

Monetary Policy, Financial Crises, and the Limits to Arbitrage*

Walker Ray
UC Berkeley

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Preliminary

Abstract

With conventional monetary policy unable to stabilize the economy in the wake of the global financial crisis, central banks turned to unconventional tools. This paper embeds a model of the term structure of interest rates featuring market segmentation and limits to arbitrage within a New Keynesian model to study these policies. Because the transmission of monetary policy depends on private agents with limited risk-bearing capacity, financial market disruptions reduce the efficacy of both conventional policy as well as forward guidance. Conversely, financial crises are exactly the time when large scale asset purchases are most effective. Policymakers can take advantage of the inability of financial markets to fully absorb these purchases, which can push down long-term interest rates and help stabilize output and inflation.

Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, large scale asset purchases, forward guidance, market segmentation

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*working title...

1 Introduction

Central banks responded aggressively to worsening financial conditions and growing recessionary pressure during the global financial crisis of 2007-8. Despite steep cuts in policy rates (the Federal Reserve cumulatively cut rates by nearly 500 basis points in 2008), central banks found themselves constrained by the zero lower bound and the crisis was followed by a deep recession. Not content to sit on their hands, policymakers were forced to undertake various unconventional policy actions such as forward guidance and large scale asset purchases, the most salient of which was the quantitative easing programs carried out by the Federal Reserve.

What was the purpose of these unconventional policies? With policy rates constrained, the immediate goal was to push down long-term interest rates. But more fundamentally, policymakers believed these actions would stimulate the economy by boosting output and stabilizing inflation. As economic conditions have returned to normal, pivotal questions for macroeconomics remain. The emerging view (though not quite a consensus) in the empirical literature surrounding unconventional monetary policies is that large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) were effective at reducing long-term rates. On the other hand, interest rates were not as sensitive to forward guidance as implied by some workhorse models. Why was this? And what were the feedback mechanisms of unconventional policy actions to the broader economy?

The purpose of this paper is to study these monetary tools within a tractable, unified framework. Crucially, the analysis should encompass policy both in normal times as well as increasing degrees of financial crisis. To this end, this paper embeds a model of the term structure featuring market segmentation and limits to arbitrage within a New Keynesian framework. There are two key departures from a benchmark model. First, household borrowing depends not only on the policy rate but also on the entire term structure of interest rates. Second, the term structure is determined in financial markets whose participants face limited risk-bearing capacity and are susceptible to demand shocks, as in [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#). I use this model as a laboratory to study conventional and unconventional monetary policy, and how these actions interact with disruptions in financial markets.

The empirical literature has highlighted the centrality of financial frictions, and in particular market segmentation (e.g. [D’Amico and King \(2013\)](#), [Hamilton and Wu \(2012\)](#), [Gorodnichenko and Ray \(2017\)](#)), for understanding unconventional policy. Assuming that all household borrowing takes place frictionlessly at the short (policy) rate is a useful sim-

plification in textbook models, but is too strong an assumption for the purposes of this paper. Adding segmented bond markets to a macroeconomic model allows for rich and complicated dynamics in the determination of the term structure of interest rates. This enables the model to accomplish two goals: first, to match the relevant empirical findings regarding the term structure’s response to demand shifts; and second, to study how these term structure changes interact with aggregate outcomes in general equilibrium.

The implications of the model are important for understanding monetary policy. When financial markets are healthy, both conventional monetary policy and forward guidance are highly effective at stabilizing the economy. This is because the link between short-term and long-term rates is tight when the marginal investors in financial markets have high risk-bearing capacity: the “expectation hypothesis” holds, and long-term rates are (roughly) the average of expected short rates. Household borrowing therefore responds strongly to shifts in the path of the policy rate, leading to shifts in output and inflation. However, when financial distress is high, the link between expected short rates and the term structure is weakened. This implies that there is an under-reaction of longer-term rates in response to changes in the policy rate. Therefore, during a financial crisis, the model predicts that output and inflation are less responsive to monetary shocks than usual.

Similar logic applies to LSAPs, but the implications are exactly the opposite. Purchases of long-term bonds, as in the various rounds of quantitative easing (QE), will have little to no effect on long-term rates when financial markets are healthy. When the central bank purchases a large amount of debt securities on the secondary market, they change the portfolio allocation of the marginal investors in the debt market. Effectively, QE purchases allow financial investors to offload a big source of risk from their portfolios. If financial markets are healthy, these investors are not that concerned with this source of risk to begin with, hence do not require much excess returns to hold these securities. In this case, policies like QE will have little effect. But as financial markets become unable to bear risk, these purchases may matter a great deal. The ensuing shifts in the bond holdings alter the overall riskiness of these portfolios. By changing the riskiness of marginal investors’ portfolio allocations, QE leads to changes in equilibrium prices of bonds, which in turn feeds back into the household borrowing decision. This general equilibrium channel is akin to the familiar household Euler equation; under the right conditions, QE can boost output and stabilize the economy.

Benchmark models are not amenable to studying unconventional policies. Because of the extreme forward-looking behavior of agents and the lack of any financial frictions, forward

guidance policies are highly effective to the point of stretching credibility. Conversely, LSAP policies are completely ineffective. The limited arbitrage setup in my framework breaks this link. But it will still be the case that the term structure is rendered arbitrage-free, so that there are no riskless trades left on the table. Any deviations from the expectations hypothesis are due to the risky portfolio allocations chosen by financial market arbitrageurs (the marginal investors in the model). Hence, the channel through which unconventional policies like QE can have aggregate effects is by changing the various market prices of risk.

Of course, one fundamental source of risk is the movement in the short (policy) rate that is set by the central bank. All bonds are exposed to this risk, so as long as arbitrageurs are not perfectly risk-neutral there will be deviations from the expectations hypothesis. All else equal, arbitrageurs will require excess expected returns in order to hold positive amounts of longer term debt. This effect weakens the strength of forward guidance, but opens the door for LSAPs. The central bank is able to change the portfolio allocations of arbitrageurs, which through changes in the price of risk lead to changes in interest rates.

The exact impact of LSAP programs depends on how the purchases are structured, as this affects the interaction with the sources of risk in the model and the broader feedback mechanisms in the macroeconomy. The model delivers interesting and relevant interactions in general equilibrium. Because the policy rate responds to shifts in output and inflation, the expected path of short rates is a function of future expected output and inflation. When financial markets exhibit imperfect risk-bearing capacity, there is a disconnect between longer-term rates and the expected path of short rates. But it is exactly these longer-term rates which affect household borrowing and hence determine output and inflation. Thus, the model exhibits rich feedback mechanisms; moreover, the dynamics of the model depend crucially on the health of financial markets. On the other hand, conditional on the term structure dynamics, the aggregate dynamics of the model stay close to benchmark models. The model adds only a handful of additional endogenous parameters which differentiate it from more familiar “three-equation” New Keynesian models. Therefore, the model is amenable to closed-form analysis.

I lay out the main building blocks of the “New Keynesian Preferred Habitat” framework in Section 2. Section 3 then considers models where prices are fully rigid. This is of course extreme and rules out important and interesting aggregate dynamics. However, many of the results can still be obtained and this simplifying assumption also allows for a clearer focus on the intuition for the results. The main benefit is that this rules out interesting but tricky determinacy issues (to which I return to later). In the most basic setup, the

central bank sets the policy rate according to a Taylor-type rule subject to shocks. This is the only source of uncertainty. I then consider two extensions. First, I study forward guidance by assuming the central bank announces a path of policy rates. Second, I study QE by allowing the central bank to directly purchase long-term bonds in the secondary market. The analysis confirms the intuition described above: conventional monetary policy and forward guidance become less effective as financial markets become disrupted (in the sense of both moving long-term rates and of impacting output); while at the same time, LSAP policies become more effective.

Next, Section 4 allows for prices to be sticky but not fully fixed. The main results go through here, but only if a determinacy condition is met. Moreover, this determinacy condition depends on the health of financial markets. A novel implication is that as financial markets become more imperfect, the model moves toward the region of indeterminacy. To the extent that model indeterminacy is either a proxy or a cause of excess volatility, this result shows how a purely financial crisis can lead to macroeconomy instability. I also show how determinacy can be restored if the central bank follows an endogenous rule for QE purchases. The main result is that, as financial frictions increase, the standard Taylor rule eventually becomes unable to guarantee determinacy (for any parameterization). But the same forces that make standard policy ineffective also make QE more effective, hence this carries some of the weight of the determinacy issues and restores stability.

Finally, in order to derive analytical results, the models above all considered no sources of shocks besides monetary shocks. Section 5 extends the model to allow for many sources of shocks, developing the tools to solve the model numerically. These exercises confirm the results found in the more parsimonious models and also allows for exploration of new experiments. In particular, I study more complicated LSAP programs like Operation Twist (where the Federal Reserve bought long-term debt and sold short-term debt). I find these policies may be effective, depending on which maturities are targeted for purchase and the overall structure of risk in the financial markets. However, in certain cases Operation Twist-style policies can have the net effect of raising effective borrowing rates of households, resulting in contractionary policy. Section 6 discusses additional extensions of the model concludes.

This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. The main theoretical contribution is to extend the logic of [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#) to a general equilibrium macroeconomic setting. This setup is amenable to analyzing state-dependent responses to policy changes while maintaining a relatively tractable framework. The model can also be

viewed as a microfoundation for an affine term structure in macroeconomic factors. This contribution adds to the large literature exploring the importance of macroeconomic factors in explaining the term structure, such as [Ang and Piazzesi \(2003\)](#). Other papers that tie term structure modeling to New Keynesian macroeconomic dynamics include [Hördahl et al. \(2006\)](#), [Rudebusch and Wu \(2008\)](#), and [Bekaert et al. \(2010\)](#).

Theoretically, this paper also introduces a relatively tractable model in which aggregate demand explicitly depends on long-term rates, and how to solve the model with or without the expectations hypothesis. The model is also one in which aggregate dynamics are approximated linearly, while still demonstrating sensitivity to risk.

I focus on market segmentation and limits to arbitrage as important mechanisms for understanding the term structure and QE-type policies, based on empirical work (e.g. [D’Amico and King \(2013\)](#), [Hamilton and Wu \(2012\)](#), [Gorodnichenko and Ray \(2017\)](#), [Greenwood and Vayanos \(2014\)](#), [Beraja et al. \(2015\)](#)) and theoretical work (e.g. [Alvarez et al. \(2002\)](#), [Gertler and Karadi \(2013\)](#)). This overcomes the irrelevance results derived in [Wallace \(1981\)](#) and contrasts with an alternative view that treats QE as an expansion of the money supply.

More generally the paper falls into a broad class of macroeconomic models focusing on financial frictions (e.g. [Adrian and Duarte \(2018\)](#); see [Brunnermeier et al. \(2012\)](#) for a survey). The model also has a similar flavor as recent work which focuses on breaking the tight link between the path of future expected policy and current economic responses (e.g. [McKay et al. \(2016\)](#), [Farhi and Werning \(2017\)](#), [Gabaix \(2016\)](#)). These papers make agents less responsive to expected future shocks. My approach is similar, but the degree of under-reaction is governed by the risk-bearing capacity of financial markets.

2 A New Keynesian Preferred Habitat Framework

I work with continuous time New Keynesian models that are largely characterized by a Phillips curve (relating current inflation π_t to current and future output gaps x_t), an Euler equation (relating consumption growth to the real borrowing rate that households face), and a monetary policy rule that governs how the nominal policy rate r_t reacts to macroeconomic variables. The setup is similar to [Werning \(2011\)](#).

The key difference between my model and a textbook New Keynesian model is that households face some “effective” nominal borrowing rate that depends not only on short rates, but also on longer rates. Assume that there is a continuum of zero-coupon nominal

bonds with maturities $\tau \in (0, T]$, with time t price $P_{t,\tau}$ and yield given by

$$R_{t,\tau} = -\frac{\log P_{t,\tau}}{\tau}$$

I assume that the effective nominal rate faced by households is given by

$$\tilde{r}_t \equiv \int_0^T \eta(\tau) R_{t,\tau} d\tau \quad (1)$$

where $\eta(\tau)$ is a positive but otherwise arbitrary weighting function. This is a flexible way to allow for household borrowing to depend explicitly on long-term interest rates. Assuming that all household borrowing takes place at the short rate is a useful simplification but is too strong an assumption for the purposes of studying unconventional policies like forward guidance and QE. My specification aims to capture aspects of household borrowing that are typically abstracted away in simple models. Although I do not explicitly model durable consumption or housing, in reality these are drivers of household borrowing that depend a great deal on long-term interest rates. Capital investment is also outside the model, but firm investment is similarly sensitive to long-term interest rates.¹

Formally, these household borrowing weights may arise for lifecycle borrowing reasons, or due to household's limited access to debt markets. Appendix C presents microfoundations based on the latter setup. I relegate the derivations to the appendix due to the similarity with the derivation of a baseline New Keynesian model and start the exposition with the familiar linearized aggregate equations governing the dynamics of the macroeconomy. The so-called “IS” curve is modified such that the output gap evolves according to

$$dx_t = \varsigma^{-1} (\tilde{r}_t - \pi_t - \bar{r}) dt \quad (2)$$

where ς^{-1} is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and \bar{r} is the “natural” real borrowing rate. As in a benchmark model, changes in the output gap are increasing in the nominal borrowing rate and decreasing in inflation. The only difference is that now the rate at which households borrow depends on the entire term structure of interest rates.

The Phillips curve, relating current inflation to current and future output, is unchanged

¹See [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) for a discussion of household portfolio allocations across short- and long-term assets in the United States. Note that I focus purely on maturity, rather than differences between liquid and illiquid savings vehicles.

relative to a standard New Keynesian model:

$$d\pi_t = (\rho\pi_t - \delta x_t) dt \tag{3}$$

ρ is the discount rate and δ governs the degree of price stickiness. $\delta \rightarrow \infty$ implies fully flexible prices, while $\delta \rightarrow 0$ implies fully rigid prices.

Finally, the central bank controls the instantaneous short rate r_t (the policy rate). At first, I will assume that this takes the form of a Taylor-type rule where the policy rate reacts to current levels of output and inflation subject to shocks. When studying forward guidance, I will also consider models in which the central bank announces a path of the policy rate.

For modeling the macroeconomic data generating process, I attempt to stay as close as possible to a benchmark “three equation” New Keynesian model for two reasons. First, even in partial equilibrium solving the term structure model becomes quite complicated. Embedding this setup in a dynamic general equilibrium model adds to the complexity. Keeping the model tractable and deriving analytical results is only possible if the underlying dynamics of the macroeconomy are kept simple. Second, because the mechanisms of simple New Keynesian models are still present in more sophisticated models, it’s reasonable to expect that the findings of my model will hold in more detailed extensions.

Before diving into the details, some intuitive results are immediate. The central bank sets only the short rate, while the rest of the term structure of interest rates is an equilibrium object. Moreover, the household effective borrowing rate depends on these rates, so specifying only a rule for the policy rate does not close the model. However, if the expectations hypothesis holds, then long-term yields are fully determined by the expected path of short rates. In this case, without fully solving the model it’s possible to see how unconventional policies will work. Forward guidance is powerful: by announcing a path of short rates, long-term rates will react immediately, and therefore the household effective borrowing rate will also move sharply. This implies that consumption (and output) will also respond sharply. On the other hand, QE is ineffective: purchases of long-term bonds have no effect on the path of short rates, and hence do not change long-term yields.

But if the expectations hypothesis does not hold, a monetary policy rule no longer closes the model and it becomes necessary to specify how the entire term structure of interest rates are determined. For this purpose, I embed a “preferred habitat” model of the term structure, as in [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#). Interest rates are determined by the interaction of two types of investors: clientele investors who have idiosyncratic demand for bonds of specific

maturities, and arbitrageurs with limited risk-bearing capacity who integrate bond markets. The preferred habitat view of the term structure has long been of relevance to practitioners, but less so in academic models. Partly this is due to the fact that naïve forms of preferred habitat models conflict with no-arbitrage conditions: if the term structure was determined only by clientele investors with extreme preferences across maturity space, bonds that are close to one another in maturity space could have large price differences. The [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#) framework avoids the unrealistic outcome of extreme segmentation by allowing for arbitrageurs, the marginal investors in bond markets, to integrate bonds of different maturities. The setup ensures that no-arbitrage conditions are satisfied. However, when arbitrageurs do not have perfect risk-bearing capacity, deviations from the expectations hypothesis arise.

Arbitrageurs choose how much of each bond to hold (denoted by $b_{t,\tau}$) in order to maximize an instantaneous mean-variance trade-off of the change in wealth

$$\max_{b_{t,\tau}} E_t dW_t - \frac{a}{2} Var_t dW_t$$

subject to their budget constraint:

$$dW_t = \left(W_t - \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} d\tau \right) r_t dt + \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}} d\tau$$

$\frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}}$ is the instantaneous return of a τ bond, while r_t is the short rate. The risk-aversion parameter $a \geq 0$ is fixed, but should be thought of as a proxy for limited risk-bearing capacity of financial markets.

The other side of the bond market is the demand from idiosyncratic clientele preferred habitat investors, which is given by:

$$\tilde{b}_{t,\tau} = \alpha(\tau)\tau(R_{t,\tau} - \beta_{t,\tau}) \tag{4}$$

The function $\alpha(\tau) > 0$ governs how sensitive these investors are to returns for τ bonds. This function is otherwise unrestricted; but the sign restriction implies that demand from preferred habitat investors is downward-sloping (increasing in yields). $\beta_{t,\tau}$ is a demand shifter, and can be positive or negative. Note that, holding $R_{t,\tau}$ fixed, an increase in $\beta_{t,\tau}$ implies that τ investors *reduce* their holdings of τ bonds. I will consider different forms of this shifter (both deterministic and stochastic) in later sections. In equilibrium, bond

prices must adjust so that arbitrageurs absorb the demand from preferred habitat investors ($b_{t,\tau} = -\tilde{b}_{t,\tau}$) while satisfying their portfolio allocation problem.

