

Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

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■ Backlash against globalization resulted in adverse political consequence.

- The withdrawal of the welfare state has, in the case of UK, been a main driver behind political events such as Brexit.
- Other channels that usually blamed might have had only limited effect (e.g., immigration, import competition).

What was chronology of events?

The Conservative party imposes austerity measures after 2010;

→ Certain demographics turn against mainstream political parties between 2010 and 2015.

→ UKIP benefits from this support and increases its importance between 2010 and 2015 → Brexit referendum in 2016;

→ Leave option is declared the winner by a rather narrow margin.

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
■ Election data

- Westminster, European and local elections.
- In total, 570 harmonized constituencies.
- Data accounts for the diversity of electoral systems, and timing of elections.


■ Individual-level panel data

- Political preferences.
- Attitudes towards the quality and representativity of the political system.
- Direct questions about Brexit.

Panel A. UKIP vote in 2004



Panel B. UKIP vote in 2014



Panel C. Leave share




FIGURE 2. UKIP VOTE SHARE IN THE EP ELECTIONS IN 2004, 2014, AND THE LEAVE SHARE IN THE 2016 EUROPEAN UNION REFERENDUM

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



FIGURE 3. NONPARAMETRIC EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, AND SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION AS OF 2001 ON SUPPORT FOR UKIP OVER TIME

Panel A. Composition of government spending



Panel B. Spatial variation in austerity shock




FIGURE 4. GOVERNMENT SPENDING PER CAPITA AND DISTRIBUTION OF AUSTERITY SHOCK ACROSS LOCAL AUTHORITY DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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District-level model

■ Three econometric models, centered around a pooled difference-in-differences specification:

$$y_{i,r,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Year} > 2010) \times \text{Austerity}_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,r,t}$$

where

- $y_{i,r,t}$ is the UKIP voter share in an election in a district in a region
- α_i is a vector of time-invariant political preferences across districts
- $\beta_{r,t}$ is a vector of non-linear time trends across regions
- $\mathbb{1}(\text{Year} > 2010)$ is a characteristic function interacted with the exposure of district i to austerity measure j , $\text{Austerity}_{i,j}$

The pooled DiD estimator is complemented by event studies which confirm the results.

TABLE 1—THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT AUSTERITY MEASURES ON SUPPORT FOR UKIP
ACROSS LOCAL, EUROPEAN, AND WESTMINSTER ELECTIONS

UKIP vote share in:	Overall (1)	TC (2)	CB (3)	CTB (4)	DLA (5)	BTX (6)
<i>Panel A. Local elections</i>						
1(Year > 2010) × Austerity	0.014 (0.003)	0.081 (0.013)	0.036 (0.044)	0.128 (0.036)	0.166 (0.031)	0.162 (0.086)
Average effect	6.460	7.116	2.587	0.9208	6.084	1.747
Standard deviation	1.747	1.903	0.3405	0.9960	2.028	0.9033
Mean of dependent variable	4.49	4.49	4.49	4.49	4.49	4.49
Local authority districts	345	346	346	346	346	346
Observations	3,260	3,263	3,263	3,263	3,263	3,263
<i>Panel B. European elections</i>						
1(Year > 2010) × Austerity	0.008 (0.002)	0.049 (0.009)	0.054 (0.028)	0.060 (0.028)	0.128 (0.018)	0.001 (0.047)
Average effect	3.692	4.297	3.893	0.4322	4.672	0.0086
Standard deviation	0.9988	1.149	0.5125	0.4676	1.557	0.0044
Mean of dependent variable	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1
Local authority districts	378	379	379	379	379	379
Observations	1,134	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137
<i>Panel C. Westminster elections</i>						
1(Year > 2010) × Austerity	0.008 (0.002)	0.076 (0.009)	−0.025 (0.025)	0.043 (0.030)	0.178 (0.021)	0.064 (0.041)
Average effect	3.978	6.997	−1.81	0.3966	6.664	0.7642
Standard deviation	0.9839	1.715	0.2260	0.3542	2.062	0.3735
Mean of dependent variable	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03
Harmonized constituencies	566	566	566	566	566	566
Observations	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047




FIGURE 5. NONPARAMETRIC EFFECT OF AUSTERITY ON SUPPORT FOR UKIP OVERALL AND BY INDIVIDUAL MEASURES

Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in English and Welsh local council elections from 2000–2015. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these simulated incidence of the austerity measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90 percent confidence bands indicated.

