hour of need, after making him blind for many years to the love which, until the last sad months, had called to him in vain Human affection alone, at this time, seemed to him to give value to life He was lonely, full of doubts, without 10 any moral compass to guide his course, yet in the value of human affection he felt a basis on which to build To his surprise, he found himself no longer troubled by Breitstein's pessimism It now seemed clear to him that there are things in life which are not dust and ashes, but the reason for this conviction remained obscure With reviving interest, he felt an overwhelming necessity to discover the reason; and with this intention, he decided to leave his native town and enlarge his knowledge of mankind

For one year, it was decided, Forstice's post was to be filled by a substitute, leaving him free to travel and reflect. He travelled in many countries, and spoke with men of many races The sense of an undiscovered 20 mystery never left him, yet, when he endeavoured to put into words the vague thoughts which beset him, he found himself baffled always by the terrible solidity of the world of common things To his scientific habit of mind, it was hard to believe that any wisdom could come through the apparent revelation of a moment Sometimes he would almost decide to put away the search, but again and again it was revived by some influence from the beauty or the horror of nature or of human life; again and again, though as yet unsupported by reason, the belief returned that, somehow, human life is of infinite value and is redeemed by some hidden splendour.

At length, returning, he found himself in Florence, and paid a visit to his 30 friend Forano the mathematician To him he spoke of his doubts and his vain attempts to solve them "Come with me", replied Forano, "to the next meeting of the 'Amanti del Pensiero'. Did you never hear of them? They have always been few, but they have existed now for a century Many great men have been among them, united only in the belief that clear candid thought is the greatest of human activities. In their early days, Leopardi was the leading spirit among them, then Mazzini for a time in spite of his exile; now for many years no one man has been dominant They meet this day week; lay your problem before them, and though I cannot promise that we shall solve it, I think I can promise an interesting discussion."

When the evening came, Forano took him to a small dingy room behind a

café, where about ten or twelve men were assembled, some silently smoking long thin cigars, others excitedly discussing with a wealth of gesture. He was introduced to all, and after a few mutual compliments (rather awkward on his side), he told his difficulties in much the same way as he had told them to Forano, who was now the first to open the discussion.

"I have no doubt," he said, "that many things in the world make it worth preserving; for my part, as is natural, it is mathematics that I value most. In the essence of mathematics there is something of which the value is not to be measured by its usefulness or by its educational importance, but is in some way not commensurable with common goods. Daily life, human relations, the pleasures of hearing and seeing, so far as I have experienced them, are not such as would make me desire this world to endure, others may find more in them, but to me they lack perfection, and what lacks perfection seems of no account. In mathematics I see perfection, and with perfection a kind of restfulness which I find nowhere else."

"I suppose the foundation of the mathematical impulse is pleasure in a proof—not in the proof of some conclusion already valued, but in proof for its own sake, quite regardless of the question what it is that is proved. This pleasure seems to be twofold: partly the delight in human capacity, partly 20 the aesthetic delight in logical structure. Both these elements exist throughout mathematics, and the further we penetrate the greater they become."

"It is not only the possibility of discovering proofs that gives satisfaction to the mathematician, it is also the nature of the objects with which he deals. Everything in the every-day world seems hap-hazard, uncertain, approximate, in the mathematician's world, everything is necessary, certain, exact. In the every-day world, everything is changing and passing; in the mathematician's world, everything is eternally the same: his truths and his concepts are nowhere subject to the power of Time. In the every-day world, nothing is solid or reliable: the strongest affections fade, the closest friends 30 grow cold, and by our own wantonness we estrange the few who might be faithful. But mathematics never changes, never refuses its help when we require it, is never offended by a temporary neglect."

"Mathematics gives most joy when life gives most disgust. Remote from the passion and sordidness, the weakness and failure of our human world, the mathematician enters upon a calm world of ordered classic beauty, where human will, with its violence and uncertainty, counts for nothing; with joyful resignation he contemplates the unchanging hierarchy of exact, certain, shining truths, subsisting in lofty independence of Man, of time and place, of the whole universe of shifting accidental particular things. 40 With a kind of proud self-abasement, like that of the mystic in communion with his God, the mathematician feels at once the vastness and strength of the non-human world of mathematics, and the enhancement of Man's glory by his power of knowing and loving such a world. In the sublimity of the

world of abstract thought he finds a joy which outweighs the shortcomings of the world of will and emotion, in its chiselled perfection of form his thirst for worship finds an outlet. And so long as any perfection, however rare and however difficult, can enter into human life, he feels that the world does not exist in vain."

The next to speak was the philosopher Nasispo "I agree entirely", he said, "as regards the beauty of the mathematical world, and the proud submission of thought to truth But I do not think it is necessary—at least, I do not think it always will be necessary—to ignore the world of actual existence in order to achieve what the mathematician values His ideal world ¹⁰ seems to me needlessly remote from our actual universe; so regarded, it cannot bear fruit in the ordinary relations of life, but only in the intellectual cloister to which the mathematical ascetic retires from the cares and temptations of the world I believe that the same attitude which the mathematician adopts towards the abstract world is possible also towards the world of existence, and that thereby all our emotions towards common things can be ennobled.

"The great merit of the mathematician's world, apart from its beauty, is its timelessness through this, the mathematician's thoughts are not of things subject to generation and decay, and are freed from the restlessness ²⁰ and anxiety which besets hopes that are at the mercy of Fate But even what is most transitory—the summer lightning, or an infant's smile—has some share of eternity eternally it is true that such a thing once was, eternally it remains part of the history of the universe, eternally its essence subsists in the abstract world For a brief moment, it takes on the colour and substance of actual existence; through all the ages it remains something which once had life and actuality Perhaps, under the influence of practical desires, we attach too much importance to the passing existence, too little to the unchanging subsistence in the world of Being. Perhaps, if we could survey all time in one divine intuition, if we could rise above our hopes and fears ³⁰ into the region of untroubled contemplation, we should see the flight of Time as a thing of far less importance than it seems to actors entangled in the unknown drama What is best in human life is brief; even the mathematician's joy in his eternal world is soon interrupted by fatigue or the business of the day. To eager desire, what is gone is of no account, only what is and what is to come gives value to life But what is, is transitory, and what is to come, is uncertain. Thus desire begets despair, and Time brings into the world still-born even the joys to which some brief moments of life might have been accorded.

"But to contemplation not fettered by desire, whatever has been ⁴⁰ eternal: all the beauty and wonder of a moment shines on for ever in the world of Being The true philosopher will so discipline his heart and so foster the spirit of contemplation that he will see the eternity incarnate in the

passing show, while the bodily life of beauty flies, its eternal soul lives on in his remembrance. His life must still be in time, and still itself be transitory, but his thought, while it persists, may be freed from slavery to Time: he may see the world with the vision of the eternal, and find again, even in what is most brief, the untroubled calm of the mathematician's abstract world.

"To the eternal vision, the actual world is no longer hap-hazard, uncertain, or inexact. To our piecemeal view, it seems such, but to an all-embracing view the whole is eternally necessary, determined, precisely what it is and not otherwise. The joy and peace of this contemplation is 10 Spinoza's intellectual love of God, that 'infinite love with which God loves himself', and the soul which is filled with the intellectual love of God is at one with all other souls inspired by the same love. In this contemplation consists our eternal life; for in this contemplation, Self and Time and all that makes division is transcended. Not fully, to us bound in the trammels of the flesh, is this contemplation possible, but dimly, in moments of mystic insight, we can rise above our usual grovelling bodily vision into a transfigured world, where the Whole emerges from its parts, and the majesty of the cosmic order is revealed.

"To those who have known this vision, all love, all affection, all desire, 20 are transformed. they lose the terror and the madness and the insistence that beset the slave of Time, and become filled with the vast calm of contemplation, the greatness and eternity of the universe impregnates every minutest portion, and the fear of loss is softened by the mystic timelessness of what is loved. Good and evil, to this vision, are swallowed up in the infinity of the world, and a boundless joy, the joy of union, fills the soul with worship and love and the peace of eternal life."

The next to speak was the poet Pardicreti. "Although I agree", he said, "that the attitude both of the mathematician and of the philosopher is one of those that it is good to take towards the world, still there is something in me 30 that rebels against any closed system, any finality, any abiding city for the soul. My mathematical friend, I felt, treated mathematics a little too much as if it were Abraham, and he could rest eternally on its reasonable bosom. And Nasispo too made his good purely contemplative, purely receptive. But Man is active as well as contemplative, creative as well as receptive. There is in life something of adventure and daring, which I should not wish to forget: imagination can impose beauty upon the world, and bring into existence much of the vision which its hopes reveal. It is not only the world as it is in itself that is interesting, but also and chiefly the world as illumined by men, the reflection on the outer darkness of the central fire in the soul. Consider 40 what we poets have made out of the stars, and in themselves, if science knows everything, they are only bits of matter wandering aimlessly through space.

"Even if we do not travel a step outside science, there is still—perhaps

more than ever before—a grand Lucretian epic to be written on the subject of Matter. Matter, like mathematics, exhibits at once the littleness and the greatness of Man, littleness in outward power, greatness in thought and passion. Humbling to the vanity which centres the universe about schemes of human salvation, Matter is at the same time an incentive to the pride which will not be turned aside from its purposes by an indifferent world.

“The unknown inhuman wildness of the universe is more delightful to me than the orderly schemes of theologians, because it leaves more play for imagination, for possibilities, for the unending search after something greater than our minds can conceive. I do not desire a God: I want a world 10 where there is always something to be done, a virgin forest in which to hew a way, a night to illumine with beacon fires, an infinite chaos with a core of cosmos gradually growing, I desire to possess my soul in face of an alien universe, and to learn to love it and make beauty out of it without assimilating it to Man.

“A strange belittling of the universe is involved in all anthropomorphism. What is important to *me*, the primitive man thinks, *must* be important to the universe. The whole scheme of salvation is an endeavour to preserve this instinctive sense of self-importance. Through successive refinements, all religion which is directed primarily to human destiny prolongs this 20 simple-minded faith that the universe cannot be indifferent to what is of overwhelming importance to us. Day after day and night after night, men look out upon the vastness of the world: the sea beats upon the shore, the sun rises and sets, the starlight reaches us after years of lonely voyaging through space. Age after age, matter is hurled through the void, never resting, never attaining a goal, clashing, smashing, destroying and again creating, blindly, endlessly, yet with the cold regularity of perfect mechanism. In the midst of this huge unthinking world, a few little specks on one of the smallest of the planets passionately claim that they are the centre about which all revolves. Defying Copernicus, they range the moral 30 order still in concentric spheres about this little earth, and imprison the great wild universe within the tame walls of their tidy imaginations. God made the sun to light the day, the moon to light the night, and the stars to guide the belated traveller to his home. When this crude anthropomorphism has been refined by philosophy, men still believe that all reality is like human minds in being spiritual. Their loves and hates, their hopes and fears, are still indications of the purpose of the universe. Because man’s activities have purposes, and because the universe is ceaselessly active, they suppose the universe too must have a purpose.

“Thus without reason man projects himself upon the world by schemes 40 of salvation, by metaphysical theories, he makes the universe subordinate to himself, smaller than himself. And in so doing he shuts himself out from the greatness of which he is capable—the greatness of impartial contemplation,

the greatness of rising above human hopes and fears, the greatness of seeing undismayed the majestic mystery of the passionless indeflectible cosmos. Not by such means is human salvation to be achieved, but by going forth freely, open-eyed, to toss on the uncharted sea. There, in the soul gifted with courage, human ideals grow to meet and grapple with the greatness of their apparent foes; hope and despair become world-embracing, and end at last in reconciling man to the universe by the discipline of desire and the victory of thought.

"The mind of Man, almost helpless in the midst of the vast wild world, is
10 the meeting-place and focus of all the abysses of space and all the procession
of the ages. Sense and passion, the mirror and the central fire, strangely
blended, at once reveal and transform the world; and as imagination darts
the light of passion now here, now there, its sudden rays pierce the as-
tonished darkness of the outer night, and the mirror of sense reveals
undreamed-of visions to the soul."

"But beyond the farthest depths that the fire of passion can illumine, felt
rather than seen, there is something which is not darkness, some mystery,
some glory. All great poetry, whatever its nominal theme may be, strives
20 after the revelation of this glory. Graceful images, exquisite pictures of
outward beauty, deep thought, profound passion even, will not make
poetry truly great—the one quality needed is the indefinable quality of
magic. A cadence, a single word rich with ages of poignant feeling, a hint of
the life-in-death of ancient loves, will bring the sudden disquieting doubt,
the sudden unimaginable hope, making our solid daily world rock and
dissolve in mist, revealing behind the shows of sense—what? No man can
say; yet this unknown something is the life of all the highest beauty, the goal
of the poet's aspiration, the one supreme glory in comparison with which all
else is dross."

The next to speak was Chenskoff the Russian novelist, who had come as
30 the guest of Pardicreti. "Like my friend Pardicreti", he said, "I think the
highest quality of all art, as of poetry, is magic, the suggestion of another
world behind the world of common sense. And like Forano, I have not
found in human relations anything that could satisfy the craving for beauty;
glimpses there are of an unsurpassable splendour, but the littlenesses of
envy and the daily round, or the crashing thunderbolts of the world of
matter, seem always to prevail against them."

"But there is one thing in human life that I feel to be of deep importance,
one thing for which mathematics, or any pursuit that is remote from
emotion, cannot provide an outlet. That one thing is Pain—not the acci-
40 dental pain of day by day, but the infinite pain that lies at the heart of life. I
doubt if there can be really great achievement except through pain, it is pain
that gives clear sure beauty, the sense of having been wrought in the fire. It
is pain that gives the quality of yearning; without that, a man may be an

appreciator, but not a creator. All supreme beauty makes us travel on in thought to things beyond human life, the things of vision, that are just suggested in the greatest things the world contains. That is what makes the madness of it all—the vision just beyond our reach, that we long to bring to earth and fix—but it flies, and only echoes of it fill the soul with longing. The artists and madmen and creators are those who have seen heaven for a moment, and they wander through the earth trying to see it again, feeling nothing else counts, all else is exile—and all that the earth contains cannot content them, because it is not heaven, not the glory that has blinded them to common things.

10

"Perhaps we of the chaotic North are not yet capable of the detachment, the impersonal intellectual vision, which two thousand years of civilization have given to the descendants of Roman greatness. To me, human life has always appeared struggling and passionate, and by contrast, before I had found an outlet for the infinite pain, I sought relief in whatever was least struggling and least passionate—calm, unfeeling Power, Necessity marching to its conclusions over the recurring generations of crushed lives and bleeding souls. A cold joy came to me from Pardicreti's *Epic of Matter*, the unhasting solemn procession from the nebula to the Solar System, to Life, at last to Man, and thence, in all likelihood, back to universal Death, an unending inevitable development, proceeding with unchanging regularity, producing human hopes, ideals, and despair as a trivial incident in its march. I loved waste solitary places, rocky headlands where sea and land contended for mastery in a solemn recurring rhythm, where man and every living thing could be forgotten, where the outward tumult of the waves soothed my inward restlessness, and made me receptive of the unbending calm that lay beneath the noise and foam. Feeling, I thought, turns men from their purposes, makes them weak, irregular, and despicable; to have no feeling is to be strong. I longed to march through a pre-determined development with the ruthless consistency of the material world, to be as regular, if necessary as cruel, as though I were a mere embodiment of lifeless force. Contempt for myself and all mankind, a proud passion to transcend the vanity of human existence, upheld me in this worship of the eternal sublimity of fate.

"But this detachment, passionately as I sought to achieve it, was rendered impossible for me by the infinite pain which I felt to be the ultimate truth of life. The laughter of children, or the bright-eyed energy of youth, attacking the old world with the ever-new freshness of untested faith, would rouse in me an almost unbearable anguish—the vision of the awful journey that lay ahead, crushing out gaiety, hope, desire, in the long agony of life. Late at night, I would go out into the starlight to feel the wind on my forehead and hear it in the trees—coming none knew whence, going none knew whither, wandering eternally round the world like an unquiet ghost that longs for rest.

but can find no rest while Time endures Like the night-wind, humanity wanders homeless through life, coming out of the unknown, returning again into the unknown darkness, restless, seeking it knows not what, longing for an abiding city only to be found in extinction, passing through the earth like the wind, and like it leaving not a trace behind, weary with a whole eternity of pain, in which the dumb striving of the universe becomes conscious and moans and throbs in travail. Sunset skies, memories of childhood, tales of vanished love, would rouse in me that infinite pain on which I felt that all life is built—all the energy and idealism, all the frenzy,
10 madness, and wickedness of the world Intoxication, cruelty, lust, restless activity, are all inspired, I felt, by fear of that infinite pain; but all are unavailing, since all fail to find an escape from the pursuing spectre This pain is unlike all other pain, it is a revelation, in a flash, of some part of the inmost secret of life, filling the whole soul with utter longing for some other world than this, some heaven, unimaginable, indescribable, where there could be rest not purchased by extinction. Blinely and helplessly men reach out for this or that, they snatch the cup of water from each other's parched lips, and spill the precious drops in the burning desert sand, but the infinite pain remains. Some become insane and find a futile happiness in a world of
20 lies, some seek forgetfulness in sensual orgies, some hope for relief through a life of doubtful battle, others through a treadmill round of trivial duties, many, after the terrible sorrows of childhood, escape the pain by escaping from real life into a mere automatic bodily survival

"And looking back over my own life, I saw the same dread of the infinite pain, driving me hither and thither in restless passion, making my life a fever except in a few rare moments of courage which had partially redeemed it Suddenly, as with a new insight, I saw that all the noise and fury was mere cowardice, mere shouting in the night to keep the ghosts away. There was, I saw, another way to deal with this pain, to turn and fight it, to face it and
30 subdue it and make it minister to wisdom; to take it into the soul and endure while it stabbed and stabbed again; and so to rise above it, and learn through it the vision of heaven, the mysterious unity of all life in the search for liberation The mystery is revealed in the conquest of pain by acceptance, in the vision which sees undismayed the deepest horror in the dark caverns of the Soul, in the paean that celebrates the flaming mystic marriage of pain. And in the marriage of pain the soul dies to Self, for Self is the terror and the flight; it lives to Life, to the whole world, to love for all that struggles and suffers and lives.

"And I saw that, though all real life is passion, there are passions of
40 different kinds. there are the passions of escape, restless, insistent, finite, parting man from man, growing in frenzy as escape grows more impossible; and there are the passions born of the marriage of pain, which are infinite, uniting man to man, sweeping over the whole soul like a wind from the sea,

bearing with them the assurance that they fulfil the supreme purposes of life, embodying all its greatness, its splendour, its poignant sorrow and its unquenchable yearning after another world.

"All life is built on the infinite pain, and from this pain there is no escape. The attempt to escape leads only through growing terror to madness; but acceptance of the pain leads, through a moment of unimaginable anguish, to a new life, free, boundless, and so filled with mystic glory that the pain, though it still lives and gives life, no longer dominates and no longer makes all existence a burden almost too heavy to be borne. Each free Soul is a fire sending forth its flaming light and heat into the vastness of nature's night,¹⁰ conquering some portion of the wild universe for human ideals and human worship. Its life may be brief, but it is not the life of a slave or a coward; it is a life of conquest, of creation, making some part exist of that imagined heaven which would still the infinite pain. Pain is the gateway to the good, and survives in the best we know; but beyond the best we know, dimly, haltingly, we conceive another best, not perhaps attainable by man, but shining through the glory of the heavens and the earth, almost incarnated in love, hauntingly leading us on like distant music over the darkening sea."

The last to speak was Giuseppe Alegno, an unobtrusive silent man, not famous like the others, living alone on the very modest salary of a small post²⁰ under Government. His few intimate friends loved his delicate reverent sympathy, his poignant humour, and the gentle wise sorrow with which he regarded the combats and follies of mankind. Too kindly to permit himself the luxury of despair, too tentative and concrete to give his assent to any gospel, he never directly revealed his inmost view of life, and even now, he contented himself with doubts and illustrations.

"The chief thing that has impressed me", he said, "during the discussion, is, what a fine thing it must be to be a great man. For a poor devil who has to spend his days cooped up in a dingy office, it is pleasant to think that others have more agreeable professions, and I do not doubt that the joys of your³⁰ pursuits are worthy of all the praises you have bestowed upon them. But if I might be the spokesman of ordinary mortals, I should suggest that we exist on our own account, and not merely as material for the lordly imaginations of men of genius. We common people, who are, after all, the great majority of mankind, are too limited, too full of daily cares, to appreciate the refined delights of your various heavens. We cannot understand mathematics and philosophy, we are indifferent to poetry, and music only pleases us when we can dance to it. We like novels well enough, but they must be about lost wills or amazing murders, not about the mystic marriage of pain."

"This morning I had a long conversation with my old washerwoman. Her⁴⁰ face is wrinkled like a withering apple, her eyes tired but still shrewd, her legs stiffening with rheumatism, her arms red and rough from the wash-tub. Her husband, she tells me, gambled, then stole, then went to prison, where

he died years ago. Her only son is at the war; she cannot read, and feels doubtful whether he is still alive His wife died lately, leaving four young children whom the old woman has to care for as best she may. The children, of course, are subject to all the troubles of childhood. just now it is whooping-cough, at other times it is measles or teething, but always it is something. Her clients often fail to pay, and her rent is often hard to find. Now what would you advise me to say to her?

“Forano, I suppose, would ask her to rejoice in the proof that her clients owe her a large sum of money which she is not likely to get, and in the 10 non-human truth of a subtraction-sum which makes it likely that her landlord will soon turn her out. Nasispo would tell her that, though the whooping-cough may pass out of the world of existence, it will whoop on for ever in the world of Being. Pardicreti would tell her to admire the inexorable order of the motions of matter when the steam blinds her and the smell of soap-suds on a summer’s day overwhelms her Chenskoff would tell her to thank her stars that she has enough finite troubles to keep off the infinite pain which besets those who have time for it But I doubt if she would find much very real comfort in any of these sublime reflections

“I suppose you want to know what I say to her But I don’t say anything. I 20 keep an eye on the newspapers and try to reassure her on the subject of her son; when her situation is worse than usual, I sometimes help her with her rent, but in the main I merely listen to her without doing anything Once I asked whether she hoped to go to heaven, but she said her father was a Garibaldino who hated the priests and taught her to disbelieve all that they preached. I did not see how to instruct her in any of your fancy religions that are not taught in churches; so I reminded her that the eldest boy would soon be old enough to earn money, and promised that I would help him to get employment.

“All that has been said in our discussion about the aristocratic goods 30 enjoyed by great men is no doubt true, and I do not deny its importance. But as a universal gospel it is defective ‘First become a King, and then enjoy your kingdom’—that is really your advice But we cannot all be kings, and we live in democratic times, when ordinary mortals refuse to be ignored. Either you must make your gospel as accessible to the poor and needy as Christianity has been, or you must find some other gospel which does not demand exceptional powers in the disciple.

“Why do men and women continue to live at present? Most, no doubt, from mere instinct; but this motive, as civilization advances, will become less and less general. With those who reflect, the usual motive is the 40 dependence of others Human life is such a cunningly-devised network that, though pain is nearly universal, most human beings, by a voluntary death, would increase the pain for others And so the machine goes on, grinding out suffering; and so, I suppose, it will go on till the human race is

extinct. I do not believe what is needed is a gospel, but merely courage, and the habit of not reflecting on our own misfortunes. If you ask what purpose is served by human life in general, and whether it would be better if it should cease, I can only say I do not know. But if any purpose is served, it must be one that can enter into the daily lives of common men, not a rare and difficult good, realized only by the few, to whom all the other millions are to be ministering slaves. Show me a heaven that is open to my washerwoman, and I will join your religion, but if you are to go to heaven and leave my washerwoman to perdition, I will not bow down before your unjust God, however great may be the joys he offers to his chosen worshippers ”

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PART III

While the “Amanti del Pensiero” were discussing, very varying thoughts and feelings passed through the mind of Forstice. Except Forano and Chenskoff in their belittling of human affections, each speaker in turn convinced him, and he was feeling his question almost answered when Alegno again plunged him into perplexity. The pessimism of Breitstein, he had come to see, was the self-centred pessimism of spiritual death. any genuine interest in any other human being made it impossible. But the pessimism of Alegno was the outcome, obviously, of a very real interest in other human beings. Was it possible that even he was blind to something which could exist in the humblest lives, some good as infinite as that of the philosopher and the poet, but not dependent, like theirs, on a knowledge and a capacity only possible to the few? Some instinct told him that it must be so; but in articulate thought he could not answer Alegno. Doubt still held him, and he saw that his search must still continue

At this time, with his doubts still unsolved, he was summoned home to England by the illness of his uncle Tristram Forstice. Having been left an orphan while still a boy, John Forstice had come into the guardianship of his uncle, a kindly, slightly sentimental, country gentleman, with scientific interests and probably good scientific capacity, but remaining an amateur for lack of early training. To him John as a boy owed much in the way of opening larger horizons, and suggesting possibilities of discovery which stimulated his growing delight in the world of science. Tristram Forstice, who had never married, was now an old man, living alone in a big rambling house, inherited from his father, on a desolate part of the Anglesey coast. Half the house was shut up, and in the garden the paths were overgrown with weeds, unclipped box hedges choked the roses, and old trees lay rotting where the winter storms had uprooted them. Outside the garden, the sea moaned day and night, and rain and mist shrouded the wind-swept moors. The old man, now growing rapidly weaker and visibly nearing his end, lived daily more and more in memories of the past—of his parents, of

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John's father, of other brothers and sisters all of whom he had survived; gradually he almost ceased to distinguish John as an actual living being, confounding him with the earlier generation who were more present to his mind.

There was in the neighbourhood only one other big house, now let, built in the reign of Charles II by Robert Belasys the politician, and inhabited, until the last thirty years, by his descendants John had heard it said that his uncle had wished to marry Catherine Belasys, the last of the family; but she had married an unknown penniless artist, who, after causing her much unhappiness, had become insane. When he at length died, gossip had again expected that she would marry Tristram Forstice, but to the astonishment of all and the indignation of many, on the death of her only child, a delicate boy, which happened very soon afterwards, she retired from the world into a sisterhood, where she still lived, devoting her time and her money to the relief of suffering among the poor.

Beyond these few outward facts and unsubstantiated conjectures, John had known nothing as to his uncle's part in the life of Catherine Belasys. Now, however, his uncle began to speak of her, at first seldom and briefly, but gradually more and more. He spoke of her as she appeared in girlhood, sometimes busy with the labourers and their families, whose needs she always knew, at other times dominated by the sea and the mist, brooding on the transitoriness of human things, and so haunted by the sense of man's impotence as almost to lose her hold on life. Of her marriage he spoke little; but John felt that it had been due to an impulse to free herself from the paralyzing influence of her surroundings, a swift passionate effort to live in the present and the future, to escape from the dominion of the past and the unchanging world of nature.

"Her beauty", Tristram said, "was not like the beauty of other women; it spoke to the soul, not to the senses. All the sorrow and pity of the world lived in it, often, watching her face in repose, I felt an almost unbearable sacred anguish, a pain piercing down and down till its sharp point touched my heart, rousing the infinite home-sickness of the exile from a remembered heaven. The spirit of the sea was in her beauty, all its wildness and all its eternal strength. But deeper even than strength, compassion shone from her eyes and made all her motions gentle. I never felt her young, she seemed always to me the immortal mother of sorrows, old as human life, inflexible as fate, tender as the first warm breath of spring."

Tristram Forstice was sinking fast, and often now became incoherent, wandering in his talk, or living again among scenes of childhood. On one of the latest days on which his mind was clear, he spoke at last without reserve of Catherine.

"When I am dead", he said, "I wish you to go to Sister Catherine with a message from me. Tell her that I loved her to the last, she knows that my

love began as soon as I was of an age to love, but I wish her to know also that it continued to the end There was a time—a very brief time—when she returned my love. We were to have married, but her boy, whom she watched over with a tense and terrible anxiety because he was delicate and she feared his father's madness, fell ill and died. Rightly or wrongly, she felt that her love for me had led her to take less thought than usual for the child, and remorse rose like a dividing spectre between us. And even if that could have been overcome, she had suffered too much: her capacity for personal happiness was exhausted, and all the joys of love were dead irrevocably. No life was possible to her except a life wholly devoted to others, and we parted—not without some bitterness on my side. I wish you to tell her that I have long since understood, long since ceased to feel bitterness, that our little moment of happiness has lived in my memory, that my heart has built a precious shrine for the ashes of dead hopes, and has enriched it with whatever of wisdom the lonely years have brought I have no belief in a future life, I do not delude myself with the thought of a meeting in heaven; and after spending half a lifetime with her image, I could not face her actual presence even in another world. But one last word of love and understanding I do wish to send "

He then gave his nephew, out of a locked box by his bedside, a journal and 20 a packet of letters—Catherine's and his own, for she had returned his when she went into the sisterhood, but had not wished him to return hers. The journal he wished his nephew to read as soon as he was dead, the letters were to be dealt with as Sister Catherine might decide Soon his strength failed him and he ceased to speak, not many days afterwards he died.

Through the night, in the silence of the almost empty house, John Forstice read his uncle's journal, living over again the long sorrows and brief joys of the love which had just been ended—a love silent and solitary, except for one short interval The journal began while Catherine was still a girl and Tristram was little more than a boy. After a period of growing hope, held in 30 check by the diffidence of inexperienced love, her future husband appears proud and shy, Tristram stands aside, inwardly raging, foreseeing disaster, doing nothing to avert it With her engagement, the journal ceases for some years. It begins again when Tristram, after a long absence, returns to his father's deathbed, and learns of the madness of Catherine's husband In various ways he is of use to her in her distress, his love flames up after the years during which it has been buried; gradually, bit by bit, it wins a timid response, and hopes of happiness appear Then, after her husband's death, there are a few weeks of joy, but even during these weeks he feels her spirit constantly escaping from him into a vast passionless world of eternal things 40 into which he cannot find an entrance. Very soon the catastrophe of the child's death shatters his hopes The final parting, though he knows it to be inevitable, fills him with impotent rebellion; its very inevitability makes it

the more cruel, and increases the anger which he directs by turns against fate and against Catherine Slowly a calmer mood returns, and he finds in memory a possession of which nothing but death can deprive him But never for a moment does he doubt that passionate love is what is of most worth in his life; that whether it brings joy or whether it brings sorrow, it is still the only thing that can concern him profoundly. Slowly he learns to turn his love to other uses, to universalize it and make it minister to sympathy and wisdom The last entry in his journal, after many struggles, arrives at the philosophy which inspired the kindly affectionateness of his

10 later years

"No, passionate love is not to be judged by its duration, or by the happiness or unhappiness that it causes Those who look at it from without, seeing only the restlessness and the havoc that it brings in its train, may be pardoned if they judge that the world would be better without it But those who know it from within willingly bear the pain, the heart-ache and the weariness of lonely years these things are as nothing beside the moment of spiritual meeting in the silent ecstasy of union. There is in all human intercourse, to those who have the power of love, some disquieting hint, some wistful suggestion, of a mystical world where solitude is overcome,

20 where the walls that divide each separate soul from its comrades are broken down, where the division between Self and Other is of no account. But accidents of time and place, the business of life, superficial disagreements, the barriers of insistent egoism, and mere poverty of feeling, make the realization of such a world impossible here on earth. Only in some unknown heaven, in the communion of just spirits made perfect, imagination hauntingly suggests an unattainable ideal One small portion of this ideal, in rare moments, the passionate lover achieves, and in comparison of what those moments reveal, all else in the world seems of little worth, he feels himself at once rising to a dizzy pinnacle among the stars, and sinking deeper and

30 deeper into an ocean of joyful death '*Verweile doch, Du bist so schon*' is not the language of the greatest passion. The greatest passion knows that mortality cannot live at such a height or such a depth, and longs for death to prevent the return to common earth. An infinite poignant pain, of more worth than any mundane joy, interpenetrates and heightens the happiness of love's fruition; for the world and the finiteness of the human soul cannot long permit the full infinity of mystic passion But all the greatest things, however brief their outward life may be, seem, in some unintelligible way, to live for ever in a remote world of light. In that world of light, the lover feels, the soul might share the eternity of its love, if the moment of utter

40 perfection could be immortalized by swift death But the world returns with its cares, the heaven seen for a brief space is closed again, and worship is left in place of the living epiphany. But the epiphany has brought its own wisdom, for all true worship is wisdom. Through love, something of the

infinity of every human soul is revealed; something of the reverence and tenderness of love goes out towards all mankind; and something of the shining glory of love irradiates all the stunted lives of imprisoned souls. To the man who has once known love, despair of the world is not possible; for through all failures and sorrows there remains the memory of that joy and the knowledge of what is possible in human life ”

Immediately after his uncle's funeral, John carried out his last wishes by visiting Sister Catherine, the Mother Superior (as she now was) of a sisterhood in a dark smoky manufacturing town. He was shown into a large bare room, with oilcloth on the floor, empty except for some books, a table, and a few hard chairs. What sort of woman would he find, he wondered, as he waited full of nervous dread. Would she be a cold formal nun, who would receive him and his message with a heart dead to the world, or even with disapproval? In these unknown surroundings his fear grew greater; already he felt his voice and manner loud and coarse. How should he bring himself to deliver a message from a lover here? But his imaginings were cut short by a Sister calling him to the Mother Superior's room.

As he went in, he saw the beaming face of a little girl, bending up to kiss, with evident devotion, a dim face shrouded in a dark veil—he heard afterwards that she was one of the many adopted orphans. As the child disappeared, he saw a small frail form enveloped in a dark blue serge habit, a face soft in skin but deeply lined with lines of suffering, and giving at once the impression that hardly any body remained round that vivid glowing soul. At once he knew how foolish all his anticipations had been; as he stood looking down at those wonderful far-seeing eyes that looked at him, he felt at once that to her he could give his message simply and fully. A hand with long sensitive fingers was put on his arm; “come and sit here”, she said. He looked round the room. rigidly plain, but somehow with a feeling of simple beauty and sweetness in it; books and some religious pictures covered the walls; beside her chair were a few dim and faded photographs, one of a young boy. In one corner was a *Prie-Dieu* and a crucifix. The only ornament was a bunch of flowers that the child had just left.

As he began to speak, the face opposite him, or rather the eyes, lost the smile he had felt so welcoming, and there came a look that seemed to give almost too much silent suffering understanding, the outcome of tragic sorrow and renunciation; but besides this and above it all there was something he had never seen before in all those he had met, a sort of gentle tender radiant light, that saw something, worshipped something, he could not see, some ever-present vision of light and love. As he talked, the long thin fingers were clasped together, the eyes rested on him; but from time to time he saw them look up and out, as if bringing all the tale of love and devotion that he laid at her feet up to some other Presence. Was there any tinge of warmth or satisfaction for the devotion that he brought her? No, he felt, in that soul

where Self was renounced, none; only overwhelming reverence and deep emotion When he mentioned some of his uncle's kind deeds, and his generous affectionate manner of life, her whole body seemed to quiver with gladness

At length she spoke; her voice appeared to come from far away, as if from another world, yet it had notes of strangely poignant feeling, holding an agony of compassion for all the sorrows of mankind Her vivid memory of tiny details about his uncle surprised him. Gradually she passed on to speak of the heavenly love, avoiding mention of beliefs which she knew he could
10 not share

“Yes, human life contains much that is bad, more of bad, perhaps, than of good, by the common standards of the market-place But the bad is limited, circumscribed; it is possible to see the whole of a bad thing, to isolate it and pass beyond it Much also of what is thought to be good, is limited in the same way, but not all Have you ever, perhaps in moments of the profoundest sorrow, seen a light break through from beyond, felt as though you were floating out on an invisible boat into the infinite ocean of Being, to a region beyond the storms of our rock-bound human shores, where strife never comes, where pain and sin seem to be absorbed in the
20 oneness of infinite love, where beauty, which in our nether world has the terror of death-bringing lightning in the night, shines with a steady radiance that illuminates the world foreshadowed in our restless yearning? In that world, Truth no longer frowns like an avenging God; for the goods which Truth forbids are not the goods of that world, the evils which Truth reveals are powerless against the peace of that uncharted sea In that world, there are no boundaries; our human powers cannot reach the limits of its joy. Those who have known its freedom cannot again wholly confine their thoughts within the prison of finite hopes and fears in which their previous life has been immured They know that in every human spirit there is
30 something that is infinite and divine, perishable, perhaps, and obscured by the mists of restless desire, but yet of greater import than all the rest of what makes man's life; they know that only in the victory of the divine can peace be found. To every human spirit they give a love which is the expression of the infinite, a love seeking nothing for itself, scarcely seeking for others those lesser goods that a more finite love would demand, but aiming always at freeing the infinite in others from the trammels of earth.

“And to those to whom this liberation has come, utter despair is no longer possible; through pain, through the loss of those they love, even through the seeming degradation of those whom they would most wish to help, they see
40 still shining the sun of that transfigured world, they know that somehow, inexpressibly, inspite of sin and grief, human life has a value which is infinite, reaching out to the stars, embracing the whole universe, uniting all that is past and all that is to come in a vast whole of love. For love is the good and love

reveals the good; love is the sun that shines through the casements of our prison, and love is the power that unlocks the prison gates and makes us free citizens of the world of light While love lives, the world deserves to last ”

When she became silent again, what had she said? A great deal to him, yes, more than he could account for. He felt almost bewildered, as though he had made a new discovery, but it was not her words that had said so much, for after all they were few—it was something else. Her words had come as from a soul filled with infinite love, tender sympathy, and reverence, they had come with some unknown and vibrating value. Love deep as his for her was in her heart for the man who was dead, of that John felt 10 convinced; but even if he had known of it before he died, would it have satisfied his longing? Probably not, for was it not a love hitherto unknown to him, a love taken up and fused into the love of her God? Self and desire purged away in the fire of suffering, leaving a love passionate still, yes, but only—he could dimly imagine—passionate to give, not to receive. He could picture her hour after hour on her knees, looking up, or bowed in worship and reverence, holding in the arms of the soul that being who after all these years was so precious to her. Long silence had not touched or dimmed those prayers—her look alone showed that.

Was there regret for all she had missed? Sorrow and anguish for the pain 20 she had caused, perhaps; but above it all, he felt again, there was a faith, obstinate and unfailing, that she had but withdrawn herself from his life to leave him in more powerful, more enfolding, and more infinitely tender hands.

A chapel bell aroused him from his musings “Ah, is it already time for vespers?” she said. He went; but as he held that emaciated hand, he felt, in spite of disbelief, an irresistible desire to bend in reverence before her, to say “you will bless me too, won’t you?” As if dimly conscious of his thoughts, she looked up with glowing eyes and said “You he loved, and you gave him tender care and comfort in those last days. I shall never forget you ” Again 30 her words were few, but her look spoke much more

As he walked away, some instinct made him look up at the house, and rather to his surprise he saw her standing at a window with sad look, he felt she was looking at him as the last link with that past now outwardly and visibly for ever at an end. As he looked up, the second Vesper Bell rang; she turned slowly away and disappeared

In the street, rain was falling, children begrimed with sooty mud were quarrelling and crying, men returning from their work were laying bets in loud tones on the result of the next football match, from a neighbouring factory a torrent of sordid girls poured forth with harsh laughter and brutal 40 jests, bumping into Forstice with oaths as he tried to make his way through them. For a moment the contrast was greater than tense nerves could bear; then the thought of universal love returned, and he began to see, no longer

with his own eyes, but with those eyes of vision that had been filling his soul with new light. Outwardly degraded as they were, each of those spiritually stunted human beings seemed to him of infinite value, with some hidden beauty buried beneath the visible horror. The new insight which the last hour had brought could not, he felt, be all delusion, yet it was hard to find a place for it beside his other beliefs—the belief that the soul dies at death, that Matter rules the world, that spiritual forces are powerless against natural laws, mere shining bubbles on the surface of the hurrying stream.

Absorbed in a profound questioning, he soon ceased to see or hear the sights and sounds of the street; in a dream he reached the station, in a dream he travelled home. Through all his thinking, that voice and those eyes still spoke to him: he could not share the beliefs which inspired them, yet he could not doubt that they held some wisdom of immeasurable importance to mankind, some truth as true as any of the truths of science. He remembered the feeling of the mystery of life which had come to him when his wife died, the haunting sense of an undiscovered infinite value in human existence which had been only deepened by all the evils that he had seen. He remembered the unreasoning instinct which had kept him from acquiescing in the pessimism of Alegno. That secret in which Wisdom was shrouded he 20 felt that Mother Catherine possessed, and yet, and yet, how could it be disentangled from the God, the life of prayer, the belief in the power of spirit, with which in her it was entwined?

Day after day, in a passion of thought, the same problem held him; hour after hour, sitting or slowly pacing backwards and forwards, he saw side by side the two truths, the truth of science and the truth of vision; struggling to make them combine, he saw them still apart, still mutually destructive, yet still both true. Very slowly, with much doubt, not without some loss in the glory of the vision, he found a kind of possibility of union, not clear-cut or definite, not adequate or fully satisfying, yet enough to persuade him that a 30 union could exist, and that neither need be wholly sacrificed to the other.

Gradually he came to see that most of the good and evil we seem to find in the world is a reflection of our own feeling. love and hate, desire and aversion, cut the world in two, fill it with strife, make it fragmentary, the battleground of a doubtful warfare. But there is another way of viewing the world, more receptive, more impartial, a way filled with welcoming acceptance. When this way of feeling is strong, it makes us think of the world as wholly good, no longer fragmentary, but one, because one emotion goes out to the whole. The heart of this feeling is reverence, a wondering sense of infinity in everything. The beauty created by the artist rouses this feeling, 40 and embodies his restless search for the ideal infinite beauty which he feels to be somewhere, everywhere, close at hand always, yet just hidden by a veil that at any moment may be torn asunder.

But the mystical acceptance of the world subsists side by side with horror

of cruelty and lust; and thus a conflict grows between the vision and the facts of our daily world. And so the mystic comes to feel that our daily world is unreal, or less real than the world of his worship behind the world of sense he imagines another world, more perfect and more real. But here the verdict of science is absolute if the vision is to have a real place, to be a source of wisdom, not of illusion, it must accept the every-day world, retaining the mystic's feeling without the mystic's beliefs as to the nature of the universe.

But the vision seemed to bring with it acquiescence, nevertheless we cannot acquiesce in pain and cruelty and lust. So long as the world of science and the world of vision are both regarded as having the same reality, this contradiction must remain. We can love those who inflict pain, who are cruel or lustful; we can feel that they are blind, and be filled with compassion for their ignorance of all that gives value to life; but though we may love them, we cannot passively acquiesce in their blindness, or cease to wish them different.

Two truths, not wholly separable one from another, are revealed by the vision, and survive the critical scrutiny of science. The first of these gives a contemplation of the actual world more vast, more free, more impersonal, than the view of daily life: by rising above the mists of desire, away from the belittling, distorting influence of hopes and fears, we can attain at moments, however imperfectly, to the divine all-embracing intuition of the universe, free from the *here and now*, free from the prison-house of Self, revealing the Whole, eternal and infinite in spite of the brevity and limitation of every part when seen in separate isolation. The great cold outer world, though it may not satisfy our mundane desires, is, to the eyes of vision, splendid, full of wonder, full of unhaunting inevitable sublimity. Towards other human beings, the eyes of vision are the eyes of love, not of the love which asks, but of the love which gives. Man, like the rest of nature, is part of the eternal Whole, to the eternal vision, all his deeds have their pre-determined place, all are from the beginning of time necessarily what they are and not otherwise, no more exposed to indignation than the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. But Man, unlike what we know of mere matter, is endowed with the power of thought and feeling, in every man's heart the infinite pain, the infinite longing, which make the unmost fibre of our life, call out to us for love and sympathy; and when the vision has effaced Self and quieted indignation, no obstacle hinders the free outpouring of love in response to this call.

The other truth which the vision reveals is the possibility of a life here on earth immeasurably greater than the life of the human society as it exists now. The world of vision exists only in fragments, it is a possible world, not quite the actual world, partly real, but partly hoped for. The goods of vision are infinite: they outweigh all other goods and evils. It is in man's power to realize them, in each individual's power partially, in the power of mankind.

as a whole fully. All that is greatly evil in the world is due to human beings, and would cease if they lived in the vision. Poverty, illness, the prospect of death, separation from those we love, none of these make the vision impossible, though some make it more difficult of attainment. It is not outward events that make the difference, except as they affect our way of feeling towards the world: the way of feeling is everything. Pain and pleasure are not of much account, except when they dim the vision. Success and failure are of almost no account.

There is a finite and an infinite way of feeling about everything; the infinite way is aware of heaven as a living possibility here on earth. The heaven of the mystic vision does not yet exist, except in dim struggling fragments entangled in earth; the artist, the lover, and the saint, see it in aspiration, and help the fragments to grow and emerge from their earthly integuments. The heaven of the vision would exist fully if all men possessed the vision fully: only the finiteness and limitation of men's thought and feeling prevents our birth into the free life.

The fullest vision requires the fullest knowledge, the fullest worship, the fullest love, all these are the outcome of reverence, reverence not only to what is deemed specially worthy of reverence, but to everything, to the mystery of existence, to the infinity embodied in every particle of the Whole. Loyalty to science is not hostile to the vision, but a necessary outcome of it. Indifference to knowledge is a kind of irreverence, an assumption that our ignorant imaginings surpass what really is. All search for truth is a kind of reverence, a kind of worship, and all fear of truth a blasphemy.

It is through reverence that the infinite enters into human lives. A very little leaven of the infinite will redeem a whole life. The good life is not contemplation only, or action only, but action based on contemplation, action attempting to incarnate the infinite in the world. A life devoted to knowledge or beauty or love is a life inspired by the vision, a life in the infinite. Our human existence, in spite of all its pain and degradation, is redeemed by any portion, short or long, great or small, of knowledge or beauty or love, and the greatest of these is love.

These thoughts shaped themselves slowly in Forstice's mind during the lonely days which he spent in his uncle's house, in the midst of accounts and legal business and the sorting of papers, while the autumn rain beat on the window panes, and the howling gales carried the leaves in swirling eddies through the air. But now his year of absence was ended, with a pang that seemed like a second death he bade farewell to the scene of the joys and sorrows that had become a part of his own life, and with resolute hope he returned to the study and teaching of physics in which the remainder of his days were spent.

The End.

Mysticism and Logic [1914]

"MYSTICISM AND LOGIC" appeared in *The Hibbert Journal*, 12 (July, 1914) 780–803. The editor, L P Jacks, found the article long, commenting "This is a length we admit only in the case of exceptionally valuable articles—as yours is" (28 April 1914). The manuscript which Jacks returned is lost.

The essay was conceived as a popular lecture to be given in America, but its composition was difficult. That "Mysticism and Logic" proved troublesome appears from remarks in letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell. On 9 January 1914 Russell announced

I am contemplating a lecture on "Mysticism and Logic" I have to have a popular lecture to give in America, and I feel as if I could do something good on that subject I know now what I really believe about it—I no longer oscillate with changing moods If I could do it right, it might be very good (#961)

By the end of the next day he had a draft but felt disappointed with it "it is not as good as it ought to be I shall have to alter it" (#962). A further letter numbered #919 (suggesting Nov 1913 but almost certain to have been written on the evening of 11 Jan 1914) notes laconically, "I have finished my lecture on "Mysticism and Logic". It is not very good—it is mostly made up of scraps from the other lectures—but it will have to do" (The "other lectures" were the Lowell Lectures he was also preparing, which became *Our Knowledge of the External World*. The speed of composition is accounted for by Russell's method of fabricating much of the essay from previously written sections of this book.) A few days later he states, "I am re-writing my paper on mysticism and logic, making it much more what I hoped. I was in too much of a hurry before. It doesn't aim at eloquence, but only at careful exact statements" (#968). Russell also explained in this letter his worries which had made Lady Ottoline think he was depressed, he admitted, "I was disappointed about 'Mysticism and Logic', but that too is all right now" On 15 January he again judged the paper to be near completion

I have all but finished my paper on mysticism and logic. It is very much improved, though still far short of what it ought to be. But I think it is interesting enough to do as a lecture. I will give it you when you come home (#969)

The day following he wrote to her commenting that he did not have the journalist's ability to write to order and that the lecture had worried him, but he concluded that indeed the essay had been finished at midnight "It is not so good as it ought to be, but it will do. It is sober, careful, and balanced, not eloquent" (#970)

The paper was read at least twice in England on 24 January at Queens' College, Cambridge and on 1 March 1914 to the Cambridge "Heretics" (Founded in 1909, the "Heretics" rejected appeals to authority in questions of religion) Russell took the paper with him to America where he was to deliver the Lowell Lectures at Boston (The topic of epistemology supplanted Russell's suggestion to A. Lawrence Lowell that he would speak on "The place of good and evil in the universe". Lowell, however, had informed him that the Trust did not allow the questioning of the authority of scripture "The place of good and evil" had been Russell's alternative when his plans for "Insight" did not develop. See headnote to "Prisons", 7) In America "Mysticism and Logic" was given at least three times to a gathering in Greenwich, Connecticut, at Wellesley College in Massachusetts and in Madison, Wisconsin

Despite the difficulty of composition, "Mysticism and Logic" makes an essential statement, as Jacks had recognized. That Russell persisted in trying to perfect the argument but ended dissatisfied, and that the paper nevertheless gave the title to one of his most important collections of essays, show the theme of intuition and reason to be as central as any Russell addressed. As Alan Wood points out, "because Russell was the greatest rationalist of all, he had to admit that reason cannot prove the mystics wrong" (1957, 62) In certain moods, for instance those induced by contemplating nature and reading Spinoza, Russell was himself a mystic, the dichotomy in his nature is powerfully portrayed by the essay The genesis of "Mysticism and Logic" should be seen not only through remarks to Lady Ottoline on its actual composition, but as integral to the entire debate with her on revealed religion and indeed to his long struggle with himself His views in "Mysticism and Logic" are the distillation of many attempts to accommodate his scepticism to her belief As he wrote to her on 29 November 1911

your belief only survives because you do not believe in reason That is the serious division, not God, who is a mere symptom When I say you don't believe in reason, I mean that passionate feeling seems to you a ground for belief, which exempts one from further minute examination When I am with you I am not conscious of antagonism, I am only conscious of intense endeavour to find ways of meeting on fundamental things without being false to my creed. My view is that passionate feeling is often a sufficient ground for judging things good or bad, but not for judging that they exist

Russell and Lady Ottoline each sought release from the prison of this world, but they could not agree on means of liberation. "Mysticism and Logic" is thus related to "Prisons", Russell's unsuccessful attempt at a work on the philosophy of religion

which he wrote with Lady Ottoline's beliefs in mind. The dichotomy between intuition and reason which he had failed to bridge in "Prisons" is openly avowed in the essay, a modern impasse brilliantly typified. The essay is directly related to "The Essence of Religion" (8), and it stems from the religious concern of "The Pilgrimage of Life" (2). "Mysticism and Logic" culminates an endeavour to decide the truths of intuition beginning with "Greek Exercises" (1888–89).

The copy-text is *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (1918). Collations of the relevant passages of "Mysticism and Logic" and *Our Knowledge of the External World* are provided in the textual notes.

METAPHYSICS, OR THE attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, others through the other alone: in Hume, for example, the scientific impulse reigns quite unchecked, while in Blake a strong hostility to science coexists with profound mystic insight. But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonize the two was what made their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.

Before attempting an explicit characterization of the scientific and the mystical impulses, I will illustrate them by examples from two philosophers whose greatness lies in the very intimate blending which they achieved. The two philosophers I mean are Heraclitus and Plato.

Heraclitus, as every one knows, was a believer in universal flux: time builds and destroys all things. From the few fragments that remain, it is not easy to discover how he arrived at his opinions, but there are some sayings that strongly suggest scientific observation as the source.

"The things that can be seen, heard, and learned", he says, "are what I prize the most." This is the language of the empiricist, to whom observation is the sole guarantee of truth. "The sun is new every day", is another fragment; and this opinion, in spite of its paradoxical character, is obviously inspired by scientific reflection, and no doubt seemed to him to obviate the difficulty of understanding how the sun can work its way underground from west to east during the night. Actual observation must also have suggested to him his central doctrine, that Fire is the one permanent substance, of which all visible things are passing phases. In combustion we see things change utterly, while their flame and heat rise up into the air and vanish.

"This world, which is the same for all," he says, "no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out."

"The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea, and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind."

This theory, though no longer one which science can accept, is nevertheless scientific in spirit. Science, too, might have inspired the famous saying to which Plato alludes. "You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you." But we find also another statement among the extant fragments: "We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not."

The comparison of this statement, which is mystical, with the one quoted by Plato, which is scientific, shows how intimately the two tendencies are

blended in the system of Heraclitus. Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe; and this kind of feeling leads Heraclitus, on the basis of his science, to strangely poignant sayings concerning life and the world, such as

"Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child's."

It is poetic imagination, not science, which presents Time as despotic lord of the world, with all the irresponsible frivolity of a child. It is mysticism, too, which leads Heraclitus to assert the identity of opposites. "Good and ill are one", he says; and again: "To God all things are fair and good and right, ¹⁰ but men hold some things wrong and some right."

Much of mysticism underlies the ethics of Heraclitus. It is true that a scientific determinism alone might have inspired the statement: "Man's character is his fate"; but only a mystic would have said:

"Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows"; and again.

"It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul"; and again

"Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things"¹

Examples might be multiplied, but those that have been given are enough ²⁰ to show the character of the man. the facts of science, as they appeared to him, fed the flame in his soul, and in its light he saw into the depths of the world by the reflection of his own dancing swiftly penetrating fire. In such a nature we see the true union of the mystic and the man of science—the highest eminence, as I think, that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought.

In Plato, the same twofold impulse exists, though the mystic impulse is distinctly the stronger of the two, and secures ultimate victory whenever the conflict is sharp. His description of the cave is the classical statement of belief in a knowledge and reality truer and more real than that of the senses: ³⁰

Imagine a number of men living in an underground cavernous chamber, with an entrance open to the light, extending along the entire length of the cavern, in which they have been confined, from their childhood, with their legs and necks so shackled that they are obliged to sit still and look straight forwards, because their chains render it impossible for them to turn their heads round: and imagine a bright fire burning some way off, above and behind them, and an elevated roadway passing between the fire and the prisoners, with a low wall built along it, like the screens which conjurors put up in

¹ All the above quotations are from Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* (2nd ed., 1908), pp. 40 146–156

front of their audience, and above which they exhibit their wonders

I have it, he replied.

Also figure to yourself a number of persons walking behind this wall, and carrying with them statues of men, and images of other animals, wrought in wood and stone and all kinds of materials, together with various other articles, which overtop the wall, and, as you might expect, let some of the passers-by be talking, and others silent.

You are describing a strange scene, and strange prisoners.

10 They resemble us, I replied.

Now consider what would happen if the course of nature brought them a release from their fetters, and a remedy for their foolishness, in the following manner Let us suppose that one of them has been released, and compelled suddenly to stand up, and turn his neck round and walk with open eyes towards the light, and let us suppose that he goes through all these actions with pain, and that the dazzling splendour renders him incapable of discerning those objects of which he used formerly to see the shadows What answer should you expect him to make, if some one were to tell him that in those days he was watching foolish phantoms, but that now he is somewhat nearer to reality, and is turned towards things more real, and sees more correctly; above all, if he were to point out to him the several objects that are passing by, and question him, and compel him to answer what they are? Should you not expect him to be puzzled, and to regard his old visions as truer than the objects now forced upon his notice?

20 Yes, much truer ..

Hence, I suppose, habit will be necessary to enable him to perceive objects in that upper world At first he will be most successful in distinguishing shadows; then he will discern the reflections of men and other things in water, and afterwards the realities; and after this he will raise his eyes to encounter the light of the moon and stars, finding it less difficult to study the heavenly bodies and the heaven itself by night, than the sun and the sun's light by day.

30 Doubtless.

Last of all, I imagine, he will be able to observe and contemplate the nature of the sun, not as it *appears* in water or on alien ground, but as it *is* in itself in its own territory.

40 Of course.

His next step will be to draw the conclusion, that the sun is the author of the seasons and the years, and the guardian of all things in the visible world, and in a manner the cause of all those things which he and his companions used to see.

Obviously, this will be his next step .

Now this imaginary case, my dear Glaucon, you must apply in all its parts to our former statements, by comparing the region which the eye reveals, to the prison house, and the light of the fire therein to the power of the sun: and if, by the upward ascent and the contemplation of the upper world, you understand the mounting of the soul into the intellectual region, you will hit the tendency of my own surmises, since you desire to be told what they are, though, indeed, God only knows whether they are correct. But, be that as it may, the view which I take of the subject is to the following effect. In the world of knowledge, the essential Form of Good is the limit of our enquiries, and can barely be perceived, but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful,—in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason;—and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes ²

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But in this passage, as throughout most of Plato's teaching, there is an identification of the good with the truly real, which became embodied in the philosophical tradition, and is still largely operative in our own day. In thus allowing a legislative function to the good, Plato produced a divorce between philosophy and science, from which, in my opinion, both have suffered ever since and are still suffering. The man of science, whatever his hopes may be, must lay them aside while he studies nature, and the philosopher, if he is to achieve truth, must do the same. Ethical considerations can only legitimately appear when the truth has been ascertained: they can and should appear as determining our feeling towards the truth, and our manner of ordering our lives in view of the truth, but not as themselves dictating what the truth is to be.

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There are passages in Plato—among those which illustrate the scientific side of his mind—where he seems clearly aware of this. The most noteworthy is the one in which Socrates, as a young man, is explaining the theory of ideas to Parmenides

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After Socrates has explained that there is an idea of the good, but not of such things as hair and mud and dirt, Parmenides advises him “not to despise even the meanest things”, and this advice shows the genuine scientific temper. It is with this impartial temper that the mystic's apparent insight into a higher reality and a hidden good has to be combined if philosophy is to realize its greatest possibilities. And it is failure in this

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² *Republic*, 514–17, translated by Davies and Vaughan

respect that has made so much of idealistic philosophy thin, lifeless, and insubstantial. It is only in marriage with the world that our ideals can bear fruit: divorced from it, they remain barren. But marriage with the world is not to be achieved by an ideal which shrinks from fact, or demands in advance that the world shall conform to its desires.

Parmenides himself is the source of a peculiarly interesting strain of mysticism which pervades Plato's thought—the mysticism which may be called "logical" because it is embodied in theories on logic. This form of mysticism, which appears, so far as the West is concerned, to have originated with Parmenides, dominates the reasonings of all the great mystical metaphysicians from his day to that of Hegel and his modern disciples. Reality, he says, is uncreated, indestructible, unchanging, indivisible, it is "immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end, since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away." The fundamental principle of his inquiry is stated in a sentence which would not be out of place in Hegel. "Thou canst not know what is not—that is impossible—nor utter it, for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be." And again "It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is, for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be." The impossibility of change follows from this principle; for what is past can be spoken of, and therefore, by the principle, still is.

Mystical philosophy, in all ages and in all parts of the world, is characterized by certain beliefs which are illustrated by the doctrines we have been considering.

There is, first, the belief in insight as against discursive analytic knowledge: the belief in a way of wisdom, sudden, penetrating, coercive, which is contrasted with the slow and fallible study of outward appearance by a science relying wholly upon the senses. All who are capable of absorption in an inward passion must have experienced at times the strange feeling of unreality in common objects, the loss of contact with daily things, in which the solidity of the outer world is lost, and the soul seems, in utter loneliness, to bring forth, out of its own depths, the mad dance of fantastic phantoms which have hitherto appeared as independently real and living. This is the negative side of the mystic's initiation: the doubt concerning common knowledge, preparing the way for the reception of what seems a higher wisdom. Many men to whom this negative experience is familiar do not pass beyond it, but for the mystic it is merely the gateway to an ampler world.

The mystic insight begins with the sense of a mystery unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenly become certain beyond the possibility of a doubt. The sense of certainty and revelation comes earlier than any definite belief. The definite beliefs at which mystics arrive are the result of reflection upon the inarticulate experience gained in the moment of insight. Often,

beliefs which have no real connection with this moment become subsequently attracted into the central nucleus; thus in addition to the convictions which all mystics share, we find, in many of them, other convictions of a more local and temporary character, which no doubt become amalgamated with what was essentially mystical in virtue of their subjective certainty. We may ignore such inessential accretions, and confine ourselves to the beliefs which all mystics share.

The first and most direct outcome of the moment of illumination is belief in the possibility of a way of knowledge which may be called revelation or insight or intuition, as contrasted with sense, reason, and analysis, which are regarded as blind guides leading to the morass of illusion. Closely connected with this belief is the conception of a Reality behind the world of appearance and utterly different from it. This Reality is regarded with an admiration often amounting to worship, it is felt to be always and everywhere close at hand, thinly veiled by the shows of sense, ready, for the receptive mind, to shine in its glory even through the apparent folly and wickedness of Man. The poet, the artist, and the lover are seekers after that glory: the haunting beauty that they pursue is the faint reflection of its sun. But the mystic lives in the full light of the vision: what others dimly seek he knows, with a knowledge beside which all other knowledge is ignorance. 20

The second characteristic of mysticism is its belief in unity, and its refusal to admit opposition or division anywhere. We found Heraclitus saying "good and ill are one"; and again he says, "the way up and the way down is one and the same." The same attitude appears in the simultaneous assertion of contradictory propositions, such as. "We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not." The assertion of Parmenides, that reality is one and indivisible, comes from the same impulse towards unity. In Plato, this impulse is less prominent, being held in check by his theory of ideas; but it reappears, so far as his logic permits, in the doctrine of the primacy of the Good. 30

A third mark of almost all mystical metaphysics is the denial of the reality of Time. This is an outcome of the denial of division; if all is one, the distinction of past and future must be illusory. We have seen this doctrine prominent in Parmenides; and among moderns it is fundamental in the systems of Spinoza and Hegel.

The last of the doctrines of mysticism which we have to consider is its belief that all evil is mere appearance, an illusion produced by the divisions and oppositions of the analytic intellect. Mysticism does not maintain that such things as cruelty, for example, are good, but it denies that they are real: they belong to that lower world of phantoms from which we are to be 40 liberated by the insight of the vision. Sometimes—for example in Hegel, and at least verbally in Spinoza—not only evil, but good also, is regarded as illusory, though nevertheless the emotional attitude towards what is held to

be Reality is such as would naturally be associated with the belief that Reality is good. What is, in all cases, ethically characteristic of mysticism is absence of indignation or protest, acceptance with joy, disbelief in the ultimate truth of the division into two hostile camps, the good and the bad. This attitude is a direct outcome of the nature of the mystical experience with its sense of unity is associated a feeling of infinite peace. Indeed it may be suspected that the feeling of peace produces, as feelings do in dreams, the whole system of associated beliefs which make up the body of mystic doctrine. But this is a difficult question, and one on which it cannot be

10 hoped that mankind will reach agreement.

Four questions thus arise in considering the truth or falsehood of mysticism, namely

- I. Are there two ways of knowing, which may be called respectively reason and intuition? And if so, is either to be preferred to the other?
- II Is all plurality and division illusory?
- III Is time unreal?
- IV. What kind of reality belongs to good and evil?

On all four of these questions, while fully developed mysticism seems to me mistaken, I yet believe that, by sufficient restraint, there is an element of 20 wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is the truth, mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world. The metaphysical creed, I shall maintain, is a mistaken outcome of the emotion, although this emotion, as colouring and informing all other thoughts and feelings, is the inspirer of whatever is best in Man. Even the cautious and patient investigation of truth by science, which seems the very antithesis of the mystic's swift certainty, may be fostered and nourished by that very spirit of reverence in which mysticism lives and moves.

I. REASON AND INTUITION³

30 Of the reality or unreality of the mystic's world I know nothing. I have no wish to deny it, nor even to declare that the insight which reveals it is not a genuine insight. What I do wish to maintain—and it is here that the scientific attitude becomes imperative—is that insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth, in spite of the fact that much

³ This section, and also one or two pages in later sections, have been printed in a course of Lowell lectures on *Our Knowledge of the External World*, published by the Open Court Publishing Company. But I have left them here, as this is the context for which they were originally written.

of the most important truth is first suggested by its means. It is common to speak of an opposition between instinct and reason; in the eighteenth century, the opposition was drawn in favour of reason, but under the influence of Rousseau and the romantic movement instinct was given the preference, first by those who rebelled against artificial forms of government and thought, and then, as the purely rationalistic defence of traditional theology became increasingly difficult, by all who felt in science a menace to creeds which they associated with a spiritual outlook on life and the world. Bergson, under the name of "intuition", has raised instinct to the position of sole arbiter of metaphysical truth. But in fact the opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new.

Where instinct and reason do sometimes conflict is in regard to single beliefs, held instinctively, and held with such determination that no degree of inconsistency with other beliefs leads to their abandonment. Instinct, like all human faculties, is liable to error. Those in whom reason is weak are often unwilling to admit this as regards themselves, though all admit it in regard to others. Where instinct is least liable to error is in practical matters as to which right judgment is a help to survival: friendship and hostility in others, for instance, are often felt with extraordinary discrimination through very careful disguises. But even in such matters a wrong impression may be given by reserve or flattery; and in matters less directly practical, such as philosophy deals with, very strong instinctive beliefs are sometimes wholly mistaken, as we may come to know through their perceived inconsistency with other equally strong beliefs. It is such considerations that necessitate the harmonizing mediation of reason, which tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the possible sources of error on the one side and on the other. In this there is no opposition to instinct as a whole, but only to blind reliance upon some one interesting aspect of instinct to the exclusion of other more commonplace but not less trustworthy aspects. It is such one-sidedness, not instinct itself, that reason aims at correcting.

These more or less trite maxims may be illustrated by application to Bergson's advocacy of "intuition" as against "intellect". There are, he says, "two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object: the second that we enter into it." The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at

the *relative*, the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*.⁴ The second of these, which is intuition, is, he says, "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible" (p. 6). In illustration, he mentions self-knowledge "there is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures" (p. 8). The rest of Bergson's philosophy consists in reporting, through the imperfect medium of words, the knowledge gained by intuition, and the consequent complete condemnation of all the pretended knowledge derived from science and common sense

This procedure, since it takes sides in a conflict of instinctive beliefs, stands in need of justification by proving the greater trustworthiness of the beliefs on one side than of those on the other. Bergson attempts this justification in two ways, first by explaining that intellect is a purely practical faculty to secure biological success, secondly by mentioning remarkable feats of instinct in animals and by pointing out characteristics of the world which, though intuition can apprehend them, are baffling to intellect as he interprets it.

- 20 Of Bergson's theory that intellect is a purely practical faculty, developed in the struggle for survival, and not a source of true beliefs, we may say, first, that it is only through intellect that we know of the struggle for survival and of the biological ancestry of man if the intellect is misleading, the whole of this merely inferred history is presumably untrue. If, on the other hand, we agree with him in thinking that evolution took place as Darwin believed, then it is not only intellect, but all our faculties, that have been developed under the stress of practical utility. Intuition is seen at its best where it is directly useful, for example in regard to other people's characters and dispositions. Bergson apparently holds that capacity for this kind of knowledge is less explicable by the struggle for existence than, for example, capacity for pure mathematics. Yet the savage deceived by false friendship is likely to pay for his mistake with his life; whereas even in the most civilized societies men are not put to death for mathematical incompetence. All the most striking of his instances of intuition in animals have a very direct survival value. The fact is, of course, that both intuition and intellect have been developed because they are useful, and that, speaking broadly, they are useful when they give truth and become harmful when they give falsehood. Intellect, in civilized man, like artistic capacity, has occasionally been developed beyond the point where it is useful to the individual, 30 intuition, on the other hand, seems on the whole to diminish as civilization increases. It is greater, as a rule, in children than in adults, in the unedu-

4 *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 1.

cated than in the educated. Probably in dogs it exceeds anything to be found in human beings. But those who see in these facts a recommendation of intuition ought to return to running wild in the woods, dyeing themselves with woad and living on hips and haws.

Let us next examine whether intuition possesses any such infallibility as Bergson claims for it. The best instance of it, according to him, is our acquaintance with ourselves, yet self-knowledge is proverbially rare and difficult. Most men, for example, have in their nature meannesses, vanities, and envies of which they are quite unconscious, though even their best friends can perceive them without any difficulty. It is true that intuition has 10 a convincingness which is lacking to intellect while it is present, it is almost impossible to doubt its truth. But if it should appear, on examination, to be at least as fallible as intellect, its greater subjective certainty becomes a demerit, making it only the more irresistibly deceptive. Apart from self-knowledge, one of the most notable examples of intuition is the knowledge people believe themselves to possess of those with whom they are in love. The wall between different personalities seems to become transparent, and people think they see into another soul as into their own. Yet deception in such cases is constantly practised with success, and even where there is no intentional deception, experience gradually proves, as a rule, that the 20 supposed insight was illusory, and that the slower more groping methods of the intellect are in the long run more reliable.

Bergson maintains that intellect can only deal with things in so far as they resemble what has been experienced in the past, while intuition has the power of apprehending the uniqueness and novelty that always belong to each fresh moment. That there is something unique and new at every moment, is certainly true, it is also true that this cannot be fully expressed by means of intellectual concepts. Only direct acquaintance can give knowledge of what is unique and new. But direct acquaintance of this kind is given fully in sensation, and does not require, so far as I can see, any special 30 faculty of intuition for its apprehension. It is neither intellect nor intuition, but sensation, that supplies new data; but when the data are new in any remarkable manner, intellect is much more capable of dealing with them than intuition would be. The hen with a brood of ducklings no doubt has intuition which seems to place her inside them, and not merely to know them analytically; but when the ducklings take to the water, the whole apparent intuition is seen to be illusory, and the hen is left helpless on the shore. Intuition, in fact, is an aspect and development of instinct, and, like all instinct, is admirable in those customary surroundings which have moulded the habits of the animal in question, but totally incompetent as 40 soon as the surroundings are changed in a way which demands some non-habitual mode of action.

The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of

philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most civilized men. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that the rapid, rough-and-ready methods of instinct or intuition will find in this field a favourable ground for their application. It is the older kinds of activity, which bring out our kinship with remote generations of animal and semi-human ancestors, that show intuition at its best. In such matters as self-preservation and love, intuition will act sometimes (though not always) with a swiftness and precision which are astonishing to the critical intellect. But philosophy is not one of the pursuits which illustrate our affinity with the past: it is a highly refined, highly civilized pursuit, demanding, for its success, a certain liberation from the life of instinct, and even, at times, a certain aloofness from all mundane hopes and fears. It is not in philosophy, therefore, that we can hope to see intuition at its best. On the contrary, since the true objects of philosophy, and the habits of thought demanded for their apprehension, are strange, unusual, and remote, it is here, more almost than anywhere else, that intellect proves superior to intuition, and that quick unanalyzed convictions are least deserving of uncritical acceptance.

In advocating the scientific restraint and balance, as against the self-assertion of a confident reliance upon intuition, we are only urging, in the sphere of knowledge, that largeness of contemplation, that impersonal disinterestedness, and that freedom from practical preoccupations which have been inculcated by all the great religions of the world. Thus our conclusion, however it may conflict with the explicit beliefs of many mystics, is, in essence, not contrary to the spirit which inspires those beliefs, but rather the outcome of this very spirit as applied in the realm of thought.

II. UNITY AND PLURALITY

One of the most convincing aspects of the mystic illumination is the apparent revelation of the oneness of all things, giving rise to pantheism in religion and to monism in philosophy. An elaborate logic, beginning with Parmenides, and culminating in Hegel and his followers, has been gradually developed, to prove that the universe is one indivisible Whole, and that what seem to be its parts, if considered as substantial and self-existing, are mere illusion. The conception of a Reality quite other than the world of appearance, a reality one, indivisible, and unchanging, was introduced into Western philosophy by Parmenides, not, nominally at least, for mystical or religious reasons, but on the basis of a logical argument as to the impossibility of not-being, and most subsequent metaphysical systems are the outcome of this fundamental idea.

The logic used in defence of mysticism seems to me faulty as logic, and open to technical criticisms, which I have explained elsewhere. I shall not

here repeat these criticisms, since they are lengthy and difficult, but shall instead attempt an analysis of the state of mind from which mystical logic has arisen.

Belief in a reality quite different from what appears to the senses arises with irresistible force in certain moods, which are the source of most mysticism, and of most metaphysics. While such a mood is dominant, the need of logic is not felt, and accordingly the more thoroughgoing mystics do not employ logic, but appeal directly to the immediate deliverance of their insight. But such fully developed mysticism is rare in the West. When the intensity of emotional conviction subsides, a man who is in the habit of reasoning will search for logical grounds in favour of the belief which he finds in himself. But since the belief already exists, he will be very hospitable to any ground that suggests itself. The paradoxes apparently proved by his logic are really the paradoxes of mysticism, and are the goal which he feels his logic must reach if it is to be in accordance with insight. The resulting logic has rendered most philosophers incapable of giving any account of the world of science and daily life. If they had been anxious to give such an account, they would probably have discovered the errors of their logic; but most of them were less anxious to understand the world of science and daily life than to convict it of unreality in the interests of a super-sensible "real" world.

It is in this way that logic has been pursued by those of the great philosophers who were mystics. But since they usually took for granted the supposed insight of the mystic emotion, their logical doctrines were presented with a certain dryness, and were believed by their disciples to be quite independent of the sudden illumination from which they sprang. Nevertheless their origin clung to them, and they remained—to borrow a useful word from Mr Santayana—"malicious" in regard to the world of science and common sense. It is only so that we can account for the complacency with which philosophers have accepted the inconsistency of their doctrines with all the common and scientific facts which seem best established and most worthy of belief.

The logic of mysticism shows, as is natural, the defects which are inherent in anything malicious. The impulse to logic, not felt while the mystic mood is dominant, reasserts itself as the mood fades, but with a desire to retain the vanishing insight, or at least to prove that it *was* insight, and that what seems to contradict it is illusion. The logic which thus arises is not quite disinterested or candid, and is inspired by a certain hatred of the daily world to which it is to be applied. Such an attitude naturally does not tend to the best results. Every one knows that to read an author simply in order to refute him is not the way to understand him; and to read the book of Nature with a conviction that it is all illusion is just as unlikely to lead to understanding. If our logic is to find the common world intelligible, it must not be

hostile, but must be inspired by a genuine acceptance such as is not usually to be found among metaphysicians.

III TIME

The unreality of time is a cardinal doctrine of many metaphysical systems, often nominally based, as already by Parmenides, upon logical arguments, but originally derived, at any rate in the founders of new systems, from the certainty which is born in the moment of mystic insight. As a Persian Sufi poet says

10 Past and future are what veil God from our sight
 Burn up both of them with fire! How long
 Wilt thou be partitioned by these segments as a reed?⁵

The belief that what is ultimately real must be immutable is a very common one. It gave rise to the metaphysical notion of substance, and finds, even now, a wholly illegitimate satisfaction in such scientific doctrines as the conservation of energy and mass.

It is difficult to disentangle the truth and the error in this view. The arguments for the contention that time is unreal and that the world of sense is illusory must, I think, be regarded as fallacious. Nevertheless there is some sense—easier to feel than to state—in which time is an unimportant 20 and superficial characteristic of reality. Past and future must be acknowledged to be as real as the present, and a certain emancipation from slavery to time is essential to philosophic thought. The importance of time is rather practical than theoretical, rather in relation to our desires than in relation to truth. A truer image of the world, I think, is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is. Both in thought and in feeling, even though time be real, to realize the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom.

That this is the case may be seen at once by asking ourselves why our 30 feelings towards the past are so different from our feelings towards the future. The reason for this difference is wholly practical: our wishes can affect the future but not the past—the future is to some extent subject to our power, while the past is unalterably fixed. But every future will some day be past; if we see the past truly now, it must, when it was still future, have been just what we now see it to be, and what is now future must be just what we shall see it to be when it has become past. The felt difference of quality between past and future, therefore, is not an intrinsic difference, but only a

⁵ Whinfield's translation of the *Masnavi* (Trübner, 1887), p. 34

difference in relation to us: to impartial contemplation, it ceases to exist. And impartiality of contemplation is, in the intellectual sphere, that very same virtue of disinterestedness which, in the sphere of action, appears as justice and unselfishness. Whoever wishes to see the world truly, to rise in thought above the tyranny of practical desires, must learn to overcome the difference of attitude towards past and future, and to survey the whole stream of time in one comprehensive vision

The kind of way in which, as it seems to me, time ought not to enter into our theoretic philosophical thought, may be illustrated by the philosophy which has become associated with the idea of evolution, and which is 10 exemplified by Nietzsche, pragmatism, and Bergson. This philosophy, on the basis of the development which has led from the lowest forms of life up to man, sees in progress the fundamental law of the universe, and thus admits the difference between *earlier* and *later* into the very citadel of its contemplative outlook. With its past and future history of the world, conjectural as it is, I do not wish to quarrel. But I think that, in the intoxication of a quick success, much that is required for a true understanding of the universe has been forgotten. Something of Hellenism, something, too, of Oriental resignation, must be combined with its hurrying Western self-assertion before it can emerge from the ardour of youth into the mature wisdom of manhood. 20 In spite of its appeals to science, the true scientific philosophy, I think, is something more arduous and more aloof, appealing to less mundane hopes, and requiring a severer discipline for its successful practice

Darwin's *Origin of Species* persuaded the world that the difference between different species of animals and plants is not the fixed immutable difference that it appears to be. The doctrine of natural kinds, which had rendered classification easy and definite, which was enshrined in the Aristotelian tradition, and protected by its supposed necessity for orthodox dogma, was suddenly swept away for ever out of the biological world. The difference between man and the lower animals, which to our human conceit 30 appears enormous, was shown to be a gradual achievement, involving intermediate beings who could not with certainty be placed either within or without the human family. The sun and the planets had already been shown by Laplace to be very probably derived from a primitive more or less undifferentiated nebula. Thus the old fixed landmarks became wavering and indistinct, and all sharp outlines were blurred. Things and species lost their boundaries, and none could say where they began or where they ended.

But if human conceit was staggered for a moment by its kinship with the ape, it soon found a way to reassert itself, and that way is the "philosophy" 40 of evolution. A process which led from the amoeba to Man appeared to the philosophers to be obviously a progress—though whether the amoeba would agree with this opinion is not known. Hence the cycle of changes

which science had shown to be the probable history of the past was welcomed as revealing a law of development towards good in the universe—an evolution or unfolding of an ideal slowly embodying itself in the actual. But such a view, though it might satisfy Spencer and those whom we may call Hegelian evolutionists, could not be accepted as adequate by the more whole-hearted votaries of change. An ideal to which the world continuously approaches is, to these minds, too dead and static to be inspiring. Not only the aspiration, but the ideal too, must change and develop with the course of evolution: there must be no fixed goal, but a continual fashioning of fresh needs by the impulse which is life and which alone gives unity to the process.

Life, in this philosophy, is a continuous stream, in which all divisions are artificial and unreal. Separate things, beginnings and endings, are mere convenient fictions. There is only smooth unbroken transition. The beliefs of today may count as true today, if they carry us along the stream; but tomorrow they will be false, and must be replaced by new beliefs to meet the new situation. All our thinking consists of convenient fictions, imaginary congealings of the stream reality flows on in spite of all our fictions, and though it can be lived, it cannot be conceived in thought. Somehow, without explicit statement, the assurance is slipped in that the future, though we cannot foresee it, will be better than the past or the present: the reader is like the child which expects a sweet because it has been told to open its mouth and shut its eyes. Logic, mathematics, physics disappear in this philosophy, because they are too "static", what is real is an impulse and movement towards a goal which, like the rainbow, recedes as we advance, and makes every place different when we reach it from what it appeared to be at a distance.

I do not propose to enter upon a technical examination of this philosophy. I wish only to maintain that the motives and interests which inspire it are so exclusively practical, and the problems with which it deals are so special, that it can hardly be regarded as touching any of the questions that, to my mind, constitute genuine philosophy.

The predominant interest of evolutionism is in the question of human destiny, or at least of the destiny of Life. It is more interested in morality and happiness than in knowledge for its own sake. It must be admitted that the same may be said of many other philosophies, and that a desire for the kind of knowledge which philosophy can give is very rare. But if philosophy is to attain truth, it is necessary first and foremost that philosophers should acquire the disinterested intellectual curiosity which characterizes the genuine man of science. Knowledge concerning the future—which is the kind of knowledge that must be sought if we are to know about human destiny—is possible within certain narrow limits. It is impossible to say how much the limits may be enlarged with the progress of science. But what is

evident is that any proposition about the future belongs by its subject-matter to some particular science, and is to be ascertained, if at all, by the methods of that science. Philosophy is not a short cut to the same kind of results as those of the other sciences: if it is to be a genuine study, it must have a province of its own, and aim at results which the other sciences can neither prove nor disprove

Evolutionism, in basing itself upon the notion of *progress*, which is change from the worse to the better, allows the notion of time, as it seems to me, to become its tyrant rather than its servant, and thereby loses that impartiality of contemplation which is the source of all that is best in philosophic thought and feeling. Metaphysicians, as we saw, have frequently denied altogether the reality of time. I do not wish to do this, I wish only to preserve the mental outlook which inspired the denial, the attitude which, in thought, regards the past as having the same reality as the present and the same importance as the future. "In so far", says Spinoza,⁶ "as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictate of reason, it will be equally affected whether the idea is that of a future, past, or present thing." It is this "conceiving according to the dictate of reason" that I find lacking in the philosophy which is based on evolution

IV GOOD AND EVIL

20

Mysticism maintains that all evil is illusory, and sometimes maintains the same view as regards good, but more often holds that all Reality is good. Both views are to be found in Heraclitus. "Good and ill are one", he says, but again, "To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right." A similar twofold position is to be found in Spinoza, but he uses the word "perfection" when he means to speak of the good that is not merely human. "By reality and perfection I mean the same thing", he says;⁷ but elsewhere we find the definition: "By *good* I shall mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us."⁸ Thus perfection belongs to Reality in its own nature, but goodness is relative to ourselves and our needs, and disappears in an impartial survey. Some such distinction, I think, is necessary in order to understand the ethical outlook of mysticism: there is a lower mundane kind of good and evil, which divides the world of appearance into what seem to be conflicting parts; but there is also a higher, mystical kind of good, which belongs to Reality and is not opposed by any correlative kind of evil.

It is difficult to give a logically tenable account of this position without

⁶ *Ethics*, Bk iv, Prop LXII

⁷ *Ibid*, Pt II, Df. vi

⁸ *Ibid*, Pt IV, Df. i

recognizing that good and evil are subjective, that what is good is merely that towards which we have one kind of feeling, and what is evil is merely that towards which we have another kind of feeling. In our active life, where we have to exercise choice, and to prefer this to that of two possible acts, it is necessary to have a distinction of good and evil, or at least of better and worse. But this distinction, like everything pertaining to action, belongs to what mysticism regards as the world of illusion, if only because it is essentially concerned with time. In our contemplative life, where action is not called for, it is possible to be impartial, and to overcome the ethical

10 dualism which action requires. So long as we remain *merely* impartial, we may be content to say that both the good and the evil of action are illusions. But if, as we must do if we have the mystic vision, we find the whole world worthy of love and worship, if we see

The earth, and every common sight .
Apparell'd in celestial light,

we shall say that there is a higher good than that of action, and that this higher good belongs to the whole world as it is in reality. In this way the twofold attitude and the apparent vacillation of mysticism are explained and justified

20 The possibility of this universal love and joy in all that exists is of supreme importance for the conduct and happiness of life, and gives inestimable value to the mystic emotion, apart from any creeds which may be built upon it. But if we are not to be led into false beliefs, it is necessary to realize exactly *what* the mystic emotion reveals. It reveals a possibility of human nature—a possibility of a nobler, happier, freer life than any that can be otherwise achieved. But it does not reveal anything about the non-human, or about the nature of the universe in general. Good and bad, and even the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are the reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in

30 themselves. And therefore an impartial contemplation, freed from all pre-occupation with Self, will not judge things good or bad, although it is very easily combined with that feeling of universal love which leads the mystic to say that the whole world is good.

The philosophy of evolution, through the notion of progress, is bound up with the ethical dualism of the worse and the better, and is thus shut out, not only from the kind of survey which discards good and evil altogether from its view, but also from the mystical belief in the goodness of everything. In this way the distinction of good and evil, like time, becomes a tyrant in this philosophy, and introduces into thought the restless selectiveness of action.

40 Good and evil, like time, are, it would seem, not general or fundamental in the world of thought, but late and highly specialized members of the

intellectual hierarchy.

Although, as we saw, mysticism can be interpreted so as to agree with the view that good and evil are not intellectually fundamental, it must be admitted that here we are no longer in verbal agreement with most of the great philosophers and religious teachers of the past. I believe, however, that the elimination of ethical considerations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary and—though this may seem a paradox—an ethical advance. Both these contentions must be briefly defended.

The hope of satisfaction to our more human desires—the hope of demonstrating that the world has this or that desirable ethical characteristic—is not one which, so far as I can see, a scientific philosophy can do anything whatever to satisfy. The difference between a good world and a bad one is a difference in the particular characteristics of the particular things that exist in these worlds: it is not a sufficiently abstract difference to come within the province of philosophy. Love and hate, for example, are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are closely analogous attitudes towards objects. The general form and structure of those attitudes towards objects which constitute mental phenomena is a problem for philosophy, but the difference between love and hate is not a difference of form or structure, and therefore belongs rather to the special science of psychology than to philosophy. Thus the ethical interests which have often inspired philosophers must remain in the background: some kind of ethical interest may inspire the whole study, but none must obtrude in the detail or be expected in the special results which are sought.

If this view seems at first sight disappointing, we may remind ourselves that a similar change has been found necessary in all the other sciences. The physicist or chemist is not now required to prove the ethical importance of his ions or atoms; the biologist is not expected to prove the utility of the plants or animals which he dissects. In pre-scientific ages this was not the case. Astronomy, for example, was studied because men believed in astrology. It was thought that the movements of the planets had the most direct and important bearing upon the lives of human beings. Presumably, when this belief decayed and the disinterested study of astronomy began, many who had found astrology absorbingly interesting decided that astronomy had too little human interest to be worthy of study. Physics, as it appears in Plato's *Timaeus* for example, is full of ethical notions: it is an essential part of its purpose to show that the earth is worthy of admiration. The modern physicist, on the contrary, though he has no wish to deny that the earth is admirable, is not concerned, as physicist, with its ethical attributes: he is merely concerned to find out facts, not to consider whether they are good or bad. In psychology, the scientific attitude is even more recent and more difficult than in the physical sciences: it is natural to consider that human nature is either good or bad, and to suppose that the difference between

good and bad, so all-important in practice, must be important in theory also. It is only during the last century that an ethically neutral psychology has grown up; and here too, ethical neutrality has been essential to scientific success.

In philosophy, hitherto, ethical neutrality has been seldom sought and hardly ever achieved. Men have remembered their wishes, and have judged philosophies in relation to their wishes. Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy. But even
10 from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven forth. It is a commonplace that happiness is not best achieved by those who seek it directly; and it would seem that the same is true of the good. In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires.

We are thus brought back to our seeming paradox, that a philosophy which does not seek to impose upon the world its own conceptions of good and evil is not only more likely to achieve truth, but is also the outcome of a higher ethical standpoint than one which, like evolutionism and most
20 traditional systems, is perpetually appraising the universe and seeking to find in it an embodiment of present ideals. In religion, and in every deeply serious view of the world and of human destiny, there is an element of submission, a realization of the limits of human power, which is somewhat lacking in the modern world, with its quick material successes and its insolent belief in the boundless possibilities of progress. "He that loveth his life shall lose it", and there is danger lest, through a too confident love of life, life itself should lose much of what gives it its highest worth. The submission which religion inculcates in action is essentially the same in spirit as that which science teaches in thought; and the ethical neutrality by which its
30 victories have been achieved is the outcome of that submission.

The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our power to create—the good in our own lives and in our attitude towards the world. Insistence on belief in an external realization of the good is a form of self-assertion, which, while it cannot secure the external good which it desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power, and destroy that reverence towards fact which constitutes both what is valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper.

Human beings cannot, of course, wholly transcend human nature, something subjective, if only the interest that determines the direction of
40 our attention, must remain in all our thought. But scientific philosophy comes nearer to objectivity than any other human pursuit, and gives us, therefore, the closest contact and the most intimate relation with the outer world that it is possible to achieve. To the primitive mind, everything is

either friendly or hostile, but experience has shown that friendliness and hostility are not the conceptions by which the world is to be understood. Scientific philosophy thus represents, though as yet only in a nascent condition, a higher form of thought than any pre-scientific belief or imagination, and, like every approach to self-transcendence, it brings with it a rich reward in increase of scope and breadth and comprehension. Evolutionism, in spite of its appeals to particular scientific facts, fails to be a truly scientific philosophy because of its slavery to time, its ethical preoccupations, and its predominant interest in our mundane concerns and destiny. A truly scientific philosophy will be more humble, more piecemeal, more arduous, offering less glitter of outward mirage to flatter fallacious hopes, but more indifferent to fate, and more capable of accepting the world without the tyrannous imposition of our human and temporary demands.

Part IV

Defence of Free Trade

General Headnote

THE SEVEN PAPERS collected here reveal Russell as a clear and orthodox expositor of the free-trade doctrines advanced by contemporary British neo-classical economists of whom Alfred Marshall was the most distinguished. Like them he argued the case for free trade on economic and moral grounds. These two themes pervaded not only his written papers but also his speeches at the time, for from January through March 1904 Russell gave at least thirteen and almost certainly several more public talks in defence of free trade (see Appendix I). Unfortunately, only fragmentary reports of some speeches have been recovered. His writings on the fiscal question consist of three articles and four letters to editors.

The occasion for Russell's activity on behalf of free trade was Joseph Chamberlain's sudden announcement, on 15 May 1903, of his aim to convince the British to adopt a policy of tariff reform. He hoped to convert a majority of the electorate both to imperial preference and to domestic protection. Preference, by giving tariff privileges to the colonies, would be, Chamberlain claimed, the first step to imperial federation, while protection would assist British industries and provide revenue for social reform. Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary in Arthur Balfour's Unionist Government, was appealing beyond the authority of his Cabinet colleagues to the country at large. Although from the mid-1890s Chamberlain had been foremost in warning his countrymen that Britain's economic position was being seriously eroded, his new campaign was revolutionary in its political implications. He was attempting to overturn Sir Robert Peel's famous Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 which led Britain to adopt free trade. Both Whigs and most Tories had accepted free trade by the early 1850s and by 1903 it had acquired virtual sanctity. By September Chamberlain had resigned as Colonial Secretary in Arthur Balfour's Unionist Administration to undertake an extended speaking campaign in carefully chosen British cities from early October 1903 to mid-February 1904. Since free trade was associated with so many deeply entrenched Victorian values, Chamberlain's campaign created the greatest domestic political crisis between the Irish Home Rule controversy of 1886 and the introduction of the Lloyd George Budget of 1909.

From the outset of Chamberlain's advocacy of tariff reform, Russell was implacably opposed. His family's Liberal heritage was founded on the beliefs that free trade promoted class harmony, prosperity at home and peace abroad. By contrast, tariffs implied class conflict, corrupt lobbies in Parliament, international tension and possibly trade wars. Tariff reform thus represented for Russell the values of

reactionary groups, as he wrote to Helen Flexner in 1911, "the Boxers are almost indistinguishable from our Protectionists" (8 Jan.) The contradictions between, for example, Balfour's policy of retaliation and Chamberlain's advocacy of imperial preference appealed to Russell's passion for revealing inconsistencies as a means of logically demolishing the arguments of his opponents

Russell's commitment to free trade had been strengthened by his conversion experience of February 1901. Before that time, influenced by the Webbs and the economic historian W A. S. Hewins, Russell had gone through a brief phase of identifying with the Liberal Imperialist faction in the Party (1967, 153). There was no precedent in his personal or family background for such imperialist sympathies. Overwhelmed by patriotism, he had ardently supported Britain in the South African War which had broken out in October 1899 (1967, 136; Couturat Papers, especially Russell to Couturat, 18 Dec 1899, 16 Jan 1900 and 21 June 1900). Russell stated (1967, 146) that his conversion convinced him that imperialism inexorably led to war and hence suffering, whereas free trade fostered peace and compassion. In his judgment, the individual's personal morality would be nurtured by free-trade policies, since they were based on the ideals of toleration among nations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the advent of tariff reform caused Russell to disavow formally his earlier imperialism by resigning from the Coefficients, an imperialist discussion group founded by the Webbs.

Russell's growing participation in the fiscal question lifted him, however temporarily, out of the depressed mood which he had suffered throughout much of 1902 and early 1903. Involvement in a major campaign which had moral implications suited his nature. To Elie Halévy, the French historian and political philosopher, Russell claimed that the fiscal question had placed England "morally on its trial" (3 Nov 1903). As he told Gilbert Murray on 2 September, he had been encouraged by the controversy to study the life of the most distinguished Victorian free trader, Richard Cobden, and to read generally in the literature of the subject (What specific works he read—beyond those mentioned in the articles—have not been ascertained. Clearly, he drew on the economic theory he had studied during the mid-1890s.) His enthusiasm had already emerged in a letter to Lucy Donnelly on 29 July 1903:

in a few days I shall .. plunge into the Free Trade question (as a student only). We are all wildly excited about Free Trade, it is to me the last piece of sane internationalism left, and if it went I should feel inclined to cut my throat. But there seems no chance whatever of Chamberlain's succeeding—all the brains are against him, in every class of society.

This sanguine view taken by Liberals, such as Russell, was severely shaken as the tariff reformers in November captured the Liberal Unionist Party. On 10 December Russell wrote pessimistically to Halévy that if Chamberlain did not "break down" he would "win in the end". The three by-elections in the last fortnight in December, won by supporters of Chamberlain, could have only further alarmed free traders.

Discouraged by Chamberlain's apparent success and angered, no doubt, by the Webbs' continued interest in imperialism, Russell resigned from the Fabian Society as was announced in December (*Fabian News*) However, his confidence increased as he worked on the subject and as a series of by-elections early in January suddenly revealed the weakness of Chamberlain's electoral position. By 19 January 1904 he wrote to Murray that provided voters were given "elementary instruction" on free trade, protection would be defeated

Some indication of the importance with which Russell viewed his crusade can be gathered from Logan Pearsall Smith's observations to his sister, Mary Berenson, written on 17 January 1904 (misdated in Smith 1950, 80) He described Russell as

tremendously keen fighting Protection I went to Bertie's lecture on Friday (15 Jan 1904). It was very clear and intellectual and even witty, and was successful in every way He is writing a good deal, and becoming quite a public man It seems like using a razor to chop wood .

While it is impossible to assess the impact of Russell's writings and speeches on the collapse of Chamberlainism early in 1904, evidence indicates that his contributions had some effect Though sometimes published anonymously, Russell's ideas reached a significant number of readers, particularly those who followed such prestigious periodicals as *The Edinburgh Review* and *The Contemporary Review* The latter, in particular, edited by the Nonconformist Percy Bunting, had a large audience Thus Gilbert Murray, when congratulating Russell on his letter to *The Westminster Gazette*, observed that he "was interested yesterday to hear John Buchan say (not knowing, I think, that we were friends) that your letters were the best free trade statements that there were" (17 Feb 1904) This praise is revealing since Buchan, although a free trader, was a staunch Unionist Russell himself considered his article in *The Edinburgh Review* to be his fullest statement, and Halévy's agreement with Russell's arguments after reading that article gives some evidence of its intellectual force (Russell to Halévy, 29 Feb 1904, and Halévy to Russell, 23 March 1904)

Free trade continued to be of significance to Russell after 1904, and was a central part of his programme in the 1907 by-election he fought in Wimbledon At the time of his exhilaration over the passing of the Parliament Act in August 1911, Russell wrote to Lady Ottolme Morrell

Politics affect my happiness profoundly—I remember when Tariff Reform began, going about London and looking at the working men and seeing them in my thoughts ground under Trusts and landlords, robbed of half the poor livelihood they had, from being deluded by interested sophists It seemed to me so terrible that I *had* to do something for Free Trade, little as it was. And now the world is so different. (#169a [11 Aug 1911])

Literature of the Fiscal Controversy [1904]

RUSSELL'S FIRST PAPER on free trade is a review article analyzing the arguments of two leading protagonists on opposing sides of the debate. He devoted most of the review to *The Tariff Problem* (1903), a book by William (later Sir William) James Ashley (1860–1927). Ashley was a prominent scholar of the emerging English school of economic history, Professor of Commerce at the University of Birmingham and widely acknowledged then and now as the most prestigious academic defender of Chamberlain's tariff reform ideas. In fact, the book was written at Chamberlain's request after Ashley had congratulated him on his famous speech of 15 May (Amery 1969, 289–91). Russell pointed out that Ashley wisely grasped the historical fact, so often overlooked by free traders, that many economic conditions change over time. The respect for some of Ashley's arguments evident in this paper is absent from Russell's longer review article (12) published anonymously two weeks later in *The Edinburgh Review*.

Unlike the vast majority of tariff reformers, Ashley favoured social reform for the working classes more than imperial development, believed in the necessity and efficacy of trade unions, and condemned those employers who wanted to abolish collective bargaining. Ashley did advocate imperial union, especially with Canada, but subordinated this concern to social reform. About Ashley's reform and trade union views, Russell was silent, in spite of the fact that he shared them. These very views, anathema to many tariff reformers who desired tariffs simply to protect their enterprises from foreign competition, reduced Ashley's influence among Chamberlain's supporters. Moreover, Russell distorted at least one of Ashley's concerns, namely about the preservation and enhancement of trade unions. According to Russell, Ashley in his last chapter "mentions, incidentally, that Krupp and Mr Carnegie succeeded in destroying Unions, while English employers have failed to do the like" (189 10–12). In fact, Ashley, writing of Krupp and Carnegie in his penultimate chapter, observed disapprovingly that British employers "knew that the Carnegie management had succeeded in crushing unionism in its works, they knew that the Krupp system was one of extreme paternal government" (190–1). The reference to Andrew Carnegie (1835–1919) related to the breaking of trade unions in Carnegie's American steel works during the 1892 Homestead strike. Ashley did not say that the Krupps destroyed trade unions, and no evidence has come to light that they directly did so or even attempted such action, at least up to the time that Russell wrote this review. In his desire to advance the case for free trade, Russell may have

equated paternalism with destruction of unions Privately to his Cambridge friend, Maurice Amos, Russell wrote that Ashley's book, while "perhaps the ablest statement of the case", was "very dishonest" (6 Dec 1903)

Russell was understandably concerned to point out discrepancies between Ashley and Chamberlain Hence the review emphasized that Ashley's book advocated tariffs as high as fifty and seventy-five per cent This extreme suggestion was formulated, as Russell notes, before Chamberlain (at Glasgow on 6 October 1903) detailed for the first time his own fiscal programme urging the imposition of a ten per cent general tariff on all foreign manufactured goods

By contrast with his treatment of Ashley, Russell contented himself with only a concise, laudatory review of Pigou, whose free-trade ideas he shared Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959), a Cambridge economist, was the leading disciple of Marshall, and succeeded him as Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge in 1908, a position he held until 1943

The manuscript not being extant, the copy-text is the published article in *The Independent Review*, 1 (Jan 1904) 684–8 Among the members of the editorial council of this New Liberal monthly were Edward Jenks (ed.), and Russell's friends G Lowes Dickinson, G M Trevelyan and N Wedd The January 1904 issue is date-stamped 31 December 1903 by the British Library Russell's copy is unmarked

The Tariff Problem By W. J. Ashley London P. S. King & Son, 1903 Pp viii, 210

The Riddle of the Tariff. By A. C. Pigou London. R. Brimley Johnson, 1903. Pp. xi, 107.

PROFESSOR ASHLEY'S WORK is, probably, the best presentation in existence of the case for Protection and Imperial Preference. It is not vitiated, like so many writings on the same side, by elementary mistakes in economic reasoning, the policy that it advocates is coherent, and the grounds adduced in its favour have much apparent force. These grounds are derived, not, like the usual arguments of orthodox economists, from a consideration of the equilibrium of trade, but from a forecast of its changes. Although it is not given to mortals (except Tariff Reformers) to know the future, it is yet possible to give reasons for disbelieving in Professor Ashley's predictions. At the same time, it must be admitted, and it should be urged, that Free Traders have given too little attention to the changes produced by economic forces, and have confined their discussions too much to the short-period effects of tariffs. I see no reason to think that different results would be arrived at by a change in this respect; and I believe that a change of method would remove something of the contempt so widely felt for "economic pedantry".

After an introductory chapter on State control in general, the author proceeds to discuss the policy of free imports. He admits that Protection always involves a loss at first, but he argues, like List, that productive power is more important, in the long run, than momentary wealth. He suggests certain limitations to the policy of free imports. bargaining power, the merely temporary cheapness of dumped products, the loss due to non-transferability of labour from a decaying trade to a growing one, and the necessity of some trades for national defence. These arguments are developed later

Professor Ashley then passes to the outlook. He points out that, by the law of increasing returns, production for a large market is cheaper than for a small one, and he suggests that foreign countries, especially America, have a larger market than we have, though he gives no reason for this suggestion. He holds that, by successive onslaughts in times of depression, America will extinguish our metallurgical trades, and that, under Free Trade, we shall find it impossible to revive them when they are gone. Then, he tells us, the secondary industries, which use iron and steel, will also be destroyed by American dumping. And this process is already in operation. The better trades are stationary or declining, and those that grow are objectionable. In the end, we are told, England will become a country for tourists and rich people who like picturesque scenery; and the history of Holland will be repeated.

Many things may be said in criticism of this fancy picture. To begin with, the economies of production on a large scale are, I think, exaggerated; and, so long as all English production is not concentrated in a single Trust, it is plain that the market supplied by English manufactures is large enough to secure more of such economies if they exist. And the picture of the ruin of the iron and steel trades is not borne out by their recent history, for, in spite of their outcry, they have made large profits, and the imports have been very small, in proportion, not only to home production, but to the exports. In any case, ruin would not come suddenly; and if it appeared to be impending (which it does not), a bounty would, surely, be a better method, since it would not deprive us of the immense advantages we gain from cheap steel. As for the export of coal being an expenditure of capital, the same holds of iron, not only in respect of the ore (if this is native), but also in respect of the coal employed. Yet, merely because our exports of iron are more or less stationary, this argument is never employed by Protectionists. Another inconsistency is this. It is urged, with some truth, that we should be in a bad way if, owing to decay of the iron and steel trade, we were unable to repair our ships at home in time of war; yet the supply of Welsh coal to rival navies is decried. Is it not plain that, if the one would be an evil, the other must be an advantage? That foreign ships depend on our coal, is surely a most potent superiority in our naval position. Again, of the seven export trades to which Professor Ashley objects, two—soap and confectionery—are carried on, in part at least, under excellent conditions; while in two others, America's export to us is growing faster than our exports. Such arguments, it may be said, only affect details; but the Protectionist case is made up of details. The broad fact is, of course, that, in most of our staple trades, we have had to face the growth of European and American competition, and that nothing we can do will restore the manufacturing monopoly we once possessed. But this in itself has not injured us, unless superiority to other nations be more desired than prosperity. And the dangers which Professor Ashley dreads seem all to presuppose dumping on a scale which is most improbable. Moreover, the hypothesis that, if primary industries were destroyed, secondary manufactures could next be attacked, would only be legitimate if, among all our competitors, primary and secondary industries were everywhere carried on jointly by single firms. If this were not the case—and it is certainly most improbable—we should continue to enjoy, as now, the benefit of greater cheapness in the half-manufactured goods.

To meet the supposed dangers, a “policy of industrial defence” is advocated. Defensive tariffs will be necessary, but only as a temporary and provisional measure, our true safety lies in developing the economic unity of the Empire. Until the transition to economic Imperial unity is completed, we must have a defence against the assaults of Trusts. The Trusts will not collapse, as some hope, and Professor Ashley boldly maintains, admitting that they are a result of Protection, that they are really beneficent, and even

afford the best hope of improving the conditions of labour. This is a paradoxical assertion, with which probably few people will be found to agree.

Against the dumping practised by Trusts, import duties, it is argued, are the only possible defence. It is conceded that they will not be of much use in commercial negotiation (p. 132)—a remark which may be commended to Retaliators. An all-round low tariff, Professor Ashley says—writing before Mr. Chamberlain's Glasgow speech—would be no good, it would not be sufficient against dumping, and would preserve some trades not worth preserving (This is the first time it is admitted that some of our decaying trades are undesirable.) What is required is, that the Executive should have power to impose high duties at discretion; 50 to 75 per cent would often be necessary. These duties, when the danger is passed, might be removed again, for fear our manufacturers should lose the stimulus of competition

This scheme, it must be confessed, is most unpractical. To begin with, Protection is only electorally feasible if it is universal. And it is most improbable that Parliament would surrender the control of taxation, that historic bulwark of our liberties. Most improbable of all is the supposition, that such duties, once imposed, could be removed by a mere Executive act

20 At least two General Elections, and mountains of agitation, would be required.

But it is the Imperial aspect that interests Professor Ashley most. His proposal, in this respect, is the one which was made at Glasgow, and immediately abandoned in view of Colonial repudiation. It is the proposal for a “schedule of forbidden industries”. Professor Ashley points out, that there is no hope of inducing the Colonies to abandon those industries which they have established, or to refrain from establishing such as they are peculiarly fitted for. He even goes so far as to suggest, that it may ultimately become desirable to transport to Canada the men employed in iron and steel

30 in this country—a proposal hardly likely to commend itself to their present employers. But, in regard to industries for which the Colonies are naturally unfitted, he hopes that some arrangement may be possible. He even goes so far, in urging the Colonists to concentrate on agriculture, as to suggest (p. 158) that manufactures are a curse, on account of the conditions of labour, and that the Colonists might avoid this curse. But unless they begin at a late chapter of his book, they are not likely to be persuaded by him on this point.