This bond market setup is stylized: arbitrageurs are infinitesimally lived, and a τ -bond preferred habitat investor cares only about a specific slice of maturity space. Nevertheless, the model captures important facets of segmented markets, and how limited arbitrage smooths out idiosyncratic demand shocks. The preferred habitat setup is a natural way to study the effects of LSAP programs. Moreover, private investors such as pension funds and insurance companies often have demand for long-term bonds that arise from the need to match their long-term liabilities; these sources of demand are not captured by intertemporal consumption substitution decisions that drive the term structure in more standard models. But these investors are not the only participants; otherwise debt markets would exhibit extreme segmentation. Arbitrageurs integrate debt markets and eliminate risk-free arbitrage opportunities, but are risk-averse and face limits to their trading activities. How conventional and unconventional policy affects the entire term structure will depend heavily on the limits to arbitrageurs' risk-bearing capacity.

In general, the term structure will be determined by complicated interactions between these two classes of investors and the general equilibrium dynamics of the macroeconomy. But two limiting cases can be analyzed. First, if arbitrageurs are risk-neutral ($a = 0$, so they only care about expected returns), then equilibrium can only be achieved if $E_t \left[\frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}} \right] = r_t$. And if expected instantaneous returns of all bonds are equalized at the short rate, then risk-neutral arbitrageurs are indifferent between any bond allocation. In this case, they will absorb any demand shifts from preferred habitat investors without any equilibrium price changes. In other words, idiosyncratic demand shifts will not affect the term structure of interest rates.

In the other extreme, if arbitrageurs abandon the bond market (allocating the entirety of their wealth to the risk-free short rate), then equilibrium is only satisfied ($0 = b_{t,\tau} = -\tilde{b}_{t,\tau}$) if yields satisfy $R_{t,\tau} = \beta_{t,\tau}$. This would imply that bonds of very close maturity could have very different yields (and would potentially evolve unrelated to the short rate). Again, note that in this extreme case an increase in the demand shifter $\beta_{t,\tau}$ would push up the τ -bond yield. But this extreme segmentation does not occur in equilibrium because arbitrageurs do take non-zero positions in long-term bonds. The impact of changes in preferred habitat demand (if any) will depend on how arbitrageurs adjust their portfolio allocations. In turn, this will depend on the equilibrium dynamics of the short rate and other macroeconomics variables.

What does general equilibrium look like in this model? From the perspective of households, the key factor is how sensitive their effective borrowing rate is to the short rate. The model reduces to a benchmark New Keynesian model when these rates move one-for-one, but in general $\tilde{r}_t \neq r_t$. Suppose that the effective rate is highly responsive to the policy rate. Then household borrowing is also highly sensitive to the policy rate, and therefore the growth rate of consumption will also react strongly to the policy rate. On the other hand, when the effective rate is insensitive to the policy rate, then the pass-through of changes in the policy rate to households is weakened. Through the borrowing decisions of the household, the growth rate of consumption is less responsive to the policy rate. That is,

$$\frac{\partial dx_t}{\partial r_t} \propto \frac{\partial \tilde{r}_t}{\partial r_t}$$

Moreover, the sensitivity of the change in the output gap to the policy rate will determine the equilibrium reversion rate of monetary shocks. The higher the sensitivity, the quicker output gaps revert to steady state. Inflation will follow a similar path since, due to standard Phillips curve dynamics, inflation is the present discounted value of future output gaps. Thus, through the central bank's endogenous reactions to either output or inflation, the policy rate also reverts back to steady state quickly.²

However, the sensitivity of the effective borrowing rate to the policy rate is an equilibrium object which also depends on financial markets. Bond prices will adjust in order to achieve equilibrium in bond markets, such that arbitrageurs' portfolio allocation satisfies their mean-variance tradeoff while also clearing the market given the demand from preferred habitat investors. In this model, arbitrage is imperfect and the term structure will not be characterized by the expectations hypothesis except under special circumstances. Therefore, it is the risk-adjusted dynamics of the macroeconomy which determine bond prices in financial markets, rather than the actual dynamics of the short rate only. For example, in response to a monetary shock, the response of the yield of a τ bond will be roughly equal to the risk-adjusted average of the short rate over the life of the bond. Thus, if the short rate has a very high risk-adjusted mean reversion rate, long-term bond yields will not respond much to shocks to the short rate. This force implies that increases in the risk-adjusted reversion

²The sensitivity of the change in the output gap to the policy rate plays a similar role as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ς^{-1}). In this case, the responsiveness of household borrowing to the policy rate is governed by preferences, namely the willingness to tolerate large changes in consumption across short periods of time. But the outcome is the same: when changes in the output gap are sensitive to the policy rate, the equilibrium rate at which shocks dissipate is high.

rate of monetary shocks lead to decreases in the sensitivity of all bond yields to the policy rate. In particular, the effective borrowing rate of households also becomes less responsive.

General equilibrium is obtained when these two forces balance. Thus, characterizing equilibrium involves two key steps: first, understanding the differences between the actual and risk-adjusted dynamics of the economy; and second, linking household savings and consumption choices with the bond prices determined in imperfect financial markets.

3 A Rigid Price Model

This section simplifies the model by assuming prices are fully fixed. This is an obviously extreme assumption, but many of the key results can still be obtained in this case. The upside is that the solution is considerably simpler, and I can sidestep determinacy issues that arise when prices can adjust. I return to these questions in Section 4.

As discussed in Section 2, the difficulty in solving the model relative to standard New Keynesian models is the mismatch between the effective borrowing rate and the policy rate. The approach I take to solving the model is as follows: start with the conjecture that bond prices are affine functions of the macroeconomic state variables. This allows the macroeconomic dynamics to be transformed into a system of linear differential equations. Conditional on the affine coefficients, solving for the rational expectations equilibrium is straightforward. Then, I turn to solving for these affine coefficients by solving the arbitrageur's portfolio problem. Putting both sides of the model, I characterize the unique general equilibrium solution.

Next, I explore the implications for monetary policy. First I focus on conventional policy, where the central bank sets the policy rate through a Taylor rule. Then I study forward guidance by assuming the central bank instead announces a long-lived interest rate peg. Finally, I study LSAPs by allowing the central bank to purchase longer-term bonds on the secondary market. Throughout, I focus on how these policies affect the macroeconomic dynamics of the model, and in particular how these effects depend on the risk-bearing capacity of investors in financial markets.

3.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics

Prices are fully fixed when the parameter $\delta \rightarrow 0$. In this case, Eq. (2) is simply

$$dx_t = \varsigma^{-1} (\tilde{r}_t - \bar{r}) dt \tag{5}$$

Again, consumption (and output) growth is increasing in the borrowing rate, but now borrowing depends on some weighted average of the term structure of interest rates, given by Eq. (1).

I assume the central bank follows a Taylor rule with persistence:

$$dr_t = -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_x x_t - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \quad (6)$$

where $B_{r,t}$ is a standard Brownian motion and σ_r governs the size of the shocks. ϕ_x governs the feedback rule for changes in output to changes in the policy rate. κ_r is a mean-reversion parameter; if $\kappa_r \rightarrow \infty$ Eq. (6) simplifies to a (non-stochastic) Taylor rule, with no gradual adjustments in the policy rate. r^* is the central bank's target policy rate, which it sets in order to deliver a steady state with zero output gap. In a benchmark model where the household borrowing rate is the same as the policy rate, this is accomplished by setting $r^* = \bar{r}$, but in this setup the optimal target is more complicated. I return to this in later sections.

Here I assume that monetary shocks are the only source of uncertainty. These shocks matter because the interest rate exhibits persistence. While the modification is partly made in order to make the model interesting, it is also an empirically motivated change. Central banks rarely change the policy rate by large jumps, instead preferring to smooth out changes over time (see [Coibion and Gorodnichenko \(2012\)](#) for an overview).

Unlike a standard New Keynesian model, the interest rate rule does not close the model; it is necessary to specify how the entire term structure of interest rates are determined in equilibrium. I conjecture that the model features an affine term structure (which I will confirm in the next section):

$$-\log P_{t,\tau} = A_r(\tau)r_t + C(\tau)$$

Note this also implies the effective borrowing rate is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{r}_t &= \left[\int_0^T \frac{\eta(\tau)}{\tau} A_r(\tau) d\tau \right] r_t + \left[\int_0^T \frac{\eta(\tau)}{\tau} C(\tau) d\tau \right] \\ &\equiv \hat{A}_r r_t + \hat{C} \end{aligned}$$

and hence the IS curve given by Eq. (5) becomes

$$dx_t = \varsigma^{-1} \left(\hat{A}_r r_t + \hat{C} - \bar{r} \right) dt \quad (7)$$

In terms of the macroeconomic dynamics, the coefficients \hat{A}_r and \hat{C} are the only difference between my model and a standard New Keynesian model; setting $\hat{A}_r = 1$ and $\hat{C} = 0$ recovers the standard dynamics. From the perspective of understanding aggregate dynamics, it is seen from Eq. (7) that \hat{A}_r is the key determinant of the responsiveness of consumption growth to the policy rate. Additionally, the coefficient functions $A_r(\tau)$ and $C(\tau)$ are equilibrium objects which will depend on the interplay of arbitrageurs and preferred habitat investors in imperfect financial markets. In particular, $A_r(\tau)$ governs the sensitivity of the returns of a τ -bond to short-rate *risk*. Thus, \hat{A}_r is the weighted average of risk sensitivity of the entire term structure. In general equilibrium, \hat{A}_r will have to satisfy both of these roles.

The affine functional form implies that the macroeconomic dynamics are governed by a linear stochastic differential equation, written in matrix form (in terms of deviations from steady state) as

$$d\mathbf{Y}_t = -\Upsilon (\mathbf{Y}_t - \mathbf{Y}^{SS}) dt + \mathbf{S} d\mathbf{B}_t \quad (8)$$

where

$$\Upsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_r & -\kappa_r \phi_x \\ -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

I solve for the rational expectations equilibrium following [Buiter \(1984\)](#), the continuous time analogue of [Blanchard and Kahn \(1980\)](#). In general, let $\mathbf{Y}_t = [\mathbf{y}_t \ \mathbf{x}_t]^T$ where \mathbf{x}_t are the “jump” variables and \mathbf{y}_t are the state variables. Under certain determinacy conditions, the dynamics under rational expectations are given by

$$d\mathbf{y}_t = -\Gamma (\mathbf{y}_t - \mathbf{y}^{SS}) dt + \mathbf{S} d\mathbf{B}_t \quad (9)$$

$$\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}^{SS} = \Omega (\mathbf{y}_t - \mathbf{y}^{SS}) \quad (10)$$

where Γ and Ω are given by Eqs. (C10) and (C11).³

In the current rigid price model, the output gap x_t is a jump variable, while the interest rate rule implies that r_t is a state variable. Then the rational expectations equilibrium is determinate if and only if Υ has one stable eigenvalue λ_1 ; the general equilibrium dynamics

³With an abuse of notation, I use the same symbols for the shocks \mathbf{S} and \mathbf{B}_t in the general dynamics Eq. (8) and the state space representation Eq. (9).

simplify to

$$\begin{aligned} dr_t &= -\lambda_1(r_t - r^{SS}) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \\ x_t - x^{SS} &= \omega_x(r_t - r^{SS}) \end{aligned}$$

The following Lemma characterizes the conditions under which the model is determinate under rational expectations. Additionally, it characterizes the relationship between \hat{A}_r , λ_1 , and ω_x . All proofs are in Appendix A.

Lemma 1 (Characterizing \hat{A}_r , rigid prices). *Consider the rigid price model.*

1. Υ has exactly one eigenvalue with positive real part if and only if $\hat{A}_r > 0$. Further, this stable root is real: $\lambda_1 > 0$.
2. $\hat{A}_r = h(\lambda_1)$ where $h : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$:

$$h(\lambda) \equiv \frac{\lambda(\lambda - \kappa_r)}{\varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r\phi_x} \quad (11)$$

3. The output gap dynamics are given by

$$\omega_x = -\frac{\varsigma^{-1}\hat{A}_r}{\lambda_1} = \frac{\kappa_r - \lambda_1}{\kappa_r\phi_x}$$

The first result in Lemma 1 says that the model will be determinate when consumption growth moves in the same direction as changes in the policy rate. This is a natural conjecture, which I will confirm holds in general equilibrium. Since prices are fully fixed, changes in the policy rate coincide with changes in the real short rate. Therefore, through standard intertemporal decisions of the household, one would expect that a higher real borrowing rate would lead to higher savings and thus increasing consumption into the future. However, this result is not immediate in my model because of the disconnect between the policy rate and the effective borrowing rate (even when nominal and real rates coincide). To show that this result holds requires explicitly determining the term structure of interest rates.

The second and third results characterize \hat{A}_r and ω_x in terms of the macroeconomic parameters and the equilibrium eigenvalues of the model. Note that when the model is determinate, $\omega_x < 0$; this says that a positive (contractionary) shock to the policy rate leads to an immediate decline in the output gap.

As discussed previously, \hat{A}_r is pulling double duty: it governs both the sensitivity to risk of the term structure, as well as the sensitivity of changes in the output gap to the policy rate. Lemma 1 characterizes \hat{A}_r in terms of the latter. Thus, the function $h(\cdot)$ should be thought of as the mapping between $\frac{\partial dx_t}{\partial r_t}$ (how sensitive the output gap is to the policy rate) and λ_1 (the equilibrium mean reversion rate of monetary shocks). This result, together with the results in the next section, are used to solve for \hat{A}_r in general equilibrium.

Focusing on the determinate case, a high degree of sensitivity of consumption growth to the policy rate is associated with high mean reversion of the policy rate. Intuitively, in this case household borrowing decisions are highly responsive to the policy rate. An increase in the level of the policy rate implies that households increase savings significantly; this leads to an immediate drop in the level of consumption (hence output) and then a rapid increase in consumption growth leading back to steady state. Through the endogenous response of the Taylor rule, this implies that the policy rate also quickly returns to steady state. That is, a high \hat{A}_r is associated with high λ_1 and large (negative) ω_x .

Conversely, as \hat{A}_r decreases towards zero, so does ω_x and λ_1 approaches κ_r , the inertial term of the Taylor rule. Note that $h(\lambda_1)$ is negative when $0 < \lambda_1 < \kappa_r$. That is, the model is indeterminate if in equilibrium monetary shocks mean revert *slower* than the inertial term of the Taylor rule κ_r .

The general equilibrium value of the mean reversion rate of monetary shocks (the stable eigenvalue λ_1) is of course endogenous. However, studying how the dynamics of the model change as this parameter varies exogenously is illuminating. Because the model only features two macroeconomic variables, phase diagrams can be used to study the aggregate dynamics.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Figure 1 plots phase diagrams of the rigid price models for different values of the mean reversion rate of monetary shocks λ_1 . First, I consider a benchmark New Keynesian model where the Euler equation depends only on the short rate. Equivalently, in my model this says that $\hat{A}_r = 1$; with the given parameterization I consider this implies $\lambda_1 \approx 0.9$. This model is shown in Panel A. Note that the stable arm (the solid blue line) slopes downwards; after a positive monetary shock (increase in the short rate), the output gap jumps down and then the economy moves along this arm back to steady state. The dashed and dot-dashed lines show example (unstable) trajectories for the initial conditions $r = -1, x = 0$ and $r = 0, x = 1$.

What happens if λ_1 is higher than this benchmark case? This would mean that in equilibrium, monetary shocks mean revert faster. In Panel B, I set $\lambda = 1.1$, which implies from Lemma 1 that $\hat{A}_r > 1$. Now the stable arm (the solid blue line) is much steeper (more negative slope) than the benchmark case, meaning that monetary shocks move output more than the benchmark prediction. The opposite is true when equilibrium monetary shocks mean revert slower: for $\lambda_1 = 0.8$ in Panel C, $0 < \hat{A}_r < 1$ and the stable arm is flattened.

Finally, it is possible that the mean reversion rate is slow enough (λ_1 is small enough) that the model moves to a region of indeterminacy. In Panel D, I set $\lambda_1 = 0.6$ which implies $\hat{A}_r < 0$. Now the “stable” arm is upward-sloping (which would imply a positive monetary shock decreases the output gap), but note that this is no longer the unique stable path. Any initial level of the short rate and the output gap will return to steady state. The trajectories from initial conditions $r = -1, x = 0$ and $r = 0, x = 1$ shown by the dotted and dash-dotted lines are seen to return to steady state, whereas in the previous examples these were unstable paths. This is because, when \hat{A}_r is negative, household borrowing moves in the opposite direction as the policy rate, leading to model indeterminacy.

Which of these cases will occur in general equilibrium? In general equilibrium it will turn out to be the case that the relevant parameter space is one in which monetary shocks mean revert slower than the baseline, but will still guarantee determinacy. In order to derive these results, I now turn to explicitly modeling the term structure.

3.2 Term Structure Determination

To study limited arbitrage, I embed a “preferred habitat” model of the term structure based on [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#). Interest rates are determined by the interaction of two types of investors: clientele investors with idiosyncratic demand for bonds, and risk-averse arbitrageurs.

Given the affine functional form conjecture, I derive the optimality conditions of the arbitrageurs. Ito’s lemma allows for the calculation of the instantaneous return of a τ bond, and hence the mean and variance of the change of arbitrageur’s wealth. Arbitrageurs’ expectations are rational and hence in equilibrium they expect the state variables to evolve according to Eq. (9). For the case of a scalar state, the dynamics are given by

$$dr_t = -\gamma(r_t - r^{SS})dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \quad (12)$$

In equilibrium it will be the case that $\gamma = \lambda_1$, the (only) positive eigenvalue of the matrix Υ

described in the previous section. However, since arbitrageurs take as given the dynamics of the short rate, it is useful to studying how the term structure is determined for arbitrary dynamics of the short rate, governed by some $\gamma > 0$.

Lemma 2 (Arbitrageur optimality conditions, scalar state). *Suppose the short rate is characterized by Eq. (12) for some $\gamma > 0$. Then arbitrageurs choose a portfolio allocation such that*

$$\mu_{t,\tau} - r_t = A_r(\tau)\zeta_t \quad (13)$$

$$\zeta_t \equiv a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} A_r(\tau) d\tau \quad (14)$$

where $\mu_{t,\tau}$ is the expected instantaneous return of a τ -maturity bond, given by Eq. (A1).

Conditional on the dynamics of the policy rate, the optimality conditions are the same as in Vayanos and Vila (2009). What this says is that a τ bond's expected excess return, $\mu_{t,\tau} - r_t$, is proportional to its sensitivity to the short rate, as measured by $A_r(\tau)$. This measure of proportionality is the same across all bonds, and follows solely from the absence of (risk-free) arbitrage.

