From 4e244a39a1a574e3a938cbe12c616128153513a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shane Weeden <sbweeden@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 20:17:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2000 from sbweeden/sweeden_1998

SHA: 065b83648d83c2b4caba83c91051f124b2b63dfa
Reason: push, by sbweeden

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 index.html | 317 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 160 insertions(+), 157 deletions(-)

diff --git a/index.html b/index.html
index 7e402a708..7c81f4d13 100644
--- a/index.html
+++ b/index.html
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   <meta content="ED" name="w3c-status">
   <meta content="Bikeshed version 82ce88815, updated Thu Sep 7 16:33:55 2023 -0700" name="generator">
   <link href="https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/" rel="canonical">
-  <meta content="f8163ea38ba03fb2352b5d6730bac6db1225b30a" name="document-revision">
+  <meta content="065b83648d83c2b4caba83c91051f124b2b63dfa" name="document-revision">
 <style type="text/css">
 body {
     counter-reset: table;
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@
   <div class="head">
    <p data-fill-with="logo"><a class="logo" href="https://www.w3.org/"> <img alt="W3C" height="48" src="https://www.w3.org/StyleSheets/TR/2021/logos/W3C" width="72"> </a> </p>
    <h1>Web Authentication:<br>An API for accessing Public Key Credentials<br>Level 3</h1>
-   <p id="w3c-state"><a href="https://www.w3.org/standards/types#ED">Editor’s Draft</a>, <time class="dt-updated" datetime="2023-11-15">15 November 2023</time></p>
+   <p id="w3c-state"><a href="https://www.w3.org/standards/types#ED">Editor’s Draft</a>, <time class="dt-updated" datetime="2023-11-29">29 November 2023</time></p>
    <details open>
     <summary>More details about this document</summary>
     <div data-fill-with="spec-metadata">
@@ -6160,6 +6160,9 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="8.2.1" id="sctn-packed-attestation-cert-
     <li data-md>
      <p>If the related attestation root certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, the Extension OID <code>1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.4</code> (<code>id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid</code>) MUST be present, containing the AAGUID as a 16-byte OCTET STRING.
 The extension MUST NOT be marked as critical.</p>
+     <p>As <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨④">Relying Parties</a> may not know if the attestation root
+certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, it is suggested that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑤">Relying Parties</a> check if the extension
+is present, and if it is, then validate that it contains that same AAGUID as presented in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②④">attestation object</a>.</p>
      <p>Note that an X.509 Extension encodes the DER-encoding of the value in an OCTET STRING.
 Thus, the AAGUID MUST be wrapped in <i>two</i> OCTET STRINGS to be valid. Here is a sample, encoded Extension structure:</p>
 <pre>30 21                                     -- SEQUENCE
@@ -6637,9 +6640,9 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="8.9" id="sctn-compound-attestation"><spa
      <ol>
       <li data-md>
        <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-iterate" id="ref-for-list-iterate①⑨">For each</a> <var>subStmt</var> of <var>attStmt</var>, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑤">verification procedure</a> corresponding to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format-identifier" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format-identifier⑤">attestation statement format identifier</a> <code><var>subStmt</var>.fmt</code> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure-inputs" id="ref-for-verification-procedure-inputs⑥">verification procedure inputs</a> <var>subStmt</var>, <var>authenticatorData</var> and <var>clientDataHash</var>.</p>
-       <p>If validation fails for one or more <var>subStmt</var>, decide the appropriate result based on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨④">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
+       <p>If validation fails for one or more <var>subStmt</var>, decide the appropriate result based on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑥">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If sufficiently many (as determined by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑤">Relying Party</a> policy) <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-item" id="ref-for-list-item①③">items</a> of <var>attStmt</var> verify successfully,
+       <p>If sufficiently many (as determined by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> policy) <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-item" id="ref-for-list-item①③">items</a> of <var>attStmt</var> verify successfully,
 return implementation-specific values representing any combination of outputs from successful <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑥">verification procedures</a>.</p>
      </ol>
    </dl>
@@ -6658,7 +6661,7 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="9" id="sctn-extensions"><span class="sec
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑥">Client extension processing</a> for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension③">registration extensions</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension③">authentication extensions</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>When creating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑤⑦">public key credential</a> or requesting an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①③">authentication assertion</a>, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party③④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> can request the use of a set
-of extensions. These extensions will be invoked during the requested operation if they are supported by the client and/or the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator⑦">WebAuthn Authenticator</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑥">Relying Party</a> sends the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑦">client extension input</a> for each extension in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③③">get()</a></code> call
+of extensions. These extensions will be invoked during the requested operation if they are supported by the client and/or the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator⑦">WebAuthn Authenticator</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> sends the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑦">client extension input</a> for each extension in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③③">get()</a></code> call
 (for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension④">authentication extensions</a>) or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③②">create()</a></code> call (for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension④">registration extensions</a>) to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑧⑥">client</a>.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑧⑦">client</a> performs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑦">client extension processing</a> for each extension that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⓪">client platform</a> supports, and augments the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①③">client data</a> as specified by each extension, by including the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier⑨">extension identifier</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①⓪">client extension output</a> values.</p>
    <p>An extension can also be an <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="authenticator-extension">authenticator extension</dfn>, meaning that the extension involves communication with and
@@ -6678,9 +6681,9 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="9" id="sctn-extensions"><span class="sec
 Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑧">authenticator extension output</a> is returned as part of the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data⑤①">authenticator data</a>, authenticator extensions
 MAY also specify an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs">unsigned extension output</a>, e.g. for cases where an output itself depends on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data⑤②">authenticator data</a>.
 Part of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑨">client extension processing</a> for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension⑦">authenticator extensions</a> is to use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑨">authenticator extension output</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs①">unsigned extension output</a> as an input to creating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①①">client extension output</a>.</p>
-   <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions⑧">WebAuthn Extensions</a> are OPTIONAL for both clients and authenticators. Thus, any extensions requested by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> MAY be
+   <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions⑧">WebAuthn Extensions</a> are OPTIONAL for both clients and authenticators. Thus, any extensions requested by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> MAY be
 ignored by the client browser or OS and not passed to the authenticator at all, or they MAY be ignored by the authenticator.
-Ignoring an extension is never considered a failure in WebAuthn API processing, so when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑧">Relying Parties</a> include extensions with any
+Ignoring an extension is never considered a failure in WebAuthn API processing, so when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⓪">Relying Parties</a> include extensions with any
 API calls, they MUST be prepared to handle cases where some or all of those extensions are ignored.</p>
    <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions⑨">WebAuthn Extensions</a> MUST be defined in such a way that lack of support for them by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑧⑧">client</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②③⑨">authenticator</a> does not endanger the user’s security or privacy.
 For instance, if an extension requires client processing, it could be defined in a manner that ensures
@@ -6713,7 +6716,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.2" id="sctn-extension-specification"><
 the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-processing" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-processing③">authenticator extension processing</a> rules, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#cbor" id="ref-for-cbor①⑤">CBOR</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①⓪">authenticator extension output</a> value.
 Extensions MAY specify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs②">unsigned extension outputs</a>.</p>
    <p>Any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑤">client extension</a> that is processed by the client MUST return a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①③">client extension output</a> value so that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party③⑤">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> knows that the extension was honored by the client. Similarly, any extension that requires authenticator processing MUST return
-an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①①">authenticator extension output</a> to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> know that the extension was honored by the authenticator. If an
+an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①①">authenticator extension output</a> to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪①">Relying Party</a> know that the extension was honored by the authenticator. If an
 extension does not otherwise require any result values, it SHOULD be defined as returning a JSON Boolean <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①④">client extension
 output</a> result, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension was understood and processed. Likewise, any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension⑨">authenticator
 extension</a> that does not otherwise require any result values MUST return a value and SHOULD return a CBOR Boolean <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①②">authenticator extension output</a> result, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension was understood and processed.</p>
@@ -6723,7 +6726,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.3" id="sctn-extension-request-paramete
 in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑥">get()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑤">create()</a></code> call,
 while the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#cbor" id="ref-for-cbor①⑥">CBOR</a> <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="authenticator-extension-input">authenticator extension input</dfn> is
 passed from the client to the authenticator for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①⓪">authenticator extensions</a> during the processing of these calls.</p>
-   <p>A <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⓪">Relying Party</a> simultaneously requests the use of an extension and sets its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①①">client extension input</a> by including an entry in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑦">extensions</a></code> option to the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑥">create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑦">get()</a></code> call.
+   <p>A <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪②">Relying Party</a> simultaneously requests the use of an extension and sets its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①①">client extension input</a> by including an entry in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑦">extensions</a></code> option to the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑥">create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑦">get()</a></code> call.
 The entry key is the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier①②">extension identifier</a> and the value is the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①②">client extension input</a>.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Other documents have specified extensions where the extension input does not always use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier①③">extension identifier</a> as the entry key.
 New extensions SHOULD follow the above convention.</p>
@@ -6742,8 +6745,8 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.3" id="sctn-extension-request-paramete
 <c- p>});</c->
 </pre>
    <p>Extension definitions MUST specify the valid values for their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①③">client extension input</a>. Clients SHOULD ignore extensions with
-an invalid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①④">client extension input</a>. If an extension does not require any parameters from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪①">Relying Party</a>, it SHOULD be defined
-as taking a Boolean client argument, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪②">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+an invalid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①④">client extension input</a>. If an extension does not require any parameters from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪③">Relying Party</a>, it SHOULD be defined
+as taking a Boolean client argument, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪④">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    <p>Extensions that only affect client processing need not specify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-input" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-input①⓪">authenticator extension input</a>. Extensions that have
 authenticator processing MUST specify the method of computing the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-input" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-input①①">authenticator extension input</a> from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①⑤">client extension
 input</a>,
@@ -6791,11 +6794,11 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1" id="sctn-defined-client-extensions
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.1. </span><span class="content">FIDO <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="appid">AppID</dfn> Extension (appid)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-appid-extension"></a></h4>
    <p>This extension allows <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party③⑦">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> that have previously registered a
 credential using the legacy FIDO U2F JavaScript API <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidou2fjavascriptapi" title="FIDO U2F JavaScript API">[FIDOU2FJavaScriptAPI]</a> to request an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion⑥">assertion</a>. The
-FIDO APIs use an alternative identifier for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪③">Relying Parties</a> called an <var>AppID</var> <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-appid" title="FIDO AppID and Facet Specification">[FIDO-APPID]</a>, and any credentials created using those APIs will be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑧">scoped</a> to
+FIDO APIs use an alternative identifier for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑤">Relying Parties</a> called an <var>AppID</var> <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-appid" title="FIDO AppID and Facet Specification">[FIDO-APPID]</a>, and any credentials created using those APIs will be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑧">scoped</a> to
 that identifier. Without this extension, they would need to be re-registered in
 order to be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑨">scoped</a> to an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④①">RP ID</a>.</p>
    <p>In addition to setting the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid">appid</a></code> extension input,
-using this extension requires some additional processing by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪④">Relying Party</a> in order to allow users to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①③">authenticate</a> using their registered U2F credentials:</p>
+using this extension requires some additional processing by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑥">Relying Party</a> in order to allow users to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①③">authenticate</a> using their registered U2F credentials:</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>List the desired U2F credentials in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②①">allowCredentials</a></code> option
@@ -6818,8 +6821,8 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
 credentials created with WebAuthn are not backwards compatible with the FIDO
 JavaScript APIs.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid②">appid</a></code> should be set to the AppID
-that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑤">Relying Party</a> <em>previously</em> used in the legacy FIDO APIs.
-This might not be the same as the result of translating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑥">Relying Party</a>'s WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④④">RP ID</a> to the AppID format,
+that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑦">Relying Party</a> <em>previously</em> used in the legacy FIDO APIs.
