

# A TWO-COUNTRY NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH LIMITED ARBITRAGE IN CURRENCY AND BOND MARKETS

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CEBRA, August 2025

# Motivation

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# Motivation: International Finance Puzzles

- Textbook international macro:
  - Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) holds
  - The Expectation Hypothesis (EH) holds
- Empirically:
  1. Strong patterns in FX: currency carry trade is profitable  $\implies$  deviations from UIP  
[Fama 1984...]
  2. Strong patterns in FI: bond carry trade is profitable  $\implies$  deviations from the EH  
[Fama & Bliss 1987, Campbell & Shiller 1991...]
  3. Exchange rates disconnected from fundamentals; but important comovement in term premia and currency risk premia across countries  
[Obstfeld & Rogoff 2001, Itskhoki & Mukhin 2021, Lustig et al 2019, Lloyd & Marin 2019, Chernov & Creal 2020...]
  4. Quantitative easing not only reduced domestic yields, but also had strong effects on exchange rates and foreign yields  
[Bhattarai & Neely 2018...]

# Motivation: Macro Consequences

- Recent work has emphasizing the **critical role** of imperfect financial intermediation:
  - Market segmentation interacts with risk exposure of intermediaries to generate movements in risk premia  
[Gabaix & Maggiori 2015, Itskhoki & Mukhin 2019, Koijen & Yogo 2020, Greenwood et al 2023, Gourinchas, Ray, Vayanos 2025...]
- **Key insight:** portfolio flows crucial for generating correlated movements in FX and bond premia. **Key questions** in **general equilibrium**:
  - What is the role of **endogenous** portfolio flows induced by real economy (households, import/exports)?
  - How do frictions change monetary policy transmission to the **real economy**?
- **This paper:** develops two-country New Keynesian model in which:
  - Asset markets are segmented for households
  - Bond and currency markets are partly integrated by arbitrageurs with limited capital
  - Formally: two-country version of Ray, Droste, Gorodnichenko (2024); GE version of Gourinchas, Ray, Vayanos (2025)

# Preview

1. Can reproduce **general features** regarding the joint behavior of bond and currency risk premia
2. Rich transmission of monetary policy via exchange rate and term premia, contrasting with standard models. **Key mechanisms:**
  - Shifts in arbitrageurs' **risk exposure** lead to changes in required risk compensation
  - **Hedging behavior** of arbitrageurs  $\implies$  tight linkage between bond term premia and currency risk premia
  - In the presence of market segmentation, policy shocks lead to **large shifts in risk exposure**
3. Hedging properties of domestic and foreign bonds determined by **general equilibrium forces:**
  - **Endogenous rebalancing** within and across countries
  - **Endogenous monetary reaction** to shocks
4. Real effects of monetary policy (particularly **unconventional**) depend critically on these rebalancing mechanisms; may have **unintended consequences**

## Model Setup

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# Model Setup

- Continuous time two-country New Keynesian model with imperfect arbitrage
- **Agents:**
  - **Households:** supply labor, consume, save via bond markets
  - **Firms:** monopolistic competitors face nominal frictions
  - **Arbitrageurs:** imperfect risk-bearing capacity, conduct carry trades
- **Policymakers:**
  - **Central bank:** conducts short rate and balance sheet (QE) policy
  - **Government:** issue debt, otherwise passive
- **Bond markets:**
  - Continuum of **zero coupon bonds** with maturity  $0 \leq \tau \leq T \leq \infty$
  - Local currency bond price  $\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}, \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}$
  - Nominal exchange rate  $\mathcal{E}_t$  (H price of F currency)
  - Yield to maturity  $y_{Ht}^{(\tau)} = -\log \mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)} / \tau, y_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} = -\log \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} / \tau$
  - Nominal short rates: in equilibrium,  $i_t = \lim_{\tau \rightarrow 0} y_{Ht}^{(\tau)}, i_t^* = \lim_{\tau \rightarrow 0} y_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}$

# Households

- H HHs choose consumption and labor  $C_t, N_t$  in order to solve (analogous for F HHs)

$$V_0 \equiv \max E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \Psi_t u(C_t, N_t) dt$$

$$\text{subject to: } d\mathcal{B}_t = [\mathcal{W}_t N_t - \mathcal{P}_t C_t] dt + \mathcal{B}_t d\tilde{\mathcal{R}}_t + d\mathcal{F}_t$$

