Notes on Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017)

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My notes follow the organization of the paper. Particular focus is on sections 3, 4, and 5. In creating these notes, I used the online appendix for the original paper. The appendix has notes from Job's lecture on related papers, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Boerma and Karabarbounis (2021).

1 Introduction

- What is the optimal degree of progressivity of tax/transfer system?

- Reasons for more progressivity

  - Counteracts inequality in initial conditions
  - Substitutes for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk

- Reasons for less progressivity

  - Reduces incentives to work
  - Reduces incentives to invest in skills

- Develop general equilibrium model with these four trade-offs

- Results for U.S. calibration:

  - Baseline model indicates current system is too progressive
  - Adding that poverty constrains skill investment indicates the current system is close to optimal

2 Tax Function

- Tax revenue for pre-tax income y is

$$T(y) = y - \lambda y^{1-\tau} \tag{1}$$

- After-tax income $\tilde{y}_i$ for pre-tax income y_i

$$\tilde{y}_i = y_i - T(y_i)$$
$$= y_i - y_i + \lambda y_i^{1-\tau}$$
$$= \lambda y_i^{1-\tau} \tag{2}$$

Thus, $1 - \tau$ is elasticity of after-tax income to pre-tax income.

- If $\tau > 0$ then marginal rates exceed average rates (progressive), if $\tau < 0$, marginal rates are smaller than average rates (regressive), and, if $\tau = 0$, marginal rates and average are the same $\implies$ flat tax.

$$\frac{1 - T'(y_i)}{1 - \frac{T(y_i)}{y_i}} = \frac{1 - (1 - \lambda(1-\tau)y^{-\tau})}{1 - (1 - \lambda y^{-\tau})}$$
$$= 1 - \tau \tag{3}$$

- With balanced budget $gY = \int T(y_i)di$, so income-weighted marginal rate is

$$\int T'(y_i)\left(\frac{y_i}{Y}\right)di = \int (1 - (1-\tau)\lambda y_i^{-\tau})\left(\frac{y_i}{Y}\right)di$$
$$= \frac{1}{Y}\int y_i di - (1-\tau)\frac{1}{Y}\int \lambda y_i^{1-\tau}di$$
$$= 1 - (1-\tau)\frac{1}{Y}\int y_i - T(y_i)di$$
$$= 1 - (1-\tau)\frac{1}{Y}(Y - gY)$$
$$= 1 - (1-\tau)(1-g) \tag{4}$$

2.1 Empirical Fit

2.2 Robustness

2.3 Discussion

3 Economic Environment

- Economy is steady state, so time subscripts omitted.

3.1 Demographics

- Agents indexed by $i = [0,1]$.

- Yaari perpetual youth structure:

  - At every age a, an agent survives to next period with probability $\delta < 1$.
  - Each period newborn agents of size $1 - \delta$ enter economy.

3.2 Life Cycle

- At beginning of live, agent i chooses initial investment in skills s_i.

- Agent i then enters labor market and faces random fluctuations in labor productivity z_i.

- Every period, agent i chooses hours of work $h_i \geq 0$ and consumption of private good c_i.

3.3 Technology

- $\theta > 1$ denotes elasticity of substitution across skill types

- $N(s)$ denotes average effective hours worked by individuals with skill type s

- $m(s)$ denotes the density of individuals with skill type s

- Output Y is constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of effective hours supplied by continuum of skill types $s \in [0, \infty)$:

$$Y = \left(\int_0^\infty [N(s) \cdot m(s)]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} ds \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \tag{5}$$

- Marginal product from an additional unit of effective hours of skill type s is

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial N(s)} = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \left(\int_0^\infty [N(s) \cdot m(s)]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} ds \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}-1}$$

$$= \left(\frac{Y}{N(s) \cdot m(s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

- Resource constraint is

$$Y = \int_0^1 c_i di + G \tag{6}$$

3.4 Preferences

- β is the "pure" discount factor

- Agent i has preferences over private consumption, hours worked, public goods, and skill investment effort:

$$U_i = -v_i(s_i) + (1 - \beta\delta) E_0 \sum_{a=0}^\infty (\beta\delta)^a u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G) \tag{7}$$

where expectations are taken over the future idiosyncratic productivity shocks.

- $\psi \geq 0$ denotes the elasticity of skill investment wrt to the return to skill

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- $\kappa_i \geq 0$ is an individual-specific parameter that determine the utility cost of acquiring skills (larger $\kappa_i \implies$ the skills are cheaper, so κ_i can be thought of as learning ability); κ_i is assumed to be distributed exponential with parameter η: $\kappa_i \sim Exp(\eta)$

- The disutility of the initial skill investment $s_i \geq 0$ is

$$v_i(s_i) = \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \kappa_i^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} s_i^{\frac{1+\psi}{\psi}} \tag{8}$$

- Let $\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi_i]$ be the disutility of work effort with $\varphi_i \sim N(\frac{v_\varphi}{2}, v_\varphi)$ and κ_i and φ_i are uncorrelated.

- Let $\sigma > 0$ determine aversion to hours fluctuations

- Let $\chi \geq 0$ measure the taste for public goods relative to private consumption goods

- The period utility function

$$u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G) = \log c_{ia} - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi_i]}{1+\sigma}(h_{ia})^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \tag{9}$$

- Define the tax-modified Frisch elasticity $\hat{\sigma}$ as:

$$\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} \equiv \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau} \tag{10}$$

3.5 Labor Productivity and Earnings

- Log labor efficiency z_{ia} is sum of a random walk and orthogonal white noise

$$\log z_{ia} = \alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia} \tag{11}$$
$$\text{where } \alpha_{ia} = \alpha_{i,a-1} + \omega_{ia}$$
$$\omega_{ia} \sim^{iid} N(-\frac{v_w}{2}, v_w)$$
$$\alpha_{i0} = 0$$
$$\varepsilon_{ia} \sim^{iid} N(-\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}, v_\varepsilon)$$

- Individual earnings y_{ia} is the product of the equilibrium price for labor from skill type s_i, individual labor productivity, and the number of hours worked.

$$y_{ia} = p(s_i) \times \exp(\alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia}) \times h_{ia} \tag{12}$$

3.6 Financial Assets

- Partial insurance structure with ε shocks fully insurable but α shocks are not

- Full set of state-contingent claims indexed by the ε shocks.

- Let $B(\mathbf{E})$ and $Q(\mathbf{E})$ denote the quantity and the price of insurance claims purchased that pay one unit of consumption iff $\varepsilon \in \mathbf{E} \subset \mathbb{R}$.

- Insurance claims in zero net supply and newborn agents start with zero initial holdings

- Notice special cases of autarky with $v_\varepsilon = 0$ and full insurance with $v_\omega = 0$

3.7 Markets

- Competitive market for final consumption good, all types of labor services, and financial claims.

- Final consumption good is numeraire

3.8 Government

- Government chooses (g, τ) where g is government consumption as fraction of aggregate output and τ determines the degree of progressivity of the tax system.

- Given (g, τ), the average level of taxation λ balances its budget:

$$G \equiv gY = g \int_0^1 y_i di = \int_0^1 (y_i - \lambda y_i^{1-\tau}) di \tag{13}$$

3.9 Agent's Problem

- At $a = 0$, given (κ_i, φ_i), agent chooses a skill level given. FOC of (??) wrt s_i

$$\frac{\partial v_i(s_i)}{\partial s_i} = (1 - \beta\delta) E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^a \frac{\partial u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G)}{\partial s_i}$$

In words, the marginal disutility of skill investment must equal the present discounted value of the higher associated expected lifetime wages. The derivative of (??) is

$$\frac{\partial v_i(s_i)}{\partial s_i} = \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \frac{1+\psi}{\psi} \kappa_i^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} s_i^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = \left(\frac{s_i}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}}$$

Combining

$$\left(\frac{s_i}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = (1 - \beta\delta) E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^a \frac{\partial u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G)}{\partial s_i} \tag{14}$$

- At $a > 0$, timing is:

  1. ω_{ia} realized
  2. Insurance market for ε shocks opens and individual buys claims $B(\cdot)$
  3. ε_{ia} is realized
  4. Chooses hours h_{ia}, receives y_{ia}, pays taxes, and chooses private consumption c_{ia}

- When insurance purchases are made (middle of period), budget constraint is

$$\int_E Q(\varepsilon) B(\varepsilon) d\varepsilon = 0 \tag{15}$$

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- When paying taxes and choosing consumption (end of period), budget constraint is

$$c_{ia} = y_{ia} - T(y_{ia}) + B(\varepsilon_{ia})$$

$$= y_{ia} - y_{ia} + \lambda y_{ia}^{1-\tau} + B(\varepsilon_{ia})$$

$$= \lambda[p(s_i)\exp(\alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia})h_{ia}]^{1-\tau} + B(\varepsilon_{ia}) \tag{16}$$

- Thus, given s_i, an agent solves

$$\max_{\{c_{ia},h_{ia}\}_{a=1,\dots,\infty}} E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^a u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G)$$

$$\text{s.t. } 0 = \int_E Q(\varepsilon)B(\varepsilon)d\varepsilon$$

$$c_{ia} = \lambda[p(s_i)\exp(\alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia})h_{ia}]^{1-\tau} + B(\varepsilon_{ia})$$

3.10   A Special Case: The Representative Agent's Problem

- Consider the representative agent case of this model.