+This might not be the same as the result of translating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑧">Relying Party</a>'s WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④④">RP ID</a> to the AppID format,
 e.g., the previously used AppID may have been "https://accounts.example.com"
 but the currently used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑤">RP ID</a> might be "example.com".</p>
    <dl>
@@ -6866,7 +6869,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>Returns the value of <var>output</var>. If true, the <var>AppID</var> was used and thus, when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash">verifying the assertion</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑦">Relying Party</a> MUST expect the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash⑤">rpIdHash</a></code> to be the hash of the <var>AppID</var>, not the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑦">RP ID</a>.</p>
+     <p>Returns the value of <var>output</var>. If true, the <var>AppID</var> was used and thus, when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash">verifying the assertion</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑨">Relying Party</a> MUST expect the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash⑤">rpIdHash</a></code> to be the hash of the <var>AppID</var>, not the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑦">RP ID</a>.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs⑤"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs</c-></a> {
   <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑦"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean " id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appid"><code><c- g>appid</c-></code><a class="self-link" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appid"></a></dfn>;
 };
@@ -6883,7 +6886,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.2" id="sctn-appid-exclude-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.2. </span><span class="content">FIDO AppID Exclusion Extension (appidExclude)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-appid-exclude-extension"></a></h4>
    <p>This registration extension allows <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party③⑧">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> to exclude authenticators that contain specified credentials that were created with the legacy FIDO U2F JavaScript API <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidou2fjavascriptapi" title="FIDO U2F JavaScript API">[FIDOU2FJavaScriptAPI]</a>.</p>
-   <p>During a transition from the FIDO U2F JavaScript API, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> may have a population of users with legacy credentials already registered. The <a href="#sctn-appid-extension">appid</a> extension allows the sign-in flow to be transitioned smoothly but, when transitioning the registration flow, the <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑤">excludeCredentials</a> field will not be effective in excluding authenticators with legacy credentials because its contents are taken to be WebAuthn credentials. This extension directs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤①">client platforms</a> to consider the contents of <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑥">excludeCredentials</a> as both WebAuthn and legacy FIDO credentials. Note that U2F key handles commonly use <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#base64url-encoding" id="ref-for-base64url-encoding①④">base64url encoding</a> but must be decoded to their binary form when used in <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑦">excludeCredentials</a>.</p>
+   <p>During a transition from the FIDO U2F JavaScript API, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⓪">Relying Party</a> may have a population of users with legacy credentials already registered. The <a href="#sctn-appid-extension">appid</a> extension allows the sign-in flow to be transitioned smoothly but, when transitioning the registration flow, the <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑤">excludeCredentials</a> field will not be effective in excluding authenticators with legacy credentials because its contents are taken to be WebAuthn credentials. This extension directs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤①">client platforms</a> to consider the contents of <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑥">excludeCredentials</a> as both WebAuthn and legacy FIDO credentials. Note that U2F key handles commonly use <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#base64url-encoding" id="ref-for-base64url-encoding①④">base64url encoding</a> but must be decoded to their binary form when used in <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑦">excludeCredentials</a>.</p>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Extension identifier
     <dd data-md>
@@ -6958,7 +6961,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.2" id="sctn-appid-exclude-extension
      </ol>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>Returns the value <code>true</code> to indicate to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑨">Relying Party</a> that the extension was acted upon.</p>
+     <p>Returns the value <code>true</code> to indicate to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①①">Relying Party</a> that the extension was acted upon.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs⑥"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs</c-></a> {
   <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑧"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean " id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appidexclude"><code><c- g>appidExclude</c-></code><a class="self-link" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appidexclude"></a></dfn>;
 };
@@ -6984,7 +6987,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⓪">Registration</a></p>
     <dt data-md>Client extension input
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⓪">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①②">Relying Party</a>.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs⑧"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs</c-></a> {
     <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑨"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean " id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-credprops"><code><c- g>credProps</c-></code><a class="self-link" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-credprops"></a></dfn>;
 };
@@ -7013,21 +7016,21 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk②">rk</a></code> is <code>true</code>, the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑤">discoverable credential</a>.
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk③">rk</a></code> is <code>false</code>, the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①②">server-side credential</a>.
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk④">rk</a></code> is not present, it is not known whether the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑥">discoverable credential</a> or a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①③">server-side credential</a>.</p>
-        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⓪">authenticators</a> create <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑦">discoverable credentials</a> even when not requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤②">client platform</a>. Because of this, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤③">client platforms</a> may be forced to omit the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑤">rk</a></code> property because they lack the assurance to be able to set it to <code>false</code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①①">Relying Parties</a> should assume that, if the <code>credProps</code> extension is supported, then <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤④">client platforms</a> will endeavour to populate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑥">rk</a></code> property. Therefore a missing <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑦">rk</a></code> indicates that the created credential is most likely a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#non-discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-non-discoverable-credential④">non-discoverable credential</a>.</p>
+        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⓪">authenticators</a> create <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑦">discoverable credentials</a> even when not requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤②">client platform</a>. Because of this, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤③">client platforms</a> may be forced to omit the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑤">rk</a></code> property because they lack the assurance to be able to set it to <code>false</code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①③">Relying Parties</a> should assume that, if the <code>credProps</code> extension is supported, then <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤④">client platforms</a> will endeavour to populate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑥">rk</a></code> property. Therefore a missing <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑦">rk</a></code> indicates that the created credential is most likely a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#non-discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-non-discoverable-credential④">non-discoverable credential</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="CredentialPropertiesOutput" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname"><code>authenticatorDisplayName</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-USVString" id="ref-for-idl-USVString⑤">USVString</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
         <p>This OPTIONAL property is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#human-palatability" id="ref-for-human-palatability⑦">human-palatable</a> description of the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①②">managing authenticator</a>,
 chosen by the user.</p>
         <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨①">client</a> MUST allow the user to choose this value,
 MAY or MAY not present that choice during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑥">registration ceremonies</a>,
-and MAY reuse the same value for multiple credentials with the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①③">managing authenticator</a> across multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①②">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+and MAY reuse the same value for multiple credentials with the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①③">managing authenticator</a> across multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①④">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
         <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨②">client</a> MAY query the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④①">authenticator</a>, by some unspecified mechanism, for this value.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④②">authenticator</a> MAY allow the user to configure the response to such a query.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④③">authenticator</a> vendor MAY provide a default response to such a query.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨③">client</a> MAY consider a user-configured response chosen by the user,
 and SHOULD allow the user to modify a vendor-provided default response.</p>
-        <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①③">Relying Party</a> includes an <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#struct-item" id="ref-for-struct-item①②">item</a> in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①④">credential records</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①④">Relying Party</a> MAY offer this value, if present,
+        <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑤">Relying Party</a> includes an <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#struct-item" id="ref-for-struct-item①②">item</a> in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①④">credential records</a>,
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑥">Relying Party</a> MAY offer this value, if present,
 as a default value for the <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname①">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> of the new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①⑤">credential record</a>.</p>
       </dl>
      </div>
@@ -7042,11 +7045,11 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
      <p>None.</p>
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4" id="prf-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.4. </span><span class="content">Pseudo-random function extension (<dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="prf">prf</dfn>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#prf-extension"></a></h4>
-   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑨">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①①">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension⑨">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑤">Relying Party</a> to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential①⑨">credential</a>. The PRFs provided by this extension map from <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⓪">BufferSource</a></code>s of any length to 32-byte <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①①">BufferSource</a></code>s.</p>
+   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑨">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①①">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension⑨">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑦">Relying Party</a> to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential①⑨">credential</a>. The PRFs provided by this extension map from <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⓪">BufferSource</a></code>s of any length to 32-byte <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①①">BufferSource</a></code>s.</p>
    <p>As a motivating example, PRF outputs could be used as symmetric keys to encrypt user data. Such encrypted data would be inaccessible without the ability to get assertions from the associated <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⓪">credential</a>. By using the provision below to evaluate the PRF at two inputs in a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion⑧">assertion</a> operation, the encryption key could be periodically rotated during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion⑨">assertions</a> by choosing a fresh, random input and reencrypting under the new output. If the evaluation inputs are unpredictable then even an attacker who could satisfy <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification④⑨">user verification</a>, and who had time-limited access to the authenticator, could not learn the encryption key without also knowing the correct PRF input.</p>
    <p>This extension is implemented on top of the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension. It is a separate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①⓪">client extension</a> because <code>hmac-secret</code> requires that inputs and outputs be encrypted in a manner that only the user agent can perform, and to provide separation between uses by WebAuthn and any uses by the underlying platform. This separation is achieved by hashing the provided PRF inputs with a context string to prevent evaluation of the PRFs for arbitrary inputs.</p>
    <p>The <code>hmac-secret</code> extension provides two PRFs per credential: one which is used for requests where <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⓪">user verification</a> is performed and another for all other requests. This extension only exposes a single PRF per credential and, when implementing on top of <code>hmac-secret</code>, that PRF MUST be the one used for when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤①">user verification</a> is performed. This overrides the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#enumdef-userverificationrequirement" id="ref-for-enumdef-userverificationrequirement⑥">UserVerificationRequirement</a></code> if neccessary.</p>
-   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> this extension may be implemented for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④④">authenticators</a> that do not use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> so long as the behavior observed by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑥">Relying Party</a> is identical.</p>
+   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> this extension may be implemented for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④④">authenticators</a> that do not use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> so long as the behavior observed by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑧">Relying Party</a> is identical.</p>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Extension identifier
     <dd data-md>
@@ -7132,7 +7135,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4" id="prf-extension"><span class="
      </ol>
     <dt data-md>Authenticator extension input / processing / output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#prf" id="ref-for-prf">This extension</a> uses the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑦">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#prf" id="ref-for-prf">This extension</a> uses the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑨">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>dictionary</c-> <dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-type="dictionary" data-export id="dictdef-authenticationextensionsprfoutputs"><code><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsPRFOutputs</c-></code></dfn> {
@@ -7156,9 +7159,9 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4" id="prf-extension"><span class="
      </div>
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.5. </span><span class="content">Large blob storage extension (<dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="largeblob">largeBlob</dfn>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-large-blob-extension"></a></h4>
-   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①①">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①④">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①②">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑧">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑦">authenticators</a> can only store small amounts of data, and most <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑨">Relying Parties</a> are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⓪">Relying Party</a> might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.</p>
-   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②①">Relying Parties</a> can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.</p>
-   <p>Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑤">registration</a> context. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②②">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑥">registration extension</a> when creating the credential if they wish to later use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①③">authentication extension</a>.</p>
+   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①①">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①④">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①②">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⓪">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑦">authenticators</a> can only store small amounts of data, and most <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②①">Relying Parties</a> are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②②">Relying Party</a> might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.</p>
+   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②③">Relying Parties</a> can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.</p>
+   <p>Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑤">registration</a> context. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②④">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑥">registration extension</a> when creating the credential if they wish to later use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①③">authentication extension</a>.</p>
    <p>Since certificates are sizable relative to the storage capabilities of typical authenticators, user agents SHOULD consider what indications and confirmations are suitable to best guide the user in allocating this limited resource and prevent abuse.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> In order to interoperate, user agents storing large blobs on authenticators using <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> are expected to use the provisions detailed in that specification for storing <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html#large-blob" id="ref-for-large-blob">large, per-credential blobs</a>.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②③">Roaming authenticators</a> that use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> as their cross-platform transport protocol only support this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob">Large Blob</a> extension for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑧">discoverable credentials</a>,
@@ -7195,10 +7198,10 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><
         <p>A DOMString that takes one of the values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#enumdef-largeblobsupport" id="ref-for-enumdef-largeblobsupport">LargeBlobSupport</a></code>. (See <a href="#sct-domstring-backwards-compatibility">§ 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types</a>.) Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑧">registration</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionslargeblobinputs-read"><code>read</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean①⑤">boolean</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>A boolean that indicates that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②③">Relying Party</a> would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑤">authentication</a>.</p>
+        <p>A boolean that indicates that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑤">Relying Party</a> would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑤">authentication</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionslargeblobinputs-write"><code>write</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⑤">BufferSource</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>An opaque byte string that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②④">Relying Party</a> wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑥">authentication</a>.</p>
+        <p>An opaque byte string that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑥">Relying Party</a> wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑥">authentication</a>.</p>
       </dl>
      </div>
