

# Northwestern

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## Economics

**Victoria R. Marone**

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**Fields** Research: Industrial Organization, Economics of Healthcare  
Teaching: Industrial Organization, Economics of Healthcare

**Education:** Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2020 (anticipated)  
Dissertation: “Essays on Health Insurance Market Design”  
Committee: Igal Hendel (Chair), Leemore Dafny, Gaston Illanes, Amanda Starc  
M.A., Economics, Northwestern University, 2015  
Harvard Kennedy School, Pre-Doctoral Fellow in residence, 2016–2017  
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government  
B.S. Mathematics; B.S. Energy, Business, and Finance; with honors in Management and Organization; Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College, 2012

**Honors & Awards** Northwestern Economics Distinguished Teaching Assistant Award 2018–2019  
Northwestern University Susan Bies Award for best 3<sup>rd</sup> year research paper 2017  
Pi Beta Kappa 2012  
Phi Eta Sigma 2012  
Jane Wood Reno Memorial Student Leadership and Service Award 2012  
Kermit Anderson Memorial Award for Academic Excellence 2011  
Hess Award for Academic Excellence in Earth and Mineral Engineering 2011  
H. Freeman Stecker Award in Mathematics 2011  
USA Today Student Leadership Award 2010  
WISER/MURE Undergraduate Research Scholarship 2009

**Teaching Experience** Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University  
Economics of Medical Care (ECON 307), Prof. Matthew Notowidigdo, 2015, 2018  
MMSS Senior Seminar (MMSS-398), Prof. Joseph Ferrie, 2018, 2019  
Teaching Assistant, Harvard Kennedy School of Government  
U.S. Healthcare Industry and Regulatory Policy (SUP-578M), Prof. Leemore Dafny, 2017  
Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management  
U.S. Healthcare Strategy (STRTX-945), Prof. Leemore Dafny, 2016

**Research Experience** Research Assistant, Prof. Matthew Notowidigdo, Northwestern University, 2017–2018  
Research Assistant, Prof. Leemore Dafny, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2016–2017  
Research Assistant, Prof. Leemore Dafny, Northwestern University, 2016  
Research Assistant, Prof. Igal Hendel, Northwestern University, 2015

**Previous Employment** Bates White Economic Consulting, Washington D.C., 2012–2014

**Presentations** American Society of Health Economists, ASHEcon, Washington D.C., 2019  
Empirical Methods in Economics, University of Chicago, 2018

**Refereeing** *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Journal of Public Economics, Inquiry*

**Programming** Stata, Python, Matlab

**Job Market Paper** “Should There be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?” with Adrienne Sabety

The availability of choice over coverage level—“vertical choice”—is widespread in U.S. health insurance markets, but there is limited evidence of its effect on welfare. The socially efficient level of insurance coverage, which optimally trades off risk protection and moral hazard, likely varies across consumers. We show that in regulated competitive health insurance markets, vertical choice should be offered only if consumers with higher willingness to pay for insurance also have a higher efficient level of coverage. We test for this condition empirically using administrative data from a large employer and a model of consumer demand for health insurance and healthcare utilization. We estimate substantial heterogeneity in the efficient coverage level across consumers, but do not find that higher willingness to pay is associated with higher efficient coverage level. Optimal regulation is to offer a single coverage level. Relative to a status quo with vertical choice, offering only the optimal single level of coverage increases welfare by \$302 per household, equal to a fifth of the potential welfare loss from adverse selection that would arise if the market were unregulated.

**Other Papers** “Regulating Markups in U.S. Health Insurance” with Steve Cicala and Ethan M. J. Lieber. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11 (4): 71–104 (October 2019).

A health insurer’s Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully-insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule’s introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market, and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected.

“All Medicaid Expansions Are Not Created Equal: The Geography and Targeting of the Affordable Care Act” with Craig Garthwaite, John Graves, Tal Gross, Zeynal Karaca, and Matthew Notowidigdo. *Brookings Institute*, (September 2019).  
NBER Working Paper No. 26289

We use comprehensive patient-level discharge data to study the effect of Medicaid on the use of hospital services. Our analysis relies on cross-state variation in the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, along with within-state variation across ZIP Codes in exposure to the expansion. We find that the Medicaid expansion increased Medicaid visits and decreased uninsured visits. The net effect is positive for all visits, suggesting that Medicaid leads the uninsured to consume more hospital services overall. The increase in emergency department visits is largely accounted for by “deferrable” medical conditions. Lastly, we find significant heterogeneity across Medicaid-expansion states in the effects of the expansion, with some states experiencing a large increase in total utilization and other states experiencing little change. We investigate the sources of this heterogeneity with an eye towards predicting the effects of future expansions or disenrollments.

**"Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, Pricing, and the Cost of Network Breadth"** with Leemore S. Dafny, Igal Hendel, and Christopher Ody. *Health Affairs* 36, no. 9 (September 2017).

Anecdotal reports and systematic research highlight the prevalence of narrow-network plans on the Affordable Care Act's health insurance Marketplaces. At the same time, Marketplace premiums in the period 2014–2016 were much lower than projected by the Congressional Budget Office in 2009. Using detailed data on the breadth of both hospital and physician networks, we studied the prevalence of narrow networks and quantified the association between network breadth and premiums. Controlling for many potentially confounding factors, we found that a plan with narrow physician and hospital networks was 16 percent cheaper than a plan with broad networks for both, and that narrowing the breadth of just one type of network was associated with a 6 percent to 9 percent decrease in premiums. Narrow-network plans also have a sizable impact on federal outlays, as they depress the premium of the second-lowest-price silver plan, to which subsidy amounts are linked. Holding all else constant, we estimate that federal subsidies would have been 10.8 percent higher in 2014 had Marketplaces required all plans to offer broad provider networks. Narrow networks are a promising source of potential savings for other segments of the commercial insurance market.

**"Oscar Health Insurance: What Lies Ahead for a Unicorn Insurance Entrant?"** with Leemore Dafny. Harvard Business School Case 319-025, August 2018. (Revised August 2019.)

## In Progress

**"Winners and Losers Under Counterfactual Health Risk Pooling"** with Benjamin Vatter

We study public policy proposals that would decouple health risk pools from employment pools in the US. These policies, such as 'Medicare for All,' would pool health risk at the state or national level, overturning the status quo of pooling risks at the firm level. Generally speaking, firms with on average healthy employees would be worse off, and firms with on average sick employees would be better off, but little is known about the extent of existing variation along this dimension. We analyze a large, national data set of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance and present novel evidence on the variation in average health spending across firms. We find that {55} percent of firms (representing {38} percent of individuals) have average health spending that is below the national average. We also find that {9} ({2}) percent of firms have average health spending that is two times lower (higher) than the national average, suggesting that big winners and big losers would exist. We then construct the joint distribution of firms' average health spending and average employee zip-code income and find that pooling health risk across firms would on average be regressive, distributing {4} percent of total healthcare spending from the highest to the lowest income quartile.

## Languages

English (native), Norwegian (conversational)

## References

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