There is a chapter on the incidence of the corn duties, which argues (1) that a small tax will raise the price of corn by less than the tax, (2) that no part of this rise will appear in the price of bread, (3) that it would not matter

40 if bread were dearer. The first of these points may, perhaps, be true, though the argument upon which it is based (namely, that we are by far the largest customer for American wheat), is shown in the course of the discussion (p. 193) to be likely to become less true in the future

The second argument is based on the fact, that the price of the loaf does

not vary by less than a halfpenny, while the difference made by the tax would be less than a halfpenny. This argument, which is often applied, is formally fallacious. A precisely analogous argument would be this. Inner circle trains run every ten minutes; hence, a delay of a minute in reaching the station cannot make a passenger later in reaching his destination. It is obvious that the tax would sometimes make no difference, while at other times it would just turn the scale, and make a difference of a halfpenny.¹ The third argument, whatever its validity, is not suitable for electioneering.

The last chapter sets forth Protection and Imperial Reciprocity as necessary to Trade Unionism, although it mentions, incidentally, that Krupp and Mr Carnegie succeeded in destroying Unions, while English employers have failed to do the like. We are next told that Peace and Retrenchment demand this policy—Peace, because Free Traders will fight to retain the open door in China (as the Protectionists would “take it lying down”); Retrenchment, because the policy will induce the Colonies to subscribe to armaments. And, finally, we are told that the Empire will break up if we hesitate. Canada will conclude a reciprocity treaty with the United States. This is an astounding statement, in view of the American Protectionist’s horror of Reciprocity. If we adopt this policy, it appears, we may hope to rival America in the purity of our politics, and Russia in wealth and general enlightenment. A great ideal, truly!¹ Happy those who do not live to see its realization.

Mr Pigou’s little book, *The Riddle of the Tariff*, is an admirably clear statement of the Free Trader’s answers to such arguments as Professor Ashley’s. The author points out, in regard to dumping, how much smaller in amount, and how much less ruinous in its effects, it is, than the trades affected have led us to believe, how impossible it would be to devise a tariff which should diminish fluctuations, how unprofitable it would be to any foreign nation deliberately to attempt the ruin of an English industry, unless—what is unlikely—the result would be a world-wide monopoly,³⁰ since, without this result, prices could not afterwards be sufficiently raised to make good the loss. The discussions of general Protection, of tariff bargaining, and of Imperial Preference, are all excellent. In conclusion, while deciding against Retaliation, Protection, and Preference, Mr. Pigou points out that, in combination, they involve new evils, not to be found in any one separately. Thus, for example, either Protection, or Preference, as a policy, would hamper tariff bargaining, which requires a willingness to abandon duties in return for concessions by other nations. The book is too compressed to be summarized; and a review can do little more than advise readers to study it.

¹ The fallacy is one which has been exposed in logic books ever since Greek times. It proves that no one ever becomes bald, because the loss of one hair will not make a man bald.

The Tariff Controversy [1904]

THIS PAPER APPEARED anonymously in *The Edinburgh Review*, the Whiggish quarterly edited by Russell's kinsman, Arthur Elliot, first cousin of Lord Amberley. The article is Russell's most comprehensive statement on the free-trade question, and the one he viewed as his most significant contribution to the debate. His high evaluation led him to recommend that Halévy consult his paper.

I will not bother you with economic arguments, as you will find what I have to say in the January number of the *Edinburgh Review*, in an article called "The Fiscal (*sic*) Controversy" The *Edinburgh* articles are anonymous, so it must not become publicly known that the article is by me Of course, being obliged to be topical, I avoided more or less going into the general principles by which free trade is to be defended (29 Feb 1904)

In spite of his insistence to Halévy that his paper was topical, his remarks are set in a large historical context, primarily that of British economic policy during the Victorian period Only from this perspective, Russell assumed, could development of the fiscal struggle since Chamberlain inaugurated it on 15 May 1903 be understood Like "Literature of the Fiscal Controversy" (11), this essay is a review article Besides assessing again the books by Ashley and Pigou, Russell also evaluated three other publications.

1 The first was a book of Chamberlain's speeches on tariffs and imperialism commencing with the 15 May declaration at Birmingham and concluding with his second Birmingham speech on 4 November. Russell focused on Chamberlain's keynote Glasgow speech of 6 October 1903 where the tariff reform programme was first outlined in its entirety (The speeches in the volume are, of course, an interim collection, since the last speech in Chamberlain's famous campaign was on 19 January 1904 in London)

2. The Board of Trade Blue Book embodied the results of an inquiry commissioned by Arthur Balfour early in June 1903 to examine the state of British trade It was published in September 1903 The Prime Minister hoped to fulfil two purposes by the inquiry He wanted to gain time for militant free-trade and tariff reform factions in his Cabinet to desist from quarrelling and hence to preserve the administration Second, he wished to have data gathered and collated to provide him with a fiscal solution which would suit the country's needs and satisfy the warring groups in

his Government. The inquiry was kept firmly under the Prime Minister's control, since it was entrusted to his brother, Gerald Balfour, President of the Board of Trade.

3 The *Handbook* was published by a Chamberlainite organization, the Tariff Reform League, composed mainly of industrialists. This body had been formed on 21 July 1903 as a national organization to persuade the working classes to accept tariffs as the best guarantee against unemployment. The League eventually subsumed the Birmingham Tariff Commission, led by Chamberlain's longtime local Liberal Unionist agent in the West Midlands, Charles A. Vince. Although, when Russell reviewed the *Handbook*, the League and the Committee were nominally separate, they were in fact united. Thus Vince, who wrote the tract, did so under the auspices of the League.

Russell's passing reference to Pigou was as favourable as in Paper 11, and his critique of Ashley no less severe. As in Paper 11, he misrepresented Ashley on an important point. At 208–39–41 Russell quoted Ashley's assertion that England "has a 'differential advantage' over America and her colonies in the presence of a mass of cheap, low-grade and docile labour" (Ashley 1903, 110), and stated that thereby the economic historian is implying that many English workers are "deficient in virility". In a dramatic manner, Russell challenged Ashley's use of the term "docile". In fact, Ashley's description was derived from the assessments of many London workers as recorded by the influential social observers, Charles Booth (*ibid.*, 109–10) and C. F. G. Masterman (*ibid.*, 193–4n.). Ashley deplored what he perceived as worker "docility", and attributed the characteristic to the weakening of Britain's industries under free trade.

Of the seven free-trade papers, there is no information about the circumstances of their composition except for this article, and, even for this one, documentation is slight. In view of the speed with which Elliot sent it to the printer and the fact that Russell's engagement diary and Elliot's journal record a meeting between them on 17 November 1903, it is likely that the article was written late in November or early in December. Elliot complimented Russell in an undated letter from the Isle of Wight, written while Elliot was completing work on the January issue; that is, after receiving corrected galley proofs from Russell.

It is very long since I have read a better or more interesting paper than you have sent me, on this Fiscal Controversy

It is very well reasoned as well as very well written, and it deals with the really big issues involved, instead of merely tossing about figures and statistics. Your article is *exactly* what I wanted for the "Review", and I am greatly obliged to you for your contribution. I sent your corrected proof to the printers today. I shall see it again in page form, but you have made so few alterations that I don't suppose you will want to see a revise ...

The "Review" comes out on 15th January

As a prominent Unionist free trader, Elliot valued this paper as a contribution to his attempts to create a free-trade Liberal Unionist coalition against protectionism in any form

Unfortunately, the corrected proofs and the original manuscript appear to have been destroyed. Hence, the copy-text is the published article in *The Edinburgh Review*, 199 (Jan 1904) 169-96.

Imperial Union and Tariff Reform Speeches Delivered from May 15 to November 4, 1903 By the Right Hon Joseph Chamberlain, M.P. London. Grant Richards, 1903 Pp xi, 211

Memoranda, Statistical Tables and Charts Prepared in the Board of Trade with Reference to Various Matters Bearing on British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions (Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 67 253ff, Cd. 1761.) London: HMSO, 1903. Pp xii, 495.

The Tariff Problem By W. J. Ashley London P. S King & Son, 1903. Pp. viii, 210

A Short Handbook for Speakers and Students of the Policy of Preferential Tariffs Westminster: The Tariff Reform League, (1903) Pp. 117, xi.

The Riddle of the Tariff. By A. C. Pigou London R Brimley Johnson, 1903 Pp xi, 107

ENGLISH POLITICS, USUALLY piecemeal and practical, have at two most important periods been dominated by a general theoretical doctrine. The first of these was the age of Puritanism, the second, somewhat less strongly defined, was the era of Liberal ascendency, which culminated in Mr. Gladstone's first Administration. The a priori and somewhat abstract love of liberty which inspired that era has now grown rare, and the arguments by which the reforms of the middle of the century were advocated have lost their power of convincing. It is natural, under the circumstances, that whatever is revocable in the policy of doctrinaire Liberalism should now be called in question. If the old policy is in any respect to be preserved, the old arguments, whether sound or unsound, must be either replaced by new ones or at least re-stated in a newer vocabulary.

The attack upon free trade, which has been inaugurated by Mr Chamberlain, is a part of this general movement, and owes a great deal of its popularity to the change in the national ideals. The new ideals are appealed to as ideals, the old are dismissed as shibboleths. Nevertheless, if the claim of the free traders to a scientific basis was not mistaken, there must be, from the new point of view as from the old, grave objections to the imposition of protective import duties. We can only decide whether this is so by a somewhat detailed examination of the case which is now put forward for protection.

Mr Chamberlain's case may be stated, in outline, as follows

(1). Foreign tariffs have inflicted grave injuries upon our export trade; and so long as we adhere strictly to free trade, we have no means of inducing

any mitigation of these tariffs. It is therefore desirable to retaliate by the threat and, if necessary, by the imposition of duties calculated to injure their exports to us, since these duties would enable us to offer a *quid pro quo* in negotiating commercial treaties. (2). Protection enables foreign countries to "dump" in England, i.e. to sell to us below cost price and recoup themselves by high prices in their home markets. By this process, sufficiently continued, they can destroy a particular industry, and then raise their prices. Iron and steel are at present threatened in this way; when they have been destroyed the same process can be applied to machinery or ship-building or
10 any of the other trades that use iron and steel as raw material. In the end, all the better trades, all those that contribute most to national well-being, will have gone abroad, and we shall be left only with such as require no special skill and offer a poor remuneration to labour. In other respects also—by lower wages, longer hours, etc.—foreigners compete in ways which are unfair and should be stopped. It is useless to prohibit, by legislation or Trade Union action, long hours and bad conditions of labour at home, so long as the products of foreign "sweated" labour are allowed to come in and compete. (3) Our exports, on the whole, unlike those of Germany and America, have remained nearly stationary for thirty years but while exports to pro-
20 tected countries, especially of manufactured goods, have diminished, those to our colonies have increased. If, however, our colonies develop further their present protectionist policy, the colonial market also will gradually be closed to us. Hence it is wise, while we can, to secure preferential treatment in their market, which we can do by giving them preferential treatment in ours. This involves the taxation of food, but not, it is averred, of raw material.

Of these three objects, the first alone is advocated in Mr Balfour's *Notes on Insular Free Trade* and in his Sheffield speech. Adherence to this policy constitutes, apparently, the minimum demanded as a test of loyalty to the
30 Conservative party. But "Retaliation" is certainly regarded, by most of its advocates, as including not only the endeavour to enlarge the markets abroad for our exports, but also the protection of the home market against cheap imports, at least so far as their cheapness is considered to be "unfair". And it cannot be doubted that the Conservative party, if it obtains a substantial majority at the polls, will proceed to the imposition of purely protective duties. It is only the third object—the establishment of preference for colonial food-stuffs—that is definitely "unauthorized". Of the three parts of the policy, we shall try to show that the second and third together form a coherent whole; but that the first is inconsistent with them, both in
40 its aims and in the methods necessary for attaining them. For while the second and third aim at a diminution, the first aims at an increase of foreign trade; while the first, if successful, would lead others towards our policy of free trade, the second and third would lead us to adopt their policy of pro-

tection A great part of Mr Chamberlain's propaganda is based on the assumption that it is possible, and that it is desirable, to increase exports while diminishing imports. Thus in the Tariff Reform League's *Handbook for Speakers*, the doctrine of the balance of trade is said to be disproved by the fact that our imports from the United States have grown as our exports to them have diminished This remark ignores not only the fact that American ports are crowded with British shipping, which must get its freights somehow paid for, but also the well-known consideration that trade is largely roundabout, so that we pay for our imports from the United States by sending goods say to China, which, in its turn, sends goods to America. The 10 propagation of this fallacy is the less excusable, inasmuch as the correct theory of the balance of trade has been very fully explained in the Board of Trade Inquiry Blue Book (Cd. 1761), compiled by order of a Government to which Mr Chamberlain still belonged¹ By far the greater part of our imports are received in exchange for exports, whether of goods or services, the remainder consist of interest on investments, i e on previous exports. The Board of Trade estimates the earnings of our shipping and the interest on our foreign and colonial investments each at about ninety millions; these two, together with minor items, more than account for the excess of imports, leaving a balance of exports which represents the investment of new 20 capital in our colonies and elsewhere Thus, apart from investments, foreign trade consists of exchanges, and if imports are diminished, exports must be diminished also The excess in the imports of goods could only be diminished by injuring our shipping, or by rendering our colonial and other investments unremunerative, and neither of these results is desired

There is no doubt something to be said for the idea that a country should be self-subsistent; it is a good thing, in some ways, to be independent, and under no obligation to any foreign power This policy is frequently derided and abused when practised by Tibet or the Chinese Empire it is attractive to some minds when preached for the British Empire by Mr. Chamberlain. 30 But whether the ideal of self-subsistence be good or bad, it is the height of absurdity for an advocate of self-subsistence to measure prosperity by the export trade, as Mr. Chamberlain did in his Glasgow speech

Mr Balfour commits no such fallacy either in his pamphlet or his speeches. He does not disavow the doctrine of the balance of trade which he has on several occasions expounded with great clearness He is not afraid that we shall have too many imports; he is afraid that we shall have too few. His nightmare is that foreign countries will become completely self-sufficient, and will neither purchase from us nor sell to us. If we want imports, we must have exports; our exports are being more and more shut out 40 by tariffs, how, he asks, shall we get purchasing power to pay for the im-

¹ See the "Memorandum on the Excess of Imports into the United Kingdom" (No v)

ports of food and materials that are necessary for us?

This argument is perfectly logical, its only weakness is that it is quite irrelevant to the actual circumstances, and to any that can be foreseen within any reasonable period. Indeed Mr Chamberlain's speeches are the best answer to Mr Balfour's fears. We receive a supply of goods of all kinds which is so vast and so rapidly growing that in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion a tariff blockade must be immediately set up to shelter us. There is no reason to think that this tendency will be reversed—rather the other way. And it is particularly interesting to notice that the phenomenon which most vexes the soul of the Birmingham reformers—the growing influx of manufactured luxuries, such as watches, pianos, and plate glass—ought to comfort the Prime Minister. For it means, as he knows very well, that our purchasing power has grown so rapidly that we can afford to pay not only for necessities, but for luxuries from abroad. These imports, from Mr. Balfour's point of view, constitute a satisfactory margin between us and the danger of starvation.

However, no free trader will deny that foreign tariffs are an evil; and the professed object of Mr. Balfour's policy is to increase free trade by lowering foreign tariffs. It is not to be denied that some success in this direction, which all free traders desire, might, under certain circumstances, be secured by fiscal warfare. But when import duties are advocated as a method, nine out of ten of their advocates think that protection would in itself be better than "one-sided free trade." The desire to exclude foreign goods accompanies, and in the end outweighs, the desire to get our goods into foreign markets. Consequently, when the professed object has failed, people are quite content to be left with a protective duty. Mr. Balfour at Sheffield showed, by the methods which he proposed, that he was aware of this possibility, and that he still held protection to be in itself an evil. His suggestion was not that we should, by a general tariff, at once protect the home market and attack all other countries simultaneously, but that, by taxing, at any given time, certain imports from one country only, or by threatening to do so, we should acquire the means of exacting concessions from the country in question. We should thus inflict the maximum of temporary disadvantage upon that country, while not giving way to the cry against cheap imports. In this, as in other warfare, it is better to divide one's enemies and deal with each singly. But it is notorious that Mr. Balfour's support is derived chiefly from those who would like to stop cheap imports of food-stuffs and manufactures altogether, and who therefore desire the imposition of a general tariff. In this difference we may find a criterion by which to distinguish between genuine retaliators, who admit the benefits of free imports, and retaliators who merely desire an easy and popular transition to protection.

Mr. Balfour has been accused of inconsistency in going as far as he does go

against free trade, while refusing to go further. We shall try to show that his practical judgment is in fault, but he is not inconsistent. For one who accepts the whole of the economic arguments against protection it is perfectly consistent to adopt the position that discriminating duties against a particular country are desirable if there is a near prospect that thereby the tariff of that country will be materially reduced. Whether any such prospect exists, or whether the advantages sought are worth the risk of a tariff war, are not questions of principle they are to be decided by an examination of the particular circumstances and of the probability of success. But whoever advocates retaliation on free-trade principles must give no countenance to the cry against imports.¹⁰ The probable result of any lowering of foreign tariffs would be an increase, not only in our exports, but also in our imports; and if the fear of imports prevails, the retaliator is likely to throw away what he has gained by imposing duties subsequently against the imports resulting from his own success.

Admitting that retaliation is not to be condemned on purely economic grounds, provided that it aims solely at the reduction of foreign tariffs, it remains to inquire what chance it has of succeeding in practice. In considering this question we have first to examine the recent history of commercial negotiations, and then to consider the special circumstances of the trade between the United Kingdom and the principal protectionist countries.²⁰

Sir Robert Peel, as is well known, announced, in introducing free trade in 1846, that the policy of retaliation and commercial bargaining, which had been pursued by England since 1815, had failed in its objects, and that he had become convinced that the power to negotiate was of less value than freedom to import. Nevertheless, the Cobden treaty with France in 1860, and the subsequent continental treaties, are often cited as instances in which the power of making reciprocal concessions was an essential condition of success. It is true that later attempts at negotiation between protectionist powers have been less successful, but this fact is much less widely known in England.³⁰ An examination of the various cases reveals the interesting fact that, broadly speaking, all reductions of duties which nations have embodied in treaties have been either unimportant or such as were believed by the nations granting the reductions to be in their own interests, independently of any *quid pro quo*.

The conditions under which the Cobden treaty was concluded are curious and instructive. The Government of the Second Empire believed that the French policy of prohibition or enormous duties against foreign manufactures was contrary to French interests, but the majority in the Chambers was opposed to the Government in this matter. After an abortive attempt in 1852, a Bill was introduced in 1856, by which practically the same changes were to be made as those subsequently embodied in the treaty; this Bill, however, was defeated. The Government thereupon fell back upon the

power, which the Constitution accorded to it, of altering the duties, without the consent of the Chambers, as part of a treaty with a foreign Power. Under these circumstances, the work of negotiation was not difficult for Cobden We, on our side, undertook to reduce certain duties which in any case we no longer considered desirable The degree to which the French acted for their own interests appears from the fact that, by the treaty, they were only bound not to charge duties of more than 30 per cent on our manufactures, whereas the subsequent Commission fixed the duties at an average of between 10 and 20 per cent

- 10 The Cobden treaty was followed by treaties concluded between France and most of the other continental countries. In concluding these treaties, of which we obtained the benefit, France was assisted by the general feeling in favour of free trade both at home and abroad Thus reductions of duties were regarded not merely as concessions, but also as advantageous to the country making the reductions In regard to Germany, political motives contributed greatly to the movement Prussia was desirous of keeping Austria out of the Zollverein, in order itself to remain the chief power in the Union, Austria was desirous of being admitted, but was not prepared to abandon its protective duties against non-German States. Accordingly, it
20 suited Prussia to lower the Zollverein duties below the level to which Austria was willing to assent

But the history of later negotiations, made after the return to protectionism, is very different. Without going into it in detail, we may sum it up by saying that, though the weapons of retaliation have been continually sharpened, only the minutest results have been achieved The only exception is formed by Caprivi's treaties, made avowedly on the ground that high protection had hampered the German export trade and fostered emigration "we must export either goods or men" was the maxim by which the Chancellor recommended freer trade. The ordinary course of a tariff struggle is
30 that both sides begin by the imposition of duties which they do not wish to retain, and then go through the solemn parade of giving them away The degree of protection which the dominant interests in a country really desire has rarely, if ever, been cut down substantially in deference to foreign threats.

The reasons of this want of success are not hard to discover When a strong protectionist feeling exists in a country all concessions to foreign nations are unpopular, and are opposed by powerful interests, it rarely happens that there is an exporting interest sufficiently strong to demand successfully that the duties on both sides shall be reduced. The position resembles that of the Italian States of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which allowed themselves to be dominated by condottieri whose livelihood depended upon war Under these circumstances, it is not a favourable peace, but the continuance of war, that is desired by those who direct policy. When

a nation recognizes that the absence or lowering of a duty is to its own interest, it may be able to induce some other nation to abolish some undesired duty in return. But where protection is desired, a tariff war is felt to be no great evil, since it makes the home market even more secure; thus no sufficient pressure can be brought to bear to secure a desire for peace. And where the national honour is involved, we know, from actual wars, how much will be endured before yielding. In a tariff war, the misery which a foreign nation can inflict (particularly where, owing to protection, the foreign trade is small) is seldom of that magnitude that compels surrender. Thus, in conclusion, the condition for successful bargaining is that the nations concerned should incline to free trade, and should therefore believe the concessions they make to be advantageous to themselves also. Where this condition is absent, threats will accomplish little.

It remains to consider the special circumstances of England in respect to retaliation. One essential, a desire for free trade in our own country, does not exist in the party which favours retaliation, if import duties, nominally imposed as weapons in negotiation, too quickly secured their professed object, the protectionists who had imposed them would regret the necessity of removing them. And in most foreign countries, much as they value free access to our market, it is probable that they value still more the power of protecting their home market against us.

Mr Balfour probably has in mind operations on a small scale to begin with, perhaps a duty on German toys and musical instruments, or on French silks. But it is not safe to reckon on conducting a tariff war, any more than an actual war, on the principle of limited liability. We know that with Russia, whose tariff is the highest against us, we do a growing export trade, that Russia sends us nothing but food-stuffs and raw material; that, therefore, without taxing food and raw materials, we should be powerless to attack her, and that, even if, following Mr Chamberlain, we make up our minds to tax food, our hands will have been tied by the preference granted to our colonies. Much the same applies to the United States; we still send there, in spite of their tariffs, a vast quantity of finished products, while we take from them comparatively little but food and materials, for even of the so-called manufactured goods which come here from the States, the greater part consists of materials for further manufacture. Germany, no doubt, is somewhat more vulnerable, and no doubt German business men are seriously alarmed by Mr. Chamberlain's propaganda. but we must remember even here that the German tariff has not hitherto been prohibitive, that vast quantities of our manufactures go over every year, and that the struggle which a policy of mutual "bluff" might precipitate would be at least as serious for us as for them.

Above all, however, what a British Government should always remember is that commercial wars are carried on by penal measures, not only against

the goods imported, but against the ships that carry them Whether we like it or not, the merchant vessels that carry the British flag into every port of every ocean are so many hostages that we have given to safeguard commercial peace If France or the United States were to raise to a prohibitive point their tonnage dues against our shipping, it would no doubt inconvenience them; to our rivals it would be an unlooked-for opportunity, to us it would be a deadly and perhaps irreparable blow

In regard to retaliation, to sum up, however much we may regret foreign tariffs, however conscious we may be of the injury they inflict upon us, it seems plain that we shall not alter the policy of other nations by the sincere flattery of imitation. In all foreign countries there is a party favourable to the reduction of the tariff; in Germany especially, this party is strong, and constantly growing So long as we can say, "We believe, as our practice shows, that free trade is to the interest of the nation which adopts it", so long we encourage all free-trade parties abroad, and do more for reform than we possibly could by a combination of protection and threats. But if we, by our example, show that we think the policy of foreign countries a wise policy, we lose the only real chance that exists for the eventual triumph of universal free trade.

Leaving the question of retaliation as a weapon for lowering tariff walls, let us consider the arguments adduced in favour of protection for its own sake It is said that times have changed, that experience has falsified the predictions of the free traders, that protectionist nations have progressed faster than we have, and that the old arguments are no longer applicable Now it must be admitted that the growth of huge monopolies has very materially changed the economic conditions, and that arguments postulating free competition are in many respects no longer valid What is generally overlooked, however, is that the new conditions have also provided many new and most potent arguments in favour of free trade

The old orthodox defence of free trade rested upon the advantages of division of labour, combined with the fact of differential advantages in production in different countries. A given expenditure of labour and capital can produce, in Russia, more corn than iron; in England, more iron than corn Consequently both England and Russia will be richer if Russia sends corn to England and England sends iron to Russia This argument is generally admitted in favour of universal free trade, but is said to lose its force when one of the two countries considered is protectionist. And it is urged, quite falsely, that free trade was originally advocated on the ground that foreign nations would adopt it Cobden, it is true, thought the case for free trade so strong that he believed other nations would soon be convinced; but the case which he thought so strong was the case for free trade whatever other nations might do. The view which protectionists erroneously impute to Cobden, implies that the growth of imports is an evil, only compensated, where

universal free trade exists, by the growth of exports. This, however, is almost the reverse of the free-trade case. It is urged by free traders that, whatever other nations may do, it is advantageous to England to admit freely whatever can be purchased from abroad more cheaply than it can be produced at home, and thereby to liberate labour and capital for those branches of production in which, in the actual state of the world's markets, we can employ them to the best advantage. If we shut out imports, we require a redistribution of labour and capital, by which, *ex hypothesi*, the total produce of the nation is diminished, and its wealth is consequently impaired. It is this argument which has to be tested in the light of modern economic 10 developments

It is urged on the other side by Mr Chamberlain and his followers, (1) that manufactured imports rob the British working man of his employment; (2) that the free-trade case supposes a mobility of labour and capital from trade to trade which does not, as a matter of fact, exist; (3) that much foreign competition is "unfair", i.e. consists of goods sold below cost price, or produced by sweated labour, (4) that some trades, for reasons of national well-being, are more desirable than others, and ought to be preserved even if there is some economic loss in doing so. There is no doubt an element of truth in these arguments, but their force has been much exaggerated, and 20 the opposing arguments have been wholly ignored.

(1). Broadly speaking, the notion that imports displace British labour, upon which Mr Chamberlain chiefly relies, and from which most of his support is derived, is a sheer mistake, and is recognized as such by all economists, whether free traders or protectionists. If labour and capital are allowed to find their most profitable employment, which is the result of free imports, they produce more wealth, demand is stimulated, and wages and employment increase. If, on the other hand, prices are raised by protection, there is a diminution in demand, and therefore there is less employment. The only sense in which there would be more work if imports were stopped 30 would be, that it would be necessary for every one to work harder in order to make a living; as in Germany, a man would have to work twelve hours instead of eight, to secure only about two-thirds of the wages which he secures here. But the question which lies at the bottom of Mr. Chamberlain's appeal is the question of the unemployed. Unemployment, broadly speaking, depends upon the fluctuations of trade. When a man has learned one trade, and that trade shrinks, he loses his employment. And from time to time, in all countries, there is a general depression of trade more or less severe. These are undoubtedly grave evils, and if it were true that protection would diminish them, this would constitute a powerful argument. There is, 40 however, absolutely no evidence that this is the case. Statistics of unemployment in foreign countries, in a form comparable with our own, are not easily obtainable, but, speaking generally, the smaller the market the

greater the fluctuations are likely to be. Hence the protectionist dependence on the home market should on the whole increase the number of the unemployed. This, however, is often said to be avoided by the export policy of trusts and cartels. In this respect, it should be remembered that trusts and cartels nowhere control more than a small proportion of trades, and that their policy, while helpful to themselves, causes all dependent industries to suffer. These industries flourish in England when times are bad in Germany or America. We shall return to this point in connection with dumping.

Mr. Chamberlain's argument that the importation of manufactured goods causes unemployment ought, however, to be tested by such figures as are available for this country. The following table shows the quantity of manufactured and partly manufactured goods imported into the United Kingdom, and the percentage of Trade Union members unemployed according to the Board of Trade returns:

		Imports of Manufactured and partly Manufactured Goods	Percentage of Members of Trade Unions un- employed
20	1889	100 8	2.1
	1890	98 2	2.1
	1891	97 6	3.5
	1892	98 9	6.3
	1893	98 1	7.5
	1894	101 7	6.9
	1895	107 7	5.8
	1896	117 6	3.4
	1897	123 8	3.5
	1898	125 1	3.0
30	1899	135.9	2.4
	1900	145.2	2.9
	1901	142 7	3.8
	1902	148 9	4.4

It will be observed that 1889, when the imports first passed 100 millions, was a record year in respect of employment—a record, not as Mr. Chamberlain's theory would suggest, for lack of employment, but for goodness of employment. 1893 was the bottom year for unemployment, a period, as many will remember, of great distress; and the importation of manufactured goods had diminished. From 1893 to 1899 the imports rose rapidly and steadily, and unemployment was also getting less. And this result is not

surprising, for after all men out of work do not buy American watches, nor do we increase our purchases of leather and such half-wrought materials when people cannot afford new boots. When our exports are booming, when our ships are earning full freights, when our foreign enterprises are remunerative, why should we not expect to get some return?

(2) It is possible that the older economists, dealing with less elaborate methods of production than ours, supposed a degree of mobility, as between different trades, which no longer corresponds wholly, if it ever did, to the facts. Where the amount of fixed capital is very great, or where the workman's skill is highly specialized, it may be impossible, without great 10 economic loss, to effect any sudden change from one trade to another. But where the change is gradual, as it almost always is, the postulate of the economists is fully borne out by the facts. The chief example of a decaying industry in England is agriculture, or rather wheat-raising; yet, as wheat-raising has declined, the wages of agricultural labourers have steadily increased. It cannot be pretended that any stage in the process has involved hardship to the labourer, the opening up of other fields has been quite sufficient to keep pace with the lessening of employment in this one direction. And, speaking generally, wherever the rate of decay is slow enough to be met by diminishing the investment of new capital and labour in a trade, 20 no hardship need result, provided other trades are at the same time growing at an equal or greater rate. We may admit, however, that, in the hypothetical case of an organized sudden attack upon some great industry, say by the Steel Trust, heroic measures might be necessary. What those measures should be would depend greatly on the particular circumstances, and it is possible that a temporary bounty would be the best defence. For instance, if we were deluged with cheap steel, a comparatively moderate bounty would keep our steel works "in being", and we should be vastly enriched and strengthened by the development of the steel-using trades. This question, however, belongs to our next head.

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(3) Of all the arguments for protection, dumping is certainly the strongest and the most convincing. We may define dumping as selling in a foreign country below cost price; and we may distinguish three varieties of it. It may be (1) part of the normal policy of the exporting country, (2) a temporary measure resorted to only when the home demand is abnormally slack, or (3) a definite act of aggression, designed to ruin competitors and conquer a market. These varieties cannot be sharply distinguished one from another, but their motives are different and probably the means of meeting them are different.

The existence of the first kind of dumping is very doubtful. It is commonly supposed, and it is assumed in Mr. Vince's pamphlet, that dumping of the first sort is normally practised by Germans and Americans. It is doubtless true that they normally, in some industries, where the trade is

controlled by a trust or cartel, offer their goods abroad at a lower price than at home, but there is absolutely no evidence to show that this lower price is not in itself sufficient to cover the total cost. In such cases, if they find a market in this country, their cost of production must be less than ours, and the competition is not of the kind considered "unfair" Where this is not the case, it appears that production is regulated so that in good times the whole output can be consumed at home. Germany, during the boom of 1900, imported iron and gladly sacrificed its export trade, only when trade again became bad did the export trade revive. And it is obvious that, though it may pay to work existing plant even at a loss, it is wise, in deciding what output to arrange for, to avoid the necessity for selling part of the produce at a loss in normal times. Thus dumping will only take place at times when the home market of the dumping country is shrinking, i.e. in times of depression, and this Mr Chamberlain himself admits²

The second form of dumping consists in keeping up the home price in a falling market and disposing of the surplus produce abroad for what it will fetch. The possibility of this process depends upon complete control of the home market and protection of some kind against the re-importation of what has been dumped. It is interesting to observe that List, writing in the early forties, urged the English habit of dumping as a reason for protection in Germany.³ The important point is, however, that this form of dumping will not occur at all in most years, and when it does occur, will seldom concern more than a small proportion of the produce of the dumping country. It can therefore never be sufficient to ruin a large industry in this country, but can at most cause temporary annoyance. It is admitted that the iron and steel trade has been the chief sufferer, yet, when the figures are examined, it is amazing how small a proportion, even in the worst years, the total import bears to the whole production and even to the export. The total make of pig-iron in England in 1902 was 8,518,000 tons, the total import was 223,000 tons, and the export was 1,103,000 tons. The balance of 7,638,000 tons remained to be worked up in this country, and Mr. Hugh Bell⁴ estimates that 3,474,000 tons of pig-iron were utilized in exports of iron manufactures. Considering that this trade (as appears from Income Tax Returns) was abundantly profitable, it cannot be said that the foreign competition is very deadly. And with regard to steel similar remarks apply. Thus up to the present, dumping is not serious, and, apart from definite aggression, there is no reason to suppose that it will become so.

It is possible, however, in view of the Napoleonic methods sometimes adopted in America, that a serious attempt might be made to destroy our

⁴⁰ 2 See his *Speeches*, pp 125-6

3 *Political Economy* (Longmans, 1885), p 147

4 "Protection and the Steel Trade", *Independent Review*, Oct 1903

iron and steel trade by long-continued sales below cost price. If such an attempt were made, it would certainly be wise to check it, *provided its success appeared possible*. But considering the enormous production and the enormous demand in this country, it is in the highest degree doubtful whether the utmost output of which America is capable could effect this object. And it is usually forgotten that America, if it were to make such an assault, would have to defeat us, not only in our home market, but also in all the neutral markets of the world. Now the world's demand for iron is not only growing, but is also very elastic; it would be very greatly increased by a slight fall in price. Consequently the production necessary in America would be immense, and the expense of selling such large quantities at a loss for years together would be greater than even an American Trust could endure, or than any sane man of business would voluntarily incur. Meanwhile, it would surely be foolish to undertake a whole fiscal revolution on account of a remote and improbable danger to one or two special trades, a danger which, if and when it arose, could be met easily and more efficaciously by special measures in the interests of the industry threatened.

Moreover it is very important to remember that to every one in the country except those who directly suffer from the competition, dumping is a benefit. Hitherto, all dumping has consisted of crudely manufactured articles, such as pig-iron or unwrought steel, which form the raw materials of further manufacture. Whoever is opposed to the taxation of raw materials cannot, with any consistency, object to the free importation of such things as have hitherto been dumped. In engineering, ship-building, the making of machinery, and all the other trades which employ iron and steel, cheapness is of the utmost importance, and in so far as these trades come into competition with foreign countries in neutral markets, it is at least doubtful whether, under a protective régime, they would be able to hold their own at all. And it is surprising to learn, from the account in the Inquiry Blue Book (Cd. 1761, No. xxii), that during the very period when German competition was keenest English firms were so fully employed that, but for the German supply, the demand could not have been met. Thus we find that Ryland's stated on November 9, 1901, that "the feature of the market is the stiff price of pig-iron in the Midlands. Owing to the supply not being equal to the demand, deliveries are everywhere behind, and if it were not for the supply of German steel for rolling into sheets and bars, some of the Midland ironworks would be standing" (p. 345). Surely a "ruin" of this kind is not one calling for a reversal of our whole fiscal policy!

The arguments which apply against interference with dumping apply, with even greater force, against protection from sweated foreign goods. So far as the interests of this country are concerned, it is irrelevant how the cheapness of an imported commodity is caused—whether by better natural resources, by greater technical skill, by dumping, or by sweated labour

Indeed, if any distinction can be drawn, the produce of sweated labour is even less to be feared than dumped goods; for sweating, where it occurs, is not subject to sudden and violent fluctuations, and therefore causes little disturbance to our trade. At the bottom of the fears felt in all such cases is the belief that foreigners might offer *everything* at a lower price than we could produce it for. But this belief, as Mr Pigou well shows,⁵ is groundless. For if, at any moment, we imagine the supposed state of things to exist, there would instantly be an export of gold, in consequence of which prices would fall here and rise abroad until equilibrium had been attained.

- 10 Such dumping as occurs is, in the main, rendered possible by protection. We may turn to a general examination of the effect of protection upon exports, and of the belief that protection is vindicated by the encouragement which it appears to give to exports.

It was a part of the orthodox theory of foreign trade that the imposition of import duties, partly by diminishing imports, and partly by directly or indirectly increasing the cost of production, must have the effect of diminishing exports. Perhaps one of the most convincing arguments of protectionists is their retort to this theory, that the exports of Germany and the United States have increased under protection much faster than ours have increased under

20 free trade. This important fact requires careful analysis, in order to discover (1) how far it is due to, or in spite of, protection, and (2) how far, if at all, it is an advantage to the countries concerned.

For this purpose, it may be well to take a particular instance; and perhaps the most important and the most instructive is the iron trade in Germany, this trade illustrates both what are the effects of a tariff, and how many of these effects are often completely neutralized by other and stronger forces. In the early seventies, Germany pursued a policy which amounted practically to free trade, the duty on pig-iron was abolished, after successive reductions, in October, 1873. In that year, a crisis occurred, in consequence

30 of which the German iron trade, like other trades in Germany and elsewhere, endured years of depression. The depression was attributed in Germany to free trade; and in 1878 an inquiry was set on foot, which resulted in a return to protection. Since July 1, 1879, pig-iron has been subject, in Germany, to a duty of ten marks a ton. Now it so happened that, at the very time this duty was imposed, the Thomas-Gilchrist process became available, in consequence of which German ores, previously objectionable because of the phosphorous they contained, could be cheaply and profitably smelted. This discovery gave a great and immediate impetus to the German production of iron, in consequence of which the cost of production was so

40 much reduced that the duty caused no rise in price. Germany became, in fact, a country in which, without the help of protection, iron could be pro-

duced as cheaply as anywhere. The later development, however, is most interesting and instructive. In the year 1887, the first iron cartel was formed in Westphalia, and gradually the whole iron trade became subject to cartels. The formation of these cartels, so far as it is possible to judge, could not have been accomplished without the help of the duty.⁶ These cartels were able to control prices except in so far as foreign competition sets limits. Thus they were able to raise the home price above the world price by the amount of the duty. They so regulated production that in good times they could dispose of almost the whole produce at home, but in bad times, without greatly lowering the home price, they applied the proceeds of this high price to the giving of an export bounty, by means of which their surplus was rendered saleable. Thus the effect of the duty was, at least in bad times, to stimulate the export trade. But this was possible only because German iron could, without protection, have held its own in its home market. The cost of production of iron in Germany was no greater than the cost of bringing foreign iron to German ports, but, owing to the duty, foreign iron could not be brought into Germany except at a price exceeding the German cost of production by the amount of the duty. Consequently the higher price which the cartels exacted in Germany was all surplus profit, and could be devoted to the fostering of exports.

The much more difficult question remains: How far is this state of things a benefit to Germany? That it is a benefit to the German iron and steel producers seems almost undeniable; but it is quite plain that the far more numerous classes who use iron and steel in Germany suffer by the higher price. In Germany, as in America, there is a general outcry against the policy of selling dear at home and cheap abroad; this policy, which we so much resent, is resented with more reason by the inhabitants of the countries where it is practised. One is often reminded of the Convention of Cintra, when Wellington, though he had secured a signal triumph over the French, was recalled and put on his defence before a Court of Inquiry. Thereupon Napoleon observed that *he* had intended to court-martial his generals, but the English had saved him the trouble. So with the policy of trusts and cartels; it rouses an indignation abroad which is only allayed, so far as it is allayed, by the knowledge that we regard cheapness as a grievance, and would prefer that the foreigner should ask a higher price. It is, in fact, undeniable that the high prices exacted by trusts diminish the home consumption, and injure all trades which employ the product in question as raw material; for this diminishes the power of the nation concerned to export more highly finished manufactures, and impoverishes the population as a whole; and that, though particular export trades are benefited, the total of exports is lessened and the nation suffers. If foreign exports have grown

6 See Kestner, *Die deutschen Eisenzolle 1879 bis 1890* (Leipzig, 1902), p. 44

faster than ours, that is due partly to the fact that in the seventies, from which all such estimates start, we had already exploited our natural resources much more fully, and had established a more normal proportion between our home and foreign trade. It is due also, in part, to the omission of slippage in the calculation of exports. It is well known that, while our shipping has grown, American oversea shipping has greatly declined, and it is beyond dispute that this result is largely due to the difference in the fiscal policies of the two countries. In 1872, Mr. Chamberlain's favourite year, the earnings of our oversea shipping, estimated by Sir Robert Giffen's method,
10 amounted to about thirty-six millions, in 1902 they are estimated by the Board of Trade to have amounted to ninety millions. This increase of fifty-four millions must be added to the increase of our exports in any estimate which pretends to be scientific. To a great extent, finally, the slow growth of our exports is accounted for by the prodigious growth of the home demand, due simply to the general increase of wealth. Many engineering firms have had to forego orders abroad simply because they were full up with orders for months ahead; and this case is typical of others. If England were to grow suddenly poorer, it is very probable that the exports would be stimulated, as recently in Germany, by the paucity of home purchasers. This illustrates
20 how fallacious a test of national prosperity is afforded by exports.

(4). It is said that if we persist in our free-trade policy we shall lose the trades which, from a national point of view, are the most desirable, and be left only with such as employ chiefly unskilled labour and are not coveted by foreign nations. This is one of the principal arguments in Professor Ashley's work on *The Tariff Problem*. It is not a strictly economic argument, and it must be tested, not by *a priori* reasoning, but by an examination of the facts.

Professor Ashley gives a list (p. 106) of seven growing export trades. Apparel and slops, jam and pickles and confectionery, oil and floor cloth, caoutchouc manufactures, soap, furniture, cordage and twine. These
30 trades, apparently, are regarded as peculiarly undesirable, and it is suggested that they employ sweated East End labour. On this subject there are several things to be said. The confectionery trade, which protectionists are never weary of ridiculing and decrying, contains, as is well known, some of the very best managed factories in the country, notably the Bournville cocoa and chocolate works, famous throughout the world for the satisfactory conditions under which the workpeople live. In regard to soap, the same holds of Port Sunlight. It is difficult to see any reason for objecting to these trades except that they have the effrontery to prosper. In all the seven trades concerned, Professor Ashley asserts, England "has a 'differential advantage' over America and her colonies in the presence of a mass of cheap, low-grade and docile labour" (p. 110). Peculiarly notable in connection with this dictum are the cases of caoutchouc manufactures, and of cordage and twine. For, strange to say, the United States export of these to us has been
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growing at a very much greater rate than our exports. The United States exports to us of caoutchouc manufactures, as given in the Board of Trade Blue Book (Cd. 1761), amounted in 1890 to only £62,605. They remained roughly stationary for the next four years; but from 1895 onwards they have rapidly increased, and in 1902 they amounted to £360,309. For cordage and twine, the figures for 1890 are not available; in 1891 the exports of the United States to us amounted to £12,532, and in 1902 they had grown to £112,078—an increase, as the Tariff Reform League's *Handbook* would put it, of 800 per cent. And it must be remembered that these items, which are regretted when they appear among exports, swell the totals of our imports of manufactures from the United States, with which it is sought to alarm us. Professor Ashley also gives a table of the export of spirits, which shows a steady growth. Although he apparently considers this regrettable, he does not draw any definite moral—perhaps he wishes to hint at some scheme of Licensing Reform which would enable us to consume all our spirits at home. But, inasmuch as British Possessions take three-fourths of our export of spirits, it is not clear how a policy of Imperial preference would diminish the evil. This last remark, by the way, applies to apparel and slops, and we believe to confectionery also.

But apart from such arguments, it must be urged that Professor Ashley's list is carefully selected to prove his point. The making of machinery is one of the trades which have admittedly prospered under free trade: one wonders whether Professor Ashley would be prepared to address a meeting of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers as "cheap, low-grade and docile". He might receive information which would lead him to alter the epithet "docile". Coal is admittedly most flourishing, yet it is not pretended that the coal-miner is deficient in virility. But coal-mining is decried as an expenditure of national capital, and to diminish the output of coal is an avowed object of the protectionists. The shortsightedness of this policy is most remarkable. It is highly probable that methods of storing and transporting energy will be invented within the next century, which will facilitate the use of water power and of wind, and enable the nations without coal to dispense with our services. And it is also certain that any increased difficulty in obtaining coal will greatly stimulate invention in this direction. Thus it behoves us to make the most of our coal while we can, and meanwhile to devote ourselves to paying off the national debt. Ship-building again is of all industries perhaps the most valuable commercially and politically. Under free trade we have much more than doubled our output in thirty years: and it is evident how seriously it would be affected by any increase in the cost of the materials and instruments of construction and repair. And shipping time was when we were proud that "Britannia rules the waves", but now this boast has become the mark of a Little Englander, and we are told from the Admiralty that it is *infra dig.* to be an "Imperial Carter-Paterson"! This is

truly the strangest Imperialism for a naval power

Lastly, the building trade has shown for many years a rapid growth and a steady prosperity No one, we think, has yet discovered that building, as an occupation, is specially detrimental to health or morals, while an increase in house accommodation is perhaps the one form of industrial achievement which is most warmly desired by the social reformer It is evident that protection can do nothing but harm to the building trade

The assertion that the trades which flourish under free trade are undesirable is, therefore, quite unsupported by the facts Indeed, some of the trades which are likely to be injured by protection—cotton, building, coal-mining, engineering, ship-building, and shipping—are among the most desirable as regards skill and conditions of labour, and among the most vitally important to our wealth and our imperial power

Having now examined the main arguments in favour of protection pure and simple, it remains to discuss the proposals for colonial preference. These proposals are defended partly on purely insular grounds, partly as the only practicable step towards the consolidation of the Empire; and there can be no doubt that this latter object is the one which has caused Mr. Chamberlain to take up the whole scheme But it will be better first to examine the gain which is promised to the United Kingdom.

Our exports, we are told, have, on the whole, remained nearly stationary for thirty years; but while our exports to foreign protected countries have diminished, our exports to our colonies have increased. Mr. Chamberlain said at Glasgow.

I have said that if our Imperial trade declines we decline My second point is this It will decline inevitably unless, while there is still time, we take the necessary steps to preserve it Have you ever considered why it is that Canada takes so much more of the products of British manufacturers than the United States of America does per head? When you answer that, I have another conundrum, Why does Australia take about three times as much per head as Canada? And to wind up, Why does South Africa—the white population of South Africa—take more per head than Australasia? When you have got to the bottom of that—and it is not difficult—you will see the whole argument.

He proceeded to explain the course of protection. The longer a nation has been protectionist, the more is produced at home, and the less it suffers the shame and degradation of imports. Then followed the “schedule of forbidden industries”, which has disappeared from the republished speeches. This process of protection, which Mr Chamberlain represents as being so profitable to the nation practising it, is to be arrested at its present stage by

the offer, on our part, of preferential duties on corn, meat, and wine. In the rôle of Cobden-up-to-date, he offers to the colonies the destiny which, he tells us, the United States found beneath their dignity, of digging, delving, and ploughing for us. Consequently we shall preserve at least our colonial markets, which otherwise, like the markets in Europe and the United States, would be lost to us by the growth of native industries

The inherent difficulty of the situation is this. all the arguments employed to demonstrate the advantage which we should derive from protection apply even more strongly to the colonies, and are believed by them to be sound. Mr Chamberlain's picture of the successes obtained by Germany and the 10 United States is not calculated to deter the colonies from following their example On the other hand, whatever arguments can be brought to bear in favour of lowering colonial tariffs against our manufactures apply with equal or greater force against protection in the United Kingdom Accordingly the outcome of Mr Chamberlain's campaign is to strengthen the protectionist parties throughout the Empire, and it is well known that, in spite of preferences, colonial tariffs are directed chiefly against us, because we are the chief exporters of manufactures Accordingly the proposal that, in return for preferences, a promise should be given not to start new industries by means of protection has had to be abandoned, what remains is preference, in the sense that the existing tariff, already sufficiently protective against British goods, is to be raised still higher against foreign goods. The reasoning applied by Mr. Chamberlain in regard to the principal protectionist foreign countries will show the uselessness of such a boon The most that it can secure is, that such manufactures as are imported should be British. But this only preserves us from other outside competition, and it is not Germany or France that has driven us from the American market, but America. Thus so long as the colonies accept Mr. Chamberlain's view as to the advantages of a tariff, they will continue more and more to exclude our manufactures, admitting finally (if any) only such as, for natural reasons, 30 they cannot produce themselves. It seems hardly likely that a policy which assures them that they are swelling the ranks of their unemployed by admitting our goods will encourage them to persist in that practice. It cannot be said, therefore, that, from the insular point of view, any advantage is offered to us which can for a moment be weighed against the taxation of food.

The advantages or disadvantages to the Empire that are involved in Mr. Chamberlain's scheme are more difficult to estimate, and it is, of course, undeniable that he has means of judging as to colonial sentiment which make it somewhat rash to challenge his opinion. Certainly we should show by adopting his policy, especially if we had not been told so much of advantages to ourselves, a desire for the advancement of the colonies which might well cause them to entertain friendly feelings towards us. On the other hand, in view of the extremely unequal distribution of favours between the

various colonies involved in the proposals, it is difficult to believe that disputes could be avoided, especially if we persisted in the refusal to tax foreign wool. But the taxation of foreign wool, if unaccompanied by an export drawback, would interfere seriously with our export of woollens, while if such a drawback were given, it is probable (as is pointed out by the Board of Trade) that the whole, or nearly the whole, of the tax might be recovered, since we export more wool in a manufactured form than we import raw from all foreign countries. But if this happened, the pretended preference would of course be illusory.

- 10 Apart from these difficulties, however, which, with sufficient goodwill, could perhaps be overcome, there remain serious Imperial objections to the scheme. First and foremost, it would, as the foregoing pages have sought to show, impoverish the United Kingdom, and thereby render it less able to sustain the weight of armaments. In the second place, as Lord Goschen showed at Liverpool, it would gravely endanger our food supply in time of war. It is a disputed point whether food is contraband of war, and so long as the bulk of our imported corn comes from the United States, we may be sure that they will support our contention. In a war with any power other than the United States, they would, as matters stand, secure our supply of corn
- 20 by shipping it in neutral bottoms; whereas, if our supply came from Canada, it would be necessary for us to weaken our navy by detaching cruisers sufficiently strong to convoy it across the Atlantic. Even in a war with the United States, our supply would be safer from there than from Canada. For there can be little doubt that the United States could interrupt railway communication in Canada, whereas the possibilities of gain would cause a round-about import from the United States to be inevitable. A third objection from an Imperial point of view is the far greater readiness of foreign governments to combine against us, which would result from our abandoning free trade. Hitherto, it has paid every foreign nation better that we
- 30 should possess any portion of the earth's surface than that any third power should do so, and this has rendered ineffective the very general jealousy which is felt of us. A fourth objection is the decay of our shipping which protection would cause, for our merchant shipping both affords the means of transporting armies and ensures facilities of all kinds which would be indispensable to the navy in the event of war.

Both on Imperial grounds, and as a matter of economic loss or gain, then, we hold with Professor Marshall, that the case for free trade now is even more overwhelming than it was sixty years ago. But free trade was not then, and is not now, merely a question of economic loss or gain. It involves greater issues, and must be judged by reference to larger ideals.

It is, perhaps, just because in the nineteenth century the great work of emancipation was so far advanced towards completion, that another ideal has in recent years to some extent supplanted in the public mind the old

ideal of freedom The new ideal has two main aspects. It glorifies national sentiment, which in England has been christened Imperialism, though its basis is the tie of blood and the belief in racial character as the dominant factor in history. And, secondly, it prefers deliberate efficient organization to *laissez faire*

It is too large a task even to attempt to estimate the good and evil that lie in this movement of public opinion. But we must reiterate, at the risk of appearing dogmatic, our conviction that all that is sound in Imperialism, all that is genuine in the cult of efficiency, is not merely compatible with free trade, but incompatible with any deviation from it. Indeed, historically 10 whatever we have achieved in these directions is greatly due to the larger outlook on the world, the purity and intensity of public spirit, which, if they were not caused by free trade, at least came into English politics in the free-trade epoch.

It would be cowardly to ignore the fact that so-called Imperialism sometimes has an ugly side to it. It has encouraged the belief, now accepted as almost axiomatic, that whatever benefits one nation must harm another, and vice versa Under the influence of this belief, trade is conceived as warfare; and it happens that exports have been taken as marking success, imports as marking failure. In spite of this view, no one supposes that in actual warfare 20 nations would only attack each other's exports, and leave imports to arrive unimpeded But the conception that trade offers mutual advantages has become impossible to men imbued with the spirit of grasping pugnacity which forms Bismarck's legacy to the civilized world Thus the Tariff Reform League's Speaker's *Handbook* suggests (p 18) as a question unanswerable by opponents, "Why are Protectionist countries so anxious that we shall stick to 'Free Trade'?" The reply, that though our abandonment of free trade would injure us, it would injure foreign nations also, is apparently unimaginable to the protectionist. And since it is often easier to see how others are to be injured than how we are to be benefited, it is thought a 30 sufficient recommendation of a measure that it will impoverish the foreigner And when we are told that, as all must agree, we ought to consider our colonists as brothers, it is not only forgotten that it was the decried Cobdenites who gave them self-government, but it is also forgotten that even foreigners are human beings, and that their evil is not an end in itself Indeed, the chief reason in some minds why we should cherish the colonies is that they may help us to injure other nations. That a similar spirit exists elsewhere is a poor reason to adduce. Free traders believe that, whatever other nations may do, our policy of free imports is even more beneficial to us than to them; and they refuse to accept without examination the postulate 40 that one nation's gain must be another's loss This maxim they regard as dangerous to the peace, as destructive of what is best in civilization, and finally—since it must apply, if true, within the British Empire—as fatal, in

the long run, to that Imperial unity which is professedly desired Where the spirit of monopoly is rampant, union among the different interests and classes rests on as precarious a basis as honour among thieves

There remains the plea that, as in many departments of social life organization has displaced *laissez faire*, so our foreign trade should be subject to deliberate control and organization with a view to national efficiency It is undeniable that, with the progress of science and the increased power of cooperation, it has become increasingly necessary to form huge machines, in which, to a greater or less degree, the individual is sacrificed for a common end. Our States, our armies, our businesses, are all larger than those of the past, and though more wants can be satisfied, the road from a want to its satisfaction has become longer and harder to survey There thus arises at least an apparent conflict between liberty and efficiency, and in this conflict, a large section of public opinion demands that liberty should be sacrificed. But it is open to grave doubt whether the conflict is so great as some believe. The heyday of free trade was not in fact, after all, an epoch of wholly reckless selfishness. It was during the very years when our tariff was being cleared of protective and burdensome duties that our modern system of local government and national education was created, a system which, with all its faults, represents an immense advance in the direction of order and efficiency in social life Under the aegis of free trade there has grown up the vast cooperative movement, which speaks for six million people, and forms the world's model for industrial democracy. Endless forms of voluntary organization have sprung up which obviate and mitigate the evils of a merely chaotic individualism, and the State has by perpetual experiment enlarged and defined the limits within which it can usefully assist, guide, and control these developments The antithesis between freedom and organization is thus to a large extent illusory But it is the Liberal tradition to bring schemes of State interference to two tests—first, whether they tend to depress individual energy or hamper individual initiative; secondly, whether they tend to the general public interest or only to the interest of a privileged few Judged by these tests we believe that protection stands condemned.

The modern protectionists boast of considering the dynamics of industry as well as its statics; but it may be doubted whether they have considered the dynamics of national character. We in England have prided ourselves, ever since the Armada, upon our individual energy and resourcefulness, and this quality, it is hardly possible to doubt, we owe to our long tradition of freedom. At any given moment, it may be admitted, it might be possible, provided sufficient genius could be harnessed to the machine, to obtain better results by a centralized organization than by the spontaneous efforts of unfettered enterprise But the ultimate issue depends upon the national character, and under the debilitating influence of a governmental hot-house national character cannot maintain the highest level. In the age of Louis

XIV it was supposed, with some show of reason, that nations under parliamentary government must be powerless against despotic monarchies, but under Louis XV matters wore a very different aspect, and it was not France that conquered in the end. And free cooperation, such as our English system fosters, develops qualities which no state regulation can secure. The trusts which protection calls into being, with their ruthless, masterful policy, may show vigour while they are still young; but the history of all institutions proves that decrepitude must soon overtake them, and leave a general decay of enterprise and honesty.

Mr Chamberlain has spoken much of the great ideal of empire, and has represented his opponents as men of sordid and slothful minds, to whom material wealth is all in all. The ideal of a great empire inspired by high purposes, preserving liberty and justice, pacific in its dealings with foreign powers, fulfilling its trust towards subject races—this is an ideal which has inspired many of the best of our nation, and the hope of its realization has formed a part of daily happiness. But the empire for which our admiration is demanded is an empire shorn of the qualities that have most fostered our patriotism. It is to be aggressive, filled with hatred of the foreigner, held together by narrow ties of interest—we are assured that it will break asunder unless the poorer members pay the richer ones a gratuity of some 3s 6d. a year—exploiting the labour of those who are not of British descent—Mr Chamberlain has not yet had time to consider the case of India—aiming everywhere at forcible dominion. And at home, behind the protection of the tariff, trusts will grow up, destroying liberty and corrupting our public life. In every election candidates will have to promise increased protection for the industries carried on in their constituencies, and, if they refuse, they will fail to be elected. High-minded men, disgusted at the necessity for such tactics, will no longer take part in politics, and their place will be taken by men open to the only arguments that trusts are able to employ. The purity of our public life, achieved slowly by the nineteenth century, will be a dream of the past, and interests will govern in the lobby and at the polls. This is the “great ideal” which, we are told, only Little Englanders reject, only Little Englanders will believe that we may be in the right where our policy differs from that of foreign nations. England has been in the past, and is still, pre-eminent in liberty, freedom in government, in religion, and in trade are English contributions to political practice. Nothing but a steadfast adherence to the ideal of freedom can preserve our Empire, nothing else can make it worth preserving.

Mr. Charles Booth on Fiscal Reform [1904]

IN THIS LETTER to the editor of *The Spectator*, 92 (16 Jan 1904) 83–4, Russell anticipated the main outline of his argument for his article in *The Contemporary Review* (16). His concern here too was with the tariff ideas of the pioneer social investigator of poverty, Charles Booth (1840–1916). Booth's article “Fiscal Reform” appeared in the January number of *The National Review*.

Since no manuscript is extant, the copy-text is the letter in *The Spectator*. The editor of this weekly, John St Loe Strachey, was a prominent Unionist free trader, and hence very sympathetic to Russell's fiscally orthodox position.

SIR,—The great weight justly attaching to the opinions of Mr. Charles Booth renders it important to examine the proposals for fiscal reform which he has set forth in the current number of the *National Review*. These proposals are: (1) To place a tax upon all imports from foreign countries to the extent of 5 per cent *ad valorem* when we have a commercial treaty with the country concerned, or of 10 per cent when we have no treaty. (2) To give an export drawback to those who manufacture for export from imported materials His defence of this scheme begins by a somewhat unfair criticism of the Free-trade case, which is said to be "cosmopolitan in its ideal, *laissez-faire* in its philosophy, and individualist in its principles". It is impossible to see how such a description can apply to the contention that a nation is impoverished by the imposition of Protective import-duties or export-bounties This contention is purely scientific, and is wholly independent of any particular philosophy And it has no cosmopolitan element, except a refusal to admit without evidence that the prosperity of one nation requires the poverty of others. Mr. Booth next contends that it is desirable to receive the payment on our foreign investments in the shape of raw materials rather than finished manufactures, in order that employment may be given to British labour by such imports. It is not necessary to examine whether this is desirable, since no reason is given for supposing that a uniform tariff would have this effect On the contrary, the export policy of foreign Trusts, by giving us half-finished goods more cheaply than they can be obtained in the countries where they are produced, tends to give us an advantage, in all the later stages of manufacture, which we should lose by abandoning Free-trade. How real this advantage is may be seen in any account of the doings of those German Cartels that control the production of half-finished goods One of the objects aimed at by Mr. Booth is to increase the regularity of employment He gives no grounds for supposing that this result will follow, and it is hard to guess what his grounds are Unemployment does not depend upon whether we import much or little, but upon the fluctuations of trade. A sudden increase or a sudden diminution of imports of any kind of goods will alike cause unemployment The imposition of a tariff is likely at first to cause unemployment in those trades not directly benefited by it; later, through overproduction, it causes unemployment also in the protected trades And theory and experience alike show that the fluctuations in protected countries, such as Germany and the United States, are more violent than in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Booth desires a uniform scheme, both as a safeguard against corruption and as a guarantee of finality. In both respects there is reason to think his scheme would fail. Taxation of raw cotton and wool, for example, is not within practical politics; thus some exceptions become inevitable. In regard

to other commodities, 5 per cent would soon be declared insufficient; it would be found that a uniform rate for different stages of some particular manufacture was too unscientific and must be modified. *Ad valorem* duties, again, are well-known causes of fraud, this would doubtless lead to their abandonment, in many cases, in favour of specific duties aiming at a 5 per cent average, and in fixing these duties there would be endless opportunities for corrupt influence. Another cause of divergence from uniformity would be commercial wars. Is it likely that we should remain content with a beggarly 10 per cent if we were met by an embargo on our shipping and 10 prohibitive duties on all our exports? The difficulties of export drawbacks are also very great, as experience has shown in Germany; and in any case they cannot compensate a manufacturer for the increased cost of all his tools and machinery, even assuming (as we legitimately may) that Mr. Chamberlain's promise of higher wages is groundless. On the effect of Protection on prices Mr. Booth is strangely inconsistent. He maintains in a single paragraph (p. 697) both that competition among home producers prevents Protection from raising prices, and that the formation of Trusts and Cartels resulting from Protection leads to the policy of selling dear at home and cheap abroad. The latter is, of course, the truth in regard to all goods of 20 which the production can be monopolized, and this includes almost all finished manufactures as well as (in America) a very large proportion of the food supply. One might have supposed that the gibe of being "friends of every country but their own" would have applied to those who advocate the policy of making presents to the foreigner which are refused to the home consumer, especially when, as in such a case as steel, the commodity concerned is vital to many of the greatest industries. And it is very important to note that Mr. Booth speaks of the "absolute need" of Trusts and Cartels in Protective countries. Such organizations have been sometimes supposed to aim chiefly at economy of production. In a Free-trade country, 30 if they exist, this must be their motive; and in any case they are powerless for harm. But in Protective countries their chief motive has always been the exaction of monopoly prices, and economies, when they have occurred, have only swelled profits without lowering prices; and it has been customary, at least in America, to devote part of such profits to "educating" the Legislature, the Executive, and the electorate. It is hard to believe that Mr. Booth views these results with equanimity. Yet if he does not, it is strange that he should have joined Mr. Chamberlain's Commission, where a uniform tariff is the very thing not desired —I am, Sir, &c.,

Old and New Protectionism [1904]

IN HIS EMPHASIS on the economic benefits accruing to many British industries from foreign “dumping” of cheap imports, Russell was voicing a common free-trade argument of the time. Unlike the other documents in his free-trade crusade, this letter was not prompted by any specific book or speech, but was a reaction to a frequent argument by tariff reformers.

The letter to *The Spectator*, 92 (23 Jan 1904), 125–6, was signed “A Correspondent”, but the account books of this weekly reveal Russell’s authorship. As no manuscript is extant, the copy-text is *The Spectator*.

SIR,—Our modern Protectionists are never weary of asserting that times have changed since 1846, and that arguments valid then are invalid now. And the chief new phenomenon to which they point is "dumping", which, though mentioned by List in the forties as a common English practice, is certainly more prevalent than it used to be. It is important that the arguments of Free-traders should take account of such changes as have occurred, especially in view of the fact that these changes have provided new grounds in favour of free imports. The motive and effect
10 of the old Protection was the exclusion of imports; a duty was imposed upon a commodity, such as corn, which, it was thought, would otherwise have been procured from abroad. This is still the greater part of Protectionism, and in regard to this part there is no need to admit that times have changed, or to modify the old arguments.

But there is a new kind of Protection, chiefly German in origin, though existing also in the United States. This kind of Protection is applied to trades which could in any case dominate the home market—e.g. iron and steel in Germany. Until 1879, when the Germans abandoned their brief trial of Free-trade, German iron and steel could hardly hold their own under free
20 competition. In that year, owing to the invention of the Thomas-Gilchrist process, the cost of production of German iron and steel became at least as low as that in England. The result after some years was the organization of Cartels, which kept the price in Germany artificially high, while selling abroad, when the home demand was inadequate to the supply, at a much lower price than that charged in their home market. Thus the effect of Protection in this and in many other cases is, not to keep out imports of the protected commodity, of which in any event there would be few, but to raise the price at home by the full amount of the duty, and to give the foreigner the benefit of a cheapness denied to compatriots. This new form of Protection,
30 while it may involve some inconveniences to other countries, is even more glaringly absurd than the old Protection, and more profoundly mischievous to the nation practising it. The old Protection is exactly analogous in its effects to a hostile blockade. A parallel to the new Protection may be found in the warlike practice of the Maoris. That chivalrous people, if they caught the enemy short of food and ammunition, were accustomed to furnish him with supplies, in order not to diminish the interest of the sporting event. The German policy, if less chivalrous, is no less unpractical; for in the industrial struggle cheap steel is the most formidable weapon which they could put into our hands. These warlike metaphors, usually
40 inapplicable in trade, are not wholly inappropriate in this case. But if the new Protectionism is war, it is a warfare conducted exclusively with boomerangs. the weapons aimed at the enemy return, after surprising evolutions,

to wound those who rashly hurled them.

There is a point, in regard to this policy of export-bounties, which is of interest in connection with the fear (expressed in Mr Balfour's pamphlet and speeches) lest foreign nations should become self-sufficient, and neither buy from us nor sell to us, thereby starving us of food and raw materials. Self-sufficiency was, it is true, the object of the old Protectionism—an object which, with less competence and less hope of success, it shared with the Governments of China and Tibet. But the new policy, which aims at fostering exports, renders self-sufficiency impossible. Any country which exports to us more than the interest on British capital invested in that ¹⁰ country must, whether it likes it or not, accept imports in payment. The result of its export bounties is, from our point of view, that part of the price of goods obtained from abroad is paid for us by foreign Governments. From the point of view of the foreign countries concerned, the effect is that the goods obtained by the labour and capital employed in the export trade are less than they otherwise would be by the amount of the bounty, for by that amount the goods imported in exchange are less than would be the goods imported or produced at home for home consumption if there were no such bounty. This is plain when we consider that the increase of a nation's wealth owing to labour expended in making goods for export consists of the goods ²⁰ imported in return. Thus the final outcome of the German system is that the German workman pays more for his corn than the English workman in order that the German manufacturer may pay more for his steel than the English manufacturer. The German state of things, we are told, is desired by all who are not Little Englanders and doctrinaires. If Protectionists would acquaint themselves with the German outcry against selling dear at home and cheap abroad, perhaps they would modify this strange opinion—I am, Sir, &c,

A CORRESPONDENT.

International Competition [1904]

RUSSELL'S LETTER WAS a reply to the new Colonial Secretary, Alfred Lyttelton (1857–1913), who had succeeded Chamberlain in Balfour's ministerial reorganization following the Unionist Cabinet crisis of September 1903. Although bound by friendship to the Prime Minister, Lyttelton was a Liberal Unionist like Chamberlain and had a strong sympathy for the latter's policy of imperial preference and domestic protection. Lyttelton's new prominence as Colonial Secretary made him an obvious target for Russell's criticism. Particularly irritating to Russell was Lyttelton's speech on 26 January 1904 claiming that, under free trade, British industries could not compete with goods produced abroad by cheap labour.

Since no manuscript of the letter is known, the copy-text is Russell's printed letter in *The Spectator*, 92 (30 Jan. 1904) 180.

SIR,—Mr Alfred Lyttelton in a recent speech is reported by the *Times* of January 27th as having said that it was amazing that "people who were absolutely convinced of the necessity that in England industry should be carried on under humane conditions to the worker were wholly unable to derive from that principle the obvious corollary that, if you allow these conditions to prevail in England, which of course make the production of commodities more expensive, and permit to be freely imported into this country commodities from countries abroad where those conditions of humanity do not prevail, you are obviously subjecting the workers of this country to the competition of men of lower standards, which must tend either to pull down the standard in England, or if it did not pull it down, cause the greatest friction and inconvenience." May I inquire on what terms Mr. Lyttelton would propose to admit the produce of India to compete with that of our own fields and factories? It is well known that the standard of life in India is much lower than that of any of our competitors in Europe or America. Will Mr. Lyttelton, when a tariff comes to be framed, admit American goods free for the reason—a reason constantly urged by Protectionists for other purposes—that American labour is more highly paid than ours? "Of course" Free-traders deny Mr. Lyttelton's premisses. Apart from all objections to his argument that might be based upon the theory of international trade, it has been proved in innumerable instances that high wages and good conditions, by increasing efficiency, lower the cost of production instead of raising it. Does Mr. Lyttelton think that the low-paid Russians or the highly paid Americans are our more formidable industrial competitors? Perhaps, too, the new Colonial Secretary will conduct a cable controversy with Mr. Seddon as to whether the latter was right in describing Protectionist countries as heaven and England as hell for workmen—a statement which appears inconvenient for Mr. Lyttelton's argument. What is "amazing" is not the supposed blindness of Free-traders, but the fact that a man holding high office should, on the main question of the day, permit himself to repeat an argument which has been a thousand times refuted, and which he himself, by half-an-hour's conversation with any well-informed person, would have found to be wholly fallacious. The whole question of conditions of labour in connection with international competition is clearly and ably discussed in the first chapter of *The Case for the Factory Acts*, edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb. If Mr. Lyttelton will read this discussion, perhaps his "amazement" will cease.—I am, Sir, &c.,

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Mr. Charles Booth's Proposals for Fiscal Reform [1904]

THIS PAPER, PUBLISHED in *The Contemporary Review*, contains Russell's extended reflections on Charles Booth's tariff reform article, "Fiscal Reform", published in the January number of *The National Review*. Charles Booth, the leading British writer on social questions, exposed the range of London poverty in his multi-volume *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1891–1903). This famous work generated a number of systematic and statistical investigations of the causes and remedies of poverty. A Unionist and a friend of Chamberlain, Booth was persuaded by W A S Hewins to become a member of the Tariff Commission created in December 1903 (Hewins 1929, 1 78).

In the judgment of a number of informed commentators, Booth's presence muted the partisan nature of the Commission by giving it some acceptability with the working classes. Beatrice Webb's diary indicates Booth's reputation and the impact of his affiliation in 1903.

December 20th The effect created by the accession of Charles Booth to the protectionist ranks proves what power, nowadays, is wielded by a non-party expert who is free to throw himself on one side or the other, and who is widely known to be personally disinterested, if not, indeed, philanthropic in his ends. Intrinsically I do not attach much importance to C B's. opinion on the fiscal question But for the world at large his credentials are seventeen volumes, a public life of thirty years' service, and a great expenditure of private means for public objects (Webb 1982–83, 2 311)

The Spectator, in an editorial comment, lavishly praised Russell's article, claiming that the argument was "a masterpiece of concentrated and destructive analysis" of Booth's tariff proposals (92 [6 Feb 1904] 223).

No manuscript being known, the copy-text is the published article in *The Contemporary Review*, 85 (Feb. 1904), 198–206. Russell's copy of the issue is not marked in any way.

MR CHARLES BOOTH's very temperate and moderate article on Fiscal Reform in the current *National Review* contains an entirely new scheme, which differs very widely from Mr. Chamberlain's. It seems most improbable that this scheme will find favour, since it has less of the appeal to sectional interests, which has given such success to the Glasgow plan. But the great weight which justly attaches to Mr. Booth's opinions makes an examination of his arguments important.

His proposal is, to place a perfectly uniform tax of 5 per cent on all imports from foreign countries with which we may hereafter conclude commercial treaties, and an equally uniform tax of 10 per cent on imports from other foreign countries; these taxes to be imposed for the sake, primarily, of imperial preference, secondarily for the sake of protection, and thirdly for negotiation. The duties on materials are to be refunded by a drawback to exporters of manufactures employing the materials.

This plan, it must be confessed, would be to a certain extent free, if it worked, from the most objectionable feature of Mr Chamberlain's propaganda, namely the struggle of private interests to acquire public money by means of political pressure. It is strange that Mr Booth should, under these circumstances, have joined the "Commission" which inaugurates the scramble for plunder caused by tariff-mongering. But an arithmetical barrier against corruption is indeed a pill to cure an earthquake.

It is difficult to criticize Mr. Booth's article, since no proof is given or even attempted that the adoption of his scheme would cure the evils which he fears, or secure the benefits which he claims. In replying to his contentions, however, the following division may be made.

- I. The case for Free Trade is not adequately stated in Mr. Booth's opening paragraph, and is not open to the objections urged by him.
- II. The objects which he aims at would not be achieved by his scheme.
- III. Internal difficulties render the scheme impracticable, and would prevent its adoption from having the finality which he desires.
- IV. Special evils, not anticipated by him, would result from any Protective Tariff.

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I. Mr Booth affirms that the case for Free Trade is "cosmopolitan in its ideal, *laissez-faire* in its philosophy, and individualist in its principles". This statement seems by no means correct. The Free Trader's contention is that, whatever other nations may do, a nation profits, both in regard to the amount and to the distribution of its wealth, by avoiding that kind of State interference which is constituted by Protective import duties or export bounties. As regards other kinds of State interference, Free Traders as such have no opinion, and as a matter of fact, not only many individualists, but also the Socialists of all countries are in favour of Free Trade. The only

cosmopolitan element in the Free Trade case is that Free Traders are unwilling to forego an advantage to their own country merely because the securing of that advantage incidentally benefits other countries also

It is customary to accuse Free Traders of being *doctrinaire*; but what could be more *doctrinaire* than the argument, advanced by our modern Protectionists, that, because some forms of State interference are admittedly beneficial, it is therefore illogical not to favour any and every State interference that may be suggested?

Mr. Booth asserts that Free Traders do not count the cost of friction. This is totally contrary to the facts: as a matter of fact, almost all the mitigations of friction which have resulted either from legislation or from trade unionism have been achieved by the efforts of convinced Free Traders. The assumption seems to be that a Protective Tariff tends to diminish fluctuations, and this assumption also underlies the contention that Protection would make employment more regular. For this view there is no warrant either in theory or experience as regards experience, the seven volumes on "The Disturbances in German Economic Life in 1900-2" give a sufficient refutation.¹

It is true that Free Traders, while regretting the hardships incidental to all economic transitions, are not willing to adopt the plan enforced in the ancient kingdom of the Incas, where every man was compelled by law to follow the same trade as his father. Most of the arguments used on this point by Protectionists would have applied, and were applied, against the introduction of machinery during the industrial revolution of a hundred years ago. If the most profitable trades grow faster than the population, they must grow at the expense of others which are less profitable, and there must be "ruined industries" to lament over. The town of Coventry, formerly devoted to silk, finds now a far more profitable employment in bicycles and motor cars, is this to be matter for regret?

Mr. Booth's remarks on the balance of trade do not contain any material criticism of the Board of Trade memorandum on the excess of imports. It is not claimed by Free Traders that the part of our imports which comes in payment of interest on foreign investments is paid for by present exports, though it is the return on capital formerly exported, which was presumably the produce of British labour. But this part of our imports would not be checked by an import duty, unless it were so imposed as to ruin those among us who have invested money abroad. The part of our imports which would be checked would be the part paid for by our exports, or by the earnings of our shipping, which Mr. Booth unduly ignores. The desire that the returns on our foreign investments should come in the shape of raw materials, in order to give employment to British labour, is one which, to begin with,

¹ *Die Störungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben während der Jahre 1900 ff* (Leipzig, 1903)

would in all likelihood not be furthered by a uniform tariff; and the view as to the causes of unemployment which it involves is mistaken. In 1899, in spite of a considerable import of manufactures, there was practically no unemployment in England, and the fact is that unemployment is not caused by this or that distribution of industry, but by fluctuations Wars, by diverting industry, temporarily, into abnormal channels, always cause unemployment when they cease, and the present lack of employment is presumably traceable in a great measure to the disturbances caused by the war in South Africa

A most curious charge of inconsistency is brought against the Free ¹⁰ Traders (p. 690) on the ground that, having adopted Free Trade at home, we submitted to "humiliating ourselves by resorting to persuasion". It is suggested that we might have let the policies of foreign nations alone, since, "according to the theory we upheld, they could only result in loss to those who pursued them" This implies the vicious theory that what injures other nations must be advantageous to us. As a matter of fact, Foreign Tariffs, on the Free Trade theory, are injurious both to us and to the nations imposing them Why persuasion should be considered "humiliating" it is impossible to see. The greatest diminutions of Foreign Tariffs ever effected were due to Cobden's persuasions. Is it contended that it is disgraceful to succeed by the ²⁰ appeal to reason, but honourable and desirable to fail with the "big revolver"? This is a strange view, truly. And it is forgotten why Peel abandoned the weapon whose value is so extolled "Weary of our long and unavailing efforts", he said, "to enter into satisfactory commercial treaties with other nations, we have determined at length to consult our own interests." But Peel, of course, was a cosmopolitan *doctrinaire* with no practical experience of Government.

"Our unqualified reception of imports", Mr. Booth says (p. 690), "has done much to encourage the Protective system of others, especially in Europe, and a change in this respect might now do much in the opposite ³⁰ direction.... Stripped of its ideals Free Trade may still triumph" He gives no grounds for this paradox, which will be generally admitted by students of commercial negotiations to be the opposite of the truth. The only way in which such a result may conceivably have happened is through the more dominant position which we acquired by Free Trade. Had we remained Protectionists, our manufacturers would have prospered less, and tariffs might have been less essential to their exclusion Is this what is meant? Mr. Booth's prophecy for the future appears as groundless as his statement concerning the past If we become convinced that Protection is essential to a nation's prosperity, how will that lead other nations to Free Trade? This is ⁴⁰ an instance of that lip-service which is (to modify La Rochefoucauld) the homage that Protection pays to Free Trade. If Mr Chamberlain's followers believed that his scheme would in the end further Free Trade, nine-tenths

of them would cease to desire it, since Protection is the haven in which they hope to find rest.

II. The objects aimed at by Mr Booth are: (1) Imperial unity, (2) Protection, (3) reduction of Foreign Tariffs. With regard to the first and third, it is unnecessary to repeat arguments which have already been urged *ad nauseam*, and have probably by this time convinced those who are capable of being convinced by them. But with regard to the second, there is a good deal to be said.

Mr. Booth's reasons for desiring Protection are. (1) To cause a larger proportion of our imports to consist of raw materials; (2) to increase the amount and the regularity of employment, (3) to enlarge the market for our manufactures, and (4) to stimulate enterprise through the security of the home market Let us examine whether his scheme is likely to secure these objects.

(1) To increase the proportion of our imports consisting of raw materials, it would be necessary, *prima facie*, to tax manufactured articles at a higher rate than raw materials; but Mr Booth proposes a uniform tariff, to be imposed even upon raw cotton and iron ore There is therefore no reason to think that his tax would check finished goods to any greater extent than it would check the materials employed in the manufacture of such goods for the home market. And on this point, Mr Booth himself offers us no argument.

(2). The next object is to increase the amount and the regularity of employment This assumes that a tariff will prevent fluctuations, whereas the experience of all Protected countries shows the exact opposite. In France, on the average, the number of unemployed is about double what it is in the United Kingdom In Germany, though exact statistics are hard to obtain, it is well known what a widespread collapse has occurred in recent years In America, the Steel Trust alone has lately reduced its payments of wages and salaries by £3,000,000 These facts show that regularity of employment is not to be obtained by tariffs. And especially the imposition of a new tariff always causes dislocations. At first, it injures trades incapable of Protection, such as building, railways and shipbuilding Capital and labour are attracted into the newly Protected trades, very soon there is a great over-production, a slump follows, a large proportion of employés are thrown out of work, a trust or cartel is organized to restrict output and keep up prices, and a higher tariff is demanded to remedy the evil If the demand is granted, the whole cycle is repeated. This is not a fancy picture, but plain history, verified over and over again. The variations in supply and demand which must result from commercial wars, even on the modest scale suggested by Mr Booth, will also greatly increase the irregularities of trade and industry.

(3) It is difficult to see how the markets of any industry which has an export trade can be increased by increasing the cost of production. As a matter of fact, taken all round, the market for our manufactures is larger than that of any Protected country, except in special lines stimulated by export bounties. Drawbacks will not avoid an increase in the cost of production of most manufactures, since, besides actual materials, all the tools and machinery employed will become dearer, and in any case the capital invested in paying the duty on materials is locked up until the product is exported, and this capital must bear interest. Moreover, all such arguments make the assumption—perfectly valid, but most inconvenient—that there is no truth in Mr. Chamberlain's promise of higher wages. There is every reason, therefore, to expect a shrinkage in our exports as a result of Protection, and to reject the assertion that Protection will in general give a larger market.¹⁰

(4) It is possible that, in a few trades, the first effect of Protection might be to stimulate enterprise, but it is at least equally probable that it would cause contentment with ancient methods and antiquated plant, reliance upon the tariff replacing improvement in processes. And it is certain that, with the inevitable growth of monopolies that would result, the stimulus of competition would be removed, and the public would be forced to contribute, through higher prices, to the support of the inefficient.²⁰

It is, therefore, to say the least, exceedingly unlikely that the results desired by Mr. Booth would be secured by Protection, or, more particularly, by the tariff which he advocates.

III There are grave internal difficulties in the way of Mr. Booth's plan.

It is claimed that the tariff of 5 per cent all round, and 10 per cent in the absence of a commercial treaty, is "based on simple and intelligible principles", and that uncertainty from lack of finality is not to be dreaded (p. 693). This claim is surprising, since no principles whatever, whether simple and intelligible, or complex and unintelligible, are assigned for fixing the duties at the amount suggested. The arguments in favour of the plan, if valid, would point to a higher scale of duties on manufactured articles than on raw materials, and would seem to justify a very much greater measure of Protection. Professor Ashley advocates, in certain cases, duties of 50 or even 75 per cent; and if Protection is as useful as we are told, it is hard to see why it should be so restricted.³⁰

The beneficial results which Mr. Booth anticipates from his tariff in regard to employment can obviously only occur in so far as imports are actually excluded; and, therefore, if his duties do not in any case prove prohibitive, his own "principles" would justify and require a higher rate.⁴⁰

That such a plan as Mr. Booth's should have any finality is quite incredible. Indeed here, as so often in the arguments of moderate Protectionists,

there is a curious disregard of human nature In the first place, a tax on raw cotton or wool would not be tolerated, and is outside practical politics With these exceptions go many others, thus the simplicity of the plan is at once lost Again, *ad valorem* duties are an inevitable source of fraud, since the Customs cannot discover the true values of goods imported. If, in place of *ad valorem* duties, specific quantitative duties, aiming at an average of 5 per cent, were introduced, discriminations would be necessary, and the door would be opened to corruption, the fear of which, apparently, is Mr. Booth's motive in desiring uniformity In a democratic country, it seems impossible to devise any scheme of Protection which shall avoid this danger; as soon as the electoral machine can be used by private interests for their pecuniary profit, campaigns of misrepresentation and of appeals to cupidity make political purity impossible In the same number of the *National Review*, in which Mr. Booth's article appears, there is an article on "The Most Corrupt City in the World"—Philadelphia, which is also the most Protectionist city in the world. Perhaps hereafter we may be able to show cities in this country able to dispute the prize in this proud contest

Another reason which would make the maintenance of a uniform tariff impossible would be the desire for retaliation in tariff wars If the imposition of the 10 per cent duty did not cause a foreign nation to come to terms, but provoked instead discriminating dues against our shipping and prohibitive duties on our exports, is it likely we should merely sit still and wring our hands? Surely it is obvious that we should reply by similar measures, provided that were possible And the duties imposed for retaliatory purposes would cause vested interests to grow up, which would render their subsequent removal difficult or impossible

Export drawbacks on products employing materials subject to import duties are attended with many difficulties. In the first place, is a drawback to be paid only on such as employ materials which have actually been imported, or on all exports employing dutiable materials, whether these materials have been actually imported or produced at home? If the latter plan is adopted, this causes an additional protection to the home producers of the material employed, moreover, if, as in the case of iron and steel, the home production is much greater than the importation, the expense to the Exchequer becomes great, and the Budget will be impossible without the imposition of more taxes than are contemplated. If, on the other hand, as is customary where an export drawback is given, no allowance is made except for materials actually imported, new difficulties arise If actual proof is required of identity of the materials contained in the exported goods with the materials imported, the door is opened to frauds which are almost impossible to prevent. But if proof of identity is not required, then, whenever the export of finished goods is as great as or greater than the import of the materials employed, there is no longer any protection of the home

producer of the material, since the whole of the import duty paid can be recovered by exporters. And it must be remembered that all these schemes involve the result that the foreigner will be able to buy our produce more cheaply than we shall. Surely those who advocate such a policy, rather than the Free Traders, deserve to be called "friends of every country but their own". On this policy Professor Brentano, in a recent article in favour of Free Trade in Germany, remarks "Perhaps in no point does the contradiction show more crassly between the separate interests pursued under the banner of protection of national labour and the interest of the national economy."² When he advocated English Free Trade in the *Fortnightly Review*, in August, he was said by our tariff reformers to have been ordered to do so by the German Government. It would be equally legitimate to suppose that his recent article, addressed exclusively to the Germans, had been inspired by our Protectionists.

IV It remains to consider what evils would be likely to result from the adoption of Mr. Booth's scheme

The first and obvious evil of all Protection is that it tends to increase the cost of living without any corresponding increase in wages. Mr. Booth, though he maintains, for reasons which have been already argued to be inadequate, that it would increase the regularity of employment, does not assert that wages would be raised. He does, however, contend that the cost of living would not be increased, and, in spite of his great authority, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he has overlooked some of the most important factors in deciding this question.

In Germany, food and almost all the necessities of life are dearer than in England, hardly any important commodity is cheaper, except human beings.

Mr. Booth's contentions in this respect are curiously contradictory. He urges, on the one hand, that Protection, by leading to trusts and cartels, affords manufacturers the advantage of selling dear at home and cheap abroad, on the other hand, that internal competition and the stimulus to production will prevent prices from rising by the amount of the duty. These two mutually destructive contentions occur in the same paragraph (p. 697). The fact is, of course, that the former is true in all those branches of production which permit the organization of trusts and cartels, while the latter, though it may have a measure of truth in regard to agricultural produce, will usually cease to apply before the stage at which a commodity is ready for consumption. It is impossible for a trust to own all the cattle or sheep in a country, yet, as is well known, the supply of meat in America is in the hands of trusts. Thus, by Mr. Booth's own admission, his plan will

stimulate the formation of monopolies, and will cause the foreigner to obtain our products more cheaply than they can be obtained at home.

Mr Booth asserts that the cost of living will not be appreciably increased by his scheme, and that whatever increase there is might be adjusted by lowering the duties on tea, sugar, and tobacco. The two former, at least, ought to be lowered in any case. But when we remember what Mr. Chamberlain always forgets, that the price of manufactured articles will be increased, and that generally a trade combination will succeed in exacting the full duty from consumers, it becomes impossible to accept the view that
10 the cost of living will not be raised; it seems evident, on the contrary, that it must be raised in all classes.

It would seem that one effect of Protection would be to produce the very result which Mr. Booth wishes to avoid, namely to diminish the proportion of our imports consisting of more or less raw materials, to which British labour is applied in the way of finishing manufactures. Mr. Booth admits that dumping is not wholly an evil, and he does not claim that his scheme will prevent it. But the point is that when a trust or cartel sells a half-manufactured product more cheaply for export than for home consumption, it causes the later stages of manufacture to flourish more with us than
20 in its own country. And this result of the policy of cartels is shown to be powerfully operative, as regards Germany, in the last Consular report for the district of Frankfort-on-Main.

The evils to be feared from Mr. Booth's scheme may be summed up as follows:

- (1) The policy of selling dear at home and cheap abroad, which he admits to be the result of Protection, involves, in addition to the obvious loss to the consumer, a diminution of his purchasing power, thereby restricting the home market for all commodities except, perhaps, the barest necessities.
- 30 (2). If dumping is an evil, Mr. Booth's scheme will not prevent it; if it is not an evil, what purpose will the scheme serve?
- (3). The scheme will encourage monopolies, with all the tyranny and corruption which they foster.
- (4). There is not a shadow of a reason for believing that, as is asserted without argument, the scheme will make employment more regular; on the contrary, there is every reason to think that, by restricting people's purchasing power, it will have the opposite effect at first, and will involve permanently either lower wages or longer hours.

For all these reasons, it is to be hoped that those who desire the national
40 welfare will resist the adoption of any such measures as Mr. Booth recommends.

Mr. Gerald Balfour on Countervailing Duties [1904]

RUSSELL'S LETTER TO the editor of *The Westminster Gazette* was in response to a speech in the House of Commons on 8 February 1904 by Gerald William Balfour (1853–1945). He was President of the Board of Trade in the Unionist administrations of 1900–05 and a brother of the Prime Minister. Gerald Balfour was replying to John Morley, who had proposed on 8 February, at the beginning of the 1904 parliamentary session, an amendment to the Address from the Throne condemning imperial preference. All Liberals, as well as the public at large, knew that the Unionist coalition was seriously split among three groups—those who favoured the Prime Minister's limited fiscal policy of retaliation, those who followed Chamberlain in advocating preference as well as a general tariff, and those who comprised an influential minority of free traders. Liberals hoped that the skilfully worded Morley amendment would cause sufficient numbers of anti-Chamberlain M.P.s to vote with the Opposition, thereby causing the Government to fall. In the event, the Balfour administration survived the tumultuous, week-long debate, but only with internal differences exacerbated. Nevertheless, because of Arthur Balfour's skill as a parliamentarian, the Ministry managed to last almost two more years, defying the prophecies of political commentators.

Unionist fiscal quarrels had been dramatized by the contradictory replies various Cabinet ministers gave in speaking to the Morley amendment. Because of the Prime Minister's illness, his position was defended by some of the Cabinet, particularly Gerald Balfour, who attempted to keep Unionists loyal by declaring that the Government did not support preference and a general tariff. In the absence of their leader, who was exhausted from his extensive speaking campaign, pro-Chamberlain ministers rejected such attempts on Balfour's behalf to conciliate Unionist free traders and advocated instead the full tariff reform programme.

The tone of Russell's letter reflects his satisfaction, and that of other Liberals, at the Unionist disarray. However, Russell was not concerned primarily to highlight these differences, but was determined to undermine the policy of retaliation by which the Prime Minister aspired to establish a bare minimum of agreement to hold his Ministry together.

No manuscript is known to exist. The copy-text is the letter, printed in *The Westminster Gazette*, 10 Feb 1904, p 2, an evening paper edited by the influential Liberal journalist, J A Spender.

SIR,—All Free Traders will welcome the emphatic repudiation of Protection as such which was elicited from Mr. Gerald Balfour by Mr. Morley's amendment. But in the course of his speech he endorsed certain maxims from which Protection logically follows, and Free Traders should observe that, if these maxims pass unchallenged, protective legislation will become irresistible.

His case for Retaliation rested upon the necessity of a weapon against outrageous unfairness. No one will deny—Mr. Morley himself admitted—that, when such cases arise, we should be willing, if we had a reasonable prospect of success, to adopt any not too injurious method of reprisal. But it appeared in the course of his speech that the cases of unfairness he had in his mind were not cases of adverse duties but of export bounties, and his model of Retaliation was the Sugar Convention. He pointed out, very truly, that import duties can sometimes be used by Cartels to provide export bounties, and held that this fact, so far from diminishing the harm which they do us, positively increases it.

How erroneous this view is will be evident to every person who understands the elementary principles of foreign trade. Foreign export bounties cheapen the products to which they apply, and thus give us a greater quantity of goods in return for our exports. It is true that foreign bounties injure the producers in this country with whose produce they compete, but they benefit not only the consumer but also the producers who make the exports which pay for the bounty-fed produce. In the case of sugar, as is well known, the many industries which use sugar as raw material have suffered by the rise in price; and these industries are very much larger than sugar-refining, which was the only industry injured.

The most important case in which import duties have been used to provide export bounties is steel. Is it proposed by Mr. Gerald Balfour to place countervailing duties on German, American, and Canadian steel? (In the last case there is a direct bounty.) If so, he will gravely injure engineering and machinery, ship-building and shipping; and by enhancing the price of machinery he will injure all the industries in which machinery is used. The "outrageous unfairness" in the existing state of things falls upon the trades which use steel in foreign countries, and the producers in this country who would be directly injured by a duty on steel must outnumber by fully ten to one the producers who would benefit.

If Retaliation is to be adopted, it is to be hoped that a little more intelligence will be shown in working it than was shown in the case of the Sugar Convention. Foreign import duties injure us by compelling us to manufacture at home goods which, if there were no such duties, we could import more cheaply in return for exports; but foreign bounties benefit us

by enabling us to import goods in return for our exports more cheaply than we could manufacture them ourselves. When import duties are used as export bounties, that use diminishes, and may completely counterbalance, the harm which they do by their direct use as import duties. If Retaliation is to be used as Mr. Gerald Balfour appeared to suggest, it will mean merely the sacrifice by this country of advantages derived from the folly of foreign Governments—advantages which it is likely they will cease of themselves to confer when the export policy of trusts comes to be generally appreciated by electors in the countries where it is practised.

The upshot of Mr. Gerald Balfour's suggestions is, that where foreign ¹⁰ tariffs injure us, we should "take it lying down", but where they directly or indirectly benefit us, we should hit back until the benefit was withdrawn.—Yours, &c.,

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Part v

Liberalism and Women's Suffrage

General Headnote

THESE PAPERS ON suffrage and politics must be examined first in the context of shifting Liberal policies on women's franchise during the years 1906–14, and second by reference to the nature and activities of the leading women's suffrage organizations in the same period. While Liberal policies on the subject and women's suffrage activities were often the result of interactions, for the sake of clarity the two aspects relating to the franchise issue are outlined separately.

In the election of January 1906 the Liberal Party, under Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, won the greatest landslide in British history since the Whig victory of 1832. With a large majority over all other parties—Unionist, Irish Nationalist and Labour combined—the Liberals appeared to be in an unassailable position to enact sweeping legislation. Not since Gladstone's Ministry of 1880–85 had there been a Liberal majority Government, and for the previous twenty years the Unionist Coalition had been almost continuously in power. For many progressives such as Russell, the 1906 triumph accelerated the rethinking of Liberal theory and policy which had been going on among "New Liberals" since late in the 1880s. Russell shared with many of those Liberals a belief that the broadening of the franchise was a necessary condition for progress in politics and society. He could, therefore, take great comfort in the fact that a majority of the successful Liberal M.P.s favoured the principle of some form of women's suffrage (Blewett 1972, 338), and that a majority of the Party had been committed, however vaguely, to the attainment of full manhood suffrage since the Newcastle Programme of 1891. Indeed, by the establishment of a Liberal M.P.s' Suffrage Committee, in contrast to the traditional small all-party groups which had existed during past late-Victorian and early-Edwardian administrations, suffrage had become a particular Liberal cause. Yet, in practice, the Edwardian franchise was still far from democratic, even for men. Owing to various cumbersome requirements and restrictions, particularly relating to registration, at most sixty per cent of adult males were eligible to vote in any election before 1918, and plural voting gave an inordinate advantage to the wealthy and the university educated.

The victorious Liberal Government, however, had no official commitment to the enactment of any form of women's suffrage. The Party as a whole, and certainly the Cabinet, were far more intent, for example, on passing during 1906 and 1907 legislation concerning labour and education. Moreover, from 1908 on, various social reforms and defence measures were given priority, dwarfing official considerations

of women's suffrage, no matter how great the pressures applied by suffrage societies. This attitude was also partly the result of implacable opposition by a number of important Cabinet ministers, particularly Louis Harcourt and, until 1911, Herbert Henry Asquith himself. Hence, the Government of Campbell-Bannerman and, from April 1908, that of Asquith, refused to make women's suffrage a Government policy. Moreover, with the rejection of the Lloyd George Budget by the House of Lords in November 1909, the struggle to curtail the veto power of the Upper House absorbed Liberal energies until August 1911, when the Parliament Act was passed.

From 1906 through 1909 Liberal administrations ensured that the private members' bills were either "talked out" on second reading or defeated by other manipulations of parliamentary procedure. There were two kinds of such bills. One, traditionally presented in most sessions, would give women the vote on the same basis as men—thereby, many Liberals feared, significantly increasing the potential Unionist vote by enfranchising middle-class, propertied women. The other kind of bill, such as that put forward by Russell's cousin Geoffrey Howard in 1909, proposed adult suffrage. This recommended legislation appealed to many Liberals and also to the Labour Party, which in 1907 had made the attainment of adult suffrage part of their programme. However, so long as the House of Lords had veto powers, such a measure would never pass. Moreover, the Liberals had done very well in 1906 under a franchise system which allowed only about sixty per cent of the male population to vote. Some Liberals, therefore, were very reluctant to see the coming of universal suffrage, since such a massive and sudden infusion of inexperienced voters could threaten their political supremacy. Many Liberals were also responsive to the demands of the various female suffrage societies which opposed such a measure, because it would not recognize exclusively women's right to vote.

After the 1910 elections many Liberal MPs supported adult suffrage, despite all the uncertainties such a policy posed. The reason for this change was that the elections had left the Liberals and the Unionists virtually equal in the Commons, rendering Asquith's administration dependent for continuance in office upon the Labour Party and the Irish Nationalist Party. Since the present electoral system could no longer be counted on to deliver a Liberal majority, some Cabinet ministers too considered gambling on a wider measure of franchise reform, hoping that most new working-class electors would vote Liberal. Thus the all-party Conciliation Committee, formed in 1910, which proposed women's suffrage Conciliation Bills in 1910 and 1911, was totally unsuccessful. Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of Trade, attacked the first Bill as so limited as certain to benefit only the Unionists. Even the somewhat broader 1911 Bill was unacceptable to the Liberals and was dismissed in March 1912. These Liberal actions led to unprecedented suffragette agitation. Their violence was intensified by Asquith's public commitment in November 1911 that the Liberals would enact manhood suffrage, which could be expanded by amendment to women. The suffragettes (and most suffragists) wanted franchise legislation which would deal exclusively with women. Their militancy contributed to a general public backlash which reinforced the Liberal

rejection of the second Conciliation Bill.

By June 1912 the Liberal Government were prepared to sponsor the Franchise and Registration Bill which would have abolished all plural voting and simplified registration for the franchise. The Government granted that the Bill could be amended to include women, and some amendments to the Bill were immediately drawn up by members of the Labour Party and some leaders of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. To allow both sides in the Cabinet to express their opinions, the ministers agreed to consider the different amendments as "open questions" on which they could speak and vote according to their convictions. On 27 January 1913, to the consternation of the suffrage advocates in the Cabinet and most supporters of women's suffrage (save for the militants), the Speaker ruled that if any amendment approving women's suffrage were carried, it would so fundamentally alter the Bill that the proposed legislation would have to be withdrawn. Russell reflected much outraged opinion when he exclaimed to Lady Ottoline Morrell, "The Speaker's bombshell about the Franchise Bill is very upsetting. I wish he could be hanged drawn and quartered" (#680, pmk 24 Jan. 1913). After that fiasco, one last pre-war private member's bill was put forward and voted down in May 1913. Such lack of success was disheartening because Liberals such as Russell had long believed that their Party would enact some measure of women's suffrage.

In expectation of Lloyd George's support for the relatively wide second Conciliation Bill, Russell enthusiastically set the suffrage issue in its historical setting for Lady Ottoline:

So I suppose it is nearly certain that next year about seven million women will get the vote. It is astonishing. I have *no* doubt in my mind that it is one of those great events, like religious toleration or emancipation of slaves, that date a period and become landmarks for the whole future. I think the only other thing of equal importance in our age is the awakening of the Far East. (#261, pmk. 18 Nov 1911)

Unfortunately for Liberals, the Asquith Government after 1912 was distracted by domestic labour unrest, the German threat, and particularly the Ulster crisis, and so handicapped by vacillation about extending suffrage, that no measure of franchise reform was enacted before the outbreak of World War I.

The Liberal failure to carry some form of women's suffrage cannot simply be attributed to a governmental and public reaction against the militant suffragettes. Nor can the blame be placed exclusively on Asquith. The Liberal Party as a whole were unwilling, for a variety of reasons, to grasp the opportunity to extend the franchise. They paid dearly for their failure. When the Fourth Reform Act was passed by a predominantly Unionist Coalition Government in 1918 only a limited, privileged minority of women, thirty years of age and over, got the vote. Though many of the 8,479,000 eligible to cast ballots did vote, the women who voted seem to have supported the Coalition.

A summary of the major competing suffrage organizations, as they developed in Edwardian Britain, presents a general background against which to place the papers in this section. In 1906, the year when Russell probably composed "On the Democratic Ideal" (18) and "The Status of Women" (19), there were two, profoundly different groups agitating for women's franchise. The one which Russell very actively supported until 1909 was the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS). Indeed, late in 1906 Russell accepted a position on the newly formed council of the National Union and was elected to the Executive Committee in early February 1907. He attended meetings regularly, donated generously and took particular interest in the Cambridge branch. The NUWSS traced its beginnings to 1865 when John Stuart Mill first made women's suffrage an issue by bringing it before the electors in the constituency of Westminster. The same year a society in London was formed to debate the subject, and in 1866 Mill and Henry Fawcett presented a petition to the Commons calling for enfranchisement regardless of sex. That event initiated the continuous campaign for women's suffrage. Working by constitutional means and looking to the Liberal Party to advance their cause, some 600 localized women's organizations acted as pressure groups. In 1897, these societies were affiliated by the president, Millicent Fawcett, under the title of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. By 1906 their members and followers were popularly known as "suffragists" to distinguish them from the new militant "suffragettes" as, from early 1906, members of the recently established Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) came to be popularly designated.

Russell was first attracted to the NUWSS by their constitutional approach to women's suffrage, as well as by their emphasis on education and a general disposition in favour of the Liberal Party. Although fundamentally in favour of adult suffrage, as opposed to Mrs Fawcett's concentration on gaining the vote for females on the same, limited grounds as males, Russell from 1906 to 1909 viewed the NUWSS as the group most likely to get some women the vote. The depth of his commitment to the wider franchise is revealed in letters to Margaret Llewelyn Davies:

All my sympathies are with Adult Suffrage: women who merely want to be among the oppressors rather than among the oppressed don't seem to me worthy of much sympathy. But it seems plain that Adult Suffrage can only be got after a tremendous agitation, extending over many years, and not then unless a large majority of women can be brought really to desire it. (2 April 1907)

In the face of necessity, he was prepared to compromise. His position was made explicit in correspondence to Davies: "The other policy, of refusing the half-loaf altogether, seems to me fatal" (20 Sept. 1907). He feared that support for adult suffrage could be an excuse "to shelve women" (19 Feb. 1908).

The sister of two of Russell's best friends from Cambridge, Crompton and Theodore, Miss Davies was a prominent suffragist and the leading person in the

Women's Co-operative Movement Russell's "very profound admiration" led him to engage in an extended correspondence with her on women's rights. Indeed, her persuasions gave him the final impetus in 1909 to resign from the Executive of the NUWSS and join the People's Suffrage Federation (PSF). Until 1909, however, Russell consistently worked with the NUWSS, urging them to support the Liberal Party as the only alternative to gain their ends. He persisted with the NUWSS even though Mrs Fawcett and most of her followers were suspicious of the Liberals as ultimately not trustworthy, particularly after Asquith (an avowed anti-suffragist) became Prime Minister in April 1908. Russell was exasperated with their unwillingness to give steady support to the Liberals, and he found them, as he complained to Miss Davies, "largely undemocratic" (2 April 1907). To Lucy Donnelly he was even more sharply critical of the NUWSS and in particular Mrs Fawcett, whose "position is that, although the vote should be independent of sex, it should not be independent of property I have no sympathy with this view" (17 Nov 1909). Russell was also very sceptical of the suffragists' concentration on franchise equality, when "from the point of view of the economic struggle women are so heavily handicapped by nature" (to Davies, 22 July 1906). He believed that this economic disability was fundamental to women because so many became mothers, a function for which they were unpaid. This problem, particularly for working-class women, could only be rectified by maternity allowances—a view Russell first tentatively put forward to Alys in 1894 and maintained all his life.

Despite these reservations, Papers 20–24 are evidence of his concern to persuade the NUWSS and the Liberal Party to act in unison, if only to secure a limited measure of female enfranchisement. By November 1909, however, Russell found that he could no longer serve on the Executive. In addition to his other differences, he objected, as Paper 25 indicates, to their insistence that all political issues be subordinated to the attainment of the franchise. Russell believed after the Lords' rejection of the Lloyd George Budget in 1909 that the pre-eminent political issue was the Liberal need to control the House of Lords. Therefore, the NUWSS policy in asking their followers to support in the forthcoming election *any* candidate, regardless of party, provided he favoured suffrage, was regarded by Russell as dangerous political opportunism which could lead to the election of Unionists pledged to uphold the power of the Upper House. Russell's disengagement from the NUWSS allowed him, at last, to follow his preferences by joining a new organization advocating adult suffrage—the People's Suffrage Federation. By comparing the slogans of the two groups, the greater attraction to Russell of the aims of the PSF is evident. The motto of the NUWSS was "To obtain the Parliamentary Suffrage for Women on the same terms as it is, or may be, granted to Men"; while that of the PSF was "to obtain the Parliamentary suffrage for every adult man and woman, on a short residential qualification". As Paper 25 reveals, the Liberal and Labour members who comprised the PSF recognized that their parties were increasingly determined to carry out adult suffrage because the present franchise laws and their anomalies favoured the Unionists.

The other principal Edwardian women's suffrage organization, the Women's Social and Political Union, was founded in Manchester in 1903 by Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters, Christabel and Sylvia. Impatient with the cautious, constitutional methods of the traditional suffrage societies, the WSPU mounted from October 1905 a campaign of militancy to try to force the Liberals to pass a franchise bill giving women the vote on the same terms as men. Their militancy increased as they failed to coerce the Government, and as Christabel's implacable belief in political intimidation came to dominate the WSPU. From heckling, disrupting meetings and holding mass rallies, WSPU members resorted to hunger strikes in prison, and ultimately to arson and other attacks on people and property. Beginning in 1909, the harassed Liberal Government reacted with a policy of forcible feeding and tacit support for harshness and even brutality by the police against suffragettes.