     <dt data-md>Client extension processing (<a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑨">registration</a>)
@@ -7298,7 +7301,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><
      </div>
     <dt data-md>Authenticator extension processing
     <dd data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob①">This extension</a> directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑤">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob①">This extension</a> directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑦">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    </dl>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2" id="sctn-defined-authenticator-extensions"><span class="secno">10.2. </span><span class="content">Authenticator Extensions</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-defined-authenticator-extensions"></a></h3>
    <p>This section defines extensions that are both <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①②">client extensions</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①②">authenticator extensions</a>.</p>
@@ -7313,7 +7316,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.1" id="sctn-uvm-extension"><span cl
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②①">Registration</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑧">Authentication</a></p>
     <dt data-md>Client extension input
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑥">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑧">Relying Party</a>.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs①①"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs</c-></a> {
   <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean②⓪"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean " id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-uvm"><code><c- g>uvm</c-></code><a class="self-link" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-uvm"></a></dfn>;
 };
@@ -7393,13 +7396,13 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.1" id="sctn-uvm-extension"><span cl
 </pre>
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension"><span class="secno">10.2.2. </span><span class="content">Supplemental public keys extension (<dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="supplementalpubkeys">supplementalPubKeys</dfn>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension"></a></h4>
-   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①③">authenticator</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②②">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑨">authentication extension</a> provides a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑦">Relying Party</a> with additional public key(s) for credentials. This is done by creating <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential③">user credential</a>-specific key pairs on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤②">authenticator</a>, when required key pairs do not already exist for the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential④">user credential</a> being created or exercised, and returning these supplemental keys (along with signatures by them) to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑧">Relying Party</a>. This is done each time this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys③">supplementalPubKeys</a> extension is included with either a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑦">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑨">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> call.</p>
+   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①③">authenticator</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②②">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑨">authentication extension</a> provides a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑨">Relying Party</a> with additional public key(s) for credentials. This is done by creating <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential③">user credential</a>-specific key pairs on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤②">authenticator</a>, when required key pairs do not already exist for the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential④">user credential</a> being created or exercised, and returning these supplemental keys (along with signatures by them) to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⓪">Relying Party</a>. This is done each time this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys③">supplementalPubKeys</a> extension is included with either a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑦">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑨">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> call.</p>
    <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤③">authenticator</a> is incapable of generating a supplemental key pair, or the registration or authentication operation fails for any reason, that key pair is omitted from the output. If no supplemental key pairs remain then this extension is ignored. In this case, there is no <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys④">supplementalPubKeys</a> extension output generated.</p>
    <p>Supplemental keys are not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential⑤">user credentials</a> and they do not have their own <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④①">credential IDs</a>. Instead, any returned keys are a contextual attribute of their associated <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential⑥">user credential</a>. That is, when that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential⑦">user credential</a> is used—along with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑤">supplementalPubKeys</a> extension—on a particular <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤④">authenticator</a>, a particular set of supplemental keys are returned by the extension, along with signatures demonstrating proof-of-possession of those keys.</p>
    <p>Supplemental keys never have a scope that is larger than the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential⑧">user credential</a>. That is, they are never shared between any two <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential⑨">user credentials</a> and can never be used to link two <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①⓪">user credentials</a> together. They only communicate continuity of some property of their associated <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①①">user credential</a>.</p>
    <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-usage"><span class="secno">10.2.2.1. </span><span class="content">Relying Party Usage</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-usage"></a></h5>
-   <p>This extension is intended for use by those <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑨">Relying Parties</a> employing risk-analysis systems informing their sign-in decisions. This extension signals the continuity of some property <i>when used consistently</i> with both <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑧">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> and <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④⓪">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> operations. The property being signaled depends on the scope of the supplemental key and its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②⑧">attestation</a> statement, if any. The clearest example of a supplemental key is one that is device-bound. Repeated observation of a device-bound supplemental key indicates that a credential is being used repeatedly from the same device. (Which cannot be otherwise assumed in the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-eligible" id="ref-for-backup-eligible②">backup eligible</a> credentials.) But supplemental keys with wider scopes are also defined and the exact properties that they communicate depend on the attestation included along with them.</p>
-   <p>When a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⓪">Relying Party</a> uses the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension with a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑨">create()</a></code> call to create a new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①②">user credential</a>, a signature by one or more new supplemental keys may be returned along with the new supplemental public keys themselves. For the sake of example, assume that a single supplemental public key is returned, called “SPK1”. For as long as the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①③">user credential</a> is exercised within the scope of the supplemental key, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③①">Relying Party</a>'s subsequent <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④①">get()</a></code> operations for that credential will likely generate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①②">assertions</a> including further signatures by “SPK1”.</p>
+   <p>This extension is intended for use by those <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③①">Relying Parties</a> employing risk-analysis systems informing their sign-in decisions. This extension signals the continuity of some property <i>when used consistently</i> with both <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑧">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> and <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④⓪">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> operations. The property being signaled depends on the scope of the supplemental key and its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②⑧">attestation</a> statement, if any. The clearest example of a supplemental key is one that is device-bound. Repeated observation of a device-bound supplemental key indicates that a credential is being used repeatedly from the same device. (Which cannot be otherwise assumed in the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-eligible" id="ref-for-backup-eligible②">backup eligible</a> credentials.) But supplemental keys with wider scopes are also defined and the exact properties that they communicate depend on the attestation included along with them.</p>
+   <p>When a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③②">Relying Party</a> uses the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension with a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑨">create()</a></code> call to create a new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①②">user credential</a>, a signature by one or more new supplemental keys may be returned along with the new supplemental public keys themselves. For the sake of example, assume that a single supplemental public key is returned, called “SPK1”. For as long as the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①③">user credential</a> is exercised within the scope of the supplemental key, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③③">Relying Party</a>'s subsequent <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④①">get()</a></code> operations for that credential will likely generate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①②">assertions</a> including further signatures by “SPK1”.</p>
    <p>The credential may move beyond the scope of that supplemental key (for example, by being exported and imported elsewhere, if <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-eligible" id="ref-for-backup-eligible③">backup eligible</a>) and, if used in this new domain, the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④②">get()</a></code> operation will return a <i>new</i> supplemental key, SPK2, and its signature. Subsequent <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④③">get()</a></code> operations may observe either SPK1 or SPK2, depending on the context in which the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①④">user credential</a> is being used.</p>
    <p>A usage example is thus:</p>
    <blockquote>
@@ -7409,7 +7412,7 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
    <blockquote>
     <p>Say that a sign-in request appears at a website along with some geolocation signal that has not been seen for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑥">user account</a> before, and is outside of the typical usage hours observed for the account. The risk may be deemed high enough not to allow the request, even with an assertion by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#multi-device-credential" id="ref-for-multi-device-credential⑨">multi-device credential</a> on its own. But if a signature from a supplemental key that is device-bound, and that is <i>well established</i> for this user can also be presented, then that may tip the balance.</p>
    </blockquote>
-   <p>The weight that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③②">Relying Parties</a> give to the presence of a signature from a supplemental key may be based on information learned from its optional attestation. An attestation can indicate the level of protection enjoyed by a hardware-bound key, or the policies for other types of supplemental key.</p>
+   <p>The weight that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③④">Relying Parties</a> give to the presence of a signature from a supplemental key may be based on information learned from its optional attestation. An attestation can indicate the level of protection enjoyed by a hardware-bound key, or the policies for other types of supplemental key.</p>
    <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-definition"><span class="secno">10.2.2.2. </span><span class="content">Extension Definition</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-definition"></a></h5>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Extension identifier
@@ -7434,15 +7437,15 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
       <dl>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-scopes"><code>scopes</code></dfn>, <span> of type sequence&lt;<a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-DOMString" id="ref-for-idl-DOMString⑦⑦">DOMString</a>></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>This required member MUST be non-empty. It specifies the scopes of supplemental public keys that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③③">Relying Party</a> requests. Values are taken from the CDDL below (i.e., currently defined values are <code>provider</code> and <code>device</code>); authenticators silently ignore unrecognized values. Specifying the scopes that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③④">Relying Party</a> can use allows an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑤">authenticator</a> to avoid the work of generating superfluous supplemental keys.</p>
+        <p>This required member MUST be non-empty. It specifies the scopes of supplemental public keys that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑤">Relying Party</a> requests. Values are taken from the CDDL below (i.e., currently defined values are <code>provider</code> and <code>device</code>); authenticators silently ignore unrecognized values. Specifying the scopes that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑥">Relying Party</a> can use allows an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑤">authenticator</a> to avoid the work of generating superfluous supplemental keys.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestation"><code>attestation</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-DOMString" id="ref-for-idl-DOMString⑦⑧">DOMString</a>, defaulting to <code>"indirect"</code></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑤">Relying Party</a> MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-conveyance" id="ref-for-attestation-conveyance⑤">attestation conveyance</a>.
+        <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑦">Relying Party</a> MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-conveyance" id="ref-for-attestation-conveyance⑤">attestation conveyance</a>.
 Its value SHOULD be a member of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#enumdef-attestationconveyancepreference" id="ref-for-enumdef-attestationconveyancepreference⑤">AttestationConveyancePreference</a></code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑤">Client platforms</a> MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#map-exists" id="ref-for-map-exists⑧">member does not exist</a>.</p>
         <p>The default value is <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-attestationconveyancepreference-indirect" id="ref-for-dom-attestationconveyancepreference-indirect②">indirect</a></code>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats"><code>attestationFormats</code></dfn>, <span> of type sequence&lt;<a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-DOMString" id="ref-for-idl-DOMString⑦⑨">DOMString</a>>, defaulting to <code>[]</code></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑥">Relying Party</a> MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②⑨">attestation</a> statement format used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑥">authenticator</a>.
+        <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑧">Relying Party</a> MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②⑨">attestation</a> statement format used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑥">authenticator</a>.
 Values SHOULD be taken from the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-iana-webauthn-registries" title="Web Authentication (WebAuthn) registries">[IANA-WebAuthn-Registries]</a> established by <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-rfc8809" title="Registries for Web Authentication (WebAuthn)">[RFC8809]</a>.
 Values are ordered from most preferable to least preferable.
 This parameter is advisory and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑦">authenticator</a> MAY use an attestation statement not enumerated in this parameter.</p>
@@ -7584,7 +7587,7 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
            <p><var>attFormat</var> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format②⑤">attestation statement format</a> appropriate for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⓪">authenticator</a> based on <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats①">attestationFormats</a></code>, and <var>attAaguid</var> is the corresponding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#aaguid" id="ref-for-aaguid③">AAGUID</a>, which MAY be the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥①">authenticator’s</a> AAGUID. (Since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key①">supplemental public key</a>'s scope is different from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①⑥">user credential</a>, it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key②">supplemental public key</a> with “device” scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)</p>
           <dt data-md>enterprise
           <dd data-md>
-           <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑦">Relying Party</a> wants to receive an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④②">attestation statement</a> that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥②">Authenticators</a> MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑧">RP ID</a>. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for <code>direct</code> attestation. Otherwise <var>attFormat</var> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format②⑥">attestation statement format</a> appropriate for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥③">authenticator</a> based on <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats②">attestationFormats</a></code>, and <var>attAaguid</var> is the corresponding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#aaguid" id="ref-for-aaguid④">AAGUID</a>, which MAY be the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥④">authenticator’s</a> AAGUID.</p>
+           <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑨">Relying Party</a> wants to receive an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④②">attestation statement</a> that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥②">Authenticators</a> MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑧">RP ID</a>. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for <code>direct</code> attestation. Otherwise <var>attFormat</var> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format②⑥">attestation statement format</a> appropriate for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥③">authenticator</a> based on <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysinputs-attestationformats②">attestationFormats</a></code>, and <var>attAaguid</var> is the corresponding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#aaguid" id="ref-for-aaguid④">AAGUID</a>, which MAY be the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥④">authenticator’s</a> AAGUID.</p>
            <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> CTAP2 does not currently provide for an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#makecred-enterpriseattestation">enterpriseAttestation</a> signal during an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#authenticatorGetAssertion">authenticatorGetAssertion</a> call. Until that is changed, <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#platform-managed-enterprise-attestation">platform-managed enterprise attestation</a> will not work in that context with CTAP2 <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑤">authenticators</a>.</p>
          </dl>
         <li data-md>
@@ -7616,7 +7619,7 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
          <p>Append <var>supplementalPubKey</var> to <var>spks</var>.</p>
         <li data-md>
          <p>Let <var>spkSig</var> be the result of signing the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion-signature" id="ref-for-assertion-signature①⓪">assertion signature</a> <a href="#fig-signature">input</a> with <var>supplementalPrivateKey</var>.</p>
-         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion-signature" id="ref-for-assertion-signature①①">assertion signature</a> <a href="#fig-signature">input</a>, and thus <var>spkSig</var>, covers the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑧">Relying Party</a>'s <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge③">challenge</a></code> because it includes the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data" id="ref-for-collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data②①">hash of the serialized client data</a>. Thus the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑨">Relying Party</a> knows that <var>spkSig</var> is a fresh signature.</p>
+         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion-signature" id="ref-for-assertion-signature①①">assertion signature</a> <a href="#fig-signature">input</a>, and thus <var>spkSig</var>, covers the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⓪">Relying Party</a>'s <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge③">challenge</a></code> because it includes the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data" id="ref-for-collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data②①">hash of the serialized client data</a>. Thus the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④①">Relying Party</a> knows that <var>spkSig</var> is a fresh signature.</p>
