BOSCO MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2018

­Historic Security Council

1998-1999

STUDY GUIDE

**Chairperson’s Address**

Greetings delegates, and welcome to the oldest,most consistent and prestigious committee at BoscoMUN – the United Nations Security Council. We aim to infuse uniqueness into this grand old committee by simulating the first ever historic Security Council at Bosco MUN. The freeze date will be set at 1st October, 1998.

In a country still colonized by genocidal Yugoslavians, the onus is now upon the Security Council to take note of the situation and ensure Justice prevails in its truest sense, and ensure that this time it’s the goodwill that prevails and not the Super Powers. The UNSC faces its first real challenge after the end of the Cold War – and it will not be easy to dissipate the last war of the 20th century.

Your Co- Vice Chairperson will be **Aurin Chakraborty**, now called the HAMmer of the school, he often resorts to HAM sessions at the time you really wouldn’t call for it. The Treasurer of the School Drama Club, he takes keen interest in the fields of Drama and Public Speaking. Don’t miss out on spicy gossip from him during committee

**Satrajeet Sen**, the Co- Vice Chairperson, is what you would call a laughter club in itself. The Treasurer of the school MUN/ Debate Club, he is a pro at Rules of Procedure. A person/ child who is an over enthusiast in public speaking, cricket and ofcourse cricket auctions and everything he’s probably involved in. Don’t miss out on his apparently childish but absolutely direct trolling ability while you falter in committee.

**Devesh Maniramka**, the Director of the committee, is the school Vice- Prefect. A person whose dedication level cannot be questioned. An extremely hardworking human being, he is not going to think twice before pointing out your mistakes in public. A promising debater and a competitor for being the School Prefect, don’t miss out on buttering qualities in committee.

The Rapporteur for the committee is **Rohan Sonthalia**, a class 10 student. He is newbie with a promising future in the MUN arena. Watch out for his cheeky yet valid comments in committee. **With Regards,**

**Mayank Keoliya. (Chairperson)**

**History of Kosovo**

Kosovo was absorbed into the [Serbian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbia) state of Rascia in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, and was part of the [Serbian Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_Empire)from 1346 to 1371. In 1389, in the [Battle of Kosovo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kosovo), the army of the Serbian Prince [Lazar Hrebljanović](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazar_Hrebljanovi%C4%87) was defeated by the [Ottoman Turks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Turks), who finally took control of the territory in 1455.

Kosovo was economically important, as the modern Kosovo capital [Priština](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pri%C5%A1tina) was a major trading centre on routes leading to ports on the [Adriatic Sea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adriatic_Sea). Also, mining was an important industry in [Novo Brdo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novo_Brdo) and [Janjevo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janjevo).

The ethnic composition of Kosovo's population during this period included Serbs, Albanians, and [Vlachs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlachs) along with a token number of [Greeks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greeks), [Croats](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croats), [Armenians](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenians), Saxons, and [Bulgarians](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarians)

### Ottoman Period

The [Ottomans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Empire) brought [Islam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam) with them and later also created the [Vilayet of Kosovo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vilayet_of_Kosovo) as one of the Ottoman territorial entities. Ottoman rule lasted for about 500 years, in which time the Ottomans were the absolute power in the region.Due to the oppression from the Ottomans, other migrations of Orthodox people from the Kosovo area continued throughout the 18th century. Most Albanians eventually adopted [Islam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), while most Serbs did not. In 1766, the Ottomans abolished the [Serbian Patriarchate of Peć](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_Patriarchate_of_Pe%C4%87) and the position of [Christians](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christians) in Kosovo was greatly reduced.

### Interbellum Period

The 1918–1929 period of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians witnessed a rise of the Serbian population in the region and a [decline](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Forced_Deportation_of_Albanians_in_the_Years_1912%E2%80%931941&action=edit&redlink=1) in the non-Serbian numbers.

