

ASSIGNMENT OF BACHELOR'S THESIS

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Instructions

Review known timing side channel attacks on RSA decryption and signing operations. Create a demonstration application that will perform timing attack on RSA in order to determine the private key. The application will be used in courses on cryptology and computer security as a part of laboratory exercises. Consider an attack on a local computer or over the network and evaluate its time complexity.

References

Will be provided by the supervisor.

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Prague March 7, 2017

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Bachelor's thesis

Timing Attack on the RSA Cipher

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13th May 2018

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In Prague on 13th May 2018

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Abstrakt

Tato práce se zabývá replikací útoku na RSA kryptosystém časovým postranním kanálem, který je realizován měřením času algoritmu opakovaných čtverců s Montgomeryho násobením. Útok se zaměřuje na měření času trvání dešifrování rozdílných zpráv s určitými vlastnostmi. Práce popisuje základní principy a slabiny RSA kryptosystému. Výsledkem práce je demonstrativní aplikace, která bude použita ve vyuce předmetch, zabývajících se počítačovou bezpečností.

Klíčová slova RSA, kryptoanalýza, časový útok, postranní kanál, Montgomeryho násobení

Abstract

This thesis is focused on replication of timing attack on RSA cryptosystem introduced by Paul Kocher, which is done by measuring time of square and multiply algorithm with Montgomery multiplication. The attack is based on measuring execution time of decryption function on messages with different properties. The thesis describe main principles and vulnerabilities of RSA cryptosystem. Implementation should be used for education purposes, mainly in security courses.

Keywords RSA, cryptanalysis, timing attack, side channel, Montgomery multiplication

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Introduction

Information security is nowadays very important. Through the network flows lot of information which is essential to keep in private. Due to this, many ciphers were invented and are used to encrypt communication over network. One of these ciphers is RSA. In past time there were several vulnerabilities on this cipher. I will focus on timing attack which exploit data dependency of decrypting algorithm.

This thesis will explain the main thoughts of RSA cryptosystem, its known vulnerabilities and how to defend against them. Thesis also introduce reader to timing attack problematic. It will compare two targets of timing attack, Kochers original attack on multiplication versus Dhems attack on square. Although both attack can be easily defended just by eliminating data dependency in decryption (resp. signing) algorithm.

Purpose of this thesis is demonstrative. The final application should be used in cryptography courses on Faculty of Information chnologies on CTU, mainly in Advanced Cryptology course. It should demonstrate progress of guessing private key bit by bit. There will be two approaches of guessing key. First original introduced by Paul Kocher which focuses on extra modular reduction during multiply operation[1]. The second approach was introduced by J.-F. Dhem and collective where they focus on extra modular reduction during square phase[2].

Lastly, I will introduce several ways of defense against timing attacks which will avoid data dependency. So that execution of time will be either constant or not telling us any usable information.

State-of-the-art

In 1996 Paul Kocher presented timing attack on several cryptosystems including RSA[1]. The cryptosystems have in common that all of them are using modular exponentiation or they are public key cryptosystems. Kochers idea was to attack square and multiply algorithm which uses Montgomery multiplication. He intend to exploit execution time of decrypting and signing algorithms because there is dependency on private exponent. After Kocher there have been more tries with better success, for example J.-F. Dhem, F. Koeune, P.-A. Leroux, P. Mestre, J.-J. Quisquater and J.-L. Willems who improved Kochers study[2].

Used mathematical principles

In this chapter I will introduce mathematical theorems and principles which will be referenced through the thesis

2.1 Euler's theorem

RSA

RSA is public-key cryptosystem which was developed at MIT by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. The cryptosystem was published in the 1977.

Main thought of public-key cryptosystem is sharing encryption key to whoever asks for it. Because it is used just for encryption, we can be sure that attacker could not retrieve any information about secret decryption key. Each subject of the conversation keeps his decryption key in private.