- The rep agent problem entails no cross-sectional dispersion in disutility of work effort ($v_\varphi = 0$), no idiosyncratic labor efficiency permanent shocks ($v_\omega = 0$), no idiosyncratic labor efficiency transitory shocks ($v_\varepsilon = 0$), and perfectly elastic production across skill types ($\theta = \infty$).

- The relevant state variable for the general model is the skill investment and the current level of the productivity random walk, but the rep agent both are degenerate, thus the rep agent problem a static consumption/leisure choice where (λ, g, τ) are given:

$$\max_{C,H} \log C - \frac{H^{1+\sigma}}{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \tag{17}$$

$$\text{s.t. } C = \lambda H^{1-\tau}$$

$$\implies \max_H \log(\lambda H^{1-\tau}) - \frac{H^{1+\sigma}}{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G$$

- FOC wrt H

$$\frac{(1-\tau)\lambda H^{-\tau}}{\lambda H^{1-\tau}} = H^\sigma$$

$$\implies (1-\tau) = H^{\sigma+1}$$

$$\implies \log H^{RA}(\tau) = \frac{1}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) \tag{18}$$

Taking logs of both sides of the budget constraint and substituting:

$$\log C^{RA}(g, \tau, \lambda) = \log \lambda + (1-\tau)\log H^{RA}(\tau)$$

$$= \log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) \tag{19}$$

- With degenerate skill distribution, aggregate output equals aggregate hours $Y = H$. The government budget constraint implies

$$G = gY = gH = Y - \lambda Y^{1-\tau} = H - \lambda H^{1-\tau}$$
$$\implies g = 1 - \lambda H^{-\tau}$$
$$\implies \lambda(g, \tau) = H^\tau(1 - g)$$

Substituting into (**??**),

$$
\begin{aligned}
\log C^{RA}(g, \tau) &= \log C^{RA}(g, \tau, \lambda(g, \tau)) \\
&= \log(H^\tau(1 - g)) + \frac{1 - \tau}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) \\
&= \tau \log(H) + \log(1 - g) + \frac{1 - \tau}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) \\
&= \tau \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) + \log(1 - g) + \frac{1 - \tau}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) \\
&= \log(1 - g) + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau)
\end{aligned}
$$

- More progressivity lowers rep agent labor supply:

$$\frac{\partial \log H^{RA}(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{-1}{(1 + \sigma)(1 - \tau)} < 0$$

- More progressivity lowers rep agent consumption:

$$\frac{\partial \log C^{RA}(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{-1}{(1 + \sigma)(1 - \tau)} < 0$$

- At high enough levels of progressivity, the rep agent stops working

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lim_{\tau \to 1} H^{RA}(\tau) &= \lim_{\tau \to 1} \max\{0, \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau)\} \\
&= \max\{0, -\infty\} \\
&= 0
\end{aligned}
$$

4 Equilibrium

- Recursive formulation to define stationary competitive equilibrium

- Individual state variables:

    - (κ, φ) for skill accumulation decision at $a = 0$
    - (φ, α, s) for beginning-of-period insurance claims purchasing decisions
    - $(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, \bar{B})$ for end-of-period consumption and labor supply decisions where $\bar{B} = B(\varepsilon; \varphi, \alpha, s)$

- Given (g, τ), a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a tax level λ; asset prices $Q(\cdot)$; skill prices $p(s)$; decision rules $s(\kappa, \varepsilon), c(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, s), h(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, s)$, and $B(\cdot; \varphi, \alpha, s)$; and aggregate quantities $N(s)$ such that:

  1. HHs solve their problem and $s(\kappa, \varepsilon), c(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, s), h(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, s)$, and $B(\cdot; \varphi, \alpha, s)$ are the associated decision rules.

  2. Labor markets for each skill type clear and $p(s)$ is the value of the marginal product from an additional unit of effective hours of skill type s:

$$p(s) = \left(\frac{Y}{N(s) \cdot m(s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

  3. Asset markets clear, and the prices $Q(\cdot)$ of insurance claims are actuarially fair.

  4. Government budget constraint holds (i.e., λ satisfies (**??**)).

Proposition 1. *The equilibrium hours-worked allocation is*

$$\log h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau) = \log H^{RA}(\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} \varepsilon - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}(1 - \tau)} \mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau) \tag{20}$$

where $\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau) = \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - \tau(1 + \hat{\sigma}))}{\hat{\sigma}} \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}$. The consumption allocation is

$$\log c(\varphi, \alpha, s; g, \tau) = \log[C^{RA}(\tau)\vartheta(\tau)] + (1 - \tau)[\log p(s; \tau) + \alpha - \varphi] + \mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau) \tag{21}$$

where $\vartheta(\tau)$ is common across agents.

Proof of Proposition 1:

- The roadmap of the proof is to (1) separate the economy into "island" for each (φ, s, α), (2) solve the static "island planner problem", and (3) verify that this allocation satisfies the conditions of the CE. The intuition behind this result is that, since the market is complete wrt to ε, so the CE allocation is efficient, so it can be computed as the solution to an island-specific planner problem.

- Since each island transfers zero net financial wealth between periods and preferences are time separable, each island-specific planner problem is static.

- Island-specific resource constraint is island-aggregate consumption equals island-aggregate after-tax income:

$$\int_E c(\varepsilon) dF_\varepsilon = \lambda \int_E [p(s) \exp(\alpha + \varepsilon) h(\varepsilon)]^{1 - \tau} dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \lambda \int_E \exp[(1 - \tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha + \varepsilon)] h(\varepsilon)^{1 - \tau} dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \lambda \exp[(1 - \tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \int_E \exp[(1 - \tau)\varepsilon] h(\varepsilon)^{1 - \tau} dF_\varepsilon$$

- Taking (φ, s, α), (G, λ, τ), and $p(s)$ as given, the island planner problem is

$$\max_{\{c(\varepsilon), h(\varepsilon)\}} \int_E \left\{ \log c(\varepsilon) - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi]}{1+\sigma} h(\varepsilon)^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \right\} dF_\varepsilon$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \int_E c(\varepsilon) dF_\varepsilon = \lambda \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \int_E \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon] h(\varepsilon)^{1-\tau} dF_\varepsilon$$

- Let γ be the multiplier on the resource constraint. The lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = \int_E \left\{ \log c(\varepsilon) - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi]}{1+\sigma} h(\varepsilon)^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \right\} dF_\varepsilon$$

$$+ \gamma \left[\lambda \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \int_E \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon] h(\varepsilon)^{1-\tau} dF_\varepsilon - \int_E c(\varepsilon) dF_\varepsilon \right]$$

- FOC wrt $c(\varepsilon)$:

$$\frac{1}{c(\varepsilon)} = \gamma \implies c(\varepsilon) = c = \frac{1}{\gamma} \quad \forall \varepsilon$$

Thus, consumption is the same across agents on an island regardless of their realization of $\varepsilon \implies$ perfect consumption risk sharing

- FOC wrt $h(\varepsilon)$:

$$\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi] h(\varepsilon)^\sigma = \gamma \lambda (1-\tau) \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon] h(\varepsilon)^{-\tau}$$

$$\implies h(\varepsilon)^{\sigma+\tau} = \gamma \lambda (1-\tau) \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha) - (1+\sigma)\varphi] \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon]$$

$$\implies h(\varepsilon) = \gamma^{\frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}} [\lambda(1-\tau)]^{\frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}} \exp\left[\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi\right] \exp\left[\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon\right]$$

- Substituting both conditions into the resource constraint The resource constraint can be

expressed as

$$c = \lambda \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \int_E \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon] h(\varepsilon)^{1-\tau} dF_\varepsilon$$

$$\implies \gamma^{-1} = \lambda \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)]$$

$$\cdot \int_E \exp[(1-\tau)\varepsilon] \gamma^{\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}} [\lambda(1-\tau)]^{\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}}$$

$$\exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)^2}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{(1+\sigma)(1-\tau)}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi\right] \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)^2}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon\right] dF_\varepsilon$$

$$\implies \gamma^{\frac{-\sigma-1}{\sigma+\tau}} = \lambda^{\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}} (1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}} \exp[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha)] \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)^2}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{(1+\sigma)(1-\tau)}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi\right]$$

$$\cdot \int_E \exp\left[\left(\frac{(1-\tau)^2 + (1-\tau)(\sigma+\tau)}{\sigma+\tau}\right)\varepsilon\right] dF_\varepsilon$$

$$\gamma^{\frac{-\sigma-1}{\sigma+\tau}} = \lambda^{\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}} (1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}} \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{(1+\sigma)(1-\tau)}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi\right]$$

$$\cdot \int_E \exp\left[\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\right)\varepsilon\right] dF_\varepsilon$$

- Focusing in on the last term, we can solve using MGF of normal distribution:[1]

$$\int_E \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon\right] dF_\varepsilon = \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\frac{-v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\frac{(1-\tau)^2(1+\sigma)^2}{(\sigma+\tau)^2}v_\varepsilon\right]$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)^2(1+\sigma)^2}{(\sigma+\tau)^2} - \frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\right)\right]$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)^2(1+\sigma)^2 - (1-\tau)(1+\sigma)(\sigma+\tau)}{(\sigma+\tau)^2}\right)\right]$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)[(1-\tau)(1+\sigma) - (\sigma+\tau)]}{(\sigma+\tau)^2}\right)\right]$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)(1 - 2\tau - \tau\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)^2}\right)\right]$$

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[1]If $X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$, then $E[\exp(aX)] = \exp(a\mu + \frac{a^2\sigma^2}{2})$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*).

