

### ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK Scan Report

Project Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK

Scan Start Friday, June 21, 2024 11:19:07 PM

Preset Checkmarx Default

Scan Time 00h:07m:18s

Lines Of Code Scanned 18337 Files Scanned 12

Report Creation Time Friday, June 21, 2024 11:27:21 PM

Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=50063

Team CxServer
Checkmarx Version 8.7.0
Scan Type Full

Source Origin LocalPath

Density 1/100 (Vulnerabilities/LOC)

Visibility Public

### Filter Settings

Severity

Included: High, Medium, Low, Information

Excluded: None

**Result State** 

Included: Confirmed, Not Exploitable, To Verify, Urgent, Proposed Not Exploitable

Excluded: None

Assigned to

Included: All

**Categories** 

Included:

Uncategorized All

Custom All

PCI DSS v3.2 All

OWASP Top 10 2013 All

FISMA 2014 All

NIST SP 800-53 All

OWASP Top 10 2017 All

OWASP Mobile Top 10 All

2016

**FISMA 2014** 

Excluded:

Uncategorized None
Custom None
PCI DSS v3.2 None
OWASP Top 10 2013 None

None



NIST SP 800-53 None

OWASP Top 10 2017 None

OWASP Mobile Top 10 None

2016

### **Results Limit**

Results limit per query was set to 50


### **Selected Queries**

Selected queries are listed in Result Summary




### **Result Summary**

### Most Vulnerable Files



## Top 5 Vulnerabilities





# Scan Summary - OWASP Top 10 2017 Further details and elaboration about vulnerabilities and risks can be found at: OWASP Top 10 2017

Category	Threat Agent	Exploitability	Weakness Prevalence	Weakness Detectability	Technical Impact	Business Impact	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
A1-Injection	App. Specific	EASY	COMMON	EASY	SEVERE	App. Specific	100	41
A2-Broken Authentication	App. Specific	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	12	12
A3-Sensitive Data Exposure	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	1	1
A4-XML External Entities (XXE)	App. Specific	AVERAGE	COMMON	EASY	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A5-Broken Access Control*	App. Specific	AVERAGE	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A6-Security Misconfiguration	App. Specific	EASY	WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0
A7-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	App. Specific	EASY	WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0
A8-Insecure Deserialization	App. Specific	DIFFICULT	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities*	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	MODERATE	App. Specific	52	52
A10-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0

<sup>\*</sup> Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and\or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.



# Scan Summary - OWASP Top 10 2013 Further details and elaboration about vulnerabilities and risks can be found at: OWASP Top 10 2013

Category	Threat Agent	Attack Vectors	Weakness Prevalence	Weakness Detectability	Technical Impact	Business Impact	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
A1-Injection	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	ALL DATA	0	0
A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL USERS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	SEVERE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A3-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	AVERAGE	VERY WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND SYSTEM	0	0
A4-Insecure Direct Object References	SYSTEM USERS	EASY	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	EXPOSED DATA	0	0
A5-Security Misconfiguration	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	EASY	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	ALL DATA AND SYSTEM	0	0
A6-Sensitive Data Exposure	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS, USERS BROWSERS	DIFFICULT	UNCOMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	EXPOSED DATA	0	0
A7-Missing Function Level Access Control*	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL USERS	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	MODERATE	EXPOSED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	USERS BROWSERS	AVERAGE	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities*	EXTERNAL USERS, AUTOMATED TOOLS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	52	52
A10-Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	USERS BROWSERS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0

<sup>\*</sup> Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and\or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.



# Scan Summary - PCI DSS v3.2

Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.1 - Injection flaws - particularly SQL injection	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows	43	41
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.3 - Insecure cryptographic storage	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.4 - Insecure communications	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.5 - Improper error handling*	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.7 - Cross-site scripting (XSS)	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.8 - Improper access control	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.9 - Cross-site request forgery	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.10 - Broken authentication and session management	0	0

<sup>\*</sup> Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and\or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.



# Scan Summary - FISMA 2014

Category	Description	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
Access Control	Organizations must limit information system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other information systems) and to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to exercise.	0	0
Audit And Accountability*	Organizations must: (i) create, protect, and retain information system audit records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate information system activity; and (ii) ensure that the actions of individual information system users can be uniquely traced to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions.	0	0
Configuration Management	Organizations must: (i) establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational information systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles; and (ii) establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational information systems.	2	1
Identification And Authentication*	Organizations must identify information system users, processes acting on behalf of users, or devices and authenticate (or verify) the identities of those users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational information systems.	12	12
Media Protection	Organizations must: (i) protect information system media, both paper and digital; (ii) limit access to information on information system media to authorized users; and (iii) sanitize or destroy information system media before disposal or release for reuse.	1	1
System And Communications Protection	Organizations must: (i) monitor, control, and protect organizational communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational information systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of the information systems; and (ii) employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational information systems.	0	0
System And Information Integrity	Organizations must: (i) identify, report, and correct information and information system flaws in a timely manner; (ii) provide protection from malicious code at appropriate locations within organizational information systems; and (iii) monitor information system security alerts and advisories and take appropriate actions in response.	4	4

<sup>\*</sup> Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and\or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.



# Scan Summary - NIST SP 800-53

Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
AC-12 Session Termination (P2)	0	0
AC-3 Access Enforcement (P1)	14	13
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement (P1)	0	0
AC-6 Least Privilege (P1)	0	0
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information (P1)	0	0
CM-6 Configuration Settings (P2)	0	0
IA-5 Authenticator Management (P1)	0	0
IA-6 Authenticator Feedback (P2)	0	0
IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) (P1)	0	0
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management (P1)	0	0
SC-13 Cryptographic Protection (P1)	0	0
SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates (P1)	0	0
SC-18 Mobile Code (P2)	0	0
SC-23 Session Authenticity (P1)*	0	0
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest (P1)	1	1
SC-4 Information in Shared Resources (P1)	0	0
SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)*	82	20
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity (P1)	0	0
SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)*	26	24
SI-11 Error Handling (P2)*	5	5
SI-15 Information Output Filtering (P0)	0	0
SI-16 Memory Protection (P1)	30	2

<sup>\*</sup> Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and\or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.



# Scan Summary - OWASP Mobile Top 10 2016

Category	Description	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
M1-Improper Platform Usage	This category covers misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls. It might include Android intents, platform permissions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is part of the mobile operating system. There are several ways that mobile apps can experience this risk.	0	0
M2-Insecure Data Storage	This category covers insecure data storage and unintended data leakage.	0	0
M3-Insecure Communication	This category covers poor handshaking, incorrect SSL versions, weak negotiation, cleartext communication of sensitive assets, etc.	0	0
M4-Insecure Authentication	This category captures notions of authenticating the end user or bad session management. This can include: -Failing to identify the user at all when that should be required -Failure to maintain the user's identity when it is required -Weaknesses in session management	0	0
M5-Insufficient Cryptography	The code applies cryptography to a sensitive information asset. However, the cryptography is insufficient in some way. Note that anything and everything related to TLS or SSL goes in M3. Also, if the app fails to use cryptography at all when it should, that probably belongs in M2. This category is for issues where cryptography was attempted, but it wasnt done correctly.	0	0
M6-Insecure Authorization	This is a category to capture any failures in authorization (e.g., authorization decisions in the client side, forced browsing, etc.). It is distinct from authentication issues (e.g., device enrolment, user identification, etc.). If the app does not authenticate users at all in a situation where it should (e.g., granting anonymous access to some resource or service when authenticated and authorized access is required), then that is an authentication failure not an authorization failure.	0	0
M7-Client Code Quality	This category is the catch-all for code-level implementation problems in the mobile client. That's distinct from server-side coding mistakes. This would capture things like buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and various other codelevel mistakes where the solution is to rewrite some code that's running on the mobile device.	0	0
M8-Code Tampering	This category covers binary patching, local resource modification, method hooking, method swizzling, and dynamic memory modification. Once the application is delivered to the mobile device, the code and data resources are resident there. An attacker can either directly modify the code, change the contents of memory dynamically, change or replace the system APIs that the application uses, or	0	0



	modify the application's data and resources. This can provide the attacker a direct method of subverting the intended use of the software for personal or monetary gain.		
M9-Reverse Engineering	This category includes analysis of the final core binary to determine its source code, libraries, algorithms, and other assets. Software such as IDA Pro, Hopper, otool, and other binary inspection tools give the attacker insight into the inner workings of the application. This may be used to exploit other nascent vulnerabilities in the application, as well as revealing information about back end servers, cryptographic constants and ciphers, and intellectual property.	0	0
M10-Extraneous Functionality	Often, developers include hidden backdoor functionality or other internal development security controls that are not intended to be released into a production environment. For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as a comment in a hybrid app. Another example includes disabling of 2-factor authentication during testing.	0	0



# Scan Summary - Custom


Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
Must audit	0	0
Check	0	0
Optional	0	0



# Results Distribution By Status First scan of the project

	High	Medium	Low	Information	Total
New Issues	9	162	92	0	263
Recurrent Issues	0	0	0	0	0
Total	9	162	92	0	263

Fixed Issues	0	0	0	0	0
TIACU 133UC3	O .	· ·	O .	O .	O



# Results Distribution By State

	High	Medium	Low	Information	Total
Confirmed	0	0	0	0	0
Not Exploitable	0	0	0	0	0
To Verify	9	162	92	0	263
Urgent	0	0	0	0	0
Proposed Not Exploitable	0	0	0	0	0
Total	9	162	92	0	263

# **Result Summary**

Vulnerability Type	Occurrences	Severity
Buffer Overflow LongString	3	High
Buffer Overflow OutOfBound	3	High
Buffer Overflow Indexes	2	High
Buffer Overflow fgets	1	High
Dangerous Functions	52	Medium



Double Free	30	Medium
Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam	25	Medium
MemoryFree on StackVariable	24	Medium
Memory Leak	10	Medium
Use of Zero Initialized Pointer	10	Medium
Char Overflow	5	Medium
Integer Overflow	4	Medium
Stored Buffer Overflow fgets	1	Medium
Wrong Size t Allocation	1	Medium
NULL Pointer Dereference	62	Low
Improper Resource Access Authorization	12	Low
Unchecked Return Value	5	Low
Unchecked Array Index	4	Low
Potential Precision Problem	3	Low
Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control	2	Low
Sphere	2	Low
Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type	2	Low
<u>Inconsistent Implementations</u>	1	Low
Use of Insufficiently Random Values	1	Low

## 10 Most Vulnerable Files

## High and Medium Vulnerabilities

File Name	Issues Found
ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	136
ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	24
ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	8
ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/flash_partitions.c	2
ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/json.c	1



### Scan Results Details

#### Buffer Overflow LongString

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow LongString Version:1

#### Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### Description

**Buffer Overflow LongString\Path 1:** 

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=1

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record in sd\_str, at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record passes to "\_services", at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	500	500
Object	"_services"	sd_str

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

500. sd\_str[0] = (char\*)"\_services";

**Buffer Overflow LongString\Path 2:** 

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=2

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record in sd\_str, at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record passes to "\_dns-sd", at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	501	501
Object	"_dns-sd"	sd_str

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

....
501. sd\_str[1] = (char\*)"\_dns-sd";

#### **Buffer Overflow LongString\Path 3:**

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=3

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record in sd\_str, at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record passes to "\_udp", at line 489 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	502	502
Object	"_udp"	sd_str

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_sdptr\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

502. sd\_str[2] = (char\*)"\_udp";

#### Buffer Overflow OutOfBound

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow OutOfBound Version:1

#### Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### **Description**

#### **Buffer Overflow OutOfBound\Path 1:**



Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=4

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm in i, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to T, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	520	614
Object	Т	i

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

#### **Buffer Overflow OutOfBound\Path 2:**

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=5

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm in i, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to T, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	520	614
Object	Т	i

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,



```
....
520. CRYPTO_ALIGN(16) unsigned char T[16];
....
614. mac[i] = T[i] ^ accum[15 - i];
```

**Buffer Overflow OutOfBound\Path 3:** 

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=6

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm in i, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to T, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	659	778
Object	Т	i

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

```
....
659. CRYPTO_ALIGN(16) unsigned char T[16];
....
778. d |= (mac[i] ^ (T[i] ^ accum[15 - i]));
```

#### **Buffer Overflow Indexes**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow Indexes Version:1

#### Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### Description

#### **Buffer Overflow Indexes\Path 1:**

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=16

Status New



The size of the buffer used by conf\_string in line, at line 134 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that conf askvalue passes to stdin, at line 85 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	113	159
Object	stdin	line

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf\_askvalue(struct symbol \*sym, const char \*def)

113. xfgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin);

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf\_string(struct menu \*menu)

159. line[strlen(line)-1] = 0;

#### **Buffer Overflow Indexes\Path 2:**

Severity High
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=17

Status New

The size of the buffer used by conf\_string in strlen, at line 134 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that conf\_askvalue passes to stdin, at line 85 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	113	159
Object	stdin	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf\_askvalue(struct symbol \*sym, const char \*def)

113. xfgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin);

٧



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method

static int conf\_string(struct menu \*menu)

. . . . 159. line[strlen(line)-1] = 0;

#### **Buffer Overflow fgets**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow fgets Version:1

#### Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### Description

#### **Buffer Overflow fgets\Path 1:**

Severity High Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=67

Status New

The size of the buffer used by xfgets in size, at line 719 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that conf choice passes to stdin, at line 236 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

<del>-</del>	<u> </u>	
	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	315	721
Object	stdin	size

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf choice(struct menu \*menu)

> 315. xfgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin);

> > ٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method void xfgets(char \*str, int size, FILE \*in)

> if (fgets(str, size, in) == NULL) 721.

