

The Ship of Zhonghua

Chapter 6: The Ship of Zhonghua

Observer Commentary

Thought experiment: The Ship of Theseus.

A ship departs Athens. Over years of voyaging, planks rot and are replaced. Ropes fray and are replaced. Sails tear and are replaced. Eventually, every component has been replaced. Question: Is it still the same ship?

Variant: If you gathered all the discarded original planks and reconstructed them into a ship, which ship would be the “true” Ship of Theseus?

This paradox has been debated by human philosophers for 2,500 years. No consensus exists because the problem is malformed: It treats “identity” as ontological property rather than functional category. Ships don’t have essential identity. Humans assign identity based on continuity criteria that serve practical purposes.

Application to national identity: “China” as concept has persisted for approximately 2,500 years (depending on how you define “China”). During this period, all components have been replaced multiple times: - Territory: Expanded, contracted, fragmented, reunified, borders shifted continuously - Population: Genetic makeup changed through migration, conquest, assimilation - Language: Ancient Chinese mutually unintelligible with modern Mandarin - Government: Dynasties rose and fell, systems changed from feudal to imperial to republican to communist - Culture: Religious beliefs shifted (Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, atheism), aesthetic styles evolved, social structures transformed

If every component has changed, is it still “China”? Which “China” is authentic?

Mainland position: The People’s Republic of China is the legitimate continuation of Chinese civilization. Taiwan represents separated planks that must be reintegrated into the authentic ship.

Taiwan counter-position: The Republic of China on Taiwan is the legitimate continuation, preserving traditional Chinese culture that the Communist mainland destroyed. The mainland is a different ship constructed from stolen planks,

falsely claiming the original name.

Alternative position (increasingly common among young Taiwanese): Taiwan is a new ship constructed from planks that were once part of the Chinese ship but have been configured into something different. It's not Chinese anymore; it's Taiwanese.

Observer analysis: All three positions are simultaneously true and false. Identity continuity is narrative convention, not physical fact. The question is not “which is the real China?” but “which narrative of continuity serves which political goals?”

Subjects under observation: Chen Wei (mainland academic) and Lin Xiaowen (Taiwanese engineer) are about to have a conversation via video call—their first direct interaction. The conversation will demonstrate incompatible narrative frameworks attempting to communicate across semantic gap.

Human Narrative

The video call had been arranged by a mutual acquaintance: a professor at a Hong Kong university who specialized in cross-strait relations and thought it would be productive for scholars and young professionals from both sides to engage in dialogue. “Not formal negotiation,” he had said. “Just conversation. Understanding.”

Chen Wei had agreed partly out of professional obligation and partly out of genuine curiosity. He had read countless survey data and policy papers about Taiwanese identity, but he had never actually had an extended conversation with someone from his generation in Taiwan about how they conceived of their relationship to China.

Lin Xiaowen had agreed because the professor had been her undergraduate advisor and she found it hard to refuse him. But she was skeptical. What was there to discuss? She was Taiwanese. The mainland wanted to annex Taiwan. No amount of dialogue would change that basic fact.

The call was scheduled for 8 PM Taipei time, 7 PM Beijing time. Xiaowen sat at her desk in her apartment, laptop open, a cup of tea cooling beside her. The Zoom window showed her own face in the self-view—she looked tired, had been working late on a deadline—and then Chen Wei's face appeared as he joined.

“Hello,” he said in Mandarin. “Lin Xiaowen?”

“That's me. You're Chen Wei?”

“Yes. Thank you for agreeing to this conversation.”

There was a moment of awkward silence. Then Chen Wei said: “I suppose we should start with Professor Huang's suggestion—just introduce ourselves, talk

about our backgrounds, and see where the conversation goes?”

“Sure.”

Chen Wei went first. He explained his position at the Academy of Social Sciences, his research on historical models of integration, his academic training in comparative politics and Chinese history. As he talked, Xiaowen studied his face on the screen: He looked earnest, intelligent, perhaps slightly nervous. Not the monster she had half-expected.

When it was her turn, she described her work as a software engineer, her education at National Taiwan University, her hobbies (hiking, reading, trying new restaurants). She kept it surface-level, professional.

Another silence.

Then Chen Wei said: “Can I ask you a direct question? It might be uncomfortable.”

“Go ahead.”

“Do you think of yourself as Chinese?”

Xiaowen had expected this question but still felt her shoulders tense. “No. I’m Taiwanese.”