Plugging back into resource constraint:

$$\gamma^{\frac{-\sigma-1}{\sigma+\tau}} = \lambda^{\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}}(1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}} \exp\left[\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha - \varphi)\right]$$

$$\cdot \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)(1-2\tau-\tau\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)^2}\right)\right]$$

$$\implies \gamma^{-1} = \lambda(1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[(1-\tau)(\log p(s) + \alpha - \varphi)\right] \exp\left[\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-2\tau-\tau\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\right)\right]$$

$$\log c = \log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) + (1-\tau)[\log p(s) + \alpha - \varphi] + \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-2\tau-\tau\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\right)$$

- Defining the last term as $\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau)$:

$$\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau) = \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-2\tau-\tau\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\right)$$

$$= \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{1-2\tau-\tau\sigma}{\hat{\sigma}}\right)$$

$$= \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\left(\frac{1-\tau-\tau(1+\sigma)}{\hat{\sigma}}\right)$$

$$= \frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat{\sigma}))}{\hat{\sigma}}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}$$

- Recall that $\log C^{RA} = \log(1-g) + \frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau)$, so we can rewrite consumption as

$$\log c = \log[C^{RA}\vartheta] + (1-\tau)[\log p(s) + \alpha - \varphi] + \mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau)$$

where $\log \vartheta \equiv \log \lambda - \log(1-g) - \frac{\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau)$. This equation matches (**??**).

- Turning back to the intratemporal FOC and taking logs and substituting in consumption:

$$\log h(\varepsilon) = \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\log\gamma + \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\log\lambda + \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\log(1-\tau) + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon$$

$$= \frac{-1}{\sigma+\tau}\left[\log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) + (1-\tau)[\log p(s) + \alpha - \varphi] + \mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau)\right]$$

$$+ \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\log\lambda + \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\log(1-\tau) + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}(\log p(s) + \alpha) - \frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon$$

$$= \left[\frac{-1}{\sigma+\tau} + \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\right]\log\lambda + \left[\frac{-1(1-\tau)}{(\sigma+\tau)(1+\sigma)} + \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\right]\log(1-\tau)$$

$$+ \left[\frac{-(1-\tau)}{(\sigma+\tau)} + \frac{(1-\tau)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\right][\log p(s) + \alpha] + \left[\frac{-1(1-\tau)}{\sigma+\tau} - \frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau}\right]\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau)$$

$$= \frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon; \tau)$$

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- Recall that $\log H^{RA}(\tau) = \frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau)$, so this equation can be rewritten to match (**??**):

$$\log h(\varepsilon) = \log H^{RA}(\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\sigma+\tau}\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon;\tau)$$

$\square$

- With log utility and zero wealth, income and substitution effects on labor supply from different α and s exactly offset, so hours are independent of α and s

- Decompose hours into four terms:

$$\log h(\varphi,\varepsilon;\tau) = \underbrace{\log H^{RA}(\tau)}_{\text{rep agent hours}} - \underbrace{\varphi}_{\text{idiosyncratic disutiltiy of work}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\varepsilon}_{\text{insurable shock}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon;\tau)}_{\text{effect of insurable wage variation}}$$

Notice that the insurable shock ε has no income effect (because insurable) and is mediated by $\hat{\sigma}^{-1}$ which is lowered by more progressivity. The idea with the last term is that insurable wage variation means that agents are able to work more when they are productive and take more leisure when unproductive; this raises average productivity.

- Decompose consumption into five terms:

$$\log c(\varphi,\alpha,s;g,\tau) = \underbrace{\log[C^{RA}(\tau)\vartheta(\tau)]}_{\text{rep agent}} + \underbrace{(1-\tau)\log p(s;\tau)}_{c \text{ is inc. in skill/skill price}} + \underbrace{(1-\tau)\alpha}_{c \text{ is inc. in uninsurable productivity}}$$
$$- \underbrace{(1-\tau)\varphi}_{h \text{ is dec. in disutility of work, so } c \text{ is too}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon;\tau)}_{\text{effect of insurable wage variation}}$$

Notice that more progressivity (higher τ) reduces passthrough of skills (skill prices), uninsurable labor productivity, and disutility of work

Proposition 2. *In equilibrium, skill prices are given by*

$$\log p(s;\tau) = \pi_0(\tau) + \pi_1(\tau)\cdot s(\kappa;\tau), \text{ where} \tag{22}$$

$$\pi_1(\tau) = \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}(1-\tau)^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \tag{23}$$

$$\pi_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{\theta-1}\left\{\frac{1}{1+\psi}\left[\psi\log\left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta}\right) - \log(\eta)\right] + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right)\right\} \tag{24}$$

The skill investment allocation is given by

$$s(\kappa;\tau) = [(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^\psi \cdot \kappa = \left[\frac{\eta}{\theta}(1-\tau)\right]^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}\cdot\kappa \tag{25}$$

and the equilibrium skill density $m(s)$ is exponential with parameter $\eta^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}\left[\frac{\theta}{1-\tau}\right]^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}$.

Proof of Proposition 2:

- Recall from (**??**) that the disutility of the initial skill investment is

$$v(s) = \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \kappa^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} s^{\frac{1+\psi}{\psi}}$$

  where $\kappa \sim \exp(\eta)$.

- Recall from (**??**) that the optimality condition for skill investment is

$$\frac{\partial v(s)}{\partial s} = \left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = (1-\beta\delta)E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a \frac{\partial u(c(\varphi,\alpha,s;g,\tau),h(\varphi,\varepsilon;\tau),g)}{\partial s}$$

- Using the hours and consumption solutions from Proposition 1,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial s} u(c(\varphi,\alpha,s;g,\tau),h(\varphi,\varepsilon;\tau),g) = \frac{\partial}{\partial s}\left[\log c(\varphi,\alpha,s;g,\tau) - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi_i]}{1+\sigma}(h(\varphi,\varepsilon;\tau))^{1+\sigma} + \chi\log G\right]$$

$$= \frac{\partial}{\partial s}\left[\log[C^{RA}\vartheta] + (1-\tau)[\log p(s;\tau) + \alpha - \varphi] + \mathcal{M}(v_\varepsilon;\tau)\right]$$

$$= (1-\tau)\frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s}$$

- Plugging to the above optimality condition,

$$\left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = (1-\beta\delta)E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a \left[(1-\tau)\frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s}\right]$$

$$= \left[(1-\tau)\frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s}\right](1-\beta\delta)E_0 \sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a$$

$$= \left[(1-\tau)\frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s}\right](1-\beta\delta)(1-\beta\delta)^{-1}$$

$$= (1-\tau)\frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s}$$

- Guess that

$$\log p(s;\tau) = \pi_0(\tau) + \pi_1(\tau)\cdot s \implies \frac{\partial \log p(s;\tau)}{\partial s} = \pi_1(\tau)$$

  for some $\pi_0(\tau)$ and $\pi_1(\tau)$

- Thus, the guess implies that

$$\left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = (1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau) \implies s(\kappa;\tau) = [(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{\psi}\cdot\kappa$$

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- Since $\kappa \sim Exp(\eta) \implies s(\kappa;\tau) \sim Exp(\zeta)$ where $\zeta \equiv \eta[(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{-\psi}$ with density $m(s) = \zeta\exp(-\zeta s)$.[2]

- Turning to production side of economy, Proposition 1 implies that effective hours worked $N(s)$ are independent of skill type s, so $N(s) = N$ for all s, so aggregate output is

$$Y = \left(\int_0^\infty [N \cdot m(s)]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} ds \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$$

Equilibrium requires that $p(s)$ is the value of the marginal product of effective hours of skill type s:

$$p(s) = \left[\frac{Y}{N \cdot m(s)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

$$\implies \log p(s) = \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta}\log(m(s))$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta}\log[\zeta\exp(-\zeta s)]$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{Y}{N\zeta}\right) + \frac{\zeta}{\theta}s$$

- Matching coefficients, we can derive $\pi_1(\tau)$

$$\pi_1(\tau) = \frac{\zeta}{\theta}$$

$$= \frac{\eta}{\theta[(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{\psi}}$$

$$\implies [\pi_1(\tau)]^{1+\psi} = \frac{\eta}{\theta(1-\tau)^{\psi}}$$

$$\implies \pi_1(\tau) = \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}(1-\tau)^{\frac{-\psi}{1+\psi}}$$

Thus, we get (??)

---

[2]In general, if $X \sim Exp(\lambda)$ then $aX \sim Exp(\frac{\lambda}{a})$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*).

- Thus, ζ is

$$\zeta = \eta[(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{-\psi}$$

$$= \eta(1-\tau)^{-\psi}\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{-\psi}{1+\psi}}(1-\tau)^{\frac{-\psi^2}{1+\psi}}$$

$$= \eta^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}\left(\frac{\theta}{1-\tau}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}$$

- Plugging into $m(s)$, we get

$$m(s) = \zeta\exp(-\zeta s)$$

$$= \eta^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}\left(\frac{\theta}{1-\tau}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}\exp\left(-\eta^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}\left(\frac{\theta}{1-\tau}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}s\right)$$

- Furthermore, we get $s(\kappa;\tau)$

$$s(\kappa;\tau) = [(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{\psi}\cdot\kappa$$

$$= \left[(1-\tau)\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}}(1-\tau)^{\frac{-\psi}{1+\psi}}\right]^{\psi}\cdot\kappa$$

$$= \left[\frac{\eta}{\theta}(1-\tau)\right]^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}\cdot\kappa$$

Thus, we get (**??**).