After the Axis [invasion of Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Yugoslavia) in 1941, most of Kosovo was assigned to Italian-controlled Albania, with the rest being controlled by Germany and Bulgaria. A three-dimensional conflict ensued, involving inter-ethnic, ideological, and international affiliations, with the first being most important. Nonetheless, these conflicts were relatively low-level compared with other areas of Yugoslavia during the war years, with one Serb historian estimating that 3,000 Albanians and 4,000 Serbs and Montenegrins were killed, and two others estimating war dead at 12,000 Albanians and 10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins. Most sources put the numbers of Serbs killed during WWII in Kosovo at anywhere from 10,000-40,000, with 250,000 forcibly expelled.

*"We should endeavour to ensure that the Serb population of Kosovo should be removed as soon as possible ... All indigenous Serbs who have been living here for centuries should be termed colonialists and as such, via the Albanian and Italian governments, should be sent to concentration camps in Albania. Serbian settlers should be killed."*

*Mustafa Kruja, the then Prime Minister of Albania, June 1942*

After the war, in a bid to terminate the cycle of revenge and ethnic conflict, the new Communist government of Yugoslavia prohibited the return of 50,000–70,000 Serbs and Montenegrins who were expelled from their homesteads by Kosovo Albanians during the war, while conversely 70,000 settlers from Albania moved to Kosovo to replace the expelled Serb population. Subsequently, the ethnic balance of Kosovo shifted strongly in favour of the Albanians.

### Yugoslavian Period

Following the end of the war and the establishment [Communist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Communist_Party) Yugoslavia, Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous region of Serbia in 1946 and became an autonomous province in 1963. The Communist government did not permit the return of all of the refugees.

With the passing of the 1974 Yugoslavia constitution, Kosovo gained virtual self-government.

Throughout the 1980s tensions between the Albanian and Serb communities in the province escalated. The Albanian community favoured greater autonomy for Kosovo, whilst Serbs favored closer ties with the rest of Serbia. **There was little appetite for unification with Albania itself, which was ruled by a**[**Stalinist**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalinist)**government and had considerably worse living standards than Kosovo.**

Beginning in March 1981, Kosovar Albanian students organized [protests seeking that Kosovo become a republic within Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_protests_in_Kosovo). Those protests rapidly escalated into violent riots involving 20,000 people in six cities that were harshly contained by the Yugoslav government. The demonstrations of March and April 1981 were started by Albanian students in Priština, protesting against poor living conditions and the lack of prospects (unemployment was rampant in the province and most of the university educated ended up as the unemployed).

Perhaps the most politically explosive complaint leveled by the Kosovo Serbs was that they were being neglected by the Communist authorities in Belgrade. In August 1987, [Slobodan Milošević](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slobodan_Milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87), then a rising politician, visited Kosovo. He appealed to Serb nationalism to further his career. Having drawn huge crowds to a rally commemorating the Battle of Kosovo, he pledged to Kosovo Serbs that "No one should dare to beat you", and became an instant hero of Kosovo's Serbs. By the end of the year Milošević was in control of the Serbian government.

Through 1988 and 1989, dominant forces in Serbian politics engaged in a series of moves that became known as the [anti-bureaucratic revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-bureaucratic_revolution). The leading politicians of Kosovo and the northern province of [Vojvodina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vojvodina) were sacked and replaced, and the level of autonomy of the provinces started to be unilaterally reduced by the Serbian federal authority. In protest, the Kosovo Albanians engaged in mass demonstrations, and Trepča miners [began a hunger strike](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Kosovo_miners%27_strike).

The new constitution significantly reduced the provinces' rights, permitting the government of Serbia to exert direct control over many previously autonomous areas of governance. In particular, the constitutional changes handed control of the police, the court system, the economy, the education system and language policies to the Serbian government. It was strongly opposed by many of Serbia's national minorities, who saw it as a means of imposing ethnically based centralized rule on the provinces.