No-arbitrage implies that the amount of excess return per unit of risk is the same for all bonds; this is ζ_t , the market price for risk. The expected excess return compensates arbitrageurs for taking on additional risk, which in this case comes from the short rate and so is fully characterized by the coefficient function $A_r(\tau)$. This compensation is higher when risk aversion is high (a), volatility is high (σ_r^2); or their portfolio is already sensitive to risk (the integral term). The optimality conditions immediately imply that when arbitrageurs are risk neutral ($a = 0$), expected excess returns of all bonds are zero, and arbitrageurs are indifferent between holding any amount of bonds.

Arbitrageurs must hold the opposite of preferred habitat investors, whose demand is given by Eq. (4). Here I assume that the demand shifter $\beta_{t,\tau}$ is independent of time and deterministic: $\beta_{t,\tau} \equiv \bar{\beta}(\tau)$. I will relax this assumption in later sections.

In equilibrium, prices must adjust such that arbitrageurs absorb the demand from preferred habitat investors and satisfy their mean-variance tradeoff. When arbitrageurs are risk-neutral and only care about expected returns, they will want to buy (sell) any bond with expected return greater than (less than) the risk-free rate. In this case, in equilibrium all bonds will have expected excess returns of zero and arbitrageurs will accomodate any shifts in demand from preferred habitat investors, recovering the results of a standard

model of the term structure. But when arbitrageurs are risk averse, arbitrageurs will require non-zero excess expected returns to accomodate preferred habitat investors' demand. In this case, prices will depend on the arbitrageurs' portfolio allocations.

Thus, when $a > 0$, their portfolio is endogenous. The demand for bonds from preferred habitat investors along with the condition $b_{t,\tau} = -\tilde{b}_{t,\tau}$ leads to equilibrium conditions that characterize the coefficient function $A_r(\tau)$ and $C(\tau)$ in terms of the dynamics of the short rate.

Lemma 3 (Affine coefficients, scalar state term structure). *Suppose the short rate is characterized by Eq. (12) for some $\gamma > 0$. Then $A_r(\tau)$ is given by:*

$$A_r(\tau) = \tau f(\nu(\gamma)\tau) \quad (15)$$

where $f(x) = \frac{1-e^{-x}}{x}$ and $\nu(\gamma)$ is given by

$$\nu(\gamma) = \gamma + a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau)\tau^2 f(\nu(\gamma)\tau)^2 d\tau \quad (16)$$

$C(\tau)$ is given by Eq. (A2). Then $\hat{A}_r = g(\gamma)$ where $g: \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$:

$$g(\gamma) = \int_0^T \eta(\tau) f(\nu(\gamma)\tau) d\tau \quad (17)$$

The exponential function $f(x) = \frac{1-e^{-x}}{x}$ is a common functional form which occurs as solutions to differential equations such as these. The results from Lemma 3 help to characterize the responsiveness of the term structure to the policy rate. It follows that $A_r(\tau) > 0$, and moreover the affine functional form of bond prices implies the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log P_{t,\tau}}{\partial r_t} &= -A_r(\tau) = \frac{e^{-\nu\tau} - 1}{\nu} \\ \frac{\partial R_{t,\tau}}{\partial r_t} &= \frac{1}{\tau} A_r(\tau) = \frac{1 - e^{-\nu\tau}}{\nu\tau} \\ \mu_{t,\tau} - r_t &= A_r(\tau)\zeta_t = \frac{1 - e^{-\nu\tau}}{\nu}\zeta_t \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, taking derivatives with respect to maturity τ gives:

$$\left| \frac{\partial^2 \log P_{t,\tau}}{\partial r_t \partial \tau} \right| > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 R_{t,\tau}}{\partial r_t \partial \tau} < 0, \quad \left| \frac{\partial \mu_{t,\tau} - r_t}{\partial \tau} \right| > 0$$

That is, as maturity increases, bond (log) prices become more sensitive while bond yields become less sensitive to the short rate. And as maturity increases, excess expected returns grow in magnitude (the sign depends on ζ_t , the market price of short-rate risk).

Recall that, from the perspective of aggregate dynamics, \hat{A}_r is the key determinant of the sensitivity of output growth to the policy rate (determined by the function $h(\cdot)$ derived in Lemma 1). Additionally, from the perspective of term structure determination, \hat{A}_r also governs the weighted average sensitivity of bond yields to short-rate risk. Lemma 3 shows that this is determined by the function $g(\cdot)$.

The key to characterizing the behavior of $g(\cdot)$ is the parameter ν . Intuitively, what is ν , and how does it compare to γ ? γ governs the actual dynamics of the short rate, while ν governs the dynamics of the short rate under the risk-neutral measure. When risk aversion is non-zero, these parameters do not coincide. Eq. (16), which determines the parameter ν , is a fixed point problem and so will not have a simple solution except in the case when $a = 0$. But the proof of Lemma 3 shows that $\nu \geq \gamma$ and is increasing in γ , with equality if and only if $a = 0$. Since ν is increasing in γ , it follows that $g'(\gamma) < 0$. That is, bond yields become less responsive to policy rate movements when monetary shocks revert faster. Thus, the effective borrowing rate also becomes less sensitive.

The fact that $\nu \geq \gamma$ says that the risk-adjusted average of the short rate over the life of a long-term bond is lower than the expected average over the same period. Thus

$$\frac{1}{\tau} E_t \left[\int_0^\tau \frac{\partial r_{t+u}}{\partial r_t} du \right] = f(\gamma\tau) \geq f(\nu\tau) = \frac{\partial R_{t,\tau}}{\partial r_t}$$

The expectations hypothesis implies that these two responses should be identical, which occurs only when arbitrageurs are perfectly risk-neutral. Thus, this result says that long-term yields under-react to changes in the short rate.

Putting everything together, Lemma 3 shows how the interaction of arbitrageurs and preferred habitat investors characterizes the term structure. The arbitrageur's portfolio problem leads to a disconnect between the actual and risk-adjusted dynamics of the model. This leads to the under-reaction of longer-term rates (and therefore the effective borrowing rate) to changes in the policy rate. Further, if monetary shocks mean revert more quickly,

the effective borrowing rate becomes less responsive to the policy rate.

However, these are partial equilibrium results, conditional on the dynamics of the policy rate. This section parameterized short rate mean reversion by γ , but this is determined in equilibrium as $\gamma = \lambda_1$, the stable eigenvalue. The previous section documented a general equilibrium effect: increases in the sensitivity of household borrowing to the policy rate leads to longer-lasting monetary shocks. In other words, increases in λ_1 leads to an increase in $h(\lambda_1)$ but a decrease in $g(\lambda_1)$. In general equilibrium, it must be that $\hat{A}_r = h(\lambda_1) = g(\lambda_1)$, so these forces must balance. The next section characterizes this interaction and solves for the general equilibrium solution.

3.3 General Equilibrium Solution

The results of Lemma 1 and 3 lead to a solution for \hat{A}_r , which characterizes general equilibrium. Recall $h(\cdot)$ determines the sensitivity of output growth to the policy rate, while $g(\cdot)$ determines the sensitivity of longer-term yields to the policy rate. Both are a function of the equilibrium rate of mean reversion of monetary shocks. In equilibrium, \hat{A}_r will have to satisfy both of these jobs.

Proposition 1 (General equilibrium, rigid prices). *Consider the rigid price model. There exists a unique positive eigenvalue of Υ $\lambda_1 > 0$ for which $g(\lambda_1) = h(\lambda_1)$, which fully characterizes the model equilibrium. Further, this implies $0 < \hat{A}_r < 1$.*

In this model, household borrowing decisions depend on the weighted average of longer-term yields. Hence consumption growth also depends on the weighted average of longer-term yields. Therefore, the sensitivity of output growth to the policy rate must coincide with the sensitivity of the effective borrowing rate to the policy rate. When output growth reacts strongly to the policy rate, monetary shocks mean revert quickly. On the other hand, due to the interaction of arbitrageurs and preferred habitat investors in imperfect financial markets, short-lived monetary shocks lead to a low degree of sensitivity of longer-term yields to the policy rate. The proof of Prop. 1 shows that these forces balance in general equilibrium, leading to a unique value of λ_1 and \hat{A}_r .

Prop. 1 characterizes λ_1 and \hat{A}_r . As shown in the phase diagram analysis in Section 3.1 this is key to understanding how monetary policy works.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium obtained in Prop. 1. In a benchmark New Keynesian model, implicitly it is always the case that $\hat{A}_r = 1$. This is because household borrowing takes place entirely at the short rate, so through the lens of my model the effective borrowing rate and the policy rate coincide. Once household borrowing depends on longer-term rates, this one-to-one correspondence breaks down. In particular, since long-term rates respond less than one-to-one with short rates, then $\hat{A}_r < 1$. Figure 2 also shows that in equilibrium, monetary shocks last longer than a benchmark model (lower λ_1). Since monetary shocks move long-term rates (and hence the effective borrowing rate) less than one-for-one, output also moves less. This means that the endogenous response of the central bank is muted relative to the benchmark, hence the shock mean reverts slower in equilibrium.

How does the sensitivity of long-term rates depend on the health of financial markets? Figure 2 shows that \hat{A}_r (the weighted sensitivity of long-term rates to changes in the short rate) declines as risk aversion increases. In fact, the entire curve $g(\lambda)$ shifts down. Recall from the discussion of Lemma 3, there is a partial equilibrium effect that leads to an under-reaction of long-term rates to changes in the policy rate. Due to financial market imperfections, long-term rates under-react to monetary shocks relative to the expectations hypothesis baseline. Moreover, this under-reaction becomes more severe as the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs declines. What are the general equilibrium implications of this under-reaction?

[Figure 3 about here.]

Figure 3 plots of the responses the short rate and long-term rates to a monetary shock, and explores the effects of increasing risk aversion graphically. Panel A corresponds to a low level of risk aversion, while Panel B sets risk aversion very high. In both panels, the solid line is the average change in the average short rate over the course of τ periods, while the dotted line is the immediate change in the yield of a τ bond. Under the expectations hypothesis, the two responses would be identical. Hence as expected, in Panel A when risk aversion is close to zero, the responses are very similar. But in Panel B where risk aversion is high, the responses differ by quite a bit. The immediate response of long-term rates lies well below the expected path of average short rates (which is the response of long-term rates that would occur under the expectations hypothesis).

Interestingly, the response of the term structure under the expectations hypothesis differs between the two experiments. Why is this? In this model, the expectations hypothesis implies that the response of long-term rates is solely determined by λ_1 , the mean reversion

of the short rate. But this is an equilibrium object, which depends on the risk aversion of arbitrageurs. In the parameterizations considered in these two experiments, in equilibrium $\lambda_1 = 0.74$ when risk aversion is low vs. $\lambda_1 = 0.67$ when risk aversion is high. This can be seen comparing the solid lines in each panel: the monetary shock lasts longer when risk aversion is high in the second panel compared to the first.

3.4 Conventional Policy

What are the implications for monetary policy, and how do they differ from benchmark models?

In equilibrium, \hat{A}_r is characterized by the intersection of the functions $g(\cdot)$ and $h(\cdot)$ (defined in Lemmas 1 and 3). This additionally determines the eigenvalues of the model. Note that (from Lemma 3), the parameters governing the macroeconomic dynamics (for example, κ_r and ϕ_x) only enter through the eigenvalue λ_1 . Fixing λ , the term structure side of the model is independent of these parameters. Similarly, from Lemma 1, the term structure parameters (for example, a and σ_r^2) only enter through the coefficient function $A_r(\tau)$. Fixing $A_r(\tau)$, the aggregate dynamics of the model are independent of these parameters. Hence, for comparative statics, it is possible to make substantial progress despite the complexity of the model.

Corollary 1.1 (Comparative statics, rigid prices). *Consider the rigid price model. In general equilibrium:*

1. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial a} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial a} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial a} > 0$. Moreover, $\hat{A}_r \rightarrow 0$, $\omega_x \rightarrow 0$, and $\lambda_1 \rightarrow \kappa_r$ as $a \rightarrow \infty$. Further, if $a \neq 0$, the same results hold for σ_r .
2. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \kappa_r} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \kappa_r} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial \kappa_r} > 0$.
3. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \phi_x} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \phi_x} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial \phi_x} > 0$.
4. Consider two different weighting functions $\eta^s(\tau)$ and $\eta^\ell(\tau)$, such that for some T^* , $\eta^s(\tau) \geq \eta^\ell(\tau) \iff \tau \leq T^*$. Then $\lambda_1^s > \lambda_1^\ell$, $\hat{A}_r^s > \hat{A}_r^\ell$, $\omega_x^s < \omega_x^\ell$ where superscripts denote the equilibrium outcomes under the corresponding weighting functions.

Note that when household borrowing depends on long-term interest rates (so $\eta(\tau) > 0$ for some $\tau > 0$) it will always be the case that $\hat{A}_r < 1$. This is because the effective borrowing rate does not respond one-to-one with the policy rate. Partly this is somewhat

mechanical, and will be true even when arbitrageurs are risk neutral. In this case, the response of long-term rates to a change in the policy rate will be equal to the average change of expected future policy rates, and these shocks to short rates are not permanent but instead mean-revert.

The first result in Cor. 1.1 says something more interesting: as the risk aversion of arbitrageurs increases, household borrowing becomes less responsive to changes in the policy rate. That is to say, \hat{A}_r is decreasing in the risk aversion of arbitrageurs. This occurs because long-term rates under-react to shifts in the expected path of short rates. In other words, now the response of long-term rates to a change in the policy rate will be smaller than the average change of expected future policy rates. This implies that current borrowing (and hence output) responds less than it would when financial markets exhibit perfect risk-bearing capacity.

The fact that current macroeconomic outcomes are less responsive to future expected policy changes bears a similarity to recent work that derives a “discounted Euler equation,” as in Gabaix (2016) or Farhi and Werning (2017). But the mechanism here is not that, for behavioral reasons, household forecasts deviate from the actual paths of future outcomes. Rather, expected changes in policy are transmitted through imperfect financial markets, which endogenously decreases the responsiveness of current macroeconomic variables to future expected policy changes.

The model makes clear that monetary policy is effective only to the extent that policy changes are transmitted through financial markets. In the model, the health of financial markets is proxied by the risk aversion of arbitrageurs, which is a fixed parameter. But more generally, risk aversion may increase during periods of financial panics (e.g. as in Kyle and Xiong (2001)). This implies that monetary policy may become less effective during financial crises.

The next result relates to the persistence of the central bank’s policy rule (governed by the mean reversion in the Taylor rule, κ_r). This governs the level of inertia in the central bank’s policy rate (a higher value implies the rate returns to the target rate faster). Recall that λ_1 determines the equilibrium mean reversion behavior of the policy rate. So unsurprisingly, if the central bank reduces the inertia in its policy rule (increases κ_r) then the policy rate in equilibrium mean reverts faster (higher λ_1); because policy rate gaps persist for less time, the effective borrowing rate responds less to these monetary shocks (lower \hat{A}_r).

The intuition regarding the central bank’s sensitivity to output (ϕ_x) is somewhat similar to the mean reversion parameter. The central bank responds more forcefully to output

gaps, so in equilibrium the policy rate deviations subside faster (higher λ_1). Because they are shorter lived, output responds less as well.

How does the model depend on the weighting function, $\eta(\tau)$, that determines the effective borrowing rate? The final result in Cor. 1.1 answers this question. The two weighting functions correspond to two models where the effective borrowing rate is more geared towards short-term rates (η^s) or long-term rates (η^ℓ). So the results says that, as the effective borrowing rate becomes more dependent on long-term rates, the model is less sensitive to the policy rate. Further, in equilibrium this implies that monetary shocks persist longer.

3.5 Optimal Monetary Target

Before turning to unconventional policy, I also solve for the “optimal” target in the central bank’s policy rule r^* , which guarantees a steady state with zero output gap. In a benchmark model the central bank simply sets $r^* = \bar{r}$, the natural short rate. But when the effective borrowing rate depends on long-term rates, this is no longer the case. The central bank still should set their target to the natural short rate; but the natural short rate differs from the household’s natural effective rate. Moreover, as with the transmission of monetary shocks, the optimal target also depends on the risk-bearing capacity of financial markets.

Corollary 1.2 (Optimal target, rigid prices). *Consider the rigid price model. Then the optimal target short rate that delivers $x^{SS} = 0$ is the “natural” short rate, given by*

$$r^* = \frac{\bar{r} - \hat{C}}{\hat{A}_r} \quad (18)$$

Further, $\frac{\partial r^*}{\partial a} > 0$.

Cor. 1.2 says that as the risk-bearing capacity of financial markets increases, the optimal central bank target falls. Note that the natural effective borrowing rate (which is the steady state value of the effective borrowing rate) is $\tilde{r}^{SS} = \bar{r}$ and is determined by factors outside of the control of the central bank (and is assumed to be fixed in this model). The effective borrowing rate is an affine function of the short rate (both in transition and in steady state), and hence the natural short rate is the steady state value of the short rate that delivers the natural effective rate. That is,

$$\tilde{r}^{SS} = \bar{r} = \hat{A}_r r^{SS} + \hat{C}$$

As risk-bearing capacity of financial markets increases (decreases in the risk aversion parameter a), the sensitivity of the effective rate to the short rate \hat{A}_r increases. Thus, the natural short rate r^{SS} also increases as a falls.

Intuitively, this is because healthier financial markets strengthen the link between long-term rates and the policy rate. This may help explain the secular decline observed in the average policy rate of advanced economy central banks.

3.6 Forward Guidance

Given the key under-reaction result when financial markets exhibit limited risk-bearing capacity, it is natural to expect that more explicit forward guidance policies will also prove less effective. This section studies this policy and confirms this intuition.

Instead of following a Taylor rule for setting the short rate, suppose instead that the central bank announces a target peg for interest rates r^\diamond , which will last for a set period of time t^\diamond before returning to a standard Taylor rule. That is, the short rate evolves according to:

$$dr_t = \begin{cases} -\kappa_r^\diamond(r_t - r^\diamond) dt + \sigma_r^\diamond dB_{r,t} & \text{if } 0 < t < t^\diamond \\ -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_x x_t - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} & \text{if } t \geq t^\diamond \end{cases}$$

and initially, the short rate at $t = 0$ is at the peg: $r_0 = r^\diamond$. Note that this setup implies that the peg is the target, but the policy rate may deviate from this target. The shocks to the short rate are again the only source of uncertainty in order to keep the solution tractable.