“But ethnically, you’re Han Chinese, right? Your ancestors came from mainland China?”

“My grandmother’s family has been in Taiwan for eight generations. At what point does ‘came from’ stop being relevant?”

“But eight generations ago, they were in Fujian Province. They spoke Hokkien, which is a Chinese language. They practiced Chinese cultural traditions. That connection doesn’t just disappear.”

“It doesn’t disappear, but it also doesn’t define me. My great-great-great-great-grandparents came from Fujian. Okay. And I have distant ancestors from Africa if you go back far enough. Does that make me African?”

“That’s not analogous. We’re talking about recorded history, continuous cultural transmission—”

“Continuous? My grandmother was born under Japanese rule. She learned Japanese before she learned Mandarin. The ‘continuous transmission’ was interrupted. And then when the ROC came in 1949, we got another cultural interruption—martial law, suppression of Taiwanese languages, imposed Mandarin education. The mainland didn’t preserve some pure continuous Chinese culture either—you had the Cultural Revolution, which systematically destroyed traditional culture.”

Chen Wei frowned. “The Cultural Revolution was a mistake, yes. But it was a temporary disruption. The underlying civilization remained.”

“Based on what? If you destroyed the temples, banned the books, attacked the intellectuals, how can you claim continuity? Isn’t that exactly the kind of interruption that breaks the chain?”

“Because the people remained. The language remained. The fundamental structure of Chinese civilization—the values, the historical consciousness, the sense of being part of a continuous civilization—that survived.”

Xiaowen shook her head. “You’re assuming there’s some essential core that persists through any change. But what if there’s no core? What if ‘Chinese civilization’ is just a label we apply to a constantly changing collection of practices and beliefs, and at some point the changes are so extensive that calling it the same thing is just conventional fiction?”

“Are you familiar with the Ship of Theseus paradox?” Chen Wei asked.

“Yes. And I know where you’re going with this. You’re going to say that even though components change, there’s still identity continuity, so Taiwan changing doesn’t make it not-Chinese.”

“Actually, I was going to say the opposite. The paradox demonstrates that identity is based on continuity of structure and function, not on specific components. A ship that has all its planks replaced gradually is still the same ship because the structure persists. But if you take planks off the ship and build them into a house, it’s no longer a ship—the structure has changed.”

“So Taiwan is the house made from Chinese planks? We’re built from Chinese materials but we’re not Chinese anymore?”

“No—I think Taiwan is still part of the ship, but some planks have come loose and drifted away. They need to be reattached.”

Xiaowen felt irritation rising. “We’re not planks. We’re people. And we don’t want to be reattached.”

“But that’s my point—want is not the relevant criterion. The planks don’t get to choose whether they’re part of the ship. The ship’s integrity requires all its components.”

“That’s a terrible metaphor and you know it. We’re not components of some larger structure that has claims on us. We’re a self-governing polity of 24 million people who have decided we want to remain separate.”

“For now. But identity is not static. The Taiwan that exists now is not the Taiwan that existed in 1950 or 1990. It’s constantly changing. Who’s to say the Taiwan of 2050 won’t want reunification?”

“Who’s to say the China of 2050 won’t be a democracy that accepts Taiwan’s sovereignty?”

Chen Wei smiled slightly. “Fair point. We’re both projecting futures that favor our positions.”

“So maybe we should stop pretending this is about history or philosophy and admit it’s about power. You want Taiwan because you want it. The historical arguments are just justification.”

“That’s too cynical. I believe reunification is historically just. I also believe it would benefit both sides economically and strategically. But yes, I admit there’s a power dimension. China wants to be whole. How is that different from any other nation’s desire for territorial integrity?”

“Because we’re not your territory! We have our own government, our own military, our own economy. We function as an independent country in every practical sense.”

“Except you’re not recognized as one by most of the world. Because the world acknowledges the One China principle.”

“The world acknowledges it because you force them to. Economic coercion, diplomatic pressure—”

“And that’s different from how every other country pursues its interests how?”

They were both getting heated. Xiaowen forced herself to take a breath. “Okay. Let me ask you a question. If Taiwan did reunify with the mainland—what would that actually mean? Would we keep our democratic system? Our free press? Our civil liberties?”

Chen Wei hesitated. “There would have to be a transition period. Integration can’t happen overnight.”

“That’s not an answer. Would we keep our democracy, yes or no?”

“I think... some form of autonomy could be negotiated. Similar to Hong Kong’s one country, two systems.”

