

ejoy2d Scan Report

Project Name	ejoy2d
Scan Start	Friday, June 21, 2024 11:26:29 PM
Preset	Checkmarx Default
Scan Time	00h:09m:05s
Lines Of Code Scanned	5533
Files Scanned	7
Report Creation Time	Friday, June 21, 2024 11:41:30 PM
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066
Team	CxServer
Checkmarx Version	8.7.0
Scan Type	Full
Source Origin	LocalPath
Density	1/100 (Vulnerabilities/LOC)
Visibility	Public

Filter Settings

Severity

Included: High, Medium, Low, Information

Excluded: None

Result State

Included: Confirmed, Not Exploitable, To Verify, Urgent, Proposed Not Exploitable

Excluded: None

Assigned to

Included: All

Categories

Included:

Uncategorized All

Custom All

PCI DSS v3.2 All

OWASP Top 10 2013 All

FISMA 2014 All

NIST SP 800-53 All

OWASP Top 10 2017 All

OWASP Mobile Top 10
2016 All

Excluded:

Uncategorized None

Custom None

PCI DSS v3.2 None

OWASP Top 10 2013 None

FISMA 2014 None

NIST SP 800-53	None
OWASP Top 10 2017	None
OWASP Mobile Top 10 2016	None


Results Limit

Results limit per query was set to 50


Selected Queries

Selected queries are listed in [Result Summary](#)


Result Summary



Most Vulnerable Files



Top 5 Vulnerabilities



Scan Summary - OWASP Top 10 2017

Further details and elaboration about vulnerabilities and risks can be found at: [OWASP Top 10 2017](#)

Category	Threat Agent	Exploitability	Weakness Prevalence	Weakness Detectability	Technical Impact	Business Impact	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
A1-Injection	App. Specific	EASY	COMMON	EASY	SEVERE	App. Specific	17	17
A2-Broken Authentication	App. Specific	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A3-Sensitive Data Exposure	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A4-XML External Entities (XXE)	App. Specific	AVERAGE	COMMON	EASY	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A5-Broken Access Control*	App. Specific	AVERAGE	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A6-Security Misconfiguration	App. Specific	EASY	WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0
A7-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	App. Specific	EASY	WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0
A8-Insecure Deserialization	App. Specific	DIFFICULT	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	App. Specific	0	0
A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities*	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	MODERATE	App. Specific	25	25
A10-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring	App. Specific	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	App. Specific	0	0

* Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and/or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.

Scan Summary - OWASP Top 10 2013

Further details and elaboration about vulnerabilities and risks can be found at: [OWASP Top 10 2013](#)

Category	Threat Agent	Attack Vectors	Weakness Prevalence	Weakness Detectability	Technical Impact	Business Impact	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
A1-Injection	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	ALL DATA	0	0
A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL USERS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	AVERAGE	SEVERE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A3-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	AVERAGE	VERY WIDESPREAD	EASY	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND SYSTEM	0	0
A4-Insecure Direct Object References	SYSTEM USERS	EASY	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	EXPOSED DATA	0	0
A5-Security Misconfiguration	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS	EASY	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	ALL DATA AND SYSTEM	0	0
A6-Sensitive Data Exposure	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, ADMIN USERS, USERS BROWSERS	DIFFICULT	UNCOMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	EXPOSED DATA	0	0
A7-Missing Function Level Access Control*	EXTERNAL, INTERNAL USERS	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	MODERATE	EXPOSED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	USERS BROWSERS	AVERAGE	COMMON	EASY	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0
A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities*	EXTERNAL USERS, AUTOMATED TOOLS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	25	25
A10-Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	USERS BROWSERS	AVERAGE	WIDESPREAD	DIFFICULT	MODERATE	AFFECTED DATA AND FUNCTIONS	0	0

* Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and/or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.

Scan Summary - PCI DSS v3.2

Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.1 - Injection flaws - particularly SQL injection	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows	16	16
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.3 - Insecure cryptographic storage	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.4 - Insecure communications	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.5 - Improper error handling*	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.7 - Cross-site scripting (XSS)	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.8 - Improper access control	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.9 - Cross-site request forgery	0	0
PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.10 - Broken authentication and session management	0	0

* Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and/or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.

Scan Summary - FISMA 2014

Category	Description	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
Access Control	Organizations must limit information system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other information systems) and to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to exercise.	0	0
Audit And Accountability*	Organizations must: (i) create, protect, and retain information system audit records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate information system activity; and (ii) ensure that the actions of individual information system users can be uniquely traced to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions.	2	2
Configuration Management	Organizations must: (i) establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational information systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles; and (ii) establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational information systems.	0	0
Identification And Authentication*	Organizations must identify information system users, processes acting on behalf of users, or devices and authenticate (or verify) the identities of those users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational information systems.	0	0
Media Protection	Organizations must: (i) protect information system media, both paper and digital; (ii) limit access to information on information system media to authorized users; and (iii) sanitize or destroy information system media before disposal or release for reuse.	0	0
System And Communications Protection	Organizations must: (i) monitor, control, and protect organizational communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational information systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of the information systems; and (ii) employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational information systems.	0	0
System And Information Integrity	Organizations must: (i) identify, report, and correct information and information system flaws in a timely manner; (ii) provide protection from malicious code at appropriate locations within organizational information systems; and (iii) monitor information system security alerts and advisories and take appropriate actions in response.	0	0

* Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and/or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.