The output gap still evolves according to Eq. (5), but the dynamics of the effective borrowing rate \tilde{r}_t differ from the baseline case. Conjecturing once again that bond prices are affine implies

$$-\log P_{t,\tau} = \begin{cases} A_r^\diamond(\tau)r_t + C^\diamond(\tau) & \text{if } 0 < t < t^\diamond \\ A_r(\tau)r_t + C(\tau) & \text{if } t \geq t^\diamond \end{cases} \implies \tilde{r}_t = \begin{cases} \hat{A}_r^\diamond r_t + \hat{C}^\diamond & \text{if } 0 < t < t^\diamond \\ \hat{A}_r r_t + \hat{C} & \text{if } t \geq t^\diamond \end{cases}$$

Now there are two sets of affine coefficient functions to solve for, corresponding to the two different monetary regimes. But note that after the peg ends ($t \geq t^\diamond$), the model reduces to the one considered in Section 3. Further, during the peg ($0 < t < t^\diamond$), the results already derived in the baseline model can be utilized to solve for the term structure coefficients. Lemmas 2 and 3 still apply, with $\gamma = \kappa_r^\diamond$.

With this characterization of the term structure during the two monetary regimes, I now turn to solving for the rational expectations equilibrium dynamics, and in particular the initial level of the output gap x_0 .

Proposition 2 (Forward guidance, rigid prices). *Consider the forward guidance rigid price model. In general equilibrium:*

1. $\frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r^\diamond} \leq 0$, is increasing in a , and approaches 0 as $a \rightarrow \infty$.
2. $\frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond} \leq 0$, is increasing in a , and approaches 0 as $a \rightarrow \infty$.

As in a benchmark model of forward guidance, my model predicts that if the central bank sets a very low interest rate peg, then the output gap falls ($\frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r^\diamond} \leq 0$), and that this effect grows as the duration of the peg lengthens ($\frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond} \leq 0$). The more interesting results from Prop. 2 is how these forces interact with the level of risk aversion of arbitrageurs. The first result says that the current output gap becomes less sensitive to the size of the forward guidance shock as the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs falls. Moreover, output eventually becomes completely insensitive as arbitrageurs become infinitely risk averse. The second part of Prop. 2 is an analogous finding for the interaction of the duration of an interest rate peg and risk aversion. The effectiveness of lengthening the peg also diminishes as arbitrageur risk aversion increases, eventually becoming completely ineffective.

Figure 4 shows this graphically. The dark “level” line corresponds to $\frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r^\diamond}$, while the lighter “length” line corresponds to $\frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond}$. As risk aversion increases, both of these effects are mitigated.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Intuitively, when financial markets are disrupted, the sensitivity of output to forward guidance falls. Note that in this model, households are still very forward-looking: households are still very responsive to far-off changes in their borrowing rates, and so conditional on the expected path of the effective borrowing rate the model delivers similar predictions as a benchmark New Keynesian model. The mitigating effect comes from the mismatch between the policy rate and the effective borrowing rate, which is bridged by imperfect financial markets.

3.7 Quantitative Easing

While forward guidance is less effective when financial markets are disrupted, this imperfection opens the door to LSAP policies. Given that the expectations hypothesis does not hold, purchases by the central bank may have price effects; moreover, it's natural to think that QE-type policies would push down long-term rates. This section studies this policy and confirms this result.

I now suppose that in addition to setting the short rate, the central bank also directly purchases longer term bonds through open market operations. In the model, these purchases take place through the demand shifter $\beta_{t,\tau}$ in preferred habitat investor demand given by Eq. (4). I assume that

$$\begin{aligned}\beta_{t,\tau} &= \bar{\beta}(\tau) + \theta(\tau)\beta_t \\ d\beta_t &= -\kappa_\beta \beta_t dt\end{aligned}\tag{19}$$

Note that this formulation treats LSAP programs as a zero-probability shock β_t to preferred habitat investor demand, which mean-reverts according to κ_β . The function $\theta(\tau)$ governs where in maturity space the purchases are targeted. To capture the essence of a QE shock, I assume that $\theta(\tau) \geq 0$ for all maturities (and strictly positive for some maturities). This means that the central bank is only seeking to purchase positive amounts of long-term bonds. This rules out LSAP programs like Operation Twist; I return to this type of policy in an extension of the model.⁴

Now the affine functional form of bond prices implies that

$$\begin{aligned}-\log P_{t,\tau} &= A_r(\tau)r_t + A_\beta(\tau)\beta_t + C(\tau) \\ \implies \tilde{r}_t &= \hat{A}_r r_t + \hat{A}_\beta \beta_t + \hat{C}\end{aligned}$$

which introduces a new coefficient function $A_\beta(\tau)$.

⁴Were the QE programs demand or a supply shocks? By treating the central bank as another “preferred habitat” investor, the model implicitly assumes that the QE purchases are (positive) demand shocks. But if the central bank is thought of as a conglomerate with the fiscal authority, then QE purchases are perhaps more naturally thought of as (negative) supply shocks: by buying bonds, the central bank acts on behalf of the fiscal authority and removes these bonds from the secondary market. If instead the central bank is thought of as a separate entity from the fiscal authority, QE purchases are just those of a particularly large institutional investor, in which case it is more natural to think of QE as a (positive) demand shock.

Whichever the preferred labeling, in either case the outcome is the same. As the model makes clear, the effects are all about how the purchases impact the marginal investors, the arbitrageurs. Whether QE is thought of as a demand or supply shock, the result is that QE leads to changes in the portfolio allocation of arbitrageurs.

This change complicates the model, because there are now two state variables. However, monetary policy remains the only source of uncertainty, so solving the model is similar to the previous case.

First, I solve the macroeconomic dynamics, taking as given the affine coefficients. Write the model in matrix form Eq. (8), where

$$\Upsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_r & 0 & -\kappa_r \phi_x \\ 0 & \kappa_\beta & 0 \\ -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r & -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Lemma 4 (Characterizing \hat{A}_r and \hat{A}_β , rigid prices). *Consider the rigid price QE model.*

1. Υ has exactly two eigenvalues with positive real part if and only if $\hat{A}_r > 0$. Further, these stable roots are real. One of these eigenvalues is κ_β , the other is $\lambda_1 > 0$.
2. \hat{A}_r is given by Eq. (11).
3. The rational expectations equilibrium dynamic matrices (from Eqs. (9) and (10)) are given by

$$\Gamma = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1 & \frac{\hat{A}_\beta \varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r \phi_x}{\lambda_1 + \kappa_\beta - \kappa_r} \\ 0 & \kappa_\beta \end{bmatrix} \quad (20)$$

$$\Omega = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\kappa_r - \lambda_1}{\kappa_r \phi_x} & \frac{\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta}{\kappa_r - \lambda_1 - \kappa_\beta} \end{bmatrix} \quad (21)$$

Next, given how the state evolves in general equilibrium, I solve the arbitrageurs optimality conditions and equilibrium allocations, which solves for the affine term structure coefficient functions.

Lemma 5 (Affine coefficients, demand factor term structure). *Suppose the short rate and demand factor are characterized by*

$$\begin{aligned} dr_t &= -(\gamma_1(r_t - r^{SS}) + \gamma_{12}\beta_t) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \\ d\beta_t &= -\gamma_2\beta_t dt \end{aligned}$$

Then \hat{A}_r is given by Eq. (17) (and ν given by Eq. (16)). \hat{A}_β is given by

$$\hat{A}_\beta = \frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \gamma_2} \int_0^T \eta(\tau)(f(\nu\tau) - f(\gamma_2\tau)) d\tau \quad (22)$$

where the coefficient ν_{12} is given by Eq. (??).

Note that, conditional on the equilibrium value of λ_1 , \hat{A}_r is the same as the baseline rigid price model. This also implies that \hat{A}_β , the sensitivity of the effective borrowing rate to QE shocks, does not affect the determinacy of the model. In fact, if $\beta_t = 0$, then the dynamics of the model are exactly the same as the baseline rigid price model. This is unsurprising, as in this case QE is a zero-probability shock and hence the model evolves as if QE will never occur.

The coefficient \hat{A}_β determines the effects of QE in general equilibrium. The key is under what conditions this coefficient is non-zero, and what sign.

Proposition 3 (QE, rigid prices). *Consider the QE rigid price model. Suppose that $\theta(\tau) \geq 0$. In general equilibrium:*

1. $\hat{A}_\beta \geq 0$ and $\frac{\partial x_t}{\partial \beta_t} \leq 0$, with equality if and only if $a > 0$.
2. $\hat{A}_\beta \rightarrow 0$ as $\kappa_\beta \rightarrow \infty$.

In words: if arbitrageurs are perfectly risk-neutral (financial markets exhibit perfect arbitrage), QE has no effect. This is the standard result: the expectations hypothesis holds, and since QE purchases do not change the expected path of short rates, there is no change in long-term rates. More explicitly, with perfect risk-neutrality, arbitrageurs (the marginal investors in bond markets) only care about expected instantaneous returns. In equilibrium it therefore must be the case that these are equalized for all bonds (and equal to the policy rate). When expected excess returns are always zero, arbitrageurs are happy to accommodate any shifts in demand, hence in equilibrium yields are unchanged. Since long-term rates are unaffected by QE purchases, there is no direct effect on household consumption or savings decisions, therefore no indirect effect on the expected path of the policy rate.

But whenever arbitrageurs are risk-averse, LSAPs push down interest rates and boost output. It is still the case that QE purchases do not have a (direct) effect on the expected path of the policy rate. But when arbitrageurs care about risk, expected excess returns of long-term bonds are not necessarily zero. Arbitrageurs demand compensation for taking on

risk, and in equilibrium the market price of risk is not zero. Since the price of risk depends on the portfolio allocations of arbitrageurs, the more concentrated the arbitrageurs' portfolio is in risky long-term bonds, the higher this compensation is required to be. By purchasing long-term debt, QE effectively reduces the amount of risk arbitrageurs are required to hold, which puts downward pressure on returns of all bonds.

This partial equilibrium effect is mitigated by a general equilibrium effect: when long-term rates fall, so does the effective borrowing rate of households. Through the standard Euler equation dynamics, this implies that consumption (hence output) will rise. But then the endogenous response of the central bank is to increase the policy rate. This indirect effect puts countervailing upward pressure on long-term rates, as the expected path of short rates is higher than before. But since arbitrageurs are risk-averse, this upward pressure is weakened relative to the predictions of the expectations hypothesis. Prop. 3 shows that this indirect effect does not outweigh the direct effect, and it will still be the case that in general equilibrium QE purchases will push down effective borrowing rates, leading to an increase in output.

Together, these results show that the effectiveness of the two major unconventional monetary policy tools are mirror images of one another. In either case, passthrough to households only occurs to the extent that arbitrageurs respond to the policy changes. For forward guidance, healthy financial markets are key as arbitrageurs only care about the future path of the policy rate. But as financial markets become disrupted, arbitrageurs become more concerned with risk and less responsive to future changes in the short rate. Then this is exactly the time when LSAPs are most effective: by removing risk from the portfolio of arbitrageurs, these purchases push down long-term interest rates and boost output.

The second result in Prop. 3 shows that the effect of QE depends critically on the mean reversion properties of purchases.

[Greenlaw et al. \(2018\)](#), [Greenwood et al. \(2016\)](#)

4 Allowing for Sticky Prices

This section extends the analysis from Section 3 to allow for inflation. I confirm the results in the case of fully rigid prices go through when prices are sticky but not fully fixed. The main difference between the two models is the conditions for determinacy. In the rigid price model, determinacy in general equilibrium was guaranteed. Once prices are not fixed,

determinacy is only guaranteed for some parameterizations of the model.

This result is also present in a benchmark New Keynesian model, and is often stated as the following: the central bank must move the nominal rate more than one-for-one with inflation, in order to move real rates. In benchmark models this is achieved by a simple inequality condition on the Taylor rule coefficients (frequently $\phi_\pi > 1$). But because aggregate dynamics depend on the household's real effective borrowing rate, the determinacy condition involves the entire term structure of interest rates. And since monetary policy is transmitted to the term structure through imperfect financial markets, this condition will implicitly depend on the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs. As I will show, increasing limits to arbitrage moves the model towards the region of indeterminacy.

4.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics

Now I assume that prices are not fully rigid, so $\delta > 0$ and inflation and the output gap evolve according to Eqs. (3) and (2). The central bank follows a Taylor rule with persistence:

$$dr_t = -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_\pi \pi_t - \phi_x x_t - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \quad (23)$$

where $B_{r,t}$ is a standard Brownian motion. ϕ_π and ϕ_x govern the feedback rule for changes in inflation and output to changes in the policy rate, and κ_r is the mean-reversion parameter. r^* is the central bank's target policy rate, which is set to deliver zero inflation and output gap in steady state.

Again start with the conjecture that the model features an affine term structure in the state variables. Both inflation π_t and the output gap x_t are jump variables, while as before the interest rate rule implies that r_t is the only state variable, so the term structure is characterized by two coefficient functions $A_r(\tau)$ and $C(\tau)$. Writing the model in matrix form according to Eq. (8) gives

$$\Upsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_r & -\kappa_r \phi_\pi & -\kappa_r \phi_x \\ 0 & -\rho & \delta \\ -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r & \varsigma^{-1} & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

The rational expectations equilibrium is determinate if and only if Υ has one stable eigenvalue λ_1 ; under rational expectations the dynamics of the short rate and inflation and

the output gap are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} dr_t &= -\lambda_1(r_t - r^{SS}) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \\ \pi_t &= \omega_\pi(r_t - r^{SS}), \quad x_t = \omega_x(r_t - r^{SS}) \end{aligned}$$

The following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium object \hat{A}_r in terms of this eigenvalue.

Lemma 6 (Characterizing \hat{A}_r , sticky prices). *Consider the sticky price model.*

1. Υ has exactly one eigenvalue with positive real part if and only if

$$\hat{A}_r > \frac{\delta}{\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x} \quad (24)$$

2. \hat{A}_r is given by the function $h : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$:

$$h(\lambda_1) = \frac{(\lambda_1 - \kappa_r)(\lambda_1^2 + \lambda_1\rho - \varsigma^{-1}\delta)}{\varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda_1\phi_x)} \quad (25)$$

3. The inflation and output gap dynamics are given by

$$\omega_\pi = \frac{\delta(\kappa_r - \lambda_1)}{\kappa_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda_1\phi_x)}, \quad \omega_x = \frac{(\lambda_1 + \rho)(\kappa_r - \lambda_1)}{\kappa_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda_1\phi_x)}$$

The macroeconomic dynamics continue to nest the benchmark New Keynesian model, where the affine coefficients are simply $\hat{A}_r = 1$ and $\hat{C} = 0$. When this is the case, if the central bank only cares about inflation (so $\phi_x = 0$), the determinacy condition Eq. (24) simplifies to the standard condition that $\phi_\pi > 1$. But in this model, \hat{A}_r is a general equilibrium object which will depend on the risk aversion of arbitrageurs. Thus, whether the model satisfies determinacy will also depend on the level of risk aversion.

Note that as $\delta \rightarrow 0$, all the above results simplify to what was found in the case of fully rigid prices.

4.2 General Equilibrium Solution

The policy rate is the only state variable, hence conditional on the equilibrium dynamics of the policy rate, the arbitrageur optimality conditions and the characterization of the affine coefficients is the same as when prices are fully fixed. Thus, the results of Lemma 6 and 3

together solve for \hat{A}_r and λ_1 in general equilibrium. This also allows for a characterization of when the model has a unique equilibrium.

Proposition 4 (General equilibrium, sticky prices). *Consider the sticky price model.*

1. *There exists some positive eigenvalue of Υ $\lambda_1 > 0$ for which $g(\lambda_1) = h(\lambda_1)$.*
2. *If the model is determinate (the inequality in Eq. (24) is satisfied), then $\hat{A}_r < 1$ and is unique, which fully characterizes the model equilibrium.*

Note that if Eq. (24) is violated, there exists another eigenvalue $\lambda_2 > 0$ such that $\hat{A}_r = h(\lambda_2)$. This implies the model is indeterminate. \hat{A}_r may still be unique, but it may also be the case that there is some $0 < \lambda' < \lambda_1$ such that $g(\lambda') = h(\lambda')$. Hence, rather than attempting to define some selection criteria to re-establish determinacy, I choose to only focus on models that satisfy the conditions for determinacy.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium obtained in Prop. 4. The dotted light orange and dark teal lines are $g(\cdot)$ for low and high levels of risk aversion, respectively. Unlike the rigid price model, this plot illustrates that for some parameterizations (in this case, when risk aversion is very high), equilibrium is no longer unique. Finally, I also plots the equivalent function $g(\cdot)$ for a benchmark New Keynesian model (the dotted grey line). Note that the determinacy condition of the benchmark model depends only on the properties of the function $h(\cdot)$ (which is determined by the macroeconomic parameters); financial frictions are not present.

4.3 Conventional Policy

This section studies how conventional monetary policy works in the sticky price model.

Corollary 4.1 (Comparative statics, sticky prices). *Consider the sticky price model. In general equilibrium:*

1. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial a} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial a} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_\pi}{\partial a} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial a} > 0$.
2. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \kappa_r} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \kappa_r} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_\pi}{\partial \kappa_r} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial \kappa_r} > 0$.
3. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \phi_\pi} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \phi_\pi} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_\pi}{\partial \phi_\pi} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial \phi_\pi} > 0$.

4. $\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \phi_x} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \phi_x} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_\pi}{\partial \phi_x} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial \phi_x} > 0$.
5. Consider two different weighting functions $\eta^s(\tau)$ and $\eta^\ell(\tau)$, such that for some T^* , $\eta^s(\tau) \geq \eta^\ell(\tau) \iff \tau \leq T^*$. Then $\lambda_1^s > \lambda_1^\ell$, $\hat{A}_r^s > \hat{A}_r^\ell$, $\omega_\pi^s < \omega_\pi^\ell$, $\omega_x^s < \omega_x^\ell$ where superscripts denote the equilibrium outcomes under the corresponding weighting functions.