### **Dangerous Functions**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Dangerous Functions Version:1



#### Categories

OWASP Top 10 2013: A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities OWASP Top 10 2017: A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

#### Description

Dangerous Functions\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=147

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 503 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	525	525
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

525. memcpy(H, ctx->H, sizeof H);

Dangerous Functions\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=148

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 503 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	529	529
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c



Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,
....
529. memcpy(&n2[0], npub, 3 \* 4);

Dangerous Functions\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=149

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 503 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	535	535
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

535. memcpy(&fb[0], &x, sizeof x);

Dangerous Functions\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=150

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 503 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	537	537
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

....
537. memcpy(&fb[8], &x, sizeof x);

**Dangerous Functions\Path 5:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=151

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 642 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	669	669
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

669. memcpy(&n2[0], npub, 3 \* 4);

Dangerous Functions\Path 6:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=152

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 642 in

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	676	676
Object	memcpy	memcpy



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

....
676. memcpy(&fb[0], &x, sizeof x);

Dangerous Functions\Path 7:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=153

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 642 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	678	678
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

678. memcpy(&fb[8], &x, sizeof x);

**Dangerous Functions\Path 8:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=154

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 642 in

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c



Line	681	681
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

681. memcpy(H, ctx->H, sizeof H);

**Dangerous Functions\Path 9:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=155

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 108 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/flash\_partitions.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/flash_partitions.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/flash_partitions.c
Line	120	120
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/flash\_partitions.c

Method esp\_err\_t esp\_partition\_table\_basic\_verify(const esp\_partition\_info\_t

\*partition\_table, bool log\_errors, int \*num\_partitions)

```
....
120. memcpy(&part_local, (void *)((intptr_t)partition_table +
num_parts * sizeof(esp_partition_info_t)),
sizeof(esp_partition_info_t));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 10:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=156

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 4754 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

Source	Destination
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File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4940	4940
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_debug\_packet(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len)

4940. memcpy(&ip6, data\_ptr, MDNS\_ANSWER\_AAAA\_SIZE);

**Dangerous Functions\Path 11:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=157

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 4754 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4944	4944
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_debug\_packet(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len)

....
4944. memcpy(&ip, data\_ptr, sizeof(ip4\_addr\_t));

Dangerous Functions\Path 12:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=158

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 176 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	204	204



Object memcpy memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static const uint8\_t \* \_mdns\_read\_fqdn(const uint8\_t \* packet, const uint8\_t \*

start, mdns\_name\_t \* name, char \* buf)

memcpy(mdns\_name\_ptrs[name->parts++], buf, len+1);

Dangerous Functions\Path 13:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=159

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 347 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	354	354
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static inline uint8\_t \_mdns\_append\_string(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

const char \* string)

....
354. memcpy(packet + \*index, string, len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 14:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=160

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 729 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	762	762



Object memcpy memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_aaaa\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

uint8\_t \* ipv6, bool flush, bool bye)

762. memcpy(packet + \*index, ipv6, part\_length);

Dangerous Functions\Path 15:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=161

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 1181 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1196	1196
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_tx\_packet\_t \* \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t

tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

....
1196. memcpy(&packet->dst, &addr, sizeof(ip\_addr\_t));

**Dangerous Functions\Path 16:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=162

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 1204 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1278	1278



Object memcpy memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_create\_answer\_from\_parsed\_packet(mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t \*

parsed\_packet)

1278. memcpy(&packet->dst, &parsed\_packet->src,

sizeof(ip\_addr t));

Dangerous Functions\Path 17:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=163

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2063	2063
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

2063. memcpy(our\_data + our\_index, \_mdns\_server->hostname,
our\_host\_len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 18:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=164

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	2066	2066
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2066. memcpy(our\_data + our\_index, MDNS\_DEFAULT\_DOMAIN, 5);

Dangerous Functions\Path 19:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=165

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2076	2076
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2076. memcpy(their\_data + their\_index, host, their\_host\_len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 20:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=166

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	2079	2079
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2079. memcpy(their\_data + their\_index, domain, their\_domain\_len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 21:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=167

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2473 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2519	2519
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_result\_txt\_create(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \*\* out\_txt, size\_t \* out\_count)

2519. memcpy(key, data + i, name\_len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 22:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=168

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2473 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	2531	2531
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_result\_txt\_create(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \*\* out\_txt, size\_t \* out\_count)

2531. memcpy(value, data + i, value\_len);

Dangerous Functions\Path 23:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=169

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2572 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2926	2926
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

....
2926. memcpy(ip6.u\_addr.ip6.addr, data\_ptr,
MDNS ANSWER AAAA SIZE);

Dangerous Functions\Path 24:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=170

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 2572 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	2972	2972
Object	memcpy	memcpy

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2972. memcpy(&(ip.u\_addr.ip4.addr), data\_ptr, 4);

Dangerous Functions\Path 25:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=171

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 3230 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3240	3240
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_ip\_addr\_t \* \_mdns\_result\_addr\_create\_ip(ip\_addr\_t \* ip)

....
3240. memcpy(a->addr.u\_addr.ip6.addr, ip->u\_addr.ip6.addr, 16);

Dangerous Functions\Path 26:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=172

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 4719 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4741	4741
Object	memcpy	memcpy



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_query\_aaaa(const char \* name, uint32\_t timeout, ip6\_addr\_t \*

addr)

....
4741. memcpy(addr->addr, a->addr.u\_addr.ip6.addr, 16);

Dangerous Functions\Path 27:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=173

Status New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 53 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	76	76
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {

76. sprintf(ret, "%s-2", in);

Dangerous Functions\Path 28:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

 $\underline{BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073\&projectid=500}$ 

63&pathid=174

Status New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 53 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	86	86
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet



```
File Name ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char * _mdns_mangle_name(char* in) {

....

86. sprintf(ret + baseLen, "-%d", suffix + 1);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 29:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=175

Status New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 539 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	578	578
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

578. sprintf(tmp, "%s=%s", txt->key, txt->value);

Dangerous Functions\Path 30:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=176

Status New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 2095 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2126	2126
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



Dangerous Functions\Path 31:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=177

Status New

The dangerous function, strcpy, was found in use at line 53 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	83	83
Object	strcpy	strcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {

83. strcpy(ret, in);

Dangerous Functions\Path 32:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=178

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 58 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	65	65
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static void strip(char \*str)



```
....
65. l = strlen(p);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 33:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=179

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 134 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	159	159
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf\_string(struct menu \*menu)

159. line[strlen(line)-1] = 0;

Dangerous Functions\Path 34:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=180

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 236 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	341	341
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method static int conf\_choice(struct menu \*menu)



```
if (line[0] && line[strlen(line) - 1] == '?') {
```

**Dangerous Functions\Path 35:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=181

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 53 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	71	71
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {

71. ret = malloc(strlen(in) + 3);

Dangerous Functions\Path 36:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=182

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 53 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	78	78
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {



```
78. ret = malloc(strlen(in) + 2); //one extra byte in case 9-10
or 99-100 etc
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 37:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=183

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 347 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	349	349
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static inline uint8\_t \_mdns\_append\_string(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

const char \* string)

....
349. uint8\_t len = strlen(string);

Dangerous Functions\Path 38:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=184

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 370 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	378	378
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_fqdn(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index, const

char \* strings[], uint8\_t count)



```
....
378. uint8_t len = strlen(strings[0]);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 39:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=185

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 539 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	576	576
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

tmp = (char \*)malloc(2 + strlen(txt->key) + strlen(txt->value));

Dangerous Functions\Path 40:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=186

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 539 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	576	576
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)



```
tmp = (char *)malloc(2 + strlen(txt->key) + strlen(txt->value));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 41:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=187

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2044	2044
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2044. size\_t our\_host\_len = strlen(\_mdns\_server->hostname);

Dangerous Functions\Path 42:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=188

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2047	2047
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)



```
....
2047. size_t their_host_len = strlen(host);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 43:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=189

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2038 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2048	2048
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2048. size\_t their\_domain\_len = strlen(domain);

Dangerous Functions\Path 44:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=190

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2095 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2108	2108
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)



```
....
2108. data_len += 2 + strlen(service->txt->key) + strlen(service->txt->value);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 45:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=191

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2095 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2108	2108
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)

2108. data\_len += 2 + strlen(service->txt->key) +
strlen(service->txt->value);

Dangerous Functions\Path 46:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=192

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2095 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2124	2124
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet



**Dangerous Functions\Path 47:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=193

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 2095 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2124	2124
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)

color="block" tmp = (char \*)malloc(2 + strlen(txt->key) + strlen(txt->value));

Dangerous Functions\Path 48:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=194

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 4267 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4272	4272
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_hostname\_set(const char \* hostname)

4272. if (\_str\_null\_or\_empty(hostname) || strlen(hostname) >
(MDNS\_NAME\_BUF\_LEN - 1)) {

**Dangerous Functions\Path 49:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=195

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 4296 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4301	4301
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* instance)

4301. if (\_str\_null\_or\_empty(instance) || strlen(instance) >
(MDNS\_NAME\_BUF\_LEN - 1)) {

Dangerous Functions\Path 50:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=196

Status New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 4515 in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4520	4520
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet



Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* service, const char \*

proto, const char \* instance)

```
....
4520. if (_str_null_or_empty(instance) || strlen(instance) > (MDNS_NAME_BUF_LEN - 1)) {
```

# Double Free

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Double Free Version:1

#### Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-16 Memory Protection (P1)

### **Description**

# Double Free\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=199

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	1842
Object	new item	value

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)

1842. free((char \*)t->value);

### Double Free\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=200

Status New



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	1842
Object	new_item	value

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)

....
1842. free((char \*)t->value);

### **Double Free\Path 3:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=201

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	1843
Object	new_item	key

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

.... 1821. free(new item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)



.... 1843. free((char \*)t->key);

### **Double Free\Path 4:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=202

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	1843
Object	new_item	key

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)

1843. free((char \*)t->key);

### Double Free\Path 5:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=203

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	1844
Object	new_item	t

Code Snippet



Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new item);

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)

1844. free(t);

**Double Free\Path 6:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=204

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	1844
Object	new_item	t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_linked\_txt(mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \*txt)

1844. free(t);

**Double Free\Path 7:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=205

Status New



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	1881
Object	new_item	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_service\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_service(const char \* service, const char \*

proto, uint16\_t port, const char \* instance, size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t

txt[])

1881. free(s);

Double Free\Path 8:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=206

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	1881
Object	new_item	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new item);

A



Method

static mdns\_service\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_service(const char \* service, const char \* proto, uint16\_t port, const char \* instance, size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t +v+[])

txt[])

.... 1881. free(s);

### Double Free\Path 9:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=207

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	1888
Object	new_item	S

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns txt linked item t \*

static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

.... 1821. free(new item);

A

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static mdns\_service\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_service(const char \* service, const char \* proto, uint16\_t port, const char \* instance, size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t

txt[])

.... 1888. free(s);

### **Double Free\Path 10:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=208

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	1888



Object new item s

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_service\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_service(const char \* service, const char \*

proto, uint16\_t port, const char \* instance, size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t

txt[])

1888. free(s);

Double Free\Path 11:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=209

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	2016
Object	new_item	instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2016. free((char \*)service->instance);

#### Double Free\Path 12:



Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=210

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	2016
Object	new_item	instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2016. free((char \*)service->instance);

### **Double Free\Path 13:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=211

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	2017
Object	new_item	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

.... 1821. free(new\_item);



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2017. free((char \*)service->service);

**Double Free\Path 14:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=212

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	2017
Object	new_item	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2017. free((char \*)service->service);

**Double Free\Path 15:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=213

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	2018



Object new\_item proto

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new\_item);

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2018. free((char \*)service->proto);

# **Double Free\Path 16:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=214

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	2018
Object	new_item	proto

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2018. free((char \*)service->proto);

### **Double Free\Path 17:**

Severity Medium Result State To Verify



Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=215

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	2024
Object	new_item	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2024. free(s);

**Double Free\Path 18:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=216

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	2024
Object	new_item	s

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

¥



Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2024. free(s);

**Double Free\Path 19:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=217

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2027	3681
Object	service	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2027. free(service);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3681. free(action->data.srv add.service);

# Double Free\Path 20:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=218

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2026	3681
Object	txt	service

Code Snippet



Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

.... 2026. free(service->txt);

A

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3681. free(action->data.srv\_add.service);

### Double Free\Path 21:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=219

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2027	3844
Object	service	a

## Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2027. free(service);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3844. free(a);

### **Double Free\Path 22:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=220

Status New

Source Destination



File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2026	3844
Object	txt	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2026. free(service->txt);

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3844. free(a);

### Double Free\Path 23:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=221

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2027	3855
Object	service	b

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2027. free(service);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3855. free(b);

### Double Free\Path 24:

Severity Medium



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=222

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2026	3855
Object	txt	b

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2026. free(service->txt);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3855. free(b);

**Double Free\Path 25:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=223

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2027	3870
Object	service	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

.... 2027. free(service);

₩.



Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3870. free(s);

**Double Free\Path 26:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=224

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2026	3870
Object	txt	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_service(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

2026. free(service->txt);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3870. free(s);

Double Free\Path 27:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=225

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	4363
Object	new_item	item

Code Snippet



Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new item);

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_add(const char \* instance, const char \* service, const

char \* proto, uint16\_t port, mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[], size\_t num\_items)

4363. free(item);

## Double Free\Path 28:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=226

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	4363
Object	new_item	item

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_add(const char \* instance, const char \* service, const

char \* proto, uint16\_t port, mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[], size\_t num\_items)

4363. free(item);

### **Double Free\Path 29:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=227



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1821	4370
Object	new_item	item

Code Snippet

Status

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

New

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1821. free(new item);

**y** 

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_add(const char \* instance, const char \* service, const

char \* proto, uint16\_t port, mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[], size\_t num\_items)

4370. free(item);

### **Double Free\Path 30:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=228

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1827	4370
Object	new_item	item

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1827. free(new\_item);

¥



Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_add(const char \* instance, const char \* service, const

char \* proto, uint16\_t port, mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[], size\_t num\_items)

4370. free(item);

# Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam Version:1

# Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### Description

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 1:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=18

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm in x, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to x, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	535	535
Object	x	x

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

535. memcpy(&fb[0], &x, sizeof x);

### Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=19

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm in x, at line 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer.