Russell had comparatively few public comments to make about the suffragettes, even though their sensational tactics received massive publicity in Edwardian Britain and overshadowed the efforts of the NUWSS and other moderate groups such as the PSF. While Russell admired the bravery demonstrated by many suffragettes, he agreed with unyielding Government policies toward them as necessary to uphold the law. He fulminated to Lucy Donnelly about those WSPU sympathizers who deplored forcible feeding over which "an absurd fuss has been made":

It has been constantly resorted to for ordinary criminals without anybody's objecting to it. The women to whom it has been applied have committed serious acts of violence and other things calculated to kill innocent people. If the Government lets them out when they starve, all criminals will adopt the hunger strike, and the criminal law is at an end. (17 Nov 1909)

Adding to WSPU notoriety was their ruthless authoritarianism, based partly on the model of the Irish Nationalist Party, and especially the much publicized periodic purges of members not considered by Christabel and her mother to be sufficiently obedient. Despite repugnance at many of their actions, Russell did remark to Davies on 3 November 1906 that "at first" he thought the militants "were making a mistake, but now they do seem to have really helped on public opinion". In *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* (27), Russell in 1910 mocked A V Dicey's claim that women had less persistence than men. He observed ironically that the jurist's belief that suffragette influence on British policy would be unfortunate was, no doubt, based on their "sad lack of tenacity" (312-32). Moreover, some years after the Great War he reflected even more favourably about the suffragettes, for they "showed that they possessed as much courage as the bravest men, this demonstration was essential in winning them the vote" (1925, 81).

Yet Russell, with his belief in reasoned argument and the sanctity of Parliament, was fundamentally unsympathetic to the WSPU. As he lamented to Lady Ottoline, their militancy had, in his estimation, destroyed the second Conciliation Bill and "put off Women's Suffrage for twenty years" (#383, pmk 14 March 1912). His

commitment to the PSF, with its advocacy of the franchise for all adult men and women, was antithetical to the narrow sectarianism of the WSPU. Suffragettes held in contempt his cherished vision of better personal relations between the sexes founded on mutual understanding rather than militant feminism. No matter what differences Russell had with some groups fighting for women's rights, he was proud of his involvement in the struggle. As he wrote in old age, "Few things are more surprising than the rapid and complete victory of this cause throughout the civilized world. I am glad to have had a part in anything so successful" (1967, 155).

On the Democratic Ideal [c. 1906]

"ON THE DEMOCRATIC Ideal" and "The Status of Women" (19) are Russell's first essays on two related topics the extension of liberty generally and women's suffrage in particular. These papers, which Russell left unpublished, reflect beliefs derived from the intellectual legacies of his family and from John Stuart Mill. Mill's *On Liberty* (1859), *The Subjection of Women* (1869) and *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861) were all directly influential.

There is, in Russell's correspondence, clear evidence that he was writing on suffrage in the spring of 1906. In a letter of 4 June to Margaret Llewelyn Davies, he expressed the central idea of "The Status of Women", an idea which also has a major place among a number of related topics in "On the Democratic Ideal".

I think woman suffrage important, not so much on account of the direct political effect, as because I detest the general assumption of women's inferiority, which seems to me degrading to both men and women. It seems to me the most desirable effect of women's suffrage would be to root this assumption out of people's minds, with an immense gain in private life.

A month earlier, he had told her

I do wish I could write on the Suffrage—I should like it much better than writing on mathematics. But, to confess the truth, I have at times made attempts, and they have been so lamentable that I came to the conclusion I was incapable of that sort of writing (9 May)

If the two papers printed here represent two of these "attempts", the severity of his judgment is unwarranted. However, his self-deprecation on this topic at this period could explain why neither paper was published. The possibility that these attempts were made before the 1906 Liberal election victory seems remote. By that victory, women's suffrage for the first time became a cause closely identified with most Liberals and therefore having a reasonable chance of success. The Liberal landslide of January, therefore, must have given Russell new incentive to consider the theoretical assumptions of liberalism and the need to widen the franchise if these ideals were to be realized.

It was unfortunate for the cause of women's suffrage that these papers remained

unpublished When they are placed alongside “Liberalism and Women’s Suffrage” (23) and *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* (27), Russell’s potential as one of the leading theorists in Edwardian Britain on female suffrage can be conjectured Such a possibility was predicted by Davies when she challenged Russell to have more confidence in his ability to articulate his convictions “I’ve come to the conclusion that, as a relaxation when your book is done, you must write us a new and modern classic on the Suffrage—to replace Mill—or rather, continue him You see what faith I have in you as an unprejudiced, logical and right-feelinged person” (4 May 1906). The papers, particularly “The Status of Women”, also reveal his capacity for the kind of systematic and creative political theorizing evident later in such well-known books as *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) As essays, both approach the high literary quality of the best in Russell’s *oeuvre*

“On the Democratic Ideal” locates the issue of women’s suffrage within a wide theoretical and historical pattern The assumption is that the extension of freedoms within the domestic sphere will be the next phase in human advancement from medieval “obedience” to modern emancipation Such an abstract treatment was unusual at a time when most writers were addressing themselves to practical tactics, often in polemical terms (Indeed, Russell himself focused on specific issues later when, as in Papers 21, 22 and 25, a topical problem commanded his attention) The emphasis Russell places on the proposition that liberty is most important in private relations reflects directly his personal experiences, both in his marriage and in his upbringing Many of the ideas in “On the Democratic Ideal” appear in various forms in his later writings, while many arguments from “The Status of Women” were adapted for “Liberalism and Women’s Suffrage”

The copy-text for “On the Democratic Ideal” is the manuscript (RA 220 010990)

OF THE ENDS which men ought to pursue, both in their private and in their public actions, the most important, by far, are good relations between human beings. In private life, this would be generally recognized; in public life, it is obscured mainly by the very long chain of causes and effects separating the immediate purpose of the statesman from the distant result which is to justify his measures. It is obscured also by the fact that some ends, such as national greatness, are often mistakenly regarded as good in themselves, although, when challenged, most people would adduce further good effects likely to flow from the attainment of such ends. But the public good is made up of many private goods, and is not (at least in any great degree) a new and different kind of good. Whatever, therefore, is admitted to be the chief end of private action, must also be one of the chief ends, if not the only end, of public action. Hence we ought, whether in daily life or in politics, to direct a chief part of our endeavours to the production of good relations between man and man.

If this be so, it is not surprising that any change in the general opinion as to the sort of relations that are best should modify profoundly the whole structure of society. Such a change has been progressively accomplishing itself ever since the renaissance destroyed the mediaeval philosophy of life. Broadly, where the middle ages valued authority, obedience, and the fidelity of the servant to his master, we value liberty, reason, and the equal affection of comrades. This change pervades all departments of thought and action, it is so profound that to most of us the mediaeval view of life is more unintelligible than the Chinese. But this change is not yet complete; in many ways the older ideal lingers, while in other ways real goods, allied to the older ideal, have been unduly neglected. The purpose of the present essay is, first to define and defend the modern ideal, and then to consider its application to various special questions, showing incidentally certain ways in which it may have to give place before other ends of no less importance.

The view to be advocated is, that equal relations are better as ends, and are very generally better as means, than unequal ones, and that the essence of equality consists in the preservation of individual judgment on both sides. This was not held to be the case when politics were feudal and theologies were Christian. In those days, men reasoned that the best of all relations is the relation of the good man to God; that this is a relation of absolute submission; that, therefore, it is good to have as many such relations as possible among human beings, and that such relations are to be found in the relation of the vassal to his lord, of wife to husband, and of child to parent. In the *Fioretti di San Francesco*, generally so full of gentleness, we come over and over again upon the phrase "santa ubbedienza"—to me, and I imagine to most men of our time, a phrase quite out of keeping with the tone of the Franciscan gospel. So in the Jesuit revival of mediaevalism, unquestioning obedience is the first and most binding of all rules. From this

insistence upon submission comes a lack of respect for human dignity, a habit of cringing, of the good before the good, and of others before the strong. Dante's respect for Beatrice, we feel, is not quite compatible with a due self-respect, but shows rather a certain self-indulgence in prostration. To this temper of mind is due the strange legality of the middle ages, a legality which profoundly influenced practical politics—e.g. by making Pope and Emperor, however hostile, each feel the other to be a necessary power in the organization of Christendom. Legality may be defined as the habit of accepting premisses without scrutiny, and using reason only to deduce consequences. This habit prevailed in the middle ages, because the ¹⁰ premisses were laid down by authority, and submission to authority was held to be a virtue. The praise of such intellectual submission has almost completely disappeared, only occasionally, parents may maintain that their children have no right to an independent opinion. But in other respects, the mediaeval ideal is less obsolete.

One still living institution, in which the belief in submission is embodied, is the confessional. The advantages of the confessional are patent. The sinner is compelled to face his sin, and is at the same time enabled to escape from the morbidity of interminable remorse by means of absolution. The degree of sinfulness, and the best road to amendment, are declared by a man ²⁰ whose training and experience ought to make him specially fitted for such a task. And the advice and admonition which he gives are those of a man who usually is not in any way an interested party. What he says, he has a recognized right to say, so that anger is almost impossible; and his pronouncement is authoritative, so that, however painful, it must not be questioned. All these advantages are very great, and yet I believe the Protestant objection to the confessional to be just. I will not dwell upon the arguments derived from the influence which it gives to the priesthood, since these are remote from our theme. The evil which seems to me fatal is the loss of self-respect, the abandonment of private judgment and private responsibility, which the practice of confession inevitably involves. It is not permissible for the penitent to question the dictum of the priest, or to adopt a code of morals in any way different from his. Hence the habit of reflecting upon moral questions is checked, and without this habit, any advance in the moral code is impossible. And the practice of deciding in the face of temptation, which is essential to moral strength, is not required by those who may and must seek the decision of a priest. Absolution, again, however comforting, is false to the facts. Whatever has been done is irrevocable, and its consequences, good or bad, continue through all time. Thus there is in nature no forgiveness of sins; and a mechanical method of acquiring the ³⁰ belief that they are forgiven cannot but make them seem less sinful than they really are. In all these ways, the confessional is, in its essence, weakening to the sense of individual responsibility; and whoever has the degree of self-

reliance which is necessary to a strong character must feel in the submission of his judgment a humiliation of a very desirable kind of pride.

Equality, in some sense, is necessary to all the best human relationships. But it is necessary to define this sense very carefully. It is not necessary that there should be equality in virtue, in intellect, or in attainments, and it is not necessary that either side should be unconscious of the absence of such equality. The kind of equality which is essential is a circumscribed and special kind, it is that kind which was affirmed by advocates of the Rights of Man. The doctrine of indefeasible natural rights is now generally abandoned, and with good reason. It is impossible to set limits to the evil which may be rightly inflicted upon an individual in the interests of mankind. Nevertheless, there is an important element of truth in the doctrine, and it is highly desirable that this should not be rejected along with the falsehood. The element of truth consists, I think, mainly in this, that the use of compulsion or force in dealing with men is in itself a very great evil, which must be added to the further evil forcibly inflicted, if we are to strike the right balance between the good and the harm resulting from any particular case of compulsion. And the evil inherent in compulsion is the evil of a relation deficient in that particular kind of equality which it is our business

20 to define.

The essence of the equality to be sought is *liberty*. It is good that, to the utmost possible extent, every man's actions should proceed from his own judgment and his own choice. It is bad that others should employ an outward compulsion to force a man to do what he considers evil, even if he is mistaken in so considering it. It is bad that others should exert their will to induce a man, voluntarily but against his own judgment, to act as they think right. It is bad that a man should himself resign to others the task of deciding what he ought to do. All these are forms of subjection which are incompatible with the best relation between the compeller and the compelled. And except where the compulsion is external to the will of the man compelled, the surrender of the will is an intrinsic evil, apart from and additional to the evil in the relation of compeller and compelled, while on the side of the compeller, the absence of respect for the other is an intrinsic evil, involving a form of self-assertion which is always regrettable, though sometimes necessary. Thus the equality which is essential to the best relations consists in this, that neither should demand the submission of the other's will, or offer the submission of his own.

The above principles, like all other principles concerning good and evil, or right and wrong, are liable, in practice, to come into conflict with others, 40 and must in many cases give way before others. Instances of such limitations will meet us when we come to the application of our principles. But it will be well first to define our principles more exactly by removing certain cases of only apparent conflict.

Is it right, apart from consequences to others, to employ force to compel a man to do what he himself judges to be right, but nevertheless intends not to do? This covers the case of soldiers in battle, who are prevented by force from running away; also constant cases in dealing with children, especially when they have lost their tempers. I think even in this case our principle is against compulsion, that is to say, the compulsion is in itself an evil. But it is a far less evil than where there is disagreement as to what ought to be done, it is, in fact, so slight an evil that it may easily be outweighed by good consequences such as commonly may be expected in cases of this kind.

Is it right to employ will to force a man to reconsider his decision, in a case 10 where the compeller feels certain that the decision is wrong, and suspects that it is not unbiased? This is a question which arises constantly in dealing with impetuous people; and it is one which is very hard to separate in practice from a direct influence on the will. But in respect of its badness it is very widely separated, being in fact very much less bad. I think in this case we must decide that intrinsically the assumption of superiority involved is bad here too, but that the *effects* upon the man compelled are likely to be good, not bad as in the other case. Better to convince a man of a general rule than directly as to a particular duty.

The question of resigning to others the decision as to one's duty is one 20 which, in practice, may easily become very difficult. It is obvious at once that our principle is not opposed to the asking of advice from those who have more knowledge of the matter than we have. But in such cases, their opinion is the best possible ground for our own, and therefore there is no surrender of private judgment in guiding ourselves by what they advise. The matter becomes a little more difficult when we merely feel generally that so-and-so's judgment is better than ours. I think in such cases it is wrong to accept the judgment of another merely because it is his judgment, but often right to ask the kind of advice which consists in suggesting data for our own judgment. If, however, after discussion, our own judgment is unchanged, it 30 seems not justifiable to act on the judgment of another, even if that other usually has a better judgment than our own.

Although the kind of equality which is desirable does not exclude the recognition that others are better or worse than ourselves, and is therefore compatible with any degree of admiration or the reverse, it does exclude all deference to everything except the intrinsic excellence or wisdom of others. Respect for kings or parents or husbands, simply because they are kings or parents or husbands, belongs to the mediaeval order of thought, and is not compatible with the kind of equality that we have agreed to be good. Before the nineteenth century, most people appear to have believed unquestioningly that deference to rank is a plain duty. How much things have changed in this respect appears, for example, from Boswell's account of Johnson's meeting with George III. The decay of this deference is the source of 40

snobbery: people still act, and to some extent feel, in accordance with a notion of right conduct which they no longer really believe in. And thus actions which, in Dr. Johnson, were honest and all but admirable, cannot now be performed without definite immorality. This is one of the many ways in which an improvement of ideals makes the avoidance of blameworthy conduct more difficult.

Let us consider some of the applications of the principle of equality to the relations of men and women. Most of what is to be said applies also to other relations, but it is easier to see the application when it is stated less generally.

10 It is evident at once, if the principle is accepted, that the traditional subjection of women, as embodied in the promise to "obey", makes the best kind of marriage impossible. It is unnecessary to linger over this, since it is obvious. Whoever prefers to rule or to submit, when equality and reciprocal freedom are possible, has not a just conception of human dignity, or of the excellence of a cooperation founded on reason

But even those who accept equality in theory do not, in practice, always realize what it involves, or always voluntarily endure the trouble and inconvenience which it is apt to cause

A very obvious application of the doctrine, which yet is sometimes denied, is, that it is not justifiable, before marriage, for either party to conceal past actions which the other party may judge to be seriously blameworthy. It is often said that such judgment is almost certain to be erroneous, especially when it is the judgment of an ignorant girl. But even if this be admitted—and it is dangerous to leave the decision of such a point to one of the interested parties—yet it is not permissible (unless in very unusual cases) to lead people into an action which they only commit through ignorance of relevant facts; and this is especially to be avoided where the action consists in establishing the most intimate possible relation with the deceiver. In fact, the chief ground for truthfulness in dealing with others is, 30 that its absence involves a wholly unjustifiable assumption of superiority, a decision on their behalf of questions which they ought themselves to decide. It is better, in fact, as a general rule, that people should decide wrongly for themselves, than that others should decide rightly for them; and this is especially the case as regards marriage, where the person deciding for the other is one of the parties to the marriage.

Many women who would agree strongly as to the case we have just discussed, would nevertheless make no scruple of "managing" their husbands. That is to say, they would decide themselves what should be done, and would then use what is called "tact" to induce a similar decision on the 40 part of their husbands. They would soon come to the belief that men are unreasonable, and would thenceforth no longer attempt to employ reason where they had an end to secure. This involves exactly the same assumption of superiority as was involved in the previous case, and is therefore in itself a

serious evil. But it is more often justifiable as a means than the other. For when a marriage is only in prospect, there is not the same need as afterwards to make the best of a bad job. Thus where experience absolutely proves that reason cannot be hoped for, the use of "tact" may be justifiable if the end to be secured is very important. But probably this would hardly apply to one per cent of the cases in which it is at present employed

Equality in marriage is more important than equality in any other relation, for marriage is the most intimate of all relations, and in the absence of complete equality it becomes intrinsically very bad, and productive of degrading results on both sides. Where, therefore, equality in the sense of mutual independence of judgment is practically impossible, a marriage becomes an evil, and this evil is greater if it is not felt to be such than if it is. But of course the fact of its being an evil is very seldom a sufficient ground for its dissolution.

Probably the chief argument in favour of woman's suffrage is the effect which its mere existence would gradually have upon the private relations of men and women. Whether it would do good or harm by its direct political effects, whether better or worse measures would be passed owing to its enactment, it is impossible to foretell, and the experience obtainable does not seem sufficient to enable us to decide. But the recognition of legal equality would tend to produce a recognition of private equality, and this is an almost certain good result, since it tends to diminish the exercise of power and increase the appeal to reason in a relation where power is quite peculiarly odious.

The most difficult relation in which to preserve the essentials of equality is that of parents and children, because in this relation so much inequality is decreed by nature. For this reason, the relation of parents and children can with difficulty be as good a thing in itself as the relation of men and women. This is obscured by the fact that the parental relation is so very indispensable as a means, and by the fact that, if it is to be satisfactory, it calls for the very highest degree of intrinsic excellence in the parent. But in spite of these two facts, the relation in itself is somewhat vitiated by the inherent inequality. This appears plainly by the fact that the many women whose attitude to those they like is what is called "motherly" are incapable of friendship in its best forms: philanthropy, for them, usurps the place of love. This evil exists in the most desirable parental relation, but is not observed there because it is required for the performance of duty.

In spite, however, of the inevitable inequalities of parents and children, a great deal more equality than usually exists can be attained by those who realize its importance. Most mothers acquire, during the infancy of their children, a love of power which they afterwards find it hard to renounce, especially in regard to their daughters. The love of power grows unperceived, developing by minute gradations out of the most unselfish desire to

do what is right by those who necessarily depend on one's services. But its bad effects in the relation of parents and children are hard to exaggerate. It produces an instinctive desire both to prevent outside influences, and to check any tendency to independence of judgment. To those who have it, it may appear to be a mere desire to protect its object from risks of misfortune; yet it entails the almost certain misfortune of producing a lack of self-reliance and a deficiency of independent friends and interests.

The first rule, for those who aim at the greatest possible amount of equality between parents and children, is, that unreasoning obedience should only be exacted in rare cases, or in trivial matters of manners or practical convenience, and that, in cases where it is exacted, the utmost endeavour should be made to persuade the child that these are cases where, for special reasons, it is right for the present to accept the judgment of one's elders. The next point, which is involved in the carrying out of the first, is to be far more scrupulously truthful with children than parents commonly think necessary. Those who defend obedience generally argue either that children are quite willing to believe what they are told without asking for reasons, or that it is useless to give the right reasons, because children know too little to be convinced by them. The first is no doubt largely true of many children, but it is not true of the most thoughtful, and it is not desirable that it should be true. The habit of unquestioning acceptance of traditional beliefs is the chief obstacle to every kind of progress, and is absolutely prohibitive of intellectual development. It is therefore better to eradicate it where it is strong, than to foster it where it is weak. But it is very doubtful whether it is as common as parents suppose. Those who exact deference forget how nearly deference is allied to hypocrisy, and how little, consequently, they are likely to know of their children's thoughts. Parents who realize their children's powers of scepticism, on the other hand, adopt the opposite argument, that to the inexperienced it is impossible to give reasons that will be convincing. This argument they profess to support by experience, but as a rule their experience is really the result of a lack of truthfulness. Believing that the real reasons cannot be understood by their children, or involve knowledge which is bad for the young, they invent sham reasons; the children perceive that these reasons are invalid and insincere, and conceive a suspicion which thenceforth makes it almost impossible to convince their judgments.

But when nothing in the slightest degree untrue is ever said to children, when every question is either answered sincerely or not answered at all, a confidence grows up which makes it possible to obtain belief when it is said that there are reasons, though these cannot yet be given. And for the parents, too, it is a useful check to have to explain their reasons, for after all, many commands to children are unreasonable or selfish, and the children in such cases are justified in feeling sceptical.

In these two ways, by exacting the minimum of obedience, and by strict truthfulness, a degree of equality can be introduced between parents and children, which will rapidly increase as the children grow older, and will make, when they grow up, a relation far better than any domineering parent can legitimately hope for

Parents who feel very strongly their parental obligations are sometimes apt to commit the opposite errors to those we have been considering they tend to subordinate themselves unduly to their children, giving up for them goods which they ought to retain But this again infringes the rule of equality, and constitutes a violation of justice Justice may be defined as the prevalence of the greater good over the lesser, without regard to persons, i.e as the pursuit of the good *per se*, rather than of one's own good, or the good of one's friends or one's children or one's country or any other particular class of human beings. Therefore when parents sacrifice greater goods in their own lives to lesser goods in their children's, their action, though unselfish, is unjust And it too often happens, when this is done, that nature takes its revenge by leading them later on to demand as a recompense a corresponding unjust sacrifice of their children to them.

In regard to forms of government, the argument for equality would now be generally recognized in Western Europe and in America. But democracy is not usually defended on the ground of the excellence inherent in equality; and yet this seems to be the most unquestionable of the benefits which democracy confers It is true that even democracy, simply because it is a form of government, infringes the ideal of mutual independence. This ideal could only be fully realized by a complete absence of government, and then only if every citizen was willing to forego the private exercise of force So long as there is government, the performance or avoidance of certain acts is enforced by the threat of penalties; thus even if the rule is that of the majority, there is a minority which is subject to compulsion Anarchists are right in urging that liberty cannot be fully secured so long as there is government; but they are wrong in supposing that it would be secured if there were none. The criminal law, for example, consists very largely in forcible prevention of the use of force; hence its abrogation would presumably lead to an increase rather than a diminution of force. This case is clear without going outside our principle of liberty; but other cases, such as compulsory education, can only be justified by remembering that other goods besides liberty may be secured by government, and may be so great as to outweigh the evils of some compulsion Every such case must be considered on its merits; the only thing that can be said generally is that, since compulsion is an evil, it may be unjustifiable even when its results are on the whole good; for the intrinsic evil of the compulsion may more than counter-balance the goodness of its results

The man who has based his social and political philosophy most com-

pletely on the evils of compulsion is Tolstoi. His views on government, on the criminal law, on the immorality of war, and on non-resistance generally, all spring mainly from this source. His perception of intrinsic good and evil in human relations is extraordinarily just; where he errs in regard to ends is chiefly in underestimating the intellectual goods: knowledge and love of beauty and the virtues connected with these. But even when, as in most cases, his judgment as to ends is not at fault, his judgment as to means is vitiated by impatience and lack of reasoning power. He holds as a maxim—and most of his arguments depend upon his holding—that what is intrinsically evil can never be justified by the goodness of its consequences. Yet no one can hold such a view consistently, and when it is examined it is seen at once to be without foundation. If by a small exercise of force—say by locking up a homicidal maniac—I can prevent a great deed of violence—say the blowing up of the Houses of Parliament—it is obvious that by using force I diminish the total evil in the world, and even the total amount of force. It is impossible consistently to hold that force is an evil, and that I ought to abstain from an action which diminishes its total amount without entailing other and greater evils. Yet it will be found that, if this is not held, all Tolstoi's arguments cease to be demonstrative, and become merely considerations which must be remembered in reaching a decision. But as such considerations they deserve very great weight; and it is probable that the final decision ought to be much oftener in agreement with his than current morality is willing to admit. His influence, therefore, except in so far as it opposes the intellectual virtues, is likely to be far more for good than for evil; especially as the limitations to which his doctrines are subject are likely to be realized only too readily by most readers.

To sum up. Inequality in human relations has three main forms (1) where a man is compelled to act against what would otherwise be the decision both of his will and of his judgment; (2) where he is persuaded to let his will run counter to his judgment; (3) where he voluntarily surrenders his judgment into the keeping of another. All these forms of inequality are bad in themselves, and are productive of certain bad results: love of power in the superior, lack of independence and self-respect in the inferior. The realization of their badness entails as practical consequences the endeavour to secure absolute equality in the relations of men and women, and the greatest possible degree of equality in the relations of parents and children. It also affords a broad argument for democracy and for restricting the interference of governments. But at every point there is a possibility of conflict with other ends, and whether equality ought to give way must be judged independently in each instance. All that can be urged generally is that we should constantly remember that equality and liberty are good, and that their opposites are evil. Everything beyond this must be left to the decision of the individual in the particular circumstances that life happens to present.

The Status of Women [c. 1906]

SINCE THE CONCERNS of "The Status of Women" are so intertwined with those of "On the Democratic Ideal" (18), the two papers are discussed together in the previous headnote. The exact sequence of composition cannot be established, but near contemporaneity can be assumed.

The copy-text for "The Status of Women" is the untitled manuscript, which is in the possession of Mr Hallam Tennyson. Apparently Russell gave the manuscript to Tennyson's mother, Ivy Tennyson (c 1879–1958), who, as Ivy Pretious (A25 39), was the secretary of the Free Trade Union during most of the Edwardian period. Russell had originally met her during his campaign against tariff reform in 1903 and 1904, when he came to admire her very much.

IT HAS BEEN the custom of almost all ages and nations to assign to women a status more or less inferior to that assigned to men. There can be little doubt that the dominion of men, like the dominion of aristocracies, was based originally upon superior physical force. But as civilization has advanced, such a basis has been increasingly felt to be inadequate, and other reasons have been found for preserving the traditional practice. Those who challenge this practice must admit the immense weight of authority opposed to them; and although some societies in the past have had something approaching equality between men and women, no support is to be derived from their example, since they have all been either very barbarous or very corrupt. The weight of authority has, however, in modern times, been consciously or unconsciously set aside by advocates of various other changes, such as internationalism, democracy, and the emancipation of slaves. In all these respects, ideals formerly impracticable have begun to be in some degree possible, chiefly owing to the removal of material difficulties by the increase in the productivity of labour. The need of labour for producing the necessities of life is a chief part of man's bondage to matter, which, apart from defects in human nature, renders the realization of imagined goods largely impossible. By the progress of mechanical inventions, this bondage has been much lightened; and many formerly unattainable ideals have therefore become in a greater or less degree attainable. For this reason, if for no other, past experience must not be too readily accepted as a guide for the future.

The argument in favour of equality between men and women is merely an application of the general argument in favour of liberty. I shall try to show that this general argument applies with peculiar force to women, on account of the intimacy of their relations with men. I shall then consider the special arguments adduced against liberty in this case, admitting that some of them have much force, but contending that they are not sufficient to outweigh the gains which may be hoped from the equality of men and women.

It is hardly necessary to dwell long upon the benefits of liberty in general. In the modern world there is a wide-spread recognition of the gain to character involved in acting upon one's own initiative rather than upon outside compulsion, and it is felt by most unbiased persons that all forcible dominion is bad in itself, as well as degrading in its effects both upon master and slave. So much may be taken as admitted.

But most people, in thinking of liberty, think first and foremost of political liberty, the freedom of states, the self-government of the citizens, and so forth. It is liberty in these forms that has been the battle-cry of revolutions and of parties of progress. Economic liberty, that is to say, liberty from the tyranny of employers, is sought by socialists and by most labour-parties; but this is still liberty in a relation which, in spite of its importance, is not itself a very close relation. What I wish to urge is, that

liberty becomes increasingly important as the relation concerned is more intimate, that, therefore, it is more important in the family than in the state, and most important of all in the relations of men and women. The more two people have to do with each other, the more desirable it becomes that they should not prey upon each other's spontaneity, not impair each other's self-respect and self-reliance. It must be admitted that this is not achieved at present except in rare cases, indeed people seldom even endeavour to achieve it. Very few have the self-control required in order to leave liberty to those whose possible mistakes are greatly feared. It is owing to this cause that the relations involving the most of mutual affection are very often those by which the characters of men and women are most degraded, and why those who have been most compelled to forego human companionship are so often the strongest and best of mankind.

But there is more than this to be said as to the importance of equality between men and women. It is not always sufficiently realized that love without respect is degrading, both to the one who loves and to the one who is loved. To the one who loves, it affords a constant temptation to think that the qualities whose absence makes respect impossible are not really important; to the one loved, it brings the complacent feeling that, since love has been obtained, further improvement is unnecessary. It tends, again, to make love patronising. A young man bitterly observed to me once that his father had always given him exactly the same quality of affection as he gave to his dog; and too often this is the quality of affection which husbands give to wives or wives to husbands. Such affection, when its object is a human being, is not good, but very bad, it involves the unpardonable crime of not desiring for the person loved the goods which in one's own case one recognizes as the most important. People are far too apt to be content with seeking happiness for those they love, reserving virtue for themselves. In this form, such a fault is rather feminine than masculine; but its correlative in men is the habit of regarding judgment and power as their own special prerogatives. In this attitude there is a deep-seated contempt, generally returned by its object; thus love fails to involve the working together for ends which both value, and both remain really alone. To any one who has once realized what human companionship is capable of being, almost all existing marriages seem to involve something which is very near to inconstancy.

But it is said that, however true this may be in the private relations, it is perfectly possible to have private equality between men and women without granting political rights to women. Although the bare theoretical possibility may be admitted, I believe this to be practically untrue; indeed I hold that the principal reason why it is desirable that women should have the same political rights as men is the effect which would result in their private relations. As to the effect upon politics, it is probable it would be small, and

it is quite uncertain whether it would be good or bad. But the effect on private life seems to me almost undubitably very good and very important

In practice, however theorists may find other grounds, the ground which weighs with almost all men against women's suffrage is the supposed inferiority of women in political capacity. I am not concerned, for the moment, with the question whether this inferiority really exists, nor yet with the question whether, if it does exist, it affords a valid ground for refusing the suffrage to women. The only thing I am concerned with at present is the effect upon private life of the acceptance of such an argument.

- 10 This effect is, to make it be believed that, however excellent women may be in deciding strictly household matters, their views upon all larger issues neither are nor should be worthy of respect. Even in questions concerning their own sons—the choice of a school or a profession, for example—they are often supposed to be incapable of judging, although, as a fact, their greater knowledge of their sons often outweighs, in the comparison with their husbands, their smaller knowledge of the world. In all the more difficult decisions of life, in all cases of public duty, men who believe in women's unfitness for such issues are compelled to forego discussion with their wives, and to take on their own sole responsibility steps which affect
20 their wives at least as much as themselves. By not being consulted, women soon become unworthy to be consulted; the love of power, which is ingrained in almost every human being, cannot find a legitimate outlet, and therefore turns, except in a few women of more than usual sincerity, to the arts of managing and "tact", of inventing false reasons and choosing times when the lord and master is "in a holiday humour, and like enough to consent" All this, which is evil, and is traditionally urged against women, is as directly the result of oppression as are bombs in Russia And all this, if the law recognized the right of women, as of men, to a voice in government, would tend to die a natural death, to be replaced gradually by equal
30 comradeship, where the love of power, rampant on both sides in an unequal relation, is replaced by a domestic democracy in which the victory is to the one who has the best reasons to urge. But so long as women are debarred from all share in public life, so long most men will continue to regard them as unfit for the decision of large issues.

- All these arguments in favour of woman's suffrage may be admitted, and yet it may be held that the arguments against it are stronger From all practical measures, there is a mixture of good and evil to be expected, and therefore there will be valid arguments on both sides. Judgment is needed to strike the balance; and judgment is usually an instinctive feeling hardly
40 capable of argumentative expression. I will admit at once that certain real evils are to be expected from the political emancipation of women, though I think these evils are less than many people suppose. But those who consider that the balance is on the side of evil do not, in my opinion, adequately

realize the inherent excellence of liberty or the inherent badness of power and subordination. The whole development of civilization in modern times has been towards the growth of liberty, towards the endurance of any evil rather than forcible compulsion. At every stage in this process, opponents have urged that anarchy must result: in the decay of the mediaeval Empire, of the Catholic Church, of the absolute dominion of kings, in the growth of democracy and religious toleration, those who loved the old systems have seen the final break-down of Law, and have predicted a dissolution of society into warring atoms. But at every stage these prophets of evil have proved to be mistaken.

The first argument to be considered is the argument that women are inherently inferior to men in one or other of the qualities required in politics. It is said that they lack public spirit, that their affections habitually obscure their judgment, that they have an innate love of intrigue and underhand methods, that they are more under the dominion of priests than men are. For these reasons, it is urged that those who dread superstition and corruption or who desire a statesmanlike large-minded conduct of affairs, ought to dread the extension of the suffrage to women.

Whether or not such accusations are just, it is to be observed, in the first place, that it by no means follows that women should be excluded from politics. The arguments are the same by which every step towards democracy has been resisted. Queen Elizabeth informed the House of Commons that it was incapable of understanding foreign affairs. In those days the necessary intellect and virtue were confined to the royal family. The Reform Bills of 1832, 1867 and 1884 were resisted on exactly the ground alleged by this argument against women. Even so liberal and broad-minded a publicist as Bagehot felt that the risks of the Bill of 1867 outweighed its probable benefits. And it cannot be denied that, if the main thing required were an intelligent electorate, all steps towards democracy would be a mistake. No one could pretend that a working-man has as a rule the same equipment for forming sound political opinions as a professional man or a man of leisure. And yet, when we come to particular measures, liberals at least must admit that a restricted suffrage would yield what are, in their opinion, worse results than those obtained by the present system. The reason, of course, is simple. From a mixture of natural selfishness and lack of imagination, few people, whether educated or uneducated, have much comprehension or sympathy for the interests of other classes than their own. Hence any class excluded from power is sure to be unduly neglected; and if this class is a large one, the detriment to the community is very great. For this reason, extensions of the suffrage even to people of less intelligence or education than its former possessors generally furthers the welfare of the community as a whole. And beyond this gain as regards specific measures, there is the gain in liberty, in self-respect, and in the sense of responsibility resulting

from a share in government.

This brings us to the second point which is to be urged in reply to the above objection to woman's suffrage. Granting still, for the sake of argument, the indictment against the majority of women as they are at present, it is to be observed that the alleged defects are those which are always to be found in inferiors. In spite of all the care which English education bestows upon truth-speaking, it is notorious that hardly any schoolboy makes any scruple of lying to his schoolmasters. But as a rule his mendacity ceases when he ceases to be subject to a dominion against which he rebels. Hence it
10 may be legitimately hoped that liberty would in time eradicate many of the moral defects which, at present, may be justly charged against a certain proportion of women. The intellectual defects, also, are mainly those which result from the absence of responsibility. If we consider working-men, it is surely obvious that the suffrage is a tremendous force for their education in judgment and self-respect and the power of taking large views. And whoever has watched in men the influence of responsibilities on character can hardly doubt that in women the same cause would produce a similar effect. The contention, therefore, that women have certain faults in a greater degree than men, so far from making against their admission to equal rights,
20 makes really in favour of it, as being the readiest and surest way of diminishing these faults.

But it must be further urged that the degree to which the faults in question are peculiar to women is commonly much exaggerated. In every section of the community, the average man cares only for the interests of his own class. Postmen vote for the interests of postmen, landlords for those of landlords, manufacturers for those of manufacturers, and so on. The number who conceive and pursue the interests of the nation as a whole is very small. This is one reason, as already urged, why it is important that people of every class should have equal power, since a class excluded from
30 power will have its interests almost certainly neglected. Thus this first argument against woman's suffrage must be dismissed along with the analogous arguments against all other steps towards democracy.

The next argument is much more serious. It is urged that, if politics were carried on by both sexes, the private relations of the men and women concerned would be bad in themselves, destructive of serious work, and inimical to trust and honour between colleagues. In this argument, I admit, there is a great deal of force. Let us see, however, what is to be said on the other side.

In the first place, the evils feared have always existed in a very large
40 measure, and have been even fostered by the fact that a love of power in women, having no legitimate outlet, has always been forced into intrigue. Every reader of history can easily recall many cases of the evil influence of ambitious women. It seems to be forgotten that, although women do not sit

The Ocean of Life.

Now known, unknown, eternal, the waves break on its ~~gentle~~ ^{gentle} ~~beach~~ ^{beach}, travelling from the grey horizon to this infinite end. No soul except from the mystery of childhood, & rarely one day, reaches the mounting shore of Death. Vast or sad is the ocean of life, ~~which~~ yet calm with infinite space, ~~not~~ ^{sunny}, restless, rebellious, eager, full of yearning for the land from which Death parts it, but great & free, deep, unmeasurable & sublime, happens to rise when mystic vision has raised above the little ripples of Self & its passing ~~ways~~. O struggling anxious soul, forget thy ~~fraternal~~ ^{dear} wishes, forget hopes & fears, ^{by} joys, pain, & look upon the world with open eyes. Then will ~~the~~ ^{the} world be no longer a great curse, no curse terrible, but beautiful ^{as the fading light of evening} ~~and the beauty of sunset skies~~; then will even sorrow become divine, a voice revealing in the darkness the secret message of nature; then Time & Change & Fate lose their cruel empire, while tenderness, pity, & the wisdom of infinite love enfold the ~~great~~ ^{magic} ~~burden~~ ^{of sadness} of humanity. So may we learn become one with that great soul that speaks in the stars, in the dawn, in the rustle of midnight breezes, in the ~~long~~ ^{rush} ~~of~~ mountain tops, in the ceaseless singing of birds, & in the tender grace of willows whitened by the passing wind -

Jan. 14. 1903. Returned yesterday morning from Florence, where Agg was very unhappy, tho' I did my best for her. The atmosphere & Art & luxury we rather trying to me, & at first I couldn't understand why I had liked B.B., but gradually I got to like him again. The place was especially beautiful. I wrote part of an essay on the Free man's worship; also more of the Pilgrimage of Life; but I was rather uninspired. I read enormously to make up. Last night MacCarthy came & I talked to him in a way that I hoped would be useful. Today I heard from Gilbert that a telegram or telegram I had sent him had induced him to start writing one. I dined tonight at David's. Agg & Anna left Italy. The river is by now an old friend to me - I could gladly live with it always.

Jan. 27. I spent some days at Genoa. Agg is very ill with rheumatic arthritis in [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]. My essay on the Free man's Worship, which is finished, is all right; my more imaginative attempts are weak & affected, & must be discarded. Agg came to Cambridge for a night, & was terribly unhappy, because, being pressed & forced as to why I wouldn't live in Cambridge, I had had to tell her (about 6 weeks ago) that she ~~is~~ on my nerves when she was with Cambridge people. She is becoming very well - at present she is working as a factory-girl in a factory to get knowledge also. I drink & so on. I am unhappy beyond what I know how to bear - dull, aching depression, not anguish - would it were! Happiness is gone for ever, my work is second rate & all I care for is gone or dying. The fire & inspiration I had has left me, & I cannot believe I shall do any more useful thing to make the long pain worth while.

The Free Man's Worship.

To Dr. Faustus in his study Mephistopheles told the history of the Creation, saying:

"The endless praises of the choir of angels had begun to grow wearisome; for, after all, did he not deserve their praise? Had he not given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeserved praise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured? He smiled inwardly, & resolved that the great drama should be performed.

"For countless, ~~and~~ the hot nebula whirled aimlessly through space. At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets, the planets cooled, boiling ~~and~~ burning now - leaved & toseed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the ocean, & developed rapidly, in the quickening warmth, into vast forest trees, huge ferns springing from the dark mould, sea-monsters breeding, fighting, dying, & passing away. And from the monsters as the play unfolded itself, man was born, with the power of thought, the knowledge of good & evil, & the cruel thirst for worship. And man saw that all is passing in this mad monstrous world, that all is struggling to snare, at any cost, a few brief moments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And man said: 'There is a hidden

~~Cold, well, and the fire is his warming
& heat his cooling. But to die upon the Cross for
Man's salvation.~~

~~A strange belief in~~ the universe is involved in ~~the~~ all anthropomorphism ~~of~~ God. That is important to me, the originator thinks, most important to the universe. The whole scheme of salvation is an endeavour to preserve this conviction since it is self-importance : from momentous influences & a religion which is based upon man's own saving, probably this very ~~other~~ single-minded field that the universe cannot comprehend & that is ~~overwhelming~~ ~~not~~ important to us. Day after day & night after night men look out over the vastnesses of the world : the sea beats upon the shore, the sun rises & sets, ~~soaring~~, clouds drift across the ~~sky~~, the Starlight reaches us as in years of rough voyages, through space. Age after age, matter is hurled through the void, never resting, never ~~reaching~~ ^{attaining} a goal, clashing, crashing, destroying & again creating, blindly, endlessly, yet with

3

The above principles, like all other principles concerning good & evil, or right & wrong, are liable, in practice, to come into conflict with others, & must in many cases give way before others. Instances of such limitations will meet us when we come to the application of our principles. But it will be well first to define our principles more exactly by reviewing certain cases of our apparent conflict.

Is it right to employ force to compel a man to do what he himself judges to be right, but nevertheless considers not to do? This covers the case of soldiers in battle, who are compelled by force from running away; also constant cases in dealing with children, especially when they have lost their terrors: I think even in this case one principle is against another, that is to say, the compulsion is in itself an evil. But it is a far less evil than where there is disagreement as to what ought to be done; it is, in fact, so slight an evil that it may easily be outweighed by good consequences such as commonly may be expected in cases of this kind.

Is it right to employ will to force a man to reconsider his decision in a case where the compeller feels certain that the decision is wrong, & prospects that it is not undissolved? This is a question which arises constantly in dealing with impulsive people; & it is one which is very hard to separate in practice from a direct influence on the will. But here in respect of its badness it is very widely separated, being in fact very much less bad. I think in this case we must decide that inherently the ~~act of compulsion~~ of superficially involved is bad here too, but that the effects are likely to be good, not bad as in the other case.




PLATE VI. Russell suffers defeat at Wimborne By-Election. Photograph from the *Daily Mirror* of 16 May 1907.

On other subjects, it is not necessary that I should say much. You are in favour of Home Rule for Ireland, & I am very desirous of measures to mitigate the evils of unemployment. I have spent my life as an advocate of Temperance legislation, & I strongly supported the Licensing Bill of 1908. On the question of the Navy, I have throughout opposed ~~of the government programme~~, but against the concentration on the one hand & against the "economists" on the other hand.

We have ~~now~~ to sum up, two great constitutional issues to decide, the one constitutional, the other economic. On the one hand, we have to decide whether we are to surrender to it ~~for~~ the right of self-government — at which our franchises won, or rather we shall not rather preserve & extend democracy by defending the Commons & making them more truly representative of the people. On the other hand, we have to decide ~~before~~ Tariff reform & the Government's fiscal policy, ~~which~~ shall we have ^{industrial} taxes on necessities; taxes which (as the North very well knows) must cripple our industries to benefit the owners of the soil, or shall we rather have taxes which, while they fall on the rich, at the same time open new sources of ~~employment~~ & for labour & capital, & can't fail to mitigate the many evils of poverty & ~~unemployment~~? I say these issues are connected; for if once the H. of L. organises control over taxation, we may suffer the evils of Tariff Reform for many a long day before its beneficiaries will allow it to be swept away.

PLATE VII. The cancelled passage in Paper 26, the "Address to the Bedford Liberal Association" (1910), is one of Russell's few observations on British defence policy before 1914. See 302: 41–303: 17.

Please return copy with proofs (3) (cont'd)
Sir Inspiration Concordance

I regret the delay in replying to Professor Frothingham's letter of a fortnight ago. It is due to the difficulties & perils of a worse & disorderly in the University Library. Brooke's Six Theses has remained below my notice, but I have sighted "Brodrick & Free Style", & find that Professor Frothingham's references are to the judgment of the Dean of Arches, against which, on the question of the inspiration of Scripture, there was an appeal resulting in the Privy Council judgment from which I quote:—
The Dean's declaration was not in evidence before the Privy Council; & its judgment, while, on this point, supported that of the Dean of Arches, was altogether more cautious than his.

I have some difficulty in understanding how it is possible to believe a book without believing its contents; & if so, is it required that a certain percentage should be believed? And if so, shall it be over fifty per cent., or forty or fifteen proportion be sufficient?

Bertrand Russell.

Trinity College
Cambridge

PLATE VIII. Paper 39c, "Inspiration" (1914). The editor of *The Cambridge Magazine*, C. K. Ogden, assigned the title and acceded to Russell's wish that the last paragraph be deleted. See page 405.

in Parliament, members of Parliament do not forego the society of women. For this very simple reason, it is quite doubtful whether the evil in question would be increased or diminished by affording an open and legitimate career for the women who wish their will to be effective in the course of public events

A second point is that the argument we are considering does not apply against women voting, but only against women being eligible to Parliament or to public bodies. Although the two are allied, they are not inseparable, and it is perfectly possible to stop half-way. Indeed, our present practice illustrates the possibility, since we allow women both to vote for and to sit on many local bodies. But I do not wish to insist upon this, unless in an argument on the quite special question of woman's suffrage. For all the reasons alleged above in favour of equality between men and women apply with the same force in favour of their eligibility as in favour of giving them the vote. And these reasons, in my opinion, are so strong that, even if some harm were to result, I should still consider it highly probable that the good would be greater. If, however, the evils in question were considered intolerable, almost all of them could be obviated by the simple device of declaring women not eligible till after the age of forty-five.

Another argument against woman's suffrage is, that it would tend to destroy the family, to encourage women not to marry, and not to have children if they did marry. The last of these points is the most definite and the easiest to deal with. We may observe (1) that the number of women actually in politics would in any case be very small, so that the effect on the birth-rate would be statistically negligible; (2) that the diminution of the birth-rate is marked in all civilized countries, and is mainly due to the combined effect of economic prudence and neo-malthusianism; (3) that, since this is so, it is plainly independent of the status of women; (4) that, if it is considered desirable to check it, the only way is either to destroy civilization or to remove the economic motive for small families; (5) that the latter can easily be done by the State, by assisting parents financially in the education and maintenance of their children, as is already done to a considerable extent by the schools; (6) that a diminution in the birth-rate is not in itself an evil, but only becomes an evil in so far as it affects the better stocks more than the worse; (7) that, if it is an evil, it is one which natural selection is constantly keeping in check. This argument, therefore, is both irrelevant and unsound.

The vaguer fear, that the equality of women would tend to destroy the family, is rather harder to meet. I do not, however, for a moment believe that it has any soundness whatever. The Arab imagines it necessary to keep his wives veiled and practically imprisoned in order to prevent them from imitating his vices; but experience proves, in this as in other matters, that a greater freedom produces a greater fitness for freedom. No system hitherto

devised has worked well, and it is not likely that any system to be devised hereafter will avoid much evil and great suffering. But the mistakes of the free are apt to teach wisdom, whereas the evasions of the slave teach only peevishness and deceit. It is not worth while to keep every one in a prison for fear a few should fall over precipices and be killed. And a principal reason why family life as it exists, though it is the source of the greatest goods, is also the source of the greatest evils in most people's lives, is just the absence of that respect for each other's liberty which it is the purpose of women's emancipation to foster. Under any imaginable system, some families will 10 come to grief; but I do not believe the number would be nearly as great if those women whose energies require an outlet were more encouraged to find some other outlet than worrying the other members of their families. And as for the plea that women will not marry if they are able to support themselves, I think a very little experience would destroy this belief; and in any case it seems hardly likely that the best wives are those who are only harried into matrimony by mama's hints that they are not worth their board and lodging.

But not only are the evils to be feared, in this respect, less than many people suppose; there are great goods which are only to be obtained by 20 encouraging young women to earn their own living. Whoever thinks it better to live in the real world, however bad it may be, than in a world of polite fictions, must have felt the superiority of those women who, for one reason or another, have at some time had to do battle with society in the kind of way that men do in making their careers. I do not think it desirable that women should continue all their lives in this battle, but I do think it desirable that every one should be forced to realize what human nature really is, and what are the ordinary conditions of life. The silliness and sentimentality, combined with undue demands, which so largely characterize women's dealings with the people they are fond of, are far less 30 common among those who have had to earn a living than among those who have always been sheltered. And the power of admitting facts, without which people can neither act rightly themselves nor help others to act rightly, is very seldom acquired by those who have never faced the world on their own account. For all these reasons, the ideal of liberty, even at the cost of much hardship and some tragedies, is to be preferred to a pampered and protected "innocence".

I wish I had the art to depict the self-reliant straightforward woman whom I think we ought to try to produce. George Meredith has attempted it, but he gets too much of his effect by omitting virtues which one usually 40 regards as feminine: most of his women are hard and rather coarse. The woman I imagine is to retain the sympathy and kindness which belong with the maternal instinct, while everything is to be done by education and way of life to cure the indirectness which comes of the instinct for being loved

rather than for loving. And when the world contains women of this type, the companionship of men and women will become something which at present exists only in very rare cases, where on both sides good ends are desired, and reason takes the place of the desire to have one's own way. At present, men and women seldom have any real companionship, or any real understanding of each other's best brought together by a temporary attraction, they remain strangers, and as a rule hamper each other's development. In all this there is no necessity, it is due mainly to the fact that subordination rather than liberty is expected, and that women's follies and men's vices are pleasing to the sense of superiority of husbands or wives as the case may 10 (be.) To teach men and women to love equality and liberty is the (true) beginning of all reform in personal relations, and until thus is done people will continue to degrade and depress those with whom their lives are passed.

The Wimbledon By-Election [1907]

"I DON'T SUPPOSE a pair of more oddly contrasted candidates will be in the field again for another 100 years, as you and Chaplin" (23 May 1907) G M Trevelyan thus summed up his reaction to Russell's participation in the Wimbledon by-election of 14 May. Chaplin's victory by a large majority (nearly 7,000 votes) was no surprise to anyone, least of all to Russell. The outcome was a foregone conclusion because Wimbledon was unswerving in its allegiance to the Unionist Party. Indeed, it was considered "the safest Conservative seat in the whole of Greater London" (Pelling 1967, 67). The need for a by-election had arisen when the Unionist M P, Eric Hambro, retired. Henry Chaplin (1840–1923), the quintessential Tory squire who had been in Parliament for Sleaford from 1885 until the Liberal sweep of 1906, was nominated. When the Liberal Party decided to spare itself the expense of an official candidate, Chaplin with justifiable complacency expected a "walk-over". And indeed there was no serious threat when Russell was invited to stand as the candidate for the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies with unofficial support from the Liberal Party. The day before publicly declaring his candidacy, he had written to Ivy Pretious, saying that he would not consider running unless defeat were assured "I am determined not to go into politics . It is a howling joke, and amuses me almost as much as it annoys me" (1 May 1907). In the course of the campaign, Russell had further cause for amusement and annoyance.

The extension of the franchise to women was Russell's principal concern. He was the first person to run as a candidate for the NUWSS. For his part, Chaplin was proud of being, as he called himself, "an old offender upon the question of female suffrage" (*The Westminster Gazette*, 4 May 1907). But with Chaplin a firm adherent of tariff reform and a member of Chamberlain's inner circle, Russell was not reluctant to defend free trade. Other matters, such as the growing controversy over the taxation of land values, also received attention. Thus a campaign that was intended to emphasize a single issue became concerned with some other major political questions of the time, although Russell was able to maintain the primacy of women's suffrage. Suffragist journals were delighted that a candidate from such a distinguished political family had come forward in favour of their cause (see *Women & Progress*, 1 [10 May 1907] 433) and the NUWSS *Annual Report* for 1907 noted with satisfaction that subscriptions had been raised by Mrs Fawcett's organization in order to assist his candidacy (12). Suffragettes, such as Sylvia Pankhurst, however, were angry that he had not restricted himself exclusively to women's suffrage.

Because women's suffrage was a topic which some people dismissed as frivolous, Russell's election meetings were subject to levity and unruliness. On several occasions, speeches were interrupted by pranks. Once a dusting of cayenne pepper in the hall created a general outburst of sneezing, and another time great commotion ensued when rats were let loose. After one meeting, Alys, who had been campaigning actively for her husband, was struck in the face by an egg. Russell made the most of his opponent's embarrassment over the incident by canvassing the next day in an egg-stained coat. Chaplin wrote a letter of apology to which Russell responded with assurances that no harm had been done.

Although Russell had no official support from the Liberal Party, the electorate perceived him as its candidate because his commitment to Liberal causes was well known and indeed his very name was synonymous with Liberalism. A number of prominent Liberals who encouraged Russell by speaking on his behalf were L T Hobhouse, Philip Morrell and C P. Trevelyan. He received hearty endorsement in a telegram from the Chief Whip of the Liberal Party, George Whitely.

Russell described the Wimbledon election as "short and arduous". He continued. "When, in later years, I campaigned against the first world war, the popular opposition that I encountered was not comparable to that which the suffragists met in 1907" (1967, 153). The acknowledgement of the effort involved belies Russell's pretense that the election was unimportant to him. A struggle against impossible odds for a principle he believed to be right satisfied his enjoyment of a crusade and his view of himself as a potential leader of public opinion. Judging by the large amount of newspaper coverage, the by-election gave valuable publicity to the cause (For a good report, see Appendix III.) Shortly after the election Russell looked back on the experience as having provided a welcome release from the anguish induced by the failure of his marriage and the strains of authorship. "The whole thing was quite sudden and unpremeditated, and although on the whole it was disagreeable, it did me good, and much of it was great fun" (to Helen Flexner, 23 May 1907).

Many short reports of interviews with Russell were published during the campaign. In a letter to Alys of May 1907 Russell remarked that in London one day he had been "interviewed by about fifty papers". Alys's mother subscribed to a clipping service for the purpose of collecting stories on the campaign. Several interviews may be found in this collection (RA). Included also are posters and other election artifacts. Because the cover of the election pamphlet bearing Russell's photograph has been frequently chosen by commentators, it helps to form the image of him as a determined Edwardian reformer.

The copy-text for "Reply to Chaplin" (20a) is Russell's election pamphlet. For "Election Address" (20b), the report in *The Wimbledon Herald* on 11 May is used. "Last Message to the Electors" (20c) is taken from *The Daily News*, 14 May, p. 8.

3rd May 1907

The proper complement of Free Trade is, in my opinion, the

To the Electors of the Wimbledon Division of Surrey

GENTLEMEN

I come before you primarily as a supporter of the proposal to

GRANT THE SUFFRAGE TO WOMEN

on the same terms as to men. I consider that the exclusion of women from direct political action is unjust and inexpedient, and that no reason exists for prolonging this exclusion. If elected, I should urge the claims of women to enfranchisement at every opportunity.

I am in favour of a

UNIVERSAL SCHEME OF OLD AGE PENSIONS

which I hope to see carried out by the present Government.

I am

Subject to the paramount claims of this question, I shall, if elected, be a supporter of the present Government. In particular, I consider the **main-tenance of Free Trade essential** to the

prosperity of the United Kingdom, and I believe that the imposition of preferential duties in favour of

Colonial produce must raise the cost of living and tend to the disruption of the Empire, while a protective tariff must foster trusts and promote political corruption

TAXATION OF LAND VALUES

which would, I believe, affect very beneficially the development of suburbs, and remove the heavy burden on industry which is caused by the present rates. As a preliminary to this measure, I should strongly **urge the passing of a Valuation Bill**, by which the value of land should be estimated apart from that of houses or other improvements

Committee Rooms

Barham Ruse.

• VICTORIA CRESCENT
Broadway

20b Reply to Chaplin

DEAR MR. CHAPLIN,—Please accept my thanks for your letter of regret, which I duly received. I do not, of course, need your assurance to know that you would be the first to regret and discourage such incidents.

I am happy to say that no serious mischief to my wife has resulted.
—Yours very truly,

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

20c Last Message to the Electors

IASK FOR the Liberal vote because I am a Liberal through and through. I am just as much a Liberal as dozens of the Ministerialists in the House, who are as keen as ever I can be upon the women's suffrage question. To those who waver about giving me their vote because they have doubts on the women's question I would say: Do you prefer Mr. Chaplin, the Protectionist and crusted Tory, to one who is at least a Free Trader and a Progressive? Such persons should remember that every vote not given to me is a vote given to my opponent.

After the Second Reading [1908]

THIS PAPER OFFERS Russell's immediate reaction to the successful passage (on 28 February) of the second reading of a Liberal private member's bill for women's enfranchisement. The bill passed by a majority of 179 votes. The intention of the bill presented by Henry York Stanger was to give women all the franchises then held by men. Such an aim had been advocated by groups of Liberals ever since Mill's attempts in the 1860s. In practice, Stanger's Bill would have extended the existing irregularities and inequalities. If women had been granted the vote on the same terms as men, then most working women, lacking sufficient property or education, would have been excluded on the same basis as so many of their male counterparts.

In spite of the limited nature of the bill, Russell argued for its enactment. On 19 February, he had written to Margaret Llewelyn Davies to say that he would be participating in a NUWSS executive conference the next day to encourage the Labour members to support its second reading. The concern was that the commitment of some Labour members to adult suffrage would make them hesitant to support a compromise position. To Davies, Russell explained his reasoning: "As you are supporting Stanger, I rather gather that *genuine* Adult Suffragists support him, and that we shall be able to put down those who oppose as people who only use Adult to shelve women."

Russell himself was entirely committed to adult suffrage, but he knew that this ideal could be reached only by stages. During the Wimbledon by-election, he had stated his position "Personally, I am in favour of adult suffrage, irrespective of sex, but I am prepared to take what I can get to go on with" (*The Daily Chronicle*, 4 May 1907). As he judged the situation at the time, only a limited bill had any chance of becoming law, and even that would probably take about five years.

Stanger's was early in the sequence of several private members' bills expressing the desire to give the vote to women during the 1906–14 Liberal administrations. Although these bills were valuable for drawing attention to the cause, they were incapable of bringing about real change. Many M.P.s tended to vote for such bills, especially at the second reading, partly because their support involved merely a show of general agreement rather than a serious commitment to work for enactment. Only with the formal support of the Liberal Government could Stanger have hoped for success, and even then the Bill would have been rejected by the House of Lords. Such support was not forthcoming because the Liberals had such a large majority and such confidence (still unchallenged by by-election losses) that they had little

incentive to undertake electoral reform, despite solemn pledges made by many individual M.P.s. Because a number of Cabinet members and a large minority of backbenchers opposed women's suffrage, the Liberal leaders were not prepared to see their Party split on what they considered a relatively minor issue compared with pressing fiscal, social and naval problems. With the advantage of hindsight, the failure of these bills seems inevitable. Even at the time, Russell's hope was tentative.

No manuscript being extant, the copy-text is the article in *Women's Franchise*, the publication for all suffrage societies, 1 (12 March 1908) 429.

THE WOMEN'S ENFRANCHISEMENT Bill, having passed its second reading by a triumphant majority, has been relegated to a Committee of the whole House, and there, for practical purposes, it ends for this session. It therefore becomes necessary to ask ourselves how we are ever to get beyond a second reading. If the Government were to take up our measure, it would presumably become law. But the Government merely reflects the opinions of members of its party in the House. If the members who voted for the second reading were willing to put pressure upon the Government to give facilities, the Bill might become law this session. But we know that most of them are not willing. Just as the Government reflects the opinion of its party in the House, so the House reflects the opinions of the electors, and of those who, like the women who belong to political organizations, have the power of influencing the votes of electors. Thus it is only by agitation in the country that we can hope to avoid an endless series of second readings which come to nothing.

In all political agitation there are three bodies to be considered: the Government, the House of Commons, and the nation. (I say "the nation" rather than "the electors", because I believe that women, even without the vote, can find many means of making their desire for the vote effective.) Of these three, only the Government ultimately can give us Women's Suffrage. But the Government follows the lead of the House of Commons, and the House of Commons follows the lead of the nation. If the feeling in the country were such that members would feel their seats endangered if Women's Suffrage failed to become law, we may be sure that members would do their utmost to secure its enactment.

Thus it is not to the Government nor yet to the House of Commons that we must look for the impetus which is to bring us success, but to the nation. Pressure on the Government, or on individual members, may be a very effective form of propaganda, and as such may be valuable; but until we can bring sufficient pressure to bear to effect our object, it is chiefly for the sake of propaganda that it is worth while to exercise pressure. One of the advantages of taking part in by-elections is that by this method propaganda among electors is intimately combined with pressure upon candidates. But it is plain that there can be no effective pressure upon candidates or upon members or upon the Cabinet, except in so far as we have a vigorous popular movement at our back.

The apparent disadvantage of propaganda in the country, as compared with direct operations at headquarters, is that it seems slow, and makes great demands on patience. But it is not so slow, in the long run, as a succession of private members' Bills, each as barren as its predecessors. And our movement has now reached that point where it grows like a snowball by the help of its own momentum. In a few more years we may hope to be such a power in the country as no Parliament and no Government can afford to

neglect. And when that time comes, we shall have no difficulty in getting our reform passed into law. Meanwhile, let us realize that it is not primarily the Government or the House of Commons that we have to convert, but the nation. In this task we may go forward with good hope, in view of the extraordinarily rapid progress of recent years.

Mr. Asquith's Pronouncement [1908]

SOON AFTER HE became Prime Minister, Asquith spoke on 20 May 1908 to a group of sixty Liberal M P s who wanted Government support for Stanger's Bill Instead, he gave assurances that before the end of the current Parliament, constitutional reforms would be enacted He suggested that an amendment concerning women's suffrage could be added to the proposed Electoral Reform Bill if the members of the deputation wished to introduce it Since, by his reckoning, about two-thirds of his Party favoured women's suffrage, Asquith was confident that it would pass readily The provisos were that the proposed changes must have popular approval and broaden the franchise significantly

Russell's response to Asquith's promise was written for *Women's Franchise*, the publication for all suffrage societies. He asked the suffragists to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Liberals in recognition of the fact that no legislation on this inflammatory topic could possibly succeed unless it was sponsored by the Liberal Party In a letter to Russell, Millicent Fawcett expressed her wariness of Asquith's pronouncement which she regarded as mere subterfuge Experience had led her to regard his Party as untrustworthy "I have as a suffragist suffered too much from the political tricks of official liberalism for the last thirty years, not to be on my guard against them now" (25 May 1908). Rosalind Nash (wife of Vaughan Nash, private secretary to the Prime Minister) wrote in response to Russell's article to explain why patience with the Liberals seemed so difficult "A great deal of allowance of course must be made for the suspicions the suffrage societies feel—which are intensified by their inexperience of political dealings and the terribly embittering effect of having to fight for such an elementary right as the vote, so long, and against professed Liberals" (30 May 1908)

For these reasons, the suffragists would not heed Russell's plea for trust Nor did they find it possible to welcome the proposed amendment They immediately resented it on the ground that the women's vote would be treated as a mere appendage to an important bill A further complaint was that, by placing the responsibility for the introduction and the wording of the amendment in the hands of the members of the deputation, Asquith was denying it official government sanction and thereby making its passage less likely This denial was made even though, by his own calculation, the majority of the Liberal Party supported women's suffrage These were among the objections raised in a letter to Asquith drafted in August by Margaret Llewelyn Davies for the signature of various suffrage organizations (RA 510 073132)

Russell's article aroused a flurry of controversy. In the next issue of *Women's Franchise* there were three letters of protest. Millicent Fawcett wrote to make clear that Russell, though then a member of the Executive Committee of the NUWSS, was offering a private opinion. She proceeded to cast doubt on Asquith's sincerity by referring to a comment he had made in response to a question of how women's suffrage would be enacted. His characteristically noncommittal answer in the House of Commons on 26 May was that he had been asked "a contingent question in regard to a remote and speculative future". Frank Russell wrote to say that he could not share his brother's sanguine attitude. In his judgment, the pronouncement was an insult to women because Asquith wanted an increase of only the male electorate. A shrewd reader signing herself "W H A" detected a contradiction between Russell's advice to compromise about the amendment and his insistence that it must be formulated so that working women would be included.

The immediate critical response Russell's position had elicited, especially that from Mrs Fawcett, inspired a long letter to Miss Davies where he explained the strategy behind his recommending support for Asquith. Essentially, he believed that Asquith had earned some gratitude for having conceded something, however little. If they were always greeted with hostility, Liberals would cease to have any incentive to support women's suffrage. In Russell's opinion, based more on faith than reality, an amendment to the Reform Bill, as a part of a government measure, might be carried through Parliament "as if the Government had proposed it" (27 May 1908). And then passage through the Lords might be less in jeopardy than if it had official government support. Russell recorded being in "a state of excitement and irritation ever since Asquith's pronouncement" (*ibid.*) because women who wanted the vote were showing so little shrewdness in their behaviour and tactics. Indeed, he termed their reaction "idiotic" (to Davies, 8 Aug. 1908).

The danger he predicted on 5 June was that Asquith would retaliate by living up to the traditional accusations of suffragists:

In spite of the public castigation which I have received at the hands of Mrs Fawcett (and my brother!) I remain unrepentant, though I think that the suffragists, by minimizing Asquith's concession, may succeed in persuading him into taking their view of his meaning (To Davies, 5 June 1908)

Disagreement about the appropriate response to Asquith's pronouncement must have played a role in Russell's eventual decision to resign from the Executive Committee of the NUWSS. Most other members of the Executive felt growing impatience and disillusionment with the Prime Minister. Russell's view that Asquith should not be opposed by the NUWSS put him "in disgrace all round" among the Executive (to Davies, 5 June 1908).

There being no extant manuscript, the copy-text is the article in *Women's Franchise*, 1 (28 May 1908) 565

MR ASQUITH'S PROMISE to the deputation of Suffragist members is the most important event which has yet occurred in the history of the movement. The effect of his promise is that, provided we can retain our majority in the House of Commons, Women's Suffrage will—barring unforeseen accidents—become incorporated in a Government Bill. It is therefore to all intents and purposes as good as if the Government had directly taken up the enfranchisement of women. Unless the House of Lords rejects the suggested Reform Bill, there is therefore every likelihood that women will acquire votes before the next General

10 Election.

The two points which seem of most importance for those who wish to further the cause of Suffrage are, first, that such a measure as Mr Asquith foreshadows will be rejected by the Lords unless they feel there is a really strong movement behind it, and secondly, that a Women's Suffrage Amendment, if it is to fulfil Mr Asquith's conditions, must not merely propose to extend the present franchise to women, but must be so drafted as to enfranchise the majority of working women

As regards the first point, it is evident that the likelihood of the Lords accepting the Bill depends upon the force behind it, and that this will be the 20 united force of the Suffrage Movement and the Government. Whatever, therefore, strengthens either increases our chance of success during the present Parliament, and whatever weakens either diminishes *pro tanto* our chance of success during the present Parliament. This consideration points to the necessity for the utmost activity in Suffrage propaganda, and to the unwise of making such propaganda, in future, actively hostile to the Government.

As regards the second point, it will not, of course, be the business of the Suffrage Societies to draft the Amendment to be proposed, since the nature of this Amendment must be decided, when the time comes, by our friends 30 in Parliament. But it will be the business of the Suffrage Societies to support whatever Amendment our friends in Parliament may introduce, rather than to stickle for the precise formula which would express our avowed objects. To many of us a wider extension than would be afforded by the present qualification would be very welcome; to all, presumably, it would be better than nothing. For the present, therefore, if we wish to further women's enfranchisement, it would seem desirable to keep an open mind as to the exact shape in which it is to come

Success is now at last in sight. All that remains is that we should do our part in retaining the friendship of the House of Commons, and in extorting 40 the respect of the House of Lords. The Government no longer needs to be intimidated, but the Lords may; and therefore now, as before, the road to victory lies through the creation of an overwhelming public opinion in our favour.

Liberalism and Women's Suffrage [1908]

THIS PAPER WAS published in the July 1908 issue of *The Contemporary Review*, an important monthly with a larger and much more diverse audience than the suffrage journals where most of Russell's articles on this question appeared. The paper revised, updated and extended the discussion begun at a theoretical level in "The Status of Women" (19). When Russell wrote "Liberalism and Women's Suffrage", there was an urgency not present when he wrote the first paper. In early 1906, the recently elected Liberal Government was confident, united and, with its massive majority, unchallenged. In April 1908, when Asquith succeeded the dying Campbell-Bannerman, Liberal fortunes had begun to erode. By July 1908, the Liberal Party had been shaken through a series of dramatic by-election reverses, particularly from January through June 1908. Liberal morale was near its nadir as the Unionist-dominated House of Lords systematically destroyed much government legislation, and the Unionist Party was increasingly confident of victory at the next general election.

Particularly galling to many Liberals was the fact that, during these months of frustration in 1908, suffragette militancy and suffragist anger had risen to a high level (Russell labelled both groups as suffragists, distinguishing them only by the term "militant" to refer to the Women's Social and Political Union.) Many Liberals deplored suffragette opposition to Liberal candidates at by-elections during this time. Especially alarming was the apparent success that the combination of suffragette militancy and suffragist aloofness had had in contributing to the defeat, on 24 April 1908 at North-West Manchester, of the newly appointed President of the Board of Trade, Winston Churchill. Russell was reacting to these and to other suffragist and suffragette public demonstrations of hostility to the Liberal Government when he urged cooperation instead. In June two particular occasions disturbed Russell. On 13 June 1908, 13,000 "constitutional" suffragists marched to the Albert Hall in an attempt to persuade the Government to grant women the vote. Far more menacing to Liberals was the massive demonstration of WSPU supporters, numbering at least 250,000, at Hyde Park on 21 June.

Although Russell, in discussing the theoretical arguments presented for and against women's suffrage, appeared to write with detachment, the fervour he felt for the cause emerged in the last sentence, where he exhorted all Liberals not to be guilty of "treachery to all their professions" by failing to support enthusiastically votes for women. Russell's attack on the arguments against women's suffrage are marshalled

in a less abstract and a more aggressive fashion than had been the case in "The Status of Women" (19). The more argumentative nature of the present document may reflect the fact that by 1908 the opponents of female suffrage had finally been forced by the growing agitation to organize themselves in order to articulate their conservative views. Indeed, up to 1908 public apathy or hostility to women's suffrage had been so strong that neither the Government nor the opponents of votes for women had had much reason for concern. On 21 July 1908 the Women's National Anti-Suffrage League held its inaugural meeting. Although there was not time for Russell to speak directly about this new organization in his paper, the arguments he addressed were closely associated with this group. Many who had not formally affiliated themselves to combat women's suffrage had voiced their opposition individually before and concurrent to the emergence of this League. In addition to the many aristocrats and old-fashioned middle-class philanthropists, many working men held a conservative view of women different from the perception presented by Russell. Those who opposed women's suffrage maintained that men and women lived and worked largely in "separate spheres". The distinction was buttressed by tradition, many religious beliefs, and psychological and physiological explanations of sex differences (see Harrison 1978, 56, 72 and *passim*).

Some of these beliefs and conventions with which Russell was forced to contend were given special plausibility from the support of particular authorities. Some doctors, for example, gave their professional sanction to the view that women were physically weaker and more susceptible to "hysteria" than men. Women's alleged inferiority in strength and stability, a widely held Victorian shibboleth, was said to disqualify them from warfare and thereby from voting. The argument that women could not bear arms was particularly telling to people anxious by 1908 about the security of Britain's vast empire and apprehensive of possible hostilities with Germany. Since military values and fears obsessed so many anti-suffragists, it is not surprising that men, led by the former proconsuls Lord Cromer and Lord Curzon, by 1910 had taken over the Women's National Anti-Suffrage League and transformed it into the National League for Opposing Women's Suffrage.

Russell, with his belief in internationalism, his loathing of militarism, and his denial that men and women lived in "separate spheres", was very much a pioneer attacking some of the most pervasive convictions held with adamantine firmness in Edwardian Britain.

The copy-text is the manuscript (RA 220 011180). The paper was collated with *The Contemporary Review*, 94 (July 1908) 11-16.

BY MR ASQUITH's pronouncement of May 20th, women's suffrage, for the first time in this country, becomes likely to form part of a Bill intended by the House of Commons to pass into law. It now rests with the friends of women's suffrage in the House of Commons to introduce a suitable amendment into the promised Electoral Reform Bill, and with the friends of democracy in the country to use their utmost endeavours to force the acceptance of this Bill on the House of Lords. In spite of the continued opposition to Liberals on the part of the militant suffragists, the cause of women's suffrage is now, at any rate for the moment, bound up with the fortunes of Liberalism. As temporary circumstances have tended to cause ¹⁰ an apparent divergence of interest between Suffragists and Liberals, it may be well now to remind ourselves of the permanent reasons which should lead the two to cooperate. The reasons in favour of women's suffrage are all such as ought to appeal with special force to Liberals. In the heat of political controversy, reasons of principle are too often lost sight of; I shall therefore make an attempt to recall them, and to show that they are such as no consistent Liberal can fail to acknowledge.

The grounds in favour of women's suffrage are, in the main, the same as those in favour of democracy in general; but in some respects these grounds apply with special force to the case of women. It is plain that no man can call ²⁰ himself truly a democrat if he is in favour of excluding half the nation from all participation in public affairs. Yet we find that democracy, now-a-days, is usually conceded as no longer open to discussion, even by people who are strong opponents of the claims of women. Such people, it seems to me, have forgotten what the benefits of democracy really are, for if they remembered them, they could hardly fail to see that these benefits are to be expected from the enfranchisement of women just as much as from the enfranchisement of working men. I shall, therefore, make no apology for recalling some of the main arguments in favour of democracy.

The chief traditional argument in favour of democracy is that it is difficult ³⁰ for one class to judge of the interest of another, and rare for one class to care as much for the interest of another as for its own. The illustrations of this in history are too numerous to need citing oligarchies have invariably been more or less ignorant of and indifferent to the interests of those whom they governed. It may be said that the relations of men and women are so close that this particular argument does not apply to the case of women. But I think this view is not borne out by the facts. There are, as every one knows, many respects in which the laws are unequal as between men and women. And there are many evils from which women suffer which are quietly accepted as inevitable, because those who have political power are not those ⁴⁰ who have to endure the evils. Is it just, for example, that a working woman and her children should, through no fault of her own, be reduced to destitution if her husband takes to drink? Yet no one regards this as a

political question

But perhaps a more important argument for democracy is its educational effect on the voter, and its effect in improving the relations between different classes. To speak first of the educational effect: there is the direct education of being brought into contact with political questions, and there is the education of character resulting from responsibility and freedom. Of these two, the education of character seems to me the more important, but the other is by no means a small matter. Any one who has watched an election must have been struck by the amount of knowledge on politics which the voters acquire from meetings and canvassers and discussions among themselves. The diffusion of such knowledge throughout the population not only increases the stability of a civilization, but also has the merit of making people aware of greater and more important matters than are to be found in their personal circumstances.

Closely connected with this purely political education is the education of character which I spoke of just now. It is good for people to feel that momentous questions depend in part upon their decision. It leads them to think responsibly and seriously, and it cultivates self-respect. One of the great arguments in favour of liberty is that those who have the direction of their own lives are in general intrinsically better than they would have been if others had regulated their lives for them. And this applies with at least as much force to the part of life which is political or affected by politics as it does to more private concerns. Therefore when it is said that women should be politically educated first before being given the vote, it is forgotten that the vote itself is the great engine of political education. This has proved to be the case with working men, who very generally had hardly any political education before they got the vote; and that it will prove so with women seems not open to doubt.

Another of the arguments for democracy is that it improves the relations between classes. When one class has power and another has not, those who have the power are not likely to feel as much respect for those who have not as for those who have. We all know the aristocratic attitude in politics, the attitude which instinctively ignores all interests except those of its own class, and feels that other classes are comparatively of no account. This attitude has been rapidly dying out under the influence of popular election. But in relation to women all men are in the position of aristocrats, and a contempt for the opinions or interests of women receives no political punishment. Considering how much closer are the relations of men and women than the relations of different classes, and how much better for both parties are equal relations than unequal ones, this must be regarded as a powerful argument in favour of giving votes to women. For it seems certain that the political enfranchisement of women would react beneficially on private life, engendering greater liberty and greater mutual respect in the

relations of the sexes

The chief arguments of principle in favour of women's suffrage may, then, be summed up as follows. First, that from defect of imagination and good will no class can be trusted to care adequately for the interests of another class, and that in fact women's interests have been unduly neglected by men. Secondly, that participation in politics widens people's outlook, and improves character by cultivating self-respect and a sense of responsibility; and that these advantages are just as certain to accrue to women if they have the vote as they were to accrue to working-men Thirdly, that it is easier to give due respect to those who have the same legal powers as we ¹⁰ have, and that a feeling of equality between men and women is of immense benefit not only in politics but in private life

I ought to add among the arguments of principle the argument of abstract justice This argument is sometimes supposed to rest upon an antiquated philosophy of natural right, and is therefore now rather discredited. But it does not seem to me to require any such fallacious foundation To inflict a special disability upon any class of the community is in itself an evil, and is calculated to generate resentment on the one side and arrogance on the other. It may be admitted that this evil, in some cases, is more than balanced by compensating advantages, but it remains an evil, and any gain for the ²⁰ sake of which it is to be endured must be very great and very certain. In the case of the disabilities of women, no such gain is apparent, and the argument from justice must therefore be admitted.

Having now considered the main arguments in favour of giving votes to women, I will pass to some of the arguments on the other side.

(1). We are often told that women are unreasonable, that they are governed by their emotions, and that they are unable to understand politics I don't know that I need waste much time on this argument. "Reason", in the mouths of those men who advance this modest opinion, generally means "wanting what I want", and "being governed by emotions" means "wanting what I don't want". Queen Elizabeth considered the House of Commons incapable of understanding foreign politics, because their aims were not the same as hers. The House of Lords considers the House of Commons incapable of understanding the Land Question, because the House of Commons doesn't recognize the paramount necessity of increasing rents. I suspect that women's incapacity for politics is of the same kind, and that if they alone had the vote, it would be men who would be incapable and emotional.

(2). We are told that women would be priest-ridden, that they would vote always at the dictation of their religious advisers In Catholic countries ⁴⁰ there may be some truth in this as things stand, though in Great Britain there seems no reason whatever to think it would be the case. But if it were true, it would only mark the neglect of women's political education, which

is due to their exclusion from the vote, and would presumably be remedied by their enfranchisement. If it were not remedied, that would mean that a minority are inflicting their policy upon the majority, and that those who fear priestly domination are nevertheless prepared to prolong their own domination because they are so certain that it is the better. But such a position is the negation of all democratic principles, and would, if logically carried out, be found to justify all degrees of intolerance, including religious persecution. This argument, therefore, even if it were not mistaken as to facts, would not be available for any one who believes in popular govern-

ment

(3). Women, it is said, ought not to have the vote because they cannot fight. If this argument were pushed home, we ought to disfranchise all men who are too old to fight, or are in any way physically incapable; and we ought to disfranchise Quakers because they will not fight. But it is hard to see why the vote should be confined to those who can fight. The idea seems to be that you will have all the men on one side and all the women on the other, and that then the action of the majority would be defeated by an appeal to arms. But the supposition is so fantastic that it is hard to take it seriously, especially as the same people who make it tell us that it is unnecessary to give votes to women, because they would always vote with their husbands. The notion that in such a country as England an appeal to arms could ever be made successfully against the decision of Parliament is obviously absurd; and if this idea is not entertained, the question whether women can fight is of no importance

(4). I come now to a very favourite argument. Women's Suffrage, we are told, would promote quarrels in families and destroy the happiness of home life. Those who advance this argument apparently think that it is impossible to discuss without quarrelling, that a man cannot be happy unless all his words are received as oracles by a dutiful family, and that the ideal of home life is to avoid all conversation on every important subject. A husband and wife who cannot get on together unless they confine themselves to trivialities had better, I should say, learn a little mutual forbearance; and I should count it among the advantages of women's suffrage that it would tend to promote a reasonable discussion of things outside the home.

(5). It is often said that women ought not to have votes because they do not want them. Those who say this, by the way, are loudest in condemnation of those women who have taken steps to let us know that they do want votes. But that is natural, for no one is so annoying as a person who disproves one's favourite argument. Speaking seriously, the allegation that women do not want the vote is rapidly becoming untrue, although it is perhaps not yet untrue of the majority. But even if it is still true of the majority, it does not warrant the conclusion that women ought not to have the vote. In the first place, it does not warrant the exclusion of that large and

increasing number of women who do want the vote. In the second place, all the arguments which we considered in favour of women's suffrage remain valid even if women are indifferent, and when women have had the political education resulting from the franchise, they will see the advantage of the vote. The question, therefore, whether a majority of women desire the vote is not really relevant to the issue, though it does of course vitally affect the likelihood of their getting the vote.

(6). One bogey which is used to frighten timid people is the argument that there are more women than men in the United Kingdom, and that therefore we should be governed by women if we gave the vote to all women. Now in the first place very few advocates of women's suffrage demand the vote for *all* women. In the second place, if it is urged that any measure of women's suffrage would be merely a stage on the way to the enfranchisement of all women (which I should admit), it still does not follow that we should be governed by women. This assumes, like the argument that women cannot fight, that we shall have all women on one side and all men on the other; but I cannot think that either sex will make themselves so very obnoxious as to bring about such a result as that. And in the third place, even if we were governed by women, would it be so very terrible? At present we are governed by men, and the result, though perhaps not very admirable, is one which we all endure patiently. I fail to see why being governed by one sex should be any worse than being governed by the other. This argument, therefore, is peculiarly futile, for what it dreads would certainly not happen, and there is no reason to think it would matter if it did. 20

There remains one reason against the Suffrage, which certainly has more force than all the others put together: I mean the instinctive love of dominion. Most men like to be cock of the walk somewhere, and home is generally the only place where they get a chance. They dread that in an equal contest they might fail to maintain the lead, and they therefore insist that the matrimonial race shall continue to be a handicap. For this reason, many men who are willing enough that spinsters and widows should have votes are most unwilling that married women should, because they do not wish to lose the one corner where they have mastery. Against this state of mind it is useless to bring mere arguments. It has been partially overcome among educated people by novelists and playwrights; but among the uneducated it is still rampant. While it is the most serious obstacle with which advocates of women's suffrage have to contend, it must also be said that one of the gains to be expected from women's suffrage is that it will tend to substitute for the somewhat brutal desire for mastery a cooperation which cannot fail to develop the intelligence and the good will of both parties. 40

I would appeal to Liberals, therefore, in the name of all their professed principles, to support the demand which women suffragists make, namely the demand that women should have votes on the same terms as men. It is

only through supporting this demand that we can hope to reach that complete democracy which ought to be our goal; and to resist such a demand from a section of the nation can only be justified by oligarchical principles such as no Liberal has a right to hold. The gains to the community to be expected from granting it are very great. First, an immense advance in the political education of women, and a broadening of their outlook on life. Secondly, a gain to liberty, and an improvement in the attitude of men towards women. Thirdly, in the long run, a greater care for questions of women's work, of the rearing and education of children, and of all those ¹⁰ increasingly important problems upon which the biological future of the race depends. The rise of women to equality with men, which has been rapidly advancing during the past half-century, is one of those great social improvements of which only a few occur in a thousand years. To let prejudice or an uncertain party advantage stand in the way of our contributing to this improvement is unworthy of men who have liberty at heart, and I most earnestly hope that few Liberals will any longer be guilty of such a treachery to all their professions.

The Present Situation [1909]

THIS MIMEOGRAPHED LETTER was written by Russell on 17 February 1909 as a position paper in his capacity as a member of the Executive of the NUWSS. The letter was written the day after Russell attended the annual meeting between the suffragists and M.P.s favourable to the cause. On 9 February, he had optimistically reported to Margaret Llewelyn Davies a change in the attitude of this organization.

The N.U. is growing more favourable to "democratic lines", it seems to me. And there seemed no great horror at the thought of the M.P.s going for a wider measure this year. It is chiefly Mrs Fawcett who holds back, but she was not present today.

His impression that the views of the group had grown more compatible with his own was to prove illusory. But it induced him at the time to suggest that the NUWSS should endorse an extended rather than a limited bill like Stanger's. A year earlier, he had dismissed the attempt to argue that position as a completely futile undertaking.

I fear it is hopeless to get the N.U. to support Dickinson's Bill. In the first place, many of them dislike it, in the second place, they are always asked whether they are asking for votes for working men's wives, and they soothe the working men by saying they are not; so it would hardly be honest at present to do much actively for Dickinson. His speeches in favour of his Bill make them furious—surprisingly so. (To Davies, 15 Jan 1908)

(W H Dickinson had in 1907 proposed two Private Members Bills. The First stated that the same qualifications that gave men the vote should be applied to women and that marriage should not disqualify women from voting. Russell was referring to Dickinson's Second where a special clause was inserted about residency in lodgings or dwelling houses so that there could be no doubt that he intended working-class women to be included.) Russell overestimated either the shift in the position of the NUWSS or their receptivity to his persuasion. Before 1909 was over, he resigned from the Executive but retained membership. One motive for leaving the Executive was the desire to support the Liberal Party, the other was the opportunity to work for adult suffrage in the People's Suffrage Federation (PSF).

The copy-text is the typed letter (RA 510 073139)

THE PRESENT SITUATION is extremely inconvenient for the National Union, and it is not easy at first sight to determine what we ought to do

Certain facts seem not open to question. (1) Mr. Stanger's Bill has no chance of getting through the present House of Commons (2) A wider Bill has no chance of getting through the present House of Lords (3) The electors in general, while prepared to tolerate Mr. Stanger's Bill, are vehemently opposed to the enfranchisement of their own wives

It results from these facts that there is no chance of the enfranchisement of women in the present Parliament, and that, in the form in which Liberals are prepared to take it up, it will militate against them at the next General Election. It results also that, if the Liberals are returned at the next election, Women's Suffrage is practically certain to become law during the next Parliament, since the Lords will then no longer be a barrier; while, if the Conservatives are returned, there is no reason to think that they will grant the Suffrage. On the other hand, if (as is probable) the Liberals are not returned to power at the next election, and if we have made ourselves more or less responsible for a sweeping measure enfranchising the wives of working men, we run a risk of sharing whatever unpopularity such a measure may incur. Against this three arguments may be adduced: (1) that we can, without much difficulty, make it plain that we support such a measure unwillingly, as being the best in the field, and that we would rather support Mr. Stanger's Bill; (2) that in any case it will, in all likelihood, be twelve years before the Suffrage question again becomes immediately practical, since the next Parliament is likely to rely upon Tariff Reform for its popularity; (3) that although the objection of men to the enfranchisement of their wives is a fact to be reckoned with, it is also an integral part of the very evil we exist to combat. The vote (like everything else) is a means to an end, and the end is that women should be recognized as the equals of men, but this end is not attained so long as men object to their wives having votes while women do not object to the votes of their husbands. We cannot therefore regard our work as completed so long as the present prejudice on the subject of wives is sufficiently strong to be politically important

It may be worth while to consider for a moment the reasons of the M.P.'s for adopting the course they propose. Next year they will have to move an Amendment to the Government Reform Bill, and it is of vital importance to the cause that that Amendment should secure as good a vote as possible. For this reason, it is important in the present Session to introduce a measure which will test the feeling of the House and the Government and thereby make it possible to frame the Amendment on the lines most likely to

commend themselves to the House and the Government. This seems a cogent reason for introducing a wider measure than Mr. Stanger's, though not for introducing so wide a measure as was proposed last night. We ought not, therefore, to place difficulties in the way of members adopting the course which, in view of the Parliamentary situation, is most likely to further the cause of Women's Suffrage.

It may be said that the projected Amendment to the Reform Bill has no importance, in view of the certain rejection of the whole Bill (not the Amendment only) by the Lords. This seems to me a great mistake, for the following reasons In the course of the conflict with the Lords, the Liberal 10 Party will (if skill is shown by Suffragists) become committed to the Amendment; if, when this occurs, Suffragists show any inclination to support Liberals, it becomes immensely more probable than it otherwise would be that the Conservative Party will take up Mr. Stanger's Bill, in which case, our battle is won And in any case, to have one Party committed to the enfranchisement of women is no small matter

For the above reasons I should urge on the Executive the following course: (1) to urge the Parliamentary Committee to adopt some less extreme measure, such as Mr Dickinson's No. 2, but not (like that Bill) making a special female qualification; (2) in either event, to support the Bill introduced by the Parliamentary Committee As for (2), it appears to me that our avowed aim leaves us no option we must support any Bill which equalizes the franchise as between men and women We profess to be indifferent as to the terms on which men have the vote; but this indifference is not maintained if we refuse to support a Bill introducing sex equality on the ground of an alteration in the qualifications for a vote. The words "or may be" in our aim seem in danger of being forgotten. And it should not be difficult to make it plain that we support such a measure solely because it enfranchises women, and that for its other clauses we are in no way responsible.

BERTRAND RUSSELL 30

Please bring this to the Committee on February 18th

Should Suffragists Welcome the People's Suffrage Federation? [1909]

THE STATED OBJECTIVE of the People's Suffrage Federation (PSF) was "to obtain the Parliamentary suffrage for every adult man and woman, on a short residential qualification" This objective had been the goal of many franchise reformers since at least the time of the Reform Bill of 1884. It was totally in harmony with Russell's own views in a way that the more limited goals of the National Union had never been

Russell had been invited by Margaret Llewelyn Davies and Rosalind Nash to attend a meeting held 16 June 1909 to make plans for this organization On 18 October he wrote to Lucy Donnelly about the newly formed PSF "after some hesitation I have decided to join it It is having a very great success, but is regarded with grave suspicion by most ardent suffragists, and I am having a difficult time with Mrs Fawcett and Co" On 25 November Russell put an end to the "difficult time" by resigning from the Executive of the NUWSS In August of 1908 he had wished to make a whole-hearted commitment to adult suffrage, but fear that such action might be misinterpreted restrained him. As Russell expressed the problem to Margaret Llewelyn Davies "I should feel as if I was not being quite a true friend to women" (8 Aug)

By October 1909, his patience with the NUWSS and particularly the Executive was exhausted To Helen Flexner in America he wrote "I wonder whether your suffragists are as trying as ours Ours have the bigotry of a small religious sect, and the suspiciousness of Parisians in the war of 1870" (27 Oct) The insistence by the NUWSS that all public issues must be subordinated to the attainment of the franchise brought Russell's final breach with the Executive Russell believed that the pre-eminent political problem was to find a way to curtail the power of the House of Lords over the House of Commons This concern was shortly to become a strong theme in his "Address to the Bedford Liberal Association" (26) The Lords' rejection of the Lloyd George Budget in November 1909 had surprised the nation and raised the greatest constitutional issue since the Reform Bill crisis of 1830-32 At stake, Russell believed, was the future government of the country by either the Lords or the Commons. If control of finance were lost, then the Commons would be so weakened that the right to vote would cease to be meaningful The struggle for the franchise had to be seen, Russell thought, in the context of the entire political situation of the time, and not in the narrow and obdurate manner of the NUWSS.

In the forthcoming election fought over the Lords' veto, the NUWSS had decided to support, regardless of their political affiliation, all candidates who favoured female suffrage. In adopting this position, they were more astute than the WSPU which campaigned actively against Liberals as a matter of policy. Even so, Russell found the position of the NUWSS unacceptable. A vote for a Unionist candidate who favoured suffrage would not, he cautioned, achieve the desired result. Whereas the women's suffrage societies felt intense impatience with the Liberal Party, the PSF believed that the only hope for progressive measures was from the Liberal and Labour Parties. Indeed, many in the Executive were themselves well known in these parties. The Executive included from the Labour Party, Arthur Henderson (leader of the Parliamentary Party), Margaret Bondfield (later to be the first woman in the Cabinet), and Mary Macarthur (the influential social reformer and women's labour organizer) and as well the Liberals G. M. and Janet Trevelyan.

Russell claimed in his old age that Margaret Llewelyn Davies, one of the two honorary secretaries of the organization, persuaded him to join. But he had himself reached the conclusion that limited measures would not suffice. "It is not women as women that I want enfranchised, but women as human beings. And even poor women are human beings" (to Lucy Donnelly, 17 Nov 1909). Full adult suffrage had long been Russell's overriding desire, but the possibility of achieving it had seemed to be too far in the future for active effort. The prospects had improved sufficiently by 1909 for Russell to cast aside compromise policies.

Reform of the franchise had growing appeal to Liberal and Labour Parties because the anomalies of the system favoured the Unionist Party. There was a growing feeling among Liberal and Labour supporters that the removal of the sex disqualification would only further enshrine the irregularities and inequalities in the system. After the Liberals lost approximately 100 seats in the first 1910 election, the need for electoral reform seemed yet more compelling.

Russell was actively involved in the PSF until early 1913. By January 1910, he had been appointed to the Executive, he wrote *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* (27), his longest and most important paper on the question of suffrage, for their series of pamphlets. Throughout February and March 1911 he worked to establish the Cambridge PSF branch, and his efforts continued until October. By early 1913, he became discouraged as the prospect of suffrage "receded indefinitely" (to Donnelly, 18 April 1913). The withdrawal of the Franchise and Registration Bill in January brought this sense of disillusionment. In 1916 when he was asked for £31 for "winding up the affairs of the old People's Suffrage Federation", Russell told Lady Ottoline Morrell that he thought the organization "had had its funeral long ago" (#1352, 5 Feb.).

The article was published in the main periodical of the NUWSS, *The Common Cause*, 9 December 1909. The disclaimer made by the editor, the famous feminist and pacifist Helena Swanwick, at the beginning of Russell's article indicates that his message was unwelcome to many members of the NUWSS.

The following article, by Mr Bertrand Russell, who has resigned from the Executive of the National Union, is not put forward as from the Union, but as an expression of Mr Russell's own views and those of the promoters of the People's Suffrage Federation, of which he is a member

The NUWSS were not receptive to the argument that adult suffrage was in their best interest. They feared that a bill which started out favouring adult suffrage might be changed into manhood suffrage. Moreover, they wanted recognition of equality through legislation which would specifically grant females the franchise.

The copy-text is *The Common Cause*, 1 (9 Dec. 1909) 463-4.

THE FORMATION of the People's Suffrage Federation, and its rapid success with most of the friends of Women's Suffrage in the House of Commons and elsewhere, has come upon many Suffragists as a blow. It has seemed both a cause and a symptom of new years of delay, and a proof of treason on the part of Parliamentary friends. I do not myself share this view, which I believe to be the result of lack of knowledge as to the political situation. It appears to me, on the contrary, that the People's Suffrage Federation, while in no way superseding the societies which work for women's enfranchisement only, has a function to perform which must be performed by someone before the Suffrage can be won. In this question ¹⁰ there are two matters to consider—namely, the attitude of the country and the position of the political parties.

To begin with the country. It is commonly said by those who regard the explicit advocacy of Adult Suffrage as ill-judged that the country is willing to acquiesce in the removal of the sex disability, but is still strongly opposed to a measure which would make women the majority of voters. To this it might be replied, in the first place, that a fairly large section of the country—notably the Trade Unionists and the Labour Party—considers the distinction of rich and poor more important, politically, than the distinction of men and women, and is therefore willing to enfranchise ²⁰ women if by so doing it will not increase the propertied vote, but not otherwise. But a more important consideration is that our enemies believe—as most of us do—that the removal of the sex disability would almost certainly lead, in no long time, to full Adult Suffrage. This is one of the main arguments used by Anti-Suffragists, and it is not answered by merely pointing out that Adult Suffrage is not what we are asking for, since it appears likely that Adult Suffrage would be the ultimate result, if not the intention, of our success. It therefore becomes necessary to meet the Adult Suffrage bugbear by argument, and to persuade people that Adult Suffrage, if it came, would not be disaster. Until people are persuaded of this few will ³⁰ give active support to any measure of women's enfranchisement, though many will give a useless theoretical assent to the principle. It is not the business of a Suffrage society to advocate one method of giving justice to women rather than another; hence any society whose object is merely to secure electoral justice to women must remain neutral as between different Bills, each of which secures that men and women have votes on the same terms. Therefore, since it is necessary to our success that Adult Suffrage should cease to be a bugbear, we ought to rejoice in the formation of a society which, unlike the Suffrage societies, can explicitly preach Adult Suffrage. The ostrich policy of hiding our heads in the sand whenever Adult ⁴⁰ Suffrage is mentioned does not blind our opponents, and it is therefore necessary that someone should adopt a bolder course.

The party situation enforces the same lesson. A very large majority of the

politicians who support the principle of Women's Suffrage belong to the Liberal and Labour parties, both of which are immovably opposed to the mere removal of the sex disability without change in the qualifications. The Labour party, at their Congress in Hull about two years ago, pronounced for Adult Suffrage as against the single removal of the sex disability, and recently almost all their M.P.'s have joined the People's Suffrage Federation. Mr Asquith has declared that any Suffrage measure which he can accept must be on "democratic lines", and this is the attitude of almost all the Liberal M.P.'s who are in favour of Suffrage. This attitude is largely the result of reports of their election agents as to the political effect of enfranchising women on the present basis, and it is therefore not likely to change. But it is unjust to suppose that those Liberal and Labour men who prefer a wider measure are not genuine supporters of the Suffrage; many of them are very genuine supporters, though there are no doubt other measures for which they care at least as much. Suffrage can only be obtained through a party, and it is a pity to antagonize the two parties in which we have the most support, merely because they desire to combine the removal of the sex disability with a change in the qualifications for a vote, which is a matter upon which, as Suffragists, we are not called upon to have an opinion. It is time to recognize that most people who favour Women's Suffrage differ as to how it should be brought about, according to their party, and that it is not our business to take sides in this question, since legal justice, which is our aim, is equally secured in either case. It may seem as though the Liberal-Labour method were less practicable than the other, but it has many more advocates among Liberals and Labour men than the other has among Conservatives, and it cannot be said that Conservatives show any symptoms of friendliness to Women's Suffrage. It should, however, be reckoned among the advantages of the advocacy of Adult Suffrage that a serious prospect of such a measure being carried by Liberals is more likely than any other imaginable cause to stimulate the Conservatives into the adoption of a less sweeping measure.

Finally, it should be remembered, as one of the uses of the People's Suffrage Federation, that it enlists the active support of many people who will not work for a measure that concerns women only. There are many people—mostly men—to whom the principle that every adult human being should have a voice in the government is inspiring and worth much effort, whereas the principle that, given an adequate property qualification, sex alone should not disqualify leaves them cold, because they are not interested in women as such, but only in women as among the dispossessed. To such men—and it would be an error to regard them as unimportant or insincere—opposition to a measure which will enfranchise not only women, but some men also, appears, however unjustly, to show a lack of generosity and an inability to appreciate the broad grounds which justify the claims of

women And it is too often forgotten that the appeal to reason is the only ground upon which women can hope to receive any large measure of support from men.

For all these reasons, I would urge Suffragists to regard the People's Suffrage Federation as a friend rather than as an enemy, and as able and willing to do a work which, while in no way replacing the work of the Suffrage societies, must be performed before they can hope to attain their goal.

Address to the Bedford Liberal Association [1910]

THIS HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED manuscript, written shortly before its delivery on 26 April 1910, presents the clearest and fullest account prior to 1914 of Russell's old-fashioned Radicalism leavened by some influence from New Liberalism. It was not published because, although Russell delivered this address to the Bedford Liberal Association, he was not in the event selected as their candidate. The Radical nature of the document is revealed by his emphasis on what he considered the heinous behaviour of the House of Lords in rejecting the 1909 Budget, his outrage about the extensive list of other Liberal legislative measures destroyed by the Upper House and, particularly, his urgent call for a sweeping taxation of land values. These views, together with his mild support for extensive social reforms, show his agreement with David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and the other leading New Liberal politicians. Since this was a very practical electoral message to rank-and-file voters, it is understandable that there is little discussion of political theory. Indeed, Russell's address does not differ significantly in content from most other Radical electoral proclamations. But the depth and detail with which he argues his points, the historical examples he employs, and the rhetorical power of his style mark this address as a far more ambitious statement than all but a few of the contemporary election manifestos. Some of this detail might have been lost had he been adopted as a candidate and had he, in such a case, felt obliged to shorten his address.

The dominant theme of his address, the need for stringent restraints on the powers of the House of Lords, was not only a policy he had long espoused, but also a family tradition. In 1893 just after the Lords had rejected Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill, his grandmother, Countess Russell, wrote to a stepdaughter that, if possessed of the power, she would "declare" the House of Lords "injurious to the best interests of the nation and for ever dissolved" (MacCarthy and Russell 1910, 284). Russell's own hostility to the very existence of the House of Lords was already evident in 1906, when he wrote to Halévy "I wish the Lords would reject the Trade Disputes Bill, that might give a real chance of getting them abolished... But I fear they have too much sense" (11 Oct.). By April 1910 Russell was so alarmed by the Lords' persistent mutilation and rejection of so much proposed Liberal legislation that he considered the political crisis to be "the most important since 1832" (297, 7).

Russell's advocacy of the taxation of land values, the second main theme of his address, also placed him firmly on the left wing of the Liberal Party. Like many New

Liberals, of whom Lloyd George was the most noted, Russell believed that a comprehensive series of social reforms could be financed primarily by taxing land values. Experience was to prove that land taxes as inaugurated by the passage of Lloyd George's 1909 Budget in the spring of 1910 were never to bring in enough revenue to offset the costs of collecting them. Nevertheless, Russell knew that in Edwardian Britain the essential dividing line between Liberals and Unionists lay in their different approaches to raising revenue. Liberal plans to tax land values and to increase the graduated income tax came under the rubric of direct taxation which would fall most heavily on the wealthy classes. Tariff reform, with its reliance on indirect taxes, would protect the wealthy while placing the heaviest burdens upon the poorer classes, particularly since under Chamberlain's scheme food would be taxed.

Russell's address said virtually nothing about foreign policy. One of his biographers misjudges this omission as evidence "of how little anybody was expecting or thinking about a war" (Wood 1957, 73). Certainly it is true that the single issue of the House of Lords dominated politics throughout 1910. But, in fact, most Unionists and many Liberals were apprehensive about what they perceived as German expansionist ambitions, particularly when backed by an increasingly powerful fleet. Hence, they tended as a matter of course to stress in their election manifestos the need for strengthening the British navy. By contrast, many Radicals, convinced of Germany's pacific intentions and hostile to militarism and the armaments interests, advocated disarmament and arbitration as essential to British foreign policy. Russell's pacifist impulses and partial blindness to the massive European military preparation made him resist the majority opinion as to the growing likelihood of war. His optimism no doubt explains the failure to make any reference to foreign policy, although he held strong if undeveloped views.

Russell's family heritage in addition to his well-known attachment to Radical causes made him, for many Liberals, a very desirable candidate. Moreover, he had already run a witty and courageous, if unsuccessful, by-election campaign at Wimbledon in 1907 where his candidacy had achieved national recognition. The January 1910 election had left Liberals and Unionists with very nearly equal members. Liberal power would only be retained by alliance with the Irish Nationalist Party and the Labour Party. Liberal agents were therefore anxious to enlist candidates with wide appeal to these groups. As early as 21 March 1910, Russell had been approached by a Liberal agent to contest Oxford City. He declined, perhaps because he was asked not to emphasize women's suffrage. Russell then took the initiative by applying "to Liberal Headquarters for a constituency" (1967, 201). The Liberal Chief Whip, the Master of Elibank, then suggested his name to the president of the Bedford Liberal Association, who wrote to Russell on 18 and 21 April to ask him to meet with the Association to see if a mutually satisfactory arrangement could be agreed upon. Bedford had traditionally been a Liberal seat but it had been lost in the January 1910 election because of internal Liberal divisions (Pelling 1967, 113, 120). Despite its predominantly Anglican tradition (and there-

fore Conservative bias), there was a strong Dissenting minority. Moreover, many of the people lived on fixed incomes and the possibility of an increase in food prices if tariff reform were victorious predisposed them to vote Liberal.

Russell's engagement diary shows that he addressed the Bedford Liberal Association at 8 p.m. on Tuesday, 26 April. According to his own account he was "received with enthusiasm" (1967, 201). But before delivering his address he was interrogated in "a small back room" by a committee of the Association which was concerned about his agnosticism. Russell later recalled that the questioning took the following form:

- Q* Are you a member of the Church of England?
- A* No, I was brought up as a Nonconformist.
- Q* And have remained so?
- A* No, I have not remained so.
- Q* Are we to understand that you are an agnostic?
- A* Yes, that is what you must understand.
- Q* Would you be willing to attend church occasionally?
- A* No, I should not.
- Q* Would your wife be willing to attend church occasionally?
- A* No, she would not.
- Q* Would it come out that you are an agnostic?
- A* Yes, it probably would come out (*ibid.*)

Since Russell's views were unacceptable to many members of the Association, on 29 April the President, T. Lee Roberts, regretfully informed him that another candidate had been chosen. His response to the rejection is revealed in a letter to Helen Flexner:

It is very doubtful whether, after all, I shall take to politics. I came very near standing for Bedford, and addressed the Liberal Executive there with that object. But they disliked suffrage and agnosticism, and chose some one else.... Also I find the expense of politics would be greater than I supposed, so for one reason and another I am rather off with the idea of standing, though nothing is settled yet (25 May 1910)

The main cost, had he become a conscientious M.P., would have been to his academic career, for on 27 May Whitehead informed him that Trinity College had decided to offer him a five-year lectureship in logic and mathematics. Russell kept to his decision not to stand as a candidate, even though he was asked to consider contesting Hastings and St Leonards or South Pancras. The candidate selected by the Bedford Liberal Association, a local man named Frederick G. Kellaway, was elected in December 1910 and served as a minor Cabinet minister in 1921-22.

