ECON 711 - PS 2

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Question 1. Convex production sets, concave production functions, convex costs

Consider a production function $f: \mathbb{R}^m_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ for a single-output firm.

(a) Prove that if the production set $Y = \{(q, -z) : f(z) \ge q\} \subset \mathbb{R}^{m+1}$ is convex, the production function f is concave.

Proof: Choose $(q,-z), (q',-z') \in Y$ such that f(z) = q and f(z') = q'. The convexity of Y implies that $t(q,-z) + (1-t)(q',-z') \in Y$ for $t \in (0,1)$. Thus, $f(tz+(1-t)z') \ge tq+(1-t)q'$ by the definition of Y. Our choice of $(q,-z), (q',-z') \implies f(tz+(1-t)z') \ge tf(z)+(1-t)f(z')$. Therefore, f is concave. \Box

(b) Prove that if f concave, the cost function

$$c(q, w) = \min w \cdot z$$
 subject to $f(z) \ge q$

is convex in q.

Proof: Fixing $w \in \mathbb{R}^k_+$, choose $q, q' \in \mathbb{R}$. Define $z \in Z^*(q, w), z' \in Z^*(q', w)$, and $\tilde{z} \in Z^*(tq + (1 - t)q', w)$ for $t \in (0, 1)$. By the concavity of f,

$$\tilde{z} \leq tz + (1-t)z'$$

$$\implies w\tilde{z} \leq w(tz + (1-t)z')$$

$$\implies w\tilde{z} \leq twz + (1-t)wz')$$

$$\implies c(f(\tilde{z}), w) \leq tc(f(z), w) + (1-t)c(f(z'), w)$$

$$\implies c(tq + (1-t)q', w) \leq tc(q, w) + (1-t)c(q', w)$$

Therefore, c is convex. \square

^{*}I worked on this problem set with a study group of Michael Nattinger, Andrew Smith, Tyler Welch, and Ryan Mather. I also discussed problems with Emily Case, Sarah Bass, and Danny Edgel.


Question 2. Solving for the profit function given technology...

Let k = 2, and let the production set be

$$Y = \{(y_1, y_2) : y_1 \le 0 \text{ and } y_2 \le B(-y_1)^{\frac{2}{3}}\}$$

where B > 0 is a known constant. Assume both prices are strictly positive.

(a) Draw Y, or describe it clearly.



y_1

(b) Solve the firm's profit maximization problem to find $\pi(p)$ and $Y^*(p)$.

The firm's profit is

$$\pi(p) = \max_{y_1, y_2 \in Y} \{ p_1 y_1 + p_2 y_2 \}$$

Define $z = -y_1$. Notice that the firm will produce $y_2 = Bz^{2/3}$ because it is the maximum output given z units of input. Thus, we can rewrite the firm's profit function as

$$\pi(p) = \max_{z} \{ p_1(-z) + p_2 B z^{2/3} \} = \max_{z} \{ p_2 B z^{2/3} - p_1 z \}$$

Setting the first order condition of the profit function to zero:

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial z} = p_2(2/3)Bz^{-1/3} - p_1$$
$$z^* = \left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3$$

Plugging z^* into transformations for y_1, y_2 :

$$y_1^* = -\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3$$
$$y_2^* = B\left(\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3\right)^{2/3}$$
$$= B^3\left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2$$

Notice that $Y^*(p)$ is single-valued:

$$Y^*(p) = \left\{ (y_1, y_2) : y_1 = -\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3, y_2 = B^3\left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2 \right\} \implies y(p) = \left(-\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3, B^3\left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2\right)$$

Thus, the profit function is

$$\pi(p) = p_1 \left(-\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3 \right) + p_2 \left(B^3 \left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2 \right)$$

$$= \frac{B^3 p_2^3}{p_1^2} \left(\frac{2^2}{3^2} - \frac{2^3}{3^3}\right)$$

$$= \frac{4B^3 p_2^3}{27p_1^2}$$

(c) Since $Y^*(p)$ is single-valued, I'll refer to it below as y(p). Verify that $\pi(\cdot)$ is homogeneous of degree 1, and $y(\cdot)$ is homogeneous of degree 0.

For $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$:

$$\pi(\alpha p) = \frac{4B^3(\alpha p_2)^3}{27(\alpha p_1)^2}$$

$$= \alpha \frac{4B^3(p_2)^3}{27(p_1)^2}$$

$$y(\alpha p) = \left(-\left(\frac{2(\alpha p_2)B}{3(\alpha p_1)}\right)^3, B^3\left(\frac{2(\alpha p_2)}{3(\alpha p_1)}\right)^2\right)$$

$$= \left(-\left(\frac{2p_2B}{3p_1}\right)^3, B^3\left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2\right)$$

(d) Verify that $y_1(p) = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial p_1}(p)$ and $y_2(p) = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial p_2}(p)$.