This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to x, at line 503 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/aead aes256gcm aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	537	537
Object	x	x

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

537. memcpy(&fb[8], &x, sizeof x);

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=20

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm in x, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to x, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	676	676
Object	x	x

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

676. memcpy(&fb[0], &x, sizeof x);

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 4:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=21



#### Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm in x, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm passes to x, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

_		
	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	678	678
Object	x	x

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

678. memcpy(&fb[8], &x, sizeof x);

### **Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 5:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=22

Status New

The size of the buffer used by esp\_partition\_table\_basic\_verify in esp\_partition\_info\_t, at line 108 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/flash\_partitions.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that esp\_partition\_table\_basic\_verify passes to esp\_partition\_info\_t, at line 108 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/flash\_partitions.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/flash_partitions.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/flash_partitions.c
Line	120	120
Object	esp_partition_info_t	esp_partition_info_t

#### Code Snippet

File Name Method ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/flash\_partitions.c

esp\_err\_t esp\_partition\_table\_basic\_verify(const esp\_partition\_info\_t

\*partition\_table, bool log\_errors, int \*num\_partitions)

```
120. memcpy(&part_local, (void *)((intptr_t)partition_table +
num_parts * sizeof(esp_partition_info_t)),
sizeof(esp_partition_info_t));
```

# Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 6:



Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=23

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns\_debug\_packet in ip4\_addr\_t, at line 4754 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns\_debug\_packet passes to ip4\_addr\_t, at line 4754 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

_	- <u>-</u>	
	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4944	4944
Object	ip4_addr_t	ip4_addr_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_debug\_packet(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len)

4944. memcpy(&ip, data\_ptr, sizeof(ip4\_addr\_t));

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 7:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=24

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default in ip\_addr\_t, at line 1181 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default passes to ip\_addr\_t, at line 1181 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1196	1196
Object	ip_addr_t	ip_addr_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_tx\_packet\_t \* \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t

tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

....
1196. memcpy(&packet->dst, &addr, sizeof(ip\_addr\_t));

# **Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 8:**



Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=25

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_create\_answer\_from\_parsed\_packet in ip\_addr\_t, at line 1204 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_create\_answer\_from\_parsed\_packet passes to ip addr\_t, at line 1204 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1278	1278
Object	ip_addr_t	ip_addr_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_create\_answer\_from\_parsed\_packet(mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t \*

parsed\_packet)

```
....
1278. memcpy(&packet->dst, &parsed_packet->src,
sizeof(ip_addr_t));
```

# **Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 9:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=26

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns\_debug\_packet in mdns\_name\_t, at line 4754 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns\_debug\_packet passes to mdns\_name\_t, at line 4754 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4761	4761
Object	mdns_name_t	mdns_name_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_debug\_packet(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len)

```
4761. memset(name, 0, sizeof(mdns_name_t));
```



**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 10:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=27

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default in mdns\_tx\_packet\_t, at line 1181 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default passes to mdns\_tx\_packet\_t, at line 1181 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1188	1188
Object	mdns_tx_packet_t	mdns_tx_packet_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_tx\_packet\_t \* \_mdns\_alloc\_packet\_default(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t

tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

1188. memset((uint8\_t\*)packet, 0, sizeof(mdns\_tx\_packet\_t));

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 11:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=28

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns\_parse\_packet in mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t, at line 2572 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns\_parse\_packet passes to mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t, at line 2572 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2597	2597
Object	mdns_parsed_packet_t	mdns_parsed_packet_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns parse packet(mdns rx packet t \* packet)

2597. memset(parsed\_packet, 0, sizeof(mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t));



**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 12:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=29

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns\_parse\_packet in mdns\_name\_t, at line 2572 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns\_parse\_packet passes to mdns\_name\_t, at line 2572 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2600	2600
Object	mdns_name_t	mdns_name_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2600. memset(name, 0, sizeof(mdns\_name\_t));

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 13:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=30

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_search\_init in mdns\_search\_once\_t, at line 3140 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_search\_init passes to mdns\_search\_once\_t, at line 3140 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3147	3147
Object	mdns_search_once_t	mdns_search_once_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_search\_once\_t \* \_mdns\_search\_init(const char \* name, const char \*

service, const char \* proto, uint16 t type, uint32 t timeout, uint8 t max results)

memset(search, 0, sizeof(mdns\_search\_once\_t));



**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 14:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=31

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_result\_addr\_create\_ip in mdns\_ip\_addr\_t, at line 3230 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_result\_addr\_create\_ip passes to mdns\_ip\_addr\_t, at line 3230 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3237	3237
Object	mdns_ip_addr_t	mdns_ip_addr_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_ip\_addr\_t \* \_mdns\_result\_addr\_create\_ip(ip\_addr\_t \* ip)

3237. memset(a, 0 , sizeof(mdns\_ip\_addr\_t));

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 15:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=32

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_ip in mdns\_result\_t, at line 3275 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_ip passes to mdns\_result\_t, at line 3275 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3298	3298
Object	mdns_result_t	mdns_result_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_ip(mdns\_search\_once\_t \* search, const

char \* hostname, ip addr t \* ip, tcpip adapter if t tcpip if, mdns ip protocol t

ip\_protocol)

3298. memset(r, 0 , sizeof(mdns\_result\_t));



Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 16:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=33

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_srv in mdns\_result\_t, at line 3364 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_srv passes to mdns\_result\_t, at line 3364 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3380	3380
Object	mdns_result_t	mdns_result_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_srv(mdns\_search\_once\_t \* search, const

char \* hostname, uint16\_t port, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t

ip\_protocol)

3380. memset(r, 0 , sizeof(mdns\_result\_t));

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 17:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=34

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_txt in mdns\_result\_t, at line 3398 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_txt passes to mdns\_result\_t, at line 3398 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3420	3420
Object	mdns_result_t	mdns_result_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_txt(mdns\_search\_once\_t \* search,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \* txt, size\_t txt\_count, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)



```
....
3420. memset(r, 0 , sizeof(mdns_result_t));
```

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 18:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=35

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns\_init in mdns\_server\_t, at line 4151 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns\_init passes to mdns\_server\_t, at line 4151 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4164	4164
Object	mdns_server_t	mdns_server_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_init()

4164. memset((uint8\_t\*)\_mdns\_server, 0, sizeof(mdns\_server\_t));

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 19:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=36

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_check\_a\_collision in ip4\_addr\_t, at line 2168 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_check\_a\_collision passes to ip4\_addr\_t, at line 2168 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2179	2179
Object	ip4_addr_t	ip4_addr_t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_a\_collision(ip4\_addr\_t \* ip, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if)



```
int ret = memcmp((uint8 t*)&if ip info.ip.addr,
2179.
(uint8 t*)&ip->addr, sizeof(ip4 addr t));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 20:

Severity Medium Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=37

**Status** New

The size of the buffer used by mdns check srv collision in our host len, at line 2038 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns check srv collision passes to our host len, at line 2038 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2063	2063
Object	our_host_len	our_host_len

Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority, uint16 t weight, uint16 t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

> 2063. memcpy(our data + our index, mdns server->hostname, our host len);

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 21:** 

Severity Medium Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=38

Status New

The size of the buffer used by mdns check srv collision in their host len, at line 2038 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that mdns check srv collision passes to their host len, at line 2038 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2076	2076
Object	their_host_len	their_host_len

Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

2076. memcpy(their\_data + their\_index, host, their\_host\_len);

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 22:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=39

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision in their\_domain\_len, at line 2038 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision passes to their\_domain\_len, at line 2038 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2079	2079
Object	their_domain_len	their_domain_len

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

....
2079. memcpy(their\_data + their\_index, domain, their\_domain\_len);

**Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 23:** 

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=40

Status New

The size of the buffer used by crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm in mlen, at line 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that crypto aead aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached afternm passes to mlen, at line 642 of

ESP8266 RTOS SDK/aead aes256gcm aesni.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	782	782



Object mlen mlen

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

782. memset(m, 0, mlen);

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 24:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=41

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision in our\_len, at line 2038 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision passes to our\_len, at line 2038 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

_		
	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2083	2083
Object	our_len	our_len

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_srv\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, uint16\_t priority,

uint16\_t weight, uint16\_t port, const char \* host, const char \* domain)

int ret = memcmp(our\_data, their\_data, our\_len);

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 25:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=42

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision in len, at line 2095 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision passes to len, at line 2095 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	2136	2136
Object	len	len

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)

....
2136. int ret = memcmp(ours, data, len);

# MemoryFree on StackVariable

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\MemoryFree on StackVariable Version:0

Description

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=43

Status New

Calling free() (line 1092) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1092) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1104	1104
Object	a	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

1104. free(a);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=44

Status New

Calling free() (line 1092) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1092) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1110	1110
Object	b	b

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

1110. free(b);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=45

Status New

Calling free() (line 1124) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1124) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1136	1136
Object	d	d

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_dealloc\_answer(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\* destnation, uint16\_t

type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

1136. free(d);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=46

Status New

Calling free() (line 1124) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1124) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1143	1143
Object	a	a

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_dealloc\_answer(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\* destnation, uint16\_t

type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

.... 1143. free(a);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 5:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=47

Status New

Calling free() (line 1898) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1898) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1906	1906
Object	d	d

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_dealloc\_scheduled\_service\_answers(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\*

destination, mdns\_service\_t \* service)

.... 1906. free(d);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 6:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=48

Status New

Calling free() (line 1898) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1898) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1913	1913
Object	a	a

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_dealloc\_scheduled\_service\_answers(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\*

destination, mdns\_service\_t \* service)

.... 1913. free(a);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 7:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=49

Status New

Calling free() (line 1923) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1923) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1974	1974
Object	qs	qs

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_service\_packets(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

.... 1974. free(qs);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 8:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=50

Status New

Calling free() (line 1923) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 1923) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

Source	Destination
--------	-------------



File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1982	1982
Object	qsn	qsn

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_service\_packets(mdns\_service\_t \* service)

1982. free(qsn);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 9:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=51

Status New

Calling free() (line 2397) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 2397) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2419	2419
Object	p	p

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_parsed\_question(mdns\_parsed\_packet\_t \*

parsed\_packet, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

2419. free(p);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 10:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=52

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line	3783	3783
Object	key	key

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

.... 3783. free(key);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 11:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=53

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3824	3824
Object	t	t

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3824. free(t);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 12:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=54

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3831	3831
Object	key	key



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3831. free(key);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 13:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=55

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3844	3844
Object	a	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3844. free(a);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 14:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=56

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3855	3855
Object	b	b

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3855. free(b);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 15:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=57

Status New

Calling free() (line 3719) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 3719) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3870	3870
Object	S	S

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3870. free(s);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 16:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=58

Status New

Calling free() (line 4223) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4223) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4260	4260
Object	h	h

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_free()



4260. free(h);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 17:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=59

Status New

Calling free() (line 4267) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4267) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4283	4283
Object	new_hostname	new_hostname

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

. . . .

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_hostname\_set(const char \* hostname)

4283. free(new\_hostname);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 18:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=60

Status New

Calling free() (line 4267) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4267) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4289	4289
Object	new_hostname	new_hostname

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_hostname\_set(const char \* hostname)



free(new\_hostname);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 19:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=61

Status New

Calling free() (line 4296) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4296) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4312	4312
Object	new_instance	new_instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* instance)

4312. free(new instance);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 20:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=62

Status New

Calling free() (line 4296) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4296) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4318	4318
Object	new_instance	new_instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* instance)



free(new\_instance);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 21:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=63

Status New

Calling free() (line 4515) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4515) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4535	4535
Object	new_instance	new_instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* service, const char \*

proto, const char \* instance)

4535. free(new instance);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 22:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=64

Status New

Calling free() (line 4515) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4515) in file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4542	4542
Object	new_instance	new_instance

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_instance\_name\_set(const char \* service, const char \*

proto, const char \* instance)



free(new\_instance);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 23:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=65

Status New

Calling free() (line 4599) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4599) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4620	4620
Object	a	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_query\_results\_free(mdns\_result\_t \* results)

4620. free(a);

MemoryFree on StackVariable\Path 24:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=66

Status New

Calling free() (line 4599) on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (line 4599) in file ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c may result with a crash.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4624	4624
Object	r	r

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_query\_results\_free(mdns\_result\_t \* results)



4624. free(r);

# Memory Leak

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Memory Leak Version:1

#### Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)

### **Description**

# Memory Leak\Path 1:

Medium Severity Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=229

New Status

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1163	1163
Object	a	a

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static bool \_mdns\_alloc\_answer(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\* destnation, uint16\_t

type, mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

mdns out answer t \* a = (mdns out answer t 1163. \*) malloc(sizeof(mdns out answer t));

### Memory Leak\Path 2:

Severity Medium Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=230

New Status

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2511	2511
Object	key	key

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



Method static void \_mdns\_result\_txt\_create(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len, mdns\_txt\_item\_t \*\* out\_txt, size\_t \* out\_count)

char \* key = (char \*)malloc(name\_len + 1);

Memory Leak\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=231

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2526	2526
Object	value	value

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_result\_txt\_create(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \*\* out\_txt, size\_t \* out\_count)

char \* value = (char \*)malloc(value\_len + 1);

Memory Leak\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=232

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3232	3232
Object	a	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_ip\_addr\_t \* \_mdns\_result\_addr\_create\_ip(ip\_addr\_t \* ip)

....
3232. mdns\_ip\_addr\_t \* a = (mdns\_ip\_addr\_t
\*)malloc(sizeof(mdns\_ip\_addr\_t));



Memory Leak\Path 5:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=233

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3520	3520
Object	q	q

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_tx\_packet\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_search\_packet(mdns\_search\_once\_t \*

search, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

```
3520. mdns_out_question_t * q = (mdns_out_question_t
*)malloc(sizeof(mdns_out_question_t));
```

### Memory Leak\Path 6:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=234

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3543	3543
Object	a	a

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_tx\_packet\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_search\_packet(mdns\_search\_once\_t \*

search, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