GENTLEMEN: THE HONOUR which you have done me in asking me to address you tonight is one of which I am highly sensible, and I shall do my best, in the course of my remarks, to enable you to judge as to the nature of my political opinions, and as to the measures which I should advocate if I had the good fortune to be adopted as your candidate. We find ourselves in the midst of a political crisis of the very greatest importance—the most important, in my opinion, since 1832—and the Liberal Party can only secure victory by courage, firmness and consistency. The question which, at this moment, overshadows all others, is the question of the Lords' Veto Until that has been satisfactorily dealt with, all lines of advance are blocked, all other measures of reform are impossible. I am a whole-hearted supporter of the Resolutions which have passed the Commons; indeed it is my sense of their urgent necessity which has induced me to enter seriously upon a political career. I had hoped, in common with many others, that the last election had secured our victory; it now appears, however, that in all human probability another election will be required in order to pass the Veto Bill into law If we secure a majority in that election, even a reduced majority, I shall expect the Government to force the Veto Bill through the Lords by whatever means the Lords may render necessary On both sides, we hear talk of compromise, but I am convinced that the materials for a compromise do not exist, and I will not voluntarily be a party to any compromise. What the Government are asking appears to me just and moderate, and the power which their proposals would leave in the hands of the Lords is, in my opinion, at least as great as it ought to be.

It has been hitherto the boast of Englishmen that our Constitution was unwritten. But an unwritten Constitution requires moderation and respect for constitutional custom; and no trace of either has been exhibited by the Lords since the Liberals secured their record majority in 1906. A moment's review of the last Parliament shows that the situation is utterly intolerable to all who have reform at heart. The first work of the Lords was the destruction of the Education Bill—a measure designed to remedy an injustice about which the nation had never had a chance to pronounce until 1906 The Parliament which inflicted the injustice was elected on the Khaki cry, whereas in the election of 1906 the Government's intentions were clearly announced Yet, in spite of the overwhelming verdict of the country, the Lords so mutilated the first Bill of the new Parliament that it had to be abandoned. Emboldened by their success, they proceeded to treat all other important Bills in the same way—the Plural Voting Bill, the Licensing Bill, the Scottish Valuation Bill in two successive sessions, and the Scottish Land Bill are among their victims. Last of all, they took a step which they had never before dared to take—they threw out the Budget, hoping thereby to avoid taxes on the superfluities of the rich, and ensure, through Tariff Reform, that taxes should fall on the necessities of the poor. Not content

with paralyzing the legislative work of the Government, they thus ventured at last upon a step which, had it succeeded, would have enabled them at any moment to dictate dissolution and throw the executive machinery of government into confusion

Thus throughout the last Parliament, the Liberal Party, though in office, was not in power. One exception must be noted. the grant of self-government to South Africa. Here the House of Lords had no voice, and a wise and just measure, whose good results have become more evident every day, was carried through in spite of the fears of Mr. Balfour and the lugubrious prophecies of Lord Milner. This one example of what can be accomplished when the interference of the Lords is removed should be remembered by those who dread the limitation of the veto

The claims of the Lords, as advanced in the last Parliament, are such as Liberals can no longer tolerate; and it is time that these claims should be curtailed. Much is said by the Tories about "revolution". Such talk is an impudent falsification of the true state of affairs. It is the Lords who have attempted revolution, and when the whole of the Veto Bill has become law, the Constitution will only be restored to what it was before their usurpation began. In regard to the Budget, this is now almost admitted even by the Tories. But in regard to the legislative veto, it is equally true, though less generally recognized. I took down from my shelves the other day a book which is generally recognized as one of the best accounts of our system of Government, Bagehot's *English Constitution*. This book, which was written in 1865, cannot fail to convince any candid reader that the claims which the Lords advanced in the last Parliament constituted a shameful invasion of our hard-won liberties, an invasion—I say this deliberately—dictated, in nine cases out of ten, by no desire for the public welfare, but by economic self-interest, masquerading under some such alias as "resistance to Socialism".

"The ultimate authority in the English Constitution", says Bagehot (p. 227), "is a newly-elected House of Commons. No matter whether the question upon which it decides be administrative or legislative; no matter whether it concerns high matters of the essential constitution or small matters of daily detail; ... a new House of Commons can despotically and finally resolve."

He then proceeds to explain that the excellence of the British Constitution is due to the fact that one body (the House of Commons) has the sovereign power, and that this would not be the case but for the power of creating peers. "The head of the executive", he says (pp. 229-30), "can overcome the resistance of the second chamber by choosing new members of that chamber; if he do not find a majority, he can make a majority. This is a safety-valve of the truest kind. It enables the popular will to carry out within the constitution desires and conceptions which one branch of the

constitution dislikes and resists ”

“It is”, he says (p 97), “a remarkable peculiarity, a capital excellence of the British Constitution, that it contains a sort of Upper House, which is not of equal authority to the Lower House, yet still has some authority.”

What could be a more exact description of the state of things which will be brought about by the passing of the Veto Bill? I hope, therefore, that there will be no doubt, no hesitation, but a resolute determination to settle the Veto question once for all in the first session of the new Parliament

We are told that when the Veto question has been settled, Reform of the Lords is to be undertaken. The Lords themselves admit that they need reforming, but their idea of reform is somewhat curious They wish to fix the number of peers, and have them elected by those who at present have seats in the Upper House. The effect of this would be to exclude the few Liberal Peers who at present exist, and to destroy the King’s prerogative of creating peers. No wonder the Lords passed Lord Rosebery’s resolutions, but I do not think the country will be much impressed by such reform as that When Liberals speak of reform of the Lords, they have in mind a very different thing They wish to see an elective Second Chamber, with perhaps a small nominated element This policy I should be prepared to support, provided the limitation of the veto is maintained. Its chief merit, to my mind, lies in the fact that it would make it impossible for the Tories to undo our work At the same time, I dread the delay to other much-needed measures, and the possible division in the progressive forces. I should not, therefore, greatly regret an abandonment of the whole scheme for altering the composition of the second chamber

The proposal which led the Lords to reject the Budget was, as we all know, the proposal to tax Land Values The taxation of Land Values has had my whole-hearted support for many years, and I earnestly hope that the Government will persevere in this policy, and extend it by enabling the rates also to be assessed partly on Land Values The excellence of such taxation is to be measured by the hostility which it arouses in landlords After many years of cautious and prudent encroachment, the Lords were tempted by their indignation at having to bear a just share of the taxes to commit an act of folly which will, I fully believe, bring about their downfall. I was present in the House of Lords at the close of their debate on the Budget, and when the result of the division was announced. Much as I value the Budget, I rejoiced at the result, for I felt that now at last we should defeat them In my opinion there never was a shabbier exhibition of rich men’s greed Two alternative means of raising revenue are before the country Tariff Reform and Taxation of Land Values Tariff Reform, however much it may be called “taxing the foreigner”, is known by every educated Tariff Reformer to be a method of increasing the price of all the necessities of life—partly, but only partly, for the sake of revenue; the rest is to go to Trust magnates in

the shape of monopoly profits, and to landowners in the shape of higher rents. Thus the Lords will simultaneously increase their incomes and diminish their taxes. The other method of raising the additional revenue demanded by the Navy, by Old Age Pensions, and by those other measures of Social Reform, such as insurance against sickness or unemployment, which Mr. Winston Churchill has promised for the near future, is by means of Land Values. Now we sometimes hear it said, by those who ought to know better, that it is unjust to single out one form of property for special taxation. I should be the last to advocate any injustice, even if its victims
10 were Dukes, but there is no injustice in the Budget taxes. Take first the increment duty. If I put my money into Consols, I go on year after year receiving the same interest; but if I put my money into land, the energy and enterprise of the community, without my lifting a finger, make me continually richer. Suppose I buy a piece of land on the outskirts of a town. The town, at great expense, makes streets, builds tramways, provides gas and water and all the other necessaries of urban existence; my plot of land becomes desirable for building, and I secure for my own pocket a large share of the ratepayers' expenditure. Where is the justice of that? Surely it is more than just that a part—only one-fifth—of that increment of value which has
20 come to me by no effort of my own should be taken by the community which created the increment. Of the immense results to be expected from participation by the public in increment the town of Bedford affords, I believe, a conspicuous example. My authority is not a party pamphlet, but the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*:

Bedford, in proportion to its size, has more public endowments than any other place in the kingdom, for which it is chiefly indebted to Sir W. Harper, Lord Mayor of London in 1561, who founded here a free school, and conveyed for its support, and for portioning poor maidens, a piece of ground in London, the surplus, if any, to be given to the poor. This ground has gradually risen in value so as now to produce nearly £14,000 annually. It supports grammar, modern, preparatory and other schools.. (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed.)
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Now I say that is a better use for the money than an extra mansion or an extra yacht for some Duke, and I say that no private person can complain of taxation which only falls upon him when he has been enriched by the action of others. So much for the increment duty.

The undeveloped land duty is no less just, and even more beneficial. Suppose two men who each own an acre in a growing suburb, the two acres
40 being of the same value. One of them puts up houses or cottages, thereby benefiting the community, and making himself liable for heavy rates and for

income tax on all the rents he receives. The other prefers to hold up his land; half his very low rates are remitted to him under the Agricultural Rates Act, and of course he escapes income tax because, though his property is improving, he is not deriving a yearly income. I say it is only just that he should have to pay a tax proportional to the value of his property, in spite of the fact that, for his own purposes, he chooses to withhold it from the use for which it is most suited. Moreover it is absurd to reward him, as we do at present, for an act which is against the public interest, I mean the holding up of land. The undeveloped land duty, by bringing more land into the market, will stimulate building, lower rents, and tend to diminish the great evil of 10 overcrowding

It is, however, a necessary complement to the policy of the Budget to put a portion at least of the *rates* onto land values. This proposal has been advocated by most of the great municipalities of England and Scotland, it has been advocated by so staunch a Tory as Lord Balfour of Burleigh in the report for the Local Taxation Commission signed by him and other members of the Commission; and a motion in favour of it was carried in the Tory House of Commons in 1905. Why then has it not become law? Solely because of the House of Lords. The proposal cannot be put into force without a separate valuation of the land. This valuation is now secured to us 20 by the Budget. The Government, in two successive years (1907–8), sent up to the Lords a Bill for the valuation of land in Scotland, the first year the Lords rejected it outright, the second year they destroyed it in Committee. Taught by this experience, the Government in 1909 decided to proceed by way of the Budget—with the result which we know. The one thing the landowners will not tolerate is that the public should know the value of their land. Now, however, this valuation is secured, and nothing stands in the way of a rate on land values. I will give you one illustration of the working of such a rate. Devonshire House, as we all know, is a mansion with a fine garden, extending backwards from Piccadilly until it touches the garden of 30 Lansdowne House. The area covered is about 163,000 square feet. Next to it is a block of buildings occupying about 153,000 square feet, between Berkeley Street and Dover Street. The two pieces of land have, of course, about equal values. The rateable value (on our present system) of the Duke's house and garden is £4,168; the rateable value of the block of houses is £43,570, more than ten times as much. The present rates, in fact, constitute a tax on houses, which are a necessary of life, and like all taxes on necessities, they are indefensible and pernicious, and should be swept away. But the Duke of Devonshire and his neighbour Lord Lansdowne have hitherto failed to see the force of this argument.

The main advantage of taxes on land values is that they diminish the monopoly power of the landowner. They are, in fact, the essential complement to Free Trade. Free Trade tends to enable labour and capital to find 40

the most productive employments, whereas tariffs drive them artificially into less productive channels. But in order to complete the work of free trade we want labour and capital to have free access to the land on which they can be most profitably employed: this is essential to the welfare of all classes in the community except the actual owners of the soil. The life of England is being strangled by the continually increasing exactions of landlords: railways, tramways, municipal enterprise, everything ultimately goes to swell the rent which the landlord exacts. Worse still, large parts of the countryside are more or less depopulated for the sake of game-preserving and deer forests; every small holder is looked upon as a potential poacher. A large part of the land of England belongs to the peers; we must free ourselves from the peers before we can free the land for the people

When our quarrel with the Lords has been brought to a successful issue, I shall hope to see the Government devote itself to making the House of Commons more exactly and more completely representative of the people. As you all doubtless remember, Mr. Asquith promised in the last Parliament that, if nothing unforeseen occurred, he would introduce a Reform Bill before going to the country. This intention was frustrated by the rejection of the Budget, but was reaffirmed in his Albert Hall speech. I consider that plural voting gives a scandalous preponderance to property, and I hope to see it swept away at the earliest possible moment. I should like also to see the qualifications for the franchise simplified, and the qualifying period shortened. In all this, you will doubtless all agree with me. But I must now touch on a subject on which there exists among Liberals a great division of opinion, I mean the subject of women's suffrage. In all that we say against the Lords, we are protesting, and rightly protesting, against the unjust privileges of others; but while we make this protest, it behoves us to make sure that we are not claiming similar unjust privileges for ourselves. In the name of democracy, we protest against the claim of the Lords to govern us; in the name of democracy, the women who demand the vote protest against our claim to govern them. I cannot myself see any difference of principle between the two cases, and I see no justice in claiming for myself rights which I deny to others. We Liberals believe in government by the people, but we are too apt to forget that half the people are women. I hold myself that, as Mr. Asquith has said, any measure for the enfranchisement of women should be on democratic lines, so as not to give an added and undeserved weight to property. The solution which I prefer is Adult Suffrage, because it is direct and simple, and embodies what should be the ideal of every democrat. I would, however, support less sweeping measures if Adult Suffrage proved for the moment unattainable.

On other subjects, it is not necessary that I should say much. I am in favour of Home Rule for Ireland, and I am keenly desirous of measures to mitigate the evils of unemployment. I have been all my life an advocate of

Temperance Legislation, and I strongly supported the Licensing Bill of 1908

We have to sum up, two great connected issues to decide, the one constitutional, the other economic. On the one hand, we have to decide whether we are to surrender to the peers the right of self-government which our forefathers won, or whether we shall not rather preserve and extend democracy by defending the Commons and making them more truly representative of the people. On the other hand, we have to decide between tariff reform and the Government's land policy shall we have taxes on necessities, taxes which (as the industrial North very well knows) must 10 cripple our industries to benefit the owners of the soil, or shall we rather have taxes which, while they fall on the rich, at the same time open new sources of employment for labour and capital, and cannot fail to mitigate the many evils of poverty and unemployment? I say these issues are connected; for if once the House of Lords acquires control over taxation, we may suffer the evils of Tariff Reform for many a long day before its beneficiaries will allow it to be swept away.

In conclusion, I should wish to emphasize once more the tremendous gravity of the issues at stake. The House of Lords, Free Trade, and the land question. any one of these would provide material for an exceptionally 20 important election, and all are involved in the coming election. If we lose, we suffer the financial and legislative dominion of the Lords, we incur the corruption and the oppressive taxation and the injury to trade which must infallibly result from a protective tariff, and we become subject to huge vested interests, all concerned in maintaining the tariff. But if we win, as I am convinced we shall do, we shall at last acquire power as well as office, we shall preserve free trade and democracy, and in all likelihood inaugurate a long era of Liberal ascendancy and beneficent reform such as resulted from our victory in 1832. The future must be decided in the next few months, may each one of us do his part.

Anti-Suffragist Anxieties [1910]

PUBLISHED AS A pamphlet by the People's Suffrage Federation in June 1910, *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* was written to answer the arguments in A V Dicey's *Letters to a Friend on Votes for Women* (1909). Apart from an article called "Woman Suffrage" published in *The Quarterly Review* earlier in 1909, where many of the same ideas were set forth, this book was Dicey's only work on the topic. His fame rested on his influential studies of constitutional law and on his still controversial contribution to political and historical debate—the view that by the 1870s a golden age of individualism had been replaced in Britain by an era of collectivism.

As a right-wing Liberal Unionist, Dicey took stands antithetical to those of Russell on almost every major issue of the day. Dedicated above all to the preservation of what remained of mid-Victorian political and economic values, he deplored measures he called "socialistic" that seemed to him to undermine further *laissez-faire*. Dicey's pessimism about the future of parliamentary government, his disillusionment with party politics, his hostility to any extension of the male franchise and, indeed, his denunciation of democracy were particular points of contention. The contrast between Dicey's *Letters to a Friend* and Russell's *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* presents one of the clearest expositions of political polarity in the pamphlet controversies of the period. For example, Russell's belief in parliamentary government and his allegiance to the Liberal Party are manifested in all his political commentary. His commitment to democracy pervades his writings, particularly "On the Democratic Ideal" (18). To Russell, the passage of the Parliament Act in 1911 was essential legislation to "preserve and extend democracy" (303–6–7). For Dicey, the coming of the Parliament Act destroyed all constitutional safeguards protecting the nation against the House of Commons.

Of the many dangers Dicey perceived as threatening Edwardian Britain, he anticipated as the greatest calamity the implementation of Irish Home Rule. In fact, the danger that women might be inclined to vote for Home Rule was the dominant consideration in his decision to oppose suffrage. On all questions except for the continued integration of Ireland within the United Kingdom and opposition to women's suffrage, Dicey claimed that he was prepared "to make very considerable concessions" (Cosgrove 1980, 205).

Dicey had not always opposed women's suffrage, for as a young Liberal at Oxford, under the influence of Mill, he had been sympathetic to women's rights and had even advocated votes for those women he considered deserving (1909, 1–2). As late as

1896 and 1897, when he was already a leading Liberal Unionist, he had supported the unsuccessful effort to allow women to earn degrees from Oxford. However, by the time the demand for women's suffrage had become intense, Dicey had reversed his attitude to women's rights.

Central to Dicey's position was the claim that a distinction should be made between civil and political rights for women. While Dicey was pleased to record measures in the civil law that had given women greater control over property, he was opposed to any changes in their political status. Russell answered what he labelled "the strongest argument against women's suffrage" (313–31) by contesting Dicey's belief that government ultimately rested on force, and that, since men possessed a monopoly of physical power, women had no claim whatsoever to any governmental role. Russell also challenged another important argument, namely that working women were deluded in believing that the franchise would secure higher wages. Revealing an appreciation of the historical development of economic theory, Russell retorted that "every extension of the franchise has been followed (at a respectful distance) by a modification of the orthodox economics" (309 27–9).

While intended initially as a rebuttal to Dicey, the article developed into a substantial and autonomous statement. Unfortunately for Russell and his cause, the sponsoring organization had only a small distribution. No reviews of Russell's reply to Dicey have been found, probably because the PSF did not command wide attention.

The copy-text is the manuscript (RA 220 OI 1220)

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST women's suffrage were, until lately, by no means easy to discover. For, though much had been written and spoken in its favour, opponents still felt themselves securely entrenched behind the ramparts of prejudice and custom, and did not think it necessary or prudent to venture on the open ground of explicit discussion. Now, however, owing to the activities of the Anti-Suffrage League and the writings of an eminent Professor,¹ it has become possible to discover what are the reasons for opposition which it is thought wise to avow. It must be confessed that they do not make a very formidable array, and that many of them are old friends which have done duty against every reform since the ancient Britons first ceased to dye themselves with woad. But such as they are, they deserve examination. In this examination, Professor Dicey's book will afford a useful text.

We will begin, as the Professor himself does, with minor arguments which have not much persuasive power in themselves, but serve to raise a prejudice or a presumption which may make the reader more receptive when he comes to the really serious objections.

"The concession of Parliamentary votes to women", we are told, "must be in the United Kingdom, either for good or bad, a revolution" (p. 10).
20 Certainly we must admit that it shares this distinction with the Budget and flying-machines and wireless telegraphy and most other things. But that alone would not, at first sight, have any bearing on the question whether this revolution was for good or for bad, yet it is supposed that, if it were not for bad, it would have been made long ago. Thus Professor Dicey asserts that Mill, in *The Subjection of Women*, "in effect inculcates the neglect of the lessons to be derived from historical experience embodied in the general, if not universal, customs of mankind" (p. 7). This is the familiar argument of "the wisdom of our ancestors". But there is a special fallacy in speaking of "lessons to be derived from historical experience". For the only thing that
30 history teaches us is that men, as a rule, have not in fact allowed power to women. This is part of the larger "teaching", that the strong have almost everywhere been ruthless, and the weak have almost everywhere been oppressed. But how can history teach us that this state of things ought to continue? The world we read of in history is not so perfect a paradise as to make us feel that the institutions upon which it rested must have been wise. Are we merely to imitate the long record of war and cruelty and extortion which constitutes "the general, if not universal, customs of mankind"? The "lesson" to be learnt is—so in effect we are told—that we ought ourselves to commit every crime commonly committed by our ancestors. But if such a
40 lesson is to be inculcated, it is rather the fault of the historian than of the

¹ *Letters to a Friend on Votes for Women* By A. V. Dicey, K.C., LL.D., HON. D.C.L. (Murray, 1909)

history.

And, considered more scientifically, if the custom of keeping women in subjection were in fact "universal", no inference could be drawn from history as to its good or bad effects. In order to argue inductively as to the good or bad effects of an institution, there must be examples both ways: it must be possible to compare the effects of its presence with the effects of its absence. Otherwise, it is impossible to disentangle, by mere history, the good and the bad in all human societies, and say which of them is due to this universal custom. Now owing to the existence of women's suffrage in some countries, we can, to some extent, make such a comparison. This comparison, however, Professor Dicey has very wisely abstained from making. There is no hint or suggestion, throughout his book, that women's suffrage, where it has been tried, has been found harmful. Only a very careful reader can discover, from Professor Dicey, that any countries at all exist where women vote, and even the most careful reader could not discover how numerous they are. For one who professes to learn from history, it is odd to ignore entirely the most relevant history there is. But this history is only to be learnt, as yet, by travel or conversation, not by the unearthing of dusty archives; it would be, therefore, beneath the dignity of the historian to notice what, as yet, forms no part of "polite learning". We may suspect, however, that if any moral against women's suffrage were to be derived from the countries where it is practised, the Professor would not have ignored their existence so completely. And having learnt this "lesson of history", we can pass on to other aspects of the question.

We are told that there is no such thing as a "right" to vote, that a vote is conferred for the benefit of the community, not of the individual, and that the philosophy of natural right was long ago exploded by Burke and Bentham. As a matter of abstract ethics, this is of course true; but if it is argued that therefore there is no harm in injustice, and no truth in the contention that justice requires women's enfranchisement, then there is a far too hasty and crude application of theory to practice. The argument from justice does not require any fallacious foundation in the philosophy of natural rights. To inflict a special disability upon one class in the community is in itself an evil, and is calculated to generate resentment on one side and arrogance on the other. It may be admitted that this evil, in some cases, is more than balanced by compensating advantages; but it remains an evil, and any gain for the sake of which it is to be endured must be very great and very certain.

And when it is said that a vote is conferred for the benefit of the community, not of the individual, there is a false antithesis which is very misleading. The community is only the sum of the individuals; and if a vote confers a benefit on the individual woman, then the enfranchisement of women would confer a benefit on half the members of the community,

which goes near to proving that it would confer a benefit on the community.

The Professor makes a distinction between civil and political rights, and states that while women ought to have civil rights, they ought not to have political rights.² But the distinction, as he states it, is too subtle to be comprehensible to the lay mind. Civil rights, he says, consist in the right to govern oneself, and political rights consist in the right to govern others. But in that case, men, by the possession of political rights, have the right to govern others, i.e. women, and women therefore cannot govern themselves. This is, of course, the fact at present. By factory acts, by marriage laws, and so on, women are controlled in innumerable ways which may be good or bad, but in any case have been imposed by men, in virtue of men's political rights. The pretence that a person who does not possess political rights can possess the same control over his or her own circumstances as the person who possesses political rights, may, for aught I know, be enshrined in legal theory, but whoever considers facts cannot maintain it for a moment.

Anti-Suffragists, however, are persuaded that, as it is, women secure whatever is good for them from the bounty of Parliament, which is perfectly ready to offend the electors in order to remedy the minutest grievance of the voteless. It is astonishing what noble and self-sacrificing virtue our legislators display; but oddly enough, one finds on examination that, taking Professor Dicey's own evidence, they only began to display this virtue after the agitation for women's suffrage had achieved a certain strength, when it became undesirable to leave good arguments to those who complained of the injustices inflicted on women "The desired innovation or revolution is, we are further told, needed to deliver English women from, or guard them against, grievous wrongs. But we *now* know from happy experience that such wrongs may be, as they in fact have been, removed or averted by a Parliament consisting solely of men, and in the election whereof no woman had a part."³ Why *now*? Because now the suffrage agitation has made men conscious of some of the more glaring injustices from which women suffer. But many injustices remain; and, what is perhaps the greatest injustice of all, none of them count as injustices unless they appear to be such to those who profit by them. Parliament, we are told, will give women "relief from every *proved* wrong" (p. 27. Italics mine) But to have to prove the wrong to those who inflict it, and who have every motive, both private and political, for paying no attention to the proof, is a severe preliminary to relief. Abdul Hamid, it is said, is about to publish his memoirs, and doubtless he will state that he was always ready to grant to the Armenians relief from every *proved* wrong, but as for an occasional massacre, that was necessary in the interests of the community, for citizens have no abstract *right* to life, and therefore

² See pp. 32-4 and 79-80

³ Pp 78-9 My italics

ought only to be allowed to live if the Sultan judges that their lives are useful Garnished with allusions to Burke and Bentham, a very eloquent apologia might be constructed on these lines.

But, to do Professor Dicey justice, he is compelled, after all, to admit that women's interests do not receive that attention which they would receive if women had the vote. After conceding that trade unions have received better legislative treatment since working men have had the vote, and that the case of women is parallel, he says "Nor can any impartial critic maintain that, even at the present day, the desires of women, about matters in which they are vitally concerned, obtain from Parliament all the attention they deserve" ¹⁰ (p. 22) While giving due respect to his candour, we must maintain that, with this admission, his whole argument collapses.

The contention that the vote will raise women's wages is discussed by the Professor by means of one of those false antitheses which do duty so constantly among opponents of reform "The plain answer to it", we are told, "is that the prediction, if it means (as every working woman does understand it to mean) that a vote will in itself raise the market value of a woman's work, is false. The ordinary current price of labour depends on economical causes" (p. 38). I do not know how many working women Professor Dicey has examined as to the sense in which they believe that a ²⁰ vote would raise wages, but I greatly doubt if they are quite so simple-minded as he believes, or so ignorant of the conditions which really determine wages. The contention that "the ordinary current price of labour depends on economical causes" has been used, ever since the industrial revolution, by the opponents of trade unions and labour legislation. Yet the wages-fund theory, upon which this contention formerly rested, has been relegated to the lumber-room of obsolete errors, and every extension of the franchise has been followed (at a respectful distance) by a modification of the orthodox economics. The plain fact that the "economical causes" which determine the price of labour are themselves intimately dependent upon ³⁰ political causes, is entirely overlooked, at each fresh stage, by those who maintain that political power cannot help the wage-earner. Yet the whole history of trade unionism and of methods of taxation is an illustration of this obvious truth.

All such more or less indirect ways in which the vote may raise wages are, however, classed by Professor Dicey as "bribery". "There is", he says, "another sense in which a vote or political power may, I admit, have its pecuniary value. It may be used by women, and still more by a body of women, to wring money, or money's worth, from the State. A Ministry in want of support may bid high for the votes of women. But such traffic in ⁴⁰ votes is nothing better than sheer bribery" (p. 40) This is surely the most strangely unreal alternative. The more correct account of the matter would be that a class which is suffering injustice cannot, unless by some unusual

combination of circumstances, secure the attention of Parliament or the recognition of its wrongs, without that power of insisting upon its needs which only the vote can give. The Professor's view seems to be that Parliament should consist of 670 philosophers, who, without regard to the wishes of their constituents, decide, out of the plenitude of their wisdom, what boons they may prudently grant to a grateful nation Any other method of securing legislation is apparently regarded as corrupt But if so, corruption is of the essence of representative government. The whole effect of representative government on the choice of candidates, on the selection of
10 questions to be dealt with by legislation, on the matters to which members are forced to give their attention—all this would have to be condemned as corruption. The legitimate weight which a member naturally gives to the representations of those who will be most affected by any proposed change would also have to be counted as corruption If any of these things are not considered corrupt, then it will follow that, without corruption, women's suffrage will tend to raise women's wages For, whatever may be said by some belated adherents of the "classical" political economy, it cannot be denied that legislation and government action can affect wages—by helping or hindering collective bargaining, by increasing or diminishing the opportunities of employment, by varying the methods of raising revenue, or by the effect of raising or lowering the wages of government employees If women had the vote, they would, in all these respects, be in a better position In the first place, candidates would be likely to be selected who were sympathetic to their claims In the second place, the measures that would be to the fore at elections and in Parliament would be more likely to be such as afforded a prospect of improving the economic position of women. In the third place, members would become much more aware of the needs and wishes of women, if the women in their constituency could approach them with the status of voters. If such influences are corrupt when
20 brought to bear by women, they are corrupt when brought to bear by men, and the only pure government left in the world is that of Russia

Professor Dicey shares with other Anti-Suffragists the fear of introducing some undefined quality called "feminine emotion" into politics. Experience alone can dispel such fears, and as far as experience has gone at present, wherever women are seen taking part in public life, they show a remarkable absence of any so-called "feminine emotion". The actions of women poor-law guardians are decided by their economic opinions, socialist women taking one line, women who believe in C O S. doctrines taking another. Women on Educational Committees and teachers consider the needs of the
30 children in a serious and practical way. Organizations of working women take most level-headed views of industrial and social reforms

On the other hand, it seems to be forgotten how emotional men can be. Religious revivalism, attacks of Imperialism, Mafficking celebrations,

panics, all show that excitable forms of emotion are not confined to one sex, or to one class.

But it is time to turn our attention to the arguments upon which Professor Dicey lays most stress. There are four of them.

I "Woman suffrage must ultimately, and probably in no long time, lead to adult suffrage, and will increase all the admitted defects of so-called universal, or in strictness manhood, suffrage" (p. 55)

We will not reply by denying that adult suffrage must come, since, on the contrary, we hold that it ought to come, if possible without any intervening period during which some women only are enfranchised, and we agree that "every reason and every sentiment which supports the cry of 'Votes for women'" tells, at any rate with nine people out of ten, in favour of adult suffrage" (pp. 56-7). But we will ask: What are the "admitted defects of so-called universal, or in strictness manhood, suffrage"? There is only one defect which we are prepared to concede as "admitted" about "so-called universal" suffrage, and that is, that it is not universal, and this defect will not be increased by adult suffrage. Let us see, however, what are the defects which are supposed to be "admitted". In the first place, we are told that large constituencies are worse than small ones. "A huge constituency is, just because of its size, a bad electoral body. As the number of electors is increased, the power and the responsibility of each man are diminished. Authority passes into the hands of persons who possess neither the independence due to the possession of property nor the intelligence due to education" (pp. 58-9)

This objection to large constituencies appears to be widely felt, and to lead many people to oppose adult suffrage. Yet it is difficult to see on what it is based. The existing constituencies are of very varying size, and it is notorious that those in which corruption is most prevalent are among the smallest. This is, indeed, only what might be expected, since a given sum spent in bribery will go nearer to securing election where there are few electors than where there are many. If Professor Dicey were right, it would seem a pity that rotten boroughs were abolished. Yet we do not find it recorded that the elector of Old Sarum possessed either "the independence due to property" or "the intelligence due to education". It is to be supposed, however, that he means to argue against women's suffrage on the ground that women are poorer than men and are not given so good an education. This ground seems scarcely compatible with the view that women suffer no serious injustice at present. To be handicapped, as compared with men, both in property and in education, seems scarcely a trivial injustice. The Professor's argument is therefore the familiar argument of possessors of power: that certain things, which only power will give, are necessary to the wise use of power, and therefore only those who already have power are fit to have it. It follows that all injustices should be perpetuated, and all wrongs

must be eternal

There are, of course, other reasons which lead people to oppose adult suffrage. The Professor makes a great deal of one of these objections, namely that, since adult suffrage would produce a majority of women, it would place government in the hands of the physically weaker half of the nation, and so lead to instability. This argument we shall consider shortly. Other objections, though not urged by Professor Dicey, deserve a passing mention. The objection based upon the view that it is essentially the possession of property that confers a right to the vote belongs to another order of ideas. But it may be said in passing that no ground exists for protesting against the disfranchisement of women on the ground of sex which does not apply equally against the disfranchisement of the poor on the ground that they have no property sufficient to qualify for a vote. Objections to a majority of women, other than that derived from a possible appeal to force on the part of men, are simply variants of the denial that women ought to be placed on an equality with men. The objection is, in a word: "By all means let some women have the vote, provided you can be sure that it will make no difference, and that no grievance suffered by women will be removed by it. But if you allow women to become the majority, we, the 20 Lords of Creation, may be outvoted, and may be forced to discontinue some of the injustices dearest to our hearts. This is a disaster not to be contemplated for a moment, and therefore it would never do to admit *all* women to the vote." This, however, is merely the argument of the tyrant, who is prepared, if necessary, to conceal his tyranny, but is not prepared to abandon it. And against such an argument there would seem to be no weapon but moral exhortation, directed to extort a recognition that others also have their rights.

II. After some vague generalizations about the character of "Woman", which may be summed up in the two remarks that women have less tenacity 30 than men (p. 60), and that it would be a misfortune if British policy were determined by the fighting suffragists (p. 62)—I suppose because of their sad lack of tenacity—we come to the second great argument against women's suffrage. This is, in its entirety, as follows:

The grant of votes to women settles nothing. If conceded tomorrow, it must be followed by the cry of 'Seats in Parliament for women!' 'Places in the Cabinet for women!' 'Judgeships for women!' For the avowed aim of every suffragist, down from John Stuart Mill to Mrs Pankhurst, is the complete political equality of men and of women. The opening of the Parliamentary franchise to women is the encouragement, not the close, of a long agitation.

It is difficult to know how to treat this argument, except by the exclama-

tion "How awful!" For in fact there is no argument. It is our old friend, the thin end of the wedge, with the usual absence of any attempt to show that there is any harm in the thick end. All the same arguments might have been used—probably were used—against the enfranchisement of working men. Yet—though working men have always been eligible to Parliament and the Cabinet—they still form a small minority in Parliament, and their admission to the Cabinet has not been found to promote revolution. Such changes as are dreaded by Professor Dicey will happen very gradually, and whatever objections there may be to them at present will diminish as women acquire the political experience due to possession of the vote

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III We are told next that women ought not to have the vote because they do not want it. To this, it would seem a sufficient answer to deny the fact. The number of women who desire the vote is increasing every day, and, though no means exist of ascertaining whether it has yet become a majority, there is a practical certainty that, if not yet the majority, it soon will be. But the proper answer is that the question is not so much whether women desire the vote, as whether it is for the good of the community that they should have it. And, oddly enough, this answer is given by the Professor himself, but it is given in rebutting the contention that women ought to have the vote because they want it. He has failed to perceive the double application of his words, which are as follows:

My conviction as to the true nature of a Parliamentary vote led inevitably to the conclusion that the expediency, or what in such a matter is the same thing, the justice, of giving Parliamentary votes to English women depends on the answer to the inquiry, not whether a large number of English women, or English women generally, wish for votes, but whether the establishment of woman suffrage will be a benefit to England? (P. 8)

The question, therefore, whether or not a majority of English women desire the vote is, on the Professor's own showing, irrelevant

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IV The strongest argument against women's suffrage is the argument that all government is based, in the last resort, on *force*, and therefore the vote ought to be confined to those who are able to use force. The argument is, that if all women are enfranchised, they will form a majority of the electorate, and laws may be enacted, by their votes, to which a large majority of men are vehemently opposed—laws, for example, dealing with temperance or with the suppression of vice. Such laws men might refuse to obey, and the majority, being mainly composed of women, would be unable to enforce its will. Hence the government would be unstable, and might be upset by a successful revolution. The only way to avoid this is to confine the vote to those who can fight, i.e. to men.

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This view seems to involve a radical misconception of political facts. In the first place, it is scarcely conceivable that any law would be passed if it were strongly opposed by a large majority of men. We have to remember that, when women are first enfranchised, they will find a political system established which has been made by men, where the parties are divided according to the divisions of opinion among men, where all the candidates are men, and all the questions mainly discussed at elections will be such as have been considered important by men. The inertia of this state of things will make it impossible to change it suddenly. There will not be any sudden emergence of a large women's party, advocating the supposed special interests of women. Most women would, at first, obtain their political knowledge through the views expressed by men. Gradually, as they acquire more political knowledge, they will no doubt become more independent. But as they become more independent, they will also become better judges of what is feasible and prudent. They will realize that legislation which is detested, beyond a certain point, by a large section of the community, is unwise legislation, and they will avoid such action as might produce a conflict between men and women. An exact parallel to what is probable may be found in the rise of the Labour party. There is much more apparent opposition of interests between labour and capital than between women and men; yet, although urban working men have had the vote for over forty years, a large majority of them still prefer to vote for one or other of what Socialists call the capitalistic parties. And as the Labour party grows in numbers, it grows also in wisdom, so that it cannot be seriously maintained that the Labour party affords a menace to public order. Yet the argument that government is based upon force, if it were valid, would have applied as much against admitting working men as against admitting women. For the "force" that is meant is not actual prowess with the fists, but the power of placing an army in the field; and it is obvious that if the richer third of the nation were to engage in a conflict with the poorer two-thirds, the richer third could hire mercenaries who would utterly annihilate the poorer two-thirds. Yet this does not happen. Why? Because neither the rich nor the poor are so wholly reckless as theorists suppose. Rather than plunge the nation into civil war, the poor moderate the burdens they inflict upon the rich, and the rich confine their protests to letters to the press and diminution of charitable subscriptions. So it would be if women were the majority of the voters. Both sides would have enough forbearance and enough common sense to avoid any such sharpness of opposition as could possibly shake the stability of the government.

In fact, instead of saying that government is based on force, it would be quite as true to say that force is based on government. In a civilized community, an armed conflict with the executive is too serious a matter to be lightly undertaken, and the powers of the executive are such that a

conflict can hardly ever be successful. On the other hand, respect for the rights of minorities is, in England, so ingrained in our political traditions, that it is inconceivable that they should be disregarded to such a degree as would produce any temptation to armed resistance. And in the particular application to women's suffrage, one is tempted to wonder whether those who speak of a possible conflict ever remember that it is men and women they are speaking of. When we consider the closeness of the relations of men and women, the daily and hourly need of cooperation between them, it seems the merest fantastic nightmare to imagine men ranged in one camp and women in the other. Long before this had happened, the necessities of private life would have compelled some sort of adjustment. The man's desire for his dinner, and the woman's need of her husband's support, are sufficient safeguards of the public peace in this respect. Thus the argument that government is based on force, and ought therefore to be in the hands of the strong, may be dismissed as one which takes no account of the actual facts of human life. A sex-war might provide material for a farce, but could not be conceived in sober earnest.

It might, on the contrary, be urged with more truth that, since the strong will always have a preponderating influence by virtue of their strength, it is specially important that the weak should have such protection as is afforded by the vote. The vote will still leave them in a position in which they will have to pay respect to the wishes of the strong, but it will do what is possible to remedy the inequality due to natural causes. Indeed the whole progress from barbarism to the civilized state may be represented as an increasing protection of the weak against the strong. We no longer permit a man to steal a woman's property by means of his superior physical strength, but we still allow him to steal her means of livelihood by excluding her from professions and trades. The protection of the weak against the strong, so far as direct use of physical force is concerned, is undertaken by the police; but indirect attacks, made by means of law and custom, cannot be prevented except by the protection of the vote. The comparative weakness of women, therefore, so far from affording an argument against giving them the vote, affords an argument in favour of giving them every protection against injustice which the laws can provide, and, as the chief protection, the right to a voice as to what the laws shall be.

The objections which are explicitly urged against women's suffrage are, of course, not those which weigh most with most men. Men fear that their liberty to act in ways that are injurious to women will be curtailed, and that they will lose that pleasing sense of dominion which at present makes "no place like home". The instinct of the master to retain his mastery cannot be met by mere political arguments. But it is an instinct which finds less and less scope in the modern world, and it is fast being driven from this stronghold as it has been driven from others. To substitute cooperation for

subjection is everywhere the effort of democracy, and it is one of the strongest arguments in favour of the enfranchisement of women that it will further this substitution in all that concerns the relations of men and women.

Part vi

Other Edwardian Controversies

Religion and Metaphysics [1906]

RUSSELL WROTE OF J M E McTaggart (1866–1925) “He had a great intellectual influence upon my generation, though in retrospect I do not think it was a very good one. For two or three years, under his influence, I was a Hegelian” (1967, 63). McTaggart went up to Trinity College, Cambridge in 1885 to read for the Moral Sciences Tripos, and he became an Apostle in May, 1886. In May, 1891 he resigned from active membership as an Apostle, “taking wings” to become an “angel”. Thus Russell knew him fraternally as a member of the Cambridge intelligentsia, as a tutor and as an eminent Hegelian idealist. Although McTaggart’s philosophical influence over Russell quickly waned, they remained close friends until the First World War when, according to Russell’s account, his pacifism caused McTaggart to terminate the friendship.

Russell in his review of McTaggart’s *Some Dogmas of Religion* is kind to the book’s arguments—remarkably so in the light of his private opinion. Russell’s more specific, and sometimes more severe, criticisms were reserved for marginalia in his review copy. For instance, when McTaggart argued that the idea of immortality gives us assurance of hope because the “interests of spirit are so predominant a force in the universe”, Russell responded with a retort that the atheist McTaggart would have considered insulting “Thus is as bad as arguing from the goodness of God” (135). The annotated copy, dated by Russell February 1906 on the half-title, is now in Russell’s library. It is possible that McTaggart was shown this copy, displaying the full range of Russell’s objections to its arguments, or, it may have been that the objections were fully set out in a letter that is now lost. In any case, McTaggart in a letter of 4 March 1906 responded specifically to points about “the reality of events in time” and “an omnipotent God”. McTaggart did not attempt to defend himself against all of Russell’s objections, although in a letter of 25 March he returned to the matter of God’s omnipotence. Thus Russell’s appreciation of a book “primarily addressed to those who are not systematic students” (320) was privately qualified by remarks about the inadequacy of a number of its arguments. McTaggart did not pursue the matter.

No manuscript being extant, the copy-text is *The Independent Review*, 9 (April 1906) 109–16

THIS BOOK IS at once a criticism of popular theology, and a plea for the study of metaphysics. Religion, it is argued, depends essentially upon dogma, and no dogma can be proved except by metaphysics. The negative part of this thesis is exemplified by an examination of current arguments on immortality, free will, and the existence of God. The positive part—the proof of dogmas by metaphysical reasoning—is not undertaken, for only systematic students can understand such arguments, and the book is primarily addressed to those who are not systematic students. The conclusion is, that only metaphysicians have a right to a religion, because there is no such consensus as would warrant others in accepting any opinion on authority. For the present, it is admitted, this conclusion is tragical, but it is permissible to hope that, hereafter, metaphysics, like science, may become sufficiently certain to be taken on trust by those who cannot themselves test its reasonings. Whether, if that should ever occur, it will not be hopes rather than fears that will be extinguished, is a question which Dr. McTaggart rightly does not discuss, since evidently its decision would require the gift of prophecy.

- 20 Religion is defined as “an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large” (p. 3); metaphysics, as “the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality”, and dogma as “any proposition which has metaphysical significance” (p. 1). Religious dogmas are those which affect a man’s religious position. Some such dogmas are required for a “conviction of harmony between ourselves and the universe at large”; it is held that the minimum dogma on which, at our present level of civilization, a religion can be based, is that the universe is good on the whole (p. 11). The notion that morality is sufficient for religion is discussed and dismissed, on the Stoic theory that virtue suffices for happiness, Dr
- 30 McTaggart justly observes “A virtue which was so intense that it rendered us indifferent to the sufferings of others might be held to have passed into its opposite” (p. 23). The notion that Christ’s teaching is undogmatic is easily refuted. It is strangely difficult to read familiar words freshly. I confess I was staggered by the author’s statement that “The Sermon on the Mount . contains dogma in almost every line ‘Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted’ is not a moral precept at all. It commands nothing, it forbids nothing” (p. 25). But, surprising as this statement is, it seems undeniable. The narrower abusive sense which is now-a-days given to the word *dogma* by those who aim at broad-mindedness, is rejected—rightly,
- 40 as it seems to me—as an innovation for which there is nothing to be said.

Before proceeding to more special questions, Dr. McTaggart considers, in his second chapter, some of the general arguments by which dogmas are

advocated. The whole of this chapter is a master-piece of lucid and trenchant argument. It begins with the case of the man who believes he has an immediate conviction, say of the existence of God, and it points out that this can be no ground for any one else's belief. As for the analogy of the blind man and the man who has sight, it may be met by the analogy of the physician and the man who sees snakes; either analogy is equally applicable. The *argumentum ad horrendum* ("if this were not true the universe would be unbelievably bad") leads up to the argument that the truth of a doctrine is to be judged by its consequences, which, as is justly observed, itself has immoral consequences, and is therefore condemned by its own test. "The ¹⁰ moral evil of the argument from consequences seems to me to be that it makes us imperious in the wrong place, where our imperiousness is arrogance, and, by an inevitable consequence, makes us humble in the wrong place, where our humility is mean and servile" (p. 66). For when something we should naturally think bad is undeniably real, we are led by the argument to suppose that after all it cannot be bad. Dr. McTaggart's power of summing up an argument in an illustration is delightful. After discussing the contention that we ought to have faith because of the fallibility of our merely human powers, he says "If I have only taken a hasty view by twilight of my neighbour's garden, it would be rash of me to place much ²⁰ trust in my failure to see any lilies in it. But it would be even more rash if I proceeded from the untrustworthiness of my negative conclusion to a confident assertion that there *were* lilies in it, and that there were exactly seventeen of them" (p. 68).

The next chapter, on immortality, is rather more metaphysical than most of the book. It aims at showing that there is no reason to believe in a dependence of mind on body; and the argument used is the idealistic one, that mind is more real than body. Chapter IV, on human pre-existence, points out, what is too often overlooked, that any argument for our existence throughout the future must be an argument also for our existence ³⁰ throughout the past. To most people, this constitutes a difficulty; but to Dr. McTaggart, as to Wordsworth, it is a confirmation. He admits that it involves the loss of memory at death, but he endeavours, by ingenious, though (to me) unconvincing arguments, to show that this hardly lessens the value of immortality. He holds that the fact of love or friendship at first sight is best accounted for as the result of love or friendship in a previous existence. "The significance of this fact has been, I think, very much underrated.... It is rarely that the writings of a philosopher or a theologian find anything in a young man's love for his sweetheart except a mixture of sexual desire and folly, or anything in a young man's love for his comrade ⁴⁰ except folly pure and simple" (p. 121).¹ I find it difficult to believe that the

¹ Hegel and the writer of the First Epistle of St. John are mentioned as honourable exceptions.

fact has any such importance as is here suggested. It would be interesting to make a statistical inquiry into cases of love at first sight, with a view to discovering how often it is determined by outward beauty, and how often by congeniality of character. For, on Dr McTaggart's view, character should be at least as important as looks in bringing it about; yet I doubt if this would be found to be the case

Another argument for pre-existence which is urged is, that people seem sometimes to possess by nature qualities which others only acquire by experience, and that it is natural to suppose such qualities acquired by 10 experience in a past life. An objection which immediately occurs to one is that such qualities are not perceptible in babies "How provokingly close are those new-born babes", as Shelley remarked on Magdalen Bridge. It is surely more natural to suppose that some people learn by experience more quickly than others, than to suppose that they bring with them a wisdom which they conceal or forget until a suitable age. Another objection, which Dr McTaggart discusses at some length, is, that people inherit their characters from their parents, which seems incompatible with their bringing them from elsewhere. This argument is met by an analogy. People's hats generally fit their heads, though they were made with no regard to those 20 special heads, but selected, after they were made, as suitable to those heads. So people may have a natural affinity for parents like themselves. It does not do to press analogies, and this one certainly will not bear pressing. A man selects a hat which is shaped like his head, because that is the most comfortable sort. But a man who is selfish and tyrannical should, by the same rule, choose parents who are unselfish and gentle, and kind people ought to be much more prolific than unkind ones. We must suppose, in fact, if people have previously existed, that they are led by some mechanical necessity to be born of parents like themselves, for we cannot suppose that they would often come to this by choice

30 There is next a chapter on free will, which produces on my mind the effect which determinist arguments always do produce. The whole thing seems irrefutable, and I cannot discover any ground for wanting more, and yet, somehow, there seems to be a problem still unsolved. I cannot state the problem; I can only say that I am not satisfied that there is no problem. The main difficulty, of course, concerns responsibility. Dr McTaggart regards this as consisting in the fact that punishment and remorse may lead to amendment. I am not satisfied that this is what responsibility means; but I do not know what else it can mean.

An omnipotent God, Dr McTaggart contends, cannot be personal and 40 cannot be good. His argument on personality is rather difficult, and may, I think, be doubted. On goodness, the argument is familiar. But I think Dr. McTaggart asks too much of omnipotence when he demands that it shall be able to infringe the law of contradiction. There is a very prevalent use of the

word "omnipotence", in which it means only absolute power as to what things shall exist, without power over the laws of logic or arithmetic. Such a distinction is incompatible with Dr. McTaggart's logic, but without it there is, as it seems to me, an unnecessary departure from common-sense. It would not usually be held a limitation in omnipotence to be unable to decree that something should both exist and not exist at the same time. This weakens the effect of his argument, and leaves it doubtful how far it would be valid with the more modest view of omnipotence.

A God who created the world, Dr. McTaggart holds, could not, even if he were not strictly omnipotent, be absolved of the guilt of having created evil.¹⁰ His argument on the point appears to me not conclusive, but it would require a treatise on logic and metaphysics to examine the matter fully. A God who found things already existing, and stands to the world in the relation of a director or schoolmaster, is held to be more possible, it is even admitted (rather hastily, as it seems to me) that his existence would be rendered probable by the argument from design, if the reality of matter were admitted.² But there is reason to deny the reality of matter, and, even if the argument from design is allowed, the world is too full of evil to allow the inference that the author of the design must be good.

Dr. McTaggart's reason for holding that the order in the universe does not imply a designer, if all reality is (as he believes) a society of spirits, is that, in that case, the order would be due to the harmony which would be an essential element in the nature of the universe. Allowing this, it seems to me that many other explanations, suitable to other views of the universe, can be suggested to account for its orderliness. And, in any case, there would appear to be a fallacy, namely this: the argument from design assumes it as antecedently unlikely that the universe should have been orderly, on the ground that we can imagine more disorderly universes than orderly ones. Now the numbers of both are infinite and (I think) equal, and there is no method of estimating the antecedent probability. Arguments from probability, in general questions, assume always, it would seem, a far greater knowledge on questions of probability than we in fact possess.³⁰

Dr. McTaggart's conclusion as to the existence of God—a conclusion which is only strengthened if the above criticism is valid—is that, while a God who is good and created the universe is impossible, "when the non-omnipotent God is also taken as non-creative, there seems to me . only one reason why we should not believe in his existence—namely, that there is no reason why we should believe in it" (p. 260). He gives reasons for regarding this conclusion as not a depressing one. Theism, he says, is not an adequate

² It is remarkable that, on p. 3, the existence of matter is given as an instance of a dogma having no religious significance, while on p. 245 it is contended that the existence of matter would make the existence of a directing person probable.⁴⁰

basis for optimism, since evil exists, and we therefore cannot know that any evil is too bad to be permitted I think his argument as to the effect on happiness of believing or disbelieving in the existence of God is vitiated by attributing too much logicality to the average man Most people will accept fallacious optimistic deductions which have long been generally regarded as valid, but they will be less ready to accept such new fallacies as might be required to extract optimism out of a different creed I cannot but think also that the author underestimates the loss incurred in losing the love of God By love, he says, he means something quite different from reverence and admiration and gratitude, and, though the love of God must go, others remain to be loved (pp. 289-290). This view of the emotions is surely too atomic. A love which is mingled with reverence and admiration and gratitude, which has an object that is unchanging and sinless and always strong enough to help, is something different from any love which is possible towards a human being Love of God may seldom be as vivid as love of human beings; but it is sustaining as no other love can be Dr McTaggart appears to value love of bad people as much as love of good people (p. 73, note), and this perhaps makes him not realize the restfulness of love of God to those who suffer from the imperfections of human beings

- 20 The general conclusion arrived at is acknowledged to be mainly negative Whatever criticisms have been suggested above (and none of these criticisms are very vital) are only such as would make this conclusion even more complete. Dr McTaggart holds that the only way to reach positive conclusions is by metaphysics, though negative conclusions are possible without a positive metaphysical theory I am not convinced that even negative conclusions are possible. That the reality of evil is incompatible with the omnipotence and goodness of God, for example, is certainly a view for which there is much to be said. But unless omnipotence is taken, as it is in this book, to involve power to infringe the laws of logic—e.g. to make a thing exist and not exist at the same time—I doubt whether the incompatibility can be strictly proved It may always be possible that the evil is an essential ingredient in goods of such value as to make it better that they and the evil should both exist than that neither should Conversely, the existence of good things does not prove that the world is not the worst possible; it may be that the good things only exist in order to afford opportunity for great evils in which they are essential elements And, whether these doubts can be resolved by positive metaphysics—whether the general nature of the universe as a whole is in any way accessible to human knowledge—is a question upon which it is very difficult for many philosophers to feel the confidence
- 30 which is felt by those who in the main follow in the footsteps of Hegel

The final statement of the practical outcome is as good as it could be. Since "no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study", it follows that "whether any religion is true or not,

most people have no right to accept any religion as true" (pp 292-3) "The result may be evil; but that is unfortunately no ground for denying its truth It is no more evil than cancer, famine, or madness; and these are all real" (*ibid*). In spite of some reasons for regarding the result as rather less bad than it appears at first sight, "we are here confronted with one of the great tragedies of life" (p 297) But "is knowledge so easy to get that the highest and deepest of knowledge is likely to be had for the asking?" The principle that the kingdom of heaven is hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes "is sure to be popular, for it enables a man to believe that he is showing his meekness and humility by the confident assertion of propositions which he will not investigate and cannot prove" (p 298). In contrast with this principle of indolence, the discussion ends with the noble words of Spinoza. "Omnia paeclarata tam difficilia quam rara sunt."

The book as a whole is so excellent, both in matter and in tone, that it is difficult to find appropriate words of praise. There is great need of popular exposition, on the part of philosophers, of such parts of their philosophy as can be read with interest and understanding by the non-philosophical, and Dr. McTaggart has made a contribution to clear and unbiased thinking which cannot but be valuable to every reader

Reviews of Robertson [1906]

REMARKS IN RUSSELL's correspondences reveal that, as early as 1902, he was personally acquainted with the author of *A Short History of Freethought, Ancient and Modern* (1906), John Mackinnon Robertson (1856–1933). Both were members of the Rationalist Press Association, which had been founded in 1899 to promote rationalism, secularism and unfettered scientific inquiry by printing inexpensive books and magazines on those subjects. Indeed, the two may have met through the RPA, although, while Robertson was a leading member from its inception, Russell did not play a prominent role until the late 1920s and did not become president of the organization until the 1950s, long after Robertson was dead.

Russell and Robertson had backgrounds in British secularism which were close but not identical. The Amberleys had associated with Charles Bradlaugh M.P., the most notorious Victorian atheist, but while sharing his secularism, they rejected his militant approach. Although Russell by 1906 certainly considered himself an agnostic, he distanced himself from those who stridently proclaimed that position. Hence, he could with a degree of implied sarcasm speak of Robertson as “the man on whom Bradlaugh’s mantle has fallen” (to Lucy Donnelly, 1 Sept 1902). Russell’s observation to Lady Ottoline Morrell in 1911 that he planned to attend a Heretics lecture to hear him “maintain that Christ never existed” (#275, 2 Dec.), suggests that he found Robertson’s doctrinaire anti-clericalism tiresome. Despite reservations about Robertson’s scholarship, Russell nevertheless believed that the two volumes on free thought were a major contribution in the struggle against religious persecution and obscurantism.

Although on the whole he had high praise for the book, Russell was disturbed by what he viewed as Robertson’s dogmatism and intellectual limitations which prevented his dealing altogether satisfactorily with the main issue. Russell’s reservations were caused, in part, by Robertson’s outright dismissal of a number of major philosophers because they sympathized with some religious ideas. As well, Russell’s historical sense was affronted by Robertson’s claims that Christ, David and Solomon never existed but were creations of religious myth-makers. Also, like most Edwardian intellectuals, Russell was hostile to the claim made by many humanists such as Robertson that races were equal in intellectual aptitude. Finally, Russell, the Cambridge intellectual, found repugnant some of the sweeping judgments of the self-taught Robertson, who was a prolific writer on a range of subjects from Shakespeare to German racial theories.

Russell's satirical comments on Robertson's rational scepticism were revealed in a letter to Donnelly when he remarked that as a visitor Robertson had bored another guest with a discussion about "whether God was made of green cheese or had whiskers" (1 Sept 1902) After reading *A Short History of Freethought* in his "spare time", Russell wrote this appraisal for Aly's

Robertson's history of free thought is very interesting But he is a curiously bigoted person, full of the odium theologicum He doesn't want people to think freely, but to think so as to come to his conclusions Numbers of Greeks who insulted the Gods seem to him superior to Plato [May 1906]

Russell's critical judgment was reinforced by consultation with Gilbert Murray, who claimed that Robertson lacked both imagination and diligence (26 May 1906).

Although Robertson is probably best known as a writer on literary topics, Russell does not seem to have made an assessment of this aspect of his career However, Murray advised him that the literalism that impeded Robertson's criticism of religion also interfered with his appreciation of authors like Shakespeare and Shelley (26 May 1906) Robertson's work in this area includes *Modern Humanists* (1891), *Criticisms* (1902) and many studies of Shakespeare

As the Liberal M P for Tyneside from 1906 to 1918, Robertson was a fairly prominent politician, becoming Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade from 1911 to 1915 Russell was complimentary about Robertson as a politician, for he admired him both as a "born fighter" and as a gentleman, particularly in his courtesy to the statesman, John Morley (to Donnelly, 8 March 1907)

Russell reviewed the second edition; the first had been published in 1899 His library copy is annotated in the margins Russell's first review appeared in *The Tribune*, 4 June 1906, p 2, a daily founded in January of that year to promulgate New Liberal ideas. Indeed, the main leader writer and political editor was Leonard T Hobhouse. The second review appeared in *The Speaker*, n.s. 14 (4 Aug 1906) 402-3, a weekly of similar persuasion under the editorship of Hobhouse's friend, the historian J. L. Hammond The reviews were probably solicited.

The copy-texts are the printed articles

A Short History of Freethought, Ancient and Modern By John M. Robertson. 2nd ed., rewritten and greatly enlarged 2 vols. London Issued for the Rationalist Press Association Limited by Watts & Co , 1906. Pp xvi, 480; xiii, 455

HISTORIES OF OPINION are rarely, if ever, undertaken with the primary object of telling what men's opinions have been. Almost all aim at advocating the opinions of the author, while those whose spirit is scientific make some attempt to explain the movements of opinion in the past Mr Robertson is no exception to this rule. Besides the general purpose of showing (as he does almost beyond possibility of denial) that free thought is beneficial and its opposite is injurious, he has certain sociological theses which, in the manner of Buckle, he illustrates by the history of one nation after another He disbelieves absolutely in any such thing as national character, although he admits that one individual may be naturally abler than another, he thinks all differences of nations are wholly due to differences of opportunity. The great cause of rapid progress is, he maintains, contact with alien civilizations.

There seems, however, some arbitrariness in his application of this view. The Roman Empire brought about such an interpenetration of civilizations as had never existed before; yet the result was a degradation of the better rather than an elevation of the worse His denial of racial characteristics seems also to spring less from observation than from dislike of nationalism and imperialism. No one would deny that a spaniel and a retriever have differences of natural aptitude; and it is difficult not to believe the same of a negro and a European

Mr. Robertson traces with great ability the influence of economic causes in the growth and decay of religions. In this he appears to be much influenced by Marx, although he recognizes that Marx applied the economic principle "somewhat fanatically". He himself only applies the principle within limits. Thus he shows how the Reformation was furthered by dislike of the tribute to Rome exacted by the Papacy, and by the desire of the nobility to possess themselves of Church lands, yet he admits that if Elizabeth had not been a Protestant, England would have returned to Catholicism. Although in this instance he concedes something to what one may call accident, he tends in general to believe, like most scientific historians, that great issues must be decided by great causes. But he shows admirably how the blood of heretic martyrs is the seed of the Church, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that often quite trivial events decided which side possessed itself of the machinery of persecution, and thereby insured the triumph of its own views.

Mr. Robertson, I think, successfully establishes the thesis that rationalistic movements in the past have failed because they never extended beyond the cultivated classes, and were thus powerless against the forces of popular superstition. One of the great merits of his book is that, unlike most histories of thought, it does not confine its attention to the great names, but tries, at all stages, to give a picture of the opinions of the mass of the population. He traces the fatal effect, in antiquity, of the maxim that the traditional religions, though false, were politically useful in governing the populace, and that free inquiry must not extend to the lower orders. He does not recognize, however, that his own feeling of repugnance for such views is 10 a heritage from the missionary zeal of Christianity

The most interesting parts of this very interesting book are those that deal with the obscurer movements of early antiquity and the Middle Ages. He shows that in all ancient civilizations there was a tendency for the original national or tribal religion to give place to a purified Pantheism, under the influence of more or less rationalistic criticism, but that the new reformed religion invariably degenerated, either by coalescing with the old or by internal decay. Of this process the history of Buddhism affords a typical case. Itself the culmination of a Pantheistic movement within Brahmanism, it prevailed for some seven centuries throughout the greater part of India, 20 but it soon became at least as superstitious as its older rival, by which, in India, it was finally worsted.

Mr. Robertson is not at his best in dealing with the great philosophers, most of whom, from Plato onwards, he depreciates, as having provided weapons for obscurantism. He tends to judge men rather by the results they reached than by the temper of their inquiries. By thus test he condemns some of the most wholly reasonable men who ever lived, and it is difficult to believe that his judgments are not sometimes warped by odium theologicum. As regards the higher criticism also, he seems somewhat credulous in accepting doubtful theories which harmonize with his views 30

Nevertheless, the book is an impressive and valuable array of the benefits which mankind owes to those whom priests have endeavoured to suppress, and of the almost unbelievable folly and cruelty of persecutors in all ages. It is sobering to realize that, under the name of prosecutions for blasphemy, religious persecution continued in England down to our own time, and that even now freethinkers, alone among men, are prohibited from making bequests by will for the furtherance of what they conceive to be the truth. Mr. Robertson's very careful final summary indicates commercialism as the great danger to future free thought, but it seems legitimate to hope that the great economic interests bound up with science, together with the spread of 40 education, will prevent any return to the more noxious superstitions of the past.

THIS BOOK CONTAINS at once an interesting collection of facts, a serious attempt to explain the movements of opinion scientifically, and a vigorous plea for free thought. For each of these three reasons it is worth reading, though in regard to each it has certain blemishes.

The facts dealt with concern all ages and all countries, from the history of the Brahman Kapila, who preached atheism so eloquently and convincingly that his followers worshipped him as a god, to the history of Bradlaugh, in which this consummation has not yet been reached. Mr Robertson men-

10 tions at an early stage Spencer's "contrast between the modern communities of Fiji and Samoa, the former cruel, cannibalistic, and religious, the latter much less austere religious and much more humane. The ferocious Fijians 'looked upon the Samoans with horror because they had no religion, no belief in any such deities [as the Fijians], nor any of the sanguinary rites which prevailed in other islands.'" Other cases besides Fiji and Samoa will be found throughout the book, in which somewhat similar contrasts are exemplified. One of the most interesting of these is the crusade against the Albigenses, in which the thrifty crusaders, having been granted plenary absolution for all their sins, past, present, and future, prudently resolved

20 that their bargain should be improved by committing as many sins as possible

As a record of facts, however, Mr. Robertson's book suffers, perhaps unavoidably, by being drawn mainly from second-hand sources. He also carries his doubts as to the authenticity of manuscripts and records to what seems excessive length. David and Solomon, Elijah and Elisha, it is suggested were euhemerised gods, Buddha, Zoroaster, and even the founder of the Christian religion probably never existed, only a few stray texts in the Old Testament are pre-exilic, and Tacitus is very likely a Renaissance forgery. His judgment seems sometimes unduly influenced by

30 dislike of established opinions; thus he belittles the achievement of the Greeks (except the early Ionians), and especially dislikes the Athenians "Athens", he says, "continued to remain the most aggressively intolerant and tradition-mongering of Hellenic cities", apparently because in Athens there were more prosecutions for Atheism than elsewhere. But on this ground one might consider numerous arrests for drunkenness a proof of a community's sobriety.

Mr. Robertson holds that there is no difference in natural endowment between one race and another, and that differences in achievement are entirely to be accounted for by social and economic conditions. The great

40 cause of advance, he maintains, is contact with other civilizations "It is safe to say that if any people is ever seen to progress in thought, art, and life, with measurable rapidity, its progress is due to the reactions of foreign inter-

course." It would seem that ideas, like bacilli, lose their vigour by remaining too long in one community, but acquire new power when transplanted into fresh soil. Of this the stock instance is, of course, the effect of Byzantine civilization on the Renaissance. It is to be hoped that other causes of advance will operate in future, for the civilized world is so quickly becoming one society that soon no really foreign intercourse will be possible

Very great weight is given to economic conditions in explaining movements of thought. The Reformation, in particular, is accounted for almost entirely by motives of greed. In this it is hard not to suspect a certain bias, for Mr. Robertson's foes are those of his own household: he apparently 10 prefers Frenchmen to Englishmen, and Englishmen to Scotchmen, Mohammedans to Christians, and Catholics to Protestants. Except as regards the Reformation, he seems to make sufficient allowance for non-economic causes. He shows very interestingly how, in all ancient civilizations, a greater or lesser degree of free thought arose at a certain stage, but invariably died out because it failed to found institutions which could compete with the priesthood, and because it never reached the bulk of the population. Another constant refrain is that the rationalizers unduly neglected science, which Mr. Robertson regards as the chief bulwark of free thought. This accusation is no doubt generally well founded; but it seems 20 rather inappropriately brought in to account for the collapse of English deism, seeing that the early deists were contemporaries and associates of Newton, Harvey, Boyle, and many other distinguished men of science. The other cause assigned, that the seven years' war turned men's thoughts to colonial expansion, seems far more adequate, particularly as it was contemporaneous with the rise of the French *philosophes*.

In his judgments on philosophers, Mr. Robertson is mainly influenced by the extent to which they shook religious belief. By this test much of the best thought is condemned as of but slight value, indeed this book shows little sympathy for the dispassionate attempt to understand the world in which 30 we live. Thus Zeno and the Eleatic school are censured for occupying themselves with "the frivolous problem of Achilles and the tortoise". Now it may, of course, have been a waste of energy to acquire the insight we now possess into the nature of space and time and motion, but this insight has probably been more furthered by Zeno's "frivolous" problems than by anything else until the mathematicians of the nineteenth century. Plato, we are told, has "a repute above his deserts as a thinker". Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel are all very severely dealt with, as though their somewhat equivocal support of orthodoxy were the main fact about them. But Mr. Robertson is by no means a sceptic. He objects almost as much to 40 those who throw doubt on science as to those who do not throw doubt on religion. Thus, in discussing Sextus Empiricus, he says. "Sextus, it is true, strikes acutely and systematically at ill-founded beliefs, and so makes for

reason; but, like the whole Pyrrhonian school, he has no idea of a method which shall reach sounder conclusions... . Taken by themselves the arguments against current theism in the third book of the *Hypotypes* are unanswerable, but when bracketed with other arguments against the ordinary belief in causation they had the effect of leaving theism on a par with that belief."

The purpose of Mr Robertson's book, in fact, is political rather than historical or philosophical. He aims at proving that free thought is desirable and its opposite harmful; that this applies not only to one class or one sex,
10 but to the world at large; and that, in view of the many obscurantist reactions of the past, it is unwise to rest in what has been achieved, without constant and vigorous efforts to secure and extend the conquests of rationalism. From this point of view the things that seem open to criticism in his work are comparatively unimportant; and it must be allowed that the cumulative force of his indictment is very great indeed. But it is always open to readers who disagree with his creed to maintain that the evils caused by theological beliefs in the past were due to elements which are absent from their own beliefs. There is one conclusion, however, on which he lays great stress, and in which it is very hard to dissent from him, and that is the
20 undesirability of reticence on the part of those who hold unpopular opinions. In this respect he sets an example of courageous plain-speaking which ought to command the respect even of those who differ most widely from his conclusions.

The Development of Morals [1907]

LEONARD TRELAWNY HOBHOUSE (1864-1929) was one of the most important political philosophers of the New Liberalism in the period 1890-1914. Along with such friends and fellow writers as J A. Hobson, J. L. Hammond and Graham Wallas, he attempted to refashion Gladstonian Liberalism to incorporate a theoretical basis for collectivism while retaining the traditional Liberal emphasis on liberty. Central to all of these thinkers was the task of reformulating the theory of evolution to provide a conception of progress in moral rather than biological terms. New Liberals rejected biological theories of society such as Herbert Spencer's version of Social Darwinism, which stressed the struggle for existence among individuals, nations and races, and which eulogized competition, conflict and even racism instead of cooperation. Although protesting here against some important aspects of New Liberal theory, Russell aligned himself with their campaigns for sweeping social and educational reforms and international arbitration and eventually disarmament. This review of Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* (1906) marks the first direct public criticism he made of New Liberal political and social theory.

Hobhouse's most original concept was the theory of "orthogenetic evolution", which was first used in *Mind in Evolution* (1901) and then elaborated upon, if not mentioned specifically, in *Morals in Evolution*. This theory held that one line in the process of human evolution consisted of the gradual and self-conscious replacement of instinct by reason, and the development, again by purposeful effort, of the moral dimension of the individual. *Morals in Evolution* attempted to go beyond individuals to provide a scientific foundation for the progress of society as a whole. The teleology present in Hobhouse's "orthogenetic evolution" was the belief, which Russell refers to, that as individuals and societies become aware of their potential for harmonious growth, humanitarianism, social reform and internationalism will flourish. Such a teleology represents the highest level of optimism advanced in the social and political theory of late-Victorian and Edwardian Liberals. J. W. Burrow describes Hobhouse as "virtually the last" British evolutionary social thinker, and the one who saw most deeply into the philosophical complexities of such a theory (1966, 272). Russell's criticism of *Morals in Evolution* reflects the prevailing scepticism of Liberals a decade or so younger than Hobhouse concerning any theory based on the concept of an evolutionary development of ethics. Hobhouse's belief that the arrangement of the cosmos could provide the proper conditions for human progress may also have repelled Russell. "The Free Man's Worship" (4) is his most famous statement of his

conviction that the universe is indifferent to man's fate

In addition to its contribution to ethical and political theory, *Morals in Evolution* was Hobhouse's most important sociological book, for his later writings on social evolution were not substantially different. It made his reputation in the new field of sociology, and led to his appointment in 1907 to the Martin White Chair at the University of London—the first, and for a long time the only, chair of sociology in Britain.

Russell was, as Stefan Collini observes (1979, 230) "the most scathing critic of the account of ethical development given in *Morals in Evolution*". Perhaps because Hobhouse had a reputation as a professional philosopher, Russell chose to appraise him far more astringently than other authors, such as J. M. Robertson and G. Chatterton-Hill, whom he reviewed in the same period. Privately to Margaret Llewelyn Davies, Russell had expressed his disapproval of the book:

I have had to read (for review) Leonard Hobhouse's new book on morals in evolution—it seems to me roughly speaking worthless. It might be called "from cannibalism to the Liberal party"—a sort of advance of the human race, like "from log cabin to White House". (24 Nov 1906)

His philosophical objection was based on the belief, derived from his Cambridge colleague G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), that moral qualities are non-natural and thus cannot be identified with natural processes, such as evolution or the passage of time. Hence a theory of progress can only be extrapolated from a history of morals or a theory of social evolution provided there is some objective standard of value, independent of the temporal order, in terms of which progress can be assessed. Value cannot be defined in terms of temporal order without falling into a vicious circularity. In his 1905 essay "The Elements of Ethics" (published in 1910), Russell said: "If evolutionary ethics were sound, we ought to be entirely indifferent as to what the course of evolution may be, since whatever it is is thereby proved to be the best" (15). Russell suggests in this review that such terms as "development" and "growth" contain an implicit positive evaluation, unacknowledged and unrecognized by Hobhouse. Russell's criticism of writers of "evolutionist ethics" had been expressed even earlier in his review (1904) of *Principia Ethica*. Following Moore closely, he declared there that when such writers argued that "good" meant "more evolved" they were arguing the tautology that "the more evolved is the more evolved". However, Moore's ethics in no way precluded Russell from firmly believing in the idea of progress, since he could claim that as people increasingly came to know the objective "good", mankind would improve.

Hobhouse replied to Russell's criticisms of *Morals in Evolution* in "Sociology and Ethics" (1907). His response was a more structured piece than *Morals in Evolution*. Hobhouse acknowledged that many sociologists naively believed that "all development" was "an advance to better things" (327), and disavowed such simplistic theories of evolutionary ethics. In his rebuttal, however, he claimed that Russell had

not only misunderstood the complexity of his views on evolution, but also had a flawed concept of philosophy. Russell, Hobhouse asserted, was the one who confused terms such as "development" with progress (327n). Moreover, Russell had not invalidated the core of his thesis, because he had failed to see that one line of evolution, the orthogenetic line, led to moral development which "we may identify with the growth of mind" (331). Hobhouse attacked the philosophical basis of Russell's attack, and hence the work of Moore, by claiming that the "ethical ideal is not to be worked out by any man with a turn for abstract thinking in his own head without regard to the experience of life" (328). Russell did not write a rejoinder. In 1913, however, after reading Santayana's *Winds of Doctrine* (1913), Russell abandoned Moore's idea of the objectivity of good and evil. But he never came to espouse evolutionary ethics.

Despite his rejection of evolutionary ethics here and in "Mysticism and Logic" (10), Russell, even in the period 1903–13, and thereafter, retained much of his Victorian belief in progress. This hope was based not only on prospects for economic growth but primarily on his expectation of strenuous individual efforts to introduce social and political reforms. In old age he asserted that "the best part of human history lies in the future" (1956, 17).

The copy-text is Russell's review in *The Independent Review*, 12 (Feb. 1907) 204–10.

IN THIS WORK, Mr. Hobhouse traces the development of moral ideas from the rudest savages to the present day, or perhaps rather further. His first volume tells what men have thought it right to do, while his second tells why they have thought so; that is to say, his first volume tells what standard of conduct has, at various times and places, been expected of men, while his second deals with the ethical, religious or magical beliefs which have made men consider such conduct desirable. The first volume is divided into chapters dealing with different subjects, such as property and marriage, each of which separately is traced through its whole development. The second volume is divided according to the various ethical systems dealt with, and is therefore more or less progressive, putting the most developed systems last

The parts of the book which deal with savages and early civilizations are, to my mind, the more interesting, if only on account of the curious facts which always make anthropology pleasing. Thus we learn that Babylonian sorcerers used to invoke the coal-scuttle under the title "child of Ea", and that there are tribes which do not know that human beings have fathers. It is curious, too, to see how far the European's idea of the savage has travelled since the time when he was the "noble savage" and had all the virtues that civilized man is apt to lack. Thus we read of a Red Indian, telling of his ideas of hospitality, who said "If a white man enters one of our cabins we all treat him as I do you. We dry him if he is wet, we warm him if he is cold, and give him meat and drink that he may allay his hunger and thirst, and we spread soft furs for him to rest and sleep on. We demand nothing in return. But if I go into a white man's house at Albany and ask for victuals and drink, they say, 'Where is your money?' And if I have none, they say, 'Get out, you Indian dog!'" But this Indian, as was to be expected, lived in the eighteenth century. What one learns further about American aborigines is less idyllic. Thus among the Creek Indians, "the women were wont to make payment in tobacco for the privilege of whipping prisoners as they passed." Elsewhere, "prisoners are tortured in sufficient numbers to atone for those similarly dealt with by their enemies, and it is stated that children are encouraged to take part in the process in order to instil hardness and vindictive feelings into their minds"—a view of education which suggests the usual defence of public schools. By some savages, we find, "prisoners are not merely killed and eaten on the spot, but are taken home, well treated and fattened for the slaughter, possibly provided with a wife and encouraged to breed a family for the same purpose." "What! shall I starve as long as my sister has children whom she can sell?" was the reply of a negro to Burton. Such facts are encouraging when one feels inclined to doubt the reality of progress.

Many interesting facts about early civilizations are told by Mr. Hobhouse, notably extracts from the code of Hammurabi, which gives an astonishing insight into Babylonian society 2000 years before Christ. Many of the anticipations of Christianity mentioned in the book are very remarkable. The following is not Christian or Jewish, but is Nebuchadnezzar's hymn to Marduk on ascending the throne

O Eternal ruler! Lord of the Universe!
It is Thou who hast created me,
And Thou hast entrusted to me sovereignty over mankind
According to Thy mercy, O Lord, which Thou bestowest 10
upon all,
Cause me to love Thy supreme rule.
Implant the fear of Thy divinity in my heart

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Among the most interesting of sages are those of China. It is hard to grow very enthusiastic about Confucius, although he invented the Golden Rule, but his disciple Mencius is refreshing, if only for his remark on Generals: "There are men who say, 'I am skilful at marshalling troops; I am skilful at conducting a battle.' They are great criminals "¹ The following story of Mencius is also interesting:

When Mencius saw King Seuen much touched by the frightened appearance of an ox being led to the sacrifice, and ordering that a sheep should be substituted for it, he told him very justly that it was because "you saw the oxen and had not seen the sheep." A superior man, he went on, cannot eat the animals whose dying cries he has heard, and so he keeps away from his cook-room 20

When we come to the Greeks and the moderns, the book becomes less satisfactory, since it is impossible, within Mr. Hobhouse's limits, to give anything like an adequate discussion, and we therefore get mainly either an outline of what every one knows, or an account so compressed that it can hardly be followed unless one has read fuller accounts elsewhere 30

The main result of the inquiries into forms of social organization, marriage, property, class-relations and relations between communities, which constitute Mr. Hobhouse's first volume, is that there is a tendency to emphasize society at one pole, and the individual at the other, as against minor groups such as the clan or the commune. This conclusion carries internationalism with it as the natural goal of development, since all aggre-

¹ It is notable that Chinese anti-militarism goes too far even for Mr. Hobhouse, who suggests that it is largely due to cowardice.

gations short of humanity as a whole tend to lose their force. But although this view of development results in the main, there are, as Mr. Hobhouse admits, great difficulties the moment we come to special questions. In regard to marriage, for example, shall we regard the Catholic indissolubility of marriage or the American freedom of divorce as representing a more advanced stage? Both exist at the same date and in equally civilized countries. It might be argued that the American system is a reversion, not an advance, for great freedom of divorce existed before the rise of Catholicism. But this question will be answered by every one according to his opinion on
10 divorce, and it seems that the history of the subject can afford no guidance. Indeed it may be urged that the function of history in forming moral opinion is rather more limited than Mr. Hobhouse appears to think. The fact that things have developed in a certain direction is no evidence that it would not have been better if they had developed otherwise, nor that it would be good if they should develop further in the same direction. Thus there is a tendency for civilized societies in early stages to move towards absolute monarchy, but few people now-a-days think absolute monarchy a good form of government for the most civilized communities. The study of past moral systems is useful as showing that society can survive under institutions
20 which to us seem monstrous, and as illustrating the part played by custom and irrational prejudice in almost all beliefs. In this way, it instils wholesome doubts and promotes a careful examination of our views, and thus may suggest grounds *against* many cherished ethical dogmas; but it is quite incapable of giving grounds *for* any opinion as to what is desirable. Such an opinion can only validly come from our own perception of what is good, not from the distilled essence of the views of previous ages.

This is illustrated towards the end of Mr. Hobhouse's book, when he comes to giving his own views on ethics. These views are recommended partly by some rather summary philosophical argumentation, partly as the
30 natural outcome of previous systems. Mr. Hobhouse's ethics is not that of Mill, although his *Theory of Knowledge* is an able defence of Mill against idealist critics, in fact, his ethics is rather that of the critics than that of Mill. He rejects the view that happiness is the good, and also criticizes the utilitarians for regarding the good of society as merely the aggregate of the goods enjoyed by separate people. The end, he says, is not happiness but "the spiritual growth in which happiness is found"². "We need a standard of value which must prove its genuineness by the same test which we apply to speculative principles. It must give harmony, order, coherence to our efforts and our judgments, while its negation must leave them disordered and discordant."³ "In modern thought the principle of human development

2 II, p. 246

3 II, p. 249

under whatever name becomes in a new sense the pivot upon which ethical conceptions turn "⁴ "For rationalism the moral basis lies in the unfolding of the full meaning of the moral order, as that through which the human spirit grows "⁵ There is a difficulty in understanding what Mr Hobhouse means by these views, because development and growth presumably consist in travelling towards the good, or from good to better, and are therefore not themselves capable of being used to explain what the good is

Another difficulty in Mr Hobhouse's views is to discover what part in religion he would assign to beliefs as to the nature of the universe or of God. "Instead of religion being the basis of ethics," he says, "ethics becomes the ¹⁰ test to which religion must submit."⁶ If this means merely that we ought not to *worship* anything which is not good, there is nothing to be said against it, but if it means that our *beliefs* on religious subjects are to be influenced by our beliefs as to what is good, then it presupposes that we already know for certain that the universe is good—a paradoxical view for which no evidence is offered by Mr Hobhouse. That this view is held by him appears also from his remark⁷ that the Greek philosophers first taught the world, what it has too often forgotten, that goodness and God are identical. This presumably means that power and goodness are united, for "God", in the sense in which it was used before the Greeks, seems to mean merely a person of extraordinary power Mr. Hobhouse, therefore, must suppose that the controlling forces of the world are good The question whether this is so is not without importance, and it is a pity he has not indicated his reasons for his view "There is", he says, "no real Ahriman that strives with Ormuzd Evil is merely the automatic result of the inorganic "⁸ But is there not equally no real Ormuzd? And is not good equally the automatic result of the inorganic? This is the view which science *prima facie* suggests, and Mr. Hobhouse alleges no reason against it.

Owing to the plan of Mr Hobhouse's book, there is much material about early customs, out of which one expects his conclusions to grow; but the ³⁰ conclusions, when we reach them, seem unconnected with this material, and therefore have to be given so shortly as to seem obscure and arbitrary Yet one cannot doubt that he regards his anthropological data as merely means to an end, namely to his conclusions as to ethics and politics, and the book is rendered unsatisfactory by the very insufficient connection between his data and his conclusions The only possible connection—and this is not made out—would be that, given the opinions of the Australians, the Red Indians, the Babylonians, etc , the opinions of Mr. Hobhouse are those

⁴ II, p 251

⁵ II, p 274

⁶ II, p 252

⁷ II, p 48

⁸ II, p 281

which would naturally come next in order of development. But it is also given that the opinions of the Australians, the Red Indians, the Babylonians, etc., are palpable nonsense. What use, one wonders, may posterity make of this datum?

It is true that Mr. Hobhouse does lip-service to these sceptical suggestions. Thus he says: "Nothing is more certain, if the rationalist doctrine is true, than [that] doctrine itself will grow, and as growth implies, will change."⁹ But he feels sure that the truth is to be got by a *growth* from the present doctrine. This, indeed, is implied in the word *evolution*, which, 10 where no reason has been shown why growth rather than radical change is the road to truth, is really a question-begging term. For aught that appears to the contrary, the wheat and the tares may be a more appropriate analogy, here, though the wheat is to grow, the tares are to be destroyed. Nor can one be sure, at any stage, that the wheat is already sown; it may be that all that is now growing is tares. I do not mean that complete scepticism is the only rational attitude in ethics, but I do mean that knowledge in ethics cannot be attained by merely studying changes of opinion. And to call these changes "evolution" or "growth" or "development" is to assume that we know that the changes constitute a progress, i.e. that we know which stages are better 20 and which worse. But if we already know this, it is merely an unnecessary *détour* to deduce it from the course of events. None of us believe human sacrifice to be bad because it is by savages that it is practised, on the contrary, being already convinced that human sacrifice is bad, we infer progress from the fact that the practice has died out. The whole subject of evolution is full of opportunities for question-begging arguments, and to such arguments, I believe, its apparent power of giving guidance for the future is almost wholly due.

Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic [1907]

LATE IN JANUARY 1907 Russell agreed to requests from the editor of *The Edinburgh Review*, Arthur D. Elliot, that he write a review of G M Trevelyan's forthcoming book, *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* (1907). Russell apparently had initially hesitated, fearing that his knowledge of the topic might not be sufficient, but Elliot, his kinsman, a first cousin of the late Lord Amberley, successfully persisted.

I do not think myself that you need possess much *original detailed* knowledge of the period. What I want is a presentation of the whole story, with a *judgment* on the whole movement, and on the book, with some sort of taking stock of the results both as regards Italy herself and Europe (30 Jan 1907)

Elliot's most persuasive argument, that he wanted an article from "the grandson of the man who did so much for Italy" (27 Jan 1907), had great appeal to Russell, who admired Lord John's decisive intervention in the cause of Italian unification (1756, 111) when he was Foreign Secretary in Lord Palmerston's Ministry. This response came when Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), the embodiment of military audacity in the cause of Italian unification, seized Sicily and Naples in 1860 from the despotic Bourbons. This success was given international sanction by Lord John Russell's famous dispatch of 27 October 1860 warning the European powers that Britain looked favourably upon Garibaldi's actions and upon Italian unification generally. Lord John was told that he was "blessed night and morning by twenty millions of Italians" (Walpole 1889, 2. 328). Italian nationalists also had cause to revere another side of Russell's family. As Lord Privy Seal in Lord John's administration of 1846–52, Lady Russell's father, Gilbert Elliot, 2nd Earl of Minto, had, on a special diplomatic mission to a number of Italian states, persuaded the King of Naples to give the Sicilians a separate Parliament.

The Italophil sentiments of Lord and Lady John Russell were shared by numerous Britons. Such sympathies for Italian dreams of political freedom and unification developed from many sources in the post-Napoleonic period, particularly after George Canning became Foreign Secretary in 1822 and proclaimed Government support for liberty on behalf of oppressed nationalities. As well, Italian culture from imperial Rome to the Renaissance fascinated educated Britons and induced many writers and artists not only to travel but often to live in the Italian peninsula. In

addition, British perceptions, shared by Bertrand Russell, that Italian Liberals and revolutionaries were anti-clerical appealed to traditional anti-Catholic prejudices. This widespread admiration was essentially of Victorian vintage, for, although many British intellectuals had long looked warmly to Italy, others, as Arthur Elliot observed, had conventionally viewed Italians "as assassins and organ-grinders" (27 Jan 1907).

It was not only Whigs and middle-class Liberals who championed the cause of Italian unity but also, by the 1840s, large sections of the British working classes. Indeed, when Garibaldi visited Britain in the 1860s, thousands of working men cheered him everywhere he went throughout the country. He was welcomed most cordially at Pembroke Lodge. Liberals also lionized Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), the leading Italian and indeed European advocate of nationalism as a sacred cause, who spent many years in London as an exile. Bertrand Russell had acquired at Pembroke Lodge an admiration for the heroes of Italian nationalism, and continued as an adult to nurture this sentiment. His admiration for Mazzini was so high that he told Helen Flexner to "read Bolton King's Life of Mazzini ... it is one of those Lives of Saints that one needs to supply the void of religion" (19 March 1903). As a personal memento of his family's involvement with the Risorgimento, Russell possessed Mazzini's watch-case, which had originally been given to his mother (1967, 16). Presumably on his own initiative, he decided to review, along with Trevelyan's book, two other works on the topic: R M Johnston's *The Roman Theocracy and the Republic* (1901) and Bolton King's *Mazzini* (1902). Johnston (1867-1920) was a prolific historian who wrote on subjects ranging from Napoleon to American military history, while King (1860-1937), who also published numerous books on history, was deeply involved in the university social-reform movement, epitomized by Toynbee Hall.

At Elliot's request, Russell agreed to write the review in haste, to coincide with the publication of Trevelyan's book. Since the book was still being completed, Russell was allowed little time to read the full text, and even then some details were not in final form. On 6 February, Elliot expressed fear that Trevelyan might not meet his deadline, and he cautioned Russell that quotations made from page proofs were subject to change. Despite Russell's unhappiness at being rushed, out of friendship for Trevelyan he finished the review in time for the book's release in April. The review was published anonymously in conformity with the policy of *The Edinburgh Review*. Until Alys informed him, Trevelyan did not know the identity of the reviewer, although, after the disclosure, he told Russell "I might have guessed it from your favourite story of Jowett's remark on Mazzini" (23 May 1907). With his characteristic generosity, Trevelyan praised Russell, graciously saying that sales of the book had risen sharply as a direct result of the review (*ibid.*). So confident was Trevelyan of Russell's emotional identification with the struggle for Italian unity, that he suggested that the next time "the Austrians conquer Italy you and I will go in a couple of red shirts, together, and get comfortably killed in an Alpine pass" (*ibid.*). Later, when writing *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (1909), Trevelyan invited Russell to

accompany him on the arduous walk, retracing Garibaldi's steps from Marsala to Palermo. The rigours of the walk are described in "My Recollections of George Trevelyan" (1956a).

This discursive review of Garibaldi reveals how enthusiastically and how thoroughly, for a layman, Russell had studied the nineteenth-century movement for Italian unification. While he accepted completely the interpretations of Trevelyan, King and Johnston, he could not have written so wide-ranging a review if he had not been steeped in Italian history. Indeed, this is the longest historical review which Russell ever wrote. Years later, in *Freedom and Organization, 1814-1914* (1934), he reconsidered Mazzini in a more critical fashion (350-5).

Russell's unalloyed praise of the book reveals his affection for Trevelyan and his respect for him as an historian. The review also shows that Russell shared both Trevelyan's interpretation of Italian unification and his beliefs on how history should be written. A fluent narrative style, a division of characters into the worthy and the unworthy, a concentration on high politics, and a belief that, on the whole, the movement for unification was a noble and progressive development characterize the Whig interpretation of history upheld by both men.

While Russell decided not to make any critical judgments of Trevelyan in this review, he did have some reservations about his style, which he expressed later in a private letter. Writing to Lady Ottoline Morrell on 1 November 1911 about Trevelyan's latest book, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, Russell commented "he hasn't got over his old faults of style—it is all too rhetorical and Macaulayesque. But still it is interesting" (#239). There was much to praise in the new book. Trevelyan's treatment, he told Lady Ottoline, of Cavour and Gladstone's agent, Giacomo (later Sir James) Lacaita, and Russell's grandparents he considered "a hundred times better" (#245, 5 Nov 1911) than the way their relationship had been treated by Desmond MacCarthy in *Lady John Russell, A Memoir* (1910, 187f.). Later, Russell's slight reservation that Trevelyan's "hero-worship" might have biased his "judgment" of Garibaldi was reawakened when he met William Roscoe Thayer, the biographer of Cavour. Russell was amused, he informed Lady Ottoline, that privately Trevelyan was prepared to admit to Thayer that Garibaldi was "an old scamp" (#1004, 14 March 1914). When, however, Russell in old age wrote "My Recollections of G M Trevelyan", he felt no need to modify the enthusiasm he had expressed in this review "I am glad to see, on looking up this article, that I fully recognized his great merit as a historian".

Russell's library contains many of Trevelyan's works. They are not marked. Since no manuscript exists, the copy-text is the unsigned review from *The Edinburgh Review*, 205 (April 1907) 489-507.

Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic By George Macaulay Trevelyan
London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907. Pp. xv,
377

The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, 1846–1849 By R. M. Johnston
London and New York Macmillan and Co., 1901 Pp. xi, 375

Mazzini. By Bolton King London: J. M. Dent & Co.; New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1902. Pp. xxii, 380.

IN THE HISTORY of the long struggle for Italian independence, no part
is more heroic than the record of the short-lived Roman Republic of
1849. "That there should ever have been a time when Mazzini ruled
Rome and Garibaldi defended her walls, sounds like a poet's dream."¹ This
poet's dream has been related by Mr. Trevelyan in language which elicits all
the splendour and all the tragedy of the events which it records. His power is
equally remarkable in dramatic narrative, in descriptions of moving and
beautiful scenes, and in telling of the pathos of death in an almost hopeless
struggle. Yet truth has nowhere been suppressed or distorted, nor has
hero-worship prevented a balanced and judicious historical judgment.

The Roman Republic was proclaimed on February 8, 1849, and was
extinguished by the French entry into Rome on July 3 in the same year. To
understand its history we must take a brief survey of the revolutions of 1848,
and of the previous condition of the Papal States.

The sudden success and almost equally sudden failure of the many
revolutions of 1848 were due to the initial cooperation and subsequent
disagreement of parties with essentially divergent aims. The two chief
forces on the side of revolution were democracy and nationalism, both of
which had been flouted by the principles of 1815 and the Holy Alliance.
Although in those days almost all democrats were nationalists, by no means
all nationalists were democrats. Many, alarmed by the socialism which
appeared in Paris and was supposed ready to appear elsewhere, feared
democracy almost as much as they hated foreign domination. This pro-
duced one fatal division, exemplified in Italy by the strife between Mazzin-
ians, who desired a republic, and the Federalists and Fusionists, who
desired a federation of the existing states, or a monarchy under the King of
Sardinia. Another source of division sprang from the principle of
nationalism itself. For this principle had two forms, according as it was held
by the relatively strong or the relatively weak. As held by the relatively
weak, it meant the right of every nation to manage its own affairs, as held by
the relatively strong, it meant the right of one's own nation to oppress as

¹ Trevelyan, p. 3

many others as possible. Thus the Magyars asserted their right of self-government as against the Austrians, but would not concede any such right to the Slavs in Hungary. This incensed the Czechs, who therefore supported the Viennese Government in its struggle to suppress the Magyars. Such divisions, of which there were many in the Austrian Empire, finally gave the victory to reaction, and thus prevented Italy from achieving the expulsion of the "Barbarians".

But apart from the divisions of reformers, the forces opposed to all change were very strong. Russia, which crushed Hungary, could and would have effected much more if its aid had been necessary. And the Church, still ¹⁰ almost omnipotent with the peasantry of all Catholic countries, was generally opposed to reform except where Catholics were oppressed by heretics, as in Poland and Ireland. To this rule, however, the Pope himself formed, at first, an important exception, and his views were shared by a number of liberal Italian ecclesiastics. His gradual quarrel with liberalism produced the Roman Republic, which in turn caused a final and irreparable breach between the Church and Italian aspirations, and thereby ultimately sealed the fate of the Temporal Power.

After the fall of Napoleon, the governments in Italy were all oppressive and stupid, and the very worst (with the possible exception of Naples) was ²⁰ the government of the Pope. All important offices were filled by ecclesiastics, and the cardinal legates in the Romagna were quasi-independent satraps. Modern innovations, such as railways, were not permitted to desecrate the patrimony of St. Peter. The police employed domestic servants as spies, and would arrest men on receiving a hint from the parish priest.² The Inquisition still exercised a tyranny over all whom it disliked. "An edict is extant, issued by the Inquisitor-General of Pesaro in 1841, commanding all people to inform against heretics, Jews, and sorcerers, those who have impeded the Holy Office, or made satires against the Pope and clergy."³ Men who refused the Sacraments were not allowed to have a ³⁰ doctor.⁴ Education was successfully discouraged, on the avowed principle that "ignorant people are easier to govern." The standard in higher education may be gauged from the fact that Galileo's astronomical discoveries were not allowed to be treated as true until 1820, while his works remained on the Index until 1835.⁵ Meanwhile secret societies, such as the Sanfedists and the Centurioni, were encouraged by the government of His Holiness to murder honest men in the interests of religion and order. The state of things was such that in 1831 a joint note urging certain reforms was presented by

² Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity*, Vol. 1, p. 78.

³ *Ibid.* , p. 79

⁴ *Ibid.* , p. 81

⁵ J. M. Robertson, *History of Freethought*, second edition, Vol. II, p. 81

England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. But in spite of some show of yielding, the Pope did practically nothing to carry into effect the recommendations of the Powers, and in 1846, when Gregory XVI died, things were just about as bad as they had been in 1831. The election of a liberal successor to Gregory XVI was believed by all, including the new Pope himself, to mark the beginning of a better era; but in this belief people over-estimated the strength of the man, and under-estimated that of the office.

The steps by which, in the course of about two years, Pius IX was transformed from an ardent and amiable reformer into a passionate reactionary are well told by Mr. R. M. Johnston.⁶ Mastai Ferretti, Bishop of Imola, was elected Pope, to the surprise of all, by the Conclave of June, 1846. His liberalism, Mr. Johnston says, "might be traced, not only to the influence of his friends, and to the obvious lessons of the times .. but also to his predisposing largeness and kindness of heart." But his kindness of heart was neutralized by his weakness, which Mr. Johnston accounts for as the outcome of epilepsy, from which he suffered.

In the irresponsible impulsiveness, in the lack of intellectual precision and vigour, in the vanity, the love of effect and of praise
 20 that he added to his naturally benevolent qualities, he showed all the weakness and lack of balance that so frequently accompany epilepsy .. In the Bishop of Imola's personal appearance might be detected the expression of his constitutional deficiencies. Although strikingly handsome, and of dignified demeanour, yet a close scrutiny revealed a mouth that was weak, and eyes that could not support a steady gaze. Perhaps the best trait of his feeble character was his charitableness, which, if Pasolini is to be trusted, was as unostentatious as it was extensive.⁷

In the beginning of his reign, Pius's acts were chiefly inspired by the work
 30 of Gioberti, *Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani*, which advocated an Italian federation under the presidency of a liberal Pope. The Pope began by proclaiming an amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, and was gradually led on by the love of popularity to greater and greater concessions. At first all went well. But the amiable Pope, never imagining the possibility of a conflict between the interests of reform and the interests of the Church, had unfortunately forgotten Austria. Austria dominated Italy from the

⁶ *The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, 1846-1849* Mr. Johnston's more recent work, *The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy* (Macmillan, 1904), is instructive as showing how the epoch of French rule produced sufficient enlightenment to make the urban populations
 40 detest the subsequent reaction

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 32-3

fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and, though nominally only governing Lombardy and Venetia, was able, in normal times, to impose its will throughout the whole Peninsula. To Austria, a rejuvenated Italy would be a menace, and a liberal Pope appeared, in the words of Metternich, to be "the greatest misfortune of the age". Thus no real progress was possible in Italy without a war with Austria. But to fight a Catholic Power, to alienate orthodox populations and risk a schism, was no part of Pius IX's rose-water programme. This inherent contradiction drove him step by step into opposition to the Italian liberals, forced to choose between the good of Italy and the good of the Church, he chose, as he was bound to do, the good of the Church, while his subjects chose the good of Italy.¹⁰

In the first months of 1848, when the Austrian power seemed hopelessly broken by revolution and civil war, while Italians everywhere extorted constitutions from their rulers, and forced a united attack on the Austrian army under Radetzky, the Pope yielded, at least outwardly, to the clamour of the Romans, and allowed his forces to be led to the war under General Durando. But he forbade his general to cross the border, insisting that he should confine himself to the defence of the frontier; and on April 29 he delivered an allocution informing the Cardinals, among other things, that

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When now some desire that we, likewise with the other people and sovereigns of Italy, should undertake a war against the Germans, we have at length thought it our duty that, in this your solemn assembly, we clearly and openly declare that this is wholly abhorrent from our counsels, seeing that we, although unworthy, discharge on earth the office of Him who is the author of peace and lover of charity, and, agreeably to the duty of our Supreme Apostleship, regard and embrace with equal paternal earnestness of love, all tribes, peoples, and nations.⁸

From this time onward the Pope and the Romans were definitively at variance. The Austrians, by Radetzky's genius, and by the weakness and dissensions of his enemies, were victorious in North Italy; Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, was discredited, and in Central Italy a more democratic and republican movement, inspired largely by Mazzini, endeavoured to prolong resistance without royal help. "La guerre royale a fini, la guerre du peuple commence", said Mazzini in August. The following months, down to the fall of Rome and Venice, were the only period during which Mazzini's plan of a republican war unaided by royal or foreign troops was seriously tried; and it must be confessed that the issue justified the subsequent

⁸ Johnston, p. 360. Such considerations did not, of course, weigh with the Holy Father against the forcible re-conquest of the Papal States in the following year.

reliance of Italians on Piedmont, and of Piedmont on foreign help

After some aimless vacillations, the Pope appointed a ministry under Count Rossi, a capable and courageous opponent of democracy and the Austrian war (September 16) Rossi came increasingly into conflict with the turbulent Roman mob, led by the genial and loquacious Angelo Brunetti, nicknamed *Ciceruacchio*, and on November 15, as he was on his way to open the Chamber, he was assassinated⁹ The Pope, after being insulted by the mob, fled to the Neapolitan fortress of Gaeta, where he placed himself under the protection of King Bomba, and appealed to all the Catholic Powers to 10 reinstate him The Romans summoned a constituent assembly, elected by manhood suffrage, and the assembly proclaimed the Republic (February 8, 1849) Of this republic, attacked simultaneously by the French, the Austrians, the Spaniards, and the Neapolitans, Mazzini became virtually dictator,¹⁰ and Garibaldi was the principal defender, until it ceased to exist by the French entry into Rome on July 3 It is the history of its defence and of Garibaldi's subsequent retreat which Mr Trevelyan relates.

"I shall", he says,

conceal nothing prosaic and nothing discreditable—neither 20 Garibaldi's mistakes during the siege, nor the misconduct of some of his associates, nor the hostility with which in some places the rural population regarded the red-shirts. Hoping to make the story of the defence of Rome, of the retreat of the Garibaldians and the escape of their chief stand out in all its details of place and colouring, I have not only visited the scenes in the capital and near it, but have walked along the whole route traversed by Garibaldi's column from the gate of Rome to Cesenatico on the Adriatic, and have visited the scenes of his adventures near Comacchio and Ravenna.... To come in solitary 30 places, on the very wayside fountains at which, as the survivors have recorded, they slaked their raging thirst, and on other turns of the road where they found no water that terrible July; to stand on the hill whence they last saw the dome of St. Peter's, and on the other hill where they shouted and wept at sight of the Adriatic; to traverse the oak woods through which they marched under the stars, or by morning light; or where they slept through the long Italian midday; to draw breath in the quiet monastery gardens, perched high over hills of olive and plains of vines, wherein they tasted brief hours of

⁹ At the time, it was not known who had committed the murder From evidence only recently made accessible, it appears that the assassin was Ciceruacchio's son, Luigi Brunetti Whether his father was an accomplice is not known Trevelyan, pp 80, 81, 306

¹⁰ He was nominally at first only an ordinary member of the Assembly, after the news of Charles Albert's defeat at Novara, he was made one of a Triumvirate (end of March, 1849), of which the other members completely submitted to his guidance

coolness and repose, to scale the bare mountains up which they dragged their little piece of cannon, and descend the gorge where at last they let it lie when the Austrians were hard upon them; to see the streets and piazzas in which the citizens held last festivals of the tricolor in honour of their passage, and the villages where the rear-guard fought, and where the laggards were killed by the pursuers; to hear the waves breaking on the mole whence the last of the army put to sea in the midnight storm; to stand on the lonely beach and sand-dunes where Garibaldi waded ashore with his Anita in his arms, and in the room of the farmhouse where he watched her die, while the Austrians might at any moment have been knocking at the door; to see these places and to find that the story is very dear to rich and poor, learned and ignorant, in a progressive and a free country, conscious that it owes its progress and freedom to these heroes, both those who perished and those who survived—this has taught me what cannot be clearly learnt from the pages of Ruskin or Symonds, or any other of Italy's melodious mourners, that she is not dead but risen, that she is not the land of ruins but of men, not the country of ghosts, but the country which the living share with their immortal ancestors¹¹

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If Garibaldi deserves the place of honour among the defenders of Rome, the man who did most to make Rome worth defending was Mazzini. Mazzini's rare charm and power, and the terrible sadness of his life, are told by Mr. Bolton King in one of the most interesting of biographies.¹²

Born at Genoa in 1805, he became a Carbonaro as soon as he was grown up. But he incurred the suspicion of the Piedmontese authorities by not being stupid.

