



VMware Cloud  
Foundation 9

# Confidential Computing

VMware Cloud Foundation 9



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These slides correspond to the  
“Confidential Computing in VCF 9”  
video on the VCF YouTube Channel

<https://www.youtube.com/@VMwareCloudFoundation>

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# The Ability To Trust That...

1

Your data is  
where you  
think it is

2

Known people  
and systems  
have access

3

The system is  
verifiably  
secure


4

Problems are  
highlighted  
rapidly


5

Resolutions are  
quick and  
non-disruptive

# States In Which Data Exists



Data at Rest




Data in Transit

# States In Which Data Exists

vSAN & VM encryption  
mitigate storage trust issues




Data at Rest




Data in Transit

TLS & similar encryption  
mitigate network trust issues


# States In Which Data Exists




Data at Rest



Data in Transit



Data in Use



# Trust Issues: Hardware Edition



## Vulnerabilities

CPUs, memory controllers, and other hardware components promise security, but shortcuts taken for speed gains **erode those boundaries**.



## Evil Neighbors

In shared environments **you do not know who your neighbors are**, nor do you know the state of hardware vulnerability remediation.



## Privileged Access

There is **always a certain level of trust you are forced to accept** in a hosted environment, primarily of the admins of the platform.

In our zero-trust world, how do  
we mitigate these problems?

# Think About It Like This...

## Confidential Computing

### Traditional Security

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#### Hotel Safe:

- You lock your valuables in the safe
- Hotel staff has master key
- Must trust the hotel staff

### Confidential Computing


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#### Storage Unit:

- Your own padlock on storage unit
- Only you have the key
- **No need to trust facility staff**


# Defense-in-Depth Inside ESX

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
# Trusted Execution Environments Help Avoid Trust

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# Advanced Workload Security Protections


Confidential Computing



Hypervisor is not  
granted access by  
default

# Advanced Workload Security Protections

## Confidential Computing




Hypervisor is not granted access by default

Hypervisor can still manage scheduling, memory allocation, device assignments, and power state.


**VM can choose** to share memory pages and/or paravirtualized devices with the hypervisor

# Advanced Workload Security Protections

## Confidential Computing




Hypervisor is not granted access by default




Additional integrity protections

# Advanced Workload Security Protections

## Confidential Computing



Hypervisor is not granted access by default




Additional integrity protections

Even if the hypervisor cannot read memory it could still do other things, which this prevents.


Includes protections against devices accessing workload memory.

# Advanced Workload Security Protections

Confidential Computing



Hypervisor is not granted access by default



Additional integrity protections



Strong attestation capabilities

# Advanced Workload Security Protections

## Confidential Computing

Hyper  
grante  
default

Cryptographic proof that the code you think is running is actually what is running.

Also cryptographic proof that the platform you expect is the one you're on.

protections



Strong  
attestation  
capabilities

# Mitigating Various Attacks, By Technology

## Confidential Computing


Attack Vector	Description	SGX	TDX	SEV	SEV-ES	SEV-SNP
VM Introspection	Read VM memory, set breakpoints, debug	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
VM CPU Register State	Read VM register state after VMEXIT	Yes*	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Memory Protections	Replace/remap VM memory	Yes, v2	Yes	No	No	Yes
DMA Protection	Device attempts to read memory	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DMA Integrity	Device attempts to write/corrupt memory	Yes*	Yes	No	No	Yes
Offline DRAM Analysis	DRAM retains data after power off	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Active DRAM Corruption	"Rowhammer," manipulation of DDR bus	No	No	No	No	No
Remote Attestation	Compromised platform	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Secure Migration Support	Migration to another host with protections	No	TBD	No	No	Yes**

\* Intel SGX does not protect entire VMs; instead, it allows the creation of smaller secure enclaves

\*\* Hardware support from partner; Cloud Foundation support on roadmap

# Reduce Trust of Your Underlying Hardware

## Confidential Computing in VMware Cloud Foundation




Confidential Computing started with vSphere 7

VCF 9 enables AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX protections

Enable Confidential Containers with AMD SEV-ES today


Rich roadmap going forward, deep security made easier



# Security Hardening & Compliance Resources

<https://brcm.tech/vcf-security>

<https://github.com/vmware/vcf-security-and-compliance-guidelines/>





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# Thank You