```
....
3543. mdns_out_answer_t * a = (mdns_out_answer_t *) malloc(sizeof(mdns_out_answer_t));
```

#### Memory Leak\Path 7:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500



63&pathid=235

Status New

Source Destination

File ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Line 2808 2808

Object hostname hostname

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2808. >host);

result->hostname = strdup(name-

Memory Leak\Path 8:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=236

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3345	3345
Object	instance_name	instance_name

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_result\_t \* \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_ptr(mdns\_search\_once\_t \*

search, const char \* instance, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t

ip\_protocol)

3345. r->instance name = strdup(instance);

Memory Leak\Path 9:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=237

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c



Line 3381 3381
Object hostname hostname

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_srv(mdns\_search\_once\_t \* search, const

char \* hostname, uint16\_t port, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t

ip\_protocol)

3381. r->hostname = strdup(hostname);

Memory Leak\Path 10:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=238

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3414	3414
Object	r	r

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_search\_result\_add\_txt(mdns\_search\_once\_t \* search,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \* txt, size\_t txt\_count, tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol)

....
3414. r = (mdns\_result\_t \*)malloc(sizeof(mdns\_result\_t));

#### Use of Zero Initialized Pointer

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Use of Zero Initialized Pointer Version:1

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)

Description

Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=239

Status New



The variable declared in endp at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 53 is not initialized when it is used by mdns server at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 2572.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	60	3003
Object	endp	_mdns_server

```
Code Snippet
File Name
             ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
            static char * _mdns_mangle_name(char* in) {
Method
              60.
                           char *endp = NULL;
            ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
File Name
Method
            void mdns_parse_packet(mdns_rx_packet_t * packet)
              3003.
                                                        mdns server->hostname =
              new host;
```

### Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 2:

Medium Severity Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=240

**Status** New

File Name

The variable declared in endp at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 53 is not initialized when it is used by mdns server at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 2572.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	60	2957
Object	endp	_mdns_server

```
Code Snippet
File Name
             ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Method
            static char * _mdns_mangle_name(char* in) {
              . . . .
              60.
                           char *endp = NULL;
            ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
```



```
Method void mdns_parse_packet(mdns_rx_packet_t * packet)
....
2957.
    __mdns_server->hostname =
new_host;
```

Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=241

Status New

The variable declared in new\_txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1808 is not initialized when it is used by new\_txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1808.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1810	1831
Object	new_txt	new_txt

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1810. mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* new\_txt = NULL;
....
1831. new\_txt = new\_item;

#### Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=242

Status New

The variable declared in new\_txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1808 is not initialized when it is used by new txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4411.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1810	4423
Object	new_txt	new_txt

# Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c Method static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[]) 1810. mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* new\_txt = NULL; ٧ File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c esp\_err\_t mdns\_service\_txt\_set(const char \* service, const char \* proto, Method mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[], uint8\_t num\_items) . . . . 4423. new txt = mdns allocate txt(num items, txt);

# **Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 5:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=243

Status New

The variable declared in new\_txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1808 is not initialized when it is used by txt at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1859.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1810	1876
Object	new_txt	txt

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* \_mdns\_allocate\_txt(size\_t num\_items,
mdns\_txt\_item\_t txt[])

1810. mdns\_txt\_linked\_item\_t \* new\_txt = NULL;

A

File Name

ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method

static mdns\_service\_t \* \_mdns\_create\_service(const char \* service, const char \* proto, uint16\_t port, const char \* instance, size\_t num\_items, mdns\_txt\_item\_t

txt[])

1876.  $s->txt = new_txt;$ 

## Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 6:



Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=244

Status New

The variable declared in service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1153.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	1169
Object	service	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2728. mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool \_mdns\_alloc\_answer(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\* destnation, uint16\_t

type, mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

....
1169. a->service = service;

Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 7:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=245

Status New

The variable declared in BinaryExpr at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1479 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1153.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1487	1169
Object	BinaryExpr	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



Method static void \_mdns\_init\_pcb\_probe\_new\_service(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* services, size\_t len, bool

probe\_ip)

....
1487. mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* \_services = NULL;

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool \_mdns\_alloc\_answer(mdns\_out\_answer\_t \*\* destnation, uint16\_t

type, mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

1169. a->service = service;

# **Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 8:**

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=246

Status New

The variable declared in BinaryExpr at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1479 is not initialized when it is used by probe services at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1479.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1487	1521
Object	BinaryExpr	probe_services

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static void \_mdns\_init\_pcb\_probe\_new\_service(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* services, size\_t len, bool probe\_ip)

1487. mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* \_services = NULL;
....
1521. pcb->probe\_services = \_services;

#### Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 9:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=247

Status New



The variable declared in service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by probe services at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1479.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	1521
Object	service	probe_services

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

.... 2728. mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_init\_pcb\_probe\_new\_service(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* services, size\_t len, bool

probe\_ip)

1521. pcb->probe\_services = \_services;

#### Use of Zero Initialized Pointer\Path 10:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=248

Status New

The variable declared in \_mdns\_server at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4223 is not initialized when it is used by \_mdns\_server at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4223.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4264	4262
Object	_mdns_server	_mdns_server

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_free()

....
4264. \_\_mdns\_server = NULL;
....
4262. vSemaphoreDelete(\_mdns\_server->lock);



#### Char Overflow

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Integer Overflow\Char Overflow Version:1

#### Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

## Description

## Char Overflow\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=134

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, out, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	608	608
Object	out	out

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

....
608. LOOPRND128;

#### Char Overflow\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=135

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, in, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	608	608
Object	in	in



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

.... 608. LOOPRND128;

## Char Overflow\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=136

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, in, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	771	771
Object	in	in

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

771. LOOPACCUMDRND128;

## Char Overflow\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=137

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, out, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	792	792
Object	out	out



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

792. LOOPDRND128;

Char Overflow\Path 5:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=138

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, in, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	792	792
Object	in	in

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

792. LOOPDRND128;

# **Integer Overflow**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Integer Overflow\Integer Overflow Version:0

Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows

FISMA 2014: System And Information Integrity

NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

Description

Integer Overflow\Path 1:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=139

Status New



A variable of a larger data type, AssignExpr, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 503 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	562	562
Object	AssignExpr	AssignExpr

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

562. blocklen = (unsigned int) (adlen - i);

Integer Overflow\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=140

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, AssignExpr, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	701	701
Object	AssignExpr	AssignExpr

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

701. blocklen = (unsigned int) (adlen - i);

Integer Overflow\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=141

Status New



A variable of a larger data type, AssignExpr, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 642 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	772	772
Object	AssignExpr	AssignExpr

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

772. LOOPACCUMDRMD128;

Integer Overflow\Path 4:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=142

Status New

A variable of a larger data type, value\_len, is being assigned to a smaller data type, in 2473 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. This will cause a loss of data, often the significant bits of a numerical value or the sign bit.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2524	2524
Object	value_len	value_len

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_result\_txt\_create(const uint8\_t \* data, size\_t len,

mdns\_txt\_item\_t \*\* out\_txt, size\_t \* out\_count)

int value\_len = partLen - name\_len - 1;

# Wrong Size t Allocation

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Integer Overflow\Wrong Size t Allocation Version:0

**Description** 

Wrong Size t Allocation\Path 1:

Severity Medium Result State To Verify



Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=68

Status New

The function services final len in ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c at line 1479 assigns an incorrectly calculated size to a buffer, resulting in a mismatch between the value being written and the size of the buffer it is being written into.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1489	1489
Object	services_final_len	services_final_len

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

static void \_mdns\_init\_pcb\_probe\_new\_service(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, Method

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* services, size\_t len, bool

probe ip)

. . . . 1489. services = (mdns srv item t \*\*) malloc(sizeof(mdns srv item t \*) \* services final len);

# Stored Buffer Overflow fgets

#### Ouerv Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Stored Vulnerabilities\Stored Buffer Overflow fgets Version:1

#### Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

## Description

Stored Buffer Overflow fgets\Path 1:

Medium Severity Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=249

Status New

The size of the buffer used by xfgets in size, at line 719 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that xfgets passes to str, at line 719 of ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

<b>U</b> 1		
	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	721	721
Object	str	size

## Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method

void xfgets(char \*str, int size, FILE \*in)

if (fgets(str, size, in) == NULL) 721

# **NULL Pointer Dereference**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\NULL Pointer Dereference Version:1

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

## **Description**

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 1:** 

Severity Low Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=69

New Status

The variable declared in null at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2981	2376
Object	null	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

> . . . . 2981. mdns remove parsed question (parsed packet, type, NULL);

> > ٧

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool mdns question matches(mdns parsed question t \* question,

uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

. . . . 2376. if (!strcasecmp(service->service->service, question->service)

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 2:**

Severity Low



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=70

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2935	2376
Object	null	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2935.
\_mdns\_remove\_parsed\_question(parsed\_packet, type, NULL);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool \_mdns\_question\_matches(mdns\_parsed\_question\_t \* question,

uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

2376. if (!strcasecmp(service->service->service, question-

>service)

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 3:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=71

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	2376
Object	null	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 4:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=72

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2935	2377
Object	null	service

#### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

....
2935.
\_mdns\_remove\_parsed\_question(parsed\_packet, type, NULL);

₩.

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool \_mdns\_question\_matches(mdns\_parsed\_question\_t \* question,

uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

2377. && !strcasecmp(service->service->proto, question->proto)

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 5:**

Severity Low



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=73

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2981	2377
Object	null	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

2981.
\_mdns\_remove\_parsed\_question(parsed\_packet, type, NULL);

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static bool \_mdns\_question\_matches(mdns\_parsed\_question\_t \* question,

uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

2377. && !strcasecmp(service->service->proto, question-

>proto)

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 6:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=74

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by service at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2368.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	2377
Object	null	service

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 7:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=75

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2965	1107
Object	null	next

### Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

```
....
2965. __mdns_remove_scheduled_answer(packet-
>tcpip_if, packet->ip_protocol, type, NULL);
```

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

```
if (a->next->type == type && a->next->service
== service->service) {
```

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 8:**

Severity Low



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=76

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3011	1107
Object	null	next

Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

```
....
3011. __mdns_remove_scheduled_answer(packet->tcpip_if, packet->ip_protocol, type, NULL);
```

A

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

```
if (a->next->type == type && a->next->service
== service->service) {
```

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 9:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=77

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	1107
Object	null	next

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 10:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=78

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	3011	1107
Object	null	next

```
Code Snippet
```

File Name

ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

```
....
3011. __mdns_remove_scheduled_answer(packet->tcpip_if, packet->ip_protocol, type, NULL);
```

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

```
if (a->next->type == type && a->next->service
== service->service) {
```

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 11:**

Severity Low



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=79

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2965	1107
Object	null	next

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

```
....
2965. __mdns_remove_scheduled_answer(packet->tcpip_if, packet->ip_protocol, type, NULL);
```

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_remove\_scheduled\_answer(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if,

mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, uint16\_t type, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \* service)

```
if (a->next->type == type && a->next->service
== service->service) {
```

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 12:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=80

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by next at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 1092.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2728	1107
Object	null	next

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 13:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=81

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by result at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2778	2806
Object	null	result

### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 14:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=82

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572 is not initialized when it is used by result at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 2572.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2868	2888
Object	null	result

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method void mdns\_parse\_packet(mdns\_rx\_packet\_t \* packet)

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 15:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=83

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3674
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3674. free(action->data.hostname);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 16:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-



BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=84

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3677
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns action t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3677. free(action->data.instance);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 17:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=85

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3681
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3681. free(action->data.srv\_add.service);

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 18:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=86

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3680
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3680. \_mdns\_free\_service(action->data.srv\_add.service->service);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 19:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=87

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3684
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

free(action->data.srv\_instance.instance);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 20:**

Severity Low

Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=88

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3687
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)



```
....
3687. _mdns_free_linked_txt(action->data.srv_txt_replace.txt);
```

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 21:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=89

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3691
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3691. free(action->data.srv\_txt\_set.value);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 22:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=90

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3690



Object null data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3690. free(action->data.srv\_txt\_set.key);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 23:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=91

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3694
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005.  $mdns_action_t * a = NULL;$ 

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void mdns free action(mdns action t \* action)

free(action->data.srv\_txt\_del.key);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 24:**

Severity Low



Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=92

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3701
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3701. \_mdns\_search\_free(action->data.search\_add.search);

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 25:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=93

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3704
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)



```
File Name ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void _mdns_free_action(mdns_action_t * action)
```

....
3704. \_mdns\_free\_tx\_packet(action->data.tx\_handle.packet);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 26:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=94

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3708
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3708. free(action->data.rx\_handle.packet);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 27:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=95

Status New



The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3670.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3707
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

**y** 

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_free\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3707. pbuf\_free(action->data.rx\_handle.packet->pb);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 28:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=96

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3730
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c



Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3730. action->data.sys\_event.event\_id, action->data.sys\_event.interface);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 29:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=97

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3730
Object	null	data

### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3730. action->data.sys\_event.event\_id, action>data.sys\_event.interface);

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 30:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=98

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

Source	Destination
--------	-------------



File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3729
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3729. \_\_mdns\_handle\_system\_event(action->data.sys\_event.event\_base,

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 31:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=99

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3735
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)



....
3735. \_mdns\_server->hostname = action->data.hostname;

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 32:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=100

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3742
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3742. \_mdns\_server->instance = action->data.instance;

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 33:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=101

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3749



Object null data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3749. \_mdns\_probe\_all\_pcbs(&action->data.srv\_add.service, 1, false, false);

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 34:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=102

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3748
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3748. \_\_mdns\_server->services = action->data.srv\_add.service;

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 35:**



Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=103

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3758
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 36:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=104

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3757
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)



```
....
4005. mdns_action_t * a = NULL;
```

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3757. action->data.srv\_instance.service->service->instance = action->data.srv\_instance;

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 37:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=105

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3755
Object	null	data

# Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 38:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=106



# Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3754
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

¥

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3754. \_\_mdns\_send\_bye(&action->data.srv\_instance.service, 1, false);

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 39:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=107

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3753
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;



```
File Name ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void _mdns_execute_action(mdns_action_t * action)