- Again matching coefficients, we get derive $\pi_0(\tau)$ in terms of aggregate output and effective hours:

$$\pi_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{Y}{N\zeta}\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{Y}{N}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) + \frac{\psi}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log(1-\tau)$$

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Using $Y = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\exp(\pi_0(\tau))N$ from Corollary 2 below, we get

$$\pi_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\exp(\pi_0(\tau))N}{N}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) + \frac{\psi}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log(1-\tau)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta}\pi_0(\tau) + \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) + \frac{\psi}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log(1-\tau)$$

$$\implies \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}\pi_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{\theta}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) - \frac{1}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) + \frac{\psi}{\theta(1+\psi)}\log(1-\tau)$$

$$\implies \pi_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{\theta-1}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) - \frac{1}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\log\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) + \frac{\psi}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\log(1-\tau)$$

$$= \frac{1}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log\left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta} - \log(\eta)\right)\right] + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right)$$

Thus, we get (**??**)

□

- Notice "Mincerian" form of log equilibrium skill price (i.e., affine function of s):

$$\log p(s;\tau) = \underbrace{\pi_0(\tau)}_{\text{base log-price of lowest skill level}} + \underbrace{\pi_1(\tau)}_{\text{pretax marginal return to skill}} \cdot s(\kappa;\tau)$$

- Notice from (**??**) that higher progressivity reduces the after-tax returns to investing in skills $\implies$ depresses skill investment

- Notice from (**??**) that progressivity increases the equilibrium pretax marginal return to skill. Stiglitz effect: Higher τ means more compressed skill distribution toward zero, so high skills are more scarce $\implies$ imperfect substitutability in production drives up the pretax return to skills.

Corollary 1. *The distribution of log skill premia $\pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa;\tau)$ is exponential with parameter θ. Thus, the variance of log skill prices is*

$$var(\log p(s;\tau)) = \frac{1}{\theta^2}$$

The distribution of skill prices $p(s;\tau)$ is levels is Pareto with scale (lower ound parameter $\exp(\pi_0(\tau))$ and Pareto parameter θ.

Proof of Corollary 1:

- The log of the skill premium for an agent with ability κ is

$$\pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau) = \pi_1(\tau)[(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^\psi \cdot \kappa$$
$$= [\pi_1(\tau)]^{1+\psi}(1-\tau)^\psi \cdot \kappa$$
$$= \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)(1-\tau)^{-\psi}(1-\tau)^\psi \cdot \kappa$$
$$= \frac{\eta}{\theta} \cdot \kappa$$

- Therefore, since $\kappa \sim Exp(\eta) \implies \pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau) \sim Exp(\theta)$

- The variance of log skill prices is[3]

$$var(\log p(s; \tau)) = var(\pi_0(\tau) + \pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau)) = var(\pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau)) = \frac{1}{\theta^2}$$

- Since log skill premia are exponentially distributed, skill prices in levels are distributed Pareto with lower bound parameter (or scale) $\exp(\pi_0(\tau))$ and Pareto parameter (or shape) is θ.[4]

$$\pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau) \sim Exp(\theta)$$
$$\implies \exp(\pi_0(\tau) + \pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau)) = \exp(\pi_0(\tau))\exp(\pi_1(\tau) \cdot s(\kappa; \tau)) \sim Pareto(\exp(\pi_0(\tau)), \theta)$$

□

- Notice that inequality in skill prices is independent of progressivity τ. Why? Two forces perfectly offset: (1) Stiglitz effect and (2) higher progressivity compresses skill distribution.

- Skill prices are Pareto and other stochastic components of wages are log normal, so wages and earnings have Pareto right tails, which is well supported empirically (e.g. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011). Consumption also has Pareto right tails (consistent with Toda 2015).

Corollary 2. *Average hours worked $H(\tau)$ and average effective hours $N(\tau)$ are independent of skill type s. $H(\tau)$, $N(\tau)$, and output $Y(\tau)$ are given by*

$$H(\tau) = E[h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau)] = (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp\left[\left(\frac{\tau(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}^2} - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\right)\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right] \tag{26}$$

$$N(\tau) = E[\exp(\alpha + \varepsilon)h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau)] = H(\tau)\exp\left(\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_\varepsilon\right) \tag{27}$$

$$Y(\tau) = E[p(s; \tau)\exp(\alpha + \varepsilon)h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau)] = N(\tau)E[p(s; \tau)] \tag{28}$$

where $E[p(s; \tau)] = \exp(\pi_0(\tau)) \cdot \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$. Aggregate labor productivity is $\frac{Y(\tau)}{H(\tau)} = \frac{Y(\tau)}{N(\tau)} \cdot \frac{N(\tau)}{H(\tau)} = E[p(s; \tau)]\exp(\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_\varepsilon)$

---

[3]If $X \sim Exp(\lambda)$, then $var(X) = \frac{1}{\lambda^2}$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*).
[4]In general, if $X \sim Exp(\lambda)$, $k\exp(X) \sim Pareto(k, \lambda)$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*).

Proof of Corollary 2:

- Aggregate hours is

$$H(\tau) = \int \int h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau) dF_\varphi dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int \int \exp\left[\frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] dF_\varphi dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] \int \exp[-\varphi]dF_\varphi \int \exp\left[\frac{1}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon \right] dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] \exp\left[-\frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right] \exp\left[-\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma} + \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma^2} \right]$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) - \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma} + \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma^2} \right]$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(\frac{\tau(1+\hat\sigma) - \hat\sigma}{\hat\sigma^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right)$$

Thus, we get (**??**).

- Aggregate effective hours is

$$N(\tau) = \int \int \int \exp(\alpha + \varepsilon) h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau) dF_\varphi dF_\alpha dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int \int \int \exp\left[\alpha + \varepsilon + \frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] dF_\varphi dF_\alpha dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \exp\left[\frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] \int \exp(\alpha)dF_\alpha \int \exp(-\varphi)dF_\varphi$$

$$\cdot \int \exp\left[\frac{\hat\sigma + 1}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon \right] dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))}{\hat\sigma}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \right] \exp\left[\frac{\hat\sigma + 1}{\hat\sigma}\frac{-v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{(\hat\sigma + 1)^2}{\hat\sigma^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right]$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(\frac{\tau(1+\hat\sigma) + \hat\sigma}{\hat\sigma^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right)$$

$$= H(\tau)\exp\left(\frac{1}{\hat\sigma}v_\varepsilon \right)$$

Thus, we get (**??**).

- Aggregate output is equal to aggregate labor earnings:[5]

$$Y(\tau) = \int \int \int \int p(s,\tau) \exp(\alpha + \varepsilon) h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau) dF_s dF_\varphi dF_\alpha dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int p(s,\tau) dF_s \int \int \int \exp(\alpha + \varepsilon) h(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau) dF_\varphi dF_\alpha dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int p(s,\tau) dF_s N(\tau)$$

$$= \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \exp(\pi_0(\tau)) \cdot N(\tau)$$

Thus, we get (**??**).

□

4.1 Efficiency

- $\tau = 0$ (i.e., flat taxes or no progressivity) is generally not efficient for two reasons: (1) there are no private markets to insure α shocks and (2) there's a free-riding problem, in the sense, higher labor supply means more tax revenue and higher g, but private agents take g as exogenous, so labor supply is too low.

- Proposition 3 proves that without α shocks (i.e., $v_\omega = 0$) and without free-riding problem (i.e., $\chi = 0$), then $\tau = 0$ is efficient. The associated Pareto weights put more weight on agents with higher learning ability κ and lower disutility of work effort φ.

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[5]If $X \sim Pareto(x_m, \alpha)$, then $E[X] = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} x_m$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*)

5 Welfare Effects of Tax Reform

- Here, we compare steady state equilibria (one associated with (g_{-1}, τ_{-1}) and one associated with (g, τ)) and assuming away transitional dynamics (or, "skill investment is reversible"). The paper considers polar opposite of this with "irreversible skill investment" in section 6.3.

5.1 Social Welfare Function

- Baseline is utilitarian social paper who cares equally about the utility of all agents

- Assume that planner discounts the lifetime utility of future generations at rate γ

- Social welfare evaluated as of date 0 is

$$\mathcal{W}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1}) \equiv (1 - \gamma)\Gamma \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \gamma^j U_{j,0}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1}) \tag{29}$$

where $U_{j,0}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1})$ is remaining expected lifetime utility as of date 0 for the cohort that entered the economy at date j (discounted back to date of birth) and $\Gamma \equiv \frac{\gamma - \beta\sigma}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}$ provides convenient normalization.

Proposition 4. *In the model with fully reversible investment, when the social welfare function is given by (??), welfare from implementing policy (g, τ) is*

$$\mathcal{W}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1}) = \begin{cases} \log(1-g) + \chi \log g + (1+\chi)\frac{\log(1-\tau)}{(1+\hat{\sigma})(1-\tau)} - \frac{1}{1+\hat{\sigma}} & (a) \\ +(1+\chi)\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}[\phi \log(1-\tau) + \log(\frac{1}{\eta\theta^\psi}(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1})^{\theta(1+\psi)})] & (b) \\ -\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)\theta}[(1-\tau) - \frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma}\frac{(1-\gamma)}{(1-\beta\delta)}(1-\tau_{-1})] & (c) \\ -[-\log(1 - (\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})) - (\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})] & (d) \\ -(1-\tau)^2\frac{v_\varphi}{2} & (e) \\ -[(1-\tau)(\frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma-\beta\delta})\frac{v_\omega}{2} - \log(\frac{1-\delta \exp(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega)}{1-\delta})] & (f) \\ +(1+\chi)[\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_\varepsilon - \sigma\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}] & (g) \end{cases} \tag{30}$$

Proof of Proposition 4:

- Two steps: (1) derive a closed-form solution for the residual fiscal instrument λ and (2) substitute allocations into social welfare function to derive (??)