Scan Summary - NIST SP 800-53

Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
AC-12 Session Termination (P2)	0	0
AC-3 Access Enforcement (P1)	0	0
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement (P1)	0	0
AC-6 Least Privilege (P1)	0	0
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information (P1)	0	0
CM-6 Configuration Settings (P2)	0	0
IA-5 Authenticator Management (P1)	0	0
IA-6 Authenticator Feedback (P2)	0	0
IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) (P1)	0	0
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management (P1)	0	0
SC-13 Cryptographic Protection (P1)	0	0
SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates (P1)	0	0
SC-18 Mobile Code (P2)	0	0
SC-23 Session Authenticity (P1)*	0	0
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest (P1)	0	0
SC-4 Information in Shared Resources (P1)	0	0
SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)*	3	3
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity (P1)	0	0
SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)*	0	0
SI-11 Error Handling (P2)*	6	6
SI-15 Information Output Filtering (P0)	0	0
SI-16 Memory Protection (P1)	0	0

* Project scan results do not include all relevant queries. Presets and/or Filters should be changed to include all relevant standard queries.

Scan Summary - OWASP Mobile Top 10 2016

Category	Description	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
M1-Improper Platform Usage	This category covers misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls. It might include Android intents, platform permissions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is part of the mobile operating system. There are several ways that mobile apps can experience this risk.	0	0
M2-Insecure Data Storage	This category covers insecure data storage and unintended data leakage.	0	0
M3-Insecure Communication	This category covers poor handshaking, incorrect SSL versions, weak negotiation, cleartext communication of sensitive assets, etc.	0	0
M4-Insecure Authentication	This category captures notions of authenticating the end user or bad session management. This can include: -Failing to identify the user at all when that should be required -Failure to maintain the user's identity when it is required -Weaknesses in session management	0	0
M5-Insufficient Cryptography	The code applies cryptography to a sensitive information asset. However, the cryptography is insufficient in some way. Note that anything and everything related to TLS or SSL goes in M3. Also, if the app fails to use cryptography at all when it should, that probably belongs in M2. This category is for issues where cryptography was attempted, but it wasn't done correctly.	0	0
M6-Insecure Authorization	This is a category to capture any failures in authorization (e.g., authorization decisions in the client side, forced browsing, etc.). It is distinct from authentication issues (e.g., device enrolment, user identification, etc.). If the app does not authenticate users at all in a situation where it should (e.g., granting anonymous access to some resource or service when authenticated and authorized access is required), then that is an authentication failure not an authorization failure.	0	0
M7-Client Code Quality	This category is the catch-all for code-level implementation problems in the mobile client. That's distinct from server-side coding mistakes. This would capture things like buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and various other code-level mistakes where the solution is to rewrite some code that's running on the mobile device.	0	0
M8-Code Tampering	This category covers binary patching, local resource modification, method hooking, method swizzling, and dynamic memory modification. Once the application is delivered to the mobile device, the code and data resources are resident there. An attacker can either directly modify the code, change the contents of memory dynamically, change or replace the system APIs that the application uses, or	0	0

	modify the application's data and resources. This can provide the attacker a direct method of subverting the intended use of the software for personal or monetary gain.		
M9-Reverse Engineering	This category includes analysis of the final core binary to determine its source code, libraries, algorithms, and other assets. Software such as IDA Pro, Hopper, otool, and other binary inspection tools give the attacker insight into the inner workings of the application. This may be used to exploit other nascent vulnerabilities in the application, as well as revealing information about back end servers, cryptographic constants and ciphers, and intellectual property.	0	0
M10-Extraneous Functionality	Often, developers include hidden backdoor functionality or other internal development security controls that are not intended to be released into a production environment. For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as a comment in a hybrid app. Another example includes disabling of 2-factor authentication during testing.	0	0

Scan Summary - Custom


Category	Issues Found	Best Fix Locations
Must audit	0	0
Check	0	0
Optional	0	0

Results Distribution By Status

First scan of the project

	High	Medium	Low	Information	Total
New Issues	0	45	12	0	57
Recurrent Issues	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	45	12	0	57

Fixed Issues	0	0	0	0	0
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Results Distribution By State

	High	Medium	Low	Information	Total
Confirmed	0	0	0	0	0
Not Exploitable	0	0	0	0	0
To Verify	0	45	12	0	57
Urgent	0	0	0	0	0
Proposed Not Exploitable	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	45	12	0	57

Result Summary

Vulnerability Type	Occurrences	Severity
Dangerous Functions	25	Medium
Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam	16	Medium
Divide By Zero	4	Medium
Unchecked Return Value	6	Low
Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type	3	Low

Arithmenic Operation On Boolean	2	Low
NULL Pointer Dereference	1	Low

10 Most Vulnerable Files

High and Medium Vulnerabilities

File Name	Issues Found
ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	23
ejoy2d/lobject.c	14
ejoy2d/matrix.c	4
ejoy2d/lvm.c	4

