

CHAPTER 2

Defining emotion concepts: discovering “cognitive scenarios”

Introduction

Ten years ago Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 12) argued that “an analysis of emotion must go beyond differentiating positive from negative emotions to give a systematic account of the qualitative differences among individual emotions such as fear, envy, anger, pride, relief, and admiration”. While a great deal of work has been done during the intervening decade I believe no such systematic account has as yet emerged.

This chapter makes an attempt at such a systematic account, anchored in an independently established and justified set of universal semantic primes. While no exhaustive discussion of all the emotion concepts encoded in the English lexicon has been attempted, the account given here does include detailed analysis of some fifty emotion concepts such as *fear*, *pride*, *relief*, and *admiration*, which constitute the core of the English emotion lexicon. Most of the emotion concepts which have been written about in the extensive cross-disciplinary literature on “emotions” have in fact been covered here, and while it was impossible to discuss the literature on individual “emotions” fully, all sections of this chapter include some critical discussion of their earlier treatment – by psychologists, philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and historians.

Like any other set of complex entities, emotion concepts can be classified in many different ways. For the purposes of this chapter, I have divided them into six groups based on the following general themes: (1) “something good happened” (e.g. *joy* or being *happy*); (2) “something bad happened” (e.g. *sadness* or *grief*); (3) “something bad can/will happen (e.g. *fear* or *anxiety*); (4) “I don’t want things like this to happen” (e.g. *anger* or *indignation*); (5) “thinking about other people” (e.g. *envy* or *Schadenfreude*); and (6) “thinking about ourselves” (e.g. *shame* or *remorse*). Each of these themes is linked with some aspect of the cognitive scenarios which underlie the emotion concepts included in a given group.

1 “Something good happened” and related concepts

Like other languages, English has a relatively small set of emotion terms referring to “good events” (cf. Averill 1980) and not all such words are linked with “good feelings”. For example, *envy* implies that “something good happened”, but alas, it happened to someone else, and the experiencer feels “something bad”, not “something good”. We assure other people that we feel something good because something good happened to them when we *congratulate* them; but *congratulate* is a speech act verb, and there is no corresponding emotion term (while there *is* a term – at least a loan word – for feeling something good because something bad happened to someone else; see section 5).

In this section I will discuss several common English words which are linked with thoughts about “good things” that happened, are happening, or will/can happen, and which imply “good feelings”. These words include *joy*, *happy* (and *happiness*), *contented*, *pleased* (and *pleasure*), *delighted* (*delight*), *relieved* (*relief*), *excited* (*excitement*), and *hope*. (As the nouns do not always mean the same as the corresponding adjectives I will not attempt to standardize the part of speech used to identify a given emotion concept.) For comparison, I will also include here the word *relief*, which refers to “good feelings” but not to “good events”.

1.1 Joy

Joy is not a very common everyday word in modern English, and its frequency is much lower than that of the adjective *happy*. One could say that the concept of being *happy* has expanded in the history of English emotions, at the expense of *joy*. For example, in Shakespeare’s writings (Spevack 1968) *joy* and *happy* have the same frequency of 215, whereas in Bernard Shaw’s works (Bevan 1971) *happy* is seven times more common than *joy* (339: 52). The reasons for this decline of *joy* and expansion of *happy* will be discussed later.

Nonetheless, the cognitive scenario of *joy* is simpler than that of *happy* or *happiness*, and partly for this reason *joy* is a better starting point for the analysis of “positive emotion terms”. There are two crucial cognitive components in the *joy* scenario, an evaluative one: “something very good is happening”, and a volitive one: “I want this to be happening”.

A full explication of *joy* follows:

Joy (X felt joy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:

- (c) "something very good is happening"
- (d) I want this to be happening"
- (e) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this

Instead of commenting on the individual components of this explication directly, I will discuss them in relation to the explication of the related and culturally more salient concept of *happy*.

1.2 Happy and happiness

I have at last got the little room I have wanted so long, and am very happy about it. (Louise May Alcott, 1975[1846]: 32)

As this quote illustrates, we are *happy* when something good has happened to us that we have wanted to happen (e.g. when we get, at last, a room of our own). One clear difference between *happy* and *joy*, then, has to do with the personal character of the former (highlighted by expressions such as *pursuit of happiness* or *personal happiness*), and the non-personal, "selfless" character of *joy*. Unlike being *happy*, *joy* can be shared with other people and can be seen as open to everyone (cf. expressions like *the joy of Christmas* or *the joy of knowledge*). If *joy* implies that "something very good is happening", *happy* implies that "some good things happened TO ME". (Of course people can pursue happiness *en deux*, as a couple, but this doesn't make it non-personal or selfless.)

As the phrasing of these two components suggests, the "TO ME" aspect of being *happy* defines only one dimension of the contrast with *joy*. There is also the temporal dimension and, so to speak, the quantitative one. Unlike *joy*, being *happy* can be understood as a long-term state (as well as an emotion), and as an emotion, it can be seen as a more "settled" one than *joy*. In some ways, *joy* can be seen as more intense, more thrilling than being *happy* – and more likely to be a short-term emotion. To quote J. D. Salinger (1964: 155): "the most singular difference between happiness and joy is that happiness is a solid and joy a liquid. Mine started to seep through its container as early as the next morning."

Being *happy* is more consistent, then, with goals achieved and dreams fulfilled than with unexpected and undreamed-of good events. (One is more likely to be, in C. S. Lewis' and Wordsworth's phrases, "surprised by joy" than "surprised by being happy"; and one can hardly *seek joy*, as one can *seek happiness*.) This is consistent with the past tense of the

evaluative component in *happy*: “some good things happened to me” (vs. “something very good is happening” in *joy*) and also with the past tense of the volitive component: ‘I wanted things like this to happen to me’ (vs. ‘I want this to be happening’ in *joy*). It is also consistent with a broader range of causes: “some good things” vs. “something very good” in *joy*. Since being *happy* can be a long-term state it may seem to be better portrayed in terms of present rather than past events (“some good things are happening to me” rather than “some good things happened to me”). But in fact, an expression like *a happy end* implies that some good things have already happened (to the protagonists), while inviting the inference that after that, no change in their fortunes is to be expected. Of course more good things can happen to them in the future, but *happy* doesn’t depend on that; rather, it implies a state based on some good things which have already happened. A hypothetical “*joyous end*” wouldn’t have a similarly backward-looking perspective, and would suggest, rather, that the end itself was a joyous moment.

But there is one further important difference between being *happy* and *joy*, which (as we will see) links the former with *contentedness*: the implication that one doesn’t want anything else, that one has all one wanted. This leads us to the following explication:

Happy (X was happy).

- (a) X felt something (because X thought something)
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “some good things happened to me”
- (d) I wanted things like this to happen
- (e) I don’t want anything else now”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this

The differences between *happy* and *joy*, then, can be summed up in the form of the following contrasts: (1) the presence vs. absence of “to me”; (2) “happened” vs. “is happening”; (3) “some things” vs. “something”; (4) “good” vs. “very good”; in components (c) and (f); (5) “I wanted” vs. “I want”; and (6) the presence vs. absence of the component “don’t want anything else”.

It must be emphasized, however, that the adjective *happy* differs in meaning from the noun *happiness* and is, so to speak, weaker. For example, if one says

I am happy with the present arrangements.

one is not implying that one feels happiness. The fact that one can combine *happy* with *quite*, as in the following exchange:

- A: Are you thinking of applying for a transfer?
 B. No, I am quite happy (*joyful, *joyous) where I am.

suggests that to feel *happy* one doesn't even have to feel "something very good" – it can be simply "something good". Nor does one have to think that "some very good things" have happened to one – it can be simply "some good things".

Finally, there is the question of the possibility of feeling unaccountably *happy*:

I feel happy today, I don't know why.

The noun *happiness* appears to be more dependent on some basic cognitive appraisal ("some very good things happened to me"), as does also the noun *joy* ("something very good is happening"). But the adjective *happy* (like the adjective *sad*) can be also used to describe, so to speak, a certain mood, not necessarily linked with any thoughts, no matter how diffuse or less than fully conscious.

The noun *happiness*, whose implications far exceed those of the adjective *happy*, can be compared with similarly "superlative" words in other European languages, such as *Gliick* in German, *bonheur* in French, *felicità* in Italian, or *sčast'e* in Russian (e.g. when I say that "I'm happy with the present arrangements" I don't mean that I experience "happiness"). By contrast, the English adjective *happy* is much "weaker" in meaning than the corresponding adjectives in German (*glücklich*), French (*heureux*), Italian (*felice*), or Russian (*sčastlivyj*), which do imply a feeling of happiness. One consequence of this difference is that, for example, human faces described by Ekman (1975: 36) and others as evidently "happy" ("everyone agrees on what the faces say", according to the caption) would not normally be described in the other languages mentioned as *glücklich*, *heureux*, *felice*, or *sčastlivyj*. The meaning of *happiness* can be explicated as follows:

Happiness (X felt happiness)

- (a) X felt something (because X thought something)
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "some very good things happened to me"
- (d) I wanted things like this to happen
- (e) I can't want anything else"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (g) X felt something like this (because X thought something like this)

The main differences between *happiness* and *happy* lie in the contrast

between “very good” and “good” (components (c) and (f)) and between “I can’t want anything else” vs. “I don’t want anything else” (component (e)). In *happiness* (as in *Gliick*, *bonheur*, *felicità* and *sčast’e*) one’s heart is, so to speak, filled to overflowing, and there is no room left for any further (unfulfilled) desires or wishes.

This difference in “intensity” between *happy* and *happiness* appears to be the result of a historical process in the course of which *happy* “weakened” and expanded in use at the same time (at the expense of more “intense” concepts like *joy* and *rejoice*). In support of this conjecture I would point out that the frame “happy with” (e.g. “I’m happy with the present arrangements”) appears to be a modern innovation. For example, there are no such cases among the 215 occurrences of *happy* in Shakespeare’s writings (Spevack 1968), whereas the concordance of Bernard Shaw’s works (Bevan 1971) shows twelve such examples and in the OED (1993[1933]) the earliest quote for “happy with” is dated 1947. *Happy with* doesn’t imply *happiness* but something less intense than that (rather like *satisfied*). It could be suggested, therefore, that both the decline of *joy* (as well as of the verb *rejoice*) and the semantic weakening of *happy* are manifestations of an overall process of the “dampening of the emotions”, the trend against emotional intensity, characteristic of modern Anglo emotional culture (cf. P. Stearns 1994).

At the same time, the remarkable expansion of the concept *happy* (in its less intense and more pragmatic persona) is consistent with the spread of the emotional culture of “positive thinking”, “optimism”, “cheerfulness”, “fun”, and so on. (See chapter 6.)

Considerations of this kind make one sceptical about the reliability of questionnaires trying to find out the proportion of people who regard themselves as “happy” in different societies (cf. e.g. Myers and Diener 1995; Pinker 1997). First, cross-cultural investigations of this kind are misleading because the words supposedly corresponding to *happy* (e.g. *glücklich*, *heureux*, *felice*, *sčastlivyj*) in fact differ from *happy* considerably; and second, in a culture where “positive thinking” and “feeling good” are valued and seen as signs of success and indeed achievements in themselves, any self-reports about “being happy” are bound to reflect in some (unknown) measure the pressure of the prevailing emotional ideology.

1.3 Contented

The word *contented* could apply to the (presumed) feelings of a cat lying comfortably in a warm spot. Its meaning can be stated as follows:

Contented (X was contented)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "some good things happened to me before now"
- (d) I feel something good because of this now
- (e) I don't want other things now"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Like *happy*, *contented* can combine with the modifier *quite*: "She is quite contented (quite happy) here", but unlike *happy*, it doesn't easily combine with *very*: "She is very happy (?very contented) here". This difference in combinability highlights the fact that *contented* is "weaker" and more pragmatic than *happy* (while *happy* is "weaker" and more "pragmatic" than *happiness* or *joy*). *Contented* is also more focussed on the present well-being ("I feel something good now") based on past good events ("some good events happened to me before now"), and on the lack of present desires ("I don't want other things now"). It is therefore more limited in scope than *happy*, which is based on past events ("some good things happened to me") matching past wanting ("I wanted something like this to happen") and therefore is more compatible with the achievement of goals and fulfilment of long-term wishes.

1.4 *Pleased and pleasure*

Mr Butler, who is highly pleased with Mr King's past administration of his property, wished . . . to give him some token of his satisfaction (Kemble 1975[1839]: 263).

The quote above is 160 years old, but it fits the current use of the word *pleased* well: one is *pleased* with something that has – in one's estimation – gone well and in accordance with one's wishes.

To begin with, then, *pleased* – unlike *happy* – requires a thought. It would be odd to say "I feel pleased, I don't know why", as one can say "I feel happy, I don't know why". One is *pleased* "with something" or "about something", that is, one thinks about something and one feels *pleased* because of this.

If *happy* is compatible with the achievement of goals and with the fulfilment of wishes, so is *pleased*; but *pleased* is less personal and has, so to speak, a sharper focus. For example, if a colleague gets a promotion, and I say that I am *pleased*, this implies that I think that something good

happened and that I wanted it (this particular event) to happen. If I say to the colleague, however, that I am *happy* (about her promotion) I imply that I identify with the colleague (“something good happened to me”), and also, that I wanted good things (in general) to happen to her.

Pleased seems also to be more “focussed” than *happy* because it refers (prototypically) to one particular event rather than to “some events” in the plural. For this reason, no doubt, *pleased* cannot be linked with open-ended and diffused causes implied by references to place or time:

- I am happy here.
- ?I am pleased here.
- I feel happy today.
- ?I feel pleased today

Neither does *pleased* refer to “not wanting other things”; it is focussed (prototypically) on one particular event (“something good happened”) and implies nothing about other things, whether desired or not desired.

- Pleased* (X was pleased)
- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something good happened”
- (d) I wanted this to happen”
- (e) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this

Finally, a “warning” about *pleasure*. Despite the morphological kinship with *pleased*, *pleasure* is semantically only a distant cousin; when one is *contented*, *delighted*, *relieved*, or *excited*, one feels *contentedness*, *delight*, *relief*, or *excitement*, but when one is *pleased* one doesn’t necessarily feel *pleasure*. In fact, *pleasure* is usually not regarded as an “emotion” at all, and with good reason, for it doesn’t imply any cognitive scenario at all, not even a prototypical one. Rather, it implies only that a person feels something good because of something that is happening to him or her at the same time – not necessarily something seen as “something good”. It is only the feeling which is (feels) “good”, no cognitive evaluation needs to be involved.

In their theory of emotions, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) decided to use the terms *pleased* and *displeased* as indefinable semantic primitives, analysing all other emotion terms with the help of these two. The authors defended their decision by emphasizing that these terms “sim-

ply represent the best we can do to find relatively intensity-neutral English words that refer (only) to the undifferentiated affective reactions one can have to events and their consequences" (p. 20). In fact, however, *pleased* and *displeased* are as complex as any other emotion terms and need to be analysed themselves, and the perfect primitives which can be found for this purpose are the extremely versatile universal human concepts GOOD and BAD.

1.5 Delight

A person who feels *delighted* has just discovered that something unexpected and very good has happened, as the birthday girl did in the following example:

She arrived to candlelight and twenty five presents – from trinkets to treasures – hidden Easter-egg style throughout the apartment . . . After the fourth or fifth gift, and all the way up to her birthday number, she would look at me incredulously each time or squeal with childlike delight as she eagerly set out to find the next surprise." (Feinstein and Mayo 1993: 56)

Roughly speaking, *delighted* could be compared to a mixture of being surprised and very pleased at the same time, but as the proposed explications of *delighted* and *pleased* show, *pleased* is more compatible with achievements of goals and with a sense of control over events ("I wanted this to happen"). In addition, *delighted* implies also that what happened is not just "good" but "very good", and that one feels something "very good" because of this. In politeness routines, therefore, "I'm delighted to hear it" sounds more enthusiastic (sometimes gushing) than "I'm pleased to hear it".

