Appendix

A Data Construction

A.1 Construction of the Dataset

I build my dataset using three primary sources of data: matched employer-employee records, maternity and parental leave registers, and unemployment insurance registers.

The unit of observation of the employer-employee matched data is the calendar month. This time aggregation poses an empirical challenge because maternity leave periods, parental leave periods, and UI benefits may be exhausted in the beginning, middle, or end of the calendar month. From the information available from the maternity and parental leave application registers, and the unemployment registers, I know the exact start and end date of each leave period. I assign each event to months in the following way:

- If I observe individuals working and on leave or unemployment insurance within the same month, I assign individuals to leave or unemployment insurance within that month if the start date of the leave period or unemployment insurance spell is before the 15th of the month

- If I observe individuals on two types of leave within the same month, I assign individuals the month to the type of leave that occupied the majority of the month

The definition of the month of the end of maternity leave is particularly important for my analysis which uses relative time from the end of maternity leave as the main time variation in the empirical strategy. Following the description above, I build the relative time variable in which $t = 0$ corresponds to the end of maternity leave in the following way:

- $t = 0$ corresponds to the last month in which I observe a maternity leave event in the matched employer-employee data if the day of the end of maternity leave reported in the maternity leave applications registered is before the 15th of the month

- $t = 0$ correspond to the month following the last month in which I observe a maternity leave event in the matched employer-employee data if the day of the end of maternity leave reported in the maternity leave applications register is after the 15th of the month

In the few cases in which I do not observe the exact date of the end of maternity leave, because I cannot match the employer-employee data with the maternity leave applications register, I assign

$t = 0$ in the following way. If I observe either parental leave events or unemployment insurance events following the end of maternity leave, I assign $t = 0$ based on information on the start date of these events. If women start working right after the end of maternity leave, I assign $t = 0$ as the last month in which I observe maternity leave. All the results are robust to the specification in which I assign $t = 0$ to the last month in which I observe maternity leave in the matched employer-employee datasets[23].

A.2 Sample Selection

My primary analysis sample imposes two main sample restrictions. First, I restrict to first births as explained in Section 3.1. The results are robust to the inclusions of higher-parity births[24]. The second sample restriction I impose is that I exclude mothers whose temporary contract expires around the end of their maternity leave. In particular, I exclude mothers whose contract expires *before* the end of maternity leave reported in the register for applications. This is because this particular set of contract terminations is not an active choice of mothers, but it is mechanical and driven by the end of the contract. Therefore, these mothers are not entitled to job protection and face different incentives than other mothers. One potential concern is that part of the results shown in Figure 5 is mechanically driven by temporary contracts ending. I believe this is unlikely because there is no reason to believe that the reforms impacted the timing of ending and duration of temporary contracts, usually set to one or two years. Second, given the restriction explained above, temporary contracts represent a small portion of my sample. Finally, in Figure A11, I report a robustness check restricting to mothers who had a permanent contract before birth.

The final dataset is a balanced panel containing all mothers who gave birth to their first child (parity one) between 2012 and 2016. The panel spans from 2 years before the end of their compulsory maternity leave to 4 years after and comprises approximately 640,000 mothers employed in the private sector before giving birth. Note that with *balanced* panel I mean that I follow a mother from 2 years before birth to 4 year after birth by observing whether she is in one of this four categories:

1. Employed in the private sector

2. On any type of leave

3. On unemployment insurance

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[23]Results available upon request.
[24]Results available upon request.

4. Not employed, on leave or unemployed. Not that in this case I cannot distinguish whether a mother exited the labor force or moved to the public sector or became self-employed.

Importantly, when I refer to non-participation, except for the periods of unemployment insurance, I specifically refer to non-participation to the private sector as I cannot exclude the possibility that the mother became self-employed or moved to public employment.