Individual-level model

■ Three econometric models, centered around a pooled difference-in-differences specification:

$$y_{i,w,d,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{d,w,t} + \gamma \times Post_{i,j,t} \times T_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,d,w,t}$$

where

- $y_{i,r,t}$ is a dummy revealing if an individual has a preference for UKIP
- $\beta_{d,w,t}$ captures time-fixed effects.
- $Post_{i,j,t}$ captures the welfare benefit cuts.
- $T_{i,j}$ is a sub-population

The pooled DiD estimator is complemented by event studies which confirm the results.

TABLE 2—THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT AUSTERITY MEASURES ON SUPPORT FOR UKIP:
EXPLOITING INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA

Support UKIP:	Any (1)	CTB (2)	DLA (3)	BTX (4)
<i>Panel A</i>				
Post × benefit cut	0.028 (0.004)	0.026 (0.005)	0.051 (0.013)	0.027 (0.006)
Mean of dependent variable	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352
District FE and region × wave × time fixed effects	X	X	X	X
<i>Panel B</i>				
Post × benefit cut	0.026 (0.005)	0.025 (0.005)	0.043 (0.013)	0.026 (0.006)
Mean of dependent variable	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352
District × wave × time fixed effects	X	X	X	X
<i>Panel C</i>				
Post × benefit cut	0.019 (0.005)	0.019 (0.006)	0.030 (0.015)	0.016 (0.006)

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
TABLE 3—THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT AUSTERITY MEASURES ON SUPPORT FOR OTHER PARTIES:
EXPLOITING INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA

	Any (1)	CTB (2)	DLA (3)	BTX (4)
<i>Panel A. Support for Conservatives</i>				
Post × benefit cut	−0.023 (0.005)	−0.019 (0.005)	−0.022 (0.011)	−0.027 (0.006)
Mean of dependent variable	0.259	0.259	0.259	0.261
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352
<i>Panel B. Support for Labour</i>				
Post × benefit cut	0.014 (0.005)	0.017 (0.007)	−0.004 (0.016)	0.011 (0.008)
Mean of dependent variable	0.351	0.351	0.351	0.348
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352
<i>Panel C. Support for Liberal Democrats</i>				
Post × benefit cut	0.008 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.010)	0.013 (0.005)
Mean of dependent variable	0.0815	0.0815	0.0815	0.0828
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352
<i>Panel D. Support for no party</i>				
Post × benefit cut	−0.010 (0.006)	−0.015 (0.007)	0.009 (0.013)	−0.006 (0.008)
Mean of dependent variable	0.193	0.193	0.193	0.193
Local authority districts	379	379	379	379
Observations	252,642	252,642	252,642	245,352

TABLE 4—WIDER MEASURES OF PERCEPTIONS OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND TURNOUT:
INCLUDED ONLY IN SOME WAVES OF THE USOC STUDY

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Public officials don't care</i>			
Post \times benefit cut	0.078 (0.020)	0.073 (0.021)	0.051 (0.040)
Mean of dependent variable	3.37	3.37	3.37
Local authority districts	378	378	378
Observations	75,547	75,547	75,547
<i>Panel B. Don't have say in what government does</i>			
Post \times benefit cut	0.096 (0.020)	0.093 (0.021)	0.068 (0.041)
Mean of dependent variable	3.34	3.34	3.34
Local authority districts	378	378	378
Observations	75,897	75,897	75,897
<i>Panel C. Your vote is unlikely to make a difference</i>			
Post \times benefit cut	0.020 (0.011)	0.021 (0.011)	0.020 (0.022)

Panel A. Evolution of benefit and labor income for individuals with no qualifications



Panel B. Evolution of benefit and labor income for individuals with university degree




FIGURE 8. NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATES CAPTURING THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR AND BENEFIT INCOME *WITHIN-INDIVIDUALS* OVER TIME FOR RESPONDENTS WITH LOW AND HIGH LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

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■ Fetzer agrees that the causes of people relying on the welfare state are crucial for understanding this dynamic. How could we capture these causes better?

■ Is Fetzer's approach methodologically sound in terms of identifying causation?

■ Is this paper really about Brexit?