Delighted (X was delighted)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I know now: something very good happened"
- (d) I didn't know that this would happen"
- (e) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this

1.6 Relief

Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) have defined *relief* as "happiness as a result of something that brings to an end fear or sadness". But of course one can feel *relief* without feeling *happiness*; and it can follow not only

fear or sadness but also some other oppressive feeling (e.g. *anxiety* or *nervousness*). In addition, concepts like *happiness*, *fear*, and *sadness* are just as complex as *relief* itself, so analysing *relief* via those three concepts constitutes a case of explaining unknowns via unknowns.

The definition of *relief* proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) is somewhat more satisfactory in this respect (although it uses one emotion term, too, *pleased*): “(pleased about) the disconfirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event”. But this analysis, too, relies on concepts which are complex and highly language-specific (*disconfirmation*, *prospect*, *undesirable*). Avoiding concepts of this kind we can say that if *delighted* implies that something unexpected – and very good – has happened, *relieved* implies that something expected – and bad – is not going to happen. More precisely:

Relieved (X was relieved)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “I thought that something bad would happen
- (d) I felt something bad because of this
- (e) I know now: this bad thing will not happen”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

(As will be argued in more detail later, this is directly antithetical to *disappointment*.)

1.7 *Excitement*

There is a wonderful kind of excitement in modern neuroscience, a romantic, moon-walk sense of exploring and setting out for new frontiers. (Jamison 1997: 196)

Excitement – like *hope* – is linked with future rather than present or past events: it implies that “something very good will happen”; it also implies, like *hope*, that “I want this to happen”. In *excitement*, this is often linked with an active attitude (“I want to do something”). This active attitude, however, is not linked with a sense of control; on the contrary, there is an element of “out-of-controlness” here, in so far as one cannot fully control one’s thoughts (“I can’t think about other things now”).

Like *delight* and *relief*, *excitement* (as well as *surprise*) is also linked with a recent discovery or realization (“I know now”). Unlike *delight* (or *surprise*), however, it doesn’t imply anything contrary to expectations

("I didn't think that this would happen"). Like *joy*, *excitement* refers to current rather than past desires ("I want this to happen"), and this combined with the certainty that the desired event will happen creates an impression of vividness, "arousal", and something like thrill.

Excited (X was excited)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I know now: something very good will happen"
- (d) I want it to happen
- (e) I can't think about other things now"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

1.8 Hope

Like *excitement*, *hope* refers to desired future events. But unlike in *excitement*, these desired future events are seen as "good" rather than "very good", and they are seen as possible rather than certain ("I think good things can happen" vs. "I know now: something very good will happen"). As the phrasing of the two components just mentioned suggests, prototypically *hope* is also less focussed than *excitement* ("some good things" vs. "something very good"). Finally, *hope* implies a lack of knowledge about the future ("I don't know what will happen"), and in this (as well as in some other respects) it is parallel to *fear*:

Hope (X felt hope)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I don't know what will happen"
- (d) some good things can happen (some time after now)
- (e) I want these things to happen"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Fear will be discussed later, but it will be useful to outline its explication here for comparison:

Fear (X felt fear)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something

- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I don't know what will happen"
- (d) some bad things can happen
- (e) I don't want these things to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I don't know if I can do anything"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

Apart from the "good vs. bad" contrast, the main difference between *fear* and *hope* lies in components (f) and (g) of *fear*, which suggest a desire to do something as well as a sense of helplessness. No parallel components are included in *hope*, which may seem, as a result, a more placid, less involved, attitude. In addition, however, *hope* seems to be focussed on more distant events than *fear*: in *fear*, the threat can extend to any time from now to a distant future, whereas in *hope*, the good events to come seem to be separated (at least notionally) from the present time. *Hope* is different in this respect not only from *fear* but also from *excitement*, which can also refer to imminent events (and also from *confidence*, which will not be discussed here). Hence the subcomponent "some time after now" in component (d) of *hope*.

2 "Something bad happened" and related concepts

In English, as in many other languages, there are many emotion terms associated with cognitive scenarios in which something bad happened, is happening, or will happen. In this chapter, words of this kind are divided into two broad categories, one including real events (past or present), and the other hypothetical (essentially, future) events. The first category, discussed in this section, includes the words *sadness*, *unhappiness*, *distress*, *sorrow*, *grief*, and *despair* (for comparison I will also discuss here *disappointment* and *frustration*), and the second (section 3), words like *fear*, *fright*, *dread*, and *anxiety*.

2.1 Sadness

The concept of "sadness" has often been discussed in the literature, and various interpretations have been proposed. For example, Paul Harris (1989: 103) linked "sadness" with the situation "when desirable goals are lost", Richard Lazarus (1991: 122) assigned to it (as its "core relational theme") "having experienced an irrevocable loss", whereas

Philip Johnson-Laird and Keith Oatley (1989: 91) have suggested that it should be treated as an unanalysable semantic primitive.

To begin with Johnson-Laird and Oatley's suggestion, *sad* is a complex concept, related to other complex concepts (such as, for example, *disappointed*, *distressed*, *worried*, etc.) and sharing with them certain components; it cannot, therefore, be a semantic primitive. Furthermore, it is certainly not a universal concept: there are languages (e.g. Tahitian) which have no word corresponding to anything like it (cf. Levy 1973: 305), and other languages which have various words roughly comparable but none corresponding to it exactly. (See, for example, my discussion of the closest counterparts of *sadness* in the Australian language Pitjantjatjara in Wierzbicka 1992c and in Russian in Wierzbicka 1998b.) Levy (1984) himself has put forward a hypothesis that "sadness" is "hypocognized" in Tahitian. The idea of "hypocognition" has been readily accepted by many other scholars – in my view, too readily, both because the hypothesis is essentially unverifiable, and because it gives an unduly privileged position to the English lexicon (as a standard for what is "hypocognized" elsewhere). What is verifiable (on the basis of lexical evidence) is that the Anglo concept of *sadness* is just as language- and culture-specific as are the Russian concepts of *toska*, *grust'*, or *pečal'* or the Pitjantjatjara concept of *tjituru-tjituru*. (For detailed discussion, see Wierzbicka 1992c; for other arguments against *sadness* as a supposedly universal human emotion, see C. Stearns, 1993.)

Returning to English, Harris' analysis allows him to capture some relationships between *sadness* ("desirable goals lost") and certain other emotion concepts, notably *anger* ("desirable goals blocked") and *joy* ("desirable goals achieved"). But it does not capture the similarities and differences between *sadness* and, for example, *unhappiness*, *distress*, or *disappointment*. It is also inconsistent with empirical linguistic evidence. The word *goal* implies that one is doing something because one wants something to happen. But the word *sad* can also be applied to situations where no "goals" are involved at all. For example, I may feel sad when I hear that my friend's dog died, but this has nothing to do with any goals that I may have had.

Lazarus' (1991) suggestion that *sadness* is linked with an "irrevocable loss" is not sustainable either. If there is an emotion concept in English which can be characterized in these terms, it is *grief*, not *sadness*. For example, if the death of a friend or a relative causes us *grief*, this implies indeed that we construe this death as, roughly speaking, an "irrevocable loss" (see section 2.5). *Sadness*, however, doesn't have to be linked with personal losses at all. Consider, for example, the following statement by a woman visiting in hospital a colleague dying of cancer (Callanan and Kelley 1993: 50):

I miss you a lot at work . . . I feel so sad about what's happening to you.

The “theme” of the visitor’s sadness is not the fact that she is losing a colleague (although she misses her at work) but rather the “bad thing” that has happened (the colleague’s illness) and the awareness that she can’t do anything about it.

Thus, the prototypical cognitive scenario associated with the concept *sad* involves an awareness that “something bad has happened” (not necessarily to me) and an acceptance of the fact that one can’t do anything about it. More precisely, this scenario can be represented as follows (cf. chapter 1, section 9):

- Sad* (X was sad)
 - (a) X felt something
 - (b) sometimes a person thinks:
 - (c) “I know: something bad happened
 - (d) I don’t want things like this to happen
 - (e) I can’t think: I will do something because of it now
 - (f) I know I can’t do anything”
 - (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
 - (h) X felt something like this

Consider, for example, the following passage from a wife’s account of the last stages of her husband’s illness:

Sometimes we’d talk about the early years of our marriage, and his hopes for the boys, and how awful it was that he’d gotten sick. We’d cry because we didn’t know how we’d manage without one another. It sounds sad, and it was, but it was a lot better than yelling at each other, as we’d been doing. (Callanan and Kelley 1993: 47)

The wife acknowledges that something bad has happened, she expresses something like regret at what has happened, but she accepts that she can’t do anything about it (unlike at an earlier stage when both she and her husband were angry and unaccepting).

As has often been pointed out, a person who feels *sad* may not be conscious of the reason for the sadness, and one can say:

I feel sad today, I don’t know why.

For this reason, component (a) of the explication has been formulated as “X felt something”, not as “X felt something because X thought some-

thing" (the person who is said to feel *sad* doesn't have to think about anything in particular: "something bad happened"). Nonetheless, the feeling of sadness – to the extent to which it can be identified at all – can only be identified with reference to a prototypical cognitive scenario ("X feels like people usually do when they think . . .").

Comparing *sadness* with *distress*, Ekman and Friesen (1975: 117) argued that "sadness is a passive, not an active feeling", and that while "in distress there is more of a protest against the loss, in sadness you are resigned to the loss". Again, the word *loss* is not well chosen, for it implies that "something bad happened to me", and yet if my friend's dog dies I may be sad although no personal loss is involved. But the idea of something like resignation and of a passive rather than active attitude is, I think, correct, and consistent with the explication proposed here (cf. components (d), (e), and (f)).

2.2 *Unhappiness*

Unhappiness differs from *sadness* in a number of ways. Firstly, it does require some underlying thoughts (i.e. some known reason), for while one can say "I feel sad, I don't know why", it would be a little odd to say "I feel unhappy, I don't know why".

Secondly, *unhappy* implies a more "intense" feeling and a "stronger" negative evaluation (one can be crushed by unhappiness, but not by sadness), and it is less readily combinable with minimizing qualifiers like *a little* or *slightly*:

- She felt a little (slightly) sad.
- ?She felt a little (slightly) unhappy.

Thirdly, *unhappy* has a more personal character than *sad*: I can be saddened by bad things that have happened to other people, but if I am unhappy, I am unhappy because of bad things that have happened to me personally.

Fourthly, *unhappy* – in contrast to *sad* – does not suggest a resigned state of mind. If in the case of *sadness* the experiencer focusses on the thought "I can't do anything about it", in the case of *unhappiness* he/she focusses on some thwarted desires ("I wanted things like this not to happen to me"), and hence it is more closely associated semantically with *happy*. The attitude is not exactly "active" because one doesn't necessarily want anything to happen, but it is not "passive" either, for one doesn't take the perspective "I can't do anything about it".

Finally, *unhappy* seems to suggest, prototypically, a state extended in time rather than a momentary occurrence (cf. "a moment of sadness")

vs. “*a moment of unhappiness*”). It seems also (like *happy*) to refer, prototypically, to “*some things*” (in the plural) rather than simply “*something*”.

Unhappy (X was unhappy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks for some time:
- (c) “*some very bad things happened to me*”
- (d) I wanted things like this not to happen to me
- (e) I can’t not think about it”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad for some time
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

2.3 Distress

The key differences between *distress* and *sadness* lie in the present orientation of *distress* (“*something bad is happening now*” vs. “*something bad happened*”); in its personal character (“*something bad is happening to ME*”); in its “*active and less resigned*” attitude, noted by Ekman and Friesen (“*I don’t want this to be happening to me*”, “*because of this I want to do something*”). The overall meaning of *distress* can be represented as follows:

Distressed (X was distressed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “*something bad is happening to me now*”
- (d) I don’t want this to be happening
- (e) because of this I want to do something if I can
- (f) I don’t know what I can do
- (g) I want someone to do something”
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

In various works on facial expression of emotions (see e.g. Ekman 1973) the words *distress* or *distressed* are often used to refer to crying infants, whereas the word *sad* is used in connection with photographs showing adults who neither cry nor scream (one can imagine “*tears of sadness*”, but only tears, not loud crying or screaming). This contrast in

the choice of labels is consistent with the definitions proposed here. The state of mind of a crying infant is no doubt more consistent with a present tense personal concern ("something bad IS HAPPENING TO ME now"), posited here for *distressed*, than with the past tense impersonal thought posited for *sad* ("something bad HAPPENED").

Furthermore, a crying infant is not quietly accepting the situation but actively opposing it ("I don't want this to be happening"). The infant may feel helpless and unable to cope with that situation ("I don't know what I can do"), but he or she is not passive; rather, he or she is trying to signal his or her feelings to the outside world, thus implicitly calling for help ("I want someone to do something"). The phrases *cry of distress* and *damsel in distress* point in the same direction, as does also the common phrase *distress signals*, used with reference to ships. The ship's crew may well wish to signal a message along the following lines: "something bad is happening to us", "we don't want this to be happening", "because of this we want to do something", "we don't know what we can do" (and, by implication: "we want someone (else) to do something"). But there would be no point in any ship sending out "signals of sadness", or, for that matter, "signals of unhappiness".

Consider also the following passage from a newspaper article, reporting Australian academics' *distress* at what was happening to Australian education as a result of the then Government's policies (*The Australian*, 3 July 1991, p. 11):

What we are saying to the Government is: "ignore this at your peril". We are really doing them a favour, 18 months before an election, by showing how deeply academics feel.

We want a result. We aren't interested in the Coalition or the Government, we are doing this for higher education. The bottom line is that people are distressed at what is happening to the higher education system.

If the academics said they were *sad* rather than *distressed* they would be implying that something bad had already happened and that they couldn't do anything about. (Consequently, they would not be sad AT something, but BECAUSE of something; cf. Osmond 1997.) The choice of *distressed* implies here a current situation ("something bad is happening to us now"), an opposition to this situation ("we don't want this to be happening"), a desire to do something ("we want to do something because of this if we can"), uncertainty as to what one can do ("we don't know what we can do"), and a call for action by someone else, the Government ("we want someone to do something").

2.4 Sorrow

Sorrow (which is very different in meaning from the adjective *sorry*) is

personal, like *distress* and *unhappiness*, not impersonal like *sadness* ("something very bad happened TO ME"). It is more "intense" than *sadness* ("something VERY bad happened to me"). It can be caused by a past event (somebody's death, some other great loss), but if so then it is not focussed on that past event as such. Rather, it implies a long term state (possibly resulting from a past event, or from a past discovery of a long-term condition (e.g. childlessness or an incurable disease of one's child or spouse). If the experiencer focusses on the past event as such, however, then one would speak of a *tragedy* rather than of a *sorrow*. *Sorrow* may have its roots in the past, but the stress is on the on-going, long-term state. This aspect of *sorrow* is highlighted in the following (admittedly archaic) examples from Stevenson (1949:1886):

The longest sorrow finds at last relief.
(William Rowley)

Eighty odd years of sorrow have I seen.
(Shakespeare)

In terms of attitude, *sorrow* can be said to be half way between *sadness* (accepting) and *distress* (not accepting). Since the "bad thing" is perceived as still happening ("something very bad is happening to me") the experiencer's attitude can be one of "not wanting" ("I don't want this to be happening"). At the same time, however, the realization that one "can't do anything" encourages a more accepting attitude ("I can't think: I will do something because of this" – but not "I want to do something because of this", as in the case of *distress*).

It is also interesting to compare *sorrow* with *unhappiness*, since the two concepts are often applicable to the same situation, depending on the speaker's construal of it. In both cases, the event is seen as very bad for the experiencer, and in both cases this event looms large in the experiencer's thoughts ("I can't not think about this"). One clear difference between the two has to do with the temporal perspective: an *unhappy* person thinks "some very bad things happened to me", whereas *sorrow* is associated with the thought "something very bad is happening to me". In addition, *sorrow* – but not *unhappiness* – suggests a degree of resignation ("I can't do anything about it"), whereas *unhappiness* – but not *sorrow* – suggests thwarted desires ("I wanted things like this not to happen"). Presumably, it is this semi-accepting, or at least semi-resigned attitude to long-term intense adversity or pain ("something very bad is happening to me") which lends *sorrow* its peculiar air of dignity, which commands not only compassion but also respect. To quote Oscar Wilde's "De profundis": "Where there is sorrow, there is holy ground" (Stevenson 1949: 1884).

