Advanced Microeconomics, Fall 2012

3 hours closed book exam

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There are 3 problems. The problems B and C have the same weight in the marking process and Problem A has half the weight of Problem B.

Below

$$\mathbb{R}^{k}_{+} = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^{k} \mid x_{h} \geq 0 \text{ for } h = 1, 2, \dots, k\} \text{ and } \mathbb{R}^{k}_{++} = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^{k} \mid x_{h} > 0 \text{ for } h = 1, 2, \dots, k\}$$

for k = 1, 2, ...

Problem A

- (a) What is meant by a rational preference relation? Solution: See MWG
- (b) The production possibility set Y exhibits non-decreasing returns to scale. What does this mean? Solution: Seen NotesProd or MWG
- (c) Give a graphic example of a consumption possibility set in \mathbb{R}^2 where commodity 1 is indivisible. Is your consumption possibility set a convex set. **Solution:** For example,

$$X = \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid x_1 \in \left\{0, 1, 2, \ldots\right\}, x_2 \ge 0 \right\}$$

which is not a convex set since (1,5) and (2,5) belongs to X but (1/2)(1,5)+(1/2)(2,5) does not belong to X.

(d) Assume that Arrow's assumptions for a SWF are satisfied and that Schedule 1 below is mapped to a ranking for society with a above b. What can be concluded about society's ranking of a and b for Schedule 2? Solution: Since the a-b pattern is the same in Schedule 2 the SWF must, by Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, map also Schedule 2 to a ranking with a above b.

Schedule 1			Schedule 2		
b	\mathbf{c}	a	\mathbf{c}	b	\mathbf{c}
a	b	\mathbf{c}	b	a	a
\mathbf{c}	a	b	a	\mathbf{c}	b

- (e) Let $\mathcal{E} = (\mathbb{R}^2_+, u^i, \omega^i)_{i \in \{a,b\}}$ be a pure exchange economy where consumers satisfy assumptions F1,F2 and F3. How is the total (aggregate) excess demand defined for this economy? **Solution:** See NotesWa or MWG
- (f) Let $\xi(p_1, p_2, \mathbf{w}) = \left(\frac{1}{4} \frac{\mathbf{w}}{p_1}, \frac{3}{4} \frac{\mathbf{w}}{p_2}\right)$ be the demand function of a consumer in a private ownership (pure exchange) economy with $\mathbf{w} = p_1 \omega_1 + p_2 \omega_2, \omega_1, \omega_2 > 0$. Will the consumer's excess demand function satisfy the Gross Substitutes assumption? Does you answer depend on the initial endowment ω of the consumer? Solution: See Example 17.F.2 in MWG.

Problem B

- (a) Consider an economy $\mathcal{E} = ((\mathbb{R}^L_+, u^i)_{i \in \{a,b\}}, Y, \omega)$ where the (only) producer satisfies P1 and the consumers satisfy F1 and F2. Let $((\bar{x}^i)_{i \in \{a,b\}}, \bar{y})$ be a Pareto optimal allocation. Show that \bar{y} is an efficient production in Y. (**Hint**: Argue by contradiction.) **Solution:** See NotesOpt.
- (b) State and prove The First Theorem of Welfare Economics for a pure exchange economy (without private ownership). (**Hint**: Argue by contradiction.) Where do you need Assumption F2? **Solution:**See NotesOpt or MWG Proposition 16.C.1.

Problem C

Let $\mathcal{E} = \{(X, u), Y, \omega\}$ be a private ownership economy with a single consumer (who owns the single producer) and

$$X = \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid x_1 \ge 2, x_2 \ge 0 \right\}$$

$$Y = \left\{ y \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid y_2 \le 2 \left(-y_1 \right)^{1/2}, y_1 \le 0 \right\}$$

$$u(x_1, x_2) = (x_1 - 2) x_2$$

$$\omega = (4, 0)$$

(a) Does Y satisfy Assumption P1? State and solve the Producer Problem for prices $p = (p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_{++}$ and find the maximal profit.

Solution: The Producer Problem is

$$Max_{y \in Y} p_1 y_1 + p_2 y_2$$

A production solving the Producer Problem is be an efficient production. Thus we can consider the problem

$$Max p_1y_1 + p_2y_2$$
 subject to $y_2 - 2(-y_1)^{1/2} = 0$

and derive the following marginal conditions

$$p_1 - \lambda (-y_1)^{-(1/2)} = 0$$

$$p_2 - \lambda = 0$$

which gives
$$(y_1, y_2) = \left(-\frac{p_2^2}{p_1^2}, 2\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right)$$
 and the profits are $-p_1\frac{p_2^2}{p_1^2} + 2p_2\frac{p_2}{p_1} = -\frac{p_2^2}{p_1} + 2\frac{p_2^2}{p_1} = \frac{p_2^2}{p_1}$.

(b) Solve the Consumer Problem as $p = (p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_{++}$ and wealth is given by $w \ge 2p_1$. Hint: You may consider rewriting the budget restriction as $p_1(x_1 - 2) + p_2x_2 \le w - 2p_1$ if you recall the solution with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Solution:

Using the solution for the Cobb-Douglas function we get

$$(x_1 - 2, x_2) = \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_1}, \frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_2}\right)$$
 which implies
 $(x_1, x_2) = \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_1} + 2, \frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_2}\right)$

(c) Assume that wealth is now given by the value of initial endowment and profits. Derive the market balance condition for good 1. If $p = (p_1, p_2)$ satisfies this condition is then (p_1, p_2) an equilibrium price system? Solution:

The market balance condition for good 1 is $x_1 = y_1 + \omega_1$, or using the results from (a), (b) and $w = 4p_1 + \frac{p_2^2}{p_1}$

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{4p_1 + \frac{p_2^2}{p_1} - 2p_1}{p_1} + 2 = -\frac{p_2^2}{p_1^2} + 4$$

(d) Put $p_1 = 1$ and find p_2 from the market balance condition in (c). Solution:

$$\frac{1}{2}(2+p_2^2) = -p_2^2 + 2 \Longleftrightarrow$$

$$\frac{3}{2}p_2^2 = 1 \Longleftrightarrow$$

$$p_2 = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{1/2}$$

(e) Find the Walras equilibrium for \mathcal{E} . Check that both markets balance.

Solution:

The equilibrium prices are
$$(p_1, p_2) = \left(1, \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{1/2}\right)$$

$$(x_1, x_2) = \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_1} + 2, \frac{1}{2} \frac{w - 2p_1}{p_2}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{2} (2 + p_2^2) + 2, \frac{1}{2} \frac{2 + p_2^2}{p_2}\right) = \left(\frac{10}{3}, \frac{4}{3}\right)^{1/2} = \left(\frac{10}{3}, 2\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{1/2}\right)$$

$$(y_1, y_2) = \left(-\frac{p_2^2}{p_1^2}, 2\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right) = \left(-\frac{2}{3}, 2\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{1/2}\right)$$

Obviously market 2 balances and for market 1: $\frac{10}{3} = -\frac{2}{3} + 4$ so also that market balances