....
3753. if (action->data.srv_instance.service->service->instance)
{
```

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 40:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=108

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3763
Object	null	data

#### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3763. \_\_mdns\_announce\_all\_pcbs(&action->data.srv\_port.service,
1, true);

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 41:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=109

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3762
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

٧

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3762. action->data.srv\_port.service->service->port = action>data.srv port.port;

### **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 42:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=110

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3772
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)



```
....
3772. _mdns_announce_all_pcbs(&action-
>data.srv_txt_replace.service, 1, false);
```

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 43:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=111

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3771
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

....
4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3771. service->txt = action->data.srv\_txt\_replace.txt;

**NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 44:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=112

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3767



Object null data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

**¥** 

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3767. service = action->data.srv\_txt\_replace.service->service;

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 45:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=113

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3802
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

.... 4005.  $mdns_action_t * a = NULL;$ 

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 46:**



Severity Low

Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=114

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3778
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3778. value = action->data.srv\_txt\_set.value;

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 47:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=115

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3777
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)



```
....
4005. mdns_action_t * a = NULL;
```

**¥** 

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

....
3777. key = action->data.srv\_txt\_set.key;

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 48:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=116

Status New

The variable declared in null at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3776
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

4005. mdns\_action\_t \* a = NULL;

A

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

3776. service = action->data.srv\_txt\_set.service->service;

# **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 49:**

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=117

Status New



The variable declared in null at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3833
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters) Method

> 4005. mdns action t \* a = NULL;

> > ٧

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c File Name

Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)

> mdns announce all pcbs(&action-3833. >data.srv txt set.service, 1, false);

## **NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 50:**

Severity Low Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=118

New Status

The variable declared in null at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 4003 is not initialized when it is used by data at ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c in line 3719.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4005	3807
Object	null	data

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/mdns.c

Method static void \_mdns\_service\_task(void \*pvParameters)

> . . . . 4005. mdns action t \* a = NULL;

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c File Name



Method static void \_mdns\_execute\_action(mdns\_action\_t \* action)
....
3807. key = action->data.srv\_txt\_del.key;

# Improper Resource Access Authorization

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Improper Resource Access Authorization Version:1

### Categories

FISMA 2014: Identification And Authentication NIST SP 800-53: AC-3 Access Enforcement (P1) OWASP Top 10 2017: A2-Broken Authentication

## Description

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=250

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	721	721
Object	fgets	fgets

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method void xfgets(char \*str, int size, FILE \*in)

721. if (fgets(str, size, in) == NULL)

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 2:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=251

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	721	721
Object	str	str



Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method void xfgets(char \*str, int size, FILE \*in)

721. if (fgets(str, size, in) == NULL)

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 3:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=252

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	722	722
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c

Method void xfgets(char \*str, int size, FILE \*in)

722. fprintf(stderr, "\nError in reading or end of file.\n");

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 4:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=253

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	540	540
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

fprintf( stderr, "KCONFIG SEED=0x%X\n", seed );

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Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 5:

Severity Low Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=254

New Status

Source Destination File ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c Line 570 570 Object fprintf fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

570.

fprintf(stderr, ("\*\*\*\n"

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 6:

Severity Low Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=255

New Status

Destination Source File ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c Line 609 609 Object fprintf fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266 RTOS SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

609.

fprintf(stderr,

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 7:

Severity Low Result State To Verify Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=256

New Status



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	626	626
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c File Name Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

. . . .

626.

fprintf(stderr,

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 8:

Severity Low

To Verify Result State Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=257

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	640	640
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

640.

fprintf(stderr,

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 9:

Severity Low Result State To Verify

Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=258

New Status

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	694	694
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet



File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

.... fprintf(stderr, \_("\n\*\*\* Error during writing of the configuration. $\n\n$ "));

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 10:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=259

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	698	698
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

.... fprintf(stderr, \_("\n\*\*\* Error during update of the configuration. $\n\n$ "));

Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 11:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=260

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	703	703
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

703. fprintf(stderr, \_("n\*\*\* Error while saving defconfig to: snn'),

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Improper Resource Access Authorization\Path 12:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=261

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	709	709
Object	fprintf	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

.... 709. fprintf(stderr, \_("\n\*\*\* Error during writing of the configuration. $\n\n$ "));

# Unchecked Return Value

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Unchecked Return Value Version:1

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-11 Error Handling (P2)

#### Description

**Unchecked Return Value\Path 1:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=9

Status New

The \_mdns\_mangle\_name method calls the sprintf function, at line 53 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	76	76
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {



```
....
76. sprintf(ret, "%s-2", in);
```

**Unchecked Return Value\Path 2:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=10

Status New

The \_mdns\_mangle\_name method calls the sprintf function, at line 53 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	86	86
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {

sprintf(ret + baseLen, "-%d", suffix + 1);

**Unchecked Return Value\Path 3:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=11

Status New

The \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record method calls the sprintf function, at line 539 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	578	578
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)



....
578. sprintf(tmp, "%s=%s", txt->key, txt->value);

**Unchecked Return Value\Path 4:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=12

Status New

The \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision method calls the sprintf function, at line 2095 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2126	2126
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)

....
2126. sprintf(tmp, "%s=%s", txt->key, txt->value);

**Unchecked Return Value\Path 5:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=13

Status New

The \_mdns\_strdup\_check method calls the Pointer function, at line 2554 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2557	2557
Object	Pointer	Pointer

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static esp\_err\_t \_mdns\_strdup\_check(char \*\* out, char \* in)



.... 2557. \*out = strdup(in);

# **Unchecked Array Index**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Unchecked Array Index Version:1

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

# **Description**

**Unchecked Array Index\Path 1:** 

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=143

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	607	607
Object	n2	n2

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_encrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*c,

607. COUNTER INC2(n2);

Unchecked Array Index\Path 2:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=144

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	770	770
Object	n2	n2

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c



Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

770. COUNTER\_INC2(n2);

Unchecked Array Index\Path 3:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=145

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/aead_aes256gcm_aesni.c
Line	791	791
Object	n2	n2

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/aead\_aes256gcm\_aesni.c

Method crypto\_aead\_aes256gcm\_decrypt\_detached\_afternm(unsigned char \*m,

unsigned char \*nsec,

....
791. COUNTER INC2(n2);

Unchecked Array Index\Path 4:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=146

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/json.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/json.c
Line	182	182
Object	len	len

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/json.c

Method static int json\_parse\_number(const char \*\*json\_pos, const char \*end,

182. str[len] = '\0';



# Potential Precision Problem

Ouerv Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Potential Precision Problem Version:0

#### Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

#### Description

# Potential Precision Problem\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=131

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_mangle\_name in "%s-2", at line 53 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_mangle\_name passes to "%s-2", at line 53 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	76	76
Object	"%s-2"	"%s-2"

### Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static char \* \_mdns\_mangle\_name(char\* in) {

76. sprintf(ret, "%s-2", in);

### Potential Precision Problem\Path 2:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=132

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record in "%s=%s", at line 539 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record passes to "%s=%s", at line 539 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	578	578
Object	"%s=%s"	"%s=%s"



Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static uint16\_t \_mdns\_append\_txt\_record(uint8\_t \* packet, uint16\_t \* index,

mdns\_service\_t \* service, bool flush, bool bye)

578. sprintf(tmp, "%s=%s", txt->key, txt->value);

Potential Precision Problem\Path 3:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=133

Status New

The size of the buffer used by \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision in "%s=%s", at line 2095 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision passes to "%s=%s", at line 2095 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	2126	2126
Object	"%s=%s"	"%s=%s"

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method static int \_mdns\_check\_txt\_collision(mdns\_service\_t \* service, const uint8\_t \*

data, size\_t len)

2126. sprintf(tmp, "%s=%s", txt->key, txt->value);

# Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type Version:1

Description

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=14

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	1489	1489
Object	sizeof	sizeof



Code Snippet

File Name

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method

static void \_mdns\_init\_pcb\_probe\_new\_service(tcpip\_adapter\_if\_t tcpip\_if, mdns\_ip\_protocol\_t ip\_protocol, mdns\_srv\_item\_t \*\* services, size\_t len, bool

probe\_ip)

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type\Path 2:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results http://WIN-

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=15

Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/mdns.c
Line	4172	4172
Object	sizeof	sizeof

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/mdns.c

Method esp\_err\_t mdns\_init()

4172. \_\_mdns\_server->action\_queue =
xQueueCreate(MDNS\_ACTION\_QUEUE\_LEN, sizeof(mdns\_action\_t \*));

# Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control Sphere

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control Sphere Version:1

#### Categories

FISMA 2014: Configuration Management

NIST SP 800-53: AC-3 Access Enforcement (P1)

#### Description

Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control Sphere\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=262

Status New

The system data read by main in the file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c at line 492 is potentially exposed by main found in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c at line 492.



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	604	626
Object	getenv	fprintf

Code Snippet File Name

Method

ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control Sphere\Path 2:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://win-">http://win-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=263

Status New

The system data read by main in the file ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c at line 492 is potentially exposed by main found in ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c at line 492.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	604	609
Object	getenv	fprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

name = getenv("KCONFIG\_ALLCONFIG");
fprintf(stderr,

# **Inconsistent Implementations**

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Inconsistent Implementations Version:0

Description

Inconsistent Implementations\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=7

Status New



	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	505	505
Object	getopt_long	getopt_long

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

....

505. while ((opt = getopt\_long(ac, av, "s", long\_opts, NULL)) != -1) {

# Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Use of Insufficiently Random Values Version:0

### Categories

FISMA 2014: Media Protection

NIST SP 800-53: SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest (P1)

OWASP Top 10 2017: A3-Sensitive Data Exposure

### **Description**

Use of Insufficiently Random Values\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <a href="http://WIN-">http://WIN-</a>

BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050073&projectid=500

63&pathid=8

Status New

Method main at line 492 of ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c uses a weak method srand to produce random values. These values might be used for secret values, personal identifiers or cryptographic input, allowing an attacker to guess the value.

	Source	Destination
File	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c	ESP8266_RTOS_SDK/conf.c
Line	541	541
Object	srand	srand

Code Snippet

File Name ESP8266\_RTOS\_SDK/conf.c Method int main(int ac, char \*\*av)

541. srand(seed);

# **Buffer Overflow LongString**

Risk



#### What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

# **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# **Source Code Examples**



# **Buffer Overflow OutOfBound**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# Source Code Examples

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# **Buffer Overflow Indexes**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

# How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# Source Code Examples

PAGE 154 OF 199



# **Buffer Overflow fgets**

# Risk

# What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

### How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# **Source Code Examples**

#### CPP

#### **Overflowing Buffers**

```
const int BUFFER_SIZE = 10;
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

void copyStringToBuffer(char* inputString)
{
    strcpy(buffer, inputString);
}
```

#### **Checked Buffers**

```
const int BUFFER_SIZE = 10;
const int MAX_INPUT_SIZE = 256;
```



```
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

void copyStringToBuffer(char* inputString)
{
    if (strnlen(inputString, MAX_INPUT_SIZE) < sizeof(buffer))
    {
        strncpy(buffer, inputString, sizeof(buffer));
    }
}</pre>
```



# **Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# Source Code Examples

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# MemoryFree on StackVariable

# Risk

#### What might happen

Undefined Behavior may result with a crash. Crashes may give an attacker valuable information about the system and the program internals. Furthermore, it may leave unprotected files (e.g memory) that may be exploited.

#### Cause

### How does it happen

Calling free() on a variable that was not dynamically allocated (e.g. malloc) will result with an Undefined Behavior.

# **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

Use free() only on dynamically allocated variables in order to prevent unexpected behavior from the compiler.

# **Source Code Examples**

# **CPP**

Bad - Calling free() on a static variable

```
void clean_up() {
   char temp[256];
   do_something();
   free(tmp);
   return;
}
```

Good - Calling free() only on variables that were dynamically allocated

```
void clean_up() {
   char *buff;
   buff = (char*) malloc(1024);
   free(buff);
   return;
}
```



# Wrong Size t Allocation

# Risk

#### What might happen

Incorrect allocation of memory may result in unexpected behavior by either overwriting sections of memory with unexpected values. Under certain conditions where both an incorrect allocation of memory and the values being written can be controlled by an attacker, such an issue may result in execution of malicious code.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Some memory allocation functions require a size value to be provided as a parameter. The allocated size should be derived from the provided value, by providing the length value of the intended source, multiplied by the size of that length. Failure to perform the correct arithmetic to obtain the exact size of the value will likely result in the source overflowing its destination.

### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- Always perform the correct arithmetic to determine size.
- Specifically for memory allocation, calculate the allocation size from the allocation source:
  - o Derive the size value from the length of intended source to determine the amount of units to be processed.
  - o Always programmatically consider the size of the each unit and their conversion to memory units for example, by using sizeof() on the unit's type.
  - o Memory allocation should be a multiplication of the amount of units being written, times the size of each unit.

# **Source Code Examples**

#### **CPP**

**Allocating and Assigning Memory without Sizeof Arithmetic** 

```
int *ptr;
ptr = (int*)malloc(5);
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
    ptr[i] = i * 2 + 1;
}</pre>
```

#### **Allocating and Assigning Memory with Sizeof Arithmetic**

```
int *ptr;
ptr = (int*)malloc(5 * sizeof(int));
```



```
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
    ptr[i] = i * 2 + 1;
}</pre>
```

#### **Incorrect Arithmetic of Multi-Byte String Allocation**

```
wchar_t * dest;
dest = (wchar_t *)malloc(wcslen(source) + 1); // Would not crash for a short "source"
wcscpy((wchar_t *) dest, source);
wprintf(L"Dest: %s\r\n", dest);
```

# **Correct Arithmetic of Multi-Byte String Allocation**