The results in Cor. 4.1 confirm the results of the rigid price model carry over to the case of sticky prices. The first result show that the responsiveness of the (nominal) effective borrowing rate to changes in the short rate declines as risk aversion increases. In general equilibrium, when the model is determinate, this will imply that the real effective borrowing rate also becomes less responsive, hence inflation and output also respond less to changes in the short rate as risk aversion increases. This also implies that monetary shocks become less persistent. The final result, which shows what happens when household borrowing becomes more concentrated towards long-term rates, has similar results. Borrowing becomes less responsive to the short rate, and thus inflation and output also respond less to changes in the short rate. In equilibrium, this implies that monetary shocks are not as persistent.

The other set of results relate to the central bank's policy rule. Increases in the mean-reversion parameter (κ_r), the sensitivity to inflation (ϕ_π), and the sensitivity to output (ϕ_x) all cause shocks to the policy rate in equilibrium to mean revert faster (higher λ_1) and therefore the (nominal) effective borrowing rate responds less to these monetary shocks (lower \hat{A}_r). Again in general equilibrium, when the model is determinate, this also leads to smaller changes in inflation and output.

4.4 Determinacy

In the rigid price model, determinacy was guaranteed. This is no longer the case once prices are not fixed. Moreover, the determinacy condition is more complicated than a benchmark New Keynesian model.

Corollary 4.2 (Determinacy, sticky prices). *Consider the determinacy condition of the sticky price model. If $\delta > 0$, there exists some upper bound \bar{a} such that, whenever $a > \bar{a}$, the model is indeterminate. Similarly, there are upper bounds for κ_r and σ_r (if $a \neq 0$) above which the model is indeterminate. For ϕ_π and ϕ_x there exists upper bounds above which the model is determinate.*

From a macroeconomic perspective, the reason for indeterminacy in this model is analogous to a standard model. Suppose inflation increases. The central bank responds by in-

creasing the policy rate, but if the real borrowing rate faced by households does not rise then the policy response is unable to stabilize the macroeconomy. This logic holds in my model, but the relationship between the policy rate and the household effective borrowing rate is complicated by the fact that policy changes are passed through by risk-averse arbitrageurs.

The first result in Cor. 4.2 says that if financial markets become severely disrupted, the model moves into the region of indeterminacy. This is for the same reason that conventional policy becomes less effective: the passthrough of policy rate changes to the (nominal) effective borrowing rate becomes dampened, and this dampening can become severe enough that the real effective borrowing rate no longer moves to stabilize the economy.

On the other hand, the central bank can guarantee determinacy given any level of (finite) risk aversion by responding more aggressively to inflation (or output). Perhaps more interestingly, if the policy rule does not exhibit enough inertia (that is, the mean reversion rate κ_r is very high), this can also induce model indeterminacy. This is perhaps one theoretical reason why central banks seem to pursue inertial policy rules. A high degree of monetary policy inertia implies that changes in the policy rate are endogenously passed to long-term rates. When household borrowing depends on a mix of short- and long-term rates, this leads to larger responses of output and inflation.

What does it mean in reality for a macroeconomic model to exhibit indeterminacy? As discussed in e.g. Clarida et al. (2000), one practical way of thinking about indeterminacy is that it induces excess volatility. When policy is such that it gives rise to an indeterminate model, this opens up the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations and the like. This may increase the amount of volatility in the model.

In the model, the parameters governing both the central bank's policy rule as well as the risk aversion of arbitrageurs are fixed across time. But stepping outside the model, what do the results in Cor. 4.2 say? One interpretation is that if financial crises are thought of as large disruptions in financial markets, with big increases in risk aversion of investors (or the risk-bearing capacity of investors), then this result says that financial crises can lead to macroeconomic instability, even if the cause of the crises was unrelated to the macroeconomy.

Central bankers can induce stability again, but they can do so by becoming more aggressive. This runs counter to the idea that central banks should become more passive in crises, and make up for it after the crisis passes.

4.5 Forward Guidance

This section extends the previous analysis of forward guidance to the case of sticky prices. As before, the central bank announces a target peg for interest rates r^\diamond , which will last for a set period of time t^\diamond before returning to a standard Taylor rule. That is, the short rate evolves according to:

$$dr_t = \begin{cases} -\kappa_r^\diamond(r_t - r^\diamond) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} & \text{if } 0 < t < t^\diamond \\ -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_\pi \pi_t - \phi_x x_t - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} & \text{if } t \geq t^\diamond \end{cases}$$

and initially, the short rate at $t = 0$ is at the peg: $r_0 = r^\diamond$. Inflation and the output gap still evolve according to Eqs. (3) and (2).

Since the policy rate is the only state variable, the affine functional form is the same as in the rigid price model. Using the same approach as before, I now turn to solving for the rational expectations equilibrium dynamics and the initial level of inflation π_0 and the output gap x_0 .

Proposition 5 (Forward guidance, sticky prices). *Consider the forward guidance sticky price model. In general equilibrium:*

1. $\frac{\partial \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond} \leq 0$ and $\frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r^\diamond} \leq 0$. Both are increasing in a , and approach 0 as $a \rightarrow \infty$.
2. $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond} \leq 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond} \leq 0$. Both are increasing in a , and approach 0 as $a \rightarrow \infty$.

Note that inflation and the output gap fall if the central bank increases the level of the peg, and this effect grows with the length of the peg. So the first result of Prop. 5 says that current inflation and output become less sensitive to the size of the forward guidance shock as the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs falls, and eventually become completely insensitive; while the second result says the same regarding length of the peg.

[Figure 6 about here.]

Figure 6 shows the results regarding inflation and output graphically. The dark “level” line in the first panel corresponds to $\frac{\partial \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond}$, while the lighter “length” line corresponds to $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond}$. The second panel plots the same objects for the output gap x_0 . As risk aversion increases, both of these effects are mitigated.

4.6 Quantitative Easing

I now modify the sticky price model to allow for QE shocks. Suppose that the central bank also purchases long-term bonds, so that the demand shifter in Eq. (4) evolves according to Eq. (19).

First, I solve the macroeconomic dynamics, taking as given the affine coefficients. Write the model in matrix form Eq. (8), where

$$\Upsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_r & 0 & -\kappa_r \phi_\pi & -\kappa_r \phi_x \\ 0 & \kappa_\beta & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\rho & \delta \\ -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r & -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta & \varsigma^{-1} & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Lemma 7 (Characterizing \hat{A}_r and \hat{A}_β , sticky prices). *Consider the sticky price QE model.*

1. Υ has exactly two eigenvalues with positive real part if and only if the condition Eq. (24) is satisfied. Further, these stable roots are real. One of these eigenvalues is κ_β , the other is $\lambda_1 > 0$.
2. \hat{A}_r is still given by Eq. (25).
3. The rational expectations equilibrium dynamic matrices are given by Eqs. (A5) and (A6).

Given the equilibrium value of λ_1 , \hat{A}_r is the same as the sticky price model. The determinacy condition is also equivalent. As in the rigid price model, this is because I treat QE as a zero-probability event. Moreover, conditional on how the state evolves in general equilibrium, the arbitrageurs optimality conditions and portfolio problem is the same as considered in Lemma 5. Therefore, putting everything together shows how QE shocks impact the economy in general equilibrium.

Proposition 6 (QE, sticky prices). *Consider the QE sticky price model. In general equilibrium, the model is determinate then*

$$\hat{A}_\beta \geq 0 \implies \frac{\partial \pi_t}{\partial \beta_t} \leq 0, \frac{\partial x_t}{\partial \beta_t} \leq 0$$

with equality if and only if $a = 0$.

Prop. 6 confirms that in the sticky price model, when the determinacy condition is satisfied QE works in the same way as in the rigid price model. Expansionary QE shocks

move both inflation and output in the same direction, but only when arbitrageurs are not risk-neutral.

4.7 Can QE Be Stabilizing?

The results above show that, under the right financial conditions, QE can move output and inflation. A separate question is: can the central bank use QE to achieve determinacy and stabilize the economy?

Suppose that the central bank conducts QE operations in a similar manner to how it sets the policy rate. I study this in my model by modifying the idiosyncratic demand factor from Eq. (19) so that it endogenously reacts to output and inflation:

$$d\beta_t = -\kappa_\beta \left(\beta_t - \phi_\pi^\beta \pi_t - \phi_x^\beta x_t \right) dt \quad (26)$$

[Figure 7 about here.]

Figure 7 shows how the determinacy conditions varies with different levels of risk aversion (a) and QE responsiveness to inflation (ϕ_π^β , Panel A) or the output gap (ϕ_x^β , Panel B). When risk aversion is very low, the model is determinate for all values of ϕ_π^β and ϕ_x^β . Moreover, changes in the responsiveness to either inflation or output have no effect on the determinacy condition (the value of the unstable eigenvalues). As risk aversion increases, the baseline model with no endogenous QE responses quickly moves towards the region of indeterminacy. But allowing for a stabilizing QE policy that reacts to inflation ($\phi_\pi^\beta > 0$) moves the model back towards the region of determinacy. For strong enough responses of QE to inflation, the model regains determinacy. However, the higher is risk aversion, the response of QE must become more and more aggressive to guarantee determinacy. On the other hand, while a QE policy that reacts to the output gap can also help recover determinacy for intermediate levels of risk aversion, for higher levels of risk aversion the magnitude of the response must be much larger than in the inflation case (that is, determinacy is guaranteed for $\phi_\pi^\beta < \phi_x^\beta$).

5 General Numerical Model

This section generalizes the analysis from the previous sections and develops the tools to solve the model numerically. In particular, the extensions considered in this section allow

for a richer set of shocks, and multiple “demand” shocks. This allows me to study not only standard QE policies, but more complicated LSAP programs such as Operation Twist, where the Federal Reserve bought long-term bonds while selling shorter term securities.

5.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics

I assume prices are sticky but not fully rigid, and I add shocks besides monetary policy. In particular, I add shocks that shift demand for bonds coming from the idiosyncratic preferred habitat investors. This model allows me to explore the robustness of the results in the previous section, as well as explore the implications for unconventional monetary policy.

$$d\pi_t = (\rho\pi_t - \delta x_t - z_{\pi,t}) dt \quad (27)$$

$$dx_t = \varsigma^{-1} (\tilde{r}_t - \pi_t - \bar{r} - z_{x,t}) dt \quad (28)$$

$$dr_t = -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_\pi\pi_t - \phi_x x_t - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \quad (29)$$

The cost-push shock to the Phillips curve and demand shock to the Euler equation⁵ follow simple processes:

$$dz_{i,t} = -\kappa_{z_i} z_{i,t} dt + \sigma_{z_i} dB_{z_i,t}$$

Additionally, I assume there are some demand factors that affect the demand of preferred habitat investors:

$$d\beta_{k,t} = -\kappa_{\beta_k} \beta_{k,t} dt + \sigma_{\beta_k} dB_{\beta_k,t}$$

⁵Notes that the shocks $z_{\pi,t}$ and $z_{x,t}$ enter Eqs. (27) and (28) with a negative sign, as in this setup they are shocks to the change in inflation and output. Compare with a standard discrete-time New Keynesian model:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + z_{\pi,t} \\ \implies E_t \pi_{t+1} - \pi_t &= (\beta^{-1} - 1) \pi_t - \beta^{-1} \kappa x_t - \beta^{-1} z_{\pi,t} \\ x_t &= -\sigma^{-1} (i_t + E_t \pi_{t+1} - \bar{r}) + E_t x_{t+1} + z_{x,t} \\ \implies E_t x_{t+1} - x_t &= \sigma^{-1} (i_t + E_t \pi_{t+1} - \bar{r}) - z_{x,t} \end{aligned}$$

where the shocks enter with a negative sign when written in terms of changes.

This is the only change to the term structure side of the model: the demand shifter $\beta_{t,\tau}$ from idiosyncratic preferred habitat investors is given by:

$$\beta_{t,\tau} = \bar{\beta}(\tau) + \sum_k \beta_{k,t} \theta_k(\tau)$$

$\theta_k(\tau)$ governs how shifts in the demand factor $\beta_{k,t}$ affects the level of demand for τ bonds. Note that, unlike the QE models explored in previous sections, the demand shocks are now stochastic.

As before, I conjecture that bonds are affine in the state variables. Now the state consists of the short rate and all of the shocks. Using the matrix notation in Eqs. (8), (9), and (10), let \mathbf{Y}_t be the vector of all variables, and denote the state as a vector \mathbf{y}_t . Analogously to the baseline model, the effective rate is therefore

$$\tilde{r}_t = \mathbf{y}_t^T \hat{\mathbf{A}} + \hat{C}$$

and the preferred habitat demand shifter is

$$\beta_{t,\tau} = \bar{\beta}(\tau) + \mathbf{y}_t^T \Theta(\tau)$$

where $\Theta(\tau)$ is a vector of that collects the $\theta_k(\tau)$ functions corresponding to each $\beta_{k,t}$ demand shocks (and is zero for the other state variables).

5.2 Term Structure Determination

Lemma 8 characterizes the affine coefficients in the generalized model.

Lemma 8 (Affine coefficients, generalized term structure). *Suppose the state variables are characterized by Eq. (9) for some matrix Γ , with the short rate r_t ordered first. Then the following characterizes the affine coefficients $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ and $C(\tau)$. Define the matrix*

$$\mathbf{M} = \Gamma^T - a \left[\int_0^T \alpha(\tau) (\tau \Theta(\tau) - \mathbf{A}(\tau)) \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T d\tau \right] \Sigma \quad (30)$$

Letting \mathbf{e}_1 be the first standard basis coordinate vector, if \mathbf{M} is diagonalizable and invertible then $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ solves

$$\mathbf{A}(\tau) = \mathbf{G} \mathbf{D}^{-1} [\mathbf{I} - \exp(-\mathbf{D}\tau)] \mathbf{1} \quad (31)$$

where \mathbf{D} is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of \mathbf{M} , and \mathbf{G} is the matrix of corresponding eigenvectors, normalized such that $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{1} = \mathbf{e}_1$, where $\mathbf{1}$ is a vector of ones. The solution for the constant function is given by Eq. (A11).

This is nothing more than the multidimensional generalization of Lemma 3, with the matrix \mathbf{M} corresponding to the scalar ν . Note that $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ is the solution to a fixed point problem, because \mathbf{M} depends on an integral term involving $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$. This is similar to the fixed point problem which defines the parameter ν , but is now complicated by the fact that the problem is no longer scalar-valued. Except in special cases, the problem no longer lends itself to tractable solutions but instead must be solved numerically.

5.3 General Equilibrium Numerical Solution

I now solve the generalized model from the previous section and explore the implications for monetary policy. The previous section characterized the partial equilibrium solutions for the macroeconomic dynamics and term structure coefficient functions. However, unlike the baseline model, numerical techniques are required to fully solve the model. The algorithm is described in Appendix B.

[Table 1 about here.]

In order to numerically solve the model I need to take a stance on the parameterization of the model. Table 1 summarizes the calibration used in the exercise. The maximum maturity of a bond is set to 10 years. The functions of maturities τ up to T ($\eta(\tau)$, $\alpha(\tau)$, and $\theta_k(\tau)$) are relatively unrestricted in the setup of the model but require functional form assumptions in order to solve numerically. I assume that $\eta(\tau)$ is a simple average; this is the most straightforward way to capture the spirit of the model but is perhaps somewhat extreme as it puts a lot of weight on the long end of the term structure. I set $\alpha(\tau) = \exp(-.01\tau)$ which implies that the elasticity of preferred habitat investors declines modestly with maturity of the bond. The demand factor functions $\theta_k(\tau)$ can be thought of as proxies for the types of purchases that the Federal Reserve undertook during its various rounds of QE. I assume that $\theta_k(\tau)$ are Dirac delta functions centered at maturities of length 3 and 7 years. This is a useful way of capturing the targets of QE bond purchases; of course actual purchases were not so concentrated, but this is a useful simplification.

For all shocks, I assume that the mean reversion parameters $\kappa_i = 0.4$ and the variances are $\sigma_i^2 = 0.1$. I study the model as arbitrageurs go from perfectly risk-neutrality ($a = 0$) to

a very high degree of risk aversion ($a = 75$). The key result is how the model's qualitative predictions depend on the level of risk aversion. I set the macroeconomic parameters in order to study the model with a very high degree of risk aversion while still maintaining determinacy. This is the reason for the high degree of price stickiness and aggressive monetary policy, which guarantees the model is far away from the region of indeterminacy for all levels of risk aversion. The results of this exercise should be taken as illustrative rather quantitative.

5.4 Response to a Monetary Shock

I first study the macroeconomic response to a standard monetary shock. The shock is a 100 basis point fall in the policy rate (an expansionary shock).

[Figure 8 about here.]

The first panel of Figure 8 plots the immediate response of the yield curve (in terms of deviations from steady state). Lighter lines plot the response for low levels of risk aversion; the darker lines correspond to high levels of risk aversion. When risk aversion is very low, the entire yield curve shifts down significantly; even long maturity yields fall by over ten basis points. This is because monetary shocks are fairly persistent in the calibration considered in this exercise, and so when risk aversion is low the response of long-term yields are roughly equal to the average change in the expected path of the policy rate. But as risk aversion increases, the darker lines begin to move closer to zero. While short-term rates still respond strongly, long-term rates become nearly unresponsive. The expected path of the policy rate is not that different, but arbitrageurs do not equalize the expected returns of all bonds and hence long-term rates under-react to the change in the policy rate.

The bottom panels of Figure 8 plot the immediate responses of output and inflation, with the level of risk aversion on the x-axis. These results show that as risk aversion increases, the immediate macroeconomic effects of a monetary shock fall. This follows from the results regarding the yield curve. Since the entire yield curve becomes less responsive to a given monetary shock, the household effective borrowing rate similarly responds less. Hence the consumption response (and output gap response) is smaller. Smaller output gaps into the future imply that inflation also responds less.

5.5 Response to QE Shocks

I now study the response to two types of QE shocks. In the model, these correspond to shocks to the demand factors which I label as $\beta_{s,t}$ (short-term shock, purchases concentrated at 3-year maturities) and $\beta_{\ell,t}$ (long-term shock, purchases concentrated at 7-year maturities).

[Figure 9 about here.]

Figure 9 plots the response to a unit shock to the short demand factor $\beta_{s,t}$. The top panel plots how the yield curve changes immediately, where darker lines correspond to increasing levels of risk aversion. The bottom panels plot immediate responses of output and inflation (with the level of risk aversion on the x-axis).