- **Step 1**

- Starting from government budget constraint (??),

$$gY = \int_0^1 (y_i - \lambda y_i^{1-\tau})di$$

$$= \int_0^1 y_i di - \lambda \int_0^1 y_i^{1-\tau} di$$

$$= Y - \lambda \tilde{Y}$$

$$\implies \lambda = \frac{(1-g)Y}{\tilde{Y}}$$

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where $\tilde{Y} \equiv \int_0^1 y_i^{1-\tau} di$

- To compute $\tilde{Y}$, it is useful to aggregate by age group. Let $\tilde{Y}^a$ be average per capita disposable income for agents in age group a:

$$\tilde{Y}^a = \int \int \int \int [y(s,\varphi,\varepsilon,\alpha)]^{1-\tau} m(s) ds dF_\alpha^a dF_\varphi dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int \int \int \int [\exp(\log h(\varepsilon) + \log p(s) + \alpha_a + \varepsilon)]^{1-\tau} m(s) ds dF_\alpha^a dF_\varphi dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= \int \int \int \int \left[\exp\left(\left(\frac{1}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) - \varphi + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M} \right) + \pi_0(\tau) + \pi_1(\tau)s + \alpha_a + \varepsilon \right) \right]^{1-\tau}$$
$$\cdot \zeta \exp(-\zeta s) ds dF_\alpha^a dF_\varphi dF_\varepsilon$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\mathcal{M} \right) \exp((1-\tau)\pi_0(\tau)) \int \exp(-\varphi(1-\tau)) dF_\varphi$$

$$\cdot \int \exp\left(\frac{(1+\hat{\sigma})(1-\tau)}{\hat{\sigma}}\varepsilon \right) dF_\varepsilon \int \exp((1-\tau)\alpha_a) dF_\alpha^a \int \exp[\pi_1(\tau)(1-\tau)s] m(s) ds$$

$$= (1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\mathcal{M} \right) \exp((1-\tau)\pi_0(\tau)) \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right)$$

$$\cdot \exp\left(\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}} \left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}} - 1 \right) \right) \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^a}{2} \right) \cdot \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1 + \tau}$$

because

$$\int \exp[\pi_1(\tau)(1-\tau)s] m(s) ds = \int \exp[\pi_1(\tau)(1-\tau)s] \zeta \exp(-\zeta s) ds$$

$$= \int \zeta \exp[(\pi_1(\tau)(1-\tau) - \zeta)s] ds$$

$$= \int \zeta \exp\left[\left(\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1-\tau)^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} (1-\tau) - \left[(1-\tau)\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1-\tau)^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \right]^{-\psi} \right) s \right] ds$$

$$= \int \zeta \exp\left[\left(\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1-\tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} - \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{-\psi}{1+\psi}} (1-\tau)^{\frac{-\psi}{1+\psi}} \right) s \right] ds$$

$$= \int \zeta \exp\left[-\frac{\theta - 1 + \tau}{\theta} \eta[(1-\tau)\pi_1(\tau)]^{-\psi} s \right] ds$$

$$= \int \zeta \exp\left[-\frac{\theta - 1 + \tau}{\theta} \zeta s \right] ds$$

$$= \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1 + \tau} \int \frac{\theta - 1 + \tau}{\theta} \zeta \exp\left[-\frac{\theta - 1 + \tau}{\theta} \zeta s \right] ds$$

$$= \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1 + \tau} \cdot 1$$

- Note that $v_\alpha^a = Var(\alpha_a) = Var(\alpha_0 + \omega_1 + ... + \omega_a) = v_\alpha^0 + a v_\omega = a v_\omega$.

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- Define $\mathcal{K}$ such that

$$\tilde{Y}^a = \mathcal{K} \cdot \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^a}{2}\right)$$

$$\mathcal{K} \equiv (1-\tau)^{\frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\mathcal{M}\right) \exp((1-\tau)\pi_0(\tau)) \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2}\right)$$

$$\cdot \exp\left(\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}-1\right)\right)\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right)\frac{\theta}{\theta-1+\tau}$$

$$\implies \log\mathcal{K} = \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\mathcal{M} + (1-\tau)\pi_0(\tau) - \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2}$$

$$+ \left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}-1\right)\right)\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1+\tau}\right)$$

- Now sum across age groups

$$\tilde{Y} = (1-\delta)\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}\delta^a\tilde{Y}^a$$

$$= (1-\delta)\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}\delta^a \cdot \mathcal{K} \cdot \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^a}{2}\right)$$

$$= \mathcal{K} \cdot (1-\delta)\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}\delta^a \cdot \exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{av_\omega}{2}\right)$$

$$= \mathcal{K} \cdot (1-\delta)\sum_{a=0}^{\infty} \cdot \exp\left(a\left[\log(\delta) - \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\omega}{2}\right]\right)$$

$$= \mathcal{K} \cdot (1-\delta)\frac{1}{1-\exp\left(\left[\log(\delta) - \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\omega}{2}\right]\right)}$$

$$= \mathcal{K} \cdot \frac{(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\exp\left(-\tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\omega}{2}\right)}$$

$$\implies \log\tilde{Y} = \log\mathcal{K} + \log(1-\delta) - \log\left[1-\delta\exp\left(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega\right)\right]$$

$$= \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}\mathcal{M} + (1-\tau)\pi_0(\tau) - \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2}$$

$$+ \left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}}-1\right)\right)\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1+\tau}\right)$$

$$+ \log(1-\delta) - \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^0}{2} - \log\left[1-\delta\exp\left(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega\right)\right]$$

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- Recall that Y from Corollary 2:

$$Y = (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left(\frac{\tau(1 + \hat{\sigma}) - \hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\sigma}^2} \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} v_\varepsilon\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \eta^{\frac{-1}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}} \left(\frac{1 - \tau}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}}$$

$$\implies \log Y = \frac{1}{1+\sigma} \log(1 - \tau) + \frac{\tau(1 + \hat{\sigma}) - \hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\sigma}^2} \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} v_\varepsilon + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}\right) + \frac{-1}{(\theta - 1)(1 + \psi)} \log \eta$$

$$+ \frac{\psi}{(\theta - 1)(1 + \psi)} \log\left(\frac{1 - \tau}{\theta}\right)$$

- Substituting into the modified GBC:

$$\log \lambda = \log(1 - g) + \log Y - \log \tilde{Y}$$

$$= \log(1 - g) + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) + \frac{\tau(1 + \hat{\sigma}) - \hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\sigma}^2} \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} v_\varepsilon + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}\right) + \frac{-1}{(\theta - 1)(1 + \psi)} \log \eta$$

$$+ \frac{\psi}{(\theta - 1)(1 + \psi)} \log\left(\frac{1 - \tau}{\theta}\right) - \frac{1 - \tau}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} \mathcal{M} - (1 - \tau)\pi_0(\tau) + \tau(1 - \tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2}$$

$$- \left(\frac{(1 - \tau)(1 + \hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}} \left(\frac{(1 - \tau)(1 + \hat{\sigma})}{\hat{\sigma}} - 1\right)\right) \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} - \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1 + \tau}\right)$$

$$- \log(1 - \delta) + \log\left[1 - \delta \exp\left(\frac{-\tau(1 - \tau)}{2} v_\omega\right)\right]$$

$$= \log(1 - g) + \frac{\tau(1 - \tau)}{\sigma + \tau} \left(\frac{1 + \sigma}{\sigma + \tau} + 2 + \sigma\right) \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{\tau}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau) + \tau(1 - \tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} - \log(1 - \delta)$$

$$+ \log\left[1 - \delta \exp\left(\frac{-\tau(1 - \tau)}{2} v_\omega\right)\right] + \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{\tau}{\theta - 1} \log\left(\frac{1 - \tau}{\theta}\right) - \frac{1}{1 + \psi} \frac{\tau}{\theta - 1} \log \eta + \frac{\theta + \tau - 1}{\theta - 1} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}\right)$$

$$+ \log\left(\frac{\theta - 1 + \tau}{\theta}\right)$$

Thus, we have an expression for λ.