B Alternative Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity Design

In addition to the difference-in-differences design introduced in Section 3.2, I can use a regression discontinuity design using as cutoff the end of maternity leave date dividing fully untreated mothers to partially treated mothers (Figure A4). Following Deshpande 2016, I estimate the RD parametrically. The estimating equation is:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbb{1}[\tau_i \geq 0] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \tau_i^k + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \tau_i^k \mathbb{1}[\tau_i \geq 0] + X_i' \delta + \varepsilon_i \tag{8}$$

where τ_i is the end of maternity leave date of mother i normalized so that $\tau = 0$ at the cutoff date (May 1, 2012 for the replacement rate reform and September 1, 2014 for the duration reform). τ_i^k is a polynomial of order k in the mother's end of compulsory maternity leave date. X_i is a matrix of covariates. The coefficient of interest is β, which gives the effect on Y of ending the compulsory maternity leave right before or right after the cutoff.

The key assumption for identification in an RD design is that treatment is as good as randomly assigned in a neighborhood of the cutoff and that counterfactual outcomes are smooth at the cutoff. A potential threat to the RD design is strategic manipulation of the running variable. This is unlikely in this institutional setting for different reasons. First, the unemployment insurance reforms were unexpected and hard to anticipate. Second, the possibility of UI take up within the choice period, allowed mothers ending their maternity leave even before the actual introduction of the reform to be eligible for the more generous UI regime making threshold manipulation not necessary. Finally, the end of compulsory maternity leave date is overall hard to manipulate since it is strictly related to the exact date of birth. Unless mothers reacted to the unemployment insurance reforms by manipulating the timing of births, manipulation of the threshold is unlikely. Appendix Figure A6 shows the distribution of end of maternity leave dates around the cutoff dates (solid blue lines) and around the actual implementation of the reforms dates (dashed blue lines). On average, while there is expected seasonality across different months driven by seasonality in the number of births and an overall decrease in number of births over time, the sample of mothers ending their maternity leave around the introduction of the two reforms are balanced. I formally test for a discontinuity in the density function at the cutoff using the test proposed by McCrary (2008). As shown in Figure ??, the McCrary test do not reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the threshold. I also check for whether covariates are balanced around the cutoff. I perform a test for a number of pre-birth demographic and labor market characteristics and find that covariates are overall balanced.

C Complier Characteristics

Consider a binary variable $Z \in \{0, 1\}$ that captures whether mothers are eligible for the more generous UI regime. Z effectively shifts a component of the mother's outside option $b + Z\Delta b$, by either increasing UI replacement rate or by increasing UI duration. Let $D \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate if a mother takes up UI, whether she was treated or not. Let D_0 and D_1 denote the potential values that D takes fro $Z = 0$ and $Z = 1$ respectively. We can characterize the three groups of mothers described above by their potential outcomes: always-takers (AT) with potential outcomes $(D_0 = 1, D_1 = 1)$ and share π^{AT}, never-takers (NT) with potential outcomes $(D_0 = 0, D_1 = 0)$ and share π^{NT} and compliers (C) with potential outcomes $(D_0 = 0, D_1 = 1)$ and share π^C.

In my setting, I compare eligible (c_1) and ineligible (c_0) cohorts, before and after childbirth (t_0 and t_1) respectively. Therefore, $Z = 1$ for c_1 and 0 otherwise.

I first estimate the share of always-takers, compliers and never-takers. This is easily done by running the following simple regression: $Y_i = \alpha + \gamma T_i + \varepsilon_i$, where $T_i = 1$ if i is eligible for the more generous UI regime and 0 otherwise and Y_i is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i took up UI during the "choice period", namely at any $t \in [0, 9]$ from the end of compulsory maternity leave. We have that $\pi^C = \hat{\gamma}, \pi^{AT} = \hat{\alpha}, \pi^{NT} = 1 - \hat{\alpha} - \hat{\gamma}$.

Next, I estimate expected value of a characteristics x for the three groups. Estimating the expected value of a characteristic x for *never-takers* is straightforward. All individuals in c_1 who do not take up UI in the "choice period" are never-takers if we assume that the standard monotonicity assumption in the instrumental variable literature, $(D_1 - D_0 \geq 0)$, holds. We can estimate the characteristic x of a never-taker by the corresponding sample mean $\frac{1}{N_{c_1}^{nt}} \sum_{i \in c_1} x_i 1(D_i = 0)$.

