Secure programing assignment 1

CSE 5382-001


Submitted by:

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Task 1: Manipulating Environment Variables

Use "printeny" or "eny" command to print out the environment variables:



Observation: Prints all the environment variables

Observation: Displays PWD environment variable

Use "export" and "unset" to set or unset environment variables:

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~$ export new_temp_env="/home/seed"
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~$ printenv new_temp_env
/home/seed
```

Observation: Creating an environment variable using "export" and using "printenv" command to see if the variable is created at that location.

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~$ unset new_temp_env
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~$ printenv new_temp_env
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~$
```

Observation: using "unset" to remove the variable from the list.

Task 2: Passing Environment Variables from Parent Process to Child Process

Step1:

Observation: executing child process

```
[09/15/21]seedeVM:-/Labsetup$ vi myprintenv.c
[09/15/21]seedeVM:-/Labsetup$ cat myprintenv.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h

#include <stdio.h

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h

#include <std>#include <std>#incl
```

Observation: executing parent process

```
Step3:
```

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ diff file file2
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Observation: there is no difference in the output files created in the either step's as the "diff" command doesn't give out any output. (can be verified using cat command on each file) Hence it can be interpreted that the child process inherits all the environment variables from parent.

Task 3: Environment Variables and execve()

Step1:

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat myenv.c
#include <unistd.h>
extern char **environ;
int main()
{
    char *argv[2];
    argv[0] = "/usr/bin/env";
    argv[1] = NULL;
    execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, NULL);
    return 0;
}

[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc myenv.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ a.out > task3_1
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task3_1
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```


Observation: simply executing "/usr/bin/env" but we do not get any environment variables as NULL is used as the third parameter

Step2:

C

catall.c

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi myenv.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat myenv.c
#include <unistd.h>
extern char **environ;
int main()
  char *argv[2];
  argv[0] = "/usr/bin/env";
  argv[1] = NULL;
  execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, environ);
  return 0:
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc myenv.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ a.out > task3_2
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task3 2
SHELL=/bin/bash
SESSION_MANAGER=local/VM:@/tmp/.ICE-unix/2565,unix/VM:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2565
QT ACCESSIBILITY=1
COLORTERM=truecolor
XDG CONFIG DIRS=/etc/xdg/xdg-ubuntu:/etc/xdg
XDG MENU PREFIX=gnome-
GNOME DESKTOP SESSION ID=this-is-deprecated
GNOME SHELL SESSION MODE=ubuntu
```



```
XDG CURRENT DESKTOP=ubuntu:GNOME
VTE_VERSION=6003
GNOME TERMINAL SCREEN=/org/gnome/Terminal/screen/1386272f 0b18 404c b369 61ddde6
64563
INVOCATION ID=2a32a72bf8a143899ec825081fa8d6ae
MANAGERPID=2307
GJS DEBUG OUTPUT=stderr
LESSCLOSE=/usr/bin/lesspipe %s %s
XDG SESSION CLASS=user
TERM=xterm-256color
LESSOPEN=| /usr/bin/lesspipe %s
USER=seed
GNOME TERMINAL SERVICE=:1.131
DISPLAY=:0
SHLVL=1
QT IM MODULE=ibus
XDG RUNTIME DIR=/run/user/1000
JOURNAL STREAM=9:41361
XDG DATA DIRS=/usr/share/ubuntu:/usr/local/share/:/usr/share/:/var/lib/snapd/des
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/us
r/local/games:/snap/bin:.
GDMSESSION=ubuntu
DBUS SESSION BUS ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus
 =./a.out
OLDPWD=/home/seed
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Observation: after changing the 3rd argument from null to environ and compiling and executing the same program, we can see that the process prints all the environment variables that it inherits. Here we are passing the environment variables in while invoking the execve() method along with "/usr/bin/env".

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task4.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main()
        system("/usr/bin/env");
        return 0 ;
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc task4.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ a.out
GJS DEBUG TOPICS=JS ERROR; JS LOG
LESSOPEN=| /usr/bin/lesspipe %s
USER=seed
SSH AGENT PID=2530
XDG SESSION TYPE=x11
SHLVL=1
HOME=/home/seed
OLDPWD=/home/seed
DESKTOP SESSION=ubuntu
GNOME_SHELL_SESSION_MODE=ubuntu
GTK MODULES=gail:atk-bridge
MANAGERPID=2307
DBUS SESSION BUS ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus
COLORTERM=truecolor
IM CONFIG PHASE=1
LOGNAME=seed
JOURNAL STREAM=9:41361
=./a.out
XDG SESSION CLASS=user
USERNAME=seed
TERM=xterm-256color
GNOME DESKTOP SESSION ID=this-is-deprecated
WINDOWPATH=2
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/us
```

Observation: The program prints all the environment variables of the current process. The system() command would use fork() to create a child process which executes the shell command. Hence the child process would display all the environment variables.

<u>Task 5: Environment Variable and Set-UIDPrograms:</u>

Step1: running the given program