- Discount factor shock  $\Psi_t$
- Takes as given CPI  $\mathcal{P}_t$ , nominal wage  $\mathcal{W}_t$ , flow transfers  $d\mathcal{F}_t$  (from firms, fiscal authorities, and intermediaries)
- Faces “effective” portfolio returns

$$d\tilde{\mathcal{R}}_t = \eta_{Ht}(0) i_t dt + \int_0^T \eta_{Ht}(\tau) \frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}} d\tau + \eta_{Ft}(0) \left[ i_t^* dt + \frac{d\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] + \int_0^T \eta_{Ft}(\tau) \frac{d(\mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*})}{(\mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*})} d\tau$$

- Portfolio weights  $\eta_{kt}(\tau)$  subject to frictions
- Benchmark: fixed. Time-variation can capture **rebalancing shocks**

**Key takeaway:** asset prices not pinned down by HHs; consumption/savings choices function of “effective” rates



# Firms

- Continuum of intermediate goods  $j \in [0, 1]$  in H (analogous  $j' \in [0, 1]$  in F)
- CES demand: elasticities  $\epsilon$  (domestic),  $\mu$  (cross-border); home-bias terms  $\alpha, \alpha^*$

$$C_{kt}(j) = \left( \frac{\mathcal{P}_{kt}(j)}{\mathcal{P}_{kt}} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_{kt} \quad (k = H, F), \quad C_{Ht} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}}{\mathcal{P}_t} \right)^{-\mu} C_t, \quad C_{Ft} = \alpha \left( \frac{\mathcal{P}_{Ft}}{\mathcal{P}_t} \right)^{-\mu} C_t$$

- Produce using labor, technology  $Y_t(j) = Z_t L_t(j)$ . Nominal price  $\mathcal{P}_{Ht}(j)$  chosen:

$$U_0^j \equiv \max E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\varrho t} V_{B,t} \frac{d\Pi_t(j)}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht} Y}$$

$$\text{where: } d\Pi_t(j) \equiv [\mathcal{P}_{Ht}(j) Y_t(j) - \mathcal{W}_t L_t(j)] dt - d\Theta_t(j)$$

- **Costs of production:** wage bill  $\mathcal{W}_t L_t(j)$  and flow deadweight costs:

$$d\Theta_t(j) = \frac{\vartheta}{2} (\pi_{Ht}(j) - \varpi_t)^2 \mathcal{P}_{Ht} Y_t dt$$

- Rotemberg rigidity parameter  $\vartheta$  and “target” inflation rate  $\varpi_t$  (aggregate cost-push shock)

**Key takeaway:** pricing frictions; marginal costs function of domestic wage

- Mean-variance optimization

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & E_t d\mathcal{X}_t - \frac{a_t}{2} \text{Var}_t d\mathcal{X}_t \\ \text{subject to: } \quad & d\mathcal{X}_t = \mathcal{X}_t i_t dt + \mathcal{X}_t^{FX} \left[ \frac{d\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_t} + (i_t^* - i_t) dt \right] \\ & + \int_0^T \mathcal{X}_{Ht}(\tau) \left[ \frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}} - i_t dt \right] d\tau + \int_0^T \mathcal{X}_{Ft}(\tau) \left[ \frac{d(\mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*})}{(\mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*})} - \left( i_t^* dt + \frac{d\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right) \right] d\tau \end{aligned}$$

- $\mathcal{X}_t^{FX}$ : CCT.  $\mathcal{X}_{kt}(\tau)$ :  $\tau, k = H, F$  BCT (H currency positions)
- Risk-return trade-off governed by  $a_t$ 
  - Risk aversion coefficient (captures all limits to risk-bearing capacity)
  - All gains/losses transferred to HHs
  - **Note:**  $\implies$  CIP holds

**Key takeaway:** risk averse arbitrageurs' holdings increase with expected return

# Asset Returns

- In equilibrium:  $N_B$  sources of **aggregate risk**, vector of Brownian terms  $\mathbf{B}_t$ 
  - Shocks: technology, discount factor, cost-push, rebalancing, supply/QE, ...
- Write bond returns and FX appreciation/depreciation

$$\frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}} = \mu_{Ht}^{(\tau)} dt + \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ht}^{(\tau)} d\mathbf{B}_t, \quad \frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}} = \mu_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} dt + \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} d\mathbf{B}_t, \quad \frac{d\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_t} = \mu_t^{\mathcal{E}} dt + \boldsymbol{\sigma}_t^{\mathcal{E}} d\mathbf{B}_t$$

