

ECON 736A: Problem Set 2

Alex von Hafften

October 21, 2022

1 Acharya and Dogra (2020)

1. Carefully prove Proposition 1 in the paper

Proposition 1. *Individual decision problem: Given a sequence of real interest rates, aggregate output, and idiosyncratic risk $\{r_t, y_t, \sigma_{y,t}\}$, household i 's consumption decision can be expressed as*

$$c_t^i = C_t + \mu_t(a_t^i + y_t^i) \quad (1)$$

where $a_t^i = A_t^i/P_t$ is real net worth at the state of date t and C_t and μ_t solve the following recursions:

$$C_t[1 + \mu_{t+1}(1 + r_t)] = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \beta(1 + r_t) + C_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1}\bar{y}_{t+1} - \frac{\gamma\mu_{t+1}^2\sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2} \quad (2)$$

$$\mu_t = \frac{\mu_{t+1}(1 + r_t)}{1 + \mu_{t+1}(1 + r_t)} \quad (3)$$

We prove with guess and verify. With CARA utility, the household Euler equation is

$$e^{-\gamma c_t^i} = \beta(1 + r_t)E_t e^{-\gamma c_{t+1}^i}$$

Taking logs of both sides

$$-\gamma c_t^i = \ln \beta(1 + r_t) + \ln E_t e^{-\gamma c_{t+1}^i}$$

Guess consumption decision rule is

$$c_t^i = C_t + \mu_t(a_t^i + y_t^i)$$

where C_t and μ_t are deterministic. Using the HH budget constraint and the guessed consumption decision rule, we can get c_{t+1}^i :

$$\begin{aligned}
a_{t+1}^i &= (1+r_t)(1-\mu_t)(a_t^i + y_t^i) - (1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t \\
\Rightarrow c_{t+1}^i &= \mathcal{C}_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1}[a_{t+1}^i + y_{t+1}^i] \\
&= \mathcal{C}_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1}[(1+r_t)(1-\mu_t)(a_t^i + y_t^i) - (1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t + y_{t+1}^i]
\end{aligned}$$

All terms in c_{t+1}^i are known at t except for y_{t+1}^i which is normal, so c_{t+1}^i is normal with

$$\begin{aligned}
E_t[c_{t+1}^i] &= \mathcal{C}_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1}[(1+r_t)(1-\mu_t)(a_t^i + y_t^i) - (1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t + \bar{y}_{t+1}] \\
Var_t[c_{t+1}^i] &= \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2
\end{aligned}$$

Applying MGF of normal distributions,

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln E_t[e^{-\gamma c_{t+1}^i}] &= E_t[-\gamma c_{t+1}^i] + \frac{Var_t[-\gamma c_{t+1}^i]}{2} \\
&= -\gamma E_t[c_{t+1}^i] + \frac{\gamma^2 Var_t[c_{t+1}^i]}{2} \\
&= -\gamma \mathcal{C}_{t+1} - \gamma \mu_{t+1}[(1+r_t)(1-\mu_t)(a_t^i + y_t^i) - (1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t + \bar{y}_{t+1}] + \frac{\gamma^2 \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2}
\end{aligned}$$

Substituting into the logged Euler equation,

$$-\gamma[\mathcal{C}_t + \mu_t(a_t^i + y_t^i)] = \ln \beta(1+r_t) - \gamma \mathcal{C}_{t+1} - \gamma \mu_{t+1}[(1+r_t)(1-\mu_t)(a_t^i + y_t^i) - (1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t + \bar{y}_{t+1}] + \frac{\gamma^2 \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2}$$

Matching coefficients on $(a_t^i + y_t^i)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
-\gamma \mu_t &= -\gamma \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)(1-\mu_t) \\
\mu_t(1 + \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)) &= \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t) \\
\mu_t &= \frac{\mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)}{1 + \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)}
\end{aligned}$$

Matching constant coefficients:

$$\begin{aligned}
-\gamma \mathcal{C}_t &= \ln \beta(1+r_t) - \gamma \mathcal{C}_{t+1} + \gamma \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)\mathcal{C}_t + \gamma \bar{y}_{t+1} + \frac{\gamma^2 \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2} \\
\mathcal{C}_t[1 + \mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)] &= -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \beta(1+r_t) + \mathcal{C}_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1} \bar{y}_{t+1} - \frac{\gamma \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2}
\end{aligned}$$