         <li data-md>
          <p>Append <var>spkSig</var> to <var>spkSigs</var>.</p>
        </ol>
@@ -7628,9 +7631,9 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
      </ol>
    </dl>
    <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-aaguid"><span class="secno">10.2.2.2.1. </span><span class="content">AAGUIDs</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-aaguid"></a></h6>
-   <p>Any non-zero <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#aaguid" id="ref-for-aaguid⑤">AAGUID</a>s included in the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑥">supplementalPubKeys</a></code> extension output aid a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⓪">Relying Party</a> in validating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑤">attestation statement</a> of the supplemental public key. The interpretation of each AAGUID depends on the scope of the corresponding key. Some or all may differ from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-aaguid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-aaguid⑧">aaguid</a> in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attested-credential-data" id="ref-for-attested-credential-data①⑧">attested credential data</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#multi-device-credential" id="ref-for-multi-device-credential①⓪">multi-device credential</a>. Thus the AAGUID of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key④">supplemental public key</a> MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.</p>
+   <p>Any non-zero <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#aaguid" id="ref-for-aaguid⑤">AAGUID</a>s included in the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑥">supplementalPubKeys</a></code> extension output aid a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④②">Relying Party</a> in validating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑤">attestation statement</a> of the supplemental public key. The interpretation of each AAGUID depends on the scope of the corresponding key. Some or all may differ from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-aaguid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-aaguid⑧">aaguid</a> in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attested-credential-data" id="ref-for-attested-credential-data①⑧">attested credential data</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#multi-device-credential" id="ref-for-multi-device-credential①⓪">multi-device credential</a>. Thus the AAGUID of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key④">supplemental public key</a> MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.</p>
    <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations"><span class="secno">10.2.2.2.2. </span><span class="content">Attestation calculations</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations"></a></h6>
-   <p>When computing attestations, the process in <a href="#sctn-generating-an-attestation-object">§ 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object</a> takes two inputs: <code>authData</code> and <code>hash</code>. When calculating an attestation for a supplemental public key, the typical value for <code>authData</code> contains the attestation signature itself, which is impossible. Also the attestation of a supplemental public key is potentially used repeatedly, thus may want to be cached. But signing over values that include <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④①">Relying Party</a>-chosen nonces, like the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data" id="ref-for-collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data②②">hash of the serialized client data</a>, makes that impossible.</p>
+   <p>When computing attestations, the process in <a href="#sctn-generating-an-attestation-object">§ 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object</a> takes two inputs: <code>authData</code> and <code>hash</code>. When calculating an attestation for a supplemental public key, the typical value for <code>authData</code> contains the attestation signature itself, which is impossible. Also the attestation of a supplemental public key is potentially used repeatedly, thus may want to be cached. But signing over values that include <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④③">Relying Party</a>-chosen nonces, like the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data" id="ref-for-collectedclientdata-hash-of-the-serialized-client-data②②">hash of the serialized client data</a>, makes that impossible.</p>
    <p>Therefore when calculating an attestation for a supplemental public key, the inputs are:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -7641,7 +7644,7 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.2.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public
    <p>The attestation signature is thus typically calculated over the bytes of <code>(h’737570706c656d656e74616c5075624b657973206174746573746174696f6e2e00ffffffff' || <var>aaguid</var> || <var>spk</var> || <var>nonce</var>)</code>. The 37-byte prefix ensures domain separation: it takes the place of the RP ID hash, flags, and signature counter fields in those messages and ensures that no attestation signature for a supplemental public key can be confused with a signature for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①⑧">user credential</a>.</p>
    <p>Note that when <var>nonce</var> is empty, then the (signed) authenticator extension output MAY be constant. However, the (unsigned) <var>spkSig</var> output is always unique and prevents replay of the (signed) extension output without knowledge of the supplemental private key.</p>
    <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification"><span class="secno">10.2.2.3. </span><span class="content"><code>supplementalPubKeys</code> Extension Output Verification Procedures</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification"></a></h5>
-   <p>Verifying the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑦">supplementalPubKeys</a></code> extension output is performed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④②">Relying Party</a> whenever a supplemental public key is returned within the extension output.</p>
+   <p>Verifying the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑦">supplementalPubKeys</a></code> extension output is performed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④④">Relying Party</a> whenever a supplemental public key is returned within the extension output.</p>
    <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-supplementalpubkeys⑧">supplementalPubKeys</a> extension adds the following <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#struct-item" id="ref-for-struct-item①③">item</a> to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①⑥">credential records</a>:</p>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-for="credential record" data-dfn-type="abstract-op" data-export id="abstract-opdef-credential-record-supplementalpubkeys">supplementalPubKeys</dfn>
@@ -7669,8 +7672,8 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3" id="sctn-supplemental-public-k
      </dl>
    </dl>
    <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification-create"><span class="secno">10.2.2.3.1. </span><span class="content">Registration (<code>create()</code>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification-create"></a></h6>
-   <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④③">Relying Party</a> requested the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension in a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create④①">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> call,
-then the below verification steps are performed in the context of <a href="#reg-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">step 19</a> of <a href="#sctn-registering-a-new-credential">§ 7.1 Registering a New Credential</a> using these variables established therein: <var>credential</var>, <var>clientExtensionResults</var>, <var>authData</var>, and <var>hash</var>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④④">Relying Party</a> policy may specify whether a response without a <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension output is acceptable.</p>
+   <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑤">Relying Party</a> requested the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension in a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create④①">navigator.credentials.create()</a></code> call,
+then the below verification steps are performed in the context of <a href="#reg-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">step 19</a> of <a href="#sctn-registering-a-new-credential">§ 7.1 Registering a New Credential</a> using these variables established therein: <var>credential</var>, <var>clientExtensionResults</var>, <var>authData</var>, and <var>hash</var>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑥">Relying Party</a> policy may specify whether a response without a <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension output is acceptable.</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Verify that the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-supplementalpubkeys" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-supplementalpubkeys">supplementalPubKeys</a></code> member of <var>clientExtensionResults</var> exists, and contains the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysoutputs-signatures" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionssupplementalpubkeysoutputs-signatures">signatures</a></code> field. Let <var>signatures</var> be the value of that field.</p>
@@ -7683,11 +7686,11 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public
      <ol>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Extract the contained fields from <var>attObjForSupplementalPubKey</var>: <var>aaguid</var>, <var>spk</var>, <var>nonce</var>, <var>fmt</var> and <var>attStmt</var>. Also let <var>scope</var> reflect the scope, specified by the member of the <code>scope</code> group that is present.</p>
-       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The latter <var>attObjForSupplementalPubKey</var> fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of the top-level <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②④">attestation object</a>.</p>
+       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The latter <var>attObjForSupplementalPubKey</var> fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of the top-level <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②⑤">attestation object</a>.</p>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Verify that <var>signature</var> is a valid signature over the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion-signature" id="ref-for-assertion-signature①②">assertion signature</a> <a href="#fig-signature">input</a> (i.e. <code>authData</code> and <code>hash</code>) by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key⑤">supplemental public key</a> <var>spk</var>. (The signature algorithm is the same as for the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential①⑨">user credential</a>.)</p>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑤">Relying Party</a> wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑧">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature①⑧">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format②⑨">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑦">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑥">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
+       <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑦">Relying Party</a> wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑧">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature①⑧">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format②⑨">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑦">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑧">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> If <var>fmt</var>’s value is "<a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑧">none</a>" there is no attestation signature to verify.</p>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Create a new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record-supplemental-public-key-record" id="ref-for-credential-record-supplemental-public-key-record①">supplemental public key record</a> with the contents:</p>
@@ -7714,8 +7717,8 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.1" id="sctn-supplemental-public
    </ol>
    <p>See also <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-usage">§ 10.2.2.1 Relying Party Usage</a> for further details.</p>
    <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification-get"><span class="secno">10.2.2.3.2. </span><span class="content">Authentication (<code>get()</code>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-verification-get"></a></h6>
-   <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑦">Relying Party</a> requested the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension in a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④④">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> call,
-then the below verification steps are performed in the context of <a href="#authn-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">step 17</a> of <a href="#sctn-verifying-assertion">§ 7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion</a> using these variables established therein: <var>credential</var>, <var>clientExtensionResults</var>, <var>authData</var>, <var>hash</var>, and <var>credentialRecord</var>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑧">Relying Party</a> policy may specify whether a response without a <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension output is acceptable.</p>
+   <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑨">Relying Party</a> requested the <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension in a <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④④">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> call,
+then the below verification steps are performed in the context of <a href="#authn-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">step 17</a> of <a href="#sctn-verifying-assertion">§ 7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion</a> using these variables established therein: <var>credential</var>, <var>clientExtensionResults</var>, <var>authData</var>, <var>hash</var>, and <var>credentialRecord</var>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⓪">Relying Party</a> policy may specify whether a response without a <code>supplementalPubKeys</code> extension output is acceptable.</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Let <var>recognizedSpks</var> be a new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty⑦">empty</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#ordered-set" id="ref-for-ordered-set⑨">set</a>.</p>
@@ -7762,7 +7765,7 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public
            <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> This authenticator is not generating a fresh per-response random nonce.</p>
           <dt data-md>does not equal <var>spkRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-supplementalpubkeys-record-attstmt" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-supplementalpubkeys-record-attstmt②">attStmt</a> by binary equality:
           <dd data-md>
-           <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑨">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature①⑨">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format③⓪">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑧">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑨">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
+           <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑨">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature①⑨">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format③⓪">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑧">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤①">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
            <p>If the result is:</p>
            <dl class="switch">
             <dt data-md>successful
@@ -7792,10 +7795,10 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public
            <dl class="switch">
             <dt data-md>If <var>fmt</var>’s value is "none":
             <dd data-md>
-             <p>There is no attestation signature to verify and this is a new supplemental key. Unless <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⓪">Relying Party</a> policy specifies that this attestation is unacceptable, <a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-create-a-new-supplemental-public-key-record" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-create-a-new-supplemental-public-key-record">Create a new supplemental public key record</a> and then continue to the next iteration, if any.</p>
+             <p>There is no attestation signature to verify and this is a new supplemental key. Unless <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤②">Relying Party</a> policy specifies that this attestation is unacceptable, <a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-create-a-new-supplemental-public-key-record" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-create-a-new-supplemental-public-key-record">Create a new supplemental public key record</a> and then continue to the next iteration, if any.</p>
             <dt data-md>Otherwise:
             <dd data-md>
-             <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤⓪">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature②⓪">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format③①">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑨">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤①">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
+             <p>Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that <var>attStmt</var> is a correct <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤⓪">attestation statement</a>, conveying a valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-signature" id="ref-for-attestation-signature②⓪">attestation signature</a>, by using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format③①">attestation statement format</a> <var>fmt</var>’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①⑨">verification procedure</a> given <var>attStmt</var>. See <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations">§ 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤③">Relying Party</a> policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.</p>
              <p>If the result is:</p>
              <dl class="switch">
               <dt data-md>successful
@@ -7807,12 +7810,12 @@ <h6 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2.2.3.2" id="sctn-supplemental-public
              </dl>
            </dl>
           <li data-md>
-           <p>Otherwise there is some form of error: we recieved a known <var>spk</var> value, but one or more of the accompanying <var>aaguid</var> or <var>scope</var> values did not match what the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤②">Relying Party</a> has stored along with that <var>spk</var> value. Terminate these verification steps.</p>
+           <p>Otherwise there is some form of error: we recieved a known <var>spk</var> value, but one or more of the accompanying <var>aaguid</var> or <var>scope</var> values did not match what the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤④">Relying Party</a> has stored along with that <var>spk</var> value. Terminate these verification steps.</p>
          </ol>
        </dl>
      </ol>
    </ol>
-   <p>At the end of these steps, <var>recognizedSpks</var> contains zero or more <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key①④">supplemental public keys</a> that were previously known for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential②①">user credential</a>. These keys make claims about the continuity of certain factors between this authentication attempt and previous ones. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤③">Relying Party</a> should judge those claims in light of the attestations provided, if any, and evaluate the risk of this authentication in light of this information.</p>
+   <p>At the end of these steps, <var>recognizedSpks</var> contains zero or more <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#supplemental-public-key" id="ref-for-supplemental-public-key①④">supplemental public keys</a> that were previously known for this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-credential" id="ref-for-user-credential②①">user credential</a>. These keys make claims about the continuity of certain factors between this authentication attempt and previous ones. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑤">Relying Party</a> should judge those claims in light of the attestations provided, if any, and evaluate the risk of this authentication in light of this information.</p>
    <p>See also <a href="#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-extension-usage">§ 10.2.2.1 Relying Party Usage</a>.</p>
    <p>To <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="abstract-op" data-export id="abstract-opdef-create-a-new-supplemental-public-key-record">Create a new supplemental public key record</dfn>, perform the following steps:</p>
    <ol>
@@ -8448,7 +8451,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="12.4" id="sctn-extensions-reg"><span cla
     <li data-md>
      <p>WebAuthn Extension Identifier: largeBlob</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Description: This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①④">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②⑥">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension②③">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤④">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential.</p>
+     <p>Description: This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①④">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②⑥">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension②③">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Specification Document: Section <a href="#sctn-large-blob-extension">§ 10.1.5 Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)</a> of this specification</p>
    </ul>
@@ -8456,15 +8459,15 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="13" id="sctn-security-considerations"><s
    <p>This specification defines a <a href="#sctn-api">Web API</a> and a cryptographic peer-entity authentication protocol.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-authentication-api" id="ref-for-web-authentication-api①⑥">Web Authentication API</a> allows Web developers (i.e., "authors") to utilize the Web Authentication protocol in their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②②">registration</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑤">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①③">ceremonies</a>.