The Albanian representatives in provincial government largely opposed the constitutional changes and abstained from ratification in the Kosovo assembly. In March 1989, preceding a final push for ratification, the Yugoslav police rounded up around 240 prominent Kosovo Albanians, apparently selected based on their anti-ratification sentiment, and detained them with complete disregard for [due process](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_process). When the assembly met to discuss the proposals, tanks and armored cars surrounded the meeting place. Though the final vote failed to reach the required two-thirds majority threshold, it was declared as having passed.

### Building of Unrest

After the constitutional changes, the parliaments of all Yugoslavian republics and provinces, which until then had MPs only from the [Communist Party of Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Yugoslavia), were dissolved and multi-party elections were held for them. Kosovo Albanians refused to participate in the elections and held their own, unsanctioned elections instead.

The new constitution abolished the individual provinces' official media, integrating them within the official media of Serbia while still retaining some programs in the [Albanian language](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_language). The Albanian-language media in Kosovo was suppressed. Funding was withdrawn from state-owned media, including that in the Albanian language in Kosovo. The constitution made creating privately owned media possible, however their functioning was very difficult because of high rents and restricting laws. State-owned Albanian language television or radio was also banned from broadcasting from Kosovo. However, privately owned Albanian media outlets appeared; of these, probably the most famous is "Koha Ditore", which was allowed to operate until late 1998 when it was closed after it published a calendar which was claimed to be a glorification of ethnic Albanian separatists.

The constitution also transferred control over state-owned companies to the Serbian government (at the time, most of the companies were state-owned). In September 1990, up to 12,000 Albanian workers were fired from their positions in government and the media, as were teachers, doctors, and workers in government-controlled industries, provoking a [general strike](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_strike) and mass unrest.

**Ibrahum Rugova and KLA**

In 1989 [Ibrahim Rugova](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibrahim-Rugova), leader of the ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo, initiated a policy of nonviolent protest against the abrogation of the province’s [constitutional](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constitutional) [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) by [Slobodan Milošević](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Slobodan-Milosevic), then president of the Serbian republic. Milošević and members of the Serbian minority of Kosovo had long objected to the fact that Muslim Albanians were in [demographic](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/demographic) control of an area held sacred to the Serbs. (Kosovo was the seat of the [Serbian Orthodox Church](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Serbian-Orthodox-Church) as well as the site of the Turkish defeat of the Serbs in 1389 and the Serbian victory over the Turks in 1912.) Tensions increased between the two ethnic groups, and the international community’s refusal to address the issue lent support to Rugova’s more radical opponents, who argued that their demands could not be secured through peaceful means. The [Kosovo Liberation Army](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kosovo-Liberation-Army) (KLA) emerged in 1996, and its sporadic attacks on Serbian police and politicians steadily escalated over the next two years.

By 1998 the KLA’s actions could be qualified as a substantial armed uprising. Serbian special police and, eventually, Yugoslav armed forces attempted to reassert control over the region. Atrocities committed by the police, paramilitary groups, and the army caused a wave of refugees to flee the area, and the situation became well publicized through the international media. The Contact Group—an informal coalition of the [United States](https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States), Great Britain, [Germany](https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany), [France](https://www.britannica.com/place/France), [Italy](https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy), and Russia—demanded a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo, the return of refugees, and unlimited access for international monitors. Milošević, who had become president of Yugoslavia in 1997, agreed to meet most of the demands but failed to [implement](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implement) them. The KLA regrouped and rearmed during the cease-fire and renewed its attacks. The Yugoslav and Serbian forces responded with a ruthless counteroffensive and engaged in a program of [ethnic cleansing](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing). The [United Nations](https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations) (UN) Security Council condemned this excessive use of force and imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Resolution 1160 (1998) but the violence continued.