He was, as the governor of Genoa told his father, "gifted with some talent, and too fond of walking by himself at night absorbed in thought. What on earth," asked the offended officer, "has he at his age to think about? We don't like young people thinking without our knowing the subject of their thoughts."¹³

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He was arrested, during the excitement caused by the French Revolution of 1830, on the capital charge of initiating a government spy as a Carbonaro. He escaped the death penalty by perjury, but was thenceforth compelled to live in exile. Disgusted by the flummery and futility of the Carbonari, and

¹¹ Pp 5, 6

¹² *Mazzini* (Dent, 1902). Mr. Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity* (James Nisbet & Co., 1899) should also be read by all who wish to understand the movement as a whole

¹³ Bolton King's *Life of Mazzini*, p. 18

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by the failure of their last attempt at revolution in 1831, he founded a new secret society, "Young Italy", with the watchword "God and the people", and "the three inseparable bases of independence, unity, and liberty"—"that is," as Mr Trevelyan interprets, "the Austrian must go, the various small states must be united in one, and democratic government with liberty of opinion must be established." To these aims Mazzini devoted the whole of his energies throughout the rest of his life. Unfortunately, he regarded liberty as inconsistent with monarchy, and therefore became, when after 1849 union under Victor Emmanuel was accepted by almost all Italians as 10 the best practicable policy, a hindrance rather than a help to the achievement of what was possible in his hopes. And throughout his life he invariably, as is usual with exiles, over-estimated the forces on his side, and therefore allowed his friends to become involved in plots and petty insurrections which had no chance of success. But in the early years, by his impassioned writings, and by the inspiration of his devoted ardour for a great idea, he more than any other man created the hope and the determination which made Italian unity possible. The men to whom Garibaldi and Cavour and Victor Emmanuel appealed responded to that appeal because Mazzini had roused them. Garibaldi, on his visit to England in 1864, 20 forgetting many quarrels, expressed this feeling at a gathering at which Mazzini was present: "I rise", he said,

to make a declaration which I ought to have made long since. There is a man here amongst us who has rendered the greatest services to our country and to the cause of freedom. When I was a youth and had only aspirations towards good, I sought for one able to act as the guide and counsellor of my youthful years. I sought such a guide as one who is athirst seeks the water spring. I found this man. He alone watched when all around slept, he alone kept and fed the sacred flame ... This man is Joseph Mazzini: he is my friend and teacher.¹⁴

30 Such recognition, however, rarely fell to the lot of Mazzini, whose sorrows had few compensations. His dearest friend, Jacopo Ruffini, was arrested by the Piedmontese government while fomenting one of Young Italy's plots, and committed suicide in prison. Giuditta Sidoli, to whom he was engaged, but whom his exile's life never permitted him to marry, was employed by him in his conspiracies, and we owe what we know of their correspondence to the copies made by the Tuscan police.¹⁵ Always relentless, always ready to sacrifice himself and others to his political aims, he yet possessed a wonderful gentleness and unwillingness to inflict avoidable

¹⁴ Trevelyan, p. 19

¹⁵ Bolton King's *Mazzini*, p. 68

pain In London, where he lived with few intervals from 1837 till the last years of his life, he suffered at first such poverty that he had to pawn his clothes for food; yet he managed to help needy exiles, and during one winter he gave away his only overcoat.¹⁶

Going out one winter morning, he found a young girl on the doorstep worn out with cold and hunger.. He took her in and put her in his landlady's charge When the girl afterwards married, and was deserted by her husband, he undertook the education of her children, and for many years devoted to it a large share of his scanty income.¹⁷

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In one of the many London lodging-houses which he endured, "he could not eat his landlady's ill-cooked dinners, and hid the untouched food rather than hurt her feelings "¹⁸

In the earlier years of his exile, he suffered terribly from loneliness. "The other day", he writes from Switzerland in 1834,

I was looking at the Alps in the distance—beyond them is my country, my poor country that I love so much, where my father and mother are, and my two sisters, and another sister who has been dead many years, and the tomb of the best friend of my youth, who died for liberty, and meadows and hills and beautiful lakes like your own, and flowers and oranges and a beautiful sky—all that one needs to make one die happy, and I thought sadly on it all.¹⁹

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"There is so much agony in life", he writes in another letter, "that when I see a baby quiet, smiling, at peace, I can only wish for death for it" (p. 58); and again: "He who, through fatality of circumstances, cannot live the serene life of family, has a void in his heart that nothing fills, and I, who write these pages, well I know it" (p. 72). In later life, though in England he had friends, he became more and more estranged from contemporary Italy, which he could never forgive for its adhesion to the House of Savoy. Although his whole life was one of devoted service, the long years of plots and intrigues weakened his sense of honour, and led him into unnecessary deceptions; brooding in solitude over his republican ideal, he became filled with bitter hatred of its opponents, and with an impatience that almost always clouded his judgment. Though his virtue sufficed to keep happiness

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¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 76

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 97

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 195

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 54

away from him, his few faults, throughout his later years, prevented his sacrifices from furthering any good cause. After Rome had been won, though unity was completed, he found no joy in the result.

"Italy, my Italy," he said,

the Italy that I have preached, the Italy of our dreams? Italy, the great, the beautiful, the moral Italy of my heart? This medley of opportunists and cowards and little Macchiavellis, that let themselves be dragged behind the suggestion of the foreigner—I thought to call up the soul of Italy, and I see only its corpse.

- 10 I want to see, before dying, another Italy, the ideal of my soul and life, start up from her three hundred years' grave: this is only the phantom, the mockery of Italy. (P. 218)

Jowett, after hearing Mazzini talk uninterruptedly for two hours, remarked, with partial truth, that he was "a man of genius, but too much under the influence of two abstract ideas, God and the principle of nationality" (p. 148). Carlyle, who certainly did not err on the side of a too facile admiration of contemporaries, nevertheless recognized better than Jowett the moral greatness of Mazzini.

"Whatever I may think", he wrote,

- 20 of his practical insight and skill in worldly affairs, I can with great freedom testify to all men that he, if I have ever seen such, is a man of genius and virtue, a man of sterling veracity, humanity, and nobleness of mind, one of those rare men, numerable, unfortunately, but as units in this world, who are worthy to be called martyr souls; who in silence, piously in their daily life, understand and practise what is meant by that.

Mazzini cherished a mystical religion, in which Rome still played a great part, though it was to be the centre of a changed and regenerated belief.

"I entered the city one evening", he says,

- 30 with a deep sense of awe, almost of worship. Rome was to me, as in spite of her present degradation she still is, the Temple of humanity. From Rome will one day spring the religious transformation destined for the third time to bestow moral unity upon Europe.²⁰

²⁰ Quoted by Trevelyan, p. 92.

It is interesting to observe that Mazzini, in spite of his unorthodoxy, retained his belief in the importance of a Church which should be catholic, not perceiving that the evils he deplored in the Papacy are the inevitable results of any such Church, whatever its dogmas, and that his own teaching, which is practically that of the gospels, would, if taught by a Church claiming universality, lead to developments as surprising as those that he deplored in the existing ecclesiastical system. But as Dictator to the Roman republic, his religious veneration for the City made him able to appeal to the highest motives as no other living man could. "Here in Rome", he told the Assembly, "we may not be moral mediocrities" In this spirit he set to work, ¹⁰ and his success, morally, must have astonished almost every one except himself.

The sordid period of the democratic revolution was over, and its period of idealism and heroism had begun. Mazzini speedily removed the elements of crime and coercion from the popular Government, and replaced them by a spirit of tolerance and liberty almost unexampled in time of national danger. Garibaldi gave to the warfare of the extreme Republicans the spirit of Thermopylae, so often mouthed by orators whose stock-in-trade was classical history, but at last brought by the red-shirts into the region of fact. Little as they liked one another, these two men between them turned a rather limp revolutionary movement, begun in murder and frothy talk of the clubs, into one of the great scenes of history. The Roman Republic showed the faults, but it showed yet more abundantly the virtues, of its origin as the work of an extreme faction. Its history is full of that appeal to the ideal in man that often guides the life of individuals, but finds little direct representation in the government of the world, except in those rare, brief moments of crisis and of concentrated passion when some despised "ideologue" is lifted to the top of the plunging wave.²¹

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Mazzini decreed that parts of the ecclesiastical lands should be leased to peasants at very low rents, and that the incomes of the greater dignitaries should be curtailed for the benefit of the poorer parish priests, he also gave the buildings of the Inquisition as lodgings for the destitute in Rome. But beyond these two acts, he did nothing hostile to the Church—indeed he carried tolerance towards all parties almost to excess. He not only left the priests unchecked in their ordinary duties and avocations, but allowed plots of which he was cognizant to be developed, sometimes warning the plotters to keep their doings from the knowledge of the public. When the mob

dragged some confessionals out of their churches to make a bonfire, "Mazzini gravely remonstrated, and the objects were restored to their proper places."²² Some terrorists endeavoured to bring about a massacre of priests, about six of whom were actually murdered in Trastevere. In this case, also, the Government succeeded in preventing the mischief from spreading further, largely (it would seem) by means of a moral appeal to the people; but unfortunately the murderers remained unpunished. The Triumvirs could, however, show vigour in suppressing crime. In Ancona, where an outbreak of anarchy and assassination occurred, order was restored by the skill and firmness of their envoy Orsini—the same man who afterwards himself tried to assassinate Napoleon III.²³

Garibaldi, whose achievements at this time form the main theme of Mr. Trevelyan's book, offers as complete a contrast to Mazzini as is possible for two men engaged in the same work, so much so that one is tempted to regard them as embodiments respectively of the abstract faculties of thought and action. Both exiles from their native country of Liguria, while Mazzini had devoted himself to literary propaganda, Garibaldi had been mastering the art of guerilla warfare by taking part in the unceasing quarrels of the South American States. If Mazzini's life makes a deeper and more serious appeal,

20 Garibaldi's delights us by its romance, its picturesqueness, and its childlike spontaneity. By profession a merchant sailor, it was in Levantine ports that he first heard of liberty and the destined union of Italy. In 1834 he entered the Sardinian Navy with a view of inducing it to take part in the revolt which Mazzini was organizing; but the plot failed, he had to fly, and "the first time he ever read his name in print was when, on reaching Marseilles, he saw in the papers that the Piedmontese Government had condemned him to death."²⁴ It was this event which led him to emigrate to South America, where he passed the twelve years from 1836 to 1848, in a career which sounds more like a boy's book of adventure than a sober record of fact.

30 Garibaldi had, perhaps, the most romantic life that history records, for it had all the trappings as well as the essence of romance. Though he lived in the nineteenth century, it was yet his fortune never to take full part in the common prose life of civilized men, and so he never understood it, though he moved it profoundly, like a great wind blowing off an unknown shore.²⁵

The story of his South American life may be read in his autobiography, from which Mr. Trevelyan has extracted almost everything that is of real

²² Trevelyan, p. 149

²³ Johnston, Appendix G, pp. 361-365

40 ²⁴ Trevelyan, p. 19

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23-4

interest. The most characteristic episode is his wooing of Anita, the Amazon wife who died during his escape in 1849. Swimming ashore from a shipwreck, in which several of his best friends were drowned, he and the survivors attacked and captured the town of Laguna, and with it the enemy's fleet, which was in the harbour. Garibaldi, thus suddenly transformed into an admiral, was welcomed as a liberator by the inhabitants of the town; and it was here that he met Anita.

The loss of Luigi, Edoardo, and others of my countrymen, left me utterly isolated; I felt quite alone in the world. Of all the friends who had made those desolate regions like home to me, not one was left ..

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Walking up and down the quarter-deck of the *Itaparica*, wrapped in my own gloomy thoughts, I came, after trying every species of argument, to the conclusion that I would look out for a woman, so as to escape from a position of intolerable weariness and discomfort. By chance I cast my eyes towards the houses on the Barra—a tolerably high hill on the south side of the entrance to the lagoon, where a few simple and picturesque dwellings were visible. Outside one of these, by means of the telescope I usually carried with me when on deck, I espied a young woman, and forthwith gave orders for the boat to be got out, as I wished to go ashore. I landed, and, making for the houses where I expected to find the object of my excursion, I had just given up all hope of seeing her again, when I met an inhabitant of the place, whose acquaintance I had made soon after our arrival. He invited me to take coffee in his house; we entered, and the first person who met my eyes was the damsel who had attracted me ashore. It was Anita, the mother of my children, who shared my life for better, for worse—the wife whose courage I have so often felt the loss of. We both remained enraptured and silent, gazing on one another like two people who meet not for the first time, and seek in each other's faces something which makes it easier to recall the forgotten past. At last I greeted her by saying, "Thou oughtest to be mine!" I could speak but little Portuguese, and uttered the bold words in Italian. Yet my insolence was magnetic. I had formed a tie, pronounced a decree, which death alone could annul.²⁶

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Love at first sight is perhaps not a very rare phenomenon, but we know of no other instance where the first sight was through a telescope. Yet the marriage proved one of the happiest known to history. Anita accompanied her husband on his campaigns, and displayed in battle the courage of a

²⁶ *Autobiography*, Werner's translation, Vol. 1, pp. 77-79. Most of the passage is quoted by Trevelyan, p. 28-9

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veteran. "Neither of these remarkable persons", says Mr. Trevelyan, "could ever have married any one else on equal terms. The elopement with Anita was the Sicilian expedition of Garibaldi's private life, and for Italy, too, he had won a heroine and a story"

Many other Italians, whose love of Italy had made them exiles, had sought a refuge in South America, and had been enlisted by Garibaldi in his "Italian legion", with a part of which, when the revolutions of 1848 broke out, he crossed the Atlantic, full of hope that the reward had come for the long years of preparation. They set sail on April 15, in a ship called the 10 *Speranza*, with little knowledge of what they might find in Europe.

And so these men, joyfully self-devoted, sailed to their graves and glories in that ship. Since they were alone upon it with no unbelievers to mock their ceremonies, every time the sun went down in ocean, they stood up in a circle on the deck, and "sang for evening prayer a patriotic hymn." ... Old Anzani, type of the proto-martyrs who had given their lives for no meed of fame or thanks in the bitter, stifled years gone by, himself sick to death, joined feebly in the chant with the young generation who were hastening as willing victims to a more conspicuous, but not a more noble, sacrifice. And with the 20 other voices blended the low, rich voice of the deliverer to be—till the song, without an audience, died upon the water's waste.²⁷

The situation, when Garibaldi landed at Nice in June, was complicated but hopeful. In all the States of Italy, popular movements had won constitutions from the rulers, and had compelled them to join, at least in appearance, in the war which Piedmont was waging against Austria. Austria itself was in the throes of revolution. Metternich had fallen, popular clamour in Vienna had extracted a constitution and had led to the flight of the Emperor, Hungary and Bohemia were claiming autonomy, and it seemed as though the Empire could never again be strong enough for 30 oppression. By the famous Five Days of street fighting, Milan had rid itself of the army of Radetzky, which was defending itself in the Quadrilateral against Charles Albert, King of Sardinia. But Radetzky was a master of the art of war, Charles Albert was constitutionally hesitating, and the governments of Central and Southern Italy viewed with alarm the prospect of being overshadowed by a great North Italian kingdom—for throughout the liberated parts of Lombardy and Venetia, a plébiscite demanding annexation to Piedmont had been voted almost unanimously. Radetzky gradually strengthened his forces, and at length defeated the Italians at Custoza on July 25. Charles Albert was compelled to abandon Milan, and almost the

whole of the Austrian provinces were reconquered, with the exception of Venice, where the Republic was proclaimed under the vigorous leadership of Manin. An armistice was concluded in August between Piedmont and Austria, and Charles Albert (except during the brief and disastrous campaign of Novara in the following year) was unable to give further help to the cause of Italian liberty "But", as Mr. Trevelyan remarks, "if Charles Albert was not the father of his country, he was the father of Victor Emmanuel."

Garibaldi, who had been at Milan, endeavoured for a while to keep up the war in the Alps, where Mazzini at first accompanied him bearing a flag inscribed "Dio e Popolo". This attempt proving fruitless, Garibaldi, to whom the authorities gave a very cold welcome, arrived in the Romagna during the ministry of Rossi, and was reluctantly permitted to raise a regiment of volunteers for the defence of Venice. But after Rossi's murder, it was no longer necessary or desirable that he and his legion should leave the Papal States, where attacks were feared from Austria and Naples. It was from France, however, that the blow came. The French republican Government, after some hesitation, decided to throw in its lot with the Catholic Powers, in order to conciliate the clerical vote, and an expedition was despatched under General Oudinot to occupy Rome. On April 27 Garibaldi and his troops entered the city; three days later, Oudinot made his first attack.

Of ultimate victory there was practically no hope, and Mazzini appears to have had little doubt as to the issue. But for the honour of Rome as the future capital, and to provide a memory about which men's desire for liberty could centre, it was rightly decided that the defence, however desperate, must be prolonged to the last possible moment. In this spirit the hopeless struggle was continued during two heroic months, after which the Temporal Power, though reinstated, could only be supported by a foreign garrison, and was doomed to fall as soon as the international situation caused the garrison to be withdrawn.

Oudinot's first attack, on April 30, was made with the utmost carelessness, and directed against a gate which no longer existed. After a hard fight, in which Garibaldi and his soldiers bore the most honourable part, the French were completely defeated, and disabled from further attack until strengthened by reinforcements from France. The Romans made many prisoners, whom they treated with great kindness, and soon set free unconditionally. Oudinot's official report declared that "this affair of April 30 is one of the most brilliant in which the French troops have taken part since our great wars."²⁸

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The French had attacked Rome under the pretence that they were

²⁸ Trevelyan, p. 146

liberating the people from the oppression of a band of terrorists and assassins. The thoroughly popular resistance of April 30 having dispelled this pretence, they adopted another. To keep the Romans quiet until reinforcements could arrive, and until the French general elections had been held, they sent Lesseps on a mission to negotiate terms (so they allowed their envoy to believe) by which the French troops and the Roman Government could avoid further hostilities. Lesseps was quickly won over by the personality of Mazzini, and at last, in an agreement concluded on May 31, conceded almost all that Mazzini asked. Having, however, exceeded his powers, he inserted a clause according to which the treaty required ratification by the French Government. The reinforcements having now arrived, Lesseps on this very day received a curt letter of recall,²⁹ and the next day (June 1) Oudinot denounced the armistice which had been arranged after April 30.

Garibaldi had been engaged meanwhile in the congenial task of harrying the Neapolitan army, which had advanced as far as Frascati and Albano, but retired (as was its wont) when it saw hostile troops approaching. The Roman Commander-in-Chief Roselli, however, treated his enemies with more respect than they deserved, thereby failing to win any notable victory, and leading Garibaldi into grave insubordination of the kind which we are allowed to admire in Nelson. From this expedition, the army only returned on May 31. Next day, Oudinot, while declaring that hostilities might be resumed at once, stated that he would not attack "the place" until Monday, June 4. Nevertheless, in the night of June 2-3 he attacked and captured the villas Pamphilj and Corsini, which gave him the key to Rome. The Italians, relying on his promise, were taken completely by surprise. His defence was that these two villas, being outside the walls, were not part of "the place", nevertheless it seems plain that he intended to mislead the Italians by his studied ambiguity.

The long fight in which, throughout the third of June, the Italians vainly hurled themselves against the Villa Corsini is described by Mr Trevelyan with great power. In spite of reckless courage, the Romans were defeated owing to bad generalship and to the inherent strength of the French position. But though the defence was henceforth hopeless, the defenders were determined to fight on.

Everyone knew that Garibaldi had commanded badly; no one loved him the less, and no one was less eager to fight and die under his orders... He had given his countrymen what the national instinct craved for at that moment more than for victory—honour. It was not tactics but heroism for which Italy was athirst in that year of

²⁹ Johnston, p 290

despair crowned and glorified by faith.³⁰

Because men remembered and told with pride and anguish the story of the uncalculating devotion of those young lives in this hopeless struggle, there grew up, as the years went by, an unconquerable purpose in the whole nation to have their capital: there rose that wild cry of the heart—*O Roma, O Morte!*—so magical even in years of discord and derision, that soon or late the Catholic world was bound to yield to it, as to a will stronger and more lasting even than its own.³¹

Throughout the following weeks the battle raged, and the slow methodical advance of the French continued. At length, on June 30, the final assault was delivered, and the city lay at the mercy of the conqueror. Mazzini, regardless of the fact that the French guns could bombard every part of the city, wished to resort to street-fighting, and was indignant with Garibaldi for declaring this to be useless. The Constituent Assembly resolved that it “ceases from a defence that has become impossible and remains at its post”. Mazzini resigned, but remained in Rome for some time after the entry of the French (which took place on July 3). It had been said that he was a tyrant, ruling an unwilling populace by terror; he remained after his power was gone to prove the untruth of this accusation, and such was his popularity that the French did not venture to arrest him. After about a week, he escaped, and soon returned to the old routine in London. For him, there came no second opportunity, and his life as a practical statesman was ended.

Meanwhile Garibaldi had begun his great retreat. On July 2, to a vast multitude assembled in the Piazza of St. Peter's, he announced in a brief speech his determination not to surrender to the foreigner.

Fortune, who betrays us to-day, will smile on us to-morrow. I am going out from Rome. Let those who wish to continue the war against the stranger, come with me. I offer neither pay, nor quarters, nor provisions; I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death. Let him who loves his country in his heart and not with his lips only, follow me.³²

³⁰ Trevelyan, pp. 190–1

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192

³² *Ibid.*, p. 231 The same speech is given by a clerical historian as follows “I offer you fresh battles and new laurels, but at the price of greater perils and fatigues. Let those follow me who have courage, let those follow me who have faith in the salvation of Italy. We have stained our hands in the blood of France, but we will plunge our arms in that of the Austrians.” O’Clery, *History of the Italian Revolution, First Period*, p. 359–60

About 4,000 of the troops responded to his invitation, and marched out into the night

The hopes which Garibaldi entertained of being able to prolong the war by rousing the rural population of Umbria and Tuscany were speedily disappointed; the peasantry, except in the Romagna, were generally unfriendly, and very many of his followers deserted. Nevertheless he still hoped to be able to join Manin in the defence of Venice. By clever feints and long night marches, he succeeded in eluding the French, Spanish and Neapolitan troops which set out in pursuit of him. At Terni he effected his junction with the regiment of Colonel Forbes, an Englishman, who so despised military attire that he went through the whole campaign and the remainder of the retreat in his ordinary clothes with a white top-hat. After crossing the border into Tuscany, the dwindling column, having escaped its first pursuers, found its route commanded by four Austrian armies, closely pursued and unable to halt, it reached at last (July 31) the little Republic of San Marino. Here, on friendly soil, Garibaldi disbanded his troops, leaving individuals to obtain such terms as they and the San Marinese could extract from the surrounding Austrians. Some were flogged, some imprisoned for long terms, but most gradually escaped

Meanwhile Garibaldi, with about 200 followers and the undaunted Anita, now nearing the time of her confinement, escaped by night through the enemy's lines, and after twenty-two hours' march arrived at the little Adriatic port of Cesenatico, whence they still hoped to be able to reach Venice. After maddening delays, they got to sea; but the moon was full, and they were sighted by the Austrian squadron. Most of their boats were captured, but Garibaldi's and two others succeeded in landing near Comacchio. Anita by this time was dying, but it was impossible to help her while the Austrians were scouring all the country round. At length, after infinite difficulties, they reached a friendly farm-house; and as they were carrying her into it, she died. "Then the noble outward calm of Garibaldi, which had been proof against the thousand dangers, disappointments, and sorrows of the past months, and had fed his fainting followers with courage, all in an instant gave way, and he burst into a flood of prolonged and bitter weeping "³³

But Garibaldi could not long indulge his grief, since his stay endangered not only his own safety, but that of those who harboured him. With only one companion, he set out on a journey full of hair's-breadth scapes, which took him at last to the Mediterranean near Pisa, and thence to Piedmont and safety. Among many incidents of this flight, one is so characteristic that it deserves to be quoted. In an inn at Cerbaja, the two travellers fell into casual conversation with a young Tuscan—as it chanced, a Liberal—to whom

sometlung about them suggested the thought of refugees.

Partly in order to test their politics, he drew a *Val d'Arno* newspaper from his pocket and handed it across the table. Seeing the elder of the two laugh and show his companion the advertisement about Garibaldi and *Leggiero*, he could not refrain from exclaiming, "And where is our Garibaldi now?" "Friend," said the stranger, rising suddenly and advancing to embrace the young man, "Garibaldi is in your arms "³⁴

In spite of such acts of rashness, Garibaldi was never betrayed, and lived to realize his hopes in happier days.

The events of 1848–9, though they brought little immediate gain to Italy, were an essential preparation for subsequent unification. At the outset, there were two main parties; those who, like Gioberti, desired a federation of the existing States, and those who, like Mazzini, desired a single Republic. Both these policies proved impossible. A federation could not be tolerated by Austria, and the existing governments, with the exception of Piedmont, were not prepared to undertake a vigorous war against Austria. Perhaps most of the governments might, in time, have been brought permanently into the position they occupied temporarily in the early months of 1848; but the Papacy could never genuinely take up such a position, because it was primarily international, not an Italian State like the rest. Thus the peculiar position of the Pope made it impossible that the federal policy could ever succeed. At the same time, the authority of the Church was such that it required rare courage to challenge its opposition; and those who possessed such courage were, at that date, mainly republicans. The weakness of their policy, which was tried in 1849, was that it could not be supported by Piedmont, which possessed the only strong Italian army, and that all the Catholic powers were prepared to suppress it by armed intervention. Only one policy remained—the one which ultimately triumphed. Italy must become a monarchy under the King of Sardinia, who, amid the general wreck of royal promises, had remained faithful to the constitution he had granted in 1848. But if this was to be possible, it was necessary that the Papacy should be so discredited that a mere king could attack it; and to bring the Papacy to this point, was a task which could only be performed by revolutionaries. The Roman Republic, led by Mazzini and Garibaldi, undertook this task, and performed it so well that the success of Piedmont was thereafter assured, given the patience to wait for opportunities, and the skill to use them when they came.

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Against the religious zeal which the Italians had defied, they must oppose a moral force, or be beaten in the end. In claiming Rome for themselves they had outraged the Irish, the Spaniards, the Austrians, half France, and many of their own countrymen. Vast spiritual agencies were at work all over the world to keep Italy out of Rome. Peter and Paul, Augustine and Loyola were rising from their graves to withstand Mazzini—the pale, frail Genoese, whose face was scarred with the sorrows of his country; and this shadowy host could call up armed men from the utmost ends of Europe to defend the Pope.³⁵

The greatness of the Eternal City was at once the glory and the misfortune of Italy; the weight of the past oppressed and dwarfed generations of men who lacked the courage and the faith to turn their thoughts towards the future. The first who possessed this courage and this faith were defeated, as the pioneers of a moral revolution always must be. Yet their protest persuaded men that the Papal rule was no longer compatible with the welfare of Italy, and to them belongs the honour of causing the downfall of an institution as noxious as it was venerable. Some, who know only the Italy of today, may be inclined to question whether, after all, the achievement has
20 been worth fighting for. But whoever reads the record of cramped lives, of intellectual and moral degradation, of systematic discouragement of all that was best, which made up the work of the governments from 1815 to 1848, must acknowledge that what has been accomplished has justified a thousandfold the wisdom and the sacrifices of those through whose courage Italy became again a great and free nation.

Reviews of Chatterton-Hill [1907-08]

RUSSELL REVIEWED GEORGE Chatterton-Hill's *Heredity and Selection in Sociology* (published in June 1907) for *The Albany Review* in October 1907 and anonymously for *The Nation* in September 1908. Although now obscure, Chatterton-Hill (1883-1947) in the early decades of the twentieth century was a popular writer in English and German on sociological, philosophical and political issues. He attempted, in arguments similar to those of the more celebrated Benjamin Kidd in *Social Evolution* (1894), to reconcile Christianity and the increasingly fashionable school of eugenics. Chatterton-Hill argued that the civilized part of the world had already passed its evolutionary peak and had started on a rapid biological regression. Only the restoration of religion, preferably Catholicism, as the major force in modern life could reverse this dismal process. His conclusion was that the socially unfit were increasing dramatically, particularly in non-Catholic countries which did not possess the sanctions to arrest, if not stop, degenerative behaviour patterns resulting in suicide, alcoholism and syphilis.

Russell was predictably scornful of Chatterton-Hill's invocation of religion as a "supra-rational" force which, embodied in Catholicism, would allow the civilized world to recover stability as the essential condition for progress. Writing to Lucy Donnelly on 1 July 1907, he remarked that he had

been reading for review a scoundrel named Chatterton Hill. He wants us all to turn Catholic on biological grounds. I have sent reviews of him both to the *Nation* (late *Speaker*) and to the *Albany*, but I doubt whether they will print them, as it was necessary to be rather shocking.

Although Russell was dismissive of much of what Chatterton-Hill wrote in *Heredity and Selection*, he was himself, like so many Edwardian intellectuals and politicians, interested in the practical and moral questions raised by eugenists. In 1904, shortly before Russell wrote these reviews, the controversial biologist Francis Galton had launched a campaign to try to make eugenics a national issue. Galton's beliefs on selective human breeding had been initially advanced in the first edition of *Heredity and Genius* (1869), although he did not coin the term eugenics until 1883.

In Britain, various individuals and groups seized upon aspects of eugenist teachings and attempted to influence social policy according to their respective interpretations of Galton. In the first place, there were the admirers of Kidd who, like

Chatterton-Hill, advocated eugenics to achieve conservative religious and political goals (Although Chatterton-Hill totally disapproved of Kidd's emphasis on altruism in Christianity, he was in broad agreement with him in his rejection of reason and in his respect for religion) Second, there were those, epitomized by Galton's most important popularizer, Karl Pearson, who were uninterested in traditional Christianity and advocated eugenics along positivist lines—a rational religion based on Social Darwinism Conservative social-imperialists tended to follow the ideas of the second group and in many cases also endorsed Kidd's advocacy of religion as a force for maintaining order in society Finally, there were many Progressives who were intrigued with the possibilities of eugenics, even though some of them were apprehensive of the coercive implications of attempting to improve the national stock Despite these reservations, men such as J.A. Hobson and Russell saw indications that some approaches to eugenics could be compatible with, and indeed conducive to, accelerating social processes to attain higher ethical goals All eugenist arguments were given a degree of urgency in national consciousness by the revelations at the time of the South African War that high percentages of possible recruits were ineligible for service owing to physical and mental disabilities

Russell's interest in eugenics preceded not only the Boer War but also the crystallization of the eugenist "schools" around the turn of the century. As early as the fall of 1894, he told Alys that he had "read a lot of Galton which interests me vastly" (20 Sept.) "I was astounded to find him preaching Socialism as a method of keeping up the breed—it is the best argument I know for Socialism" (21 Sept.) On 15 June 1895, he announced that he had "finished Galton, and find him more wonderful than I had expected . He gets a numerical estimate of the contribution of each ancestor to heredity" As a young, impressionable adult Russell gained added inspiration from Galton to live up to his distinguished lineage But Galton's work also contributed to the dread he felt in the mid-1890s of carrying the genes for insanity Russell's opposition to the illiberal Social Darwinist views of Kidd and Pearson and their popularizers seems not to have been extended to Galton

Russell's first and longer review is, in part, a defence of Liberalism and Socialism against what he considers Chatterton-Hill's crude misrepresentations and his acceptance of conflict as inevitable and necessary He agrees with Chatterton-Hill only in believing that the birth-rate had become the main factor in selection His proposal to provide "desirable parents" with state payments to keep them from the expense of bringing up their children while denying such financial assistance to "undesirable" parents indicates that he was prepared to advocate eugenist arguments which went well beyond what most New Liberals would accept Thus, there is an unresolved tension between Russell's egalitarianism and his élitism He developed these views on parents and the state in *Marriage and Morals*, when he advocated that such pecuniary rewards and penalties should be "embodied in the law", even though the "idea of allowing science to interfere with our intimate personal impulses is undoubtedly repugnant" (1929, 213) He justified such interference on the grounds that it would be "much less than that which has been

tolerated for ages on the part of religion " Because "the welfare of posterity" (*ibid*) needs to be protected and improved, possible scientific tyranny must be risked

The copy-texts are *The Albany Review*, n.s. 2 (Oct 1907) 89-98 and *The Nation*, 3 (26 Sept 1908) 918, 920. The anonymous review in the latter is attributed to Russell because of the remark to Lucy Donnelly and because of its similarity to the signed review. In addition, Russell's pocket diary records payment from *The Nation* in October 1908, and there is no more likely writing to be ascribed to him there during the preceding weeks. Neither Russell's reasons for publishing two reviews, nor the cause for the long delay between them is known.

Heredity and Selection in Sociology. By George Chatterton-Hill. London. Adam and Charles Black, 1907. Pp xxx, 571

TO THOSE ENGAGED in the immediate business of politics or philanthropy, it is as disconcerting as it is salutary to be challenged as to the remoter effects of their activities. Of all the effects of social institutions, the effect on the biological quality of the race is probably the most important, and ought, if it could be ascertained, to have the greatest weight in determining what changes we are to advocate. Yet such considerations, owing to their difficulty and remoteness, are not at present among those of which practical men take account. The only use to which Darwinian arguments have hitherto been put is to justify acts of spoliation and rapine against "inferior" races, and this use has discredited such arguments with honest people. But although the Devil can quote Scripture, it does not follow that whoever quotes Scripture is the Devil. And the facts about modern civilized nations are so serious that it has become imperatively necessary to consider them calmly. In bringing the facts to the notice of the public, Mr Chatterton-Hill has done a very useful work, though his practical recommendations are so little borne out by his facts that it is hard to regard them as anything but the expression of unscientific prejudices.

The biological problem among modern human beings is different in many essential respects from anything to be found among plants or animals, or even among men in former times. These differences are so important that, if they are overlooked, arguments based upon analogy with other parts of organic nature are pretty certain to prove misleading. In former times, success in the economic or military struggle usually meant biological success, i.e. the propagation of numerous descendants. For nations defeated in war were largely exterminated, and individuals defeated in competition often starved, while those who were successful in either respect as a rule had large families. But now-a-days exactly the opposite happens. Our conquest of India, for example, has undoubtedly diminished the Indian death-rate and increased the native population, while it has placed Englishmen in a climate which they find unhealthy and where it is difficult for them to bring up children. Similarly in the economic struggle, the poorest sections of society, throughout Western Europe, have the largest families, and this is only partially outweighed by their greater infant mortality. Thus economic and military success, throughout the modern world, are causes of biological failure, i.e. of leaving fewer descendants than are left by the poor and the vanquished. Consequently courage, intelligence, perseverance, foresight and energy are, biologically speaking, disadvantageous to a race or an individual, and these qualities, if selection continues to operate as at pres-

ent, will tend to die out of the human race To avert this consequence—a consequence which appears certain if nothing is done—is plainly a problem of the utmost importance. It may be that its solution will demand some modification of our traditional morality; if so, we must at least consider earnestly whether such modification is possible without real moral deterioration.

Mr. Chatterton-Hill, after a long biological account of heredity and selection among plants and animals, of which the main outcome is that acquired characters are very seldom inherited, proceeds to state the facts on which he bases his pessimistic view of modern civilized societies. In an interesting chapter on suicide, he points out that it is greatly on the increase, and that, on the Continent, it is more prevalent in Protestant than in Catholic countries¹ It increases in good times, and diminishes when times are bad as well as during wars² Insanity, which he considers next, is also, by the statistics, increasing enormously,³ owing chiefly, it would seem, to two causes, alcoholism and syphilis It might be thought that natural selection would in time produce a race which would enjoy immunity from these evils, but this is not the case, since they often do not prevent people from leaving a family of children. The same applies to tuberculosis, in which, though the death-rate for young people has diminished, that for people over thirty-five has increased, owing to the fact that those who would formerly have died young are now kept alive for a number of years Thus the weak and degenerate are increasingly able to leave children, and the race accordingly deteriorates.

Meanwhile the richer classes (which are assumed to be on the whole the better) marry later and have smaller families than formerly, or than is now the case with the poorer classes Figures are quoted by Mr Chatterton-Hill as to the birth-rates in the different quarters of various capitals, arranged according to wealth. It appears that the birth-rate in the poorest quarters is in each case about three times as high as in the richest, with a continual gradation between the two He does not quote figures as to the very remarkable general decline of the birth-rate during the last thirty years or so, nor the facts which show that this decline is mainly due to voluntary limitation of families on the part of the more provident and responsible members of the community. His failure to note the decline in the birth-rate also leads him not to notice, or at least not to mention, a fact which appears among the most civilized nations, and entirely upsets the crude Darwinian argument, namely that they do not, or rather soon will not, tend to increase

¹ This conclusion does not apply to England or Scotland

² So on pp 212-13. The exact opposite is stated on p 233

³ How far this apparent increase may be due to the fact that insanity is now more generally recognized as such and brought to the notice of the authorities, is not discussed, but obviously some deduction ought to be made on this account

in numbers at all, so that the cause of the struggle for existence, which prevails throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms, is ceasing to be operative. The new factor introduced by voluntary limitation of families, which is one of the most important, if not the most important, in the whole problem, is unaccountably ignored by Mr. Chatterton-Hill; and this greatly lessens the value of his statement of the question. For at present, roughly speaking, the better members of Western communities limit their families and the worse do not, thus we have a grave source of evil, produced, and presumably removable, by economic causes.

10 Although, as every one knows, unwillingness to have a large family is mainly due to economic causes, yet it is not to economic causes that Mr. Chatterton-Hill looks for a remedy. The remedy he recommends is that we should all adopt the Roman Catholic faith. Before considering his reasons for this remedy, we may point out that it is precisely the remedy which will be brought about if nothing is done. For at present the birth-rate among Roman Catholics is much higher than among others, and the difference is increasing. If no steps are taken, the population of Western Europe and America will, in all likelihood, become predominantly Roman Catholic within the present century; for in each generation those who abandon this
20 faith or who have never held it tend to die out. This is a new phenomenon which has not yet had time to produce political effects; but the statistics are so remarkable that we can hardly doubt what the result must be.⁴ Thus it seems hardly necessary to write a book advocating what will happen of itself if nothing is done.

That men of science should bring to the attention of laymen the facts of science which bear on general questions is of the utmost importance to the intelligent guidance of the State. But when they pass beyond science we must examine their arguments as closely as if they were ordinary politicians; for we shall usually find that their reasoning ceases to be valid when they
30 desert the region of their special knowledge, and that much of what they believe to be deductions from their science is merely the unconscious embodiment of class or personal bias. In the present case, this caution is very necessary; for what profess to be conclusions based on biology turn out, on examination, to be hasty inferences from doubtful metaphysical and ethical assumptions. These assumptions are made lightly, because the author is not sufficiently familiar with philosophy to know the arguments against them. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Mr. Kidd are his chief philosophical authorities, and he makes no attempt to meet the criticisms to

4 Mr Sidney Webb's very interesting articles in the *Times*, October 11 and 16, 1906, on "Physical Degeneracy or Race Suicide". These articles practically demonstrate that the decline in the birth-rate is mainly due to voluntary limitation of families, and that this cause is inoperative among Roman Catholics

which their views may be subjected. Like Mr Kidd, he assumes that reason can never prompt to any but selfish actions, though he advances no grounds in favour of this view. He holds, apparently, that no man can be led by reason to desire the welfare of the community, and that, therefore, men must be taught some mythology which shall lead them to act for the good of the community under the mistaken impression that they are pursuing their own good. (This is not definitely stated, but it seems to be his meaning.) Such a mythology he calls a "supra-rational principle". He does not tell us what motive is to induce those who, like himself apparently, do not accept this mythology, to spend their time in preaching it; for they, presumably, ¹⁰ must be purely selfish in their actions. If we infer the nature of his "supra-rational principle" from its operations in modern Europe, we shall I think agree that the things it justifies are things which reason condemns. For example, in Belgium the Church (in the main) supports the Congo atrocities, while the atheistical Socialists attack them. In France, if we judged by the unaided light of reason, we might prefer the atheistic defenders of Dreyfus to the religious forgers and perjurers who secured his condemnation. But Mr. Chatterton-Hill, under the guidance of a "supra-rational principle", apparently sees deeper on this question.⁵

Before proceeding to establish the necessity of religion, Mr ²⁰ Chatterton-Hill examines the claims of Liberalism and Socialism. There is the usual chapter on "the bankruptcy of Liberalism", without which no book on Sociology is complete. He examines "whether, firstly, Liberalism has kept the promises made in its name by all its most eminent representatives, and whether, secondly, it is theoretically as far above reproach as one might sometimes be tempted to think" (p. 450). These questions, by their form, recall a Conservative party meeting. What programme has ever fulfilled all its promises, or been theoretically above reproach? These are not the questions which have to be answered when a policy is on its trial; but if they were, how would Catholicism fare? Our author, so far as can be ³⁰ discovered, is not himself a Catholic, and therefore does not think Catholicism "theoretically above reproach". As for its promises, it has promised immortal life in heaven to all the faithful, does Mr Chatterton-Hill believe it has kept this promise?

The author finds that "two fundamental ideas underlie Liberal policy—the rights of the individual as individual, and the unrestricted competition between individuals". Between these two he finds a contradiction. But how long is it since any one has advocated unrestricted competition? He urges, however, that if this is abandoned we are led to Socialism, thus assuming that there is no middle course between unrestricted competition and no competition. The position of modern Liberalism—that com-

⁵ I infer this from his remarks on General André and M. Picquart on p. 412

petition is a useful motive power, but requires to be guided and controlled by the law—is never discussed or examined by our author. His method is to ignore all the limitations which sensible men impose upon the application of principles recognized by them as having exceptions; thus he produces a caricature, of which it is easy to show that it is unworkable. This method is too common with political theorists; but whatever else it may be, it is not scientific.

The objections to Socialism are equally inconclusive. We are told that “the ideal of communism is essentially the resultant of an ideal which is still more fundamental—that of the natural goodness of man.” This assertion certainly finds no support in Marx, whose views on human nature were essentially those of Bentham. That some communists have believed in the natural goodness of man is no doubt true; but it should not be inferred that this belief is essential to communism. In Cromwell’s army democracy was advocated on Scriptural grounds which to us seem merely fantastic; but it does not follow that democracy is a mistake. The fact that a man whom you are refuting has expressed an opinion cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of the truth of that opinion; yet no other evidence is offered by Mr Chatterton-Hill for the opinion that communism requires the natural goodness of man

His principal objection to Socialism, however, is that it would suppress conflict. I shall try to show that, in the only sense in which conflict is essential to biological progress, Socialism of some sort is a condition for its existence in a beneficent form. But the conflict which is essential is merely one which causes the better parents to leave the larger number of descendants, not one which involves a perpetually renewed massacre of the weaker. Conflict of this latter sort, however, independently of any good effects it may have, is regarded by Mr. Chatterton-Hill as a fine and noble thing, which ought to be kept up for its own sake. He says:

If we suppress conflict, we not only suppress the means by which progress is achieved and by which progress alone can be maintained, but we suppress one of the chief outlets for the expansion of life. We restrict the sphere of a life by restricting the sphere of its expansion. We thus render life poorer; we reduce its vitality, and greatly limit its possibilities of evolution.

But this is an ideal which renders life poorer, which reduces its vitality. Is it not the faith of a pessimist, of one whose belief in the value of life is not sufficiently great to tempt him to realise the possibilities of life? For one who believes in life, who believes that life possesses a value, the great object will be to realise the *maximum* amount of life possible.⁶

And a few pages later:

Socialism is, therefore, not the social force for which we are seeking, the force, namely, which is best adapted to increasing the actual tendency to widen the sphere of conflict, while at the same time increasing the value of life By aiming at the restriction of the sphere of conflict, if not at the suppression of all conflict, Socialism reduces the value of life in a corresponding measure ⁷

The "social force for which we are seeking" turns out in the end to be the Catholic faith And this conclusion, we are expected to believe, is that recommended by biological science. But putting aside for a moment the influence of conflict as a selective agency, with which alone biology has any concern, let us consider the non-biological assumptions essential to the above reasoning

It is assumed, to begin with, that no activity is so delightful, or so inherently excellent, as that of causing one's neighbour's death, whether directly by murder, or indirectly by inflicting starvation and disease It is assumed, in the second place, that a man who does not desire such activity must be a pessimist, i.e. that whoever thinks life a good must wish to deprive his neighbour of this good It is assumed, in the third place, that we ought to worship the Author of the Sermon on the Mount, not because He deserves our worship, but because such worship will be a help and an incitement to the business of killing our neighbour, and a prophylactic against our adopting any of the humanitarian fads of that misguided Visionary. The book will doubtless be hailed with acclamation by Christian apologists; I can only hope that they will note the grounds upon which its advocacy of Christianity is based.

To those who do not regard conflict as a good in itself, it is natural to ask whether no means other than conflict exist for effecting that selection which is essential to racial progress. Biology cannot tell us whether conflict is a good in itself or not, but it can (within limits) tell us whether the type of man whom we think good will be selected or eliminated by such and such institutions. And it is plain that our present institutions, both where they encourage competition and where they mitigate it, tend to eliminate the best elements of society, leaving the future to the thriftless, the ignorant and the superstitious. The economic struggle, as we saw, at present has this tendency; hence a mitigation of this struggle, such as Socialism contemplates, will do something to mitigate the evil. But this alone is insufficient. Economic motives at present induce, or soon will induce, all but the poorest or the most reckless to have small families Small families, so long as they do not involve an actual diminution of numbers, are in themselves not an evil

but a good The evil at present is, first, that it is the best people who have small families, secondly, that in some desirable classes—for instance, the middle-classes of France and the United States—the births are apparently insufficient to prevent the stock from dying out The struggle for existence, which has hitherto been Nature's method, was rendered necessary by excessive reproduction, and more or less beneficent by the fact that, on the whole, those who conquered in the struggle were usually preferable on other grounds. But as a method of progress it was objectionable, first, because it was intolerably cruel; secondly, because its selection of the best was by no means infallible. The tapeworm and the microbe are as much a product of natural selection as Shakespeare and Newton But now-a-days, the excessive reproduction which necessitated the struggle for existence is ceasing among civilized men, and the road is therefore open for more humane methods of selection The birth-rate is now the main factor in selection, and the birth-rate is controlled by economic motives. These motives at present lead to a selection of the unfittest (in a non-biological sense); but the only thing needed is an economic organization of society which shall reverse their operation. As a comparatively practicable measure, everything ought to be done to diminish the expense of bringing up children for the more desirable parents. Free education up to any grade, provided the parents reach a certain standard, would do something; free feeding of school-children, provided it were given to all, and not only to the destitute, would also do something But more than this is necessary if the present inverse selection is to be arrested It is necessary that desirable parents should be wholly relieved of the expense of bringing up their children, not only by providing such things as education free, but by a direct payment from the State to the parents. At the same time those who are considered undesirable as parents ought to be in every way encouraged to limit their families as the desirable parents do at present, and no financial help ought to be given to them by the State in bringing up their children. That all this can be done at once, it would be absurd to suppose, but some such plan should be borne in mind, and measures should be judged according as they tend towards this goal or away from it.

The above suggestions may seem to many fantastic and undesirable. But are they not far less undesirable than the suggestions of Mr. Chatterton-Hill? His plan is that we should all join in advocating the Roman Catholic religion, which, as every one knows, few educated men are able to believe, and that the object of our advocacy should be to produce such an excess of population that the nations may be compelled to exterminate each other, in the hopes that the remnant, though sunk in superstition and destitute of those intellectual acquirements which the past five centuries have brought us, may at least be physically strong, exuberant, and full of the lust of battle. Something, it is plain, must be done; but if this were the best possible,

race-extinction would have to be seriously considered as an alternative. It is, however, not the best possible. But if the best is to be done, social reformers must not be misled by biologists into regarding science as their enemy, but must learn to take account of science, however repulsive may be the garb in which it is presented to them. And men of science, too, one may hope, will learn in time to be more scientific, and will cease to use a scaffolding of biology merely to build a shelter for their prejudices.

ALTHOUGH IT IS now nearly half a century since the *Origin of Species* appeared, and although many measures adopted on quite other grounds are recommended by a smattering of "Darwinism", yet biological considerations have not begun to have any real influence upon the actions of statesmen or upon the opinions of those who are active in politics. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the conclusion that no aspect of our institutions is so important, or so urgently in need of consideration, as their effect upon the biological quality of the race. This aspect is that considered
 10 by Mr Chatterton-Hill; and although his practical recommendations appear to us for the most part unsupported by the facts to which he appeals, yet these facts are such as ought to be widely known, and such as no social reformer can safely ignore.

His book begins by a long account of the theory of heredity and natural selection, the main practical outcome of which is to show that, as Weismann has urged, acquired characteristics cannot be inherited. This conclusion, however, is subject to an exception: such acquired characteristics as affect the germ-plasm *will* affect the offspring. Thus disease, or change of climate, though both acquired, may have effects which are inherited. The
 20 extent of this exception, we are given to understand, is inconsiderable; but it remains undetermined, and somewhat mitigates the rigidity of Weismann's theories. Practically, however, we must presumably admit such facts as that an educated man's children do not inherit any greater intelligence than if their father had remained uneducated, and that, broadly, the stock is not improved except by some form of selection.

In his second part, on Social Pathology, the author accumulates his indictment against the institutions of Western Europe, and a very formidable indictment it is. Suicide and insanity are both increasing with alarming rapidity. But when we turn to the political deductions from these facts, our
 30 author shows, so it seems to us, a complete misconception of the problem. In a chapter headed "The Bankruptcy of Liberalism", he shows, as it is not difficult to do, that its two ideals of liberty and free competition are incompatible. Proceeding to Socialism, he contends that it aims at suppressing the struggle for existence, and that such suppression, by preventing the elimination of the unfit, must lower the biological quality of the race. He tells us also, of course, that Socialism postulates the natural goodness of man. He proceeds, like Mr. Kidd, to affirm that unaided reason can only prompt men to selfish actions, though he does not deign to give any grounds for this view. We want, therefore, some means of prompting men to actions
 40 contrary to reason, and this is to be found, for Europeans, in the Catholic faith, though Asiatics should be allowed to retain the religions they have.

Now in all this there seems to us to be an inadequate conception both of

the problem and of its solution. The problem is this: Given that, now-a-days, the more intelligent section of society is less prolific than the less intelligent, how shall we prevent this? To revert to mediaevalism is impossible, this proposal is virtually one for hastening the advent of those very evils which are to be feared if the present régime continues unchecked. But a real solution is possible on other lines. The birth-rate among the better sections of society has declined in recent years because of the voluntary limitation of families, and this in turn is due to the economic disadvantages of a large family. If these disadvantages were removed, the effect would cease with the cause. The problem then is essentially one of economic and social organization. It is not possible for a civilized society to make progress by the destruction of the unfit, but by the opening up of every avenue of opportunity for those who are capable of taking their part in social life.

Memories and Studies [1911]

"MEMORIES AND STUDIES" was a posthumous collection of popular essays and addresses by William James (1842–1910) Russell had met James at the Pearsall Smith house, Friday's Hill, in the early 1890s. Although he disagreed with much of his thought, he had always respected him and had read his works very attentively. Russell's critical assessments had been included only a year earlier in *Philosophical Essays*. This review was published in the university weekly *The Cambridge Review* of 16 November 1911. Russell told Lady Ottoline Morrell on 11 November "This morning I have been writing my review of W James. Quite short, as the book is unimportant" (#252). It did, however, contain the famous essay "The Moral Equivalent of War". The lack of seriousness in the tone of the letter and the review is ironical when viewed retrospectively in the light of Russell's own preoccupation with why men fight. When the First World War broke out, Russell was appalled to witness popular nationalist fervour in the streets of London that confirmed completely James's analysis.

During this and the following days I discovered to my amazement that average men and women were delighted at the prospect of war. I had fondly imagined, what most pacifists contended, that wars were forced upon a reluctant population by despotic and Machiavellian governments (1968, 16)

During the war years, Russell consistently advocated that a safe outlet must be found for man's energies that would otherwise result in aggression. This belief arose primarily from his reaction to the naive and overly optimistic pacifists who disregarded this belligerent aspect of human nature. But he was also indebted in part to James. In *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916), Russell wrote

His statement of the problem could not be bettered, and so far as I know, he is the only writer who has faced the problem adequately. But his solution is not adequate, perhaps no adequate solution is possible (P 95)

The copy-text is *The Cambridge Review*, 33 (16 Nov 1911) 118

THIS BOOK IS a collection of addresses and short articles on several occasions. Some, on American celebrities of varying degrees of fame, are of chiefly local or topical interest. Two on psychical research give William James's final verdict in this matter, based (in part at least) on the maxim that "when a man's pursuit gradually makes his face shine and grow handsome, you may be sure it is a worthy one." This suggests that mankind should be annually inspected by a Government official, selected as an expert in beauty, and having power to send the ugliest ten per cent to prison. It is to 10 be feared that chimney-sweeps, coal-miners and stokers must be incredible villains. There is an amusing essay on Herbert Spencer's autobiography, and a very interesting account of the psychological effects of the San Francisco earthquake. There is an article called "A Pluralistic Mystic", which is really in praise of the worship of Dionysus in his nitrous-oxide incarnation (he has taken advantage of modern science and is quite abreast of the age).

The most delightful part of the book consists of an essay and a speech on war—especially the speech, called "Remarks at the Peace Banquet". Since William James got away alive, one must suppose the other diners practised 20 what they preached. He told the assembled pacifists that "the plain truth is that people *want* war. They want it anyhow, for itself, and apart from each and every possible consequence. It is the final bouquet of life's fireworks" "War is human nature at its uttermost ... It is a sacrament. Society would rot without the mystical blood-payment." "Let the soldiers dream of killing, as the old maids dream of marrying" The companion essay, "On the Moral Equivalent of War", suggests peaceful methods of securing the same moral values. William James did well in insisting on the urgency of this problem, men's energies need an enemy to fight, but all progress demands that the enemy should not be human

Dramatic and Utilitarian Ethics [c. 1911]

WHILE THE TIME and the circumstances surrounding the composition of this unpublished paper are unknown, the reference to J M Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World* (1907) provides some assistance with a date. In a letter written to Lady Ottoline Morrell on 4 June 1911 (#101), Russell mentioned having seen the play the day before. In a letter mailed on 6 July of that year he told her that he had recently been reading Synge's work for the first time (#137). A date prior to the summer of 1911 therefore seems highly unlikely. The paper is a *jeu d'esprit*, having little to do with Russell's serious ethical thought.

Passages in the correspondence with Lady Ottoline show Russell pondering the possible applicability to life of behaviour suitable for the stage. The passage that raises issues most akin to those in "Dramatic and Utilitarian Ethics", albeit without the same urbane detachment, reads

I discovered today, as I was bicycling through Richmond Park, what is my *real* morality, apart from thought-out principles. I was much amused by it. It is, to behave as one might in grand opera or in epic poetry. That is why my violence does not offend me, whereas taking up with a woman for whom I have no passion does offend me. I could behave like Hamlet or Othello or even Macbeth without feeling degraded, but if I behaved like Richard Feverel I should not think myself fit to live. It came to me through thinking of Tristan and Isolde, and of how rapturous it would be to die together like the people in Rosmersholm. I am afraid it is a morality hardly suited to this age. This is only my morality of passion, besides that, I have an ascetic morality of religion, and an intellectual morality of thought. (#416, pmk
15 April 1912)

On an earlier occasion, Russell had assured Lady Ottoline that the flaws in her personality about which she had been so apologetic did not distress him. Like a character in a play, she was to be judged, he felt, by standards inappropriate for ordinary people. He continued

But you know with other people—take people in Shakespeare for instance—that when they are in any way fine they have something infinite which is untouched by this or that imperfection, and is far more important

than all the rest Think how one would have loved Hamlet. If one had only noticed that he was irritable and impatient with bores, one would have been a person of a very limited outlook (#185 [20 Sept. 1911])

The copy-text is the manuscript (RA 220 011260) Folios 3-7 (380.23-381.29), which must have contained the quotations from Voltaire and Shakespeare, are missing These quotations are supplied Internal evidence in the paper and supporting data from Russell's library permit the insertions of these quotations, as is explained in the annotations

PHILosophers in all ages have constructed systems of ethics, but they have done little to examine the desires and preferences out of which their own moral beliefs and those of other people had grown. Since no man would become a philosopher if he were not rather abnormal, the tastes out of which the ethics of philosophers have grown are usually very different from the tastes of average men. It has resulted that many of the most prevalent types of ethics have been practically ignored by philosophers. Of all the schools of modern ethical philosophy, probably the least remote from the man in the street is utilitarianism. Most ordinary men 10 have moments when they would concede that happiness for the world is what should be sought, and that an act should be performed if it is useful. But even the utilitarians fail altogether to touch many of the sources of the plain man's moral judgments, in particular his love of drama, spectacle, and swift decisiveness, his habit of appraising actions rather by their intrinsic aesthetic quality than by the goodness or badness of their effects.

Two passages, one from Voltaire, the other from Shakspeare, will illustrate what I mean. In the first, M. *Micromégas*, the huge man from Sirius, is wading through the Baltic when he becomes aware of a speck at his feet, which is in fact a ship full of philosophers. Although the philosophers are 20 too small to be visible to his eyes, he succeeds, by means of instruments, in hearing their conversation, and a discussion takes place in the following words.

(“O atomes intelligens, dans qui l'Être éternal s'est plu à manifester son adresse et sa puissance, vous devez sans doute goûter des joies bien pures sur votre globe car, ayant si peu de matière et paraissant tout esprit, vous devez passer votre vie à aimer et à penser, c'est la véritable vie des esprits ” . “Savez-vous bien, par exemple, qu'à l'heure que je vous parle il y a cent mille fous de notre espèce, couverts de chapeaux, qui tuent cent mille autres animaux couverts d'un turban, ou qui sont massacrés par eux, et que, presque par toute la terre, c'est ainsi qu'on en use de temps immémorial?” Le Sirien frémit et demanda quel pouvait être le sujet de ces horribles querelles entre de si chétifs animaux. “Il s'agit, dit le philosophe, de quelques tas de boue grands comme votre talon. Ce n'est pas qu'aucun de ces millions d'hommes qui se font égorguer prétende un fétu sur ce tas de boue. Il ne s'agit que de savoir s'il appartiendra à un certain homme qu'on nomme *Sultan*, ou à un autre qu'on nomme, je ne sais pourquoi, *César*. Ni l'un ni l'autre n'a jamais vu ni ne verra jamais le petit coin de terre dont il s'agit, et presque aucun de ces animaux qui s'égorgent mutuellement n'a jamais vu l'animal pour lequel ils s'égorgent

“Ah! malheureux! s'écria le Sirien avec indignation, peut-on con-

cevoir cet excès de rage forcenée? Il me prend envie de faire trois pas, et d'écraser de trois coups de pied toute cette fourmilière d'assassins ridicules — Ne vous en donnez pas la peine, lui répondit-on, ils travaillent assez à leur ruine ” (*Micromégas*, Chap. VII, “Conversation avec les hommes”)

How all occasions do inform against me,
And spur my dull revenge!..

Witness this army of such mass and charge
Led by a delicate and tender prince,
Whose spirit with divine ambition puff'd
Makes mouths at the invisible event,
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune, death and danger dare,
Even for an egg-shell Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honour's at the stake. How stand I then,
That have a father kill'd, a mother stain'd,
Excitements of my reason and my blood,
And let all sleep, while, to my shame, I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men,
That, for a fantasy and trick of fame,
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? O! from this time forth,
My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!

(*Hamlet*, IV.iv))

We have here the exact antithesis of the philosophy of M. *Micromégas*. 30 Instead of loving and thinking, it advocates hating and not thinking. Hamlet urges himself to give up “Thinking too precisely on the event” and exhorts his thoughts to “be bloody or be nothing worth” There can be no doubt that this is a morality which is nearer to the heart of the plain man than that of Voltaire Shakspeare, like Horace, has acquired a reputation for wisdom because, though undoubtedly a great man, his sentiments on every occasion are almost exactly those of the average bourgeois. The worthy philistine who has a son or daughter inspired by a troublesome love of justice or hope of freedom can easily find in Shakspeare some odd tag to show the folly of such youthful aspirations This is the fact to which the 40 literary critics are alluding when they say that he was a man of ripe judgment

and universal sympathy, so large in his vision as to be tolerant of everything. What they mean is that he was tolerant of all the evils which they wish to see perpetuated, and only intolerant of attempts to cure them.

Invective is easy but unprofitable. It is more to the purpose to analyze Shakspeare and the plain man than to abuse them. Why has Shakspeare such an admiration for murder? Brutus, Hamlet, Othello, and Macbeth—who are all murderers—are among the heroes he loves best, though Hamlet has to be forgiven for taking so long to make up his mind. Why has conventional morality, in spite of the fact that it is supposed to condemn murder, taken Shakspeare, the champion of murderer, as the man who has expressed its own beliefs more fully and satisfactorily than any man who ever lived?

The reason is that the average man cares about drama much more than about happiness “Le sage qui passe interrompt mille drames”, says Maeterlinck; this is one reason why the sage is hated. We like to view others externally, as a spectacle, to be applauded if the spectacle is good and hissed if it is bad. As a reflexion from this, vanity makes us desire to afford a good spectacle ourselves. It is much more dramatic to kill one’s enemy than to think it over and let him be. The advantages of being dramatic are set forth in Synge’s *Playboy of the Western World*, they are so great that no one who has imagination and vanity can wholly escape playing the part of the Playboy, or the fate of the Playboy if his dramatic faculty is poor.

The love of the dramatic is not a characteristic produced by civilization; on the contrary, it is strongest in savages, and stronger in the uneducated than in the educated. Among many savage races, a man disappointed in love will actually die of grief; no doubt if he did not he would be despised as a shallow person incapable of any real depth of feeling. If a disciple of Jeremy Bentham were to go to him and say: “Console yourself, my dear fellow; there are many other women in the world, and probably some of them are just as lovable as the incomparable dusky paragon whom you have lost, and besides, there are things you ought to do. your aged mother to feed, your little brother to protect”—if the philosopher were to say all this, he would seem to be counselling dishonour, urging the baser course, presenting a view which would make all life despicable.

It is still the practice among private soldiers, especially in France, to kill the adulterous wife and her paramour. No doubt many of them feel this a moral duty; “it is the cause, it is the cause, my soul”, they say to themselves. If they did otherwise, they would feel that they were failing in what the dramatic situation demanded. A good play in the cinemas, showing a forgiving husband who yet managed to be dramatic, would do a great deal to put an end to the *crime passionel*, but would be forbidden by the Censor as contrary to morals. In the well-to-do classes the practice is dying out, because there are so few whose lives would not be endangered by it; but

when any Sir Galahad does venture upon it, he at once becomes a popular hero. And it is scarcely possible to destroy the admiration for conduct of this kind *merely* by showing that its effects are bad

Love and war are the great outlets for the dramatic instinct, now as in the past. What most people feel about them is still untouched by utilitarian considerations. Whether their effects are good or bad is not, to the ordinary man or woman, the important consideration what matters is the heroic spectacle, and a man who attempts to spoil this by common sense is considered a public enemy.

If we accept as our ethical standard the tendency of conduct to promote or hinder human welfare, however we may define "welfare", we cannot accept the dramatic way of judging actions except when it happens to coincide with the ends which we believe to be good. But it can only do this occasionally and, as it were, by accident. The dramatic view is essentially external. It takes no account of thoughts and feelings except in so far as they issue in actions. When the best feelings, if they were strong enough, would lead a man to do nothing, it is hardly possible to present them so as to satisfy the dramatic instinct. Almost the only case I can think of where this has been done successfully is the story of the woman taken in adultery in the Gospels. A second fault in the dramatic view is that it emphasizes violence in feeling and action, at the expense of wisdom. This leads it, very easily, to cruelty. "My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth" is not a kindly sentiment. A third defect is that it concentrates attention upon those who are the focus of the drama, though the ultimately important effects may be in quite other directions. At the end of *King Lear*, Albany remarks:

... Friends of my soul, you twain
Rule in this realm, and the gor'd state sustain.

We are reminded with a shock that the wars have affected the community, not only Lear and Cordelia, Regan and Goneril. But to show the triviality of the "gor'd state" as compared to the protagonists, Kent replies:

I have a journey, sir, shortly to go;
My master calls me, I must not say no.

The Professor's Guide to Laughter [1912]

FROM THE AUTUMN of 1911 until March 1912, Russell had been intermittently reading the works of the French philosopher, Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and marshalling arguments against his central propositions. Russell frequently expressed his antipathy to Bergson in letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell. For example “He is the antithesis to me—he universalizes the particular soul under the name of *élan vital* and loves instinct Ugh!” (#206, pmk. 3 Oct 1911). In his *Monist* article, “The Philosophy of Bergson” of July 1912, Russell offered his criticisms of Bergson’s major works: *Time and Free Will* (1910), *Matter and Memory* (1911) and *Creative Evolution* (1911).

Russell considered the argument in *Laughter* (1911) to be at odds with Bergson’s general philosophy. In 1926, in “Behaviourism”, Russell gave a jocular account of the incompatibility between *Laughter* and Bergson’s other books:

Bergson, writing for a French public, holds a threat over those whose acts refute him, which is even more terrible than moral condemnation, I mean, the threat of ridicule. He shows that human beings never behave mechanically, and then, in his book on laughter, he argues that what makes us laugh is to see a person behaving mechanically—that is, you are ridiculous when you do something that shows Bergson’s philosophy to be false, and only then (P 150)

He wrote, in one afternoon, his short review of a book he considered “nearly worthless” (to Lady Ottoline, #312, 10 Jan 1912)

Russell’s library contains an unmarked edition of *Le Rire* (1911) and an annotated review copy of *Laughter*. His own index of significant passages, made in preparation for this critique, was inserted in *Laughter*, but no manuscript survives.

The copy-text is *The Cambridge Review*, 33 (18 Jan 1912) 193–4

Laughter, an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic By Henri Bergson Authorized translation, by Cloutesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. London Macmillan and Co., 1911 Pp. viii, 200.

IT HAS LONG been recognized by publishers that everybody desires to be a perfect lady or gentleman (as the case may be); to this fact we owe the constant stream of etiquette-books. But if there is one thing which people desire even more, it is to have a faultless sense of humour. Yet, so far as I know, there is no book called "Jokes without Tears, by Mr McQuedy". This extraordinary lacuna has now been filled. Those to whom laughter has hitherto been an unintelligible vagary, in which one must join, though one could never tell when it would break out, need only study M. Bergson's book to acquire the finest flower of Parisian wit. By observing a very simple formula, they will know infallibly what is funny and what is not; if they sometimes surprise their unlearned friends, they have only to mention their authority in order to silence every doubt.

"The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body", says M. Bergson, "are laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine."

When an elderly gentleman slips on a piece of orange peel and falls, we laugh, because his body follows the laws of dynamics instead of a human purpose. When a man falls from a scaffolding and breaks his neck on the pavement, we presumably laugh even more, since the movement is even more completely mechanical. When the clown makes a bad joke for the first time, we keep our countenance, but at the fifth repetition we smile, and at the tenth we roar with laughter, because we begin to feel him a mere automaton. We laugh at Molière's misers, misanthropists and hypocrites, because they are mere types mechanically dominated by a master impulse. Presumably we laugh at Balzac's characters for the same reason, and presumably we never smile at Falstaff, because he is individual throughout. "Was it for me to kill the heir-apparent? Should I turn upon the true prince?" is not the remark of an automaton; therefore it is tragedy, not comedy as was hitherto supposed.

M. Bergson's general philosophy is largely a protest against the attempt to bind down living things by the fetters of cast-iron formulas. Yet his Latin instinct for order has proved too strong for him, and he has attempted to imprison laughter, the most living of all living things, within a formula which, in spite of his amazing ingenuity, cannot be made to apply to more than a tiny fraction of the jokes that will occur to any reader. Lamb's answer to the man who asked about the prospects of the turnip crop, "I believe it depends upon the crop of legs of mutton", comes under a formula exactly opposite of M. Bergson's: it depends upon assuming something like human purpose in what is really mechanical. No doubt surprise is an

element in laughter; and it is chiefly this element, I think, which makes M. Bergson's instances amusing.

Charles Lamb's humour suggests another criticism. M. Bergson considers that absence of feeling is characteristic of laughter, sympathy, he says, makes the whole world gloomy, whereas the comic makes its appeal to intelligence, pure and simple. This is certainly not true of Lamb. In quite a different way, Hamlet's wit is full of passion, in quiet times, he would have made much fewer jokes.

The truth seems to be that the comic differs with the individual, the country, and the age. Latin wit is different from Teutonic humour, the laughter of the Parisian is different from the laughter of the Londoner. For this reason, it would seem to be impossible to find any such formula as M. Bergson seeks. Every formula treats what is living as if it were mechanical, and is therefore by his own rule itself a fitting object of laughter.

The Place of Science in a Liberal Education [1913]

WHEN BEATRICE AND Sidney Webb were preparing to inaugurate their Fabian weekly, *The New Statesman*, Beatrice invited Russell to submit papers. On 11 December 1912, she wrote

I send you now our latest venture, which may interest you, it is to come out in the spring I hope you will someday be a contributor on your own questions We want to make it representative of the best type of sane collectivism

On 8 April 1913, in the week before the first issue appeared, he submitted what was then called "Science as an Element in Culture" (renamed, presumably in 1917, "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education") Knowing that the paper was so long as to require publication in two parts, he made contingency plans to send it to *The Contemporary Review* if *The New Statesman* was reluctant to divide it However, the essay was accepted for appearance in the 24 May and the 31 May issues The view Russell advanced was one that the Webbs could readily appreciate Their London School of Economics had long been dedicated to aims similar to those Russell insisted on here especially the application of scientific methods to other disciplines and the importance of cooperation rather than competition in scholarship.

This paper was probably inspired by the reading in physics Russell had begun in November and December of 1912 He had undertaken to bring himself up-to-date on the subject as background for his work on what he then called "Matter" This interest evolved into the 1913 manuscript for *Theory of Knowledge* and then the Lowell lectures in March 1914, published later that year as *Our Knowledge of the External World* Early in November 1912, he expressed to Lady Ottoline his tentative plans for "Matter"

The whole method by which I am attacking the question is a new thing in philosophy, and I believe is the beginning of a really scientific philosophy, in which some things will be known and others frankly unknown, instead of any number of rival cocksure theories, all groundless. (#624, pmk 5 Nov. 1912)

The letters to Lady Ottoline show that some of the views applied in the paper to science as a whole arose from his reading about physics. Russell had "just been reading about Henri Becquerel, who discovered radio-activity" (Since he was concerned in this paper to make a general statement, he does not draw on this particular example.) This reading validated Russell's belief that achievements in science were usually the result of greater scholarly cooperation than in the arts. Since three other members in Becquerel's family worked in much the same field of study, it was possible to say that his discovery was the "outcome of nearly 100 years of patient experiment" (#637, 15 Nov 1912). In science, "each man can build on what others have done, and so in the end a marvellous edifice is reared" (*ibid*)

As with mathematics, Russell was attracted to physics because its abstractness demands an objectivity to which the humanities are generally less conducive. "I don't think the proper study of mankind is man—on the contrary, mankind seem to me greatest when they forget man" (#640, pmk 18 Nov 1912). Although the differences between the sciences and the arts were stressed in the letters to Lady Ottoline as much as in this paper, there was also the same insistence in both that science had much to teach other disciplines. Russell's readings in physics sharpened "a habit of mind" (#642, pmk. 21 Nov 1912) that was invaluable for problem solving. So important did he consider scientific method that he assessed for Lady Ottoline his own achievement as a philosopher by claiming that his main contribution was the application of a scientific method to philosophy. "It is what Galileo did in physics—its value is independent of the truth or falsehood of the particular results one arrives at. It satisfies me as a way of spending one's life" (#793, pmk 1 June 1913).

The arguments Russell advanced reflect his lifelong concern about education. Russell moved from a preoccupation with the abstract value of various disciplines (already seen in "On History", 5 and "The Study of Mathematics", 6) to an increasing interest in method. This change of emphasis is apparent in his later books on education and in the experimental school, Beacon Hill, founded in 1927.

The paper was reprinted as "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education" in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). It has often appeared in anthologies under that title. The original title echoed the title for Thomas Henry Huxley's famous address "Science and Culture". Huxley had argued that scientists could be educated in a special way without the usual emphasis on classics. Russell extended the argument to students for whom science was but an "element" in their education. The more prosaic title may represent Russell's turn to concrete interests in the wartime Reconstruction movement which placed particular emphasis on better and wider education, such as the Fisher Education Act of 1918 attempted to accomplish. When Constance Malleison expressed admiration for the title article in *Mysticism and Logic*, Russell replied by saying that she might also enjoy "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education". It was, he thought then, written better than any of the others in the collection.

Russell's comment implies that the paper can be profitably read alongside the companion pieces in his collection of essays. Indeed, the interconnectedness of the

papers is demonstrated forcefully by the fact that the same passage was originally used in both "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education" and "Mysticism and Logic" (10, 176 38–177 6) Of the technical papers in *Mysticism and Logic*, the strongest connection is to "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" Various papers within Part II of the present volume also invite comparison and contrast. The change from the idealization of the past to the preoccupation with the future, and the movement from the uniqueness of the humanities presented in "On History" to this argument for interaction among disciplines are noteworthy Russell's statement on the issue can also be set beside his later formulations of the problem and those by Whitehead (*Science and the Modern World*, 1925) and C P Snow (*The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, 1959)

The copy-text is the 1918 *Mysticism and Logic* version No manuscript survives. The variants between the copy-text and *The New Statesman*, 1 (24 and 31 May 1913) 202–4, 234–6 are given in the textual notes

SCIENCE, TO THE ordinary reader of newspapers, is represented by a varying selection of sensational triumphs, such as wireless telegraphy and aeroplanes, radio-activity and the marvels of modern alchemy. It is not of this aspect of science that I wish to speak. Science, in this aspect, consists of detached up-to-date fragments, interesting only until they are replaced by something newer and more up-to-date, displaying nothing of the systems of patiently constructed knowledge out of which, almost as a casual incident, have come the practically useful results which interest the man in the street. The increased command over the forces of nature which is derived from science is undoubtedly an amply sufficient reason for encouraging scientific research, but this reason has been so often urged and is so easily appreciated that other reasons, to my mind quite as important, are apt to be overlooked. It is with these other reasons, especially with the intrinsic value of a scientific habit of mind in forming our outlook on the world, that I shall be concerned in what follows.

The instance of wireless telegraphy will serve to illustrate the difference between the two points of view. Almost all the serious intellectual labour required for the possibility of this invention is due to three men—Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz. In alternating layers of experiment and theory these three men built up the modern theory of electromagnetism, and demonstrated the identity of light with electromagnetic waves. The system which they discovered is one of profound intellectual interest, bringing together and unifying an endless variety of apparently detached phenomena, and displaying a cumulative mental power which cannot but afford delight to every generous spirit. The mechanical details which remained to be adjusted in order to utilize their discoveries for a practical system of telegraphy demanded, no doubt, very considerable ingenuity, but had not that broad sweep and that universality which could give them intrinsic interest as an object of disinterested contemplation.

From the point of view of training the mind, of giving that well-informed, impersonal outlook which constitutes culture in the good sense of this much-misused word, it seems to be generally held indisputable that a literary education is superior to one based on science. Even the warmest advocates of science are apt to rest their claims on the contention that culture ought to be sacrificed to utility. Those men of science who respect culture, when they associate with men learned in the classics, are apt to admit, not merely politely, but sincerely, a certain inferiority on their side, compensated doubtless by the services which science renders to humanity, but none the less real. And so long as this attitude exists among men of science, it tends to verify itself—the intrinsically valuable aspects of science tend to be sacrificed to the merely useful, and little attempt is made to

preserve that leisurely, systematic survey by which the finer quality of mind is formed and nourished.

But even if there be, in present fact, any such inferiority as is supposed in the educational value of science, this is, I believe, not the fault of science itself, but the fault of the spirit in which science is taught. If its full possibilities were realized by those who teach it, I believe that its capacity of producing those habits of mind which constitute the highest mental excellence would be at least as great as that of literature, and more particularly of Greek and Latin literature. In saying this I have no wish whatever to disparage a classical education. I have not myself enjoyed its benefits, and my knowledge of Greek and Latin authors is derived almost wholly from translations. But I am firmly persuaded that the Greeks fully deserve all the admiration that is bestowed upon them, and that it is a very great and serious loss to be unacquainted with their writings. It is not by attacking them, but by drawing attention to neglected excellences in science, that I wish to conduct my argument.

One defect, however, does seem inherent in a purely classical education—namely, a too exclusive emphasis on the past. By the study of what is absolutely ended and can never be renewed, a habit of criticism towards the present and the future is engendered. The qualities in which the present excels are qualities to which the study of the past does not direct attention, and to which, therefore, the student of Greek civilization may easily become blind. In what is new and growing there is apt to be something crude, insolent, even a little vulgar, which is shocking to the man of sensitive taste; quivering from the rough contact, he retires to the trim gardens of a polished past, forgetting that they were reclaimed from the wilderness by men as rough and earth-soiled as those from whom he shrinks in his own day. The habit of being unable to recognize merit until it is dead is too apt to be the result of a purely bookish life, and a culture based wholly on the past will seldom be able to pierce through everyday surroundings to the essential splendour of contemporary things, or to the hope of still greater splendour in the future.

My eyes saw not the men of old;
And now their age away has rolled
I weep—to think I shall not see
The heroes of posterity

So says the Chinese poet; but such impartiality is rare in the more pugnacious atmosphere of the West, where the champions of past and future fight a never-ending battle, instead of combining to seek out the merits of both.

This consideration, which militates not only against the exclusive study of the classics, but against every form of culture which has become static,

traditional, and academic, leads inevitably to the fundamental question. What is the true end of education? But before attempting to answer this question it will be well to define the sense in which we are to use the word "education". For this purpose I shall distinguish the sense in which I mean to use it from two others, both perfectly legitimate, the one broader and the other narrower than the sense in which I mean to use the word

In the broader sense, education will include not only what we learn through instruction, but all that we learn through personal experience—the formation of character through the education of life. Of this aspect of education, vitally important as it is, I will say nothing, since its consideration would introduce topics quite foreign to the question with which we are concerned.

In the narrower sense, education may be confined to instruction, the imparting of definite information on various subjects, because such information, in and for itself, is useful in daily life. Elementary education—reading, writing, and arithmetic—is almost wholly of this kind. But instruction, necessary as it is, does not *per se* constitute education in the sense in which I wish to consider it.

Education, in the sense in which I mean it, may be defined as *the formation, by means of instruction, of certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life and the world*. It remains to ask ourselves, what mental habits, and what sort of outlook, can be hoped for as the result of instruction? When we have answered this question we can attempt to decide what science has to contribute to the formation of the habits and outlook which we desire.

Our whole life is built about a certain number—not a very small number—of primary instincts and impulses. Only what is in some way connected with these instincts and impulses appears to us desirable or important; there is no faculty, whether "reason" or "virtue" or whatever it may be called, that can take our active life and our hopes and fears outside the region controlled by these first movers of all desire. Each of them is like a queen-bee, aided by a hive of workers gathering honey; but when the queen is gone the workers languish and die, and the cells remain empty of their expected sweetness. So with each primary impulse in civilized man: it is surrounded and protected by a busy swarm of attendant derivative desires, which store up in its service whatever honey the surrounding world affords. But if the queen-impulse dies, the death-dealing influence, though retarded a little by habit, spreads slowly through all the subsidiary impulses, and a whole tract of life becomes inexplicably colourless. What was formerly full of zest, and so obviously worth doing that it raised no questions, has now grown dreary and purposeless with a sense of disillusion we inquire the meaning of life, and decide, perhaps, that all is vanity. The search for an outside meaning that can *compel* an inner response must always be disappointed: all "meaning" must be at bottom related to our primary desires,

and when they are extinct no miracle can restore to the world the value which they reflected upon it.

The purpose of education, therefore, cannot be to create any primary impulse which is lacking in the uneducated; the purpose can only be to enlarge the scope of those that human nature provides, by increasing the number and variety of attendant thoughts, and by showing where the most permanent satisfaction is to be found. Under the impulse of a Calvinistic horror of the "natural man", this obvious truth has been too often misconceived in the training of the young; "nature" has been falsely regarded as excluding all that is best in what is natural, and the endeavour to teach virtue ¹⁰ has led to the production of stunted and contorted hypocrites instead of full-grown human beings. From such mistakes in education a better psychology or a kinder heart is beginning to preserve the present generation; we need, therefore, waste no more words on the theory that the purpose of education is to thwart or eradicate nature.

But although nature must supply the initial force of desire, nature is not, in the civilized man, the spasmodic, fragmentary, and yet violent set of impulses that it is in the savage. Each impulse has its constitutional ministry of thought and knowledge and reflection, through which possible conflicts of impulses are foreseen, and temporary impulses are controlled by the ²⁰ unifying impulse which may be called wisdom. In this way education destroys the crudity of instinct, and increases through knowledge the wealth and variety of the individual's contacts with the outside world, making him no longer an isolated fighting unit, but a citizen of the universe, embracing distant countries, remote regions of space, and vast stretches of past and future within the circle of his interests. It is this simultaneous softening in the insistence of desire and enlargement of its scope that is the chief moral end of education.

Closely connected with this moral end is the more purely intellectual aim of education, the endeavour to make us see and imagine the world in an ³⁰ objective manner, as far as possible as it is in itself, and not merely through the distorting medium of personal desire. The complete attainment of such an objective view is no doubt an ideal, indefinitely approachable, but not actually and fully realizable. Education, considered as a process of forming our mental habits and our outlook on the world, is to be judged successful in proportion as its outcome approximates to this ideal; in proportion, that is to say, as it gives us a true view of our place in society, of the relation of the whole human society to its non-human environment, and of the nature of the non-human world as it is in itself apart from our desires and interests. If this standard is admitted, we can return to the consideration of science, ⁴⁰ inquiring how far science contributes to such an aim, and whether it is in any respect superior to its rivals in educational practice.

II

Two opposite and at first sight conflicting merits belong to science as against literature and art. The one, which is not inherently necessary, but is certainly true at the present day, is hopefulness as to the future of human achievement, and in particular as to the useful work that may be accomplished by any intelligent student. This merit and the cheerful outlook which it engenders prevent what might otherwise be the depressing effect of another aspect of science, to my mind also a merit, and perhaps its greatest merit—I mean the irrelevance of human passions and of the whole subjective apparatus where scientific truth is concerned. Each of these reasons for preferring the study of science requires some amplification. Let us begin with the first.

In the study of literature or art our attention is perpetually riveted upon the past: the men of Greece or of the Renaissance did better than any men do now; the triumphs of former ages, so far from facilitating fresh triumphs in our own age, actually increase the difficulty of fresh triumphs by rendering originality harder of attainment, not only is artistic achievement not cumulative, but it seems even to depend upon a certain freshness and naïveté of impulse and vision which civilization tends to destroy. Hence comes, to those who have been nourished on the literary and artistic productions of former ages, a certain peevishness and undue fastidiousness towards the present, from which there seems no escape except into the deliberate vandalism which ignores tradition and in the search after originality achieves only the eccentric. But in such vandalism there is none of the simplicity and spontaneity out of which great art springs: theory is still the canker in its core, and insincerity destroys the advantages of a merely pretended ignorance.

The despair thus arising from an education which suggests no pre-eminent mental activity except that of artistic creation is wholly absent from an education which gives the knowledge of scientific method. The discovery of scientific method, except in pure mathematics, is a thing of yesterday; speaking broadly, we may say that it dates from Galileo. Yet already it has transformed the world, and its success proceeds with ever-accelerating velocity. In science men have discovered an activity of the very highest value in which they are no longer, as in art, dependent for progress upon the appearance of continually greater genius, for in science the successors stand upon the shoulders of their predecessors, where one man of supreme genius has invented a method, a thousand lesser men can apply it. No transcendent ability is required in order to make useful discoveries in science; the edifice of science needs its masons, bricklayers, and common labourers as well as its foremen, master-builders, and architects. In art nothing worth doing can be done without genius; in science even a very moderate capacity can contri-

bute to a supreme achievement.

In science the man of real genius is the man who invents a new method. The notable discoveries are often made by his successors, who can apply the method with fresh vigour, unimpaired by the previous labour of perfecting it; but the mental calibre of the thought required for their work, however brilliant, is not so great as that required by the first inventor of the method. There are in science immense numbers of different methods, appropriate to different classes of problems, but over and above them all, there is something not easily definable, which may be called *the* method of science. It was formerly customary to identify this with the inductive method, and to associate it with the name of Bacon. But the true inductive method was not discovered by Bacon, and the true method of science is something which includes deduction as much as induction, logic and mathematics as much as botany and geology. I shall not attempt the difficult task of stating what the scientific method is, but I will try to indicate the temper of mind out of which the scientific method grows, which is the second of the two merits that were mentioned above as belonging to a scientific education.

The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thing so simple, so obvious, so seemingly trivial, that the mention of it may almost excite derision. The kernel of the scientific outlook is the refusal to regard our own desires, 20 tastes, and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world. Stated thus baldly, this may seem no more than a trite truism. But to remember it consistently in matters arousing our passionate partisanship is by no means easy, especially where the available evidence is uncertain and inconclusive. A few illustrations will make this clear.

Aristotle, I understand, considered that the stars must move in circles because the circle is the most perfect curve. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he allowed himself to decide a question of fact by an appeal to aesthetico-moral considerations. In such a case it is at once obvious to us that this appeal was unjustifiable. We know now how to ascertain as a fact 30 the way in which the heavenly bodies move, and we know that they do not move in circles, or even in accurate ellipses, or in any other kind of simply describable curve. This may be painful to a certain hankering after simplicity of pattern in the universe, but we know that in astronomy such feelings are irrelevant. Easy as this knowledge seems now, we owe it to the courage and insight of the first inventors of scientific method, and more especially of Galileo.

We may take as another illustration Malthus's doctrine of population. This illustration is all the better for the fact that his actual doctrine is now known to be largely erroneous. It is not his conclusions that are valuable, 40 but the temper and method of his inquiry. As every one knows, it was to him that Darwin owed an essential part of his theory of natural selection, and this was only possible because Malthus's outlook was truly scientific. His

great merit lies in considering man not as the object of praise or blame, but as a part of nature, a thing with a certain characteristic behaviour from which certain consequences must follow. If the behaviour is not quite what Malthus supposed, if the consequences are not quite what he inferred, that may falsify his conclusions, but does not impair the value of his method. The objections which were made when his doctrine was new—that it was horrible and depressing, that people ought not to act as he said they did, and so on—were all such as implied an unscientific attitude of mind; as against all of them, his calm determination to treat man as a natural phenomenon
10 marks an important advance over the reformers of the eighteenth century and the Revolution.

Under the influence of Darwinism the scientific attitude towards man has now become fairly common, and is to some people quite natural, though to most it is still a difficult and artificial intellectual contortion. There is, however, one study which is as yet almost wholly untouched by the scientific spirit—I mean the study of philosophy. Philosophers and the public imagine that the scientific spirit must pervade pages that bristle with allusions to ions, germ-plasms and the eyes of shell-fish. But as the devil can quote Scripture, so the philosopher can quote science. The scientific spirit is
20 not an affair of quotation, of externally acquired information, any more than manners are an affair of the etiquette-book. The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interests of the desire to know—it involves suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and the whole subjective emotional life, until we become subdued to the material, able to see it frankly, without preconceptions, without bias, without any wish except to see it as it is, and without any belief that what it is must be determined by some relation, positive or negative, to what we should like it to be, or to what we can easily imagine it to be.

Now in philosophy this attitude of mind has not as yet been achieved. A
30 certain self-absorption, not personal, but human, has marked almost all attempts to conceive the universe as a whole. Mind, or some aspect of it—thought or will or sentience—has been regarded as the pattern after which the universe is to be conceived, for no better reason, at bottom, than that such a universe would not seem strange, and would give us the cosy feeling that every place is like home. To conceive the universe as essentially progressive or essentially deteriorating, for example, is to give to our hopes and fears a cosmic importance which *may*, of course, be justified, but which we have as yet no reason to suppose justified. Until we have learnt to think of it in ethically neutral terms, we have not arrived at a scientific attitude in
40 philosophy; and until we have arrived at such an attitude, it is hardly to be hoped that philosophy will achieve any solid results.

I have spoken so far largely of the negative aspect of the scientific spirit, but it is from the positive aspect that its value is derived. The instinct of

constructiveness, which is one of the chief incentives to artistic creation, can find in scientific systems a satisfaction more massive than any epic poem. Disinterested curiosity, which is the source of almost all intellectual effort, finds with astonished delight that science can unveil secrets which might well have seemed for ever undiscoverable. The desire for a larger life and wider interests, for an escape from private circumstances, and even from the whole recurring human cycle of birth and death, is fulfilled by the impersonal cosmic outlook of science as by nothing else. To all these must be added, as contributing to the happiness of the man of science, the admiration of splendid achievement, and the consciousness of inestimable utility to 10 the human race. A life devoted to science is therefore a happy life, and its happiness is derived from the very best sources that are open to dwellers on this troubled and passionate planet.

The Ordination Service [1913-14]

LATE IN MARCH of 1913, Russell's friend the Rev F. A. Simpson, Chaplain of Trinity College, spoke out against the practice of requiring an ordinand to declare "unfeigned" belief in the Bible. Simpson was concerned that the scrupulous candidates who could not in conscience make this categorical assertion of faith would be lost to the Church, while those who did might be guilty of hypocrisy. At first, Russell did not find himself personally interested by the problem, although he did admire Simpson's courage for raising it. To Lady Ottoline Morrell, he wrote, "I don't feel the abolition of this or that test will set the Church right. The whole idea of a profession which pretends to superior holiness seems to me wrong" (#749, pmk 20 April 1913). By the time Simpson's sermon was published as *Ambassadors in Bonds* (May 1913), the growing agitation had commanded Russell's attention. He was prepared to involve himself in this relatively insignificant question even though much larger issues of divorce, social problems and the relation of Church to State preoccupied Anglicans and their opponents in this period. Although the controversy was over a minor issue, it has some importance because it opens Russell's public battle with organized religion.

On 15 May 1913 Russell summarized the responses to Simpson's work for Lady Ottoline:

The replies he gets are of three kinds: first the fine old fogeys, who say it must be *very* rare for people not to believe every word of the Bible, and that such freaks can't be provided for; second those who say that of course no one for a moment supposes that the "belief" is to be understood literally, and that there is no reason to alter it because it deceives no one, third those who say yes no doubt it would be well to alter it, but so much else wants doing that it seems queer to make such a fuss about this one point. He gives me these letters to read and they confirm my worst prejudices. (#776, pmk 15 May 1913)

In October, seventeen Examining Chaplains proposed in a letter to *The Church Times* that the ordinands be required instead to declare that the Scriptures are inspired by God. This alternative to the assertion of unfeigned belief seemed absurd to Russell. In his mind, the proposal was tantamount to saying "that what no one can believe is divinely inspired", as he noted to Lady Ottoline (#912, pmk 14 Nov

1913). He wrote "The Proposed Change in the Ordination Service" for *The Cambridge Magazine* of 22 November to ask that the phrasing of the question be reconsidered.

In the next issue of *The Cambridge Magazine*, there were seven letters—in his words to Lady Ottoline, mostly from "parsonic bigwigs" (#925, pmk 1 Dec. 1913). While Russell claimed that his stance had gained him "notoriety" (#924, pmk 29 Nov 1913), he also expressed surprise that the written opposition from the clergy was not more vehement. "I think, in view of their answers, the letter has done real good", he reported to Lady Ottoline. He formulated a reply for the 6 December issue. At that time two more letters appeared, but Russell decided against responding to them. Fearing that the debate would "degenerate into a wrangle" (4 Jan 1914), Russell had told C K Ogden, the founder and editor of *The Cambridge Magazine*, that he would refrain also from commenting on Professor Gwatkin's reply of 17 January 1914 (Henry Melville Gwatkin [1844–1916] was Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History). But Russell was persuaded by Ogden to write "Inspiration" for the 31 January issue. This letter was shortened at Russell's request by the omission of the last paragraph in an effort to avoid "a continuance of the controversy" (to Ogden, pmk 25 Jan.). Professor Gwatkin was allowed to have the last word; his answer was printed immediately following "Inspiration".

The interchange between Professor Gwatkin and Russell focused on the famous controversy over *Essays and Reviews*. Published in 1860, this work, mainly by Anglican priests, had aroused vehement opposition from orthodox Christians who considered it to be heretical. Two of its authors, Rowland Williams and Henry Bristow Wilson, were prosecuted in the Court of Arches for denying the inspiration of the Bible. They were found guilty and suspended for one year, but their sentence was reversed in 1864 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The case is cited by Professor Gwatkin to show that the Church of England was less stringent in its demands on its clergy than Russell had alleged. In "The Ordination Service: Mr Russell's Reply", this case is said to be irrelevant. In "Inspiration: Professor Gwatkin Replies", passages are cited from the Dean of Arches to show that the Church does not believe that all parts of the Bible were divinely inspired. The question asked at the ordination, Gwatkin concluded, should be interpreted as referring generally to Scripture rather than to every detail. Gwatkin's answer to "Inspiration" (31 Jan 1914) again insisted that Russell had interpreted the ordination question more literally than its authors had intended and that he had misinterpreted the *Essays and Reviews* judgment. For Gwatkin's letters, see Appendix X.

Russell found himself invigorated by the theological controversies of the day. "The row with the parsons ... [has] cheered me wonderfully", he told Lady Ottoline (#928, pmk 3 Dec 1913). From late 1912, he had followed with some interest the related discussion about whether the university should award degrees in Divinity to scholars who were not intending to become Anglican clergymen, or even to Dissenters. When a decision was reached in the spring of 1913 that allowed the conferring of degrees in such cases, Russell was pleased at so reasonable a solution. And he had

derived amusement from the fact that he could, if he wished, set about to become a Doctor of Divinity (to Lady Ottoline, #644, pmk 22 Nov. 1912)

The copy-texts are the *The Cambridge Magazine* articles for all except "Inspiration" which survives in manuscript in Ogden's papers "The Proposed Change in the Ordination Service" was published in 3 (22 Nov 1913) 173; "Mr Russell's Reply", 3 (6 Dec 1913). 229, 231; and "Inspiration", 3 (31 Jan. 1914) 300

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE CAMBRIDGE MAGAZINE"

SIR,—A letter from seventeen Examining Chaplains in this University appeared in the *Church Times* for October 31st, which raises an issue interesting not only to Churchmen, but to all who desire an improvement in the national standard of honesty. As every one knows, the existing service for the ordination of deacons contains the following question and answer:

"*The Bishop.* Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?"

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"*Answer.* I do believe them."

Every educated person knows that, except in a very few instances, this answer is a lie. A small number of clergymen have expressed the opinion that a public and solemn falsehood ought not to be demanded of those who wish to enter a profession supposed to be specially concerned in upholding the moral standard. While carefully repudiating this extreme view (though not of course in set terms), the signatories to the letter in the *Church Times* propose, as a concession to the weaker brethren, that a change should be made in the question, in order to meet the scruples which they recognize but do not share

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But what is the change which they propose? It is, that the Bishop shall ask

"Do you believe in the Holy Scriptures as given by inspiration of God?"

I cannot think that those who drew up this form of question can have realized the implications of their own suggestion. It must be remembered that the change is to be made for the sake of those who do not believe the whole of the Scriptures. Yet these very men are to be asked to say that what they do not believe is given by Divine inspiration. The only men, therefore, who will be admitted by the new formula and not by the old will be those who believe that falsehoods may be divinely inspired. Except for the authority of the Examining Chaplains, I should not have supposed that these were a large class among *ordinandi*.

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It may, of course, be said that the word "all" does not occur in the proposed question. But anywhere except in a clerical formula such a question would be unhesitatingly regarded as implying "all". And it is a natural (though no doubt an erroneous) supposition, that the formula is intended to suggest "all", while yet leaving a controversial loophole. If not, the question should be: "Do you believe in parts of the Holy Scriptures as given by inspiration of God?" Such a question, which would make explicit the limitations in what is required, would, I imagine, be at once rejected by the signatories. Either, therefore, the question is intended to deceive some, and

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to be understood by others in a non-natural sense, or else it must be supposed to apply to the whole of the Bible. But, I would ask, does any one of the signatories believe that such a passage as Genesis xix is "given by inspiration of God"?

It may seem that the question is a purely domestic one for the Church, with which no outsider ought to concern himself. But those within the Church, for the most part, have completely ceased to understand the effect which is produced on ordinary people by their forced interpretations and by their amazing reluctance to abandon formulas now universally disbelieved.

10 It is not only that this practice excludes from the Church most young men who do not fall below the average level of intellectual honesty, but that it tends to degrade those whom it does not exclude. Hypocrisy and indifference to truth are our national defects, and it is regrettable that so large and unimportant a body as the Church should devote its influence to increasing and justifying them. Now, when a change is being proposed, something might be done to remove this reproach. Is it too late to hope that a better form of question will be found?

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Trinity College,
20 November 16th, 1913

39b Mr. Russell's Reply [1913]

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE CAMBRIDGE MAGAZINE"

SIR,—The letters on the Ordination Service in your last issue call for a brief reply, though on the whole they concede so much that my reply need not be very controversial. Canon Foakes-Jackson, I am happy to find, is in agreement both as to the old question and as to the new one; Principal Tait is in agreement as to the new one, and Professor Barnes as to the old one. Only two points seem to demand discussion in my reply: the first concerns the interpretation of ecclesiastical formularies, while the 30 second concerns Professor Gwatkin's allusion to the *Essays and Reviews* case.

"It is educated opinion within the Church itself," says Professor Bethune-Baker, "rather than uneducated opinion within, or unsympathetic criticism from without, that is entitled to say what is the intention and the meaning with which ancient formularies are used at any given moment", and he adds that I understand the new question "in a sense clearly repudiated in the letter itself". It is perfectly true that in the letter itself the proposed declaration was said to be interpreted by the signatories in a way which, to my mind, is not the natural way. But whatever may be said for

strained interpretations of ancient forms which cannot be changed without difficulty, there can surely be nothing whatever to be said for introducing an innovation which still requires explanations that strike the plain man (no doubt erroneously) as sophistical. It is difficult for "educated opinion within the Church" to realize fully the impression produced by elaborate arguments to show that words do not mean what they seem to mean, and it is for this reason that a statement from outside seemed desirable.

But, I would ask, what are the reasons which lead the Church to cling to formularies which *seem* to mean much more than (we are assured) they do mean? I am quite at a loss to discover any *good* reasons. One motive, I ¹⁰ suppose, is to avoid scandal among the uneducated and the conservative, who do not know or acknowledge the necessity for the process of explaining away. The Dean of Canterbury, writing in *The Record* of November 14th, maintains that an affirmative answer, both to the old question and to the new one, is inconsistent with the results of modern criticism as regards the Pentateuch, and declares, in regard to those who accept these results, that "it is not surprising, and is a matter for sincere congratulation, that the unsophisticated minds of young men shrink from a solemn declaration of such belief" as is affirmed either in the old formula or in the new one. Thus the retention of such formulas, with an esoteric non-natural interpretation, ²⁰ serves to hide the progress of thought, to mask important differences of opinion, and to deceive the mass of believers who are ignorant of the results of Biblical criticism. This is one result—can it be a desired result?—of the retention of formularies whose plain meaning is no longer accepted.

Another motive, I suppose, is to produce an appearance of historic continuity where in fact there has been a grave departure from traditional beliefs. The theological opinions of leading ecclesiastics now are extraordinarily different from what they were a hundred or even fifty years ago, and this is wholly a matter for rejoicing. Why should the very real progress which has taken place be obscured by the desire to retain and re-interpret ³⁰ obsolete forms of words? I cannot imagine any motive except a shrinking from explicit acknowledgement of the magnitude of the change. But progress is surely not a matter to be retarded by concealment—it is rather a matter to be proclaimed and so accelerated. For this reason, if there must be formularies at all, it is surely better that they should be changed often and readily, rather than that they should be retained as a clog upon the always tardy and difficult advance towards a more humane and liberal outlook.

There remains a question of history, raised by Professor Gwatkin "The courts", he says, "have explicitly decided (*Essays and Reviews* cases, 1864) that the Church of England makes no such demands as he imagines." On ⁴⁰ this point Professor Gwatkin's memory seems to have played him false. A report of the judgment of the Privy Council will be found in the *Annual Register* for 1864 (*Chronicle*, pp. 241–246). The case was an appeal by two

of the contributors to *Essays and Reviews* against a decree of suspension for one year *ab officio et beneficio* for having maintained doctrines contrary to the teaching of the Church of England. The charges which concern us were the seventh article against Dr. Williams, accusing him of maintaining that the Bible is not the word of God or the rule of faith, and the eighth article against Mr. Wilson, setting forth that he "declared and affirmed, in effect, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were not written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and that they were not necessarily at all, and certainly not in parts, the word of God." Both were acquitted, not on the ground that such opinions as they were accused of could be tolerated, but on the ground that it was not clear that they held such opinions. Thus the judgment has no bearing on the question whether it is permissible to maintain that there are parts of the Bible which are not the word of God

The judgment is irrelevant to our question for another reason. The judgment lays down that "the articles [of accusation] must specify the doctrines of the Church which such opinions or teaching of the clerk are alleged to contravene", and the particular Articles of Religion or portions of the Formularies which contain such doctrines: and again, "Our province is .. to ascertain the true construction of those Articles of Religion and 20 Formularies referred to in each charge"; and later. "We are confined by the article of charge to the consideration of these materials." In each case the Articles and Formularies in question are enumerated, and in each case the question and answer in the Ordination of Deacons is not included. Thus nothing in the judgment has any bearing on the meaning of this question and answer.

The judgment is thus doubly inadequate to the use which Professor Gwatkin makes of it: first, because the acquittal was on a question of fact, not of doctrine; secondly, because the question in the Ordination Service was not included in the materials to which the Court repeatedly declared 30 itself to be confined.

The acquittal, even thus limited, was not unanimous. Two members of the Court dissented; these two were the Archbishops of Canterbury and York.

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Trinity College,
2nd December, 1913.

39c Inspiration [1914]

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW"

SIR,—I regret the delay in replying to Professor Gwatkin's letter of a fortnight ago. It is due to the difficulties and perils of a voyage of discovery in the University Library. Brooke's *Six Judgments* has remained below my horizon, but I have sighted "Brodrick and Freemantle", and find that Professor Gwatkin's references are to the judgment of the Dean of Arches, against which, on the question of the inspiration of Scripture, there was an appeal resulting in the Privy Council judgment from which I quoted. The Deacon's declaration was *not* in evidence before the 10 Privy Council; and its judgment, which, on this point, superseded that of the Dean of Arches, was altogether more cautious than his.

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Clio, A Muse [1913]

IN A LETTER to Lady Ottoline Morrell, Russell offered a more pointed assessment of G. M. Trevelyan's book than that given in his review

I have been reading George Trevelyan's Essays called "Clio a Muse" The first, on history, is very good—there is a really fine passage about Charles I's Cavaliers in St John's garden at Oxford The rest of the volume is tiresome. There is one which I find sympathetic, on John Woolman, whom alas you don't like There is a nice story of Carlyle, listening to some people saying "political theories make no difference to practice" After a time of silence he growled out "There was once a man called Rousseau He printed a book of political theories, and the nobles of that land laughed But the next edition was bound in their skins" (#917, 22 Nov. 1913)

Russell's respect for Trevelyan's view of history voiced in this letter, and in the published review, is heard again in "My Recollections of George Trevelyan" (1956). Russell singled out the essay "Clio, a Muse" for praise: "I cannot forbear from saying what very great pleasure and interest I have derived from his books, and how profoundly I agree with the point of view expressed in his essay 'Clio, A Muse'" (1956a, fol. 3). He reiterated there his admiration for Trevelyan's belief that history must be written in a way that permits the approach of non-historians as well as specialists Trevelyan's "scrupulous adherence to fact" also received notice

Trevelyan had rehearsed the argument for the essay "Clio, A Muse" in "The Latest View of History", a paper that appeared in *The Independent Review* in 1903. He had wished then to inaugurate a controversy about the proper function of the discipline Russell's paper "On History" (5), written in tandem with "The Latest View of History", was his contribution to the discussion.

The copy-text is the article in *The Cambridge Review*, 35 (4 Dec 1913) 189–90

THIS VOLUME CONSISTS of a collection of essays, some new, some reprinted. The first, which gives its title to the volume, is an eloquent and ably-written plea for "literary" history as against the "scientific" school. The facts of history, as Mr. Trevelyan points out, are too complex and too much subject to individual accidents to be capable of a truly scientific treatment, at any rate for many ages to come. Moreover, since they are not of direct practical utility, knowledge of them by a few experts has not ¹⁰ that importance that belongs to a technical knowledge of the sciences. "The value of history", he decides, "is not scientific. Its true value is educational. It can educate the minds of men by causing them to reflect on the past." And in order to perform this function, it must be so written as to interest those who are not historians; it must have the amplitude of treatment and the splendour of style that belong to the older historians, and these the "scientific" school would reject as things of little worth. In a passage of rare beauty, Mr. Trevelyan illustrates his own doctrine by a description of the gardens of St. John's at Oxford in the last days of King Charles's Cavaliers, before their world was destroyed for ever by the transitory might of Crom- ²⁰ well's Ironsides.

In spite of agreement with the main thesis of this truly admirable essay, it is possible, however, to entertain respectful doubts on certain minor points. Perhaps hardly enough justice is done to the patient discoveries of those who, following the "scientific" impulse, have made it possible to know the truth about the past as it could not be known through the historians of a less laborious school. To ascertain the truth is not enough for a historian: he must also make it living, and fill it with some breath of passion and imagination out of the surplus of his own vital force. But history which is not true, however splendidly written, has an essential lack. Carlyle's *French Revolution* ³⁰ would have had value of a wholly different order if he had made some approach to accuracy in such central questions as the character of Mirabeau.

Perhaps also Mr. Trevelyan does not quite realize that the difficulty of writing good history is not a difficulty in the learning of history for a Tripos or School, and that his arguments in favour of literary history might be used as arguments against the specialized study of history by the young. For in such study, if it is serious, the "dry-as-dust" aspects of history will inevitably, perhaps rightly, be brought to the fore.

The essay on history is followed by one on walking. As a historian, Mr. ⁴⁰ Trevelyan gains immensely from his practice of walking over the regions he describes; if Carlyle had had the same habit, his description of Naseby

would have been more satisfactory to FitzGerald, and his digestion more satisfactory to himself. But the profane may question whether walking quite deserves the tone of almost religious solemnity in which it is spoken of in this essay, and whether it is an example of the Providential ordering of the world that Oxford and Cambridge were placed at exactly the right distance from London for a comfortable day's walk.

The following essays—on George Meredith, on Poetry and Rebellion, on John Woolman, and on the Middle Marches, all contain interesting matter, but do not quite attain the level of the first essay. The last, called "If 10 Napoleon Had Won the Battle of Waterloo", was a prize essay for the *Westminster*. It is highly ingenious and very amusing, but it would be a pity to spoil its points by an attempt at summarizing.

Appendices

Appendix I

Press Clippings of Russell's Free Trade Speeches [1904]

FROM JANUARY THROUGH March 1904 Russell gave at least thirteen and perhaps as many as twenty-two public talks on free trade. Discussing these speeches is far more difficult than Russell's articles since no texts have yet been found and the texts may no longer exist. Moreover, because he was not a Cabinet Minister or even an MP he received very little newspaper coverage.

The most important announcement concerning his plan to give a number of speeches was on 6 January 1904 in *The Daily News*, the leading Radical newspaper in Britain. The projected six lectures were to be given at the New Reform Club—the haven of “advanced” Liberals who opposed Liberal Imperialist support of the Boer War. These six talks were probably written out in full since *The Daily News* report of 13 February notes that Alys read out Russell’s speech in his absence.