The fact that there is something irreparable about *sorrow* links it with *grief*, to which we will turn shortly. *Sorrow* and *grief* are also linked by the experiencer’s dwelling on the painful subject; but in the case of *grief* and *grieving* the experiencer intentionally focusses on the painful subject (“I want to think about this”), whereas in the case of *sorrow* there is, rather, an inability to forget (“I can’t not think about this”).

Sorrow (X felt sorrow)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks for a long time:
- (c) “something very bad is happening to me
- (d) I don’t want this to be happening
- (e) I can’t think: I will do something because of this
- (f) I can’t do anything
- (g) I can’t not think about this”
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

The combination of intensity, long-term suffering, and a semi-accepting attitude, makes *sorrow* a somewhat old-fashioned emotion. In the modern Anglo emotional culture, characterized by the “dampening of the emotions” in general and avoidance of long-term “unpleasant emotions” in particular (cf. P. Stearns 1994), *sorrow* has largely given way to the milder, less painful, and more transient *sadness*.

2.5 *Grief*

The beloved is [...] part of ourselves.
(C. S. Lewis 1989: 8)

The death of a beloved is an amputation.
(L’Engle 1989: 6)

Grief is prototypically linked with death, although it can also be extended to other situations when one “loses” a person who was “like a part of me”. By a further extension, *grief* can be attributed to a person who “loses” *something* (rather than *someone*) that was “like a part of me”: one’s capacity for work, physical mobility, sight, and so on.

Although it is often said in the literature on emotions that *sadness* is caused by a “loss”, in fact the metaphor of “loss” is much more appropriate for *grief*. As pointed out earlier, *sadness* can be caused by events

which don't affect us personally and which don't make us "lose" anyone or anything. *Grief*, however, can indeed be said (metaphorically) to be occasioned by a "loss", more specifically, by the "loss" of a person ("someone was like a part of me", "something happened to this person", "because of this this person can't be like a part of me any more"). At the moment, the experiencer is absorbed by thoughts of the painful event ("I want to think about this"), almost to the exclusion of everything else ("I can't think about other things now"). The fact that *grief* has an (intransitive) verbal counterpart (*to grieve*) is consistent with the presence of a volitive component in its meaning (*grieving* can almost be seen as something that one does, like *rejoicing* or *worrying*). One is fully absorbed by the thoughts of one's bereavement, and one is neither able nor willing to direct one's thoughts to anything else. To quote C. S. Lewis again:

There is a sort of invisible blanket between the world and me. I find it hard to take in what anyone says. Or perhaps, hard to want to take it in. It is so uninteresting. (1989: 15)

Grief (X felt grief)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad happened to me (a short time before now)
- (d) someone was like a part of me
- (e) something happened to this person
- (f) because of this this person cannot be like a part of me any more
- (h) I want to think about this
- (i) I can't think about other things now"
- (j) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (k) X felt something like this
- (l) because X thought something like this

The first cognitive component of this definition ("something very bad happened to me") is similar to that of *sorrow* in being "personal" (TO ME), intense (VERY bad), and past (HAPPENED). Unlike *sorrow*, however, *grief* is not (prototypically) a long-term state. Typically, it is caused by a recent event ("something happened a short time before now"), it is more likely to express itself in actions (if only crying), and, unlike *sorrow*, it is not associated with the thoughts "I can't think: I will do something because of this", "I can't do anything", which may lead in

the direction of resignation. In this lack of any signs of resignation or acceptance *grief* is closer to *despair* than to *sorrow*.

As the above explication illustrates, *grief* is a very intense emotion, painful, dramatic, and absorbing. It is therefore hardly surprising that the twentieth century trend against emotional intensity (what P. Stearns (1994) calls "the dampening of the passions") has also had its impact on *grief*, and that in America many psychotherapists have "castigated the old idea of grief as heartbreak" (P. Stearns 1994: 153). "A bit of grief", Stearns summarizes this trend, might be tolerable, but weeks of tears suggested "something morbid, either mental or physical" (p. 153). "By the 1970s even counselling with older widows encouraged the development of new identities and interests and promoted the cessation of grief and its ties to the past". "Grief work meant work against grief and an important attack on Victorian savouring of this emotional state."

2.6 *Despair*

Be beginning; since, no, nothing can be done
To keep at bay
Age and age's evils – hoar hair,
Ruck and wrinkle, drooping, dying, death's worst, winding sheets,
Tombs and worms, and tumbling to decay
So be beginning, be beginning to despair.
(Gerard Manely Hopkins)

When one feels *despair* over one's aging one thinks about this process as something very bad that is happening to one, something one doesn't want to accept and yet can't do anything about. As a result, life seems impossible; at the same time, one's will is still engaged – one doesn't succumb to apathy but rather one is, so to speak, in a state of impotent revolt against reality.

Other instances of *despair* can be interpreted in similar terms. Even though the triggering event can be actually in the past, the situation can be construed as on-going ("something very bad is happening to me"), as in the case of *sorrow*, although *despair* – in contrast to *sorrow* – doesn't imply duration and can be short-lived like *grief*.

Despair presents, however, a greater threat to a person's capacity to live than either *sorrow* or *grief*. *Sorrow* is like long-term suffering that one can, in principle, live with. *Grief* is, prototypically, limited in time and in scope; it is intense and absorbing, but it is not completely incompatible with hope and with a desire to live. But *despair* seems to remove the ground from under a person's feet: not only does one feel unable to counteract the very bad things that are happening to one, but one simply doesn't know how one can live on. The incompatibility between

one's volitional attitude ("I don't want this to be happening", "I want to do something because of this") and one's sense of total impotence ("I can't do anything") explains the great tension linked with *despair* (in contrast to *sorrow* and even to *grief*).

The etymology of *despair* suggests that this concept may have another aspect relating it to *hope* (cf. from Latin *sperare* "to hope", *desperare* "to lose hope"). In fact, *LDOTEL* (1984) defines *despair* as either "utter loss of hope" or a "cause of hopelessness or extreme exasperation". A loss of hope is also compatible with resignation, whereas *despair* is not, so the rough gloss provided by *LDOTEL* cannot be right; it does capture, however, that aspect of *despair* which is spelled out in the component "I can't think: some good things can happen to me" (compare the explication of *hope*, which includes the component "I think some good things can happen").

The component "I can't think: some good things can happen to me" links *despair* also with *depression*, whose two key cognitive components are "I can't do anything", and "nothing good can happen to me". But *despair* is more overwhelming and more directly life-threatening than *depression*, because of its all-embracing cognitive component "I don't know how I can live now".

Despair (X felt despair)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad is happening to me"
- (d) I don't want it to be happening
- (e) I want to do something because of this
- (f) I can't do anything
- (g) I can't think: some good things will happen to me
- (h) I don't know how I can live now"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

2.7 *Disappointment*

A fine morning, but I persuaded myself not to expect William, I believe because I was afraid of being disappointed. (Dorothy Wordsworth 1975[1802]: 181)

In its wide range of applications, spanning the very serious as well as trivial causes, *disappointment* is similar to *sadness*, and in fact it is sometimes presented in the literature as "a kind of sadness". For

example, Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989 have defined *disappointment* as "sadness caused by failure to achieve a goal". An analysis of this kind, however, is empirically inadequate, since it leads to false predictions. For example, it predicts that it should be odd to say "I am disappointed but I am not sad", as it would be odd to say:

- *It is a spaniel but it is not a dog.
- *It is a parrot but it is not a bird.

A closer examination of *disappointment* reveals, however, that it is not conceptualized as a kind of *sadness*, and (unlike *sadness*, *unhappiness*, *distress*, *grief*, or *despair*) it doesn't necessarily imply that "something bad happened". Rather, it implies that "something good didn't happen" – something that one had expected to happen.

A failure to achieve goals is not necessarily involved either: one can be *disappointed* if something desired and expected doesn't happen, even if one has never tried to do anything to bring that desired event about and has never seen it as a "goal". (For example, farmers may be disappointed if the promising-looking clouds fail to bring an expected and hoped for rain; one could hardly say, however, that the rain was the farmers' "goal".)

Disappointed (X was disappointed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I thought that something good would happen"
- (d) I felt something good because of this
- (e) I know now: this good thing will not happen"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

(As mentioned earlier this is in fact a mirror image of *relief*.)

2.8 *Frustration*

Frustration doesn't really belong in the present group either, but it is related to *disappointment* and it is useful to include it here for comparison.

As noted by R. Smith (1991: 80), "frustration is usually defined as the blocking of a goal", and this is clearly on the right track, although hardly sufficient. (In fact, we have seen that, for example, Harris 1989 defines a

different concept – *anger* – in terms of “desirable goals blocked”, contrasting it with “desirable goals lost” supposedly linked with *sadness*.)

A helpful introduction to *frustration* is provided by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 66), who have offered the following illustration:

Consider, for example, the likely reaction of a person encountering a series of problems while attempting to prepare breakfast for his family. If the person forgets to start the coffee soon enough or burns the toast or overcooks the eggs or all of these, we would not be surprised to see behavioural evidence of frustration and arousal.

As this vignette suggests, what is characteristic of *frustration* is that one wants to do something (e.g. prepare breakfast), attempts to do it, and finds (usually through a series of mishaps) that, contrary to one’s expectations, one can’t do it. We could propose, then, the following explication:

Frustration (X felt frustration)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) ‘I wanted to do something now
- (d) I thought I could do it
- (e) now I ‘see’ (have to think) that I can’t do it’
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

It is interesting to note that *frustration* is a highly culture-specific concept, very characteristic of modern Anglo culture, with its emphasis on goals, plans, and expected achievements. In other languages, the concept of “frustration” exists only as a relatively recent loan word from English (*Frustration* in German, *frustracja* in Polish, *frustracija* in Russian, *frustrasi* in Bahasa Indonesia, and so on); and as such, it has been spreading.

3 “Bad things can happen” and related concepts

Lazarus (1991: 235) opens his discussion of the “core relational themes” of the family of emotions identified by him as “fright-anxiety” as follows: “Fright, as I shall henceforth term fear, involves threats that are concrete and sudden.” But if one makes such an arbitrary first move (deciding to call *fear* “fright”), one can’t explore the differences, as well

as similarities between concepts like *fright* and *fear* and one is undermining the empirical basis of one's own discussion. Unfortunately, many psychologists often take a similarly cavalier attitude towards conceptual distinctions drawn in natural language, while at other times relying unwittingly on such distinctions as if they had some "scientific" basis independent of the language. For example, in the very same passage in which he decides to equate *fear* with *fright*, Lazarus leans heavily on the lexical distinction that English draws between *fright* and *anxiety* ("fright . . . is a more primitive reaction than anxiety"), quoting at the same time (in an English translation) Freud's ideas on "anxiety", oblivious of the fact that Freud was talking not about "anxiety" but about the German "Angst".

In this section, I will analyse the concepts *fear*, *fright*, *dread*, *panic*, *terror*, *horror*, *anxiety*, *apprehension*, *worry*, and *concern* (as well as *afraid*, *alarmed*, and *nervous*), as they really function in English, recognizing them for what they are: folk categories rooted in the English language rather than some language-independent absolutes. The German concept of "Angst", much discussed by Freud and substantially different from the English *anxiety*, will be analysed in detail in chapter 3. The common theme of this section is that "bad things can (or will) happen".

3.1 Fear and afraid

- (i) Although the figure seemed to be beckoning them, they were afraid to approach her. (Durham 1995: 22)
- (ii) The authorities were immediately suspicious of the apparitions; they feared that the large crowds attracted to them would encourage political dissent, particularly a Croatian separatist movement that was active in the region. (Durham 1995: 24)

There are several differences between the concepts *fear* and *afraid*. Firstly, *afraid* is inherently personal ("something bad can happen to me") whereas *fear* is not ("some bad things can happen"). For example, the sentence "grave fears are held for the safety of person X" implies that "something bad can happen", not that something bad can happen to the speaker. (Note the plural *fears*; hence the phrasing "some bad things"). Of course *fear* can also be (and typically is) used in situations when something bad can happen to the experiencer, but this is not necessarily the case. On the other hand, if someone is *afraid*, this implies that something bad can happen to this very person (or to someone that they identify with, as in the sentence "I'm afraid for you"). For example, if the children in sentence (i) above were *afraid* to approach the apparition the apparent thought was that "something bad could happen to us"; whereas in sentence (ii) the (Yugoslav) authorities

feared that “something bad can happen” (political dissent could spread).

Secondly, *fear* focusses on lack of knowledge as to what the future holds (“I don’t know what will happen”). For example, the common phrase “missing, feared dead” emphasizes the lack of knowledge as to what is going to happen: it is possible that we will discover that the persons in question have died. *Afraid*, on the other hand, does not include such a component and it is more compatible with situations when the danger is immediate and tangible. For example, if I am *afraid* of a dog, I do not reflect about the future (“I don’t know what will happen”) but focus on the threat itself (“something bad can happen to me”). Partly for this reason the sentence “he is afraid of God” sounds odd, whereas “he fears God” does not (although the collocation linking *fear* with *God* is now archaic). The person who “fears” God is taking a longer as well as a broader view (“I don’t know what will happen” plus “some bad things can happen”) than someone who is “afraid of God”: the latter seems to imply that God could punish me (“do something bad to me”) right now. This focus on lack of knowledge (in *fear*) explains also why one can “fear the worst” but not “be afraid of the worst” (one can be “afraid of the dog” but not “afraid of the worst”): the phrase *fear the worst* implies that one doesn’t know what will happen and that it could be “the worst”. *Afraid* is also more specific than *fear*. When one is *afraid*, one thinks about something specific: “something bad can happen to me because of this” (e.g. because I have approached the apparition). *Fear*, on the other hand, can refer to some unspecified and unknown “bad things” (*fear of the unknown*).

Finally, *fear* is more likely to mobilize one to action, in particular, to make one run away from a potentially dangerous situation (although it could also have a paralysing effect), whereas being *afraid* is more likely to stop one from doing something:

- he was too afraid to speak
- he was afraid to cross the road
- *he feared to cross the road (to speak)

For this reason, I have posited for *fear* the component “I want to do something because of this if I can” (as well as the helpless “I don’t know if I can do anything”). For *afraid*, however, I have only posited a helpless component, placing it directly after “I don’t want this to happen”, and enhancing it by the addition of the word “now”. The sequence “I don’t want this to happen”, “I don’t know if I can do anything now” implies a paralysing effect, which, as we have seen, is more characteristic of *afraid* than of *fear*. (For further discussion of *fear* see also the section on *hope*.)

Fear (X felt fear)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I don't know what will happen
- (d) some bad things can happen
- (e) I don't want these things to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I don't know if I can do anything"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

Afraid (X was afraid)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about something;
- (c) "something bad can happen to me because of this
- (d) I don't want this to happen
- (e) I don't know if I can do anything now"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

3.2 *Fright*

A telegram comes to you and you leave it on your lap. You are pale with fright. (Mary Boykin Chestnut 1975[1862]: 280)

LDOTEL (1984) defines the verb *frighten*, unilluminatingly, as "to make afraid; scare", but its definition of the noun *fright* is more helpful: "(an instance of) fear excited by sudden danger or shock; alarm". The helpful element in this definition is the word "sudden".

Fright is sudden because it is a response to something (e.g. a sudden noise); and it implies that something has just happened ("something has happened now") and that "I didn't know this would happen". It also refers to what is perceived as an immediate and tangible danger ("something bad can happen to me now").

The adjective (pseudo-participle) *frightened* differs from the noun *fright* in so far as it doesn't necessarily imply the same immediacy of either the stimulus or the perceived threat; nonetheless, collocations such as "frightened out of her/his wits" do imply that there was some "trigger". (One can't be *"afraid out of one's wits".) Sentences like "she

is frightened of the future" sound rather odd; and one can't be **"frightened to do something" as one can be "afraid to do something". All such differences point to the implication (in *frightened*) that "something happened" (probably, "now") and that "something will happen" (probably, "in a short time"). To illustrate: "the door suddenly opened and there, three or four paces within the chapel, he saw a beautiful young girl of seven or eight, dressed all in white . . . Noguer was dazzled by the sight and very frightened" (Durham 1995: 82). The sight was sudden and it immediately preceded the experience, and the perceived danger was immediate. In the case of the noun *fright* the temporal implications "something happened now", "something bad can happen to me *in a short time*" are even clearer.

