The code crash offset below of the dxgknrl.sys driver when trying to access a non paged pool pointer:

0: kd>!pool bc023f2c
Pool page bc023f2c region is Special pool

VdPN 13 1736 722 43560 Video display mode management, Binary: dxgkrnl.sys

Enabling the pool tracking in the dxgknrl.sys driver (verifier.exe /flags 0x8 /driver dxgkrnl.sys), we can check when this pointer is allocated and when is freed:

2: kd>!verifier 0x80 0x87f6be38

Log of recent kernel pool Allocate and Free operations:

There are up to 0x10000 entries in the log.

Parsing 0x00010000 log entries, searching for address 0x87f6be38.

Pool block 87f6be30, Size 000000e0, Thread 94b52600

81ea0020 nt!ExFreePoolWithTag+0x10

9896fc07 dxgmms2!VidSchiPropagatePresentHistoryToken+0xeb31

989a8ae1 dxgmms2!VidSchSubmitCommand+0x3c1

9300384f dxgkrnl!SubmitPresentHistoryToken+0x5df

93069996 dxgkrnl!DxgkPresent+0x89586

81d7d5db nt!KiSystemServicePostCall+0

Pool block 87f6be38, Size 000000d4, Thread 94b52600 8224bac3 nt! VerifierExAllocatePoolWithTag+0x69

92f664aa dxgkrnl!operator new+0x1c

93004023 dxgkrnl!ReadPresentPrivateDriverData+0x93

9300396b dxgkrnl!SubmitPresentHistoryToken+0x6fb

93069996 dxgkrnl!DxgkPresent+0x89586

81d7d5db nt!KiSystemServicePostCall+0

As we can see, the pointer is allocated in *dxgkrnl!ReadPresentPrivateDriverData* function, and freed later inside the dxgmms2.sys driver.

Setting a breakpoint in **dxgkrnl!ReadPresentPrivateDriverData+0x93** we can see how the allocation happened. It is interesting that we can control the size of the allocation through the parameter **PrivateDriverDataSize** of the **D3DKMT_PRESENT** structure:

```
ba el dxgkrnl!ReadPresentPrivateDriverData+0x93
3: kd> ba el dxgkrnl!SubmitPresentHistoryToken+0x758
3: kd> dd eax
dda5df28 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df38 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df48 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df58 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df68 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df78 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df88 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
dda5df98 alalalal alalalal alalalal alalalal
3: kd> r ebx
ebx=dda5bd60
3: kd> r eax
eax=dda5df28
```

Once the pointer is allocated, the *PrivateDriverData* array of the *D3DKMT_PRESENT* structure is copied to the non paged pool allocated chunk:

In the offset dxgkrnl!SubmitPresentHistoryToken+0x5dd the driver dxgmms2 is called trhough the function dxgmms2!VidSchSubmitCommand and a LIST_ENTRY structure which contains a copy of the previous allocated pool pointer is passed as an argument of the function call.

Inside the dxgmms2.sys driver, the function call

dxgmms2!VidSchiPropagatePresentHistoryToken+0xeb24 is called and is in this offset when a call to ExFreeHeapPool is executed to free the PrivateDriverData pool pointer previously allocated in dxgknrl!ReadPresentPrivateDriverData.

nt!ExFreePoolWithTag:

```
81f23010 8bff mov edi,edi

81f23012 55 push ebp

81f23013 8bec mov ebp,esp

81f23015 83e4f8 and esp,0FFFFFF8h

81f23018 8b4d08 mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp+8] ss:0010:cf30d6bc=dda5df28

81f2301b e810bbdfff call nt!ExFreeHeapPool (81d1eb30)
```

After the free, the code return to dxgknrl.sys, but the copy of the pointer passed in the LIST_ENTRY structure to the dxgmms2.sys driver is not checked in order to invalidate the original pointer, so the pointer to the freed non-paged pool chunk is later used in <code>dxgkrnl!SubmitPresentHistoryToken+0x758</code> causing a BSOD when the special pool is enabled for the dxgknrl.sys driver.

Although the time between the freed and the use is shrot, it is possible to reclaim the freed chunk playing with threads, one for pool spraying and other thread of triggering the vulnerability, opening good opportunities to exploit the vulnerability.