Scan Results Details

Dangerous Functions

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Dangerous Functions Version:1

Categories

OWASP Top 10 2013: A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

OWASP Top 10 2017: A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Description

Dangerous Functions\Path 1:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=33
Status	New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 435 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	439	439
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t buflen) {

```
....
439.      memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 2:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=34
Status	New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 435 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	447	447

Object	memcpy	memcpy
--------	--------	--------

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....
447.      memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 3:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=35>

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 435 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	451	451
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....
451.      memcpy(out, source + 1 + 1 - bufflen, bufflen *
sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 4:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=36>

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 435 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	467	467
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
467.      memcpy(out, POS, (LL(POS) + 1) * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 5:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=37>

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 117 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	130	130
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c

Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
130.      memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); p += l;
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 6:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=38>

Status New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 117 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	132	132
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c


```
Method      static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {  
  
    ....  
    132.      memcpy(p, sep, lsep * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 7:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=39
Status	New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 117 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	136	136
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

```
File Name    ejoy2d/lstrlib.c  
Method      static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {  
  
    ....  
    136.      memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); /* last copy (not followed by  
    separator) */
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 8:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=40
Status	New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 837 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	852	852
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

```
File Name    ejoy2d/lstrlib.c  
Method      static const char *scanformat (lua_State *L, const char *strfmt, char *form) {
```

```
.....
852.      memcpy(form, strfmt, (p - strfmt + 1) * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 9:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=41
Status	New

The dangerous function, memcpy, was found in use at line 361 in ejoy2d/lvm.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lvm.c	ejoy2d/lvm.c
Line	390	390
Object	memcpy	memcpy

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lvm.c
Method void luaV_concat (lua_State *L, int total) {

```
.....
390.      memcpy(buffer+tl, svalue(top-i), 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 10:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=42
Status	New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 813 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	825	825
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static void addquoted (lua_State *L, luaL_Buffer *b, int arg) {

```
.....  
825.          sprintf(buff, "\\%d", (int)uchar(*s));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 11:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=43
Status	New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 813 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	827	827
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static void addquoted (lua_State *L, luaL_Buffer *b, int arg) {

```
.....  
827.          sprintf(buff, "\\%03d", (int)uchar(*s));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 12:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=44
Status	New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 872 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	894	894
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
894.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, (int)luaL_checkinteger(L,
arg));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 13:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=45
Status	New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 872 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	901	901
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
901.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, n);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 14:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=46
Status	New

The dangerous function, sprintf, was found in use at line 872 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	910	910
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
910.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, luaL_checknumber(L, arg));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 15:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=47
Status	New

The dangerous function, `sprintf`, was found in use at line 872 in `ejoy2d/lstrlib.c` file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>
Line	927	927
Object	<code>sprintf</code>	<code>sprintf</code>

Code Snippet

File Name `ejoy2d/lstrlib.c`
Method `static int str_format (lua_State *L) {`

```
.....
927.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, s);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 16:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=48
Status	New

The dangerous function, `strcpy`, was found in use at line 862 in `ejoy2d/lstrlib.c` file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>
Line	866	866
Object	<code>strcpy</code>	<code>strcpy</code>

Code Snippet

File Name `ejoy2d/lstrlib.c`
Method `static void addlenmod (char *form, const char *lenmod) {`

```
....  
866.      strcpy(form + 1 - 1, lenmod);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 17:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=49
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 435 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	436	436
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
436.      size_t l = strlen(source);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 18:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=50
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 348 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	359	359
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method const char *luaO_pushvfstring (lua_State *L, const char *fmt, va_list argp) {

```
....  
359.          pushstr(L, s, strlen(s));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 19:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=51
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 348 in ejoy2d/lobject.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	410	410
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method const char *luaO_pushvfstring (lua_State *L, const char *fmt, va_list argp) {

```
....  
410.          pushstr(L, fmt, strlen(fmt));
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 20:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=52
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 575 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	580	580
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int nospecials (const char *p, size_t l) {

```
.....  
580.      upto += strlen(p + upto) + 1; /* may have more after \0 */
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 21:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=53
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 862 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	863	863
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static void addlenmod (char *form, const char *lenmod) {

```
.....  
863.      size_t l = strlen(form);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 22:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=54
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 862 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	864	864
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static void addlenmod (char *form, const char *lenmod) {


```
....  
864.      size_t lm = strlen(lenmod);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 23:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=55
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 1179 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	1246	1246
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c

Method static int str_pack (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
1246.      luaL_argcheck(L, strlen(s) == len, arg, "string contains  
zeros");
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 24:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=56
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 1322 in ejoy2d/lstrlib.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	1370	1370
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c

Method static int str_unpack (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
1370.          size_t len = (int)strlen(data + pos);
```

Dangerous Functions\Path 25:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=57
Status	New

The dangerous function, strlen, was found in use at line 240 in ejoy2d/lvm.c file. Such functions may expose information and allow an attacker to get full control over the host machine.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lvm.c	ejoy2d/lvm.c
Line	250	250
Object	strlen	strlen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lvm.c
Method static int l_strcmp (const TString *ls, const TString *rs) {

```
.....
250.          size_t len = strlen(l); /* index of first '\0' in both
strings */
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Buffer Overflow\Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam Version:1

