Project 2: Multi-Armed Bandits

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- 2.5: See Figure 1.
- 3.1.1: The regret grows linearly. This is anticipated because the selected action is always penalized, and the other action is not penalized if not selected. Each time this happens, the expected action will move towards the other action; after a certain number of iterations, the other action will be favored, resulting in a substantial loss, which in turn penalizes this inferior action and makes the expected action rewind to the superior action again. This cycle repeats infinitely. In our scenario, the losses are 0.2 and 0.8 respectively; the expected action in each cycle would be 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, since $0.2 \times 4 = 0.8 \times 1$, equivalent to having an average reward of $(0.8 \times 4 + 0.2 \times 1) \div 5 = 0.68$, which explains the observed regret $\tilde{R} = 120 = 0.8 \times 1000 0.68 \times 1000$ in Figure 2.
- 3.1.2: It is yet unclear why the regret bound would be substantially higher.

$$\bar{R}_n = \mathbb{E} \sum_{t=1}^n l_{I_t,t} - \min_{i=1,\dots,K} \mathbb{E} \sum_{t=1}^n l_i, t$$
 (1)

• 3.1.3: The statement is true because

$$E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{l}_{n}^{t}\right] = \sum_{t=1}^{T} E\left[\frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}} \mathbb{1}_{a^{t}=n}\right] = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}} p(a^{t}=n) + 0 \cdot p(a^{t} \neq n)\right] = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}} p_{n}^{t} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} l_{n}^{t} \qquad (2)$$

• 3.2.1: See Figure 3. EXP3 penalizes the inferior action super-exponentially by first lowering the probability of it being selected, and then amplifying the penalty by dividing the loss by the already small probability, in the rare case that it is indeed selected again. It would therefore take a considerable number of iterations for the probability of the superior action to drop to a similar level, causing the inferior action to be selected once and it being penalized further significantly. Generally, in the case of playing a constant game, the superior action can be quickly identified.




Figure 1: Constant Policy and Random Policy versus Constant Game




Figure 2: Generalized Weighted Majority (GWM) versus Constant Game




Figure 3: Exponential Weights for Exploration and Exploitation (EXP3) versus Constant Game




Figure 4: Exponential Weights for Exploration and Exploitation (EXP3) versus Gaussian Game

- 3.3.2: See Figure 4.
- 3.4.1: The variance is unbounded since

$$\operatorname{Var}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{l}_{n}^{t}\right] = E\left[\left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{l}_{n}^{t}\right)^{2}\right] + \left(E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{l}_{n}^{t}\right]\right)^{2}$$

$$= E\left[\left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}} \mathbb{1}_{a_{t}=n}\right)^{2}\right] + \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} l_{n}^{t}\right)^{2}$$

$$= E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \left(\frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}} \mathbb{1}_{a_{t}=n}\right)^{2}\right] + E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{t_{2} \neq t_{1}}^{T} \left(\frac{l_{n}^{t_{1}}}{p_{n}^{t_{1}}} \mathbb{1}_{a_{t_{1}}=n}\right) \left(\frac{l_{n}^{t_{2}}}{p_{n}^{t_{2}}} \mathbb{1}_{a_{t_{2}}=n}\right)\right] + \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} l_{n}^{t}\right)^{2}$$

$$= \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left(\frac{l_{n}^{t}}{p_{n}^{t}}\right)^{2} p_{n}^{t} + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{t_{2} \neq t_{1}}^{T} l_{n}^{t_{1}} l_{n}^{t_{2}} \frac{P(a_{t_{1}} = n, a_{t_{2}} = n)}{p_{n}^{t_{1}} p_{n}^{t_{2}}} + \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} l_{n}^{t}\right)^{2}.$$

$$(6)$$

Here even if the loses are bounded, the probability that appears on the denominator of the first term can be infinitely close to zero, such that the first term is unbounded. Although the probability also appears on the denominator of the second term, but due to its nominator this term is not necessarily unbounded; it is written as-is because those two events are not necessarily independent. This does

not affect our conclusion that the variance is unbounded though. The third term is always bounded.

• 4.2.1: It is straightforward to see that, using the Hoeffding's Inequality,

$$P\left(|\mu - \hat{\mu}| \ge \sqrt{\frac{\log(\delta^{-1})}{2m}}\right) \le \exp\left[-2m\left(\sqrt{\frac{\log(\delta^{-1})}{2m}}\right)^2\right] = \delta \tag{7}$$

(6)

which indicates that the probability that $\mu \geq \hat{\mu} + \sqrt{(\log(\delta^{-1}))/2m}$ is at most δ , which is equivalent in saying that the probability that $\mu \leq \hat{\mu} + \sqrt{(\log(\delta^{-1}))/2m}$ is at least $1 - \delta$.

• 4.2.2: Using the conclusion from 4.2.1, and considering the fact that C_n^t is the number of times that the reward is sampled, we have $m = C_n^t$, and $\delta^{-1} = t$, which trivially yields

$$\mu_n^t \le \hat{\mu}_n^t + \sqrt{\frac{\log t}{2C_n^t}} \tag{8}$$

• 4.3.1: See Figure 5. Note that the actions taken are not plotted since it is straightforward to see that the inferior action is taken whenever the regret steps up, and the superior action otherwise. In the case of playing a constant game, the estimated rewards for both actions converge to their true values almost immediately; the superior action will then always be selected since it has higher reward, until C_2^t on the denominator of the second term is large enough and compensate for the reward difference. This causes the inferior action to be taken, which increments C_1^t and requires C_2^t to be again adequately large in order to toggle the selected action. This happens each time the upper confidence bounds meet on the plot. This can be numerically solved:

$$\sqrt{\frac{\log(C_1^t + C_2^t)}{2C_1^t}} + 0.2 = \sqrt{\frac{\log(C_1^t + C_2^t)}{2C_2^t}} + 0.8 \tag{9}$$

for $C_1^t = 1, 2, 3, \dots, 6, 7$, we can obtain solutions for $C_2^t = 6, 20, 46, 93, 176, 322, 575$, which are basically where the inferior action is taken.

• 4.4.1: See Figure 6. UCB outperforms EXP3 initially, but the regret for EXP3 quickly approaches some asymptotic bound while that for UCB continues to grow. This is anticipated since the estimator for EXP3 is unbiased; it converges quickly to the true mean rewards for each action and all subsequent actions sampled from that multinomial distribution will truly reflect the expected rewards from both actions. However, Although UCB is able to converge to the true mean rewards equally well, its upper confidence bounds for the better actions almost monotonically decrease and the worse actions are guaranteed to be selected from time to time.




Figure 5: Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) versus Constant Game




Figure 6: UCB and EXP3 versus Gaussian Game




Figure 7: UCB and EXP3 versus Adversarial Game

• 4.5.1: See Figure 7. The adversarial game uses the following reward table:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
 (10)

In the first iteration, UCB simply chooses the first action since it possesses zero knowledge on any of the actions; it then realizes that no reward is incurred for taking this action and consequently goes on to explore the second action, which also results in zero reward. UCB can do nothing at this point except for repetitively exploring alternating actions only to achieve zero reward. It is straightforward to see that the best action results in a reward of 500. This can also be generalized: if there are n actions, the regret would be $1000 \cdot (n-1)/n$. EXP3 takes advantage of randomization and is more robust against an adversarial game.

- 5.2.1: See Figure 8.
- 5.3.1: See Figure 9.




Figure 8: UCB and EXP3 on the University Website Latency Dataset




Figure 9: UCB and EXP3 on the Path Planning Dataset