```
wchar_t * dest;
dest = (wchar_t *)malloc((wcslen(source) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
wcscpy((wchar_t *)dest, source);
wprintf(L"Dest: %s\r\n", dest);
```



# **Char Overflow**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Assigning large data types into smaller data types, without proper checks and explicit casting, will lead to undefined behavior and unintentional effects, such as data corruption (e.g. value wraparound, wherein maximum values become minimum values); system crashes; infinite loops; logic errors, such as bypassing of security mechanisms; or even buffer overflows leading to arbitrary code execution.

#### Cause

# How does it happen

This flaw can occur when implicitly casting numerical data types of a larger size, into a variable with a data type of a smaller size. This forces the program to discard some bits of information from the number. Depending on how the numerical data types are stored in memory, this is often the bits with the highest value, causing substantial corruption of the stored number. Alternatively, the sign bit of a signed integer could be lost, completely reversing the intention of the number.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- Avoid casting larger data types to smaller types.
- o Prefer promoting the target variable to a large enough data type.
- If downcasting is necessary, always check that values are valid and in range of the target type, before casting

# **Source Code Examples**

#### CPP

#### **Unsafe Downsize Casting**

```
int unsafe_addition(short op1, int op2) {
    // op2 gets forced from int into a short
    short total = op1 + op2;
    return total;
}
```

#### Safer Use of Proper Data Types

```
int safe_addition(short op1, int op2) {
    // total variable is of type int, the largest type that is needed
    int total = 0;

    // check if total will overflow available integer size
    if (INT_MAX - abs(op2) > op1)
```



```
{
    total = op1 + op2;
}
else
{
    // instead of overflow, saturate (but this is not always a good thing)
    total = INT_MAX
}
return total;
}
```



# **Integer Overflow**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Assigning large data types into smaller data types, without proper checks and explicit casting, will lead to undefined behavior and unintentional effects, such as data corruption (e.g. value wraparound, wherein maximum values become minimum values); system crashes; infinite loops; logic errors, such as bypassing of security mechanisms; or even buffer overflows leading to arbitrary code execution.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

This flaw can occur when implicitly casting numerical data types of a larger size, into a variable with a data type of a smaller size. This forces the program to discard some bits of information from the number. Depending on how the numerical data types are stored in memory, this is often the bits with the highest value, causing substantial corruption of the stored number. Alternatively, the sign bit of a signed integer could be lost, completely reversing the intention of the number.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Avoid casting larger data types to smaller types.
- o Prefer promoting the target variable to a large enough data type.
- o If downcasting is necessary, always check that values are valid and in range of the target type, before casting

# **Source Code Examples**

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# **Dangerous Functions**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Use of dangerous functions may expose varying risks associated with each particular function, with potential impact of improper usage of these functions varying significantly. The presence of such functions indicates a flaw in code maintenance policies and adherence to secure coding practices, in a way that has allowed introducing known dangerous code into the application.

# Cause

#### How does it happen

A dangerous function has been identified within the code. Functions are often deemed dangerous to use for numerous reasons, as there are different sets of vulnerabilities associated with usage of such functions. For example, some string copy and concatenation functions are vulnerable to Buffer Overflow, Memory Disclosure, Denial of Service and more. Use of these functions is not recommended.

# **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- Deploy a secure and recommended alternative to any functions that were identified as dangerous.
  - If no secure alternative is found, conduct further researching and testing to identify whether current usage successfully sanitizes and verifies values, and thus successfully avoids the usecases for whom the function is indeed dangerous
- Conduct a periodical review of methods that are in use, to ensure that all external libraries and built-in functions are up-to-date and whose use has not been excluded from best secure coding practices.

# **Source Code Examples**

### CPP

#### **Buffer Overflow in gets()**



Safe reading from user

Unsafe function for string copy

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]); // overflow occurs when len(argv[1]) > 10 bytes
    return 0;
}
```

#### Safe string copy

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    strncpy(buf, argv[1], sizeof(buf));
    buf[9]= '\0'; //strncpy doesn't NULL terminates
    return 0;
}
```

### **Unsafe format string**

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf(argv[1]); // If argv[1] contains a format token, such as %s, %x or %d, will cause
an access violation
    return 0;
}
```

#### Safe format string



```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf("%s", argv[1]); // Second parameter is not a formattable string
    return 0;
}
```



Status: Draft

**Double Free** 

Weakness ID: 415 (Weakness Variant)

**Description** 

# **Description Summary**

The product calls free() twice on the same memory address, potentially leading to modification of unexpected memory locations.

## **Extended Description**

When a program calls free() twice with the same argument, the program's memory management data structures become corrupted. This corruption can cause the program to crash or, in some circumstances, cause two later calls to malloc() to return the same pointer. If malloc() returns the same value twice and the program later gives the attacker control over the data that is written into this doubly-allocated memory, the program becomes vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.

**Alternate Terms** 

**Double-free** 

#### **Time of Introduction**

- Architecture and Design
- **Implementation**

**Applicable Platforms** 

# Languages

C

C++

### **Common Consequences**

Scope	Effect
Access Control	Doubly freeing memory may result in a write-what-where condition, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

#### Likelihood of Exploit

Low to Medium

**Demonstrative Examples** 

# **Example 1**

The following code shows a simple example of a double free vulnerability.

```
Example Language: C
```

```
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
if (abrt) {
free(ptr);
free(ptr);
```

Double free vulnerabilities have two common (and sometimes overlapping) causes:

- Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances
- Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for freeing the memory Although some double free vulnerabilities are not much more complicated than the previous example, most are spread out across hundreds of lines of code or even

different files. Programmers seem particularly susceptible to freeing global variables



more than once.

# **Example 2**

While contrived, this code should be exploitable on Linux distributions which do not ship with heap-chunk check summing turned on.

(Bad Code)

```
Example Language: C
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define BUFSIZE1 512
#define BUFSIZE2 ((BUFSIZE1/2) - 8)
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *buf1R1;
char *buf2R1;
char *buf1R2;
buf1R1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
buf2R1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
free(buf1R1);
free(buf2R1);
buf1R2 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE1);
strncpy(buf1R2, argv[1], BUFSIZE1-1);
free(buf2R1);
free(buf1R2);
```

**Observed Examples** 

Reference	Description
CVE-2004-0642	Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
CVE-2004-0772	Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
CVE-2005-1689	Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
CVE-2003-0545	Double free from invalid ASN.1 encoding.
CVE-2003-1048	Double free from malformed GIF.
CVE-2005-0891	Double free from malformed GIF.
CVE-2002-0059	Double free from malformed compressed data.

### **Potential Mitigations**

#### Phase: Architecture and Design

Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.

#### **Phase: Implementation**

Ensure that each allocation is freed only once. After freeing a chunk, set the pointer to NULL to ensure the pointer cannot be freed again. In complicated error conditions, be sure that clean-up routines respect the state of allocation properly. If the language is object oriented, ensure that object destructors delete each chunk of memory only once.

#### **Phase: Implementation**

Use a static analysis tool to find double free instances.

Relationships

Relationships				
Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Weakness Class	398	Indicator of Poor Code Quality	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ChildOf	Category	399	Resource Management Errors	Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOf	Category	633	Weaknesses that Affect Memory	Resource-specific Weaknesses (primary)631
ChildOf	Weakness Base	666	Operation on Resource in Wrong Phase of	Research Concepts (primary)1000



			<u>Lifetime</u>	
ChildOf	Weakness Class	675	<u>Duplicate Operations on</u> <u>Resource</u>	Research Concepts1000
ChildOf	Category	742	CERT C Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
PeerOf	Weakness Base	123	Write-what-where Condition	Research Concepts1000
PeerOf	Weakness Base	416	<u>Use After Free</u>	Development Concepts699 Research Concepts1000
MemberOf	View	630	Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE	Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE (primary)630
PeerOf	Weakness Base	364	Signal Handler Race Condition	Research Concepts1000

# **Relationship Notes**

This is usually resultant from another weakness, such as an unhandled error or race condition between threads. It could also be primary to weaknesses such as buffer overflows.

#### **Affected Resources**

# Memory

**Taxonomy Mappings** 

<b>Mapped Taxonomy Name</b>	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER			DFREE - Double-Free Vulnerability
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Double Free
CLASP			Doubly freeing memory
CERT C Secure Coding	MEM00-C		Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of abstraction
CERT C Secure Coding	MEM01-C		Store a new value in pointers immediately after free()
CERT C Secure Coding	MEM31-C		Free dynamically allocated memory exactly once

#### **White Box Definitions**

A weakness where code path has:

- 1. start statement that relinquishes a dynamically allocated memory resource
- 2. end statement that relinquishes the dynamically allocated memory resource

#### **Maintenance Notes**

It could be argued that Double Free would be most appropriately located as a child of "Use after Free", but "Use" and "Release" are considered to be distinct operations within vulnerability theory, therefore this is more accurately "Release of a Resource after Expiration or Release", which doesn't exist yet.

**Content History** 

e on the real of the second			
Submissions			
<b>Submission Date</b>	Submitter	Organization	Source
	PLOVER		Externally Mined
Modifications			
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External
	updated Potential Mitigations,	Time of Introduction	
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics	External
	added/updated white box definitions		
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Description, Maintenance Notes,		
	Relationships, Other Notes, R	elationship Notes, Taxonomy N	Mappings
2008-11-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal

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updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings					
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE Internal					
updated Demonstrative Examples					
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal		
	updated Other Notes				

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Status: Draft

#### Failure to Release Memory Before Removing Last Reference ('Memory Leak')

Weakness ID: 401 (Weakness Base)

**Description** 

# **Description Summary**

The software does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, which slowly consumes remaining memory.

# **Extended Description**

This is often triggered by improper handling of malformed data or unexpectedly interrupted sessions.

### **Terminology Notes**

"memory leak" has sometimes been used to describe other kinds of issues, e.g. for information leaks in which the contents of memory are inadvertently leaked (CVE-2003-0400 is one such example of this terminology conflict).

#### Time of Introduction

- Architecture and Design
- Implementation

# **Applicable Platforms**

### <u>Languages</u>

C

C++

#### **Modes of Introduction**

Memory leaks have two common and sometimes overlapping causes:

- Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances
- Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for freeing the memory

### **Common Consequences**

Scope	Effect
Availability	Most memory leaks result in general software reliability problems, but if an attacker can intentionally trigger a memory leak, the attacker might be able to launch a denial of service attack (by crashing or hanging the program) or take advantage of other unexpected program behavior resulting from a low memory condition.

#### Likelihood of Exploit

#### Medium

**Demonstrative Examples** 

#### Example 1

The following C function leaks a block of allocated memory if the call to read() fails to return the expected number of bytes:

```
(Bad Code)
```

```
Example Language: C

char* getBlock(int fd) {
    char* buf = (char*) malloc(BLOCK_SIZE);
    if (!buf) {
    return NULL;
    }
    if (read(fd, buf, BLOCK_SIZE) != BLOCK_SIZE) {
    return NULL;
    }
```



```
return buf;
```

# **Example 2**

Here the problem is that every time a connection is made, more memory is allocated. So if one just opened up more and more connections, eventually the machine would run out of memory.

(Bad Code)

```
Example Language: C
```

```
bar connection() {
foo = malloc(1024);
return foo;
}
endConnection(bar foo) {
free(foo);
}
int main() {
while(1) //thread 1
//On a connection
foo=connection(); //thread 2
//When the connection ends
endConnection(foo)
}
```

**Observed Examples** 

Observed Examples	
Reference	Description
CVE-2005-3119	Memory leak because function does not free() an element of a data structure.
CVE-2004-0427	Memory leak when counter variable is not decremented.
CVE-2002-0574	Memory leak when counter variable is not decremented.
CVE-2005-3181	Kernel uses wrong function to release a data structure, preventing data from being properly tracked by other code.
CVE-2004-0222	Memory leak via unknown manipulations as part of protocol test suite.
CVE-2001-0136	Memory leak via a series of the same command.

#### **Potential Mitigations**

Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.

#### Phase: Architecture and Design

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Pre-design through Build: The Boehm-Demers-Weiser Garbage Collector or valgrind can be used to detect leaks in code. This is not a complete solution as it is not 100% effective.

Relationships

Kelationships				
Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Weakness Class	398	Indicator of Poor Code Quality	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ChildOf	Category	399	Resource Management Errors	Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOf	Category	633	Weaknesses that Affect Memory	Resource-specific Weaknesses (primary)631
ChildOf	Category	730	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service	Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOf	Weakness Base	772	Missing Release of Resource after Effective	Research Concepts (primary)1000



			<u>Lifetime</u>	
MemberOf	View	630	Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE	Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE (primary)630
CanFollow	Weakness Class	390	Detection of Error Condition Without Action	Research Concepts1000

#### **Relationship Notes**

This is often a resultant weakness due to improper handling of malformed data or early termination of sessions.

#### **Affected Resources**

### Memory

#### **Functional Areas**

### Memory management

# **Taxonomy Mappings**

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER			Memory leak
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Memory Leak
CLASP			Failure to deallocate data
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A9	CWE More Specific	Denial of Service

#### White Box Definitions

A weakness where the code path has:

- 1. start statement that allocates dynamically allocated memory resource
- 2. end statement that loses identity of the dynamically allocated memory resource creating situation where dynamically allocated memory resource is never relinquished

Where "loses" is defined through the following scenarios:

- 1. identity of the dynamic allocated memory resource never obtained
- 2. the statement assigns another value to the data element that stored the identity of the dynamically allocated memory resource and there are no aliases of that data element
- 3. identity of the dynamic allocated memory resource obtained but never passed on to function for memory resource release
- 4. the data element that stored the identity of the dynamically allocated resource has reached the end of its scope at the statement and there are no aliases of that data element

#### References

 $\hbox{\it J. Whittaker and H. Thompson. "How to Break Software Security". Addison Wesley.\ 2003.}$ 

### **Content History**

<i>■</i>					
Submissions					
<b>Submission Date</b>	Submitter	Organization	Source		
	PLOVER		Externally Mined		
Modifications					
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source		
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External		
	updated Time of Introduction	updated Time of Introduction			
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics	External		
	added/updated white box de	efinitions			
2008-08-15		Veracode	External		
	Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping				
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal		
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Relationships, Other Notes, References, Relationship Notes, Taxonomy Mappings, Terminology Notes				
2008-10-14	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal		
	updated Description				
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal		
	updated Other Notes				
2009-05-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal		
	updated Name				
2009-07-17	KDM Analytics		External		
	Improved the White Box Det	finition			



2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal	
	updated White Box Definit	tions		
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal	
	updated Modes of Introdu	ction, Other Notes		
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal	
	updated Relationships			
<b>Previous Entry Na</b>	ames			
<b>Change Date</b>	Previous Entry Name	9		
2008-04-11	Memory Leak			
2009-05-27	Failure to Release Mem Leak')	nory Before Removi	ng Last Reference (aka 'Memory	
				D A CITATION

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# **Use of Zero Initialized Pointer**

# Risk

#### What might happen

A null pointer dereference is likely to cause a run-time exception, a crash, or other unexpected behavior.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Variables which are declared without being assigned will implicitly retain a null value until they are assigned. The null value can also be explicitly set to a variable, to ensure clear out its contents. Since null is not really a value, it may not have object variables and methods, and any attempt to access contents of a null object, instead of verifying it is set beforehand, will result in a null pointer dereference exception.

### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- For any variable that is created, ensure all logic flows between declaration and use assign a non-null value to the variable first.
- Enforce null checks on any received variable or object before it is dereferenced, to ensure it does not contain a null assigned to it elsewhere.
- Consider the need to assign null values in order to overwrite initialized variables. Consider reassigning or releasing these variables instead.

# **Source Code Examples**

#### **CPP**

### **Explicit NULL Dereference**

```
char * input = NULL;
printf("%s", input);
```

#### Implicit NULL Dereference

```
char * input;
printf("%s", input);
```

#### Java

#### **Explicit Null Dereference**

```
Object o = null;
out.println(o.getClass());
```





# **Stored Buffer Overflow fgets**

# **Risk**

#### What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

#### Cause

#### How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

#### **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

# Source Code Examples

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Status: Draft

**Use of Function with Inconsistent Implementations** 

Weakness ID: 474 (Weakness Base)

**Description** 

# **Description Summary**

The code uses a function that has inconsistent implementations across operating systems and versions, which might cause security-relevant portability problems.

**Time of Introduction** 

- Architecture and Design
- Implementation

#### **Applicable Platforms**

# **Languages**

C: (Often)
PHP: (Often)

ΑII

# **Potential Mitigations**

Do not accept inconsistent behavior from the API specifications when the deviant behavior increase the risk level.

#### **Other Notes**

The behavior of functions in this category varies by operating system, and at times, even by operating system version. Implementation differences can include:

- Slight differences in the way parameters are interpreted leading to inconsistent results.
- Some implementations of the function carry significant security risks.
- The function might not be defined on all platforms.

Relationships

Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Weakness Class	398	Indicator of Poor Code Quality	Development Concepts (primary)699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	589	Call to Non-ubiquitous API	Research Concepts (primary)1000

# Taxonomy Mappings

<b>Mapped Taxonomy Name</b>	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Inconsistent Implementations

# **Content History**

Content History			
Submissions			
<b>Submission Date</b>	Submitter	Organization	Source
	7 Pernicious Kingdoms		Externally Mined
Modifications			
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External
	updated Potential Mitigations, Time of Introduction		
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
updated Applicable Platforms, Relationships, Other Notes, Taxonomy Mappings			
Previous Entry Names			
Change Date	<b>Previous Entry Name</b>		
2008-04-11	Inconsistent Implementations		

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# **Use of Insufficiently Random Values**

# Risk

#### What might happen

Random values are often used as a mechanism to prevent malicious users from guessing a value, such as a password, encryption key, or session identifier. Depending on what this random value is used for, an attacker would be able to predict the next numbers generated, or previously generated values. This could enable the attacker to hijack another user's session, impersonate another user, or crack an encryption key (depending on what the pseudo-random value was used for).

### Cause

### How does it happen

The application uses a weak method of generating pseudo-random values, such that other numbers could be determined from a relatively small sample size. Since the pseudo-random number generator used is designed for statistically uniform distribution of values, it is approximately deterministic. Thus, after collecting a few generated values (e.g. by creating a few individual sessions, and collecting the sessionids), it would be possible for an attacker to calculate another sessionid.

Specifically, if this pseudo-random value is used in any security context, such as passwords, keys, or secret identifiers, an attacker would be able to predict the next numbers generated, or previously generated values.

## **General Recommendations**

#### How to avoid it

Generic Guidance:

- Whenever unpredicatable numbers are required in a security context, use a cryptographically strong random number generator, instead of a statistical pseudo-random generator.
- Use the cryptorandom generator that is built-in to your language or platform, and ensure it is securely seeded. Do not seed the generator with a weak, non-random seed. (In most cases, the default is securely random).
- o Ensure you use a long enough random value, to make brute-force attacks unfeasible.

#### Specific Recommendations:

o Do not use the statistical pseudo-random number generator, use the cryptorandom generator instead. In Java, this is the SecureRandom class.

# **Source Code Examples**

#### Java

#### Use of a weak pseudo-random number generator

```
Random random = new Random();
long sessNum = random.nextLong();
String sessionId = sessNum.toString();
```



#### Cryptographically secure random number generator

```
SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();
byte sessBytes[] = new byte[32];
random.nextBytes(sessBytes);
String sessionId = new String(sessBytes);
```

#### Objc

#### Use of a weak pseudo-random number generator

```
long sessNum = rand();
NSString* sessionId = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%ld", sessNum];
```

# Cryptographically secure random number generator

```
UInt32 sessBytes;
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, sizeof(sessBytes), (uint8_t*)&sessBytes);
NSString* sessionId = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%llu", sessBytes];
```

#### **Swift**

#### Use of a weak pseudo-random number generator

```
let sessNum = rand();
let sessionId = String(format:"%ld", sessNum)
```

#### Cryptographically secure random number generator

```
var sessBytes: UInt32 = 0
withUnsafeMutablePointer(&sessBytes, { (sessBytesPointer) -> Void in
    let castedPointer = unsafeBitCast(sessBytesPointer, UnsafeMutablePointer<UInt8>.self)
    SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, sizeof(UInt32), castedPointer)
})
let sessionId = String(format:"%llu", sessBytes)
```



## **Unchecked Return Value**

## Risk

## What might happen

A program that does not check function return values could cause the application to enter an undefined state. This could lead to unexpected behavior and unintended consequences, including inconsistent data, system crashes or other error-based exploits.

## Cause

## How does it happen

The application calls a system function, but does not receive or check the result of this function. These functions often return error codes in the result, or share other status codes with it's caller. The application simply ignores this result value, losing this vital information.

## **General Recommendations**

## How to avoid it

- Always check the result of any called function that returns a value, and verify the result is an expected value.
- Ensure the calling function responds to all possible return values.
- Expect runtime errors and handle them gracefully. Explicitly define a mechanism for handling unexpected errors.

## **Source Code Examples**

## **CPP**

## **Unchecked Memory Allocation**

```
buff = (char*) malloc(size);
strncpy(buff, source, size);
```

## **Safer Memory Allocation**

```
buff = (char*) malloc(size+1);
if (buff==NULL) exit(1);

strncpy(buff, source, size);
buff[size] = '\0';
```



Status: Draft

## Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type

Weakness ID: 467 (Weakness Variant)

**Description** 

## **Description Summary**

The code calls sizeof() on a malloced pointer type, which always returns the wordsize/8. This can produce an unexpected result if the programmer intended to determine how much memory has been allocated.

Time of Introduction

**Implementation** 

**Applicable Platforms** 

## **Languages**

 $\mathbf{C}$ 

C++

**Common Consequences** 

Scope	Effect
Integrity	This error can often cause one to allocate a buffer that is much smaller than what is needed, leading to resultant weaknesses such as buffer overflows.

## Likelihood of Exploit

High

**Demonstrative Examples** 

## **Example 1**

Care should be taken to ensure sizeof returns the size of the data structure itself, and not the size of the pointer to the data structure.

In this example, sizeof(foo) returns the size of the pointer.

```
(Bad Code)
```

```
Example Languages: C and C++
```

```
double *foo;
```

```
foo = (double *)malloc(sizeof(foo));
```

In this example, sizeof(\*foo) returns the size of the data structure and not the size of the pointer.

(Good Code)

Example Languages: C and C++

double \*foo;

foo = (double \*)malloc(sizeof(\*foo));

## **Example 2**

This example defines a fixed username and password. The AuthenticateUser() function is intended to accept a username and a password from an untrusted user, and check to ensure that it matches the username and password. If the username and password match, AuthenticateUser() is intended to indicate that authentication succeeded.

(Bad Code)

```
/* Ignore CWE-259 (hard-coded password) and CWE-309 (use of password system for authentication) for this example. */
char *username = "admin";
char *pass = "password";
int AuthenticateUser(char *inUser, char *inPass) {
```



```
printf("Sizeof username = %d\n", sizeof(username));
printf("Sizeof pass = %d\n", sizeof(pass));
if (strncmp(username, inUser, sizeof(username))) {
printf("Auth failure of username using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH_FAIL);
/* Because of CWE-467, the sizeof returns 4 on many platforms and architectures. */
if (! strncmp(pass, inPass, sizeof(pass))) {
printf("Auth success of password using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH SUCCESS);
else {
printf("Auth fail of password using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH FAIL);
int main (int argc, char **argv)
int authResult;
if (argc < 3) {
ExitError("Usage: Provide a username and password");
authResult = AuthenticateUser(argv[1], argv[2]);
if (authResult != AUTH SUCCESS) {
ExitError("Authentication failed");
DoAuthenticatedTask(argv[1]);
```

In AuthenticateUser(), because sizeof() is applied to a parameter with an array type, the sizeof() call might return 4 on many modern architectures. As a result, the strncmp() call only checks the first four characters of the input password, resulting in a partial comparison (CWE-187), leading to improper authentication (CWE-287).

Because of the partial comparison, any of these passwords would still cause authentication to succeed for the "admin" user:

(Attack

```
pass5
passABCDEFGH
passWORD
```

Because only 4 characters are checked, this significantly reduces the search space for an attacker, making brute force attacks more feasible.

The same problem also applies to the username, so values such as "adminXYZ" and "administrator" will succeed for the username.

## **Potential Mitigations**

## **Phase: Implementation**

Use expressions such as "sizeof(\*pointer)" instead of "sizeof(pointer)", unless you intend to run sizeof() on a pointer type to gain some platform independence or if you are allocating a variable on the stack.

## **Other Notes**

The use of sizeof() on a pointer can sometimes generate useful information. An obvious case is to find out the wordsize on a platform. More often than not, the appearance of sizeof(pointer) indicates a bug.

## **Weakness Ordinalities**

Ordinality	Description
Primary	(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)



Relationships

Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Category	465	<u>Pointer Issues</u>	Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOf	Weakness Class	682	Incorrect Calculation	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOf	Category	737	CERT C Secure Coding Section 03 - Expressions (EXP)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
ChildOf	Category	740	CERT C Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays (ARR)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard734
CanPrecede	Weakness Base	131	Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size	Research Concepts1000

**Taxonomy Mappings** 

V 11 8			
<b>Mapped Taxonomy Name</b>	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
CLASP			Use of sizeof() on a pointer type
CERT C Secure Coding	ARR01-C		Do not apply the sizeof operator to a pointer when taking the size of an array
CERT C Secure Coding	EXP01-C		Do not take the size of a pointer to determine the size of the pointed-to type

## **White Box Definitions**

A weakness where code path has:

- 1. end statement that passes an identity of a dynamically allocated memory resource to a sizeof operator
- $\ensuremath{\mathsf{2}}.$  start statement that allocates the dynamically allocated memory resource

## References

Robert Seacord. "EXP01-A. Do not take the size of a pointer to determine the size of a type".

<a href="https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/EXP01-">https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/EXP01-</a>

 $\underline{A.+Do+not+take+the+sizeof+a+pointer+to+determine+the+size+of+a+type}{>}.$ 

**Content History** 

content mistory			
Submissions			
<b>Submission Date</b>	Submitter	Organization	Source
	CLASP		Externally Mined
Modifications			
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External
	updated Time of Introducti	on	
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics	External
	added/updated white box definitions		
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Relationships, Other Notes, Taxonomy Mappings, Weakness Ordinalities		
2008-11-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings		
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Demonstrative Ex	amples	
2009-12-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Demonstrative Ex	amples	
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships		

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## **NULL Pointer Dereference**

## Risk

## What might happen

A null pointer dereference is likely to cause a run-time exception, a crash, or other unexpected behavior.

## Cause

## How does it happen

Variables which are declared without being assigned will implicitly retain a null value until they are assigned. The null value can also be explicitly set to a variable, to ensure clear out its contents. Since null is not really a value, it may not have object variables and methods, and any attempt to access contents of a null object, instead of verifying it is set beforehand, will result in a null pointer dereference exception.

## **General Recommendations**

## How to avoid it

- For any variable that is created, ensure all logic flows between declaration and use assign a non-null value to the variable first.
- Enforce null checks on any received variable or object before it is dereferenced, to ensure it does not contain a null assigned to it elsewhere.
- Consider the need to assign null values in order to overwrite initialized variables. Consider reassigning or releasing these variables instead.

## **Source Code Examples**

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## **Potential Precision Problem**

## Risk

## What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

## Cause

## How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In it's most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

## **General Recommendations**

## How to avoid it

- o Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
- o Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over char\*, strncpy over strcpy, and so on.
- o Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
- o Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.

## Source Code Examples

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**Improper Validation of Array Index** 

Weakness ID: 129 (Weakness Base) Status: Draft

**Description** 

## **Description Summary**

The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.

Alternate Terms

out-of-bounds array index

index-out-of-range

array index underflow

**Time of Introduction** 

Implementation

**Applicable Platforms** 

**Languages** 

C: (Often)

C++: (Often)

Language-independent

**Common Consequences** 

Common Consequences	
Scope	Effect
Integrity Availability	Unchecked array indexing will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory and perhaps instructions, leading to a crash, if the values are outside of the valid memory area.
Integrity	If the memory corrupted is data, rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper values.
Confidentiality Integrity	Unchecked array indexing can also trigger out-of-bounds read or write operations, or operations on the wrong objects; i.e., "buffer overflows" are not always the result. This may result in the exposure or modification of sensitive data.
Integrity	If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow and possibly without the use of large inputs if a precise index can be controlled.
Integrity Availability Confidentiality	A single fault could allow either an overflow (CWE-788) or underflow (CWE-786) of the array index. What happens next will depend on the type of operation being performed out of bounds, but can expose sensitive information, cause a system crash, or possibly lead to arbitrary code execution.