 The entities comprising the Web Authentication protocol endpoints are user-controlled <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator⑧">WebAuthn Authenticators</a> and a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party④⑤">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>'s
-computing environment hosting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑤">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-application" id="ref-for-web-application⑥">web application</a>.
-In this model, the user agent, together with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client⑦">WebAuthn Client</a>, comprise an intermediary between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑦">authenticators</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑥">Relying Parties</a>.
-Additionally, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑧">authenticators</a> can <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation③①">attest</a> to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑦">Relying Parties</a> as to their provenance.</p>
+computing environment hosting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑦">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-application" id="ref-for-web-application⑥">web application</a>.
+In this model, the user agent, together with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client⑦">WebAuthn Client</a>, comprise an intermediary between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑦">authenticators</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑧">Relying Parties</a>.
+Additionally, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑧">authenticators</a> can <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation③①">attest</a> to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑨">Relying Parties</a> as to their provenance.</p>
    <p>At this time, this specification does not feature detailed security considerations. However, the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidosecref" title="FIDO Security Reference">[FIDOSecRef]</a> document provides a security analysis which is overall applicable to this specification.
 Also, the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidoauthnrsecreqs" title="FIDO Authenticator Security Requirements">[FIDOAuthnrSecReqs]</a> document suite provides useful information about <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑨">authenticator</a> security characteristics.</p>
    <p>The below subsections comprise the current Web Authentication-specific security considerations.
 They are divided by audience;
 general security considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while security considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⓪">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑤">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑧">Relying Party</a> implementers
+while security considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⓪">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑤">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⓪">Relying Party</a> implementers
 are grouped into respective subsections.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.1" id="sctn-credentialIdSecurity"><span class="secno">13.1. </span><span class="content">Credential ID Unsigned</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credentialIdSecurity"></a></h3>
    <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④②">credential ID</a> is not signed.
@@ -8485,7 +8488,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.2" id="sctn-client-authenticator-prox
 then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪①">client</a> has to trust the third party to
 enforce the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②①">scope</a> restrictions and control access to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⑧">authenticator</a>.
 Failure to do either could result in
-a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑨">Relying Party</a> receiving <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①④">authentication assertions</a> valid for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⓪">Relying Parties</a>,
+a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥①">Relying Party</a> receiving <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①④">authentication assertions</a> valid for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥②">Relying Parties</a>,
 or in a malicious user gaining access to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑤">authentication assertions</a> for other users.</p>
    <p>If designing a solution where the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⑨">authenticator</a> does not need to be physically close to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪②">client</a>,
 or where <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪③">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⓪">authenticator</a> do not communicate directly,
@@ -8507,38 +8510,38 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.3.2" id="sctn-ca-compromise"><span cl
 Authenticator manufacturer may need to ship a firmware update and inject new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-private-key" id="ref-for-attestation-private-key⑥">attestation private keys</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①①">certificates</a> into already
 manufactured <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①④">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>, if the exposure was due to a firmware flaw. (The process by which this happens is out of
 scope for this specification.) If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑤">WebAuthn Authenticator</a> manufacturer does not have this capability, then it may not be
-possible for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥①">Relying Parties</a> to trust any further <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤①">attestation statements</a> from the affected <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑥">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>.</p>
-   <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥②">Relying Parties</a> in <a href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates">§ 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates</a>.</p>
-   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4" id="sctn-security-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">13.4. </span><span class="content">Security considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥③">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-security-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
+possible for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥③">Relying Parties</a> to trust any further <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤①">attestation statements</a> from the affected <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑥">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>.</p>
+   <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥④">Relying Parties</a> in <a href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates">§ 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates</a>.</p>
+   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4" id="sctn-security-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">13.4. </span><span class="content">Security considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑤">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-security-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.1" id="sctn-rp-benefits"><span class="secno">13.4.1. </span><span class="content">Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-rp-benefits"></a></h4>
    <p>The main benefits offered to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party④⑧">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> by this specification include:</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Users and accounts can be secured using widely compatible, easy-to-use multi-factor authentication.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥④">Relying Party</a> does not need to provision <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧④">authenticator</a> hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
-any conforming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑤">authenticator</a> and use that same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑥">authenticator</a> with any number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑤">Relying Parties</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑥">Relying Party</a> can optionally
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑥">Relying Party</a> does not need to provision <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧④">authenticator</a> hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
+any conforming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑤">authenticator</a> and use that same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑥">authenticator</a> with any number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑦">Relying Parties</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑧">Relying Party</a> can optionally
 enforce requirements on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑦">authenticators</a>' security properties by inspecting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤②">attestation statements</a> returned from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑧">authenticators</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③②">Authentication ceremonies</a> are resistant to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.
 Regarding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑦">registration ceremonies</a>, see <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>, below.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑦">Relying Party</a> can automatically support multiple types of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑤">user verification</a> - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑨">Relying Party</a> can automatically support multiple types of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑤">user verification</a> - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
 methods - with little or no code change, and can let each user decide which they prefer to use via their choice of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑨">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑧">Relying Party</a> does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⓪">Relying Party</a> does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.</p>
    </ol>
-   <p>As stated in the <a href="#sctn-conforming-relying-parties">Conformance</a> section, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑨">Relying Party</a> MUST behave as described in <a href="#sctn-rp-operations">§ 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations</a> to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>.</p>
+   <p>As stated in the <a href="#sctn-conforming-relying-parties">Conformance</a> section, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦①">Relying Party</a> MUST behave as described in <a href="#sctn-rp-operations">§ 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations</a> to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.2" id="sctn-seccons-visibility"><span class="secno">13.4.2. </span><span class="content">Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-seccons-visibility"></a></h4>
-   <p>Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within <code><a data-link-type="element" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-iframe-element" id="ref-for-the-iframe-element④">iframe</a></code>s as described in <a href="#sctn-iframe-guidance">§ 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements</a>, may make users vulnerable to <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="ui-redressing">UI Redressing</dfn> attacks, also known as "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking">Clickjacking</a>". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⓪">Relying Party</a>'s intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦①">Relying Party</a>. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.</p>
-   <p>Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑥">client platform</a> and thus is not vulnerable to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ui-redressing" id="ref-for-ui-redressing①">UI Redressing</a>, it is likely important for an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦②">Relying Party</a> having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental <a href="https://w3c.github.io/IntersectionObserver/v2/">Intersection Observer v2</a>'s <code>isVisible</code> attribute. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦③">Relying Party</a>'s script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects <code>isVisble</code> being set to <code>false</code>, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.</p>
+   <p>Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within <code><a data-link-type="element" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-iframe-element" id="ref-for-the-iframe-element④">iframe</a></code>s as described in <a href="#sctn-iframe-guidance">§ 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements</a>, may make users vulnerable to <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="ui-redressing">UI Redressing</dfn> attacks, also known as "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking">Clickjacking</a>". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦②">Relying Party</a>'s intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦③">Relying Party</a>. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.</p>
+   <p>Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑥">client platform</a> and thus is not vulnerable to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ui-redressing" id="ref-for-ui-redressing①">UI Redressing</a>, it is likely important for an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦④">Relying Party</a> having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental <a href="https://w3c.github.io/IntersectionObserver/v2/">Intersection Observer v2</a>'s <code>isVisible</code> attribute. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑤">Relying Party</a>'s script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects <code>isVisble</code> being set to <code>false</code>, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.3" id="sctn-cryptographic-challenges"><span class="secno">13.4.3. </span><span class="content">Cryptographic Challenges</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-cryptographic-challenges"></a></h4>
    <p>As a cryptographic protocol, Web Authentication is dependent upon randomized challenges
 to avoid replay attacks. Therefore, the values of both <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialcreationoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialcreationoptions①③">PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge④">challenge</a></code> and <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions①④">PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge④">challenge</a></code> MUST be randomly generated
-by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦④">Relying Parties</a> in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
+by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑥">Relying Parties</a> in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
 returned <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-challenge⑧">challenge</a></code> value in the client’s
 response MUST match what was generated. This SHOULD be done in a fashion that does not rely
-upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑤">Relying Party</a> SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
+upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑦">Relying Party</a> SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
 until the operation is complete. Tolerating a mismatch will compromise the security
 of the protocol.</p>
    <p>Challenges SHOULD be valid for a duration similar to the
@@ -8551,88 +8554,88 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.4" id="sctn-attestation-limitations
 may allow the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party④⑨">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to derive assurances about various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⓪">authenticator</a> qualities.
 For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨①">authenticator</a> model, or how it stores and protects <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②②">credential private keys</a>.
 However, it is important to note that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤④">attestation statement</a>, on its own,
-provides no means for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑥">Relying Party</a> to verify that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②⑤">attestation object</a> was generated
+provides no means for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑧">Relying Party</a> to verify that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②⑥">attestation object</a> was generated
 by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨②">authenticator</a> the user intended, and not by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186①">man-in-the-middle attacker</a>.
-For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑦">Relying Party</a> script.
-The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑧">Relying Party</a> must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
-to protect the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②⑥">attestation object</a> from <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186②">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.</p>
+For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑨">Relying Party</a> script.
+The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⓪">Relying Party</a> must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
+to protect the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object②⑦">attestation object</a> from <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186②">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.</p>
    <p>Under the assumption that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑧">registration ceremony</a> is completed securely, and that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨③">authenticator</a> maintains
 confidentiality of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②③">credential private key</a>, subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③③">authentication ceremonies</a> using that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑤⑧">public key
 credential</a> are resistant to tampering by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186③">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.</p>
    <p>The discussion above holds for all <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②④">attestation types</a>. In all cases it is possible for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186④">man-in-the-middle attacker</a> to replace the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#publickeycredential" id="ref-for-publickeycredential②⑦">PublicKeyCredential</a></code> object, including the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤⑤">attestation statement</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑥">credential public key</a> to be registered, and subsequently tamper with future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑥">authentication assertions</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②③">scoped</a> for the
-same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑨">Relying Party</a> and passing through the same attacker.</p>
-   <p>Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⓪">Relying Party</a> has registered the attacker’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑦">credential public key</a> rather
-than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③④">authentication ceremonies</a> with that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧①">Relying Party</a>: unscathed
+same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧①">Relying Party</a> and passing through the same attacker.</p>
+   <p>Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧②">Relying Party</a> has registered the attacker’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑦">credential public key</a> rather
+than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③④">authentication ceremonies</a> with that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧③">Relying Party</a>: unscathed
 ceremonies will fail, potentially revealing the attack.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②⑤">Attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑨">Self Attestation</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑨">None</a> can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧②">Relying Parties</a> can possibly display <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨④">authenticator</a> information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
-a genuine <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑤">authenticator</a> of the same model as the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑥">authenticator</a>, or the user might notice that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧③">Relying Party</a> reports
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②⑤">Attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑨">Self Attestation</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑨">None</a> can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧④">Relying Parties</a> can possibly display <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨④">authenticator</a> information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
+a genuine <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑤">authenticator</a> of the same model as the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑥">authenticator</a>, or the user might notice that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑤">Relying Party</a> reports
 a different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑦">authenticator</a> model than the user expects.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> All variants of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑤">man-in-the-middle attacks</a> described above are more difficult for an attacker to mount
 than a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑥">man-in-the-middle attack</a> against conventional password authentication.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.5" id="sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates"><span class="secno">13.4.5. </span><span class="content">Revoked Attestation Certificates</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates"></a></h4>
-   <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①②">attestation certificate</a> validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧④">Relying Party</a>'s policy
-requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑤">Relying Party</a> also
+   <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①②">attestation certificate</a> validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑥">Relying Party</a>'s policy
+requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑦">Relying Party</a> also
 un-registers (or marks with a trust level equivalent to "<a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation②⓪">self attestation</a>") <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑤⑨">public key credentials</a> that were registered
 after the CA compromise date using an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①③">attestation certificate</a> chaining up to the same intermediate CA. It is thus RECOMMENDED
-that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑥">Relying Parties</a> remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②③">registration</a> in order to un-register
+that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑧">Relying Parties</a> remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②③">registration</a> in order to un-register
 related <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⓪">public key credentials</a> if the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②④">registration</a> was performed after revocation of such certificates.</p>
    <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑧">authenticators</a> in <a href="#sctn-ca-compromise">§ 13.3.2 Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.6" id="sctn-credential-loss-key-mobility"><span class="secno">13.4.6. </span><span class="content">Credential Loss and Key Mobility</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credential-loss-key-mobility"></a></h4>
    <p>This specification defines no protocol for backing up <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②④">credential private keys</a>, or for sharing them between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑨">authenticators</a>.