When risk aversion is very low, there is little to no response to a QE shock. This is because arbitrageurs are able to fully absorb the purchases without requiring any changes in the returns of their portfolio. This implies that there is no reaction in the yield curve, hence there is no feedback to household borrowing. But as risk aversion increases, the effects increase. Again this is due to the behavior of arbitrageurs. QE purchases essentially offload some risk from the portfolio of arbitrageurs. Hence, they require smaller excess returns to hold other bonds, which pushes down interest rates. This leads to a decline in the effective borrowing rate of households, which boosts consumption (hence output) on impact. As risk aversion increases, the magnitude of the response of the term structure increases, leading to larger macroeconomic effects.

[Figure 10 about here.]

Figure 10 repeats the above exercise for unit shocks to the long demand factor $\beta_{\ell,t}$. Once again, there is nearly no response when arbitrageurs are close to risk neutral; as risk aversion increases, so too does the magnitude of the response of the yield curve and macroeconomic variables.

The intuition is similar for both “short” and “long” QE shocks, but comparing the differential impacts also reveals interesting results. When risk aversion is low, the response of the yield curve to both short-term and long-term purchases is very similar in shape. The response is hump-shaped, with the peak response occurring at shorter to intermediate maturities, and pushes both short- and long-term spot rates in the same direction. Only the magnitude differs, with the long-term shock leading to somewhat larger responses.

However, when risk aversion becomes sufficiently high, the effects become more localized. In response to the short demand shock, the effect on short rates grows in magnitude while the effect for long-term rates falls and eventually turns slightly positive. For the long demand shock, the response of short rates begins to decline, similarly turning positive for very high values of risk aversion, while the response of long rates continues to grow as risk aversion increases. This result shows that as risk aversion increases, so too does the localization of demand shocks. This is a key partial equilibrium result from [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#) and [Gorodnichenko and Ray \(2017\)](#); this exercise shows that the finding holds in general equilibrium.

What causes this localization? Intuitively, consider the limiting case when arbitrageurs only want to minimize the variance of the change in their wealth. Hence they allocate their entire portfolio to the short (risk-free) rate, taking no positions in any other longer-term bonds. In response to a long-term demand shock from preferred habitat investors, arbitrageurs would be unwilling to make any changes their portfolio allocation to accommodate the shift. The only way for the net supply condition to be satisfied is if the prices of the bonds that are affected by the demand shock respond. Moreover, these are the only bonds that see price changes. In other words, the demand shock has only local effects.

Of course, even when arbitrageurs are very risk-averse the bond market will not exhibit this type of extreme segmentation. But the qualitative behavior of the term structure response is different for low and high levels of risk aversion. When risk aversion is low, demand shocks have a (small) effect, but the location of the shock does not matter. Because the key source of risk that arbitrageurs are concerned with is short-rate risk. Every bond has some sensitivity to this source of risk, hence shifts in demand from preferred habitat investors change the portfolio allocations of arbitrageurs. Thus this changes the market price of short-rate risk, and as this impacts all bonds this has a global effect regardless of where the demand shock originates. For example, in response to positive demand shifts, arbitrageurs sell bonds, reducing their exposure to short-rate risk. Hence they require lower expected returns to hold bonds, pushing down rates. The bonds that respond the most are those most sensitive to short-rate risk, which does not depend on the location of the shock, but only on the stochastic (mean-reversion) properties of the shocks.

But when risk aversion is very high, demand shocks have a (large) effect, and the location of the shock matters. When risk aversion is very high and there are multiple sources of risk (short-rate risk, multiple demand factors, and other structural shocks), arbitrageurs try to limit their exposure to these sources of risk. This means that demand shocks must have

mostly local effects, since otherwise arbitrageurs would be exposing themselves to other sources of risk. In other words, if a demand shock for long-term debt had big effects on short-term debt, this would be because arbitrageurs were making large changes to their holdings of short-term debt. But this changes their exposure to other sources of risk. Hence they choose not to integrate the markets across maturities, and the shocks stay more localized.

5.6 Response to an Operation Twist Shock

Next, I look at a policy mimicking “Operation Twist,” where the Federal Reserve purchased long-term securities and sold short-term securities. To model this, I analyze the effect of a simultaneous increase in long-term purchases ($\beta_{\ell,t}$) and decrease in short-term purchases ($\beta_{s,t}$). Figure 11 plots the yield curve and real responses.

[Figure 11 about here.]

The previous QE exercises showed that when risk aversion is low, the yield curve reacts similarly to the short and long demand factors; the only difference is the magnitude of the response to the long demand factor is larger. When the two shocks are combined but with opposite sign, this implies that the long demand factor dominates, leading to a decline in the term structure. The macroeconomic response is thus a similar but muted version of the QE responses observed previously.

But as can be seen in Figure 11, when risk aversion is high enough, the short and long demand factors have differential impacts on the yield curve. The combination of the two shocks leads to declining long-term rates, but at some point leads to increasing short-term rates. For intermediate values of risk aversion, real effective borrowing rates still fall, leading to increases in output and inflation. However, as risk aversion continues to increase, the magnitude of the macroeconomic effects declines. For extreme values of risk aversion, the sign eventually flips: after the Operation Twist shock, both inflation and the output gap actually decline.

I emphasize that the purpose of these exercises is to illustrate the possible responses to various LSAP policies, rather than to make clear quantitative predictions. Nevertheless, the key result is that the transmission of these policies depends crucially on the health of financial markets. As with conventional monetary policy explored in the baseline model, the effectiveness of QE policies varies with the level of risk aversion of arbitrageurs. But the interaction is the opposite of conventional policy. QE has no effect when arbitrageurs

are risk neutral; as risk aversion increases, QE becomes more and more effective at moving the yield curve and hence boosting output.

Policies like Operation Twist may have more ambiguous effects. When financial markets are highly disrupted, bond markets become much more segmented. Targeted buying and selling of securities throughout the term structure will have highly localized effects. Depending on which maturities are the most important for household borrowing, this could end up having the opposite of the intended effect, leading to falling consumption.

5.7 Optimal Policy

A full treatment of a planner's optimal policy problem is beyond the scope of this paper. Allowing for the central bank to choose a path of the policy rate that differs from the Taylor-type rules considered in this paper will in general lead to bond prices which are not affine functions of the state variables. Instead, I consider a simpler optimal policy problem. Suppose that the central bank also responds to the cost-push and demand shocks. That is, the monetary rule now reads:

$$dr_t = -\kappa_r(r_t - \phi_\pi \pi_t - \phi_x x_t - \phi_{z_\pi} z_{\pi,t} - \phi_{z_x} z_{x,t} - r^*) dt + \sigma_r dB_{r,t} \quad (32)$$

This section analyzes how the central bank would choose to set ϕ_z^π and ϕ_z^x optimally, as a function of financial market health. I assume a quadratic loss function for the planner, given by

$$\min_{\phi_{z_\pi}, \phi_{z_x}} E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} (w_\pi \pi_t^2 + w_x x_t^2) dt$$

where $w_\pi \geq 0$ and $w_x \geq 0$ are the weights that the planner assigns to inflation and output, respectively. Appendix C.6 derives the general expression for this present discounted value of future second moments of the jump variables in this class of models.

[Figure 12 about here.]

Figure 12 plots the optimal coefficients ϕ_{z_π} (Panel A) and ϕ_{z_x} (Panel B) as a function of risk aversion. I consider three experiments, where the planner cares about inflation and output equally (solid lines); inflation only (dashed lines); and output only (dashed-dotted lines). Unsurprisingly, the equal weighting case lies in between the two extremes, though in this experiment the equal weighting scheme is very similar to the output-only outcomes.⁶

⁶Note that in a full optimal policy experiment, the quadratic loss function is an approximation to the

First, note that regardless of weights, the optimal coefficient on demand shocks $z_{x,t}$ is positive. Suppose that the central bank does not respond to demand shocks ($\phi_{z_x} = 0$). Then demand shocks move inflation and output in the same direction (so-called “divine coincidence”). Hence, variation in both inflation and output can be minimized by raising the policy rate in response to demand shocks. By leaning against the wind, both output and inflation respond less to these shocks. The magnitude will depend on the planner weights, but not the sign.

On the other hand, in this model cost-push shocks $z_{\pi,t}$ do not satisfy divine coincidence. If the central bank does not respond to cost-push shocks ($\phi_{z_\pi} = 0$), then in response to a shock inflation increases while output falls. Thus, if the central bank only cares about inflation, the optimal response is to counteract this force by raising rates ($\phi_{z_\pi} > 0$). If instead the planner only cares about output, the optimal response is to lower rates ($\phi_{z_\pi} < 0$); while this increases the severity of inflation fluctuations, it mitigates the output response.

The signs of the optimal coefficients are similar to what is found in benchmark New Keynesian models. More interesting is how these optimal coefficients vary as financial market imperfections increase. For all weighting schemes, the optimal coefficients are increasing as arbitrageur risk aversion increases. The reason is that monetary policy relies on the pass-through provided by financial markets. As the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs becomes disrupted, monetary policy pass-through to households (and hence output and inflation) is weakened. Moreover, as financial market disruptions increase, the economy becomes less stable and the output and inflation responses to these shocks increase. For inflation, the response to both shocks becomes more positive; while for output, the response to demand shocks becomes more positive while the response to cost-push shocks increases towards zero. Thus, the planner’s optimal response to these shocks also increases.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper studies conventional and unconventional monetary policy through the lens of a general equilibrium “preferred habitat” New Keynesian model. When consumption depends on both short- and long-term borrowing rates, the transmission of monetary policy to the macroeconomy depends on imperfect financial markets. As a result, standard monetary policy becomes less effective when financial markets are disrupted. For the same reason, the

welfare loss function, and the planner weights would be derived from this welfare function. The literature often finds that the optimal weighting scheme puts nearly all weight on inflation.

effectiveness of forward guidance is weakened. However, financial crises open the door to other unconventional policies like quantitative easing, which can push down long-term rates and stabilize output and inflation.

The stylized framework considered in this paper suggests a number of promising directions for future work. For example, the model does not allow for default risk, but in reality the key borrowing rates for households will not be default-free. Moreover, a major part of some QE programs was targeting mortgage-backed securities. The localization results suggest that during financial disruptions, LSAP programs will be most effective when they target borrowing markets to which households are most responsive. But the sensitivity of real activity to different borrowing rates, and the stability of this relationship over time, is an open empirical question.

The results relating financial health and the determinacy of the model are important for understanding how policymakers can achieve macroeconomic stability. Empirically, the model suggests revisiting the empirical work studying the stability properties of central bank policy rules, as the requirements for stability are state-dependent. Furthermore, the findings provide a possible justification for macro-prudential policies. The model assumes that risk aversion is fixed, but in reality the risk-bearing capacity of financial markets is endogenous. When this capacity is too low, the result is macroeconomic instability. If investors in financial markets do not internalize this, then there is an externality that policymakers can fix. Extending the model to allow for endogenous risk-bearing capacity is useful for understanding how these macro-prudential policies should be carried out.

This paper shows that LSAPs should be a tool in central bankers' arsenal to stabilize the economy during financial crises. But the predictions of the model are not only dependent on the health of financial markets but also sensitive to interactions with the location of the purchases in maturity space, how long the purchases last, how sensitive the real economy is to long-term rates, and the structure of the other fundamental shocks in the economy. However, policymakers are likely to face a great deal of uncertainty about these factors. This suggests that a better approach may be to target specific long-term rates, allowing for flexibility in the open-market operations used to achieve these targets. More generally, the model should serve as the basis for more quantitative analysis in order to design optimal policies.

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Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. The results follow from analyzing the characteristic polynomial of Υ :

$$c(\lambda) = \lambda^2 - \kappa_r \lambda - \varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r \phi_x \hat{A}_r$$

1. Note that $c(\lambda)$ is increasing iff $\lambda > \frac{1}{2}\kappa_r$. Additionally, $c(\lambda) \rightarrow \infty$ whenever $\lambda \rightarrow \pm\infty$. Note

$$c(0) = c(\kappa_r) = -\varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r \phi_x \hat{A}_r$$

Hence if $\hat{A}_r > 0$, the expression above is negative which implies $c(\lambda)$ has two roots: $\lambda_1 > \kappa_r$ and $\lambda_2 < 0$.

2. Setting $c(\lambda)$ to zero and solving for \hat{A}_r gives Eq. (11). Note that $h(\lambda)$ is a positive quadratic with zeros at $\lambda = 0$ and $\lambda = \kappa_r$; for $\lambda \in (0, \kappa_r)$, $h(\lambda)$ is negative.
3. The eigenvector associated with λ_1 is

$$q_1 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\lambda_1}{\varsigma^{-1}\hat{A}_r} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

In this case Ω , the matrix governing the equilibrium dynamics of the jump variables in Eq. (10), is simply a scalar, given by $\omega_x \equiv \frac{q_{21}}{q_{11}}$. Substituting the solution for \hat{A}_r gives the result.

□

Proof of Lemma 2. This result is the scalar counterpart of the optimality conditions derived in Lemma 8. The expected instantaneous return simplifies to

$$\mu_{t,\tau} = A'_r(\tau)r_t + C'(\tau) + \gamma(r_t - r^{SS})A_r(\tau) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_r^2 A_r(\tau)^2 \quad (\text{A1})$$

□

Proof of Lemma 3. The functional forms of $A_r(\tau)$, $C(\tau)$, and ν are again the scalar analogues of the results in Lemma 8. In this case, $\mathbf{M} \equiv \nu$ and simplifies to Eq. (16) and

$C(\tau)$ simplifies to

$$C(\tau) = \frac{1}{2} \quad (\text{A2})$$

If $a = 0$ it immediately follows that $\nu = \gamma$, so throughout assume that $a > 0$. In this case, solving for ν is a fixed point problem. Since $\alpha(\tau) > 0 \forall \tau$, this implies

$$a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau)^2 d\tau > 0$$

Hence, the right-hand-side of Eq. (16) is strictly greater than γ .

Next, note

$$\frac{\partial f(\nu\tau)^2}{\partial \nu} = 2\tau f(\nu\tau) f'(\nu\tau)$$

$f(\cdot)$ is a strictly decreasing, convex function, approaching 0 as $x \rightarrow \infty$. So the above expression is negative. This implies the right-hand-side of Eq. (16) is strictly decreasing in ν . Further, as $\nu \rightarrow \infty$, if $\tau > 0$ then $f(\nu\tau) \rightarrow 0$. Thus

$$\int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau)^2 d\tau \rightarrow 0$$

which implies the right-hand-side of Eq. (16) approaches γ as $\nu \rightarrow \infty$.

Hence there exists a unique $\nu \in (\gamma, \infty)$ such that Eq. (16) is satisfied. Treating ν as a function of γ , I derive some additional properties. Recall $\nu(\gamma) > \gamma$. Further,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial f(\nu\tau)^2}{\partial \gamma} &= 2\tau f(\nu\tau) f'(\nu\tau) \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial \gamma} \\ \implies \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial \gamma} &= \left(1 - 2a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^3 f(\nu\tau) f'(\nu\tau) d\tau \right)^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

Also note $\alpha(\tau) \tau^3 f(\nu\tau) \geq 0$ and $f'(\nu\tau) \leq 0$, so

$$0 < \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial \gamma} < 1$$

Fixing γ , note that

$$\frac{\partial \nu}{\partial a} = \frac{\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau)^2 d\tau}{1 - 2a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^3 f(\nu\tau) f'(\nu\tau) d\tau}$$

Hence ν is increasing in a .

Finally, \hat{A}_r is given by

$$\hat{A}_r \equiv \int_0^T \frac{\eta(\tau)}{\tau} A_r(\tau) d\tau$$

Eq. (17) is obtained by substituting Eq. (15). If $\eta(\tau)$ is the Dirac delta function, then $g(\gamma) = 1 \forall \gamma$. Otherwise,

$$g'(\gamma) = \int_0^T \eta(\tau) \tau f'(\nu\tau) d\tau \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial \gamma}$$

hence $g'(\gamma) < 0$ and additionally $g(\gamma) \rightarrow 0$ as $\gamma \rightarrow \infty$.

□

Proof of Prop. 1. In general equilibrium, λ_1 and \hat{A}_r are determined by the intersection of Eqs. (17) and (11). Recall from the proof of Lemma 3, for $\lambda > 0$, $g(\lambda)$ is strictly positive, decreasing, and approaches 0 as $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$. From the proof of Lemma 1, $h(\lambda)$ is negative for $0 < \lambda < \kappa_r$, but is strictly increasing and grows without bound when $\lambda \geq \kappa_r$. Hence there exists a unique $\lambda_1 > \kappa_r > 0$ such that $g(\lambda_1) = h(\lambda_1)$. Figure 2 plots examples of the intersection of g and h .

□

Proof of Corollary 1.1. Recall from Prop. 1 that \hat{A}_r (and the associated eigenvalue λ_1) are determined by the intersection of a downward sloping curve $g(\lambda)$ and an upward sloping (in the neighborhood of the intersection λ_1) curve $h(\lambda)$. And while these curves depend on the parameters of the model, the parameter dependence is disjoint: $g(\cdot)$ only depends on the parameters governing the term structure side of the model, while $h(\cdot)$ depends on the macro parameters. This greatly simplifies studying comparative statics.

1. The proof of Lemma 3 showed that ν is increasing in a . Then

$$\frac{\partial g(\lambda)}{\partial a} = \int_0^T \eta(\tau) f'(\nu\tau) d\tau \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial a}$$

which implies that for any given λ , an increase in a leads to a downward shift in $g(\lambda)$. Since $h(\lambda)$ is unchanged, this implies that the point of intersection shifts downward and to the left.

Further, note that as $a \rightarrow \infty$, $\nu \rightarrow \infty$. To see why, suppose instead that $\nu \rightarrow \nu^* < \infty$. Then $f(\nu\tau) \rightarrow f(\nu^*\tau) > 0$. But then

$$a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau)^2 d\tau \rightarrow \infty$$

and therefore the right-hand side Eq. (16) grows without bound, a contradiction. This immediately implies that $f(\nu\tau) \rightarrow 0$ and therefore so too does $g(\lambda)$ for $\lambda > 0$. As before, this says that the point of intersection of g and h continues shifting downward and to the left until $\hat{A}_r = 0$ and $\lambda_1 = \kappa_r$.