- Arbitrageur **optimality conditions**:

$$\mu_t^{\mathcal{E}} + i_t^* - i_t \equiv \lambda_t^{\mathcal{E}} = a_t \boldsymbol{\sigma}_t^{\mathcal{E}} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_t$$

$$\mu_{Ht}^{(\tau)} - i_t \equiv \lambda_{Ht}^{(\tau)} = a_t \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ht}^{(\tau)} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_t$$

$$\mu_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} + \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} [\boldsymbol{\sigma}_t^{\mathcal{E}}]^\top - i_t^* \equiv \lambda_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} = a_t \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_t$$

- **Market price of risk**:

$$\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_t^\top = \chi_t^{FX} \boldsymbol{\sigma}_t^{\mathcal{E}} + \int_0^T \chi_{Ht}(\tau) \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ht}^{(\tau)} d\tau + \int_0^T \chi_{Ft}(\tau) \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*} d\tau$$

- H debt supply and QE purchases (analogous in F):

$$\mathcal{G}_t \left( \theta_{Ht}(0) i_t dt + \int_0^T \theta_{Ht}(\tau) \frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}} d\tau \right) \equiv \mathcal{G}_t d\check{\mathcal{R}}_t$$

$$\mathcal{QE}_t \int_0^T \theta_{Ht}^{QE}(\tau) \left[ \frac{d\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)}} - i_t dt \right] d\tau \equiv \mathcal{QE}_t d\check{\mathcal{R}}_t^{QE}$$

- All gains/losses transferred per-period to domestic HHs
- Market clearing:

$$\mathcal{B}_t \eta_{Ht}(\tau) + \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{B}_t^* \eta_{Ht}^*(\tau) + \mathcal{X}_{Ht}(\tau) = \mathcal{G}_t \theta_{Ht}(\tau) - \mathcal{QE}_t \theta_{Ht}^{QE}(\tau)$$

$$\mathcal{B}_t \eta_{Ft}(\tau) + \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{B}_t^* \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau) + \mathcal{X}_{Ft}(\tau) = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{G}_t^* \theta_{Ft}^*(\tau) - \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{QE}_t^* \theta_{Ft}^{QE*}(\tau)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{B}_t \eta_{Ht} + \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{B}_t^* \eta_{Ht}^* - \mathcal{G}_t = \mathcal{X}_t^{FX}, \quad \mathcal{B}_t - \mathcal{G}_t = -\mathcal{E}_t [\mathcal{B}_t^* - \mathcal{G}_t^*]$$

**Key takeaway:** gov't/HH asset positions affect arbitrageurs risk exposure in equilibrium

# Exchange Rate, LOP, Terms of Trade

- LOP (goods):

$$\mathcal{P}_{Ht}(j) = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ht}^*(j) \quad j \in H \implies \mathcal{P}_{Ht} = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ht}^*$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{Ft}(j') = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^*(j') \quad j' \in F \implies \mathcal{P}_{Ft} = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^*$$

- LOP (bonds):

$$\mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)} = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ht}^{(\tau)*}, \quad \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)} = \mathcal{E}_t \mathcal{P}_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}$$

- Terms of trade and real exchange rate

$$S_t \equiv \frac{\mathcal{P}_{Ft}}{\mathcal{P}_{Ht}}, \quad Q_t \equiv \frac{\mathcal{P}_t^*}{\mathcal{P}_t} \mathcal{E}_t = \left( \frac{\alpha^* + (1 - \alpha^*) S_t^{1-\mu}}{(1 - \alpha) + \alpha S_t^{1-\mu}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu}}$$

- Symmetric equilibrium:  $\mathcal{P}_{k,t}(j) = \mathcal{P}_{k,t}$  for  $k = H, F$ 
  - Simplification: (second-order) Rotemberg costs paid to HHs
- Production, labor, and goods market clearing:

$$Y_t = Z_t L_t = Z_t N_t = C_{Ht} + C_{Ht}^*$$

$$Y_t^* = Z_t^* L_t^* = Z_t^* N_t^* = C_{Ft} + C_{Ft}^*$$

- Aggregate wealth dynamics  $B_t = \frac{\mathcal{B}_t}{Y \mathcal{P}_{Ht}}$  (relative to H GDP)

$$dB_t = \frac{Y_t}{Y} NX_t dt + B_t (d\tilde{\mathcal{R}}_t - \pi_{Ht} dt) + \nu dX_t - G_t d\check{\mathcal{R}}_t + QE_t d\check{\mathcal{R}}_t^{QE}$$