 In general, it is expected that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②⑤">credential private key</a> never leaves the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⓪">authenticator</a> that created it. Losing an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪①">authenticator</a> therefore, in general, means losing all <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥①">credentials</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑤">bound</a> to the
-lost <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪②">authenticator</a>, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥②">credential</a> registered with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑦">Relying Party</a>. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
+lost <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪②">authenticator</a>, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥②">credential</a> registered with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑨">Relying Party</a>. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
 multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥③">credentials</a> for the same user. For example, a user might register <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-credential" id="ref-for-platform-credential②">platform credentials</a> on
 frequently used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑤">client devices</a>, and one or more <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-credential" id="ref-for-roaming-credential①">roaming credentials</a> for use as backup and with new or rarely used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑥">client
 devices</a>.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑧">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥④">credentials</a> to the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑦">user account</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑨">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD make use of the <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials②">excludeCredentials</a></code></code> and <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user⑦">user</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id⑨">id</a></code></code> options to ensure that these
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⓪">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥④">credentials</a> to the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑦">user account</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨①">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD make use of the <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials②">excludeCredentials</a></code></code> and <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user⑦">user</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id⑨">id</a></code></code> options to ensure that these
 different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑤">credentials</a> are <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑥">bound</a> to different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪③">authenticators</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.7" id="sctn-unprotected-account-detection"><span class="secno">13.4.7. </span><span class="content">Unprotected account detection</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-unprotected-account-detection"></a></h4>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
-   <p>This security consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⓪">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty①②">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑦">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
+   <p>This security consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨②">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty①②">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑦">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
 For example, if using authentication with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①⑤">server-side credentials</a> as the first authentication step.</p>
    <p>In this case the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑧">allowCredentials</a></code> argument risks leaking information
 about which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑧">user accounts</a> have WebAuthn credentials registered and which do not,
 which may be a signal of account protection strength.
 For example, say an attacker can initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑥">authentication ceremony</a> by providing only a username,
-and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨①">Relying Party</a> responds with a non-empty <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑨">allowCredentials</a></code> for some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑨">user accounts</a>,
+and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨③">Relying Party</a> responds with a non-empty <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑨">allowCredentials</a></code> for some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑨">user accounts</a>,
 and with failure or a password challenge for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④⓪">user accounts</a>.
 The attacker can then conclude that the latter <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④①">user accounts</a> likely do not require a WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①④">assertion</a> for successful authentication,
 and thus focus an attack on those likely weaker accounts.</p>
    <p>This issue is similar to the one described in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a> and <a href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak">§ 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs</a>, and can be mitigated in similar ways.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.8" id="sctn-code-injection"><span class="secno">13.4.8. </span><span class="content">Code injection attacks</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-code-injection"></a></h4>
-   <p>Any malicious code executing on an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised④">origin</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②④">scope</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨②">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑥">public key credentials</a> has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client⑧">WebAuthn Clients</a> only expose the WebAuthn API in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#secure-context" id="ref-for-secure-context①">secure contexts</a>,
-which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨③">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+   <p>Any malicious code executing on an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised④">origin</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②④">scope</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨④">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑥">public key credentials</a> has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client⑧">WebAuthn Clients</a> only expose the WebAuthn API in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#secure-context" id="ref-for-secure-context①">secure contexts</a>,
+which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑤">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <p>Code injection can happen in several ways;
 this section attempts to point out some likely scenarios and suggest suitable mitigations,
 but is not an exhaustive list.</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Malicous code could be injected by a third-party script included by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨④">Relying Party</a>,
+     <p>Malicous code could be injected by a third-party script included by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑥">Relying Party</a>,
 either intentionally or due to a security vulnerability in the third party.</p>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑤">Relying Party</a> therefore SHOULD limit the amount of third-party script included on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑤">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑤">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②③">credentials</a>.</p>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑥">Relying Party</a> SHOULD use Content Security Policy <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-csp2" title="Content Security Policy Level 2">[CSP2]</a>,
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> therefore SHOULD limit the amount of third-party script included on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑤">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑤">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②③">credentials</a>.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> SHOULD use Content Security Policy <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-csp2" title="Content Security Policy Level 2">[CSP2]</a>,
 and/or other appropriate technologies available at the time, to limit what script can run on its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑥">origins</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Malicious code could, by the credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑥">scope</a> rules, be hosted on a subdomain of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⓪">RP ID</a>.
 For example, user-submitted code hosted on <code>usercontent.example.org</code> could exercise any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②④">credentials</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑦">scoped</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤①">RP ID</a> <code>example.org</code>.
-If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> allows a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑨">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>,
+If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> allows a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑨">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>,
 malicious users could use this to launch a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑦">man-in-the-middle attack</a> to obtain valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑦">authentication assertions</a> and impersonate the victims of the attack.</p>
-     <p>Therefore, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> by default SHOULD NOT allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⓪">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>.
-If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> needs to allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①①">origin</a></code>,
-then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⓪">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT serve untrusted code on any allowed subdomain of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑦">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑧">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑦">public key credentials</a>.</p>
+     <p>Therefore, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⓪">Relying Party</a> by default SHOULD NOT allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⓪">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>.
+If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪①">Relying Party</a> needs to allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①①">origin</a></code>,
+then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪②">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT serve untrusted code on any allowed subdomain of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑦">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑧">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑦">public key credentials</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.9" id="sctn-validating-origin"><span class="secno">13.4.9. </span><span class="content">Validating the origin of a credential</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-validating-origin"></a></h4>
    <p>When <a href="#rp-op-registering-a-new-credential-step-origin">registering a credential</a> and
 when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying an assertion</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪①">Relying Party</a> MUST validate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①②">origin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①④">client data</a>.</p>
-   <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪②">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT accept unexpected values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①③">origin</a></code>,
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪③">Relying Party</a> MUST validate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①②">origin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①④">client data</a>.</p>
+   <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪④">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT accept unexpected values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①③">origin</a></code>,
 as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⑤">credentials</a>.
 Although the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑨">scope</a> of <a data-link-type="dfn">WebAuthn credentials</a> prevents their use on domains
 outside the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤②">RP ID</a> they were registered for,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪③">Relying Party</a>'s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑤">Relying Party</a>'s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection
 in case a faulty <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪④">authenticator</a> fails to enforce credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③⓪">scope</a>.
 See also <a href="#sctn-code-injection">§ 13.4.8 Code injection attacks</a> for discussion of potentially malicious subdomains.</p>
-   <p>Validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪④">Relying Party</a>.
+   <p>Validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑥">Relying Party</a>.
 For example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -8647,11 +8650,11 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.9" id="sctn-validating-origin"><spa
      <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> See <a href="#sctn-code-injection">§ 13.4.8 Code injection attacks</a> for a discussion of the risks of allowing any subdomain of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⑤">RP ID</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A web application with a companion native application might allow <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⑧">origin</a></code> to be an operating system dependent
-identifier for the native application. For example, such a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑤">Relying Party</a> might require that <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⑨">origin</a></code> exactly equals some element of the list <code>["https://example.org", "example-os:appid:204ffa1a5af110ac483f131a1bef8a841a7adb0d8d135908bbd964ed05d2653b"]</code>.</p>
+identifier for the native application. For example, such a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑦">Relying Party</a> might require that <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⑨">origin</a></code> exactly equals some element of the list <code>["https://example.org", "example-os:appid:204ffa1a5af110ac483f131a1bef8a841a7adb0d8d135908bbd964ed05d2653b"]</code>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>Similar considerations apply when validating the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①①">topOrigin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①⑤">client data</a>.
-When <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①②">topOrigin</a></code> is present, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑥">Relying Party</a> MUST validate that its value is expected.
-This validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑦">Relying Party</a>.
+When <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①②">topOrigin</a></code> is present, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> MUST validate that its value is expected.
+This validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑨">Relying Party</a>.
 For example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -8669,7 +8672,7 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="14" id="sctn-privacy-considerations"><sp
    <p>The privacy principles in <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-privacy-principles" title="FIDO Privacy Principles">[FIDO-Privacy-Principles]</a> also apply to this specification.</p>
    <p>This section is divided by audience;
 general privacy considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while privacy considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑤">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪④">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> implementers
+while privacy considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑤">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪④">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⓪">Relying Party</a> implementers
 are grouped into respective subsections.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.1" id="sctn-privacy-attacks"><span class="secno">14.1. </span><span class="content">De-anonymization Prevention Measures</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-attacks"></a></h3>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
@@ -8683,53 +8686,53 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.1" id="sctn-privacy-attacks"><span cl
      <p>These are registered by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤⓪">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> and subsequently used by the user to prove possession of the corresponding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②⑥">credential
 private key</a>. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑤">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑥">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The user’s identities specific to each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑨">Relying Party</a>, e.g., usernames and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑤">user handles</a>.</p>
-     <p>These identities are obviously used by each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⓪">Relying Party</a> to identify a user in their system. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑥">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑦">authenticator</a>.</p>
+     <p>The user’s identities specific to each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①①">Relying Party</a>, e.g., usernames and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑤">user handles</a>.</p>
+     <p>These identities are obviously used by each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①②">Relying Party</a> to identify a user in their system. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑥">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑦">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The user’s biometric characteristic(s), e.g., fingerprints or facial recognition data <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-isobiometricvocabulary" title="Information technology — Vocabulary — Biometrics">[ISOBiometricVocabulary]</a>.</p>
-     <p>This is optionally used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑧">authenticator</a> to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑥">user verification</a>. It is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①①">Relying Party</a>, but in
+     <p>This is optionally used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑧">authenticator</a> to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑥">user verification</a>. It is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①③">Relying Party</a>, but in
 the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③⓪">platform authenticators</a>, it might be visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑦">client</a> depending on the implementation.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The models of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑨">authenticators</a>, e.g., product names.</p>
-     <p>This is exposed in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤⑥">attestation statement</a> provided to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①②">Relying Party</a> during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑤">registration</a>. It is also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑧">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⓪">authenticator</a>.</p>
+     <p>This is exposed in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement⑤⑥">attestation statement</a> provided to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①④">Relying Party</a> during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑤">registration</a>. It is also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑧">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⓪">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The identities of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①①">authenticators</a>, e.g., serial numbers.</p>
-     <p>This is possibly used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑨">client</a> to enable communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①②">authenticator</a>, but is not exposed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①③">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>This is possibly used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑨">client</a> to enable communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①②">authenticator</a>, but is not exposed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑤">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①④">Relying Party</a>. The following sections describe the measures taken to
-prevent malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑤">Relying Parties</a> from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.</p>
+   <p>Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑥">Relying Party</a>. The following sections describe the measures taken to
+prevent malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑦">Relying Parties</a> from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.2" id="sctn-non-correlatable-credentials"><span class="secno">14.2. </span><span class="content">Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑧">Public Key Credentials</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-non-correlatable-credentials"></a></h3>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
    <p>Although <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑥">Credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑨">credential public keys</a> are necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤①">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to enable strong
-authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑥">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑧">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑦">Credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key④⓪">credential public keys</a> are meaningless in isolation, as they only identify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-key-pair" id="ref-for-credential-key-pair⑦">credential key pairs</a> and not users directly.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑨">public key credential</a> is strictly <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③①">scoped</a> to a specific <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑦">Relying Party</a>, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⓪">client</a> ensures that its existence is not
-revealed to other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑧">Relying Parties</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑨">Relying Party</a> thus cannot ask the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①①">client</a> to reveal a user’s other identities.</p>
+     <p>Each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑨">public key credential</a> is strictly <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③①">scoped</a> to a specific <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑨">Relying Party</a>, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⓪">client</a> ensures that its existence is not
+revealed to other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⓪">Relying Parties</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②①">Relying Party</a> thus cannot ask the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①①">client</a> to reveal a user’s other identities.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①②">client</a> also ensures that the existence of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⓪">public key credential</a> is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⓪">Relying Party</a> without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑥">user
-consent</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy">§ 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy</a> and <a href="#sctn-assertion-privacy">§ 14.5.2 Authentication Ceremony Privacy</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②①">Relying Party</a> thus cannot silently identify a user, even if the user has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦①">public key credential</a> registered and available.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①②">client</a> also ensures that the existence of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⓪">public key credential</a> is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②②">Relying Party</a> without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑥">user
+consent</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy">§ 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy</a> and <a href="#sctn-assertion-privacy">§ 14.5.2 Authentication Ceremony Privacy</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②③">Relying Party</a> thus cannot silently identify a user, even if the user has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦①">public key credential</a> registered and available.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①③">Authenticators</a> ensure that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑧">credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key④①">credential public keys</a> of different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦②">public key credentials</a> are
-not correlatable as belonging to the same user. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②②">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their
+not correlatable as belonging to the same user. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②④">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their
 systems without additional information, e.g., a willfully reused username or e-mail address.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①④">Authenticators</a> ensure that their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①④">attestation certificates</a> are not unique enough to identify a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑤">authenticator</a> or a small group of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑥">authenticators</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-attestation-privacy">§ 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy</a>. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②③">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their systems by tracking individual <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑦">authenticators</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①④">Authenticators</a> ensure that their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①④">attestation certificates</a> are not unique enough to identify a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑤">authenticator</a> or a small group of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑥">authenticators</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-attestation-privacy">§ 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy</a>. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑤">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their systems by tracking individual <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑦">authenticators</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>Additionally, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-side-discoverable-public-key-credential-source" id="ref-for-client-side-discoverable-public-key-credential-source⑧">client-side discoverable public key credential source</a> can optionally include a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑥">user
-handle</a> specified by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②④">Relying Party</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦③">credential</a> can then be used to both identify and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑥">authenticate</a> the user.