- **Step 2**

- Period utility at age $a \geq 0$ is

$$u(c_a, h, G) = \log c_a - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi]}{1+\sigma} h^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G$$

$$= \left[\log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) + (1-\tau)[\log p(s) + \alpha_a - \varphi] + \mathcal{M} \right]$$

$$+ \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi]}{1+\sigma} \exp\left((1+\sigma)\log h\right) + \chi \log G$$

$$= \log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) + (1-\tau)[\pi_0(\pi) + \pi_1(\tau)s] + (1-\tau)(\alpha - \varphi) + \mathcal{M}$$

$$+ \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)\varphi]}{1+\sigma} \exp\left(\log(1-\tau) - (1+\sigma)\varphi + \frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon - \frac{(1+\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\mathcal{M} \right) + \chi \log G$$

$$= \log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) + (1-\tau)\left[\frac{1}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)} \left[\psi \log\left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta} - \log(\eta) \right) \right] + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \right]$$

$$+ (1-\tau)\frac{\eta}{\theta}\kappa + (1-\tau)(\alpha_a - \varphi) + \mathcal{M}$$

$$+ \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \exp\left(\frac{(1-\tau)(1+\sigma)}{\sigma+\tau}\varepsilon - \frac{(1+\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau)}\mathcal{M} \right) + \chi \log G$$

$$= \log \lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)} \left[\psi \log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}} \right) \right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$- \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} \exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat{\sigma}(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M} \right) \exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat{\sigma}}\varepsilon \right) + (1-\tau)\kappa\frac{\eta}{\theta} + \chi \log G + (1-\tau)\alpha_a$$

- Denote average utility at age a with $\bar{u}_a$:

$$\bar{u}_a = \int\int\int\int u(c_a, g, G)dF_\kappa dF_\varepsilon dF_\varphi dF_\alpha^a$$

$$= \int\int\int\int \left[\log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}\right.$$

$$\left. - \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M}\right)\exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon\right) + (1-\tau)\kappa\frac{\eta}{\theta} + \chi\log G + (1-\tau)\alpha_a\right]dF_\kappa dF_\varepsilon dF_\varphi dF_\alpha^a$$

$$= \log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\int\varphi dF_\varphi + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$+ \chi\log G - \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M}\right)\int\exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon\right)dF_\varepsilon + (1-\tau)\frac{\eta}{\theta}\int\kappa dF_\kappa + (1-\tau)\int\alpha_a dF_\alpha^a$$

$$= \log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$+ \chi\log(gY) - \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1-\tau}{\theta} - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^a}{2}$$

$$= \bar{u} - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\alpha^a}{2}$$

where

$$\bar{u} = \log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$+ \chi\log(gY) - \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1-\tau}{\theta}$$

because[6]

$$\exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\mathcal{M}\right)\int\exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma}\varepsilon\right)dF_\varepsilon = \exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma(1-\tau)}\frac{(1-\tau)(1-\tau(1+\hat\sigma))v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma}\right)$$

$$\cdot\exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma}\frac{-v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{(1+\sigma)^2}{\hat\sigma^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right)$$

$$= \exp\left(-\frac{(1+\sigma)(1-\tau-\tau\hat\sigma)v_\varepsilon}{2\hat\sigma^2} + \frac{1+\sigma}{\hat\sigma}\frac{-v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{(1+\sigma)^2}{\hat\sigma^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right)$$

$$= \exp\left(\frac{v_\varepsilon(1+\sigma)}{2\hat\sigma} - \frac{v_\varepsilon(1+\sigma)^2}{2\hat\sigma^2} - \frac{v_\varepsilon(1+\sigma)}{2\hat\sigma} + \frac{v_\varepsilon(1+\sigma)^2}{2\hat\sigma^2}\right)$$

$$= 1$$

---

[6]If $X \sim Exp(\lambda) \implies E[X] = \frac{1}{\lambda}$ (Casella and Berger, *Statistical Inference*).

$$(1-\tau)\frac{\eta}{\theta}\int \kappa dF_\kappa = (1-\tau)\frac{\eta}{\theta}\frac{1}{\eta}$$
$$= \frac{1-\tau}{\theta}$$

- Substituting in for λ and Y in the expression for $\bar{u}$:

$$\bar{u} = \log\lambda + \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$- \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1-\tau}{\theta} + \chi\log(gY)$$

$$= \left[\log(1-g) + \frac{\tau(1-\tau)}{\sigma+\tau}\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau} + 2 + \sigma\right)\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) + \tau(1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} - \log(1-\delta)\right.$$

$$+ \log\left[1 - \delta\exp\left(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega\right)\right] + \frac{\psi}{1+\psi}\frac{\tau}{\theta-1}\log\left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta}\right) - \frac{1}{1+\psi}\frac{\tau}{\theta-1}\log\eta + \frac{\theta+\tau-1}{\theta-1}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right)$$

$$\left. + \log\left(\frac{\theta-1+\tau}{\theta}\right)\right]$$

$$+ \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) - (1-\tau)\frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{1-\tau}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\left[\psi\log(1-\tau) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta-1)^{1+\psi}}\right)\right] + \mathcal{M}$$

$$- \frac{1-\tau}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1-\tau}{\theta} + \chi\log(g)$$

$$+ \chi\left[\frac{1}{1+\sigma}\log(1-\tau) + \frac{\tau(1+\hat{\sigma}) - \hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\sigma}^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_\varepsilon + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) + \frac{-1}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi)}\log\eta\right.$$

$$\left. + \frac{\psi}{(\theta-1)(1+\psi}\log\left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta}\right)\right]$$

$$= \log(1-g) + \chi\log g + (1-\chi)\frac{\log(1-\tau)}{(1+\hat{\sigma})(1-\tau)} - \frac{1}{1+\hat{\sigma}}$$

$$+ (1+\chi)\left[\frac{1}{\theta-1}\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}\log(1-\tau)\frac{1}{\theta-1}\frac{1}{1+\psi}\log\left(\frac{1}{\eta\theta^\psi}\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right)^{\theta(1+\psi)}\right)\right]$$

$$- \left[-\log\left(1 - \left(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta}\right)\right) - \frac{1-\tau}{\theta}\right] - (1-\tau)^2\frac{v_\varphi}{2}$$

$$+ \log\left(\frac{1 - \delta\exp(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega)}{1-\delta}\right) + (1+\chi)\left[\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} - \sigma\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}\right]$$

- Disutility from skill investment

$$v(s(\kappa)) = \frac{-\kappa^{-1/\psi}}{1 + \frac{1}{\psi}} s(\kappa, \tau)^{1+1/\psi}$$

$$= \frac{-\kappa^{-1/\psi}}{1 + \frac{1}{\psi}} \left[\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}(1 - \tau) \right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \kappa \right]^{1+1/\psi}$$

$$= -(1 - \tau)\kappa \frac{\eta}{(1 + \frac{1}{\psi})\theta}$$

- The average disutility skill investment $\bar{v}_Y$

$$\bar{v}_Y \equiv E[v(s(\kappa))]$$

$$= E\left[-(1 - \tau)\kappa \frac{\eta}{(1 + \frac{1}{\psi})\theta} \right]$$

$$= -(1 - \tau)E[\kappa] \frac{\eta}{(1 + \frac{1}{\psi})\theta}$$

$$= -\frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1}{\theta}(1 - \tau)$$

- The costs of transition to skill investment from τ_{-1} to skill investment under τ

$$\bar{v}_O \equiv \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1}{\theta}(1 - \tau) - \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1}{\theta}(1 - \tau_{-1})$$

$$= -\frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1}{\theta}(\tau - \tau_{-1})$$

- Now we can aggregate utility across cohorts

$$\mathcal{W}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1}) = (1 - \gamma)\frac{\gamma - \beta\delta}{\gamma(1 - \beta\delta)} \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \gamma^j U_{j,0}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1})$$

$$= \underbrace{(1 - \gamma)\frac{\gamma - \beta\delta}{\gamma(1 - \beta\delta)} \sum_{j=-\infty}^{-1} \gamma^j U_{j,0}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1})}_{\text{born before tax reform}} + \underbrace{(1 - \gamma)\frac{\gamma - \beta\delta}{\gamma(1 - \beta\delta)} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \gamma^j U_{j,0}(g, \tau; \tau_{-1})}_{\text{born after tax reform}}$$

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- The utility of the agents born after tax reform:

$$(1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\sum_{j=0}^{\infty}\gamma^j U_{j,0}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1}) = (1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\sum_{j=0}^{\infty}\gamma^j\left((1-\beta\delta)\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a\bar{u}_a - \bar{v}_Y\right)$$

$$= \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma}\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a\bar{u}_a - \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\bar{v}_Y$$

$$= \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma}\sum_{a=0}^{\infty}(\beta\delta)^a[\bar{u} - (1-\tau)a\frac{v_\omega}{2}] - \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\bar{v}_Y$$

$$= \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma}\left[\frac{\bar{u}}{1-\beta\delta} - \frac{\beta\delta}{(1-\beta\delta)^2}(1-\tau)\frac{v_\omega}{2}\right] - \frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\bar{v}_Y$$

- The agents of the agents born before tax reform:

$$(1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}\sum_{j=-\infty}^{-1}\gamma^j U_{j,0}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1}) = (1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma-\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}$$

$$\cdot\left[\gamma^{-1}(\beta\delta)[(1-\beta\delta)[\bar{u}_1 + (\beta\delta)\bar{u}_2 + ...] - \bar{v}_0]\right.$$

$$\left. + \gamma^{-2}(\beta\delta)[(1-\beta\delta)[\bar{u}_2 + (\beta\delta)\bar{u}_3 + ...] - \bar{v}_0] + ...\right]$$

- Thus, we get

$$(1-\gamma)\frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma(1-\beta\delta)}(\bar{u} - \bar{v}_O)$$