- Net exports  $NX_t \equiv 1 - \frac{C_t}{P_{Ht} Y_t}$
- $\nu$ : share of arbitrageurs owned by H HHs

# Equilibrium

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# Equilibrium Macro Dynamics

- “Low risk, low risk-bearing” approximation implies modified NK equations
- Phillips curves

$$E_t d\pi_{Ht} = \left[ \varrho \pi_{Ht} - \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\vartheta} \right) m_t + u_t \right] dt, \quad E_t d\pi_{Ft}^* = \left[ \varrho \pi_{Ft}^* - \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\vartheta^*} \right) m_t^* + u_t^* \right] dt$$

- Consumption Euler equations

$$E_t dc_t = \varsigma^{-1} [\tilde{\mu}_{Ht} - \pi_t + v_t] dt, \quad E_t dc_t^* = \varsigma^{-1} [\tilde{\mu}_{Ft}^* - \pi_t + v_t^*] dt$$

- $u_t, u_t^*, v_t, v_t^*$  from inflation target shocks, discount factor shocks
- Marginal costs  $m_t, m_t^*$  depend on wages, technology, terms of trade
- Modified Euler equations depend on effective borrowing rates

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mu}_{Ht} &= i_t + \tilde{\lambda}_t, \quad \tilde{\mu}_{Ft}^* = i_t^* + \tilde{\lambda}_t^*, \quad \mu_t^{\mathcal{E}} = i_t - i_t^* + \lambda_t^{\mathcal{E}} \\ \mu_t^{\mathcal{E}} &= \pi_{Ht} - \pi_{Ht}^* = \pi_{Ft} - \pi_{Ft}^*, \quad \pi_t = (1 - \alpha)\pi_{Ht} + \alpha\pi_{Ft} \end{aligned}$$



# Equilibrium Risk Prices

- Aggregate wealth dynamics:

$$db_t = [NXy_t + nx_t + (b_t - g_t)\varrho + B\tilde{\mu}_t - G\check{\mu}_t] dt + [B\tilde{\sigma} - G\check{\sigma}] d\mathbf{B}_t$$

- Asset market clearing:

$$x_t^{FX} = -\eta_F^* g_t + (1 - \eta_{Ft}^*) S(G^* s_t + g_t^*)$$

$$+ (\eta_H - (1 - \eta_F^*)) b_t$$

$$- (G + SG^*) \eta_{Ft}^* + B(\eta_{Ht} + \eta_{Ft}^*)$$

$$x_{Ht}(\tau) = (\theta_H(\tau) - (1 - \eta_F^*(\tau))) g_t - \theta_H^{QE}(\tau) q e_t - (1 - \eta_F^*(\tau)) S(G^* s_t + g_t^*)$$

$$- (\eta_H(\tau) - (1 - \eta_F^*(\tau))) b_t$$

$$+ G(\theta_{Ht}(\tau) + \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau)) + SG^* \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau) - B(\eta_{Ht}(\tau) + \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau))$$

$$x_{Ft}(\tau) = (\theta_F^*(\tau) - \eta_F^*(\tau)) S(G^* s_t + g_t^*) - S\theta_F^{QE*}(\tau) q e_t^* - \eta_F^*(\tau) g_t$$

$$- ((1 - \eta_H(\tau)) - \eta_F^*(\tau)) b_t$$

$$+ SG^*(\theta_{Ft}^*(\tau) - \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau)) - G\eta_{Ft}^*(\tau) + B(\eta_{Ht}(\tau) + \eta_{Ft}^*(\tau))$$

# Equilibrium Characterization I

- Conjecture that bonds prices and the terms of trade are linear functions of state variables (includes forcing variables, supply factors, HH wealth):

$$s_t = -\mathbf{A}_s^\top \mathbf{x}_t, \quad p_t^{(\tau)} = -\mathbf{A}(\tau)^\top \mathbf{x}_t, \quad p_t^{(\tau)*} = -\mathbf{A}^*(\tau)^\top \mathbf{x}_t$$

- Dynamics as a function of state and jump variables  $\mathbf{Y}_t$ , risk price variables  $\mathbf{z}_t$  (includes terms of trade, effective rate/FX premia  $\tilde{\lambda}_t, \tilde{\lambda}_t^*, \lambda_t^\mathcal{E}$ )

$$\begin{bmatrix} d\mathbf{x}_t \\ E_t d\mathbf{y}_t \end{bmatrix} = -(\boldsymbol{\Upsilon}_Y \mathbf{Y}_t + \boldsymbol{\Upsilon}_Z \mathbf{z}_t) dt + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{\sigma} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} d\mathbf{B}_t$$