3.1 Principle

RSA is based on modular exponentiation. There are three important numbers which are used in computing modular exponentiation resp. encrypting messages.

- n - Modulus which is used during whole cipher algorithm.
- e - Encryption exponent. Exponent e is used to modular exponentiation of message so that we get ciphertext. Exponent must meet the condition $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$ where ϕ is Euler's totient function and \gcd is the greatest common divider function. This condition will be explained later.
- d - Decryption exponent. It is computed by finding modular inversion of public exponent e in modulus $\phi(n)$.

Commonly used value of e is 65537.

The cryptosystem consists of two keys, public and private. Public key is used for encrypting messages and is composed of modulus n and public exponent e . Private key is composed of modulus n and private exponent d .

3. RSA




Figure 3.1: RSA illustration[3]

3.1.1 Key generation

This is steps needed to generate keypair including public and private key

- Generate p and q , which have to be distinct prime numbers large enough to make factorization of their product hard problem. If we choose too small p and q , we are risking that attacker could do factorization of n so that he could easily compute our private exponent d using Euler's totient function ϕ .
- Compute n , where $n = pq$
- Compute Euler's totient function $\phi(n)$. Because we know p and q it is simple to compute it. We know that n is product of p and q which are prime numbers. Euler's totient function ϕ for prime numbers equals $\phi(P) = P - 1$ where P is prime number. Also we know that Euler's totient function ϕ is multiplicative. So the problem is:

$$\phi(n) = \phi(p * q)$$

Now we use multiplicative rule:

$$\phi(p * q) = \phi(p) * \phi(q) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$$

Then we get simple formula for computing $\phi(n)$

$$\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$$

- Generate e from 3 to $n - 1$ which meets condition $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$. In most implementation of RSA is used $e = 65537 = 2^{16} + 1$
- Compute $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$
- The pair (e, n) is released as public key
- The pair (d, n) is kept secret as private key

3.1.2 Key distribution

- Alice would like to send Bob secret message.
- Bob generates public key (e, n) and his private key (d, n) .
- Bob sends Alice public key using reliable route (it has not to be secret route).
- Due to high value of n possible attacker will not be able compute d from public keypair (e, n) because factorization of n is not possible in polynomial time.
- Alice uses it to encrypt her message and sends it to Bob.
- Bob decrypts her message using his private key.

3.1.3 Encryption

Encryption is done by using public keypair (e, n) :

$$c = |m^e|_n$$

where m is plaintext message and c is encrypted message which will be sent to receiver.

3.1.4 Decryption

Decryption is done similar thanks to relation $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. We can simply power ciphertext to our private exponent d to obtain original message.

$$|c^d|_n = |(m^e)^d|_n = |m^{ed}|_n$$

Now that we know, that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ which can be overwriten to form $ed = 1 + k * \phi(n)$. From that we get:

$$|m^{ed}|_n = |m^{1+k*\phi(n)}|_n = |m^1 * m^{k*\phi(n)}|_n$$

From Euler's theorem ($a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$) we can substitute $m^{k*\phi(n)}$ for 1.

$$|m^1 * m^{k*\phi(n)}|_n = |m^1 * 1|_n = m$$

We got desired message m .

3. RSA

3.1.5 Signing

RSA signing is used to verify whether the message was not changed on the way from sender to receiver. The process is really similar to decryption but we do not encrypt message itself. We first use some one way function on message, mostly there is used some hash function, then we encrypt the hash of the message but we use our private exponent for encryption. That would mean anyone could decrypt the signature by using our public key and compare it with actual hash of the received message. If they equals we can be sure that it is original message and was not changed on the way to from sender. If someone tries to change the content of message, he has to have sender private key to generate valid signature, otherwise he will not be able to generate signature from different hash (which has to change, when he change the content of message).

3.2 Security

Security of RSA is relied on inability to do factorization of large integer in polynomial time. From paper “Factoring estimates for a 1024-bit RSA modulus”[] we can say that breaking 1024-bit RSA key would last about year long on device worth of 10 millions american dollars.