Fright

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something has happened now"
- (d) I didn't know that this would happen now
- (e) I know now that something bad can happen to me in a short time
- (f) I don't want this to happen
- (g) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (h) I don't know if I can do anything"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

3.3 *Terrified, petrified, horrified*

One day . . . I was walking up the stairs with my baby in my arms and the three-year-old holding my hand, when again I was immobilized by pain. I was terrified of dropping the baby. (Spufford 1996: 35)

If one is *terrified*, what one is *terrified of* is seen not simply as "something bad" but as something "very bad". What one is *terrified of* is very real, for something very bad is already happening. And yet the target of terror is also partly in the future, because the present 'bad event' is seen here as a source of a future threat, though not a distant one (" . . . can happen now"). This future threat is necessarily personal ("something very bad can happen TO ME NOW"). The experiencer's attitude is one of an intense non-acceptance ("I don't want this to happen"); at the same time, it is one of total helplessness ("I can't do anything").

Terrified (X was terrified)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad is happening"
- (d) something very bad can happen to me now because of this
- (e) I don't want this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I can't do anything now"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

Petrified appears to be a more specific version of *terrified*: it is a *terror* which leads to a kind of paralysis ("I can't move"). (Note, however, the further difference between "can happen" in *terrified* and "will happen" in *petrified*, which presents the latter as subjectively more inevitable).

Petrified (X was petrified)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad is happening"
- (d) because of this something very bad will happen to me now
- (e) I don't want this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I can't do anything now
- (h) I can't move"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

The main difference between *terror* and *horror* concerns the relationship between the experiencer and the victim: in the case of *terror*, the two are identical, whereas in the case of *horror* they can be, and usually are, different. One is *horrified* to see what has happened to someone else, just as one is *appalled* to see what has happened to someone else. A second difference between *horror* and *terror* (which is not unrelated to the first one) has to do with the present orientation of the former: since *horror* is, essentially, the feeling of a spectator, it concerns primarily what happened "now" rather than what will, or can, happen. (Strictly

speaking, therefore, the term *horrified* should not be included in the present section at all; it is useful, however, to discuss it here for comparison with the intuitively closely related concept *terrified*.)

Unlike *appalled*, however, which is always an “on-looker’s” reaction (see section 2.4.), *horror* can sometimes refer to some nightmare involving the experiencer himself or herself, as in the following story about an earthquake:

At first he thought he was in a dream. Then he caught an image of having dived under his desk, and in a moment of stark horror he realized that this was very real. He screamed for help. All was silence . . . Then came the realization that he might slowly die in this terrible manner. More alone than he'd ever felt, his mind grew dark with terror. (Feinstein and Mayo 1993: 44)

It is particularly interesting to observe the experiencer's changing perspective from *horror* to *terror*. *Horror* is accompanied by the realization (“I know now”) that “something very bad has just happened and in fact is still happening” (an earthquake). Then the perspective focusses on one's personal danger (“then came the realization that he might slowly die in this terrible manner”), that is, “something very bad can happen to me”; and there is no longer a sense of sudden discovery (one can be *terrified*, though not *horrified*, for a very long time).

In both cases, the experiencer is innerly opposing the terrible event (“I don't want this to be happening”, “I don't want this to happen”), in both cases he/she would dearly want to do something to avoid it (“I want to do something because of this if I can”), and in both cases he/she feels powerless and helpless (“I can't do anything”).

The present orientation attributed here to *horror* may seem to be inconsistent with the cases of a sudden discovery of some horrifying truths concerning the past. For example, in Helen Demidenko's novel *The Hand that Signed the Paper* (1994: 7) the heroine discovers some old photographs showing, among other war scenes, her father in an SS uniform chasing “a poor-looking man with a big star around his neck” and “wielding a rifle with deadly intent”. Although the word *horrified* is not actually used, the reader may well understand that that's what the heroine feels, and one can well imagine the word *horrified* being used in such a scene (“she was horrified to see . . . ”).

It is interesting to note, however, that in this case the photographs involved the experiencer personally (because of what they were telling her about her father), and that the experience could therefore be construed in terms of “something very bad has happened to me now” (“I've discovered some dreadful truths about my father”) rather than necessarily in terms of “something very bad happened to some people there”.

In fact, if the photographs were gruesome but involved only strangers it would be odd to say that the heroine was horrified to see them. One could say that they were horrific images but not that she was *horrified* to see them – unless they somehow involved her personally. Of course the experience of horror is not always personal, because one can indeed be only an on-looker, but it seems it can always be construed as involving the present: "something very bad happened now" (either to someone else – the victim, or to me the discoverer).

Horrorified (X was horrified)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad has happened now"¹
- (d) I didn't think that something like this could happen
- (e) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (f) I can't do anything"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

3.4 *Dread*

... I learned to dread the monotonous, constant, routine repeat of them [pains] over and over and over again. (Spufford 1996: 51)

Dread refers to an event or events seen as not simply "bad", but "very bad". In this respect, it is similar to *terrified*, *petrified* and *horrified* rather than to *afraid* or *fear*. But *dread* refers to a future event, and not even necessarily an imminent one ("something very bad will happen to me"), whereas *horror* refers to the present and the immediate past ("something very bad has happened now"), and *terror* to the immediate future. Consequently, the reality of the dreaded event is purely subjective: one doesn't really know that it will happen; on the other hand, one thinks that one knows exactly what will happen to one if and when this hypothetical event happens. Consider also the following sentences (from a medical-journal paper):

Throughout much of history the now treatable disease of leprosy was the most dreaded of medical afflictions. The reason for this dread was . . . that it inexorably caused ghastly and chronic disfigurement or deformity.

The word "inexorable" provides a helpful clue here: people *dreaded* leprosy because they knew what would happen (to those afflicted). If

dread were to be replaced in this sentence with *fear* the emphasis would be on what one didn't know rather than on what one did. *Fear* implies: "I don't know what will happen", whereas *dread* implies "I know what will happen to me (if X happens)".

The great vividness of *dread* appears to stem from the combination of imagination and subjective certainty: the experiencer is not quite certain that the dreaded event will take place (e.g. that he/she will get leprosy), but "knows" exactly what its consequences will be. These consequences are experienced as very real, but since they are in the future, the imagination is not constrained by evidence.

The future orientation of *dread* links it with *fear*, and its personal character ("something very bad will happen TO ME") links it with *afraid*. But *fear* implies uncertainty ("I don't know what will happen"), and *afraid* is at least compatible with uncertainty ("something bad CAN happen to me"), whereas *dread* implies subjective certainty – if not as to the future event itself then at least as to its consequences. This is why the sentences (i) and (ii) below invite quite different inferences:

- (i) She was afraid to go to the dentist.
- (ii) She dreaded going to the dentist.

Sentence (i) implies that the action will probably not take place, whereas sentence (ii) implies that it probably will, and also that its consequences are quite clear in the person's mind. Similarly, the phrase "the fear of flying" can refer to people who never fly (because of their fear of flying), but if someone "dreads flying" this implies that they probably do (or will) fly, and that they know exactly what they can expect if and when they do fly.

Dread

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about something:
- (c) "if this happens, something very bad will happen to me"
- (d) I know what
- (e) I don't want this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I can't do anything"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

3.5 Alarmed

a local newspaper . . . made its way into our house, wrapped around the rhubarb. . . . I hid it where our son could not possibly find and read it. To my alarm, it disappeared from its hiding place (Spufford 1996: 39)

The person who is *alarmed* has just become aware of some event which works like a warning: if I don't do something now, something bad will happen. An alarm clock is not meant to alarm us in the emotional sense of the word, but it does provide a useful simile: the sleeping person wakes up becoming suddenly aware that "something has happened now", that they have to do something now (get up), and that if they don't do it something bad will happen. The emotional *alarm* has all the same essential elements: the suddenness, the mobilisation to action, the awareness of an impending danger, and of the need to act "now". In addition, however, it appears to have an element of uncertainty, linking it with confusion and even panic: the alarmed person does not have things under control and does not have a clear plan of action. This is reflected in the component "I don't know what I will do". This uncertainty, together with the sudden onset of the emotion, links the emotional *alarm* with *fright*.

Alarmed (X was alarmed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something has happened now"
- (d) because of this I know: something bad can happen in a short time
- (e) I don't want it to happen
- (f) because of this I have to do something
- (g) I don't know what I will do"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

3.6 Panic

As I ferreted in this [the nappy bucket], my hands sticky with dextrose, a cry of panic went up from the six-year-old, "Mummy, the gerbils have escaped into the garden, and the owl will get them!" (Spufford 1996: 58)

Panic is a feeling which might overcome a student at an exam. The topic is announced ("something has happened now"). The student realizes that she hadn't expected this kind of topic and knows nothing about it and so has to write about something that she knows nothing about; the situation, therefore, is assessed as "bad" ("something bad is happening"). The student has to mobilize herself to action – otherwise the exam will be a disaster ("if I don't do something, something very bad will happen to me"). Of course, the student doesn't want that disaster ("I don't want this to happen"). Consequently, something has to be done immediately ("because of this, I have to do something now"). Presumably, something *CAN* be done. But what? The panic-stricken student does not know what she can do ("I don't know what I can do"); she cannot collect her thoughts ("I can't think now").

As this analysis shows, *panic* is related in various ways to *alarm* (in particular, in the sudden realization that something is wrong and that something has to be done immediately), and to *terror* (in particular, in the vividness, the immediacy, and the intensity of the impending danger: "something very bad can happen to me now"). It is also related to concepts such as *distress* ("I don't know what I can do"). *Panic* mobilizes one into action, as does *fright*, and at the same time it prevents us from effective action, as does *terror* or the feeling of being *petrified*. The component "I can't think now" of *panic* is analogous to the "I can't move" of *petrified* and to the "I can't do anything" of *terrified*. At the same time, the active component "I have to do something (now)" makes *panic* very different from such paralysing emotions. In *panic*, the ineffectiveness is due not to any paralysis, but rather to confusion and to unfocussed agitation.

Panic (X felt panic)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something is happening now"
- (d) if I don't do something now something very bad will happen to me because of this
- (e) I don't want this to happen
- (f) because of this I have to do something now
- (g) I don't know what I can do
- (h) I can't think now"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

3.7 Anxiety

Anxiety can be, as psychologists say, "free-floating", in the sense that the bad events threatening me are unidentified ("I don't know what will happen"). These "bad events" appear also to be more subjective than grounded in some danger with an identifiable basis ("MAYBE something bad will happen to me" rather than "something bad CAN happen to me"). The resulting feeling is debilitating as it makes one feel helpless ("I can't do anything now"). It is related, in different ways, to *worry* and *dread*, as well as to *fear*. It is not, however, a passive attitude; rather, it has an active aspect ("I want to do something if I can"), which in combination with the helpless "I can't do anything now" element leads to something like impotent agitation.

Anxiety (X felt anxiety)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks for some time:
- (c) 'I don't know what will happen'
- (d) maybe something bad will happen to me
- (e) I don't want this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I can't do anything now"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

For example, a student awaiting the results of examinations may well be in a frame of mind producing anxiety: "I don't know what will happen" (i.e. what my results will be), "maybe something bad will happen to me" (i.e. I will discover that my results are bad), "I don't want this to happen" (the student is not resigned but actively wishes for good results), "I want to do something because of this" (the student is agitated and eager to do something to influence the outcome), "I can't do anything now" (he/she realizes that at that stage nothing can be done).

Of all the concepts discussed so far *fear* seems to be the closest to *anxiety*; there are, however, two important differences between the two. First, *fear* can be impersonal ("something bad can happen"), whereas *anxiety* is always personal ("maybe something bad will happen to me"). For example, as mentioned earlier, the phrase "missing, feared dead" implies that "something bad can happen", not that "something bad can happen to me". And second, *fear* is not quite as helpless as *anxiety* (cf. "I

don't know if I can do anything" vs. "I can't do anything now"). For example, *fear* can lead to an attempt to run away, but *anxiety*, which is often associated with waiting, has to be simply endured.

3.8 Nervous

He had enjoyed it, seeing Bonnie out in public, nervous, but nonetheless smiling, talking to people (Capote 1967: 5)

Like *anxiety*, being *nervous* implies that "I don't know what will happen", and that "maybe something bad will happen". Unlike *anxiety*, however, it doesn't imply that maybe something bad will happen "to me" personally.

Furthermore, unlike *anxiety* and unlike most other concepts in this field, *nervous* focusses specifically on "risks" accompanying future actions: I can only be *nervous* if I am going to do something, and if I think that something bad can happen while I am doing it. (For example, I am going to make a speech, and I could forget what I was going to say; or I am going to meet people in public, like Bonnie in the example, and I think I could make a faux pas in the process.) One way or another, something can "go wrong".

The attitude of a person who is *nervous* is not completely passive and helpless, as is that of a person experiencing *anxiety* ("I can't do anything now"), but a sense of not being fully in control is certainly there ("I don't know what I can do").

Nervous (X was nervous)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "I have to do something
- (d) I don't know what will happen when I am doing it
- (e) maybe something bad will happen
- (f) I don't want this to happen
- (g) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (h) I don't know what I can do"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

3.9 Worry

In that fortnight, inevitably, an ophthalmic appointment we had been waiting for for months came up for Bridget at the Hospital for Sick Children. We were deeply worried about her eyesight: it seemed

essential I should go to hear what the new specialist said. (Spufford 1996: 96)

If *alarmed* suggests a sudden onset of emotion, *worried* and *worry* suggest a long-term thinking process. One is *worried about* something (as one is *concerned about* something), and this "aboutness" of *worried* reflects its link with an on-going thinking process ("for some time").

Worry is rooted in uncertainty. Unlike *fear*, it refers primarily to the present ("something is happening now"), but it also has a future dimension: what is happening now may lead to something bad.

For example, in the quote adduced above the parents are worried about their child's eyesight because they have noticed some "worrying signs". The signs are in the present, but the danger is in the future ("something is happening to her eyesight; something bad can happen because of this"). Similarly, if a daughter is late in coming home the *worrying* mother may think: "something is happening to my daughter – something bad can happen to her". If one has a healthy and thriving baby one may still *fear* all sorts of bad things that might happen to him or her; but if one *worries* about one's baby then one must have noticed something in the present that could lead to something bad. One doesn't want anything bad to happen and one wants to do something because of this; but one doesn't know what one can do. Thus, the attitude is not passive and resigned but rather active and agitated; it is lacking, however, in a sense of direction ("I want to do something", "I don't know what I can do"). These last two components indicate a kind of inner conflict and jointly account for the fruitless agitation implied by this concept.

Worried (X was worried)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks for some time:
- (c) "something is happening now"
- (d) something bad can happen because of this
- (e) I don't want it to happen
- (f) because of this I want to do something
- (g) I don't know what I will do"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
 - (i) X felt something like this
 - (j) because X thought something like this

3.10 *Concern*

The concepts *concerned* and *worried* are closely related, yet they differ in

some important respects. To begin with, one is usually *concerned* about someone else, whereas *worry* is often linked with thoughts about oneself (cf. “she is worried about her own health” vs. slightly dubious “she is concerned about her own health”). In addition, *worried* is focussed entirely on bad things which may happen to people; by contrast, *concerned* implies a desire for good things, as well as a “dis-want” of bad ones. For this reason, having *concern* for someone is also related to *caring* for someone; *worry* is much further from *care* (although *cares* in the plural are closer to *worries* than *care* in the singular is to *worry* in the singular). Furthermore, *concern* does not imply the same agonizing uncertainty (“I don’t know what I can do”) as *worry* does. Finally, *concern* is not necessarily a “bad”, undesirable feeling, whereas *worry* is (cf. “this person feels something” vs. “this person feels something bad”).