- Fixed point: solve for
  - Risk-adjusted dynamics  $\mathbf{M}$  ( $N_x \times N_x$ )
  - Mapping from state to risk prices  $\mathbf{A}_Z$  ( $N_x \times N_z$ )

# Equilibrium Characterization II

- Equilibrium dynamics:

$$\mathbf{\Upsilon} = \mathbf{\Upsilon}_Y + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{\Upsilon}_Z \mathbf{A}_Z & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \implies d\mathbf{x}_t = -\mathbf{\Gamma} \mathbf{x}_t dt + \boldsymbol{\sigma} dB_t, \quad y_t = \mathbf{\Omega} \mathbf{x}_t$$

- Equilibrium coefficients:

$$\mathbf{A}_S = \mathbf{M}^{-1} (\mathbf{e}_{r_H} - \mathbf{e}_{r_F}^*), \quad \mathbf{A}_H(\tau) = \int_0^\tau e^{-\mathbf{M}u} du \mathbf{e}_i, \quad \mathbf{A}_F(\tau) = \int_0^\tau e^{-\mathbf{M}u} du \mathbf{e}_i^*$$

- Equilibrium mapping from state to [real/nominal rates](#)  $\mathbf{e}_{r_k}, \mathbf{e}_i$
- Equilibrium mapping from state to [quantities](#)  $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_k(\tau)$
- Fixed point:

$$\mathbf{L} = \int \boldsymbol{\Theta}_H(\tau) \mathbf{A}_H(\tau)^\top d\tau + \int \boldsymbol{\Theta}_F(\tau) \mathbf{A}_F(\tau)^\top d\tau + \boldsymbol{\Theta}_e \mathbf{A}_S^\top \implies \check{\mathbf{M}} = \mathbf{\Gamma}^\top - a \cdot \mathbf{L} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}$$

$$\check{\mathbf{A}}_Z = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{A}_S & a \cdot \mathbf{L} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{A}_S & a \cdot \mathbf{L} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \int \eta(\tau) \mathbf{A}_H(\tau) d\tau & a \cdot \mathbf{L} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \int \eta^*(\tau) \mathbf{A}_F(\tau) d\tau \end{bmatrix}$$

# Key Mechanisms

## Macro Dynamics:

- Macro dynamics are similar to textbook open-economy NK model **conditional on**:
  - Dynamics of **effective borrowing rates**  $\tilde{\mu}_t, \tilde{\mu}_t^*$  (textbook:  $\tilde{\mu}_t = i_t, \tilde{\mu}_t^* = i_t^*$ )
  - Dynamics of **terms of trade**  $s_t$  (textbook: from risk-sharing condition)
- Fall in effective rates stimulates domestic consumption for usual NK reasons
- Domestic/foreign output and net export reaction depends on FX movements

## Asset Returns:

- Deviations from EH/UIP depends on **arbitrageur risk exposure**
- **Asset position imbalances** arise due to
  - Endogenous **dynamics of HH wealth**
  - **HH rebalancing** following asset appreciation due to sticky portfolio weights
  - Exogenous changes in supply/QE
- Equilibrium risk pricing depends on **endogenous hedging properties** of bonds across maturities and countries

## Results: Stylized Model


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# Bond and Currency Returns: Partial Equilibrium Intuition

Partial equilibrium assumptions: suppose

- Short rates  $\text{corr}(i_t, i_t^*) \approx 0$  and no supply/QE/bond demand shocks
- HH rebalancing (local)  $\frac{\partial b_{jt}(\tau)}{\partial \mathcal{P}_{jt}^{(\tau)}} < 0$ , (cross)  $\frac{\partial b_{Ft}}{\partial \mathcal{E}_t} < 0$ , wealth dynamics  $db_t \approx 0$

## Proposition (Carry Trades)


- Both  $CCT$  and  $BCT_H$  return decrease with  $i_{Ht}$
-  In addition,  $BCT_F$  increases with  $i_{Ht}$

Intuition: Bond and FX Premia Cross-Linkages

- When  $i_{Ht} \downarrow$  global arbitrageurs want to invest more in  $CCT$  and  $BCT_H$
- $\mathcal{E}_t$  and  $X_t^{FX} \uparrow$ : increased FX exposure (risk of  $i_{Ft} \downarrow$ )
- Hedge by investing more in  $BCT_F$  (since foreign bonds appreciate when  $i_{Ft}$  drops)  
 $\implies BCT_F$  decreases

