

# Velisarios: Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Protocols Powered by Coq

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# Bugs and attacks are pervasive



# Solutions?



testing?

verification?


# Depends on assumptions abt environment




#cloudbleed

testing?


verification?



# State machine replication



# Byzantine Generals



# A need for verification

vmware®




Formal framework to verify  
implementations of BFT protocols




reference protocol:

PBFT

# PBFT?




# Overarching Goal






# Not the first tool. Where do we fit?


	Running code	Byz. (synch.)	Byz. (asynch.)
IronFleet/EventML/Verdi/Disel/PSync	✓	✗	✗
HO-model/PVS	✗	✓	✗
Event-B	✓/✗	✓	✗
IOA/TLA <sup>+</sup> /ByMC	✗	✓	✓
Velisarios	✓	✓	✓




# Interlude models of distributed computations















OR













# Use case: PBFT agreement


**Lemma** agreement :

```
forall (eo : EventOrdering) (e1 e2 : Event) (v1 v2 : View) (ts : Timestamp)
      (c : Client) (i1 i2 : Rep) (r1 r2 : Request) (a1 a2 : list Token),
authenticated_messages_were_sent_or_byz_sys eo PBFTsys
→ correct_keys eo
→ exists_at_most_f_faulty [e1,e2] f
→ loc e1 = PBFTreplica i1
→ loc e2 = PBFTreplica i2
→ In (send_reply v1 ts c i1 r1 a1) (output_system_on_event PBFTsys e1)
→ In (send_reply v2 ts c i2 r2 a2) (output_system_on_event PBFTsys e2)
→ r1 = r2.
```

# Use case: PBFT evaluation




# Future Work



LIVENESS



TIMELINESS



DOWN TO C