Concern (X was concerned)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks for some time about someone:
- (c) “something bad can happen to this person
- (d) I don’t want this to happen
- (e) I want good things to happen to this person
- (f) because of this I want to do something if I can”
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

3.11 *Apprehension*

Apprehension is a fairly mild emotion, as compared with *fear*, *afraid*, *fright*, or *scared* (not to mention *dread* or *terror*). The explication proposed below accounts for this in two ways: first, it refers to bad things that only **CAN** – rather than **WILL** – happen; and second, it emphasizes the experiencer’s uncertainty as to whether these bad things will happen at all (“I don’t know if it will happen”).

Apprehension (X felt apprehension)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something bad can happen
- (d) I don’t want this to happen
- (e) I don’t know if it will happen”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad, not very bad

- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

4 "I don't want things like this to happen" and related concepts

Evaluation and will typically go hand in hand: we want "good things" to happen, and we don't want "bad things" to happen. In the area of emotions, however, the relation between will and evaluation is not always as simple as that. Sometimes, "bad things" happen that we feel something about but that do not engage our will; and sometimes we don't want something to happen (or to be happening) not because we think it is "something bad" but simply because it is contrary to our will.

Often, what is involved is not simply "I don't want this to happen (or: to be happening)", but rather, more generally, "I don't want things like this to happen", that is, an attitude including both a kind of protest against something that has already happened and an opposition to any future repeats. In this section I will focus on concepts of precisely this kind, that is, on *anger*, *indignation*, *fury*, and *outrage*, including also, for comparison, *rage*, *shocked*, and *appalled*. (For an earlier discussion of *irritated*, *annoyed*, and *mad*, and some other related concepts, see Wierzbicka 1994a.)

4.1 Anger

Anger is one of the most frequently discussed emotion concepts, and the range of the interpretations varies widely. Some authors (e.g. Harris 1989) write about "goals blocked", others (e.g. Lazarus 1991: 122) link *anger* with "a demeaning offense against me and mine", or with an "affront" (e.g. Averill and More 1993), still others (e.g. Stein, Trabasso, and Liwag 1993: 287) claim that "almost any type of loss or aversive state can evoke anger when a belief about goal reinstatement is strongly held".

But consider, for example, the situation of a mother who becomes angry when she discovers that her unruly child has broken a precious vase. There is no question here of "goals blocked", of "affront", of a "demeaning offense", or of a "belief about goal reinstatement"; it is consistent, however, with the normal understanding of such a sentence to interpret it in terms of the following simple scenario (in the angry person's mind):

this person did something bad
 I don't want this person to do things like this
 I want to do something because of this

We can now test this scenario against a wide range of situations where *anger* is attributed to people – including those where people's goals are indeed “blocked”, or when a “slight” occurs, or where a desire for “retaliation” may be involved. If we do so, it emerges that the simple scenario proposed here applies to them too.

Over the years, I have experimented with a number of different scenarios for *anger* myself, including components like “I want to do something to this person because of this”, “I (would) want to do something bad to this person because of this”, and “I want this person to feel something bad” (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1992c and 1994a). Upon further testing, however, it transpired that the more general form of the *anger* scenario outlined above is more accurate and more consistent with the contemporary usage (at least for the basic meaning of *angry*, which I will call *angry*₍₁₎ to distinguish it from a more recent sense, *angry*₍₂₎, to be discussed later).

X was angry₍₁₎ (*with Y*)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone:
- (c) “this person did something bad
- (d) I don't want this person to do things like this
- (e) I want to do something because of this”
- (f) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

The explication outlined above refers to sentences where the word *angry* is used in the frame “angry with” (“person X was angry with person Y”). There is, however, another modern usage of the word *angry*, typically associated with the frame “angry at” (rather than “angry with”), as in the following example: “Dying people may feel angry [...] Some people feel angry at God for allowing them to get sick, at their doctors for not being able to find a cure, at the government for putting money into weapons instead of medical research, or at the world in general” (Callanan and Kelley 1993: 44).

In this more recent usage the implication is not that “someone did something bad” but rather that “something bad happened because someone did (or didn't do) something”. For example, when some dying people are “angry at God” or “angry at their doctors” the implication is not that God, or the doctors, did something bad, but rather, that “something bad happened” (the illness), and that God, or the doctors, failed to do something to prevent it or cure it. Typically, this second usage implies

less control than the first one ("I want to do something because of this IF I CAN"; with an invited inference that perhaps I can't do much at all).

X was angry₍₂₎ at Y

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something bad happened"
- (d) because someone did (didn't do) something
- (e) I don't want things like this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can"
- (g) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

4.2 Indignation

Indignation is similar to *anger* in so far as it, too, is based on the judgment that "someone did something bad" and is active rather than passive. In this case, however, the judgment is more likely to concern an unspecified person ("someone" rather than "this person") and the volitional impulse is less likely to be directed against a specific person and is also less likely to be acted upon.

For example, on reading a newspaper story about a group of highly paid public servants demanding a high pay rise and threatening to strike should their demand not be met, a person-in-the-street is perhaps more likely to be *indignant* than to be *angry*. The exclamations which one might hear in such a situation are "How could they!", or "What arrogance!" There is no question of doing anything in response, because usually one feels unable to either identify or affect the culprits; at the most, one can write an *indignant* letter to the newspaper. One thinks ("indignantly"): "I don't want things like this to happen", but there is no purposeful "I want to do something" air about it. Above all, one wants to express one's opinion about the "bad action" ("I want to say what I think about this").

Lazarus (1991: 227) states that "indignation and outrage clearly imply having been wronged", but as the above example indicates, this is not always the case. On the contrary, although one *can* be *indignant* when one feels wronged (e.g. when one is unjustly accused of cheating), typically *indignation* is linked with more general concerns. The proposed components "someone did something bad" and "I don't want things like this to happen" account for this. (There is no "someone-did-something-bad-to-me" component here.)

Finally, *indignation* appears to be somehow related to *surprise* (and, since this surprise is caused by something bad, it is also related to *dismay*, *shock*, and *outrage*). The thought underlying this emotion is not merely “someone did something bad” but also “how could they have done something like this”. In the explication, this element of unexpectedness is portrayed by means of the component “I didn’t think that someone could do something like this”.

Indignation (X felt indignation)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) ‘I know now: someone did something bad’
- (d) I didn’t think that someone could do something like this
- (e) I don’t want things like this to happen
- (f) I want to say what I think about this”
- (g) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

4.3 *Fury*

At first sight, *fury* (that is, being *furious*) may seem to be just a variety of *anger* (a particularly strong or intense *anger*). In fact, however, the scenario linked with the word *furious* differs qualitatively from that linked with the word *angry*, and in some respects comes closer to the scenario of *outrage*. Above all, *furious* – like *outraged* – implies that something very bad has happened.

The fact that one can be *furious* “with someone” – as one can be *angry* “with someone” – suggests that the bad event is seen as due to somebody’s action (“something very bad happened because someone did something”). But unlike in the case of *anger* (*anger*₍₁₎) the action itself doesn’t have to be regarded as “bad”. For example, if a husband mentions, accidentally, a fact which his wife has asked him to keep secret she can be *furious* with him (because of what she sees as the very bad consequences of his indiscretion), but she doesn’t need to think that “he has done something bad”. Nor does the infuriating action have to be seen as unexpected (the wife could even regard her husband’s “infuriating” action as quite typical of him).

But although the action may be seen as neither “bad” nor unexpected the emotion occasioned by it is very strong (“this person feels something very bad”, rather than simply “this person feels something bad”, as in the case of *anger*). What is more, *furious* implies not only an

impulse to do something (as does also *angry*) but an impulse to do something to the person responsible for what has happened. Thus, an *angry* person may simply slam the door and leave; but someone who is *furious* is more likely to "want to do something (bad) to" the person involved. On the other hand, this impulse of the *furious* person to "do something to the other person" is usually short-lived ("I want to do something to this person now"), whereas the impulse of the *angry* person to "do something" can last much longer ("I want to do something because of this").

Solomon (1997: 11) asks: "Does it matter whether we call [it] 'anger' or rather . . . 'fury' or 'outrage' or 'moral indignation'? (What are the differences here?)" And he replies: "'fury' suggests violence, 'outrage' indicates violation, and 'moral indignation' suggests righteousness". Unfortunately, Solomon doesn't tell us what exactly he means by "violence", "violation", and "righteousness". But his statement that *fury* suggests violence is compatible with the component "I want to do something (bad) to this person now".

If we consider that the person with whom the experiencer is *furious* is not regarded as having done something bad but only as having done something because of which something (very) bad happened, the violent impulse implied by *fury* may well seem irrational and unjustifiable. This is consistent with the somewhat pejorative connotations of the word *furious*: one can sometimes be "justifiably angry", but hardly "justifiably furious".

As we will see, the irrationality of *fury* is somewhat less pronounced than that of *rage*, which implies also a lack of control and an inability to think. Unlike *rage*, *fury* can be "cold" and "calculating". Nonetheless the phrase "justifiable fury" sounds as odd as "justifiable rage"; on the other hand, one can perhaps be "understandably furious", though not "understandably enraged". I think that the explications of *fury* sketched below and that of *rage* in the next section account for all this.

Fury (X was furious with Y)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "something very bad happened"
- (d) because this person did something
- (e) I don't want this person to do things like this
- (f) I want to do something bad to this person now"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (h) X felt something like this (for a short time)
- (i) because X thought something like this

4.4 Rage

I sat down and wrote to my husband, words so much worse than anything I can put in this book [her diary], and as I wrote I was blinded by rage . . . Years, death, depopulation, bondage, fears (Mary Boykin Chestnut, 1975[1865]: 285)

The best clues to the concept of *rage* are provided by common collocations involving this concept, such as “blind rage”, “impotent rage”, “tears of rage”, “rage and frustration”, “get into a rage”, “fit of rage”, or “uncontrollable rage”. Trying to follow these and other similar clues, I propose the following tentative explication:

Rage

- (a) X felt something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something very bad is happening to me now
- (d) I don’t want this to be happening
- (e) I have to do something now
- (f) I don’t know what I will do
- (g) I want to do something bad
- (h) maybe something bad will happen because of this
- (i) I don’t want to think about this (about what will happen)”
- (j) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (k) X felt something like this

Rage appears to be centred on things happening to the experiencer, or to someone with whom she/he identifies, and on things happening in the present rather than on something that has happened in the past (component (c)). What is happening to the experiencer doesn’t have to be due to any human action. In fact, one can “fly into a rage” over gadgets which refuse to work, for example, a television set or a lawn-mower. In accordance with popular beliefs, *rage* can be attributed to a bull who is being teased with a red rag. The bull is not believed to become *furious*, but rather, to get into a *rage*, and the bull’s presumed attitude appears to be consistent with the proposed scenario: “something is happening to me now” (I’m being teased with a red rag); “I don’t want this to be happening; I want to do something now”. This part of the scenario of *rage* is similar to that of *distress*, but the scenario of *rage* doesn’t stop here. The experiencer becomes desperate and obstinate at the same time; and the impulse to act becomes “blind” (“I don’t know what I will

do"), destructive ("I want to do something bad now"), and oblivious of the consequences ("maybe something bad will happen because of this – I don't want to think about this").

The "blindness" and "out-of-controlness" of *rage* are reflected in the combination of components "I will do something now" and "I don't know what I will do"; and its irrationality is reflected in the lack of connection between the destructive impulse "I want to do something bad now" and the unattainable goal "I don't want this to be happening". The proposed scenario suggests that the destructive impulse is caused by the experiencer's inability to attain the goal and the compulsion to act immediately in any way whatsoever rather than by any perception that by "doing something bad" he/she may somehow attain it.

The proposed scenario of *fury* is not similarly "illogical". The impulse "to do something (bad) to the person in question now" is not necessarily illogical from the point of view of the experiencer's apparent goal: "I don't want this person to do things like this". The sequence of components proposed for *fury* is therefore more coherent, although the attitude portrayed in it may still seem irrational for reasons mentioned earlier (the lack of proportion between the "offence": "this person did something", and the desired retaliation: "I want to do something bad to this person now").

4.5 Outrage

We are outraged by recent decisions of the Vice Chancellor, which are detrimental to the best interests of our students and a further erosion of our working conditions. (from Goddard 1998)

In some ways, *outrage* is similar to *indignation*. In both cases, the experiencer thinks that "someone did something very bad" and that (roughly speaking) one wouldn't have expected something like this to happen; she/he takes an unaccepting, protesting attitude along the lines of "I don't want things like this to happen". But an *indignant* person may wish to do no more than to say what he or she thinks about the "bad action". An *outraged* person, however, cannot be similarly disinclined to do anything, and the attitude implied by this word is more active and more goal-oriented: "I want to do something because of this" rather than merely "I want to say what I think about this".

In addition, *outrage* implies a thought that "something very bad happened", whereas *indignation* implies only that "someone did something very bad" (whether or not there are some very bad consequences).

This last difference may account, to some extent, for the moral overtones of *outrage*, which *indignation* as such doesn't have (although

righteous indignation does). For example, a teenager can be *indignant* at the suggestion that he has cheated in a game, thus implying that the accuser “has done something very bad”, without necessarily implying that something bad has happened because of this (unless the injustice of the accusation itself should count as something very bad that has happened).

Even if we decided, however, to include in the explication of *indignation*, as well as that of *outrage*, the component “something very bad happened”, the fact remains that *outrage* has a greater moral weight than *indignation*. This may be due partly to the social rather than individual character of *outrage*: the perpetrators must be, or represent, a group, and so must the victims, or those who identify with the victims. For example, if someone mistreats my child I would be *angry*, even *furious*, rather than *outraged*. On the other hand, if I discover that some teachers mistreat children in the school my child attends then I could indeed be *outraged*.

This last example helps us also to sort out the semi-personal, semi-impersonal nature of *outrage*. Pace Lazarus (1991: 227; quoted in the section on *indignation*), I cannot be *outraged* if someone mistreats or insults me personally, or even me and my friends, although I can be *outraged* (as a parent) if I hear that the children in my local school are somehow mistreated. At the same time, I can't be *outraged* over the treatment of some children in Uganda or Sudan (although I can be *shocked* and *appalled* by it). To be *outraged*, then, I have to have a role in the situation, a role which makes it imperative for me to take an interest in the matter and to act. This suggests the following formula: “I have to do something because of this”, as well as “I want to do something because of this” (with the implication that I'm going to do something on other people's behalf, rather than defend my own personal interests or rights).

Indignation is compatible with a sense of individual or personal wrong (as when one is accused of cheating), but it doesn't imply any particular role requiring me to act (on behalf of other people).

This leads us to the following explication:

Outrage

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “I know now: something very bad happened to some people
- (d) because some other people did something very bad
- (e) I didn't think these people could do something like this
- (f) I don't want things like this to happen

- (g) I want to do something because of this
- (h) I have to do something because of this"
- (i) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (j) X felt something like this
- (k) because X thought something like this

4.6 Appalled

When allegations of physical and sexual violence emanate from a classroom, parents are *outraged*, the community *appalled*. (Example quoted in Goddard 1998)

As the quote above illustrates, the concept of "appalled" is fairly close to that of "outraged". In both cases, the (prototypical) experiencer thinks that "something very bad happened" and that one wouldn't have thought something like this could happen. But the same sentence also illustrates some differences in the attitude. The parents feel responsible for their children; they want to do something about the situation and they think they have to do so; the community, on the other hand, reacts more as onlookers: onlookers can be *horrified* or *appalled*, but they cannot be *outraged*. This suggests that we should not posit for *appalled* the component "I want to do something because of this".

Another difference between *outraged* and *appalled* can be illustrated with the following sentence (also from Goddard 1998):

They were appalled (*outraged) to see the suffering of the people in the wake of the floods.

In this sentence, *appalled* sounds natural, for it suggests that "something very bad happened to someone"; but *outraged* sounds odd here – mainly, it seems, because it implies human action rather than a natural disaster. This shows that while *appalled* and *outraged* share the implication that "something very bad happened", *appalled* doesn't carry the further implication that it happened "because someone did something very bad".

