## W3C Linked Data Notifications High-Level Security Review


## Preamble

This page contains a high-level security review of the draft W3C Linked Data Notifications (LDN) specification https://www.w3.org/TR/ldn/.

## Background

The premise of the LDN specification is to enable a sender to be able to automatically discover and send a message to a recipient in an asynchronous manner.

- Discovery: Given a web resource such as a users home page on a social media website a sender can discover the owner's (recipient/s) Inbox (URL) address by making a GET or HEAD request. The result of a GET or HEAD request upon the web resource includes the address of the owner's inbox in the HTTP Link header field or via RDF.
- Sending: Given a discovered Inbox, a Sender sends a message via an HTTP POST. The Sender may include AuthN and or AuthZ headers to control access to the Inbox.
- Retrieving: The owner/recipients can consume messages from an Inbox via an HTTP GET request. An owner/recipient may include AuthN and or AuthZ headers to control access to the Inbox.



## Notes

Though AuthN/Z are mentioned in respect to the sending and consuming of messages there's no mention of that during discovery. This could open a fishing attack whereby a resource linked to an inbox could be discovered without the consent of the owner. An example case could be a social network site that displays public information about the user to all. Without AuthZ'ing the consumers of this information the contact details (the linked data) for a user would be able to be harvested without the consent of the user.

There's very little information around error codes. Many "return appropriate 4xx". There's a worry that this would open up an implicit discovery path if errors are not ordered. For example, if a malicious Sender was trying to ascertain if a particular entity had an inbox at a specific service provider, the Sender could simply try and send requests to Inboxes of their choice. Now if sending a message required an AuthZ token (let's assume our malicious sender doesn't have one or it's invalid) but our receiving web-service firstly checked whether an inbox exists before the AuthX details and returned a "404 Not Found" when no inbox exists or "401 unauthorised" when it does, the Sender can ascertain valid inboxes with out successfully AuthZ'ing.

I don't see any explicit "use HTTPS" recommendation. Probably implied.

s3.3.3 Sender Verification Receivers should verify the sender of the notification

· by having a whitelist of senders with write access to the Inbox

- · requiring authentication to enforce receiver's knowledge of every sender
- retrieving a copy of the notification from the sender's domain to verify its origin
- checking a digital signature which accompanies the notification"

I think a key worry as an end user would be spam. (A DoS issue, in security terms.) I don't think the three approaches based on sender identity really address this (global whitelist management is impractical, and spam from e.g. a cryptographically authenticated throwaway identity is still spam).

Requiring retrieval of the notification from the sender is more promising. A few observations:

- retrieving the notification immediately it is received doesn't help much the spammer only has to maintain a working source address for a few milliseconds.
- retrieving the notification just before it is read would probably help (since the spammer has to keep its URI available for an extended period) but at the cost of introducing user-visible delays and exposing information about the user's reading behavior to senders.

This is the same issue that large email providers face i.e. spam filtering.