Categories

PCI DSS v3.2: PCI DSS (3.2) - 6.5.2 - Buffer overflows
OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

Description

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 1:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=14
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in l, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to l, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c

Line	439	439
Object	l	l

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
439.         memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 2:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=15>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	439	439
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
439.         memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 3:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=16>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in l, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to l, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	447	447

Object	I	I
--------	---	---

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
447.         memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 4:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=17>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	447	447
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
447.         memcpy(out, source + 1, 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 5:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=18>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in bufflen, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to bufflen, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	451	451
Object	bufflen	bufflen

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....
451.      memcpy(out, source + 1 + 1 - bufflen, bufflen *
sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 6:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=19>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	451	451
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c

Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....
451.      memcpy(out, source + 1 + 1 - bufflen, bufflen *
sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 7:

Severity Medium

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=20>

Status New

The size of the buffer used by luaO_chunkid in char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaO_chunkid passes to char, at line 435 of ejoy2d/lobject.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	467	467
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method void luaO_chunkid (char *out, const char *source, size_t bufflen) {

```
....  
467.      memcpy(out, POS, (LL(POS) + 1) * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 8:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=21>
Status New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in l, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to l, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	130	130
Object	l	l

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
130.      memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); p += l;
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 9:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=22>
Status New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	130	130
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
130.         memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); p += 1;
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 10:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=23
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in lsep, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to lsep, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	132	132
Object	lsep	lsep

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
132.         memcpy(p, sep, lsep * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 11:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=24
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	132	132
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
132.          memcpy(p, sep, lsep * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 12:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=25
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in l, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to l, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	136	136
Object	l	l

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
136.          memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); /* last copy (not followed by  
separator) */
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 13:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=26
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by str_rep in char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that str_rep passes to char, at line 117 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	136	136
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {


```
....
136.      memcpy(p, s, l * sizeof(char)); /* last copy (not followed by
separator) */
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 14:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=27
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by *scanformat in char, at line 837 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that *scanformat passes to char, at line 837 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	852	852
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static const char *scanformat (lua_State *L, const char *strfmt, char *form) {

```
....
852.      memcpy(form, strfmt, (p - strfmt + 1) * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 15:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=28
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by luaV_concat in l, at line 361 of ejoy2d/lvm.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaV_concat passes to l, at line 361 of ejoy2d/lvm.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lvm.c	ejoy2d/lvm.c
Line	390	390
Object	l	l

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lvm.c
Method void luaV_concat (lua_State *L, int total) {

```
....
390.          memcpy(buffer+tl, svalue(top-i), 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam\Path 16:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=29
Status	New

The size of the buffer used by luaV_concat in char, at line 361 of ejoy2d/lvm.c, is not properly verified before writing data to the buffer. This can enable a buffer overflow attack, using the source buffer that luaV_concat passes to char, at line 361 of ejoy2d/lvm.c, to overwrite the target buffer.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lvm.c	ejoy2d/lvm.c
Line	390	390
Object	char	char

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lvm.c
Method void luaV_concat (lua_State *L, int total) {

```
....
390.          memcpy(buffer+tl, svalue(top-i), 1 * sizeof(char));
```

Divide By Zero

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Medium Threat\Divide By Zero Version:1

[Description](#)

Divide By Zero\Path 1:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=10
Status	New

The application performs an illegal operation in matrix_inverse, in ejoy2d/matrix.c. In line 31, the program attempts to divide by t, which might be evaluate to 0 (zero) at time of division. This value could be a hard-coded zero value, or received from external, untrusted input t in matrix_inverse of ejoy2d/matrix.c, at line 31.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/matrix.c	ejoy2d/matrix.c
Line	43	43
Object	t	t

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/matrix.c
Method matrix_inverse(const struct matrix *mm, struct matrix *mo) {

```
....  
43.    o[0] = (int32_t)((int64_t)m[3] * (1024 * 1024) / t);
```

Divide By Zero\Path 2:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=11>
Status New

The application performs an illegal operation in matrix_inverse, in ejoy2d/matrix.c. In line 31, the program attempts to divide by t, which might be evaluate to 0 (zero) at time of division. This value could be a hard-coded zero value, or received from external, untrusted input t in matrix_inverse of ejoy2d/matrix.c, at line 31.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/matrix.c	ejoy2d/matrix.c
Line	44	44
Object	t	t

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/matrix.c
Method matrix_inverse(const struct matrix *mm, struct matrix *mo) {

```
....  
44.    o[1] = (int32_t)(- (int64_t)m[1] * (1024 * 1024) / t);
```

Divide By Zero\Path 3:

Severity Medium
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=12>
Status New

The application performs an illegal operation in matrix_inverse, in ejoy2d/matrix.c. In line 31, the program attempts to divide by t, which might be evaluate to 0 (zero) at time of division. This value could be a hard-coded zero value, or received from external, untrusted input t in matrix_inverse of ejoy2d/matrix.c, at line 31.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/matrix.c	ejoy2d/matrix.c
Line	45	45
Object	t	t

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/matrix.c

Method `matrix_inverse(const struct matrix *mm, struct matrix *mo) {`

```
....
45.    o[2] = (int32_t)(- (int64_t)m[2] * (1024 * 1024) / t);
```

Divide By Zero\Path 4:

Severity	Medium
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=13
Status	New

The application performs an illegal operation in `matrix_inverse`, in `ejoy2d/matrix.c`. In line 31, the program attempts to divide by `t`, which might be evaluate to 0 (zero) at time of division. This value could be a hard-coded zero value, or received from external, untrusted input `t` in `matrix_inverse` of `ejoy2d/matrix.c`, at line 31.