Unlike *outraged*, *appalled* has also a reflective quality – as if one felt compelled to take note of and to reflect on terrible things that happen to people. The fact that *appalled* frequently co-occurs with the phrases "to see" or "to hear" ("I was appalled to see/hear") highlights its "evidential" and compelling character. I have tried to account for this aspect of *appalled* with the component "I have to think now: very bad things happen to people". On the other hand, *appalled* doesn't seem to imply a

sudden discovery ("I know now"), characteristic of *outraged* (it is not perceived as a sudden experience, although the experiencer's attention is focussed on some compelling evidence).

This brings us to the following explication:

Appalled (X was appalled)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very bad happened to someone"
- (d) I didn't think that something like this could happen
- (e) I have to think now: very bad things happen to people"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Since *appalled* doesn't seem to refer to any human actions it may seem more closely related to *sad* than to *angry*. Unlike *sad*, however, it does refer to people. For example, I can be *sad* to see magnificent roses destroyed by the hail, but I couldn't be *appalled* by it. This "human factor" links *appalled* with the family of words which includes *anger*, *indignation*, *fury*, and *outrage*. But the decision to include *appalled* in the group of "*anger* and related words" rather than "*sadness* and related words" must be seen as basically arbitrary. Since *appalled* can also be seen as related to *horrified*, and *horrified*, which is closely related to *terrified*, has been placed together with *terrified* in the group of "*fear* and related words", *appalled* could also be included in that latter group. The truth of the matter is that there are no discrete classes here, and that different classifications are possible. What is discrete is the structure of each concept, with its strictly definable set of components.

4.7 Shocked

In many situations, *appalled* may seem to be interchangeable with *shocked*; for example, one can be either *shocked* or *appalled* by scenes of human suffering. But of course there are also differences.

To begin with, *shocked* – like *outraged* – implies not only a totally unexpected event ("I didn't think that something like this could happen"), but also a sudden discovery: "I know now (that something very bad happened)". Furthermore, *shocked* clearly doesn't include any reflective component like "I have to think now: very bad things happen to people". On the contrary, it implies a sense that one is unable to think (being, as it were, shell-shocked). Finally, it should be noted that *to be*

shocked doesn't mean the same as *to get a shock*: the latter expression does not imply that “something very bad happened”.

Shocked (X was shocked)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something has happened now
- (d) I know now: something very bad happened
- (e) I didn't think that something like this could happen
- (f) I can't think now”
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

5. Thinking about other people

Many emotion terms are linked with scenarios which involve thinking about “someone else”, with an explicit or implicit contrast with “me”. These include (among others) *envy* and *jealousy*, *pity* and *compassion*, *Schadenfreude*, *gratitude*, *admiration* and *contempt*. The feelings involved can be either “good” (as in the case of *gratitude* and *admiration*) or “bad” (as in the case of *envy* or *contempt*); and the evaluative components of the cognitive scenario are not always aligned in value with the feeling; e.g. in the case of *envy* “something good” happens to another person, and yet one feels “something bad”, whereas in the case of *Schadenfreude* something bad happens to another person, and yet one feels “something good”.

5.1 Envy and jealousy

*Env*y involves thinking about good things that happen to other people and wishing that things like this would happen to us. It also implies a kind of comparison between oneself and other people leading to a negative assessment (“this is bad”) and to a “bad feeling”.

According to Parrott (1991: 23), “envy occurs when another has what one lacks oneself, whereas jealousy is concerned with the loss of a relationship one has”. It seems clear, however, that (as the word is normally used), *envy* doesn't have to be focussed on possessions as such: strictly speaking, it is not a question of what another person “has” and of what I “lack”, but rather, of “good things that have happened to another person and have not happened to me”.

Obviously, the observation that some good things have happened to

someone else and have not happened to me does not exhaust the full scenario of *envy*: a crucial part of this concept involves the experiencer's "wishes" or "wants". To state what these wishes are, Parrott divides envy into two types: "nonmalicious envy" and "malicious envy", and he states that "the focus of nonmalicious envy is 'I wish I had what you have' . . . whereas the focus of malicious envy, on the other hand, is 'I wish you did not have what you have.'"

But when we examine the ways the word *envy* is actually used we do not find sufficient grounds for positing two separate meanings here. Rather, we can say that in all its uses *envy* implies that "I want things like this to happen to me". Furthermore, in all its uses *envy* implies a negative evaluation of the observed state of affairs: "something good happened to this person", "it didn't happen to me", "this is bad". Whether or not this scenario appears to be associated with "malice" depends on the context. The evaluative component "this is bad" does lend itself to different interpretations, for it can be taken as referring especially to the component "something good happened to this other person" or to the component "it didn't happen to me". But since it can always be understood as referring to the combination of these two components, there is no need to posit polysemy here. Instead, we can posit the following unitary meaning:

Envy (X felt envy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "something good happened to this other person"
- (d) it didn't happen to me
- (e) this is bad
- (f) I want good things like this to happen to me"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

Let us turn now to *jealousy*, which Parrott defines as "an emotion experienced when a person is threatened by the loss of an important relationship with another person (the 'partner') to a 'rival'" (p. 15). I believe that this statement is essentially on the right track, as is also the statement that "What is also true is that jealousy involves a triangle of relations" (p. 16).

Parrott's further elaborations, however, notably that "at the heart of jealousy is a *need to be needed*" (p. 17) or that *jealousy* involves "a loss of self-esteem" or "a loss of a relationship", appear to be unfounded and

unnecessary. For example, a child jealous of her sibling does not have to feel that she has lost the relationship with the mother. What is really essential is that *jealousy* involves (prototypically) three parties rather than two and that it has to do with other people's good feelings. For example, a *jealous* husband is thinking about his wife but at the same time he is also thinking about some third party; and his thoughts must involve his wife's feelings: the husband wants his wife to "feel good feelings" for him and he suffers because it seems to him that his wife "feels good feelings" for someone other than himself.

Unlike *envy*, *jealousy* doesn't necessarily imply any unfavourable comparison between myself and somebody else (the idea is not that my wife, or my parent, loves (or likes) someone else and doesn't love (or like) me). Nor is it necessarily a question of my wife, or my mother, loving (or liking) somebody else more than me. Rather, the *jealousy* scenario can be summed up in three key components which are not strictly speaking comparative: (1) "I want this person to feel good feelings for me"; (2) "I think this person feels good feelings for someone other than me"; (3) "this is bad". Everything else is variable. The relationship between these three key components of *jealousy* is left unspecified and is compatible both with an interpretation in terms of an invidious comparison and with one in terms of an exclusive claim on somebody else's affections or favours.

Jealousy (X felt jealousy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "I want this person to feel good feelings for me"
- (d) I think this person feels good feelings for someone other than me
- (e) I don't want this
- (f) I can't not think about this"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

Parrott (1991: 23) asks "why these two emotions [*jealousy* and *envy*] should be so readily conflated". Parrott himself answers this question by suggesting that, first, both emotions involve "a loss of self-esteem", and second, "*jealousy* and *envy* may frequently co-occur". Neither of these explanations makes any reference to the inherent semantics of the two words. On the other hand, the explications proposed here do exhibit some commonalities. First, *envy* implies that "something good

happened to someone else”, while *jealousy* implies that “someone feels good feelings for someone else”. Second, *envy* implies that “I want good things like this to happen to me”, while *jealousy* implies that “I want this person to feel good feelings for me”. Third, *envy* implies a negative evaluation (“this is bad”), whereas *jealousy* (which tends to be, as Parrott says, “more intense”, more violent, more active) implies a greater volitional involvement (“I don’t want this”) and an (often obsessive) preoccupation (“I can’t not think about this”). Clearly, then, while there are important differences between the two concepts, there are also striking similarities.

It should be added that, as noted by Parrott and others, the adjective *jealous* is sometimes used in an extended sense, which brings it closer to *envy*, as, for example, in the sentence “he is jealous of his brother’s success”. The noun *jealousy*, however, does appear to be restricted to triadic interpersonal relations, as suggested in the proposed explication.

Finally, we should note that (as documented by P. Stearns 1994) a major change occurred in this century in Anglo, and especially Anglo-American, culture with respect to *jealousy*, which came to be profoundly disapproved of and regarded as a sign of immaturity, possessiveness, and so on. Cross-cultural analysis (see e.g. Sommers 1984) has suggested that “Americans were far more likely to profess great discomfort with jealousy than were people from most other cultures” (P. Stearns 1994: 234), and studies conducted in America suggested that “an increasing number [of Americans] either denied jealousy or admitted deep personal responsibility for the emotion” (*ibid.*).

Envoy, which used to be regarded as one of the seven deadly sins (cf. e.g. M. Bloomfield 1967[1952]), appears to be now seen as a less grave offence; after all, it can be said to imply only a desire for equality, which is one of the key modern ideals. On the other hand, “possessiveness”, which is associated with *jealousy*, is one of the cardinal sins of modern times.

5.2 Pity and self-pity

Pity, like *envy*, involves comparing our own lot with that of other people. In the case of *envy*, the comparison is unfavourable to us: “something good happened to this person, it didn’t happen to me”; in the case of *pity*, it is the other way around: “something bad happened to this person, it didn’t happen to me”.

The two concepts, however, are not fully symmetrical, for the assessment is in both cases negative: in the case of *envy*, I think it is bad that those good things didn’t happen to me, in the case of *pity*, it is bad that those bad things happened to this other person.

The focus of *pity*, then, is on the other person (the one to whom bad things have happened) rather than on oneself, and so the feeling is "bad" rather than "good". In fact, it might even be questioned whether any comparison is involved at all. I would note, however, that it would be odd to say of a prisoner in a concentration camp that he or she felt *pity* for another prisoner in exactly the same position. *Compassion*, yes, but probably not *pity*. On the other hand a guard, whose position is quite different, could indeed be said to feel *pity* for a prisoner.

The implicit comparison between the unfortunate person and myself explains also the whiff of superiority that *pity* has: it is not exactly a fellow-feeling. Presumably, this is why people are so often afraid of other people's *pity* (while they are not afraid of their *compassion*): "I fear pain, dependency, ugliness, and loss of control. Pity from others. Being tolerated. Doctors with tubes and shots and knives and drugs" (Feinstein and Mayo 1993: 19).

Pity (X felt pity)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "something bad happened to this other person"
- (d) this is bad
- (e) something like this is not happening to me"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Self-pity may seem to be simply a special case of *pity*, but in fact it is not quite that: since *pity* involves an implicit comparison between another person and myself, one cannot be the target of one's own *pity*. *Self-pity*, then, is not a special case of *pity*, but rather, something like *pity* but focussed on one's own misfortunes and involving an implicit comparison with other people (by no means a detached one). Being a sort of misapplication and distortion of *pity*, *self-pity* has always a pejorative and as it were ironic ring, whereas *pity* does not.

Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 106) state that *self-pity* requires a certain degree of "detachment" and "self-distancing" and that when people experience *self-pity* they "view themselves as though they were someone else, they view their misfortune as undeserved, and they complain 'Why me? What have I done to deserve this?'" I believe the point about the "complaining" character of *self-pity* (which implies, inter alia, that one feels "something bad") is well taken; but the words "detachment" and "self-distancing" seem less apposite. In fact, the

“complaining character” of *self-pity* distinguishes it from *pity* and suggests an inability to look at oneself in a detached way, from the outside. One can look at oneself in this way if one is, for example, “angry with oneself” or “displeased with oneself” (as one can be angry, or displeased, with someone else), but not when one is wallowing in *self-pity*. One cannot genuinely *pity* oneself, as one cannot *envy* oneself, be *jealous* of oneself, be *grateful* to oneself, or feel *compassion* for oneself.

Self-pity (X felt self-pity)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something bad happened to me
- (d) this is bad
- (e) something like this is not happening to other people”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

5.3 *Compassion*

The Vietnamese holy man [Thich Nhat Hanh] talked about how the suffering we see around us provides an opportunity to develop the compassion that the Buddhists think of as the noblest emotion. Instead of responding to others’ misfortune with fear or pity or guilt – all of which create distance – he teaches that we can turn such events into opportunities to practice opening our hearts, to know our oneness with all other beings. (Feinstein and Mayo 1993: 50)

Compassion is relatively close to *pity*, but it differs from it in some significant ways. What the two share is the idea that something bad happened to another person. In the case of *compassion*, however, there is no potentially invidious comparison with myself, which could be interpreted as patronizing. Strictly speaking, therefore, *compassion* does not belong to the category discussed in the present section; it is useful, however, to include it here for comparison with *pity*.

Compassion implies also that the target person is aware of their own misfortune and is suffering, whereas in the case of *pity*, the target person need not be aware of any misfortune (yet another reason why *pity* may invite a suspicion of a superior and patronizing attitude on the part of the experiencer). This means that in the case of *compassion* the component “something bad happened to this person” needs to be accompanied by a further component “this person feels something bad

because of this", while the comparative component of *pity* ("something like this didn't happen to me") should not be included here.

Finally, *compassion* implies an impulse, or at least a desire, to do something for the suffering person if it is possible ("I want to do something good for this person if I can"), which in the case of *pity* is absent.

Compassion (X felt compassion)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "something bad happened to this person"
- (d) this person feels something bad now
- (e) I want to do something good for this person if I can"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

5.4 *Schadenfreude*

The concept of *Schadenfreude* has recently been the subject of intense world-wide discussions on the Internet. It has not, however, been the subject of any rigorous semantic analysis, and the discussions, animated and stimulating though they were, tended to be carried out in a theoretical vacuum. Apparently, the meaning of *Schadenfreude* was regarded by most discussants as self-evident – so much so that no attempt to state it precisely seemed needed; and, consequently, no thought seemed to be given to the need for a methodological framework suitable for undertaking such a task.

One point which seems clear is that in the prototypical scenario the experiencer thinks about someone else: "something bad happened to this person"; and also that while he or she thinks this he or she "feels something good".

But this is not the whole story. A person who feels something good while thinking that something bad happened to someone else could be a sadist, rather than someone experiencing *Schadenfreude*. To use again the example of a guard and some prisoners in a concentration camp, the guard could be cruel and inhuman, and could feel something good thinking of the suffering occurring all around, but she/he could hardly feel *Schadenfreude*. On the other hand, a guard who disliked another guard could feel *Schadenfreude* at this other guard's misfortune – especially if it were not a serious misfortune but rather some miscalculation in an attempt to obtain an advantage.

Typically, then, *Schadenfreude* occurs among people who are in a comparable situation. It is directed at someone who in the past has enjoyed good luck – perhaps (in someone else's view) excessively or undeservedly so. And it is likely to occur in a climate of competition and envy. The experiencer seems to perceive the world (or her/his local world) in terms of a wheel of fortune, where good and bad things happen to people, and where the distribution of good and bad things among people may often seem unfair – an imbalance which can sometimes be satisfactorily corrected. The experiencer doesn't think, cruelly, "I want bad things to happen to this person", but rather something along the lines of "it serves her right" (because she seems so arrogant and so complacent). The situation is seen more in terms of a satisfying reversal of fortune than in terms of a real misfortune.

Schadenfreude (X felt Schadenfreude)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "many good things happened to this person before now"
- (d) this person thought: 'this is good'
- (e) something bad has happened to this person now
- (f) now I think: this is good"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

5.5 *Gratitude*

Gratitude is clearly based on the thought that someone else has done something good for me. This central component of the *gratitude* scenario is so salient that it is easy to think that it is the only one. In fact, however, there is more to *gratitude* than that. For example, a small child, aware of all the good things that her mother is doing for her, may well respond with love rather than with gratitude, and in fact the word *gratitude* doesn't seem entirely appropriate, or natural, for this particular relationship. Somehow or other *gratitude* implies a certain distance. To account for this impression of distance I would propose for this concept a second component: "this person didn't have to do it". A small child may well think that her mother does good things for her, but she would be less likely to think that her mother "doesn't have to do it".