There is a community challenge where people trying to factorize RSA keys of different length. The latest success was on 768-bit length key which was factored in 2009. In that time the factorization took 3 years of execution time. Nowadays standard key length is 1024 which have not been factored yet.

3.3 Optimization

Because we generally use high value of modulus n the exponentiation of message of similar bit length is quite time consuming so several algorithms to increase speed of computation was developed.

3.3.1 Chinese remainder theorem

By using CRT we can significantly speed up decryption of received messages or signing outgoing message. This method is not usable during encrypting phase because we need to know p and q factors of n which are parts of private key. Assuming that $p > q$ we can divide :

$$dP = e^{-1} \pmod{p-1}$$

$$dQ = e^{-1} \pmod{q-1}$$

$$qInv = q^{-1} \pmod{p}$$

After that, we compute message m with given c :

$$m_1 = c^{dP} \pmod{p}$$

$$m_2 = c^{dQ} \pmod{q}$$

$$h = qInv \cdot (m_1 - m_2) \pmod{p}$$

$$m = m_2 + hq$$

Finding modular exponentiation cost grows with cube of number of the bits in n , so it is still more efficient to do two exponentiation with half sized modulus

3.3.2 Montgomery Multiplication

Normal modular multiplication could be quite slow for large numbers, due to processor have to run several operations before it gets desired remainder. On the other hand P. L. Montgomery developed algorithm which assumes that processor do division by power of 2 really fast.

Montgomery presented algorithm, which transform numbers to Montgomery base and then compute modular multiplication efficiently. To transform number to Montgomery base we need to compute $\bar{a} = ar \pmod{n}$ where r is the next power of 2 greater than n . For example if $2^{63} < n < 2^{64}$ then desired r will be 2^{64} . The multiplication in Montgomery base is done by:

$$\bar{u} = \bar{a}\bar{b}r^{-1} \pmod{n}$$

where r^{-1} is modular inversion of r .

As we can see \bar{u} is in Montgomery base of the corresponding $u = ab \pmod{n}$ since

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u} &= \bar{a}\bar{b}r^{-1} \pmod{n} \\ &= (ar)(br)r^{-1} \pmod{n} \\ &= (ab)r \pmod{n} \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

3. RSA

Montgomery reduction which gives us \bar{u} is implemented this way:

Algorithm 1 Montgomery Reduction

```
1: function MON_RED( $\bar{a}, \bar{b}, N$ )
2:    $t \leftarrow \bar{a} * \bar{b}$ 
3:    $m \leftarrow N^{-1} * t \pmod{r}$ 
4:    $\bar{u} \leftarrow (t + mN)/r$ 
5:   if  $\bar{u} > N$  then
6:      $\bar{u} \leftarrow \bar{u} - N$ 
7:   end if
8:   return  $\bar{u}$ 
9: end function
```

Its main advance is that it never performs division by the modulus n but we still need to find out u and precompute n^{-1} using the extended Euclidean algorithm. It is done by this algorithm:

Algorithm 2 Montgomery Multiplication

```
1: function MON_MULT( $a, b, n$ )
2:    $r \leftarrow 2^{\text{BitLen}(n)}$ 
3:   Compute  $n^{-1}$  using the extended Euclidean algorithm
4:    $\bar{a} \leftarrow a * r \pmod{n}$ 
5:    $\bar{b} \leftarrow b * r \pmod{n}$ 
6:    $\bar{u} \leftarrow \text{Mon\_Red}(\bar{a}, \bar{b})$ 
7:    $u \leftarrow \text{Mon\_Red}(\bar{u}, 1)$ 
8:   return  $u$ 
9: end function
```