```
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi task5.c
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task5.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
extern char**environ;
int main()
{
    int i = 0;
    while (environ[i] != NULL)
    {
        printf("%s\n", environ[i]);
        i++;
    }
}
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Step2: changing permissions

```
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc task5.c -o task5
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chown root task5
[09/15/21] seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 task5
```



Step3:

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ export task5 env="task5env"
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ printenv task5 env
task5env
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./task5
SHELL=/bin/bash
SESSION MANAGER=local/VM:@/tmp/.ICE-unix/2565,unix/VM:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2565
QT ACCESSIBILITY=1
COLORTERM=truecolor
XDG CONFIG DIRS=/etc/xdg/xdg-ubuntu:/etc/xdg
XDG MENU PREFIX=gnome-
GNOME DESKTOP SESSION ID=this-is-deprecated
GNOME SHELL SESSION MODE=ubuntu
SSH AUTH SOCK=/run/user/1000/keyring/ssh
XMODIFIERS=@im=ibus
DESKTOP SESSION=ubuntu
SSH AGENT PID=2530
GTK MODULES=gail:atk-bridge
PWD=/home/seed/Labsetup
LOGNAME=seed
XDG SESSION DESKTOP=ubuntu
XDG SESSION TYPE=x11
GPG_AGENT_INF0=/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent:0:1
XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/Xauthority
GJS DEBUG TOPICS=JS ERROR;JS LOG
WINDOWPATH=2
HOME=/home/seed
USERNAME=seed
IM CONFIG PHASE=1
LANG=en US.UTF-8
LS COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd
=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sq=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;4
4:ex=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arc=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lha=01;
           task5_env=task5env
```

Observation: the new environment variable (shown in second image) that was created was inherited along with the other environment variables and are displayed when the program is executed.

Task 6: The PATH Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs:

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi task6.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task6.c
#include<stdlib.h>
int main()
{
    system("ls");
    return 0;
}
```



Compiling the above program, and change its owner to root, and make it a Set-UID program.

[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup\$ gcc task6.c -o task6 [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup\$ sudo chown root task6 [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup\$ sudo chmod 4755 task6



```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./task6
      a.out
               catall.c file2
                              myprintenv.c task3 2 task5
                                                       task6
      cap leak.c file
                      myenv.c task3 1
                                         task4.c task5.c task6.c
Changing the code to test our own command for syterm():
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi task6.c
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat task6.c
 #include<stdlib.h>
 int main()
         system("ifconfig");
         return 0;
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc task6.c -o task6
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chown root task6
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 task6
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./task6
 docker0: flags=4099<UP,BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
         inet 172.17.0.1 netmask 255.255.0.0 broadcast 172.17.255.255
         ether 02:42:3e:eb:4e:d6 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
         RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
         RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
         TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
         TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
 enp0s3: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
         inet 10.0.2.4 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.2.255
         inet6 fe80::6a04:3638:16b4:83b prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
         ether 08:00:27:df:57:91 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
         RX packets 725 bytes 918577 (918.5 KB)
         RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
         TX packets 590 bytes 49856 (49.8 KB)
         TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
 lo: flags=73<UP,L00PBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
         inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
         inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
         loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
         RX packets 162 bytes 13130 (13.1 KB)
         RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
         TX packets 162 bytes 13130 (13.1 KB)
         TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
 [09/17/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Observation: the system() command invokes fork() which creates new process and executes the command. This execution could be affected by other users since system() command would refer to the environment variables. Therefore this prgm is proven to be very dangerous.

Task 7: The LD PRELOAD Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs:

```
Step1.1: building a dynamic link library
   [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi mylib.c
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat mylib.c
  #include <stdio.h>
  void sleep (int s)
          /*If this is invoked by a privileged program, you can do damages here!*/
          printf("I am not sleeping!\n");
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
Step1.2: compiling the program
      [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc -fPIC -g -c mylib.c
      [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc -shared -o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o -lc
      [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
Step1.3: set the LD PRELOAD environment variable
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ export LD PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ printenv LD_PRELOAD
  ./libmylib.so.1.0.1
Step1.4: compiling myprog.c
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi myprog.c
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat myprog.c
  #include <unistd.h>
  int main()
           sleep(1);
           return 0;
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc myprog.c -o myprog
Step2.1: Make myprog regular program, and run it as a normal user.
  [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./myprog
  I am not sleeping!
```

Observation: we see the custom sleep() method that we created is being invoked as we have included it in the environment variable

Step2.2: Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it as a normal user.

```
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# gcc -o myprog myprog.c
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# chmod u+s myprog
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# exit
exit
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ls -l
total 156
-rwxrwxr-x 1 seed seed 16696 Sep 15 17:51 a.out
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                       761 Dec 27 2020 cap_leak.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                       471 Feb 19 2021 catall.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 2953 Sep 15 15:28 file
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 2953 Sep 15 15:32 file2
-rwxrwxr-x 1 seed seed 18688 Sep 15 18:44 libmylib.so.1.0.1
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 183 Sep 15 17:23 myenv.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 148 Sep 15 18:41 mylib.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 5944 Sep 15 18:44 mylib.o
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 418 Sep 15 15:32 myprintenv.c
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 16696 Sep 15 19:11 myprog
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 57 Sep 15 18:49 myprog.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                         0 Sep 15 17:16 task3 1
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 2953 Sep 15 17:23 task3 2
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                       91 Sep 15 17:50 task4.c
-rwxrwxr-x 1 root seed 16768 Sep 15 18:03 task5
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 160 Sep 15 18:00 task5.c
-rwxrwxr-x 1 4755 seed 16696 Sep 15 18:24 task6
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                         60 Sep 15 18:24 task6.c
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./myprog
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Observation: when a program is set as a privileged root program it would ignore the previously set LD PRELOAD variable while executing. Hence the custom sleep function is not called here.