But even adding this second component to the first and most obvious one may not be enough. Conceivably, one could still say: "I know she

did many good things for me, and I know she didn't have to do it, but I can't say I feel grateful". What appears to be missing is something about the experiencer's will: I don't necessarily want to reciprocate, but at least I want to think good things about my benefactor ("I want to think good things about this person because of this"). When this third element is also present (together with some "good feelings") then one could hardly say that "I am not really grateful".

Often, *gratitude* is taken to imply that the beneficiary owes the benefactor a debt, or that some strings may be attached to the benefit; or that the beneficiary simply wants to "repay the favour". All such associations, however, are contextual and variable, whereas the "gratuitous" nature of the benefit and some "good thoughts" about the benefactor do indeed seem to be part of the invariant.

Gratitude (X felt gratitude)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "this person did something good for me"
- (d) this person didn't have to do it
- (e) I want to think good things about this person because of this"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 147–8) have described *gratitude* as a "compound emotion that results from the conjunction of the eliciting conditions of admiration and joy". Since the eliciting conditions of *admiration* and *joy* are "praiseworthy action" and "desirable event" respectively, this characterization of *gratitude* makes it in their system an opposite of *anger*, whose eliciting conditions are "blameworthy action" and "undesirable event".

In my view such a characterization of *gratitude* is rather artificial. For one thing, *gratitude* does not necessarily imply either *admiration* or *joy*; for another, it is not a conceptual opposite of *anger*. The basic thought behind *gratitude* is "this person did something good for me", whereas the basic thought behind *anger* is "this person did something bad", not "this person did something bad for me" (or "to me"). The action that one is *grateful* for is not seen as "something desirable" but as "something good for me". In fact, I can be *grateful* for something that at the time I didn't want at all but that I now appreciate as "good for me". One

can admire the elegant symmetry of the definitions constructed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) but here the system they have constructed departs somewhat from empirical reality.

5.6 Admiration and self-admiration

Her courage and resourcefulness are amazing. It's good to be able to admire one's own daughter. (Spufford 1996: 111)

Admiration, like many other emotion terms (e.g. *contempt* or *envy*), can be used as a name of a “disposition” as well as an “emotion” sensu stricto. In the explication proposed here, however, I will focus on the emotion, as in the frame “X felt admiration for Y” (rather than “X admired Y”).

There are two key elements in the cognitive scenario of *admiration*: a very positive evaluation of somebody else’s abilities (“this person can do some very good things”), and a comparative perspective (“not many other people are like this”). Each of these elements requires some discussion.

The word “ability” can be misleading in this context, for we can feel *admiration* for someone’s attitude (e.g. in the face of adversity) rather than for any tangible achievements or accomplishments. But the semantic component “this person can do some things very well” can be understood more broadly, and can include inner activities: the way one (psychologically) confronts a threat, “battles” with illness, “works through” suffering and personal catastrophes, and so on. What the phrasing of this component does not include is, for example, good looks, but I think this is correct: normally it would be odd to say “I felt admiration for her huge blue eyes / for her gorgeous red hair” (although one can say, of course, “I admired her gorgeous red hair”, using the word *admire* in a different sense: “to look admiringly”).

The component “not many other people are like this” is clearly necessary: the thoughts which underlie *admiration* place the target person above the ordinary level. What is less clear is whether or not *admiration* implies also some kind of comparison with oneself: if I feel *admiration* for someone do I need to place them (in some respect) above myself? Although the matter requires further investigation, I am inclined to think that some component along those lines is indeed necessary, and I have included it in the explication (not in the form “I am not like this” or “I want to be like this” but rather a more hypothetical “I would want to be like this if I could”). In support of this component I would point out that parents who think about their children: “this girl/boy can do some things very well, not many other people are like

this” could well be described as “proud” rather than “full of admiration”. If, however, a mother or father thinks, in addition, “I would want to be like this if I could” this does indeed sound admiring rather than simply proud.

Admiration (X felt admiration)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) “this person can do some very good things
- (d) not many other people are like this
- (e) I would want to be like this if I could”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Finally, a few words need to be said about *self-admiration*, which is clearly inconsistent with the above scenario. As in the case of *self-pity*, however (which is not *pity* but *pseudo-pity*), *self-admiration* is not a special case of *admiration* but a distortion of the real thing; and both words (*self-pity* and *self-admiration*) carry more than a tinge of mockery and moral disapproval.

Self-admiration

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “I can do some very good things
- (d) not many other people are like this
- (e) other people would want to be like this if they could”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

5.7 Contempt

Contempt may seem to be a mirror image of *admiration*; in fact, however, the relationship between the two is more complex than that.

To begin with, *contempt* is not focussed on what someone else can or cannot do. For example, if the Nazis had contempt for the “inferior races” (like Jews and Slavs), the implied attitude was not “these people can’t do good things” but rather something like “these people are not

people like those for whom I can have some respect". Thus, *contempt* seems to divide people (from the experiencer's point of view) into two categories: "those about whom I can think some good things" and "those who are not like this and about whom I can't think good things". More precisely, this attitude can be represented as follows: "I can think good things about some people – this person is not someone like these people – I can't think good things about someone like this".

One difficult point to decide on concerns any comparison between the person one feels *contempt* for and oneself. In the case of *admiration* I have posited the component "I would want to be someone like this if I could". In the case of *contempt*, it would be difficult to propose a symmetrical negative component: "I wouldn't want to be someone like this if . . ." (if what?). But a straightforward superiority component ("I am not someone like this" or "this person is not someone like me") doesn't sound quite right either. It would appear, therefore, that *contempt* doesn't involve any direct and explicit comparison with oneself, and that the suggestion of my personal superiority over the target of *contempt* is there only by implication (presumably, if I have *contempt* for person Y I am not like this myself). The fact that there is no such word as *self-contempt* corresponding to the well-established *self-admiration* suggests that in the case of *contempt* an element of explicit comparison with oneself is perhaps missing.

Contempt (X felt contempt for Y)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
- (c) "I can think good things about some people"
- (d) this person is not someone like these people
- (e) I can't think good things about someone like this"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

6. Thinking about ourselves

In this section I will discuss a group of emotions that, for example, Taylor (1985) (who devoted to them a whole book) calls "emotions of self-assessment", and that many other authors have characterized as "self-conscious emotions" (see e.g. Price Tangney and Fischer 1995). In my terms, what this group shares is the experiencer's idea that "other people can think something (either good or bad) about me" (*shame*, *embarrassment*, *pride*) or that the experiencer is thinking about his/her

own actions (*remorse, guilt*). In all cases the attention is, or appears to be, focussed on the experiencer.

6.1 Shame

As noted, for example, by Miller (1993: 179), “In the English-speaking world . . . we have moved from a culture of shame to a culture of embarrassment”. The point is well taken, and it is an important one, but to explain what really happened “in the English-speaking world” we have to pay some attention to semantics. For while it is true that *embarrassment* has come to occupy centre-stage, at the expense of *shame* (cf. P. Stearns 1994), it is also true that the meaning of *shame* has changed, and that the modern English *shame*, which is being continually squeezed out by the modern English notion of *embarrassment*, is not the same *shame* which, for example, Hamlet was referring to when he said to his mother: “O shame! where is thy blush?”

In Shakespeare’s language (and for a long time thereafter) *shame*, which was then associated with blushing, was regarded as a good thing – a necessary thing, and not a bad thing at all (cf. e.g. Swinburne: “Man is a beast when shame stands off from him”, quoted in Stevenson 1949: 1809). It is not just the importance of *shame*, then, which has changed, but also its very meaning. (The older meaning has survived in the adjective *shameless*: to be *shameless* is a bad thing, precisely because in that older sense *shame* was something good and necessary.) But to understand how the meaning of *shame* changed we first have to examine its current meaning. In current usage, *shame* often refers to something bad that we have done, and it often goes hand in hand with *remorse*. But people can also be *ashamed* of something for which they are not in any way responsible, for example, they can be *ashamed* of their parents, or of their origin. Furthermore, we can be *ashamed* of our shortcomings, of our inability to spell correctly, of our clothes. To account for all these different possibilities, I have phrased the first cognitive component of *shame* (in its modern sense) as “people can know something bad about me” (rather than as “I did something bad”).

If there is some “shameful” truth about us that we would like to hide from other people it is because we don’t want them to *think* something bad about us (rather than merely *know* it), but this bad opinion which we want to avoid would have to be based on some facts, i.e. on knowledge. Since the anticipated “bad thoughts” are grounded in knowledge, they are seen as having an objective basis, and this implies that the experiencer shares the negative judgment attributed in advance to other people.

As argued, in particular, by Gabriele Taylor (with reference to Sartre 1948), in *shame* the experiencer not only imagines an audience who will know, and therefore think, something bad about him or her, but also identifies with it: “the agent looks at his own action through the observer’s eyes and so it is suddenly revealed to him what it amounts to” (Taylor 1985: 68); it is necessary, then, that “a person feeling shame judges herself adversely” (*ibid.*).

A similar point is made by Miller (1993: 149), who draws a vignette of a person discovered stealing from the offering dish: “Here I think we can still distinguish between the sensation of being exposed in a furtive act from the sensation of knowing yourself as a person who does shameful things. The former is an intense humiliation, the latter shame.”

A fellow linguist once confessed that he was ashamed of the fact that he – a lecturer in linguistics – could not pronounce certain sounds which are routinely taught in courses on phonetics. It was clear that while this linguist didn’t want this “compromising” fact to become widely known, he felt he had to agree with the negative judgment that, he thought, its discovery would lead to (and that in fact he found this self-judgment particularly painful). To account for this aspect of *shame*, I have posited for it the sequence of components: “if people know this they are ‘bound to’ (i.e. can’t not) think something bad about me”, “when I think about it I can’t not think the same”.

Shame (X was ashamed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “people can know something bad about me
- (d) I don’t want people to know this
- (e) if people know this they can’t not think something bad about me
- (f) when I think about it, I can’t not think the same”
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

Shame is widely regarded as a “moral emotion” and is often linked with the notion that “I have done something bad” (cf. e.g. Harré 1990: 199). But as the last example shows, this is not necessarily the case. The notion that “I have done something bad” is necessarily involved in *remorse*, but not in *shame*. What is indeed necessary is that there is (as we see it) something bad about us that other people can know. For

example, not being able to pronounce certain sounds may not be widely regarded as a very bad thing; to be *ashamed* of it, however, I have to think of it as something truly bad – and, moreover, as "something bad that people can know *about me*". Bad things that happen to me cannot normally be regarded as "something bad *about me*", but bad things that I am ashamed of can. In that sense, one could understand why *shame* – in contrast to, for example, *embarrassment* – may seem to "engage the moral" (Harré 1990: 199).

The older meaning of *shame*, I would suggest, didn't include the knowledge component: "people can know something bad about me". The "blush of shame" did not indicate that people know something bad about the blusher but only that the blusher didn't want other people to know, and to think, anything bad about her.

Hamlet's mother may well have been afraid that people could know bad things about her, but such an apprehension wasn't invariably associated with *shame*. In fact, the older English *shame* was often "forward-looking" and it implied the thought "I don't want people to know bad things about me (and therefore I will not do certain things)" rather than a thought implying a *fait accompli*: "people can know bad things about me (because there is something bad to know)". To quote the eighteenth century writer Edmund Burke:

Whilst shame keeps its watch, virtue is not wholly extinguished in the heart. (quoted in Stevenson 1949: 1809)

As this quote illustrates, the older meaning of *shame* reflected a social climate in which other people's view of the individual was expected to act as a powerful means of control: it was expected that people wouldn't do certain things because they wouldn't want other people to know, and to think, bad things about them; and it was assumed that the very thought of other people's potentially negative view of a person could make this person blush.

The modern meaning of *shame*, however, does not reflect a kind of society where "other people's" anticipated view of us can be expected to act as a powerful regulator of our behaviour. In the modern Anglo society – as reflected in the mirror of semantics – other expectations and other concerns have come to the fore, as reflected, in particular, in the rise of the concept of *embarrassment* in modern English (to be discussed in the next section).

The change in the meaning of the English *shame* should also be a warning to all those who are inclined to absolutize *shame* as a "universal human emotion". What "shame"? The Shakespearian *shame*? The modern English *shame*? Or any one of a number of other emotions (such as, for example, the German *Scham* or the Polish *wstyd*), whose names

are routinely translated into English as *shame* but which in fact do not mean the same?

John Braithwaite, the author of the important legal work *Crime, Shame, and Reintegration* (1989) states that “the most important work on shame in Western history is Norbert Elias’s two volumes on *The Civilizing Process*”, and he notes that “Elias sees shame in the ascendant rather than declining during the last 700 years”. Braithwaite argues that “while Elias identifies an interesting trend toward the democratizing of shame, he overstates it” (Braithwaite 1989: 25); and he refers to Thomas Scheff’s (1990: 16) observation that “during the twentieth century we became ashamed to be ashamed in certain ways and the very word *shame* atrophied in our vocabulary”. Braithwaite concludes that “Half a century after Elias wrote, the withering of many types of shame has significantly reversed the most fundamental unilateral trend in his theory” (p. 27).

What appears to be overlooked in this discussion is the fact that Elias didn’t write about *shame* at all, but rather, about the German *Scham* (which in fact is closer in meaning to the Shakespearian than to the modern English *shame*). As noted by P. Stearns (1994) and Miller (1993), the English *shame* declined largely at the expense of *embarrassment*; but German doesn’t have a word corresponding to the English *embarrassment* as it doesn’t have a word corresponding to the modern English *shame*; and no comparable process has occurred in the German language (whatever other changes may have occurred instead).

6.2 Embarrassment

Embarrassment is one of the most important emotion concepts in the modern Anglo world. Its ascent – at the expense of *shame* and also *guilt* – has been extraordinary. As Miller (1993: 199) notes, “Undoubtedly, as a historical matter, the realm of embarrassment expanded and continues to expand at the expense of shame.” Miller endorses Harré’s (1990) view that this expansion is due to the fact that “the category of morals has shrunk relative to the category of manners and convention”. P. Stearns (1994) makes a number of similar comments, remarking, in particular, on the weakening of the association between *embarrassment* and blushing: “Blushing, rather charming in a Victorian context when embarrassment had few heavy duties, recedes in notice in our own age, when embarrassment is more central and its invocation more uniform than random individual proclivity to blushing can express” (p. 354).

What, then, is *embarrassment*, and how does it differ from *shame*? Harré (1990: 199) defines it as an emotion “occasioned by the realisation that others have become aware that what one has been doing . . . has

been a breach of conventions and the code of manners, a judgment in which I, as actor, concur”, and he contrasts it with *shame* in terms of “moral infraction” vs. “breach of convention”, remarking that “shame engages the moral, embarrassment the conventional”.

This is helpful, but clearly not sufficient, if only because a person can be embarrassed without being an “actor”, that is, without doing anything. In fact, typically *embarrassment* is used with reference to situations where something (undesirable) is *happening* to a person rather than to situations when a person is *doing* something. For example, one can be acutely embarrassed if one’s trousers split in public or if one’s stomach produces loud rumbling noises – clearly, situations when “something is happening to me” rather than “I am doing something”.

Harré’s reference to other people’s awareness of the experiencer’s predicament appears persuasive; in the NSM framework, this aspect of *embarrassment* could be accounted for by means of the component “other people know that this is happening to me”.

Since the embarrassing event is, prototypically, in the present rather than past (one finds oneself in an embarrassing situation), other people’s awareness of it must mean (or at least invites the inference) that these other people are physically present. In P. Stearns’ (1994: 147) words, the increasingly powerful emotion of *embarrassment* “assumed an audience”, and presupposed an “audience response”; it also assumed a “sensitivity to others’ reactions” (p. 148). This expected audience response takes, above all, the form of “audience attention”: not only do “other people know what is happening to me” (as suggested by Harré), but “they are (I assume) thinking about me because of this”.