By consulting his engagement diary for 1904 one can be almost certain that he also gave talks on three successive Mondays at Chelsea, probably at the Borough Hall, 1 February, 8 February and 15 February, all at 8:30 p.m. As well the engagement diary reveals a similar pattern of three successive Thursday talks at Paddington, on 4 February, 11 February and 18 February, all again at 8:30 p.m. and probably at the Town Hall. In a letter to Lucy Donnelly on 28 February, Russell writes of lecturing the night before on the fiscal question in Deptford to “the local Branch of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers” at a public house. This reference, noted in his pocket diary as “Sat. 27 (Feb) Deptford”, leads to the speculation that other cryptic entries may have indicated places and times for talks on free trade. For example, he may have spoken at the Free Trade Union which he visited on 16 February at 2:30 p.m. His reference in the Donnelly letter that “In a fortnight I shall have done with fiscal things” gives credibility to the assumption he spoke on three successive Fridays, 26 February, and 4, 11 March (after his New Reform Club lectures were over) at 8:30 p.m. at a place designated in his diary inscrutably as “B.H.” He may also have spoken on the fiscal question at Islington on 26 January at 3:30 p.m., at Barford on 30 January, at Newnham College, Cambridge on 13 February, at Marlow on 22 February at 7:30 p.m. and somewhere in Cambridge on 2 March at 3 p.m. In summary, he without doubt gave thirteen talks, probably at least seventeen and perhaps as many as twenty-two.

I.1 "Announcement" *Daily News* (London), 6 Jan. 1904, p. 16

THE FIRST LECTURES of the newly-organized Free Trade Educational Committee, to which we refer in another column, will be delivered by the Hon Bertrand Russell, beginning on Friday, January 15th, at 6 p m , at the New Reform Club, 10, Adelphi-terrace, Strand. Tickets of admission, for which no charge is made, will be sent on application to Miss Pretious, hon secretary, at the above address, together with a full syllabus of these lectures

The lecturer, who is the brother and heir of Earl Russell, of agnostic, Radical, automobile, and other fame, is probably the deepest thinker at present standing next-door to a peerage. He has held a Fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished undergraduate career, and has published works on philosophy, geometry, mathematics, and politics His "Principles of Mathematics" appeared last year

I.2 "Summary" *Daily News* (London), 13 Feb. 1904, p. 10.

"DUMPING" ON THE COLONIES

AT THE REFORM Club, Adelphi, last night, the Hon Mrs Bertrand Russell read a paper by her husband on preferential tariffs

In the course of this he said that if Mr Chamberlain took the same view about Free Trade when he went on his tour to the Colonies as he did now he would have to talk to the Colonists somewhat in the following strain "Gentlemen,—We in England, awakened at last from our Cobdenite nightmare, have discovered that imports of manufactures are the greatest curse a nation can endure We therefore, having learned to think Imperially, and having equal regard for all parts of his Majesty's dominions, except India, South Africa, and other places, invite you, the self-governing Colonies, to take the burden of unemployment and starvation upon yourselves, in order that we may practise upon you the dumping which we are no longer going to tolerate from foreigners."

Mr Chamberlain's proposals, Mr Russell contended, would lead to disruption of the Empire, the enmity of foreign nations, and the risk of a league of all the Powers that desired England's overthrow.

Appendix II

Comments on Sociological Papers [1904–05]

THE TWO PAPERS to which Russell responded with these uncharacteristically terse written communications were presented to the Sociological Society in London. This group was formed in 1904 to bring together a full range of opinion about the scope and purpose of sociology. Members of the Society's council under the chairmanship of Sir E. W. Brabrook included G. P. Gooch, L. T. Hobhouse, J. A. Hobson, Benjamin Kidd, H. J. Mackinder, J. M. Robertson, Rollo Russell and Graham Wallas. Meetings consisted of a formal paper or papers to which the audience responded. Both the paper and the responses were published in *Sociological Papers* together with written communications.

"On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy" is an abstract of two papers, one by Emile Durkheim and one by Victor V. Branford, the honorary secretary. Like all the papers read during the spring and summer of 1904, they were included in *Sociological Papers*, 1 (1905) along with the discussions and the written responses they inspired. Durkheim and Branford called for a change of methodology from speculation to observation and for the integration of specialized areas within sociology.

Francis Galton's papers "Restrictions in Marriage" and "Studies in National Eugenics" were read with fine tuning on Valentine's Day, 14 February 1905 during the Society's second session (*Sociological Papers*, 2 [1906]). To answer the complaint that the imposition of restrictions on marriage for eugenic reasons would be regarded as a severe infringement of freedom, Galton showed that some limits have always been enforced by society. In "Studies in National Eugenics", he tabulated the problems in most urgent need of investigation. Since 1895, when Russell read *Heredity and Genius* (1869), he had been fascinated by Galton's ideas.

The major reason for soliciting Russell's opinion on these two papers was the desire to add prestige and range to the Society. Although he was interested in the boundaries of philosophical investigation (as these overlapped with other disciplines) and in eugenics, the issues in the papers were not ones with which his name was publicly associated at the time. The curtiness of Russell's replies may indicate some doubts about the stature of sociology as a fledgling discipline, or indeed about this Society—composed, as it was, largely of "wealthy amateurs with careers elsewhere, academic deviants, or very old men" (Abrams 1968, 103).

The copy-texts are the entries in *Sociological Papers*.

II.1 *Sociological Papers*, 1 (1905): 244.

From The Hon Bertrand Russell

(*Author of "Principles of Mathematics", &c*)

THE ONLY POINT on which I distinctly disagree is the statement that "a controlling science of sociology is, as Comte shows, a necessary postulate of science itself " To my mind, this view involves a confounding of origin and validity

II.2 *Sociological Papers*, 2 (1906) 47

THE HON. BERTRAND Russell, who wrote —"I have read Mr Galton's two papers in abstract with much interest, and agree entirely with the view that marriage customs might be modified in a eugenic direction "

Appendix III

Press Clippings on the Wimbledon By-Election [1907]

THIS COLUMN APPEARED in *The Morning Post* on 9 May 1907. From the extensive newspaper coverage devoted to the election, this account provides a useful example because many of the events and controversies are mentioned.

III.I "Incidents in the Wimbledon Contest". *The Morning Post* (London), 9 May 1907, p. 5

NOW THAT THE true state of affairs is thoroughly appreciated there are signs of increased interest in the Wimbledon election. The nominations took place yesterday, and next Tuesday the voters in this wide constituency will have to decide between Mr Chaplin, the Unionist candidate, and Mr Bertrand Russell, the nominee of the National Union of Women's Suffragist Societies. The Liberal Party feared a straight fight, but the Unionists place no weight on the decision arrived at by the executive of that party to take no "official" part in the contest, for they know full well that the Liberals are working heart and soul for Mr. Russell. In addition many hundreds of ladies from other parts of the country have been imported for the purpose of canvassing on behalf of Mr Chaplin's opponent, and they are exerting the most strenuous efforts. The Unionist organization is doing excellent work, but to further combat the onslaught Mr Whitford, the Conservative agent, will be glad to hear, at Mr Chaplin's Central Committee Rooms, 29, Broadway, Wimbledon, of ladies and others who are willing to canvass on behalf of Mr Chaplin and to assist in refuting the misleading statements made by Mr Russell's supporters. Two bills posted yesterday show the straits to which the Suffragists are put. One sets forth that "Every vote given to a Tory means a vote in favour of dear food," and the other calls on "Wimbledon electors to follow Sleaford and reject the man who wants to tax your children's food." There is nothing about female suffrage, but, as Mr Chaplin said yesterday to a representative of the *Morning Post*,

they are devoting themselves again to one of the old frauds by which the last General Election was won. They are accusing me of a desire to tax food so as to make it dear to their children. A more outrageous charge never was made against anyone in the world. Nothing would induce me to support a policy which could injure the position of the children of this country or the families of the working class by adding to the cost of their living or increasing the burden of their lives, and unless I am profoundly mistaken in my views of the effect of the policy of Colonial Preference the very opposite is the result that we may anticipate. Once that policy is thoroughly established, so illimitable are the resources of Canada and other countries that in all human probability, as far as it is safe to prophesy anything, their food is likely to be cheaper than it has ever been before.

After a busy morning in the borough from which the constituency takes its name Mr Chaplin attended the Purley Horse Show and distributed the prizes, and in the evening he spoke at Beddington. Mr Russell and his friends were also fully occupied, no fewer than three meetings being held last night on the outskirts of the division.

THE NOMINATIONS

Twenty-two nomination papers were handed in on behalf of Mr Chaplin, eighteen being from the occupation polling districts and four from the freeholders having qualifications in the South London polling districts of the constituency One Wimbledon paper was signed entirely by working men, including some labourers and road-sweepers Mr Chaplin was the first of the two candidates to appear before the Returning Officer, who sat at the Town Hall, Wimbledon, and he was accompanied by Sir Joseph Lawrence, Mr Whitford, his election agent, and Mr. Archer, a sub-agent whose work is concerned chiefly with the out-voters. The papers were signed by prominent Unionists in every part of the division, including Wimbledon itself, Merton, Mitcham, Wallington, Purley, Whyteleafe, Carshalton, Warlingham, Caterham Valley, Coulsdon, and Sanderstead. On behalf of Mr Russell, who was accompanied on his visit to the Town Hall by Mr. Massey, the ex-Liberal agent and the director of affairs for the Suffragists in this contest, six papers were handed in, but they contained no names of any prominence

THE INJURY TO MRS RUSSELL

Mrs Russell, who is working very hard in furthering her husband's candidature, fortunately was not seriously injured by the ruffian who on Tuesday evening threw an egg which struck her on the forehead The disgraceful act has disgusted the Unionists quite as much as their political opponents, and it is particularly gratifying to them to know that Mrs Russell is not, as was first feared might be the case, prevented from continuing her electioneering work. When a representative of the *Morning Post* called at the Suffragists' Central Committee Room early yesterday morning he found Mrs. Russell busily engaged She smilingly informed him that the egg was a fresh one, and that, while she was startled for the moment, she felt no ill effects beyond a slight swelling on the forehead Mr Chaplin took the first possible opportunity of showing his regret at the incident Sir Joseph Lawrence personally informed Mrs Russell of the disgust felt by Mr Chaplin and all his supporters that such an act should have been perpetrated, and his own willingness to offer a substantial reward for the apprehension of the offender Mrs. Russell thanked Sir Joseph for this expression and said she was fully assured that all parties in the division deplored such a proceeding She had no doubt the egg was meant for her husband, who was seated by her side in the motor-car, but "it skimmed his nose and caught me on the forehead " Not content with asking Sir Joseph Lawrence to call personally at Mr. Russell's Committee-room, Mr Chaplin stated to our representative that he could not find words to express his regret that such an act could have been possible, and he also sent the following letter

Dear Mr Russell,—I have heard with deep regret of the outrage upon Mrs Russell on the 7th instant, and I have already expressed my views upon it to

the Press. Permit me to say to you how sorry I am that anything of the kind should have occurred or been possible in Wimbledon. Allow me to assure you that whatever influence I possess will be exercised so as to prevent, if possible, any recurrence of an incident which no one regrets more profoundly than myself. I hope with all my heart that what I have heard is true that no serious mischief has resulted from it to Mrs Russell.—I am, yours very truly, Henry Chaplin

Mr. Russell replied as follows

Dear Mr Chaplin,—Please accept my thanks for your letter of regret, which I have duly received. I do not, of course, need your assurance to know that you would be the first to regret and discourage such incidents. I am happy to say that no serious mischief to my wife has resulted —Yours very truly, Bertrand Russell

Appendix IV

Meeting at Cambridge [1907]

AT THE QUARTERLY meeting of the Council of NUWSS held at Cambridge on 9 July 1907, Russell proposed a resolution and spoke about his recent experiences in Wimbledon His speech was included in a summary of the meeting reported in the *Women's Franchise* for 11 June 1907 Russell's motion carried by a large majority

IV ("Meeting at Cambridge"). *Women's Franchise*, 11 July 1907,
p. 22.

THE HON. BERTRAND Russell proposed "That this meeting calls upon the Government to take steps to introduce a measure early next Session to remove the disqualification of sex in regard to the Parliamentary Franchise "

He said the question had become very pressing, and was one which a great democratic Government, such as the present Government professed itself to be, should take up. It was quite time the Government should listen to the demands of women who wanted the Suffrage To effect that, they must be in a position to offer them advantage if they took it up, and disadvantage if they did not. Otherwise their claims would be put aside for other things, which more clamorous groups urged upon them If they were to be in that position, it was vitally necessary that they should be strong throughout the country, they should be energetic, and they should be numerous in advocating the Suffrage, and they should not give the candidates who were not in favour of the Suffrage the same support they were prepared to give to those who were If men would reflect more upon the subject, if they would not allow their first prejudices to overcome them, they would realize that the relation of co-operation was better than the relation of dominion, and when that relation of dominion was an unwilling one it should not be the part of any one with any generosity in his nature to insist upon retaining that dominion against the will of the other party

Referring to the Suffragist fight at Wimbledon, Mr Russell said it was undertaken chiefly as propagandist work They thought so pronounced an opponent of the Suffrage as Mr Chaplin ought not to be allowed to be elected without any protest whatever There was nothing like an election for bringing home facts to people who would not otherwise be reached At first people laughed, but at every meeting a change came over them They began to see that the Suffrage was a serious question, and that to laugh at it did not prove one a serious person (Applause) Fighting an election was an extremely effective method of propaganda, and one in which they would do better and better every time they adopted it After a time their opponents in the Wimbledon election laid their heads together, and indulged in the unusual exercise of thinking (Laughter.) As a result they produced a poster of a man who said to his wife, "No, thanks, my dear, you go home and mind the baby, and leave politics to me." (Applause)

"I thought that would be just about the intellectual level of those here to-night who are opposing it," said Mr Russell He went on to say that, in answer to the poster, they pointed out to the electors that if they wished to mind the baby they must see that the causes of infant mortality—such as bad milk and insanitation—were seriously dealt with. An enormous number of infant lives were sacrificed quite unnecessarily, and it was essential that women should have votes if these things were to be prevented They were in the last phase of the fight, and victory could not be long delayed (Applause)

The Chairman, in thanking Mr Russell for his speech spoke of his splendid fight at Wimbledon, and mentioned, for the benefit of those who were only impressed by figures, that the supporters of the movement had to find 1,500*l* with which to fight the election, and they did so with the greatest possible ease. (Applause.)

Appendix v

Deputation to Mr. Asquith [1908]

WOMEN'S FRANCHISE for 6 February 1908 reported Russell's participation in the deputation to Asquith on 30 January to urge the extension of the franchise to women. Other speakers included Millicent Fawcett, who introduced the deputation, and Walter McLaren, a Liberal who in 1888 had been a member of the first parliamentary committee to advocate women's suffrage. Asquith replied by expressing doubt that his government would be prepared to take the initiative for the requested reform. Instead, the onus rested with the members of the NUWSS to "satisfy the country that the majority of women are in favour of it" and to convince "the male electorate that it is expedient not only in the interests of women, but in the still larger and wider interests of society as a whole."

v "Deputation to Mr Asquith" *Women's Franchise*, 6 Feb 1908, p 364

MR BERTRAND RUSSELL said the present position was a painful dilemma to those who, like himself, were in equal measure Liberals and Suffragists, and who were Suffragists because they were Liberals. As Mr Asquith had himself said, the task of Liberalism was to complete the enfranchisement of the people, and to complete that enfranchisement they felt that it was necessary that the present strong and growing demand of women should be recognized. The House of Commons as at present elected represented an oligarchy just as truly as did the House of Lords. All over the country a large proportion of women were coming to the conclusion that they could no longer work for a Government which did not recognize their right to vote. Some would merely abstain, but an increasing number had decided either to devote themselves to the Labour party or to simply oppose whatever Government was in power. They earnestly hoped that the Liberal party would take this matter into consideration, and that the Government, before the present Parliament came to an end, would introduce a measure for giving the franchise to women on the same terms as men. They asked it not only in the interests of women but in the interests of Liberalism.

Appendix VI

A Protest from the Voteless [1910]

RUSSELL'S LETTER WAS published in *The Common Cause* for 28 April 1910. It was written in support of a suggestion made in a letter by Dora Edgell titled "A Protest from the Voteless" (21 April 1910). Her idea was that candidates would pay attention to the number of potential votes they were missing if placards saying "Not Able to Vote" were redistributed for prominent display on the property of each woman concerned.

VI "A Protest from the Voteless" *The Common Cause*, 2 (28 April 1910) 43.

TO THE EDITOR "THE COMMON CAUSE"

MADAM,—The suggestion of your correspondent, Dora Edgell, in this week's *Common Cause*, entitled "A Protest from the Voteless", appears to me deserving of all possible support. A great effect could be produced by a placard bearing some such words as—

NOT ABLE TO VOTE

Paupers, Lunatics, Criminals, and

WOMEN HAVE NO VOTE

I hope the N U will consider the suggestion in time for the next election.—Yours,

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

Bagley Wood, Oxford,

April 21, 1910

Appendix VII

Women's Suffrage [1911]

THIS OUTLINE WAS included along with a page of similar sketchiness about Persia in letter #277a, postmarked 3 December 1911 to Lady Ottoline Morrell. When she commented that the notes on Persia were "much the most vivid" of the two subjects (5–6 Dec.), Russell replied.

Yes, Persia was more alive in my remarks, because I am bored to extinction by Women's Suffrage—there is nothing new about it and the old weary round has lost its power to move me—but I still think it just as important as I did (7 Dec.)

In spite of the unfinished state of this outline, it is worth attention as the only source of information—aside from private letters—for Russell's thinking on women's suffrage after 1910. Its purpose is not known as there are no speeches to likely audiences recorded in the pocket diary (RA 240.107507) at the time and no allusions to planned articles on the topic in the letters.

The copy-text is the manuscript (RA REC ACQ. 449)

VII "Women's Suffrage".

I PRESENT SITUATION

(1) ASQUITH HAS STATED that he intends next year to introduce and carry through House of Commons a Bill for practically manhood suffrage, and to accept any Women's Suffrage Amendment that the House carries, whether wide or narrow. (2) Lloyd George and other Cabinet Ministers have agreed (apparently) to advocate an Amendment conferring votes on (a) women who now have the municipal vote (b) wives of voters Lloyd George is undertaking a campaign in favour of Women's Suffrage (3) The Government has promised facilities for the Conciliation Bill, which gives votes to women occupiers, but if the Amendment to the Reform Bill is carried, this promise will lapse

II THEORY

Same as democracy (1) No unrepresented class is treated fairly Grievances of women (2) Without political responsibility people's education is incomplete, their character is likely to be less serious and their outlook more limited than if they had a voice in public affairs (3) Good relations between classes or individuals are *equal* relations, where neither has power over the other One-sided power generates arrogance on one side and resentment on the other

Appendix VIII

Persia [1911]

IN A LETTER to Lady Ottoline written on 5 or 6 December 1911 (#277a), Russell enclosed the following outline of his views on British foreign policy towards Persia. The outline is not printed as a separate paper because it is part of a letter and hence does not have an identity of its own. Russell was prompted to write this expression of his own views on the question because he had learned that Philip Morrell was going to speak in Parliament on British policy. Earlier, on 3 or 4 December, he had written Lady Ottoline

I saw Philip had given notice of a question about Persia. The truth is Grey had been singularly outwitted by men cleverer than he is. It is disastrous for Persia and ourselves and the world. (#276)

Russell's outline is important for several reasons, not the least because, however slight, it presents his only extant if embryonic essay on foreign policy up to the outbreak of war. Like many Radicals, Russell took a particular interest in Persia and, indeed, was in contact with the Persia Committee, a pressure group that attempted to influence the British government to support the cause of constitutionalism in that country. Thus Russell's interest arose from the fact that unlike many other minor states, Persia was viewed by Radicals as lacking the cruelty associated with Turkey and the cultural backwardness of Morocco. The fact that Persian Liberals had extracted a constitutional assembly in 1906 from the despotic Shah seemed to justify Radical hopes. Idealistically, the Radicals aspired to see Persian constitutionalism as a model for political experiments in the East. Russell's fulmination represented a common Radical repugnance to the British foreign policy of coming to terms with Russia by the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 (and not 1908 as Russell speculates). Alarmed by Russian weakness in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) and the subsequent 1905 Revolution, British foreign-policy makers, led by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, negotiated the Entente out of fear that Germany had upset the balance of power in Europe. Radicals despised any British diplomatic agreement with despotic Tsarist Russia.

The events to which Russell refers in his December 1911 letters were the previous attempts by the Russians to control Persian affairs through the despotically inclined Shah in 1908 whom Liberals had deposed in 1909. Soon after, in June 1909, Persian constitutionalists appointed an American advisor, Morgan Shuster, to reform the

state's finances so that the country would be free from the Russian loans of 1900 and 1901. Fearful that Shuster would succeed, Russia precipitated the crisis of 1911. Russian troops were already threatening the northern border of Persia when the Tsarist government's two ultimatums of November were issued demanding the dismissal of Shuster.

Russell's fears that constitutional government would be extinguished in Persia were confirmed by the expulsion of the parliament in Teheran on 24 December 1911 by Persian anti-Liberals with the support of 12,000 Russian troops. Russian domination of Persia continued until World War I despite the pleas of Radicals to convince the British government to act against Russia. Russell's allusion to Germany reveals a common Radical belief in 1911–12, namely that Germany should invest heavily in Persia and thereby act as a powerful counterpoise against the machination of Russian and British diplomats. The draconian remedy proposed for Grey, whom since their days as Coefficients in 1902 and particularly since 1905, Russell had deeply distrusted, reveals his conspiratorial view of European history. This view also anticipates Russell's long indictment of Grey (and almost the whole Liberal Cabinet) in *The Policy of the Entente, 1904–1914* (1915).

VIII "Persia".

BY THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY (1908?) PERSIA WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS, A RUSSIAN SPHERE IN THE NORTH, A BRITISH SPHERE IN THE SOUTH, AND A NEUTRAL ZONE. BUT BOTH PARTIES PROTESTED THAT THE DIVISION WAS FOR PURELY COMMERCIAL (RAILWAY ETC.) PURPOSES, NOT POLITICAL. IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN TREATED AS POLITICAL. THE RUSSIANS LATELY PICKED A QUARREL WITH PERSIA ON A FRIVOLOUS PRETEXT, AND ADVANCED TROOPS. THEY UNDERTOOK TO WITHDRAW THE TROOPS IF PERSIA AGREED TO THEIR DEMANDS. WE THEREUPON ADVISED PERSIA TO AGREE, ON THE DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF SO RUSSIA WOULD WITHDRAW, PERSIA DID SO, BUT RUSSIA SAID IT WAS TOO LATE, LAUNCHED A NEW ULTIMATUM AND ADVANCED MORE TROOPS. THE RESULT WILL NECESSARILY BE THE EXTINCTION OF PERSIAN NATIONALITY, JUST WHEN PERSIA HAS UNDERTAKEN REFORM AND LEARNED TO WORK A PARLIAMENT. BRITISH INTERESTS WILL SUFFER (A) BY THE LAND-FRONTIER WITH RUSSIA, WHICH IN AFGHANISTAN WE DID EVERYTHING TO AVOID (B) BY THE FACT THAT RUSSIA CAN, WHENEVER IT CHOOSES, ACQUIRE SOUTHERN PERSIA, WITH PORTS ON THE PERSIAN GULF, THREATENING OUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH INDIA (C) BY THE FACT THAT WE APPEAR AS RUSSIA'S ALLY IN OPPRESSING PERSIA, WHICH IS REGARDED THROUGHOUT THE EAST AS THE INTELLECTUAL ARISTOCRACY OF ISLAM, WE THUS OFFEND OUR MOHAMMEDAN SUBJECTS IN INDIA, THE MOST WARLIKE AND HITHERTO THE MOST LOYAL. MOREOVER WE HELP IN THE PERPETUATION OF A CRIME AGAINST LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND CIVILIZATION.

Motive: FEAR OF GERMANY—WHICH NEARLY CAUSED WAR LAST SUMMER, AND IS THE GROUND FOR OUR VAST NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

Cure: FRIENDSHIP WITH GERMANY

Means: ASSASSINATION OF GREY

Appendix IX

Protests Against the Prosecutions [1912]

DURING THE YEARS 1910–14, Britain experienced the greatest wave of labour unrest and accompanying strikes since the days of the Chartist movement in early Victorian times. This unrest has been attributed to many causes—particularly the stagnation of real working-class wages, alleged threats to working-class culture presented by Liberal welfare legislation and opportunities for workers to strike because of high employment. At the time and later, commentators and historians have also explained the unrest as arising in part from syndicalist doctrines, which began to be spread among workers, especially by the peripatetic trade union leader Tom Mann (1856–1941) who returned home from Australia in May 1910. Essentially, Mann and those young and relatively few trade unionists who were influenced by him advocated that workers use their industrial strength instead of their electoral influence first to win control of their industries. These syndicalists then aspired to abolish traditional government by linking nationally the various industrial democracies. Many syndicalists, particularly the London anarchist Guy Bowman, believed that such workers' control could only be achieved by revolution.

Mann had derived many of his ideas from the French social philosopher, Georges Sorel (1847–1922), whose book *Reflections on Violence* (1912, 1st ed., 1908) became the gospel for syndicalists. In fact, Mann had visited France in 1910 on his way back to Britain to familiarize himself with the latest syndicalist theoretical developments. Soon after his arrival in Britain in the spring of 1910, he established the Industrial Syndicalist Education League which published, until 1914, a number of successive papers with different titles but presenting the same ideology. The letter in this appendix was reprinted verbatim from *The Times* in the March–April issue of *The Syndicalist*, which had been founded in January 1912.

Mann's activism was soon evident, for he instigated and dominated the huge Liverpool dock strike on 14 June which involved 70,000 men and was not settled until 23 August. Just before the strike a rank-and-file worker wrote anonymously an "Open Letter to British Soldiers" which appeared in *The Irish Worker*, edited by the major Irish Labour activist, James Larkin. *The Syndicalist* printed this letter without comment in January, its first issue. Another worker, Fred Crowsley then printed the letter in pamphlet form and distributed pamphlets to, among others, soldiers at the base in Aldershot. This action caused the government, already very uneasy about syndicalism and distressed by the waves of strikes, to take action. Mann, Crowsley, the printers and Bowman were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for six

months, except for Bowman who received nine months. (While Mann and Bowman were incarcerated, *The Syndicalist* was edited by Frank Russell's friends Gaylord Wilshire and Upton Sinclair. Their friendship probably accounts for Lord Russell's long letter attacking the imprisonments which lies alongside the protest Russell signed)

These prison terms caused Russell and the other signatories of the letter printed here to write their protest, which originally appeared in *The Times* on 27 March 1912, p. 14. The range of protestors is indicative of the outrage felt by many intellectuals—the Christian Socialist Barnett, the historians Fisher and Trevelyan, the musician Vaughan Williams, the poet Masefield and the novelist Zangwill, to identify those who were not Radical M.P.s. Apparently such protests coupled with the anger of leaders in the Labour Movement were effective for Mann and the others were released in seven weeks. As Russell noted to Lady Ottoline Morrell in May 1912 “It is something that the Syndicalists’ sentences are reduced” (#458)

The labour unrest of 1910-14 and the often clumsy and high-handed way the Asquith Government treated the agitation, accelerated Russell’s radicalization. His letters to Lady Ottoline contain many references to what he viewed as a Liberal lack of sympathy for the workers, particularly the miners. His later advocacy of Guild Socialism, a variant of syndicalism, contained in *Roads to Freedom* (1918) can be anticipated in this observation to Lady Ottoline in March 1912

I have had a letter from Bell’s the publishers asking me to write a book on Syndicalism. I wish life was long enough, I should *love* doing it, and I should love the excuse for getting to know all sorts of revolutionaries. I suppose they wrote to me because of my book on German Socialism . Syndicalism does rather tempt me—I should have to sacrifice the precious long vacation to it though. Every one keeps saying it is the enemy—even Labour Members grow respectable about it. This makes me like it—if only I knew what it is. (#397)

The copy-text is the letter to the Editor published in the 27 March 1912 edition of *The Times*

IX "A Protest Against the Prosecutions". *The Times*, 27 March 1912, p 14

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

SIR,—We, the undersigned, have read with the gravest alarm the reports of the trial of the editor and printers of the *Syndicalist* newspaper, and the sentences passed upon them. The offence was that the newspaper contained as one of its articles an "Open Letter to British Soldiers", of which the most incriminating sentences ran as follows—

When we go on strike to better our lot, which is the lot of your fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters, you are called upon by your officers to murder us Don't do it Boys, don't do it "*Thou shalt not kill*", says the Book Don't forget that It does not say—unless you have a uniform on. No murder is murder, whether committed in the heat of anger on one who has wronged a loved one or by pipe-clayed Tommies with rifles

For publishing and printing this letter in his newspaper, the editor, Mr Bowman, was sentenced to nine months' hard labour, and the printers, the brothers Buck, to six months' hard labour. The printers, by their counsel, "contended that they were merely the printers of the paper and had nothing to do with the article, the views of which they did not share." This was not denied, but they had the same measure meted out to them as the little printers and booksellers who supplied the public with Paine's works during the anti-Jacobin terror in England. The sentences the brothers Buck are now undergoing are cruelly severe, as well as impolitic.

These proceedings against the *Syndicalist* were taken under an Act of 1797, under which there has been no prosecution since 1804. The Act was passed in the year of the mutiny at the Nore, when the loyalty of the armed forces of the Crown was most seriously in question, in time of a dangerous European war. Today we have peace abroad, and at the date of the trial the strike had been remarkably orderly at home. The troops were nowhere in collision with the strikers or the mob. Above all, the loyalty of Army and Navy was never less in question than it is to-day. What soldier cared about the *Syndicalist* and how many had heard of it before this ill-advised prosecution?

Now, as the first result of these proceedings, there is perhaps not a soldier but has heard that it is a moot question under what circumstances he is justified in refusing to fire on a mob. And the civilian population has been set on to discuss the question with heat and mutual recrimination. In this way the prosecution has done, on a mild calculation, about ten thousand times as much to advertise the question as the *Syndicalist* could have done by itself. It has, moreover, compelled many who completely disagree with the *Syndicalist* to stand up at its side for the right of free speech.

If the Government adopts the course of prosecuting every one who expresses publicly the view that the soldiers should not fire on a mob of their fellow-citizens they will be issuing a challenge to the leaders of working-class opinion to take up that attitude

The opinion that soldiers should refuse to shoot their fellow-citizens, whether true or not, is very prevalent and will not be put down by State prosecutions, but only fostered a hundredfold. If the expression of this opinion is persecuted, it will become more and more the shibboleth of the whole Labour movement. The view was held not only by the Quakers in old time, but in our own day was taught to all Europe by Tolstoy in works of his which have been broadly circulated in translation and highly honoured by all classes and parties in this island, however much they may disagree with him.

There is another serious aspect of the matter—namely, the very different treatment accorded to the rich and powerful men who incite the Protestants of Ulster to prepare for armed rebellion, and who by threats of violence have actually prevented a meeting from being held in a certain hall in Belfast. To Liberals and Conservatives in the House of Commons this is a subject of good-natured banter, but in the working man, who sees one of his own class thrown into prison for six months' hard labour for doing less, as he imagines, than some highly-placed politicians, feelings of fierce indignation against injustice are aroused. This is not an era when we can afford to have one law for the rich and another for the poor in political cases.

The methods by which Pitt crushed the premature Radicalism of his day will not serve to crush the Labour movement now, but they may serve to render it revolutionary and to enlist it under the banners of the more extreme leaders. These methods of State prosecution will certainly embitter the social strife which it is the object of all of us, whatever view we take of the questions at issue, to keep within peaceful channels. We are, &c.,

Samuel A. Barnett
H. A. L. Fisher.
John Masefield
Philip Morrell
Arthur Ponsonby
Joseph Rowntree.
Bertrand Russell
G. M. Trevelyan
J. C. Wedgwood.
Ralph Vaughan Williams
J. H. Whitehouse
Israel Zangwill

Appendix x

Letters from Professor Gwatkin [1913–14]

THESE LETTERS APPEARED in *The Cambridge Magazine* on 24 November 1913, 17 January and 31 January 1914 in response to Russell's opinions about the ordination service. Although Russell's first statement elicited several letters, Professor Gwatkin's are singled out because of his tenacious pursuit of the debate

x.1 "The Ordination Service Some Replies to Mr Russell". *The Cambridge Magazine*, 3 (29 Nov. 1913) 204.

SIR,—Mr Bertrand Russell begins roundly, "Every educated person knows that, except in a very few instances, this answer is a lie" I thank him for the "very few" exceptions, but I am sorry he has so bad an opinion of all the rest of the clergy, for he reiterates the charge of "hypocrisy and indifference to truth," tells them that they are "below the average level of intellectual honesty," and seems to sweep away even his exceptions by saying that the formularies "are now universally disbelieved"

I, for one, do not know what "every educated person knows" I know that in my own case it was not a lie, and to the best of my knowledge it is not commonly a lie in other cases Mr Bertrand Russell has no right to limit the words in a way the Church of England does not limit them, and then denounce as liars those who do not agree with him Does the Church of England require us to take every statement of those books literally? Are we forbidden to use common sense and criticism? Mr Bertrand Russell is not awake to the fact that the courts have explicitly decided (*Essays and Reviews* cases, 1864) that the Church of England makes no such demands as he imagines. A good deal of ignorance may be pardoned to an "outsider", but if Rip van Winkle undertakes to lay down the law, at least let him do it with common civility

His particular objection to the proposed change seems weak He sees that the mere absence of the word *all* would not make much difference, but he forgets that its deliberate withdrawal could not but mark an important change.

H M GWATKIN

EMMANUEL COLLEGE

November 24, 1913.

x.2 "Professor Gwatin Replies" *The Cambridge Magazine*, 3 (17 Jan. 1914) 252

I THANK MR Bertrand Russell for his courtesy, and quite agree that the facts of the *Essays and Reviews* judgment which he quotes are irrelevant But if he will turn to the judgment itself (Brooke, *Six Judgments*, p 82) he will find something more to the purpose

"It was charged that it was a contradiction of the doctrine of the Church of England as laid down in Arts vi and xx, the Nicene Creed, and the Ordination Service of Priests to affirm that any part of the Books of the Old and New Testaments upon any subject whatever, however unconnected with religious faith or moral duty, was not written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit Held [*i.e.*, by the Court] that the charge that every part of the Scriptures was written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit was not established, as it is not to be found either in Arts vi and xx, the Formularies, the Service for the Ordination of Priests, or the Nicene Creed"

Again (p. 87), on the fifteenth charge:—

Art VI, "which may be considered the pivot Article of the Church . contains no declaration of the Bible being throughout supernaturally suggested, or any intimation as to which portions of it were owing to a special Divine illumination, nor the slightest attempt at defining inspiration, whether mediate or immediate, whether through, or beside, or over-ruling the natural faculties of the subject of it—not the least hint of the relation between Divine and human elements in the composition of the Bible."

If Mr. Russell will read a little further he will find that the Deacon's declaration of belief was before the Court, and that it was explicitly interpreted (Brodrick and Freemantle, p 256) as requiring "*a bona fide* belief that the Holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation and to that extent have the *direct* sanction of the Almighty," and again (p 257) it is further interpreted as leaving open the authorship of Daniel and other books, and as allowing Jonah, the Deluge, the crossing of the Red Sea, and such like "statements of Scripture as to historical facts" to be understood in a figurative sense

Further, the Court declares (p 254) that the Articles and Formularies are binding on the clergy "according to legal construction," not according to what Mr. Russell or myself may think their "plain meaning "

In fact, a comparison with Art VI seems to show that the Ordination Question refers to the *books* of the Scriptures, not to their contents in detail.

H M GWATKIN

Emmanuel College,
Cambridge

December 31st, 1913.

X.3 "Letters to the Editor Inspiration" *The Cambridge Magazine*, 3 (31 Jan 1914). 300.

TO THIS PROFESSOR Gwatkyn replies —

Mr Russell is right, the passages belong to the Dean of Arches But

1. The final judgment "supersedes" the Dean of Arches only so far as it reverses his decisions

2. The final judgment decides that the doctrine Mr Russell finds in the Deacon's declaration is not contained where it naturally would come, in the Articles, the Nicene Creed, or the Ordination of Priests

Mr Russell has no right to introduce a cardinal doctrine by forcing on a single question (which seems to refer to a different matter) and interpretation which is not necessary, has no support elsewhere, and contradicts the known beliefs of its authors.

Appendix XI

The Harvard Crimson Interview [1914]

THIS REPORT APPEARED IN *The Harvard Crimson* OF 21 MARCH 1914, PP. 1, 5 AT THE TIME OF RUSSELL'S LOWELL LECTURES (SEE H10)

XI "About Cambridge University" *The Harvard Crimson*, 21 March 1914, pp 1, 5.

. HON BERTRAND RUSSELL BRIEFLY CHARACTERIZES ENGLISH SCHOOL

HON BERTRAND RUSSELL, M A, F R S , exchange professor of Philosophy from Cambridge University, England, has described for the *Crimson* some of the marked characteristics of the English university and how it differs from the other great English university, Oxford, and from Harvard. Most significant is the method of teaching in the university, which is much more personal in its nature, although the number of students is even greater than at Harvard. There are few professors, but a great number of instructors in the various colleges which make up the university, and they devote their time particularly to individual men, studying their personal needs and characters. The result is that Cambridge produces more scholars and men prominent in learning than Oxford, while the latter, giving greater attention to the classics, to government, and to philosophy produces men prominent in the political life of the Empire.

A difference between Cambridge and Harvard which seems marked to Professor Russell lies in the fact that the elective system does not exist in Cambridge. The students are required to choose a definite line of study on some one subject which they must carry through at least three years. It has been proved that, generally speaking, students have shown the most interest in history, science ranking second, and mathematics and classics third. Cambridge is also much stronger than Oxford in economics, a fact which was especially emphasized by Professor Josef Schumpeter, the Austrian economist, who has delivered several lectures here this week.

Cambridge offers special preparation to men who wish to enter the Indian civil service, but as to government posts, the studies in the regular curriculum prepare students directly for the examinations. On the whole, however, Oxford is much more in touch with government affairs and offices, while Cambridge is essentially noted for international learning. Oxford has placed the prominent politicians in the government service while Cambridge graduates have become more generally men of science and of mathematics.

The Union for Cambridge undergraduates is very similar to the Oxford Union, and includes in its membership a great per cent of the members of the university. The leaders from the House of Commons and the House of Lords often address them, and the students themselves engage in debates on the great political questions of the day. Mr Balfour, a graduate of Cambridge, recently delivered a lecture before the student body.

The organization centers about two main sources of interest, economic and political, and theological or philosophical. The young students have unusually strong ideas on politics and many tend to become socialists. The Cambridge branch of the Fabian Society is very prominent, and the Society of Heretics, though different in theory, is much the same in its scope of activity.

It is difficult to make broad distinctions between Oxford and Cambridge. As was noted above, Oxford tends to surpass Cambridge in non-academic affairs, the latter excelling in scholarship and research, especially in scientific departments. On the other hand Oxford's reputation in the classics is more than justified.

Annotation

1 Journal

7·1 **the Murray's at Churt** Gilbert Murray (1866–1957), classical Greek scholar, translator and later Liberal internationalist Murray retired from Glasgow University in 1899 to Churt, Surrey, where he remained until 1905. In 1889 he married Lady Mary Henrietta Howard (d. 1966), eldest daughter of the 9th Earl of Carlisle and Russell's aunt, the Radical Countess of Carlisle. Russell and Murray had a large correspondence, which survives. Russell wrote "A Fifty-Six Year Friendship" for Murray's *An Unfinished Autobiography* (1960).

7·2–3 **Podmore's book** ... "the grass-eating atheists" Frank Podmore, (1856–1910) *Modern Spiritualism* (1902, 2. 166). Podmore was a prominent London secularist, interested in psychical research and spiritualism. Indeed, he was a founder and member of the Council of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882 and remained on the Council until 1909. He was also a founding member of the Fabians and sat on their Executive Committee.

7·5 **FitzGerald** Probably Edward FitzGerald (1809–1893), poet and translator of the Persian poem *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyám* (1859). The poem's praise of pleasure and enjoyment of beauty diminish the claims of "glory" and "respect" (see A18 36–7).

7·7 **Euripides text** By 1902 Gilbert Murray had translated into English rhyming verse Euripides's *Hippolytus* and *The Bacchae* (see A12.2), and he went on to translate other plays.

7·14 **Aunt Agatha's** Lady Mary Agatha Russell (1853–1933), Russell's spinster paternal aunt. An early companion and teacher of Russell at Pembroke Lodge, Aunt Agatha was always concerned for his welfare. Until 1903, when she built Rozeldene at Hindhead, Surrey, to be near her brother Rollo, Aunt Agatha lived mainly at Pembroke Lodge. Prior to 1903 she also rented a house in the country near Hindhead.

7·15 **Miss Jones** Muriel Frida Jones of Hooton Grange near Chester, whose will mentioning Russell's Aunt Agatha was probated 16 September 1904. The sister was probably Catherine Amy Jones of Honey Hill, Haslemere.

7·29–30 **wife of Hinton ... daughter of Boole** Mary Boole, eldest daughter of George Boole the logician (1815–1864), married Charles Howard Hinton, who was a schoolmaster at Uppingham, mathematician and author of "What Is the Fourth

Dimension?" (1880) Russell's review of Hinton's *The Fourth Dimension* (1904) is found in *Mind* (1904). Boole's *Investigation of the Laws of Thought* (1854) is cited by Russell as initiating the study of formal symbolic logic (1903, 10). Boole's wife, Mary Everest, wrote popular books expounding her husband's views on mathematics and education. She was an early apostle of the "subconscious mind" and of inherited racial blood-consciousness. The "conscientious bigamist" was Charles Howard Hinton, who on 27 October 1885 was charged with bigamy with Maude Florence Weldon. He pleaded guilty and through his counsel expressed regret at his behaviour. The court heard a letter commending Hinton's character from Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol. Hinton was sentenced to three days in prison.

7 33-4 **Waggoner's Wells** Waggoner's Wells was a frequent destination for walks. It was about two and a half miles from Rollo Russell's house at Hindhead, near Haslemere, Surrey. Russell's elder brother Frank twice mentions in his journal walking and picnicking there (24 Sept. and 6 Oct. 1883).

8 1 **Stein** Leo Daniel Stein (1872-1947), author, art critic and collector, brother of the author Gertrude Stein.

8. 7 **Alys** Alys Russell (1867-1951). They were married in 1894 and divorced in 1921.

8 10 **the Davies's** Crompton (1868-1935) and Theodore (1871-1905) Llewelyn Davies. As Russell says in his *Autobiography* (1967, 57ff.), the Davies brothers were among his closest friends at Trinity College, Cambridge. These friendships lasted their lifetimes.

8 12 **Bishop of London** Arthur Foley Winnington-Ingram (1858-1946), Bishop of London from 1901 to 1939.

8 14 **Charles Trevelyan** Charles Philips Trevelyan (1870-1958), a Trinity College friend of Russell's and the elder brother of Robert Calverley, the writer, and George Macaulay, the historian. Charles was a prominent Edwardian Radical M.P. who moved to the Labour Party in 1914.

8 18 **Education Bill ... Balfour's** On 12 November 1902 the Unionist Government of Arthur Balfour (1848-1930) passed the England and Wales Education Act, conferring state educational authority on the elected county and borough councils, while maintaining denominational schools under partial public funding. Liberals and Nonconformists had opposed the bill as reactionary, believing it to serve Anglican and Roman Catholic interests. Theodore Davies was then a second-class clerk in the Treasury Department.

8 20 **John Woolman** John Woolman (1720-1772), American Quaker abolitionist. Russell may not have read Woolman's *Journal* until Christmas 1904, when he and Alys were given the 1871 edition.

8: 23-4 Crompton ... land values ... his league for taxing them ... his rosy hopes. Crompton Llewelyn Davies (1868-1935) was for many years the Secretary of the English League for the Taxation of Land Values. Founded in the early 1880s, this, the largest organization of its kind, advocated traditional Radical doctrines that landlords should be heavily taxed whereas other capitalists should incur light levies.

This major Radical tenet had gained added force from Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* (1879). Thereafter the term "taxation of land values" had been a key slogan, indeed a panacea, for many Radicals and New Liberals, who believed that revenues from such a tax would provide the necessary sources for government programmes of social reform. Russell's scepticism about the "rosy hopes" may have been directed against this assumption. Or he may have believed that only outright nationalization of the land would prove both equitable and adequate for necessary revenue. In his *Autobiography* (1967, 46) he claimed that after his Aunt Agatha had introduced him as an adolescent to George's ideas he had been in favour of land nationalization, at least until the coming of World War I. Russell later defined George's concept of the single tax in an essay to Lady Constance Malleson while he was in prison in August 1918. He traced the ancestry of the concept to Mill. Russell also claimed that Crompton's persuasive enunciation of the doctrine of taxation of land values had inspired Lloyd George's famous 1909 Budget with its controversial land clauses.

8.25 Meredith's bounder-friend Mathews The Cambridge economist Hugh Owen Meredith (1878–1964), who had a King's College friend, Charles Myles Mathews (1878–1928). Mathews later became his brother-in-law.

8.26 Evelyn's Evelyn Whitehead (1865–1961), wife of the philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead, was formerly Evelyn Ada Maud Rice Willoughby-Wade (See A9 24).

8.26–7 wedding-party at the Pollocks Alice Isabella Pollock, daughter of Sir Frederick Pollock (1845–1937), the legal scholar, Liberal Unionist politician and biographer of Spinoza, married Sydney Philip Waterlow on 10 November 1902. Russell discusses their marriage in "Family, Friends and Others" (1972, 274).

8.30–1 Graham Wallas ... Frobel Graham Wallas (1858–1932), a prominent early Fabian and political theorist, addressed the conference of the Froebel Society in January 1901, criticizing their pedagogy (see Wallas 1901). Wallas disagreed with the argument made by Friedrich Wilhelm August Froebel (1782–1852) that the child's natural tendencies should be allowed to unfold according to an inner law. Wallas emphasized the need for direction by external influence. See Paper 3.

8.31 wrote to him agreeing In Russell's letter of 13 November 1902 (original in Wallas papers, LSE), Russell wrote in opposition to Froebel: "Not only must the child be sacrificed to the man, but the man also, he who loses his life for the Ideal's sake shall find it, and all the Christian sayings about being crucified to the world seem to me to embody a truth which the luxury and softness of modern life is in terrible danger of forgetting."

8.32 the Prothero's Probably Sir George Walter Prothero (1848–1922), medieval historian at King's College, Cambridge and at Edinburgh, and editor of *The Quarterly Review* from 1899 to 1922. He lived at 24 Bedford Square.

8.32 Mrs. Napier Probably Maud Denison Gooch, daughter of Colonel G N W Holbrook. She married Major-General William John Napier.

8.32 Gooch George Peabody Gooch (1873–1968), distinguished historian and editor, Liberal MP 1906–10, and President of the National Peace Council 1933–36.

His most significant historical writings were on British historiography and the causes of World War I. He reviewed the first volume of Russell's *Autobiography* (Gooch 1967) and he edited *The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878* (1925).

8:35 Miss Harrison Jane Ellen Harrison (1850-1928), a Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge from 1898, she was one of the first generation of women in higher education. A lecturer in classical archaeology, she followed the new anthropology of Sir James Frazer and Emile Durkheim, she also wrote on Greek archaeology, language, literature and religion. Russell and Alys saw Miss Harrison socially, and occasionally she stayed at Friday's Hill. She had a reputation for being formidable, but Russell remarked to Murray that they had taken a holiday in the Lakes with Miss Harrison, "who was most agreeable" (26 Sept 1903)

8:40 Miss Fletcher's Probably Mary Fletcher (1873-1965), Librarian and Registrar of Girton College, Cambridge (1897-1900), and Librarian and Director of Studies in Moral Sciences at Newnham College (1913-1920)

8:41-2 Les Femmes célibataires en Angleterre Unidentified

9:3-4 the Marshalls Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge 1884-1908, was a distinguished economist. When Russell in 1894 had seriously considered committing himself to the study of economics, he consulted Marshall about an appropriate reading list. Marshall's wife, Mary Paley (1850-1944), had in 1871 been one of the original five students of Newnham College, Cambridge, and was later a lecturer in economics there. Respected in her own right, she collaborated with her husband on his first book

9:5-6 William James and John Morley William James (1842-1910), the American philosopher and psychologist, author in this period of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). John Morley (1838-1923), Lord Morley of Blackburn, was a Liberal statesman, biographer and essayist

9:10 Mrs. Prothero Probably Mary Frances Butcher (1854-1934), daughter of the Bishop of Meath, who married George Walter Prothero in 1882 (See A8 32)

9:11 Wallace collection A noted London art collection based on the private collection of the 3rd and 4th Marquesses of Hertford and expanded by the latter's son, Sir Richard Wallace.

9:11 read proofs *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), which Russell was then seeing through the press

9:12 Grace Grace Thomas Worthington (1866-1937) was a cousin of Alys Russell (See Strachey 1980, 85.) After her divorce in America, she moved to a cottage called Van Bridge at Fernhurst, Sussex

9:12 the Hugh Bells Sir Hugh Bell (1844-1931), iron magnate, industrialist and Unionist free trader. His sister Mary Katharine ("Maizie") married Lyulph Stanley, Russell's uncle. Sir Hugh was also a respected public benefactor. His wife, Florence Eveleen Eleanore Olliffe (1851-1930), was a shrewd social commentator whose *At the Works* (1907), and similar studies, provided a detailed record of working-class life in the context of the whole class structure.

9:13 Gertrude Bell Gertrude Lothian Bell (1868-1926), daughter of Sir Hugh,

was a traveller in the Middle East and a translator of Persian literature. Also a mountain climber and archaeologist, she was one of the most intrepid women of her age.

9. 17 **Sir F. Pollock** See A8: 26–7

9. 18 **circular points at infinity** In projective geometry, one of two points at which every circle intersects the ideal line.

9. 19–20 **Geoffrey Drage** Drage (1860–1955), a writer on many subjects (including Russian history, free trade, unemployment, and poverty), had been a back-bench Unionist M.P. from 1895 to 1900.

9. 24 **Evelyn ... Alfred** For Russell's professional and personal relations with Alfred and Evelyn Whitehead, see especially his 1967, 144ff

9. 26 **Theodore** Probably Theodore Llewelyn Davies (See A8: 10)

9. 31 **Tiny and North** The Whiteheads' children were Thomas North (1891–1969), who was called North and Jessie Maria (b. 1894), called Tiny. Another son, Eric Alfred (b. 1898), was killed in action in France in 1918.

9. 34 **George Trevy** An affectionate name for the historian George Macaulay Trevelyan, O.M. (1876–1962), Russell's friend since Cambridge days. See H32 and 40.

9. 39 **Centre of Indifference at Wallington** The Centre of Indifference, according to Thomas Carlyle in *Sartor Resartus* (1887, 176), is a necessary stage in the spiritual quest that must be passed by those travelling from "the Negative Pole to the Positive" (Russell's copy of the book is inscribed "Bertrand A. W. Russell from his affectionate Grandmother Stanley of Alderley, January 1889"). Wallington is the country house in Northumberland where the Trevelyan brothers grew up.

9. 41 **Jack Pollock** Sir John Pollock (1878–1963), son of Sir Frederick Pollock, was a Cambridge student when his sister was married. He went on to become a minor author and a correspondent with *The Times* and served with the Red Cross.

9. 43–10. 2 **Mary Bateson ... Willie's Mary Bateson** (1865–1906), medievalist and historian of the borough customs of Leicester, was perhaps the most distinguished woman historian of her era in Cambridge. Russell wrote to Lucy Donnelly calling Bateson "one of the most courageous and public-spirited people in Cambridge, and very genuinely devoted to learning" (18 Jan. 1907). Her brother "Willie" was William Bateson (1861–1926), the pioneer Mendelian who coined the term "genetics" and gave the science its place in biology.

9. 43 **Grantchester** Russell was staying with the Whiteheads, who lived in Grantchester, near Cambridge.

10. 11–12 **Mrs. Shuckburgh ... Florence** Frances Mary Shuckburgh (1852–1920) was wife of Dr Evelyn Shirley Shuckburgh (1843–1906), a classical scholar at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. They lived at Grantchester. Florence was the third child.

10. 21 **the Mill House** From 1898 to 1906 the Whiteheads lived in the Mill House, Grantchester. Russell and Alys had lived with the Whiteheads during part of 1901 and 1902.

10. 23 **Mrs. Verrall** Margaret de G. Merrifield Verrall (1858–1916) was author of

The Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens (1890), her husband was Arthur Verrall, a classical scholar of Trinity College and first King Edward VII Professor of English Literature

10. 25 **Jourdain** Philip E B Jourdain (1879-1919), the mathematician and logician, went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1899, taking his BA in mathematics in 1902. In 1904 he got honourable mention in the annual mathematical competition for the Smith's Prize. Failing health kept Jourdain's career in jeopardy. In 1901-02 he attended Russell's lectures on the foundations of mathematics, beginning a correspondence soon after. The surviving letters have been edited by I Grattan-Guinness (1977). Jourdain's amusing parody of their exchanges on logic is found in *The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll* (1918)

10. 37 **Kanthack** Probably Alfred Antunes Kanthack (1863-1898), a brilliant Cambridge doctor and bacteriologist who died of cancer. He resembles Jourdain in early promise lamentably cut short.

10. 39-40 **the Bobby Trevelays** Robert Calverley Trevelyan (1872-1951), the writer and an old Trinity College friend of Russell, was married to Elizabeth des Amorie van der Hoeven. Russell's considerable correspondence with both survives

10. 40 **the Waterlows ... Lady Pollock** Sir Sydney Philip Waterlow (1878-1944), a career diplomat, at the time of this comment was a Third Secretary in the British Embassy in Washington. The bride's mother was Georgina Harriet Pollock (1846-1935).

11. 3-6 **Bobby and his wife ... my publisher** Robert and Elizabeth Trevelyan. Their house was at The Shiffolds, Dorking. His publisher at this time was Longmans, Green

11. 4 **MacCarthy** Sir Charles Otto Desmond MacCarthy (1877-1952) Educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was an Apostle, MacCarthy became a leading critic and journalist with *The New Statesman* and *The Sunday Times* and a prominent member of the Bloomsbury group. He and Lady Agatha Russell were co-authors of a memoir of Lady John Russell

11. 9-10 **Lion and Bobby Phillimore** Lucy FitzPatrick Phillimore (1869-1957) and Robert Charles Phillimore (1871-1919) were wealthy socialists and close friends of Russell. "Lion" Phillimore corresponded with Russell throughout her life. Their home was at Elstree near Radlett, Herts

11. 16 **Encyclopaedia Britannica dinner** The publishers of the tenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1902) held a dinner on 21 November 1902 at the Hotel Cecil in London. It was presided over by the editor, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace. Many contributors attended, and the guest list included the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the President of the Board of Education and other notables. Russell contributed "Geometry, Non-Euclidean" to this edition.

11. 17 **Cantor** Georg Cantor (1845-1918), the German mathematician, whose theory of transfinite numbers influenced Russell in *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), was not confined to an asylum but rather to a "Nerven-klinik". See

Grattan-Guinness 1980, 62

II. 18 **Larmor** Sir Joseph Larmor (1857–1942), a Cambridge physicist who formulated the electromagnetic theory of matter. He was the Secretary of the Royal Society (1901–12). In the 1902 edition of the *Britannica*, he was the author of “Aether”, “Dimensions of Units”, “Energetics”, “Theory of Radiation” and “Radiometer”.

II. 18 **Hobson of Christ’s** Ernest William Hobson (1856–1933), a Cambridge mathematician and brother of J A Hobson, the economist and social theorist. Though yet to publish *Theory of Functions of a Real Variable* (1907), he held advanced mathematical views. Hobson wrote “Trigonometry” for the ninth edition and “Fournier’s Series” and “Spherical Harmonics” for the tenth edition of the *Britannica*.

II. 20 **Balfour** Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930), Prime Minister 1902–05; created 1st Earl of Balfour in 1922. He was a minor philosopher much admired in his day, whom Russell reviewed critically in 1914 and 1923.

II. 20 **Lubbock** Sir John Lubbock (1834–1913), 1st Baron Avebury (1900), financier, politician and Darwinian amateur scientist. As a Liberal parliamentarian (1870–86) who shifted to Liberal Unionism (1886–1913), Lubbock became a prominent advocate of right-wing causes.

II. 22 **Tansley** Arthur George Tansley (1871–1955), a Cambridge botanist until 1920. He became Sherardian Professor of Botany at Oxford in 1927, after a period of psychological study with Freud in Vienna. Tansley and Russell had been members of the editorial committee of *The Cambridge Observer* in 1892.

II. 24–5 **the Creightons** The family of Mandell Creighton (1843–1901), Bishop of London and author of *History of the Papacy* (1882–87). In 1902 the family consisted of his widow, Louise von Glehn Creighton (1850–1936), and their four daughters and three sons.

II. 25–6 **Cambridge Women’s Dining Club** Some time before 1891 Mrs Creighton and Mrs Arthur Lyttelton formed the Cambridge Ladies’ Dining Club in answer to their husbands, who dined in college. They met by turns in members’ houses and a talk was given each time. The other original members were Mrs. Prothero, Lady Jebb, Mrs Marshall, Mrs Verrall, two Mrs Darwins, Mrs James Ward, Mrs. Henry Sidgwick and Baroness von Hugel.

II. 31 **the Sandersons** T J Cobden-Sanderson (1840–1922) was founder of the Doves Press. His wife Anne (1853–1926) was the daughter of Richard Cobden, the Radical statesman, she later became a suffragette. Russell tells how the atheistic Cobden-Sanderson was prevented from continuing as his guardian on the death of his parents (1967, 17). Cobden-Sanderson maintained an active interest in Russell.

II. 33 **the new Review** *The Independent Review*, a journal of New Liberal opinion, published first in October 1903 under the editorship of Edward Jenks. On the editorial council were C. F G Masterman, G M Trevelyan, F. W. Hirst, G. Lowes Dickinson and Nathaniel Wedd. The cover for the first issue was designed by Roger Fry. “The Free Man’s Worship” (Paper 4) first appeared in the third issue (Dec.

1903)

11 34 my paper on Mathematics "The Study of Mathematics" (Paper 6)

12 1 Britten Unidentified.

12: 2 Murray arrived bringing his *Euripiides* Murray brought Russell an advance copy of his *Euripiides* (1902), which was to be published in December. The book, published as Vol 3 of "The Athenian Drama", contains Murray's translations of *Hippolytus* and *The Bacchae*, as well as Aristophanes's *The Frogs*. Russell's library copy is inscribed "Bertrand Russell from G M."; there are no marginalia. In the next line, "the dear lyrics" refers to the translation of *Hippolytus* (Russell 1967, 145-6). See also A7 7 and A15: 8

12 5 Lion Phillimore See A11: 9-10.

12 6 Alberto Ball Albert Ball (1880-1930) was a British civil servant and journalist. He was sometimes known as Alberto in recognition of his Venetian family.

12 6 Mackinder Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), Oxford geographer, geopolitical theorist and Liberal Unionist M.P. from 1910 to 1912, thereafter (when the Liberal Unionists merged) a Unionist M.P. until 1922. He was the author in 1902 of *Britain and the British Seas*. Later Russell seems not to have liked him any better—he wrote Lucy Donnelly that he had dined at the Webbs along with "Mackinder, whom you doubtless remember; the head Beast of the School of Economics" (8 Feb 1905). From 1903 to 1908 Mackinder was Director of the London School of Economics.

12 6 the de Filippi's Caroline FitzGerald married Filippo de Filippi on 3 September 1901. He was a pathologist at Genoa University. Caroline was the sister of Russell's schoolboy friend at Southgate, Edward FitzGerald.

12 6 Miss Hurlbatt Ethel Hurlbatt (1866-1934), Principal of Bedford College, London, 1898-1906. She lectured in political economy from 1899 to 1906.

12. 15 Logan Russell's brother-in-law, Logan Pearsall Smith (1865-1946). He lived in Paris during the early 1890s.

12 16-17 Alys went out to play golf .. at Kendals Kendals Hall at Radlett, Herts., was Robert and Lion Phillimore's house, a short distance from Porter's Park Golf Club.

12 27-8 the Kinsellas ... Douglas Kate, Louise and Frances ("Joe") were daughters of Thomas Kinsella, the Irish-American congressman, who was divorced from their mother. The Kinsella sisters were models to the artist James Abbott McNeill Whistler, working for him as late as 1902. *The Morning Post* records the birth of a daughter to Captain and Mrs. Douglas Robinson on 28 November 1902, at 38A, St. George's Road, London, s.w.

13. 7-8 the Stouts George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), philosopher and psychologist, was one of Russell's Cambridge tutors. In 1898 Stout moved to Oxford to become Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy. His wife, Ella Turnbull Ker, whom he married in 1899, died in 1935.

13 15 the Sidney Balls Sidney Ball (1857-1918), Fellow of St John's College, was for some years president of the Fabian group at Oxford. Ball was author of Fabian

Tract 72, *The Moral Aspects of Socialism* (1896) His wife was Oona Howard Butlin (1866–1941).

13 22–3 my article “Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics” (1901)

13 24 Emily Dawson A Quaker cousin of Alys She was an occasional member of Bernard and Mary Berenson’s circle in Florence, and also spent time with Alys in England

13. 26 Bradley Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924), Oxford idealist philosopher, author of *The Principles of Logic* (1883) and *Appearance and Reality* (1893). Bradley was the foremost British neo-Hegelian and a critic of Mill’s empiricism and utilitarianism Bradley’s kidney disorder probably accounts for the remark on physical pain

13 36 Corpus Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford

13. 37 Shultz Wolfgang Shultz (1881–1936) was known mainly as a German philosopher and historian whose works include studies of Pythagoras and of ancient Germanic tribes

13 40 F. C. S. Schiller Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864–1937) became, upon his return in 1897 to Corpus Christi from Cornell, the leading British apostle of William James’s pragmatism Schiller’s *Formal Logic* (1912) answered objections such as Russell’s by attacking logical systems which did not lead to clarification of everyday ethical issues Schiller wrote to Russell immediately after their discussion, and Russell replied “Certainly mere verbal logic-chopping was very far from my intentions, which were to defend what I believe to be a vital principle of philosophy, but argument before an audience is apt to be lacking in philosophic detachment”

14 5 Mrs. Shuckburgh and May May was the eldest Shuckburgh child. For Mrs. Shuckburgh, see A10. 11–12. The nature of May’s tragedy is not known.

14. 35 Preface to my book *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903) The Cambridge University Press date-stamped the manuscript of the preface 10 Dec. 1902 (RA 230.030350–FI)

14: 36 Tom Moore ... unpublished poems Thomas Sturge Moore (1870–1944), the first child of Daniel and Henrietta Sturge Moore, was brother of G. E. Moore. Tom Moore lived at 40, Well Walk, Hampstead, NW 3 His poetry was collected in four volumes in 1931–33.

14: 38 Matthew Arnold ... “The Voice” This poem by Matthew Arnold (1822–1888) appeared in *The Strayed Reveller and other Poems* (1849) Opinion varies as to whether the voice belongs to the Roman Catholic convert, John Henry Newman, or to Arnold’s passion, Marguerite, or even perhaps to Dr Arnold, the poet’s father and famous headmaster at Rugby in early Victorian Britain

14: 42 St. Jerome’s cell St. Jerome (342–420), scholar and translator of the Vulgate Bible, upheld the monastic life in Bethlehem

15. 3–4 Alan Beeton Probably Alan Edmund Beeton (1880–1942), who was educated at Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge Beeton was a portrait painter and the only son of Henry Ramie Beeton, who lived at 9, Maresfield Gardens, Hampstead. On 6 December 1902 Russell wrote to Alys. “Alan Beaton (*sic*) is

staying at Grantchester, and a French artist friend of his is in Alfred's rooms" He comments, "Alan is extraordinarily keen about his Art".

15 4 Rochot Unidentified.

15 5 Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), German philosopher whose prophetic writings and other ideas were distasteful to Russell

15. 8 the *Bacchae* In Murray's *Euripides* (see A12 2)

15 9-12 the Coefficients ... Haldane's ... Grey ... Reeves and Wells The Coefficients were originally a non-partisan dining and discussion club founded in 1902 by Sidney Webb to discuss problems of the British Empire and national efficiency. The club met monthly and kept printed minutes. Russell resigned in 1903, when it was clear that protectionist and imperial federation sentiments would prevail. Among its early members were the Liberal Imperialists R B Haldane (1856-1928), from late 1905 until 1912 Secretary of State for War, and Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933), Foreign Secretary from late 1905 to 1916. The novelist and prophet of science H G Wells (1866-1946) was also prominent, as was the New Zealand politician and social reformer William Pember Reeves (1857-1932). Until its demise in 1909, the club fell increasingly under the domination of Unionist politicians and journalists who fervently espoused Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform doctrines. Recollections of the Coefficients are found in Russell's piece on Wells in *Portraits from Memory* (1956).

15 13 Fry Roger Fry (1866-1934), the artist, critic and sponsor of post-Impressionism in England, had gone up to King's College, Cambridge, in 1885 and was made an Apostle in 1887. In the 1920s Fry painted Russell's portrait (now in the National Portrait Gallery).

15 13 Dolmetsch Arnold Dolmetsch (1858-1940) was an antiquarian musicologist, instrument collector and performer. Dolmetsch lectured and gave concerts as part of a string trio using early instruments.

15 17 Mrs. Thackeray Ritchie Anne Isabella Thackeray (1837-1919), daughter of the novelist W M Thackeray, married Sir Richmond Thackeray Willoughby Ritchie (1854-1912). As a novelist, writer of memoirs and biographical sketches, she followed the affairs of England's literary and artistic leaders for many years.

15 18-19 Carlyle ... his wife's See A16 14

15. 18-19 Grandmama Stanley at Dover Street Henrietta Maria, Lady Stanley of Alderley (1807-1895), Russell's maternal grandmother, lived with her unmarried daughter Maude (see A16 26) in a large Mayfair house at 40, Dover Street. Russell writes of his grandmother Stanley, "She was an eighteenth century type, rationalistic and unimaginative, keen on enlightenment, and contemptuous of Victorian goody-goody priggery" (1967, 33). She cultivated the best intellectual company which included Thomas Carlyle. (See A16. 14)

15 28 Murray's book Most likely his *Euripides*

15 30 the Hobhouses Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse (1864-1929), philosopher, New Liberal political theorist, scientist and journalist. Impressed by scientific objectivity, Hobhouse believed that philosophy should synthesize all the sciences

rather than divide itself into conflicting schools He was empirical and non-dogmatic, yet without much following as a philosopher. The book mentioned is probably *The Theory of Knowledge* (1896), which Russell had read, or possibly *Mind in Evolution* (1901). There is nothing to show that his marriage in 1891 to Nora Burgess Hadwen was unhappy Russell reviewed very critically his *Morals in Evolution* (1907), Paper 31

16 1 **the Courtney's** Leonard Henry Courtney (1832–1918), created 1st Baron Courtney of Penwith in 1906, married in 1883 Catherine Potter (1847–1929), a sister of Beatrice Webb A follower of John Stuart Mill and a Liberal Unionist, Courtney had been the leader of the pro-Boers in Britain during the South African War His wife shared his anti-imperialist sentiment She was a woman of strong social conscience who had entered social work with the pioneer, Octavia Hill Both the Courtneys were strongly sympathetic to conscientious objectors during the First World War and worked for a negotiated peace

16 4 **Jepson** Edgar Jepson (1863–1938), a popular novelist, was a close friend of Russell's elder brother, Frank George Santayana says of Jepson "He had already, at twenty, doubled human knowledge in one of the sciences, the science *de modis veneris* There had been forty modes before, now there were eighty" (1945, 54) Jepson's second novel, *The Passion for Romance*, appeared in 1896.

16.5 **Molly's** Molly was Marian Somerville, née Cooke (c.1861), second wife of John Francis Stanley, the 2nd Earl Russell (1865–1931) They were married in Reno, Nevada, early in 1901, an event which caused Frank to be found guilty of bigamy, since English law did not recognize his Reno divorce. The House of Lords sentenced him to three months in jail in 1901 In 1915 they were divorced

16 7 **dined with the Cobden-Sandersons** Probably at 15, Upper Mall, Hammersmith.

16 7 **the Mackails** John William Mackail, o m (1859–1945), and his wife Margaret (c.1866–1938), daughter of the Pre-Raphaelite painter, Sir Edward Burne-Jones In 1884, Mackail joined the Education Department of the Privy Council, rising in 1903 to be its Assistant Secretary. He was also a leading literary scholar, translator and critic, publishing essays on classical, Renaissance and modern poetry Russell wrote to Gilbert Murray on 12 December 1902 saying that he and Alys had just met the Mackails; he found her very beautiful but objected to his extreme democratic views

16 14 **Carlyle's House** Now 24, Cheyne Row, Chelsea, this eighteenth-century house was Thomas Carlyle's (1795–1881) residence from 1834 until his death His wife was Jane Baillie Welsh (1801–1866) It subsequently became a shrine, preserving the atmosphere in which Carlyle wrote such celebrated books as *The French Revolution* (1837) The Russells moved close by to 14, Cheyne Walk for the winter of 1902–03, and for part of the winter of 1903–04 they lived at 13, Cheyne Walk.

16 25 **the Webbs and Whiteheads** Sidney James Webb, Baron Passfield (1859–1947), and Martha Beatrice Webb (1858–1943), the Fabian Socialists, founders of the London School of Economics, historians of trade unionism and the Labour

movement generally and pioneer social scientists For the Whiteheads, see A8 26
16 26 **Aunt Maude** Maude Stanley (1832-1915), daughter of Edward, 2nd Baron Stanley of Alderley, and Henrietta Maria; sister of Kate Stanley, Russell's mother. A spinster, Russell's Aunt Maude was a benefactor of the poor and founded girls' clubs for the underprivileged He found her "a perfect aunt" (Russell and Russell 1937, 1 23)

16. 27 **Lady Hermione Blackwood** Lady Hermione Catherine Helen Blackwood (1869-1960), daughter of the 1st Marquess of Dufferin She served as a nurse in the Great War and never married

16. 28 **Mrs. Jeyes** Probably Géneviève Frances MacGregor Sherman, daughter of Charles Edward King Sherman In 1901 she married Samuel Henry Jeyes (1857-1911) Jeyes was educated in classics at Trinity College, Oxford, and became Assistant Editor of *The Standard*, a biographer and a barrister in the Inner Temple

16 28-9 **Uncle Rollo's cottage** (See A7. 14) Russell writes, "In the year 1883 my uncle Rollo bought a house ('Dunrozel') on the slopes of Hindhead, where, for a long time, we all visited him for three months in every year" (1967, 47) The Hon Francis Albert Rollo Russell (1849-1914) introduced Russell to the family of his future wife Alys, the Quaker Pearsall Smiths who had migrated to "Friday's Hill" in the Surrey neighbourhood from their native Philadelphia Uncle Rollo figures as Uncle Tristam Forstice in Russell's *The Perplexities of John Forstice* (See Paper 9)

16. 34 **Sir Francis Jeune** Sir Francis Henry Jeune (1843-1905), made Baron St Helier in the year of his death, was best known to the public as a judge in divorce cases In 1892, he was appointed a Privy Councillor and President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the Appeal Court The first husband of his wife, Mary Stewart Mackenzie, was John Constantine Stanley, an uncle of Russell's. Lady Jeune was a famous hostess in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain

16 41 **Mrs. Lowndes** Marie Adelaide Lowndes (1868-1947) was the elder sister of the Catholic writer, Hilaire Belloc, and wife of Frederick Sawrey Archibald Lowndes, a journalist on *The Times* Mrs Lowndes was a prolific novelist specializing in mysteries Russell had first met her in 1894, probably at Friday's Hill.

17 4 **the Beetons** Alan Beeton's wife was Geneste Penrose (See A15 3-4)

17: 5 **Wickstead** Possibly Rev Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844-1927), Unitarian minister and a distinguished neo-classical theorist on political economy

17 5-6 **my popular article in the International Monthly** See A13 22-3.

17. 19 **Bernard Berenson** Bernard Berenson (1865-1959), art critic, historian of Renaissance painting and dealer. From 1900 he lived with his extensive library and art collection at I Tatti, a Tuscan villa near Florence Alys's sister, Mary Costeloe, left her husband for Berenson, whom she married on 27 December 1900

17. 23-4 **a rhapsody on tragedy** Written on a post card sent to Murray by Russell on 31 December 1902, the rhapsody on tragedy reappears in "The Free Man's Worship" (Paper 4, 70 24-34)

17 25 **the Davies's** In 1904 Crompton and Theodore Llewelyn Davies lived at 14, Barton Street, Westminster.

17 34 working as a factory girl Alys's interest in temperance reform led her to a concern with the working conditions of poor women Her experiences as a working girl in a rope factory are outlined in an article, "Four Days in a Factory" (1903)

17 41 Imperial Protection The policy of low tariffs among Britain and her dominions and other colonies and of higher tariffs against the rest of the world

17 41 Hewins William Albert Samuel Hewins (1865–1931), political economist and first Director of the London School of Economics (1895–1903) He was also Joseph Chamberlain's main economic adviser Hewins was Secretary of the Tariff Commission 1903–17 and its Chairman 1920–22 Russell claimed that Hewins had temporarily influenced him "in the direction of Imperialism and Imperialistic Zollverein" (1967, 153)

18. 3 League of Cambrai The League of Cambrai was a coalition of the powers of the Papacy, France and Aragon formed by Pope Julius in 1508 to defeat their common enemy, Venice, then supreme in the Mediterranean

18 6 Miss Gray Unidentified

18. 22 Gilbert read his *Hippolytus* Russell wrote that during the Lent term of 1901, "Gilbert Murray came to Newnham to read part of his translation of *The Hippolytus*, then unpublished Alys and I went to hear him, and I was profoundly stirred by the beauty of the poetry" (1967, 145–6, 156ff.)

18 25 my Index To *The Principles of Mathematics*

18 34 Beatrice Creighton Beatrice Creighton (1874–?) was the first child of Mandell Creighton and Louise von Glehn Creighton (see AII 24) Beatrice was a close friend of Beatrice Webb and became a deaconess of St Hilda's Ootacamund

18 35 lady-novelist Mary Cholmondeley (1859–1925) was the author of *Red Portage* (1899)

18 36–7 Fitzgerald ... *dolce far mente* existence The poet Edward Fitzgerald's idea of a life of sweetness for its own sake, producing nothing (See A7. 5)

19 9–10 a work on the aim and scope of Philosophy Nothing more of this work is known

19 11 Masterman Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman (1874–1927), author, journalist and Christian Socialist, from 1900 a Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge Russell's expectations were high after having recently read Masterman's *From The Abyss* (1902) He had written to G M Trevelyan (25 Jan.) that the book "gives most impressively the picture of plodding, careful lives, without hope, without much fear, toiling slowly to the grave" First elected in 1906, Masterman became a very promising Liberal politician, his cabinet career was cut short by his inability to win a by-election in 1914.

19 14 Bury's John Bagnell Bury (1861–1927) gave his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in Cambridge University on 26 January 1903 Bury argued that the study of history should be scientific, relying on the systematic and minute analysis of sources in order to secure the facts

19 31 the Verrals See A10 23

19 33 her mother See A20 33

20. 11 **He wrote** See Murray's letter of 16 February 1903 and his undated notes evidently sent a day or two later
- 20: 15 **Agnes** Daughter of Gilbert and Mary Murray. She died tragically in 1922 while working in Vienna for the Friends' War Victims Relief.
- 20 22 **Miss Birch** Una Birch (1876-1949), later Dame Una Pope-Hennessy, author of many books on literary and historical subjects Russell discusses his criticism of her books more fully in letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell of 22, 23 and 26 April 1911 (#37, 39 and 43)
- 20 33 **Carey and Mrs. Smith** Martha Carey Thomas (1857-1935), Quaker educator and feminist Carey Thomas was the niece of Hannah Whitall Smith and thus Alys's cousin As President of Bryn Mawr College, Carey Thomas had the reputation of being domineering Russell's fourth wife was her biographer (see Finch 1947) Hannah Whitall Smith (1831-1911), Quaker devotional writer, evangelist, feminist and temperance reformer, was the eldest daughter of John Mickle Whitall and Mary Tatum Whitall of Philadelphia In 1851 she married another Quaker, Robert Pearsall Smith, also an evangelist. In 1874 they moved to England, where Russell met their daughter Alys. Of his mother-in-law Russell said that he "came gradually to think her one of the wickedest people I had ever known" (1967, 148)
- 21 1 **Dr. Savage** Sir George Henry Savage (1842-1921) was successively physician-superintendent of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, lecturer on mental diseases at Guy's Hospital and consultant physician at Guy's Hospital and the Earlwood Idiot Asylum He wrote on insanity and was editor of *The Journal of Mental Science*
- 21 6 **the history of Mrs. Sanger** Anna Dorothea ("Dora") Pease (1865-1955) came from a Quaker family and was educated at Newnham College, Cambridge She married Charles Percy Sanger in 1900 Despite suffering from severe arthritis, she worked in humane causes
- 21 8 **Cousin Maggie Elliot** Margaret Elliot (1828-1901), elder daughter of Gilbert Elliot, Dean of Bristol, she was a distant cousin of Russell's grandmother, Countess Russell Margaret Elliot was a philanthropist seeking to improve the lot of workhouse girls, she also wrote pamphlets on aspects of the Poor Law. Alys recorded in her journal that the first visit took place on 12 June 1894
- 21 20-1 **Metropolitan Association for Befriending Young Servants** Founded in 1875.
- 21 29 **Moore ... reading party** George Edward Moore (1873-1958), Cambridge contemporary of Russell, Apostle and author of *Principia Ethica* (1903) Moore was in the habit of organizing reading parties for his closest friends This reading party was held at The Lizard in Cornwall at Easter 1903. It is not known what Russell's homilies concerned, or when they were given.
22. 5 **Principles of Mathematics, Vol. II** The projected second, technical volume, to supplement *The Principles of Mathematics*, was never completed but formed the basis of Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13)
22. 7 **an article on Meinong** "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", published in three parts in *Mind*, 1904 Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) was an

Austrian philosopher and psychologist whose theory of non-existent objects was closely studied by Russell. Russell's own theory of descriptions is an alternative way of treating putative reference to the non-existent. Russell's correspondence has been published Meinong's *Philosophenbriefe aus der wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz von Alexius Meinong* (1965).

22 11–12 **Tolstoi's *Roman du Mariage*** Russell wrote to Bernard Berenson on 31 March 1903 “I read Tolstoi's *Le Roman du Mariage* (*sic*) incredibly accurate, like all his books, and (to my mind) more beautiful than most. the Russian seasons are so vivid in it that the words almost smell of spring and autumn” (I Tatu archives)

22 13 ***Quisanté*** Sir Anthony Hope (Hawkins) (1863–1933) *Quisanté* (1900) Quisanté is driven by a political ambition which estranges him from his wife

22 21–3 “the bygone year ... it.” Ll 35, 39–40 of Matthew Arnold's “The Voice”

22 24 **Friday's Hill** See A16 28–9

22 35–6 **the Mill House** See A10. 21

22 36 **the peace** The Treaty of Vereeniging, negotiated, 15 to 31 May 1902, ended the South African War which had started on 12 October 1899

23 5–6 “**Monotonous, melancholy, eternal**”, etc. This piece was titled “The Ocean of Life” and dated June 1902 See Paper 2p

23 7 **Maeterlinck's *Le Trésor des Humbles*** Maurice Maeterlinck (1862–1949), *Le Trésor des humbles* (1876)—an essay brooding on creation and death in the Belgian symbolist's characteristic manner

23 25 **Frege** Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), the German mathematician and logician who anticipated Russell's interpretation of mathematics in *Principia Mathematica*. Russell says that he possessed Frege's *Begriffsschrift* (1879) for years without understanding it until he “independently discovered most of what it contained” (1967, 68). He devoted an appendix of *The Principles of Mathematics* to Frege's views. Russell's correspondence with Frege has been published in *Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel* (1976).

23 25 **proofs** *The Principles of Mathematics*

23 27–8 **Mrs. Frank Darwin** Mrs. Frank Darwin (1856–1903), née Ellen Woods-worth Crofts, second wife of Sir Francis Darwin (1848–1925), and a friend of Jane Harrison. Her sudden death gave great shock to Russell, who wrote to Gilbert Murray that “She was a most delightful woman, for whom I had a strong affection” (26 Sept. 1903).

23 29 **Little Buckland** The cottage near Broadway in Worcestershire where Russell and Alys lived briefly in August 1902

23 43–24 1 **my paper on Mathematics** See A11 34

24 7 **the Contradiction** The contradiction was a mathematical paradox discovered by Russell when working on *The Principles of Mathematics* in 1901. The paradox concerns the class of all classes that are not members of themselves. It is better known as the “Russell paradox”. See 1901, Chap. x

25 34 **Alfred, the Davies's and Sanger** Alfred North Whitehead; Theodore and Crompton Llewelyn Davies, and Charles Percy Sanger (1871-1930)—the latter a contemporary of Russell's at Trinity and also an Apostle Sanger, who became a Chancery barrister, was a man of brilliant gifts and an unassuming, kindly disposition

25 39 **Miss Pretious Ivy Pretious** (*c* 1880-1958), Secretary of the Free Trade Union, Russell met her in 1901 through George Trevelyan. She married Sir Charles Tennyson, a specialist in international law, diplomat and scholar. From a letter to Lucy Donnelly (19 Sept 1904), it appears that by trying to protect Ivy from involvement with a prominent M.P. Russell himself was attracted to her. For an account of Russell's relationship with Ivy Pretious, see Clark 1975, 102-4

26 2-3 **Helen Thomas ... Grace** Helen Thomas (1871-1956) was the youngest sister of Carey Thomas. Russell first met Helen Thomas in Paris in 1894 and again at Bryn Mawr in 1896 when he thought her gentle and kind. In 1903 she married Simon Flexner (1863-1946), physician and first Director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. Russell and Helen Thomas corresponded at length before her marriage and to some extent afterwards. For Grace, see A9 12

26 5 4 **Ralston Street, Chelsea.** Russell and Alys moved to 4, Ralston Street, Chelsea, for part of 1905. During this period their house in Bagley Wood, Oxford, was being built

26 23-4 **my mother's miniature** The miniature painting portrayed Katharine Louisa Russell (1842-1874), Viscountess Amberley, fourth daughter of the 2nd Baron Stanley of Alderley, and wife of Viscount Amberley. Both parents had died before Russell was four, his mother just after his second birthday. They had been advanced thinkers, "ardent theorists of reform" (1967, 15)

26 24 **Barrett** Barrett appears to have been the Russells' maid. According to Barbara Strachey (1980, 213), Alys hired unmarried mothers as maids

26 26 **Lucy Donnelly** Lucy Martin Donnelly (1870-1948) had been a Bryn Mawr student and contemporary of Alys and Helen Thomas. For many years she was Professor of English at Bryn Mawr. She maintained an extensive correspondence with Russell until her death. Russell's fourth wife, Edith Finch, was her companion in her last years

26 29 **Mrs Mason** Possibly Josephine Mason, painter, miniaturist and etcher living in 1902 at 169, Ebury St, London, s w, or Mrs Evelyn Mason, miniature painter, of 4, Kempion Road, Walham Green.

27 7 **Chamberlain** Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) is noteworthy for having split political parties on two occasions. In 1886 he divided the Liberal Party of Gladstone by opposing Home Rule and in 1903 he split both his own Party, the Liberal Unionists, and the Conservative Party over the tariff question. See Part iv

2 The Pilgrimage of Life

35 1 **Plato tells us** *Republic*, Bks. 5–7 Russell was reading the *Republic* in November, 1902.

36 41 **Carlyle** See A16 14

36 42 **Ibsen** Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) Russell had avidly read this Norwegian dramatist's works in German translation during the 1890s. The effect of *Ghosts* is mentioned in his *Autobiography* (1967, 83–4). An appreciation is included in "Revolt in the Abstract", Chap. 3 of Pt. 1 of *Fact and Fiction* (1961).

36 42 **Nietzsche** See A15 5

38 34 **Thebaid** Desert near Thebes in Egypt

40. 11–13 **Mazzini ... love.**" Quoted in Bolton King's *Mazzini* (1902, 57) Russell included discussion of this book in "Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic" (Paper 32). Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was the leading advocate for the creation of an Italian nation state and the main prophet of nationalism as a moral cause. See A344 10

41 10 **Moloch** The pagan god who demanded the sacrifice of children (II Kings 23. 10) In a letter of 11 November 1902 to Helen Thomas, Russell wrote "Moloch embodies man's piteous endeavours to placate the resistless forces of nature. surely, he thinks, the cruelty of human sacrifice must suffice to appease their lust of blood. But they crush him none the less, with the same smug indifference. Man is not a citizen of the world of nature, but an alien among hostile powers, and until he abandons his outward life voluntarily to their tyranny, the inner life of the mind has no liberty, no dignity of haughty self-assertion. Such is the rationale of human sacrifice to my mind, and now I find a ghostly pleasure, in groves, on great planes (*sic*), and on old hills from which the vastness of the world is visible, in thinking of our sad ancestors, generation after generation, hoping to find the secret key to unlock the hearts of the gods, sacrificing their dearest to omnipotent injustice. Their view of life, after all, was truer than that of our sleek optimists."

44 11–14 **This is the message ... whitened by the passing wind.** This passage is repeated at the end of "The Ocean of Life" and echoed in *Autobiography* (1967, 149–50).

46 5 **The Two Races of Man** The title of one of Charles Lamb's *Essays of Elia* (1823) is "The Two Races of Men"

48 7–8 **the day when Dante returned from the kingdom of the dead** An imaginative way of referring to the time when *Divine Comedy* was completed, that is approximately 1314. The poem ends with the recovery of the normal world and the sight of the stars

53. 38–54: 1 **The Everlasting No ... forever hate thee"** "The Everlasting No" is the title of Chap. 7 of Bk. 2 of *Sartor Resartus* by Thomas Carlyle. When in the conclusion of the chapter, the Everlasting No claims the ownership of the universe, Teufelsdröckh responds "I am not thine, but Free, and forever hate thee!" (1887, 163) In a letter to Helen Thomas, Russell wrote "There are no books on the subject

of morals, because moralists have almost all been either Christian or wicked The best thing I know is the Everlasting No in *Sartor Resartus* The great secret of virtue, and of whatever peace of mind an evil world still leaves pardonable, is to abandon all internal demand for happiness, to realize that happiness is only for the frivolous, and that life, to those who have eyes to see, is filled with tragedy and compassed round with spectres And then courage! There is my gospel for you" (5 May 1902)

54 2-3 "He's a Good Fellow and 'twill all be well" *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyám*, translated by Edward FitzGerald, st. 64, 1 4

54: 10-14 Life's but... Signifying nothmg. *Macbeth*, v, v, 24-8.

55 11-12 the rhetoric by which God answered Job out of the whirlwind Job 38 1-41: 34.

3 The Education of the Emotions

60 34-5 Like the base Indian .. tribe *Othello*, v, ii, 346-7.

61 5 Froebel Friedrich Wilhelm August Froebel (1782-1852), German educational reformer and author of *The Education of Man* (1885, 1st German ed , 1826)

4 The Free Man's Worship

66 1 Dr. Faustus ... Mephistophilis In *Doctor Faustus* (c 1589) by Christopher Marlowe, Faustus sells his soul to Mephistophilis (a fallen angel in the service of Lucifer) in exchange for twenty-four years of exceptional power and knowledge Russell read the play in October 1891 There is no known record of Russell having read Goethe's version of the legend prior to 1912, at which time it aroused his displeasure (letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, #514, 27 July) In a letter of 4 July 1923, Russell made explicit to his publisher Thomas Mosher that his allusion was to Marlowe "There is one very small point as to which I feel slightly undecided. In the first sentence of the Essay I wrote 'Mephistophilis', not 'Mephistopheles', the allusion being to Marlowe, not to Goethe, as appears by my speaking of 'Dr Faustus'. But apparently no one realizes that Marlowe used the spelling with an i, so perhaps it is not worth bothering about. I leave the matter to your discretion" Russell's manuscript spelling differs from Marlowe's in that Marlowe editions give Mephostophilis, but the manuscript spelling is closer to it than printed versions of "The Free Man's Worship" and is therefore followed here

67 32 Moloch See A41 10.

67 42-3 God's answer to Job out of the whirlwind See A55 11-12

68 19 Carlyle and Nietzsche See A16. 14 and A15. 5.

68. 42 Promethean Indignation against Zeus caused Prometheus to steal fire from the gods and give it to man For this defiant act, he was punished by being chained while his liver was devoured daily by an eagle.

71 19-20 like Duncan ... well *Macbeth*, III, ii, 22-3

5 On History

77 7-8 little Restoration scandals recorded by Grammont Anthony Hamilton's *Memoirs of the Life of Count de Grammont* (in French 1713; English trans 1714) recounts the amorous intrigues in the court of Charles II Russell wrote to Helen Thomas to say that the work was "the most amusing, delightful, and improper book that I have ever read. . Scandal is like things of beauty, its loveliness increases, I much prefer it two centuries old" (30 Dec 1901).

77 8-9 letters on the Piedmontese massacres, by which Milton, in the name of Cromwell John Milton (1608-1674) was appointed Secretary for Foreign Tongues to the Council of State under Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) in March 1649 In this capacity, he wrote a series of letters on behalf of the Protectorate expressing moral outrage about the violent anti-Protestant action taken by Immanuel, Duke of Savoy, against the citizens of Piedmont Allegedly with the complicity of France, Immanuel was said in early 1655 to have massacred or put to flight those subjects who would not be converted to Catholicism Russell recalls in *Fact and Fiction* (1961) his early enthusiasm for Milton's prose and doctrines "I had known the sonnet beginning 'Avenge, O Lord, Thy slaughtered saints, whose bones Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold' But I had not known until I read his prose works that in his capacity of Foreign Secretary he sent paraphrases of this sonnet to many of the governments of Europe. Never since that time has the Foreign Office spoken in such accents" (33-4).

77. 29 Burke argued Although he believed the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 and the American Revolution to be warranted, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) thought that revolutions were seldom justified. He saw the French Revolution as leading to the tyranny of the many by the few, or even by a single dictator. But his judgments of Cromwell were less harsh than Russell implies, for he wrote "In England, the government of Cromwell was to be sure somewhat rigid, but for a new power, no savage tyranny" (Burke 1808, 7: 196) In "Reflections on the Revolution in France", he contrasts Cromwell favourably with the French revolutionaries as one who advanced "the dignity of the people" (5: 102)

78 29 with Mommsen Theodor Christian Matthias Mommsen (1817-1903) viewed as decisive in Rome's decline the failure to defeat the German, Ariovitus, and hence extend its boundary beyond the Rhine "People felt that now another spirit and another arm had begun to guide the destinies of Rome" (Mommsen 1862-67, 4, Pt 1: 247) Russell read *History of Rome* in August 1898 and *The Provinces of the Roman Empire* in October 1898

78 38-79 5 A very flagrant instance of this danger is Carlyle ... indefensible. According to Carlyle's theory of the hero, a great man has the moral obligation to compel ordinary mortals according to his godlike vision The masses are of little interest because their function is simply to obey His praise of Frederick is found in his multi-volume *The History of Friedrich II of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great* (1858-60) which Russell read in May 1898 Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) is

discussed in Lecture 6 "The Hero as King" of *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (1840) In "Shooting Niagara, and After?" (1867) Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) is said to be "magnanimous and fortunate" Carlyle showed his contempt for blacks in "The Nigger Question" and in his defence of Governor Eyre against the public outcry over the brutal methods he had used to quell an uprising in Jamaica. Lack of sympathy for the Irish problem is shown, for example, in "The Present Time" (1850). Servants who are unemployed because of their alleged insubordination are spoken of as "thirty-thousand Distressed Needle-women" (Carlyle 1888a, 7: 94) This passage is marked in Russell's copy and an entry for it is made in the list he wrote at the back of the book Entries are made there too for "Idle Blacks" and "Slavery". In 1902, Russell had called Carlyle "the only author who knows the place of History among the Fine Arts" (to Lucy Donnelly, 1 Sept.)

79: 33 the Age of Pericles The period in fifth century Athens of extraordinary creativity in literature and art when the city's democratic political forms attained their greatest development Evidence for Pericles's political activity begins from 472 B.C., and he exercised undisturbed political domination of the city state from 443 until his death in 429

80 29-30 when Dante returned from the kingdom of the dead See A48 7-8

6 The Study of Mathematics

85 37-40 Yet the very men ... every intelligent learner. Russell could be alluding to the tripos system under which he had studied and its justification by such as Whewell This system, especially in the non-rigorous presentation of the foundations of the calculus even in Russell's time, led Russell to remark in his *Autobiography*. "My mathematical tutors had never shown me any reason to suppose the Calculus anything but a tissue of fallacies" (1967, 67) Further details of Whewell's influence are given in Becher 1980

86 42 This passage was pointed out to me by Professor Gilbert Murray. Murray contributed the Plato quotation in an undated letter to Russell On 28 October 1902 Russell responded "Revered Philosopher! (He added later "Addressed to Plato") I am deeply indebted to you for saying such true and admirable things on the subject of Mathematics, and I often ardently wish that you could know the beautiful things that have been found by those who did not presume to regard themselves as your successors Etc Etc." "Dear Gilbert—I will certainly insert your quotation, which is most apt"

87 24-5 proofs ... of Euclid In criticizing the way in which geometry was taught Russell may have had in mind either Hawtrey's text (1874) from which he was taught by his brother Frank or, more likely, Potts's (1845) which was used in the Cambridge tripos In his *Autobiography*, Russell writes. "At the age of eleven, I began Euclid, with my brother as my tutor. I had not imagined that there was anything so delicious in the world" (1967, 36) However, in *Portraits from Memory* he admits to having been "full of doubt and perplexity" (1956, 19) at having to accept such things

as axioms without proof In his own introduction to the subject, therefore, Russell seems not to have been dismayed by the “tedious apparatus” of traditional presentations of Euclid

87 28–9 such as those . . meet in a point For example, the theorem that the three lines bisecting the angles of any given triangle meet in one point, the centre of the inscribed circle

87 43 superposition A method used in Euclid for proving the congruence of geometrical figures by superposing one on the other (See Euclid 1908, Bk 1, Prop 4.) To the extent that this method is taken as relying on a concrete physical action, i.e., placing one figure upon another, it undermines the logical, non-empirical, nature of geometry This matter is treated by Russell under the heading of “Axiom of Free Mobility” in *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (1897) and in the chapter on metrical geometry in *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903, 405). (See also his 1983, 293–6)

88 5 Algebra Russell wrote that “The beginnings of Algebra I found far more difficult (than geometry), perhaps as a result of bad teaching” (1967, 36). The tutor had thrown a book at Russell’s head for not remembering what he had been taught

88 31–4 Zeno the Eleatic . . Cantor . . Dedekind Zeno (*fl c* 450 B.C.) devised four paradoxes designed to show that motion was impossible The paradoxes exposed difficulties in the mathematical concepts of continuity and infinity Despite much discussion, little headway was made with the paradoxes until the development in the nineteenth century of the mathematical theory of infinity by Georg Cantor (1845–1918) and Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) Russell discusses the Zeno paradoxes and their modern resolution in *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903, 358) and in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914, chaps 5–7)

89 4–5 has hardly himself . . intellect is dispelling Cantor devoted much attention in his writings to refuting philosophical and theological arguments against actualizing infinity, and Russell may be referring to the fact that Cantor saw himself as finally resolving past problems rather than leading the way to new mathematical or logical frontiers

90 18–20 Symbolic Logic . . Aristotle . . nineteenth century Systematic work in formal logic can be regarded as starting with the works which comprise Aristotle’s *Organon*, in particular the *Prior Analytics* in which the syllogism is expounded It was only in the nineteenth century that logic developed significantly beyond the syllogistic, although the existence of valid non-syllogistic arguments had been known for centuries Among those who contributed to this development and whom Russell would have had in mind, were Augustus De Morgan, George Boole, Ernst Schröder, Giuseppe Peano and Gottlob Frege The culmination of the nineteenth-century development of logic was Frege’s project of proving that arithmetic was derivable from logic Russell extended this programme seeking to establish logicism, the theory that all mathematics is derivable from logic

91 1 analysis That branch of mathematics concerned with functions and related concepts such as limit and continuity The integral and differential calculus are thus parts of analysis

91 10-11 **Philosophers have ... held that the laws of logic ... are laws of thought** The view that ultimately the laws of logic are laws of thought is called psychologism and had been held in different forms by philosophers of almost all persuasions Russell's early criticism of it can be found in his review of Heymans (1983, Paper 40)

92 27-8 **Euclid ... axiom of parallels** The axiom of parallels is often stated in the form, for any line and a point not on the line there is one and only one line through the point not intersecting the given line. This postulate, essential for Euclidean geometry, was long thought to be more problematic than the others (e.g., it is the only axiom which involves the notion of infinity) In the nineteenth century it was shown that the postulate was independent of Euclid's other postulates, and that consistent (non-Euclidean) geometries could be elaborated in which the postulate was not true

93 25 **conic sections** The theory of conic sections—the ellipse, parabola and hyperbola—has been taken as an example of mathematics which was abstract in origin but which eventually found practical application The study of conic sections appears to have originated in classical Greek times and found significant application only in the seventeenth century with Johannes Kepler's theory of the elliptic orbits of the planets. However, the historian Otto Neugebauer has conjectured that the theory of conic sections originated from their need in the theory of sundials in antiquity (1948)

7 Prisons

102 12 ***Sub specie aeternitatis.*** Under the aspect of eternity Spinoza 1910, xxii

102 15 "whose service is perfect freedom" "A Collect for Peace", *The Book of Common Prayer*

106 6 "Man is the measure of all things" Protagoras In Burnet 1908, 188 (fragment 1)

8 The Essence of Religion

119 3 **Promethean** See A68. 42

119 17 **Xerxes chastizing the Hellespont** An incident narrated by Herodotus concerning the futile gesture by Xerxes, Persian King from 486 to 465 B.C., during the war with the Athenians and their Greek allies

9 *The Perplexities of John Forstace*

128 11 **Cromer** A fashionable resort on the Norfolk coast

128 26 **garden-party** Russell disliked garden-parties, as he made clear in letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell (4 June 1911, 14 June 1911 and 19 July 1912, #101, 113 and 504) but he knew them to be the quintessential Edwardian social event at which distinguished company gathered.

128 30 **Mr. Hatfield Lane** Mr Hatfield Lane is a thinly disguised reference to the South African entrepreneur and politician Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902). Hatfield House is the ancestral home of the Cecil family, while Lane suggests Rhodes

128 35 **statues in Parliament Square** The statues in Parliament Square, near the Houses of Parliament in London, are of Victorian Prime Ministers such as George Canning, Viscount Palmerston, the Earl of Derby, Sir Robert Peel and Benjamin Disraeli and other statesmen

129 12 **snivelling Little-Englanders** Used as a term of derision by imperialists to mock free traders as parochial and indifferent to the patriotism of colonists. The term was primarily used to refer to Richard Cobden and his followers. Contemporary admirers of Cobden used the expression with pride. Hence, Russell wrote of his Grandmother Russell, “She was a fierce Little Englander, and disapproved strongly of Colonial wars” (1967, 29)

129 12–13 **the treachery of the Admiralty** Probably a reference to the popular Unionist conviction that by 1909 the Germans had been allowed by the Liberal Governments and some senior Admiralty officials to gain significant advantages in the Anglo-German naval race

129 13 **dishonest incompetence of the War Office** Probably refers to the famous Elgin War Commission Report of December 1903 which documented many instances of incompetence and confusion in the War Office during the South African War, noting that on some occasions that Ministry had presented incomplete and conflicting evidence on the conduct of government administrators, soldiers and suppliers of military needs

129. 39 **Breitstein** Probably Sir Alfred Beit (1853–1906), sometime governor of the South African De Beers Consolidated Mines, who made a fortune in diamonds. Diamonds are the “bright stones” of the name. Cecil Rhodes was a Director of the De Beers Mines

130 6 **Shifsky the socialist** A composite figure in which Sidney Webb (1859–1947), the Fabian Socialist is the main model. He advocated government control of public services, following the example of the Post Office. Others Russell seems to have had in mind were Henry Mayers Hyndman (1842–1921), the idiosyncratic Marxist who founded the Social Democratic Federation in 1881, and William Morris, the “ethical” Socialist writer and poet who was a passionate proponent of aesthetic reform emphasizing the values of medieval decorative arts

131. 25 ‘**the most ancient heavens, fresh and strong**’ Adapted from Wordsworth, “Ode to Duty”, st. 7, l. 56

131 26 ‘**moving about in worlds not realized**’ Wordsworth, “Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood”, st. 9, l. 146

133 22 **his wife** Mrs Forstice is a thinly veiled portrait of Russell’s wife Alys. By 1906 Alys was sufficiently despondent to hope that she had cancer.

135 31 **Forano the mathematician** A composite of Frege and Peano. For Frege, see A23 25. The Italian Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932), according to Russell, “extended the region of mathematical precision backwards towards regions which had

been given over to philosophical vagueness" (1944, 12)

135 33 'Amanti del Pensiero' Russell places his imaginary academy of savants, "the lovers of thought", in Florence. He knew the city well, having a decade earlier begun "The Free Man's Worship" at Bernard Berenson's nearby villa I Tatu. The Amanti del Pensiero may suggest the Platonic Academy founded in mid-fifteenth century Florence by the Humanist Marsilio Ficino. The discussion group also draws upon Russell's experience in the 1890s of the Cambridge Apostles

135: 36 **Leopardi** Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837), the pessimistic but deeply romantic Italian poet read by Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell during their affair. Russell marked "L'Infinito", "A se stesso" and "La ginestra, o il fiore del deserto" in the Table of Contents of his Italian edition of 1907

135 37 **Mazzini** See Paper 32 and 40 11-13

137 6 **the philosopher Nasispo** Nasispo is an anagram for Spinoza Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677), the pantheist yet rationalist metaphysician

138 10-11 'infinite love' Part v, Prop XXXVI

138: 27 **the poet Pardicreti** A composite of the names Leopardi and Lucretius. Lucretius (c 98-55 BC), author of the philosophical poem *De Rerum Natura*, exemplifies the classical in poetry, while Leopardi exemplifies the nineteenth-century romantic.

139 1 **a grand Lucretian epic** Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura* is a didactic poem on the nature of things in the physical world and a monument to Epicurean philosophy.

140 29 **Chenskoff** This character, originally a Russian composer, was changed to a novelist. Russell may have had first in mind Tchaikovsky. He retained the name, drawing into the fictional character Dostoyevsky and possibly Turgenev.

143. 19 **Giuseppe Alegno** Alegno seems, as Russell says, to signify the common man.

144. 31-2 'First become a King, and then enjoy your kingdom' Unidentified

145 27 **Tristram Forstice** Like John Forstice, Russell was orphaned while a small boy. Tristram Forstice is based on his Uncle Rollo who belonged to his grandparents' household into which Russell was taken at age four. Russell wrote "My Uncle Rollo had some importance in my early development, as he frequently talked to me about scientific matters, of which he had considerable knowledge" (1967, 24). Russell had been delighted by Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* (1760-67) which he was given as a boy. Tristram, because of the name's derivation from *tristes*, has connotations of sadness in love in that novel.

146. 8 **Catherine Belasys** The name Catherine Belasys may have been Lady Ottoline's choice, since she introduced the story of this heroine into the work. The saintly Catherine is a version of Mother Julian, who as a member of a religious sisterhood in Truro, Cornwall had greatly influenced Lady Ottoline in her girlhood. Mother Julian's death in 1912 is a key topic in the correspondence between Russell and Lady Ottoline. Lady Ottoline wrote of her in her *Early Memoirs* "Her presence seemed to radiate some lovely and loving spiritual power. She seemed to me like Saint Stephen, with heavenly lights in her face, and she gave me, above all, such a

feeling of reverence that I never lost the desire, when I entered her room, to kneel to her, but it was not to her as a person one desired to kneel, but to some wonderful transcendental light in her soul" (1963, 97) Saintliness is conveyed by the name Catherine, while Belasys is an English surname of Norman origin, also given to estates meaning "beautiful seat"

148 30 **'Verweile doch, Du bist so schon'** Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, Pt. I, l. 1700 (1965, 61) [Translation. "Linger on, you are so fair!"]

10 Mysticism and Logic

158. 6 **Hume** David Hume (1711–1776), the Scots philosopher who determined to apply experimental methods to philosophy in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) and *An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding* (1748)

158 7 **Blake** William Blake (1757–1827), the English mystical poet who felt antipathy to Bacon, Locke and Newton, but most of all to Newton He objected to the belief that truth could be reached through scientific experimentation or mathematical investigation

158 16 **Heraclitus** (c 540–480 BC) On 30 June 1913, Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell "I feel amazingly alive and full of thoughts I have been reading all the known fragments of Heraclitus (*sic*), which are wonderful He is only known from a few scattered quotations—some mere nonsense—and no one knows what he thought or believed—strange, the genius and fire and agony of it all gone, gone, and only a few swift lightning flashes remembered" (#820) Some of the same fragments as in the essay are quoted in the letter On 20 February 1914, Russell wrote to Lucy Donnelly, "I find that of all the men that ever lived, Heraclitus is the most intimate to me"

158 16 **Plato** On 16 September 1913, Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline "Yes, Plato is wonderful But he is not intimate to me—I haven't enough urbanity for him And I have begun to feel just a hint of the mediaeval prison-house in his authoritativeness and insistence on ethics as against science Burnet's book made me feel this more But of course really he is about as great as any man who ever lived" (#870)

158 38 to which Plato alludes *Cratylus*, 402

161 36–7 "not to despise ... things" *Parmenides*, 130

162 6 **Parmenides himself** In a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell of 18 January 1914, Russell wrote about his reaction to the discovery that mysticism was indebted to Parmenides "It is odd: one thinks of mysticism as so essentially Eastern It makes me realize more than ever the greatness of the pre-Socratic philosophers Parmenides really invented metaphysical mysticism in the West" (#972)

162 11 **Hegel and his modern disciples** Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) Influenced by his philosophy teacher G F Stout and by McTaggart, Russell had accepted neo-Hegelianism from 1893 to 1898 The other modern disciples Russell probably had in mind were T H Green, Bernard Bosanquet and F H

Bradley

162 13-15 "immovable in the bonds ... cast them away" John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (1908, 200), fragment 8, ll 27-30

162 16-18 "Thou canst not know ... can be." *Ibid*, p 198 (fragments 4, 5, ll 7-9)

162 18-20 "It needs must be . to be." *Ibid*, p 198(fragment 6, ll 1-3)

163 35 Spinoza and Hegel For Spinoza, eternity is understood to be the very nature of existence (Bk. I, Prop. 8) For an example of Hegel's discussion on this subject see *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol 2, *The Philosophy of Nature*, #257-60, cf. esp #259

165 4 Rousseau Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) Russell came to appreciate Rousseau only in 1915 When he read *Emile* in May, he told Lady Ottoline Morrell that it was "very interesting" "I love his style I see at last that he really is a great man" (#1275).