	Source	Destination
File	<code>ejoy2d/matrix.c</code>	<code>ejoy2d/matrix.c</code>
Line	46	46
Object	<code>t</code>	<code>t</code>

Code Snippet

File Name `ejoy2d/matrix.c`
 Method `matrix_inverse(const struct matrix *mm, struct matrix *mo) {`

```
....
46.    o[3] = (int32_t)((int64_t)m[0] * (1024 * 1024) / t);
```

Unchecked Return Value

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Unchecked Return Value Version:1

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SI-11 Error Handling (P2)

Description

Unchecked Return Value\Path 1:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=1
Status	New

The addquoted method calls the `sprintf` function, at line 813 of `ejoy2d/lstrlib.c`. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>	<code>ejoy2d/lstrlib.c</code>

Line	825	825
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c

Method static void addquoted (lua_State *L, luaL_Buffer *b, int arg) {

```
....
825.          sprintf(buff, "\\%d", (int)uchar(*s));
```

Unchecked Return Value\Path 2:

Severity Low

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=2>

Status New

The addquoted method calls the sprintf function, at line 813 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	827	827
Object	sprintf	sprintf

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c

Method static void addquoted (lua_State *L, luaL_Buffer *b, int arg) {

```
....
827.          sprintf(buff, "\\%03d", (int)uchar(*s));
```

Unchecked Return Value\Path 3:

Severity Low

Result State To Verify

Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=3>

Status New

The str_format method calls the nb function, at line 872 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	894	894
Object	nb	nb

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
894.          nb = sprintf(buff, form, (int)luaL_checkinteger(L,  
arg));
```

Unchecked Return Value\Path 4:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=4>
Status New

The str_format method calls the nb function, at line 872 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	901	901
Object	nb	nb

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
901.          nb = sprintf(buff, form, n);
```

Unchecked Return Value\Path 5:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=5>
Status New

The str_format method calls the nb function, at line 872 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	910	910
Object	nb	nb

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
910.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, luaL_checknumber(L, arg));
```

Unchecked Return Value\Path 6:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=6>
Status New

The str_format method calls the nb function, at line 872 of ejoy2d/lstrlib.c. However, the code does not check the return value from this function, and thus would not detect runtime errors or other unexpected states.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	927	927
Object	nb	nb

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_format (lua_State *L) {

```
....  
927.                nb = sprintf(buff, form, s);
```

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type Version:1

[Description](#)

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type\Path 1:

Severity Low
Result State To Verify
Online Results <http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=7>
Status New

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lgc.c	ejoy2d/lgc.c
Line	474	474
Object	sizeof	sizeof

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lgc.c
Method static lu_mem traversetable (global_State *g, Table *h) {

```
.....
474.                                sizeof(Proto *) * f->sizep +
```

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type\Path 2:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=8
Status	New

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lgc.c	ejoy2d/lgc.c
Line	1031	1031
Object	sizeof	sizeof

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lgc.c
Method static lu_mem singlestep (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
1031.                g->GCmemtrav = g->strt.size * sizeof(GCObject*);
```

Use of Sizeof On a Pointer Type\Path 3:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=9
Status	New

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lobject.c	ejoy2d/lobject.c
Line	386	386
Object	sizeof	sizeof

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lobject.c
Method const char *luaO_pushvfstring (lua_State *L, const char *fmt, va_list argp) {

```
.....
386.                char buff[4*sizeof(void *) + 8]; /* should be enough space
for a '%p' */
```

Arithmenic Operation On Boolean

Query Path:

CPP\Cx\CPP Low Visibility\Arithmenic Operation On Boolean Version:1

Categories

FISMA 2014: Audit And Accountability
NIST SP 800-53: SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)

Description

Arithmetic Operation On Boolean\Path 1:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=31
Status	New

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	123	123
Object	BinaryExpr	BinaryExpr

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_rep (lua_State *L) {

```
....
123.     else if (l + lsep < 1 || l + lsep > MAXSIZE / n) /* may
overflow? */
```

Arithmetic Operation On Boolean\Path 2:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=32
Status	New

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c	ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Line	1272	1272
Object	BinaryExpr	BinaryExpr

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lstrlib.c
Method static int str_packsize (lua_State *L) {

```
....
1272.     luaL_argcheck(L, totalsize <= MAXSIZE - size, 1,
```

NULL Pointer Dereference

Query Path:

Categories

NIST SP 800-53: SC-5 Denial of Service Protection (P1)
OWASP Top 10 2017: A1-Injection

Description

NULL Pointer Dereference\Path 1:

Severity	Low
Result State	To Verify
Online Results	http://WIN-BA8RD5TJ8IG/CxWebClient/ViewerMain.aspx?scanid=1050076&projectid=50066&pathid=30
Status	New

The variable declared in 0 at ejoy2d/lgc.c in line 824 is not initialized when it is used by g at ejoy2d/lgc.c in line 824.

