## ECON 712 - PS 3

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- 1. Consider the following overlapping generations problem. In each period t=1,2,3,... a new generation of 2 period lived households are born. Each generation has a unitary mass. There is a unit measure of initial old who are endowed with  $\bar{M}>0$  units of fiat money. Each generation is endowed with  $w_1$  in youth and  $w_2$  in old age of non-storable consumption goods where  $w_1>w_2$ . There is no commitment technology to enforce trades. The utility function of a household of generation  $t\geq 1$  is  $U(c_t^t,c_{t+1}^t)=\ln(c_t^t)+\ln(c_{t+1}^t)$  where  $(c_t^t,c_{t+1}^t)$  is consumption of a household of generation t in youth (i.e., in period t) and old age (i.e., in period t+1). The preference of the initial old are given by  $U(c_1^0)=\ln(c_1^0)$  where  $c_1^0$  is consumption by a household of the initial old.
- (a) State and solve the planner problem.

In any period t, the social planner weights agents alive equally and optimally allocates resources between them given preferences and technologies:

$$\max_{\substack{(c_t^t, c_t^{t-1}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2}} \ln(c_t^t) + \ln(c_t^{t-1})$$
 s.t.  $c_t^t + c_t^{t-1} \le w_1 + w_2$ 

Since utility is strictly increasing in consumption, we know that the maximum will occur at  $c_t^t + c_t^{t-1} = w_1 + w_2 \implies c_t^{t-1} = w_1 + w_2 - c_t^t$ . Thus, we can write the social planner's problem as an unconstrained maximization problem:

$$\max_{c_t^t \in \mathbb{R}_+} \ln(c_t^t) + \ln(w_1 + w_2 - c_t^t)$$

Setting the first order condition to zero:

$$\frac{1}{c_t^t} - \frac{1}{w_1 + w_2 - c_t^t} = 0$$

$$\implies c_t^t = \frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}$$

Plugging the solution into the equation for the consumption of old agents:

$$c_t^{t-1} = w_1 + w_2 - \frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}$$
$$= \frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}$$

<sup>\*</sup>I worked on this problem set with a study group of Michael Nattinger, Andrew Smith, and Ryan Mather. I also discussed problems with Emily Case, Sarah Bass, and Danny Edgel.

(b) State the representative household's problem in period  $t \ge 0$ . Try to write the budget constraints in real terms.

I break the household problem into the problem facing an initial old agent and the problem facing agents born in period t > 0. Let  $p_t$  be the number of dollar per unit of consumption good in period t. Define  $m_{t+1}^t \in \mathbb{R}_+$  as the monetary holdings of the generation born in t between periods t and t + 1.

The problem facing the initial old agents is:

$$\max_{c_1^0 \in \mathbb{R}_+} \ln(c_1^0)$$
s.t.  $c_1^0 \le w_2 + \frac{\bar{M}}{p_1}$ 

The problem facing agents born in period t > 0 is:

$$\max_{\substack{(c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \\ \text{s.t. } c_t^t \leq w_1 - \frac{m_{t+1}^t}{p_t}}} \ln(c_t^t) + \ln(c_{t+1}^t)$$

$$c_{t+1}^t \leq w_1 - \frac{m_{t+1}^t}{p_t}$$

$$c_{t+1}^t \leq w_2 + \frac{m_{t+1}^t}{p_{t+1}}$$

- (c) Define and solve for an autarkic equilibrium, assuming that it exists.
- (d) Define and solve for a competitive equilibrium assuming valued money but with  $w_2 = 0$ .
- (e) Compare the solutions to the planners problem, the autarky equilibrium and the stationary monetary competitive equilibrium with valued money, all with  $w_2 = 0$ .
- (f) What happens to consumption, money demand and prices in a competitive equilibrium with valued money if the initial money supply is halved, i.e.  $\bar{M}' = \frac{\bar{M}}{2}$ . Keep the assumption that  $w_2 = 0$ .
- 2. Plot the trade offer curves for the following utility functions where the endowment is  $(w_1, w_2)$  for goods 1 and 2, respectively.

(a) 
$$U = 10c_1 - 4c_1^2 + 4c_2 - c_2^2, (w_1, w_2) = (0, 2)$$

(b) 
$$U = \min 2c_1 + c_2, c_1 + 2c_2, (w1, w_2) = (1, 0)$$

(c) 
$$U = \min 2c_1 + c_2, c_1 + 2c_2, (w1, w_2) = (1, 10)$$