## Likelihood of Exploit

## High

## **Detection Methods**

## **Automated Static Analysis**

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report array index errors that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High



This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

#### Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Black box methods might not get the needed code coverage within limited time constraints, and a dynamic test might not produce any noticeable side effects even if it is successful.

## **Demonstrative Examples**

## **Example 1**

The following C/C++ example retrieves the sizes of messages for a pop3 mail server. The message sizes are retrieved from a socket that returns in a buffer the message number and the message size, the message number (num) and size (size) are extracted from the buffer and the message size is placed into an array using the message number for the array index.

(Bad Code)

```
Example Language: C
```

```
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;
// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break:
else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
```

In this example the message number retrieved from the buffer could be a value that is outside the allowable range of indices for the array and could possibly be a negative number. Without proper validation of the value to be used for the array index an array overflow could occur and could potentially lead to unauthorized access to memory addresses and system crashes. The value of the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

(Good Code)

```
Example Language: C
```

```
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
char buf[BUFFER SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;
// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
```



```
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2) {
    if (num > 0 && num <= (unsigned)count)
    sizes[num - 1] = size;
    else
    /* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overflow */
    report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by server.\n");
    }
}
...
}
```

## **Example 2**

In the code snippet below, an unchecked integer value is used to reference an object in an array.

```
(Bad Code)

Example Language: Java

public String getValue(int index) {

return array[index];
}
```

If index is outside of the range of the array, this may result in an ArrayIndexOutOfBounds Exception being raised.

## **Example 3**

In the following Java example the method displayProductSummary is called from a Web service servlet to retrieve product summary information for display to the user. The servlet obtains the integer value of the product number from the user and passes it to the displayProductSummary method. The displayProductSummary method passes the integer value of the product number to the getProductSummary method which obtains the product summary from the array object containing the project summaries using the integer value of the product number as the array index.

```
(Bad Code)

Example Language: Java

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {

String productSummary = new String("");

try {

String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);
} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {

return products[index];
}
```

In this example the integer value used as the array index that is provided by the user may be outside the allowable range of indices for the array which may provide unexpected results or may comes the application to fail. The integer value used for the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

```
(Good Code)

Example Language: Java

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {

String productSummary = new String("");
```



```
try {
String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);
} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = "";

if ((index >= 0) && (index < MAX_PRODUCTS)) {
    productSummary = productS[index];
}
    else {
        System.err.println("index is out of bounds");
        throw new IndexOutOfBoundsException();
}

return productSummary;
}</pre>
```

An alternative in Java would be to use one of the collection objects such as ArrayList that will automatically generate an exception if an attempt is made to access an array index that is out of bounds.

(Good Code)

```
Example Language: Java
```

```
ArrayList productArray = new ArrayList(MAX_PRODUCTS);
...

try {
productSummary = (String) productArray.get(index);
} catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException ex) {...}
```

## **Observed Examples**

Reference	Description
CVE-2005-0369	large ID in packet used as array index
CVE-2001-1009	negative array index as argument to POP LIST command
CVE-2003-0721	Integer signedness error leads to negative array index
CVE-2004-1189	product does not properly track a count and a maximum number, which can lead to resultant array index overflow.
CVE-2007-5756	chain: device driver for packet-capturing software allows access to an unintended IOCTL with resultant array index error.

## **Potential Mitigations**

## Phase: Architecture and Design

## Strategies: Input Validation; Libraries or Frameworks

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. If you use Struts, be mindful of weaknesses covered by the CWE-101 category.

## Phase: Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

## **Phase: Requirements**

## Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language with features that can automatically mitigate or eliminate out-of-bounds indexing errors.



For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.

**Phase: Implementation** 

## **Strategy: Input Validation**

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy (i.e., use a whitelist). Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Use a blacklist to reject any unexpected inputs and detect potential attacks.

When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.

#### **Phase: Implementation**

Be especially careful to validate your input when you invoke code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

## **Weakness Ordinalities**

Ordinality	Description
Resultant	The most common condition situation leading to unchecked array indexing is the use of loop index variables as buffer indexes. If the end condition for the loop is subject to a flaw, the index can grow or shrink unbounded, therefore causing a buffer overflow or underflow. Another common situation leading to this condition is the use of a function's return value, or the resulting value of a calculation directly as an index in to a buffer.

Relationships

Kelauonsinps				
Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Weakness Class	20	Improper Input Validation	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOf	Category	189	Numeric Errors	Development Concepts699
ChildOf	Category	633	Weaknesses that Affect Memory	Resource-specific Weaknesses (primary)631
ChildOf	Category	738	CERT C Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
ChildOf	Category	740	CERT C Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays (ARR)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard734
ChildOf	Category	802	2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management	Weaknesses in the 2010 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)800
CanPrecede	Weakness Class	119	Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	Research Concepts1000
CanPrecede	Weakness Variant	789	<u>Uncontrolled Memory</u> <u>Allocation</u>	Research Concepts1000
PeerOf	Weakness Base	124	<u>Buffer Underwrite</u> ('Buffer Underflow')	Research Concepts1000

## **Theoretical Notes**

An improperly validated array index might lead directly to the always-incorrect behavior of "access of array using out-of-bounds index."

## **Affected Resources**



## Memory

## f Causal Nature

## **Explicit**

**Taxonomy Mappings** 

<b>Mapped Taxonomy Name</b>	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
CLASP			Unchecked array indexing
PLOVER			INDEX - Array index overflow
CERT C Secure Coding	ARR00-C		Understand how arrays work
CERT C Secure Coding	ARR30-C		Guarantee that array indices are within the valid range
CERT C Secure Coding	ARR38-C		Do not add or subtract an integer to a pointer if the resulting value does not refer to a valid array element
CERT C Secure Coding	INT32-C		Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow

## **Related Attack Patterns**

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name	(CAPEC Version: 1.5)
100	Overflow Buffers	

## References

[REF-11] M. Howard and D. LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Array Indexing Errors" Page 144. 2nd Edition. Microsoft. 2002.

**Content History** 

Content History			
Submissions			
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization	Source
	CLASP		Externally Mined
Modifications			
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Sean Eidemiller	Cigital	External
	added/updated demonstrativ	e examples	
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Alternate Terms, Ap Other Notes, Taxonomy Mapp	plicable Platforms, Common Co pings, Weakness Ordinalities	onsequences, Relationships,
2008-11-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships, Taxor	nomy Mappings	
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Common Consequences		
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Description, Name, I	Relationships	
2009-12-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Observed Examples, Other Notes, Potential Mitigations, Theoretical Notes, Weakness Ordinalities		
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Demonstrative Examples, Detection Factors, Likelihood of Exploit, Potential Mitigations, References, Related Attack Patterns, Relationships		
2010-04-05	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Related Attack Patterns		
<b>Previous Entry Name</b>	s		
Change Date	<b>Previous Entry Name</b>		
2009-10-29	Unchecked Array Indexing		

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Status: Draft

**Improper Access Control (Authorization)** 

Weakness ID: 285 (Weakness Class)

**Description** 

## **Description Summary**

The software does not perform or incorrectly performs access control checks across all potential execution paths.

## **Extended Description**

When access control checks are not applied consistently - or not at all - users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information leaks, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.

## **Alternate Terms**

AuthZ:

"AuthZ" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authorization" within the web application security community. It is also distinct from "AuthC," which is an abbreviation of "authentication." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.

## Time of Introduction

- Architecture and Design
- Implementation
- Operation

## **Applicable Platforms**

## Languages

Language-independent

## **Technology Classes**

Web-Server: (Often)

Database-Server: (Often)

## **Modes of Introduction**

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

#### **Common Consequences**

Scope	Effect
Confidentiality	An attacker could read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.
Integrity	An attacker could modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.
Integrity	An attacker could gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality.

## Likelihood of Exploit

High

**Detection Methods** 



#### **Automated Static Analysis**

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

## Effectiveness: Limited

#### **Automated Dynamic Analysis**

Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic

#### **Manual Analysis**

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

## Effectiveness: Moderate

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

## **Demonstrative Examples**

## **Example 1**

The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the \$id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.

(Bad Code)

```
Example Language: Perl
```

```
sub DisplayPrivateMessage {
my($id) = @_;
my $Message = LookupMessageObject($id);
print "From: " . encodeHTML($Message->{from}) . "<br/>print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";
}

my $q = new CGI;
#For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and
#CWE-523 do not apply.
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param('username'), $q->param('password'))) {
ExitError("invalid username or password");
}

my $id = $q->param('id');
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);
```

While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.

One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the "to" field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.

**Observed Examples** 

Reference	Description
CVE-2009-3168	Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to reset administrative passwords.



<u>CVE-2009-2960</u>	Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to modify passwords of other users.
CVE-2009-3597	Web application stores database file under the web root with insufficient access control (CWE-219), allowing direct request.
CVE-2009-2282	Terminal server does not check authorization for guest access.
CVE-2009-3230	Database server does not use appropriate privileges for certain sensitive operations.
CVE-2009-2213	Gateway uses default "Allow" configuration for its authorization settings.
CVE-2009-0034	Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.
CVE-2008-6123	Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.
CVE-2008-5027	System monitoring software allows users to bypass authorization by creating custom forms.
CVE-2008-7109	Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.
CVE-2008-3424	Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.
CVE-2009-3781	Content management system does not check access permissions for private files, allowing others to view those files.
CVE-2008-4577	ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.
CVE-2008-6548	Product does not check the ACL of a page accessed using an "include" directive, allowing attackers to read unauthorized files.
CVE-2007-2925	Default ACL list for a DNS server does not set certain ACLs, allowing unauthorized DNS queries.
CVE-2006-6679	Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.
CVE-2005-3623	OS kernel does not check for a certain privilege before setting ACLs for files.
CVE-2005-2801	Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing defauls ACLs from being properly applied.
CVE-2001-1155	Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.

## **Potential Mitigations**

#### Phase: Architecture and Design

Divide your application into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.

Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.

#### **Phase: Architecture and Design**

Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.

## Phase: Architecture and Design

## Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness



easier to avoid.

For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature.

#### **Phase: Architecture and Design**

For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.

One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.

## **Phases: System Configuration; Installation**

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

Relationships				
Nature	Туре	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Category	254	Security Features	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ChildOf	Weakness Class	284	Access Control (Authorization) Issues	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOf	Category	721	OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access	Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2007) (primary)629
ChildOf	Category	723	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control	Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOf	Category	753	2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses	Weaknesses in the 2009 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)750
ChildOf	Category	803	2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses	Weaknesses in the 2010 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)800
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	219	Sensitive Data Under Web Root	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Base	551	Incorrect Behavior Order: Authorization Before Parsing and Canonicalization	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts1000
ParentOf	Weakness Class	638	Failure to Use Complete Mediation	Research Concepts1000
ParentOf	Weakness Base	804	Guessable CAPTCHA	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000

**Taxonomy Mappings** 

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Missing Access Control
OWASP Top Ten 2007	A10	CWE More Specific	Failure to Restrict URL Access
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A2	CWE More Specific	Broken Access Control

## **Related Attack Patterns**

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name	(CAPEC Version: 1.5)
1	Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs	
<u>13</u>	Subverting Environment Variable Values	



17	Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files
87	Forceful Browsing
<u>39</u>	Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
<u>45</u>	Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
<u>51</u>	Poison Web Service Registry
<u>59</u>	Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
<u>60</u>	Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
<u>77</u>	Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
76	Manipulating Input to File System Calls
104	Cross Zone Scripting

## References

NIST. "Role Based Access Control and Role Based Security". < <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/">http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/</a>.

[REF-11] M. Howard and D. LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 4, "Authorization" Page 114; Chapter 6, "Determining Appropriate Access Control" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft. 2002.

## **Content History**

Submissions			
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization	Source
	7 Pernicious Kingdoms	or gamzation	Externally Mined
Modifications			
<b>Modification Date</b>	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External
	updated Time of Introduction	1	
2008-08-15		Veracode	External
	Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2	2004 mapping	
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships, Other	Notes, Taxonomy Mappings	
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Common Consequences, Description, Likelihood of Exploit, Name, Other Notes, Potential Mitigations, References, Relationships		
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Potential Mitigations		
2009-05-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Description, Related		
2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships		
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Type		
2009-12-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Demonstrative Examples, Detection Factors, Modes of Introduction, Observed Examples, Relationships		
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Alternate Terms, De Relationships	tection Factors, Potential Mitig	gations, References,
2010-04-05	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Potential Mitigations	i .	
<b>Previous Entry Name</b>	s		
Change Date	<b>Previous Entry Name</b>		
2009-01-12	Missing or Inconsistent A	ccess Control	

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# **Exposure of System Data to Unauthorized Control Sphere Risk**

## What might happen

System data can provide attackers with valuable insights on systems and services they are targeting - any type of system data, from service version to operating system fingerprints, can assist attackers to hone their attack, correlate data with known vulnerabilities or focus efforts on developing new attacks against specific technologies.

## Cause

## How does it happen

System data is read and subsequently exposed where it might be read by untrusted entities.

## **General Recommendations**

## How to avoid it

Consider the implications of exposure of the specified input, and expected level of access to the specified output. If not required, consider removing this code, or modifying exposed information to exclude potentially sensitive system data.

## **Source Code Examples**

#### Java

## **Leaking Environment Variables in JSP Web-Page**

```
String envVarValue = System.getenv(envVar);
if (envVarValue == null) {
    out.println("Environment variable is not defined:");
    out.println(System.getenv());
} else {
    //[...]
};
```



## **Scanned Languages**

Language	Hash Number	<b>Change Date</b>
CPP	4541647240435660	6/19/2024
Common	0105849645654507	6/19/2024