	Source	Destination
File	ejoy2d/lgc.c	ejoy2d/lgc.c
Line	830	830
Object	0	g

Code Snippet

File Name ejoy2d/lgc.c
Method static int runafewfinalizers (lua_State *L) {

```
.....
830.    g->gcfinnum = (!g->tobefnz) ? 0 /* nothing more to finalize? */
```

Divide By Zero

Risk

What might happen

When a program divides a number by zero, an exception will be raised. If this exception is not handled by the application, unexpected results may occur, including crashing the application. This can be considered a DoS (Denial of Service) attack, if an external user has control of the value of the denominator or can cause this error to occur.

Cause

How does it happen

The program receives an unexpected value, and uses it for division without filtering, validation, or verifying that the value is not zero. The application does not explicitly handle this error or prevent division by zero from occurring.

General Recommendations

How to avoid it

- Before dividing by an unknown value, validate the number and explicitly ensure it does not evaluate to zero.
 - Validate all untrusted input from all sources, in particular verifying that it is not zero before dividing with it.
 - Verify output of methods, calculations, dictionary lookups, and so on, and ensure it is not zero before dividing with the result.
 - Ensure divide-by-zero errors are caught and handled appropriately.
-

Source Code Examples

Java

Divide by Zero

```
public float getAverage(HttpServletRequest req) {  
    int total = Integer.parseInt(req.getParameter("total"));  
    int count = Integer.parseInt(req.getParameter("count"));  
  
    return total / count;  
}
```

Checked Division

```
public float getAverage(HttpServletRequest req) {  
    int total = Integer.parseInt(req.getParameter("total"));  
    int count = Integer.parseInt(req.getParameter("count"));  
  
    if (count > 0)  
        return total / count;  
    else  
        return 0;  
}
```

Buffer Overflow boundcpy WrongSizeParam

Risk

What might happen

Buffer overflow attacks, in their various forms, could allow an attacker to control certain areas of memory. Typically, this is used to overwrite data on the stack necessary for the program to function properly, such as code and memory addresses, though other forms of this attack exist. Exploiting this vulnerability can generally lead to system crashes, infinite loops, or even execution of arbitrary code.

Cause

How does it happen

Buffer Overflows can manifest in numerous different variations. In its most basic form, the attack controls a buffer, which is then copied to a smaller buffer without size verification. Because the attacker's source buffer is larger than the program's target buffer, the attacker's data overwrites whatever is next on the stack, allowing the attacker to control program structures.

Alternatively, the vulnerability could be the result of improper bounds checking; exposing internal memory addresses outside of their valid scope; allowing the attacker to control the size of the target buffer; or various other forms.

General Recommendations

How to avoid it

- Always perform proper bounds checking before copying buffers or strings.
 - Prefer to use safer functions and structures, e.g. safe string classes over `char*`, `strncpy` over `strcpy`, and so on.
 - Consistently apply tests for the size of buffers.
 - Do not return variable addresses outside the scope of their variables.
-

Source Code Examples

CPP

Overflowing Buffers

```
const int BUFFER_SIZE = 10;
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

void copyStringToBuffer(char* inputString)
{
    strcpy(buffer, inputString);
}
```

Checked Buffers

```
const int BUFFER_SIZE = 10;
const int MAX_INPUT_SIZE = 256;
```

```
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

void copyStringToBuffer(char* inputString)
{
    if (strlen(inputString, MAX_INPUT_SIZE) < sizeof(buffer))
    {
        strncpy(buffer, inputString, sizeof(buffer));
    }
}
```

Dangerous Functions

Risk

What might happen

Use of dangerous functions may expose varying risks associated with each particular function, with potential impact of improper usage of these functions varying significantly. The presence of such functions indicates a flaw in code maintenance policies and adherence to secure coding practices, in a way that has allowed introducing known dangerous code into the application.

Cause

How does it happen

A dangerous function has been identified within the code. Functions are often deemed dangerous to use for numerous reasons, as there are different sets of vulnerabilities associated with usage of such functions. For example, some string copy and concatenation functions are vulnerable to Buffer Overflow, Memory Disclosure, Denial of Service and more. Use of these functions is not recommended.

General Recommendations

How to avoid it

- Deploy a secure and recommended alternative to any functions that were identified as dangerous.
 - If no secure alternative is found, conduct further researching and testing to identify whether current usage successfully sanitizes and verifies values, and thus successfully avoids the use-cases for whom the function is indeed dangerous
 - Conduct a periodical review of methods that are in use, to ensure that all external libraries and built-in functions are up-to-date and whose use has not been excluded from best secure coding practices.
-

Source Code Examples

CPP

Buffer Overflow in gets()

```
int main()
{
    char buf[10];

    printf("Please enter your name: ");
    gets(buf); // veryveryverylongname
    if (buf == ACCEPTED_NAME)
    {
        // Do something
    }
    return 0;
}
```

Safe reading from user

```
int main()
{
    char buf[10];

    printf("Please enter your name: ");
    fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin); //setting the amount of bytes to read
    if (buf == ACCEPTED_NAME)
    {
        //Do something
    }
    return 0;
}
```