## QE: Partial Equilibrium Intuition

Following unexpected  $QE_H$  (maintaining PE assumptions):


- Home yields decline:  $\downarrow y_{Ht}^{(\tau)}$
-  Also reduces yields in country  $F$   $\downarrow y_{Ft}^{(\tau)*}$ , and depreciates the Home currency  $\uparrow \mathcal{E}_t$

**Intuition:** Bond and FX Premia Cross-Linkages

- Arbitrageurs decrease  $H$  bond exposure (less exposed to risk of  $i_{Ht} \uparrow$ )
- More willing to hold assets exposed to this risk: increase holdings of  $F$  bonds and currency, pushing down  $F$  yields and depreciating the  $H$  currency

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**Limits of partial equilibrium logic**

- MP-induced spillovers to asset prices
- But asset price movements  $\implies$  changes in consumption, inflation, wealth across countries
- Thus,  $\text{corr}(i_t, i_t^*) \neq 0$  and wealth dynamics  $db_t \neq 0$  which complicates the partial equilibrium hedging logic



# Bond and Currency Returns: General Equilibrium Intuition

Simplifying assumptions: suppose

- Fully rigid producer prices ( $\vartheta \rightarrow \infty$ ), single global discount risk factor  $v_t = -v_t^*$
- Symmetric, zero wealth/supply steady state

## Proposition (Macro Dynamics)

If arbitrageur risk aversion  $a > 0$  large enough, then relative to  $a = 0$ :


- Aggregate wealth  $b_t$  is **stationary**;  $CCT$  and  $BCT_H$  increasing,  $BCT_F$  decreasing in  $b_t$
- Terms of trade  $s_t$  **under-react** to discount factor shocks
- Consumption  $c_t, c_t^*$  **over-reacts** iff effective duration  $\tilde{\eta}(\tau)$  large enough

Intuition: Bond and FX Premia Cross-Linkages

- When  $\uparrow b_t$ , arbitrageurs are long  $CCT$ ,  $BCT_F$ ; short  $BCT_H$
- Following **discount factor shock**  $\implies \downarrow c_t, \uparrow c_t^*$
- $\implies$  F currency  $\uparrow \mathcal{E}_t$  and expected depreciation
- But  $\uparrow db_t$ , thus **F currency appreciates by less** in order to accommodate higher expected return on  $CCT$

## QE: General Equilibrium Intuition

Following unexpected  $QE_H$  (maintaining GE assumptions):


- Home yields decline and Home currency depreciates:  $\downarrow y_{Ht}^{(\tau)}$  and  $\uparrow \mathcal{E}_t$
-  Also boosts output in country  $H$ :  $\uparrow y_t$ 
  - Ambiguous effects in country  $F$
  - If ToT channel and home-bias is large enough, can reduce output in country  $F$   $\downarrow y_t^*$

Open Economy Macro Implications:

- Domestic monetary conditions (conventional or QE) affect both yield curves and the exchange rate
- Imperfect insulation even with floating rates

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
Open Economy Macro Implications:

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Limits of stylized macro intuition:

- Risk premia function of  $b_t$  only
- $\implies$  counter-factual factor structure of asset prices

# Asset Return Factor Structure




- Additional risk factors necessary to fit data (Gourinchas, Ray, Vayanos 2025)

# Adding Additional Risk Factors


- Illustrative model to better understand qualitative features (work in progress):
  - H/F discount factor shocks  $v_t, v_t^*$
  - H/F supply shocks  $g_t, g_t^*$
  - H/F rebalancing shocks: across maturities  $\beta_t, \beta_t^*$ ; across currencies  $\gamma_t$
- Compare discount factor shocks and QE shocks
  - Also relative to risk-neutral benchmark

# Discount Factor Shock IRFs



- Under-reaction and then over-shooting mean-reversion of ToT
- $\implies$  longer-lasting H recession, eventual F expansion
  - Actually changes sign of conditional  $\text{corr}(i_t, i_t^*) \neq 0$  (albeit quantitatively small)

# QE Shock IRFs



- QE leads to H expansion, F contraction; inflationary (through ToT movements)
- Over longer horizons, the pattern switches due to H wealth effects
  - Also see Kamdar & Ray (2025) for unintended redistribution effects of QE

# Concluding Remarks

- Present an **integrated general equilibrium framework** to understand **macro consequences** of term premia, currency risk premia
- **Rich transmission of monetary policy** domestically and abroad:
  - To asset prices via FX and term premia
  - To real economy via asset market segmentation



Thank You!

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