- Combining agents from before and after tax reform and collecting terms, we get (**??**):

$$\mathcal{W}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1}) = \begin{cases} \log(1-g) + \chi\log g + (1+\chi)\frac{\log(1-\tau)}{(1+\hat{\sigma})(1-\tau)} - \frac{1}{1+\hat{\sigma}} \\ +(1+\chi)\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}[\phi\log(1-\tau) + \log(\frac{1}{\eta\theta^\psi}(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1})^{\theta(1+\psi)})] \\ -\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)\theta}[(1-\tau) - \frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma}\frac{(1-\gamma)}{(1-\beta\delta)}(1-\tau_{-1})] \\ -[-\log(1-(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})) - (\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})] \\ -(1-\tau)^2\frac{v_\varphi}{2} \\ -[(1-\tau)(\frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma-\beta\delta})\frac{v_\omega}{2} - \log(\frac{1-\delta\exp(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega)}{1-\delta})] \\ +(1+\chi)[\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_\varepsilon - \sigma\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}^2}\frac{v_\varepsilon}{2}] \end{cases}$$

□

Corollary 3. *The optimal pair (g,τ) is independent of τ_{-1}.*

Proof of Corollary 3: Term (c) of $\mathcal{W}$ is the only term that includes τ_{-1} is additively separable from policy parameters, g and τ. So, the term with τ_{-1} can be dropped and it would not affect optimal choice of g or τ. □

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Corollary 4. *Social welfare $\mathcal{W}(g, \tau)$ is globally concave in g, if $\sigma \geq 2$, is also globally concave in τ.*

Proof of Corollary 4:

- The first and second derivatives of $\mathcal{W}$ wrt g is

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}}{\partial g} = \frac{-1}{1-g} + \frac{\chi}{g}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{W}}{\partial g^2} = \frac{g-1}{(1-g)^2} + \frac{-\chi g}{g^2} < 0$$

  Therefore, $\mathcal{W}$ is globally concave in g.

- All but term (g) are clearly concave in τ.

- The second derivative of term (g) wrt to τ is

$$-(1+\chi)\frac{\sigma - 2\tau}{(\sigma + \tau)^4}(1+\sigma)^2 v_\varepsilon$$

  $\sigma \geq 2 \implies \sigma - 2\tau \geq 0 \implies$ term (g) is concave in τ.

$\square$

Corollary 5. *The welfare-maximizing value of τ is independent of g.*

Proof of Corollary 5: Terms with τ are additively separable from terms with $g \implies$ the FOC wrt τ is not a function of g. $\square$

Corollary 6. *The welfare-maximizing value for g is given by*

$$g^* = \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi}$$

Proof of Corollary 6: Following from setting the first derivative of $\mathcal{W}$ wrt g (see proof of Corollary 4) to zero and solving for g. $\square$

Corollary 7. *The welfare-maximizing value of progressivity is independent of the learning ability distribution parameter η.*

Proof of Corollary 7: η only appears in term (b), which is additively separable from terms that include τ. Therefore, η does not show up in the FOC of $\mathcal{W}$ wrt τ. $\square$

Corollary 8 discusses a special case where the government discounts future generation at the same discount rate as the HH discount factor (i.e., $\beta = \gamma$). In this case, the social welfare function is equal to the average period utility in the cross section.

5.2 Decomposition of the Social Welfare Function

Each term in $\mathcal{W}$ has an economic interpretation and captures a force in determining optimal progressivity:

$$\mathcal{W}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1}) = \underbrace{\log(1-g) + \chi \log g + (1+\chi)\frac{\log(1-\tau)}{(1+\hat{\sigma})(1-\tau)} - \frac{1}{1+\hat{\sigma}}}_{\text{Term (a) is welfare of representative agent}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1+\chi)\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}[\phi\log(1-\tau) + \log(\frac{1}{\eta\theta^{\psi}}(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1})^{\theta(1+\psi)})]}_{\text{Term (b) captures that higher progressivity reduces productivity because it reduces skill investment}}$$

$$- \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)\theta}[(1-\tau) - \frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma}\frac{(1-\gamma)}{(1-\beta\delta)}(1-\tau_{-1})]}_{\text{Term (c) captures welfare cost of skill investment}}$$

$$- \underbrace{[-\log(1-(\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})) - (\frac{1-\tau}{\theta})]}_{\text{Term (d) captures welfare cost of consumption dispersion across skill types}}$$

$$- \underbrace{(1-\tau)^{2}\frac{v_{\varphi}}{2}}_{\text{Term (e) captures welfare cost of consumption dispersion from leisure preferences (through dispersion in hours worked)}}$$

$$- \underbrace{[(1-\tau)(\frac{\beta\delta}{\gamma-\beta\delta})\frac{v_{\omega}}{2} - \log(\frac{1-\delta\exp(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_{\omega})}{1-\delta})]}_{\text{Term (f) captures welfare cost of uninsurable wage risk}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1+\chi)[\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}}v_{\varepsilon} - \sigma\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}^{2}}\frac{v_{\varepsilon}}{2}]}_{\text{Term (g) captures welfare from insurable wage risk}}$$

5.2.1 Welfare of the Representative Agent

- Proposition 5 derives welfare for representative agent (term (a)). Government would choose regressive taxes in representative agent economy to increase the private return of working and increase labor supply.

5.2.2 Welfare from Skill Investment

- Higher progressivity reduces productivity and welfare because it reduces skill investment and thus compresses the skill distribution (term (b)). Since production is imperfectly substitutable across skill types, this compressing of the skill distribution lowers productivity.

- Term (c) captures that skill investments are not costless. The first part is the average skill investment across all generations and the second part captures the change in skills associated with the tax reform.

- Progressivity impacts equilibrium skill prices and quantities. Term (d) captures the welfare cost of consumption dispersion across skill types.

5.2.3 Welfare from Preference Heterogeneity and Uninsurable Wage Risk

- With heterogeneity in preferences for leisure translates into dispersion in hours worked and thus earnings and consumption. Term (e) reflects the welfare cost of associated with this consumption dispersion.

- Uninsurable shocks also lead to consumption dispersion, which is captured by term (f).

5.2.4 Welfare from Insurable Wage Risk

- Some wage risk is insurable. Term (g) captures the welfare associated with insurable wage risk.

- More insurable wage dispersion improves welfare because individual hours worked become more positively correlated with individual productivity, so aggregate output increases

- Hours dispersion is costly because the disutility associated with hours is convex.

5.3 When Should Taxes Be Progressive?

Proposition 6. τ^* *is strictly positive if and only if*

$$
\underbrace{\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)\theta}}_{lower\ investment\ cost} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{(\theta-1)\theta}}_{less\ skill\ price\ inequality} + \underbrace{(v_\varphi + v_\alpha)}_{less\ \alpha\ and\ \varphi\ inequality}
$$
$$
> \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}}_{lower\ productivity\ due\ to\ less\ investment} + \underbrace{\chi\left(\frac{1}{1+\sigma} + \frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}\right)}_{lower\ G\ due\ to\ less\ hours\ and\ less\ investment} \tag{31}
$$

Proof of Proposition 6:

- Assume $\gamma = \beta$

- Approximate term (f) in (**??**) with

$$
-[(1-\tau)(\frac{\delta}{1-\delta})\frac{v_\omega}{2} - \log(\frac{1 - \delta\exp(\frac{-\tau(1-\tau)}{2}v_\omega)}{1-\delta})] \approx -(1-\tau)^2\frac{v_\alpha}{2}
$$

- The derivative of (**??**) wrt τ is

$$
\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1})}{\partial\tau}\Big|_{\tau=0} = -\left(\frac{1}{1+\sigma} + \frac{\psi}{1+\psi}\frac{1}{\theta-1}\right)(1-\chi) - \frac{1}{1+\psi}\frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1}{\theta-1} + v_\varphi + v_\alpha
$$

- Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}(g,\tau;\tau_{-1})}{\partial \tau}\Big|_{\tau=0} > 0 \iff \frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)\theta} + \frac{1}{(\theta-1)\theta} + (v_\varphi + v_\alpha) > \frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} + \chi\left(\frac{1}{1+\sigma} + \frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}\right)$$

$$(32)$$

□

The terms in proposition 6 can be interpretted as marginal benefits/costs of increasing progressivity at $\tau = 0$.

5.4 Optimal Marginal Tax Rate at the Top

6 Quantitative Analysis

6.1 Parameterization

6.2 Results

6.3 Progressivity When Past Skill Investment is Fixed

6.4 Modeling Public Consumption

6.5 Inequality Aversion

6.6 Political-Economic Determination of Progressivity

7 Skill Investment Constraints

8 Empirical Evidence

9 Conclusions

Appendix: Lecture Notes on HSV (2014) and BK (2021)

Job presented a simplified version of HSV (2014) and BK (2021), which are closely related papers. I have included these lecture notes because I found them helpful in understanding the more complicated HSV (2017).

Question: We have data on consumption, hours, and wages $\{c_i, h_i, w_i\}_i$. Can we perfectly rationalize these data?