-This means that a privacy-conscious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑤">Relying Party</a> can allow creation of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④②">user account</a> without a traditional username,
-further improving non-correlatability between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑥">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+handle</a> specified by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑥">Relying Party</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦③">credential</a> can then be used to both identify and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑥">authenticate</a> the user.
+This means that a privacy-conscious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑦">Relying Party</a> can allow creation of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④②">user account</a> without a traditional username,
+further improving non-correlatability between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑧">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.3" id="sctn-biometric-privacy"><span class="secno">14.3. </span><span class="content">Authenticator-local <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition④">Biometric Recognition</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-biometric-privacy"></a></h3>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator①">Biometric authenticators</a> perform the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑤">biometric recognition</a> internally in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑧">authenticator</a> - though for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③①">platform
 authenticators</a> the biometric data might also be visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①③">client</a>, depending on the implementation. Biometric data is
-not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤②">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>; it is used only locally to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑦">user verification</a> authorizing the creation and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑥">registration</a> of, or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑦">authentication</a> using, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦④">public key credential</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑦">Relying Party</a> therefore cannot discover the
-user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑧">Relying Party</a> cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
-use for forging logins at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑨">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
-   <p>In the case where a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⓪">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑥">biometric recognition</a>, this is performed locally by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator②">biometric authenticator</a> perfoming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑧">user verification</a> and then signaling the result by setting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-uv" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-uv①⑦">UV</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤①">flag</a> in the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①⑤">assertion</a> response,
-instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③①">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤②">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>; it is used only locally to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑦">user verification</a> authorizing the creation and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑥">registration</a> of, or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑦">authentication</a> using, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦④">public key credential</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑨">Relying Party</a> therefore cannot discover the
+user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⓪">Relying Party</a> cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
+use for forging logins at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③①">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+   <p>In the case where a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③②">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑥">biometric recognition</a>, this is performed locally by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator②">biometric authenticator</a> perfoming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑧">user verification</a> and then signaling the result by setting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-uv" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-uv①⑦">UV</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤①">flag</a> in the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①⑤">assertion</a> response,
+instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③③">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-authenticator"><span class="secno">14.4. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑨">authenticators</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-authenticator"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4.1" id="sctn-attestation-privacy"><span class="secno">14.4.1. </span><span class="content">Attestation Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-attestation-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①⑤">Attestation certificates</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-key-pair" id="ref-for-attestation-key-pair⑦">attestation key pairs</a> can be used to track users
@@ -8765,72 +8768,72 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4.2" id="sctn-pii-privacy"><span clas
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-client"><span class="secno">14.5. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑥">clients</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-client"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.1" id="sctn-make-credential-privacy"><span class="secno">14.5.1. </span><span class="content">Registration Ceremony Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>In order to protect users from being identified without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑦">consent</a>, implementations of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-create-slot" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-create-slot①②">[[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)</a></code> method need to take care to not leak information that
-could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤③">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑤">credentials</a> listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③②">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials③">excludeCredentials</a></code> is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑦">bound</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③②">authenticator</a>:</p>
+could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤③">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑤">credentials</a> listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③④">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials③">excludeCredentials</a></code> is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑦">bound</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③②">authenticator</a>:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>No <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③③">authenticators</a> are present.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>At least one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③④">authenticator</a> is present, and at least one present <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑤">authenticator</a> is excluded.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③③">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing for
+   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑤">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing for
 which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑥">credentials</a> are available. For example, one such information leak is if the client returns a
-failure response as soon as an excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑥">authenticator</a> becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑦">authenticator</a> is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③②">platform authenticator</a> - the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③④">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①④">ceremony</a> was canceled before the
+failure response as soon as an excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑥">authenticator</a> becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑦">authenticator</a> is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③②">platform authenticator</a> - the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑥">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①④">ceremony</a> was canceled before the
 timeout and before the user could feasibly have canceled it manually, and thus conclude that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑦">credentials</a> listed in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials④">excludeCredentials</a></code> parameter is available to the user.</p>
    <p>The above is not a concern, however, if the user has <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑧">consented</a> to create a new credential before a
 distinguishable error is returned, because in this case the user has confirmed intent to share the information that would be
 leaked.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.2" id="sctn-assertion-privacy"><span class="secno">14.5.2. </span><span class="content">Authentication Ceremony Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-assertion-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>In order to protect users from being identified without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑨">consent</a>, implementations of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-discoverfromexternalsource-slot" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-discoverfromexternalsource-slot①④">[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)</a></code> method need to take care to not
-leak information that could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑧">credential</a> is listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑤">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⓪">allowCredentials</a></code>:</p>
+leak information that could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑧">credential</a> is listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑦">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⓪">allowCredentials</a></code>:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A named <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑨">credential</a> is not available.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A named <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧⓪">credential</a> is available, but the user does not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent③⓪">consent</a> to use it.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑥">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing
+   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑧">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing
 for which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧①">credentials</a> are available. For example, one such information leak is if the client returns a
 failure response as soon as the user denies <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent③①">consent</a> to proceed with an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑧">authentication ceremony</a>. In this
-case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑦">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑤">ceremony</a> was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
+case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑨">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑤">ceremony</a> was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
 one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧②">credentials</a> listed in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③①">allowCredentials</a></code> parameter is
 available to the user.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.3" id="sctn-os-account-privacy"><span class="secno">14.5.3. </span><span class="content">Privacy Between Operating System Accounts</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-os-account-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>If a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③③">platform authenticator</a> is included in a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑦">client device</a> with a multi-user operating system, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③④">platform
 authenticator</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑧">client device</a> SHOULD work together to ensure that the existence of any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-credential" id="ref-for-platform-credential③">platform credential</a> is revealed
 only to the operating system user that created that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-credential" id="ref-for-platform-credential④">platform credential</a>.</p>
-   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">14.6. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑧">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
+   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">14.6. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⓪">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.1" id="sctn-user-handle-privacy"><span class="secno">14.6.1. </span><span class="content">User Handle Contents</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-user-handle-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>Since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑧">user handle</a> is not considered personally identifying information in <a href="#sctn-pii-privacy">§ 14.4.2 Privacy of personally identifying information Stored in Authenticators</a>,
 and since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑧">authenticators</a> MAY reveal <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑨">user handles</a> without first performing <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥②">user verification</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑨">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④①">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
 addresses or usernames, in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle③⓪">user handle</a>. This includes hash values of personally identifying information, unless the hash
-function is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258">salted</a> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258①">salt</a> values private to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⓪">Relying Party</a>, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
+function is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258">salted</a> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258①">salt</a> values private to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④②">Relying Party</a>, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
 values. It is RECOMMENDED to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle③①">user handle</a> be 64 random bytes, and store this value in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④③">user account</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><span class="secno">14.6.2. </span><span class="content">Username Enumeration</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-username-enumeration"></a></h4>
    <p>While initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑨">registration</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑨">authentication ceremony</a>, there is a risk that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤⑤">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> might leak sensitive
-information about its registered users. For example, if a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④①">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
-initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑧">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑥">ceremony</a> for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④②">Relying Party</a> responds with a failure, but then
+information about its registered users. For example, if a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④③">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
+initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑧">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑥">ceremony</a> for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④④">Relying Party</a> responds with a failure, but then
 successfully initiates an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⓪">authentication ceremony</a> for "j.doe@example.com", then the attacker can conclude that "j.doe@example.com"
-is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④③">Relying Party</a> has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
-"j.doe@example.com" has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④④">user account</a> at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④④">Relying Party</a>.</p>
-   <p>The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑤">Relying Party</a> may implement to mitigate or prevent information
+is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑤">Relying Party</a> has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
+"j.doe@example.com" has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④④">user account</a> at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑥">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+   <p>The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑦">Relying Party</a> may implement to mitigate or prevent information
 leakage due to such an attack:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>For <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⓪">registration ceremonies</a>:</p>
      <ul>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑥">Relying Party</a> uses <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑦">Relying Party</a>-specific usernames to identify users:</p>
+       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑧">Relying Party</a> uses <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑨">Relying Party</a>-specific usernames to identify users:</p>
        <ul>
         <li data-md>
          <p>When initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②①">registration ceremony</a>, disallow registration of usernames that are syntactically valid e-mail
 addresses.</p>
-         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The motivation for this suggestion is that in this case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑧">Relying Party</a> probably has no choice but to fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②②">registration ceremony</a> if the user attempts to register a username that is already registered, and an information
+         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The motivation for this suggestion is that in this case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⓪">Relying Party</a> probably has no choice but to fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②②">registration ceremony</a> if the user attempts to register a username that is already registered, and an information
 leak might therefore be unavoidable. By disallowing e-mail addresses as usernames, the impact of the leakage can be
-mitigated since it will be less likely that a user has the same username at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④④⑨">Relying Party</a> as at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⓪">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+mitigated since it will be less likely that a user has the same username at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤①">Relying Party</a> as at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤②">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
        </ul>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤①">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses to identify users:</p>
+       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤③">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses to identify users:</p>
        <ul>
         <li data-md>
          <p>When initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②③">registration ceremony</a>, interrupt the user interaction after the e-mail address is supplied and
@@ -8850,7 +8853,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><
 ceremony by invoking <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④⑤">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> using a syntactically valid <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions①⑤">PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions</a></code> object that is populated with plausible imaginary values.</p>
        <p>This approach could also be used to mitigate information leakage via <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③②">allowCredentials</a></code>;
 see <a href="#sctn-unprotected-account-detection">§ 13.4.7 Unprotected account detection</a> and <a href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak">§ 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs</a>.</p>
-       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The username may be "provided" in various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤②">Relying Party</a>-specific fashions: login form, session cookie, etc.</p>
+       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The username may be "provided" in various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤④">Relying Party</a>-specific fashions: login form, session cookie, etc.</p>
        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> If returned imaginary values noticeably differ from actual ones, clever attackers may be able to discern them and
     thus be able to test for existence of actual accounts. Examples of noticeably different values include if the values
     are always the same for all username inputs, or are different in repeated attempts with the same username input. The <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③③">allowCredentials</a></code> member could therefore be populated with pseudo-random values
@@ -8867,17 +8870,17 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><
    </ul>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.3" id="sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak"><span class="secno">14.6.3. </span><span class="content">Privacy leak via credential IDs</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak"></a></h4>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
-   <p>This privacy consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤③">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④④">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty①③">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③④">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
+   <p>This privacy consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑤">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④④">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty①③">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③④">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
 For example, if using authentication with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①⑥">server-side credentials</a> as the first authentication step.</p>
    <p>In this case the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑤">allowCredentials</a></code> argument risks leaking personally identifying information,
-since it exposes the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑨">credential IDs</a> to an unauthenticated caller. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⓪">Credential IDs</a> are designed to not be correlatable between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤④">Relying Parties</a>,
+since it exposes the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑨">credential IDs</a> to an unauthenticated caller. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⓪">Credential IDs</a> are designed to not be correlatable between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑥">Relying Parties</a>,
 but the length of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤①">credential ID</a> might be a hint as to what type of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④⓪">authenticator</a> created it.
-It is likely that a user will use the same username and set of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④①">authenticators</a> for several <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑤">Relying Parties</a>,
+It is likely that a user will use the same username and set of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④①">authenticators</a> for several <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑦">Relying Parties</a>,
 so the number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤②">credential IDs</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑥">allowCredentials</a></code> and their lengths
 might serve as a global correlation handle to de-anonymize the user.