Estimating the expected value of a characteristic for always-takers and compliers is more challenging. The expected value of a characteristic x for mothers in cohort c_1 who do take up UI is a weighted average weighted average of the expected value of x for compliers and always-takers, where the weights represent the share of compliers and always-takers. Therefore the expected value of x for compliers is:

$$E^C[x] = E\left[x | D_0 = 0, D_1 = 1, c_1\right] = \frac{\pi^C + \pi^{AT}}{\pi^C} E\left[x | D_1 = 1, c_1\right] - \frac{\pi^{AT}}{\pi^C} E\left[x | D_0 = 1, c_1\right] \quad (9)$$

We can estimate the RHS of equation 9 empirically. $E\left[x | D_1 = 1, c_1\right]$ is the expected value of x for all-takers, namely all mothers taking up UI after the reform. It is possible to estimate this using

the corresponding sample mean: $\left(\frac{1}{N_{c_1}^{all-takers}}\right)\sum_{i\in c_1}x_i 1(D_i = 1)$. Calculating $E\left[x|D_0 = 1, c_1\right]$ is more difficult, because we cannot know whether a worker who takes up UI after the reform would have taken up UI before the reform. Because of monotonicity we know that individuals who take up UI before the reform, also take up UI after the reform. Therefore, if trends in x are parallel across cohorts and Z is independent from D and x, we have that $E\left[x|D_0 = 1, c_1\right] = E\left[x|D_0 = 1, c_0\right]$. This can be estimated by the corresponding sample mean $\left(\frac{1}{N_{c_0}^{always-takers}}\right)\sum_{i\in c_0}x_i 1(D_i = 1)$.

D   Welfare Effects Derivation

Welfare Effect of Changes in Benefits

The government maximizes equation 4 subject to the budget constraint 5 and to the condition that the individual chooses her behavior optimally. Individual behavior is a function of PL benefits and durations so we can write: $\tau(b,B) = \frac{L(b,B)}{T-D(b,B)}b + \frac{E}{T-D(b,B)}$.

The government problem is $max_{b.B}W(b,B,\tau(b,B))$. The marginal effect of increasing b on welfare is given by:

$$\frac{dW}{db} = \int_0^B S_t dt u'(c_{l,t\leq B}) - \int_0^T [1 - S_t]\, dt v'(c_e)\frac{d\tau}{db}$$

$$\frac{dW}{db} = Bu'(b) - (T - D)v'\frac{d\tau}{db}$$

where we use the envelope theorem. With some rearrangements we get:

$$\frac{dW}{db}\frac{1}{v'(c_e)} = L \times \frac{u'(c_{l,t\leq B}) - v'(c_e)}{v'(c_e)} - \left(\frac{dL}{db}b + \frac{dD}{db}\tau\right)$$

Normalizing by L, which is how much more it is transferred to women on leave, we get:

$$\frac{dW}{db}\frac{1}{Lv'(c_e)} = \frac{u'(c_{l,t\leq B}) - v'(c_e)}{v'(c_e)} - \left(\eta_{L,b} + \eta_{D,b}\frac{D}{L}\frac{\tau}{b}\right)$$

which corresponds to equation 6.

E   Additional Figures

Figure A1: Example of Use of Unemployment Insurance as Alternative to Parental Leave

Home / INPS / Kit Dimissioni volontarie + Naspi + Maternità

Kit Dimissioni volontarie + Naspi + Maternità

★★★★★ (1 recensione del cliente)

€140.00

Richiedi il Kit dimissioni volontarie + Naspi + Maternità. Valuta la possibilità di dimetterti volontariamente senza preavviso e chiedere il sussidio di disoccupazione Naspi oltre che la prestazione maternità. Sportello Mamme ti aiuterà nella pratica di dimissioni volontarie da convalidare presso la DTL del comune di residenza, ad istruire la pratica di domanda di Naspi e di maternità obbligatoria. Senza stress e senza code!