**KOSOVO WAR**

**Racak Massacre (pronounced “ra cha k”)**

The Račak massacre was the [mass killing](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Mass_killing) of 45 [Kosovo Albanians](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kosovo_Albanians) that took place in the village of Račak in central [Kosovo](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kosovo) in January 1999. On 15 January, reports were received by the [Kosovo Verification Mission](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kosovo_Verification_Mission) (KVM), an unarmed observer force from the OSCE(Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), of civilians being killed in Račak. KVM monitors attempted to gain access to the area but were refused permission by security forces despite strong protests. On 16th January, accompanied by a number of foreign journalists and members of the [European Union](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/European_Union)'s [Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kosovo_Diplomatic_Observer_Mission) (KDOM), they found a total of 40 bodies in and around the village. Another five bodies had allegedly been removed by family members. In all, 45 were reported killed, including a 12-year-old boy and three women. All had been shot and the KVM team reported that it found several bodies decapitated. Global media coverage of this brought headlines to several countries and pressured US President Clinton(against whom impeachment proceedings had already begun) to consider a speedy solution – by peace or war.

**Rambouillet Negotiations**

The Racak Massacre prompted the US and French government to use pacific settlement to resolve the Kosovo issue. Delegations from the  United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia were invited to the Chateau de Rambouillet alongside a Kosovar Albanian delegation and one from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Diplomatic negotiations began on 6th February,1999. The refusal of the FRYto negotiate on any major issue, its hostile aggression and opposition to independent monitors in Kosovo led to the failure of the talks and prompted the NATO to discuss use of armed forces in Kosovo.

**EMERGENCE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE**

The clandestine political organisation LPK had been active since 1982. By the early 1990s, the idea of armed resistance was becoming predominant in their thinking. In fact, most of the people who contributed to the emergence of the KLA had been in the LPK movement for shorter or longer periods of time, operating within Kosovo or abroad. This is important to note because the LPK, or at least some of its leadership members, played a crucial role in setting up the foundations and providing financial and logistical support to the KLA. The LPK provided political guidance to the nucleus of this armed insurgency, and consciously encouraged them to portray themselves as an army of liberation that adhered to the Geneva International Convention of 1949 and other international treaties, such as the Right to Self-Determination of the UN Charter, and that of Helsinki and Paris. Internally, the armed struggle drew its legitimacy from the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (although this was not recognised internationally), specifically Article 77, which stipulated:

“The defence of the country is an inviolable and inalienable right, obligation and great duty for every citizen” (quoted in Elshani, 1998). From this cooperation with the LPK, the KLA came out with a directive which was meant to regulate its internal functioning and war strategy. It stated that the “KLA should commit liberation acts with a just character, and not attack socio-cultural monuments, civilian population and subjects of importance for the life of the people”. It further stipulated that only the following should be subject to KLA attacks:

1. The military and police apparatus, including their telecommunication equipment;

2. The special police units, volunteers, paramilitary personnel, as well as combatants brought from Croatia and Bosnia into Kosovo;

3. Albanian persons who, after conclusive evidence, had been identified as traitors and working with the enemy forces;

4. Finally, military actions were not allowed to be exercised in public spaces, i.e. in places where civilian lives would be at risk (Kelmendi 1999).