165 9 Bergson Russell had written a critique of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) called "The Philosophy of Bergson" published in *The Monist* of July 1912 See also Paper 37

168 41 I have explained elsewhere *Our Knowledge of the External World As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* (1914, 45-7).

169 28 Mr. Santayana—"malicious" George Santayana (1863-1952) speaks of the "malicious psychology" motivating the transcendental philosophers' criticism of knowledge, in *Reason in Science* (1906, 309)

170 7 Sufi Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell on 18 January 1914 "I am now reading a translation of a very long Persian poem called 'Masnavi Ma'navi' by a thirteenth century Sufi mystic. I borrowed it from Bevan he tells me Arabic and Persian mysticism was borrowed from the Neo-Platonists" (#972)

171 11 Nietzsche See A15 5

171 26-8 natural kinds ... Aristotelian tradition Aristotle, in *De Anima*, classified nature by immutable categories from the inorganic level upwards. Man was perceived as the supreme achievement of nature

171 34 Laplace Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) set forth the nebular hypothesis in a note in *Exposition du système du monde* (1796)

172 4 Spencer Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" and claimed to have studied society "scientifically" on the basis of evolutionary principles His works include *Social Statics* (1851), *The Principles of Psychology* (1855), *The Principles of Sociology* (1876-96) and *The Principles of Biology* (1864-67)

172 5 Hegelian evolutionists Probably Samuel Alexander, author of *Moral Order and Progress* (1889) and David G Ritchie, author of *Darwin and Hegel* (1893)

174 14-15 The earth .. celestial light The second and the fourth lines of "Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood" by William Wordsworth

176: 25-6 "He that loveth his life shall lose it" John 12 25

11 Literature of the Fiscal Controversy

186. 23 like List Friedrich Georg List (1789–1846) was the leading German critic of classical economic theory in his emphasis on tariff policies to promote national power. His theories provided justification for those economists, politicians and industrialists who called for tariffs as the necessary alternative to free trade. In particular, he was determined to emancipate the Prussian state from an overwhelming dependence on British manufactured goods. His views were presented in his famous book, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (1841, 1st English ed., 1885)

187. 42 assaults of Trusts During the years 1898 to 1903 the British press voiced grave concern about American economic competition, especially that organized in trusts. The incident that caused the most alarm, though it proved unsuccessful, was J P Morgan's attempt to gain control of British Atlantic shipping.

188. 7 Retaliators Supporters of Prime Minister Balfour's fiscal policy advocated giving British governments the power of imposing tariffs to be used as a bargaining weapon to lower foreign tariffs. Since retaliation excluded the more controversial policy of imperial preference, Balfour on 1 October 1903 at Sheffield committed the Unionists to this limited fiscal approach.

188. 33 concentrate on agriculture Since Ashley wrote his book at the request of Chamberlain (Amery 1969, 5 289–90), it is not surprising that he should advocate virtually the same controversial suggestion which the former Colonial Secretary had urged in his famous Glasgow speech inaugurating the tariff reform campaign. At Glasgow, Chamberlain had expressed his desire that the colonies emphasize the production of food and raw materials and desist from manufacturing which competed with British industries. With the self-governing colonies, particularly Canada, already committed to the development of tariff-protected industries, Chamberlain's request was a political blunder which offended many colonials and gave ammunition to his domestic critics. In the official version published the day after the speech, Chamberlain cut out most of this particular plea to the colonists and modified what remained so as to render it as innocuous as possible.

189. 17–19 Canada ... Reciprocity Russell was wrong since a Canadian-American reciprocity agreement negotiated in 1911 was rejected by both the Canadian Parliament and electorate and not, paradoxically, by the American Congress which contained many powerful protectionists who had since 1866 successfully thwarted the re-negotiation of such a treaty.

12 The Tariff Controversy

193. 18 Mr. Gladstone's first Administration William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898) whose Ministry from 1868 to 1874 was most noted for its destruction or reduction of many aristocratic privileges in economic, military, social and political spheres.

194 27-8 **Mr. Balfour's Notes on Insular Free Trade** A document arguing that British governments needed that threat of retaliatory duties to try to force down high tariffs It was circulated to the Cabinet on 5 August 1903 and published in September as *Economic Notes on Insular Free Trade*.

194 36-7 **preference ... is definitely "unauthorized"** Doubtful that the electorate was ready to accept taxes on imported food coming from outside the Empire, Balfour at Sheffield on 1 October had not committed his government to preference Balfour could omit preference from the government fiscal programme, because he and Chamberlain had in mid-September agreed secretly that the Colonial Secretary should resign from the Cabinet to launch a personal campaign to convert the electorate to the whole of his tariff programme, including food taxes

196 10 **the Birmingham reformers** Birmingham in the West Midlands was the heart of Chamberlain's Radical Unionists political organization and had been from the mid-1880s a centre of protectionist sympathy Chamberlain chose many of his lieutenants, such as C A Vince, from the Birmingham area

197 22 **Sir Robert Peel** He (1788-1850) was the famous Conservative Prime Minister (1841-46) whose growing resolve to abolish tariffs, culminating in the repeal of the Corn Laws, led to Britain's position as the first and only country fully committed to free trade until a comprehensive system of imperial preference was created by the Ottawa agreements of 1932

197 26 **Cobden treaty with France in 1860** Acting at the request of Gladstone and with the approval of the Liberal Government, Richard Cobden (1804-1865) negotiated the famous Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of January 1860 The Treaty allowed many hitherto prohibited British goods into France, and gave France import access to the British market nearly as privileged as those rights enjoyed by the colonies Although Russell is correct in stating that France still kept many tariffs high, the Treaty was viewed mistakenly by free traders as the first major step towards full international free trade

197 37 **Second Empire** In existence from 1852 to 1870, it was ruled by Napoleon III (1808-1873), a son of the great Napoleon's brother Louis

198 17 **the Zollverein** By 1834, Prussia had created a north German customs union that excluded the Habsburg Empire The union abolished tariffs among one half of the remaining thirty-eight States composing the German Confederation The Zollverein provided the economic base for the political unification of Germany

198 22-3 **return to protectionism** Anxious to protect Junker landlords from economic ruin by the sudden influx late in the 1870s of cheap New World cereals and desirous also of maintaining an agrarian peasantry as a reservoir for conscripts, Bismarck reversed his earlier free-trade policies and pushed protectionist measures through the Reichstag in 1879 Germany's return to protectionism was paralleled in most European states, especially those which maintained large standing armies, and in the United States These tariff increases in all industrial countries except for Britain confounded the belief of followers of Peel and Cobden that the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 would usher in an era of lasting, universal free trade

198 26 **Caprivi's treaties** Count Georg Leo Caprivi (1831–1899), succeeded Bismarck as Chancellor of Germany from 1890 to 1894. His commercial treaties with six European states significantly lowered German tariffs against those countries while stimulating German industrial exports.

201 35 **the question of the unemployed** Increasingly from the mid-1880s, unemployment was seen by British politicians, administrators and writers on social problems as the root of much crime and distress. Edwardian governments concentrated, mostly unsuccessfully, on policies designed to reduce unemployment.

203 23–4 **the Steel Trust** The United States Steel Company, created by Andrew Carnegie and sold to J P Morgan in 1901, had almost monopoly control of the industry in America by 1904.

204 19 **List** See A186 23

204 31–2 **Hugh Bell** See A9 12

204 38 **Napoleonic methods** A hyperbolical comparison to Napoleon's "Continental System" which was an unsuccessful attempt, implemented in 1806 and 1807, to destroy Britain's economy and hence resistance by excluding British imports from his Empire and allied countries. The American McKinley tariff of 1890 and the Dingley tariff of 1897 in particular had had severe effects on the tinplate industry and parts of the steel industry.

205 33 **Ryland's stated** The full title of the trade journal was the *Iron Trade Circular and Hardware Weekly Messenger* (Birmingham).

206 35 **Thomas–Gilchrist process** Sidney Gilchrist Thomas (1850–1885), metallurgist and inventor, and Percy Gilchrist, (1851–1935), chemist, developed this process in 1879 for the deposphorization of iron ores. The full exploitation of high phosphorus iron ore from Lorraine provided much of the impetus for the industrial growth of the Ruhr.

207 28 **the Convention of Cintra** An armistice signed by Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852), later the Duke of Wellington (1809), and his two superior officers on 22 August 1808 allowed a battered French army to retreat from Portugal. The armistice causing a public outcry in England led to a military Court of Inquiry. All three military leaders were exonerated, but Wellesley alone was voted a sum of money by Parliament.

208 8 **Chamberlain's favourite year** Chamberlain chose 1872 because exports were particularly high that year owing to British businessmen exploiting trading opportunities in the aftermath of the Franco–Prussian War. Critics claimed that Chamberlain, in his attempt to show the very small increase in British exports from 1872 to 1902, had chosen a most atypical year.

208 9 **Sir Robert Giffen** Economist and statistician, Giffen (1837–1910) was a powerful Victorian civil servant whose financial acumen was often sought by politicians and members of Royal Commissions. A dedicated free trader, he became a formidable expert attacking Chamberlain's tariff reform proposals.

208 34 **Bournville** Model factory town built up by the Quaker "cocoa magnate", George Cadbury, near Birmingham between 1893 and 1900.

208. 37 **Port Sunlight** In 1888, William Hesketh Lever founded this model town near Liverpool to house the workers from his soap factory
209. 24 "cheap, low-grade and docile" Ashley, p 110.
209. 43 **Carter-Paterson** Well-known national cartage firm
212. 14-16 **Goschen ... time of war** George Joachim Goschen (1831-1907), first Viscount Goschen (1900), in his speech at Liverpool on 6 November 1903, denied that preference would help secure the United Kingdom. Since he was a respected senior statesman (and had been Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1886-92), financier and free trader, this speech was an important indication of the opposition to Chamberlain's policy within the Unionist Alliance. He had been a Liberal Cabinet Minister in Gladstone's 1868-74 Ministry and a Liberal Unionist Minister under Lord Salisbury in the Unionist Administrations of 1886-92 and 1895-1900
212. 37 we hold with Professor Marshall Along with thirteen other leading economists, Marshall signed a free-trade manifesto which appeared in *The Times* (15 Aug 1903) Since he was generally regarded as the most distinguished economist in England, Alfred Marshall's signature on the document gave encouragement to free traders and umbrage to tariff reformers The phrase referred to comes from a passage claiming that free trade has been justified for "reasons which are now stronger than formerly"
213. 9 **cult of efficiency** The term "national efficiency" had a clear meaning and significance in the political debate of the day Dismayed by military incompetence during the Boer War, many concerned Britons determined to restructure traditional institutions of government so that the nation could face more effectively the rivalries of Great Powers, particularly Germany Efficiency became the slogan for a blueprint of change if the country and empire were to survive Although the quest for national efficiency initially cut across both traditional party alignments and distinctions such as "capitalist" and "socialist", many Radicals, Russell among them, were always apprehensive of authoritarian implications in the "cult" After Chamberlain's call for fiscal change in May 1903, the idea of efficiency was increasingly associated with Chamberlainite tariff reformers and state socialists, particularly the Webbs The effect of tariff reform was to break the cross-party unity essential to the "national efficiency" campaign Chamberlain had not been part of it and always deplored unorganized, non-party movements—indeed the tariff reform campaign was, in one of its aspects, an attempt to regain the initiative from the coalition-minded politicians capitalizing on the Boer War crisis
215. 32 **Little Englanders** See A129. 12

13 Mr. Charles Booth on Fiscal Reform

217: 10-11 "cosmopolitan ... principles" "Fiscal Reform", 686

14 Old and New Protectionism

- 220 5 **List** See A186 23
 220 20 **Thomas—Gilchrist process** See A206 35.
 221 25 **Little Englanders** See A129 12

15 International Competition

- 223 27 **Mr. Seddon** Richard John Seddon (1845–1906), fervent imperialist and socialist premier of New Zealand, 1893–1906, was the strongest supporter among the colonial leaders of Chamberlain's policy of preference. Late in 1903 Seddon was able to legislate a Preferential Trade Act favouring British and Imperial imports. The remark was made by Seddon in the New Zealand Parliament: "The 'Open Door' policy of fifty years had resulted in an open Hades for British workmen and British manufacturers, while foreign workers and manufacturers, made secure behind fiscal barriers, were enjoying heavenly prosperity" (*The Morning Post*, 20 Nov. 1903).
- 223 36 **the first chapter** By Beatrice Webb herself

16 Mr Charles Booth's Proposals for Fiscal Reform

- 226 16 **seven volumes** There are eight volumes rather than seven
 227 9 **war in South Africa** 12 October 1899 to 31 May 1902.
 227 19–20 **due to Cobden's persuasions** From his first major speech in the House of Commons in July 1842 attacking tariffs, Richard Cobden was recognized as the most eloquent advocate of free trade in Parliament and in the country. His most effective speech came in March 1845 when, according to his biographer John Morley (1908, 1 342), Peel listened carefully and then turned to his Cabinet colleague, Sidney Herbert, exclaiming "You must answer for this, for I cannot." This story, accepted by Peel's biographers, helps explain the Conservative Prime Minister's determination in 1846 to repeal the Corn Laws.
227. 23–6 "**Weary of our ... own interests.**" *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd ser., Vol. 83 (27 Jan 1846)
227. 41 **(to modify La Rochefoucauld)** The original maxim of La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680) was "Hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue" (Maxim 218)
230. 14 **an article** By Gustavus Myers (1904)
- 231 5–6 "**friends of every country but their own**" In *The Mikado*, Act 1, by W. S. Gilbert, Ko-Ko sings "Then the idiot who praises, with enthusiastic tone, / All centuries but this, and every country but his own" (1952, 324)
- 231 6 **Professor Brentano** Lujo Brentano (1844–1931) in "Über Ausfuhrprämien" Brentano was a German economist best known for his study of trade unions, *On the History and Development of Gilds, and the Origin of Trade Unions* (1870).
- 231 10 **advocated English Free Trade** "The Proposed Reversal of English Commercial Policy" (1903)

232 21 in the last Consular report *Report for the Year 1902 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Frankfort-on-Main*

17 Mr. Gerald Balfour on Countervailing Duties

234 2-3 Mr. Morley See A9 5-6.

234 14 model of Retaliation was the Sugar Convention By the late 1890s European policies of providing large export bounties to their sugar beet producers had almost destroyed the market for British West Indian sugar. Responding to a veiled threat by Britain that she would impose retaliatory duties, those European countries that processed sugar met in Brussels. In March 1902, they signed the Sugar Convention, thereby providing for the gradual abolition of the bounty system. Like Russell, many British free traders deplored the Convention since the bounties had provided British consumers and industries with cheap sugar. Protectionists saw the Convention as a vindication of retaliation and as the only means of saving the British West Indian economies.

18 On the Democratic Ideal

248 39 In the *Fioretti di San Francesco Little Flowers of St Francis* A legendary biography of St Francis of Assisi written in the fourteenth century

248 40 "santa ubbedienza" Holy obedience

251 42-3 Boswell's account of Johnson's meeting with George III During his private audience in February of 1767, Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) showed his natural courtesy and wit, but there was no obsequiousness in his manner. James Boswell (1740-1795) recalled the incident in his great work, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791).

19 The Status of Women

260 25-6 "in a holiday ... consent" *As You Like It*, IV, 1, 70-1

260 27 bombs in Russia In the late-nineteenth century, Russia was noted for revolutionaries' bombing attempts against the autocratic tsars and leading officers of state. The most significant incident was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 by terrorists called The People's Will. He had survived seven attempts on his life.

261. 22-3 Queen Elizabeth informed the House of Commons that it was incapable of understanding foreign affairs Although the conflict was characteristic of her entire reign, this allusion may refer to the repeated attempts in 1586-87 by the House of Commons to convince the Queen to accept the sovereignty of the Low Countries and to strike other blows at Catholicism. On 1 March 1587, the Queen called the Speaker to Greenwich to order him to inform the Commons not to interfere in foreign policy since such attempts impinged upon her prerogative.

261 27–8 Bagehot felt that the risks of the Bill of 1867 outweighed its probable benefits Walter Bagehot (1827–1877) speculates on the probable effects of the Bill in his introduction to the second edition (1872) of *The English Constitution*. Unless great caution is taken, the Bill may undermine that source of the country's stability, which in Bagehot's words is "deference", or due respect for social superiors

263. 10–11 to vote for and to sit on many local bodies The Municipal and Corporations Elections Act of 1869 had given the municipal vote to unmarried women ratepayers. In 1894, the Local Government Act permitted qualified married women to vote for Parish and District Councils with the stipulation that the same property could not be used to qualify both husband and wife. By this Act, neither sex nor marital status could disqualify a person from serving on Parish or Urban Councils, Boards of Guardians or from acting as the chairman for District Councils.

264 38 George Meredith In "What Shall I Read?", Russell records having finished the following *The Amazing Marriage* (1895) in January 1896, *The Egoist* (1879) in June 1891, *Evan Harrington* (1861) in December 1901, *Harry Richmond* (1871) in February 1902, *One of Our Conquerors* (1891) in July 1894, *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* (1859) in February 1893, *The Tragic Comedians* (1880) in February 1896 and *Vittoria* (1867) in April 1892.

20 The Wimbledon By-Election

268 34–5 Universal Scheme of Old Age Pensions Various schemes for old age pensions had been put forward since the 1880s. By the time of the 1906 election a large majority of Liberal M.P.s were on record as favouring some pension plan, even though a pension plan was not official policy. To the delight of Radicals like Russell, Asquith in 1908 finally introduced in the Budget and Lloyd George piloted through the House of Commons the Old Age Pensions Act which, however modest, was enormously popular among the working classes and marked a decisive step towards the creation of a welfare state. Its universality lay in its non-contributory nature and in the provision that all persons seventy or over whose income did not exceed £26 a year would receive 5s a week. The exceptions were that no one could receive a pension who had been in prison within the last ten years, was a lunatic, was in receipt of poor relief or had been "habitually" unemployed (without paying dues to Friendly Societies or trade unions).

21 After the Second Reading

272 1 Women's Enfranchisement Bill Put forward as a Private Member's Bill by Henry York Stanger (1849–1929), Liberal M.P. for North Kensington (1906–10), barrister and county court judge.

22 Mr. Asquith's Pronouncement

276. 5 barring unforeseen accidents *The Times*'s account of Asquith's pronouncement reported him as qualifying his promise to the members of the deputation. He warned them that they "must also be aware that politics were full of surprises, and that sometimes unforeseen accidents occurred which were detrimental to plans however carefully considered" (21 May 1908)

23 Liberalism and Women's Suffrage

281. 34 Land Question See Paper 26

283 35 by novelists and playwrights Novelists such as Henry James, H. G. Wells, George Meredith and Arnold Bennett and playwrights Henrik Ibsen and George Bernard Shaw among them had presented the problems of the "new" woman

24 The Present Situation

286. 6 Stanger's Bill See A272 1

286. 18-19 if (as is probable) the Liberals are not returned Although Russell's forecast turned out to be wrong (the Liberals won 272 seats while the Unionists won 270), many factors made the prediction seem plausible. Numerous electors were frustrated by the Liberal failure to pass particular legislative measures, even though many failures resulted from rejection by the Unionist-dominated House of Lords. Moreover, some legislation which was enacted, such as the Old Age Pensions Act, frightened many middle-class voters who feared that such measures were socialistic. Reflecting on by-election losses, Russell lamented to Margaret Llewelyn Davies that reforms had brought Liberals "more enemies than friends" (24 June 1908). Hence, voters were prepared to return in large numbers to their previous Unionist affiliation from which in 1906 they had been temporarily alienated, particularly by tariff reform. By 1908, some electors were prepared to accept tariff reform as a lesser evil than Liberal social reform. It was common knowledge among politicians by early 1909 that the Unionists were anticipating a majority of at least forty after the next election.

286 21-2 whatever unpopularity such a measure may incur In 1907, Russell wrote to Margaret Llewelyn Davies concerning the Bill introduced by Willoughby Hyett Dickinson (1844-1928), Liberal backbencher for St Pancras North. "I think working men would loathe it. It seems to me ninety per cent of working men don't wish their wives to have votes" (16 Nov.)

286 26 twelve years Russell's predictions about when suffrage might be attained varied widely with the occasion. In a letter to Helen Flexner of 3 February 1908, he wrote, "I should not be much surprised if we got it within the next six years, though ten years is what I think most likely". The duration of parliaments where the government had a strong majority could legally be seven years. Since Russell

assumed that the Unionists would win the next election with a significant majority and that the Liberals would serve out their remaining four years, there could be no new Liberal Ministry returned for at least eleven years.

287. 14 the Conservative Party will take up In the unlikely event that the Conservatives came to favour any women's suffrage bill, the limited rather than the extended version would be their certain choice A limited bill would restrict the new voters to the propertied classes where the Conservative Party could be certain of increasing power

287 19 Mr. Dickinson's No. 2 The second reading debate on the No 2 Bill introduced by Dickinson had occurred on 8 March 1907 The Bill stated that the same qualifications that gave men the vote should be applied to women and that marriage would not disqualify women from voting On 6 March, Russell had written to Aly, "It seems to me the prospects for Dickinson's bill look worse every day" Indeed, the Bill was talked out

287 26 "or may be" The overriding aim, according to the motto of the National Union, was "To obtain the Parliamentary Suffrage for Women on the same terms as it is, or may be, granted to Men "

25 Should Suffragists Welcome the People's Suffrage Federation?

292 4 Congress in Hull At this meeting of the Labour Party held 22 January 1908, a resolution was put forward by a representative of the Independent Labour Party recommending that the franchise be granted to women on the same terms as men This was amended to a statement in favour of full adult suffrage. The amendment was overwhelmingly supported The objection to the initial resolution was that it would have the effect of giving two votes to every middle-class household Since seven million working-class households lacked the vote altogether, the majority of the delegates felt that this inequity should be remedied first Although the further amendment was then made that the government extend the franchise to working women, this proposal was not adopted The meeting was seen as a defeat for women who wanted the vote

292 8 "democratic lines" In Asquith's speech of 20 May 1908, he stipulated that the amendment to the promised Electoral Reform Bill must be made upon "democratic lines" It must have the overwhelming support of the men and women of the country

26 Address to the Bedford Liberal Association

297 6-7 political crisis of ... greatest importance ... since 1832 The rejection by the House of Lords on 30 November 1909 of Lloyd George's Budget created analogies to the political struggle which preceded the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 The Lords had only passed that measure, after first rejecting one version of it, when the Whig Government persuaded the King if necessary to

"swamp" the Upper House by the creation of new peers favourable to reform
297 10-11 Lords' Veto ... all lines of advance are blocked Since the Liberal victory of 1906, the House of Lords had selectively rejected or amended beyond recognition much proposed government legislation, culminating in the rejection of the 1909 Budget Most Liberals had assumed that the Liberal victory in the general election of January 1910 had ensured that, should the Lords again defy the majority in the House of Commons, new peers would be created to pass any subsequent legislation In fact, the Prime Minister had neither been given nor had even requested such guarantees from the King Russell and most other Liberals were dismayed by what they considered Asquith's failure, but had no recourse but to accept that another election would be needed before the power of the House of Lords would be effectively curbed

297 12-13 Resolutions which have passed the Commons On 14 April 1910 the Liberal Government passed three resolutions designed to shackle the House of Lords' veto powers The first would forbid the Lords to amend or reject a "money bill" as defined by the Speaker The second would limit the power of the Upper House to delay other legislation to two years and a month That is, if a bill passed the Commons in three successive sessions, it would become law regardless of majority opposition from the Lords The third recommended that the maximum length of parliaments be reduced from seven to five years These resolutions formed the basis of the Parliament Bill which was eventually passed in August 1911

297 16 another election will be required Russell predicted correctly, for in December 1910 there was another election which produced substantially the same results as the first 1910 election

297 19 by whatever means the Lords may render necessary The Liberal Government publicly threatened the Unionists that it was prepared to ask the King to create enough new peers to carry the legislation in the event that the Lords refused to pass the Parliament Bill When a list of prospective peers was later found in Asquith's papers one of 249 suggested was Bertrand Russell See Jenkins, *Mr Balfour's Poodle* (1954, 170-1), for other names of note on the list.

297 20 we hear talk of compromise Such rumours in fact materialized after King Edward VII died unexpectedly on 6 May 1910 The accession of the inexperienced George V prompted leading Liberals and Unionists to explore the possibility of a two-party constitutional conference to settle by compromise the impasse between the two Houses of Parliament Encouraged by the new King's hopes for a party truce, four Liberals and four Unionists met twenty-one times between 16 June 1910 and the announcement on 10 November of the failure of the Constitutional Conference. The negotiators had not restricted themselves to the Parliament Bill, but examined a wider range of issues including even a possible coalition government. All these efforts were unsuccessful.

297 30-1 destruction of the Education Bill Like the 185 Nonconformists who had been elected in 1906, Russell opposed the 1902 Education Act (See A8 18), particularly since it gave rate aid to Anglican and Roman Catholic schools. The 1906

Liberal Education Bill which attempted to remedy some of the Nonconformist grievances was amended so drastically by the Anglican-dominated House of Lords that the Liberals were forced to withdraw the measure. The same fate befell three similar bills, one in 1907 and two in 1908.

297 33 the Khaki cry The election of 1900 was known as the "Khaki" election because the Unionists, in an attempt to exploit patriotic fervour, called for a popular mandate in October when it appeared (prematurely in fact) that the Boers were on the verge of surrender. The tone of the election was set by Chamberlain's alleged claim, "A seat lost to the Government is a seat sold to the Boers".

297 38–40 the Plural Voting Bill, the Licensing Bill, the Scottish Valuation Bill . the Scottish Land Bill The Lords rejected all of these proposed measures. The Plural Voting Bill (1906) would have abolished the system whereby an elector could vote in as many constituencies as he owned property, the Licensing Bill (1908) was designed to reduce the number of public houses by one third in an attempt to curb alcoholism among the working classes. The latter was to be the main government measure of the 1908 parliamentary session. The Scottish Valuation Bill (1907) was intended to designate the capital value of what land, apart from improvements, would sell for on the open market. The Scottish Land Bill was fashioned to give small-holders security of tenure, at a rent to be determined by a Land Court with compulsory powers.

297 41 they threw out the Budget The Lords' rejection on 30 November 1909 came after the House of Commons had spent seventy days on the measure from its introduction on 29 April 1909 until the Budget passed its third reading on 4 November 1909.

298 6–7 grant of self-government to South Africa ... House of Lords had no voice The Campbell-Bannerman Government was dedicated to bringing about cooperation between the Boers and the English in South Africa by conciliation of the former. Hence in both of the erstwhile Boer Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the franchise was given to Afrikaanders and British alike, even though the Boers constituted a majority and under the grant of responsible government could regain power. To prevent the House of Lords from vetoing the constitution for these two new colonies, the Liberal Government granted the constitutions by requesting the King to exercise his royal prerogative to legislate for conquered colonies by Letters Patent. Both Balfour, the leader of the recently defeated Unionist Coalition, and Viscount Milner, the former High Commissioner for South Africa who had precipitated the Boer War, deplored these concessions as certain to lead eventually to the British loss of South Africa as a whole.

298 15 said by the Tories about "revolution" Unionist rhetoric employing the term "revolution" or "revolutionary" to describe the nature and probable impact of the Budget was well exemplified by J L Garvin, the influential editor of *The Observer*, and Lord Hugh Cecil, the prominent M P and a cousin of Balfour.

298 23 Bagehot's English Constitution Russell's copy was the 1894 edition which he read in October 1895. The passages quoted from p. 97 and p. 227 are marked.

299 9-10 Reform of the Lords In 1907 Lord Newton had introduced a House of Lords Reform Bill As Chairman of a Select Committee appointed in response to this Bill, Rosebery (the former Liberal Prime Minister) set forth some recommendations but these were not debated His resolutions of March 1910 were that the Lords should undertake their own reform and that voting rights should not be available automatically to all peers These proposals gained ready passage though nothing came of them

299 27-8 taxation of Land Values has had my whole-hearted support for many years On 2 January 1910 Russell wrote optimistically to Lucy Donnelly about Liberal prospects in the forthcoming election He claimed that an important issue in their favour was the land taxes which embodied "a principle I have cared for ever since I began to know economics, and capable, I believe, of transforming the lives of working people" Russell's commitment to this policy is also well illustrated in his correspondence with Halévy On 10 March 1905 he informed Halévy that a Liberal strength lay in "Taxation of Land Values which is immensely popular, and (in my opinion) thoroughly sound economically "

299 34 bring about their downfall This was not the first time that Russell had hoped that the peers would bring about their own destruction On 11 October 1906 he had written to Halévy "I wish the Lords would reject the Trade Disputes Bill, that might give a real chance of getting them abolished, as it would rouse fury But I fear they have too much sense "

300 3-7 additional revenue demanded by the Navy, by Old Age Pensions ... which ... Churchill has promised ... by means of Land Values In a series of well publicized speeches in 1908 and 1909 Winston Churchill (1874-1965) urged the Liberals to take as their major responsibility the solution of social questions Churchill's arguments reflect not only the paramountcy which he and Lloyd George had acquired in questions of reform, but also reveal how closely their statements coincided with the policies advocated by Liberal intellectuals Churchill and other Radicals were disturbed by the Government decision early in 1909 to build eight dreadnaughts by early 1912 Churchill, Lloyd George and their supporters agreed to these terms with the proviso that the cost of these armaments and projected social reforms would be financed by direct taxes which would fall most heavily on the wealthy The Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 already cost nearly £8 million a year Hence, the Lloyd George Budget of 1909 sought to raise an extra £16 million to pay for naval armaments and pensions as well as reforms such as Lloyd George's unemployment insurance scheme and Churchill's system of Labour Exchanges The taxation of land values, which Churchill advocated as the main source of the needed revenue, was in part to be implemented by those specific land taxes which Lloyd George incorporated into his Budget Ironically, these taxes never brought in enough revenue to offset the cost of collection and were repealed in 1922 Ever since Churchill had crossed the floor in 1904 to become a Liberal, Russell had admired him as a progressive politician (letter to Halévy, 10 March 1905) During the January 1910 election campaign Russell described Churchill as having shown himself "capable of speeches which put close economic reasoning in a form that anybody

can understand" (letter to Lucy Donnelly, 2 Jan.)

301. 2 Agricultural Rates Act In April 1896 the Unionist Government of Lord Salisbury passed this Act which, because it gave such substantial tax relief to landlords, became the most controversial legislation of that year. A consequence of the measure was a diminution of revenue to the state, caused by the assessment of agricultural land at half its rateable value. This deficit was essentially to be made up by Exchequer subsidies derived from death duties.

301. 15-16 Balfour of Burleigh ... Local Taxation Commission Hugh Alexander Bruce (1849-1921), 6th Baron Balfour of Burleigh, Secretary of State for Scotland in Unionist administrations 1895-1903, had been chairman of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation which presented its final reports in 1901. Balfour of Burleigh had signed the Separate Report on Urban Rating and Site Values. This Report proposed to divide the Site Value Rating between owners and occupiers and recommended the separate valuation of land and houses. This statement of the principle of a shared liability for taxation was an encouragement to Radical reformers.

301 17-18 motion ... carried in the Tory House of Commons in 1905 On 14 April 1905, Sir John Brunner's Taxation of Land Values Bill passed by a majority of ninety. The intention of the Bill was to assess urban land values with a view to rating them according to their current market price. Many M.P.s, certain that the Bill would not pass, either did not bother to vote in the division or felt that they could vote for a proposal certain to be doomed.

301 41-2 diminish the monopoly power of the landowner A traditional Radical belief, harking back to the 1830s, was that unless the great aristocratic estates were broken up, the landlords would retain the substance of power in the state, no matter what other reforms were passed. At the heart of the argument was the conviction that landed wealth and privilege were immoral and a hindrance to the development of the economy. While land reformers agreed that the power of the landlords was pernicious, there was no agreement on the best means to change the system. The scheme which commanded the widest support among Radicals, including Russell, was that known as "free trade in land". This would be achieved by abolishing the laws of primogeniture, entail and, especially, settlement. Necessary parallel steps would be the compulsory registration and valuation of the land. Such policies would lead, Radicals were convinced, to free competition on the market in land which, in turn, would transfer gradually much of the arable land to the working classes as small holdings. Although Liberals made land reform the centre of their last social reform campaign in 1914 neither then nor later were the great estates broken up and a yeoman proprietor class established.

302 10-11 A large part of the land of England belongs to the peers Although estimates varied because of incomplete data, some Radicals accepted the figures published in 1881 by the Warden of Merton College, Oxford, G.C. Brodrick. He reckoned that some 4,000 proprietors, with 1,000 acres or more, owned one half of England and Wales. Other Radicals inclined to Sir Arthur Arnold's claim, made in 1880, that 7,000 persons owned four-fifths of the land in the United Kingdom.

Whatever the exact figures, Russell was in the mainstream of Radical opinion in his belief that the problem of land concentration was urgent. Land reformers believed that the problem was worsening, exacerbating social problems and increasingly allowing landlords to exert a stranglehold on the community.

302: 19 his Albert Hall speech To launch the Liberal election campaign, Asquith delivered an important policy speech in the Albert Hall on 10 December 1909. The banner draped at the front "Shall the people be ruled by the Peers?" announced the main theme. Asquith said then that the widening of the franchise and the removal of electoral irregularities were contingent upon the limitation of the Lords' veto. Ten thousand enthusiastic men attended the speech.

302: 20 plural voting gives a scandalous preponderance to property Plural voting depended upon owning pieces of property, however small, in various constituencies. On 20 December 1910 *The Daily News* commented "A man may own a constituency. It will give him one vote. He may own twenty small stables in twenty constituencies, and he exercises twenty votes."

302: 22-3 qualifications for the franchise simplified ... qualifying period shortened To qualify for a vote each male had to fall under at least one of seven franchises, the property, freemen, university, occupation, household, lodger or service franchise. Many were disfranchised because as servants or sons living with their parents, for example, they did not fit into any of the seven categories. Many more were disfranchised because the franchise provisions directly excluded them, as was the case with those receiving poor law relief, or indirectly excluded them, as was the case with party officials. Far more significantly than any other franchise qualifications, registration requirements limited the number of votes, since four of the seven franchises, including the largest, the household, demanded at least twelve months residency in one place (and another six before the voting register came into force). The franchise and registration laws meant that only about sixty per cent of all adult males (or thirty per cent of the adult population) were eligible to vote in the 1910 elections.

302: 24-5 great division of opinion At the Albert Hall, Asquith promised that women's suffrage would come before the new government. Since women had been excluded from the audience because their presence might be too disruptive, this assurance must have seemed ill-timed. This exclusion, together with Asquith's well-known opposition to women's suffrage, caused Russell to be somewhat defensive about the Liberal division of opinion.

303. 10 as the industrial North very well knows Tariff reform had little appeal to the textile industries of Lancashire and, with the exception of some industries around Birmingham, little attraction for workers and industrialists in the steel, coal and shipping industries of the Midlands and the Northeast. Tariffs would not benefit coal which was an exporting industry, shipping was thriving, particularly when cheap steel plates could be imported without tariff costs, and most of the steel industry was sufficiently competitive in world markets not to wish for protection. Tariff reform was especially repugnant in Lancashire, the cradle of the free-trade

ideology Russell exulted to Lucy Donnelly on 2 January 1910 "Winston addressed 40,000 Lancashire men in a week, and showed that they would be ruined by Protection, and now the Tories daren't show their faces anywhere near Manchester" Without making significant gains in "the industrial North" the Unionists could not hope for a majority over the Liberals, much less a majority over the Liberals in alliance with Irish Nationalists and the Labour Party

303 29 **our victory in 1832** Russell always regarded the Whig victory in the Reform Bill crisis of 1832 as the "decisive battle between reactionaries and progressives in England" The peaceful outcome "saved England from revolution, and it was my grandfather who did most to secure the victory" (1956, 109)

27 Anti-Suffragist Anxieties

306 6 **Anti-Suffrage League** The Women's National Anti-Suffrage League was formed in 1908 Membership, drawn mainly from the upper classes, included Mrs Humphry Ward, Gertrude Bell and Lady Jersey The major aim of the organization was to prevent the enfranchisement of women and deny them the right to run for Parliament There was, however, no objection to their established role in municipal politics and community organizations. After amalgamation in December 1910 with the Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage, the name was changed to the National League for Opposing Women's Suffrage The League's activities included campaigning and publishing *The Anti-Suffrage Review*. Dicey was honoured as a "Prominent Anti-Suffragist" in the May 1911 issue

306. 7 **an eminent Professor** A V Dicey (1835–1922), Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford (1882–1909), held a lectureship on private international law established by All Souls College (1910–13) and was the author of works on British law, notably *Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1885)

306 25 **Mill, in *The Subjection of Women*** Dicey believed that John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) allowed his generosity to conquer his usual good judgment in *The Subjection of Women* (1869), which traced the position of women through history and argued that the time for their emancipation had come

306. 28 "**the wisdom of our ancestors**" A phrase of Edmund Burke in "Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with America", *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke* (1808, 3: 81).

307 9–10 **women's suffrage in some countries** New Zealand, the first country to give the vote to women, had done so in 1893 By 1910 other countries included Norway and Australia, and some states in the United States.

307 13–6 **Only a very careful reader . . how numerous they are.** Dicey seems to make no acknowledgement, although there is a reference (18) to universal suffrage in some of the United States

307 25–8 **We are told . . . by Burke and Bentham.** Dicey 1909, 14

308 9 **By factory acts, by marriage laws** Factory acts throughout the nineteenth century limited the hours a woman could work per week Dealing with the com-

plaint that this legislation created new problems for women, Dicey wrote "Despotism is none the less trying because it may be dictated by philanthropy, and the benevolence of workmen which protects women from overwork is not quite above suspicion when it coincides with the desire of artisans to protect themselves from female competition" (1909, 22-3) On the marriage laws he was less equivocal "The change in the law produced by the Married Women's Property Acts, 1870-92, and for most practical purposes completed by 1882, has removed almost every grievance of which a married woman in respect of her property had reason to complain" (*ibid*, 26)

308 36-7 Abdul Hamid Abdul Hamid (1842-1915), the Sultan of Turkey (1876-1909), was colloquially called "the Damned" As the instigator of the Armenian massacres (1895-96), he was seen as the epitome of autocracy and savagery The rumour of his intention to publish his memoirs seems to be Russell's invention.

309 26 wages-fund theory This pessimistic theory, deriving from Malthus and Ricardo, stated that the portion of capital each entrepreneur set aside to pay subsistence wages was fixed inexorably by forces beyond anyone's control If the ratio of funds devoted to wages was increased (as by the unionization of the workers) at the expense of profits, capitalists would be forced to shut down their factories or face bankruptcy Wages could not be increased even on the basis of need, or the number of dependants a worker had The theory assumed a nearly static economy in which productivity increased very slowly, if at all Appalled by the grim implications of this "law" and convinced that it was no longer theoretically tenable, Mill, in 1869 ("Thornton on Labour and Its Claims"), promulgated his famous rejection of the theory—a rejection accepted by most subsequent economists

309 33 methods of taxation The increase in the power of Labour was a major factor in the Liberals' pioneering of new forms of taxation after 1906. For example, in 1907, to the horror of strict adherents of *laissez-faire*, Asquith's budget differentiated between earned and unearned income, taxing the latter more heavily

310 17 belated adherents of the "classical" political economy Economists such as J E Cairnes held fast in the 1870s and 1880s to concepts such as the wages-fund theory, thereby rejecting Mill's criticisms of *laissez-faire* and the new marginal utility analysis of Alfred Marshall

310 33 "feminine emotion" Dicey 1909, 62

310 36-7 women poor-law guardians Duties of guardians involved distribution of money and administration of the workhouse The first woman had been elected to the position in 1875.

310 37-8 socialist women . C O.S. doctrines Those who followed Charity Organization Society doctrines held that the problem of poverty must be approached on an individual basis, with little government involvement According to the C O S , a virtuous needy person could be encouraged to ameliorate his position through thrift and self-help The C O S was criticized by New Liberals and Socialists for the selectivity of its approach because the "undeserving" poor were

often the more destitute and because of the assumption that chronic poverty was caused by defects of character

310 39 Women on Educational Committees By the Education Act of 1870, women could serve on school boards. Three women had been appointed to the Royal Commission on Secondary Education in 1895. When the Education Act of 1902 placed control of state schools in the county and borough councils, it was stipulated that women should always be eligible for these committees.

310. 43 Mafficking celebrations The relief of Mafeking on 17 May 1900 in the South African War released unprecedented popular rejoicing, which, however, often degenerated into jingoistic, unruly crowd behaviour. This aspect of the celebrations gave the term "Mafficking" the connotation of mass vandalism and irrationality. Since Russell had become a pro-Boer by 1901 and was thereafter embarrassed by his temporary imperialism, the term must have had a particularly distasteful connotation for him.

311 33 Old Sarum Before its abolition by the Reform Act of 1832, this constituency was synonymous with electoral abuse of the most notorious sort. Thomas ("Diamond") Pitt (1653–1726)—the great-grandfather of Prime Minister William Pitt—purchased Old Sarum in 1690. As owner of this rotten borough, he was able to elect himself or dependants to Parliament.

312 34–40 The grant ... long agitation. Dicey 1909, 62

313 6–7 their admission to the Cabinet John Burns (1858–1943) was the first working man to attain this position. He had started work at the age of twelve in a candle factory. His Cabinet appointment signalled the importance that the Liberal leadership accorded organized labour. While Burns had eschewed his earlier socialism and rejected the Independent Labour Party, working men remembered his important role in the 1889 London Dock Strike and his political activities as a Lib-Lab M.P. Russell commented in 1906 "The Cabinet is excellent. I am very glad John Burns is in it" (letter to Lucy Donnelly, 1 Jan.). As a member of the Liberal Cabinet from 1905 to 1914, he held conservative views that disappointed his supporters. His opposition to Poor Law reform caused the most consternation.

314 19 the rise of the Labour Party Russell, writing shortly after the first 1910 election, in which the Labour Party won forty seats, was convinced that its foundations were well grounded and probably permanent. The Party emerged from the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) formed in 1900 by a majority of the trade unions to resist employers' attempts to restrict their growing assertiveness. The LRC, in secret alliance with the Liberals, ran quite a number of candidates in the 1906 election of whom thirty were successful. After the election it assumed the official title of the Labour Party and, although practically in alliance with the Liberals, decided to sit on the Opposition benches.

314 21 urban working men ... vote Ever since Disraeli had engineered the passage of the Second Reform Act in 1867, working-class voters had constituted a majority of the borough electorate. The Third Reform Act of 1884 had made them a majority of the voters in the counties. Their support for the traditional parties was based

primarily on residual Liberalism in the one case and deference to traditional Conservative institutions and values in the other

28 Religion and Metaphysics

321 32 Wordsworth William Wordsworth (1770-1850), in "Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood" (1807), makes a claim for pre-existence "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting / The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star, / Hath had elsewhere its setting, / And cometh from afar" (ll 59-62)

322 12 as Shelley remarked on Magdalen Bridge The poet Shelley (1792-1822) was unable to prove that new-born babes had knowledge of a previous existence Thomas Jefferson Hogg in *Shelley at Oxford* (1904) tells of the poet, when crossing Magdalen Bridge, taking a baby from its mother's arms with the question "Will your baby tell us anything about pre-existence, madam?" (168) When told that the baby could not speak, Shelley (who held that knowledge is reminiscence) could not believe that a baby had so soon forgotten language.

324 40 those who in the main follow in the footsteps of Hegel Russell refers to such Neo-Hegelians as F H Bradley and McTaggart himself, against whose metaphysical comforts he had rebelled nearly a decade earlier

325 13 Spinoza: "*Omnia paeclarata tam difficilia quam rara sunt.*" The last sentence of Spinoza's *Ethics* "But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare "

29 A History of Free Thought

328: 13 Buckle Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-62) wished to make history a scientific discipline, particularly through the use of archival data Robertson wrote *Buckle and his Critics* (1895)

328. 30 "somewhat fanatically" Robertson, 2: 381.

328 31-5 Thus he shows ... Catholicism. (Robertson, I 449-51, 425) Russell wrote in the margin on p. 425 beside the remark about Elizabeth "Not an economic cause"

328 38 the blood of heretic martyrs Russell marked this passage "The legate, Arnold, abbot of Citeaux, being asked at an early stage how the heretics were to be distinguished from the faithful, gave the never-to-be-forgotten answer, "Kill all, God will know his own" (Robertson, I 322)

329 1 the thesis This thesis is summarized in Robertson, 2 400, 404

329 18-22 Of this process ... worsted. Robertson, I 46-60

329 23-5 great philosophers ... obscurantism Of Plato, for instance, Robertson writes "One of the great prose writers of the world, he has won by his literary genius—that is, by his power of continuous presentation as well as by his style—no less than by his service to supernaturalist philosophy in general, a repute above his deserts as a thinker" (Robertson, I 168-9) Russell put two question marks in the margin

329 29-30 As regards the higher criticism ... views. Robertson, 2 351-60.

30 Free Thought, Ancient and Modern

330 7 **Kapila** (Robertson, 1 50) Kapila is credited with the formulation of a system of ancient Indian philosophy, but his historicity is questionable

330 8 **Bradlaugh** When Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891) was elected to Parliament in 1880 as the Member for Northampton, the problem arose as to whether a professed atheist could be admitted to the House of Commons. This controversy and the concomitant difficulty of whether he could take the Parliamentary Oath without breaking the Blasphemy Laws were exploited by the Conservatives so successfully that the early part of Gladstone's second administration (1880-85) was seriously disrupted. J M Robertson wrote "An Account of His Parliamentary Struggle, Politics and Teachings" for *Charles Bradlaugh*, the biography written by Bradlaugh's daughter

330 10 at an early stage Robertson (1 34) quotes Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* (1873, 293-4).

330 18 **Albigenses** Convinced that heretics in Christian countries were more dangerous than those in remote lands, Pope Innocent III, early in the thirteenth century, called for a crusade against the Albigenses of Southern France and Northern Italy. The many adherents of the sect believed the universe to be organized on a dualistic principle with matter governed by evil and spirit by absolute goodness. Many thousands were slaughtered by the crusaders

330 18-21 **thrifty crusaders ... as many sins as possible** (Robertson, 2 321) This passage is marked in Russell's copy and "future" is underlined

330 25-6 **David ... euhemerised gods** Russell marked the passages on 1 101 in which these and other Old Testament figures are treated as semi-mythic beings

330. 26-7 **Buddha, Zoroaster, and even the founder of the Christian religion probably never existed** Robertson states that Buddhism "cannot have arisen on one man's initiative in the manner claimed in the legends" (1 54). Zoroastrianism is declared to be "the work of one Zarathustra or any one reformer" (1·68). He is dubious about Jesus' existence as a historical figure because of the discrepancies in the Gospel stories. Alongside his catalogue of these inconsistencies, Russell has written "I don't think much of this list" (2. 218-19)

330 27-8 **only a few stray texts in the Old Testament are pre-exilic** Robertson, I Chap 4

330. 28-9 **Tacitus is very likely a Renaissance forgery** Robertson gives rise to this remark by commenting that one of the sentiments which Tacitus attributes to Tiberius—"the Gods' wrongs are the Gods' business"—has an un-Roman sound" (1 211). He casts doubt on the credibility of the *Annals* by commenting in a footnote "That such a phrase should have been written by an emperor in an official letter, and yet pass unnoticed through antiquity save in one historical work, recovered only in the Renaissance, is one of the minor improbabilities that give colour to

the denial of the genuineness of the Annals" (I 211n) Tacitus (*c.* 56-*c.* 120) is generally regarded as the greatest Roman historian

330. 32-3 "Athens ... cities" (Robertson, I: 156) This passage is marked in Russell's copy

330 40-331 1 "It is safe to say ... foreign intercourse." (Robertson, I 123-4)
This passage is marked in Russell's text

331 3-4 the effect of Byzantine civilization on the Renaissance "Renaescent Italy is, after ancient Greece, the great historical illustration of the sociological law that the higher civilizations arise through the passing-on of seeds of culture from older to newer societies, under conditions that specially foster them and give them freer growth. The straitened and archaic Byzantine art, unprogressive in the hidebound life of the Eastern Empire, developed in the free and striving Italian communities till it paralleled the sculpture of ancient Greece" (Robertson, I 343)

331 12-14 Except as regards the Reformation, he seems to make sufficient allowance for non-economic causes. "Only as an eddy in the movement of freethought is the Reformation intellectually significant Politically it is a great illustration of the potency of economic forces" (Robertson, I 478)

331 21-3 collapse of English deism . . Newton, Harvey, Boyle Because deists believed that God reveals himself through the design of the universe, the discoveries of scientists showing the ordered plan of Nature reinforced their position Sir Isaac Newton's (1642-1727) theories about light and gravity did the most to contribute to the perception of the world as intricately patterned Also important were the discoveries of William Harvey (1578-1657) about the circulation of the blood and of Robert Boyle (1627-1691) concerning the behaviour of air under pressure Robertson's discussion of deists includes Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Earl of Shaftesbury

331 24 seven years' war The Seven Years' War (1756-63) was the most important international conflict before the wars of the French Revolution The two peace treaties of 1763 established England conclusively as the world's dominant colonial nation, while recognizing Prussia as a European great power

331 31 Zeno and the Eleatic school See A88 31-4.

331 32 "the frivolous problem of Achilles and the tortoise" (Robertson, I 145) Russell wrote in the margin "Shame!"

331. 37 "a repute above his deserts as a thinker" (Robertson, I 169) Russell put two question marks in the margin

331 42-332. 6 Sextus ... on a par with that belief." (Robertson, I 186-7) Russell wrote "so it is" beside the last sentence Sextus Empiricus (late 2nd century-early 3rd century) preserved the history of Greek Scepticism in two works *Outlines of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes* and *Against the Dogmatists*.

31 The Development of Morals

336· 18 invoke the coal-scuttle “The oddly placed invocation to the coal-scuttle is a reference to the ritual where the sin or curse was burnt up” (*Morals in Evolution*, 2 69)

336· 19 tribes which do not know that human beings have fathers *Morals in Evolution*, I 163 “Some Melanesians hold that paternity is due to a cocoa-nut, bread-fruit, or something similar” (I 163n)

336. 23–9 “If a white man ... dog!” (I 347–8)

336 31–2 “the women ... passed.” (I. 245)

336 33–6 “prisoners are tortured ... minds” (I 247)

336 37–40 “prisoners are .. purpose.” (I· 247–8)

336 40–1 “What! ... sell?” (I. 288)

336 41 Burton Sir Richard Francis Burton (1821–1890), explorer, linguist and earlyanthropologist was most renowned for his expedition in search of the sources of the Nile He travelled extensively in Central and West Africa, the Middle East and South America Of his numerous publications, his translation of *The Arabian Nights* was his greatest popular success. Russell’s library contains *The Arabian Nights* in twelve volumes

337 2 the code of Hammurabi Hammurabi (c 1792–1750 B C) was the sixth ruler of the first (“Amorite”) dynasty of Babylon The great code is the most complete extant record of Babylonian law and provides the first historical evidence of any law code

337 5–6 Nebuchadnezzar’s hymn to Marduk Nebuchadnezzar, described in the Old Testament, was the son of the founder of the Neo-Babylonian empire over which he reigned from c 604 to 561 B.C His prayers and hymns, such as those to the supreme god Marduk, reflect the highest level of Babylonian ethical and religious thought, although in western Judeo–Christian history he is noted primarily as the ruler who destroyed Jerusalem and the Jewish state of Judea in 586 B C

337. 17–18 “There are men ... criminals.” (I 265.)

337 20–5 When Mencius ... cook-room. (I 263.)

338 5 American freedom of divorce Because the constitution left divorce to state jurisdiction, divorce laws in the United States varied widely from state to state Throughout the country there were over 72,000 divorces in 1906 or 4.4 per thousand of marriages

338 31 his Theory of Knowledge In *Theory of Knowledge A Contribution to Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics* (1896), Hobhouse used Mill’s empirical method to support his own idealism Included among Mill’s idealistic critics discussed are F H Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet

339 24 Ormuzd Ormuzd and Ahriman were gods of good and evil in the ancient dualistic Indo-Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism Whereas Ormuzd exists eternally in endless light, Ahriman dwells in temporality and darkness Their struggle results in the ultimate triumph of good over evil.

32 Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic

344 10 Mazzini He envisioned the nation that would emerge after the revolution as being modelled on the Roman Republic and based on democratic principles and a reformed Catholicism. The ultimate unification of Italy under the Piedmontese (or Sardinian) monarchy deeply disillusioned him.

344 19 French entry into Rome The expeditionary force sent to crush the Roman Republic was authorized by Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808-1873). There was great irony in Louis Napoleon's policy, since as a young man he had been a member of the Carbonari, the most famous of the Italian secret societies advocating unification of the peninsula through revolution. Louis Napoleon, nephew of Emperor Napoleon I, catapulted to world fame by becoming President of the Second French Republic in November 1852. In authorizing the French expedition to Rome, Louis Napoleon was acting from motives of domestic political expediency.

344 26 principles of 1815 Enunciated by the Treaties of Chaumont in 1814 and consolidated by the formation of the Quadruple Alliance in 1815 after the battle of Waterloo. Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain agreed to work together to prevent the return of Napoleon or any member of his dynasty, as well as any revival of French power.

344 26 the Holy Alliance An association of three conservative states based on general ideas expressed in a document drawn up in 1815 by the Tsar of Russia, Alexander I. This document had exhorted that European rulers govern their subjects and conduct their diplomacy by Christian principles. The vague ideals expressed were endorsed by Prussia and Austria, and later by many minor European states, but never by Britain and France.

344 28-9 socialism which appeared in Paris The short-lived National Workshops set up early in 1848 by the Provisional Government of the Second French Republic acting at the urging of the Utopian Socialist member of that administration, Louis Blanc.

344 32 Federalists and Fusionists These factions eventually merged to form the Italian National Society under the leadership of Count Camillo di Cavour.

344 33-4 King of Sardinia Because the Sardinian monarchy was the only indigenous royal dynasty in the peninsula, it became a focal point of Italian unity. During the revolutions of 1848, King Charles Albert (1798-1849) had unsuccessfully led his troops against Austria which controlled much of the peninsula. After his defeat, he abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel.

345 1-4 Magyars asserted ... to suppress the Magyars The Hungarians in March 1848 asserted their independence from Austrian rule maintaining only a personal allegiance to the Habsburg emperor. After many Habsburg attempts, the Hungarian rebellion was finally crushed in May 1849 by a Russian army which Tsar Nicholas I had offered to bring into the field to support the new Habsburg emperor, Francis Joseph.

345 6-7 achieving the expulsion of the "Barbarians" Russell's allusion is to

Machiavelli's famous "Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians", *The Prince*, Chap 26

345 13–14 **the Pope ... at first, an important exception** Pius IX, Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti (1792–1878), popularly known as Pio Nono

345 35–6 **the Sanfedists and the Centurioni** To fight Liberal secret societies, the government of the Papal States organized their own para-military groups to preserve discipline. In some parts of the Papal States they were called Sanfedists and in other parts, and more generally, after 1843, they were named Centurioni.

345 38 **in 1831 a joint note** As a result of a conference among the Great Powers in which anxiety was expressed that revolution might break out in the atrociously governed Papal States, specific reforms were urged upon Pope Gregory XVI (1765–1846). The only reform he adopted was the institution in 1832 of civil courts.

346. 30 **Gioberti, *Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani*** Translation *Moral and Civic Preeminence of Italians*. Published in 1843 by Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852).

347 1 **fortresses of the Quadrilateral** The Austrian defence network in Northern Italy was based on the four historic fortresses (located between Lombardy and Venetia) Mantua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnano.

347. 4–5 **in the words of Metternich ... "the greatest misfortune of the age"** Count Metternich (1773–1859), arch-conservative Chancellor of the Habsburg Empire from 1809 to 1848, observed of Pius IX: "The Pope is shown more clearly every day to be lacking in any practical intelligence. Born and bred in a liberal family, he never turned his mind to affairs of government and allowed himself to become entangled in a net from which he is no longer able to escape." See de Bertier de Sauvigny 1962.

347. 12–13 **Austrian power seemed hopelessly broken** By March 1848, revolution in Vienna had forced Metternich to flee and the Emperor Ferdinand I to retreat to a nearby fortress. Nationalist rebellions in Hungary, Bohemia and many Italian states led to the establishment of a constitutional assembly and contributed to the widely held belief that the Austrian Empire was irrevocably collapsing.

347 15 **under Radetzky** Count Field-Marshal Johann Joseph Radetzky (1766–1858) was the most distinguished Habsburg general of his era. His decisive victories over the Piedmontese armies at Custoza in 1848 and Novara in 1849 led to the successful restoration of Austrian power in Northern Italy.

347 16–17 **General Durando** General Giovanni Durando (1804–1869) was a Sardinian soldier whom Pius IX reluctantly agreed to place in command of the forces of the Papal States. Durando disobeyed Pius IX's wishes and crossed the frontiers of the Papal States to side with the Piedmontese in what proved to be an abortive campaign.

347 18–19 **he delivered an allocution informing the Cardinals** In response to General Durando's impulsive attempt to commit papal troops against the Austrians, Pius IX publicly addressed his clergy repudiating any involvement in the war against Austria.

348 3 **Count Rossi** Count Pellegrino Rossi (1787-1848) was a jurist, diplomat and politician who attempted to preserve the Pope's temporal power by reforming the Papal States and checking Piedmontese ambitions His assassination precipitated the crisis which led to the creation of the Roman Republic

348 5 **Angelo Brunetti** Angelo Brunetti (1800-1849) was a popular leader before and during the period of the Roman Republic. He was instrumental in moving the bulk of the Roman populace to a republican point of view, thus paving the way for the uprising of November 1848 After the fall of the Republic, he was shot

348. 9 **King Bomba** Ferdinand II (1810-1859), King of the Two Sicilies, was for Liberals everywhere the epitome of reactionary rule The popular nickname "King Bomba" was coined after he subjected revolutionaries in Messina to a devastating bombardment and subsequent massacre

350: 1 **last attempt at revolution in 1831** Inspired by the July Revolution of 1830 in France, the Carbonari instigated abortive revolts in Northern Italy and the Papal States which were swiftly and savagely repressed

350 2 **"Young Italy"** Disgusted by the ineptness of the Carbonari and anxious to involve more young Italians in the national movement, Mazzini founded "Young Italy" and tried to infuse it with the force of a new religion Although the influence of this movement waned in Italy after the revolutionary failures of 1848-49, the organization had an international appeal to militant nationalists

350 9 **Victor Emmanuel** Victor Emmanuel II (1820-1878), King of Piedmont and Sardinia 1849-61 and first King of Italy after 1861

350. 18 **Cavour** Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861) Of Liberal persuasion, he was prime minister of Piedmont from 1851 to 1861 and the architect of Italian unification

350. 19 **Garibaldi ... visit to England in 1864** In April 1864 Garibaldi arrived in England to thank the British people for the support they had given him in his successful 1860 campaign to destroy Bourbon power in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. He was so popular that a section of the Whig aristocracy vied with Mazzinians and English Radicals for his company.

350. 20-1 **gathering at which Mazzini was present** Garibaldi spoke at the house in Teddington of the Russian radical author and journalist, Alexander Herzen

350. 31 **Jacopo Ruffini** Ruffini (1805-1833) His suicide led Mazzini to elevate him to the status of a martyr in the cause of Italian unity

350. 33 **Giuditta Sidoli** Giuditta Bellerio Sidoli (1804-1871), the widow of a Carbonari, spent two years with Mazzini before returning to Italy in 1833 in search of her children. Although she saw Mazzini only once again, his notoriety caused her to be imprisoned in 1852 for alleged complicity in his nationalist plots

352 2 **After Rome had been won** Until 1870, Rome had remained apart from the new Italian state, under Papal control This control was sustained by a French garrison which Napoleon III withdrew after defeats in the Franco-Prussian War Piedmontese soldiers then entered the city and nationalists claimed

that by this last step in Italian unification the temporal power of the Pope was at an end

352 13 Jowett Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893), famous Master of Balliol College and Professor of Greek at Oxford.

352 16–26 Carlyle ... recognized ... “Whatever ... is meant by that.” Thomas Carlyle’s letter was published in *The Times*, 19 June 1844 in protest against the British government’s policy of opening Mazzini’s mail and passing the contents on to his Italian enemies

353 7–8 Dictator to the Roman republic On the news of the decisive Austrian victory over the Piedmontese at Novara, the leaders of the Republic in Rome set up an emergency triumvirate Mazzini’s prestige and leadership were so dominant that he was designated formally as a Triumvir with supreme executive authority and functioned as a dictator.

354 10 Orsini Felice Orsini (1819–1858), a Carbonaro and a follower of Mazzini, demonstrated high administrative skills in serving the Roman Republic. Orsini’s attempt on Napoleon III’s life in January 1858 was made because he considered that the Emperor was proceeding too slowly in support of Italian unification. In fact, Napoleon III’s support of Piedmont in the 1859 war against Austria was essential to the ultimate achievement of Italian unity

354 11 Napoleon III Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, President of the Second French Republic, engineered in December 1851 a coup d'état against the Republic which led to him being proclaimed Emperor Napoleon III late in 1852. He was forced to abdicate when his Empire was destroyed in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War and replaced by the Third Republic

356 1–4 “Neither of these ... and a story.” Trevelyan, p. 31.

356 7 “Italian legion” A group of some 600 Italian volunteers created to defend the republic of Uruguay against the attempted conquest by Argentina supported by a dissident Uruguayan faction. During the course of the conflict, Garibaldi’s men adopted the red shirt which became famous as the uniform of his men in Italy. Only some sixty to seventy Legionaries accompanied Garibaldi to Italy in 1848.

356 26 Metternich had fallen On 13 March 1848, Metternich resigned and fled to England

356 27–8 the flight of the Emperor Ferdinand I (1793–1875) and his family fled from revolutionary Vienna to Innsbruck on 17 May 1848 and soon after he abdicated in favour of his grandson, Francis Joseph I (1830–1916).

356 30 famous Five Days of street fighting Long frustrated by Austrian rule, the Milanese were inspired by the news of the 13 March revolution in Vienna to set up barricades against General Radetzky’s troops on 18 March. Stunned by the rebel onslaughts and fearful of being trapped in Milan by the approaching Piedmontese army, Radetzky withdrew on 22 March to the fortresses of the Quadrilateral

356. 36–7 a plébiscite demanding annexation to Piedmont Seizing upon an appeal from the Milanese and desirous of heading off a radical movement in his own

territories, Charles Albert declared war against Austria on 22 March in an attempt to transform a national war into one of Piedmontese dynastic conquest. Charles Albert's attempt at territorial aggrandizement seemed vindicated when a majority of Venetians and Lombards voted in favour of annexation to Piedmont. This large majority reflected peasant distrust of the revolution and of republican promises, and was in reality a protest vote against the rich middle class rebels.

356 38 **Custoza** This battle was the turning point in the Austrian-Piedmontese War. By this victory Radetzky was able to escape from the confines of the Quadrilateral and push the Piedmontese out of Lombardy. Soon after Charles Albert was obliged to sue for an armistice.

357 3 **Manin** Daniel Manin (1804-1857), lawyer and revolutionary. After news of the revolt in Vienna, Manin and his supporters proclaimed the establishment of the Venetian Republic on 22 March 1848.

357 5 **Novara** On 23 March 1849, Radetzky decisively defeated the disorganized Piedmontese causing Charles Albert to abdicate and his successor, Victor Emmanuel II, to sue for peace.

357 13 **Rossi** See A348 3

357 17-18 **The French republican Government** The Second Republic was proclaimed on 24 February 1848 after King Louis Philippe abdicated in reaction to radical demonstrations in Paris. By April 1849 radicals and socialists in the Republican "coalition" had been completely crushed by moderate and conservative Republicans, thus paving the way for intervention against the Roman Republic. Under pressure from Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who had been elected President of the Republic in November 1852, an expedition was sent to capture Rome as part of a general campaign to revive the power of the Catholic Church and to save society from "radicalism".

357 20 **General Oudinot** General Nicolas Charles Victor Oudinot (1791-1863) was the son of one of Napoleon's marshals, the Duc de Reggio. Oudinot had earlier distinguished himself in Napoleon's great defensive battles of 1813 and 1814 after the retreat from Moscow.

358 5 **Lesseps** Baron Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805-1894) was a junior diplomat when he was sent to Rome on what he considered to be a friendly mission to make a peace settlement between Mazzini and the other Roman Triumvirs and France. The treaty of 31 May provided for the French to protect Rome but said nothing about the future of the Republic or the possible return of the Pope. By the time the treaty was signed the French government, determined to avenge their army's retreat of 30 April, had brought in reinforcements and hence repudiated the peace settlement and recalled de Lesseps.

358 18 **Commander-in-Chief Roselli** General Pietro Roselli (1808-1865) was a Roman general of the regular army who, because of his admiration for Mazzini, had chosen to lead revolutionary forces. As commander-in-chief of the Republican armies, he was dilatory and ineffectual and was soon involved in constant feuds with Garibaldi.

358 20-1 **insubordination ... we are allowed to admire** in Nelson Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) on three occasions apparently disobeyed orders twice in the West Indies and most notoriously at the Battle of Copenhagen. On the last occasion Nelson, when ordered to break off battle with the Danes on 1 April 1801, allegedly put the telescope to his blind eye exclaiming "I do not really see the signal" (Southey 1813, 2. 124). After his victory he reportedly told his crew "I have fought contrary to orders, and I shall, perhaps, be hanged. Never mind. let them!" (*ibid.*, 138)

359 16 "**ceases ... and remains at its post**" Trevelyan, p. 228 Mazzini dissented from this decision of the Assembly, refused to agree to the surrender and, in fact, remained in Rome defying the French to apprehend him

360 10 **Colonel Forbes** Hugh Forbes (1808-1892) was an English adventurer devoted to the ideal of Italian unification. He fought against Ferdinand II in Palermo and then travelled north to assume command of the Republican army after the fall of Rome

361 13 **Gioberti** See A346 30

361 32 **faithful to the constitution he had granted in 1848** On 4 March Charles Albert had hastily promulgated a constitution for Piedmont in the hope of retaining support of moderate opinion. The constitution made few concessions to democracy with full executive power remaining in the hands of the King and membership in the elected lower chamber confined to the rich. Toleration and civil rights, hitherto restricted only to Catholics, were granted to Jews and Protestants. As well, wide freedom of the press and association was conceded generally. Eventually this document formed the basis for the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy

33 Politics of a Biologist

366 11-13 **The only use to which Darwinian arguments have hitherto been put ... races** A major exponent of this view was Karl Pearson. In a more muted form, Benjamin Kidd expressed the same justification for racism and militarism. Of course, entirely opposite conclusions were also drawn from Darwinism. The theory was interpreted by many New Liberals to support their belief that man was beginning to develop beyond conflict towards universal brotherhood

367 11 **suicide ... on the increase** Chatterton-Hill, p. 186

367 12-13 **more prevalent in Protestant than in Catholic countries** Chatterton-Hill, pp. 195-6 Chatterton-Hill anticipates the comment about England in the second note by saying that Anglicanism combines the social cohesiveness of religion and patriotism

367 14 **Insanity** Chatterton-Hill, pp. 257-309

367 27-9 **Figures are quoted ... according to wealth.** Chatterton-Hill, pp. 326-8

368 37 **Schopenhauer** Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a Prussian philosopher most remembered for his revolt against the rationalism of the Enlighten-

ment by an advocacy of the primacy of the will.

368 37 **Nietzsche** See A15 5

368 37 **Mr. Kidd** Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916) had gained wide acclaim with the publication of *Social Evolution* (1894). He intended the work to answer both Marx and Spencer

369 1 **Like Mr. Kidd** On p. 372, Chatterton-Hill quotes Kidd's statement "the teaching of reason to the individual must always be that the present time and his own interests therein are all-important to him. Yet the forces which are working out our development are primarily concerned, not with these interests of the individual, but with those of the race" (1894, 78). Religious beliefs are necessary, in Kidd's view, to combat this rational tendency

369 14-15 **in Belgium the Church (in the main) supports the Congo atrocities, while the atheistical Socialists attack them** Through exposés by E D Morel, Roger Casement and Joseph Conrad, British people were alerted to the barbarisms that had been perpetrated in the Congo. Expressions of outrage had little effect in Belgium because such protests were easy to dismiss as arising from imperial jealousy by another apparently successful form of imperialism. The opportunity for this exploitation had been created when at the Berlin conference of 1884, the Congo was said to "belong" to Leopold II. From 1885 to 1908, he controlled the Congo Free State and pillaged its resources, particularly its rubber. King Leopold urged Belgian Catholic orders to set up missions in the Congo. Because they were there at his invitation, they were more inclined to keep silent about the exploitation than Protestants from England, America and Scandinavia who had been established there for some time and were far less dependent on the administration. People in Belgium therefore lacked unbiased reports from an autonomous moral authority about the situation. Father Vermeesch was an exception to the general quiescence of the Belgian Church. His *La Question Congolaise* (1906) had a greater impact than protests from socialists because their anti-monarchism made their criticisms seem less objective

369 16-18 **atheistic defenders of Dreyfus to the religious forgers and perjurers who secured his condemnation** The most famous of these were the radical Georges Clemenceau, the socialist Jean Jaurès and the novelist Émile Zola. Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935) had been deported to Devil's Island in 1894 on the charge of treason. The allegation was that he had supplied Germany with French army secrets. Gradually evidence was assembled to show that his trial had been grossly unjust. Dreyfus received a formal pardon in September 1899 and was eventually reinstated in the army. The main "religious forgers and perjurers" are generally recognized (at least by supporters of Dreyfus) as being Major H J Henry, a counter-intelligence officer and the anti-semitic journalist, Edouard Drumont

369 22 **chapter on "the bankruptcy of Liberalism"** Pt 3, Chap 2

369 42 **General André and M. Picquart** General L J N André (1838-1913) was a strong anti-clerical Republican in command of the French artillery. After Dreyfus was pardoned, he became Minister of War from 1900 to 1904 and in this position led

a purge of anti-Republican army officers. Major Marie-George Picquart (1854–1914), as head of counter-intelligence after 1896, examined the Dreyfus file and concluded that the condemned man was innocent and a different officer guilty. When he tried to reopen the case, army leaders had him transferred to Tunisia. After Dreyfus was acquitted, Picquart was vindicated and made Minister of War in Clemenceau's Cabinet of 1906–09.

370 9–10 “the ideal ... goodness of man” Chatterton-Hill, p. 476

370 14–15 In Cromwell's army democracy was advocated on Scriptural grounds A key concept was that the emphasis on adherence to law had been replaced by egalitarianism derived from the New Testament. In spite of the great stress on liberty and equality in Puritan thought, an anti-democratic element existed because of the belief that certain people, the elect, formed a spiritual élite.

372 20 Free education up to any grade School fees for elementary schools had been abolished in 1891. In 1906, the Liberal Government provided extra revenue to those secondary schools that had one quarter free enrolment.

372 21 free feeding of school-children The Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906 allowed local authorities to provide meals for needy children but did not compel them to do so.

34 Biology and Politics

374 15–16 Weismann has urged The German biologist, August Weismann (1834–1914), in *Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems* (1889), presented his controversial theory of the germ plasm.

374. 37 Mr. Kidd See A366 11–13 and A368 37

35 Memories and Studies

377 4 American celebrities Louis Agassiz, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Robert Gould Shaw, Francis Booth and Thomas Davidson

377 5 Two on psychical research “Frederick Myers’ Services to Psychology” (1911) and “Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher” (1911)

377 7–8 “when a man’s pursuit .. one.” (P. 195)

377 12 Herbert Spencer Spencer’s *Autobiography* had appeared in 1904 (the year after his death). See A172 4

377 21–3 “the plain truth ... fireworks.” (P. 304)

377. 24–5 “War is ... blood-payment.” (P. 304)

377 25–6 “Let the soldiers ... marrying.” (P. 305)

36 Dramatic and Utilitarian Ethics

380 17 Micromégas *Œuvres Choisies de Voltaire* (1752, I. 221–2). This passage is marked in Russell’s copy and “Cp Hamlet IV 4” is written in the margin. The

passage from Shakespeare is found in *Hamlet*, IV, iv, 32-66. The same juxtaposition of passages occurs in "Voltaire's Influence on Me" (1958) [Translation] "O Ye intelligent atoms, in whom the supreme Being hath been pleased to manifest his omniscience and power, without all doubt your joys on this earth must be pure and exquisite for being unencumbered with matter, and to all appearance, little else than soul, you must spend your lives in the delights of love and reflexion, which are the true enjoyments of a perfect spirit". "you must know, for example, that this very moment, while I am speaking, there are one hundred thousand animals of our species, covered with hats, slaying an equal number of fellow creatures who wear turbans; at least, they are either slaying or slain and this hath been nearly the case, all over the earth, from time immemorial" The Sirian shuddering at this information, begged to know the cause of those horrible quarrels among such a puny race, and was given to understand, that the subject of the dispute was some pitiful mole-hill no bigger than his heel not that any one of those millions who cut one another's throats, pretends to have the least claim to the smallest particle of that clod; the question is to know, whether it shall belong to a certain person, who is known by the name of Sultan, or to another whom (for what reason I know not) they dignify with the appellation of Caesar Neither one nor t'other has ever seen, or ever will see the pitiful corner in question, and scarce one of those wretches who sacrifice one another, hath ever beheld the animal on whose account they are mutually sacrificed!

"Ah nuscreants!" cried the indignant Sirian, "such excess of desperate rage is beyond conception I have a good mind to take two or three steps and trample the whole nest of such ridiculous assassins under my feet" "Don't give yourself the trouble," replied the philosopher, "they are industrious enough in procuring their own destruction"]

382 14-15 "Le sage qui passe interrompt mille drames", says Maeterlinck *La Sagesse et la destinée* (1949, 40) by Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949)

382 20 Synge's *Playboy of the Western World* J M. Synge (1871-1909) In the play (1907), Christy Mahon gains adulation and love with his claim to having committed parricide. When his angry father appears on the scene, Christy is forced to abandon his pretensions to heroism Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell "It is an astonishingly good play, but I think the end unnecessarily brutal" (#101, 4 June 1911)

382. 37 "it is the cause, it is the cause, my soul" *Othello*, v, ii, 1

383. 19 the woman taken in adultery in the Gospels John 8 3-11

383 26-7 ... Friends ... sustain. *King Lear*, v, iii, 321-2

383 31-2 I have a journey ... say no. *King Lear*, v, iii, 322-3

37 The Professor's Guide to Laughter

385 8 "Jokes without Tears, by Mr. McQuedy" Russell's title is based on *French without Tears* (1895-97) and *German without Tears* (1900) by Lady Bell (A9 12)

MacQuedy was a humourless Scot in Thomas Love Peacock's novel, *Crochet Castle* Russell recorded the novel in "What Shall I Read?" in December 1892 and March 1898

385 16–18 "The attitudes ... machine." *Laughter An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (1911a, 29) This paragraph is italicized in Bergson's text. Russell has marked this passage

385 26 We laugh at Molière's misers Beside Bergson's theory of types, Russell wrote in the margin, "All rot Balzac e g. gets tragedy from types" (163).

385 30–1 "Was it for me ... true prince?" *I Henry IV*, II, iv, 300–2 Beside Bergson's reference to Hamlet's individuality, Russell wrote in the margin, "Falstaff is just as unique" (162).

385 36 within a formula Beside Bergson's statement, "it would be idle to attempt to derive every comic effect from one simple formula", Russell wrote, "hear hear" in the margin (36)

385 38 Lamb's answer Charles Lamb (1775–1834), letter-writer, essayist, critic Recounted in a letter to Mrs Williams of 2 April 1830 and in one to Sarah Hazlitt of 24 May 1830 *The Works of Charles and Mary Lamb* (1912, 6 896, 912–13)

38 The Place of Science in a Liberal Education

390 20–1 Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz Michael Faraday (1791–1867) developed theories about electric and magnetic forces which he investigated experimentally James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879) developed mathematical equations for Faraday's theories This knowledge was first applied to the creation and reception of radio waves by Heinrich Rudolf Hertz (1857–1894) (Cf Russell 1931, 152–3) While at Cambridge, Russell had read "Clerk Maxwell's great book on electricity and magnetism This book had been the subject of Whitehead's Fellowship dissertation" (1959, 42–3) About the same period, he wrote, "I studied Hertz's *Principles of Mechanics*, and I was delighted when Hertz succeeded in manufacturing electromagnetic waves" (*ibid*, 39)

391 37 Chinese poet Ch'en Tzu-Ang (656–698). The poem, titled "Regrets", was translated by Herbert A Giles Lucy Donnelly gave Russell an anthology of Giles's translations Thanking her on 2 January 1910 he wrote: "The Chinese poems are interesting often very artistic, with a peculiar quaint quality; the only thing that is disappointing about them is that they are not more unlike our poetry in sentiment "

394 41–2 In art nothing worth doing can be done without genius Compare "All great literature requires the rare and all but impossible combination of fiery emotion with an intellect capable of viewing it impersonally Where the latter fails, you get mere Byron; where the former, mere preciosity" (Russell to Helen Thomas, 31 March 1902)

395 26 Aristotle *De Caelo*, 1 Russell uses stars as if synonymous with heavens Aristotle said that stars do not move, but that they are attached to spheres that do

396 4–11 Malthus ... Revolution Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) argued,

in *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, rev 1803), that human populations multiply in a geometrical progression, while food supplies increase only arithmetically. This pessimistic hypothesis was an assault not only on political but also on religious utopias. Both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels consistently and ferociously attacked the Malthusian doctrine as a product unique to the capitalist mode of production. Among the leading religious opponents of Malthus were the poets Robert Southey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the essayist William Hazlitt. They were affronted not only at the Malthusian contradiction of scriptural injunctions for mankind to increase and multiply but were appalled primarily at the economist's disregard of God as a wise and benevolent Father eternally watching over each individual.

39 The Proposed Change in the Ordination Service

402 3 Genesis xix Russell uses the same illustration in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell ‘I wonder if they really think the unedifying tales in Genesis are ‘inspired by God’—e.g. the tale of how Lot’s daughters made him drunk in order to conceive by him’ (#912, 14 Nov 1913).

402 23 your last issue 29 November 1913 Besides those mentioned by Russell there were two more writers, C. R. Fay and C. E. Winn, whose letters appeared at this time.

402 25 Canon Foakes-Jackson Frederick John Foakes-Jackson (1855–1941), Dean of Jesus College (1895–1916) and honorary Canon of Peterborough (1901–26). His letter suggested that candidates be required to “acknowledge the authority” of the Scripture. He praised Russell for helping religion from outside the Church.

402 27 Principal Tait The Rev. Arthur James Tait (1872–1944), Principal, Ridley Hall, Cambridge (1907–27). He commented that Russell had found the “weak spot” in the proposed new question. The former question did not, he argued, involve intellectual dishonesty. To acquiesce to it meant a confession of belief in the Scripture as the revelation of God to man.

402. 27 Professor Barnes William Emery Barnes (1859–1939), Professor of Divinity, Cambridge (1901–34), Old Testament scholar. He noted that although Biblical data about astronomy and geology are often erroneous and the history mixed with myth, the Scripture as a whole contains truth that originated from God.

402 30 Professor Gwatkin’s Henry Melville Gwatkin (1844–1916), a patristic specialist, Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge (1891–1916).

402 30 Essays and Reviews A highly controversial book of articles, later condemned by Convocation, containing Frederick Temple, “The Education of the World”, Rowland Williams, “Bunsen’s Biblical Researches”, Baden Powell, “On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity”, H. B. Wilson, “The National Church”, C. W. Goodwin, “On the Mosaic Cosmogony”, Mark Pattison, “Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688–1750”, and Benjamin Jowett, “On the Interpretation of Scripture”. Although the authors of the various papers did not

collaborate, they provided collectively a clear outline of Broad Church opinion. The editor was J Parker

402 32-3 **Professor Bethune-Baker** James Franklin Bethune-Baker (1861-1951), Professor of Divinity, Cambridge (1911-35)

403 13 **The Dean of Canterbury** Henry Wace (1836-1924)

403 13 **The Record** The paper was published from 1 January 1828 to December 1948 After this time, it was incorporated with *The Church of England Newspaper*

404 4 **Dr. Williams** Rowland Williams (1817-1870), Vice-Principal and Professor of Hebrew in the Theological College of St David's, Lampeter (1850-62)

404 6 **Mr. Wilson** Henry Bristow Wilson (1803-1888), Rawlinson Professor of Anglo-Saxon at Oxford (1839-44)

404 6-9 "declared and ... of God." *Annual Register*, 106 244

404 15-17 "the articles ... contravene" *Ibid.*, 242

404 18-20 "Our province ... charge" *Ibid.*

404 20-1 "We are ... materials." *Ibid.*, 244-5

404 32-3 **Archbishops of Canterbury and York** Charles Thomas Longley (1794-1868), Archbishop of Canterbury (1862-68) and William Thomson (1819-1890), Archbishop of York (1862-90)

405 5 **Brooke's Six Judgments** *Six Judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1850-72* (1872), edited by William G Brooke

405 6 "Brodrick and Freemantle" *A Collection of the Judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ecclesiastical Cases* (1865), by the Hon George Charles Brodrick and the Rev W H Freemantle

405 8 **Dean of Arches** Dr Stephen Lushington (1782-1873), Dean of Arches (1858-67) The Court of Arches acted as an intermediate appeal body for judgments handed down by various diocesan courts

40 Clio, A Muse

407 6-7 **the "scientific" school** Trevelyan's objections are general ones against those who, in his opinion, would reduce the discipline to mere accumulation of data about the past Such change of history's function he attributes to the influence of German scholars In "The Latest View of History", he was reacting to the ideas of J B Bury, as they were expressed in his inaugural address as Regius Professor of Modern History in Cambridge.

407 11-13 "The value ... the past." *Clio, A Muse* (12).

407 16 **older historians** Trevelyan praises such writers on historical subjects as the Earl of Clarendon, Edward Gibbon, Walter Scott, Thomas Babington Macaulay and Thomas Carlyle for their imaginative recreations of the past.

407 17-18 **passage of rare beauty** *Clio, A Muse* (26-7) Part of the passage is marked in Russell's copy

407 18-21 **description ... King Charles's Cavaliers ... Cromwell's Ironsides** In the English Civil War, members of the Royalist army were nicknamed Cavaliers

because they were said to be as ruthless as the Spanish "Cavalieros" The most disciplined part of the army on the other side, the regiment which Cromwell had personally selected and trained, was originally called the Ironsides As the military prowess of this group came to inspire other troops, the name was applied to the whole of Cromwell's army Cromwell's supporters are said to have "transitory might" because the interregnum lasted for only eleven years from 1649 to 1660

407 33 **Mirabeau** Honoré Gabriel Mirabeau (1749-1791) was a powerful orator and leader in the early stages of the French Revolution Because he believed in both monarchical rule and democratic reform, he saw himself as a moderating influence, but extreme revolutionaries repudiated him Presumably, Russell takes exception to Carlyle's attribution of unqualified heroism to Mirabeau He may be objecting also to the reliance on epithets like "royal" and "man-ruling" that substitute for a thorough analysis of his personality and motivation

407 42-408 2 **if Carlyle ... to himself** For the sake of this witticism, Russell slurs over some facts His attitude to Carlyle is in marked contrast to Trevelyan's Carlyle indeed suffered from chronic dyspepsia Since he was legendary for his walking, Russell's suggestion that yet more of this activity could have cured him is merely facetious Trevelyan calls him "a patron saint of Walking" (61) More important, he has high praise for his virtues as a historian That Carlyle indeed failed to walk over the actual site of Naseby battlefield was due to an unfortunate misunderstanding Misled by an erroneous marker on Edward FitzGerald's land, Carlyle went over the wrong area When FitzGerald pointed out the error, Carlyle asked him to do excavations to determine where the heaviest fighting had been Although FitzGerald's work provided Carlyle with detailed information, the description that emerged in *Cromwell* (1845, I 211-16) seems rather perfunctory This cursoriness in the treatment of the famous battle of Naseby (14 June 1645), the decisive turning point in the Civil War, is surprising to Russell

408. 4-6 **an example ... day's walk** Trevelyan actually wrote, "the wisdom of our ancestors, surely not by an accident, fixed those two seats of learning each at the same distance from London, and at exactly the right distance for a test walk" (69)

408 10-11 **prize essay for the Westminster** The prize was won in July 1907 from the Liberal evening daily *The Westminster Gazette*

Textual Notes

Textual Principles and Methods

RUSSELL'S WRITINGS VARY greatly, not only in subject matter but also in respect to the form in which the text survives. Some items survive only in print, others exist only in manuscript. A number are preserved in both manuscript and printed forms, sometimes more than one of each, in certain cases typescripts or proofs are also available. In addition, Russell made marginal notes in his own copies of some of his publications. Thus the preparation of this edition involves a wide variety of editorial decisions. In the present volume the manuscript whenever it survives is taken as the copy-text—that document closest to the author's accidentals (Accidental features in a text include punctuation, paragraphing, spelling, capitalization and word-division, etc., whereas substantive features are in general the words themselves and their order.) That copy-text is then emended to incorporate in subsequent versions whatever substantive changes are considered authorial. When no manuscript is extant, the printed version over which Russell is judged to have exercised greatest control is taken as the copy-text.

I REGULARIZATION

Alterations made in manuscripts chosen as copy-texts are confined to the regularization of features that might be distracting. For printed copy-texts, an effort is made to replace accidentals originating in the publisher's styling with Russell's preferences. The texts are, thus, essentially unmodernized. Certain typographical modifications have however been made to various features of the copy-texts. Titles of papers are given a consistent capitalization, and any terminal period removed. Section headings are centred and sub-section headings italicized. Titles of books mentioned in the texts are italicized. Numbers below 100 are given in words, and the number of dots in ellipses is regularized. A consistent form is imposed on the salutations and closings of letters by always using a comma with a dash after "Sir" and always giving Russell's address and date (if provided) at the end. When Russell's practice reveals no clear preferences, his small inconsistencies are retained, provided that the *O E D* records both forms. Thus for example, "house-keeping" was written in the "Journal" with and without a hyphen and followed here:

Russell's bibliographical references are emended to a uniform format. Footnote indicators have been replaced by a continuous numeration through each paper.

Russell used various typographical techniques to distinguish the different elements of references, but they are not modern techniques and are inconsistently applied. In Russell's review articles the standard bibliographical details of the book(s) under discussion are given here before the paper. In the original, they often appeared as footnotes to titles. The amount of data Russell provided varied widely, depending on the editorial policy of the journal. These citations are regularized in content as well as position.

Manuscripts

Regularization of the manuscripts is limited to the following additional minor changes:

Foreign words and phrases like *Sub specie aeternitatis* (102 12) have been italicized (in keeping with Russell's mature preferences and with standard printing practice), unless they are enclosed in quotation marks in the copy-text. In addition, accents have been corrected where necessary.

As a rule, all abbreviations that would normally be expanded in print are silently expanded. However, the textual notes record the expansion of abbreviations of the names of people, places and organizations. Abbreviations are not expanded in outlines (such as 7a) unless a particular short form might be distracting. (Thus, "cpsn" is expanded to "comparison" at 102 11.) Short forms in outlines are preserved as much as is reasonable in order to maintain the character of these documents.

A small number of inconsistencies in mechanical accidentals are corrected. Since these are infrequent, they have been silently emended according to the following rules.

- a) Quotation marks are editorially supplied (e.g. at 136 16). Single quotation marks are changed to double when needed.
- b) Commas are supplied around such phrases as "he said" (e.g. at 136 6).
- c) A colon is supplied where missing before quoted conversation (e.g. at 12 29).
- d) The order of punctuation and closing quotation marks has been made consistent with Russell's usual style, i.e. terminal punctuation is set before the quotation marks only if it is part of the original quotation.
- e) Capitals are changed to lower case for words that originally began a sentence, but were moved to a later position by an insertion or transposition.

Printed Copy-Texts

Regularization of the printed copy-texts attempts no more than the replacement of certain aspects of the styling imposed by the original printer. Emendations of accidentals are generally minor and have been made silently. Russell's preferred forms have been used as the standard for spelling and word-division. He usually favoured "z" over "s" for words which can be spelled with either (although "patronising" at 259 21 is an exception). In his manuscripts Russell rarely marked for italicization terms such as "a priori", "i.e." and "e.g." and he put no comma

following “*i e*” and “*e g*” Thus, printed copy-texts have been emended so as to reflect these known preferences. Subheadings are removed from newspaper articles (as in Paper 30) because they are certain to be additions by newspaper editors. Periods are removed after names like “*Gregory XVI*” (at 346 3)

II COPY-TEXT DECISIONS IN VOLUME 12

Papers 1, 2, 3, 7, 18, 19 and 26 exist only in manuscript Paper 9 exists in manuscript and published form, but as its publication was posthumous, it may be ignored for textual purposes Twenty-two papers and items 20a, 39a and 39b were printed only once In two cases there are two printed versions, one of which disqualifies itself immediately (Paper 5 was reprinted in 1966 and Paper 8 in 1961 These versions are too late to require collations And Russell’s statement in 1963 that he never reprinted Paper 8 makes clear that the 1961 version did not have his scrutiny, although he wrote a Preface to the collection) For essays which have been reprinted in numerous editions (such as Papers 4 and 6), collations are offered only for versions that show signs of authorial intervention The rationale for the choice of copy-text for papers which exist in multiple versions is as follows (A note on substantive variants is also included)

Paper 4

The copy-text for “The Free Man’s Worship” is the manuscript Substantive readings deriving from the following editions have been scrutinized *The Independent Review* (1903), *Philosophical Essays* (1910) and *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). For the publication edited by Thomas Bird Mosher in 1923, Russell wrote a Preface, but he made no substantive changes. The accidentals of the first edition are uncharacteristic of Russell, while the 1910 and the 1918 editions restore many of the accidentals of the manuscript version This restoration possibly means that the manuscript was available to the publisher, Longmans, but it does not imply direct authorial supervision. In *Philosophical Essays*, accidental changes were introduced, but most of these are rejected here on the ground that there is no firm evidence that they are authorial Most of the substantive changes made in 1910 are deletions of words or sentences These revisions would not have necessitated Russell’s examination of all the accidentals in the essay Because the subject of this paper is so allegorical, the capitalization of words like Man, Death, etc is treated as a substantive change

Paper 6

Virtually the same conditions apply to “The Study of Mathematics” Its first publication was delayed until 1907 (when it appeared in *The New Quarterly*) The accidentals of this edition are corrupt But the substantive changes introduced there and in *Philosophical Essays* are considered authorial The copy-text is the manuscript

Paper 10

For "Mysticism and Logic", no manuscript appears to have survived. The essay underwent extensive substantive revision after its first publication in *The Hibbert Journal* (1914). These changes were made in preparation for its appearance as the first paper in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). The changes are of such range as to have probably required careful scrutiny of the paper's accidentals by the author. Furthermore, Russell would have had more opportunity to express his wishes for accidental features in this collection of his own essays than would have been possible in a journal. Most important, the accidentals in *Mysticism and Logic* seem more characteristic of Russell's habits. Of the two printed texts, the 1918 edition is therefore selected as the copy-text.

Paper 20b and c

"Last Message to the Electors" warrants special comment because it is an attribution of a statement to Russell by a newspaper and therefore cannot be taken as authoritative in the usual sense. While there is no doubt that the gist of Russell's message is accurately conveyed, it may not be verbatim. Other accounts of the statement vary in extremely trivial ways. These variants are of the same order as those apparent in Russell's reply to Chaplin as presented in *The Wimbledon Herald* (20b) and as presented in *The Morning Post* (Appendix III). The newspaper columns reporting on the Wimbledon election contain many other quotations attributed to Russell. But, predictably, they are so repetitive of the election address that their inclusion is unnecessary. "Last Message to the Electors" does, however, provide a slightly different perspective from the rest. The choice of *The Daily News* is also appropriate, since it was by far the leading Radical newspaper in Britain at the time.

20c was published in *The Suffragette* by E. Sylvia Pankhurst in 1911.

Paper 23

The copy-text for "Liberalism and Women's Suffrage" is the manuscript. It is emended to include the substantive variants in *The Contemporary Review* (1908).

Paper 27

The copy-text for *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* is the manuscript. The pamphlet version is unreliable in its accidentals. In substantives, the substitution of "large" for "huge" (311 19) in the pamphlet is almost certainly a misreading of Russell's handwriting and is therefore rejected.

Paper 38

There are very few differences in the accidentals of this paper as it appears in *New Statesman* (1913) and in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). Although in practice the choice of copy-text therefore in this instance has scarcely notable consequences, *Mysticism and Logic* is selected because it is the one over which the author is likely to have exercised control.

Paper 39c

The copy-text for "Inspiration", the manuscript, required emendation for only one substantive change. The deletion of the last paragraph was made at Russell's request in a postcard to C K Ogden, the editor of *The Cambridge Magazine* (25 Jan 1914). The change of "difficulties" to "perplexities" in the printed version is not followed because of the likelihood that the alteration originated with the editor rather than the author. Ogden's papers show that he intervened habitually and freely with offerings from contributors. Had Russell himself felt compelled to make this revision, mention of his wish might be expected on the postcard.

Guide to the Textual Notes

THE TEXTUAL NOTES provide a complete record of the available evidence of the progression of Russell's thought from authorial alterations, revisions of manuscripts through variants in typescripts, proofs and later printings. Comparison of different versions of a passage, as reconstructed from the textual notes, permits an appreciation of his creative process and literary style. The textual notes also record editorial emendations of Russell's text. All of the textual notes are recorded in a single comprehensive register. This feature allows the reader to find in one place all of the available evidence for the determination of the substantives of a given passage. Unless otherwise identified, the archival location is McMaster. Such identification is provided in the headnote.

Format

For each paper a brief physical description of the copy-text and any other pertinent textual documents is provided. In the case of holograph or typed documents the description offers an exact statement of their foliation (the numbering of the leaves), the paper size, and whether they are written in pencil or ink, typed or mimeographed. Italic numbers in the foliation refer to unnumbered leaves, and a number in parentheses refers to a leaf's initial numbering in cases of alteration. Other major features—such as a change in the type of paper used—are described as required. Also included in the description is an identification of the symbols used in the textual notes to denote the various texts of the paper at hand. The most common symbol is "CT", the abbreviation for "copy-text".

Record of Authorial Alterations

The most frequent kind of note concerns authorial alterations. A precise vocabulary is used to cover insertions of words, words written over words, and deletions of words. Whenever practicable, such terms as "*inserted*", "*inserted in margin*", "*above deleted*", "*before deleted*", "*after deleted*", "*transposed from*" and "*written over*" are used to describe the nature and location of the alteration. The term "*replaced*" is employed when the alteration does not easily lend itself to description by the other terms. For example, at 91 20, "*acknowledging*" is said to have *replaced* "*the acknowledgment of*" because this is the most economical way of recording the alteration. The revision must be seen as one change involving two different forms (1) the deletion of "the" and "of" and (2) the writing of "ing" over "ment".

Alterations have been combined when it appears that they are dependent parts of a larger revision. The presence of cancelled illegible words is rarely recorded. Ignored too are false starts, letters written over the same letters, words written over the same words, and incomplete words (except when they are part of a large alteration or are otherwise thought to be of interest).

Each note is comprised of a number of distinct components, as in the following example:

7 23 much CT] before deleted and well

In "7 23 much", there is a page/line reference to and reading from the present volume. "CT" indicates that this reading coincides with the final reading in the copy-text. A right-hand square bracket completes this component of the note. The next component is a phrase describing the nature and location of the alteration in the copy-text. Editorial comments, which are found always to the right of the square bracket, are in italic. The final component is the prior reading. The complete note is to be understood as follows: At page 7, line 23, the reading "much" is from the copy-text where it appears immediately before the deleted "and well".

Record of Variants

Another kind of note records a variant reading from another version of a paper. Where the variant reading is adopted in this text, the variants are recorded thus:

282 25 favourite 08] weighty CT

When Russell published his essay in *The Contemporary Review* (08), he apparently decided that the intended sarcasm might be missed in his original description of his opponent's arguments as "weighty". The copy-text has been emended to account for this substantive revision.

Where several versions are collated, the variants are presented as follows:

85 12 is 07, 10, 18] seems CT

As the preamble to the textual notes for "The Study of Mathematics" indicates, the text printed in *The New Quarterly* is represented by 07, that in *Philosophical Essays* by 10, and that in *Mysticism and Logic* by 18. When the collated texts exhibit several variants, the use of additional square brackets is required as in this example:

93 1 by patience and discipline, 18] by patience, by discipline, 10] by patience, by austerity, by stern discipline, CT, 07

Compound Textual Notes

Complex situations in the documents require the use of compound textual notes:

For example, two levels of revision in a passage from the manuscript of Paper 2 are indicated by this note

53 29 is CT] *after pencil deletion*, the awful (*awful above deleted great*) enemy of sinners,

Angle brackets are used in such instances for the primary stage of revision. On rare occasions, double angle brackets within single brackets are needed to present all the stages of composition, as in the following

93 28-9 citizen The use of mathematics 07, 10, 18] citizen *<before deleted* Ocean *((Ocean inserted))* Navigation, the use of *((theuse of inserted))* steam and electricity—to take striking instances—are all rendered possible *((before deleted by))* only by mathematics) CT

Theoretically, this method might be extended to reach still further levels of revision; but in practice no more have been required for Volume 12

Editorial Emendations

The reading

130 41 Lane] Lanes CT

shows that the reading in the present volume differs from that in the copy-text. That no text is cited as the source of the preferred reading indicates that the word was editorially altered. In most cases, in *The Perplexities of John Forstice*, Russell struck the “s” from his character’s name, but for this instance he neglected to do so.

The note

21 20-1 Metropolitan Association for Befriending Young Servants]
M A B Y S CT

records the editorial expansion of a proper name

1 Journal

The copy-text (CT) is holograph material contained in a notebook which measures 215 x 278 mm and is bound in a sand grain cloth of dark purple. Russell did not number the pages in the notebook, but to indicate the position of the "Journal", numbers are here assigned. Beginning at the front, the contents of the notebook are

- I "B Russell Trin Coll Cambridge
Jan. 1898"
2-8 Notes on measurements
9 leaf removed
10-33 Notes on measurements (continued)

When the notebook is turned over, the following new material is found

- 1-7 Lectures on Lotze/MacTaggart
Lent Term 1898
8-9 leaves removed
10-25 Lectures on Lotze (continued)
26-35 Journal
36 leaf removed
37-49 Journal (continued)
50-1 leaves removed
52-64 Journal (continued)

There are forty-one blank leaves between the front and back material. CT is written in ink and is untitled

- 7 11 forgetting who he is CT] inserted
7 12 her CT] after deleted their
7 23 much CT] before deleted and well
7 42 explain CT] after deleted do
7 42-3 [She died of enteric in South Africa,
1904] CT] inserted in pencil

- 8 26 Evelyn's] E's CT *Also at 20 37*
9 24 Evelyn] E CT *Also at 9 25, 10 5,*
10 35, 11 27, 11 28, 15 7, 17 8, 17 27,
25 32, 25 33, 25 41
9 24 Alfred] A CT
9 33 George CT] inserted
9 40 happiness —Jack CT] replaced happiness, and Jack
9 40 Pollock CT] inserted
9 40 his CT] replaced she
9 40 sister CT] inserted
10 1 History CT] before deleted of
10 3 talked CT] before deleted very well and inspiringly
10 20 Aly] A CT *Also at 10 21, 21 32,*
23 33, 25 24, 25 34
10 21 housekeeping CT] before deleted illegible passage ending in the old style
10 37 Kanthack] Canthack CT
11 4 MacCarthy] McCarthy CT *Also at*
17 22
11 5 Bob CT] after deleted Bobbie,
11 17 Heard that Cantor is mad and in an asylum CT] inserted
11 26-7 Mrs Creighton] Mrs C CT
11 32 Mrs Sanderson] Mrs S CT *Also at*
11 37
11 34 Sanderson] S CT
11 35 that CT] inserted
11 36 is CT] above deleted to be
12 6 Alberto Ball CT] inserted
12 6 de Filippi's] De Phillipi's CT
12 6 Hurlbatt] Hurlbat CT
12 7 de Filippi] de Phillipi CT
12 17 Kendals] Kendalls CT
12 20 got out of it CT] before deleted till Alys degraded me
12 28 danger CT] before deleted I "

12 31 Kate CT] *after deleted* so
 13 37 Shultz] Schulz CT
 14 12 thus CT] *above deleted* last
 14 14 Alys CT] *after deleted* Sh
 14 17 struggling CT] *above deleted* pale
 14 22 buoyant] bouyant CT
 14 30 revivify CT] *after deleted* give
 14 39-40 Moore thought it referred to Dr Arnold CT] *inserted*
 16 4 Jepson] Jephson CT
 16 20 Jane Harrison] Jane H CT
 16 28 Jeyes] Jays CT *Also at* 16 31
 16 28 Sherman] Shearman (*in pencil above deleted* Bayle) CT
 16 29 Lady Hermione] Lady H CT *Also at*
 17 1
 17 9 Tom CT] *inserted*
 17 19 Bernard Berenson] B B CT
 17 28 arthritis CT] *before deleted* costs £200
 a year to keep under, then invariably attacks the spine, and causes death after years of agony
 18 6-7 Aunt Agatha's] A A 's CT
 18 28 Mrs Prothero] Mrs P CT
 19 1 "The Free Man's Worship"] the free man's worship CT
 19 3 comradeship] comradeship CT
 19 11-12 Masterman] M CT

19 22 delightful CT] *before deleted* She is extraordinarily sympathetic to me, and I could not help talking very well on the function of mothers in producing great men (against B Creighton), on the education of women, on the democratic idea, the morality of achievement, Sturgess and Kate, and a host of other topics It is a pity I cannot see her oftener,
 19 33 Monday CT] *above deleted* Tuesday
 20 24-5 [This judgment is mistaken, her worldliness is only an armour against ridicule (1905)] CT] *inserted*
 21 16 one hates CT] *replaced* you hate
 21 17 one CT] *above deleted* you
 21 18 say CT] *after deleted* she
 21 20-1 Metropolitan Association for Befriending Young Servants] M A B Y S CT
 22 10 Mary Murray] M M CT *Also at*
 24 17, 25 21, 27 15
 22 41 Nearly two years in this case [1905] CT] *footnote inserted*
 23 6 , etc] etc CT
 23. 33 Alys's CT] *above deleted* her
 25 39 Miss Pretious] Miss P CT
 27 15 Gilbert Murray] G M CT
 27 37 feeling CT] *above deleted* impulse

2 The Pilgrimage of Life

The copy-texts (CT) of the fragments of "The Pilgrimage of Life" are the manuscripts They have been organized from the unfinished texts which Russell sent to Lady Ottoline Morrell The fact that the extant text is so fragmentary (and, indeed, was never actually completed) means that it is impossible to determine conclusively the position of any given fragment within the larger whole Parts of the text may well be drafts which Russell intended to delete or rephrase The presence of parallel passages in two or more places is evidence of this (e.g. 43 32-5 and 44 8-11, and 44 11-14 and 49 15-18)

Many of the fragments do not have titles Where no clear evidence exists that they are parts of an extant titled fragment, they are listed as "Untitled" Accordingly, it should not be assumed that the extant text comprises twenty-one distinct subsections

In the text as it is printed here the foliation has been used as an approximate guide to the order of the fragments Of the forty-seven leaves which comprise the copy-texts, five are not numbered, whereas most of the others are numbered in more than one of three discernible numbering schemes

The numbers in ink in the upper right corner were probably assigned first, since Russell usually numbered his manuscripts in this way (Sometimes these are written over other numbers, which appear in parentheses in the table) Russell probably assigned new numbers (in pencil) in the upper right corner when he revised the work The numbers in the upper left probably resulted from a further revision, and thus are assumed to be Russell's final intention Thus, as far as possible, the order of presentation respects the numbers in the upper left corner When no

number is present there, the number in pencil in the upper right takes precedence over the number in ink. The five unnumbered leaves are placed close to those parts of the text which they most nearly resemble.

Three of the fragments are dated in pencil 2n, "The Communion of Saints" (March 1902), 2o, "Untitled" (April 19, 1902), and 2p, "The Ocean of Life" (June 1902). For a

collation of 2n (48 6-23) and "On History" (80 28-81 1) see the textual notes for 5.

There are a few logical theorems on the verso of the first folio of 2t, "The Atonement".

The forty-seven leaves of the manuscripts are written in ink and measure 222 x 284 mm with slight variation (within 2 mm). The foliation is given in the table below.