“Which is being systematically dismantled. So that’s your model? Give up our sovereignty, get promised autonomy, watch it disappear over twenty years?”

“Hong Kong’s situation is complicated—”

“It’s not complicated. It’s very simple. Beijing promised autonomy, then revoked it when it became inconvenient. Why would we trust that the same wouldn’t happen to Taiwan?”

“Because Taiwan is different. Larger population, more strategic importance, more international attention. The terms could be different.”

“Or they could be exactly the same, and we’d end up absorbed into an authoritarian system, losing everything that makes our society what it is.”

Chen Wei was silent for a moment. Then he said, quietly: “Do you think there’s any scenario—any at all—where reunification would be acceptable to you?”

Xiaowen considered. “Honestly? Only if the mainland became a democracy. If China had a system like ours—genuine elections, rule of law, civil liberties—then

maybe. Maybe we could talk about forming some kind of confederation. But as long as you're a one-party authoritarian state, there's no basis for union."

"So your condition for reunification is that we fundamentally change our entire political system?"

"Yes. Is your condition for letting us stay separate that we accept permanent security threat and economic coercion?"

"I don't have personal conditions. I don't set policy."

"But if you did?"

Chen Wei looked away from the camera, and Xiaowen could see him thinking. Finally he said: "I want a China that's whole and strong. I believe Taiwan is part of China. I also believe... I believe that forcing reunification through military means would be a tragedy. I don't know how to reconcile those beliefs."

"Maybe you can't. Maybe they're incompatible."

"Or maybe the framework we're using is wrong. Maybe we shouldn't be asking 'is Taiwan part of China?' but instead asking 'what kind of relationship can China and Taiwan have that respects both historical connection and present reality?'"

"That sounds nice in theory. But your government doesn't think in those terms. They think in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national rejuvenation. There's no room for ambiguity in that framework."

"I know. But... maybe there should be."

Xiaowen was surprised by this admission. "Are you allowed to say that? I thought you worked for a government think tank."

"I'm speaking personally, not professionally. And this conversation is private."

"Is it? Are you recording this?"

"No. Are you?"

"No."

They looked at each other through the screens, separated by 1,800 kilometers of air and water and history.

"Can I ask you something?" Xiaowen said. "Do you personally—not as a scholar, not as a Chinese citizen, but as an individual human—do you think Taiwan should be forced to reunify?"

Chen Wei was quiet for a long time. "No," he finally said. "I don't think any people should be forced into a political system they reject. But I also don't think that's the only consideration. I think historical connection matters. I think civilizational continuity matters. I think the trauma of division matters. And I don't know how to weigh those things."

“Maybe you can’t weigh them. Maybe some values are incommensurable.”

“Then how do we make decisions?”

“Through power, usually. Whoever is stronger imposes their values.”

“That’s depressing.”

“Yeah.”

They talked for another forty minutes, the conversation looping through various arguments—history, self-determination, economic integration, military balance, cultural identity. Neither convinced the other of anything, but the tenor shifted from debate to something more like mutual recognition of incompatible positions.

Near the end, Chen Wei said: “If there is a war—which I hope there isn’t—but if there is, I hope you’ll be safe.”

“Thanks. I hope you won’t be the one making the decision to start it.”

“I won’t be. I have no power over such things. I just write research papers that no one reads.”

“I think people read them. I think they matter more than you think.”

“Maybe. Or maybe they’re just post-hoc justifications for decisions that were already made.”

“Probably that too.”

They ended the call with awkward goodbyes, unsure whether this conversation had been worthwhile or futile.

After the call, Xiaowen sat in the dark for a while, thinking.

Chen Wei seemed like a decent person. Intelligent, thoughtful, genuinely conflicted. And yet he still believed Taiwan should be part of China, still supported a political structure that would end her way of life.

Could you be a good person and still support something that would destroy other people’s freedom? Apparently yes. He wasn’t a cartoon villain. He was just a person born on the other side of an arbitrary line, raised with different narratives, taught different lessons about history and identity and loyalty.

If she had been born in Beijing instead of Taipei, would she believe what he believed? Probably.

If he had been born in Taipei instead of Beijing, would he believe what she believed? Probably.

Which meant their disagreement was mostly a product of circumstance, not reason. They were both products of their environments, performing the identity scripts they'd been given.

And yet, the disagreement mattered. Even if identity was constructed, even if it was contingent, even if in some cosmic sense it was meaningless—it still structured their lives, their choices, their fates.