[1]   **Aggiungi al carrello**

Categoria: INPS

Notes: The figure shows an example of a website advertising the possibility of using unemployment insurance as an alternative to parental leave benefits.

Figure A2: Changes in UI Eligibility: Replacement Rate Reform

Notes: The figure reports the number of UI claims over time by women under the age of 50 before and after the replacement rate reform s distinguishing between *Aspi* and *MiniAspi.* Details on the characteristics of the subsidies are presented in Section 2.

Figure A3: Distribution of UI Take Up by Time Relative to End of ML

Notes: The figures reports the distribution of UI take-up by time relative to the end of compulsory maternity leave in 2012.

Figure A4: Eligibility for UI Regimes by End of Maternity Leave Date

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

Not Treated   Partially Treated   Fully Treated

End of ML

2012m1   2012m4   2013m1

(b) Duration Reform

Not Treated   Partially Treated   Fully Treated

End of ML

2014m5   2014m8   2015m5

Notes: The figure illustrates for which dates the mothers were eligible for different unemployment insurance regimens, depending on the end of their maternity leave. Panel A shows the dates for the replacement rate reform. Panel B shows the dates for the duration reform.

Figure A5: Effect of the Reforms on UI Take-Up After Childbirth

(a) Replacement Rate Reform   (b) Duration Reform

Notes: The plots illustrate the share of mothers taking up unemployment insurance before their child's first birthday by month-of-end-of-ML bin for different UI regimes. The solid blue lines display quadratic spline estimates. The grey dots on the right of the cutoffs represent partially treated mothers (as shown in Figure A4). Panel A presents results for the replacement rate reform while Panel B presents results for the duration reform. The cutoffs refer to the cutoff date separating the *not treated* and the *partially treated* group as shown in Figure A4.

Figure A6: Frequency of End of Maternity Leave Dates

Notes: The figure reports the number of observations in each month-of-end-of-maternity-leave bin for the entire sample. The solid blue lines correspond to the cutoff dates using in the RD design specified in equation 8 (specifically to the cutoff date separating the *not treated* and the *partially treated* group in Figure A4). The dashed blue lines correspond to the actual time of introduction of the reforms (specifically to the cutoff date separating the *partially treated* and the *fully treated* group in Figure A4) for both reforms.

Figure A7: Density of End of Maternity Leave Dates and McCrary Test

(a) Replacement Rate Reform   (b) Duration Reform

Notes: The graphs plot the density function of mothers by end-of-compulsory-maternity-leave date for the replacement rate reform (Panel A) and for the duration reform (Panel B). The test statistics (and associated p-value in parentheses) for the McCrary test of the discontinuity in the probability density function of the running variable at threshold is 0.639 (0.552) for the replacement rate reform and -0.564 (0.572) for the duration reform.

Figure A8: DISTRIBUTION OF UI POTENTIAL BENEFIT DURATION AFTER THE DURATION RE-
FORM

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of potential benefit duration for mothers taking up UI after the duration reform.

Figure A9: PLACEBO SPECIFICATIONS

(a) 2009-2010   (b) 2010-2011

Notes: The figures report difference-in-differences estimates of the coefficients β_k from 2 where the dependent variable is the probability that a mother is on unemployment insurance at relative time t (where $t = 0$ corresponds to the time of end of compulsory maternity leave) for different placebo cohorts. The figure reports the 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Figure A10: Effects of the Reforms on Separations from Pre-Birth Employer: Decomposition

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures report difference-in-differences estimates of the coefficients β_k from 2 where the dependent variable is the probability that a mother resigns from the pre-birth employer (triangle) or the probability that a mother separates voluntarily through other types of separations (square) at relative time t (where $t = 0$ corresponds to the time of end of compulsory maternity leave). The figure reports the 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Panel A reports results for the replacement rate reform while panel B reports results for the duration reform.

Figure A11: Effects of the Reforms on UI Take-Up: Restricting to Permanent Workers

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures report difference-in-differences estimates of the coefficients β_k from 2 estimated on the probability that a mother is on UI at relative time t restricting the sample to mothers with a permanent contract before childbirth. $t = 0$ corresponds to the time of end of compulsory maternity leave. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Panel A reports results for the replacement rate reform while panel B reports results for the duration reform.