2. *Carefully derive equations 4.1-4.4 in the paper.*

Linearizing (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), and (2.2)

$$\mu_t = \frac{\mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)}{1+\mu_{t+1}(1+r_t)} \quad (4)$$

$$y_t = y_{t+1} - \frac{\ln \beta(1+r_t)}{\gamma} - \frac{\gamma \mu_{t+1}^2 \sigma_{y,t+1}^2}{2} + g_t - g_{t+1} \quad (5)$$

$$\Psi \Pi_t (\Pi_t - 1) = 1 - \theta(1 - mc_t) + \Psi (\Pi_{t+1} - 1) \Pi_{t+1} \left[\frac{1}{1+r_t} \frac{x_{t+1}}{x_t} \right] \quad (6)$$

$$1 + i_t = (1+r) \Pi_t^{\Phi_\pi} \geq 1 \quad (7)$$

around the flexible price level of output $y^* = 1$, $\mu = \frac{r}{1+r}$, and $\Pi = 1$, we get

$$\hat{y}_t = \Theta \hat{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\gamma} (i_t - \pi_{t+1}) - \Lambda \hat{\mu}_{t+1} \quad (8)$$

$$\hat{\mu}_t = \tilde{\beta} \hat{\mu}_{t+1} + \tilde{\beta} (i_t - \pi_{t+1}) \quad (9)$$

$$\pi_t = \tilde{\beta} \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t \quad (10)$$

$$i_t = \Phi_\pi \pi_t \quad (11)$$

where

$$\Theta = 1 - \frac{\gamma \mu^2}{2} \frac{d\sigma^2(y^*)}{dy}$$

$$\Lambda = \gamma \mu^2 \sigma_y^2(y^*)$$

$$\tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{1+r}$$

κ denotes the slope of the linearized Phillips curve, and \hat{y}_t , $\hat{\mu}_t$, i_t , and π_t denote the log deviation of y_t , μ_t , $1+i_t$, and Π_t from their steady state values.

2 Werning (2015)

1. Carefully derive Proposition 5 in the paper.

Proposition 5. *Suppose utilities satisfy are log utility, household income satisfies $\gamma_t^i(s, Y) = \tilde{\gamma}_t^i(s)Y$ (i.e., proportional to aggregate income) and borrowing constraints satisfy $B_t^i(s, Y) = \tilde{B}_t^i(s)Y$ (i.e., also proportional to aggregate income). In addition, suppose initial bond holdings are zero $b_0^i = 0$ for all households. Then $\{C_t, R_t\}$ is part of an equilibrium if and only if*

$$U'(C_t) = \beta_t R_t U'(C_{t+1}) \quad (12)$$

for some sequence of discount factors $\{\beta_t\}$, independent of both $\{R_t\}$ and $\{C_t\}$.

I follow Werning's discussion following the proposition.

First, we can construct the discount factors β_t and household allocation by considering a “reference” equilibrium where aggregate income is constant $\tilde{Y}_t = 1$. This equilibrium includes interest rates $\{\tilde{R}_t\}$, household consumption and wealth $\{\tilde{c}(s^t; a_0), \tilde{a}(s^t; a_0)\}$, and asset prices are the discounted value of future dividends $\tilde{q}_t = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\tilde{R}_t \tilde{R}_{t+1} \dots \tilde{R}_{t+1+s})^{-1} \tilde{d}_{t+1+s}$. Define $\beta_t \equiv \frac{1}{\tilde{R}_t}$. The aggregate euler equation (12) holds trivially:

$$\begin{aligned} U'(\tilde{C}_t) &= \beta_t \tilde{R}_t U'(\tilde{C}_{t+1}) \\ \iff U'(\tilde{Y}_t) &= \frac{1}{\tilde{R}_t} \tilde{R}_t U'(\tilde{Y}_{t+1}) \\ \iff U'(1) &= U'(1) \end{aligned}$$

We can now consider another sequence $\{C_t, R_t\}$ that satisfies (12) and guess the equilibrium objects and verify that equilibrium conditions hold. We can guess that household i consumption and wealth, interest rates, and asset prices are the following:

$$\begin{aligned} c^i(s^t; a_0) &\equiv \tilde{c}^i(s^t; a_0) C_t \\ a^i(s^t; a_0) &\equiv \tilde{a}^i(s^t; a_0) C_t \\ R_t &\equiv \tilde{R}_t \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \\ q_t &\equiv \tilde{q}_t C_t \end{aligned}$$

For the household Euler equation, start with the household Euler equation in the reference equilibrium:

$$\begin{aligned}
& U'(\tilde{c}^i(s^t; a_0)) \geq \beta \tilde{R}_t E_t[U'(\tilde{c}^i(s^{t+1}; a_0))] \\
\iff & U'(\tilde{c}^i(s^t; a_0)) \frac{C_t}{C_t} \geq \beta \tilde{R}_t E_t \left[U'(\tilde{c}^i(s^{t+1}; a_0)) \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t+1}} \right] \\
\iff & U'(c^i(s^t; a_0)) \geq \beta \frac{\tilde{R}_t C_{t+1}}{C_t} E_t \left[U'(c^i(s^{t+1}; a_0)) \right] \\
\iff & U'(c^i(s^t; a_0)) \geq \beta R_t E_t[U'(c^i(s^{t+1}; a_0))]
\end{aligned}$$