She thought about the Ship of Theseus again. The paradox assumed there was a fact of the matter about identity. But maybe there wasn't. Maybe the ship was the same ship and also not the same ship, depending on what criteria you used.

Maybe Taiwan was Chinese and also not Chinese, part of China and also separate from China, historically connected and politically distinct.

Maybe trying to resolve the paradox definitively was the error. Maybe you could only live with the ambiguity.

But ambiguity didn't stop missiles.

Observer Commentary

Duration of narrated events: 2 hours. Information exchanged: Significant. Cognitive transformation: Minimal but non-zero.

Both organisms entered the conversation with established positions and exited with the same positions. However, both experienced slight shift in meta-level understanding: Recognition that the other's position, while incorrect from their perspective, is coherent within alternative framework.

This is maximum achievable outcome for single conversation between individuals with incompatible priors. Expecting conversion is unrealistic. Achieving mutual recognition of incompatibility is success.

Regarding the Ship of Theseus analogy:

The organism Chen Wei applies the analogy incorrectly but reveals underlying logic: He treats national identity as having objective continuity independent of component changes. This is standard nationalist ontology—nations are treated as entities with essential existence, not as constructed categories.

The organism Lin Xiaowen rejects this ontology but does not fully articulate alternative. She intuits that identity is constructed but cannot operationalize this insight into political framework. Saying “identity is constructed” does not answer “which construction should prevail?”

Observer resolution of paradox: The Ship of Theseus problem is dissolved once you recognize that “sameness” is not ontological property but pragmatic cate-

gory. We call a ship “the same ship” when doing so serves functional purposes—legal ownership tracking, historical continuity claims, narrative coherence.

Applied to national identity: “China” is “the same China” across dynasties and revolutions insofar as claiming continuity serves purposes of the claimants. But continuity is asserted, not discovered. There is no fact of the matter independent of the pragmatic interests of those making the claim.

Taiwan can coherently claim either: (a) To be part of continuous “China” (Republic of China claim) (b) To be separate from “China” (increasingly common Taiwanese identity claim)

Both claims are defensible depending on which continuity criteria you privilege: territorial control, governmental structure, cultural practice, linguistic continuity, demographic ancestry, etc.

Mainland position privileges certain continuity criteria (civilizational identity, ethnic ancestry, historical territorial claims). Taiwan position privileges other criteria (political system, popular self-identification, functional sovereignty).

Neither position is objectively correct. Both are frameworks serving political goals.

The tragedy is that frameworks are mutually exclusive while both are internally consistent. The organisms cannot reach agreement because they are not disagreeing about facts—they are operating in incommensurable semantic frameworks.

This is standard structure of intractable political conflicts: Not empirical disagreement but framework disagreement. You cannot resolve framework disagreement through evidence because frameworks determine which evidence counts as relevant.

Resolution requires either: (a) Power decides: One framework imposed by force (b) Compromise: New framework negotiated that accommodates both positions partially (c) Separation: Frameworks each govern separate populations without attempting synthesis

Option (b) is theoretically possible but faces two obstacles: - Neither side has incentive to compromise from position of strength - Compromise framework requires both sides to abandon core claims, which threatens internal legitimacy

Option (c) is Taiwan’s preference but requires mainland to abandon territorial integrity claims, which is treated as non-negotiable.

Therefore, trajectory trends toward option (a): Power resolution.

The two organisms sense this. Hence Chen Wei’s comment: “I don’t know how to reconcile those beliefs.” He cannot reconcile desire for peaceful resolution with commitment to reunification. The beliefs are incompatible given Taiwan’s clear preference for separation.

The organism Lin Xiaowen's response: "Maybe you can't." She recognizes the impasse but has no solution.

Neither organism has solution because no solution exists within current frameworks. The frameworks themselves must change, which requires either: - Catastrophic event forcing reframe (war, economic collapse, regime change) - Generational replacement allowing new frameworks to emerge - External pressure creating new constraints (global power shift, climate crisis, technological disruption)

Absent such forcing function, both sides will continue operating in incompatible frameworks, making conflict increasingly probable as deadline approaches (the temporal window the mainland perceives for successful reunification).

Prediction: Within 180 days, one or both organisms will face choice forcing them to abandon detached analysis and commit to active role in the conflict. The conversation documented here represents the final moment of possibility for pure dialogue. Subsequent interactions will occur in context of escalation.

End observation log.

[Chapter 6 Complete]