3.3.3 Square and Multiply

This optimization uses bitwise representation of the exponent. The algorithm picks all byte from left (MSB) to right and despite their value, it determines which operation will be performed for each bit. For bits equal to 1 we perform squaring preset value c then we multiply it with the base of exponentiation m . For bits equal to 0 we just perform squaring part. Therefore we get data dependent operation, which will be used in our attack. For even faster implementation we use Montgomery multiplication instead of normal one. In some papers this Square and Multiply algorithm is called Montgomery exponentiation

Algorithm 3 Square & Multiply algorithm

```
1: function SQUARE_AND_MULTIPLY( $m, e, n$ )
2:    $c \leftarrow 1$ 
3:    $k \leftarrow \text{BitLen}(e)$ 
4:   for  $i \leftarrow k - 1, 0$  do
5:      $c \leftarrow \text{Mon\_Mult}(c, c)$ 
6:     if  $e[i] == 1$  then  $\triangleright$   $i$ th bit of exponent  $e$ 
7:        $c \leftarrow \text{Mon\_Mult}(c, m)$ 
8:     end if
9:   end for
10:  return  $c$ 
11: end function
```

3.4 Vulnerabilities

TODO

Attacks

The basic idea of timing attacks was presented by Kocher in 1996. He specified theoretical attacks not only on RSA.

Both variant of attack are based on similar principle. They divide messages from set M to several subsets M_i due to response of some Oracle O . Then by measuring time of decrypting or signing and guessing bits of secret exponent by comparing times of each set.

4.1 Attack on multiply

First Kochers idea was to exploit multiply operation in Square and Multiply algorithm. Kocher mean to measure time of decryption (or signing) messages using the private key d and focus on conditional multiply step. We are attacking each bit of d with knowledge of $i - 1$ bits we can guess the i th bit. Let $d = d_1, d_2, \dots, d_k$ where k is bit length of d and d_1 is MSB. We can assume that $d_1 = 1$ so we can attack bit d_2 .

We need oracle O which predict whether final Montgomery reduction happened during multiply step:

$$O(m) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } m^2 * m \text{ is done with final reduction} \\ 0 & \text{if } m^2 * m \text{ is done without final reduction} \end{cases}$$

where m is message from set M . We can now divide messages to 2 subsets:

$$M_1 = \{m \in M : O(m) = 1\}$$

$$M_2 = \{m \in M : O(m) = 0\}$$

4. ATTACKS

We can now measure time of these two subsets. We are expecting same times for doing square part, but in multiply part will be messages from M_1 higher, due to final Montgomery Reduction. We compare means of sets M_1 and M_2 . If time of M_1 is significantly bigger then the final reduction was done therefore bit d_2 is 1. If the times of M_1 and M_2 are equal then bit d_2 is 0. .

Problem: We cannot be sure what is significant difference between time means. So our guesses cannot be precise.

4.2 Attack on square

Focusing on squaring operation will give us better results. The procedure is similar but we generate two oracles and four sets of messages. We similarly iterate through the bits of secret key d as in multiply attack. When we know $i - 1$ bits and we are guessing i th bit we compute m_{temp} which has value before unknown possible multiplication step.[2]

We first presume that bit d_i is 1. If the presumption is right then the following steps will be executed. m_{temp} will be multiplied by m , then the result of multiplication will be squared. We will execute the multiplication step and then we will check if in the square step is done with or without reduction. By this criterion we divide messages to subsets M_1 if the reduction was computed or M_2 if not. The oracle will be:

$$O_1(m) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (m_{temp} * m)^2 \text{ is done with final reduction} \\ 0 & \text{if } (m_{temp} * m)^2 \text{ is done without final reduction} \end{cases}$$

Secondly, we presume that bit d_i is 0. In that case only the square phase m_{temp}^2 will be executed so we similarly divide messages to subsets M_3 with reduction and M_4 without reduction. Oracle O_2 :

$$O_2(m) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } m_{temp}^2 \text{ is done with final reduction} \\ 0 & \text{if } m_{temp}^2 \text{ is done without final reduction} \end{cases}$$

We now get 4 subsets of M :

$$M_1 = \{m \in M : O_1(m) = 1\}$$

$$M_2 = \{m \in M : O_1(m) = 0\}$$

$$M_3 = \{m \in M : O_2(m) = 1\}$$

$$M_4 = \{m \in M : O_2(m) = 0\}$$

Let $T_i(M_i)$ be the mean time of computing messages from M_i .

