# Security / Crypto Basics

... for C++ Developers

# Topics

- Very quick intro
- Getting Random Data
- How to work with passwords?
- How to encrypt data?
- How to communicate securely?

# First rule of Crypto: don't do it yourself!

- Getting Cryptography right is REALLY hard
  - Use well tested / reviewed implementations!
- Even using standard libs is hard (cf. OpenSSL)
  - But there are nicer alternatives.

Here are some basic guidelines how NOT TO FAIL immediately.

### Types of Algorithms - Hashes

#### Trap Door Functions / "Hash Functions"

- Simple (non-cryptographic) example: f(x) = x % 2
  - Simple to calculate, impossible to reverse
  - CRC / Checksum / parity: validate data, NOT cryptographic!
- Cryptographic Hashes:
  - very easy to calculate hash for an input
  - o very (computationally) difficult to calculate the input ("preimage") of any given hash.
  - very unlikely that two (even slightly) different messages produce the same value ("collision")
    - should be "not even close"
- Examples: MD HA-1, SHA-2/3 (256,384,512)
  - (SHA-256 [0..128] is also OK!)

recently broken, don't use (but don't panic;))

### Types of Algorithms - Symmetric

Most secure (in theory): "One Time Pad" - Problem: len(key) == len(data)

XOR

Key: 43252987948237957298347598734987598274587...

Data: The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog ...

Ciphertext: 624965798629875962557609827967405769...

#### **Block Cipher**

Key: 1234	Key: 1234	Key: 1234	Key: 1234	Key: 1234	Key: 1234
The quick	brown fox	jumps over	the lazy	dog <pad></pad>	The quick
234345234	102340912				234345234

#### Types of Algorithms

#### Stream Cipher

XOR

Key:  $1234 \rightarrow RNG(salt: 1234) \rightarrow 1498759875983789573984759873498572893$ 

Data: The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog ...

Ciphertext: 624965798629875962557609827967405769...

Block as Stream Cipher Counter (CTR) or "Chiper Block Chaining" (CBC)

Key: 123 1	Key: 123 2	Key: 123 3	Key: 1234			Key: 123   i
The quick	brown fox	jumps over	The quick	i = Hash(E	NC-TXT)	brown fox
234345234	102340912		234345234			020934809

## Types of Algorithms - Public Key (RSA or EC)

Private Key The quick brown fox ... SIG + The quick brown fox ... + Public Key Verified + Public Key The quick brown fox ... Ciphertext: 1349130948108092... + + Private Key **Plaintext** 

### **Encryption Strength**

Strength (bits)	Hash	Symmetric	Elliptic Curve (~bits)	RSA Modulus / DH Group
56	MD5	DES-56	112	768
80	~SHA-1	2-DES	160	1024
112	SHA2/3-224	3-DES	224	2048
128	SHA2/3-256	AES-128	256	3072
192	SHA2/3-384	AES-192	384	7680
256	SHA2/3-512	AES-256	512	15360

Verordnung Nr. 428/2009 (Dual-Use) 5A002: Symm. 56, EC 112, RSA/DH 512

### Crypto Libraries

- "default": OpenSSL
  - well known / reviewed
  - ugly old API
  - o code is a mess, several projects try to fix it up
    - LibreSSL (OpenBSD folks) close to original API
    - BoringSSL (Google) more cleanups, diverging API
- Good alternative: Botan
  - nice/safe C++ API
  - SSL/TLS, Crypto Hardware support
  - Recently reviewed / endorsed by BSI
    - 3 year support / bugfix grant
- Crypto++: reasonable C++ API, no SSL

# Library Basics: Getting random data

- Good random data essential for secure crypto!
- DON'T use std::random\* for cryptography
- Use platform library, OpenSSL by default
  - Other options: read from /dev/random
  - CryptGenRandom on Windows