Since the LPK was closely associated with the establishment of the KLA, the former’s initial idea was to act as a political wing to the army. Political and strategic decisions regarding the war would rest with the former, whilst the latter would be the depoliticised guerrilla formation on the ground. However, in reality there were difficulties attached to this vision. A large part of the LPK’s leadership was based in the West – mainly in Switzerland and Germany. In addition, with the KLA’s growth, it made sense that the people who had founded it and were inside Kosovo should take complete ownership of the movement. As the KLA became increasingly stronger, this is what happened. However, by offering its political and financial support, the LPK assisted in creating the right conditions for the establishment of the KLA . In the first half of the 1990s, other groups were established that saw war as the inevitable means to achieve liberation. Such was the case with the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës, LKÇK). Formed in March 1993, it placed special importance on preparing the population for upcoming armed resistance by means of mobilization and disseminating political information. In this respect, although the goal was clearly identical, there was an ideological difference between the LKÇK and the KLA. The LKÇK believed that prior to entering a conflict people should be prepared for the “path to national liberation”, through a comprehensive propaganda and mobilisation effort. True to their word, from 1993 to 1999 they clandestinely published and distributed a magazine called “Çlirimi” (Albanian for “Liberation”) . The KLA tactic, on the other hand, seemed to consist of entering a conflict sooner rather than later, while the mobilisation of the masses would naturally be borne out of that conflict. Although there was a ‘divergence in concepts’ and approach towards open warfare, combatants on the ground both from the KLA and the LKÇK ranks sought a common front for cooperation. Facing the same enemy, this cooperation most often developed naturally amongst individuals and groups at different operational levels. By 1997-8 the KLA was swiftly becoming the dominant military and even political factor. Seeing this, the LKÇK’s members joined forces with the KLA, thereby contributing to the latter’s strengthening of organizational capacities. Since many of the LKÇK’s members were based in Prishtina, this merging of forces actually assisted in “urbanising the conflict”. Rural regions of Kosovo were directly affected by the armed conflict, whereas urban areas had somehow been insulated from it thus far. However, with an increasing number of combatants operating from the cities, the existing urban-rural divide on the ownership and perception of the conflict was lessening. Increasingly, this was no longer a war waged in the hills of Drenica, or the Dukagjin plateau, while Prishtina and other cities bizarrely went about their normal daily business. This was a conflict that was affecting everyone, it was enveloping all parts of the country, and as such everybody had a stake in it. With these various armed cells in formation, it seemed prudent that there should be one unified chain of command structure. In fact on 11 May 1998, following a period of negotiations, the LKÇK signed an agreement with the KLA which consisted of two points. The first point stated that the entire military capacity of the LKÇK would formally merge under the command of the KLA’s General HQ, while the former would continue to preserve their political entity. This part of the agreement was implemented. The second point set some guidelines for the creation of a “joint political war front”, a sort of government, in which the LKÇK would partake, and which would lead the politics of war. This second point of the agreement did not come to fruition .

The question as to whether there was a centralised or joint political war front amongst Albanians, as the conflict with Belgrade accelerated, is legitimate, seeing that every armed/ resistance cell had an identical political goal: the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian occupation. This goal was bigger than any ideology, according to everyone’s understanding. Only the means and methods for reaching this goal might have varied. In this regard, this objective was also shared by the nonviolent movement. Thus, on the wider political goal, a synergy and understanding existed across the board. Therefore to analyse the formation of the joint political war front, or the lack of it, the contribution of all the actors belonging to the armed as well as the nonviolent resistance movements ought to be taken into consideration. Some have been quite direct in their claim that the KLA leaders fell short of contributing to the creation of a “joint front for the liberation of Kosovo” . There were a few other armed cells that sprung up during the 1990s, as was the case with the LKÇK or the LPK. With the KLA’s rise, the expectation was that the “joint front” would be representative of all the various factions of the time. Moreover, the KLA grew in juxtaposition with the LDK’s nonviolent resistance. Far from talking about coordinated political efforts, certain tensions developed in this relationship. However, we make mention of this debate to highlight the political climate which accompanied the emergence of the KLA. What the recent historical facts show, though, is that this formation, which was eventually named the Kosovo Liberation Army, came to attract popular support in increasing waves. There was also a natural fusion between it and other existing resistance cells. Its political goal being straightforward, i.e. the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia, the KLA went on to become the dominant armed force for Kosovar Albanians.

As the crisis was accelerating, the first cells of the KLA began to appear. Its political goal, as stipulated clearly in its name, was straightforward: creating a Kosovo army that would start a liberation struggle against the oppressor. Its overall political platform remained the same as those of the clandestine groupings of the ‘Ilegalja’ movement in the 1980s and beyond .