Certainly, only one of oracles is giving us the right results. We can compare time difference between O_1 and O_2 . That means if $T_1 - T_2$ is greater than $T_3 - T_4$ then we can be sure that bit d_i is 1, otherwise $d - i$ is 0. The problem from multiply attack is no more actual because one of the differences have to be higher than other.

Defense

5.1 Additional reduction

The most obvious defense is to add dummy subtraction to Montgomery reduction algorithm which does not change any value but consume the same amount of time as if the real subtraction was performed. This should not significantly slow the computation but it totally eliminate this type of timing attack by making Montgomery reduction constant time function.

5.2 Masking

We can mask the ciphertext before computation of $c^d \pmod n$ so the attacker will not know which cipher text is decrypted. It is done simply by generating pair of masks before each exponentiation. We generate random mask m . Then we compute m' :

$$m' = (m^{-1})^e \pmod n$$

where e is public exponent.

Before each exponentiation we multiply the ciphertext c with mask m' so we get masked x_m :

$$\begin{aligned} x_m &= (c * m')^d \pmod n \\ &= (c * (m^{-1})^e)^d \pmod n \\ &= c^d * m^{-1} \pmod n \end{aligned} \tag{5.1}$$

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from where we can see that c^d is our desired message masked by m^{-1} . Then we simply recover x by multiplying by $m[1]$:

$$\begin{aligned}x &= x_m * m \pmod{n} \\&= x * m^{-1} * m \pmod{n} \\&= x \pmod{n}\end{aligned}\tag{5.2}$$

To avoid situation when even generating of mask could become target of timing attack, there is simple workaround. To generate new mask, just square the mask pair:[1]

$$\begin{aligned}m &= m^2 \pmod{n} \\m' &= m'^2 \pmod{n}\end{aligned}$$

Realisation

6.1 RSA implementation

For our purposes we cannot use existing RSA implementation because they commonly have this vulnerability fixed. So it was needed to write own unsecure implementation of RSA cryptosystem. It is still possible use key generation algorithm from OpenSSL because it is not target of our attack. Python 3.6.1 was used and module Crypto for working with keys.

6.1.1 Montgomery

The main part of RSA is mechanism for modular exponentiation. As was told before we are using Montgomery multiplication for speed up computation. It is based on pseudocode in section 2.2.2.

```
def montgomery_product(a, b, n, r, n_inv):  
    t = (a * b)  
    m = ((t & (r - 1)) * n_inv) & (r - 1)  
    u = (t + m * n) >> (r.bit_length() - 1)  
    if u > n:  
        return u - n  
    return u
```

Some optimization was done to let reduction have greater time impact. Instead of modulo r is used bitwise AND with $r - 1$ and instead of division by r is used bitwise shift to right $r.bit_length() - 1$.

6.1.2 Square and Multiply

Due to computation in Montgomery base we also need to little edit the square and multiply algorithm to transform arguments to Montgomery base and at the end back to normal base. We also need precompute r and n^{-1} .

```
def square_and_multiply(ot, n, e):
    r = 2 ** (n.bit_length())
    g, n_inv, r_inv = egcd(n, r)

    if (r * r_inv + n * n_inv) == 1:
        n_inv = -n_inv % r
    else:
        raise Exception("bad_GCD")

    ot = (ot * r) % n
    st = (1 * r) % n
    for i in "{0:b}".format(int(e)):
        st = montgomery_product(st, st, n, r, n_inv)
        if i == '1':
            st = montgomery_product(st, ot, n, r, n_inv)
    return montgomery_product(st, 1, n, r, n_inv)
```

