

## 20.1 Introduction to hardness of learning results

There are two classes of hardness of learning results:

1. Hardness results for proper learning: Usually, using the  $RP \neq NP$  assumption, we prove that proper learning a representation class is hard. For example, for  $k \geq 3$ , learning  $k$ -term DNF formulae and producing a  $k$ -term DNF as a hypothesis is intractable.
2. Cryptographic hardness of learning results: Here, typically using the assumption that factoring is hard, you show that a certain concept class is hard to learn, even if the learner is allowed to produce a hypothesis which does not belong to the same representation class as the target concept.

In this lecture, we will show the following cryptographic hardness of learning result: If factoring is hard, learning the concept class of polynomial sized circuits of log depth is hard.

First, we make some definitions.

## 20.2 Introducing some notions

**Definition 1** A Function Family is an exponential sized set  $F = \{f_i | i \in I\}$  of polynomial sized boolean circuits with input length  $n$ , equipped with a samplable index set  $I$ ; such that there exists an algorithm  $S$  which does the following:

$S$  accepts as input  $i \in I$  and simulates the input/ output behavior of  $f_i$ : that is, it accepts  $x$  and returns  $f_i(x)$  in polynomial time.

**Definition 2** Let  $RAND$  be the set the set of all boolean functions over  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .

**Definition 3** A Distinguisher  $D$  is a polynomial time algorithm which, when given black box access to a function  $f$ , outputs 1 or 0.

In the context of the present lecture,  $D$  will output 1 if it thinks that  $f$  is not chosen uniformly at random from  $RAND$ .

**Definition 4** A function family  $F$  is Pseudorandom Function Family (PFF) if for every distinguisher  $D$ ,  $Pr_{f \in_U RAND}(D^f = 1) - Pr_{i \in_U I}(D^{f_i} = 1) < O(e^{-n})$ . This property of  $F$  is called the Indistinguishability property.

The following notion, from David Zuckerman's Randomized Algorithms course is also helpful.

**Definition 5** A function  $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , computable in time  $\text{poly}(l)$ , is an  $(\epsilon, s(n))$  Pseudo-random Generator if, for all circuits  $c$  of size  $s(n)$ , the following property holds:  $\Pr_{y \in \{0, 1\}^n} [c(y) = 1] - \Pr_{x \in \{0, 1\}^l} [c(G(x)) = 1] \leq \epsilon$ .

**Fact 1** From a result due to Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali, we know that if one way functions exist (that is, if factoring is hard), then pseudorandom function families exist.

**Definition 6** The Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator is an algorithm with the following behavior:

1. It accepts as input the following:
  - An  $n$  bit integer  $N = pq$ , where  $p$  and  $q$  are prime numbers which are equivalent to  $3 \bmod 4$ .
  - An initial seed  $s_0$  of length  $n$  bits.
2. It outputs a stream of  $\text{poly}(n)$  bits  $b_i$ , each of which is the least significant bit of the number  $s_i$  calculated as follows:  $s_i = s_{i-1}^2 \bmod N = s_0^{2^i} \bmod N$ .

**Fact 2** If factoring is hard, no polynomial time algorithm can distinguish between a truly random  $m$  bit string and an  $m$  bit string obtained by choosing the seed  $s_0$  at random and running a BBS generator.

## 20.3 Hardness of learning circuits which compute the $i$ th bit of the output of a BBS generator

**Definition 7** Let  $\mathbb{C}$  represent any circuit class which contains circuits  $f_{s_0, N, t}$  with the following behavior:

1.  $\forall i > t : f_{s_0, N, t}(i) = 0$ .
2.  $\forall i \leq t : f_{s_0, N, t}(i) = b_i$ , the  $i$ th bit output by the BBS pseudorandom generator specified by  $N$  and the seed  $s_0$ .

**Theorem 1** If  $\mathbb{C}$  is efficiently learnable, then the BBS generator can be broken.

**Sketch of Proof** If  $\mathbb{C}$  is efficiently learnable, then there exists an  $O(n^{ck})$  time algorithm  $A$  to learn  $\mathbb{C}$  with error  $\leq 2^{-1} - n^{-k}$ ; where  $k$  and  $c$  are constants. Let  $d$  be any integer such that  $dc \neq 1$ .

We show that, using  $A$ , you can build a distinguisher  $D$  which, given a string  $b$  of  $n^{(d+1)ck}$  bits, can distinguish a BBS generated string from random string. This distinguisher works as follows:

Let  $b_i$  be the  $i$ th bit of  $b$ . Then, tuples of the form  $(i, b_i)$  are referred to as examples. Using the Uniform Distribution over the examples,  $D$  draws  $n^{ck}$  examples. Using  $A$  with this sample,  $D$  then obtains a hypothesis  $h$  with error  $\leq 2^{-1} - n^{-k}$ .

$D$  then picks uniformly at random another bit index  $j$ . It then tries predicting  $b_j$  using  $h$ . If its guess turns out to be correct, it outputs 1, which stands for the identification of  $b$  as the output of a 'generator'.

On truly random  $b$ ,  $\Pr(D^{rand} = 1) \geq 2^{-1} + \frac{n^{ck}}{n^{(d+1)ck}}$ ; but  $\Pr(D^{f_{s_0, N, t}} = 1) \geq 2^{-1} + n^{-k}$ . The difference between these,  $n^{-dck} - n^{-k}$  is not negligible. ■

## 20.4 Hardness of learning small circuits

Let the order of the group  $Z_N^*$  be  $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ .

Consider the circuit  $f_{s_0, N, t}$ . On input  $i$ , it needs to compute  $f_{s_0, N, t}(i) = s_0^{2^i} \bmod N = s_0^{2^i \bmod \varphi(N)} \bmod N$ .

If we know the precomputed values of  $2^0, 2^1, 2^2 \dots \bmod \varphi(N)$ , given any number  $k$ , we can find  $j = 2^k \bmod \varphi(N)$  by multiplying together the appropriate precomputed powers of 2. Similarly, if we know precomputed values  $s_0^0, s_0^1, s_0^2 \dots \bmod N$ , we can find  $s_0^j$  for any  $j$  by multiplying together the appropriate powers of  $s_0$ .

Thus, our circuit to compute  $f_{s_0, N, t}$  must be able to remember these precomputed values, and should be able to multiply  $n$   $n$ -bit numbers. Thus,  $f_{s_0, N, t}$  can be realized using a polynomial sized circuit of depth  $O(\log n)$ .

Thus, using the theorem we proved earlier, we see that classes of circuits of polynomial size and log depth are hard to learn.