Unsafe function for string copy

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]); // overflow occurs when len(argv[1]) > 10 bytes

    return 0;
}
```

Safe string copy

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    strncpy(buf, argv[1], sizeof(buf));
    buf[9] = '\0'; //strncpy doesn't NULL terminates

    return 0;
}
```

Unsafe format string

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf(argv[1]); // If argv[1] contains a format token, such as %s,%x or %d, will cause an access violation
    return 0;
}
```

Safe format string

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf("%s", argv[1]); // Second parameter is not a formattable string
    return 0;
}
```


Unchecked Return Value

Risk

What might happen

A program that does not check function return values could cause the application to enter an undefined state. This could lead to unexpected behavior and unintended consequences, including inconsistent data, system crashes or other error-based exploits.

Cause

How does it happen

The application calls a system function, but does not receive or check the result of this function. These functions often return error codes in the result, or share other status codes with its caller. The application simply ignores this result value, losing this vital information.

General Recommendations

How to avoid it

- Always check the result of any called function that returns a value, and verify the result is an expected value.
 - Ensure the calling function responds to all possible return values.
 - Expect runtime errors and handle them gracefully. Explicitly define a mechanism for handling unexpected errors.
-

Source Code Examples

CPP

Unchecked Memory Allocation

```
buff = (char*) malloc(size);  
strncpy(buff, source, size);
```

Safer Memory Allocation

```
buff = (char*) malloc(size+1);  
if (buff==NULL) exit(1);  
  
strncpy(buff, source, size);  
buff[size] = '\0';
```

Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type

Weakness ID: 467 (*Weakness Variant*)

Status: Draft

Description

Description Summary

The code calls sizeof() on a malloced pointer type, which always returns the wordsize/8. This can produce an unexpected result if the programmer intended to determine how much memory has been allocated.

Time of Introduction

Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Languages

C

C++

Common Consequences

Scope	Effect
Integrity	This error can often cause one to allocate a buffer that is much smaller than what is needed, leading to resultant weaknesses such as buffer overflows.

Likelihood of Exploit

High

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

Care should be taken to ensure sizeof returns the size of the data structure itself, and not the size of the pointer to the data structure.

In this example, sizeof(foo) returns the size of the pointer.

(Bad Code)

Example Languages: C and C++

```
double *foo;
...
foo = (double *)malloc(sizeof(foo));
```

In this example, sizeof(*foo) returns the size of the data structure and not the size of the pointer.

(Good Code)

Example Languages: C and C++

```
double *foo;
...
foo = (double *)malloc(sizeof(*foo));
```

Example 2

This example defines a fixed username and password. The AuthenticateUser() function is intended to accept a username and a password from an untrusted user, and check to ensure that it matches the username and password. If the username and password match, AuthenticateUser() is intended to indicate that authentication succeeded.

(Bad Code)

/ Ignore CWE-259 (hard-coded password) and CWE-309 (use of password system for authentication) for this example. */*

```
char *username = "admin";
char *pass = "password";

int AuthenticateUser(char *inUser, char *inPass) {
```

```
printf("Sizeof username = %d\n", sizeof(username));
printf("Sizeof pass = %d\n", sizeof(pass));

if (strcmp(username, inUser, sizeof(username))) {
printf("Auth failure of username using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH_FAIL);
}
/* Because of CWE-467, the sizeof returns 4 on many platforms and architectures. */
if (! strcmp(pass, inPass, sizeof(pass))) {
printf("Auth success of password using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH_SUCCESS);
}
else {
printf("Auth fail of password using sizeof\n");
return(AUTH_FAIL);
}
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int authResult;

if (argc < 3) {
ExitError("Usage: Provide a username and password");
}
authResult = AuthenticateUser(argv[1], argv[2]);
if (authResult != AUTH_SUCCESS) {
ExitError("Authentication failed");
}
else {
DoAuthenticatedTask(argv[1]);
}
}
```

In `AuthenticateUser()`, because `sizeof()` is applied to a parameter with an array type, the `sizeof()` call might return 4 on many modern architectures. As a result, the `strcmp()` call only checks the first four characters of the input password, resulting in a partial comparison (CWE-187), leading to improper authentication (CWE-287).

Because of the partial comparison, any of these passwords would still cause authentication to succeed for the "admin" user:

(Attack)

```
pass5
passABCDEFGH
passWORD
```

Because only 4 characters are checked, this significantly reduces the search space for an attacker, making brute force attacks more feasible.

The same problem also applies to the username, so values such as "adminXYZ" and "administrator" will succeed for the username.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

Use expressions such as "`sizeof(*pointer)`" instead of "`sizeof(pointer)`", unless you intend to run `sizeof()` on a pointer type to gain some platform independence or if you are allocating a variable on the stack.

Other Notes

The use of `sizeof()` on a pointer can sometimes generate useful information. An obvious case is to find out the wordsize on a platform. More often than not, the appearance of `sizeof(pointer)` indicates a bug.