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial p_1}(p) &= \frac{4B^3 p_2^3}{27 p_1^3}(-2) \\ &= -\frac{8B^3 p_2^3}{27 p_1^3} \\ &= -\left(\frac{2p_2 B}{3p_1}\right)^3 \\ &= y_1(p) \\ \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial p_2}(p) &= \frac{4B^3 p_2^2}{27 p_1^2}(3) \\ &= \frac{4B^3 p_2^2}{9p_1^2} \\ &= B^3 \left(\frac{2p_2}{3p_1}\right)^2 \\ &= y_2(p) \end{split}$$

(e) Calculate $D_p y(p)$, and verify it is symmetric, positive semidefinite, and $[D_p y]p = 0$

$$D_{p}y(p) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial y_{1}}{\partial p_{1}}(p) & \frac{\partial y_{2}}{\partial p_{1}}(p) \\ \frac{\partial y_{1}}{\partial p_{2}}(p) & \frac{\partial y_{2}}{\partial p_{2}}(p) \end{pmatrix}$$
$$= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{8p_{2}^{3}B^{3}}{9p_{1}^{4}} & \frac{-8p_{2}^{2}B^{3}}{9p_{1}^{3}} \\ \frac{-8p_{2}^{2}B^{3}}{9p_{1}^{3}} & \frac{8p_{2}B^{3}}{9p_{1}^{2}} \end{pmatrix}$$

Since both off diagonal elements of $D_p y(p)$ equal $\frac{-8p_2^2B^3}{9p_1^3}$, $D_p y(p)$ is symmetric.

$$B > 0, p_1 > 0, p_2 > 0 \implies \frac{8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^4} > 0$$

$$\det D_p y(p) = \frac{8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^4} \frac{8p_2 B^3}{9p_1^2} - \frac{-8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3} \frac{-8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3}$$
$$= \frac{64p_2^4 B^6}{81p_1^6} - \frac{64p_2^4 B^6}{81p_1^6}$$
$$= 0$$

Therefore, $D_p y(p)$ is positive semidefinite.

$$[D_p y] p = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^4} & \frac{-8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3} \\ \frac{-8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3} & \frac{8p_2 B^3}{9p_1^2} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^3} + \frac{-8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^3} + \frac{-8p_2^3 B^3}{9p_1^3} \\ \frac{-8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3} + \frac{8p_2^2 B^3}{9p_1^3} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Question 3 ... and recovering technology from the profit function

Finally, suppose we didn't know a firm's production set Y, but did know its profit function was $\pi(p)Ap_1^{-2}p_2^3$ for all $p_1, p_2 > 0$ and A > 0 a known constant.

- (a) What conditions must hold for this profit function to be rationalizable? (You don't need to check them.)
- (b) Recall that the outer bound was defined as $Y^O = \{y: p \cdot y \leq \pi(p) \text{ for all } p \in P\}$. In this case, this is $Y^O = \{(y_1, y_2): p_1y_1 + p_2y_2 \leq Ap_1^{-2}p_2^3 \text{ for all } (p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_{++}\}$. Show that any $y \in Y^O$ must have $y_1 \leq 0$, i.e., that good 1 must be an input only.
- (c) Dividing both sides by p_2 and moving $\frac{p_1}{p_2}y_1$ to the right-hand side, we can rewrite Y^O as $Y^O = \{(y_1,y_2): y_2 \leq Ap_1^{-2}p_2^3 \frac{p_1}{p_2}y_1 \text{ for all } (p_1,p_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_{++}\}$. Since the expression on the right depends only on the price ratio $\frac{p_2}{p_1}$ rather than the two individual prices, we can let $r \equiv \frac{p_2}{p_1} > 0$ denote this ratio, and write Y^O as $Y_O = \{(y_1,y_2): y_2 \leq Ar^2 \frac{y_1}{r} \text{ for all } r \in \mathbb{R}_{++}\} = \{(y_1,y_2): y_2 \leq \min_{r>0} (Ar^2 \frac{y_1}{r})\}$. Solve this minimization problem, and describe the production set Y^O .
- (d) Verify that a production set Y equal to the set Y^O you just calculated would generate the "data" $\pi(p) = Ap_1^{-2}p_2^3$ that we started with. [Hint: $2^{-2/3} + 2^{1/3} = \frac{27}{4}$].