**THE INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND NATO’S BOMBING CAMPAIGN**

“Throughout the past decade, the actors in this episode have been engaged in a far larger conflict – a struggle for the redefinition of the international system, specifically:

• the struggle for ultimate authority within the state: sovereignty vs. human rights;

• the struggle about the definition of the state: territorial integrity vs. self-determination;

• the struggle about manifestations of international interest: non-intervention vs. international action;

• the struggle among international actors: collective action vs. unilateralism”

The so-called “international factor” was becoming a major stakeholder in the political scene of the late 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, the international community had adopted the role of the passive observer, viewing the Kosovo crisis as a background to the much more attention-grabbing wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and as an essentially internal matter for Serbia/rump Yugoslavia to settle. By the end of the decade, however, international involvement was comprehensive and formidable. From being an often marginal topic of discussions at international fora , by 1999 the Kosovo issue reached the pinnacle of its internationalization . The Dayton Accords had served as a clarion-call for Kosovar Albanians that their plight was nowhere near receiving the international attention they desired. When mentioned, the situation in Kosovo was often discussed in passing, with certain actors from western countries raising concerns about human rights violations. Even then, the discussions revolved around the topic of Kosovo as an internal issue for what was left of Yugoslavia, or more precisely Serbia to settle. Accusations of human rights violations in Kosovo were flagrantly refuted by Milošević’s regime, which grew accustomed to making good use of the principle of “internal matters of sovereignty” on the issue. However, various international organizations increasingly tried to draw attention to the intolerable human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the early 1990s the European Community, later the European Union, took some enthusiastic steps towards mediating in the resolution of the Balkan conflicts, but proved to be ineffective (the words of the European Commission’s (EC) former president, Jacques Delors, “The hour of Europe has dawned”, sound cynical in retrospect). Full American involvement became increasingly necessary in order to enforce peace deals and compromises in the Yugoslav crises. As part of its monitoring role in 1992-3, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) expressed its concern regarding police reprisals against Albanian civilians in Kosovo. From 1992 to 1999, numerous resolutions were passed by the UN General Assembly in relation to the escalating crisis in Kosovo, in the context of Yugoslavia, raising deep concerns about violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Grave concerns were noted about Serbian police brutality and harassment, arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests, forced evictions, torture, ill-treatment of detainees and discrimination in the administration of justice, and killings. During 1998 and 1999, the UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions, referring to Chapter VII of UN Charter, whereby the “impending humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo was viewed as a threat to international peace and security . The acceleration of the conflict was followed by an intensification of international action, beyond just holding discussions in Western capitals. In October 1998, the US special envoy Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to deliver an ultimatum to Belgrade to cease military operations. After many deliberations, whereby Milošević was threatened with NATO’s use of force, a ceasefire was agreed .

The Holbrooke agreement proved to be short-lived, with the KLA and Serbian/Yugoslav forces re-engaging in combat. Caught in the middle, the Albanian civilian population experienced frequent retaliation by Yugoslav forces. One event that particularly outraged international public opinion was the killing of civilians in the village of Reçak, west of Kosovo. This happened on 15 January 1999 when, while going after the KLA, the Yugoslav forces retaliated and killed 45 civilians. Upon arriving at the scene, the OSCE KVM’s ambassador William Walker condemned the massacre of civilians, and called upon the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia to

investigate the atrocity .

During the NATO bombardment, on 24 May 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued an indictment against the top leadership of FRY/Serbia. The ICTY was established in 1993 in response to allegations of atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. On 10 March 1998, its jurisdiction was expanded to cover the alleged atrocities committed in Kosovo. After the NATO bombardment and the establishment of UNMIK, several KLA individuals were accused of having taken part in revenge killings and kidnappings of Serb civilians and Albanian collaborators during the conflict and in the immediate post-war period. Over the last decade, the ICTY has issued indictments against several KLA members for their alleged crimes.

***TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS (1987-1998)***

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| **BEFORE 1998** https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1987** | Slobodan Milosevic's power grows with trip to Kosovo. At large public rallies, Serb nationalists embrace him when he dramatically promises to defend their interests in the province. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1989** | Milosevic engineers changes in the Serbian constitution that vastly reduce the provincial autonomy Kosovo has enjoyed since 1974. Other measures put tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians out of work and restrict the activities of their cultural organizations. Rioting and protests by Kosovo Albanians ensue. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1991** | The bloody break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) begins as Slovenia and Croatia declare their independence. After a secret vote, ethnic Albanians proclaim the creation of their own Republic of Kosovo, though it earns little international recognition. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1992** | War breaks out in Bosnia, after it too moves for independence. Several months after Europe, USA extends diplomatic recognition to the three major breakaway Yugoslav republics, but not Kosovo. In May, Kosovar Albanians elect literary scholar and pacifist Ibrahim Rugova president in unofficial elections. Rugova begins creating a shadow government. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **Dec. 1992** | In a secret "Christmas Warning," U.S. President George Bush informs Milosevic that Serbian aggression in Kosovo will bring unilateral US military response. Clinton administration reiterates the threat on several occasions through 1998. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1993** | War in Bosnia continues, as "ethnic cleansing" spreads. NATO threatens airstrikes to defend "safe areas" created to protect Muslims. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1994** | In April, NATO carries out first airstrikes in its history -- against Bosnian Serbs. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1995** | More NATO airstrikes - along with a successful Croat/Muslim ground offensive - bring Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. On 21 Nov., the Dayton Accord ends war in Bosnia. Milosevic emerges as the region's power broker and NATO sees a lesson in its use of force. Kosovo issues, however, are left unresolved. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1996** | The [Kosovo Liberation Army](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/kla.html) (KLA) appears, and begins sporadic attacks against Serb authorities in Kosovo. Serbs ratchet up repression of student and ethnic movements in Kosovo. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **Late 1996** | [Madeleine Albright](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html) named first female US Secretary of State. As UN ambassador, Albright had argued in favor of early military intervention in Bosnia. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1997** | In October, violence escalates in Kosovo as Serbian security forces clamp down further on resistance and KLA steps up its attacks. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **13Jan1998** | Renewed crisis in Iraq as President Saddam Hussein bans weapons team led by US inspector. |
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| **19-21 Jan. 1998https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif** | First Monica Lewinsky scandal stories appear in the press. Several days later Clinton denies affair with Lewinsky, saying "I did not have sexual relations with that woman....I never told anybody to lie." |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **23 Feb. 1998** | US diplomat Robert Gelbard publicly calls KLA "without any question a terrorist group" -- a comment which some observers say Milosevic interprets as a green light to continue repression. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1 Mar. 1998** | Rugova's shadow government reportedly urges Kosovar Albanians to defend themselves against the Serbs. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **5-7 Mar. 1998** | After KLA attacks on police, Serb security forces [massacre](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/victims.html) over 50 members of the Jashari family in the village of Prekaz. In following weeks, tens of thousands rally in Pristina to protest massacre. Serbs respond with counter-demonstrations. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **7 Mar. 1998** | In Rome, Madeleine Albright declares "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia." |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **9 Mar. 1998** | "Contact Group" countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) meet in London to discuss Kosovo. In a tense meeting, Gelbard meets with Milosevic in Belgrade. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **23 Mar. 1998** | Ibrahim Rugova re-elected "president" of Kosovo with 99% of vote in controversial elections boycotted by increasingly popular Kosovar Albanian hard-liners. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **31 Mar. 1998** | UN Security Council [resolution 1160](http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm) condemns Yugoslavia's excessive use of force, imposes economic sanctions, and bans arms sales to Serbia. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1 Apr. 1998** | Judge Susan Webber Wright dismisses Paula Jones's lawsuit. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **21 Apr.** | FRY closes borders with Albania and Macedonia. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **23 Apr. 1998** | In national referendum, 95% of Serbs reject foreign mediation to solve the Kosovo crisis. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **May 1998** | Gelbard meets with KLA officials in Switzerland. Amb. Christopher Hill named US Special Envoy to Kosovo. Dayton Accord negotiator [Richard Holbrooke](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html) travels to Belgrade. Talks lead to first-ever meeting between Rugova and Milosevic on May 15, though dialogue quickly breaks down. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **28 May 1998** | Rugova and other Kosovar Albanian officials arrive in Washington to meet with Clinton, Gore, Albright and advisors. In 29 May meeting in Oval Office, Rugova seeks Clinton's support for the Kosovar Albanians' cause. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **31 May 1998** | As many as 20 Kosovar Albanians killed in retaliation for death of a Serb policeman near Glogovac. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1 Jun. 1998** | Rugova meets UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan in New York, requests UN/NATO intervention. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **11 Jun. 1998** | At NATO ministerial meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen urges NATO defense ministers to begin conceptual planning for potential intervention in Kosovo. Ministers decide to "send a signal" to Milosevic by conducting air exercises in the region. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **12 Jun. 1998** | Foreign ministers of Contact Group, plus Canada and Japan, meet in London and level more economic sanctions on FRY. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **15 Jun. 1998** | In the "Balkan Air Show," 85 NATO warplanes fly over Albania and Macedonia in show of force aimed at Milosevic. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **16 Jun. 1998** | Milosevic and Yeltsin meet in Moscow, issue joint statement approving idea of diplomatic observers in Kosovo. |