Step2.3: Make myprog a Set-UID root program, export the LD PRELOAD environment variable again in the root account and run it.

```
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# ./myprog
I am not sleeping!
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup#
```

Observation: since the LD_PRLOAD is set to the point to the custom library, again the privileged root program would call the custom Sleep() method.

```
root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# adduser user1
MAdding user `user1' ...
 Adding new group `user1' (1001) ...
 Adding new user `user1' (1001) with group `user1' ...
 Creating home directory `/home/user1' ...
 Copying files from `/etc/skel' ...
 ERROR: ld.so: object './libmylib.so.1.0.1' from LD PRELOAD cannot be preloaded (c
 annot open shared object file): ignored.
 New password:
 Retype new password:
 passwd: password updated successfully
 Changing the user information for user1
 Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default
         Full Name []: usre1
         Room Number []: 1
         Work Phone []: 1
         Home Phone []: 1
         Other []: 1
 Is the information correct? [Y/n] y
 root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# chown user1 myporg
 chown: cannot access 'myporg': No such file or directory
 root@VM:/home/seed/Labsetup# chown user1 myprog
   [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ export LD PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
   [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./myprog
   I am not sleeping!
```

Observation: we see that out custom sleep() method is being invoked in this case.

<u>Task 8: Invoking External Programs Using system() versus execve()</u>


Step1: Compile the above program, make it a root-owned Set-UID program. The program will use system() to invoke the command.

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc catall.c -o catall [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chown root catall [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
```

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./catall catall.c
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  char *v[3];
  char *command;
  if(argc < 2) {
    printf("Please type a file name.\n");
    return 1;
  }
  v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = NULL;
  command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);
  sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);
  // Use only one of the followings.
  system(command);
  // execve(v[0], v, NULL);
  return 0 ;
 [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
```

Step 2: Comment out the system(command) statement, and uncomment the execve() statement; the program will use execve() to invoke the command.

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ vi catall.c
mylib.c
        [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat catall.c
        #include <unistd.h>
        #include <stdio.h>
C
        #include <stdlib.h>
task4.c
        #include <string.h>
        int main(int argc, char *argv[])
          char *v[3];
          char *command;
          if(argc < 2) {
  printf("Please type a file name.\n");</pre>
            return 1;
          v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = NULL;
          command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);
          sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);
          // Use only one of the followings.
          //system(command);
          execve(v[0], v, NULL);
          return 0 :
```



```
сар теак.с
        [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc catall.c -o catall
                                                                                             [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chown root catall
 C
        [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
mylib.c
        [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./catall catall.c
        #include <unistd.h>
        #include <stdio.h>
 C
        #include <stdlib.h>
task4.c
        #include <string.h>
        int main(int argc, char *argv[])
          char *v[3];
          char *command;
          if(argc < 2) {
            printf("Please type a file name.\n");
            return 1;
          v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = NULL;
          command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);
          sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);
          // Use only one of the followings.
          //system(command);
          execve(v[0], v, NULL);
          return 0 ;
```

Observation: execve() uses root environment variables. And these variables can be set by privileged users only. Hence, using execve() does not cause any attack in step 1.

Task 9: Capability Leaking

```
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ cat cap leak.c
cap leak.c
           #include <unistd.h>
          #include <stdio.h>
 C
          #include <stdlib.h>
 mylib.c
         m#include <fcntl.h>
 C
          void main()
 task4.c
             int fd;
             char *v[2];
             /* Assume that /\mathrm{etc}/\mathrm{zzz} is an important system file,
            * and it is owned by root with permission 0644.

* Before running this program, you should create

* the file /etc/zzz first. */
fd = open("/etc/zzz", O_RDWR | O_APPEND);
            if (fd == -1) {
    printf("Cannot open /etc/zzz\n");
                exit(0);
             // Print out the file descriptor value
             printf("fd is %d\n", fd);
             // Permanently disable the privilege by making the
             // effective uid the same as the real uid
             setuid(getuid());
             // Execute /bin/sh
             v[0] = "/bin/sh"; v[1] = 0;
             execve(v[0], v, 0);
           [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$
         [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ gcc cap leak.c -o capleak
         [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chown root capleak
        [09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 capleak
[09/15/21]seed@VM:~/Labsetup$ ./capleak
Cannot open /etc/zzz
```

Observation: non root users will not have write access to the file zzz. When the file owner is changed to root the current privileges are revoked making the file inaccessible.