Title	Page reference in this volume	Upper left in pencil	Upper right in pencil	Upper right in ink
2a The Return to the Cave	35 2-19 35 20-33 35 34-36 10 36 11-29 36 30-8 36 39-38 17 38 18-30 38 31-40 30 40 31-41 38 41 39-42 12	1 2 3 4 5 6-9 10 11-15 18-20 21		1 1a 2(1a) 3(2) 4(3) II 3-7 8-10 22(5)
2b Untitled	42 14-29			2
2c Untitled	42 31-43 5			7
2d The Worship of Truth	43 7-25			14
2e The Message of Nature	43 27-35			
2f Untitled	44 2-14		28	
2g Duty and Fate	44 16-24			
2h Wisdom	44 26-45 9			31
2i The Past	45 11-25			36
2j Untitled	45 27-46 4			
2k The Two Races of Man	46 6-23			38
2l Untitled	46 25-47 21			
2m Untitled	47 23-38			47
2n The Communion of Saints	48 2-23			50
2o Untitled	48 25-34			
2p The Ocean of Life	49 2-18			53
2q Austerity	49 20-37 49. 37-50 33			57 58-9 2-3
2r Gentleness	50 35-51 17 51 17-52 8			68 69-70 2-3
2s The Forgiveness of Sins	52 10-35			74
2t The Atonement	53 2-32			93-4 1-2
2u Religion	53 34-55 37			1-4

2a The Return to the Cave

35 3 daylight CT] after *pencil deletion* broad
 35 7 realm CT] after *deleted upper*
 35 18 renunciation, CT] replaced renunciation of many
 35 18 much CT] above deleted many things
 35 19 precious CT] in *pencil* above *pencil deletion* valuable
 35 19 precious CT] before deleted In (replaced) Thus in) the darkness of the cave, we must remember the golden world above, for only so can we keep before us the goal of *At the bottom left of the first leaf the catchwords our path were inserted and deleted They correspond to the last words of the next leaf*
 35 25 surrendered CT] after deleted sacr
 35 31 Although we CT] replaced in *pencil We*
 35 32 yet CT] in *pencil* above *pencil deletion but*
 35 34 But CT] after deleted title Love at top offol 2
 35 34 But in CT] replaced In
 35 35 that CT] after deleted , if we would employ our time aright,
 35 35 many CT] after deleted , in our own lives,
 35 38 Thus CT] after deleted It is
 35 40-1 human affections, CT] above deleted love,
 35 41 cruel CT] above deleted stern
 36 1 substitute CT] above deleted compensation
 36 3 most CT] after deleted certain
 36 8 life CT] above deleted world
 36 10 world CT] after deleted universe
 36 11 kingdom CT] above deleted world
 36 12 region CT] above deleted world
 36 13 littleness CT] in *pencil* above *pencil deletion* triviality
 36 13-27 "Men still weakness" CT] See T40 38
 36. 29 gloom CT] before *pencil deletion* of the cave
 36 31 his former habitation CT] above deleted the upper world
 36 31 springing CT] replaced that spring
 36 32 world CT] before deleted where sorrow has its home

36 32 By CT] replaced And by
 36 34 he CT] after deleted a new insight
 36 34 learns CT] above deleted acquires a key
 36 35 men CT] after deleted great
 36 35 to know CT] above deleted and to feel
 36 35-6 to draw peace from CT] above deleted to value
 36 35 draw CT] written over acquire
 36 36 silent CT] inserted
 36 37 born CT] after deleted given to whatever is goo
 36 38 and CT] inserted in *pencil*
 36 38 duty CT] before *pencil deletion* or of association ¶It is necessary first of all to acquire that inward calm, that peace which passeth all understanding, without which the weight of human woe is too heavy to be borne We must remember that
 37 12 No joy is CT] replaced There is no joy
 37 17 of which the value is appraised CT] inserted
 37 18 it CT] written over is
 37 18 causes CT] after deleted endured (above deleted sacrificed) to it the value of the
 37 18 sacrificed CT] above deleted endured
 37 19 become CT] above deleted grow
 37 20 untrammelled CT] above deleted unfettered
 37 23 untouched CT] after deleted joyous,
 37 24 that heralded CT] above deleted that of
 37 27 The CT] replaced But the
 37 31 comforters CT] above deleted children that the soul bears to the world
 37 31 Love CT] after deleted Pity,
 37 34 advent CT] above deleted birth
 37 36 consoler CT] above deleted born of the marriage
 37 36 friend CT] above deleted offspring
 37 38 careless CT] above deleted untroubled (after deleted maiden meditations)
 38 2 auto-da-fé auto-da-fé CT
 38 11 call CT] above deleted birth
 38 15 kills CT] above deleted succeeds
 38 18-19 For pity a love CT] above deleted When, through the contemplation of nature and the past, we have learnt something of their calm, a new and better

kind of love to the world becomes possible,

38 18 For CT] *above deleted* But
 38 18 love— CT] *after deleted* the birth of
 38 20 life CT] *above deleted* world
 38 21 and CT] *above deleted* even
 38 22–3 willingness to sacrifice CT] *replaced in pencil* the sacrifice of
 38 26 discipline CT] *after deleted* service and
 38 26 by moulding CT] *after pencil deletion* enables us to endure the world
 38 27 the service patience CT] *replaced in pencil* its service
 38 31 The cloister CT] *after pencil deletion*
 ¶But the two kinds tend always to merge where it is possible All right love desires, if it can, to benefit its object, and all right love desires that its object should be worthy of admiration Austerity enters by compelling the sacrifice of what we love to what we do not love, by (forbidding the *deleted*) enforcing, in the name of truth, (, in the name of truth, *inserted*) the recognition of faults where we wish only to see merits, and, in very many cases, by compelling a solitary life in which affection can hold but a small place This paragraph appears at the top of a leaf foliated 3 in ink in the upper right corner (see the table) Russell may have intended to delete the preceding folio (i e the original fol 2) as well or to move it to some other position The new foliation does not allow it to be retained here, and the fact that it is neither explicitly deleted nor renumbered leaves its status undetermined It is printed here as 2b, "Untitled" (42 14–29)

38 32 men CT] *after pencil deletion* lives of those
 38 35 worship CT] *above deleted* service
 38 35 will CT] *above deleted* would
 38 36 unending CT] *after deleted* the endless
 38 36 joys CT] *before deleted* of the angelic host
 38 38 in CT] *after deleted* and
 38 40 weakened CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* killed
 38 41 general CT] *above deleted* public
 39 6 so full CT] *before deleted* as (this de-

leted) ours
 39 8 evil CT] *replaced evils*
 39 8 good CT] *before pencil deletion* All the more ought we to honour those who have thus dedicated their lives to great ends
 39 9 perfection CT] *above deleted* its full development
 39 10 know CT] *after deleted* fully
 39 11 a CT] *above deleted* that
 39 12 of friendship CT] *after deleted* of life
 39 14 Friendship CT] *after deleted* Too often
 39 16 absorbed as CT] *above deleted* but
 39 18 community of CT] *inserted*
 39 27 In CT] *after deleted* An
 39 27 restraint CT] *above deleted* self-control
 39 29 conflicting CT] *after deleted* the
 39 30 incomparable hopes, CT] *after deleted* hopes that
 39 30–1 hopes, the love of God was ennobled by sacrifice, CT] *replaced* hopes Thus
 39 30 the love CT] *after pencil deletion* and
 39 31 sacrament CT] *above deleted* consecration
 39 31 love CT] *replaced* love the consecration of sacrifice, ennobled
 39 31 And dwelling CT] *after deleted* For only when we have sacrificed what we hold precious do we fully realize the value of the end to which the sacrifice has been made
 39 33 the devotion CT] *after deleted* and
 39 35 contact CT] *above deleted* touch
 39 35 world CT] *after pencil deletion* real
 39 39 to believe CT] *after deleted* to belief that it is living (visi *deleted*) in one
 39 41 good CT] *after deleted* love on 2nd occurrence
 40 1 is CT] *inserted*
 40 3 solitude too often becomes a duty CT] *above deleted* the strong must live separate lives, for it is (it is *inserted*) the weak who most (who most *inserted*) need their help (most *deleted*)
 40 3 the CT] *above deleted* his on 1st occurrence
 40 7 stars CT] *after deleted* passionless
 40 7–8 the shining beacon CT] *replaced* his shining light

- 40 9 and CT] *above deleted* to
 40 10 escape this solitude, CT] *in pencil*
above pencil deletion retain all that is possi-
 ble of admiring love,
 40 14 those whom CT] *above deleted* what
 40 21 iii CT] *after deleted* who
 40 22 whose CT] *after deleted* the bright
 spirits
 40 26-7 , who dare to live CT] *above deleted*
 of a life
 40 27 the proud CT] *above deleted* their
 40 27 of the great CT] *after deleted* of the
 great
 40 30 ours CT] *Folios numbered 16-17 in*
the upper left corner of the "final" draft
(which correspond to folios 17-18 of the
penultimate draft) are missing from the
copy-text at this point, although the foliation
in ink in the upper right indicates that the text
on those folios did not form a part of the
earliest drafts (see the table)
 40 31 But although contemplative CT] *re-
 placed in pencil* Contemplative
 40 32 , it CT] *replaced* , but it
 40 32 another CT] *replaced* the other
 40 37 makes CT] *above deleted* puts
 40 38 endeavours CT] *before pencil deletion*
*"Men still come and go, (they talk, they
 laugh, they pursue their business, *inserted*
 and *deleted*) they seek eagerly a phantom
 happiness, strange! what object can they
 find worth so much activity? From an in-
 finite distance we watch their movements,*
*like the movements of ghosts in a dream
 their desires, their hopes, their aims are
 unintelligible, as of beings from another
 world. Alone, infinitely alone, we wonder
 about human life, when desire and hope
 are gone, mankind become a riddle to
 which the key is lost. Alien to us are the
 ways of men, remote from our dream are
 all their thoughts. Yet this is the human
 race! For this, life is sacrificed, pain is en-
 dured, for this happiness is to be put
 away, for thus the soul is to be covered
 with a black veil of agony, through which
 the sunlight barely shimmers. Why be ac-
 tive among the ghosts, why speak to them
 as though they were flesh and blood, or
 work for them as though they had living
 human souls? Life is a cruel enigma, and*
 the insight that sometimes seems to come
 is but the last mockery of our weakness "
- An emended version of this passage appears
 at 36 13-27*
- 40 38-9 In tired hearts CT] *inserted in pen-
 cil*
 40 39 the devil CT] *replaced* So the devil
 40 39 whispers CT] *before pencil deletion* in
 tired hearts
 40 39 that all is vanity CT] *inserted*
 40 39 an answer CT] *after pencil deletion*
 only active love can find
 40 39-40 can only be found in active love,
 in CT] *inserted in pencil*
 40 40 the love CT] *replaced in pencil* ¶The
 love
 40 42 instincts CT] *before pencil deletion*
 may arise in many ways, but arises most
 frequently through the family relation-
 ships
 41 5 Motherhood, by CT] *replaced* By
 41 5 gives CT] *after deleted* it
 41 7 other CT] *inserted*
 41 8 a love which no disenchantment can
 destroy CT] *above deleted* and embody
 the continuity of the race
 41 9 family CT] *after deleted* life of the
 41 11 sacrificed CT] *after deleted* crushed
 and
 41 12 obligations CT] *before deleted* to
 others
 41 12 merit CT] *replaced* their merits
 41 17 actions CT] *before pencil deletion* It is
 a key to unlock the temple, but it is not
 itself the temple
 41 19 broader springs of action is CT]
above deleted loves that no disenchantment
 can sever is
 41 19 The CT] *replaced* This England, the
 41 22 enchantment CT] *above deleted* magic
 41 25 scenes CT] *after deleted* the
 41 25 deep CT] *above deleted* strange
 41 28 native land CT] *above deleted* En-
 gland
 41 31 its country CT] *above deleted* England
 41 33 in these sordid ambitions, CT] *in-
 inserted in pencil*
 41 35 find CT] *before pencil deletion* in these
 sordid ambitions
 41 36-7 in generous causes, CT] *inserted*
 41 37 our nation CT] *replaced* our country

(above deleted England)

- 41 38 cherish CT] *above deleted* love
 41 38 cherish CT] *before deleted* Had this been the patriotism of our nation, we should not now be suffering the burning humiliation of disgrace (*replaced* But if this had been the patriotism of our race, what burning humiliation should we not have been spared!)
- 41 42 troubled CT] *after deleted* strange
 42 12 Golden City CT] *before deleted* Courage, courage, is all we need, courage and high resolve, courage for a little while, and then death and the eternal silence ¶ So out of pity grows service, out of service grows love, and out of love grows wisdom and the power of endurance. And when endurance has been learnt, a strange, sad beauty shines through the life of man, for tenderness, pity, and the wisdom of infinite love ennoble the tragic burden of humanity. And beyond the life of man, the untroubled (*untroubled above deleted silent*) world of sea and sun and stars endures, a reproach, (*reproach, above deleted soothing balm*) and yet a balm (*balm above deleted tonic*) to the wounded spirit stricken by the terror of its own brief torture "Peace and beauty, beauty and peace, human suffering is but of yesterday, and tomorrow it will be no more, but beauty is eternal, and peace will endure when man has fallen asleep upon the bosom of the past" This is the voice that speaks in (*the in above deleted the message of*) the stars, in (*in above deleted of*) the dawn, in the rustle of midnight breezes, in the lonely ripple of mountain tarns, in the ceaseless sighing of pines, and in the (*tender deleted*) grace of willows whitened by the passing wind. *An emended version of this passage appears at 44 2-14*

2b Untitled

- 42 16 sort CT] *above deleted* kind
 42 18 marriage CT] *after deleted* every

2c Untitled

- 43 4 is] are CT

2d The Worship of Truth

- 43 7 a CT] *above deleted* the
 43 7 God, he CT] *replaced* God who rules the lives of all alike—he frowns upon his worshippers,
 43 10 whose sting CT] *after deleted* stinging hearts
 43 20 shining CT] *above deleted* great
 43 20-1 on the mountain-tops CT] *inserted*
 43 21 mountain-tops CT] *written over* heights
 43 21 , far off in the plain, CT] *inserted*
 43 23 flame, CT] *replaced* flame transmitted by

2e The Message of Nature

- 43 27 The] the CT] *after pencil deletion* Again as in earliest childhood
 43 27 the grass CT] *after pencil deletion* again
 43 28 in CT] *after pencil deletion* again

2f Untitled

- 44 2-14 So out of pity wind CT] See T42 12
 44 11 on CT] *replaced* upon
 44 14 wind CT] *in pencil after pencil deletion* breeze

2g Duty and Fate

No textual notes

2h Wisdom

- 44 27 stern CT] *after deleted* tender,
 44 31 in turn CT] *inserted in pencil*
 44 33 happiness CT] *after deleted* love
 44 35 the happiness CT] *after deleted* of
 45 9 rest CT] *circled twice in pencil*

2i The Past

45. 22 hope CT] *before pencil deletion* for the future

2j Untitled

- 45 27 hopes CT] *after deleted* our

45 37 open the door to CT] *above deleted reward*
 46 1 prayers, CT] *before deleted* constancy,
 46 4 for ever CT] *before pencil deletion* Ah
 then let us bear the heat of the road, for
 our journey's end is peace

2k The Two Races of Man

46 19-20 by the hand CT] *after pencil deletion* tenderly

2l Untitled

46 27 him CT] *after deleted* it
 46 27 since CT] *inserted*
 46 28 home, CT] *replaced* home, and
 46 32 but CT] *before deleted* they, though
 kind, were faulty, and
 47 5 dead CT] *above deleted* their
 47 14 came he CT] *replaced* came And he

2m Untitled

47 26 dews CT] *after pencil deletion* pure
 fresh

2n The Communion of Saints

48 6 sorrow CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* feel
 48 6 sorrows CT] *replaced in pencil* sorrow
 48 7 cathedral CT] *written over illegible word*
 48 7 the day when CT] *inserted*
 48 18 paean] paeon CT
 48 21 live CT] *above deleted* life

2o Untitled

48 32 hostile CT] *before deleted* to him

2p The Ocean of Life

49 3 beach CT] *after deleted* pebbly
 49 3 their CT] *replaced* the
 49 3 destined CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* inevitable
 49 4 birth CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* childhood
 49 5 yet calm CT] *after deleted* motion
 49 6 peace, not CT] *replaced* peace Not

49 7 sunny CT] *inserted*
 49 8 sublime CT] *before pencil deletion* it
 appears to those whom mystic vision has
 raised above the little eddies {eddies *above deleted* ripples} of Self and its passing
 wants {wants *above deleted* desires}
 49 8 desires CT] *above deleted* wishes
 49 9 thy CT] *inserted on each occurrence*
 49 10 mortality CT] *after deleted* the o
 49 11 as the fading light of evening CT]
above deleted with the beauty of sunset
 skies
 49 11 sorrow CT] *after deleted* even
 49 13 will CT] *inserted*
 49 14 tragic CT] *above deleted* great
 49 15 become CT] *after deleted* learn
 49 15 of sadness CT] *inserted*
 49 17 ripple CT] *inserted before deleted* plash
(above deleted ripple)

2q Austerity

49 30 thoughts CT] *after deleted* hopes
 50 1-2 goodness CT] *before pencil deletion*
 and the hatred of evil
 50 7 thing CT] *before insertion and pencil deletion* at all costs
 50 8 we CT] *after deleted* there is
 50 10 often CT] *inserted in pencil*
 50 22 Lords CT] *after deleted* omnipotent
 50 22 while CT] *after deleted* and to them
 good and evil are as nought
 50 28 trivial CT] *after deleted* but
 50 31 merely CT] *above deleted* but
 50 32 and transitory CT] *after deleted*
 , petty,

2r Gentleness

50 38 object CT] *above deleted* end
 50 40-51 1 all who are so unfortunate CT]
replaced the unfortunates who
 51 3 such CT] *inserted*
 51 4 human CT] *after deleted* the
 51 4 rebellious CT] *above deleted* wild
 51 6 Between the good, he says to himself,
 CT] *replaced* Surely, he says to himself, in
 between the good
 51 8 It seems then CT] *replaced in pencil* At
 such times, it seems
 51 12 power CT] *after deleted* all

- 51 18 —a CT] replaced , and it is
 51 27 mere knowledge CT] replaced in pencil knowledge only
 51 32 fall of empires, CT] in pencil above pencil deletion most momentous revolutions and cataclysms,
 52 7 death CT] after deleted it be
 52 8 sublime CT] before pencil deletion Without gentleness, there is no human companionship, no good relation of man to man, with gentleness, all duties to the good become feasible

2s The Forgiveness of Sins

- 52 9 The Forgiveness of Sins CT] below pencil insertion and deletion Chapter v
 52 24 amendment CT] in pencil above pencil deletion repentance

2t The Atonement

- 53 3 may CT] inserted
 53 17 pain CT] after deleted sorrow
 53 18–19 is the part CT] after deleted to take up
 53 19 fearless love CT] above deleted a noble courage
 53 22 decide for CT] above deleted choose
 53 23 giving CT] after deleted preser
 53 25 the heaven which their own longings

3 The Education of the Emotions

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript Its nine leaves are foliated 1–9, measure 225 × 287 mm , and are written in ink Each fol has “Ei” written in the upper left corner

- 56 title The Education of the Emotions] Chapter i The Education of the Emotions CT
 58 4 cannot CT] above deleted must
 58 5 all CT] written over as
 58 9 this CT] inserted
 58 14 which CT] after deleted of
 58 20 soon CT] above deleted then
 58 25 forgotten CT] above deleted early
 58 27 lacking CT] above deleted missing
 58 30 utmost CT] inserted
 59 9 the CT] inserted

- have built, CT] above deleted all that is best
 53 29 is CT] after pencil deletion , the awful (awful above deleted great) enemy of sinners,
 53 30 calm CT] before deleted , smiling, (smiling, above deleted great,)
 53 30 and CT] inserted

2u Religion

- 53 35 dogma CT] replaced dogmas
 53 38 be CT] written over me
 54 7 at least CT] inserted
 54 26 of creeds CT] inserted
 54 40–1 careless alike of CT] replaced indifferent alike to
 55 3 presented by CT] inserted
 55 4 fatuous CT] after deleted futile,
 55 13 turn CT] after deleted rather
 55 17 what CT] before deleted alone
 55 19 a heroic CT] inserted
 55 19 thung CT] before pencil deletion in the world as we know it
 55 22 shines CT] after deleted alone
 55 25 for us CT] in pencil above pencil deletion ours
 55 36 unearthly radiance CT] above deleted dazzling splendour
 55 36 sublime CT] above deleted perfect

- 59 13 feasible CT] after deleted poss
 59 18 be able to CT] above deleted have
 59 20 to have CT] after deleted it is necessary
 59 20 the equity CT] after deleted to have
 59 21 compares CT] above deleted views
 59 21 impartially CT] after deleted with the same
 59 21–2 the magnanimity that dwells habitually upon what is great, CT] inserted
 59 37–8 the thousand CT] after deleted of
 59 38 in CT] after deleted to
 60 10 reckless CT] after deleted almost
 60 11 splendid CT] after deleted hero
 60 12 sways CT] above deleted stirs
 60 17 devised CT] before pencil deletion I remember from childhood an incident

that affected profoundly the habitual tone of my thoughts One day, in the last year of my grandfather's life, a crowd of working-men assembled on the lawn, for what reason I did not know My grandfather walked to the window, and as soon as he appeared they all applauded I, who had never heard a cheer before, was startled, but I was told that they came because he had been a good man, and had done great things for the nation What these things were, I could not yet understand; but *(the deleted)* I felt profoundly the excellence *(excellence above deleted greatness)* of a life that conferred benefits so widely felt and so long remembered, and I realized vividly the magnitude of public duties

60 21 every CT] after deleted these

60 23 ruthless CT] after deleted own
 60 23 such things as CT] inserted
 60 24 what is called CT] inserted
 60 25 for CT] after deleted or reverence for
 the past,
 60 25 worldly CT] after deleted the
 60 31 these CT] above deleted such
 60 33 though CT] inserted
 60 40 necessary CT] after deleted even
 61 2 need CT] above deleted place
 61 4 merely CT] above deleted only
 61 12 resulting CT] after deleted springin
 61 13 comes CT] above deleted springs
 61 30 For example, desire CT] replaced De-
 sire
 61 34 It CT] replaced Thus it
 61 34 , consequently, CT] inserted
 61 35 judging CT] above deleted weighing
 61 35 court CT] above deleted balance

4 The Free Man's Worship

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript The textual notes provide a collation of the manuscript and three other versions of the essay, that is 03, *The Independent Review*, 1 (Dec 1903) 415-24, 10, *Philosophical Essays* (1910) 59-70, and 18, *Mysticism and Logic* (1918) 46-57 The seventeen leaves of the manuscript are foliated 1-17, measure 220 x 288 mm and are written in ink

62 title The Free Man's Worship CT, 03, 10] A Free Man's Worship 18
 66 1 Mephistophilis CT, 03] Mephis-
 topheles 10, 18
 66 33 forego CT, 03, 10] forgo 18
 67 6 are 03, 10, 18] is CT
 67 36 receive 03, 10, 18] receives CT
 67 41 still urging 03, 10, 18] urging CT
 68 28 attain CT] above deleted realize
 68 29 these CT, 10, 18] those 03
 68 33 must CT] after deleted are
 69 20 The belief that 03, 10, 18] That CT
 69 23 austere 10, 18] austere and priceless
 CT, 03
 69 26 the great renunciation 03, 10, 18] the
 great refutation CT *In another hand in*
pencil above the great is the deleted phrase
"il gran' rifiuto" and similarly deleted
above refutation is refusal? The word re-

futation is underlined in pencil and ? is
 written in pencil in the left margin
 69 29 voice 03, 10, 18] mere (mere under-
 lined in pencil with ? in pencil preceding it in
 the left margin) voice CT
 69 39 lyrics 10, 18] limpid lyrics CT, 03
 (limpid is underlined in pencil with ? in
 pencil preceding it in the left margin CT)
 70 2 temple 10, 18] shrine At times of
 such inspiration, we seem to hear the
 strange, deep music of an invisible sea
 beating ceaselessly upon an unknown
 shore Could we but stand on that shore,
 we feel, another vision of life might be
 ours, wider, freer, than the narrow valley
 in which our private life is imprisoned CT,
 03
 70 4 that temple can be entered 10, 18] that
 ocean can be seen 03] the ocean can be
 seen CT
 70 5 paved CT] above deleted strewn
 70 16 In all CT] after deleted In this way
 mind asserts its subtle mastery over the
 thoughtless forces of nature
 70 19 which 03, 10, 18] that CT
 70 37-8 irrevocableness 03, 10, 18] ir-
 revocability CT Also at 71 13
 71 10 renunciation CT, 03, 10] enunciation
 18

71 ii begins 10, 18] begins Those who have passed through that valley of darkness emerge at last into a country of unearthly beauty, where the air is calm, and the pale sun coldly illuminates a frosty landscape, and there the deep-toned paean of freedom vibrates in the soul that has con-

quered fear CT, 03 *In CT X is written in pencil in the left margin beside this passage*

71 17 late CT, 03, 18] last 10

71 32 struggle CT, 18] *after deleted vain (in pencil above pencil deletion petty)*

71 39 light 10, 18] golden light CT, 03

5 On History

The copy-text (CT) is *The Independent Review*, 3 (July 1904). 207–15 An earlier version of the passage at 80 28–81 1 is found in 2, “The Pilgrimage of Life” (48 6–23). The following textual notes include a collation of these parallel passages. 2o denotes the version in Paper 2

79 1 Might slides] might slides CT

80 30 their CT] your 2o

80 34–5 them were they heard, but they CT] you were you heard, but you 2o

80 36 later days CT] other times 2o

80 36 out of CT] through 2o

80 39 paean] paeon CT

80 40 may not be happiness, CT] is not happiness, no, 2o

6 The Study of Mathematics

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. Its twenty-three leaves are foliated 1–3, 3a, 4–9, 9a, 10–16, 17(18), 18(17), 19–21, measure 223 × 287 mm, and are written in ink. “Chapter v 63” is written on the verso of fol 1. The present fos 17 (91 35–92 7) and 18 (92 8–31) have been transposed from their original positions. The textual notes provide a collation of CT with the following published versions: 07, *The New Quarterly*, 1 (Nov 1907), 29–44, 10, *Philosophical Essays* (1910) 71–86, and 18, *Mysticism and Logic* (1918) 58–73.

85 4 As respects CT] *above deleted* In regard to

85 9–10 it is necessary to keep alive a knowledge of their aims, CT] *inserted*

85 10 clear CT] *inserted*

85 12 forming CT] *after deleted* upon

85 13 is 07, 10, 18] seems CT

85 24 be initiated to 07, 10, 18] the initiation of CT

85 27 due 07, 10, 18] lofty CT

85 35 value 07, 10, 18] utility CT

85 35 imposed CT] *after pencil deletion* which is

85 36 , it is true, CT] *after deleted* will probably be

85 40 every CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* any

86 2 entitles 18] entitle CT, 07, 10

86 3 Deity CT, 10, 18] deity 07

86 4 more CT] *after pencil deletion* with the free broad spirit of genius,

86 5 merit CT] *after deleted* are worthy

86 5 heaven CT] *before deleted* But the mathematicians do not read Plato, while (while *above deleted* and) those who read him know no mathematics, and regard his opinion upon this question (this question *in pencil above pencil deletion* it) as merely a curious aberration

86 5–16 There is aberration CT] *inserted on fol 3a*

86 8 Many CT, 10, 18] many 07

86 9 Clemias 18] CLE CT

86 10 Stranger CT, 10, 18] stranger 07

86 10 Athenian 18] ATH CT

86 13 (*Laws*, 818) 1] (*Laws*, p 818) 1 07, 10, 18] (*Laws*, p 818) CT

86 18 without CT] *after deleted* yet

86 19 painting CT, 10, 18] paintings 07

86 21 show CT] *after deleted* possess

86 22 the highest CT] *after deleted* supreme

86 25–6 ever-renewed 10, 18] ever renewed CT, 07

86 26 second-best CT] *hyphen inserted in*

pencil

- 86 31 the CT] inserted on 2nd occurrence
 86 32 cosmos CT] above deleted world
 86 34 dreary CT] above deleted cold
 86 34 actual 07, 10, 18] visible CT
 86 35 , however, 07, 10, 18] however (inserted in pencil) CT
 86 40 the rules CT] after deleted this corresponds to rythm in poetry, and
 86 40-1 are to mathematics architecture CT] above deleted take the place of those of prosody
 86 42 This passage Murray 07, 10, 18]
No footnote in CT
 86 42 Professor 10, 18] Mr 07
 87 2 there is an air of ease and lucidity 10, 18] an air of ease and lucidity reigns CT, 07
 87 3 been thought 07, 10, 18] seemed CT
 87 5 whose CT] after deleted which
 87 6 shines CT] in pencil above pencil deletion appears
 87 9 How CT] after pencil deletion Being now agreed as to the ideal to which mathematics must strive to approximate, it remains to ask the more difficult question
 87 10 high CT] inserted in pencil
 87 13 chief ends served by mathematics, when rightly taught, is 07, 10, 18] first aims of a teacher should be, in their subject, CT
 87 18 as merely 07, 10, 18] merely as CT
 87 20 to have CT] inserted
 87 20 played CT] after deleted to be
 87 24 constitutes CT, 10, 18] consutute 07
 87 35 lines CT] after deleted parts
 87 38 amid CT] above deleted among
 88 9 reveal CT] after deleted say
 88. 13 mastery 07, 10, 18] marvellous mastery CT
 88 16 chasm CT] above deleted step
 88 31 Eleatic At 10, 18] Eleatic, at CT, 07
 88 33-40 It was assumed in this matter CT] inserted on fol 9a
 88 34 assumed CT] after deleted always
 88 36 always CT] inserted
 88 40 matter, and to render possible the creation of an exact science of the infinite 18] matter CT, 07, 10
 89 5 is dispelling CT] in pencil above pencil

deletion has dispelled

- 89 13 would CT] in pencil above pencil deletion must
 89 14 accepted CT] after deleted re] 89 17 away, let CT, 10, 18] away Let 07 89: 17 those CT] after deleted all
 89: 19 established CT] after pencil deletion which is immutably
 89-28 seem CT] in pencil above pencil deletion appear
 89-37 in CT] after deleted it is
 89-39 itself. CT] before pencil deletion So vast is the tree that the mind dwells naturally among the branches, flying like a bird from branch to branch, with no knowledge of the common trunk from which all are but offshoots A deliberate search is required (for deleted) to make the dark (make the dark inserted) descent (descent written over descend before deleted to the trunk) and up to reascend, and hard and rare is the journey for the first who venture down But soon a beaten track can be made, and the splendid unity of the tree can be made visible to every student In every careful study, this view of mathematics should be included
 89 40 mathematical text-books 07, 10, 18] the mathematical (mathematical inserted) books which are put before the young CT
 90 1 unity CT] after deleted there
 90 8 distracted by CT] inserted in pencil
 90 10-11 more important CT] after deleted prin (above deleted central)
 90 11 good CT] in pencil above pencil deletion great
 90 11 tone CT] above deleted habit
 90 12 selective CT] after deleted a
 90 15 the CT] above deleted certain
 90 16 their principles CT] replaced the principles of the various studies
 90 18 Symbolic CT] after deleted the study of
 90 20 and is CT] inserted in pencil
 90 20 still CT] after pencil deletion the subject is
 90 31 whole CT] above deleted mathematical edifice
 90 34 like CT] after pencil deletion suddenly,
 90 34 palace CT] above deleted wide land-

- scape
- 90 34 the CT] written over an on 1st occurrence
- 90 34 as CT] after deleted , a whole region
- 90 43 quite CT] inserted
- 91 1 from CT] above deleted upon
- 91 3 edifice CT] after deleted deductions
- 91 7 satisfaction CT] after deleted very great
- 91 12 reason CT] above deleted logic
- 91 12 greatly CT, 10, 18] greatly 07
- 91 13 heart CT] above deleted essence
- 91 14 an inquiry into CT] inserted
- 91 17 material CT] after deleted the
- 91 20 acknowledging CT] replaced the acknowledgment of
- 91 21 alien CT] after deleted the world of matter
- 91 24 what CT] after deleted the
- 91 24 to CT] written over in
- 91 25 conform 07, 10, 18] be subjected CT
- 91 28 we thoroughly understand CT] inserted
- 91 29 which CT, 10, 18] that 07
- 91 29 that CT, 10, 18] which 07 on 1st occurrence
- 91 29 that we CT] after deleted is thoroughly understood,
- 91 29-30 we can adequately realize the profound importance of its beauty 10, 18] the profound importance of its beauty can be adequately realized CT, 07
- 91 31-2 but in another sense 07, 10, 18] but CT
- 91 32 are 07, 10, 18] are in a sense CT
- 91 33 apprehension CT] after deleted realiz
- 91 35-92 7 It was formerly discovery CT] moved from after 92. 31 (nos 17 and 18 are transposed and renumbered)
- 91 35 It was CT] after pencil deletion diminishes the generality of the resulting theorems, and the greatest possible generality is to be sought (to be sought inserted) before all things (to be sought deleted)
¶For the right apprehension of mathematics as one among the arts, it is necessary to realize the purely ideal character of the world (with deleted in pencil) which it describes (describes in pencil above pencil deletion deals)
- 91 35-6 , in some respects, CT] inserted
- 91 39 is CT] above deleted does
- 91 40 of fact CT] inserted in pencil
- 91 43 of a kind CT] above deleted such as were
- 91 43-92 1 from such restrictions CT] inserted
- 92 1 abstract CT] after deleted creative
- 92 1 free CT] replaced free from the restrictions imposed
- 92 3 reason's CT] after deleted the
- 92 3 dealing with CT] above deleted creating
- 92 5 to be found CT] after deleted presented by the
- 92 8 very desirable CT] in pencil above deleted important
- 92 9 theorems CT] above deleted results
- 92 9 to CT] after deleted so
- 92 10 beauty CT] inserted
- 92 15-16 which it is meant to teach CT] in pencil above pencil deletion to be inculcated by its means
- 92 22 on CT] above deleted in other branches
- 92 30-1 diminishes . to be sought CT] inserted at bottom of fol 18 (formerly fol 17), see T91 35-92 7 and T91 35
- 92 33 written CT] above deleted said
- 92 33 effect CT] written over effects
- 93 1 by patience and discipline, 18] by patience, by discipline, 10] by patience, by austerity, by stern discipline, CT, 07
- 93 3 chief 07, 10, 18] great CT
- 93 4 acknowledgment of CT] above deleted submission to
- 93 5 Of 07, 10, 18] Against CT
- 93 6 edifice 10, 18] great edifice CT, 07
- 93 7 doubting CT] inserted
- 93 13 share 07, 10, 18] bear CT
- 93 16 though 07, 10, 18] however CT
- 93 21 when CT] after deleted in the face
- 93 27 every CT] after deleted the
- 93 28-9 citizen The use of mathematics 07, 10, 18] citizen (before deleted Ocean ((Ocean inserted)) Navigation, the use of ((the use of inserted)) steam and electricity—to take striking instances—are all rendered possible ((by deleted)) only by mathematics) CT
- 93 30 enriching CT] before deleted daily
- 93 33 Utility CT] replaced The utility
- 93 35 ennobling CT] inserted
- 93 39 for 07, 10, 18] to CT

7 Prisons

On the basis of content, dates of composition and paper size, these fragments have been identified as belonging to "Prisons". The arrangement of the fragments, however, is largely conjectural. The first two parts (7a and 7b) are written on paper which measures 180 × 232 mm, whereas the rest are written on paper measuring 145 × 222 mm (which apparently had first been torn in half). In each case, the copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. They are all written in ink. The single leaf of 7a is not numbered, the four leaves of 7b are foliated 1-4; the two leaves of 7c are foliated 1-2, the single leaf of 7d is not numbered, the three leaves of 7e are foliated 1-3, and the thirteen leaves of 7f are foliated 1-3, 1-6 and 1-4. 7f is dated July 1911.

For a collation of "Prisons" and "The Essence of Religion", see the textual notes for 8. No collation has been made for 7 and the conclusion of *The Problems of Philosophy* because the rearrangement and adaptation were so extensive.

7a Untitled Outline

No textual notes

7b Contemplation

102 31 desires CT] after deleted activity
 103 4 world CT] replaced great world beyond
 103 5 possible CT] above deleted given
 103 7 contemplation, CT] before deleted calm as the stars, deep as death, embracing all the ages of man's struggle in its view—this
 103 8 road CT] after deleted lone
 103 8 freedom CT] above deleted light. Also at 103 9, 103 15
 103 9 prison CT] above deleted darkness
 103 11 toil CT] after deleted burden of
 103 11 through CT] above deleted and weariness under the load of
 103 12 grave CT] after deleted silence of the
 103 15 freedom CT] before deleted in the world of light
 103 16 destruction of CT] above deleted

agony of destroying
 103 21 enlarged CT] after deleted purged of their dross,
 103 22 love, CT] before deleted shedding their light over the world,
 103 22 of division CT] inserted
 103 23 unloved CT] before deleted And from the absence of private struggle comes freedom for
 103 23 contemplative CT] inserted
 103 25 the depths CT] after deleted of all
 103 25 the hierarchy CT] after deleted all
 103 26 the CT] inserted
 103 26 eternal CT] before deleted and necessary
 103 26 met CT] after deleted all
 103 26 mirrored CT] before deleted, by the strange mystery of thought,

7c Action and Contemplation

104 11 inspires CT] above deleted controls

7d Freedom and Bondage

No textual notes

7e Prisons I

104 31 the CT] written over our
 104 31-2 our own conception of the Good CT] replaced ourselves
 105 17 unhampered CT] after deleted free
 105 21 itself CT] inserted
 105 24 those CT] written over us
 105 24 nearly CT] inserted
 105 24 in some ways CT] inserted

7f The Good

105 26 The Good CT] Chapter x (x written over III) The Good
 105 29-30 which belongs to the particular soul, CT] inserted
 105 33 which belongs to the universal soul, CT] inserted
 105 34 love, and service CT] transposed from service, and love
 105 39 feeling and will CT] transposed from

- will and feeling
- 106 1 love and service CT] *transposed from*
service and love
- 106 21 might see CT] *replaced* sees
- 106 38 and most CT] *inserted*
- 107 8 oneness CT] *above deleted* union
- 107 11 admiration CT] *after deleted*
friendship,
- 107 12 and CT] *inserted*
- 107 13 deeper CT] *before deleted* feeling
- 107 24 country CT] *before deleted* Any gregarious animal will have some instinctive desire for the good of other members of the food-group, hence spring patriotism and the family affections
- 107 37 attain, it rejects CT] *replaced* attain
What it rejects is
- 107 37-8 impulse, and extends CT] *replaced* impulse It transfers
- 107 42 its CT] *after deleted* its
- 108 1 than the intellect CT] *inserted*
- 108 14-16 Of the two souls universe,
CT] *replaced* There is, in man, a twofold being the animal, which lives in instinct, and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendants, and the divine, which seeks the infinite, *There are two question marks in the left margin*
- 108 17 animal CT] *below inserted and deleted* particular
- 108 19 world CT] *above deleted* infinite
- 108 19 world CT] *before deleted* Any interference of the animal being is a prison
- 108 19 In union with the world the soul finds its freedom. CT] *transposed from* The
- soul finds its freedom in union with the world
- 108 20-1 union in feeling, union in will CT] *transposed from* union in will, union in feeling
- 108 21-2 union in feeling is love, union in will is service CT] *transposed from* union in will is service, union in feeling is love
- 108 22 hatred, and strife CT] *transposed from* strife, and hatred
- 108 22-3 What promotes disunion CT]
after deleted Whatever promotes disunion or hinders union is a prison
- 108 23 insistent CT] *inserted*
- 108 24 combination CT] *above deleted* union
- 108 25 love, and consequent service CT]
replaced service, and love
- 108 28-9 love to allies in the conflict of rival instincts, service to those with whom there is some instinctive tie CT] *transposed from* service to those with whom there is some instinctive tie, love to allies in the conflict of rival instincts
- 108 34 to love all, and to serve all CT]
transposed from to serve all, and to love all
- 108 36-7 , in love it makes no division of friend and foe, in service it makes no division of deserving and undeserving CT]
transposed from , in service it makes no division of deserving and undeserving, in love it makes no division of friend and foe
- 108 38 part of man, CT] *above deleted* life
- 109 8 hostile CT] *above deleted* alien

8 The Essence of Religion

The copy-text (CT) is *The Hibbert Journal*, 11 (Oct 1912) 46-62. The following table identifies parallel passages in CT and 7

CT	7
120 3-18	106 38-107 8
121 13-20	104 30-105 3
121 20-35	105 11-25
121 37-122 41	108 14-109 17

The textual notes provide a collation of these passages

120 3-18 to friends world in love CT]
to friends are opposed foes, to saints, sinners, to God, the Devil. The dualistic emotions introduce disunion into the world they introduce hostile camps and a doubtful warfare They provide objects for hatred as well as objects for love ¶But besides the earthly love, which demands that the object shall be useful, beautiful or good, there is a heavenly love, which loves all indifferently It is not compassion, though it produces compassion where

there is misfortune, it is not benevolence, since it is not *merely* active. It is love, but it is not balanced by any opposing hatred. To this love, the division of the world into good and bad, though it remains true, seems of less import than the oneness of the world in love 7f

121 13 derives its power from the sense of CT] consists in 7e

121 13-14 universe which it is able to give CT] universe 7e

121 15 good CT] Good 7e

121 17 upon CT] upon Hence those who know of no other way lose the religious attitude towards the world, with this, their outlook becomes finite, and their world is impoverished even in its finite parts. It is therefore important to preserve religion. But if thus is to be possible, 7e

121 18 only CT] solely 7e

121 19-20 through impartial worship alike CT], and of immeasurable value to those who achieve it 7e

121 21 free religion from all dependence

upon dogma CT] do so 7e

121 23 self CT] Self 7e *Also at 121 28, 121 29*

121 27 Religion seeks CT] The essence of religion is 7e

121 27 by CT] achieved by 7e

121 28 self, but this CT] Self This 7e

121 32-3 By life in the infinite, such a form of union is rendered CT] Such a religion is 7e

121 34-5 has been given by the religions of the past CT] the religions of the past have given 7e

121 37 natures CT] souls 7f

122 4 is the CT] is reason, which is of the divine part The 7f

122 5 which is wisdom, CT] is Wisdom, which is 7f

122 8 self CT] Self 7f

122 14 wisdom CT] reason 7f *Also at 122 36, 122 37, 122 40 (twice)*

122 15 which it seeks CT] it seeks 7f

122 22 the CT] its 7f

9 The Perplexities of John Forstace

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. Its ninety-seven leaves measure 176 x 227 mm and are written in ink.

Part I is foliated 1-2, 3(20), 4, 5-8(22-5), 26-40, 40a(40), 41-2

Part II is foliated 1(1a), 1a, 2, 2a-4(1-3), 5-11, 11a(1), 12(2), 13-18, 19(2), 20, 21-2(2-3), 23(30), 24-7(4-7), 28-34

Part III is foliated 1-4, 4a-9, 10-12(1-3), 13-17, 18-19(12-13), 20-30, 31^(?), 32-3

128¹ 16 to CT] written over on on 2nd occurrence

128 16 his CT] written over the

128 17 devoted CT] above deleted concentrated

128 17 child-like CT] after deleted invariable

128. 19 solid CT] above deleted indubitable

128 19 results CT] before deleted which he had

128 30 Lane CT] replaced Lanes *Also at 128 33, 129 4, 130 11, 130 15, 130 21, 130 28, 130 33 See also T130 6*

128: 31 the CT] written over a on 2nd occurrence

128² 32-3 invited because the distinguished guest had expressed a wish to meet him CT] replaced invited Forstace had never been at a garden-party, (and had deleted) but the Poet's advice determined him to seize the opportunity of asking the opinion of a man who—so he had been told—possessed more knowledge of the world than any other living man

128 38 which CT] before deleted in turn

128 38 was CT] written over is

129 2-3 an intellectual CT] replaced a

129 15 she CT] above deleted Forstace

129 15 we may hope CT] above deleted I suppose

129 25-6 Forstace, who had never taken any interest in political questions, was puzzled by this answer CT] inserted

129 27 he asked CT] inserted

129 32 Forstace persisted CT] inserted

129 37 you CT] before deleted then on 2nd occurrence

- 129 38-9 asked Breitstein the pessimist financier CT] inserted
 130 2 choose CT] above deleted like
 130 3 it " CT] before deleted ¶" But",
 Forstice persisted, "since I do not know whether it is good to sacrifice the many to the few, or even whether I should be among the few or not, your answer does not help me very much, though I am {very deleted} grateful for your kindness in trying to enlighten me I am afraid my question remains, and I shall have to seek farther for the answer "
- 130 4 By this time, CT] before deleted the garden party had melted away, not without indignation against Forstice for monopolizing Hatfield Lanes, and for drawing him away from the anecdotes of international rascaldom for which he was famous
- 130 4 Breitstein CT] before deleted , the pessimist financier (financier above deleted stock-jobber)
- 130 4 , having CT] above deleted had
 130 6 Lane's CT] replaced Lanes's
 130 6 Shufsky CT] written over Shipstone
 Also at 130 26, 130 28, 131 36, 132 9
 130 7 stayed, CT] inserted before deleted remained,
 130 8 he meant CT] inserted
 130 16 African CT] inserted
 130 23 must CT] above deleted will
 130 28 Lane"], Lane "CT
 130 31 a CT] inserted in margin after deleted the on 2nd occurrence
 130 32 else CT] before deleted Economic forces are only the tension between desire and its end, the difficulty of the road that must be traversed
- 130 33 pipes CT] above deleted stops
 130 37 penultimate CT] after deleted latest
 130 38 forced CT] inserted
 130 41 Lane] Lanes CT
 130 43 and CT] inserted
 130 43 poor CT] after deleted very
 131. 7 Paradise"], Paradise" CT
 131 10 much more than CT] replaced about as much as
 131. 11 happier than any one in your Paradise, CT] above deleted as (as inserted) perfectly happy as any human being can be
 131 15 , like you, CT] inserted
 131 37 such things CT] above deleted the rest of it
 131 38 competition CT] before deleted of
 132. 1 All these problems are new to me, I do not CT] replaced It is important to me to
 132 1 problems CT] above deleted questions
 132 21 a little CT] above deleted some slight
 132 24 have found CT] above deleted can say
 132 24 experience in CT] above deleted of
 132 41 man I have ever met who has felt as you do" CT] above deleted who has given me that answer"
 132 41 do"], do" CT
 133 2 afternoon CT] above deleted day
 133 6 while CT] above deleted until
 133 7 absorbed me. CT] above deleted was interrupted by this awful (awful above deleted tiresome) problem
 133 8 happy CT] before deleted The others whom I asked all seemed to wish to continue existing themselves, but they gave me no reason for their wish that I could understand
 133 10 Most people CT] above deleted The others
 133 10 are CT] written over were
 133 11 among my acquaintance is not CT] inserted after deleted was not
 133 13 must think of CT] above deleted wish to treat
 133 14 think of CT] above deleted treat
 133 15 balancing of CT] replaced question of balancing
 133 23 dear"], dear" CT
 133 42 twelve months CT] above deleted year
 134. 3 elemental CT] above deleted simple elemental
 134 4-5 the tenderness increased, CT] replaced as her pain increased, the tenderness and understanding of his thought for her increased,
 134 6-7 little service . love CT] inserted at bottom of fol 39 and deleted from top of fol 40a
 134 8-15 Not only the world CT] inserted as new fol 40, replacing the following

passage on fol 40a (formerly fol 40) ¶An infinite tenderness possessed him, setting free, in some mysterious way, the pent-up waters of love, love to all the world, to children, to the men he met in the street, to every human being with whom chance brought him in contact The difference between one and another seemed a very little thing compared with the common need, struggling, anxious, wandering and weak, all stood in want of mutual love, of the warmth and light of human companionship in the struggle to keep off the outer darkness *In the margin above this deleted passage Russell wrote the word Expand*

- 134 10 faces CT] *above deleted* people
- 134 11 passed CT] *after deleted* met
- 134 23 destitute CT] *before deleted* All seemed to have the same unsatisfied hunger in the soul, all alike seemed to muss the one thing of value, love, freely given, without thought of return or merit or duty, out of the spontaneous impulse of the heart
- 134 26 compassion CT] *before deleted* for the struggling race of man
- 134 29 solemn CT] *after deleted* some
- 134 32 final CT] *inserted*
- 134 34 then CT] *inserted*
- 134 37 undeviating CT] *after deleted* passionless
- 134 40 he CT] *written over* we
- 135 9 affection CT] *replaced* affections
- 135 15 obscure CT] *before deleted* to him
- 135 21 mystery CT] *above deleted* wisdom
- 135 32 vain CT] *inserted*
- 135 32 attempts CT] *replaced* attempt
- 135 36 greatest CT] *above deleted* noblest
- 135 37 in spite of his exile CT] *inserted*
- 136 5 discussion CT] *before deleted* Math'n The first to speak was the mathematician Forano *The deletion occurs at the top of fol 2a, formerly fol 1*
- 136 6 , he said,] he said CT *Also at 137 6-7, 138 27*
- 136 8 something CT] *after deleted* , I feel,
- 136 9 importance CT] *above deleted* value
- 136 14 see CT] *above deleted* find
- 136 16 "I suppose] Quotation marks are editorially supplied *Also at 136 22,*

- 136 33, 137 18, 137 40, 138 6, 138 19, 138 26, 138 43, 139 7, 139 16, 139 40, 140 9, 140 16, 140 28, 140 37, 141 11, 141 35, 142 24, 142 39, 143 4, 143 18, 143 40, 144 8, 144 19, 144 29, 144 37, 145 10, 150 37
- 136 20 exist CT] *replaced* are present
- 136 24-5 approximate CT] *above deleted* inexact
- 136 38 truths CT] *after deleted* , chiselled
- 136 38 of CT] *written over* and on 2nd occurrence
- 136 40 With a CT] *replaced* A
- 137 22 —the summer lightning, or an infant's smile— CT] *inserted*
- 137 26 the ages CT] *above deleted* eternity
- 138 1 on CT] *inserted*
- 138 2 be CT] *inserted on 2nd occurrence*
- 138 16 grovelling CT] *after deleted* myopic
- 138 21 calm CT] *above deleted* peace
- 138 27 poet] Poet CT
- 138 27 Pardicreti CT] *inserted*
- 138 37 only CT] *inserted*
- 138 37 only CT] *before inserted and deleted* or chiefly
- 138 37 world CT] *after deleted* outer
- 138 40-1 if science knows everything, CT] *inserted*
- 138 42 space CT] *before pencil deletion* like celestial globe-trotters
- 138 43 Even CT] *replaced* But even
- 139 8 orderly CT] *above deleted* tidy
- 139 13 possess my soul CT] *above deleted* have courage
- 139 15 to Man CT] *before deleted* *The Lit-
tleness of Man* (title) ¶God, we are told, created Man in his own image and sent his only-begotten Son to die upon the Cross for Man's salvation *To the left of the deleted title (on fol 11a Russell wrote Part II*
- 139 16 A CT] *replaced* What a
- 139 16 all anthropomorphism CT] *above deleted* this man-made God
- 139 21 simple-minded CT] *after deleted* very naive
- 139 22 overwhelming CT] *above deleted* vast
- 139 24 the starlight CT] *after deleted* hur-
rying clouds drift across the moon,
- 139 26 attaining CT] *above deleted* reaching

- 139 35 all CT] *inserted*
- 139 35-6 like human mounds CT] *after deleted* spiritual, that is to say that all is
- 139 36 in being spiritual CT] *inserted*
- 139 39 purpose CT] *before deleted* ¶But who decreed that Reality is to be fettered by the (paltry *deleted*) limits of our experience (and imagination *deleted*)? Mind we know, matter we dimly guess at, but why should mind and matter complete the universe? Only to flatter human vanity, only to make man feel at home in the world, only to avoid the pain of unknown dangers and unimaginable possibilities
- 140 3 means CT] *above deleted* paltriness
- 140 4 in CT] *replaced* to
- 140 5 courage CT] *after deleted* the
- 140 6-7 at last in CT] *before deleted* a peace which transcends both, and
- 140 7 reconciling CT] *written over* reconciles
- 140 7 discipline CT] *above deleted* submission
- 140 14 reveals CT] *after deleted* plants
- 140 15 to CT] *written over* in
- 140 19-20 Graceful images deep thought, CT] *transposed from* Deep thought, graceful images, exquisite pictures of outward beauty,
- 140 23 life-in-death CT] *transposed in pencil from* death-in-life
- 140 24 hope CT] *after deleted* doubt
- 140 29 novelist CT] *above deleted* composer
- 140 30 think CT] *before deleted* beauty
- 140 31 all art CT] *above deleted* music
- 140 32 world of CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* one which
- 140 32 sense CT] *before pencil deletion* considers real
- 140 38 mathematics CT] *after deleted* music provides an outlet which
- 140 38 that CT] *above deleted* which
- 140 39 an outlet CT] *inserted*
- 140 40 infinite CT] *above deleted* great fundamental
- 140 40-1 I doubt if there can be CT] *replaced* There can be no
- 140 43 a man may be CT] *above deleted* one is
- 141 1 but CT] *inserted*
- 141 1 creator CT] *before deleted* I know one
- hears of placid artists—Titan, they say—but I never quite believe it, I am sure Mozart must have been full of pain
- 141 1 us CT] *written over* one
- 141 2 vision, CT] *before deleted* that one is always aspiring after,
- 141 4 our CT] *written over* one's
- 141 4 we long CT] *written over* one longs
- 141 5 the CT] *written over* one's
- 141 14-15 I had found CT] *replaced* music had given me
- 141 15 infinite CT] *above deleted* fundamental *Also at* 141 36, 142 8, 142. II, 142 18, 142 24, 143 4, 143 14
- 141 21 with CT] *after deleted* by
- 141 23 headlands CT] *above deleted* capes
- 141 24 rhythm] rythm CT
- 141 26 my CT] *written over* the
- 141 26 and CT] *above deleted* of my anguish, and opened a way for
- 141 27 calm CT] *after deleted* unfeeling
- 141 27 turns CT] *above deleted* deflects
- 141 35-41 But this detachment. Late at night, CT] *inserted as fol 20, replacing the following passage on fol 21* Other things, too, would force (force replaced beat down the ((the *above deleted* my) fortress of thought, forcing) me to hear the cry of pain in my soul The laughter of children or (or *inserted before* The) the bright-eyed energy of youth, attacking the old world with the ever-new freshness of untested (untested *above deleted* morning) faith would rouse in me an almost unbearable anguish—the vision of the awful journey that lay ahead (ahead *above deleted* before them), crushing out gaiety, hope, desire, in the long agony of life (would rouse agony of life *transposed with* or the bright-eyed faith) Late at night, after the (the *above deleted* my) day's work was ended,
- 141 41 to CT] *written over* and
- 142 1 humanity CT] *after deleted* I would feel,
- 142 7 skies, CT] *before deleted* willows whitened by the wind,
- 142 8 that CT] *written over* the *Also at* 142 II
- 142 12 from CT] *inserted*
- 142 12 Thus CT] *possibly replaced* The

- 142 13 pain CT] *after deleted* fundamental
on 1st occurrence Also at 142 29
- 142 14 life CT] *before deleted* and the universe
- 142 23 into a mere automatic bodily survival CT] *above deleted*, becoming mere digestive machines only interesting to the physiologist All this terror and flight I saw embodied in the degraded population of the London night
- 142 29 this CT] *replaced* the
- 142 32 mysterious CT] *inserted*
- 142 33 liberation CT] *before deleted* With thus thought, the worship of truth, which I had preserved throughout my wanderings, shone forth with a new brightness it was, indeed, in facing truth that the fundamental pain could be faced and conquered And the mystery and love which I had seen for a moment as I passed through the gateway of pain returned to me with a new meaning and a new force
- 142 34 vision CT] *after deleted* calm
- 142 35 paean CT] *after deleted* vast
- 142 43 wind CT] *after deleted* great
- 143 2 embodying CT] *after deleted* of
- 143 9 borne CT] *before deleted* In this new life, love, truth, beauty, irradiate the surrounding darkness *(darkness above deleted night)*, banishing strife and frenzy and discord
- 143 13 making CT] *after deleted* of
- 143 14 Pain CT] *replaced* Thus pain
- 143 18 distant CT] *inserted*
- 143 23 and follies CT] *after deleted* and cruelties
- 143 32 might be the spokesman of CT] *replaced* may speak for
- 143 32 should CT] *before deleted* like to
- 143 39 amazing CT] *above deleted* mysterious
- 144 5 measles or teething, CT] *above deleted* something else
- 144 6 pay, CT] *before deleted* and though she may keep their things
- 144 9 in CT] *above deleted* that
- 144 10 which CT] *inserted*
- 144 18 much CT] *above deleted* any
- 144 18 sublime CT] *above deleted* exalted
- 144 27 promised CT] *inserted*
- 144 29 in our discussion CT] *inserted*
- 145 1 what is needed is a gospel, but CT] *replaced* it is a gospel that is needed, it is
- 145 3 in general, CT] *inserted*
145. 13 the mind of Forstice CT] *replaced* Forstice's mind
- 145 13 Except CT] *replaced* Each speaker in turn convinced him, except
- 145: 21 exist CT] *before deleted* even
- 145 27 illness CT] *after deleted* death
145. 27 Tristram CT] *after deleted* Lancel
- 145 28 John Forstice CT] *above deleted* Philip
- 145 31 John as a boy CT] *above deleted* Philip
- 145 33-4 Tristram Forstice, who CT] *above deleted* His uncle,
- 145 35 , inherited from his father, CT] *inserted*
- 145 35 desolate CT] *above deleted* remote
- 146 1 John's CT] *above deleted* Philip's
- 146 2 John CT] *above deleted* Philip Also at 146 7, 146 16, 146 24, 147 26, 151 10
- 146 7 thirty CT] *written over* twenty
- 146 8 Catherine CT] *replaced* Aurea Also at 146 17, 146 41, 146 42, 147 24, 147 29, 148 2, 149 8, 152 20
- 146 14-15 the relief CT] *after deleted* good works
- 146 20 labourers CT] *after deleted* concerns of the
- 146 22 man's CT] *above deleted* human
- 146 24 free herself CT] *above deleted* escape
- 146 28 Tristram CT] *above deleted* he
- 146 33 all CT] *inserted on 1st occurrence*
- 146 33 its CT] *written over the on both occurrences*
- 146 33 and all CT] *inserted*
- 146 34 eternal CT] *inserted*
- 146 37 warm CT] *inserted*
- 146 40 latest CT] *written over last*
- 146 40 without CT] *after deleted* fully
- 147 1 also CT] *inserted*
- 147 2 end CT] *above deleted* last
- 147 5-6 Rightly or wrongly the child, CT] *above deleted* She fancied some neglect due to her love for me
- 147 16 life, CT] *before deleted* and
- 147 17 spending CT] *after deleted* so many
- 147 21 Catherine's CT] *above deleted* Aurea's Also at 147 35
- 147 22 wished CT] *above deleted* desired

- 147 22-4 The journal decide CT] inserted
- 147 26 house CT] above deleted night
- 147 39 joy CT] replaced great (above deleted full) happiness
- 147 42 knows CT] above deleted feels
- 148 1 the CT] inserted on 1st occurrence
- 148 8 The CT] replaced In the
- 148 11-149 6 "No, passionate love life" CT] At some stage in composition the following passage must have been intended for the section concerning Uncle Tristram's journal I cannot weigh (my deleted) love with other things—the world, or philosophy, or great achievement—it outweighs them all Somehow, mysteriously, it seems of more import than all else in my (my above deleted my) life—as though the universe destined me for love from all eternity there is my true being, there I come nearest to the divine I know love perishes—we die and it is gone— while other things persist for a (while deleted) time But all that is calculation, and who knows? in some way the essence of our love may be distilled in all our words and ways, something of its divinity may somehow become enshrined in others' thoughts, some light shining out of the soul may illumine the way to heaven There is nothing in me more infinite, more religious, more full of what is divine, than my love it is the thirst of my soul for beauty outward and inward, the worship of my heart for what is noble and gentle, the passion of my whole being to pour itself forth in utter devotion Even beside what is greatest, Love is greatest of all Love demands reverence, for it is a holy thing, a ray of light piercing the very abyss of heaven The depth and strength and wonder of it are beyond the words of human speech The fierceness of the sea, the majesty of the stars, the gentleness of spring showers, are all surpassed by love it is more fierce, more majestic, more gentle than they are I have tried to put it among things of earth, and imagine a transcendent worship above it, but that is not truth to me, to me there is no heaven, no God, no ideal, which is not incarnate in Love This is the last utter truth to me, my whole being leaps to greet it Russell sent this passage in letter 1091 (late Aug 1914) to Lady Ottoline On 24 March 1912 (letter 402), he had sent the same material (with slight variations) The earlier version differs in the use of personal references and terms of endearment because it was intended as a statement of love for Lady Ottoline In letter 1090, Russell said "I copied out for Forstace part of a letter I wrote you about the 23rd of March 1912—I enclose it—every word of it is true now, except about fierceness"
- 148 12 causes CT] above deleted brings
- 148 13 seeing CT] replaced and see
- 148 16-17 of spiritual meeting CT] replaced when souls meet
- 148 17 ecstasy CT] above deleted mystery
- 148 19 solitude CT] above deleted division
- 148 24 unknown CT] above deleted imagined
- 148 26 an unattainable CT] after deleted the beaut
- 148 31 greatest CT] above deleted deepest on both occurrences
- 148 33 pain CT] above deleted grief
- 149 2 towards CT] replaced to
- 149 7 John] Philip CT
- 149 12 full of CT] replaced in
- 149 14 these CT] written over the
- 149 14 surroundings CT] replaced surrounding
- 149 16-17 by a Sister calling him CT] above deleted and he was brought
- 149 17 Sister CT] written in left margin to replace message
- 149 20 she CT] above deleted it
- 149 21 a small frail form enveloped in a dark blue serge habit, CT] Russell circled this phrase and indicated that it was to be inserted before giving at 149 22 This instruction was later deleted
- 149 25-6 that looked at once CT] replaced, that looked at him, yet seemed at the same time fixed on the distant eternal vision At once he felt
- 149 27 here",] here" CT
- 149 27-8 He looked CT] after deleted She sat with her back to the light, by a large writing-table

- 149 28 rigidly CT] written over rudely
 149 29 and some religious pictures covered
~~CT]~~ above deleted were everywhere along
 149 29 some CT] above deleted a few
 149 31 *Prie-Dieu*] *Prie-Dieu* CT
 149 35 the outcome of CT] above deleted
 that came from
 149 36 renunciation, CT] before deleted
 from a past that had lined and furrowed
 that gentle face
 149 38 , worshipped something, CT] in-
 serted
 149 41 them] thus CT
 149 43 for CT] replaced illegible words
 150 5 appeared CT] above deleted seemed
 150 7-10 Her vivid not share CT] The
 word Expand appears in the margin beside
 this passage
 150 14 Much CT] replaced With much
 150 14 also CT] inserted
 150 14 is thought to be CT] above deleted
 passes for
 150 19 absorbed in CT] after deleted swal-
 lowed u
 150 22 world foreshadowed in CT] above
 deleted promised land of
 150 22 restless CT] inserted
 150 24 that CT] written over this
 150 25 uncharted CT] above deleted
 boundless
 150 27 wholly CT] inserted
 150 29 immured CT] after deleted confined
 150 30 infinite and CT] inserted
 150 32 they know CT] above deleted every
 human spirit is a battle-ground between
 the infinite and the finite
 151 10 for her CT] inserted
 151 32 he CT] above deleted I Also at
 151 33 (twice), 151 35
 151 32 him CT] above deleted me
 151 33 his CT] above deleted my
 151 34 him CT] written over me
 151 39 next CT] above deleted forthcoming
 151 42 tense CT] above deleted rasped
 152 1 those CT] written over the
 152 1 that CT] above deleted which
- 152 8 hurrying CT] inserted
 152 31 find CT] written over see
 152 33 make it fragmentary, CT] Russell
 circled this phrase and drew an arrow to in-
 dicate that it was to be inserted before fill it
 with strife This instruction was later de-
 leted Written in the margin beside the line is
 break it This was deleted as well
 152 35-6 acceptance CT] above deleted rev-
 erence
 152 38 heart CT] above deleted root
 152 40 ideal CT] inserted
 152 43 But CT] above deleted Yet
 152 43 subsists CT] written over coexists
 152 43 side by side CT] inserted
 153 1 lust CT] before deleted and pain
 153 4-5 the verdict of CT] inserted
 153 5 is absolute CT] above deleted inter-
 poses its veto
 153 12 we can CT] after deleted but
 153 13 value CT] after deleted real
 153 14 passively CT] inserted
 153 14 cease CT] above deleted fail
 153 16 wholly CT] above deleted easily
 153 24 separate CT] after deleted its
 153 30 the beginning of CT] above deleted
 all
 153 31 indignation CT] after inserted and
 deleted anger and
 153 35 effaced CT] after deleted raised
 153 40 fragments CT] above deleted part
 154 4 more difficult CT] above deleted
 harder
 154 15 men's CT] above deleted our
 154 19 what CT] replaced whatever
 154 24 truth CT] before deleted is on 2nd
 occurrence
 154 31-3 infinite Our human existence
 love, CT] replaced infinite, short or long,
 great or small, any portion of knowledge
 or beauty or love outweighs all the finite
 goods and evils in the world, and redeems
 our human existence, in spite of all its
 pain and degradation
 154 37 gales CT] after deleted equinoctial

10 Mysticism and Logic

The copy-text (CT) is *Mysticism and Logic* (1918), 1-32 The first publication of thus

paper is 14, *The Hibbert Journal*, 12 (July 1914) 780-803 As Russell says (in footnote

3), several passages from this paper also appear in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (14a) The following table identifies the parallel passages

CT	14a
158 1-3	19
162 12-22	166
164 30-168 18	20-6
168 34-9	166
168 40-169 3	19
169 4-6	45-6
169 7-9	19-20
169 9-15	46
169 15-21	45
169 22-170 2	46-7
170 16-28	166-7
171 16-172 11	11-12
172 12-32	14-15
172 33-173 6	16-17
175 9-176 15	26-8

The textual notes provide a collation of CT, 14 and 14a

- 158 1-3 Metaphysics, or the attempt impulses, CT, 14] Metaphysics, from the first, has been developed by the union or the conflict of these two attitudes 14a
 158 10-11 always must CT] must always 14
 159 17 of soul CT] of the soul 14
 159 22 flame in CT] flame of 14
 159 22 depths CT] depth 14
 159 29 cave CT] cave² *(Footnote* ² Republic, 517) 14 See T161 41
 159 30-161 18 senses ¶Imagine eyes ²
 ¶But] senses ¶Imagine² eyes ¶But CT] senses But 14
 159 40 Philosophy CT] Philosophers 14
 161 26 truth, 14] truth CT
 161 41 Republic . Vaughan CT] No footnote in 14
 161 41 514-17] 514 CT
 161 41 Republic, 514, translated by Davies and Vaughan CT] Footnote lacking in 14 but see T159 29
 162 12 he CT, 14] she 14a
 162 16 Hegel CT, 14] Hegel ¹ *(Footnote*
 "With Parmenides," Hegel says,
 "philosophising proper began" *Werke*
 (edition of 1840), vol xiii p 274) 14a

- 163 5 subjective CT] equal subjective 14
 164 35-8 have been printed in a course of Lowell lectures on *Our Knowledge of the External World*, published by the Open Court Publishing Company But I have left them here, as this is the context for which they were originally written CT] are from a course of Lowell lectures "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," shortly to be published by the Open Court Publishing Company 14
 165 16 realm CT] realms 14, 14a
 165 27 are sometimes CT, 14] may be 14a
 165 29 strong CT, 14a] stong 14
 166 3 intellectual CT] intellectual 14, 14a
 166 3 sympathy CT, 14a] sympathy 14
 166 16 to secure CT] designed to secure 14, 14a
 166 25 him CT, 14] M Bergson 14a
 166 29 capacity 14, 14a] capacity, CT
 166 41 It is greater, as a rule, CT, 14] Speaking broadly, it is greater 14a
 167 2 see CT, 14] find 14a
 167 35 intuition which seems CT] intuitions which seem 14, 14a
 168 14 habits 14, 14a] habit CT
 168 18-26 acceptance ¶In advocating thought CT] acceptance 14, 14a
 168 34-9 The conception idea CT, 14] The great conception of a reality beyond the passing illusions of sense, a reality one, indivisible, and unchanging, was thus introduced into Western philosophy by Parmenides, not, it would seem, for mystical or religious reasons, but on the basis of a logical argument as to the impossibility of not-being All the great metaphysical systems—notably those of Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel—are the outcome of this fundamental idea 14a
 168 40-169 3 The logic arises CT, 14] The logic used in defence of mysticism seems to me faulty as logic, and in a later lecture I shall criticise it on this ground 14a
 168 40 me 14, 14a] be CT
 169 4-6 Belief metaphysics CT, 14] Belief in the unreality of the world of sense arises with irresistible force in certain moods—moods which, I imagine, have some simple physiological basis, but

- are none the less powerfully persuasive
 The conviction born of these moods is the
 source of most mysticism and of most
 metaphysics 14a
- 169 7-9 the more West CT, 14] But the
 more thorough-going mystics do not em-
 ploy logic, which they despise they ap-
 peal instead directly to the immediate de-
 liverance of their insight Now, although
 fully developed mysticism is rare in the
 West, some tincture of it colours the
 thoughts of many people, particularly as
 regards matters on which they have strong
 convictions not based on evidence 14a
- 169 10 intensity of emotional conviction
 CT, 14] emotional intensity of such a
 mood 14a
- 169 11 grounds CT, 14] reasons 14a
- 169 13 ground CT, 14] reason 14a
- 169 15-16 The resulting logic CT, 14] The
 belief or unconscious conviction that all
 propositions are of the subject-predicate
 form—in other words, that every fact con-
 sists in some thing having some quality—
 14a
- 169 17 anxious CT, 14] honestly anxious
 14a
- 169 18-19 the errors of their logic CT, 14]
 their error very quickly 14a
- 169 23 mystics CT, 14] mystics—notably
 Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel 14a
- 169 34-5 The impulse fades, CT, 14]
 While the mystic mood is dominant, the
 need of logic is not felt, as the mood fades,
 the impulse to logic reasserts itself, 14a
- 170 7-15 insight As a Persian mass
 CT] insight 14
- 170 16-17 The arguments for the conten-
 tion CT, 14] The contention 14a
- 170 18 fallacious CT, 14] based upon fal-
 lacious reasoning 14a
- 170 27 feeling, even though time be real,
 CT, 14] feeling, 14a
- 170 31 for CT] of 14
- 170 32 past—14] past, CT
- 171 7 time CT] the time 14
- 171 17 required for CT, 14] important and
 vital to 14a
- 171 18-19 Something of Hellenism,
 something, too, of Oriental resignation,
- CT, 14] Something of Hellenism 14a
- 171 19 its hurrying Western self-assertion
 CT, 14] the new spirit 14a
- 171 20 mature wisdom CT, 14] wisdom 14a
- 171 21 In spite of its appeals to science,
 CT, 14] And it is time to remember that
 biology is neither the only science, nor yet
 the model to which all other sciences must
 adapt themselves Evolutionism, as I shall
 try to show, is not a truly scientific philos-
 ophy, either in its method or in the prob-
 lems which it considers 14a
- 171 21 philosophy, I think, CT, 14]
 philosophy 14a
- 171 33-9 family The sun ended ¶But
 CT, 14a] family But 14
- 171 33 the planets CT] planets 14a
- 172 3 ideal 14, 14a] idea CT
- 172 8 aspiration CT, 14] aspirations 14a
- 172 11-27 process ¶Life distance CT,
 14a] process 14
- 172 12 this CT] his 14a
- 172 22 which CT] who 14a
- 172 24 an 14a] no CT
- 172 26 we reach 14a] it reaches CT
- 172 28 I CT, 14] Now I 14a
- 172 28 propose CT, 14] propose at present
 14a
- 172 29 I wish only to maintain CT, 14] At
 present I wish to make only two criticisms
 of it—first, that its truth does not follow
 from what science has rendered probable
 concerning the facts of evolution, and sec-
 ondly, 14a
- 172 31 touching CT, 14] really touching
 14a
- 172 37 can CT] really can 14, 14a
- 172 38 attain truth, CT, 14] become
 scientific—and it is our object to discover
 how this can be achieved—14a
- 172 40-173 6 science Knowledge . dis-
 prove CT, 14a] science 14
- 173 7 change CT] a change 14
- 173 39 *Ibid* 14] Ethics CT
- 175 11 a scientific philosophy CT, 14]
 philosophy 14a
- 176 2 psychology CT, 14] science of
 psychology 14a
- 176 42 contact 14] constant CT

11 Literature of the Fiscal Controversy

The copy-text is *The Independent Review*, 1 No textual notes
 (Jan 1904) 684-8

12 The Tariff Controversy

The copy-text (CT) is *The Edinburgh Review*, 199 (Jan 1904) 169-96 208 34 Bournville] Bourneville CT
 211 14 against] against CT
 214 9 sacrificed] sacrificed CT
 204 39 destroy] destroy CT

13 Mr. Charles Booth on Fiscal Reform

The copy-text is *The Spectator*, 92 (16 Jan 1904) 83-4 No textual notes

14 Old and New Protectionism

The copy-text (CT) is *The Spectator*, 92 (23 Jan 1904) 125-6. 221 6 Protectionism—] Protectionism,—
 CT

15 International Competition

The copy-text is *The Spectator*, 92 (30 Jan 1904) 180 No textual notes

16 Mr. Charles Booth's Proposals for Fiscal Reform

The copy-text (CT) is *The Contemporary Review*, 85 (Feb 1904) 198-206 225 17 namely] namely, CT Also at 232 12
 226 42 *Wirtschaftsleben*] *Wirtschaftsleben*
 CT

17 Mr. Gerald Balfour on Countervailing Duties

The copy-text is *The Westminster Gazette*, 10 Feb 1904, p 2 No textual notes

18 On the Democratic Ideal

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript Its twenty-six leaves are foliated 1-26 Fols 1-10 measure 223 x 287 mm , fol 11-26 measure 143 x 223 mm The manuscript is written in ink All but the first fol have "DI" written in the upper left corner
 248 9 further CT] inserted
 248 13 the only CT] in pencil above pencil deletion the chief
 248 15 relations CT] before deleted rather than bad ones
 248 21 liberty CT] above deleted equality
 248 23 the mediaeval view of life CT] replaced mediaeval thought
 248 24 Chinese CT] in pencil above pencil deletion thought of China (and medi de-

248 2 good CT] above deleted the
 248 7 often mistakenly CT] above deleted commonly

- leted)*
- 248 24 But CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* Yet
- 248 29 place CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion way*
- 248 40 over and over again CT] *inserted*
- 249 5 To CT] *above deleted* It is from
- 249 5 is due CT] *above deleted* that
- 249 13 parents CT] *after deleted* when
- 249 24 recognized CT] *inserted*
- 250 2 of CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* which is degrading to *on 2nd occurrence*
- 250 2 desirable CT] *after deleted* necessa
- 250 3 necessary CT] *after deleted* a
- 250 10 with good reason CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* rightly
- 250 12 an CT] *above deleted* some
- 250 19 deficient in CT] *above deleted* which lacks
- 250 27 deciding CT] *after deleted* judging
- 250 29 the best CT] *in pencil above pencil deletion* a good
- 250 29 And CT] *inserted*
- 250 32 compelled, while CT] *replaced* com-
pelled And
- 250 33 respect CT] *after deleted* due
- 251 1 , apart from consequences to others,
CT] *inserted*
- 251 14 in respect CT] *after deleted* its di
- 251 17 upon the man compelled CT] *in-
serted*
- 251 18-19 Better to convince a man of a general rule than directly as to a particular duty CT] *inserted in pencil at top of fol 8*
- 251 28 often CT] *inserted*
- 252 1 with CT] *above deleted* to
- 252 16 equality CT] *after deleted* the
- 252 21 seriously CT] *inserted*
- 252 23 especially when CT] *after deleted* ex-
cept where
- 252 27 this is CT] *inserted*
- 252 42 assumption CT] *after deleted* unwar-
rantable
- 253 7 more CT] *after deleted* probably
- 253 7-8 other relation CT] *after deleted* rela
- 253 36 there CT] *inserted*
- 254 9 unreasoning CT] *inserted*
- 254 24 is strong, CT] *replaced exists,*
- 255 13 or one's country CT] *inserted*
- 255 14 Therefore CT] *replaced* And there-
fore
- 255 28 rule CT] *after deleted* will
- 256 32 results CT] *in pencil above pencil de-
letion* consequences
- 256 34 practical CT] *after deleted* a
- 256 39 whether CT] *above deleted* the cases
in which

19 The Status of Women

The copy-text (CT) is the untitled manuscript. Its sixteen leaves are foliated 1-16, measure approximately 211 x 287 mm, and are written in ink.

Since the editors have worked from a photocopy of the copy-text, the usual detail concerning the use of pencil in authorial alterations cannot be provided.

- 257 *tule* The Status of Women] *tule edito-
rially supplied*
- 258 21-3 For this reason . future CT]
*There is a question mark in the margin beside
this sentence*
- 258 26 peculiar CT] *after deleted* special and
- 258 32 wide-spread CT] *above deleted* gen-
eral
- 258 34 felt CT] *after deleted* generally
- 258 34 most CT] *inserted*

- 258 36 admitted CT] *after deleted* granted
- 259 7 rare CT] *above deleted* very few
- 259 21 bitterly observed CT] *above deleted* complained
- 259 23 give CT] *replaced* gives
- 259 39-40 Although the bare theoretical possibility may be admitted, I believe this to be practically untrue, CT] *transposed* from I believe this to be practically untrue, although the bare theoretical possibility may be admitted,
- 259 42 the CT] *after deleted* that
- 259 43 small CT] *after deleted* very
- 260 15 greater CT] *above deleted* better
- 260 15 the CT] *inserted*
- 260 16 smaller CT] *above deleted* less
- 260 24 times CT] *before deleted* and seasons
- 260 36-7 From all practical measures CT]
replaced In all practical questions

- 261 5 decay of the mediaeval Empire CT] replaced break-up of the Empire
 261 7 those CT] after deleted opponents
 261 24 were] was CT
 261 37 class CT] after deleted large
 261 40 extensions CT] after deleted apart from
 261 41 welfare CT] after deleted interests
 262 11 moral CT] inserted
 262 13 from CT] before deleted not
 262 16 influence CT] above deleted effect on the character of the
 262 29 people of CT] inserted
 263 14 the same CT] above deleted equal
 263 23-5 We may observe negligible,
 CT] *There is a question mark in the margin beside this passage*
- 263 33 (6) (5) CT
 263 35 (7) (6) CT
 264 7-8 the absence of that CT] replaced that absence of
 264 9 foster CT] after deleted dim
 264 25 this battle, CT] above deleted such a life, because
 264 31 admitting CT] above deleted facing
 264 37 depict CT] after deleted paint
 264 39 omitting CT] after deleted merely
 264 42 the CT] inserted
 265 5 seldom CT] above deleted rarely
 265 11 be] Since the manuscript is damaged, the word is editorially supplied
 265 11 true] Since the manuscript is damaged, the word is editorially supplied
 265 13 passed] past CT

20 The Wimbledon By-Election

The copy-text for 20a is Russell's election pamphlet, for 20b, the report in *The Wimbledon Herald*, 11 May 1907, and for 20c, part of "Wimbledon Today / Mr Russell's Appeal for All Liberal Votes" in *The Daily News*, 14 May 1907, p 8

supplied

20c Last Message to the Electors

- 269 9 Last Message to the Electors] title editorially supplied
 269 10 I ask for the Liberal vote because] "I ask for the Liberal vote," he said, "because CT
 269 17 opponent] opponent" CT

20a Election Address

- 268 1 Election Address] title editorially supplied

20b Reply to Chaplin

- 269 1 Reply to Chaplin] title editorially

21 After the Second Reading

The copy-text (CT) is *Women's Franchise*, 1 272 28 Government] Government CT (12 March 1908) 429

22 Mr Asquith's Pronouncement

The copy-text is *Women's Franchise*, 1 (28 No textual notes May 1908) 565

23 Liberalism and Women's Suffrage

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript Its sixteen pages are foliated 1-16, measure 224 x 286 mm , and are written in ink The last leaf is signed "Bertrand Russell" The first publication of the paper is 08, *The Contemporary Review*, 94 (July 1908) 11-16 The

textual notes provide a collation of CT and 08

- 279 7 continued 08] persistence—apparently from mere inertia—of the CT
 279 17 consistent CT] *above deleted* true
 279 20 special CT] *above deleted* even greater
 279 24 women CT] *before deleted* to enfranchisement
 279 28 recalling CT] *after deleted* spending a few minutes in
 279 31 class CT] *above deleted* person or class at both occurrences
 279 32 its CT] *above deleted* his
 279 34 ignorant of and CT] *inserted*
 279 42 and her children CT] *inserted*
 279 42 should, through no fault of her own, 08], through no fault of her own, should CT
 279 43 drink CT] *before deleted* or gets ill
 280 11 diffusion CT] *above deleted* existence
 280 11 such CT] *above deleted* thus
 280 11 throughout CT] *above deleted* among
 280 12 increases CT] *above deleted* makes for
 280 13 making CT] *after deleted* bringing
 280 13 greater CT] *after deleted* matters
 280 18 One CT] *replaced* This is one
 280 19 is CT] *inserted*
 280 20 intrinsically CT] *inserted*
 280 25 the great engine CT] *replaced* one of the great engines
 280 27 that CT] *inserted*
 280 32-3 the attitude CT] *after deleted* of which the late Lord Salisbury was a typical exponent,
 280 40 must CT] *before deleted*, in my opinion, (*replaced*, I think,)
 280 41 giving votes to CT] *replaced* votes for
 281 13 among CT] *above deleted* to
 281 14 an CT] *above deleted* some
 281 17 special CT] *inserted*
 281 17 in CT] *inserted*
 281 19 than CT] written over that
 281 25 side CT] *before deleted* These are of two kinds, general arguments, and arguments specially derived from the present

situation in the United Kingdom I will take the general arguments first

- 281 29 men CT] *inserted*
 282 4 nevertheless CT] *inserted*
 282 4 prolong CT] *above deleted* continue
 282 4-5 own domination CT] *above deleted* policy
 282 5 better CT] *above deleted* right one
 282 7 all CT] *after deleted* religious persecution and
 282 14 will not CT] *above deleted* won't
 282 17 would 08] could CT
 282 19-20 it is unnecessary to give votes to women, because they CT] *above deleted* women
 282 20 husbands CT] *replaced* husbands, and therefore it is unnecessary to give them votes
 282 25 favourite 08] weighty CT
 282 40 although CT] *above deleted* even if
 282 41 perhaps CT] *inserted*
 283 3 indifferent, and CT] *replaced* indifferent You might as well say that children ought not to be taught to read unless it can be shown that a majority of them desire it When they have learnt to read, they see the advantage of it, and
 283 12 women CT] *before deleted* the only proposal which is practical politics is that the vote should be given to women on the same terms as to men, which would leave an overwhelming preponderance of male voters
 283 12-13 any measure of women's suffrage CT] *above deleted* this
 283 17 either sex CT] *above deleted* men
 283 38-40 to substitute for the somewhat brutal desire for mastery a cooperation which cannot fail to develop the intelligence and the good will of both parties 08] to (help men, in Meredith's phrase, to "round Cape Turk" *deleted*) curb the somewhat brutal desire for mastery, and to substitute a (a *inserted*) cooperation (for despotism tempered by deceit *deleted*) which cannot fail to develop the intelligence (of the *deleted*) and the good will of both parties CT
 284 7 a gain to liberty, and CT] *inserted*
 284 13 improvements CT] *above deleted* changes

- 284 14 prejudice or an CT] *above deleted* a temporary and problem 284 16 few Liberals will CT] *replaced* Liberals will not

24 The Present Situation

The copy-text (CT) is the untitled mimeographed typed letter (17 Feb 1909)

285 *title* The Present Situation] *title editorially supplied*

286 3–4 National Union CT] *Above this, on*

his own copy, Russell wrote in ink For Women's Suffrage

287 31 Committee CT] *Below this, on his own copy, Russell wrote in ink* for Women's Suffrage

25 Should Suffragists Welcome the People's Suffrage Federation?

The copy-text is *The Common Cause*, 1 (9 Dec 1909) 463–4

No textual notes

26 Address to the Bedford Liberal Association

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. Its eighteen leaves are foliated 1–18, measure 222 × 287 mm, and are written in ink. "Bedford May 1910" is written in the upper left corner of fol 1. "Liberal Assoc" is written beside this, in pencil and in another hand.

294 *title* Address to the Bedford Liberal Association] *title editorially supplied*

297 22 compromise CT] *replaced* compromise, unless and until it becomes evident

297 22 are CT] *above deleted* is

297 28 secured their record majority CT] *above deleted* returned to power

297 39 Land CT] *above deleted* small holdings

298 1 thus CT] *inserted*

298 14 these CT] *after deleted* they w

298 20 But CT] *after deleted* In this

298 23 , which CT] *inserted*

298 39 , he says (pp 229–30,) he says (p 229) CT

299 2 , he says (p 97,) he says (p 97) CT

299 4 to CT] *after deleted* with

299 6–8 I hope Parliament CT] *inserted* after Veto Bill² at bottom of fol 5

299 26 proposal CT] *above deleted* policy

299 29 extend it by enabling CT] *replaced*

enable

300 13 make CT] *replaced* makes

300 40 or CT] *written over* and

301 6 use CT] *above deleted* purpose

301 15 the CT] *above deleted* his

301 16–17 signed by him and other members of the Commission CT] *inserted*

301 20 separate CT] *inserted*

301 41 values CT] *inserted*

301 43 tends to enable CT] *replaced* enables

302 2–3 in order to complete the work of free trade CT] *inserted*

302 10 every CT] *above deleted* a

302 18 intention CT] *before deleted*, however,

303 2 1908 CT] *before deleted* On the question of the Navy, I have throughout approved of the Government programme, both against the Conservatives on the one hand and against the "economists" on the other hand

303 3 have CT] *before deleted*, therefore,

303 9 policy shall we have CT] *replaced* policy, between

303 10 industrial CT] *inserted*

303 11 or CT] *after deleted* or

303 20 question CT] *replaced* question, and Home Rule

303 21 all CT] *before deleted* four

303 24 protective CT] *inserted*

27 *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties*

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. Its twenty-three leaves are foliated 1-2, 3(2a), 3a, 4-8, 8a, 8b, 9-11, 11a, 12-19, measure approximately 223 x 287 mm (although there is some small variation), and are written in ink. The textual notes provide a collation of CT and 10, the pamphlet published in 1910 "By the Hon Bertrand Russell" is written below the title in another hand. Compositors' signatures and marks are found in several places throughout the paper.

- 304 *title Anti-Suffragist Anxieties*] *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* 10] Arguments against Women's Suffrage CT
- 306 8 thought wise CT] *above deleted* possible
- 306 9 very CT] *inserted*
- 306 27-9 This "experience" CT] *In pencil in the left margin Russell wrote and then deleted* Expand
- 306 29 "experience" CT] *before deleted* If the experience were not so general, we could compare the (*advan deleted*) effects of granting women's suffrage
- 306 37-8 The "lesson" to be learnt is—so in effect we are told— CT] *replaced* We are told, in effect, that the "lesson" to be learnt is that
- 307 20 what, as yet, forms 10] what forms, as yet, CT
- 307 34 is CT] *written over in on 1st occurrence* Also at 307 35
- 307 42 woman, CT] *written over* women
- 307 43 half CT] *after pencil deletion* more than
- 308 4 rights² 10] *No footnote in CT (See T308 6)*
- 308 6 others 10] others * (*Footnote *See pp 32-4 and 79-80*) CT
- 308 9 present By 10] present (in innumerable ways, *deleted*) by CT
- 308 10 innumerable CT] *inserted*
- 308 17 perfectly CT] *inserted*
- 308 18 ready CT] *before deleted* at all times
- 308 22 when CT] *written over* where
- 308 23 to those CT] *after deleted* in the ba
- 308 28 solely CT] *above deleted* wholly
- 308 28 whereof CT] *after deleted* of which
- 308 29 now CT] *inserted*
- 308 36 the proof CT] *after deleted* those who offer
- 308 42 Pp 78-9] P 78 CT, 10
- 309 8 maintain CT] *after deleted* admit
- 309 13 discussed CT] *above deleted* treated
- 309 15 to it CT] *inserted*
- 309 19 I do not know CT] *after deleted* But "there is another sense in which a vote or political power may, I admit, have its pecuniary value"
- 309 25 legislation CT] *replaced* legislation—by the
- 309 30 intimately dependent upon CT] *after deleted* capable of
- 309 40 votes CT] *after deleted* support
- 310 2 without CT] *above deleted* unless it has
- 310 3 give CT] *before deleted* If this is corruption, then corruption is of the very essence of representative government ¶ As against the view that the vote will raise women's wages, it is said that this cannot happen unless by corrupt pressure on members of Parliament
- 310 3 Professor's CT] *inserted*
- 310 6 to a grateful nation CT] *inserted*
- 310 8 representative government CT] *above deleted* democracy Also at 310 9
- 310 24 measures CT] *above deleted* questions
- 310 31-311.2 Russia ¶ Professor Dicey or to one class 10] Russia CT
- 311 9 , if possible CT] *inserted*
- 311 10-13 , and we agree (pp 56-7) CT] *inserted in left margin*
- 311 13 (pp 56-7)] (p 56) CT
- 311 14 suffrage"? 10] suffrage " CT
- 311 19 huge CT] large 10
- 311 27 it is CT] it 10
- 311 38 compared with 10] compared to CT
- 312 12-13 the poor on the ground that they have no property CT] *after deleted* those who have no property on the ground of poverty
- 312 28 After some CT] *above deleted* Beyond the supposed evil of large constituencies, the only other objections urged against adult suffrage consist of

- 312 31 (p 62) CT] inserted
 313 5 always CT] inserted
 313 6 their CT] written over the
 313 18 himself, CT] inserted. The word was
 originally written in pencil and then written
 over in ink
 313 19 the vote CT] replaced votes
 313 20 it CT] after deleted them
 313 22 a CT] after deleted the
 313 27 woman CT] written over women's
 314 8 have been considered important by
 men CT] replaced men have considered
 important

- 314 11-12 Most women men 10] Most
 women, at first, will have too little politi-
 cal experience to do more than vote for the
 candidate whom their husbands or broth-
 ers recommend CT
 314 19 Labour 10] labour CT Also at
 314 23, 314 25
 314 31-2 two-thirds CT] two- inserted
 314 34 into 10] in CT
 315 13 Thus the CT] replaced illegible word
 The change was originally made in pencil
 and then written over in ink

28 Religion and Metaphysics

The copy-text (CT) is *The Independent Review*, 9 (April 1906) 109-16

29 A History of Free Thought

The copy-text (CT) is *The Tribune*, 4 June 1906, p 2

328 27 Mr Robertson] RELIGION AND

ECONOMICS ¶Mr Robertson CT
 328 38 1s] in CT
 329 23 Mr Robertson] THE BENEFITS OF
 HERESY ¶Mr Robertson CT

30 Freethought Ancient and Modern

The copy-text is *The Speaker*, n s 14 (4 Aug 1906) 402-3

31 The Development of Morals

The copy-text (CT) is *The Independent Review*, 12 (Feb 1907) 204-10

339 34 namely] namely, CT
 340 3 posterity] posterity, CT

32 Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic

The copy-text (CT) is *The Edinburgh Review*, 205 (April 1907) 489-507

345 42 Freethought] Free Thought CT
 351 32 became] became CT

354 41 p 23-4] p 24 CT
 355 39 translation] Translation CT
 355 40 p 28-9] p 29 CT
 359 39 pp 359-60] p 359 CT

33 The Politics of a Biologist

The copy-text is *The Albany Review*, n s 2 (Oct 1907) 89-98

34 Biology and Politics

The copy-text (CT) is *The Nation*, 3 (26 Sept 1908) 918, 920 374 15-16 Weismann] Weissmann CT
374 24 remained] remain CT

35 Memories and Studies

The copy-text is *The Cambridge Review*, 33 No textual notes
(16 Nov 1911) 118

36 Dramatic and Utilitarian Ethics

The copy-text (CT) is the manuscript. Its nine leaves are foliated 1, 2, 8–14, measure 169 x 227 mm and are written in ink.

380 5 tastes CT] replaced taste

380 21 a discussion takes place CT] above
deleted he addresses them

380 22 words CT] (pages missing) is written in pencil here (at the bottom of fol 2)

The quotations are editorially supplied The next extant folio is fol. 8

382 7 who are all murderers— CT] above
deleted who

382 7 best, though CT] replaced best—are

all murderers,
382 8-9 has conventional morality, CT]
inserted
382 9 it CT] *inserted before deleted conventional morality*
382 10 taken CT] *after deleted has it*
382 17 from CT] *above deleted of*
382 21 can CT] *after deleted (which are inseparable)*
382 27 Jeremy] Jeramy CT
382 35 , especially in France, CT] *inserted*
382 42 practice CT] *written over practise*
383 25 remarks CT] *before deleted* "Friend

37 The Professor's Guide to Laughter

The copy-text (CT) is *The Cambridge Review*, 385 7 humour] humour, CT 22 (18 Jan. 1912), 192-4.

38 The Place of Science in a Liberal Education

The copy-text (CT) is *Mysticism and Logic* (1918) 33–45. This paper was first printed as “Science as an Element in Culture” (13), in *The New Statesman*, 1 (24 and 31 May 1913) 202–4 and 234–6. Although the title was changed in CT, the right running-head remained “Science and Culture” (Subsequent versions corrected this inconsistency). In CT the first half of the last paragraph was omitted because virtually the same passage appeared at the end of “Mysticism and Logic”, the lead paper in that collection of essays (see 176 38–177, 13). The textual notes provide a collation of CT and 13.

Culture 13

396 41 results CT] any solid results ¶Human beings cannot, of course, wholly transcend human nature, something subjective, if only the interest that determines the direction of our attention, must remain in all our thought. But science comes nearer to objectivity than any other human pursuit, and gives us, therefore, the closest contact and the most intimate relation with the outer world that it is possible to achieve. To the primitive mind everything is either friendly or hostile, but experience has shown that friendliness and hostility are not the conceptions by which the world is to be understood. Science thus represents, though as yet only in

a nascent condition, a higher stage of evolution than any pre-scientific thought or imagination, and, like every approach

to self-transcendence, it brings with it a rich reward in increase of scope and breadth and comprehension 13

39 The Ordination Service

The copy-text for 39a is *The Cambridge Review*, 3 (22 Nov 1913) 173

The copy-text for 39b is *The Cambridge Review*, 3 (6 Dec 1913) 229, 231

The copy-text (CT) for 39c is the manuscript letter. The single leaf measures 178 × 227 mm. It is signed "Bertrand Russell." The title is assigned in Ogden's hand, preceded by Ogden's instruction "*Please return copy with proofs (3)*". Written in the lower left corner in the same hand is "Trinity College Cambridge". The textual notes provide a collation of CT and 14, the letter as printed in *The Cambridge Review*, 3 (31 Jan 1914) 300.

39a The Proposed Change in the Ordination Service

No textual notes

39b Mr Russell's Reply

No textual notes

39c Inspiration

405 3 Sir,—I 14] Sir I CT

405 4 difficulties CT] perplexities 14

405 12 his CT] before deleted ¶I have some difficulty in understanding how it is possible to believe a book without believing its contents, (a part *deleted*) is it required that a certain percentage should be believed? And if so, should it be over fifty per cent, or would a smaller proportion be sufficient?

40 Chlo, A Muse

The copy-text is *The Cambridge Review*, 35(4 Dec 1913) 189–90

No textual notes

Quotations and Intended and Lost Papers

Quotations

ALL RUSSELL'S QUOTATIONS have been checked and have been found quite accurate. As a rule, his errors are not corrected in the text, and house-styling has been restricted to displaying quotations uniformly and to regularizing bibliographical references. In this volume, Russell's errors in quoting are almost always of a trivial sort. Very rarely do his mistakes affect meaning beyond slight nuances. Many errors probably arose from relying on memory or from transcribing carelessly. But even more must have originated in the publishing process. The fact that the ratio of errors increased dramatically in printed matter substantiates this assumption (even when allowance is made for the fact that these papers contain more quotations). Never is there any sign of wilful misrepresentation of the argument in the original, but only the rather nonchalant attitude to quoting typical of the period. (Whether or not Russell misrepresents an author by his choice of quotations or his paraphrases is, of course, another issue.) Since the mistakes are so minor, they may be summarized through the use of examples from each class, rather than individually. The following survey excludes from consideration Russell's free adaptation of another author's words to the needs of his own prose (such as at 131 26 and 231 5-6).

The majority involves the omission of words or the substitution of a synonym. The omissions may be of nothing more than an article. For example "a" is left out before "metaphysical" at 320 23, "the" before "last" at 349 3 and "an" before "individual" at 369 36. More often, adjectives, adverbs and phrases are dropped. "All" is omitted before "knowledge" at 325 7, "green" before "coolness" at 349 1, "of the tribe" after "women" at 336 31, and "there" before "to mock" at 356 13. Omissions of this nature also occur at 205 33, 223 5, 348 30, 350. 21, 351. 5 and 407 11. Slightly longer omissions may be illustrated by the passage at 7 3-4. Russell referred to "the grass-eating atheists of Ham Common, who slept with their toes out of window". In his source, the statement was qualified in this way "who are fabled to have slept". Omissions of this sort occur at 325 6-7, 345 32, 347 20, 349 18, 351 5, 351 23, 351 25, 353 18 and 356 13. Perhaps the most important omission occurs at 320 25-6. Russell wrote "conviction of harmony between ourselves and the universe at large". The original read "the conviction that the universe was not quite as bad as it could possibly have been would involve a belief in some harmony between ourselves and the universe". In this case and one or two others, e.g. at 351 25, the omission may have been made with deliberation, but the modern method of using dots to indicate ellipsis was not practised. The quotation

from Plato's *Republic* in "Mysticism and Logic" leaves out a substantial passage
The omission would now-a-days be signalled by four dots at 160 10

The replacement of words by synonyms may be illustrated by the following examples Russell gives "therefore" for "consequently" (166 4), "determined" for "resolved" (227 25), "on" for "upon" (348 28) and "midday" for "noonday" (348 34) Similar slips occur at 54 11, 227 23, 348 20, 349 17-18, 349 19, 351 15, 352 29, 360 32 and 369 36 Transposition of words happened on two occasions "I only see" was rendered "I see only" (352 9) and "It depends, I believe" became "I believe it depends" at 385 39-40 Verb tense was altered twice "I shall . conceal" should read "I have concealed" (348 17-18) and "countrymen, left me" should read "countrymen, had left me" (355 8) A change of singular to plural occurred once Thus "vines" is given instead of "vine" at 348 36 Words are added on four occasions For example, the title of James's article is rendered "On the Moral Equivalent of War" instead of "The Moral Equivalent of War" (377 26-7) Russell adds "or by morning light" after "stars" (348 33-4), "its" before "progress" (349 14) and "a" before "life" (370 33)

The only muddle occurs at 348 31-2 Russell has "and on the other hill where they shouted and wept at sight" In the original, the passage reads "and that other hill where the face of Garibaldi brightened at sight"

One error seemed to deserve correction because it appears to be a typographical error that originated in press Editorial intervention to restore the word to its original was warranted also because meaning is affected Thus at 320 36 "commands" is given instead of the erroneous "commends"

Intended and Lost Papers

"THE PILGRIMAGE OF Life" (2), and "Prisons" (7) are surviving fragments of what were larger works, the same is probably the case with "The Education of the Emotions" (3). Whether the missing sections were accidentally lost, discarded as unworthy or adapted for use elsewhere cannot always be established. The transfer and transformation of extant passages in (2) and (7) are discussed in the headnotes.

It is estimated that Russell gave at least thirteen and probably several other speeches about free trade in 1904. None have survived among Russell's papers nor are any contained in the records of such organizations as the Free Trade Union. Manuscripts must have once existed since Russell was not yet an impromptu speaker. On one occasion, Alys read a speech in his absence (see Appendix I 2). By contrast, the planned lecture series on "Insight" in 1913 (see headnote to 7) probably never developed far enough to result in any manuscripts.

Russell's correspondences and journals occasionally mention other topics of interest for papers which do not seem to exist. These papers are presumed to have been abandoned, lost or destroyed, although in some instances, they may have never evolved beyond the germinal state.

In 1902–03, Russell wanted to make analyses of two authors he greatly admired, Thomas Carlyle and Maurice Maeterlinck. Only the paper on the former is known to have been written. In the journal entry of 17 December 1902, Russell mentioned having written out his views on Mr and Mrs Carlyle. The occasion for doing so was a visit to Carlyle House in Chelsea with Gilbert and Mary Murray. Gilbert Murray's comments in letters to Russell suggest that the paper may have been inspired by a reading of *Reminiscences* (1881). Although Murray raised a few points of disagreement, he praised the assessment of Carlyle's life as "extremely fair and true" (Dec 1902). Russell's comment that Carlyle had reached an understanding of his wife only after her death elicited from Murray the suggestion that these new insights might have come from writing about her with the perspective needed for a character in a book. But Murray's judgments were certainly not severe enough to have given Russell second thoughts about the value of what he had written. Thus, the circumstances associated with the loss of this paper are mysterious in view of the fact that Russell's interest in Carlyle continued for years. Although he had always had grave reservations about a genius whom he considered fundamentally cruel, this perception did not affect his view that Carlyle was the best prose writer of the

nineteenth century When in 1912, however, he thought of imitating *Sartor Resartus*, Russell found the work "curiously fantastic" though very well written To Lady Ottoline Morrell, on 23 February 1912, he observed

I don't think now-a-days people would like that sort of solemn make-believe with which he begins, and really I don't know that it ever had much point Probably it retarded the recognition of Sartor's merits, which was very slow (#355)

Russell's attraction to the works of Maeterlinck "both as literature and morality" led him in the summer of 1903 to consider writing an article on him After Alys discussed the plan with Gilbert Murray, while Russell was at Cambridge working with Whitehead, she apologized to her husband in a letter of 9 July for her inadvertent breach of confidence She had assumed that Russell had already told Murray about his idea Murray's response was encouraging, according to Alys's letter "He thought it a most excellent idea that M should be summed up by a philosopher" One can only speculate about whether it was Alys's premature revelation of Russell's plan or a waning of interest that led to the abandonment of the topic In a letter to Lucy Donnelly of 6 July 1902, the praise of Maeterlinck led to a discussion of realism This juxtaposition suggests that mimesis, interpreted in very wide terms, might also have been a concern in the paper He explained in the letter that "truth to life" was an inappropriate standard for literature, unless the definition of reality was extended to include Augustine's *Confessions* and Dante No doubt the evocative power Russell so often singled out in his statements on Maeterlinck would have required an extended discussion Although his remarks in letters were often laudatory, he did write to Helen Flexner on 16 September 1902

But I do not know what to say as to the truth of Maeterlinck's views I feel all that he says, and yet I cannot tell you what instinct there is in me against him, but I am persuaded there is a weakness of some sort in his doctrines, when I have thought it out fully, I will tell you, if I can, what it is that I feel to be wrong There are, however, undoubtedly, moments of almost mystical intimacy.

Perhaps the reservations only vaguely sensed at the time were nearly ready to be articulated in 1903

In a letter to Lucy Donnelly on 13 April 1903, Russell expressed a wish to write a collection of epigrams Perhaps this proposal was simply meant for her personal amusement, since there is no evidence that the project advanced beyond the few samples he sent to her However, it may have anticipated the "Newly Discovered Maxims of La Rochefoucauld" in *Fact and Fiction* In any case, the passage in the letter reads:

sometimes I think of making up a set of aphorisms, to be called "Satan's joys", such as Giving causes affection, receiving causes tedium, the reward of service is unrequited love (This is the biography of all virtuous mothers, and of many wives) Passions are smirched by indulgence and killed by restraint the loss in either case is inevitable And so on But these bitter truths, though they deserve to be recognized so far as they are true, are not good to dwell upon Wherever one finds oneself inclined to bitterness, it is a sign of emotional failure a larger heart, and a greater self-restraint, would put a calm autumnal sadness in the place of the instinctive outcry of pain

Russell announced in 13 May 1903 to Helen Flexner that he had written two lay sermons in imitation of those by his brother, Frank (Frank Russell had written a book called *Lay Sermons* published in 1902. During a three-month imprisonment for bigamy, he had composed twenty-two meditations on a range of religious and moral topics, heading each with a biblical quotation and developing related thoughts) Russell told her

As for the lay sermons, I have hitherto written only two, doubtless they will be published in time If I see you before that happens, I will give them to you in manuscript, if not, I will send you them with pleasure when the time comes At present, I am so weary that *everything* seems to me futile, and in that mood I cannot write But I suppose some day I shall begin to think some things less bad than others again

In *Women's Franchise* for 20 February 1908, announcement was made of the formation of a Cambridge University Association with Alfred North Whitehead as president The report continued "The Hon Bertrand Russell has promised to write a short pamphlet to be circulated throughout the University " When the university was informed of the society by this means, the association would immediately affiliate itself with the Men's League for Women's Suffrage Russell's pamphlet has not been found

In a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 23 April 1912, Russell included an autobiography in the list of work he had completed over the past twelve months (#421) Russell considered using the pseudonym Simon Styles so that no reader would guess his identity "That's not at all the sort of person I am supposed to be" (#423, [24 April 1912]) His lofty goal for this life story was to imitate Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* Lady Ottoline found his autobiography impressive when she read it in April, though Russell claimed that it had reached by then only "scraps" (#424, 25 April 1912) The size of the "scraps" was, however, substantial enough to allow the autobiography to be mentioned as consisting of chapters. When Evelyn Whitehead read the work, she declared it too egotistical. "She said even the last chapter on the fundamental pain has the taint of egotism, though less than the early ones (#442,

pmk 7 May 1912). Russell reacted to this criticism by determining to make a "fresh start" (#439, [5 May 1912]) But we may surmise that in practice he amalgamated parts of his autobiography into *The Perplexities of John Forstice* (9) Chenskoff's speech in manuscript has the deletion of "fundamental" on many occurrences before the word "pain" These and other alterations suggest that at least some of the chapter on the fundamental pain underwent revisions for a new context (from approximately 141 19 to 143 18) Russell had cause to make a special effort to preserve this chapter He had written to Lady Ottoline on 15 April "The stuff I wrote about the fundamental pain seems to me very good indeed—the most sincere and penetrating thing I have ever written" (#416) A section of Pardicreti's speech once bore the title "The Littleness of Man" In all probability, some of his speech once belonged to another chapter of the spiritual autobiography (from approximately 139 16 to 140 28) Moreover, the manuscript still shows occasional traces of the original use of the first person (see T151 32 to T151 34)

In a letter postmarked 31 May 1912, Russell told Lady Ottoline "I have written a review of a bad book by Belfort Bax" (#474) The book is doubtless *Problems of Men, Mind and Morals* (London: Grant Richards, 1912) which had appeared in March This review has not been found Possibly Russell decided against publication.

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