Note that if $a = 0$, $g(\lambda)$ is independent of changes in σ_r . But when $a \neq 0$, the same arguments above show that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \hat{A}_r}{\partial \sigma_r} &< 0, \quad \frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \sigma_r} < 0 \\ \lim_{\sigma_r \rightarrow \infty} \hat{A}_r &= 0, \quad \lim_{\sigma_r \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_1 = \kappa_r \end{aligned}$$

2. Differentiating Eq. (11) with respect to κ_r gives

$$-\frac{\lambda^2}{\varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r^2 \phi_x} < 0 \quad \forall \lambda$$

Hence the intersection shifts down and to the right.

3. Differentiating Eq. (11) with respect to ϕ_x gives

$$-\frac{\lambda(\lambda - \kappa_r)}{\varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r \phi_x^2}$$

which is negative whenever $\lambda > \kappa_r$. Hence the intersection shifts down and to the right.

4. Maturity Take arbitrary functions f and g , where f is positive and decreasing. g satisfies a single-crossing property:

$$g(x) > 0 \iff x < x^*$$

Finally, $\int g(x) dx = 0$. Then:

If $x < x^*$, then $g(x) > 0$ and $f(x) > f(x^*)$. Then $f(x)g(x) > f(x^*)g(x)$.

If $x > x^*$, then $g(x) < 0$ and $f(x) < f(x^*)$. Then $f(x)g(x) > f(x^*)g(x)$.

Hence

$$f(x)g(x) > f(x^*)g(x) \implies \int f(x)g(x) dx > f(x^*) \int g(x) dx = 0$$

Then set $f(\nu\tau)$ as f , and $\eta^s(\tau) - \eta^\ell(\tau)$ as g , which gives

$$\int_0^T (\nu\tau)\eta^s(\tau) d\tau > \int_0^T (\nu\tau)\eta^\ell(\tau) d\tau$$

which says that $g^s(\gamma) > g^\ell(\gamma)$ (using the notation from a previous Lemma). In other words, g shifts down moving from the η^s weights to the η^ℓ weights. Since h is unchanged, the equilibrium results follow.

□

Proof of Corollary 1.2. This follows from the steady state results derived in the proof of Prop. 1.

□

Proof of Prop. 2. To solve for x_0 , for $t \leq t^\diamond$ the dynamics of the policy rate under the peg imply that

$$\begin{aligned} E_0 r_t &= r^\diamond + e^{-\kappa_r^\diamond t} (r_0 - r^\diamond) \\ \implies E_0 r_{t^\diamond} &= r^\diamond \end{aligned}$$

In order to satisfy transversality conditions, once the central bank returns to a Taylor rule, the output gap must satisfy $x_{t^\diamond} = \omega_x(r_{t^\diamond} - r^{SS})$. Thus,

$$E_0 x_{t^\diamond} = \omega_x(r^\diamond - r^{SS})$$

Solving for $E_0 x_{t^\diamond}$ given x_0 gives

$$E_0 x_{t^\diamond} = x_0 + t^\diamond \varsigma^{-1} (\hat{A}_r^\diamond r^\diamond + \hat{C}^\diamond - \bar{r})$$

Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r^\diamond} &= \omega_x - t^\diamond \varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r^\diamond \\ \frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond} &= -\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_r^\diamond \end{aligned}$$

Then the result follows since

$$\frac{\partial \hat{A}_r^\diamond}{\partial a} < 0, \quad \left| \frac{\partial \omega_x}{\partial a} \right| < 0$$

□

Proof of Lemma 4. Following the same steps as in Lemma 1:

$$\hat{A}_r = \frac{\lambda_1(\lambda_1 - \kappa_r)}{\varsigma^{-1} \kappa_r \phi_x}$$

Substituting this into Υ , the eigenvalue decomposition is

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda &= \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \kappa_\beta & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\lambda_1 + \kappa_r \end{bmatrix} \\ Q &= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x}{-\lambda_1 + \kappa_r} & \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x}{\kappa_r - \kappa_\beta} & \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x}{\lambda_1} \\ 0 & \frac{\kappa_\beta^2 - \kappa_\beta \kappa_r - \lambda_1^2 + \lambda_1 \kappa_r}{(\kappa_r - \kappa_\beta) \varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta} & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Solving for the rational expectations equilibrium gives

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma &= \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1 & \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x \varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta}{\lambda_1 - \kappa_r + \kappa_\beta} \\ 0 & \kappa_\beta \end{bmatrix} \\ \Omega &= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{-\lambda_1 + \kappa_r}{\kappa_r \phi_x} & \frac{-\varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta}{\lambda_1 - \kappa_r + \kappa_\beta} \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

□

Proof of Lemma 5. This follows from the general case in Lemma 8, where

$$\Gamma = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_1 & \gamma_{12} \\ 0 & \gamma_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_r^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \implies \mathbf{M} = \begin{bmatrix} \nu & 0 \\ \nu_{12} & \gamma_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

and the elements of \mathbf{M} are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \nu &= \gamma_1 + a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) A_r(\tau)^2 d\tau \\ \nu_{12} &= \gamma_{12} + a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) [A_\beta(\tau) - \tau\theta(\tau)] A_r(\tau) d\tau \end{aligned}$$

The eigenvector decomposition gives

$$\mathbf{D} = \begin{bmatrix} \nu & 0 \\ 0 & \gamma_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{G} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \gamma_2} & \frac{\nu_{12}}{\gamma_2 - \nu} \end{bmatrix}$$

and thus

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}(\tau) &= \mathbf{GD}^{-1} [\mathbf{I} - \exp(-\mathbf{D}\tau)] \mathbf{1} \\ \implies A_r(\tau) &= \tau f(\nu\tau) \\ A_\beta(\tau) &= \frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \gamma_2} \tau (f(\nu\tau) - f(\gamma_2\tau)) \end{aligned}$$

Hence, rewriting the expression for ν gives

$$\nu = \gamma_1 + a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau)^2 d\tau$$

which is equivalent to Eq. (16).

Substituting the solution for $A_\beta(\tau)$ into the expression for ν_{12} and solving gives

$$\nu_{12} = \frac{\gamma_{12} - a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau) \theta(\tau) d\tau}{1 - \frac{a\sigma_r^2}{\nu - \gamma_2} \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 (f(\nu\tau) - f(\gamma_2\tau)) d\tau} \quad (\text{A3})$$

Thus, integrating and weighting by $\frac{\eta(\tau)}{\tau}$ gives

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{A}_r &= \int_0^T \eta(\tau) f(\nu\tau) d\tau \\ \hat{A}_\beta &= \frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \gamma_2} \int_0^T \eta(\tau) (f(\nu\tau) - f(\gamma_2\tau)) d\tau\end{aligned}$$

and hence, since the fixed point problem that solves ν is equivalent to the baseline rigid price model, so is the expression for \hat{A}_r .

□

Proof of Prop. 3. 1. Combining the coefficients used in Lemmas 4 and 5:

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_1 &= \lambda_1 \\ \gamma_2 &= \kappa_\beta \\ \gamma_{12} &= \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x \varsigma^{-1} \hat{A}_\beta}{\lambda_1 - \kappa_r + \kappa_\beta} \\ &= \frac{\kappa_r \phi_x \varsigma^{-1}}{\lambda_1 - \kappa_r + \kappa_\beta} \left(\frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \gamma_2} \int_0^T \eta(\tau) (f(\nu\tau) - f(\gamma_2\tau)) d\tau \right)\end{aligned}$$

Substituting these expressions into Eq. (A3) and rearranging gives

$$\nu_{12} = \frac{-a\sigma_r^2 N_1}{1 - \frac{\phi_x \kappa_r \varsigma^{-1}}{(\lambda_1 - \kappa_r + \kappa_\beta)(\nu - \kappa_\beta)} N_2 - \frac{a\sigma_r^2}{\nu - \kappa_\beta} N_3} \quad (\text{A4})$$

where N_1, N_2, N_3 are integral expressions:

$$\begin{aligned}N_1 &= \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 f(\nu\tau) \theta(\tau) d\tau \\ N_2 &= \int_0^T \eta(\tau) (f(\nu\tau) - f(\kappa_\beta\tau)) d\tau \\ N_3 &= \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \tau^2 (f(\nu\tau) - f(\kappa_\beta\tau)) d\tau\end{aligned}$$

First, focusing on the denominator of Eq. (A4),

$$\nu > \kappa_\beta \iff f(\nu\tau) < f(\kappa_\beta\tau)$$

hence the denominator is strictly positive. Then, since by assumption $\theta(\tau) \geq 0$, the numerator of Eq. (A4) is negative (strictly if $a > 0$). Therefore, $\nu_{12} \leq 0$ and $\hat{A}_\beta \geq 0$ (with strict inequalities when $a > 0$).

2. Taking the limit as $\kappa_\beta \rightarrow \infty$, from Eq. (A4) the limiting value of ν_{12} is

$$\nu_{12} \rightarrow -a\sigma_r^2 \int_0^T \alpha(\tau)\tau^2 f(\nu\tau)\theta(\tau)$$

Since ν is independent of κ_β , this limit is bounded. Further, $f(\kappa_\beta\tau) \rightarrow 0$ as well. Hence, taking the limit of Eq. (22) gives

$$\frac{\nu_{12}}{\nu - \kappa_\beta} \int_0^T \eta(\tau)(f(\nu\tau) - f(\kappa_\beta\tau)) d\tau \rightarrow 0$$

□

Proof of Lemma 6. 1. The characteristic polynomial of Υ is

$$c(\lambda) \equiv \lambda^3 - (\kappa_r - \rho)\lambda^2 - \varsigma^{-1}(\hat{A}_r\kappa_r\phi_x + \delta + \kappa_r\rho\varsigma)\lambda - \varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r(\hat{A}_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x) - \delta)$$

Hence:

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow +\infty} c(\lambda) = +\infty$$

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow -\infty} c(\lambda) = -\infty$$

$$c(\kappa_r) = -\varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r\hat{A}_r(\kappa_r\phi_x + \delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x) < 0$$

Hence there is some (real) $\lambda_1 > \kappa_r > 0$ such that $c(\lambda_1) = 0$. For the other two roots, note

$$c'(\lambda) = 3\lambda^2 - 2(\kappa_r - \rho)\lambda - \varsigma^{-1}(\hat{A}_r\kappa_r\phi_x + \delta + \kappa_r\rho\varsigma)$$

$$c(0) = -\varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r(\hat{A}_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x) - \delta)$$

$$c'(0) = -\varsigma^{-1}(\hat{A}_r\kappa_r\phi_x + \delta + \kappa_r\rho\varsigma)$$

So $c'(0) < 0$. If $c(0) > 0$, since $c(\kappa_r) < 0$ there will be another value $\lambda_2 \in (0, \kappa_r)$ such that $c(\lambda_2) = 0$. Hence $c(0) < 0$ is necessary for determinacy. This is satisfied iff Eq. (24) holds.

To see that this condition is sufficient, since $c'(0) < 0$, $c(\lambda)$ has a local maximum for some $\lambda < 0$, denoted $c(z) = y$. If $y > 0$ then there are two real negative zeros, one less than z and one greater than z . If $y = 0$ then there are two duplicated real negative zeros (equal to z). Finally, if $y < 0$ then there are two conjugate complex zeros. The line that intersects $(\lambda_1, 0)$ and is tangent to $c(\lambda)$ is upward sloping, and is tangent to $c(\lambda)$ at a point (M, H) where $M < z$. The real components of the complex zeros is given by M .

2. Setting $c(\lambda)$ to zero and solving for \hat{A}_r gives Eq. (25). The fact that $h(\lambda) \rightarrow \infty$ as $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$ follows for the sign restrictions on the parameters.

Note that the zeros of $h(\lambda)$ are

$$\left\{ \kappa_r, \frac{1}{2} \left(-\rho \pm \sqrt{\rho^2 + 4\delta\varsigma^{-1}} \right) \right\}$$

so there are two positive (real) zeros, and one negative (real) zero. Order these $z_1 > z_2 > 0 > z_3$. Then $z_2 + z_3 \leq -\rho < 0$ (equality holds if $z_1 = \kappa_r$). Write

$$h(\lambda) = \frac{(\lambda - z_1)(\lambda - z_2)(\lambda - z_3)}{\varsigma^{-1}\kappa_r(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda\phi_x)}$$

Differentiating with respect to λ gives

$$h'(\lambda) = h(\lambda) \left[\frac{1}{\lambda - z_1} + \frac{1}{\lambda - z_2} + \frac{1}{\lambda - z_3} + \frac{-\phi_x}{\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda\phi_x} \right]$$

If $\lambda \in [0, z_2)$, then $h(\lambda) > 0$ while the first and fourth terms in brackets are negative. Then

$$\frac{1}{\lambda - z_2} + \frac{1}{\lambda - z_3} = \frac{2\lambda - (z_2 + z_3)}{(\lambda - z_2)(\lambda - z_3)} < 0$$

since $z_3 < 0 < \lambda < z_2$ by assumption, and $z_2 + z_3 < 0$. Hence for $\lambda \in [0, z_2)$, $h'(\lambda) < 0$ and hence $h(0)$ is the maximum in this range.

Finally, $h(\lambda) > 0$ whenever $\lambda > z_1$. The second and third in brackets are positive, while

$$\frac{1}{\lambda - z_1} - \frac{\phi_x}{\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda\phi_x} = \frac{\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + z_1\phi_x}{(\lambda - z_1)(\delta\phi_\pi + \rho\phi_x + \lambda\phi_x)} > 0$$

hence for $\lambda > z_1$, $h(\lambda)$ is a positive strictly increasing function.

Also, note that the condition for determinacy is equivalent to

$$\hat{A}_r > h(0)$$

3. Substituting the expression for \hat{A}_r into Υ and carrying out the eigenvalue decomposition and solving for Ω gives the result

□

Proof of Prop. 4. 1. In general equilibrium, \hat{A}_r is determined by the intersection of Eqs. (17) and (25). Recall that for $\lambda \geq z_1$ where z_1 is the largest root of h , h is strictly increasing and grows without bound. Further, g is a positive, strictly decreasing function approaching 0. Hence there exists a unique $\lambda_1 \geq z_1$ such that

$$\hat{A}_r = g(\lambda_1) = h(\lambda_1)$$

2. For uniqueness, since g is defined for positive values only I show that there is no other $\lambda' \in [0, z_1]$ such that $g(\lambda') = h(\lambda')$. From Lemma 6, $h(0) > h(\lambda')$ in this range. Additionally, Lemma 3 says that $g(\lambda)$ is decreasing, so that $g(\lambda_1) > g(\lambda')$. If the model is determinate, then the condition from Lemma 6 gives $g(\lambda_1) > h(0)$. So $g(\lambda') > h(\lambda')$ for all $\lambda' \in [0, z_1]$. Hence \hat{A}_r is unique. Figure 5 plots examples of intersections of g and h .

□

Proof of Corollary 4.1. The proofs are similar to Cor. 1.1.

□

Proof of Corollary 4.2. 1. Since $\delta > 0$ and $\hat{A}_r \rightarrow 0$ as $a \rightarrow \infty$..

□

Proof of Prop. 5. 1. Since $\delta > 0$ and $\hat{A}_r \rightarrow 0$ as $a \rightarrow \infty$..

□

Proof of Prop. 6. Matrices

$$\Gamma = \dots \tag{A5}$$

$$\Omega = \dots \tag{A6}$$

□

Proof of Lemma. 8. Given the affine functional form assumption, I use Ito's Lemma to compute instantaneous returns. Write $P_{t,\tau}$ explicitly as a function of time t and variables \mathbf{y}_t :

$$P(t, \mathbf{y}) = \exp \{ -\mathbf{y}^T \mathbf{A}(\tau(t)) - C(\tau(t)) \}$$

Note that the dependence on the first argument t comes through τ in the coefficient functions $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ and $C(\tau)$. Of course $\frac{d\tau}{dt} = -1$, which implies

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial t} = P_{t,\tau} (\mathbf{y}_t^T \mathbf{A}'(\tau) + C'(\tau))$$

The gradient and Hessian with respect to \mathbf{y} are

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} P &= -P_{t,\tau} \mathbf{A}(\tau) \\ H_{\mathbf{y}} P &= P_{t,\tau} (\mathbf{A}(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Ito's Lemma implies the instantaneous return is

$$\frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}} = \mu_{t,\tau} dt - \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T \mathbf{S} d\mathbf{B}_t \quad (\text{A7})$$

$$\mu_{t,\tau} = \mathbf{y}_t^T \mathbf{A}'(\tau) + C'(\tau) + [\Gamma(\mathbf{y}_t - \bar{\mathbf{y}})]^T \mathbf{A}(\tau) + \frac{1}{2} Tr [\Sigma \mathbf{A}(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T] \quad (\text{A8})$$

The arbitrageur's optimality conditions are given by:

$$\frac{\partial E_t dW_t}{\partial b_{t,\tau}} = \frac{a}{2} \frac{\partial Var_t dW_t}{\partial b_{t,\tau}}$$

Use Eq. (A7) to compute the expectation and variance of the change in arbitrageur wealth:

$$\begin{aligned} E_t dW_t &= \left[\left(W_t - \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} d\tau \right) r_t + \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \mu_{t,\tau} d\tau \right] dt \\ \implies \frac{\partial E_t dW_t}{\partial b_{t,\tau}} &= (\mu_{t,\tau} - r_t) dt \end{aligned}$$

and the variance is

$$\begin{aligned} Var_t dW_t &= \left(\int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T d\tau \right) \Sigma \left(\int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \mathbf{A}(\tau) d\tau \right) dt \\ \implies \frac{\partial Var_t dW_t}{\partial b_{t,\tau}} &= 2 \left(\int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T d\tau \right) \Sigma \mathbf{A}(\tau) dt \end{aligned}$$

and the results for the optimality conditions follow.

Note that

$$b_{t,\tau} = -\tilde{b}_{t,\tau} = \alpha(\tau) [\mathbf{y}_t^T (\Theta(\tau)\tau - \mathbf{A}(\tau)) + \bar{\beta}(\tau)\tau - C(\tau)] \quad (\text{A9})$$

Substitute Eq. (A9) into Eq. (??) derived above. Equating the coefficients on \mathbf{y}_t terms (and assuming that r_t is ordered first) gives:

$$\mathbf{A}'(\tau) + \mathbf{M}\mathbf{A}(\tau) - \mathbf{e}_1 = 0$$

where \mathbf{M} is defined by Eq. (30). Note that since \mathbf{M} is itself a function of integral terms involving $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ this is a fixed point problem with no simple solution. However, treating \mathbf{M} as fixed, with initial conditions $\mathbf{A}(\tau) = 0$ the general solution is given by Eq. (??).