6.1.3 Encryption and decryption

Encryption and decryption are done just by loading keys from .pem file, then passing them to square_and_multiply function

6.2 Attack implementation

6.2.1 Generating and sorting messages

For both types of attack we are starting with set of randomly generated messages. We give them to oracle which tell us which subset message belongs to. Python module *timeit* is used for time measurements. This chunk of code assign times to messages:

```
import timeit

message_times = dict()
message_range = 50000

for i in range(0, message_range):
    tmp = random.randint(0, n)

    t = timeit.Timer('decrypt.decrypt(int(m1))',
                     setup='import _decrypt; _m1_=%i' % tmp)

    r = t.timeit(1)

    message_times[tmp] = r
```

6.2.1.1 Multiply

In this version we are attacking multiply operation. We use oracle which is very similar to RSA `square_and_multiply` function only with one difference. When the final reduction is processed, function return not only result of exponentiation but also bit which tell us that the reduction have been done.

```
...
if u > n:
    return u - n, 1
return u, 0
```

Based on this bit we decide in which subset the message is. The subsets are distinct. Experimentally, we can say that about one quarter of messages belongs to subset with reduction computed.

6.2.1.2 Square

Square attack is similar but we have two oracles which are telling us about reduction on squaring phase. Every time we give the oracle even exponent so multiplication phase will never be the last operation. Each of these oracles divide set of messages to two subsets which are distinct to each other. Each message belongs to one of M_1 or M_2 and to one of M_3 or M_4

6.2.2 Deciding the bit

6.2.2.1 Multiply

We will compare mean times of the subsets of messages. If M_1 is significantly greater then we set guessed bit to 1 and if they differ slightly we set the bit to 0. There is problem with telling what is significant difference because there is lot of noise. The noise is caused by other reductions done by other bits of secret key.

6.2.2.2 Square

We will compare differences between oracles. If oracle predicting multiply has greater difference between subsets we set 1, otherwise we set 0

I tested two different implementation of square attack. The difference is between oracles. One implementation has naive oracle which simply do whole square and multiply algorithm for each message. The second approach is to save values of particular powers so the oracle does not need to compute whole square and multiply algorithm in each iteration. It just need one square and optional multiplication in each step.

On the other hand, the naive implementation gives better results but is slightly slower.

6.2.3 Assembling secret exponent

After every guessed bit, it is added to variable d which is used by the oracles. After concatenation the new guessed exponent is tested if it is correct exponent. The test is:

- Pick some message from set
- Decrypt that message
- Do exponentiation of encrypted message to guessed private exponent d

During attack on square we are one cycle ahead so we have no option how to decide LSB so we just try to test both values of last bit.

For better fault toleration we could try guessing of last few bits by brute-force. When the whole attack is finished unsuccessfully, we can go back few bits and try to all the possibilities of key suffix. It seems reasonable to do this with maximally last 10 bits. There will be extra 1024 encryption and decryption, but it is still more efficient then repeating whole attack.

Conclusion

In my environment it was impossible to make any attack sufficient. Attack on multiply takes time to set the limit when the times differs. Even with sufficient coefficient and 10 000 samples there was no more than 50% success on guessing first unknown bit.

Attacking square was far more interesting. On 50 000 samples algorithm occasionally fails up to guessing 3 bits, but there are more cases when algorithm correctly guess more than 40 bits of key.

Because attacks do not work entirely there was no need of implementing defenses in RSA implementation.

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Acronyms

RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

MSB Most significant bit

LSB Least significant bit

CRT Chinese remainder theorem

Contents of enclosed CD

	readme.txt	the file with CD contents description
	exe	the directory with executables
	src	the directory of source codes
	wbdcm	implementation sources
	thesis	the directory of \LaTeX source codes of the thesis
	text	the thesis text directory
	thesis.pdf	the thesis text in PDF format
	thesis.ps	the thesis text in PS format