Weakness Ordinalities

Ordinality	Description
Primary	<i>(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)</i>

Relationships

Nature	Type	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Category	465	Pointer Issues	Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOf	Weakness Class	682	Incorrect Calculation	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOf	Category	737	CERT C Secure Coding Section 03 - Expressions (EXP)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
ChildOf	Category	740	CERT C Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays (ARR)	Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard734
CanPrecede	Weakness Base	131	Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size	Research Concepts1000

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
CLASP			Use of sizeof() on a pointer type
CERT C Secure Coding	ARR01-C		Do not apply the sizeof operator to a pointer when taking the size of an array
CERT C Secure Coding	EXP01-C		Do not take the size of a pointer to determine the size of the pointed-to type

White Box Definitions

A weakness where code path has:

1. end statement that passes an identity of a dynamically allocated memory resource to a sizeof operator
2. start statement that allocates the dynamically allocated memory resource

References

Robert Seacord. "EXP01-A. Do not take the sizeof a pointer to determine the size of a type".
<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/EXP01-A.+Do+not+take+the+sizeof+a+pointer+to+determine+the+size+of+a+type>.

Content History

Submissions			
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization	Source
	CLASP		Externally Mined
Modifications			
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital	External
	updated Time of Introduction		
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics	External
	added/updated white box definitions		
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Relationships, Other Notes, Taxonomy Mappings, Weakness Ordinalities		
2008-11-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings		
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Demonstrative Examples		
2009-12-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Demonstrative Examples		
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE	Internal
	updated Relationships		

[BACK TO TOP](#)

NULL Pointer Dereference

Risk

What might happen

A null pointer dereference is likely to cause a run-time exception, a crash, or other unexpected behavior.

Cause

How does it happen

Variables which are declared without being assigned will implicitly retain a null value until they are assigned. The null value can also be explicitly set to a variable, to ensure clear out its contents. Since null is not really a value, it may not have object variables and methods, and any attempt to access contents of a null object, instead of verifying it is set beforehand, will result in a null pointer dereference exception.

General Recommendations

How to avoid it

- For any variable that is created, ensure all logic flows between declaration and use assign a non-null value to the variable first.
 - Enforce null checks on any received variable or object before it is dereferenced, to ensure it does not contain a null assigned to it elsewhere.
 - Consider the need to assign null values in order to overwrite initialized variables. Consider reassigning or releasing these variables instead.
-

Source Code Examples

CPP

Explicit NULL Dereference

```
char * input = NULL;
printf("%s", input);
```

Implicit NULL Dereference

```
char * input;
printf("%s", input);
```

Java

Explicit Null Dereference

```
Object o = null;
out.println(o.getClass());
```


Indicator of Poor Code Quality

Weakness ID: 398 (*Weakness Class*)

Status: Draft

Description

Description Summary

The code has features that do not directly introduce a weakness or vulnerability, but indicate that the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

Extended Description

Programs are more likely to be secure when good development practices are followed. If a program is complex, difficult to maintain, not portable, or shows evidence of neglect, then there is a higher likelihood that weaknesses are buried in the code.

Time of Introduction

- Architecture and Design
- Implementation

Relationships

Nature	Type	ID	Name	View(s) this relationship pertains to
ChildOf	Category	18	Source Code	Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOf	Weakness Class	710	Coding Standards Violation	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	107	Struts: Unused Validation Form	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	110	Struts: Validator Without Form Field	Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Category	399	Resource Management Errors	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Base	401	Failure to Release Memory Before Removing Last Reference ('Memory Leak')	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Base	404	Improper Resource Shutdown or Release	Development Concepts699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	415	Double Free	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Base	416	Use After Free	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	457	Use of Uninitialized Variable	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Base	474	Use of Function with Inconsistent Implementations	Development Concepts (primary)699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Base	475	Undefined Behavior for Input to API	Development Concepts (primary)699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ParentOf	Weakness Base	476	NULL Pointer Dereference	Development Concepts

				(primary)699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Base	477	Use of Obsolete Functions	Development Concepts (primary)699 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	478	Missing Default Case in Switch Statement	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	479	Unsafe Function Call from a Signal Handler	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	483	Incorrect Block Delimitation	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Base	484	Omitted Break Statement in Switch	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	546	Suspicious Comment	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	547	Use of Hard-coded, Security-relevant Constants	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	561	Dead Code	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Base	562	Return of Stack Variable Address	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	563	Unused Variable	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Category	569	Expression Issues	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	585	Empty Synchronized Block	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	586	Explicit Call to Finalize()	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Variant	617	Reachable Assertion	Development Concepts (primary)699
ParentOf	Weakness Base	676	Use of Potentially Dangerous Function	Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000
MemberOf	View	700	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms	Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
----------------------	---------	-----	------------------

7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Code Quality
-----------------------	--	--	--------------

Content History

Submissions

Submission Date	Submitter	Organization	Source
	7 Pernicious Kingdoms		Externally Mined

Modifications

Modification Date	Modifier	Organization	Source
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci updated Time of Introduction	Cigital	External
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team updated Description, Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings	MITRE	Internal
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team updated Relationships	MITRE	Internal

Previous Entry Names

Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11	Code Quality

[BACK TO TOP](#)

Scanned Languages

Language	Hash Number	Change Date
CPP	4541647240435660	6/19/2024
Common	0105849645654507	6/19/2024