Suppose \mathbf{M} is diagonalizable, with $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{G}\mathbf{D}\mathbf{G}^{-1}$. Normalize \mathbf{G} such that $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{1} = \mathbf{e}_1$ (that is, its first row sum is 1, and all other rows sum to 0). Then

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^\tau \exp(-\mathbf{M}s) ds \mathbf{e}_1 &= \mathbf{G} \int_0^\tau \exp(-\mathbf{D}s) ds \mathbf{G}^{-1} \mathbf{e}_1 \\ &= \mathbf{G} \int_0^\tau \exp(-\mathbf{D}s) ds \mathbf{1} \end{aligned}$$

and if \mathbf{M} is invertible then Eq. (31) is obtained.

Again substitute Eq. (A9) into Eq. (??). Equating constant coefficients gives:

$$\begin{aligned} C'(\tau) - (\Gamma\bar{\mathbf{y}})^T \mathbf{A}(\tau) + \frac{1}{2} Tr [\Sigma \mathbf{A}(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T] \\ = a \mathbf{A}(\tau)^T \Sigma \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) (\tau \bar{\beta}(\tau) - C(\tau)) \mathbf{A}(\tau) d\tau \end{aligned}$$

Define the vector

$$\mathbf{Z}_C \equiv a\mathbf{\Sigma} \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau) [\tau \bar{\beta}(\tau) - C(\tau)] d\tau + \Gamma \bar{\mathbf{y}} \quad (\text{A10})$$

Imposing the initial condition $C(0) = 0$ and integrating, the solution for $C(\tau)$ given by

$$C(\tau) = \mathbf{n}_1(\tau)^T \mathbf{Z}_C - \frac{1}{2} \text{Tr} [\mathbf{\Sigma} \mathbf{n}_2(\tau)] \quad (\text{A11})$$

$$\mathbf{n}_1(\tau) = \int_0^\tau \mathbf{A}(u) du \quad (\text{A12})$$

$$\mathbf{n}_2(\tau) = \int_0^\tau \mathbf{A}(u) \mathbf{A}(u)^T du \quad (\text{A13})$$

Substitute $C(\tau)$ from (A11) into (A10) and solve for \mathbf{Z}_C :

$$\mathbf{Z}_C = [\mathbf{I} + a\mathbf{\Sigma} \mathbf{N}_1]^{-1} [a\mathbf{\Sigma} \mathbf{N}_2 + \Gamma \bar{\mathbf{y}}] \quad (\text{A14})$$

where \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix and

$$\mathbf{N}_1 = \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau) \mathbf{n}_1(\tau)^T d\tau \quad (\text{A15})$$

$$\mathbf{N}_2 = \int_0^T \alpha(\tau) \mathbf{A}(\tau) \left(\bar{\beta}(\tau) \tau + \frac{1}{2} \text{Tr} [\mathbf{\Sigma} \mathbf{n}_2(\tau)] \right) d\tau \quad (\text{A16})$$

□

Appendix B Numerical Solution Algorithm

This section describes the numerical solution method used to solve the generalized model.

Outer loop: Start with an initial guess of the vector $\hat{\mathbf{A}}_0$. Typically set to \mathbf{e}_1

1. Construct the implied dynamics matrix Υ_0 . Solve for the rational expectations equilibrium matrix Γ_0 (assuming stability conditions are met).
2. Solve for $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$ (the inner loop described below).
3. Construct the implied $\hat{\mathbf{A}}$. If within specified tolerance of $\hat{\mathbf{A}}_0$, stop. Otherwise, update $\hat{\mathbf{A}}_0$ (possibly with step size smaller than 1) and repeat.

Inner loop: Start with an initial guess of the vector \mathbf{M}_0 . Typically set to $\mathbf{0}$.

1. Solve the eigen-decomposition to get \mathbf{D} , \mathbf{G} , which gives $\mathbf{A}(\tau)$.
2. Construct the implied \mathbf{M} . If within specified tolerance of $\hat{\mathbf{M}}_0$, stop. Otherwise, update \mathbf{M} (possibly with step size smaller than 1) and repeat.

Appendix C Microfoundations

This section describes the model from first principles...

Time is continuous. The model consists of households, firms, arbitrageurs, and a government. The government conducts monetary policy (changes in policy rate), passive fiscal policy (changes in taxes, which play no role), and QE (changes in holdings of long-term bonds).

Households face radically incomplete markets: they can only borrow through a passive mutual fund offering an instantaneous return which is a weighted average of all yields. Infinitesimally-lived arbitrageurs are the marginal investors in financial markets.

The short rate is the main policy tool, and as in [Woodford \(2003\)](#) I consider a “cashless limit” economy.

C.1 Households

An infinitely-lived representative household seeks to maximize expected utility by choosing consumption, labor, and savings. The household problem is standard, except they are restricted to borrowing at an effective rate \tilde{r}_t . The household problem is

$$\max_{\{C_t, N_t\}} E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left(\frac{C_t^{1-\varsigma}}{1-\varsigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\xi}}{1+\xi} \right) dt \quad (\text{C1})$$

$$\text{s.t. } dW_t^H \leq (\tilde{r}_t W_t^H - P_t C_t + w_t N_t - T_t^H) dt \quad (\text{C2})$$

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_t[Q_{t,T}^H W_T^H] = 0 \quad (\text{C3})$$

Eq. (C2) is the household’s flow budget constraint; Eq. (C3) is a transversality condition. The parameter ς is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; ξ is the labor supply elasticity; ρ is the discount rate. W_t^H is household nominal wealth; C_t is consumption of composite good; N_t is labor; w_t is nominal wage; T_t^H is the net taxes and transfers to households.

$Q_{t,T}^H$ is the household's discount factor, given by

$$Q_{t,T}^H = \exp \left[- \int_t^T (\tilde{r}_s - \pi_s) ds \right] \quad (\text{C4})$$

Note that markets are not complete (and so Eq. (C4) is not the relevant discount factor for pricing securities), but Eqs. (C2) and (C3) can be replaced with an equivalent single intertemporal budget constraint

$$W_0^H = E_0 \int_0^\infty Q_{0,t}^H (P_t C_t - w_t N_t + T_t^H) dt \quad (\text{C5})$$

where W_0^H is given.

Then the intra-temporal optimality condition determining labor supply is

$$C_t^\varsigma N_t^\xi = \frac{w_t}{P_t} \quad (\text{C6})$$

and linearized intertemporal optimality conditions give

$$dc_t = \varsigma^{-1} (\tilde{r}_t - \pi_t - \rho) dt \quad (\text{C7})$$

C.2 Arbitrageurs and Preferred Habitat Investors

Arbitrageurs face a mean-variance trade-off in their wealth:

$$\max_{b_{t,\tau}} E_t dW_t^A - \frac{a}{2} Var_t dW_t^A$$

subject to their flow budget constraint

$$\begin{aligned} dW_t^A = & \left(W_t^A - M_t^A - \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} d\tau \right) r_t dt + \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} \frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}} d\tau \\ & + M_t^A r_t^M dt - T_t^A \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C8})$$

This is the same as the one considered in the main text, with the exception that arbitrageurs can also hold monetary balances M_t^A (with a return r_t^m , which must satisfy $r_t \geq r_t^m$ with equality if money supply is non-zero), and they face taxes T_t^A .

The “preferred habitat” investors are aggregated into a single passive mutual fund, which

offers households the effective borrowing rate, and invests the rest of its wealth in long-term bonds. The flow budget constraint is thus

$$dW_t^F = -W_t^H \tilde{r}_t dt + \int_0^T \tilde{b}_{t,\tau} \frac{dP_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}} d\tau + \left(W_t^F - W_t^H - \int_0^T b_{t,\tau} d\tau \right) r_t dt - T_t^G \quad (\text{C9})$$

and also pay taxes.

The demand for bonds \tilde{b}_t is given by Eq. (4). Thus the demand from the mutual fund for long-term bonds is reduced-form. Demand of this form could additionally be derived by adding another set of finite-lived, infinitely risk-averse investors as in the appendix of [Vayanos and Vila \(2009\)](#).

When studying QE, I assume that the demand shocks operate through the preferred habitat investors. In this case, it may be useful to view this mutual fund as a type of government sponsored enterprise.

C.3 Firms

Firms face [Rotemberg \(1982\)](#) pricing adjustment costs.

C.4 Steady State

Solving for the steady state

C.5 Rational Expectations Equilibrium

After linearizing around the steady state and imposing affine functional forms to the term structure, the aggregate dynamics can be written in matrix form as in Eq. (8). The solution to the rational expectations equilibrium is found by following [Buiter \(1984\)](#), the continuous time analogue of [Blanchard and Kahn \(1980\)](#). In general, let $\mathbf{Y}_t = [\mathbf{y}_t \ \mathbf{x}_t]^T$ where \mathbf{x}_t are the “jump” variables and \mathbf{y}_t are the state variables. Assuming that Υ is diagonalizable, partition the eigenvalues and eigenvectors as follows:

$$\Upsilon = Q\Lambda Q^{-1}$$

$$\Lambda = \begin{bmatrix} \Lambda_1 & 0 \\ 0 & \Lambda_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad Q = \begin{bmatrix} Q_{11} & Q_{12} \\ Q_{21} & Q_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

where the partitions correspond to the state and jump variables. If the number of “stable” eigenvalues (non-negative real parts) equals the number of state variables, then given some transversality conditions the rational expectations equilibrium dynamics are given by Eq. (10), with

$$\Gamma = Q_{11}\Lambda_1 Q_{11}^{-1} \quad (\text{C10})$$

$$\Omega = Q_{21}Q_{11}^{-1} \quad (\text{C11})$$

C.6 Conditional and Unconditional Distributions

The conditional distribution of the state variables \mathbf{y}_t given initial state \mathbf{y}_0 is normal:

$$\mathbf{y}_t|\mathbf{y}_0 \sim N(\boldsymbol{\mu}_t, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t)$$

The conditional mean is

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}_t = \mathbf{y}^{SS} + e^{-\Gamma t}(\mathbf{y}_0 - \mathbf{y}^{SS})$$

The conditional variance-covariance is

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t = \int_0^t e^{\Gamma(u-t)} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} e^{\Gamma^T(u-t)} du$$

where again $\boldsymbol{\Sigma} = \mathbf{S}\mathbf{S}^T$. Then this simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned} \text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t &= \left(\int_0^t e^{(\Gamma \oplus \Gamma)(u-t)} du \right) \text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \\ &= (\Gamma \oplus \Gamma)^{-1} \left(\mathbf{I} - e^{-(\Gamma \oplus \Gamma)t} \right) \text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \end{aligned}$$

where \oplus is the Kronecker sum. Taking the limit as $t \rightarrow \infty$, the unconditional variance-covariance is given by

$$\text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_\infty = (\Gamma \oplus \Gamma)^{-1} \text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma}$$

and the present discounted value is computed as

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}_\infty &\equiv \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t dt \\ \text{vec } \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}_\infty &= (\Gamma \oplus \Gamma)^{-1} (\rho \mathbf{I} + \Gamma \oplus \Gamma)^{-1} \text{vec } \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \end{aligned}$$

Then from Eq. (10), the conditional distribution of the jump variables \mathbf{x}_t given initial state \mathbf{y}_0 (recall the initial values \mathbf{x}_0 are endogenous) is normal:


$$\mathbf{x}_t | \mathbf{y}_0 \sim N \left(\Omega(\boldsymbol{\mu}_t - \mathbf{y}^{SS}) + \mathbf{x}^{SS}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t^{\mathbf{x}} \right)$$

and the equivalently defined covariances for the jump variables are easily computed as

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t^{\mathbf{x}} &= \Omega \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t \Omega^T \\ \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_\infty^{\mathbf{x}} &= \Omega \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_\infty \Omega^T \\ \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}_\infty^{\mathbf{x}} &= \Omega \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}_\infty \Omega^T\end{aligned}$$


Hence if $\mathbf{x}^{SS} = 0$, $E_0 [\mathbf{x}_t \mathbf{x}_t^T] = \Omega \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_t \Omega^T$.

Figure 1: Phase Diagrams, Varying λ_1




Notes: phase diagrams of the rigid price model (in terms of deviations from steady state). The solid blue line is the stable arm, while dashed black lines correspond to the trajectory of output and the policy rate given two different initial values. Each panel corresponds to different values of λ_1 , the stable eigenvalue which determines equilibrium mean reversion rate of monetary shocks. The other parameters are set to $\kappa_r = 0.7$, $\phi_x = 0.25$, and $\varsigma^{-1} = 1$.

Figure 2: Intersection of $g(\lambda)$ and $h(\lambda)$, rigid prices




Notes: intersection of the functions $g(\lambda)$ and $h(\lambda)$, which determine λ_1 and \hat{A}_r in equilibrium. The black line is $h(\cdot)$; the dashed light orange and dash-dotted dark teal lines are $g(\cdot)$ for low and high levels of risk aversion, respectively. The dotted grey line is the equivalent function $g(\cdot)$ for a benchmark New Keynesian model (fixed at unity). The parameters are set to $\kappa_r = 0.4$, $\phi_x = 0.25$, $\varsigma^{-1} = 1$, $T = 10$, $\alpha(\tau) = e^{-0.1\tau}$, $\sigma_r = 0.1$, $\eta(\tau)$ is a (truncated) Gamma distribution, and $a \in \{0, 5\}$.

Figure 3: Rate Responses to Monetary Shock




Notes: responses of average short rates (solid lines) and spot rates (dotted lines) in response to a unit policy rate shock. The first panel shows the response when risk aversion is low ($a = 1$), while the second panel plots the responses when risk aversion is high ($a = 150$).

Figure 4: Output Responses to Forward Guidance




Notes: plots of $\frac{\partial x_0}{\partial r \diamond}$ (“level”; the interaction of the level of the peg and output) and $\frac{\partial^2 x_0}{\partial r \diamond \partial t \diamond}$ (“length”; the interaction of the length of the peg and output). These objects are plotted for various levels of risk aversion (x-axis).

Figure 5: Intersection of $g(\lambda)$ and $h(\lambda)$, sticky prices




Notes: intersection of the functions $g(\lambda)$ and $h(\lambda)$, which determine λ_1 and \hat{A}_r in equilibrium. The black line is $h(\cdot)$; the dotted light orange and dark teal lines are $g(\cdot)$ for low and high levels of risk aversion, respectively. The dotted grey line is the equivalent function $g(\cdot)$ for a benchmark New Keynesian model.

Figure 6: Inflation and Output Responses to Forward Guidance




Notes: panel A plots $\frac{\partial \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond}$ ("level"; the interaction of the level of the peg and inflation) and $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_0}{\partial r^\diamond \partial t^\diamond}$ ("length"; the interaction of the length of the peg and inflation). Panel B plots the corresponding level and length interaction terms for output x_0 . These objects are plotted for various levels of risk aversion (x-axis).

Figure 7: Regions of Determinacy




Notes: the heatmaps show the region of determinacy (lighter regions, upper left) and indeterminacy (darker regions, lower right). The x-axis is the level of risk aversion a , and the y-axis is the level of the parameter ϕ_π^β (Panel A) and ϕ_x^β (Panel B), which governs how strongly QE reacts to inflation or the output gap respectively. The values correspond to the smallest unstable (real) eigenvalue in the model with these parameters. The model is determinate when this eigenvalue is negative. The dotted black line delineates the region of indeterminacy from determinacy.

Figure 8: Monetary Policy Shock




Notes: contemporaneous response of the yield curve to a monetary policy shock. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of basis points. The x-axis is maturity. Lighter lines correspond to models where risk aversion is low; darker lines to models with high risk aversion.




Notes: contemporaneous response of inflation and the output gap to a monetary policy shock. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of percentage points. The x-axis is level of risk aversion.

Figure 9: QE Shock (short-term purchases)




Notes: contemporaneous response of the yield curve to a QE shock, where purchases are concentrated at shorter term bonds. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of basis points. The x-axis is maturity. Lighter lines correspond to models where risk aversion is low; darker lines to models with high risk aversion.




Notes: contemporaneous response of inflation and the output gap to a QE shock, where purchases are concentrated at shorter term bonds. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of percentage points. The x-axis is level of risk aversion.

Figure 10: QE Shock (long-term purchases)




Notes: contemporaneous response of the yield curve to a QE shock, where purchases are concentrated at longer term bonds. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of basis points. The x-axis is maturity. Lighter lines correspond to models where risk aversion is low; darker lines to models with high risk aversion.




Notes: contemporaneous response of inflation and the output gap to a QE shock, where purchases are concentrated at longer term bonds. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of percentage points. The x-axis is level of risk aversion.

Figure 11: Operation Twist Shock




Notes: contemporaneous response of the yield curve to an Operation Twist shock, where longer term bonds are purchased and shorter term bonds are sold. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of basis points. The x-axis is maturity. Lighter lines correspond to models where risk aversion is low; darker lines to models with high risk aversion.



Notes: contemporaneous response of inflation and the output gap to an Operation Twist shock, where longer term bonds are purchased and shorter term bonds are sold. Responses are plotted as deviations from steady state, in terms of percentage points. The x-axis is level of risk aversion.

Figure 12: Optimal Response to Shocks



Notes: optimal policy coefficients on the cost-push shock (Panel A) and demand shock (Panel B) as risk aversion increases. Each line is the optimal coefficient for different planner weights. The solid line corresponds to the case where the planner puts equal weight on inflation and output; while the dashed and dashed-dotted line correspond to the cases where the planner only cares about inflation or output, respectively.

Table 1: Numerical Exercise Calibration

Parameter	Value
T	10
σ_i	0.1
κ_i	0.4
ϕ_π	3.0
ϕ_x	1.5
ρ	0.02
ς^{-1}	1.0
δ	0.001
$\eta(\tau)$	$1/T$
$\alpha(\tau)$	$e^{-.01\tau}$
$\theta_s(m)$	$\delta(m-3)$
$\theta_\ell(m)$	$\delta(m-7)$
a	$(0, 75)$