Figure A13: REPLACEMENT RATE REFORM DECOMPOSITION: ELIGIBILITY VS REPLACEMENT RATE


Notes: The graphs show the results of the estimation of specification 2 on take-up of unemployment insurance after the re-placement rate reform. The light green series (triangle) reports the results using as dependent variable the overall unemployment insurance take-up while the dark green series (square) reports the results using as dependent variable unemployment insurance take-up excluding the take-up of *Miniaspi*. See Section 2 for details.

Figure A12: ROBUSTNESS: EFFECT ON LAYOFFS

(a) Replacement Rate Reform   (b) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures report difference-in-differences estimates of the coefficients β_k from 2 where the dependent variable is the probability that a mother resigns or separates from the pre-birth employer through a layoff, firm closure or due to just cause at relative time t (where $t = 0$ corresponds to the time of end of compulsory maternity leave). The figure reports the 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Panel A reports results for the replacement rate reform while panel B reports results for the duration reform.

Figure A14: Effect of the Reforms on Non-Participation Time

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Notes: The graphs show the mean value of the total time spent out of the labor force and not on parental leave after childbirth for the two reforms by month-of-end-of-compulsory-maternity-leave bin. Panel A refers to the replacement rate reform while Panel B refers to the duration reform. The solid blue lines display quadratic spline estimates. The cutoffs refer to the cutoff date separating the *not treated* and the *partially treated* group as shown in Figure A4.

Figure A15: Effects of the Reforms on Earnings Levels

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures show the estimated effects of increasing unemployment insurance generosity on the dynamics of female earnings for both reforms. Each panel reports estimates of β_k coefficients from specification 2, using as dependent variable gross labor earnings in levels (to include zeros from non-participation). Panel A reports the results for the replacement rate reform while Panel B reports the results for the duration reform. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A16: EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS ON CHILD PENALTIES: FERTILITY

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures show the estimated effects of increasing unemployment insurance generosity on the dynamics of female earnings for both reforms. Each panel reports estimates of β_k coefficients from specification 2, normalized by the predicted earnings in the treatment group in the absence of children, $\frac{\hat{\beta_k}}{E\left[\tilde{Y}_{ik}|k,T=1\right]}$, which correspond to the percentage-point change in the child penalty at time t for women exposed to the more generous UI regime. The sample is restricted to mothers with only one child (completed fertility of one). Panel A reports the results for the replacement rate reform while Panel B reports the results for the duration reform. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A17: EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS ON PARTICIPATION: HETEROGENEITY

Occupation

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Unemployment Rate

(c) Replacement Rate Reform

(d) Duration Reform

Childcare Availability

(e) Replacement Rate Reform

(f) Duration Reform

Notes: The figures show the estimated effects of increasing unemployment insurance generosity on the dynamics of female labor force participation for both reforms. Each panel reports estimates of β_k coefficients from specification 2 on the probability of working (defined as being matched with an employer, having positive earnings and not being on leave or on unemployment at time t) for different subgroups of workers. Panel A and B report the results splitting the sample by occupation. Panel C and D report the results by the pre-birth unemployment rate in the region of residence. Panel E and F report the results by childcare availability. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A18: Effects of the Reforms on Child Penalty In Earnings: Heterogeneity

Occupation

(a) Replacement Rate Reform

(b) Duration Reform

Unemployment Rate

(c) Replacement Rate Reform

(d) Duration Reform

Childcare Availability

(e) Replacement Rate Reform

(f) Duration Reform

**Notes:** The figures show the estimated effects of increasing unemployment insurance generosity on the dynamics of female gross labor earnings for both reforms. Each panel reports estimates of β_k coefficients from specification 2 normalized by the predicted earnings in the treatment group in the absence of children, $\frac{\hat{\beta_k}}{E[Y_{ik}|k,T=1]}$, which correspond to the percentage-point change in the child penalty at time t for women exposed to the more generous UI regime. Panel A and B report the results splitting the sample by occupation. Panel C and D report the results by unemployment rate in the region of residence. Panel E and F report the results by childcare availability. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