 Knowing a user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤③">credential IDs</a> also makes it possible to confirm guesses about the user’s identity
 given only momentary physical access to one of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④②">authenticators</a>.</p>
-   <p>In order to prevent such information leakage, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> could for example:</p>
+   <p>In order to prevent such information leakage, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑧">Relying Party</a> could for example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Perform a separate authentication step,
@@ -8889,12 +8892,12 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.3" id="sctn-credential-id-privacy-l
    </ul>
    <p>If the above prevention measures are not available,
 i.e., if <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑧">allowCredentials</a></code> needs to be exposed given only a username,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑦">Relying Party</a> could mitigate the privacy leak using the same approach of returning imaginary <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑤">credential IDs</a> as discussed in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a>.</p>
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑨">Relying Party</a> could mitigate the privacy leak using the same approach of returning imaginary <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑤">credential IDs</a> as discussed in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a>.</p>
    <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="15" id="sctn-accessiblility-considerations"><span class="secno">15. </span><span class="content">Accessibility Considerations</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-accessiblility-considerations"></a></h2>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥③">User verification</a>-capable <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④③">authenticators</a>, whether <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②⑥">roaming</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③⑤">platform</a>, should offer users more than one user verification method.  For example, both fingerprint sensing and PIN entry. This allows for fallback to other user verification means if the selected one is not working for some reason. Note that in the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②⑦">roaming authenticators</a>, the authenticator and platform might work together to provide a user verification method such as PIN entry <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a>.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑧">Relying Parties</a>, at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑦">registration</a> time, SHOULD provide affordances for users to complete future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authorization-gesture" id="ref-for-authorization-gesture③⓪">authorization gestures</a> correctly. This could involve naming the authenticator, choosing a picture to associate with the device, or entering freeform text instructions (e.g., as a reminder-to-self).</p>
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑥⓪">Relying Parties</a>, at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑦">registration</a> time, SHOULD provide affordances for users to complete future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authorization-gesture" id="ref-for-authorization-gesture③⓪">authorization gestures</a> correctly. This could involve naming the authenticator, choosing a picture to associate with the device, or entering freeform text instructions (e.g., as a reminder-to-self).</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="15.1" id="sctn-timeout-recommended-range"><span class="secno">15.1. </span><span class="content">Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-timeout-recommended-range"></a></h3>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑧">Ceremonies</a> relying on timing, e.g., a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②④">registration ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>) or an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑥">authentication ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>), ought to follow <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a>'s <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/#enough-time">Guideline 2.2 Enough Time</a>. If a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑦">client platform</a> determines that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑤⑨">Relying Party</a>-supplied timeout does not appropriately adhere to the latter <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a> guidelines, then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑧">client platform</a> MAY adjust the timeout accordingly.</p>
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑧">Ceremonies</a> relying on timing, e.g., a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②④">registration ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>) or an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑥">authentication ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>), ought to follow <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a>'s <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/#enough-time">Guideline 2.2 Enough Time</a>. If a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑦">client platform</a> determines that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⑥①">Relying Party</a>-supplied timeout does not appropriately adhere to the latter <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a> guidelines, then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑧">client platform</a> MAY adjust the timeout accordingly.</p>
    <p>The <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="recommended-range-and-default-for-a-webauthn-ceremony-timeout">recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout</dfn> is as follows:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -11314,7 +11317,7 @@ <h2 class="no-num no-ref heading settled" id="issues-index"><span class="content
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New Device Registration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "1.2.4. Other Use Cases and Configurations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460"}], "title": "1.3.1. Registration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463"}], "title": "1.3.2. Registration Specifically with User-Verifying Platform Authenticator"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468"}], "title": "1.3.3. Authentication"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460"}], "title": "1.3.5. Decommissioning"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461"}], "title": "2.1.1. Enumerations as DOMString types"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2462"}], "title": "4. Terminology"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u24ea"}], "title": "5. Web Authentication API"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2464"}], "title": "5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2468"}], "title": "5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2462"}], "title": "5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Get]](options) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2464"}], "title": "5.1.4.2. Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2465"}], "title": "5.1.7. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2466"}], "title": "5.1.8. Availability of a passkey platform authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2467"}], "title": "5.2. Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u24ea"}], "title": "5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "5.2.1.1. Easily accessing credential data"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2467"}], "title": "5.4. Options for Credential Creation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2463"}], "title": "5.4.1. Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2465"}], "title": "5.4.2. Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2460"}], "title": "5.4.3. User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2463"}], "title": "5.4.4. Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2466"}], "title": "5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2462"}], "title": "5.4.6. Resident Key Requirement Enumeration (enum ResidentKeyRequirement)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2460"}], "title": "5.4.7. Attestation Conveyance Preference Enumeration (enum AttestationConveyancePreference)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2461"}], "title": "5.5. Options for Assertion Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2462"}], "title": "5.7.3. Authentication Extensions Authenticator Inputs (CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorInputs)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2467"}], "title": "5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u24ea"}], "title": "5.8.3. Credential Descriptor (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2460"}], "title": "5.8.4. Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2463"}], "title": "5.8.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2460"}], "title": "5.8.7. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHints)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2461"}], "title": "5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2466"}], "title": "6. WebAuthn Authenticator Model"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2467"}], "title": "6.1. Authenticator Data"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2462"}], "title": "6.1.1. Signature Counter Considerations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2467"}], "title": "6.1.3. Credential Backup State"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2468"}], "title": "6.2. Authenticator Taxonomy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2461"}], "title": "6.2.2. Credential Storage Modality"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2464"}], "title": "6.2.3. Authentication Factor Capability"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2461"}], "title": "6.3.2. The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2465"}], "title": "6.3.3. The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2466"}], "title": "6.4. String Handling"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2468"}], "title": "6.4.1. String Truncation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2466"}], "title": "6.5. Attestation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2468"}], "title": "6.5.1. Attestation in assertions"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2463"}], "title": "6.5.4. Attestation Types"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2467"}], "title": "7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2463"}], "title": "7.1. Registering a New Credential"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2462"}], "title": "7.2. 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Security considerations for Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2468"}], "title": "13.4.1. Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2462"}], "title": "13.4.2. Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2464"}], "title": "13.4.3. Cryptographic Challenges"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2462"}], "title": "13.4.4. Attestation Limitations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2465"}], "title": "13.4.5. Revoked Attestation Certificates"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2468"}], "title": "13.4.6. Credential Loss and Key Mobility"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2460"}], "title": "13.4.7. Unprotected account detection"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u24ea"}], "title": "13.4.8. 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Authenticator-local Biometric Recognition"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2463"}], "title": "14.5.1. Registration Ceremony Privacy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2466"}], "title": "14.5.2. Authentication Ceremony Privacy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2467"}], "title": "14.6. Privacy considerations for Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u24ea"}], "title": "14.6.1. User Handle Contents"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2461"}], "title": "14.6.2. Username Enumeration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2466"}], "title": "14.6.3. 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New Device Registration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "1.2.4. Other Use Cases and Configurations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460"}], "title": "1.3.1. Registration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463"}], "title": "1.3.2. Registration Specifically with User-Verifying Platform Authenticator"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468"}], "title": "1.3.3. Authentication"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460"}], "title": "1.3.5. Decommissioning"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461"}], "title": "2.1.1. Enumerations as DOMString types"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2462"}], "title": "4. Terminology"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u24ea"}], "title": "5. Web Authentication API"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2464"}], "title": "5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2468"}], "title": "5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2462"}], "title": "5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Get]](options) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2464"}], "title": "5.1.4.2. Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2465"}], "title": "5.1.7. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2466"}], "title": "5.1.8. Availability of a passkey platform authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2467"}], "title": "5.2. Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u24ea"}], "title": "5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "5.2.1.1. Easily accessing credential data"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2467"}], "title": "5.4. Options for Credential Creation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2463"}], "title": "5.4.1. Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2465"}], "title": "5.4.2. Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2460"}], "title": "5.4.3. User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2463"}], "title": "5.4.4. Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2466"}], "title": "5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2462"}], "title": "5.4.6. Resident Key Requirement Enumeration (enum ResidentKeyRequirement)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2460"}], "title": "5.4.7. Attestation Conveyance Preference Enumeration (enum AttestationConveyancePreference)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2461"}], "title": "5.5. Options for Assertion Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2462"}], "title": "5.7.3. Authentication Extensions Authenticator Inputs (CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorInputs)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2467"}], "title": "5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u24ea"}], "title": "5.8.3. Credential Descriptor (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2460"}], "title": "5.8.4. Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2463"}], "title": "5.8.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2460"}], "title": "5.8.7. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHints)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2461"}], "title": "5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2466"}], "title": "6. WebAuthn Authenticator Model"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2467"}], "title": "6.1. Authenticator Data"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2462"}], "title": "6.1.1. Signature Counter Considerations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2467"}], "title": "6.1.3. Credential Backup State"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2468"}], "title": "6.2. Authenticator Taxonomy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2461"}], "title": "6.2.2. Credential Storage Modality"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2464"}], "title": "6.2.3. Authentication Factor Capability"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2461"}], "title": "6.3.2. The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2465"}], "title": "6.3.3. The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2466"}], "title": "6.4. String Handling"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2468"}], "title": "6.4.1. String Truncation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2466"}], "title": "6.5. Attestation"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2468"}], "title": "6.5.1. Attestation in assertions"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2463"}], "title": "6.5.4. Attestation Types"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2467"}], "title": "7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2463"}], "title": "7.1. Registering a New Credential"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2462"}], "title": "7.2. Verifying an Authentication Assertion"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2464"}], "title": "8.2.1. Packed Attestation Statement Certificate Requirements"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2466"}], "title": "8.9. Compound Attestation Statement Format"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u24ea"}], "title": "9. WebAuthn Extensions"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2460"}], "title": "9.2. Defining Extensions"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2463"}], "title": "9.3. Extending Request Parameters"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2468"}], "title": "10.1.1. FIDO AppID Extension (appid)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2460"}], "title": "10.1.2. FIDO AppID Exclusion Extension (appidExclude)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2465"}], "title": "10.1.3. Credential Properties Extension (credProps)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2468"}], "title": "10.1.4. Pseudo-random function extension (prf)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2466"}], "title": "10.1.5. Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2467"}], "title": "10.2.1. User Verification Method Extension (uvm)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u24ea"}], "title": "10.2.2. Supplemental public keys extension (supplementalPubKeys)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2463"}], "title": "10.2.2.1. Relying Party Usage"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2460"}], "title": "10.2.2.2. Extension Definition"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2461"}], "title": "10.2.2.2.1. AAGUIDs"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2462"}], "title": "10.2.2.2.2. Attestation calculations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2463"}], "title": "10.2.2.3. supplementalPubKeys Extension Output Verification Procedures"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2467"}], "title": "10.2.2.3.1. Registration (create())"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2464"}], "title": "10.2.2.3.2. Authentication (get())"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2465"}], "title": "12.4. WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u24ea"}], "title": "13. Security Considerations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2461"}], "title": "13.2. Physical Proximity between Client and Authenticator"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2463"}], "title": "13.3.2. Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2464"}], "title": "13.4. Security considerations for Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2460"}], "title": "13.4.1. Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2464"}], "title": "13.4.2. Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2466"}], "title": "13.4.3. Cryptographic Challenges"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2464"}], "title": "13.4.4. Attestation Limitations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2467"}], "title": "13.4.5. Revoked Attestation Certificates"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2460"}], "title": "13.4.6. Credential Loss and Key Mobility"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2462"}], "title": "13.4.7. Unprotected account detection"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2461"}], "title": "13.4.8. Code injection attacks"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2468"}], "title": "13.4.9. Validating the origin of a credential"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u24ea"}], "title": "14. Privacy Considerations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "14.1. De-anonymization Prevention Measures"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2467"}], "title": "14.2. Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable Public Key Credentials"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2462"}], "title": "14.3. Authenticator-local Biometric Recognition"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2465"}], "title": "14.5.1. Registration Ceremony Privacy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2468"}], "title": "14.5.2. Authentication Ceremony Privacy"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u24ea"}], "title": "14.6. Privacy considerations for Relying Parties"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2461"}], "title": "14.6.1. User Handle Contents"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2463"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463\u2468"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u24ea"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2460"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2461"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2462"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2463"}], "title": "14.6.2. Username Enumeration"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2464"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2465"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2466"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2467"}, {"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464\u2468"}], "title": "14.6.3. Privacy leak via credential IDs"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465\u24ea"}], "title": "15. Accessibility Considerations"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465\u2460"}], "title": "15.1. Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts"}], "external": false};
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Web Authentication API"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u24ea"}], "title": "5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2460"}], "title": "5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2461"}], "title": "5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Get]](options) Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2462"}], "title": "5.1.7. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2463"}], "title": "5.1.8. Availability of a passkey platform authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2464"}], "title": "5.1.9. Deserialize Registration ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s parseCreationOptionsFromJSON() Method"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2465"}], "title": "5.1.10. Deserialize Authentication ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s parseRequestOptionsFromJSON() Methods"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2466"}], "title": "5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2467"}], "title": "5.2.2. Web Authentication Assertion (interface AuthenticatorAssertionResponse)"}, {"refs": [{"id": "ref-for-webauthn-relying-party\u2460\u2468"}], "title": "5.4.1. 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@@ -11543,7 +11546,7 @@ <h2 class="no-num no-ref heading settled" id="issues-index"><span class="content
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