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
    // guaranteed to be random.
}
```

# Example: OpenSSL RAND\_bytes

Example: Botan - Crypto/SSL for C++

How to work with passwords?

### Hashing for Passwords

- Storing/sending "username:password"
  - Eavesdropping / stealing file
- Storing/sending "hash(password)"
  - attacker does not learn user password (if hash / password are secure)
  - o but: sending hash(password) ⇒ effectively your password now!
  - Use challenge-response (see below)
- Challenge-response:
  - o server: "challenge", client: hash(challenge | pw | nonce), nonce
  - Server needs password (or hash-password)
  - o Password/hash stolen from server: attacker can impersonate client

## Hashing Problems

- Problems: simple Passwords
  - easy to guess
  - pre-compute often used hashes => Rainbowtable
- Rainbowtables
  - use (good random) SALT: hash(salt+password)
  - ⇒ store "username : SALT : hash(salt+password)"
- Computing hash(salt+password) still feasible for known passwords

#### Better Hashing for Passwords

- Prevent "easy" checking of known passwords: run HASH(salt+PW) X times
  - o for large X e.g. PBKDF2
- Problem: GPUs still fast enough
  - ⇒ BCRYPT: combines HASH with mutating MEM table, kills GPU performance
- Problem: ASICs still fast at BCRYPT
  - ⇒ SCRYPT: dynamically growing large MEM table, kills ASIC performance

# Example: OpenSSL / Botan Hashing

#### Storing Passwords

- Never use PLAINTEXT STORAGE!
- Passwd format: \$Algorithm\$Salt\$Hash(Password)

If plaintext PASSWORDS are required (also good for hashes):

- Restrict access to file / verifying process (OS security)
- Separate authentication system
- Encrypt all authentication traffic (e.g also think of NFS, SQL Connections...)
- Encrypt file (key on other medium / TPM) -> safe against discarded disk / stealing file
- Do obfuscate / make access harder, non obvious!

#### Transmitting Passwords

- Storing hash: protects against storage theft, not eavesdropping!
  - The hash is effectively your new password
- Challenge-response: server stores PW encrypted with e.g.
   HASH(PBKDF2(PASSWORD)), --> access to server store does not reveal
   hash
- less secure, simple option: just rely on TLS, send plaintext -> same security
   (-TLS) for you, but exposes user Password!

## "State of the art": "Secure Remote Pasword" (SRP)

- "DH" for passwords
- Server stores "username: verifier + salt"
  - verifier generated by client, password never transmitted
- Client/server negotiate key using Password(client), Verifier (server)
  - Client → Server: username, random key A
  - Server → Client: salt, random key B
  - If communication works, both generate matching key (may check explicitly or just encrypt)
- Standardized for SSL, available in OpenSSL / Botan
- Only "issue": stolen verifier can impersonate server
  - So still verify your certs!

How to encrypt data?

### **Encrypting Data - Use Standard Tools**

openssl aes-256-ctr -a -salt -in input.txt -out output.txt.enc openssl aes-256-ctr -d -a -salt -in input.txt.enc -out output.txt

Problem: unencrypted data written to disk!

Sqlcipher - SQLite with encryption:

simple encrypted single file data store, secure "by default"

ZIP / LZMA compressors support encryption

# Encrypting Data - Standard Algorithm: AES


Use standard algorithm: AES (perhaps Serpent, Blowfish, Stream Cipher: ChaCha20)

- 128, 192 & 256 are regarded as secure
- NOT DES, RC4

What are block chaining modes?

- → turn block cipher into stream, block key based on position
  - CBC: key hash based on previous block (don't use)
- ✓ CTR: key based on "block counter" (parallelizable!)
- ✓ GCM: authenticated encryption (otherwise CTR)
  - Additional "tag" validating data
- ✓ XTS: special disk encryption mode

#### ECB Mode:



# Example: OpenSSL / Botan Encryption

### **Encrypting Data - Disk Encryption**

- Block encryption device level, independent of filesystem
  - No metadata per block → IV based on Sector / Block offset ("tweak")
  - CBC not well suited: requires reading in sequence, allows "watermarking" attack
  - Solution: XTS mode encrypts tweak for each block
    - OpenSSL: different keys for tweak / data → 2x key size!
  - Still: no authentication of data! Attacker can revert or destroy blocks
  - → Use XTS, better use existing solution (LUKS, VeraCrypt, BitLocker etc)
- Filesystem encryption: e.g. EncFS, NTFS-EFS
  - Can use metadata (e.g. include GCM tag, like ZFS)
  - Often does not encrypt metadata (filename, change times etc)

How to communicate securely?

### Asymmetric Encryption: RSA / EC

#### Public / private key pair:


- Private Key encrypts, Public Key decrypts → Signature
- Public Key encrypts, Private Key decrypts → Encryption

#### Build certificate "chains": SSL/TLS certificate authorities

- CA certifies intermediate -> intermediate certifies your certificate
- you prove ownership of cert with private key
  - protect your private keys!
  - e.g. again encryption / obfuscation on system

#### SSL/TLS

- SSL is broken, use TLS 1.2 (1.3)
- if you "Add an exception...", might as well not encrypt at all:



- validate certificates!
- get CA certified for free: e.g. <a href="https://letsencrypt.org/">https://letsencrypt.org/</a>

### SSL/TLS - Key Negotiation - Diffie-Hellman

- Negotiate secure key without "exchanging" it
- Use "old" DH od ECDH
- Use "ephemeral" mode (DHE/ECDHE)→ "perfect forward secrecy"
- Generate your own DH parameters:

openssl dhparam -outform pem -out dhparam.pem 2048

(may take some time, 4096 even more, perhaps pre-compute per release?)

Problem: man-in-the-middle attacks - relies on CA key verification!

#### Implementing TLS

- Boost ASIO has good SSL support
  - works around OpenSSL issues
- Botan SSL
- Provide up-to-date CA files or BETTER use OS ones
- Generate (or provide self-generated) DH parameters
- Restrict accepted algorithms
- Implement certificate revocation way to notify on stolen private keys
  - Note: CRLs not used by browsers, use OSCP

#### Getting help

If you NEED to DIY, look here:

Books: Practical Cryptography (Ferguson, Schneier), Applied Cryptography (Schneier), Security Engineering (Anderson)


- https://www.securecoding.cert.org
- https://security.stackexchange.com/

#### Other Crypto APIs:

- Windows: <a href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms867086.aspx">https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms867086.aspx</a>
- Nicer C++ API (buy no SSL) <a href="https://www.cryptopp.com">https://www.cryptopp.com</a>

Stick Figure Guide to AES: <a href="http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html">http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html</a>

# Happy (and safe) coding!



https://xkcd.com/538/