F Additional Tables

Table A1: ILLUSTRATION OF PARTIALLY TREATED MOTHERS: REPLACEMENT RATE REFORM

	Timing of Resignations									
Date of End of ML	$t=3$	$t=4$	$t=5$	$t=6$	$t=7$	$t=8$	$t=9$	$t=10$	$t=11$	$t=12$
up to 2012m3	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old
2012m4	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New
2012m5	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New
2012m6	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New
2012m7	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New
2012m8	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New
2012m9	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New
2012m10	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2012m11	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2012m12	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2013m1 onwards	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New

Notes: The table shows how the eligibility for more generous unemployment insurance benefits changes with the end of maternity leave date and with the timing of resignations for the replacement rate reform. The new regime was effective from January 2013 onwards, implying that mothers ending their maternity leave from January 2013 were fully eligible for the reform, no matter the timing of their resignations. Mothers ending their maternity leave before April 2012 were fully ineligible for the reform. Mothers ending their maternity leave between April 2012 and December 2012 were partially eligible: they could access the more generous benefits only if they decided to resign at particular time periods. For example women ending their maternity leave in September 2012 would not be eligible for the more generous leave if they decided to resign right after the end of maternity leave but they would if they decided to resign from $t=7$ to $t=12$.

Table A2: ILLUSTRATION OF PARTIALLY TREATED MOTHERS: DURATION REFORM

	Timing of Resignations									
Date of End of ML	$t=3$	$t=4$	$t=5$	$t=6$	$t=7$	$t=8$	$t=9$	$t=10$	$t=11$	$t=12$
up to 2014m7	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old
2014m8	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New
2014m9	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New
2014m10	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New
2014m11	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New
2014m12	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New
2015m1	Old	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New
2015m2	Old	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2015m3	Old	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2015m4	Old	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New
2015m5 onwards	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New	New

Notes: The table shows how the eligibility for more generous unemployment insurance benefits changes with the end of maternity leave date and with the timing of resignations for the duration. The new regime was effective from May 2015 onwards, implying that mothers ending their maternity leave from May 2015 were fully eligible for the reform, no matter the timing of their resignations. Mothers ending their maternity leave before August 2014 were fully ineligible for the reform. Mothers ending their maternity leave between August 2014 and April 2015 were partially eligible: they could access the more generous benefits only if they decided to resign at particular time periods. For example women ending their maternity leave in January 2015 would not be eligible for the more generous leave if they decided to resign right after the end of maternity leave but they would if they decided to resign from $t=7$ to $t=12$.

Table A3: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE OF MOTHERS

	Full Sample
Age	33.51
	(5.012)
Tenure	22.49
	(5.944)
Full Time	0.65
	(0.477)
Permanent	0.93
	(0.257)
White Collar	0.60
	(0.490)
Blue Collar	0.31
	(0.463)
Monthly Wage	1417.99
	(2970.3)
Monthly Earnings	1521.19
	(1280.4)
Small Firm (< 15)	0.39
	(0.488)
High Female Share Establishment	0.50
	(0.500)
High Quality Establishment	0.65
	(0.477)
Observations	641607

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the full balanced sample of mothers giving birth between 2012 and 2016. All variables are measured before the start of compulsory maternity leave ($t = -5$). Monetary quantities are expressed in 2010 prices. High quality establishment is an indicator equal to 1 if the worker is employed in a firm whose AKM firm effect is above the median.

Table A4: Magnitudes of Increase in Separations

Replacement Rate Reform	
Cumulative Separations	0.03**
	(0.016)
Elasticity	0.4
Observations	127,294
Duration Reform	
Cumulative Separations	0.2***
	(0.07)
Elasticity	0.16
Observations	91,253

Notes: The table reports the pooled results of the effects of the reforms on cumulative separations up to 9 months from compulsory maternity leave. It also reports the elasticity of the level of benefits with respect to separations as well as the elasticity of the duration of benefits with respect to separations.