**March 24:** - NATO engages in war at around 8 pm with a series of cruise missiles. At least 20 targets are hit in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

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| 23-24 Jun. 1998 | Holbrooke meets with Milosevic. Travels to Kosovo, to talk directly with KLA commanders. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **6 Jul. 1998** | Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission begins monitoring operations in the province. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **Early Aug. 1998** | Serbian forces intensify their summer offensive, attack KLA and Kosovo Albanian villages in Drenica region, driving thousands into the hills. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **5 Aug. 1998** | Iraq ceases cooperation with [UN inspectors.](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/) |
| **https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif** | |
| **17 Aug. 1998** | After completing four hours of grand jury testimony, Clinton offers nationally televised admission of his "inappropriate relationship" with Lewinsky. |
| **https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif** | |
| **20 Aug. 1998** | US launches cruise missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan in response to Bin Laden's embassy bombings. In polls, significant numbers of Americans say they believe the attacks were staged to divert attention from the Lewinsky scandal. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **1-2 Sept. 1998** | At Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Moscow, Albright & Foreign Minister Ivanov together call for negotiations and an end to Serb offensive. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **5 Sept. 1998** | Former Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and Asst. Sec. of State John Shattuck travel to Kosovo & Belgrade. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **9 Sept. 1998** | Independent Counsel Starr dramatically delivers 36 boxes of impeachment information to Congress. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **9 Sept. 1998** | Serb police begin to pull bodies of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs from a canal near the village of Glodjane. At least thirty-four bodies are eventually discovered, and suspicion falls on the KLA. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **23 Sept. 1998** | UN Security Council approves [Resolution 1199](http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm) demanding cease-fire, Serb withdrawal and refugee return and calling for unspecified "additional measures" if Serbia refuses to comply. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **26 Sept. 1998** | After more than a dozen Serb police are killed in fighting with the KLA, Serb security forces kill 35 villagers - including 21 members of a single family - in and around Gornje Obrinje. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| **30 Sept. 1998** | At principals committee meeting, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pushes for airstrikes against Serbia. Administration briefs Capitol Hill on the plan. Meeting Congressional resistance, the Administration notes it has no plans to send ground troops to Kosovo, even as peacekeepers. |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | |
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/art/blank.gif | | |

**Further Research**

1. **UNSC Resolutions regarding Kosovo -https://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c24702.htm**
2. **UN Documents on Kosovo**

[**https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/kosovo/**](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/kosovo/)

1. **Intervention of NATO in Kosovo**
2. **International Response to NATO’s intervention**

**1)**[**http://columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/NATOhumanitarian.pdf**](http://columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/NATOhumanitarian.pdf)

**2) https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=451447**

1. **www.nato.int/kosovo**

**Note :We will only be accepting documents published before the freeze date as evidence for a Point of Information, Point of Order or clarification. Delegates are free to use their other sources in debate provided no checks are raised by the Executive Board or another delegate.**