Harré’s references to “a breach of conventions” or “a code of manners” are, however, too specific. For example, if someone is embarrassed at being praised in public (cf. Miller 1993: 152) no breach of convention or manners needs to be involved. Since other people’s potential “bad thoughts” are not caused by anything the experiencer has done but only by something that is happening to her (him) they cannot involve any moral judgment and may indeed have to do with manners and conventions, but strictly speaking it is not “manners” and “conventions” as such which provide a key to *embarrassment*. In fact the fear of embarrassment seems to control the lives of many people who would happily break conventions and depart from traditional codes of manners (cf. P. Stearns 1994). Indeed, the growing reliance on *embarrassment* in modern (Anglo) life can be seen as going hand in hand with a growing emphasis on “informality” and relaxation of rigid social conventions. P. Stearns (1994: 215) refers in this connection to the work of the Dutch sociologists who have emphasized “the new informality” of social relations of the later twentieth century, where “at least superfi-

cial democracy reduces detailed rules of emotional conduct but where the need to manifest appropriate responses and avoid embarrassment continues to define important constraints".

Prototypically, *embarrassment* involves being *seen* by other people: the "audience" that P. Stearns (1994) refers to is normally an "embodied" one, with their eyes on the experiencer. To quote Taylor (1985: 69–70):

A pipe may burst and demand immediate attention . . . Whatever my emotional reactions under the circumstances, embarrassment can be one of them only if I believe myself to be watched . . . This seems to suggest that, unlike shame, embarrassment requires an embodied audience, or at least requires that the agent should imagine that such an audience is present. The demand relevant to embarrassment seems to be created not so much by the burst pipe as by the eyes which are upon me.

Consider, however, the following passage from a novel:

There was in Ashley a quiet respect for things that Jim also respected. None of this had to be stated. Ashley was too incoherent to have explained and Jim would have been embarrassed to hear it, but he understood. (Malouf 1983: 7)

In this example, there is no question of being *seen* by other people; and if the only other participant in the situation, Ashley, were blind, this wouldn't have made this situation any less embarrassing for Jim either. In the situation envisaged by Malouf, something happens to Jim (Ashley openly discusses feelings and values with him), and it happens in the presence of a witness (Ashley himself). The point is not so much that Ashley would think something bad about Jim, but rather, that Ashley's attention would be focussed on him in the context of this situation (a situation of which Jim is not in control). And at this stage of the scenario the experiencer appears to generalize: "I don't want people to think about me like this". The concern, then, is with "self-presentation" in some general sense (cf. Goffman 1967), but this has to be mediated via some specific witness or witnesses, who are there and who can know (observe) what is currently happening to me and "see" me (think about me) in this light.

Exactly the same applies to C. S. Lewis' (1989: 21) comments about the *embarrassment* he can read in the faces of his stepsons when he attempts to talk to them about his grief over the death of his wife and their mother: "there appears on their faces neither grief, nor love, nor fear, nor pity, but the most fatal of all non-conductors, embarrassment. They look as if I were committing an indecency. They are longing for me to stop." The boys are embarrassed because something is happening to them which places them in an undesirable role; it happens in the presence of a witness (the stepfather himself); and the undesirable

image (as boys talking "indecently" about emotions) is projected at "people" in general (presumably, the boys cringe at the thought of being thought of by "people" as involved in such conversations).

The last two examples may seem to corroborate Harré's definition of *embarrassment* quoted earlier, with its reference to people's judgment concerning "a breach of conventions, . . . a judgment in which I, as actor, concur". But this is not always the case. For example, a girl who feels embarrassed at being looked at admiringly by a man does not need to see the situation in terms of anybody's judgment with which she, the experiencer, concurs. Here, as elsewhere, however, it does make sense to interpret the experiencer's feelings with reference to the following underlying thoughts: "something is happening to me now not because I want it", "someone knows about it", "this person is thinking about me", and "I don't want people to think about me like this".

This leads us to the following explication:

Embarrassment (X was embarrassed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something is happening to me now not because I want it
- (d) someone knows about it
- (e) this person is thinking about me
- (f) I don't want people to think about me like this"
- (g) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

The situational embeddedness of *embarrassment* (component (c)), its assumption of other people's attention (components (d) and (e)), and its concern with "self-presentation" (component (f)), make this concept a unique cultural artifact, symptomatic in many ways of the society which has created it.

In a nutshell, what appears to have happened in the big shift from *shame* to *embarrassment* in Anglo culture can be presented as follows. At the basis of the older meaning of *shame* there was a concern "I don't want other people to know bad things about me", a concern which could regulate (to some extent) a person's conduct, and which could combine social and moral considerations. Then *shame* became recast in terms of bad things which *can* (already) be known about a person (thus losing its potential for prevention of "bad things", that is, losing its role as a regulator of conduct). More or less at the same time a new cul-

turally salient concern asserted itself: concern with one's image ("I don't want people to think about me like this"), devoid of any references to "good" or "bad" and focussed on the idea of self-control (one doesn't want to be seen as a person to whom things happen not because this person wants them to happen). This new concern was the theme of the new concept of *embarrassment*. (On the importance of "self-control" in modern Anglo emotionology cf. P. Stearns 1994.) Then, gradually, the expansion of *embarrassment* at the expense of *shame* got under way, with the concerns about what Goffman (1958) called "self-presentation in interpersonal interaction" ("what is happening to me in other people's presence" and "how are other people thinking about me") coming increasingly to the fore, over and above the concern about "bad things" that other people can know about me.

The child psychologist Michael Lewis (1995) concludes his study of "embarrassed behaviour" (p. 201) in young children by stating that embarrassment, which is "the affective component of the cognitive process of self-awareness", "emerges developmentally at some time during the middle of the second year of life" (p. 215). This makes it sound as if the emergence of embarrassment were a developmental stage comparable to the emergence of the first teeth, or of the ability to walk. In fact, however, the concept of *embarrassment* is part and parcel of modern Anglo culture. It was unknown to Shakespeare (cf. Ricks 1974) and it is unknown in most other cultures of the world, which of course have their own culturally constructed "social emotions" (cf. e.g. Geertz 1976; Goddard 1996a; Harkins 1996; Myers 1986). It is difficult to see, therefore, how the "developmental emergence of embarrassment" could be meaningfully studied without a historical and cross-cultural framework.

6.3 *Pride*

We feel *proud* of our achievements, of good things that we have done, and also of good things that those close to us have done (if we emotionally identify with them). But one can also be *proud* of one's origins, or of one's beautiful singing voice; or even of one's beautiful long hair. Generally speaking, we are *proud* of something very good that people can know about us; we believe that people will have to think something good about us because of this, and we "can't help" thinking something good about ourselves.

Essentially, then, *pride* is a mirror image of *shame* (in the modern sense of the word): one may be *proud* of one's achievements as one may be *ashamed* of one's failures; one may be *proud* of one's hidden talents as one may be *ashamed* of one's hidden weaknesses; one may be *proud* of

one's origins, one's family or the shape of one's nose, as one may be ashamed of one's origins, one's family, or the shape of one's nose.

According to Gabriele Taylor (1985: 24), the crucial feature of pride is "that it is reflexive", that is, that it includes a "reference to self": "at the time of its occurrence the person feeling pride believes that in a certain respect her own worth is confirmed or enhanced . . . there is at the moment of feeling it an awareness that she has reason to think well of herself". While agreeing in essence with these comments I would suggest an even "stronger" phrasing of the references to other people's, and our own, thoughts about ourselves: not only "there is reason" for people to think well of me, and for me to think well of myself, but I secretly believe that people will be "compelled" to think well of me: "if people know this they can't not think good things about me because of this", and I am similarly "compelled" to think something good about myself ("I can't not think the same").

Pride (X felt pride)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "people can know something very good about me"
- (d) I want people to know this
- (e) if people know this they can't not think good things about me
- (f) I can't not think the same"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something good
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

6.4 *Remorse*

"Remorse is memory awake" (Emily Dickinson), memory of something bad that I have done in the past.

Remorse is clearly based on the knowledge that one has done something bad ("I know: I did something bad"). This knowledge is not due to a sudden discovery or a sudden insight into one's past actions. I knew all along that I was doing something bad but at the time I didn't want to think about it. Now, however, "my memory is awake" and the thoughts about my bad action are coming back with a vengeance: this time the voice of my conscience speaks quite loud ("I can't not think about it now"). Linked with the notion of conscience, *remorse* is related to religious concepts such as *contrition* or *penance* (which to many people seem now rather old-fashioned). It is also related to *regret*; but

regret can concern present and future events, as well as past ones, whereas *remorse* is restricted to the past:

I regret very much that I won't be able to come to your party.
 *When I think that I won't come to your party I feel remorse.

Furthermore, *regret* can refer to events and states of affairs for which we are not responsible, whereas *remorse* applies only to our own (intentional) actions.

Remorse is like a judgment passed by our conscience, a judgment which keeps reverberating in our soul whether we want it or not. I did something bad, I knew it was bad, but I did it. It wasn't a mistake, it wasn't a faux pas, it wasn't an error of judgment. It was something for which I am fully responsible. Thinking about it is far from pleasant and I might wish to suppress these thoughts, but I can't; a secret voice in my inner self keeps repeating "this was bad", and I can't not hear it, I can't not think about it.

Does a person who feels *remorse* have to wish they could undo what they have done? According to Gabriele Taylor (1985: 105), this wish is indeed a necessary ingredient of *remorse*:

we do expect some sort of action from her who feels remorse, though of course we may expect in vain. She wants to undo what she has done, and although it is evidently impossible to do just that, she would normally be expected to try and do something towards repairing the damage she takes herself to have brought about.

One can doubt, however, that such a wish for "undoing the past", let alone a wish for making reparations, is a necessary part of *remorse*. There are different kinds of remorse; some of them involve regrets, some lead to contrition and penitence, but some do not move beyond the gnawing thought "I know I did something bad", accompanied by very bad feelings. To quote Coleridge (*Remorse*, act 1, sc. 1, as quoted in Stevenson (1949:1697)):

Remorse is as the heart in which it grows;
 If that be gentle, it drops balmy dews
 Of true repentance; but if proud and gloomy,
 It is the poison tree, that pierced to the inmost,
 Weeps only tears of poison.

In my own definition of *remorse*, therefore, I have refrained from references to the experiencer's desires and possible future actions, restricting the cognitive scenario to the awareness that sometime in the past I did something bad, to the past attempts to suppress this knowledge, and to the thoughts about this past action gnawing at me now:

Remorse (X felt remorse)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) 'I know that some time ago I did something bad'
- (d) I knew it when I was doing it
- (e) I didn't want to think about it then
- (f) I can't not think about it now"
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this

Taylor (1985) frames much of her discussion of *remorse* with reference to Max Scheler's discussion of the German concept of *Reue*, which she apparently equates with *remorse*. But *Reue* doesn't really mean quite the same thing as *remorse*, and is in fact closer to *contrition* (although *contrition* can be an act of thought and will unaccompanied by feelings, whereas *Reue* does inherently engage feelings). As a result of this semantic misunderstanding, Taylor takes issue with Scheler's analysis of *Reue* (translated as *remorse*) and seems to be baffled by the great value which Scheler places on this emotion. Taylor argues (quite cogently) that *remorse* can be "as destructive and self-indulgent as guilt may be" (p. 102) and that "far from prompting repair work and bringing about a new and hopeful attitude towards the future, it may just torment the sufferer" (p. 102).

All this seems quite valid (and in fact not inconsistent with what Scheler said about *Reue*), but it seems hard to reconcile with what Taylor herself has said about the experiencer's desire "to undo what she has done" (p. 105).

While not all aspects of Taylor's analysis of *remorse* are convincing, however, her contrastive discussion of *remorse* and *guilt* is valuable and insightful, and I will draw on it in the next section.

6.5 Guilt

Guilt appears to be closely related to *remorse*, and often the two are used almost interchangeably. For example, if a man is unfaithful to his wife he may feel either *guilt* or *remorse*. On the other hand, if I cause, unintentionally, a car accident as a result of which someone dies or is severely injured, I can only feel *guilt*, not *remorse* – even if the accident was not due to my negligence, recklessness, drunken driving, or anything of the sort. It is enough that *I did something* and that something bad happened as a result. *Remorse* would not be used in this situation because *remorse* implies that "I did something bad", not that I simply

"did something" (causing something bad to happen).

I agree with Taylor (1985: 91), then, that if "while driving my car I knock down and kill a child" it is enough to make me suffer from guilt, even if "I have not been negligent but have taken all possible care". On the other hand, I cannot quite agree with the following comment: "If I can feel guilty about my privileged position in society due to circumstances of birth then I see myself as an agent causally involved: it is *my* birth which has brought about the state of affairs which is my privileged position." Being born is not something one does, and therefore I cannot feel responsible for, and guilty about, my privileged position in society *due to birth*. To feel guilty about my privileged position in society I have to think of all the opportunities of doing something about it – that is, of giving up that privileged position or atoning for it. To feel guilty I do indeed need to see myself "as an agent causally involved"; this means, however, that I need to think about something I did (or failed to do), not about something that simply happened to me.

If one's old relative is very sick, and one feels one should stay with them but instead one goes to a party, and the relative dies, one may feel either *guilt* or *remorse*, depending on one's view of the situation. If it was, for example, one's father, and one thinks it was morally wrong to leave him, and if one was conscious of it at the time, then one will feel *remorse*. If it was a distant cousin and one didn't think that it was one's obligation to stay with them but that it was nonetheless a "bad thing" that they died alone, then one will feel *guilt*. Perhaps I didn't do anything bad (in going to that party), but I did something, and because of this, something bad happened (the old relative died alone); the memory of it is a burden to me, I can't not think about it. This is *guilt*.

Lazarus (1991: 122) suggests that the "core relational theme" of *guilt* is "having transgressed a moral imperative". In fact, such a characterization would be more apposite for *remorse* than for *guilt*. For example, the driver who killed a child (through no fault of his own) has not transgressed any moral imperative and so he would not feel *remorse* (he didn't do anything bad); he could, nonetheless, feel *guilt*.

Thus, *guilt*, too, implies that I feel somehow responsible for what has happened and that in my conscience I do not find myself innocent. I cannot forget what has happened; I cannot not think about it.

There is a peculiar tension in *guilt*, different from the inner change involved in *remorse*. *Remorse* implies a contrast between the past and the present ("I didn't want to think about it then – I can't not think about it now"). *Guilt* doesn't imply any such contrast; the feeling can be (almost) concurrent with the event. It does, however, imply a contrast between my conscious judgment (which may well exculpate me because it admits only that "something bad happened", not that "I did

something bad"), and some other voice within me which nonetheless finds me "guilty" ("I can't not think that I did something bad"). This leads us to the following explication:

Guilt (X felt guilt)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) 'I did something'
- (d) something bad happened because of this
- (e) because of this I can't not think that I did something bad"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this

Taylor (1985) argues that *guilt*, in contrast to *remorse*, is "an emotion of self-assessment" (p. 100). *Remorse*, which "concentrates on the action rather than on the actor . . . seems the healthier emotion, for in turning the agent away from himself he [sic] is less threatened by the possibility of self-preoccupation and self-indulgence" (p. 101). On the other hand, in the case of a person feeling *guilt* the thoughts "are primarily on herself" (p. 104); "she believes that she has done something forbidden and that in doing what is forbidden she has disfigured and so harmed herself" (p. 103).

While I could not agree with all the details of this analysis (for example, why "forbidden" rather than simply "bad"?), I think that the basic idea is insightful. It is true that in the case of *remorse* one focusses on the action rather than on oneself as the actor, whereas in the case of *guilt* one focusses more on oneself. The explications proposed are consistent with this: the unequivocal component "I know that I did something bad" of *remorse* reflects this focus on the bad action, whereas the component "I can't not think that I did something bad" assigned to *guilt* reflects the focus on the inner tensions of the actor and the actor's thoughts about himself (herself).

7 Concluding remarks

While most of the widely used English emotion words (as well as some less widely used ones) have been discussed here, there are of course many others which have not. Perhaps the most glaring omission is that of *love*; an adequate treatment of this concept, however, would require a more lengthy study than can be accommodated here. For reasons of space, too, I have omitted *hate*, *humiliation*, *exasperation*, *enthusiasm*,

regret, and many others, despite their historical and cultural interest. At the same time, however, I believe that a good deal of ground has been covered; that the "NSM" semantic method of analysis has been demonstrated and shown to be fruitful; and, finally, that the links between semantics, culture, and history have been illustrated and elucidated.