ECON 714A - Problem Set 4

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This problem asks you to solve a model of oligopolistic competition from Atkeson and Burstein (AER 2008), which extends the Dixit-Stiglitz setup and is widely used to analyze heterogeneous markups and incomplete pass-through.

Consider a static model with a continuum of sectors $k \in [0,1]$ and $i=1,...N_k$ firms in sector k, each producing a unique variety of the good. Households supply inelastically one unit of labor and have nested-CES preferences:

$$C = \left(\int C_k^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}, C_k = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \theta > \rho \ge 1.$$

Production function of firm i in sector k is given by $Y_{ik} = A_{ik}L_{ik}$.

1. Solve household cost minimization problem for the optimal demand C_{ik} , the sectoral price index P_k , and the aggregate price index P as functions of producers' prices.

Notice that labor is inelastically supplied. The household cost minization problem is:

$$\min_{\{C_{ik}\}} \int \sum_{i=1}^{N_k} P_{ik} C_{ik} dk$$
s.t. $C = \left(\int C_k^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} dk\right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$
and $C_k = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$

Define the legrange multiplers with P and P_k :

$$\mathcal{L} = \int \sum_{i=1}^{N_k} P_{ik} C_{ik} dk + P \left[C - \left(\int C_k^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \right] + \int P_k \left[C_k - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right] dk$$

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FOC $[C_k]$:

$$P_{k} = P \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \left(\int C_{k}^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}} \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} C_{k}^{\frac{-1}{\rho}}$$

$$\implies P_{k} = P \left(\int C_{k}^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}} C_{k}^{\frac{-1}{\rho}}$$

$$\implies P_{k} = P C^{\frac{1}{\rho}} C_{k}^{\frac{-1}{\rho}}$$

$$\implies C_{k} = \left(\frac{P_{k}}{P} \right)^{-\rho} C$$

Substituting into the constraint, we get the aggregate price index and aggregate consumption in terms of the sectoral price indexes:

$$C = \left(\int \left(\left(\frac{P_k}{P} \right)^{-\rho} C \right)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

$$\implies 1 = \left(\int \left(\frac{P_k}{P} \right)^{1-\rho} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

$$\implies 1 = P^{-\rho} \left(\int P_k^{1-\rho} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

$$\implies P = \left(\int P_k^{1-\rho} dk \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

$$\implies C_k = \left(\frac{P_k}{(\int P_k^{1-\rho} dk)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}} \right)^{-\rho} C$$

We can rewrite the legrangian as:

$$\mathcal{L} = \int \sum_{i=1}^{N_k} P_{ik} C_{ik} dk + P \left[C - \left(\int \left(\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} dk \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \right] + \int P_k \left[C_k - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right] dk$$

FOC $[C_{ik}]$:

$$\begin{split} P_{ik} &= P \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \Biggl(\int \left(\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}} \right)^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} - 1} \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} \Biggl(\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}} \right)^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} - 1} \\ &\times \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \Biggl(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} - 1} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} - 1 + P_k \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \Biggl(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} - 1} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} - 1} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} - 1} \Biggr)$$

$$\implies P_{ik} = P \Biggl(\int C_k^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} dk \Biggr)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \frac{1}{\rho}} \Biggl(C_k \Biggr)^{\frac{-1}{\rho}} \Biggl(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} C_{ik}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + P_k \Biggl(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} C_{ik}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} C_{ik}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} C_{ik}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} C_{ik}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} C_{ik}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}} \Biggr)$$

$$\Longrightarrow P_{ik} = P_{ik} \sum_{\theta - 1} \left(\frac{1}{\theta} \left(\frac{1}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}} \Biggr)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}$$

Substituting in the FOC based on C_k :

$$C_{ik} = \left(\frac{P_{ik}}{P(\frac{(\frac{P_k}{P})^{-\rho}C}{C})^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} + P_k}\right)^{-\theta} C_k \implies C_{ik} = \left(\frac{P_{ik}}{2P_k}\right)^{-\theta} C_k$$

Substituting into the constraint:

$$C_k = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} \left(\left(\frac{P_{ik}}{2P_k}\right)^{-\theta} C_k \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$$

$$\implies 1 = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} \left(\left(\frac{P_{ik}}{2P_k}\right)^{-\theta} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$$

$$\implies (2P_k)^{1-\theta} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_k} \left(P_{ik}\right)^{1-\theta}$$

$$\implies P_k = \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_k} P_{ik}^{1-\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$$

- 2. Assume that firms compete a la Bertrand, i.e. choose P_{ik} taking the prices of other firms in a sector P_{jk} , $j \neq i$ as given. Derive demand elasticity for a given firm and the optimal price.
- 3. Prove that other things equal, firms with higher A_{ik} set higher markups.

4. Assume that $\rho = 1, \theta = 5, N_k = 20, and \log A_{ik} \sim i.i.d.N(0,1)$. Solve the model numerically by approximating the number of sectors with K = 100,000. You will need an efficient algorithm to compute a sectoral equilibrium (search for a fixed point, do not use "solve") nested in a general equilibrium loop solving for real wages.

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5. Compute the aggregate output C of the economy and compare it to the first-best value.

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6. Bonus task: Does the sectoral equilibrium converge to the one under Betrand competition with homogeneous goods in the limit $\infty \to \infty$?

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