Environment

1. Demography

   - HHs
   - Time: $t = 0, 1, ...$
   - Perpetual youth: $P(death) = 1 - \delta$ and $P(survival) = \delta$
   - Every time t, mass $1 - \delta$ is born
   - Age $a = 0, 1, ...$
   - Cohort $j \in (-\infty, \infty)$

2. Preferences

$$E_j \sum_{t=j}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^{t-j} u^j(c_t^j, h_t^j) = E_j \sum_{t=j}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^{t-j} \left[\frac{(c_t^j)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma} - \frac{[\exp(B^j)h_t^j]^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\eta}} \right]$$

   - η is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
   - Here, we generally focus on $\gamma \to 1 \implies$ log preferences over consumption

$$u^j(c_t^j, h_t^j) = \log c_t^j - \frac{[\exp(B^j)h_t^j]^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\eta}}$$

3. Technology

   - Production
   - $y = zh$ where y is earnings, z is wage rate per hour, and h is hours
   - $z = \exp(\alpha + \varepsilon)$ where α^j is permanent, $\varepsilon_t^j = \nu_t^\varepsilon$ varies in every time period and across agent (idiosyncratic and iid across time and agents)
   - Distributions are $\nu_t^\varepsilon \sim \Phi_t^\varepsilon$, $\alpha^j \sim \Phi_j^\alpha$, $B^j \sim \Phi_j^B$

4. Information structure

   - Perfect foresight: $\{\Phi_t^\varepsilon, \Phi_j^\alpha, \Phi_j^B\}$ are known

5. Equilibrium

- A HH denoted by $i = \{j, B^j, \alpha^j, \{\nu_t^j\}\}$
- Define island ℓ as the collection of households with identical $\{j, B^j, \alpha^j\}$
- Define states $s_t^j := \varepsilon_t^j$ and histories $s^{j,t} = (s_j^j, ..., s_t^j)$
- Agents can trade one-period bonds with people on their islands. Arrow securities with corresponding prices $q_b^\ell(\varepsilon_{t+1}^j)$
- Agents can also trade one-period bonds across islands. Arrow securities with corresponding prices $q_x(\zeta_{t+1}^j)$ where $\zeta_t^j := \varepsilon_t^j$
- HH problem:

$$\max_{\{c_t^j, h_t^j, b^\ell(s_{t+1}^j), x(\zeta_{t+1}^j)\}_{t=j}^\infty} E_j \sum_{t=j}^\infty (\beta\delta)^{t-j} u^j(c_t^j, h_t^j)$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_t^j + \int_{s_{t+1}^j} q_b^\ell(s_{t+1}^j) b^\ell(s_{t+1}^j) ds_{t+1}^j + \int_{\zeta_{t+1}^j} q_x(s_{t+1}^j) x(\zeta_{t+1}^j) d\zeta_{t+1}^j \leq y_t^j + b^\ell(s_t^j) + x(\zeta_t^j)$$

- An equilibrium is an allocation is x_j and prices $\{q_b^\ell(s_{t+1}^j)\}_{\ell,t}$ and $\{q_x(\zeta_{t+1}^j)\}_t$ such that
  - HH solves HH problem given prices
  - Asset markets clear

$$\int b^\ell(s_{t+1}^j) d\Phi_t(i) = 0 \quad \forall s_{t+1}^j, \ell$$

$$\int x(\zeta_{t+1}^j) d\Phi_t(i) = 0 \quad \forall \zeta_{t+1}^j$$

- Steps: (1) formulate auxiliary problem (island planner problem) and (2) verify that this auxiliary problem satisfy the conditions of an competitive equilibrium

Island planner problem (auxiliary problem)

- For every island ℓ, the island planner solves static problem

$$\max_{\{c,h\}_{\varepsilon_t^j}} \int u^j(c_t^j, h_t^j) d\Phi_t(\varepsilon_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \int c(\varepsilon_t^j) d\Phi = \int z(\varepsilon_t^j) h(\varepsilon_t^j) d\Phi$$

- Attach λ on the RC
- FOC wrt $c(\varepsilon_t^j)$:

$$c(\varepsilon_t^j)^{-1} = \lambda$$

Thus, there is perfect insurance on an island

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- FOC wrt $h(\varepsilon_t^j)$:

$$(\exp(B_j))^{\frac{1}{\eta}+1}h_j^{1/\eta} = z(\varepsilon_t^j)\lambda$$

Thus, hours change with ε_t^j. High ε_t^j work more.
- The RC and consumption FOC imply

$$\frac{1}{\lambda} = \int z^{1+\eta}\lambda^\eta \exp(-(1+\eta)B)d\Phi$$

$$= \lambda^\eta \exp(-(1+\eta)B)\exp((1+\eta)\alpha)\int \exp((1+\eta)\varepsilon)d\Phi$$

$$\implies 1 = \lambda\exp(-B)\exp(\alpha)\left[\int \exp((1+\eta)\varepsilon)d\Phi\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}$$

$$\implies c = \exp(\alpha - B)\underbrace{\left[\int \exp((1+\eta)\varepsilon)d\Phi\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}}_{\equiv \mathcal{C}}$$

$$\exp((1+\eta)B)h(\varepsilon) = [\exp(\alpha + \varepsilon - \alpha + B)]^\eta/\mathcal{C}^\eta$$

$$h(\varepsilon) = \frac{\varepsilon\eta}{\mathcal{C}^\eta\exp(B)}$$

- Comparative statistics: $\uparrow \varepsilon \implies \uparrow h(\varepsilon)$ and $\uparrow B \implies \downarrow h(\varepsilon)$
- α doesn't show up in h (kind of weird). Why? Income and substitution effects perfectly cancel out.

$$q_\ell(\varepsilon_{t+1}^j) = \frac{u_c(c_{t+1}(\varepsilon_{t+1}^j))}{u_c(c_t(\varepsilon_t^j))}\beta\delta \underbrace{\pi_t(\varepsilon_{t+1})}_{\text{Doesn't vary by islands}}$$

$$= \frac{c_t^j(\varepsilon_t^j)}{c_{t+1}^j(\varepsilon_{t+1}^j)}\beta\delta\pi_t(\varepsilon_{t+j})$$

$$= \exp(\alpha - B - \alpha + B)\frac{\mathcal{C}_t}{\mathcal{C}_{t+1}}\beta\delta\pi_t(\varepsilon_{t+1})$$

$$= \frac{\mathcal{C}_t}{\mathcal{C}_{t+1}}\beta\delta\pi_t(\varepsilon_{t+1})$$

Price is the same across islands.
- Risk-free asset price (let $\mathcal{E}_{t+1}$ be the support of ε_{t+1}^j):

$$q_\ell(\mathcal{E}_{t+1}) = \int \frac{u_c^j(c_{t+1}^j(\varepsilon_{t+1}^j))}{u_c^j(c_t^j(\varepsilon_t^j))}\beta\delta d\Phi_j^\varepsilon$$

$$= \beta\delta\frac{\mathcal{C}_t}{\mathcal{C}_{t+1}}$$

Equilibrium Characterization

- From the equilibrium conditions, we can map data on wages, hours, and consumption $(\hat{w}_i, \hat{h}_i, \hat{c}_i)$ to structural parameters $(\alpha_i, \varepsilon_i, B_i)$:

$$\underbrace{\hat{w}_i}_{\text{data}} = \underbrace{\exp(\alpha_i + \varepsilon_i)}_{\text{fn of structural parameter}}$$

$$\underbrace{\hat{h}_i}_{\text{data}} = \underbrace{\frac{\exp(\eta\varepsilon_i)}{\mathcal{C}^\eta \exp(B_i)}}_{\text{fn of structural parameter}}$$

$$\underbrace{\hat{c}_i}_{\text{data}} = \underbrace{\exp(\alpha_i - B_i)\mathcal{C}}_{\text{fn of structural parameter}}$$

- We can rewrite structural parameters $(\alpha_i, \varepsilon_i, B_i)$ as functions of data $(\hat{w}_i, \hat{h}_i, \hat{c}_i)$:

$$\frac{\hat{c}_i \hat{w}_i^\eta}{\hat{h}_i} = \frac{\exp(\alpha_i - B_i)\exp(\eta(\alpha_i + \varepsilon_i))}{\exp(-B_i)\exp(\eta\varepsilon_i)}$$

$$= \exp((1+\eta)\alpha_i)$$

$$\implies \underbrace{\frac{1}{1+\eta}\log\left[\frac{\hat{c}_i \hat{w}_i^\eta}{\hat{h}_i}\right]}_{\text{fn of data}} = \underbrace{\alpha_i}_{\text{structural parameter}} \tag{33}$$

$$\log(\hat{w}_i) - \alpha_i = \varepsilon_i$$

$$\implies \underbrace{\log(\hat{w}_i) - \frac{1}{1+\eta}\log\left[\frac{\hat{c}_i \hat{w}_i^\eta}{\hat{h}_i}\right]}_{\text{fn of data}} = \underbrace{\varepsilon_i}_{\text{structural parameter}} \tag{34}$$

$$\log(\hat{c}_i) = \alpha_i - B_i + \log(\mathcal{C})$$

$$\implies \underbrace{\frac{1}{1+\eta}\log\left[\frac{\hat{c}_i \hat{w}_i^\eta}{\hat{h}_i}\right] + \log(\mathcal{C}) - \log(\hat{c}_i)}_{\text{fn of data}} = \underbrace{B_i}_{\text{structural parameter}} \tag{35}$$

- We can use common estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η from the literature
- (??) Recall that

$$\mathcal{C} = \left[\int \exp((1+\eta)\varepsilon)d\Phi\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}$$

Which can be estimated as

$$\mathcal{C} \approx \left[\frac{1}{n}\sum \exp((1+\eta)\varepsilon_i)\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}$$

$$= \left[\frac{1}{n}\sum \exp\left((1+\eta)\left(\log(\hat{w}_i) - \frac{1}{1+\eta}\log\left[\frac{\hat{c}_i \hat{w}_i^\eta}{\hat{h}_i}\right]\right)\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}$$