# Software Fault Isolation using the CompCert compiler

Author: Alexandre Dang Supervisor: Frédéric Besson

Team Celtique

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## Flash vulnerable plugin

Do you know this logo?

Flash is famous for its multiple vulnerabilities


- $\rightarrow$  consequences on Flash
- ightarrow but ALSO endangers your browser



## Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [Wahbe et al, 1993]

- ▶ SFI aims to allow a protected program to execute dangerous modules in its own memory space without dangers.
- ► SFI confines the execution of the dangerous modules in a reserved memory space called sandbox


## Goals of SFI



## Overview of SFI

SFI chain is composed of two elements:

- ▶ the **generator** transforms the assembly code of the dangerous modules in order to confine the modules in their sandbox
- the verifier checks that the SFI transformations are present and valid before loading the code in memory



## Limitations of SFI

## Strength

SFI prevent attackers from using vulnerable modules to compromise our system

#### Weakness


SFI has difficulties to protect return addresses from being targeted

 $\rightarrow$  Returned Oriented Programing attacks (ROP)

### Contributions

- An approach inspired from SFI protecting return addresses against ROP attacks
- ➤ An implementation of our approach with the compiler CompCert for the x86-32 architecture

## Memory structure



#### Stack structure

 Return addresses are solely located in the stack

▶ The stack piles up frames

► Each frames matches a function

Parameters of the function

Return address

Stack data and local variables


Register saved states

Parameters for functions that will be called

## ROP attack example (1/2)

```
void reset_password() {
                            //Sensitive code
     ... reset password ...
3
5
   void foo(char* input){
6
     char buf[1];
     ... code ...
     strcpy(buf, input);
                                  //Vulnerability
     ... code ...
10
```

## ROP attack example (2/2)



## Modern ROP attacks

- ▶ ROP attacks are a common kind of attack in the industry
- Modern ROP attacks are much more complicated [Buchanan et al,2008]

"Skype URI handling routine contains a buffer overflow", 2005<sup>1</sup>

"Apple Mail buffer overflow vulnerability", 2006

"glibc vulnerable to stack buffer overflow in DNS resolver", 2016

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>From CERT vulnerability database

#### **Problematic**

We want to add additional checks at runtime to protect the return addresses.

How do we know the return addresses locations in the memory?

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How do we know the return addresses locations in the memory?

⇒ Modify the memory structure to have an easy way to distinguish return addresses locations


## Presentation of our approach

- 1. Presentation of the stack
- 2. Transformation of the stack structure
- 3. Insertion of runtime checks in the protected code
- 4. Evaluation of the approach

## Stack transformation objective


- We want a stack structure with a property on the return addresses locations
- ▶ Every return addresses location  $\underline{a}$  verifies  $\underline{a \mod n = 0}$
- ▶ The transformation is composed of two steps:
  - 1. Constant frames size
  - 2. Stack alignment

## Stack transformation (1/6) Find the biggest frames size




## Stack transformation (2/6)

Calculate the new frames size




## Stack transformation (3/6)

Fix the size of the frames




## Stack transformation (4/6)

#### Return addresses locations




## Stack transformation (5/6)

#### Insertion of a new artificial main




## Stack transformation (6/6)

#### Return addresses locations




# Stack transformation Summary



### Code transformation

- ▶ Differentiation of return addresses locations with a mod n = 0
- Insertion of additional runtime checks to protect these locations from being overwritten illegally
- Transformation of the code during the compilation phase


#### Runtime check



- ➤ The protection mechanism might be executed numerous times
- ➤ To improve performance we want to have this runtime check as fast as possible


## Branchless check

- Uses only a single if...then...else instruction
- In certain situation has shown better performance



## Branchless check


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## Implementation environment

## CompCert the certified compiler [Leroy, 2009]

- CompCert has been proven with the proof assistant Coq
- CompCert has performance similar to gcc -01




## Requirements

No modifications of the stack (inline assembly)


```
int foo(int a) {
asm(''\$sub 50, \%esp'');
printf("Hello world!");
}
```

- ▶ No function pointers to protect our runtime checks
- Need to recompile external libraries with the same frames size

## Evaluation of performance



## Evaluation of performance



#### Future work

## **Prospects**

- Test our implementation against more complicated ROP attacks
- ► Reduce the number of runtime checks with static analysis [Zeng et al, 2011]
- Improve the performance of the runtime checks with a super-optimizer
- ► See the impact of our approach on memory consumption
- Prove the security properties of our implementation

## Conclusion

- Analysis and inspiration from SFI
- Approach protecting programs against ROP attacks
- ▶ Implementation on CompCert x86-32
- Evaluation of the approach and future work

#### References

[1] Erik Buchanan, Ryan Roemer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. When good instructions go bad: Generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC.

In Paul Syverson and Somesh Jha, editors, *Proceedings of CCS 2008*, pages 27–38. ACM Press, October 2008.

[2] Xavier Leroy. Formal verification of a realistic compiler. Commun. ACM, 52(7):107–115, 2009.

- [3] David Sehr, Robert Muth, Cliff Biffle, Victor Khimenko, Egor Pasko, Karl Schimpf, Bennet Yee, and Brad Chen. Adapting software fault isolation to contemporary cpu architectures. In Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Conference on Security, USENIX Security'10, pages 1–1. USENIX Association, 2010.
- [4] Robert Wahbe, Steven Lucco, Thomas E. Anderson, and Susan L. Graham. Efficient software-based fault isolation. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 27(5):203–216, 1993.
- [5] Bin Zeng, Gang Tan, and Greg Morrisett. Combining control-flow integrity and static analysis for efficient and validated data sandboxing.

In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS '11, pages 29–40. ACM, 2011.

## Branchless example

#### Legal execution

```
if (addr > 0xff000000) {
   mask = addr & 0x0000000ff;
   mask = mask - 3;
   mask = mask >> 31;
   mask = ~mask;
   addr = mask & addr;
}
*addr = value;
Continue execution...
```

```
n = 2^8 = 0 \times 00000100
```

addr is not a return address location, it should keep its value

#### Values

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathtt{addr} = \mathtt{0xfffff718} \\ \mathtt{mask} = \mathtt{0x00000000} \end{array}$ 

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 $\mathtt{addr} = 0 \times \mathsf{fffff718}$  $\mathtt{mask} = 0 \times 00000018$ 

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#### **Values**

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mask = 0xffffffff

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Forbidden write destination the program should crash

#### Values

 $addr = 0 \times fffff700$   $mask = 0 \times 000000000$ 

#### Illegal execution

```
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